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FOREWORD 
 
These proceedings hold the talks, posters, tutorials, and symposia presented at the 26th annual meeting of 
the Cognitive Science Society.  The conference took place in Chicago, Illinois, at the Westin River North 
Hotel, August 4-7, 2004. 
 
Each year, the CogSci conference chairs highlight a particular area of cognitive science – we chose to 
highlight higher-order cognition.  This is reflected in our choice of Susan Goldin-Meadow and Doug 
Medin as our two plenary speakers, and Larry Barsalou and Art Markman for a debate on embodied 
cognition, as well as in the themes of the invited symposia: language and thought, qualitative reasoning, 
higher-order cognitive neuroscience, and large-scale representation systems. The rest of the program was 
determined by the submissions we received, and by the reviewers’ enthusiasm for them.  
 
In total, we received 370 submissions of 6-page papers, publication-based abstracts, and symposia. 
Of these, 115 were accepted for presentation as a talk or symposium, and 150 were accepted for poster 
presentation.  We also received over 150 member abstract submissions, which by design were only 
lightly reviewed, and almost all of which were accepted. 
 
Chairing a CogSci conference is a lot of work!  We couldn’t have done it without a lot of help from 
many people.  We would especially like to thank the following: 
 
The Governing Board, for inviting us to chair the meeting. 
The Program Committee, for managing the review process. 
The almost 500 reviewers, for providing professional reviews. 
Wayne Gray, for helpful advice on all aspects of conference organization. 
Chris Schunn and Rick Alterman, for their advice as chairs from earlier years. 
Frank Ritter, for organizing and coordinating the tutorial program. 
Frank Lee, for coordinating the student volunteers. 
Deborah Gruber, for her help with local arrangements and the proceedings. 
Jonathan Cohen and Jennifer Stedillie, for coordinating conference preparation. 
James Stewart, for heroic responsiveness in operating the reviewing website. 
The student volunteers at Northwestern University and the University of Chicago, especially Fey 
Parrill (UC) and Kate Lockwood (NU). 
Dan Veksler, for producing a roommate-matching website at very short notice. 
Ken Nielsen, for designing the poster. 
Rebecca Asburst, for creating the logo, and Kathleen Braun, for designing the T-shirt. 
Our sponsors: The Robert J. Glushko and Pamela Samuelson Foundation; Northwestern  
University; ONR; DARPA; AFRL; the University of Chicago; CHI Systems; and Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences. 
The plenary speakers, Susan Goldin-Meadow and Doug Medin. 
The debaters, Larry Barsalou and Art Markman. 
And above all, the authors, symposium participants, and attendees.  
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About the Society 
The Society is a non-profit professional organization, and its main activities are 
sponsoring an annual conference, publishing the journal Cognitive Science, and 
promoting research interactions across traditional disciplinary boundaries. The Society 
was incorporated as a non-profit professional organization in Massachusetts in 1979. 
 The Cognitive Science Society, Inc. brings together researchers from many fields that hold a 
common goal: understanding the nature of the human mind. The Society promotes scientific 
interchange among researchers in disciplines comprising the field of Cognitive Science, including 
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CHREST Tutorial: Simulations of Human Learning
Fernand Gobet (fernand.gobet@brunel.ac.uk)
Department of Human Sciences, Brunel University,
UXBRIDGE, Middlesex, UB8 3BH, U.K.
Peter C. R. Lane (peter.lane@bcs.org.uk)
School of Computer Science, University of Hertfordshire,
College Lane, HATFIELD, Hertfordshire, AL10 9AB, U.K.
Abstract
CHREST (Chunk Hierarchy and REtrieval STructures)
is a comprehensive, computational model of human
learning and perception. It has been used to success-
fully simulate data in a variety of domains, including:
the acquisition of syntactic categories, expert behaviour,
concept formation, implicit learning, and the acquisition
of multiple representations in physics for problem solv-
ing. The aim of this tutorial is to provide participants
with an introduction to CHREST, how it can be used to
model various phenomena, and the knowledge to carry
out their own modelling experiments.
Developing detailed process models of cognitive phenom-
ena is important to the development of cognitive sci-
ence, as only then can cognitive theories be used to gen-
erate quantitative predictions for complex phenomena.
The history of computational modelling includes many
diverse approaches, from models of single phenomena
(such as Young and O’Shea’s model of subtraction), to
integrated models covering a wide range of different phe-
nomena (such as Soar and ACT-R), to over-arching prin-
ciples, which guide the development of models in dis-
parate domains (e.g. connectionist approaches, or em-
bodied cognition).
The EPAM/CHREST tradition, which forms the
heart of this tutorial, has been providing significant
models of human behaviour since 1959. Early models
of EPAM provided the impetus to develop the chunk-
ing theory, which has been an important component
in theories of human cognition ever since. Focusing
on learning phenomena, EPAM and CHREST place
a great emphasis on how the model’s information is
learnt through interactions with an external environ-
ment. Thus, EPAM/CHREST models are typically de-
veloped from large quantities of naturalistic input. For
example, in modelling expert perception of chess players,
actual chess games are used.
Historically, CHREST is derived from the EPAM (Ele-
mentary Perceiver and Memorizer) model of Feigenbaum
and Simon (1984). In both models, learning happens as
the creation and elaboration of a discrimination network.
In addition, CHREST has mechanisms for the auto-
matic creation of schemata and for the creation of ‘lateral
links’, which can be used for creating elementary produc-
tions or elementary semantic links. CHREST can thus
be situated between production systems such as Soar and
connectionist systems. Just as EPAM was the compu-
tational embodiment of the key aspects of the chunking
theory (Chase & Simon, 1973), CHREST implements
the essential aspects of the template theory (Gobet &
Simon, 2000). In spite of its historical and contempo-
rary importance, and the diversity of domains in which
modelling has been successfully carried out, the num-
ber of people who use or understand the principles and
operation of an EPAM/CHREST model remains small.
The tutorial is structured so that participants will:
1. Acquire a comprehensive understanding of the
CHREST computational model and its relation to the
chunking and template theories of cognition;
2. Explore some key learning phenomena supporting the
chunking theory by taking part in a verbal-learning
experiment;
3. Attempt to match their own data with the perfor-
mance of a CHREST model of verbal learning; and
4. Be introduced to the implementation of CHREST in
sufficient detail to begin modelling their own data.
We have chosen a verbal-learning experiment (serial-
anticipation method) for introducing participants to
CHREST for the following reasons: the experiment is
historically important; it was one of the motivations be-
hind the development of EPAM; it can be carried out in
a short period of time; striking learning phenomena are
readily observable, in spite of the brevity of the exper-
iment; the motivation and requirements for the experi-
ment are generally clear; and, finally, it illustrates some
key features of the EPAM/CHREST architecture.
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ACT-R Tutorial
Niels A. Taatgen (taatgen@cmu.edu)
Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University
5000 Forbes Av., Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
ACT-R (Anderson, Bothell, Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere &
Qin, in press) is a cognitive theory and simulation system
for developing cognitive models.  It assumes cognition
emerges through the interaction of a procedural memory of
productions with a declarative memory of chunks and
independent modules for external perception and actions.
Since its release in 1997, ACT-R has supported the
development of over 100 cognitive models, published in the
literature by many different researchers.  These models
cover topics as diverse as driving behavior, implicit
memory, learning backgammon, metaphor processing, and
emotion.  We have recently developed a new version, ACT-
R 5.0 that is more interruptible, achieves greater across-task
parameter consistency, has better mechanisms of production
learning, and is more in correspondence with our knowledge
of brain function. The tutorial has no prerequisite
knowledge, and is intended to on the one hand give an
overview of the theory, and on the other hand offer some
direct demonstration of ACT-R models. Although a half day
is not sufficient to cover all material, it can wet the appetite
for the full ACT-R tutorial that is available on http://act-
r.psy.cmu.edu/. This website also provides for the necessary
software, and overview of researchers using ACT-R, and it
has a list of ACT-R publications (many of them
downloadable).
During the tutorial, following Taatgen, Lebiere and
Anderson (submitted) five popular research paradigms
within ACT-R will be used as a vehicle to explain the
architecture:
Instance learning
Learning by retrieving old experiences from memory,
similar to Logan’s instance theory.
Utility learning
Learning which of several available strategies is optimal by
keeping track of costs and probability of success.
Working Memory Capacity
Models in which the amount of spreading activation is
varied, which can explaining individual differences in
working memory capacity
Perceptual/Motor constrained processing
Models in which the main factor in explaining human
performance lies in the limitations of their perceptual and
motor systems.
Rule learning
Models in which new production rules are learned on the
basis of combination of old rules and substitution of
declarative knowledge.
Although these individual research paradigms have
produced interesting models by themselves, the full
potential of the architecture can only be seen when they
work together in models of complex cognition.
Figure 1: Overview of the architecture
References
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Development of Executable Cognitive Agents Using the COGNET 
Architecture and iGENTM Toolset 
 
Wayne Zachary (wzachary@chisystems.com) 
CHI Systems, Inc. 
1035 Virginia Drive, Fort Washington, PA  19034-3701 
 
Michael A. Szczepkowski (mszczepkowski@chisystems.com) 
CHI Systems, Inc. 
1035 Virginia Drive, Fort Washington, PA  19034-3701 
 
COGNET/iGENTM is a set of software tools (i.e., a 
workbench) that enables human performance specialists to 
develop, test and deploy cognitive agents -- software 
components that exhibit a level of intelligence that mimic 
human thought processes.  Cognitive agents represent the 
logical transition of research on human information 
processing to practical application.  Cognitive agents also 
represent a new and growing paradigm for research in 
decision support, intelligent human-computer interfaces, 
intelligent tutoring, etc.  From an application perspective, 
cognitive agents empower the user by combining the speed, 
efficiency and accuracy of the computer with the decision-
making capacity, experience and expertise of human 
experts.  From a research perspective, they allow cognitive 
models to be applied to problems of enhancing the 
interaction between people and information technology in 
complex work environments.    
COGNET/ iGENTM incorporates computational models of 
human cognitive processes as a basis for designing and 
building software agents.  At the same time, COGNET/ 
iGENTM incorporates many practical approaches from 
software and systems engineering to maximize its ability to 
meet real-world cognitive agent application needs.  This 
makes it fundamentally different from cognitive 
architectures, which have been developed as vehicles to test 
cognitive theories (e.g., ACT-R and theories of memory; 
EPIC and theories of dual tasking and task performance). 
This workshop introduces participants to the concepts of 
cognitive agents and to the COGNET/ iGENTM method and 
tools for cognitive agent development and prepares them to 
undertake the development of cognitive agents applications.   
This tutorial provides COGSCI attendees with a view of the 
COGNET/ iGENTM cognitive architecture that emphasizes 
the unique properties of COGNET/ iGENTM.  It also 
provides an introduction to the concepts and methods 
involved in cognitive agents and their development, 
providing participants with an important perspective linking 
theory and practice.  
The workshop begins with an examination of three major 
uses for cognitive agents:  
• Intelligent training and tutoring – specifically, the use 
of cognitive agents to provide:  
o embedded models of the student/trainee to track 
student progress against the knowledge required 
for the skill being trained; 
o an embedded instructor/tutor that can manage 
presentation of information, sequence 
instruction, and provide feedback/remediation; 
and/or 
o synthetic teammates to facilitate practice and 
teamwork in a simulated work environment.  
• decision support and electronic performance support, 
in the form of work-centered intelligent interfaces that 
assist a worker or decision maker in such functions as 
attention management, situation awareness, and/or 
contextualizing decision strategies;  
• human performance simulation, in the form of 
simulations of system users to aid design engineering 
and design evaluation, and/or synthetic players for 
mission simulations and/or interactive games.  
Examples of each type are provided. 
The workshop then covers COGNET as a cognitive-agent 
architecture based on cognitive theory.  COGNET is 
compared to other computational architectures that embody 
theories of human thought and reasoning, and the features of 
COGNET that support cognitive agent development are 
identified.  Particular focus is given to the features unique to 
COGNET/ iGENTM – including metacognition, flexible 
granularity, and expert-level knowledge structures – and to 
the constructs that specifically focus on cognitive agent 
requirements – temporal management, micromodels, 
parallel execution threads, and external application 
interfaces.  The modeling strategies by which the system 
can be used to represent complex behaviors such as 
teamwork, coaching, and cognitive workload self-reporting 
are discussed, as are the development tools available to 
support modeling and the integration of models into larger 
simulations, federations, or other applications. 
For more information on the COGNET methodology and 
iGENTM toolset, go to http://www.cognitiveagent.com.   
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ACT-R as a Unified Architecture of Cognition:
A Symposium in Honor of John R. Anderson
Organizers: Kevin Gluck (kevin.gluck@mesa.afmc.af.mil) Air Force Research Laboratory
Wayne D. Gray (grayw@rpi.edu) Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
This symposium highlights the utility of the ACT-R theory
as a tool for basic and applied cognitive science research.
Four colleagues of this year’s Rumelhart Prize winner, John
R. Anderson, will describe how his ACT-R theory has
enabled and inspired their research.
An Activation-Based Model Of Sentence
Processing As Skilled Memory Retrieval
Richard Lewis (rickl@umich.edu)
University of Michigan
This talk presents a theory and ACT-R-based model of
human sentence comprehension that embodies the following
claim: Sentence comprehension consists of a series of cue-
based retrievals from short-term (and long-term) memory,
subject to similarity-based interference and activation decay.
ACT-R does not merely serve as an implementation
language for the theory; rather it serves as the vehicle for
bringing sentence processing into detailed contact with
general and independently established principles of memory
and skilled behavior. These principles, together with some
representational assumptions from linguistic theory, provide
explanatory accounts of many parsing phenomena (such as
difficulty on embeddings and locality and recency effects),
and generate novel predictions which can be empirically
tested. Experimental work on several languages is
summarized. The work includes experiments that examine
the effects of interference and decay on distinct components
of sentence processing, experiments that distinguish
activation decay and distance-based accounts, and
experiments that begin to answer one of the basic questions
motivated by the theoretical framework: exactly what kinds
of similarity (syntactic, semantic, phonological, positional)
matters in sentence processing?
This is joint work with Shravan Vasishth, Julie Van Dyke,
and JJ Nakayama. No linguistic or psycholinguistic
background will be assumed.
Information Foraging Theory And The
Rational Analysis Of Human-Information
Interaction
Peter Pirolli (pirolli@parc.xerox.com)
Xerox PARC
Information foraging theory has been developed to provide
rational analyses of how people adapt to the task of
obtaining useful information to meet their ongoing goals,
and how technology can be better designed to improve
human-information interaction. Several ACT-R models
have been developed to model human-information foraging
theory. The information foraging approach will be
illustrated by recent models of interaction with the Web.
ACT-R and Driving
Dario D. Salvucci (salvucci@cs.drexel.edu)
Drexel University
As a complex but ubiquitous task, driving serves as an
excellent domain for both testing and applying cognitive
architectures such as ACT-R. For several years we have
worked to model driver behavior in ACT-R with two main
branches of research. First, we have developed a
computational integrated driver model that navigates
realistic highway environments, accounting for various
aspects of driver behavior including eye movements
between regions of the visual environment and steering
profiles through curves and lane changes. Second, we have
worked to predict the potential for driver distraction from
secondary tasks such as dialing cellular phones or even
primarily cognitive tasks. Both lines of research are helping
to shape a more general theoretical account of human
multitasking within the ACT-R architecture, and at the same
time, demonstrating how such architectures can facilitate the
development of practical tools that infer driver intentions
and predict driver distraction for new in-vehicle devices.
Embedded Cognition through Production
Compilation
Niels A. Taatgen (taatgen@cmu.edu)
Carnegie Mellon University
Embedded cognition refers to the fact that our reasoning
processes are not only driven by plans and goals in our
heads, but also, or maybe even mainly, by interacting with
the environment. The challenge is to develop a cognitive
system that strikes the right balance between being driven
by its internal goals and by opportunities in the
environment. In order to explore this challenge, we have
looked at a particular subdomain: following instructions. In
experimental tasks participants typically are given
instructions in a list-like fashion. For many tasks, strictly
following the instructions will lead to brittle and rigid
behavior. We will look at two examples that represent two
ends of the spectrum of complexity: a basic dual-task and a
complex real-time dynamic task. Both tasks have been
modeled in the ACT-R cognitive architecture using the
production compilation mechanism to achieve
embeddedness.
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Qualitative Modeling and Cognitive Science 
 
Gautam Biswas (Biswas@vuse.vanderbilt.edu) 
EECS Department, Vanderbilt University 
Box 1679 Station B, Nashville, TN 37325, USA 
 
Bert Bredeweg (bert@swi.psy.uva.nl) 
Department of Social Science Informatics, University of 
Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
Ronald W. Ferguson (rwf@cc.gatech.edu) 
College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology 
801 Atlantic Avenue, Atlanta, GA 30332 
 
Peter Struss (struss@in.tum.de) 
Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München 
Boltzmannstr.3, 85748 Garching b. München, Germany 
 
Bruce Sherin (bsherin@northwestern.edu) 
School of Education and Social Policy, Northwestern 
University 
Annenberg Hall, 2120 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL, 
60208, USA 
Motivation 
Qualitative reasoning research creates computational models 
that capture aspects of reasoning about continuous systems, 
including space, time, and dynamics.  It has tackled 
problems ranging from understanding human mental models 
of everyday systems to creating systems that can do 
engineering design and create scientific models.  The 
original motivations for the field came mostly from 
cognitive science: Creating accounts of human causal 
reasoning about physical systems.  However, over time the 
fields have grown more separate.  This symposium is part of 
a bridge-building effort, to create more dialogue between 
these two communities for their mutual benefit. 
 
Gautam Biswas: We have been developing computer-based 
learning systems where students teach computer agents.  
These teachable agents provide important structures to help 
shape the thinking of the learner-as-teacher.  Each agent 
manifests a visual structure that is tailored to a specific form 
of knowledge organization, and has related underlying 
qualitative reasoning mechanisms that helps the agent 
interact with the learner, and provide explanations on how 
well it has understood the material it has been taught.  This 
framework lets us build on well-known teaching 
interactions that organize student activity (e.g., teaching by 
“laying out,” teaching by example, teaching by telling, 
teaching by modeling), and keep the start-up costs of 
teaching the agent very low (as compared to programming).   
We illustrate the effectiveness of our approach through 
Betty’s Brain, a teachable agent that makes her qualitative 
reasoning visible through a concept map. 
 
Bert Bredeweg: Conceptual models are an important means 
for developing and communicating knowledge, particularly 
concerning the behavior of (physical) systems. But how can 
the use of such models be facilitated and adapted to the 
specific needs of people via software? Part of the answers 
lies in the use of qualitative models and their simulations. 
Such models provide a rich ontology to capture conceptual 
models of how humans explain system behavior. Now that 
these techniques are reasonably well understood interesting 
questions emerge concerning the automated use of them in 
aiding learners to develop, share, and communicate 
knowledge. This requires the design of graphical 
workbenches to work with such models and the 
development of smart agents that support a learner in “doing 
the right thing.” 
 
Ronald W. Ferguson: Diagrammatic reasoning is 
cognitively interesting because it involves the interaction of 
our powerful and seemingly task-independent visual system 
with knowledge about culturally-specific cognitive artifacts. 
Interpretation of new diagram types must be learned, but 
once learned, take on the character and ease of perception. 
Recent research in Qualitative Spatial Reasoning (QSR), 
which examines the development and inferential power of 
spatial relationships, may help explain why diagrammatic 
reasoning works this way, and even allow us to characterize 
what makes a diagram effective. We explore this claim 
using our GeoRep system as an example of integrating QSR 
with cognitive models of vision and problem-solving. 
 
Peter Struss: Helping to understand ecological systems, to 
analyze the reasons for the deterioration of our environment 
and climate and to propose counteractions provides an 
important challenge to knowledge-based systems. Modeling 
artifacts and diagnosing why and how man-made devices 
fail to perform as expected is an important application area 
of model-based and qualitative reasoning which is based on 
a rigorous logical theory. Extending this foundation to 
natural systems turns out to be not straightforward, 
emphasizes the needs for conceptual and qualitative 
modeling formalisms, and the problem solving techniques 
face a different level of complexity. We will discuss the 
challenges and directions of potential solutions using an 
example at the transition between technical and natural 
systems, namely water treatment processes. 
 
Bruce Sherin: Bruce Sherin’s research includes 
investigations of conceptual change in science and external 
representations in science and mathematics.  Bruce will 
serve as the discussant for the Symposium. 
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Language and Thought 
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Emory University Department of Psychology 
532 N. Kilgo Cir., Atlanta, GA 30322 
 
 
Motivation 
After decades of neglect, the language and thought 
hypothesis—that the language we speak may influence the 
way we think—has recently enjoyed a resurgence of 
interest. This new wave of language and thought research 
capitalizes on gains in our linguistic knowledge of cross-
linguistic semantic patterns and in the range and subtlety of 
psychological techniques now available. This new research 
has tackled a wide range of content areas, including space, 
time, motion, causality, the nature of the object concept, and 
theory of mind. This symposium presents methods and 
recent findings in this arena. 
 
Lera Boroditsky 
Different languages divide the color spectrum in different 
ways. Does this lead speakers of different languages to 
perceive colors differently? Results of several experiments 
suggest that color language can influence people's color 
judgments even in conditions when all color stimuli are 
present at the same time and need not be stored in memory. 
Language appears to be involved online during simple 
color-discrimination tasks such that effects of language can 
be selectively disrupted by verbal interference (but not 
spatial interference).  Further, color discrimination 
performance across a boundary that exists in one language 
but not another can be altered by linguistic interference only 
for the language group that codes that linguistic distinction.  
Finally, as the color discrimination tasks become simpler 
and faster, effects of linguistic interference disappear.  
These results suggest that language is involved online in a 
large number of low-level perceptual discriminations, but 
also that not all color discrimination is affected by language. 
 
Jill DeVilliers 
This paper will address the issue of possible connections 
between language development and thought using the case 
of Theory of Mind. There are multiple ways to construe 
connections between language and false belief reasoning, 
only some of them causal. The argument will be that the 
data are compatible with a causal connection for a specific 
aspect of language knowledge linked to recursion of 
sentences, but that this does not rule out other potential 
facilitatory effects of language. 
John Lucy 
Researchers in language and thought must constantly deal 
with the problem of devising truly matched instruction 
procedures. This paper discusses the efforts of Lucy and his 
colleagues to develop a nonverbal triads procedure: that is, a 
procedure that avoids using words like “same,” “similar,” 
“(more) like’” etc. The resulting procedure then does not 
depend on using translation equivalents in other languages, 
and offers a useful alternative for working with children and 
with deaf subjects. Some preliminary empirical results from 
new work will be described. 
Phil Wolff 
This research is on causal verbs and reasoning across 
languages. The concept of CAUSE has frequently been 
treated as a conceptual primitive in the linguistic, 
philosophical and psychological literatures. Given this 
assumption, one might expect that the meaning of words 
encoding the concept of CAUSE should be relatively 
consistent across languages. In contrast to this assumption, 
This research shows how the meaning of the verb “cause” 
and related verbs may differ significantly across languages, 
e.g., English, Russian, and German. In addition, it suggests 
that these differences in meaning might reflect underlying 
differences in the way causal events are categorized non-
linguistically. 
 
Discussant TBA 
14
Symposium: The Diversity of Conceptual Combination. 
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Edmonton, Alberta. 
Edward Wisniewski (edw@uncg.edu), 
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Introduction 
A fundamental aspect of everyday language comprehension 
is the interpretation of novel compound phrases through 
conceptual combination: a mechanism that is engaged 
whenever people interpret phrases like "sand gun", "cactus 
fish" or "pet shark".  Conceptual combination is a diverse 
and complex cognitive process: people are able to combine 
concepts in a variety of different ways (for example, a “sand 
gun” is a tool that sprays sand, while a “cactus fish” is a fish 
with prickly spines, and a “pet shark” is a shark which is 
also a pet).   This diversity is reflected in the number of 
quite different theories of conceptual combination that have 
recently been proposed by, for example, Wisniewski 
(Wisniewski, 1997), Gagné (Gagné & Shoben, 1997), Estes 
(Estes & Glucksberg, 2000), and Costello (Costello & 
Keane, 2000).  The aim of this symposium is to gather 
current researchers on conceptual combination to discuss 
both the diversity of ways in which concepts can combine, 
and the diversity of theories that have been put forward to 
account for conceptual combination.   
Diversity of Combination Types 
Combined concepts are often divided into three types:  
relational combinations (such as “sand gun”), which assert a 
relation linking the two concepts being combined; property 
combinations (such as “cactus fish”), which transfer a 
property from one concept to the other; and conjunctive 
combinations (such as “pet shark”), which describe 
something that is an example of both combining concepts.  
These types are quite loose, however, and are by no means 
definitive or all-inclusive.  In this symposium, speakers will 
address questions such as   
• Why do concepts combine in different ways?   
• How significant are the different combination types? 
• Are some combination types more important than others? 
Relationship between Theories of Combination 
Recent theoretical accounts of conceptual combination are 
strikingly different from each other, ranging from Gagne’s 
CARIN theory (which uses a standard set of 16 relational 
templates such as X-HAS-Y or X-ABOUT-Y to interpret 
compound phrases), to Wisniewski’s Dual-Process theory 
(which suggests that compound interpretation involves both 
a scenario-construction mechanism and a structural-
alignment mechanism similar to that used in analogies), to 
Costello’s Constraint theory (which describes conceptual 
combination as a process of constraint satisfaction subject to 
the pragmatic requirements of communication using 
compound phrases).  Symposium speakers will address 
questions such as   
• Why are the various theories of combination so different? 
• What common ground do these theories share? 
• How do these theories relate to each other? 
• Can we come up with an integrating framework to unite 
these theories? 
Conclusion 
By bringing together researchers taking different approaches 
to conceptual combination, this symposium will give a 
useful synthesis of the current state of conceptual 
combination research.  By directly addressing the diversity 
of concept combination, the symposium may provide the 
basis for a more unified view of this important and 
fascinating part of human thought and language. 
References 
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Cognitive Processing Effects of ‘Social Resonance’ in Interaction. 
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This symposium will consist of four presentations of recent 
work that examine the cognitive aspects of social 
resonance in interaction. By social resonance, we mean the 
state of being that pertains when individuals engaged in 
face-to-face communication feel strongly connected. The 
studies we will present elaborate and extend a wealth of 
findings, primarily from social psychology and 
anthropology, on a set of closely related concepts; e.g., 
interpersonal sensitivity (Hall & Bernieri, 2001), social 
glue (Lakin, et al., 2003), interactional synchrony 
(Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991), empathy (Sonnby-Borgstrom, 
et al. 2003, Nishio, 2002), and socially distributed 
cognition (DuBois, 2000). In choosing the term SOCIAL 
RESONANCE, we seek to emphasize the dyad or group as a 
focal level of analysis and theory. Resonance also evokes 
the dynamic interplay of behaviors, multi-modally, between 
participants in real time interactions. The social 
psychological notion of rapport, as well as recent-era 
reformulations of anthropologist Malinowkis (1923) 
construct, phatic communion, resemble the sense of social 
resonance we employ here:   
 all the different communicative strands, 
speech, gesture, posture, body movements, 
orientation, proximity, eye contact, and facial 
expressions  woven together to form the fabric of 
conversation, (Laver, 1975). 
Social resonance has been the focus of research across 
quite a range of scientific disciplines. Its presence in 
interaction is ascertained on the basis of behavioral 
observables that occur singly and in clusters, or in patterns 
of alternation or sequential unfolding across an interval of 
interaction. Examples include mimicry or mirroring of 
various nonverbal behaviors, interactional rhythm in 
conversation, and syntactic priming. The work presented 
here takes up where many social psychological and 
anthropological treatments of resonance phenomena leave 
off, by examining its impact on real-time cognitive 
processing; specifically, on processes of language 
production and comprehension. Our studies illuminate, 
through close analysis of the multi-modal (speech and 
gesture) aspects of human interaction, what psycholinguistic 
processing mechanisms may be triggered by, facilitated by--
-or, conversely---remain inactive, or even be inhibited by, 
respectively, presence or absence of social resonance. 
Kimbara and Parrill present recent work on the interaction 
between gestural mirroring (specifically, cases in which a 
speaker appears unconsciously to adjust her use of gesture 
space, in accord with her interlocutors use of space, to 
create matching nonverbal expression of spatial layouts) and 
structural priming (Bock, 1986), or, the ways in which one 
speakers choice of syntactic construction influences the 
subsequent choice of construction on the part of her 
interlocutor. Webb examines types of metaphoric gestures 
(McNeill, 1992), spontaneously produced by speakers 
addressing an audience, with respect to their roles in 
managing the interactive context (Bavelas, 1992). Welji and 
Duncan examine gestures in spontaneous narrative 
discourse, comparing interlocutors who are strangers (less 
socially resonant) with interlocutors who are friends (more 
resonant). Franklin and Duncan demonstrate perturbation of 
social resonance, as a function of cognitive load, in dyads 
where one member is instructed to deceive the other about 
the visual and narrative content of a cartoon story eliciting 
stimulus, viewed on video.  
 
Selected References 
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CogSci2004 Symposium
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John Woods (jhwoods@interchange.ubc.ca) and Dov Gabbay (dg@dcs.kcl.ac.uk),
University of British Columbia, CA and King’s College London, UK
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The symposium aims to explore abduction (inference to
explanatory hypotheses), an important but neglected topic
in scientific reasoning. The aim is to integrate philosophi-
cal, cognitive, and computational issues. The main thesis is
that abduction is a significant kind of scientific reasoning,
helpful in delineating the first principles of a new theory of
science. The status of abduction is very controversial.
When dealing with abductive reasoning misinterpretations
and equivocations are common. What are the differences
between abduction and induction? What are the differ-
ences between abduction and the well-known hypothetico-
deductive method? What did Peirce mean when he consid-
ered abduction a kind of inference? Does abduction in-
volve only the generation of hypotheses or their evaluation
too? Are the criteria for the best explanation in abductive
reasoning epistemic, or pragmatic, or both? How many
kinds of abduction are there? The symposium aims to in-
crease knowledge about creative and expert inferences.
The study of these high-level methods of abductive rea-
soning is situated at the crossroads of philosophy, episte-
mology, artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, and
logic; that is at the heart of cognitive science.
More than a hundred years ago, the great American
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce coined the term “ab-
duction” to refer to inference that involves the generation
and evaluation of explanatory hypotheses. The study of
abductive inference was slow to develop, as logicians con-
centrated on deductive logic and on inductive logic based
on formal calculi such as probability theory. In recent dec-
ades, however, there has been renewed interest in abduc-
tive inference from two primary sources. Philosophers of
science have recognized the importance of abduction in
the discovery and evaluation of scientific theories, and
researchers in artificial intelligence have realized that ab-
duction is a key part of medical diagnosis and other tasks
that require finding explanations. Psychologists have been
slow to adopt the terms “abduction” and “abductive infer-
ence” but have been showing increasing interest in causal
and explanatory reasoning.
Thus abduction is now a key topic of research in phi-
losophy of science. First, this symposium ties together the
concerns of philosophers of science and logicians, show-
ing, for example, the connections between formal models
and abduction (Meheus, Woods and Gabbay). Second, it
lays out a useful general framework for discussion of vari-
ous kinds of abduction (Magnani), such as model-based
and manipulative abductions. Third, it develops important
ideas about aspects of abductive reasoning that have been
relatively neglected in philosophy of science, including the
role of testing in abductive inference (Aliseda), and the
interrogative model of inquiry and the role of different
kinds of why-questions and strategic principles employed
in attempts to find and construct answers also at the com-
putational level (Sintonen and Paavola, Addis and Good-
ing). The clarification of these topics aims to increase
knowledge about some aspects of explanatory reasoning
and hypothesis formation very relevant in many epistemic
tasks.
1. If we stress the concept of model-based and manipu-
lative abduction (Magnani), creative inferences in science
can be seen as formed by the application of heuristic (strate-
gic) procedures that involve all kinds of good and bad infer-
ential actions and both internal and external representations,
and not only the mechanical application of rules.
2. Recent logical models can illustrate in a rigorous way
how these (strategic) abductive steps are combined with
deductive steps (Meheus, Woods and Gabbay).
3. Common to all abduction problems is a cognitive tar-
get that cannot be hit on the basis of what the abducer
presently knows. Abductive hypotheses do not enhance a
reasoner’s knowledge. Abduction, accordingly, is igno-
rance-preserving inference. These abductive processes are
dynamical (Woods and Gabbay).
4. The “abductive steps” are also analyzable in terms of
responses to surprising singular or general facts, showing a
connection to explanation-seeking why-questions (Sinto-
nen and Paavola).
5. The importance of experimental verification for hy-
potheses evaluation in science is stressed by the relation-
ship between abduction and pragmatism in Peirce (Al-
iseda).
6. Abduction cannot be thought of in isolation from the
two other type of inference (deduction and induc-
tion/validation) identified by Peirce. Computer models of
scientific behaviour and music conversation suggest that in
simulation of abduction requires the use of mixed strate-
gies using random actions as suggested by game theory
(Addis and Gooding).
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Motivation 
Cognitive neuroscience has generated considerable 
excitement among cognitive scientists. It offers a new route 
to understanding the mind. But some have argued that the 
current techniques of cognitive neuroscience apply mainly 
to perceptual-motor and attention tasks. This symposium 
considers the contribution cognitive neuroscience can make 
to the study of high-order cognition. 
Jay McClelland 
Formulating cognitive theories in terms of neural 
computations 
Cognitive Neuroscience is a relatively new field defined 
differently by different people.  One activity that might fall 
under the rubric of cognitive neuroscience is the effort to 
formulate cognitive theories in terms of the underlying 
neural computations.  This effort, I will suggest, may 
ultimately lead to theories that are not only grounded in 
neuroscience but also more satisfactory as accounts of 
cognitive phenomena.  I will exemplify the approach with 
my own work on the development of the complementary 
learning systems theory of learning and memory.  The work 
draws on insights from neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, 
neuropsychology, and connectionist modeling to develop an 
overall theory of learning and memory 
Ken Paller 
      A cognitive neuroscience perspective
          on memory with and without awareness
 
Patterns of memory impairment in patients with amnesia 
suggest that memory for facts and events depends on a 
process of "cross-cortical storage" that is not required for 
other forms of memory. This neuropsychological evidence 
provides a theoretical foundation for understanding memory 
phenomena like recollection (the conscious experience of 
remembering facts and events) and priming (a type of item-
specific implicit memory). Building on this foundation, 
measures of brain activity have revealed distinct brain 
potentials and brain activations that are associated with 
recollection of episodic memories versus certain types of 
priming. This cognitive neuroscientific approach thus 
constitutes an appropriate way to investigate the 
neurocognitive events that make "memory-with-awareness" 
so different from "memory-without-awareness." 
Paul J. Reber 
Cognitive (neuro)science: Models of recognition and 
categorization 
 
Categorization and recognition have been investigated with 
a variety of approaches that have led to very different 
conclusions.  Dissociations reported in the patient literature 
suggest separate representational systems. A resolution is 
proposed based on integrating key computational features of 
Nosofsky & Zaki’s (1998) exemplar-based model with the 
Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory, a neural 
network model of memory system organization 
(McClelland, McNaughton & O'Reilly, 1995). Functional 
neuroimaging studies of categorization and recognition with 
healthy participants (Reber et al., 1998a,b, 2003) provide 
evidence supporting the two-system CLS theory.  
Integrating computational approaches with both behavioral 
and neuroscience data thus leads to a better account of 
recognition and categorization than any single approach.  
Mark Jung-Beeman 
Imaging higher-order language comprehension and 
insight problem solving: What and how from where?  
 
Neuroimaging of higher-order cognition offers two 
advantages: First, it can provide a relatively covert measure 
of processing; and second, cortical location information can 
constrain or expand cognitive theories regarding component 
processes. In one set of studies, we used fMRI signal in 
specific cortical regions as markers for two component 
processes in drawing inferences: semantic integration, and 
semantic selection. We thus observed the engagement of 
these processes while people comprehended stories, without 
requiring a concomitant “probe task.” In another line, we 
studied insight processes in verbal problem solving and 
found involvement of an area of the right temporal lobe, 
similar to that observed in the inference experiments.  
Andrew Ortony (Discussant) 
Andrew Ortony’s work has ranged from computational 
modeling to philosophy. His current research is on emotion 
and cognition. 
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Motivation 
One of the unique features of cognitive science has been 
its emphasis on understanding how people represent and use 
knowledge.  Unfortunately, knowledge representation can 
be quite difficult if one is starting from scratch.  Having “off 
the shelf” representation systems that can be used for 
investigations can make new types of cognitive modeling 
efforts possible, at a scale that would otherwise be 
impossible.  The participants in this symposium each 
represent a different approach to building such 
representational resources. 
 
George A. Miller: WordNet is a lexical database that 
contains 146,900 English nouns, verbs, adjectives, and 
adverbs that are now organized by semantic relations into 
117,500 meanings, where a meaning is represented by a set 
of synonyms (a synset) that can be used to express that 
meaning.  An entry in WordNet consists of a synset, a 
definitional gloss, and (sometimes) one or more sentences 
illustrating usage.  The semantic relations used to organize 
words and entries are synonymy and antonymy, hyponymy, 
troponymy and hypernymy, meronymy and holonymy.  A 
currently active project, the disambiguation of definitional 
glosses, will be discussed. 
 
Charles J. Fillmore: The FrameNet project is morphing 
from a lexicon-building project to a system capable of 
providing a layer or two of semantic annotation for full 
sentences.  My remarks will summarize the kinds of 
information the FrameNet database can provide now, and 
what it should be able to offer in the not too distant future, 
for researchers in language engineering and cognitive 
science.  FrameNet is moving toward greater coverage of 
the lexicon, adaptation to specialist vocabularies, more 
systematic treatment of multiword expressions, and 
provisions for incorporating a wide variety of (non-core) 
grammatical constructions. 
 
Martha S. Palmer: Recently, a consensus has been 
achieved as to a task-oriented level of semantic 
representation to be layered on top of the existing Penn 
Treebank syntactic structures: The Proposition Bank, or 
PropBank.  PropBank consists of argument labels for the 
semantic roles of individual verbs and similar predicating 
expressions such as participial modifiers and 
nominalizations. This talk will describe the PropBank verb 
semantic role annotation being done at Penn for both 
English and Chinese.  The annotation process will be 
discussed as well as the use of existing lexical resources 
such as WordNet, Levin classes and VerbNet.  Comparisons 
with similar projects, including the FrameNet Project at 
Berkeley and the Prague Tectogrammatics project, will be 
made. 
 
Doug Lenat: Cognitive Science research could benefit from 
large-scale representational building blocks.  One such 
building block is a broad ontology of, well, everything.  
Another one, resting on that, is a formal axiomatization of 
most of the meaning of most of those concepts; i.e., millions 
of axioms about those hundreds of thousands of terms.  
These two pieces have been worked on for twenty years -- 
and the better part of a person-century of effort -- as Cyc.  
It's been highly proprietary so far, with a small tip of its 
ontology exposed as OpenCyc.  Starting this summer, 
though, Cyc is being made available in its entirety for R&D 
purposes for free, courtesy of Ron Brachman at DARPA's 
IPTO.   In this presentation I will briefly describe this 
ResearchCyc ontology and KB, and some initial utilities 
provided with it (inference engine, English-Cyc lexicon, 
interfaces), how this might fit in with the other 
infrastructure elements being described in this panel, and 
how these might leverage your work. 
Pat Hayes 
Pat Hayes, the discussant for this symposium, has the 
unique distinction of having inventing two of the most 
widely-used representations for change, the situation 
calculus (with John McCarthy) and histories.  He is a 
Fellow of the American Association for Artificial 
Intelligence and the Cognitive Science Society.   
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Introduction
One of the most interesting and frequent questions within
cognitive science is “What type of mental representation is used
when people solve problems/make decisions/think/etc.?”  This
symposium will explore the issue of mental representation
within the area of spatial cognition by examining how people
gesture within the context of a spatial task (e.g., mental
animation, scientific analysis, construction, etc.).
Spatial Transformations and Gestures
(Greg Trafton, Susan Trickett, and Cara Stitzlein)
How do experts think about complex data spaces?  We examined
experts in three domains (meteorology, submarine, fMRI) as
they solved a difficult domain problem. We found that,
consistent with previous research, they created complex spatial
mental representations (e.g., mental models) and used spatial
transformations to mentally manipulate these representations.
When we examined the gestures that these experts
spontaneously made, we found that many of their gestures
occurred while performing spatial transformations.  We suggest
that these gestures were outward manifestations of what they
were thinking that facilitated their problem solving.
Gesture use while thinking about Machines
(Mary Hegarty, Sarah Mayer and Sarah Kriz)
We examined the use of gestures while people solved "mental
animation" problems in which they have to predict the motion of
a mechanical device from static diagrams. In "think aloud"
experiments, participants gestured on more than 90% of
problems (although they were not instructed to gesture), and
their gestures communicated information that was not stated in
words.
  In another experiment, participants were asked to think aloud
while solving problems (communication group), just solved the
problems (control group), or solved the problems while tapping
a spatial pattern (dual task group). Although the communication
group gestured the most, gestures were also frequent in the non-
communicative situation experienced by the control group.
  The dual-task group had poorer performance than the control
group, suggesting that prevention of gesturing impaired
performance. These preliminary results suggest that gestures
function both in the process of inferring motion from static
diagrams and in communicating the results of this inference
process.
Gestural Models for Self and Others (B. Tversky, H. Taylor,
K. Emmorey, J. Heiser, & S. Lozano)
Three paradigms show that gestures can convey spatial
information effectively both for self and for others.  People's oral
spatial descriptions include gestures that reflect the perspective
taken on the space; they also provide a model of the space for
the listener. The information in the words is not sufficient
without the gestures. Listeners, too, gesture while hearing spatial
descriptions from unobservable speakers; these gestures appear
to help establish a spatial mental model for the listener.  People's
explanations of how to put something together include gestures
that convey the structural relations of the object and actions
needed for assembly, information that facilitates performance of
communicator and receiver.
The role of gestures in a theory of spatial representation
(Chris Schunn, Lelyn Saner and Tony Harrison)
In many complex problems, there is a significant visual or
spatial component to the problem solver's representations.
Neuropsychological and cognitive work has suggested that there
are several fundamentally different ways in which problem
solvers can represent visual/spatial information---flat vs. 3-
dimensional, near vs. far, approximate vs. detailed. Each of these
differences can have a strong influence on problem-solving
behavior. We have a theory, ACT-R/S (Harrison & Schunn,
2001), for how these features are strongly correlated in one of
three possible visual/spatial representations, how the
representations are selected, and how the representations
influence behavior. We have been using analyses of gestures to
diagnosis their representation choice. Our talk will illustrate how
our theory of spatial representation influences our use of expert
and novice problem solvers's gesture data to infer
representations beyond previous analyses and how our theory of
spatial representations has been changed by the gesture data.
The Consequences of Spatial Gestures (Justine Cassell)
Evidence from house descriptions, route descriptions, and the
description of complex objects jives with earlier studies showing
that roughly 50% of gestures convey content that is not
redundant with the content of speech.  These complementary
gestures have consequences for later speech in that they may be
referred back to – both via gesture and via speech – by both the
speaker and the listener. I address a number of questions about
the role of gesture in the semantics of ongoing talk, and their
role in spatial cognition: how do we predict what aspects of
spatial scenes will be described in gesture vs. speech, the form
that these spatial descriptions will take in gesture, and how these
features are represented by the participants in a discourse in such
a way as to serve as the context for later speech.
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Situating Abstract Concepts 
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Roughly speaking, abstract concepts such as TRUTH refer 
to entities that are neither purely physical nor spatially 
constrained (Wiemer-Hastings, Krug, & Xu, 2001).  Such 
concepts pose a classic problem for theories that ground 
knowledge in modality-specific systems (e.g., Barsalou, 
1999, 2003a,b).  Abstract concepts also pose a significant 
problem for traditional theories that represent knowledge 
with amodal symbols.  Surprisingly, few researchers have 
attempted to specify the content of abstract concepts using 
feature lists, semantic networks, or frames.  It is not enough 
to say that an amodal node or a pattern of amodal units 
represents an abstract concept.  It is first necessary to 
specify the concept’s content, before beginning the task of 
identifying how this content is represented. 
 
Hypotheses  
A common assumption is that abstract and concrete 
concepts have little conceptual content in common, if any.  
Alternatively, we propose that concrete and abstract 
concepts share important similarities.  In particular, we 
propose that they share common situational content, 
namely, information about agents, objects, settings, events, 
and mental states (Hypothesis 1).  Where concrete and 
abstract concepts differ is in their specific foci within 
background situations.  Whereas concrete concepts focus on 
objects and settings, abstract concepts focus on events and 
mental states (Hypothesis 2).  As a result of these different 
foci, the representations of abstract concepts are more 
complex, being less localized in situational content 
(Hypothesis 3).  Finally, because the content of abstract 
concepts is grounded in situations, modality-specific 
simulations could, in principle, represent it (Hypothesis 4). 
 
Method  
In an exploratory study, we assessed the content of three 
abstract concepts:  TRUTH, FREEDOM, and INVENTION.  
These concepts were compared to three concrete concepts—
BIRD, CAR, and SOFA—and also to three intermediate 
concepts—COOKING, FARMING, and CARPETING.  We 
first asked participants to produce properties typically true 
of these concepts.  We then analyzed these properties using 
two coding schemes, one that coded small protocol units, 
and a second that coded large ones. 
 
Results 
For the complete results, see Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 
(in press).  Both coding analyses offered support for 
Hypothesis 1, namely, common situational content was 
produced across concrete, intermediate, and abstract 
concepts.  For all concepts, participants tended to describe 
background situations, including information about entities, 
settings, events, and mental states.  Indeed the similarities 
between concepts were more striking than the differernces. 
Both analyses also offered support for Hypothesis 2, 
namely, concrete and abstract concepts differed in their 
situational foci.  Whereas concrete concepts focused more 
on objects, locations, and behaviors, abstract concepts 
focused more on social aspects of situations (e.g., people, 
communication, social institutions) and mental states (e.g., 
beliefs. complex relations).  Intermediate concepts lay in 
between. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, conceptual structures were 
most complex for abstract concepts.  Abstract concepts 
were most likely to contain deep hierarchies of large 
conceptual clusters organized by complex relations. 
Regarding Hypothesis 4, we see no reason that the 
content of abstract concepts cannot be represented in 
simulations.  Because their content is perceived in the 
situations that involve abstract concepts, it could, in 
principle, be reenacted later when representing them.  
Clearly, much further research beyond this exploratory 
study is necessary. 
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Notes on the Negative Side of Rationality: Critical Principles
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A central but neglected aspect of rationality is its
negative aspect: knowledge of error.  Knowledge
of error warrants and motivates criticism, so it
constitutes knowledge of principles of criticism,
or critical principles (Bickhard, 1991, 2001a,
2002; Bickhard & Campbell, 1996a).  I will
outline a model of rationality, grounded
essentially in an interactive, agent based model
of representation and cognition (Bickhard 1993,
1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2001b; Bickhard &
Campbell, 1996b; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995),
that gives central place to such negative
knowledge, and show how it solves and
dissolves multiple problems.  It puts creative
interaction and problem solving at the center of
the nature of mind, rather than portraying reason
trying to rule the passions.  It is a non-
foundationalist model, thus avoiding the problem
of the rational warrant for the foundations of
rationality.  Nevertheless it is self-consistent in
the sense that being rational is itself rational, but
without having to demonstrate that rationality
leads closer to truth.  It accounts for logic as a
natural development of rationality given
reasonable additional assumptions, such as that
of language and of the possibility of conscious
reflection, and, thus, renders logic as a rational
creation rather than the essence of rationality.
In this talk, I will focus on logic as rational
construction rather than as the center of
rationality.  Historically, logics have been
developed of greater and greater power, but no
logic can construct a logic more powerful than
itself.  If logic were the essence of rationality,
therefore, the history of logic would necessarily
be arational.  In this model, logic emerges as an
inherently wide, natural domain of possible error
and of means of avoiding those errors, and thus
avoids that problem, as well as the many other
problems of foundationalism.  This model also
naturally situates higher order logics and modal
logics within the broader framework.  I will not
be addressing the technical details of these
points, but will outline the basic perspective.
If there is time, I will also outline another
realm of advantages of this model of rationality:
It dissolves several problems in the philosophy
of science, such as the perplexities involved in
notions of progress, of realism and truth, and of
induction.
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The study of expert behaviour has attracted widespread 
attention since the seminal work of de Groot (1965) and 
Chase and Simon (1973). Of particular interest is how ex-
perts, even under time pressure, can make relatively good 
decisions in spite of strong limits in their computational 
capacities. A substantial amount of research has focused on 
chess playing, as this domain offers a well-validated and 
ecological measure of expertise (the Elo rating). Obviously, 
this question has important repercussions beyond game 
playing, and extensive research has been carried out about 
decision making in domains such as fire fighting, medical 
diagnosis, and aviation (e.g., Zsambok & Klein, 1997). 
While the importance of both recognition and search 
mechanisms is generally accepted, researchers disagree as to 
their relative importance. De Groot (1965) showed that even 
chess grandmasters seldom look at more than 100 possible 
continuations of the game before choosing a move. This 
number is vastly smaller than the number of legal moves (on 
average, for a middlegame position, the number of legal 
continuations six ply deep is about 1.8 billion, and increases 
exponentially for greater depths). De Groot (1965) also 
found that top-level grandmasters do not search reliably 
deeper than candidate masters, although more recent data 
suggest that masters search slightly deeper, on average, than 
weak amateurs (e.g., Gobet, 1998). De Groot (1965) as well 
as Chase and Simon (1973) propose that recognition, by 
allowing knowledge to be accessed rapidly, enables look-
ahead search to be highly selective. Holding (1985), by 
contrast, argued that the main determinant of chess skill is 
the ability to plan ahead by search, rather than reliance on 
recognition of positional patterns.   
Support for the role of pattern recognition in expert 
behaviour comes from two main lines of research: (a) 
perception and memory, and (b) decision making. Evidence 
from perception and memory indicates that experts can 
rapidly recognize the key features of a problem, and that 
there are important differences between experts’ and non-
experts’ eye-movements (de Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet, 
de Voogt & Retschitzki, in press). Research has also shown 
that experts have a remarkable memory for domain-specific 
material (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965; de Groot 
& Gobet, 1996). Interestingly, their superiority extends to 
the recall of random positions, although the skill difference 
is then much smaller than with game positions. CHREST, a 
detailed computer model of pattern recognition, has 
accounted for these results (de Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet 
& Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003). 
The second line of evidence comes from rapid decision 
making (e.g., Zsambok & Klein, 1997). In particular, 
research with chess players suggests that grandmasters can 
play at a high level even under severe time pressure (e.g., 
Gobet & Simon, 1996). SEARCH, a computational model 
based on CHREST, accounts for several data from expert 
problem solving, such as how average depth of search 
increases as a function of skill (Gobet, 1997). 
Recently, proponents of the predominant role of search 
processes have collected data aiming at undermining the 
importance of pattern recognition. In particular, Chabris and 
Hearst (2003), using data from rapid chess and blindfold 
chess, have questioned Chase and Simon’s (1973) and 
Gobet and Simon’s (1996) account. In this talk, I’ll show 
that Chabris and Hearst’s (2003) data, far from invalidating 
theories based on pattern recognition and selective search, 
actually support them. 
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Communal Path Construction
When people make choices within a group, they are
frequently influenced by the choices made by others. One
reason for this is that the actions of other people changes the
environment in which a person makes their choices.  In
many domains, initial pioneers reduce the costs for
followers who subsequently pursue the same path.
Our concrete instantiation of this situation is group path
formation where people travel between destinations with the
travel cost for moving onto a location inversely related to
the frequency with which the location has been visited by
others.  In this situation, people may detour from straight
paths connecting destinations to take advantage of
frequently visited, hence inexpensive, paths.  At a group
level, the mathematics of “Minimal Steiner Trees” describes
optimal path systems for connecting a set of destinations.  A
Minimal Steiner Tree (MST) is the  set of paths that fully
connects a set of destinations using the minimal amount of
total path length.  Finding minimal MSTs is a notorious NP-
complete problem, with all known, provably optimal
algorithms requiring an exponential increase in computation
as the number of destination points increases linearly
(Garey, Graham, & Johnson, 1977).  However, analog
devices such as soap films over wire frames have been
shown to spontaneously create MSTs.  Do groups of people
create path systems that approximate MSTs as well?
Path Formation Experiment
59 Indiana University undergraduates were divided into 8
groups.  The participants in each group were given the task
of traveling between randomly sampled cities from a set of
3-4 cities.  Participants were told to try to maximize their
total number of points.  Points were earned by successfully
reaching destination cities, and were deducted for travel
costs associated with each visited square on the map.  The
travel cost for a square was inversely related to the number
of times all individuals previously visited the square, with
recent visits reducing travel costs more than older visits.
As participants moved between cities, they saw their own
locations as red triangles, other participants’ locations as
yellow circles, and the moment-by-moment cost of each
map square color-coded with brightness representing ease of
travel.  Cities were arranged in triangular or rectangular
configurations.
Results and Modeling
There were systematic deviations from beeline pathways in
the direction of MSTs for all of the configurations of cities,
however the participants’ paths never converged upon
MSTs.  Greater deviations of beeline paths (see the solid
lines in Fig. 1) toward MSTs (dashed lines) were found for
the isosceles than the equilateral triangle arrangement of
cities.  In Fig. 1, the more often a square is visited, the
brighter it appears.  Furthermore, greater pro-MST
deviations were found for a small rectangle than a large
rectangle possessing the same proportions.  Finally,
asymmetric pro-MST deviations were observed, with
greater deviations for participants traveling from City A to
City B than traveling from City B to City A.
All three of these deviations from beeline pathways can
be explained by Helbing, Keltsch, and Molnár’s (1997)
“Active Walker” model of pedestrian motion.  This agent-
based model includes equations for environmental changes
produced by walking on paths that make the paths more
accessible for subsequent walkers.  At every time step, each
walker in a group moves in a direction that compromises
between moving toward the destination and moving toward
heavily trafficked locations.  This model and our
experimental groups both establish path systems that lie
between beeline and MSTs, with the deviation from beeline
paths influenced by the topology of the destinations, the
duration of travel, and the  absolute scale of the world.
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Introduction
A growing body of evidence indicates that human
word learning, nonword repetition, and immediate
serial recall (ISR) abilities are related in some way
(e.g., Baddeley et al., 1998). It seems clear why word
learning might be related to nonword repetition: ev-
ery known word was once a nonword to a particular
learner, so greater facility in processing nonwords
should lead to greater facility in eventually learning
them. But why might nonword repetition and list
recall be related?
Nonwords as Lists
One possibility is that a nonword is processed like a
list when ﬁrst encountered, and is thus directly de-
pendent on list sequencing mechanisms. If this were
the case, we would expect to observe serial position
eﬀects in repetition of the sequence of sounds com-
prising nonwords, just as in ISR of lists of words.
We conducted three experiments to examine sylla-
ble serial position eﬀects in repetition of individual
polysyllablic nonwords, and obtained signiﬁcant pri-
macy and recency in all three experiments (Gupta,
2004).
Testing Alternate Models
There are two possible explanations of these re-
sults in terms of our previous computational work
(Gupta, 1996). The two formulations can be dis-
tinguished by diﬀering predictions with regard to
correlations between ISR, nonword repetition, and
word learning. The original formulation explains
the fact that these correlations arise developmen-
tally but predicts their absence in adults. An al-
ternative formulation predicts that such correlations
obtain not only developmentally, but also in adults.
We conducted two experiments to examine whether
ISR, nonword repetition, and word learning are cor-
related in adults (Gupta, 2003). The results indi-
cated that the developmental relationships between
all three abilities also exist in adults, thus support-
ing the revised model over the original model.
Neuropsychological Investigation
The revised version of our model incorporates the
view that there is a functional relationship between
the abilities, all of which invoke the same sequenc-
ing mechanisms. If this is really the case, we would
expect relationships between these abilities to ob-
tain even following early neurological injury across
a variety of lesion sites. This is because in the case
of early lesions, there is a real possibility for remis-
sion of deﬁcits as a result of neural reorganization;
persistence of correlations would thus support the
hypothesis of an underlying functional relationship.
We examined this question by administering tests of
word learning, nonword repetition, and ISR to 5-10
year old children who had suﬀered perinatal brain
injury across a variety of sites, and to age-matched
controls (Gupta et al., 2003). The results indicate
that the relationships between ISR, nonword repe-
tition, and word learning are exhibited even under
conditions of early brain injury. These ﬁndings thus
provide further support for the functional architec-
ture of our revised model.
These various lines of evidence together clarify
how common sequencing mechanisms may underlie
both nonword processing and immediate list recall,
thereby oﬀering an explanation of why word learning
is related to list memory.
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Background
People of all ages, cultures, and backgrounds gesture
when they speak. What function do these hand movements
serve? Although there is consensus that gesture plays an
important role in language production, there is considerable
theoretical debate as to what role gesture plays in language
comprehension (Clark, 1996; Kelly, 2001; Kelly, Barr,
Church, & Lynch, 1999; Krauss, 1998; Krauss, Morrel-
Samuels, & Colasante, 1991; McNeill, 1992). At the core of
this debate is the fact that previous research has relied on
indirect behavioral measures that do not provide access to
the underlying neurocognitive processing of speech and
gesture. The present research addresses this issue by using a
more direct neurocognitive measure: event-related potentials
(ERPs). ERPs measure electrical brain activity and have
been used successfully in previous research on the neural
processing of language.
Methods
In Study 1, adult participants watched videos of speech
and gesture, in which the gesture conveyed the same,
complementary or different information as the
accompanying speech. ERPs were recorded to the speech in
these different gesture contexts. In Study 2, participants
watched videos similar to Study 1, but the gesture was
replaced with digitally-inserted visual information (a
vertical or horizontal line representing different dimensions
of the objects) that either conveyed the same,
complementary or different information as the speech. The
goal of Study 2 was to determine whether the results from
Study 1 were due to gesture per se, or simply any visual
information that preceded speech.
Results
The results from Experiment 1 have been published
(Kelly, Kravitz & Hopkins, in press) and reveal that gestures
not only influence ERPs to speech, but also that the gesture
influence is late (N400) and early (sensory, P1-N1 and P2
components) in the brain’s processing of speech. This
suggests that gestures may affect not only high-level
semantic processing of speech, but also low-level
phonological processing as well.
Study 2 is currently in progress to determine whether the
results from Study 1 are unique to gesture, or whether any
meaningful visual information will have a similar impact on
the brain’s processing of speech.
Discussion
Researchers know very little about the neural time
course of how gestures influence speech comprehension.
This question bears on important theoretical issues in
language research: are there aspects of language processing
that are impervious to contextual influence? When does a
gestural context influence the neural processing of
language? In addition, the results will address a debate in
the literature about the “specialness” of the relationship
between speech and gesture in language processing
(McNeill, 1992). Finally, by taking ERPs to speech using
real-time, multimodal videos, this project makes an
important methodological contribution to the neuroscientific
investigation of language processing.
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Overview 
Theories of language structure generally provide two things:  
a list of allowable units of various types, and rules or 
constraints that determine how the various units may be 
combined to create larger units.   Together the units and 
rules determine which larger units are part of the language 
and which are not.  In general, acceptability is an all-or-
nothing proposition:  A given proposed larger unit either is 
or is not acceptable according to this approach. 
 
In this talk I will argue instead that at there are neither rules 
nor units and that the acceptability of particular possible 
utterances is a matter of graded constraint satisfaction.  The 
particular utterances I will consider are the word-forms of 
English.  The argument will draw heavily on the prior work 
of Joan Bybee (2001) as well as on work with Karalyn 
Patterson (McClelland and Patterson, 2002a,b) and Gary 
Lupyan (Lupyan and McClelland, 2003) and continuing 
work with  Bybee, Lupyan, Catherine Harris, and Brent 
Vanderwyk. Two aspects of this effort that will be discussed 
in this talk are described below. 
Constraints on English Word Forms 
The idea that candidate word forms have graded goodness 
values has been introduced by Kessler and Treiman (1997). 
Work currently in progress with Brent Vanderwyk extends 
this idea, accounting for the relative probabilities of the 
different word bodies that occur in stressed 
monomorphemic monosyllabic words.  More traditional 
work by Harris (1994) describes a set of rules that dictate 
which phoneme sequences are legal in English and which 
are not.  However, the analysis seems incomplete in that 
there are many sequences that are legal but which occur 
relatively infrequently (e.g., sequences of the form _vpt 
where v is a short vowel and the ‘_’ indicates the missing 
word onset), while there are other sequences that occur very 
much more frequently (e.g. sequences such as _vnd, _vnt, 
_vld, _vlt, and _vst).  Harris himself allows that some forms 
are less preferred than others but offers no systematic way 
to address this. 
 
According to our analysis, word bodies may involve a 
(partial or complete) closure with the lips (as in cuff or cup), 
with the tip of the tongue (as in bass or cat), or with the 
back of the tongue (as in tack), or no closure at all (as in 
bee).  Each closure adds a complexity cost (with labial and 
back closures adding more than tip closures), but 
embellishments of a closure already paid for are relatively 
cheep.  Thus, adding nasality to a tongue tip closure (as in 
hint as compared to hit) costs relatively little while the 
combination of a labial closure and a tip closure is more 
expensive, thus explaining the relative prevalence of _vnt 
compared to _vpt.  At the time of this writing we have been 
able to use these ideas to account for nearly 90% of the 
variance in the frequencies of occurrences of different 
English word bodies. 
Language Change and Morphology 
Bybee (2001) has argued that language change transcribed 
as a shift from one phoneme to another reflects an 
underlying continuity of gestural change.  Gary Lupyan  and 
I have been exploring models of language change that 
capture the ways in which a graded constraint on the length 
of a word form gradually results in the creation of quasi-
regular past tense forms like did, said, had, and made.  Such 
forms are treated as exceptions listed in the lexicon by rule-
based approaches such as Pinker (1999); in our model, they 
arise from fully regular forms from a graded constraint that 
tends to result in the gradual shortening of very frequent 
forms.  What is lost in shortening is not completely 
arbitrary; some sign of the regular past tense inflection is 
preserved in nearly all cases, while the vowel is shortened or 
a consonant is deleted from the regular form.  Recent work 
extending our approach to account for a variety of aspects of 
the evolution of the English past tense system, building on 
Lupyan and McClelland (2003), will be presented. 
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Abstract
It is a truism of everyday life that anger and fear affect
cognition.  In high-risk perceptually complex contexts, such as
air combat, the effects of negative arousal on performance can
be significant and potentially catastrophic.  To better understand
the interaction between emotion and cognition, we studied the
effects of negative emotional stimuli on pre-attentive
sensorimotor gating and selective attention in 39 healthy adults,
as well as their relationship to neural, cardiac, and endocrine
variables associated with the arousal response.  Subjects were
tested for pre-pulse inhibition under neutral and arousal
conditions, as well as on emotionally-valent Flanker and Stroop
tasks.  Physiological arousal reactivity was measured using
functional MRI, 24-hour EKG, electrodermal activity, cortisol
testing, and dexamethasone suppression.  Subjects were
clinically assessed for levels of anger, anxiety, and perceived
stress.  Affect-valent conditions were induced using the
International Affective Picture Scale, the Morphed Eckman
Facial Stimuli, and affect-valent words matched for length and
frequency.  All conditions were counter-balanced for order.  Our
results indicate that even under relatively mild emotional
challenge, the introduction of negative emotion significantly
affected nearly all components of our cognitive battery, and
correlated with changes in heart rate and electrodermal activity.
Pre-attentive sensory gating and habituation were diminished,
which may reflect the underlying neural conditions necessary for
an increased orienting response.  On tasks that required selecting
a target in the presence of distractors, such as the Flanker Task,
arousal had the effect of reducing both response time and
accuracy. Our results were also consistent with our previous
research on the higher-order effects of arousal on reasoning,
indicating that individuals make decisions with less information
under emotional arousal.  On tasks such as the Stroop, in which
orienting to the source of arousal conflicts with selective
attention to a target, response time was lengthened.  Importantly,
the effects of negative arousal were widely variable across
individuals, falling roughly into classes of individuals who
showed strong physiological arousal response with strong
cognitive effect, individuals who showed little physiological
arousal response with little cognitive effect, and individuals who
showed strong physiological arousal response with little
cognitive effect.  It is the third group that we are investigating
most closely with fMRI, to determine which limbic feed-back
mechanisms produce the most efficient cognitive performance
under stress.   This information, in turn, will permit more
effective screening for high-risk environments to select only
those individuals that are “hard-wired” for neural aptitude
during fear.
Background
Emotional arousal primes the organism for imminent
danger by increasing the orienting response, which
permits the organism to find and focus on the source of
danger.  Once oriented to the source of danger, emotional
arousal strengthens attention to the source of danger and
diminishes attention to stimuli unrelated to its source,
narrowing the amount of peripheral information
simultaneously accessible with the target.   This two-
pronged approach has both costs and benefits:  cognition
is limited with respect to breadth, with the individual
attending to less information at a time, but is more
flexible in terms of the ability to switch attention from
one target to another.  Under most dangerous conditions
in our evolutionary past, these costs and benefits were
appropriate for survival:  in the presence of a predator, it
makes sense to focus on the predator, to ignore peripheral
information such as ambient noise, and to be able to
quickly switch attention between two or more predators
that together present a collective threat.
While the cognitive changes associated with arousal in
humans are appropriate for predator/prey contexts, most
states of arousal (fear, stress, anxiety) in modern societies
today occur under far different circumstances, in which
the source of arousal is often not a concrete palpable
entity to which one can readily orient.  Even individuals
in actually dangerous situations, such as fighter pilots in
combat, protect themselves by defying their instincts:  a
fighter pilot needs to attend not only to the “predator”
shooting at him, but equally to the myriad of dials and
instruments that keep his plane aloft and his artillery
engaged.  Thus, while emotional arousal can benefit
cognitive performance by increasing focused attention on
a target and decreasing attention to distracting irrelevant
information, emotional arousal today can just as often
wreck havoc on cognitive performance by triggering the
orienting response in the absence of an appropriate target
and by disregarding potentially relevant peripheral stimuli
(“tunnel vision”).
Easterbrook, in 1959, seems to have been the first to
fully articulate the hypothesis that arousal produces
attentional narrowing, while Bacon (1974) was
instrumental in relating attentional narrowing to the
orienting response.  Their hypotheses have since been
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supported by a wide range of studies on humans and
animals that used induced arousal by reward (Bruner et.
al, 1955), electric shock (Cornsweet, 1969), loud noise
(Hockey, 1970a), threatening words (Combs & Taylor,
1952), test anxiety (Rockett, 1956), and pre-parachuting
anxiety (Hammerton & Tickner, 1967) on various tests of
information processing. Research on selective attention in
actual dangerous environments, in which simulation acted
as the control for arousal, demonstrate that the tendency
to overlook incidental (peripheral) cues in real-life
situations can have severe implications for actual
performance.  Significant decline in performance has been
shown for complex tasks that were performed during
combat (Walker & Burkhardt, 1965), during deep-sea
diving (Baddeley, 1972), as well as during realistically-
simulated experiments in which subjects thought they
were in mortal danger and were required to perform
selective attention tasks (Berkun et. al, 1962) (Weltman &
Egstrom,1971).
While useful and informative, these early experiments
had several limitations, the most prominent of which was
that they investigated mean performance effect without
considering the effects of individual variability. Yet the
factors that predict vulnerability or resilience to the
cognitive effects of arousal have tremendous practical
importance, particularly in screening for occupations that
require complex cognitive processing under dangerous
conditions. Other limitations were the failure to
discriminate between selective attention and orienting
responses, two processes that are presumed to be linked
but nonetheless distinct, as well as the failure to
distinguish between the effects of arousal on pre-attentive
sensory gating versus the effects of arousal on attentive
selective attention, two processes that intuitively might be
linked but whose relationship has not been extensively
studied.
The purpose of our study was therefore threefold.  Our
first aim was to establish or replicate findings on mean
cognitive changes that occur in the general population in
the context of mild emotional arousal; specifically pre-
attentive sensory gating (emotional pre-pulse inhibition),
selective attention (emotional flanker task), and orienting
(emotional Stroop task). Our secondary aims were to
compare the role that emotional arousal plays in selective
attention and the orienting response, and to evaluate the
interaction of sensorimotor gating and selective attention.
Our third aim was investigate the effects of individual
variability, specifically relating to neural, endocrine, and
subjective assessment of baseline stress, anxiety, and
anger, on task performance.
Methods
Subjects:  We tested 39 adults (18 male, 21 female)
between the ages of 18 and 50 (mean = 30.92; SD =
9.103). All subjects were screened and shown to be free
from neurological and DSMIV Axis I &2 psychiatric
illness using the Schedule for Affective Disorders –
Lifetime Version (Endicott & Spitzer, 1978).
Tasks:   We used pre-pulse inhibition (PPI) as a pre-
attentive measure of sensorimotor gating.  PPI, which has
been well validated under non-emotional conditions,
measures the inhibition of the startle response when an
ordinarily startling stimulus is immediately preceded by a
“pre-pulse,” and is thought to reflect pre-attentive
thalamic “gating” of non-novel stimuli.  We used standard
acoustic methods, as per Blumenthal (1993).  During the
task, subjects viewed stimuli presented on a 21-inch
computer screen in a completely dark room. The visual
protocol consisted of a two-minute orienting cross on a
black background, followed by 48 pictures from the
International Affective Picture Scales (IAPS) (Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1995), counter-balanced for order.
These IAPS pictures were Neutral during one session and
Negative Arousal during the other session.  Sessions were
also counter-balanced for order, with a duration of 4
minutes, 58 seconds each.  The sessions were separated
by a 15 minute unrelated task, to avoid habituation or
“bleeding” between the conditions. Inter-trial intervals
were calculated to prevent a trial commencing less than 2s
before or after a picture change, to avoid the picture
change itself acting as a pre-pulse.  Data was produced
separately for Neutral and Negative Arousal conditions,
allowing for comparison between the two conditions.
We used a modified Flanker (Fan et al., 2001) to
investigate affect-valent selective attention, as well as an
emotional Stroop task (D’Alfonso et al., 1999) to measure
affect-valent orienting response.  During all three tasks,
the subject was monitored for EKG and respiration.
Physiological data were collected and recorded via the
Biopac Systems MP150 module.  Subjects performed the
tasks under two conditions, Neutral and Negative
Arousal, at the same time on two consecutive days,
counter-balanced for order.  All three tasks used
emotionally-valent words (Times New Roman 66 pt.
Font) to induce the two conditions.  Words for the two
conditions were matched for frequency and word length,
and came from lists used in previous studies (Dalgleish,
1995, John, 1988, McKenna, & Sharma, 1995).  Subjects
performed the tasks on a computer, sitting 24 inches from
the screen.  The tasks were scored for both accuracy and
average response time, calculating total score as well as
scores for the first and last thirds to measure habituation
effects.
The Flanker Task was adapted from the Attentional
Network Task (Fan et al., 2001).  For each affect
conditions, the subject was presented with a series of 48
stimulus pairs.  The first screen of the pair was an
emotionally-valent word, presented for 1s.  The second
screen of the pair presented a series of 5 white arrows on
a black background.  The subject was instructed to
identify the direction of the middle arrow by pressing a
right or left button on a keypad.  The subject’s response
immediately advanced the task to the next stimulus pair.
There were 12 variations for arrow appearance, relating to
position on screen, congruence, and direction of arrows,
which were programmed to present randomly.
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For the Stroop Task, during each affect condition the
subject was presented with 60 words that were printed in
one of four different colors: Red, Green, Yellow and Blue
(15 for each group).  The words were presented pseudo-
randomly such that no color was repeated twice in a row.
The subject was instructed to press the key corresponding
to the color of the word shown.  A practice run made up
of symbols instead of words was presented before the task
in order to get the subject comfortable using the keypad
without looking down at the keys.
Neuroimaging data was acquired with a 3T Siemens
system at the Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric
Research in Orangeburg, New York. During scanning,
subjects viewed a series of facial stimuli with negative
(angry and fearful) and neutral expressions.  Passive
viewing of an orienting cross was used as a control
condition.  The subject’s head was secured in a custom-
made head-holder and headphones were provided for
magnet noise attenuation and for experimenter/subject
communication.  198 T2*-weighted coronal echoplanar
images (EPI) were acquired covering the frontal and
temporal lobes, with TR=3000ms, TE=40ms, Flip angle =
90º, Matrix=64x64, and a FOV=224mm.  Our voxel size
was 3.5 mm3 and 31 contiguous coronal slices were
obtained.
Following the EPI, we collected 31 T2*-weighted
gradient-echo (GE) images which were used in the data-
analysis process to correct for distortion found in the EPI
images.  The parameters for the gradient-echo sequence
were TR=3000ms, TE=40ms, Matrix=64x64, with a
FOV=224mm.  Again our voxel size=3.5mm3, and 31
contiguous coronal slices were acquired.
Anatomic information for regions of interest (ROI)
analysis was obtained with an MP-RAGE sequence. T1-
weighted images were collected with TR=3000ms, TE=
minimal, Flip angle = 18º, Matrix=256x192 (zero filled to
256), and a FOV=250mm.  The voxel size was .9 mm x .9
mm x 1.3 mm and 120 contiguous sagittal slices (zero
filled to 128) were obtained.   For our image processing
we used the 198 EPI images, 31 GE images, and 128 MP-
RAGE images collected during the scanning session. The
primary steps of the image processing were: motion
correction, distortion correction, spatial normalization,
smoothing, and statistical analysis. First, the EPI images
were realigned, using an estimation of head movement,
relative to the last image (the last image is used because it
immediately precedes the GE sequence).  The EPI files
were co-registered and re-sliced using a sinc interpolation
to generate a mean EPI image as well as registered EPI
images. The mean EPI image was registered to the GE, a
distortion-free image, in order to generate a warp file that
will be applied to all the EPI images to correct for
distortion. The next step was spatial normalization in
which the images were transformed to a standard
anatomical space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) using a
T1 brain template. This procedure facilitates intersubject
comparison.  Finally, images were smoothed with a 7 mm
Gaussian kernel (twice the voxel size) so that they were
appropriate for statistical analyses.
Salivary samples were obtained at 10am and 4pm for
cortisol levels; in addition, we administered 1mg of
dexamethasone and measured 10am salivary cortisol the
following morning.
Self-report of baseline State/Trait Anxiety and
Perceived Stress were obtained using scales by
Spielberger (1970) and Kuiper (1986), respectively.
Analysis
To evaluate the effects of arousal on the entire group’s
mean accuracy and response time, we performed a
repeated measures analysis of variance, with arousal and
difficulty level as the independent measures, and
performance accuracy and response time as the dependent
measures.  Because of consistent order effects, described
below in the Results section, we included testing order
(whether the neutral or the arousal condition occurred
first) as a covariate.  To evaluate differences between
tasks, we performed a bivariate correlational and linear
regression analyses; task*condition*physiological
variables interactions were assessed using MANOVA.  To
further evaluate differences between subjects, and their
relationships to physiological variables, we first separated
subjects into K-mean clusters, based on their fMRI
activation of the left amygdala in response to neutral and
aversive visual stimuli.  Clusters were defined as non-
responders, who showed minimal activation of the left
amygdala in response to both neutral and aversive stimuli,
selective high responders, who activated in response to
aversive but not neutral stimuli, and non-selective high
responders, who responded highly to both aversive and
neutral stimuli.   Using these clusters, we then performed
a between-group analysis of variance to determine
whether different clusters corresponded with significantly
different task performance.
Results
Mean Performance Under Arousal
As shown in Table 1, arousal had a significant impact on
mean cognitive performance.  Prepulse inhibition was
reduced an average of 3% (p = 0.057, F = 3.88) under the
arousal condition, particularly in the second half, and
showed diminished habituation under arousal.  Increase in
baseline-corrected skin conductance (p = 0.000, F =
22.418), a measure of sympathetic nervous system
activation, and decrease of baseline-corrected heart-rate
(p = 0.041, F = 4.519), a measure of parasympathetic
nervous system activation, confirmed validity of the
visual stimuli in causing an emotional response.
Response time was significantly shortened for the Flanker
Task (p = 0.000, F = 18.022), with accompanying
decrease in accuracy; Flanker Task Efficiency
(accuracy/response time) was reduced an average of 3%
during the arousal condition. On the Flanker Task,
congruence had a significant impact on performance:  the
incongruent condition had lower accuracy and longer
response times than the congruent condition, which in
turn had lower accuracy and longer response times than
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the control condition.  Response time was significantly
lengthened for the Stroop task (p = 0.000, F = 18.271) in
the arousal condition, with accuracy virtually unaffected;
Stroop Task Efficiency (accuracy/response time) was also
reduced by an average of 3% during the arousal condition.
Selective Attention versus Orienting Response
We found that efficiency on the Stroop Task, which
measures the strength of the orienting response to an
emotionally-valent stimulus, and efficiency on the
Flanker Task, which measures the ability to focus on a
(neutral) target and ignore distractors under emotionally-
valent conditions, were related, as predicted.  The
correlation was stronger for the neutral condition (r =
0.386; p = 0.015) and weaker for the arousal condition (r
= 0.284; p = 0.068).  The difference between the two
conditions likely resulted from subjects’ performance on
the orienting task being more affected by arousal (F =
18.088; p = 0.000) than their performance on the selective
attention task (F = 13. 020; p = 0.001).  Since both tasks
used similar emotionally-valent stimuli (words), these
results suggest that arousal is more directly tied to the
orienting response than to selective attention.
Sensorimotor Gating versus Selective Attention
While both PPI and performance on the Flanker Task
were affected by arousal, the arousal condition had a
stronger effect on the Flanker Task (F = 13.020; p =
0.001) than on pre-pulse inhibition (F = 3.767; p = 0.061).
Our correlation and cluster analyses did not show either a
direct, inverse, or hierarchical relationship between their
pre-pulse inhibition and performance on the Flanker task,
suggesting that pre-attentive and attentive cognitive
filtering are distinct processes, mediated by different
neural networks.
Individual Variability
We found a large range of variability on all cognitive
variables between our healthy test subjects.  For example,
on the Pre-Pulse Inhibition (PPI) Task, 58% showed a
relative decline in PPI under the arousal condition
(ranging from 2% to 9% decreased PPI), while 42%
showed a relative increase in PPI under the arousal
condition (ranging from 1% to 2% increased PPI).  On the
Flanker Task, while 47% of all subjects showed a relative
decline in efficiency under the arousal condition (ranging
from 3% to 58% decline), another 51% showed a relative
increase in efficiency under the arousal condition (ranging
from 1% to 34% improvement).  Two percent had
identical scores on the neutral and arousal conditions.  On
the Stroop Task, 60% of all subjects showed a relative
decline in efficiency under the arousal condition (ranging
from 1% to 36% improvement), another 38% showed a
relative increase in efficiency under the arousal condition
(ranging from 3% to 27% improvement.  Two percent had
identical scores on the neutral and arousal conditions.
Thus results, including our own, that report a mean
decrease in sensorimotor gating and cognitive efficiency
for selective attention and orienting tasks under arousal
are statistically correct but are missing an interesting and
potentially important part of the picture.
As shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, our cluster analyses
indicate that neural reactivity was a significant factor in
predicting whether individuals’ cognition (specifically
sensory gating and selective attention) was positively or
negatively affected by arousal (for overall, trend:  p =
0.106, F = 3.000; for Flanker Task:  p = 0.037, F = 6.250).
For pre-attentive sensorimotor gating, selective attention,
and orienting, individuals who showed selective high
activation of the amygdala to aversive visual stimuli
showed improvement on the arousal condition, while
individuals who showed non-selective high activation of
the amygdala to both neutral and aversive visual stimuli
showed strong decline on the arousal condition.  Non-
responders, those individuals who showed minimal
amygdala activation to either condition, showed small
decline on the arousal condition.
Endocrine and subjective perception of baseline
perceived stress were predictive of mean performance and
physiological reactivity (electrodermal activity and heart
rate).   Afternoon (4pm) cortisol levels had significant
between-subject effects for heart rate (p = 0.043, F =
4.270) and electrodermal activity (p = 0.051, F = 4.270),
as well as a trend between-subjects effect for PPI (p =
0.100, F = 2.947).  Post-dexamethasone cortisol, a
measure of endocrine negative feedback loops, was
related to mean PPI for both conditions (p = 0.029, F =
5.432).   Mean PPI decreased with subjective perception
of baseline perceived stress (p = 0.087, F = 44.000).  For
example, individuals with Perceived Stress Scale scores
that clustered around 4.50 (“Low Stress,” SD = 2.393) on
the Perceived Stress Scales showed mean PPI of 50.993,
individuals with scores that clustered around 13.18
(“Moderate Stress,” SD = 2.538) showed mean PPI of
42.222, and individuals with scores of 21.33
(“Pronounced Stress,” SD = 2.739) showed mean PPI of
26.314.  On the Stroop Task, Low Stress individuals
showed mean response times of 924.809 ms, Moderate
Stress individuals showed mean response times of
935.104 ms, and Pronounced Stress individuals showed
mean response times of 979.127 ms. This pattern was not
observed for the Flanker Task, although Low Stress
individuals still showed shorter response times than
Pronounced Stress individuals (p = 0.009, F = 5.650).
There were no prominent age or gender effects.
Conclusions
Our study of emotional arousal’s impact on cognition
demonstrates that even the mild arousal induced in a
controlled laboratory setting is sufficient to show
consistent changes under two conditions, both of which
are common in actually dangerous contexts. For tasks
performed under conditions of arousal but without the
possibility of orienting to the aversive stimulus (such as
the Flanker Task), we recorded decrease in response time
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and accuracy.  For tasks with the possibility of orienting
to the aversive stimuli but which require attending away
from the aversive stimulus (such as the Stroop Task), we
saw no loss of accuracy, but recorded significant increase
in response time.   Our analysis indicates that selective
attention, which is fully attentive, and the orienting
response, which is only semi-attentive, are related.
Prepulse inhibition, which is wholly pre-attentive, was not
correlated with either the Flanker or the Stroop Tasks.
Finally, our analysis of variability indicates that, while
most individuals are negatively influenced by arousal,
others are not. Our use of neural clusters suggests that it is
the selectivity of the neural arousal response, rather than
its amplitude, that corresponds with the direction of
impact; future studies examining neural activation and
performance under more severe stress may shed light on
the practical implications of these results.
Figures
Table 1:  Estimated Marginal Means for
Cognitive/Physiological Measures During
Neutral & Arousal Conditions
Measure (N = 39) Condition Mean Std. Error
Prepulse Inhibition neutral 40.486 4.481
arousal 39.173 4.854
Flanker Task Acc neutral .970 .010
arousal .966 .012
Flanker Task RT neutral 652.208 43.341
arousal 637.963 37.253
Stroop Acc neutral .959 .011
arousal .966 .009
Stroop RT neutral 984.073 48.350
arousal 1007.698 46.796
Baseline Corr HR neutral -1.216 .307
arousal -2.315 .509
Baseline Corr EDAneutral .131 .055
arousal .189 .075
Evaluated at covariate: TSTORDER = 1.4595.
Table 2:  Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts for
Cognitive/Physiological Changes During Neutral
vs. Arousal Conditions
                        Measure (N = 39)
F Sig.
Prepulse Inhibition 3.883 .057
Flanker Task Acc 2.307 .138
Flanker Task  RT 18.022 .000
Stroop Acc .197 .660
Stroop RT 18.271 .000
Baseline Corrected Chge in HR 4.519 .041
Baseline Corrected Chge in EDA 22.418 .000
Figure 1:  Preattentive Sensorimotor Gating 
for NonResponder, Selective High Responder, 
and Nonselective High Responder Groups 
Defined by Activation of the Left Amygdala
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Figure 2:  Selective Attention for 
NonResponder, Selective High Responder, 
and Nonselective High Responder Groups 
Defined by Activation of the Left Amygdala
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Figure 3:  Selective Attention for 
NonResponder, Selective High Responder, 
and Nonselective High Responder Groups 
Defined by Activation of the Left Amygdala
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The Cognitive Science of Mathematics 
Mathematics is a highly technical domain, characterized by 
the fact that the very entities that constitute it are idealized 
mental abstractions. These entities cannot be perceived 
directly through the senses. Even the simplest entity in, say, 
Euclidean geometry (i.e., a point, which only has location 
but no extension,) can’t actually be perceived. This is 
obvious when the entities in question involve infinity (e.g., 
limits, least upper bounds, mathematical induction, infinite 
sets, points at infinity in projective geometry and so on) 
where, by definition, no direct experience can exist with the 
infinite itself. Lakoff and Núñez (1997, 2000) and Núñez 
(2000a, 2000b, in press), inspired by theoretical principles 
of embodied cognition and using mainly techniques from 
cognitive linguistics (especially cognitive semantics) have 
suggested that these idealized abstract technical entities in 
mathematics are created by the human imaginative mind via 
a very specific use of everyday bodily-grounded cognitive 
mechanisms such as conceptual metaphors, conceptual 
blends, analogical reasoning, fictive motion, aspectual 
schemas, and so on (see also Núñez & Lakoff 1998, in 
press). Mathematics is, according to this view, a specific 
powerful and stable product of human imagination. The 
claim is that a detailed analysis of the inferential 
organization of mathematical concepts, theorems, 
definitions, and axioms (Mathematical Idea Analysis) 
provide cognitive foundations of mathematics itself. From 
this perspective, mathematics is the network of bodily-
grounded inferential organization that makes it possible. 
The study of these foundations and their extended 
inferential organization constitutes one of the most 
important goals of the cognitive science of mathematics. 
Towards Convergent Empirical Evidence: 
Gesture and Conceptual Mappings 
So far the work by Lakoff & Núñez on the cognitive science 
of mathematics has been based mainly on cognitive 
semantics, focusing on the conceptual mappings (conceptual 
metaphors, blends, metonymies, frames, etc.) that model the 
inferential organization of mathematical concepts. Some 
important questions, however, remain open: 
1. Are the mathematical concepts considered by Lakoff & 
Núñez to be metaphorical (e.g., least upper bound, space-
filling curve, point at infinity in projective geometry, etc.) 
simply cases of “dead” metaphors with no actual 
metaphorical semantic content? In other words, is the 
meaning and inferential organization of these concepts fully 
characterized by their literal formal mathematical definition 
(as it is often claimed in mathematics proper)? 
2. If the answer to (1) is negative, what then is the 
psychological reality of the suggested conceptual metaphors 
involved? 
In this presentation I intend to address these two questions 
by: 
a) Focusing on cases in mathematics where dynamic 
language is used to refer to mathematical objects that, 
within mathematics proper, are completely defined in static 
terms via the use of universal and existential quantifiers and 
set-theoretical entities. For example, when treating limits of 
infinite series classic mathematics books often make 
statements like this one: “We describe the behavior of sn by 
saying that the sum sn approaches the limit 1 as n tends to 
infinity, and by writing 1 = 1/2 + 1/22 + 1/23 + 1/24 + …” 
(Courant and Robbins, 1978, p. 64). This statement refers to 
a sequence of discrete and static partial sums of sn (real 
numbers), corresponding to successive discrete and static 
values taken by n. Technically, numbers, as such, don’t 
move, therefore no dynamic language should provide any 
literal meaning in cases like this one. 
b) Providing evidence from gesture studies, supporting 
the claim that the conceptual metaphorical nature of these 
mathematical linguistic expressions is indeed psychological 
real, operating under strong real-time and real-world 
constraints. I will build on the increasing evidence showing 
the extremely close relationship between speech, thought, 
and gesture production at a behavioral (McNeill, 1992), 
developmental (Iverson & Thelen, 1999; Bates & Dick, 
2002), neuropsychological (McNeill & Pedelty, 1995; 
Hickok, Bellugi & Klima, 1998), psycholinguistic (Kita, 
2000), and cognitive linguistic level (Lidell, 2000; Núñez & 
Sweetser, 2001). 
I will argue that the dynamic component of many 
mathematical ideas is constitutive of fundamental 
mathematical ideas such as limits, continuity, and infinite 
series, providing essential inferential organization for them. 
The formal versions of these concepts, however, neither 
generalize nor fully formalize the inferential organization of 
these mathematical ideas (i.e., e-d definition of limits and 
continuity of functions as framed by the arithmetization 
program in the 19th century). I suggest that these deep 
cognitive incompatibilities between dynamic-wholistic 
entities and static-discrete ones explain important 
dimensions of the great difficulties encountered by students 
when learning the modern technical version of these notions 
(Núñez, Edwards, and Matos, 1999). In order to support my 
arguments I will analyze converging linguistic and gestural 
data involving infinite series, limits and continuity of 
functions, showing the crucial role played by conceptual 
metaphor and fictive motion (Talmy, 1996) in constituting 
the inferential organization of these fundamental concepts. 
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Deductive logic is concerned with logical validity 
(henceforth ‘L-validity’). An inference is L-valid only when 
it must necessarily be true if the premises are true. This 
classic definition has a built-in truth-assumption. The truth 
of L-valid inferences is always a hypothetical truth, not a 
factual truth. This means that the factual truth of the 
premises and/or conclusion does not affect L-validity and 
that a L-valid inference cannot become L-invalid by adding 
new information. Technically speaking, deductive logics are 
monotonic. This stands in apparent contrast with the 
psychological evidence to the contrary, showing that the 
premise or conclusion believability affects the reasoning 
process. Common-sense reasoning is defeasible and non-
monotonic in nature. A conclusion that is believed to be true 
at one point can be considered false later, and an inference 
that is considered valid at one point can later be revoked and 
re-evaluated as invalid. (Note that we used the unqualified 
term ‘valid’, not ‘L-valid’). Consider, e.g., the classic 
benchmark example: “If it is a bird, then it can fly. Tweety 
is a bird. Hence, Tweety can fly.” This is a L-valid 
argument. Assuming it is true that ‘if something is a bird, 
then it can fly’ and assuming that Tweety is a bird, it 
follows necessarily that it would be true that Tweety can fly. 
People will nonetheless retract the conclusion that ‘Tweety 
the bird can fly’ when being given the information that 
Tweety is in fact an ostrich. 
Some theorists have created polemics between what they 
call ‘logic theories’ and their own probabilistic theories of 
human reasoning. The core argument against theories of 
human deduction is their presumed incapability of dealing 
with the defeasibility of common-sense reasoning. I will 
argue that there is only an apparent contrast between logic’s 
monotonicity and common-sense reasoning’s defeasibility. 
It is only when we are sure that people are reasoning 
hypothetically that defeating an inference would show that 
the monotonicity of deductive logics is problematical.  
Let us assume that people aim to establish L-validity. If 
so, people are abandoning the truth-assumption when 
defeating an inference. The existence of ostriches falsifies 
the claim that ‘if something is a bird, then it can fly. It is not 
always true that when something is a bird, it can fly. If 
people abandon the truth-assumption when confronted with 
the added information, they are shifting from one notion of 
validity (i.e., L-validity) to another notion of validity (let’s 
call it P-validity). This means that they are not changing an 
L-valid inference into a L-invalid inference, but are 
changing an L-valid inference into a P-valid inference. This 
example indicates that though defeasible, common-sense 
reasoning is not necessarily non-monotonic. 
Theorists who argue against logic theories contest that 
questioning the literal truth of, e.g., ‘if it is a bird, then it can 
fly’ is involved in defeasible reasoning: “surely [this] 
mischaracterizes people’s cognitive attitude towards this 
and a million other commonsense generalizations” 
(Oaksford & Chater, 1998, p. 5). This claim as regards the 
psychological ‘truthfulness’ of a logically false conditional 
is not congruent with reality. We asked 150 first-year 
psychology undergraduates to judge whether the conditional 
is strictly speaking false when the context either did or id 
not include TF cases. These cases reflect situations where 
the antecedent is satisfied while the consequent is not (e.g., 
birds that do not fly). When there were TF cases, 83% of 
them said it is strictly speaking false. In case there were no 
such falsifying TF cases, 89% said the conditional was true. 
Moreover, with the false conditionals, 91% selected a 
conditional of the form ‘if p then possibly q’ as the best 
description of the situation. With a true conditional, 93% 
effectively preferred ‘if p then q’ as the best description. 
This first study used abstract materials (coloured figures). In 
a second study we asked 44 first-year psychology students 
to “think about the fact that for instance ostriches and 
penguins are also birds (and can not fly).” Thirty-eight 
(86%) of them judged the conditional to be false. In short, 
the falsity of the conclusion ‘Tweety flies’ in real everyday 
inference, license the conclusion that "if it is a bird, then it 
can fly" is a false utterance. 
To ground their intuition pump, Oaksford and Chater 
(1998) appeal to the comforting idea that there is true 
commonsense knowledge. “If our commonsense 
descriptions of the world and of ourselves are not candidates 
for truth then precious little else of what we call our 
commonsense knowledge of the world will be candidates 
for truth. We would then be in the paradoxical position of 
having to provide a system of human inference that is 
always based on false premises but which is nonetheless 
apparently capable of guiding successful action in the 
world!” (Oaksford & Chater, 1998, p. 5). There is really 
only an apparent contradiction (a paradox), not a 
contradiction. It is not problematical that there is preciously 
little (if any) knowledge that is strictly true. The induction 
problem still exists: every generalization is a potential over-
generalization. However, the fact that some birds do not fly 
does not make it senseless to use the generalization that 
birds fly. An absolute truth is universally applicable, but if 
something is not universally applicable then this does not 
imply that it is inapplicable. It might be inapplicable 
(applicable to none) or applicable to some (but not all). The 
demonstrable fact that most of our commonsense 
generalizations are false (i.e., not strictly true), marks that 
they only have a certain degree of truth: They are false, but 
applicable. Verity is not verisimilitude.  
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The research areas of causal and counterfactual reasoning, 
hindsight bias and regret, have often been studied in 
isolation, sometimes studied in pairs, and occasionally 
studied in triads.  I suggest that there are common 
mechanisms shared by these judgments that explain how, 
when, and why they will (a) be similarly or differently 
affected by information and (b) influence each other. 
To start, I distinguish two types of causal reasoning: the 
types of judgments we make in science when we have 
multiple examples of causes and effect and the types of 
judgments we make in law when we want to figure out the 
cause of a one-time only event.  In the former, an important 
cue to causality is covariation -- a cause is something that 
increases the probability of an effect above its usual 
probability.  I then draw an analogy to the latter -- and 
assume that a causality judgment about a person or event is 
a function of how much that person or event increases the 
probability of the eventual outcome above its "baseline" 
probability (i.e., its natural probability of occurring).   
C ≈ p(Oafter) − p(Obefore )  
The equation above represents how a causality judgment 
is a function of the estimated probability of the eventual 
outcome occurring after the target cause has occurred 
[p(Oafter)] and the estimated probability of the eventual 
outcome occurring before the target cause has occurred 
[p(Obefore)]. 
But for one-time events, how can people make probability 
judgments?  I suggest that such judgments rely on pre-
existing knowledge -- especially of previous covariations 
and causal mechanisms -- and counterfactual reasoning.  
The equation below expands the one above by putting each 
estimate over 1 (i.e., p(Oafter) + p(~Oafter) = 1). 
 
C ≈ p(Oafter)
p(Oafter)+ p(~ Oafter) −
p(Obefore)
p(Obefore)+ p(~ Obefore)  
 
That causality relies on counterfactual information in this 
manner explains the "if-only" and "even-if" effects -- ways 
in which considering counterfactuals affects causal 
judgments.  For example, if someone takes an unusual route 
home, and then is in a car accident, she might think "If only 
I had taken my usual route."  That counterfactual thought 
would increase the estimate of p(~Obefore), decrease the 
fraction on the right, and increase the causality assigned to 
the decision to take the unusual route. 
The relation to the hindsight bias is clear:  When do 
people make these probability estimates?  Typically after 
events have unfolded.  Thus, the hindsight bias is implicit in 
causality judgments.  However, these equations also suggest 
ways in which the hindsight bias can be de-biased and, in 
particular, which kinds of counterfactuals should be most 
effective in doing so.  
Finally, I argue that regret is both a counterfactual and 
causal emotion -- it depends on knowing that what you 
might have done could have changed an outcome.  Our 
studies compare measures of causality with measures of 
regret.  We find that regret depends on the difference 
between an actor's perceived causality for the (negative) 
outcome given his actual decision and the imagined 
causality for that outcome had an alternative decision been 
made. (Again, such causality judgments are made in 
hindsight.) Our experiments use this relation to explain 
"action" and "inaction" effects in regret judgments. 
I hope to relate these analyses to other types of reasoning. 
Acknowledgments 
This research was supported by an NIMH Grant. 
Relevant Publications 
Spellman, B. A., Kincannon, A., & Stose, S.  (in press).  
The relation between counterfactual and causal reasoning.  
Invited chapter to appear in D. R. Mandel, D. J. Hilton, & 
P. Catellani (Eds.), The psychology of counterfactual 
thinking.  London:  Routledge Research. 
Spellman, B. A., & Mandel, D. R.  (2003).  Causal 
reasoning, psychology of.  In L. Nadel (Ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Vol 1, pp. 461-466).   
London:  Nature Publishing Group. 
Spellman, B. A., & Kincannon, A.  (2001).  The relation 
between counterfactual ("but for") and causal reasoning:  
Experimental findings and implications for jurors' 
decisions.  Law and Contemporary Problems: Causation 
in Law and Science, 64(4), 241-264. 
Spellman, B. A., Price, C. M., & Logan, J.  (2001).  How 
two causes are different from one:  The use of 
(un)conditional information in Simpson’s paradox.  
Memory & Cognition, 29, 193-208. 
Spellman, B. A., & Mandel, D. R.  (1999).  When 
possibility informs reality:  Counterfactual thinking as a 
cue to causality.  Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 8, 120-123. 
Spellman, B. A.  (1997).  Crediting causality.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology:  General, 126, 323-348.  
Spellman, B. A.  (1996).  Acting as intuitive scientists:  
Contingency judgments are made while controlling for 
alternative potential causes.  Psychological Science, 7, 
337-342. 
 
39
Does the practice of meta-cognitive description facilitate acquiring expertise?
Masaki Suwa (suwa@sccs.chukyo-u.ac.jp)
PRESTO, JST & School of Computer and Cognitive Sciences, Chukyo University
101 Tokodachi, Kaizu, Toyota, Aichi 470-0348, Japan
Expertise as Differentiation
How do people acquire expertise? Studies on machine
learning in artificial intelligence have captured some aspects
of human learning. But its limitation lies in that the
representation of the target domain needs to be given in
advance and fixed during the process in order for a learning
mechanism to work. Contrarily, the ways people represent
the external world evolve as they become experts. Experts
are able to differentiate and perceive some features and
relations in the world that would be meaningless to novices.
This means that acquisition of expertise can be regarded as a
process of becoming able to perceive what was not evident
before. Gibson and Gibson (1955) described a similar
process, in relation to expertise, in their case, wine-tasting:
“Perceptual learning, then, consists of responding to
variables of physical stimulation not previously responded
to” (p. 34). The expertise-as-differentiation view was not
necessarily discussed in studies on chess in which expert
performance was explained by chunks (e.g. Chase and
Simon, 1973).
   Our previous studies on expert-novice differences in
design showed similar findings. Designers draw sketches in
the early design phase. Sketches are not only a record of
generated ideas but also a stimulus for new ones. The
success of a design process hinges on differentiately
perceiving features and relations in sketches and generating
interpretations of them. We found that expert designers were
more capable of associating features and relations with
functional issues (Suwa and Tversky, 1997). Further,
perceiving features and relations unheeded before, which is
difficult to do for novices, was the major driving-force for
the generation of ideas for an expert designer (Suwa, 2003).
Hypothesis: The Practice of Meta-cognitive
Description will Foster Differentiation
Then, what kind of cognitive practices in a target domain
help become able to differentiately perceive features and
relations in the external world and interpret them? We have
made a hypothesis that self-awareness of and thereby meta-
cognitive descriptions of what one has perceived and
conceived of will foster the ability of differentiation and
thus facilitate acquisition of expertise (Suwa and Tversky,
2003). Anecdotal evidence comes from the domain of sports.
A Japanese player in Major Baseball League, named Ichiro,
said in a TV interview that it is through a persistent effort of
describing how he has perceived the ball and how his body
has reacted and hit it that he had become one of the most
productive hit-maker. Our finding (Suwa and Tversky,
2003) that expert designers are better at a meta-cognitive
skill of reorganizing perception and generating
interpretations than novices is also supportive.
   We have recently obtained empirical evidence from the
case study of singing a song. A participant in the experiment
continued to sing a song for 4 months, recording his voice in
every trial of singing. During the period, he continued
describing meta-cognitively, in the form of writing in a
notebook, how he was utilizing his throat, breath and tongue
and how that helped express his feeling and emotion.
Evaluation of all the trials of singing by three musicians
after 4 months revealed that his performance exhibited a U-
shape learning curve, i.e. getting better in the beginning,
then turning worse sharply and gradually getting better and
better toward the end. This indicates that he was climbing
steps toward acquiring expertise. An interesting finding is
that the evaluation scores of the recorded songs correlated in
a statistically significant manner with the amount of meta-
cognitive descriptions accumulated for about one month up
to the time of every trial of singing. This suggests that the
practice of meta-cognitive description had a latent effect,
not an instant one, on his performance.
   We interpret this in the following manner. A meta-
cognitive description is a kind of narrative created by self.
Its validity is not assured anyhow. Important is, however,
the practice of meta-cognition itself, not its validity. A meta-
cognitive description as a narrative will effectively drive
differentiation of features and relations in the external world,
and thereby encourage the next cycle of meta-cognitive
description. This cycle will lead up to acquiring expertise.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Barbara Tversky for insightful discussions.
References
Chase, W. G. & Simon, H. A. (1973). Perception in chess,
Cognitive Psychology, 4, 55-81.
Gibson, J. J. & Gibson, E. J. (1955). Perceptual learning:
differentiation or enrichment?, Psychological Review, 62,
32-41.
Suwa, M. (2003). Constructive perception: coordinating
perception and conception toward acts of problem finding
in a creative experience, Japanese Psychological
Research, 45, 221-234.
Suwa, M. & Tversky, B. (1997). What do architects and
students perceive in their design sketches?: a protocol
analysis, Design Studies, 18, 385-403.
Suwa, M. & Tversky, B. (2003). Constructive perception: a
meta-cognitive skill for coordinating perception and
conception, Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference
of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1140-1144).
Cognitive Science Society.
40
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Papers 
41
 42
Task Interruption: Resumption Lag and the Role of Cues   
Erik M. Altmann (ema@msu.edu)
Department of Psychology
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI  48824
J. Gregory Trafton (trafton@itd.nrl.navy.mil)
Naval Research Laboratory, Code 5513
4555 Overlook Avenue S. W.
Washington, DC  20375
Abstract
The consequences of interrupting someone in the middle of a
complex task are of considerable practical and theoretical
interest.  We examine one behavioral measure of the
disruption caused by task interruption, namely the resumption
lag, or the time needed to “collect one’s thoughts” and restart
a task after an interruption is over.  The resumption lag (in
our task environment) was double the interval between
uninterrupted actions (3.8 s vs. 1.9 s), indicating a substantial
disruptive effect.  To probe the nature of the disruption, we
examined the role of external cues associated with the
interrupted task, finding that cues available immediately
before an interruption facilitate performance immediately
afterwards  (reducing the resumption lag). This c u e -
availability effect suggests that people deploy preparatory
perceptual and memory processes, apparently spontaneously,
to mitigate the disruptive effects of task interruption.
Introduction
For better or worse, interruptions are part of everyday life.
For better, interruptions are an essential part of efficient
communication, among people and between people and
machines. For worse, interruptions can be annoying, and can
seem disruptive. For example, the annoyance of unwanted
telephone solicitations drove the recent overwhelming
popularity of “do not call” registries in the United States.
Similarly, consider the “software assistant” included in
Microsoft products in the late 1990s. If Word, for example,
detected what it thought was a letter being drafted, it would
freeze the keyboard and demand to know if the user needed
“help” — a feature that in more recent editions of the
software is no longer enabled by default.
There are many parameters to how an interruption is
structured — including interruption duration, for example,
or whether the interrupted person has control over
interruption timing (McFarlane & Latorella, 2002) — and
there is also a range of different behavioral measures on
which the assess the impact of an interruption. In one classic
result, Zeigarnik (1927/1938) found that interrupted tasks
were actually remembered better, in terms of recalled detail,
than tasks that were allowed to run to completion. In more
applied work, however, interruptions have been found to
have detrimental effects on situational awareness in
dynamic task environments like aviation (Latorella, 1996),
where losing one’s place in a checklist during takeoff, for
example, can have catastrophic results (NTSB, 1988).
The current study examines the disruptive effects of
interruption in terms of the time needed to resume the
primary (interrupted) task after the secondary (interrupting)
task is complete. In less formal terms, we examine the time
needed to collect one’s thoughts, or pick up the thread
again, when an interruption is over and we can return to
what we were doing before. There is surprisingly little
research focused on this measure, and what there is is
distributed across a variety of domains and paints no clear
picture of whether interruptions are disruptive or not. For
example, in a study of interruption of administrative and
clerical workers, disruptive effects of interruption were
difficult to detect (Zijlstra, Roe, Leonora, & Krediet, 1999),
and interruption in a simple question-answering task can
actually improve performance, measured in terms of overall
accuracy and time-on-task (Speier, Vessey, & Valacich,
2003). In the mainstream cognitive psychology literature,
research on “task switching” (Monsell, 2003) would seem to
be relevant, as studies in this domain typically focus on the
“switch cost” associated with shifting from one task to
another. However, this literature is perhaps not so aptly
named; the “tasks” used in task-switching studies take a few
hundred milliseconds to complete, with switch cost a small
and not particularly relevant fraction of that (Altmann, in
press). We are interested in higher-level tasks with greater
ecological validity, where switch cost is measured not in
tens of milliseconds, but in seconds or longer.
In operational terms, the dependent measure in the current
study is the resumption lag, illustrated in Figure 1. The
resumption lag is the time interval separating the end of the
secondary task and the first subsequent action taken by the
human operator in the primary task. We report first a
comparison of this resumption lag to an estimate of the time
interval that usually separates actions in the primary task, to
give a sense of the absolute magnitude of the disruptive
effect; to preview, the mean inter-action interval, in the
highly interactive primary task we are using, is roughly 2 s,
and the resumption lag is roughly 4 s, indicating a
substantial disruption both in absolute and relative terms.
We then report on two factors that have the potential to
reduce the resumption lag. Both focus on the interruption
lag, also illustrated in Figure 1. The interruption lag is a
brief transitional interval immediately preceding an
interruption, during which the operator knows of the
pending interruption but is not yet engaged by it. An
example is the time between the phone starting to ring and
the act of actually taking the call; during this interval, there
is a brief opportunity to complete a thought, for example, or
negotiate quickly with a conversation partner (physically
present) how and when to resume after the call is over.
Many real-world interruptions, even more urgent ones,
afford a brief interruption lag; even when a fire alarm
sounds, one is still likely to take time to save changes to an
electronic document, for example, before evacuating.
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Two characteristics of the interruption lag are examined
here: (1) whether or not the primary task display is
perceptually available during this brief period, and (2) the
actual duration of this period. The relevance of these two
factors is predicated on a memory model of what makes
interruptions disruptive (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Trafton,
Altmann, Brock, & Mintz, 2003). The basic premise of the
model is that during an interruption, the cognitive
representations that support performance of the primary task
will decay, in particular relative to the cognitive
representations that support performance of the secondary
task. Thus, when resuming the primary task, retrieval cues
will be necessary to re-activate the relevant representations.
This memory analysis predicts, qualitatively, that the
interruption lag — the brief interval before an interruption
— has a crucial role to play in facilitating resumption after
the interruption. During the interruption lag, when the
operator is aware that he or she will soon be interrupted but
can still focus mentally on the primary task, there is an
opportunity to “prepare to resume,” for example by
prospectively encoding goals to accomplish at resumption
(Trafton et al., 2003). To the extent that people do engage in
such preparatory processing, it should help to have the
primary-task display perceptually available during the
interruption lag, to allow retrieval cues to be quickly
accessed and accurately encoded. Thus, to build on earlier
evidence that people do prepare to resume (Trafton et al.,
2003), we asked here whether cue availability is a factor in
this process. In the cue condition the primary task display
was preserved during the interruption lag, whereas in the
no-cue  condition the screen went blank during the
interruption lag (starting with onset of an alert signaling the
pending interruption). Moreover, because processes like
perceptual search and memory encoding take time, we
varied the duration of the interruption lag across
experiments, to examine what length of interruption lag
would render cue availability effective in reducing the
resumption lag.
Experiments
We conducted four experiments, with interruption lags of
two, four, six, and eight seconds respectively. These values
were based on evidence that an 8-second interruption lag is
enough to allow people to (at least partially) prepare to
resume (Trafton et al., 2003). The primary task involved
planning and resource allocation subject to constraints, and
thus involved a substantial amount of state information to be
represented cognitively. The secondary task was less
complex but nonetheless involved a series of tightly-spaced
forced-choice decisions unfolding over a 30- to 45-second
period. Interruption timing was under system, rather than
operator, control, a factor that tends to aggravate the
disruptive effects of interruption (McFarlane & Latorella,
2002).
The independent variable within each experiment was
whether or not cues were available during the interruption
lag. The main dependent variable was the resumption lag
(Figure 1), but we also compare the resumption lag to the
mean interval between primary-task actions, to estimate the
overall disruptive effect of an interruption.
Method
Participants  Ninety-six Michigan State University
undergraduates participated in exchange for partial credit
toward a course requirement. Each of the four experiments
involved 24 participants, randomly assigned to the cue and
no-cue conditions (described below).
Materials The primary task was a complex resource-
allocation task (Trafton et al., 2003) in which participants
were asked to defeat a set of simulated destinations using
simulated tanks. Participants selected which destinations to
attack and in what order, and issued tanks with appropriate
amounts of fuel and munitions. Fuel was consumed in
reaching a destination, and munitions were consumed in
engaging it, but tank payload was limited, as was the total
number of tanks and other resources available. Points were
awarded for defeating destinations and subtracted for
consuming resources.
Figure 2 shows a view of the primary-task display as it
normally appears when the participant is doing the task.
There is a central window with buttons for allocating tanks
to missions, choosing destinations, and displaying a map
with distances between destinations. There is also an area
for displaying mission outcomes (whether a destination was
defeated, whether a tank ran out of fuel, etc.)  To the left are
windows showing the supply pool (available fuel,
munitions, and tanks) and windows for outfitting heavy and
light tanks with varying amounts of fuel and munitions. To
the right is a window showing the participant’s scoring
Primary task performance
Alert
Interruption lag
Resumption lag
First action after interruption
Time
End of secondary task
Start of secondary task
Figure 1: Time course of an interruption.  For 
example, if the alert is the phone starting to ring, then 
the secondary task is the ensuing phone conversation.
Further primary task performance
Secondary task performance
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history from past simulations, and windows showing the
status of selected tanks and destinations.
Figure 3 shows (at a more reduced scale) the state of the
display during the interruption lag in the no-cue condition.
To signal the pending interruption (and thus mark the start
the interruption lag), an “eyeball alert” appeared in the top-
right corner of the display. In the no-cue condition, the
primary-task display was blanked out simultaneously with
alert onset, whereas in the cue condition the primary-task
display was preserved. In both conditions, with the start of
the secondary task (and thus the end of the interruption lag),
the primary-task display (whatever its state) was completely
erased and replaced with the secondary-task display.
During the interruption lag, the cursor was hidden and
disabled, so that all physical interaction with the primary
task ceased. After an interruption, the primary-task display
was reinstated in the same form it was in at the moment the
eyeball alert appeared, with the following exceptions: The
window that was active then — that is, the window that the
participant was working in at the moment the alert appeared
— was de-activated at task resumption, and the cursor was
moved to the top-left corner of the screen. The effect was to
eliminate the active window and the mouse cursor as
Figure 2: Screen shot of the primary task display during normal performance (see text for summary).
Figure 3: Screen shot of the primary task display during the 
interruption lag in the no-cue condition. The "eyeball alert" in 
the top right corner onsets at the start of the interruption lag 
and remains until start of the secondary task. In the cue 
condition the eyeball alert is identical but the primary task 
display (as in Figure 2) is preserved during the interruption lag.
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retrieval cues that participants could deploy strategically to
remind themselves of what they had been doing before the
interruption, and therefore make resumption lag more
sensitive to our experimental manipulations.
The secondary task involved evaluating “tracks,” or
targets on a radar screen, as friendly or hostile, according to
attributes like speed and shape of icon (Trafton et al., 2003).
A screenshot of the secondary-task display appears in
Figure 4. Each instance of the secondary task lasted 30 to 45
seconds; afterwards, the participant was returned directly
back to the primary task, as described above.
Design Interruption lag varied between experiments, as
described above. Within each experiment, the independent
variable was cue availability during the interruption lag
(cue, no-cue), which was manipulated between subjects.
The main dependent variable was resumption lag, the time
from the end of the secondary task to the first subsequent
action (mouse click) in the primary task. The other measure
of interest, for comparison with resumption lag, was the
inter-action interval, the mean time between actions in the
primary task. Reported values for these measures are means
of participant medians. For the inter-action interval, values
below 1 s were discarded first, to eliminate anticipation
errors, as well as ballistic components of motor plans, such
as the second click of a double-click action.
Procedure Participants were tested individually, in sessions
lasting roughly 90 minutes. A session began with a training
period, in which participants learned to perform both tasks
separately and were shown an example of how the computer
would switch them from one task to the other and back
again. After training, there were three 20-minute blocks of
actual task performance. Within each block there were 10
interruptions, each triggered by a mouse click selected
randomly to occur within a time window with quasi-random
boundaries, to make interruption timing difficult for
participants to predict.
At no point was the hypothetical function of the
interruption lag in facilitating resumption mentioned to
participants; thus, any effects of cue availability can be
attributed to spontaneous use of preparatory strategies.
Results We conducted two analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
for each experiment. The first ANOVA, for which the data
appear in Figure 5, compared mean resumption lag to mean
inter-action interval; for all four experiments the difference
was highly reliable, ps < .0001. The second ANOVA, for
which the data appear in Figure 6, compared cue resumption
lags to no-cue resumption lags. For 2- and 4-second
interruption lags, there was no effect of cue availability,
Fs<1. For the 6-second interruption lag, the cue-availability
effect was marginal, F(1,22)=4.1, p=.056.  For the 8-second
interruption lag, the cue-availability effect was reliable,
F(1,22)=5.7, p<.03.
We also conducted an omnibus ANOVA to compare
across experiments, with cue availability and interruption
lag as factors. The cue-availability effect was marginal,
F(1,88)=3.6, p=.060, the interruption-lag effect was not
reliable, F(3,88)=1.2, p>.30, and the two factors did not
interact, F(3,88)=1.4, p>.25.
Discussion
The first empirical finding was that resumption lag is
substantially longer than the mean interval between actions
(Figure 5).  This affords one measure of the disruptive effect
of interruptions, at least in this highly interactive task in
which, without interruption, actions occur at a rapid pace:
The first action after an interruption took longer to execute
than the first action after another primary-task action.  In
absolute terms, the resumption lag was 3.8 s – double the
1.9 s inter-action interval, which was measured rather
conservatively by excluding all inter-action intervals under
1 s.  This difference would appear to be of considerable
practical interest in dynamic task environments, for example
involving real airplanes or even automobiles traveling at
highway speed, in which the world can look substantially
different after an additional few seconds have elapsed.
The disruptive effect of interruption, as illustrated in
Figure 5, was large and robust, which may agree with our
intuitions about interruptions but doesn’t necessarily agree
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Figure 5: Resumption lag compared to inter-action 
interval, across experiments. The difference is an 
estimate of the disruption caused by task interruption.
Figure 4: Screen shot of the secondary task display. 
Participants classified objects moving across a simulated 
radar display, according to color, shape, and speed.
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with other controlled studies (e.g., Speier et al., 2003;
Zijlstra et al., 1999). Three factors may have contributed to
the robust effect measured here in terms of resumption lag.
First, resumption lag is a local measure, taken immediately
after every interruption; in contrast, other studies have
reported global measures, such as overall time on task
(Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; Speier et al., 2003).  In our
study, one global measure is a participants’ total score over
a session, but this was highly variable and showed no
interpretable trends (so we did not report it).  One specific
problem with global measures is that they allow for
compensatory strategies to work against the disruptive
effects of interruption. Zijlstra et al. (1999), for example,
speculate that their administrative workers compensated for
interruption by using the time in between interruptions more
efficiently.
A second factor may have been the relatively substantial
cognitive state required to perform our primary task.  In
many scenarios in this task, beyond the resource-allocation
tradeoffs involved, it was a challenge simply to piece
together missions that would actually succeed in defeating
destinations.  In other studies, the primary task was simpler
(Speier et al., 2003) and may have been more automated
(Zijlstra et al., 1999), and therefore placed a smaller
premium on maintaining complex representations in
working memory.
Finally, a third factor may have been our implementation
decision to trigger interruptions using mouse clicks, rather
than strictly on the basis of time passage.  Our rationale was
that motor actions are often selected and programmed with
the intention of achieving specific goals, so we reasoned
that action-triggered interruptions would be more likely to
disrupt these goals, which are one critical element of
cognitive state; even in mundane tasks it’s not uncommon to
have “Now what was I doing?” moments, and it may be that
these are more effectively induced by linking interruptions
to actions rather than leaving interruption timing entirely to
chance.  Indeed, in Zeigarnik’s (1927/1938) classic study,
the experimenter was charged with judging when the
participant was engrossed, in order to interrupt with the
greatest impact.
The second empirical finding was that cue availability
during the interruption lag (before the interruption) affected
performance at task resumption (after the interruption, 30 to
45 s later), at least for longer interruption lags (Figure 6).
One interpretation of this result, consistent with our memory
analysis earlier, is that the various cognitive operations
required to locate and encode retrieval cues during the
interruption lag take somewhere between 6 and 8 seconds to
complete (in our task environment). In other words, longer
interruption lags afford enough time to link cognitive
representations to external cues to facilitate retrieval later.
However, this interpretation would also seem to predict that
resumption lag in the cue condition should decrease at
longer interruption lags, because cues are facilitating
resumption. Instead, though, Figure 6 suggests that longer
interruption lags drove an increase in resumption lag in the
no-cue condition. Cue availability and interruption lag did
not interact in the cross-experiment ANOVA, so the
increase in no-cue resumption lags could be spurious, but
given the exploratory nature of this work it seems useful to
consider alternative accounts of why the cue-availability
effect was limited to longer interruption lags.
One possible explanation of the increase in no-cue
resumption lags might implicate changes in alertness or
arousal – participants might simply have gotten bored,
staring at a blank screen for 6 or 8 seconds. Some studies
suggest that task interruption serves to increase arousal and
stress, and thus improve overall (globally-measured)
performance, at least on simple tasks (Speier et al., 2003);
perhaps a long interruption lag, without visual information
to focus on, moderates this effect. However, if arousal were
to play a role in the cue-availability effect, it would remain
to explain how a change in arousal before the interruption
could affect performance after the interruption, tens of
seconds later. Perhaps a drop in arousal caused participants’
minds to wander in a way that activated irrelevant thoughts
that in turn interfered with relevant cognitive
representations. In such an account, however, memory
would again play a central role in mediating the effect of
pre-interruption variables on post-interruption performance.
One could explain the cue-availability effect without
reference to memory processes if changes in arousal during
the interruption lag persisted across the entire length of the
interruption, to influence performance directly at task
resumption. Secondary task performance was basically at
ceiling for all subjects, so offers little evidence on this
possibility. However, if arousal effects were to persist for
the entire 30 to 45 seconds of the interruption, one might
expect them to persist somewhat beyond as well, and then
only gradually dissipate. This would predict that the time
between the first and second action after the interruption
would also reflect the cue availability effect. Revisiting our
data, however, we found no difference, as a function either
of interruption lag or cue availability, in the duration of the
interval between the first and second actions after an
interruption; this measure appears in Figure 7. It seems most
likely, then, that even if cue availability and interruption lag
interact to affect arousal before an interruption, memory
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Figure 6: Resumption lag for cue and no-cue
conditions, across experiments. The difference is 
is marginally reliable with a 6-second interruption lag 
and reliable with an 8-second interruption lag (see text). 
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and/or perceptual processes mediate the delayed effect on
task resumption.
At least two avenues of future work seem indicated to
clarify the effects of our interruption-lag manipulations on
speed of task resumption. First, it will be important to repeat
these manipulations in context of a factorial design in which
interruption lag and cue availability are fully crossed; here,
one objection is that the cross-experiment comparison is
potentially confounded by changes in the subject
population.
Second, although the model that motivated these
experiments emphasizes memory processes (Altmann &
Trafton, 2002), there are alternative characterizations of
why task resumption is time consuming. In particular, one
account of automation deficit (Ballas, Kieras, Meyer, Brock,
& Stroup, 1999) — like resumption lag, but measured in
terms of accuracy — is that it reflects encoding of
perceptual information (Kieras & Meyer, 1997) rather than
memory retrieval. Thus, in our task environment it could be
that the difference between the resumption lag and the
baseline inter-action interval (Figure 5) simply reflects the
cost of re-encoding the display, and that this re-encoding is
what is facilitated by cue availability during the interruption
lag. To distinguish between these accounts, one could vary
the extent of the cognitive representations required to
perform the primary task on one hand, and the perceptual
complexity of the display on the other. Under a memory-
retrieval model, the cue-availability effect should be linked
to complex cognitive states, whereas under a perceptual-
encoding model the effect should be linked to complex
external displays; in our task environment, these two factors
are confounded.
Whatever the ultimate explanation, the cue-availability
effect shows an interesting link between what happens
before an interruption and what happens later, after tens of
seconds of intervening behavior.  In practical terms, the
effect suggests that interface designs, and possibly training
interventions, could exploit cue availability in some way to
facilitate resumption in task environments in which
interruptions are frequent and seconds matter.  In theoretical
terms, probing this effect should help us develop constraints
on models of memory, perception, and cognitive control as
these functions are deployed in complex dynamic task
environments.
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Abstract 
Analogous to Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi and Wang (1999) 
we examined the relation between linguistic categorization 
and similarity of artifacts by Dutch-speaking and French-
speaking monolingual Belgians. We replicated the 
dissociation between naming and sorting found by Malt et al. 
(1999) for speakers of English, Chinese and Spanish. We also 
investigated the relation between the two naming patterns of 
bilingual Belgians, raised simultaneously in French and in 
Dutch, and how these naming patterns can be linked to the 
naming of the monolinguals. The results showed that the 
French and Dutch naming pattern of the bilinguals didn’t 
parallel the respective naming patterns of the monolinguals, 
but rather merged into a common naming pattern. 
Introduction 
Research from several different traditions concerns the 
coupling of similarity and naming. However, different 
studies have resulted in contradicting conclusions. Some 
studies found that categorization judgments paralleled 
similarity judgments, for example the study of Smith and 
Sloman (1994). Other studies have shown a clear 
dissociation between similarity judgments and preferred 
category labels for novel objects. Keil (1989) and Rips 
(1989) presented participants with artifacts described as 
physically resembling one type of object, but having been 
made to be used as another type, or with animals looking 
like one type of animal but said to have internal parts of a 
different species. They both found that although objects 
were rated as more similar to the former, they tended to be 
categorized as the latter (see also Rips & Collins, 1993). 
Also studies that look at well-established lexical categories 
and make comparisons across speakers of different 
languages find substantial differences in naming objects, but 
only small differences in perceived similarity among the 
objects. For example, Kronenfeld, Armstrong and Wilmoth 
(1985) looked at the names given to various drinking 
vessels and the similarity among them judged by American, 
Japanese and Israeli participants. They found a dissociation 
between naming and similarity. However, the sample of 
objects used by Kronenfeld et al. (1985) was small and they 
did not attempt to assess whether the observed differences in 
naming paralleled the differences in perceived similarity.  
Malt et al. (1999) carried out a larger-scale evaluation of 
the relation of perceived similarity among objects to the 
names they are given. They presented data from speakers of 
three different language groups: American, Chinese and 
Argentinean participants, speaking respectively English, 
Chinese and Spanish. The participants performed two tasks: 
they named 60 common containers (all mostly called 
‘bottle’ or ‘jar’ in English) and they provided similarity 
ratings, by sorting the objects into piles based on three types 
of similarity: physical, functional or overall similarity. 
Speakers of the three languages showed substantially 
different patterns of naming for the set of containers, but 
they saw the similarities among the objects in much the 
same way. Malt et al. claim that the linguistic differences 
arise from differences in language-specific conventions and 
differences in language history. 
The imperfect relation between naming patterns of a 
language and non-linguistic knowledge of objects and 
between the naming patterns of two different languages 
raises questions about how bilingually-raised individuals 
build and maintain their two lexicons. Do they maintain two 
distinct and native-like naming patterns, each with its own 
language-specific conventions or do the two competing 
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patterns merge into a single pattern that may not be fully 
native-like for either language. The latter might be due to 
individual cognitive constraints on memory capacity. One 
way to address this issue is to examine the two naming 
patterns of bilinguals to see how they relate to one another 
and to the naming patterns of corresponding monolinguals. 
Belgium, a bilingual country where French- and Dutch-
speaking monolinguals live alongside bilinguals, who are 
brought up simultaneously in French and Dutch, live 
together, provides us with a laboratory to investigate this 
issue.  
Two hypotheses are suggested concerning the naming 
patterns of bilingual Belgians: First, the French and Dutch 
naming patterns are kept separate and thus parallel the 
naming patterns of respectively the French-speaking 
monolinguals and the Dutch-speaking monolinguals. 
Second, the two naming patterns merge into one naming 
pattern and the bilinguals use just one single naming pattern 
both for the French and the Dutch naming. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two native speakers of Dutch, all students or research 
assistants at the Psychology Department of the Leuven 
University, and 29 native speakers of French, students at the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Liège, participated both 
in a naming and a sorting task (to be described below). Five 
participants of the Dutch-speaking group were retested for 
the naming, to check for within subject reliability. The time 
span between the test and the retest was approximately six 
months. The bilingual subjects consisted of 25 people 
whose father is Dutch-speaking and whose mother is 
French-speaking (14 out of 25) or vice versa (11 out of 25) 
and who have been raised in both languages. All of them 
were students (except one research assistant) at the 
university of Leuven, Brussels or Louvain-la-Neuve. The 
bilingual subjects performed the naming task twice (once in 
French and once in Dutch) and the sorting task once. They 
also completed a language history questionnaire, used to 
determine the participants’ language background. Five 
bilinguals renamed the objects in French and five other 
bilinguals renamed the objects in Dutch after a time span of 
about six months. 
The Dutch- and French-speaking monolingual subjects 
received course credit or participated as unpaid volunteers. 
The bilinguals were systematically paid for their 
participation. 
Materials 
Objects. There were 2 sets of stimuli, one consisting of 73 
pictures of storage containers (as in Malt et al.’s study 
(1999)), the other consisting of 67 pictures of housewares 
for preparing food and serving food and drink. The objects 
of the first set were selected to be likely to receive the name 
‘bottle’ or ‘jar’ in American English, or else to share one or 
more salient properties with bottles and jars. Translated into 
Dutch and French, the objects are likely to be called 
respectively ‘fles’ or ‘bus’ and ‘bouteille’ or ‘flacon’.1 For 
the second set, the ‘dishes set’, objects had been selected to 
be likely to be called ‘dish’, ‘plate’ or ‘bowl’ in American 
English. In Dutch, the objects are mostly called ‘bord’, 
‘schaal’ or ‘kom’, in French ‘assiette’, ‘plat’ or ‘bol’.2  
The objects were all found at home, work, or in stores 
frequented by the researchers. For both sets, we made an 
effort to include objects that would represent a wide range 
of respectively bottles, jars and other similar containers (Set 
1) and of dishes, plates, bowls and other similar housewares 
(Set 2). The wide range of objects allows a sensitive 
comparison of the naming patterns of the Dutch-speaking 
monolinguals, the French-speaking monolinguals and the 
bilinguals. 
All objects were photographed in color against a neutral 
background with a constant camera distance to preserve 
relative size. In front of each object a ruler was included to 
provide additional size information. Because the labels on 
the objects were mostly both in Dutch and in French, no 
additional information about the nature of the content (e.g. 
ketchup) was necessary.  
Language history questionnaire. A questionnaire was 
used to determine the language background of the bilingual 
participants. Questions were asked about age and sex; where 
the participant was raised; what language her mother and 
father speaks; what language she speaks with her mother 
and father and whether she systematically speaks the same 
language (Dutch or French) with her mother and the same 
other language (French or Dutch) with her father; what 
language was used at primary and secondary school, during 
leasure activities; which language she currently uses most 
and estimated proficiency for both languages. Proficiency 
estimates were obtained by asking the participants for each 
language to encircle a number between 1 (‘not at all fluent: 
you can barely speak the language’) and 7 (‘very fluent: you 
can speak the language like a native speaker’). 
Procedure 
Naming task. In the naming task, participants were asked to 
name each object of two sets of pictures (the bottles and 
dishes sets), after looking through all the pictures of the set 
to be named to familiarize themselves with the variety of 
objects in the set. The instructions were the same as in the 
naming task of Malt et al. (1999): They were asked to give 
whatever name seemed like the best or most natural name, 
and they were told that they could give either a single-word 
name or a name with more than one word. The instructions 
emphasized that participants should name the object itself 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that we do not claim ‘jar’, ‘bus’ and ‘flacon’ to 
be translation equivalents or to cover the same group of referents. 
Referring to a dictionary, ‘bus’ is translated as ‘can’, ‘flacon’ as 
‘bottle’. ‘Fles’ and ‘bouteille’ are however translated 
unambiguously as ‘bottle’. 
2 As for the bottles set, the corresponding names (‘dish’, ‘bord’ and 
‘assiette’; ‘plate’, ‘schaal’ and ‘plat’; ‘bowl’, ‘kom’ and ‘bol’) ‘are 
not assumed to be perfect translation equivalents. 
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and not what it contained. Each participant named first all 
the objects of one set (bottles set or dishes set) and then all 
the objects of the other set (dishes set or bottles set). The 
order of the two sets was counterbalanced. The bilingual 
participants named both sets in French and in Dutch. Hence, 
besides the order of sets also the order of languages was 
counterbalanced. Between the Dutch and the French version 
of the naming task, the pictures were shuffled. 
After participants completed the naming task (once for the 
Dutch- and French-speaking participants, twice for the 
bilinguals), the pictures were again shuffled. The second 
task to be performed was the sorting task. 
Sorting task. The large number of objects prevented us 
from collecting direct pairwise similarity judgments. Instead 
we asked the participants to sort the objects into piles. Based 
on these sorting data, we can calculate a derived measure of 
similarity for each pair of objects. Sorting was based on 
overall similarity. First, participants were asked to look 
through the pictures. The instructions for the sorting were as 
follows: ‘I would like you to focus on the overall qualities 
of each container. This means that you focus on any feature 
of the container including what it looks like, what it’s made 
of, how it contains the substance that is in it (in a stack, in 
separate pieces, as a single solid, as a liquid, with pouring 
capability, etc.3) or any other aspect of the container that 
seems important or natural to you. I would like you to put 
together into piles all the containers that you think are very 
similar to each other OVERALL. Note that we are 
interested in how similar the containers themselves are 
overall, not what is in the containers. Only put two pictures 
together if the containers are like each other in an overall 
way. DO NOT put pictures together just because the 
containers hold things that tend to be found together. For 
instance, if several containers contain health products, 
DON’T put them together unless you really think the 
containers themselves are alike in an overall way.’  
Further, the participants were instructed to use as many piles 
as they wanted, but at least two different ones. They were 
not allowed to make a pile of only one picture, unless they 
really could not classify the object in one of the existing 
piles. They could take as much time as they wanted to 
complete the sort. In general, the sorting task took about 30 
minutes. 
Due to space restrictions, we will focus on the results of the 
bottles set only. However, the results with the dishes set 
were perfectly parallel to those of the bottles set. 
 
Results 
Replication of Malt et al.’s study 
Comparison of linguistic category boundaries. For each 
name produced for each object, we first calculated its 
frequency separately for each language group. Only the 
                                                          
3 This information is only provided for the sorting of the bottles, 
since it is not applicable to the dishes. 
head noun of the response was considered as the name given 
to the object. Diminutive forms of names and additional 
adjectives were disregarded. The first analysis is restricted 
to the dominant category names for each object: i.e. the 
most frequently produced name for each object. 
Table 1 shows the Dutch and French dominant category 
names for the bottles set together with the number of objects 
out of 73 for which each name was dominant. To gain an 
insight into the similarities and differences between the 
Dutch and French categories, the French categories are 
described in terms of their Dutch composition.  
 
Table 1:  Linguistic categories for the bottles set of the 
Dutch- and French-speaking monolinguals. 
French bottles 
(monolinguals) 
N 
 
Dutch Composition 
(monolinguals) 
bouteille 16 13 flessen, 3 bussen 
flacon 16 10 flessen, 3 bussen, 2 potten, 1 roller 
pot 10 9 potten, 1 fles 
boîte 7 3 dozen, 2 brikken, 1 blik, 1 pot 
tube 6 4 tubes, 1 pot, 1 stick 
spray 5 5 bussen, 1 spray 
bidon 3 3 bussen 
brique 2 1 bus, 1 doos 
berlingo 2 2 brikken 
biberon 1 1 fles 
bombe 1 1 bus 
canette 1 1 blik 
pannier 1 1 mand 
poivrier 1 1 molen 
salière 1 1 vat 
 
For Dutch-speaking monolinguals, there were three main 
categories: ‘fles’, ‘bus’ and ‘pot’4. The three categories 
together encompassed 74 per cent of the stimulus set. The 
remaining names were given to only a few objects. The 
French-speaking monolinguals used a total of 15 categories. 
Three category names were dominant for at least 10 objects 
out of 73: ‘bouteille’, ‘flacon’, ‘pot’5. The other names were 
restricted to a smaller number of objects.  
When we look at the Dutch composition of the French 
categories, we find some resemblance in how the two 
languages classify the objects into linguistic categories: the 
largest part of the objects called ‘pot’ in Dutch (9/13) are 
put into one single French category ‘pot’. All Dutch ‘tubes’ 
are put together into the French category of objects called 
‘tube’. On the other hand, there are also prominent 
differences between the naming patterns of both languages: 
The objects called ‘fles’ (# 25) in Dutch are mainly split up 
                                                          
4 ‘Fles’ is translated as ‘bottle’, ‘bus’ as ‘can’ and ‘pot’ as ‘pot’ or 
‘jar’. 
5 ‘Bouteille’ is translated as ‘bottle’, ‘flacon’ as well, ‘pot’ as ‘pot’ 
or ‘jar’. 
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into two different categories in French: ‘bouteille’ (# 13) 
and ‘flacon’ (# 10). The Dutch category ‘bus’ is not 
represented in a corresponding French category, but the 
objects are spread over 6 different categories (‘bouteille’, 
‘flacon’, ‘spray’, ‘bidon’, ‘brique’ and ‘bombe’). 
By looking at the dominant names, a lot of information in 
the data is lost. For the bottles set, only 5 objects were 
called by the same name by every Dutch monolingual and 
the same was true for the French monolinguals. Hence, it 
would be more useful to include all the names used for each 
object in the analysis. Therefore, in a second analysis, we 
calculated for each object the name distribution which can 
be described as the number of times each name was 
allocated to each object. Our intention was to compare the 
linguistic categories of the different language groups by 
comparing the naming distributions across the language 
groups. However, the naming distributions cannot be 
compared directly across the language groups since different 
language groups use different sets of names (Dutchmonolingual 
versus Frenchmonolingual). As an alternative, for each language 
group we compared the similarity of each object’s name 
distribution to every other object’s name distribution by 
using a Pearson correlation. The similarity in name 
distribution between two objects was calculated as follows: 
for each pair of objects within a language group, the 
correlation was computed across all the names between the 
name frequencies for both objects. For each language group, 
this resulted in 2628 correlations (for 73*72/2 pairs of 
objects). These correlations indicated the name distribution 
similarity between each possible pairing of the objects. The 
next step consists in correlating the 2628 name similarity 
values for the Dutch-speaking monolinguals with the 
corresponding 2628 name similarity values for the French-
speaking monolinguals. This correlation mirrors the extent 
to which the two language groups correspond in the pairs of 
objects that have similar name distributions. The correlation 
between both monolingual language groups is 0.63: a 
substantial correlation, but far from perfect. Both the 
analysis of the dominant names and the correlation between 
the name distribution similarities confirm that the French- 
and Dutch-speaking monolinguals named the objects 
differently. 
Comparison of the perceived similarity. The data from the 
sorting task were used to obtain a measure of similarity for 
each pair of objects. Pairwise similarity was recovered by 
counting for each pair of objects how many participants of a 
language group placed that pair of objects in the same pile. 
For each of both language groups, these calculations gave us 
2628 pairwise similarity judgments. The similarity 
judgments of both groups were correlated. The resulting 
correlation of 0.87 -comparable to the mean estimated 
reliability of .92- indicates that the French- and Dutch-
speaking monolinguals agree to a considerable extent on 
their perception of similarities among the objects. 
Conclusion. For the two monolingual language groups, we 
found substantial differences in naming and no differences 
in sorting. These results replicate the findings of Malt et al. 
(1999) for speakers of three different languages. 
 
Naming in bilinguals: Two hypotheses 
How did the French and Dutch naming patterns of the 
bilinguals interrelate and how are they linked to the naming 
patterns of the respective monolingual language groups? 
One possibility is that the naming of the bilinguals follows 
that of the corresponding monolinguals, i.e. the French 
bilingual naming pattern equals the naming pattern of the 
French-speaking monolinguals and the Dutch bilingual 
naming pattern equals that of the Dutch-speaking 
monolinguals. Another alternative possibility is that the 
bilinguals use just one naming pattern, or in other words, 
that their naming patterns of their two languages converge 
into a single naming pattern. To decide between these 
hypotheses, we analyzed the data both on a group level and 
on an individual level. 
Group-level analysis. Correlations were calculated among 
all the language groups (Dutchmonolingual, Dutchbilingual , 
Frenchmonolingual, Frenchbilingual) between measures of name 
similarity (i.e. name distribution similarities). Figure 1 
shows the pattern of correlations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Pattern of correlations between the name 
distribution similarities of the language groups.6  
 
When we compare the observed pattern of correlations 
with the patterns of correlations predicted by the two 
hypotheses (see Figure 2), we can conclude that the data are 
inconsistent with the two-pattern-hypothesis, since the 
correlation between the two naming patterns of the 
bilinguals (0.88) was significantly larger than the correlation 
between the naming patterns of both monolingual language 
groups (0.63), Z = 21.82 > 1.96. The data favor the one-
pattern-hypothesis. Note however that some deviations from 
a single common naming pattern were observed. For 
example, it happens that a group of objects, with a single 
                                                          
6 The upper rXY’s are the Pearson correlations, the lower 
rXY’s (in bold) are correlations corrected for unreliability of 
the data (
YYXX
XY
XY rr
rr
*
* = with rXX the reliability of X and 
rYY the reliability of Y). 
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Figure 2:  Patterns of correlations between the name 
distribution similarities of the language groups, predicted by 
the first and second hypothesis, respectively.  
 
Individual-level analysis. On the individual level, 
object*object-matrices for each individual task, containing 
0’s and 1’s with 0 indicating equal naming of both objects 
by the person performing the task and 1 indicating  different 
naming of both objects- were correlated with each other. 
This resulted in 126*125/28 different correlations between 
all possible pairs of individual tasks. Next, the correlations 
were Z’-transformed to normalize the sampling distribution 
of the correlations. Then, the Z’-transformations of the 
correlations were analyzed in a randomized block factorial 
ANOVA design, with three factors: language (two levels: 
the subjects of the pair perform the naming task in the same 
language or in a different language), person (two levels: 
correlation between naming data of the same subject or of 
different subjects) and linguistic statute (three levels: both 
subjects are monolingual, one subject is monolingual, the 
other bilingual and both subjects are bilingual), resulting in 
a 2*2*3 design with unequal cell frequencies and three 
(structurally) empty cells (see Figure 3). 
The results of the ANOVA confirmed the conclusions that 
were derived from the correlational group-level analysis.  
The three main effects –language, person, linguistic statute- 
were all significant, respectively F(1,7866) = 23.29, p < 
.0001, F(1,7866) = 42.61, p < .0001, F(2,7866) = 8.15, p < 
.0005) as was the interaction effect 
language*person*linguistic statute, F(4,7866) = 25.05, p < 
.0001. We tested the following crucial contrasts: µ221 versus 
µ223 (C1) and µ113 versus µ213 (C2). If C1 is significant, 
Hypothesis 1 is rejected, since according to the two-pattern 
hypothesis, the mean correlation between the naming of a 
French-speaking monolingual and the naming of a Dutch-
speaking monolingual must be equal to the mean correlation 
between the French naming of a bilingual and the Dutch 
naming of a(-nother) bilingual. If C2 is significant, 
Hypothesis 2 is rejected, because the one-pattern hypothesis 
                                                          
7 Remark that this kind of subdivisions occurs much more 
frequently between the monolingual naming patterns than between 
the bilingual naming patterns. 
8 126 individual tasks: = 32 Dutch-speaking monolinguals + 5 
retested Dutch-speaking monolinguals + 29 French-speaking 
monolinguals + 25 bilinguals (Dutch naming) + 5 retested 
bilinguals (Dutch) + 25 bilinguals (French naming) + 5 retested 
bilinguals (French). 
claims that the Dutch and French naming task of a (same) 
bilingual correspond equally well as the naming of that 
bilingual and the renaming (retesting) of the same bilingual 
in the same language. We found that C1 was significant, 
F(1,7866) = 299.94, p < .0001, and hence Hypothesis 1 is 
rejected. C2 was not significant, which means that 
Hypothesis 2 is retained. 
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Figure 3: 2*2*3-factorial design with unequal cell 
frequencies and three empty cells. 
 
General Discussion 
The dissociation between naming and sorting, found by 
Malt et al. (1999) for three different language groups was 
replicated for the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking 
monolinguals: The analyses of the dominant names and of 
similarities among naming distributions revealed substantial 
differences in French-speaking and Dutch-speaking 
monolingual linguistic categories for the bottles set, while in 
contrast, no differences were found in their perceptions of 
the similarity among the objects, as revealed by the high 
correlation between the sorting data of both monolingual 
language groups. Hence, similarity cannot fully account for 
the observed naming patterns. Other factors must contribute 
to linguistic categorization. Malt et al. (1999) proposed that 
besides the contribution of similarity to naming choices, 
 
C1 
 
C2 
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mechanisms such as chaining, convention and pre-emption 
influence naming patterns. 
Concerning the bilingual naming patterns, the data (at 
group and individual levels) reject the two-pattern 
hypothesis. So, we can conclude that the French and Dutch 
naming patterns of the bilinguals are not kept separate and 
hence don’t parallel the naming patterns of the French and 
Dutch monolinguals, respectively. The data are more 
consistent with the one-pattern hypothesis, suggesting that 
the two naming patterns of the bilinguals merge into one. 
However, the data also show that the assumption of a 
perfect match between the naming patterns is too strong and 
that is should be attenuated, since bilinguals did not use the 
French and Dutch category names as perfect translation 
equivalents. Apparently, even if the two naming patterns of 
bilinguals deviate from the corresponding monolingual 
naming patterns, naming in each of both languages is still 
influenced by culture- and language-specific factors: 
bilinguals name the objects in a way that is consistent with 
the language in which they name the object. This is not so 
surprising, since language and culture can’t be considered 
separately. On the other hand, the convergence of the two 
naming patterns on one naming pattern suggests that 
bilinguals do not only satisfy cultural and linguistic 
constraints, but also individual cognitive constraints: it is 
less demanding on the limited sources of memory to store 
only one set of mappings between objects and names. So, in 
a way, bilinguals do find a set of mappings between words 
and objects that meet linguistic, cultural and individual 
memory constraints. 
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Abstract 
We compared recognition memory for pictures of family 
interactions in Indonesian – in which sibling terms are based 
on relative age – and English – in which sibling terms are 
based on gender. In Experiment 1, participants saw a set of 
pictures of family interactions and gave a verbal description 
of each picture. They later received a recognition test that 
included variants that altered either seniority relations or 
gender relations.  The same method was used in Experiment 
2, except that the recognition variants were changed to be 
similar families (with parallel relationships). During study, 
participants were asked either simply to remember the 
pictures (Experiment 2a) or to provide a verbal description 
(Experiment 2b). Results from both experiments suggest 
effects of language on memory, particularly when non-
identical transfer is involved.  
Introduction 
The Whorfian Question 
Does the language we speak influence the way we think? 
This question, out of favor for many years, has had a 
resurgence of interest (Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; 
Gumperz & Levinson, 1996). There is evidence (Bowerman 
& Choi, 2003; Sera et al., 2002; Choi, McDonough, 
Bowerman, & Mandler, 1999; Levinson, 1998) that 
linguistic distinctions may influence non-linguistic 
similarity and memory for scenes (but see Munnich, 
Landau, & Dosher, 2001; Li & Gleitman, 2002 for contrary 
evidence).  
The recent investigations have mostly centered around 
perceptual arenas such as space, time and motion. However, 
classic studies in anthropological linguistics suggest that 
there are also substantial differences in semantic categories 
in social arenas such as kinship (Romney & D’Andrade, 
1964; Danziger, 2001; Foley, 1997). It is important to test 
whether these linguistic differences have cognitive 
consequences. There are direct studies of the cognitive 
effects of social semantics. Boroditsky and Schmidt (2000) 
found effects of linguistic gender on people’s encodings of 
objects. For example, they taught Spanish-English and 
German-English bilinguals English names for objects (such 
as “Mary” for a table) and found that people retained the 
names better when the gender was consistent with the 
gender of the noun in their first language. In addition, 
bilinguals’ English descriptions of the objects were 
consistent with the gender in their first language. Sera, et al. 
(2002) have also shown that gender retains semantic context 
in that cross-linguistic differences influence classification 
(Sera et al., 2002).  
Our work explores an arena of social categories, namely 
kinship terms. As Malinowski (1930) noted, some 
dimensions seem likely to be universal in kinship systems—
such as the gender of the person named, the age and/or 
generation relative to ego, and the gender of the linking 
relative. Nevertheless, kinship systems vary considerably in 
how these distinctions play out. Our study focuses on one 
pair of contrasting languages – English and Indonesian – 
which vary in the way they name sibling relations. 
Indonesian makes a lexical distinction for whether a 
sibling is older or younger. The word kakak refers to older 
sibling while the word adik refers to younger sibling.  For 
example, 
(1)   
        Saya           mempunyai       seorang               kakak. 
1st pers. sing.          have        one (person)       older sib   
                            ‘I have an older sibling’ 
 
In contrast to English brother and sister, the Indonesian 
sibling terms kakak and adik are gender-neutral.  When an 
Indonesian refers to his/her siblings, he/she speaks not in 
terms of sister and brother but rather of older and younger. 
Thus, “How’s your older sibling (kakak)?” is as natural in 
Indonesian as “How’s your brother?” is in English.  
Of course, both languages can specify both gender and 
seniority if desired.  An English speaker could refer to “your 
younger brother” and an Indonesian to “your male younger-
sibling” 
 (2)   
                          Adikmu          laki-laki         
                younger sib.-your         male            
                     ‘your younger-sibling boy’  
 
Thus, the Indonesian semantic system focuses on the 
relational seniority of siblings, whereas the English systems 
focus on gender. Our study investigates a) whether this 
linguistic difference matter to the way people think about 
family relations, and b) whether it affects the way people 
construe scenes involving families.   
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In our previous study (Anggoro & Gentner, 2003, 
Experiment 2) we used a recognition task to test whether the 
two languages induce different encodings. Indonesian and 
English speakers were shown a series of pictures: three 
kinship standards and their three corresponding family 
pictures, along with 21 other pictures (Figures 1 and 2). 
Participants were asked to remember the scenes for a later 
memory task. Recognition memory for the scenes was later 
tested using variants of the standard pictures.  Memory for 
each standard was tested using two variants: the Seniority 
Variant, which preserved the seniority relation but altered 
the gender relation, and the Gender Variant, which 
preserved the gender relation but altered the seniority 
relation.  There was a tendency for Indonesian speakers to 
make more false alarms to the Seniority Variants than to the 
Gender Variants, suggesting better memory for Seniority 
than for Gender.  English speakers showed the reverse 
pattern.  An ANOVA over language and variant type 
showed a marginally significant interaction between the two 
factors.  Other results from the same set of studies also point 
to an influence of language on encoding and recognition. 
For example, relative to English speakers, Indonesian 
speakers showed greater sensitivity to changes in seniority 
than to changes in gender in a similarity task. These results 
suggest greater sensitivity to the dimension that is required 
in naming siblings in each language.  
The Current Study 
Slobin (1987) has suggested in his thinking for speaking 
hypothesis that “[when] constructing utterances in 
discourse, one fits one’s thoughts into available linguistic 
forms.” In our current work we seek to test whether verbally 
describing the pictures would strengthen the language 
effect. In addition, we further explored the effects of a more 
challenging task that involved nonidentical transfer.  
Experiment 1 
As in our previous study, Indonesian and English 
speakers were shown a series of pictures: the three kinship 
standards (as exemplified in the top picture in Figure 2) and 
their three corresponding family pictures (Figure 1), along 
with 21 other pictures (a total of 27 pictures). For each 
picture, participants were asked to describe the scenes and 
remember them for a later memory task. After a brief filler 
task, participants were given a recognition memory test. As 
in the previous study, the test included two variants: the 
Seniority Variant, which preserved the seniority relation but 
altered the gender relation, and the Gender Variant, which 
preserved the gender relation but altered the seniority 
relation  
If describing the scenes leads participants’ encodings to 
be influenced by the semantics of their kinship systems, 
then Indonesian monolinguals will be relatively more 
sensitive to changes in relative age than to changes in 
gender, as compared to English monolinguals. Specifically, 
if verbal description heightens the effects of semantic 
categories on encoding and recognition, then we should find 
a significant interaction between language and variant type.  
 
Method 
 
Participants The participants were 15 Indonesian 
monolinguals and 13 English monolinguals, ranging in age 
from approximately 17 to 20 years old. Participants were 
either given credit or a small monetary compensation.  Data 
from Indonesian speakers were collected in Jakarta, 
Indonesia.  Data from English speakers were collected at 
Northwestern University and other areas near Chicago.  
 
Materials  The stimuli were three sets of pictures. One set 
(the Kitchen set) involved scenes of siblings performing a 
simple activity in the kitchen. The other two sets (the Ritual 
sets) involved ceremonies. Family pictures were used to 
introduce the ‘characters’ and make clear the sibling 
relations.  
 
              
         Family Picture for     Family Picture for  
              Kitchen Set                                Ritual 1 Set 
 
Figure 1:  Family pictures used in the Kitchen and Ritual 1 
sets.  
 
The triad pictures consisted of one standard picture and two 
variants: the Seniority Variant, which preserved the 
seniority relation but altered the gender relation, and the 
Gender Variant, which preserved the gender relation but 
altered the seniority relation.  
 
 
Standard 
older sister gives bowl to younger sister 
 
                  
         Seniority Variant       Gender Variant  
          older sister gives bowl  younger sister gives bowl 
             to younger brother                            to older sister 
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Figure 2:  The Kitchen set.  In the Seniority Variant, the 
bowl still goes from the older to the younger sibling, but the 
gender of the younger sibling is altered. In the Gender 
Variant, the gender of both actors is the same as in the 
standard, but the bowl now goes from the younger to the 
older sibling. 
 
 
Standard 
younger brother gives crown 
to older sister 
 
                 
          Gender Variant   Seniority Variant 
        older sister gives crown              younger brother gives crown 
            to younger brother       to older brother 
 
Figure 3:  Ritual 1 set. In the Gender Variant, the genders of 
both actors are the same as in the standard, but the crown 
now goes from the older to the younger sibling. In the 
Seniority Variant, the bowl still goes from the younger to 
the older sibling, but the gender of the older sibling is 
altered. 
 
Procedure Participants were run individually in a quiet 
room.  Instructions were given in Indonesian for the 
Indonesian speakers and English for the English speakers. 
For each set of stimuli, participants were first shown a 
family picture to ensure that they understood that the triad 
that followed only involved the children. (For the Ritual 
sets, the experimenter explained that the family lives on 
some island and they held a ritual each year. Then the 
standard was shown without further description.) For each 
standard, participants were asked to verbally describe what 
they saw in the picture. After participants had seen and 
described all of the standards, they were given a short break 
(approximately 10 minutes) during which they were asked 
to solve a few simple puzzles. Then they were given a yes-
no recognition task. The two variants for each standard were 
intermixed in semi-random order among the fillers. The 
three standards that the participants had actually seen were 
given at the end of the test.   
Results 
As in the previous study, the key dependent measure is 
the mean proportion of times a participant responded ‘yes’ 
to each variant; i.e., the false alarm rates on the Gender 
Variants vs. the Seniority Variants.  An ANOVA over 
Language and Variant Type showed a main effect of Variant 
Type (F(1,26) = 7.21, p = .01) such that participants made 
more seniority-preserving false alarms (M = .29) than 
gender-preserving ones (M =.13) and a main effect of 
language (F(1,26) = 6.61, p = .02), such that Indonesian 
speakers made more false alarms (M = .29) than English 
speakers (M = .12). As predicted, there was a significant 
interaction between the two factors (F(1,26) = 4.90, p = 
.04). Indonesian speakers made more false alarms to the 
Seniority Variants (M = .42, SD = 30) than to the Gender 
Variants (M = .16, SD = .21). English speakers showed no 
difference in false alarm rates (for Seniority Variants, M = 
.13, SD = .17, and for Gender Variants, M = .10, SD = .21).  
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Figure 4:  Results from Experiment 1. 
 
Discussion 
When participants described scenes verbally, they showed 
sensitivity to the dimension ensconced in their language on 
a subsequent recognition test. That is, Indonesians were 
significantly more able to reject variants that changed 
seniority relations than those that preserved seniority but 
changed gender. The results are stronger than those of our 
previous study (described above), in which linguistic 
descriptions were not elicited prior to the memory task. This 
suggests a ‘thinking for speaking’ effect whereby giving a 
linguistic description strengthens the effects of language on 
the encoding of the scenes.  Interestingly, in this study the 
interaction appears to be driven by the Indonesian pattern; 
the English speakers showed roughly equal false alarms. 
However, the relative difference between the two language 
groups is as predicted: Indonesian speakers attended more to 
seniority than did English speakers. This pattern fits with 
our prediction of greater relative sensitivity to the dimension 
required in naming siblings.  
One methodological point to note is that the nature of the 
design is limited in terms of the possible variants that we 
could devise for a given standard. This resulted in the 
Gender Variant being more perceptually similar to the 
Standard than was the Seniority Variant. In order to get 
around this problem, in the next study we decided to alter 
the identity match between the families in the pictures by 
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using a different family altogether for the variants. Thus, the 
variants did not retain the perceptual aspects of the Standard 
but were still designed to be relationally similar to the 
standard along either the seniority or gender dimension (see 
Figure 5).  These new variants always embodied the same 
relationships as the previous variants. Thus the new variants 
fell further along the literal similarity – analogical 
similarity continuum (Gentner, 1989) than the original ones.  
The analogous variants were used in a recognition task 
like the one described in Experiment 1. The idea was to test 
the strength of participants’ “hold” of the relation and to see 
whether verbalization would influence the strength of the 
language effect. Of course, one might predict that 
participants would not false alarm at all to the analogous 
variants; after all, the variants depict different people 
altogether. On the other side, it seems possible that applying 
a linguistic description could invite a more abstract 
encoding, and that this could increase participants’ 
propensity to recognize the same relation in different 
characters. 
 Indonesian and English speakers were shown a series of 
pictures: the three kinship standards and their three 
corresponding family pictures from Experiment 1, along 
with 23 other pictures. Participants were asked to remember 
the scenes for a later memory task. Recognition memory for 
the scenes was later tested using analogically similar Gender 
and Seniority Variants.   
 
Experiment 2a 
 
Participants Participants were 15 Indonesian monolinguals 
and 17 English monolinguals (not previously tested), 
ranging in age from approximately 17 to 20 years old. They 
were either given credit or a small monetary compensation.  
Data from Indonesian speakers were collected in Jakarta, 
Indonesia.  Data from English speakers were collected at 
Northwestern University and other areas near Chicago.  
 
Materials  There were 29 study pictures (the three standard 
pictures from Experiment 1, their three corresponding 
family pictures, and 23 filler pictures). There were 67 test 
pictures (the three standards and all six of their variants, 
plus 58 fillers, as described below). 
 
 
                  
  Identical Family Pict.          Analogous Family Pict.  
 
 
Standard 
older sister gives bowl to younger sister 
 
                  
                 Analogous          Analogous 
           Seniority Variant       Gender Variant  
            older sister gives bowl                   younger sister gives bowl 
               to younger brother                            to older sister 
 
Figure 5:  The Kitchen set, showing analogous variants used 
in Experiment 2.   
  
Procedure As in Experiment 1, before each standard 
picture, participants were shown a family picture to ensure 
that they understood that the picture that followed involved 
only the children. (For the Ritual sets, the experimenter 
explained that the family lives on some island and held a 
ritual each year. Then the standard was shown without 
further description.) Participants were simply asked to 
remember the pictures. Then they were given a short break 
(approximately 10 minutes) during which they were asked 
to complete an unrelated paper-and-pencil task. Then they 
were given a yes-no recognition task. The two analogous 
variants for each standard were intermixed in semi-random 
order among the fillers. The three standards were given at 
the end of the test.   
Results 
An ANOVA over Language and Variant Type showed no 
significant main effects or interaction (all p’s  > .1). 
Qualitatively, there was a weak tendency for Indonesian 
speakers to make more false alarms to the Seniority Variants 
(M = .36, SD = .32) than to the Gender Variants (M = .18, 
SD = .28). The English speakers showed little difference 
between the two conditions (Seniority Variants, M = .20, SD 
= .31; Gender Variants, M = .16, SD = .27).  
 
Experiment 2b 
 
Participants Participants were 15 Indonesian monolinguals 
and 17 English monolinguals not previously tested, ranging 
in age from approximately 17 to 20 years old. They were 
either given credit or a small monetary compensation.  Data 
from Indonesian speakers were collected in Jakarta, 
Indonesia.  Data from English speakers were collected at 
Northwestern University and other areas near Chicago.  
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 Materials  Same as Experiment 2a. 
 
Procedure Similar to Experiment 2b. The only difference is 
that during the study phase, participants were asked to 
verbally describe each scene, much like in Experiment 1.  
Results 
An ANOVA over Language and Variant Type revealed 
no significant main effects (all p’s >.1). As predicted, the 
ANOVA showed a significant interaction between the two 
factors (F(1,30) = 5.16, p = .03). There was a tendency for 
Indonesian speakers to make more false alarms to the 
Seniority Variants (M = .18, SD = .28) than to the Gender 
Variants (M = .11, SD = .21). The English speakers showed 
the reverse pattern; they made more false alarms to the 
Gender Variants (M = .33, SD = .24) than to the Seniority 
Variants (M = .16, SD = .21).  
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Figure 6:  Results from Experiment 2b. 
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 2 suggest that for this more 
challenging task, cross-linguistic effects on encoding and 
recognition was only evident when participants were asked 
to verbally describe the scenes. In Experiment 2a, the effects 
of semantic categories on recognition seemed to be 
“masked” by the more challenging non-identical transfer 
task. When participants described the scenes verbally, 
however, as in Experiment 2b, this effect resurfaced. The 
pattern from the previous study was also found here: 
Indonesian speakers showed greater relative sensitivity to 
changes in seniority than to changes in gender in 
recognition memory, whereas English speakers showed the 
reverse pattern, as evidenced by the marginally significant 
interaction between language and variant type. As in 
Experiment 1, this pattern suggests greater sensitivity to the 
dimension that is required in naming siblings in each 
language.  
Overall, we find a pattern of stronger results when people 
gave verbal descriptions of the scenes. Their descriptions, 
which typically included kinship terms, seem to heighten 
effects of language on encoding and memory. Using the 
identical family variants, the interaction between language 
and variant type (which was only marginal in our previous 
study) was significant in Experiment 1. Using the analogous 
variants (Experiment 2), the interaction between language 
and variant type was only significant when participants were 
instructed to use linguistic description. Our overall results 
suggest that the difference in the semantic patterns of the 
two languages may lead to differences in the way speakers 
encode situations – even nonlinguistic perceptual scenes. 
These results are consistent with the thinking for speaking 
idea in that actively using a language influences encoding 
and recognition memory. 
Our thinking-for-speaking pattern of result is consistent 
with previous research showing that cross-linguistic 
differences influence judgments of spatial pictures (Gentner 
& Feist, submitted) and motion events (Malt, Sloman, & 
Gennari, 2003), but only when participants were asked to 
use linguistic description. However, it is also important to 
note that some studies have shown effects of cross-linguistic 
semantic differences on nonlinguistic performance without 
asking participants to first verbalize the scenes (e.g., 
Boroditsky, Ham, & Ramscar, 2002; Levinson et al., 2002). 
Indeed, in our own previous studies in this arena, we found 
cross-linguistic effects in similarity judgments and word 
extension without the use of verbalization. The similarity 
task was a simple triad judgment task and the word 
extension task was a novel name given to a standard picture 
and participants were asked to extend the novel name. In 
neither case were participants asked to describe the scenes 
themselves (Anggoro & Gentner, 2003). Interestingly, a 
comparison of the present results with our prior results (in 
which no verbal descriptions were elicited) (Anggoro & 
Gentner, 2003) suggests that in some cases, the predicted 
pattern are qualitatively stronger when prior verbalizations 
are elicited. 
 
General Discussion 
 
In conclusion, our findings suggest that linguistic 
differences in kinship terms (specifically, sibling terms) 
influence the way people encode and remember scenes and 
perceive similarities among them. Overall our results 
suggest that the actual verbalization of these semantic 
distinctions strengthens the cross-linguistic effects. Since in 
our previous work, cross-linguistic effects were found with 
or without linguistic description, the most intriguing aspect 
of our current findings is that this influence of verbalization 
appears stronger when the variants were non-identical to the 
standard1. The use of language may be particularly 
important in cases where the bridge between initial 
encoding and later experience is somewhat more abstract. 
Gentner (2003) has suggested that one role of language in 
                                                          
1
 Cross-experiment analyses of recognition results comparing 
participants who had initially given linguistic description of the 
scenes with those who had not (Anggoro & Gentner, 2003) showed 
a stronger pattern in the predicted direction for analogous pairs, 
especially among English speakers. 
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cognition is to facilitate memory access between situations 
that are not superficially similar but can be categorized in 
similar ways, as in the case of relational meanings. 
Thus, our findings may provide a link between work in 
language and thought with work on analogical processing. 
Finally, our findings provide evidence that the use of 
language can influence encoding not only in spatial domains 
but also in the social arena.  
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Abstract 
Studying the communication patterns of scientists can give 
us insight into how science actually works.  We argue that 
methodological differences between different scientific 
fields should lead to recognizable differences in how sci-
entists in these fields use language to communicate with 
one another.  This paper reports on a corpus-based study 
of peer-reviewed journal articles in paleontology and 
physical chemistry which used techniques of computa-
tional stylistics to compare the rhetorical styles used in the 
two fields.  We found that indeed the two fields are readily 
distinguishable based on the stylistic character of their ar-
ticles.  As well, the most significant linguistic features of 
these distinctive styles can be connected directly to differ-
ences posited by philosophers of science between 
‘historical’ (such as paleontology) and ‘experimental’ 
(such as physical chemistry) sciences. 
Introduction 
It has become clear in recent years that communication 
among different scientists working in a laboratory is criti-
cal for scientific success (Dunbar 1995).  The particular 
uses of language by scientists serve to create a “collabora-
tive space”, whose worldview makes possible 
communication about complex observations and hypothe-
ses (Goodwin 1994).  Linguistic analysis has also been 
shown to elucidate features of scientific problem solving, 
as in Ochs et al.’s (1994) study of physicists’ metaphoric 
talk of travel in a variety of graphical spaces.   
 At the same time, philosophers of science are increas-
ingly recognizing that the classical model of a single 
“Scientific Method” (usually based on that of experimen-
tal sciences such as physics) does a disservice to sciences 
such as geology and paleontology, which are no less sci-
entific by virtue of being historically oriented.  Instead, it 
is claimed, differences in method may stem directly from 
the types of phenomena under study (Cleland, 2002).  
Experimental science (such as physics) attempts to formu-
late general predictive laws, and so relies heavily on 
repeatable series of controlled experiments which test 
hypotheses (Latour & Woolgar 1986).  Historical science, 
on the other hand, deals with contingent phenomena, 
studying specific phenomena in the past in an attempt to 
find unifying explanations for effects caused by those 
phenomena (Mayr 1976).  Because of this, reasoning in 
historical sciences consists largely of reconstructive rea-
soning, as compared to the predictive reasoning from 
causes to possible effects characteristic of experimental 
science (Gould 1986; Diamond 1999).     
 In this paper, we take some first steps towards analyz-
ing the linguistic features of scientific writing in 
experimental and historical science, using several types of 
linguistically-motivated document features together with 
machine learning methods.  Our goal is to examine if lin-
guistic features that are indicative of different classes of 
scientific articles may be usefully correlated with the rhe-
torical and methodological needs of historical and 
experimental sciences.  This paper describes a corpus-
based study of genre variation between articles in a his-
torical science (paleontology) and an experimental 
science (physical chemistry), with methodological differ-
ences as mentioned above.  We hypothesize that 
corresponding rhetorical differences between articles in 
the respective fields will also be found.  Standard meth-
ods of computational stylistics were used, confirming this 
hypothesis.  Further, we defined a set of linguistically-
motivated features for use in genre classification, based 
on systemic functional principles.  These features enable a 
more nuanced examination of the rhetorical differences, 
allowing us to correlate these linguistic differences with 
the methodological differences posited by philosophers of 
science.   
 We note that the work reported here is only a first step, 
and more extensive studies of larger and more varied cor-
pora of scientific papers will need to be undertaken in 
order to more firmly determine the links between scien-
tific rhetoric, methodology, and cognition. 
Hypotheses 
Based on prior work in the philosophy and history of sci-
ence we thus formulate our main hypothesis: 
H1: Stylistic features will distinguish more strongly 
between articles from different kinds (historical or 
experimental) of science than between articles from 
different journals in the same kind of science. 
 
We also formulate more detailed hypotheses regarding 
what sorts of rhetorical features we expect to be most 
significant in distinguishing articles in the different fields, 
based on posited methodological differences between 
historical and experimental sciences, as follows.  First, a 
key element of historical reasoning is the need to differ-
entially weight the evidence.  Since any given trace of a 
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past event is typically ambiguous as to its possible causes, 
many pieces of evidence must be combined in complex 
ways in order to form a confirming or disconfirming ar-
gument for a hypothesis (termed synthetic thinking by 
Baker (1996)).  Such thinking is, as Cleland (2002) ar-
gues, a necessary commitment of historical science (as 
opposed to experimental science), due to the fundamental 
asymmetry of causation.  A single cause will often have a 
great many disparate effects, which if taken together 
would specify the cause with virtual certainty. Since all 
the effects cannot actually be known (as some are lost in 
the historical/geological record), evidence must be care-
fully weighed to decide between competing hypotheses 
(the methodology sometimes known as “multiple working 
hypotheses”).  Experimental sciences tend, on the other 
hand, to adhere more or less to a “predict and test” meth-
odology, in which manipulative experiments are used to 
confirm or disconfirm specific hypotheses (Cleland 
2002).  We therefore hypothesize: 
H2a: Writing in historical science has more features 
expressing the weight, validity, likelihood, or typical-
ity of different assertions or pieces of evidence 
H2b: Writing in experimental science has more fea-
tures typical of explicit reasoning about predictions 
and expectations. 
Note that the presence or absence of linguistic features 
that can be linked to reasoning of a particular type is 
not by itself evidence of such reasoning.  However, a 
consistent pattern of many of these features (as shown 
below) together aligned with the dichotomy proposed 
in H2 strongly argues for such differences, which future 
research will attempt to elucidate in greater detail. 
The Corpus 
The study reported here was performed using a corpus of 
recent (2003) articles drawn arbitrarily from four peer-
reviewed journals in two fields: Palaios and Quaternary 
Research in paleontology, and Journal of Physical Chem-
istry A and Journal of Physical Chemistry B in physical 
chemistry (chosen in part for ease of electronic access).  
Palaios is a general paleontological journal, covering all 
areas of the field, whereas Quaternary Research focuses 
on work dealing with the quaternary period (from roughly 
1.6 million years ago to the present).  The two physical 
chemistry journals are published in tandem but have sepa-
rate editorial boards and cover different subfields of 
physical chemistry, specifically: studies on molecules (J. 
Phys Chem A) and studies of materials, surfaces, and in-
terfaces (J. Phys Chem B).  The numbers of articles used 
from each journal and their average (preprocessed) 
lengths in words are given in Table 1. 
Study 1: Distinctiveness 
Methodology  
We first test hypothesis H1 by testing on our corpus 
whether paleontological and physical chemistry articles 
are stylistically distinctive from each other.  The method 
was to represent each document as a numerical vector, 
each of whose elements is the frequency of a particular 
lexical feature of the text.  We then applied the SMO 
learning algorithm (Platt 1998) as implemented in the 
Weka system (Witten & Frank 1999), using a linear ker-
nel, no feature normalization, and the default parameters.  
(Other options did not appear to improve classification 
accuracy, so we used the simplest option.)  SMO is a sup-
port vector machine (SVM) algorithm; SVMs have been 
previously applied successfully to text categorization 
problems (Joachims 1998).  Generalization accuracy was 
measured using 20-fold cross-validation1. 
Features 
For this first study, we used a set of 546 functions words 
taken en masse from the stop-word list of the popular 
research information retrieval system AIRE (Grossman & 
Frieder 1998); this procedure ensured task and theory 
neutrality.  The set of function words used are similar to 
those used in many previous studies, such as Mosteller 
and Wallace’s (1964) seminal stylometric work2.  Each 
document was thus represented as a vector of 546 num-
bers between 0 and 1, each the relative frequency of one 
of the function words.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 2 shows results for binary classification between 
each pair of journals in our corpus, giving the percentage 
of test articles erroneously classified (in 20-fold cross-
validation) using linear SMO learning and function-word 
frequencies as features.  We first note that average accu-
racy on test documents from different fields (historical vs. 
experimental) was at least 97%, indicating excellent dis-
criminability (far above chance).  At the same time, the 
two physical chemistry journals are quite indistinguish-
able, as 34% is slightly greater than the error of always 
choosing the majority class (since 69/238=29% of those 
                                                          
 
In k-fold cross-validation (Mitchell 1997) the data is divided 
into k subsets of equal size. Training is performed k times, each 
time leaving out one of the subsets, and then using the omitted 
subset for testing, to estimate the classification error rate; the 
average error rate over all k runs is reported.  This gives quite a 
stable estimate of the expected error rate of the learning method 
for the given training size (Goutte 1997). 
 
2
 Relative frequencies of function words, such as prepositions, 
determiners, and auxiliary verbs, have been shown in a number 
of studies to be useful for stylistic discrimination, since they act 
as easily extracted proxies for the frequencies of different syn-
tactic constructs, and also tend not to covary strongly with 
document topic.   
 
Table 1. Journals used in the studies with number of articles 
and average words per article. 
Journal # Art. Avg. Words 
Palaios 116 4584 
Quaternary Res. 106 3136 
J. Phys. Chem. A 169 2734 
J. Phys. Chem. B 69 3301 
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articles are from Phys. Chem. B).  In the case of Palaios 
vs. Quat. Res. we get an average error rate of 10%, an 
order of magnitude higher than any error rate in the cross-
disciplinary case.  Hence these results support H1, in that 
articles across disciplines are more easily distinguished 
than articles within a single discipline (from different 
journals).  Of course, the 10% error rate obtained for dis-
tinguishing the two paleontology journals is far less than 
the 48% we would get by majority class classification, 
which points to a subsidiary distinction between these two 
journals.  This is not unreasonable, given that Quat. Res. 
deals with a specific subset of the topics in Palaios3.  We 
leave this question, however, for future research. 
Study 2: Systemic Variation 
Methodology 
In order to more precisely analyze the rhetorical differ-
ences between articles in the two fields a follow-up study 
used as features the relative frequencies of sets of key-
words and phrases derived from consideration of notions 
of systemic functional linguistics (Halliday 1994).   
 Systemic functional linguistics (SFL) construes lan-
guage as a set of interlocking choices for expressing 
meanings: “either this, that, or the other”, with more gen-
eral choices constraining the possible specific choices.  
For example: “A message is either about doing, thinking, 
or being; if about doing, it is either standalone action or 
action on something; if action on something it is either 
creating something or affecting something pre-existent,” 
and so on. A system is a set of options for meanings to be 
expressed, with entry conditions denoting when that 
choice is possible – for example, if a message is not about 
doing, then there is no choice possible between express-
ing standalone action or action on something.  Each 
option has also a realization specification, giving con-
straints (lexical, featural, or structural) on statements 
expressing the option.  Options serve as entry conditions 
for more specific subsystems. 
                                                          
3
 This may be related to the fact that Quat. Res. contains more 
articles than Palaios using chemical and radiochemical assaying, 
since such techniques are only applicable to younger remains 
from the Quaternary Period; such tools in fact are similar to the 
experimental techniques seen in physical chemistry. Indeed this 
is corroborated by the fact that the error rate between Quat Res 
and the PC journals was higher than Palaios and the same PC 
journals.  More detailed study of the specific articles will be 
needed to test and refine this  hypothesis. 
 By viewing language as a complex of choices between 
mutually exclusive options, the systemic approach is par-
ticularly appropriate to examining variation in language 
use.  A systemic specification allows us to ask the follow-
ing type of question: In places where a meaning of 
general type A is to be expressed in a text (e.g., “a mes-
sage about action”), what sorts of more specific meanings 
(e.g., “standalone action” or “action on a thing”) are most 
likely to be expressed by different types of people or in 
different contexts? A general preference for one or an-
other option, when not dictated by specific content, is 
indicative of individual or social/contextual factors.  Such 
preferences can be measured by evaluating the relative 
probabilities of different options by tagging their realiza-
tions in a corpus of texts (Halliday 1991).   
 As features, then, in the absence of a reliable systemic 
parser, we use keywords and phrases as proxy indicators 
for various systems.  For example, an occurrence of the 
word “certainly” usually indicates that the author is mak-
ing a high-probability modal assessment of an assertion.  
The drawback of this approach is lexical ambiguity, since 
the meaning of such keywords can depend on context.  
We reduce the effect of ambiguity, however, by using as 
complete a set of such systemic indicator key-
words/phrases as possible for each system we represent, 
and also by using only measures of comparative fre-
quency between the aggregated features.  In addition, 
since we use very large sets of indicators for each system, 
it is unlikely that such ambiguity would introduce a sys-
tematic bias, and so such noise is more likely to just 
reduce the significance of our results instead of biasing 
them.  Preprocessed articles in our corpus were each con-
verted into a vector of 101 feature values (relative 
frequencies of system options) and the same learning pro-
tocol (using SMO) was used as in Study 1. 
Features 
The systemic features we used are based on options 
within three main systems, following Matthiessen’s 
(1995) grammar of English, a standard SFL reference.  
Indicator lists were constructed by starting with the lists 
of typical words and phrases given by Matthiessen, and 
expanding them to related words and phrases taken from 
Roget’s Interactive Thesaurus4 (manually filtered for 
relevance).  Keyword lists were constructed entirely inde-
pendently of the target corpus.  We used systems and 
subsystems within: CONJUNCTION, linking clauses to-
gether (either within or across sentences); MODALITY, 
giving judgments regarding probability, usuality, inclina-
tion, and the like; and COMMENT, expressing modal 
assessments of attitude or applicability.  MODALITY and 
COMMENT relate directly to how propositions are as-
sessed in evidential reasoning (e.g., for likelihood, 
typicality, consistency with predictions, etc.), while 
CONJUNCTION is a primary system by which texts are 
constructed out of smaller pieces, and so may be expected 
                                                          
4
 http://www.thesaurus.com 
Table 2. Error rates for linear SMO using function word fea-
tures for pairs of journals using 20-fold cross-validation. 
 
 Historical Experimental 
 P QR PCA PCB 
Palaios -- 10% 0.4% 1% 
Quat Res 10% -- 2% 3% 
Ph Ch A 0.4% 2% -- 34% 
Ph Ch B 1% 3% 34% -- 
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to reflect possible differences in overall rhetorical struc-
ture5.  These systems and the indicators we used are 
described more fully in the Appendix. 
Results and Discussion 
We first check inter-class discriminability (H1), testing 
the results of Study 1 above.  Table 3 presents classifica-
tion error rates averaged over 20-fold cross-validation.  In 
all four cross-disciplinary cases, error rates are 17% or 
less, while in the two intra-disciplinary cases, accuracy is 
noticeably lower;  Palaios and Quat. Res. are signifi-
cantly less distinguishable at 26% error, while J. Phys. 
Chem. A and J. Phys. Chem. B are entirely undistinguish-
able6.  This further supports hypothesis H1, as above. 
Moreover, consistency with Study 1 results helps to vali-
date the approach taken in this study.  
 We now consider what consistent picture, if any, 
emerges of the rhetorical difference between the two 
classes of scientific articles (paleontology and physical 
chemistry) from the patterns of feature weights in the 
learned models.  To do this, we ran SMO on the entire 
corpus (without reserving test data) for each of the four 
pairs of a paleontology with a physical chemistry journal, 
and ranked the features according to their weight for one 
or the other journal in the weight vector.  We call a fea-
ture strong, if it was among the 30 with the highest 
absolute weights out of 101 features for the same class in 
models learned for all journal pairs.  Among strong fea-
tures, some striking patterns emerge, shown in Table 4. 
                                                          
5
 Other textual/cohesive systems, such as PROJECTION, TAXIS, THEME, 
and INFORMATION cannot be easily addressed, if at all, using a key-
word-based approach. 
6
 Error rates are higher for this feature set than for the function words 
due to the smaller number of features—clearly there are some stylistic 
differences that our systemic features do not capture.  
 First, in COMMENT, we see a preference for Validative 
comments by paleontologists and one for Predictive 
comments by physical chemists.  This linguistic opposi-
tion directly supports both hypotheses H2a and H2b, 
related to methodological differences between historical 
and experimental sciences.  As noted, the historically-
oriented paleontologist has a rhetorical need to explicitly 
delineate the scope of validity of different assertions, as 
part of synthetic thinking (Baker 1996) about complex 
and ambiguous webs of past causation (Cleland 2002).  
This is not a primary concern, however, of the experimen-
tally-oriented physical chemist; her main focus is 
prediction: the predictive strength of a theory and its pre-
dictive consistency with the evidence. 
 Next, we consider the (complicated) system of 
MODALITY.  At the coarse level represented by the sim-
ple features, we see a primary opposition in Type.  The 
preference of the (experimental) physical chemist for 
Modulation (assessing what ‘ought’ or ‘is able’ to hap-
pen) is consistent with a focus on prediction and 
manipulation of nature, and supportive of hypothesis 
H2b.  The (historical) paleontologist’s preference for Mo-
dalization (assessing ‘likelihood’ or ‘usuality’) is 
consistent with the outlook of a “neutral observer” who 
cannot directly manipulate or replicate outcomes, and is 
thus supportive of hypothesis H2a.  
 This same pattern is also seen within the complex 
paired features combining values for modality Type and 
Manifestation.  Implicit variants are more likely to be 
used for options that are well-integrated into the expected 
rhetoric, while Explicit realizations are more likely to be 
used for less characteristic types of modal assessment, as 
more attention is drawn to them in the text.  Keeping this 
in mind, note that Modalization is preferably Implicit in 
paleontology but Explicit in physical chemistry; just the 
reverse holds for Modulation.  This shows that Modaliza-
tion is integrated smoothly into the overall environment 
of paleontological rhetoric, and similarly Modulation is a 
part of the rhetorical environment of physical chemistry. 
 Finally, in the textual system of CONJUNCTION, we 
see a clear opposition between Extension, indicating pa-
leontology, and Enhancement, indicating physical 
chemistry.  This implies that paleontological text has a 
higher density of discrete informational items, linked to-
gether by extensive conjunctions, whereas in physical 
chemistry, while there may be fewer information items, 
each is more likely to have its meaning deepened or quali-
fied by related clauses.  This may be indicative that 
paleontological articles are more likely to be primarily 
descriptive in nature, requiring a higher information den-
sity, while physical chemists focus their attention more 
deeply on a single phenomenon at a time.  At the same 
time, this linguistic opposition may also reflect differing 
principles of rhetorical organization: perhaps physical 
chemists prefer a single coherent ‘story line’ focused on 
enhancements of a small number of focal propositions, 
whereas paleontologists may prefer a multifocal ‘land-
scape’ of connected propositions.  Future work will 
Table 3. Average error rates for linear SMO using systemic 
features for pairs of journals using 20-fold cross-validation. 
 
 
 Historical Experimental 
 P QR PCA PCB 
Palaios -- 26% 9% 9% 
Quat Res 26% -- 17% 14% 
Ph Ch A 9% 17% -- 32% 
Ph Ch B 9% 14% 32% -- 
 
Table 4. Strong features (see text) for Paleontology or 
Physical Chemistry, using SMO.   
 
 
System Hist. Exper. 
CONJUNCTION Extension Enhancement 
COMMENT Validative Predictive 
MODALITY/Type Modalization Modulation 
Modalization: 
  Manifestation 
Implicit Explicit 
Modulation: 
  Manifestation 
Explicit Implicit 
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include interviews and surveys of the two types of scien-
tists to investigate these hypotheses. 
Related Work 
Previous work has investigated the relationship between 
choice probabilities and contextual factors.  For example, 
Plum & Cowling (1987) demonstrate a relation between 
speaker social class and choice of verb tense 
(past/present) in face-to-face interviews.  Similarly, 
Hasan (1998) has shown, in mother-child interactions, 
that the sex of the child and the family’s social class to-
gether have a strong influence on several kinds of 
semantic choice in speech.  These previous studies in-
volved hand-coding a corpus for systemic-functional and 
contextual variables and then comparing how systemic 
choice probabilities vary with contextual factors via mul-
tivariate analysis.  By contrast, this study uses large 
numbers of neutral features and machine learning to 
automatically build accurate classification models. 
 Further, by examining differences between systemic 
preferences across scientific genres, we are quantitatively 
analyzing differences in register.  Register denotes func-
tional distinctions in language use related to the context 
of language use (Eggins & Martin 1997), and may be 
considered to comprise: mode, the communication chan-
nel of the discourse; tenor, the effect of the social relation 
between the producer and the audience; and field, the 
domain of discourse.  We focus in this paper on the field-
related distinction between historical and experimental 
science, with mode and tenor held relatively constant, by 
using articles written by working scientists drawn from 
peer-reviewed journals.  Our results indicate that the dif-
ference in the types of reasoning needed by historical and 
experimental sciences leads to correlated differences in 
rhetorical preferences (perhaps best understood as ‘func-
tional tenor’ (Gregory 1967)).   
Conclusions 
We have shown how machine learning techniques to-
gether with linguistically-motivated features can be used 
to provide empirical evidence for rhetorical differences 
between writing in different scientific fields.  Further, by 
analyzing the models output by the learning procedure, 
we can see what features realize the differences in register 
that are correlated with different fields.  This provides 
indirect evidence for methodological variation between 
the sciences, insofar as rhetorical preferences can be iden-
tified which are linked with particular modes of 
reasoning.  This study thus provides empirical evidence 
for those philosophers of science who argue against a 
monolithic “scientific method”. 
 Future work will include validating these results 
against a larger corpus of articles including more scien-
tific fields, as well as incorporating more involved 
linguistic processing—the rhetorical parsing methods 
developed by Marcu (2000) are an important step in this 
direction.  Methods for discovering rhetorically important 
features such as the subjectivity collocations of Wiebe et 
al. (2001) may also be helpful. Further, the current study 
treats each article as an indivisible whole.  However, as 
noted by Lewin et al. (2001) in their analysis of social 
science texts, the rhetorical organization of an article var-
ies in different sections of the text—future work will 
include studying rhetorical variation across different sec-
tions of individual texts, by incorporating techniques such 
as those of Teufel and Moens (1998). 
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Appendix: Systems and Features 
CONJUNCTION   
On the discourse level, the system of Conjunction serves to link 
a clause with its textual context, by denoting how the given 
clause expands on some aspect of its preceding context.  Similar 
systems also operate at the lower levels of noun and verbal 
groups, while denoting similar logico-semantic relationships, 
e.g., “and” usually denotes “additive extension”.  Options 
within Conjunction are as follows: 
 Elaboration: Deepening the content of the context 
  Appositive: Restatement or exemplification 
  Clarifying: Correcting, summarizing, or refocusing 
 Extension: Adding new related information 
  Additive: Adding new content to the context 
  Adversative: Contrasting new information with old 
  Verifying: Adjusting content by new information 
 Enhancement: Qualifying the context 
  Matter: What are we talking about 
  Spatiotemporal: Relating context to space/time 
   Simple: Direct spatiotemporal sequencing 
   Complex: More complex relations 
  Manner: How did something occur 
  Causal/Conditional: 
   Causal: Relations of cause and effect 
   Conditional: Logical conditional relations 
Note that the actual features by which we represent an article are 
the frequencies of each subsystem’s indicator features, each 
measured relative to its siblings.  So, for example, one feature is 
Elaboration/Appositive, whose value is the total number of oc-
currences of Appositive indicators divided by the total number 
of occurrences of Elaboration indicators (Appositive + Clarify-
ing).  The relative frequencies of Elaboration, Extension, and 
Enhancement within Conjunction are also used as features. 
 
COMMENT 
The system of Comment is one of modal assessment, compris-
ing a variety of types of “comment” on a message, assessing the 
writer’s attitude towards it, or its validity or evidentiality.  
Comments are generally realized as adjuncts in a clause (and 
may appear initially, medially, or finally).  Matthiessen (1995), 
following Halliday (1994), lists eight types of Comment, which 
we give here along with representative indicators for each such 
subsystem. 
  Admissive: Message is assessed as an admission 
  Assertive: Emphasizing the reliability of the message 
  Presumptive: Dependence on other assumptions 
  Desiderative: Desirability of some content 
  Tentative: Assessing the message as tentative 
  Validative: Assessing scope of validity 
  Evaluative: Judgment of actors behind the content 
  Predictive: Coherence with predictions    
 
MODALITY 
The features for interpersonal modal assessment that we con-
sider here are based on Halliday’s (1994) analysis of the 
Modality system, as formulated by Matthiessen (1995).  In this 
scheme, modal assessment is realized by a simultaneous choice 
of options within four systems7: 
Type: What kind of modality? 
 Modalization: How ‘typical’ is it? 
   Probability: How likely is it? 
   Usuality: How frequent/common is it? 
 Modulation: Will someone do it? 
   Readiness: How ready are they (am I)? 
   Obligation: Must I (they)? 
Value: What degree of the relevant modality scale? 
 Median: In the middle of the normal range. 
 High: More than normal 
 Low: Less than normal 
Orientation: Is the modality expressed as an Objective attrib-
ute of the clause or as Subjective to the writer? 
Manifestation: Is the assessment Implicitly realized by an ad-
junct or finite verb, or Explicitly by a projective clause? 
The cross-product of these subsystems gives many modality 
assessment types, each realized through a subset of indicators.  
Simple features are each option in each system above (e.g., Mo-
dalization/Probability opposed to  Modalization/Usuality), 
while complex features are pairwise combinations of such sim-
ple features.  The indicator set for each such feature is the 
intersection of the indicator sets for the two component features.   
Frequencies were normalized by the total set of occurrences of 
both primary systems (Modalization and Value in the previous 
example).   
                                                          
7
 Note that we did not consider the system of POLARITY, since it cannot 
be properly addressed without more sophisticated parsing. 
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Abstract 
 
We examine the influence of domain-specific knowledge on 
the process of learning and representing simple visual 
categories. Depending on whether subjects’ construe simple 
objects as living kinds or machines, they show differential 
sensitivity to the importance of basic shape features. In 
particular, subjects who treated the objects as machines 
placed less importance on coarse shape differences unrelated 
to the described function of the objects in both categorization 
and productive (drawing) tasks. These findings suggest that 
domain-specific functional understanding of objects may 
influence the formation of shape categories, and perhaps the 
perception of these shapes.  
Introduction 
It is typical in the study of pattern recognition to discuss 
the classification of objects as though they are a relatively 
homogeneous class of stimuli. Many sets of 2D and 3D 
shape primitives have been proposed, all with the goal of 
describing how a wide variety of forms can be catalogued 
by a small set of simple building blocks (Hoffman & 
Richards, 1986; Biederman, 1987). Special-purpose 
mechanisms are seen as add-ons that are only used to 
process particularly interesting and ecologically significant 
stimuli. The nature of these specialized processes has also 
been explored, and there is much debate over what defines a 
“special” class of stimuli (Yin, 1969; Diamond & Carey, 
1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997).  
The suggestion that object recognition only employs 
unique processes for a small minority of object classes 
stands in stark contrast to work concerned with the 
formation and application of domain-specific theories 
(Carey, 1985). It has been suggested that knowledge of 
particular domains (like biology, physics, or psychology) 
may substantially affect the reasoning employed in a range 
of tasks. Given that theory-based reasoning may guide 
performance in complex scenarios, it may also be possible 
that human observers possess theories concerning the visual 
properties of objects in various domains that affect the way 
they recognize and represent object categories. Should this 
prove to be the case, it may suggest that general accounts of 
object recognition are too coarse, in that they fail to consider 
the richness of subjects’ visual knowledge of a particular 
object category.  
It is important to establish exactly what we mean when 
we suggest that subjects may possess theories about visual 
properties of objects that affect perception. We envision a 
simple hierarchy of object knowledge (Figure 1) ranging 
from high-level theories to low-level perception of shapes. 
At the top is amodal knowledge of particular domains. At 
this level (L1), abstract facts about objects in a broad 
domain (e.g., “artifacts”) are stored propositionally (as in, 
“Machines are often built in factories to precise 
specifications”). At the second level (L2), object categories 
are defined in terms of the visual properties shared by 
members of common groups. This knowledge could be 
symbolic (“Tigers have stripes”) or encoded in terms of 
visual measurements (“Tigers have lots of contrast energy at 
a particular spatial frequency”). Finally, at the bottom level 
(L3) lies the representation constructed in perceiving an 
object as a category instance, expressed in terms of its visual 
features such as size, shape, color, etc. Our work set out to 
explore the possibility that abstract knowledge at the highest 
level of this hierarchy could affect representations 
underlying both shape categories (L3 → L2) and shape 
perception (L3 → L1). 
 
Level 3 (L3):   ABSTRACT DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE 
       ↓ 
Level 2 (L2):     CATEGORIES OF OBJECT SHAPES 
         ↓ 
Level 1 (L1):      PERCEPTION OF A PARTICULAR 
             OBJECT’S SHAPE 
 
Figure 1: A schematic view of the relationships between 
domain theories and perception. 
 
Previous experiments by Goldstone (1994) have 
demonstrated the influence of categorization on perception 
(L2 → L1). After forming categories of simple objects 
based on perceptual attributes (like luminance), subjects’ 
ability to discriminate between luminance levels was altered 
to support the newly learned perceptual groups. No abstract 
domain knowledge (L3) was implicated in these studies. 
Kelemen and Bloom (1994) demonstrated an influence of 
domain knowledge on the representation of shape categories 
(L3 → L2), but did not look at influences down to L1. Their 
stimuli were uniform circles that could vary both in size and 
color. Subjects who were told the circles were microscopic 
animals preferred to categorizethem according to color, 
while those who construed them as machines preferred to 
categorize based on size.  
Visual categorization relies on the ability to learn object 
attributes that vary more across categories than within them, 
and to accurately measure those attributes in new images. 
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Knowing that an object is a member of a particular domain 
(say “living things”) may bias the observer to expect 
particular patterns of variability. The Kelemen and Bloom 
study, as well as Keil’s work (1998), have both shown that 
color is expected to be useful for categorizing living things. 
We suggest that different aspects of shape may also be 
differentially weighted to categorize objects in different 
domains. The abstract (Level 3) knowledge observers 
possess about animals’ growth and movement as well as 
knowledge about artifact construction may lead to 
influences on representations of shape categories (Level 2), 
and the ability to make fine-grained perceptual distinctions 
at Level 1. 
Another possibility relevant to the categorization of living 
and non-living things concerns the influence of functional 
information on shape perception. It has been proposed that 
function helps set the core meaning of artifact concepts, and 
perceived shape may be relevant to artifact categorization 
primarily to the extent that it supports a functional 
interpretation (Bloom, 2000). A theory of non-living things 
may not induce any a priori preferences for particular visual 
features, but rather, flexibly bias resources towards 
functionally relevant information. Function may also 
influence which shape features are perceived to be 
important for biological categories, but in different ways. 
Landau et al. (1998) have shown that people will be more 
tolerant of certain non-rigid shape variation when 
classifying objects construed as animals (relative to those 
construed as artifacts).  
In sum, our studies here ask two main questions not 
addressed in previous work.  First, how far down in the 
hierarchy of Figure 1 do domain-specific conceptual 
influences extend? In particular, do they extend down to 
perceptual representations of individual objects? Second, 
what is the range of conceptual influences? Specifically, is 
there a role for functional understanding in forming 
representations of shape categories and individual shapes? 
In the spirit of Kelemen and Bloom, we have created novel 
2-D shapes that we have named “Marcons” and “Draxels.” 
These two populations of objects both consist of ellipses 
whose perimeters have been modified to contain sinusoidal 
bumps (Figure 2). The result is a set of stimuli that can be 
distinguished both by coarse shape information (ellipse 
eccentricity) and fine details (the frequency and/or 
amplitude of the bumps). This allows us to explore subtler 
aspects of object appearance than previous studies have 
done, and provides us with the ability to easily attribute 
function to shape properties. 
  
 
Figure 2: Constructing a Draxel. 
In the experiments we present, subjects were asked to 
learn the distinction between Draxels and Marcons. While 
both groups are given identical information about the 
behavior of these objects and the function of particular 
features, some subjects are told that the stimuli are 
nanomachines and others are told they are amoeba-like 
animals. In Experiment 1, we use productive data (subjects’ 
drawings) to determine whether domain knowledge 
influences perceptual representations. Drawings are a 
particularly useful tool in that they require subjects to make 
their perceptual representations explicit. In Experiment 2, 
we look for the effects of domain knowledge on category 
representations through a more controlled categorization 
task.  
Experiment 1 
We begin by presenting the results of a learning task in 
which subjects learn to discriminate between Marcons and 
Draxels. We assess the nature of their post-learning 
representations of the two kinds of object by collecting 
drawings from all subjects, and examining the extent to 
which differences in elongation and ‘bumpiness’ are 
expressed.  
Methods 
Stimuli 32 Marcons and 32 Draxels were hand-drawn on 2 
⅛” x 2 ¾” cards for this task using Crayola™ magic 
markers. A stencil was used to enforce a major/minor axis 
ratio of 2.9:1 for Draxels compared to a 2:1 ratio for 
Marcons. Bumps were applied to the perimeter of each 
ellipse such that Draxels contained 2.9 bumps/cm and 
Marcons contained 2.0 bumps/cm. The length of the major 
axis could take on one of 8 values for both Draxels and 
Marcons, and a dual-color contour was applied to the 
perimeter of the finished figures. The figures were also 
depicted at four different orientations (0, 90, +20, -20 
degrees from vertical). No conjunction of color, size, and 
orientation was diagnostic of object identity, leaving only 
ellipse eccentricity and bump frequency as useful criterion 
for discrimination.  
 
Subjects 24 naïve subjects (9 men, 15 women) were 
recruited from the MIT community to participate in this 
task. Subject age ranged from 18-40 years of age. 
 
Procedure Subjects were initially presented with a brief 
introductory paragraph explaining that Marcons and Draxels 
were either unicellular organisms (Animals condition) or 
nanomachines (Machines condition). In both cases, the two 
kinds of object were said to participate in “agricultural 
revitalization” by grabbing onto various chemical 
compounds with their bumps, and redistributing them across 
depleted soil. Subjects were told that Marcons and Draxels 
were quite similar, but that experts could identify them very 
accurately despite the range of individual sizes, shapes, and 
colors in which the objects appeared.  
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After reading this paragraph, subjects were shown one 
example each of a Marcon and Draxel on an 8 ½” x 11” 
placemat. These two items were the same dimension as the 
largest exemplars in the stimulus set mentioned previously, 
but were depicted with a novel dual-color contour. Subjects 
were presented with the shuffled deck of 64 cards, and 
asked to sort the pile into two stacks such that Draxels were 
on one side and Marcons on the other. Subjects were 
permitted to take as much time as they liked to sort the 
cards. 
After each round of sorting, the experimenter determined 
what false classifications were made, and presented these 
items to the subject for further study (grouped underneath 
their proper place on the sorting mat) before they were 
shuffled back into the deck for the next round. Subjects 
sorted the cards until they made fewer than 8 errors, or until 
they had sorted through the entire deck 4 times.  
When the card-sorting task had been completed, subjects 
were then presented with new instructions asking them to 
produce drawings of Draxels and Marcons. 8 examples of 
each object were requested, with the additional instruction 
that their drawings should depict what they believed 
“typical” members of each category looked like, and that 
their set of 8 drawings should attempt to cover the range of 
variations that existed within each category. After 
completing their drawings, subjects were given a brief 
questionnaire asking them to rate on a 1-10 scale how 
important were various visual features in their concepts of 
these two classes, and to enumerate in free-response style 
the differences they perceived between the two kinds of 
objects. 
Results 
Learning Rates To determine if either group showed a 
particular affinity for learning to discriminate between 
Marcons and Draxels, we examine the number of errors 
made by each group after their first and second rounds of 
sorting. These two rounds are of particular importance in 
that they indicate to what extent the task is difficult with 
only one example of each object type and how much 
improvement each group undergoes by viewing a population 
of labeled examples.  
A two-way ANOVA, with sorting round and domain as 
factors, revealed only a main effect of sorting round (p < 
0.05). Subjects improve from across rounds, but neither 
group was particularly better at performing the 
discrimination between Marcons and Draxels, nor benefited 
more than their counterparts from receiving multiple labeled 
examples after their first round of sorting. We note that of 
the 24 participants who performed this learning task, 6 
subjects (3 Animals, 3 Machines) were unable to reach our 
performance criterion of fewer than 8 mistakes after 4 
rounds of sorting.  We take this to mean that the difficulty of 
this initial task was intermediate, and unrelated to the 
domain of the objects. 
Post-Learning Questionnaire Subjects’ responses to the 
post-experiment questionnaire were analyzed to determine if 
there were differences between the Animal and Machine 
groups’ explicit feature preferences. A two-factor ANOVA 
was run on subjects’ ratings of the importance of shape 
differences between the two object categories, with feature 
type as one factor (elongation v. bumps) and subject group 
(animal v. machine) as the other factor. No main effects 
were found in the analysis, but a significant interaction (p < 
0.05) was found between feature type and subject group. 
Subjects in the Animal group rated eccentricity as a more 
important feature, compared to subjects in the Machine 
group who preferred to use the bumps. (Table 1) 
 
Table 1: 
Mean ± SD ratings of feature importance (1-10 scale) 
 Animals Machines 
Elongation 8.3 ± 4.1 6.5 ± 2.6 
Bumps 6.8 ± 2.0 8.8 ± 3.0 
Subjects’ Drawings Using these responses as a guide, we 
turn next to the drawings of Marcons and Draxels produced 
by subjects after learning. (Figure 3) The eccentricity and 
number of bumps/cm for each figure was measured by first 
inscribing the largest ellipse possible inside the bumpy 
contour. If a particular drawing was sufficiently irregular 
that this proved impossible, that figure was excluded from 
the analysis. Only 4 out of 384 drawings (all from different 
subjects) were excluded in this fashion. Eccentricity was 
determined for each figure by measuring the major and 
minor axes of the inscribed ellipse, and the number of 
bumps/cm was determined by counting the number of 
bumps on the drawing and dividing by its perimeter. We use 
the YNOT approximation of the perimeter of an ellipse 
(Maertens & Rousseau, 2000) here, which was also used in 
the creation of the stimuli. 
For each subject, we then compute the mean values of 
both eccentricity and bumps/cm for Marcons and Draxels 
across all eight drawings. The difference between these 
means is taken for each feature type, and divided by the 
maximum standard deviation of that feature within an object 
population. In this way, we express the differences in 
Marcon and Draxel shapes as a function of the separation 
and spread of the populations produced by each individual 
subject(Table 2). 
 
Table 2: 
Normalized differences between Marcon and Draxel 
features (Mean ± SD) 
 Animals Machines 
Elongation 1.93 ± 0.98 0.79 ± 1.04 
Bumps 2.42 ± 1.55 2.31 ± 1.27 
 
A two-way ANOVA was performed on these 
measurements, using feature type and subject group as 
factors. A main effect of feature type was found, (bumps > 
eccentricity, p < 0.05) with a marginally significant effect of 
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subject group (Animals > Machines, p < 0.08). No 
significant interaction was found. However, to tease apart 
the contributions of each feature type to the weak effect of 
perceived domain, we conducted a further analysis for 
simple main effects across the Animal and Machine groups. 
We find in this analysis that subjects in the Animal 
condition expressed differences in eccentricity significantly 
more than subjects in the Machine condition (p < 0.05), 
while no such difference exists for the expression of bump 
density (p > 0.8).    
 
 
 
Figure 3: Examples of Draxels (left) and Marcons (right) 
created by subjects in the “Animals” condition (top) and the 
“Machines” condition (below). Note the lack of elongation 
differences in the lower drawings. 
Discussion 
Subjects’ ratings of feature importance indicate an 
intriguing interaction between domain and the visual 
features perceived to be important. The drawings produced 
after completing the learning task show significantly more 
exaggeration of bumps across both domains, as well as 
significantly more expression of elongation differences in 
the Animal condition compared to the Machine condition. 
Bumpiness was not significantly more exaggerated in the 
Machine group compared to the Animal group, as one might 
expect from the interaction in subjects’ ratings, yet there are 
some interesting qualitative differences in the way 
differences in bumpiness are expressed. Subjects in the 
Machine condition often pointed out subtle differences 
between the two categories that were not expressed or 
described by subjects in the Animal condition. Subjects in 
the Machine condition often pointed out aspects of bump 
symmetries and asymmetries that they felt were important to 
the task, and often included these details in their drawings 
(Figure 4). Though these features are not directly related to 
the difference in bump frequency, and therefore did not 
contribute to our quantitative analysis, it is interesting to see 
how these features appear in the drawings of Machine 
subjects while remaining almost wholly absent from the 
drawings of Animal subjects. It may be that more aspects of 
bump shape need to be explicitly considered when 
constructing stimuli and examining subjects’ drawings.  
We note that both of these effects may be a consequence 
of the introductory scenario given to subjects at the 
beginning of the task. By indicating that the bumps had a 
particular functional importance, the representation of bump 
differences may have been weighted more heavily in both 
groups. It is interesting to note that in the Machines 
condition, this seems to have resulted in an overall tendency 
to ignore additional shape differences. The significance of 
elongation differences in this group may have been 
compromised by the direction of functional information 
away from these features.   
Experiment 1 provides us with direct evidence that 
domain knowledge can influence shape categorization (L3 
→ L2, in Figure 1). Evidence for effects of L3 on L1 
(perceptual shape representations) is only indirect, insofar as 
subjects are thought to produce drawings by translating a 
Level 2 representation into perceptual primitives. This is an 
important distinction, since Level 2 representations may be 
more symbolic (“Draxels are skinnier than Marcons”) rather 
than truly visual (“Draxel elongation is about 3:1”).  A 
valuable next step would be to measure perceptual abilities 
directly using psychophysical methods (e.g., Goldstone, 
1994), thereby establishing a more direct L3 → L1 link. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Over-expression of symmetry and asymmetry in 
“Machines” subjects. Draxels are at left, Marcons right.  
Experiment 2 
In our second task, we pursue possible domain-specific 
differences in shape processing using a more controlled 
task. Rather than relying on subjects’ drawings, we use a 
triad task in which subjects are asked to classify a new 
object given labeled examples of our two categories. This 
second task allows us to more closely align our findings 
with the color/size asymmetry noted by Kelemen and 
Bloom, and allows us to balance the freedom given to 
subjects in Experiment 1 with a more constrained 
environment. 
Subjects in this task are asked to make classifications 
given first a single example of each class, and then multiple 
examples of each class. Use of a single example allows for a 
relatively pure measure of subjects’ prior beliefs concerning 
what visual features are important to the task, while multiple 
examples gives us some sense of what (if anything) changes 
when subjects are given evidence of what features vary 
across a population of objects. We look for evidence of the 
interaction between domain and perceived relevance of 
features suggested by our previous experiment, while also 
investigating whether or not the domain-general preference 
for expressing differences in bumpiness persists in a task in 
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which the two feature types are pitted directly against one 
another. In terms of our proposed hierarchy, we are looking 
for influences of Level 3 on Level 2, without examination of 
Level 1 representations in any form. 
Methods 
Stimuli For this task, a subset of the original stimuli were 
used. 4 Draxel/Marcon pairs of different color schemes were 
selected, with 2 pairs taken from the largest items in the 
original set, and the remaining 2 pairs being of intermediate 
size. All of these stimuli appeared at horizontal orientation 
to ensure that subjects would only consider shape 
information when making their decisions.  
Additionally, two novel stimuli were created for each pair 
to serve as ‘unclassified’ items. Each novel item matched 
both their parents’ color and size, but would match their 
Draxel parent for one feature type (say, elongation), and 
their Marcon parent for the other (bump frequency, in this 
example). The two stimuli in each “hybrid” pair were 
complementary, such that each “Draxel elongation/Marcon 
bumps” item had a partner with the opposite pattern of 
feature inheritance.   
 
Subjects 64 subjects participated in this task, drawn from 
the MIT community.  
 
Procedure Each subject read the same short description of 
Draxels and Marcons presented in our first task. Subjects 
were then told that they were being asked to help classify a 
new object that was either a Draxel or a Marcon, but 
currently unlabeled. Subjects were told that their initial 
answer would be based on the observation of only one 
example each of a Draxel and a Marcon, and that after their 
first response they would be given multiple examples to 
look at regardless of their first answer. To ensure that 
subjects did not feel undue pressure to change their answer 
given new information, all stimuli to be presented to the 
subject were laid face-down on the table before any 
responses were solicited. In this way, we minimize the 
possibility that subjects’ might consider the new stimuli as 
additional information selected by the experimenter to guide 
them to a particular answer. 
Subjects were first shown one example each of a Draxel 
and a Marcon, (Figure 5) matched for all attributes except 
eccentricity and bump frequency. A new item was then 
shown, drawn from one of the two hybrid stimuli created for 
that initial pair of stimuli. This third item matched the color 
and overall scale of both original examples. Subjects were 
then asked to classify the new item as a Draxel or a Marcon. 
After their response was recorded, they were shown the 
three remaining examples of Draxels and Marcons. Subjects 
were asked a second time for a response, which was then 
recorded prior to rewarding the subject with M&M’s for 
volunteering. The initial pair of examples displayed, as well 
as the particular probe used as the third stimulus were 
balanced across subjects, as was the left-right arrangement 
of Draxels and Marcons.  
 
 
Figure 5: Digital versions of Draxels (left) and Marcons 
(right). Actual stimuli were hand-drawn, but we present 
these more regular, schematic images for clarity. 
Results 
On subjects’ first judgments, 21 subjects in the Animals 
condition choose to categorize the novel stimulus by 
referring to the bump frequency of the examples, with 11 
favoring eccentricity. In the Machines condition, 25 subjects 
used the bumps as a diagnostic feature, with 7 participants 
using the elongation of the ellipse. A chi-squared test 
reveals that these two distributions do not differ from each 
other. However, an additional goodness-of-fit test shows 
that the distribution of responses in the Machines condition 
differs from chance (p < 0.05), while the responses of 
subjects in the Animals condition do not. 
Moving on to consider the responses given by subjects 
after viewing multiple examples, we see that 19 subjects in 
the Animals condition favor bump frequency for 
classification, compared to 13 individuals who prefer to use 
eccentricity. In the Machines condition, the corresponding 
numbers are 27 and 5 subjects respectively. Unlike the 
single-example data, these two distributions do differ from 
one another by a chi-squared test (p<0.05).  Also, the 
responses of the Machines subjects differ from chance while 
the other responses do not.  
In each group of subjects, only two subjects changed their 
mind when presented with multiple examples of the object 
classes. This indicates that our efforts to minimize undue 
pressure on the subjects to change answers suceeded, and 
that subjects were confident in their classifications.  
Discussion 
In our triad task, we continue to see domain-specific 
differences in the preference for different aspects of object 
shape. In correspondence with our results from Experiment 
1, we see that subjects in the Animals condition do not 
significantly prefer one feature type to another. Moreover, 
as a whole, subjects who perceive the objects as machines 
have a greater tendency to ignore differences in elongation 
in favor of differences in bump frequency.  
Additionally, in both conditions we see the same overall 
bias towards using bumps that characterized subjects’ 
drawings in Experiment 1. The distribution of responses in 
the Animals condition is never different from chance in this 
study, making it difficult to draw a firm conclusion on this 
matter.  However, the qualitative agreement between the 
pattern of results obtained here and those obtained in 
Experiment 1 suggests that the effects we observe genuinely 
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reflect people’s representations of these categories, rather 
than task artifacts. 
General Discussion 
Two studies demonstrated that perceptual representations 
of simple visual shape categories differ depending on 
whether the stimuli are conceived of as living or non-living 
things. Our results show a difference in how various shape 
features are weighted across domains, but they do not yet 
speak to the origins of those differences.  The difference 
could be simply one of spatial scale, or it could reflect 
deeper differences in how function or shape variation is 
conceptualized in different domains. We conjecture that the 
functional description of the objects plays a driving role in 
the effects we observed. In a pilot study, we have presented 
subjects with the same stimuli and task of Experiment 2, 
eliminating only the instruction sheet’s explicit description 
of bump function. Preliminary results indicate that this 
manipulation eliminates the domain effects we see here, in 
that both “animal” and “machine” subjects appear equally to 
favor the bumps for categorization, and at a level equal to 
“machine” subjects in Experiment 2.   Hence, for these 
shape stimuli, functional information appears to exert a 
greater influence when the objects are construed as living 
kinds, and its primary role appears in decreasing the 
distinctiveness of the bumps for classifying these two kinds 
of microorganisms.  The bumps may be seen as pseudo-
pods, non-rigid appendages of the microorganisms that are 
used to grab compounds but are not essential shape features 
that are stable across time in an individual, let alone as a 
distinctive feature for classifying objects into kinds.  This 
interpretation is consistent with our data, although subjects’ 
post-experiment surveys did not mention any explicit 
reasoning of this sort.  Further research is needed to 
determine precisely how functional knowledge and shape 
representations interact here, but it is intriguing to speculate 
that intuitive domain theories are guiding implicit inferences 
concerning the possible dynamic aspects of simple shapes. 
The potential effects of exposing subjects to multiple 
examples of an object class are also worth exploring further. 
In this task, we see very little change in subjects’ behavior 
from one response to the other, but the number of 
observations they are allowed to make is still quite small. If 
presented with an extremely large population of Marcons 
and Draxels, subjects might undergo a more profound 
evolution of shape processing strategies. We note that in the 
Experiment 1, subjects gained far more experience with 
Marcons and Draxels than those that participated in our triad 
task. Subjects in the Animals condition also expressed an 
explicit preference for elongation rather than bumps in that 
task, which we did not see in Experiment 2. The difference 
between these two patterns of response may be related to the 
size of the observed population of each object class.  The 
possible interaction of statistical reasoning given a 
population of novel objects and prior beliefs about feature 
relevance may prove to be a rich area for further research. 
Conclusions 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that the 
categorization and perception of simple visual stimuli may 
be affected by the domain in which these objects are 
construed,  functional reasoning about object properties, and 
by the amount of experience one has with a particular 
stimulus set. Understanding all of these influences, both as 
separate mechanisms and as a coherent whole, may lead to a 
richer understanding of human object categorization and the 
perception-cognition interface.  
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Abstract
We describe an incremental, two-stage probabilistic model of
human parsing for German. The model is broad coverage, i.e.,
it assigns sentence structure to previously unseen text with
high accuracy. It also makes incremental predictions of the at-
tachment decisions for PP attachment ambiguities. We test the
model against reading time data from the literature and find
that it makes correct predictions for verb second sentences;
however, the model is not able to account for reading times
data for verb final structures because attachment preferences
in our training data do not match those determined experimen-
tally. We argue that this points to more general limitations with
our type of probabilistic model when it comes to realizing pro-
cessing strategies that are independent of the data the parsing
model is trained on.
Introduction
Experimental results show that human sentence processing
is sensitive to different types of frequency information, in-
cluding verb frame frequencies (e.g., Garnsey et al. 1997),
frequencies of morphological forms (e.g., Trueswell 1996),
and structural frequencies (e.g., Brysbaert & Mitchell 1996).
Probabilistic parsing models are an attractive way of account-
ing for this fact, as they provide a theoretically sound way of
combining different sources of frequency information into a
coherent model. Typically, these models are hybrid models,
combining symbolic knowledge (e.g., phrase structure rules)
with frequency information (e.g., rule probabilities gleaned
from a corpus).
In particular, probabilistic parsers have been used success-
fully to model attachment decisions in human sentence pro-
cessing. Early models demonstrated the viability of the prob-
abilistic approach by focusing on a small selection of relevant
syntactic constructions (Jurafsky 1996; Hale 2001). More re-
cently, broad coverage models have been proposed (Crocker
& Brants 2000; Sturt et al. 2003) that can deal with unre-
stricted text. These models are able to account for the ease
with which humans understand the vast majority of sentences,
while at at the same time making predictions for sentences
that trigger processing difficulties.
However, existing probabilistic models deal exclusively
with English data, and thus fail to address the challenges
posed by the processing of head final constructions in lan-
guages such as Japanese (e.g., Kamide & Mitchell 1999) or
German (e.g., Konieczny et al. 1997). In this paper, we ad-
dress this problem by presenting a probabilistic model of
human sentence processing in German. The model is broad
coverage, i.e., it generates accurate syntactic analyses for un-
restricted text. Furthermore, it makes predictions for PP at-
tachment ambiguities for both head initial and head final sen-
tences. The model consists of two probabilistic modules: a
syntactic module that proposes an initial attachment, and a se-
mantic module that evaluates the plausibility of the proposed
attachment, and corrects it if necessary.
We evaluate our model on reading time data for PP attach-
ment, i.e., for structures in which a prepositional phrase can
be attached either to a noun phrase or a verb. In German, PP
attachment ambiguities can occur in two syntactic configura-
tions: in verb second sentences, the verb precedes the NP and
the PP as it does in English (see (1)).
(1) Iris
Iris
tröstete
comforted
den
the
Jungen
boy
mit
with
dem
the
Lied.
song.
‘Iris comforted the boy with the song.’
(2) (daß)
(that)
Iris
Iris
den
the
Jungen
boy
mit
with
dem
the
Lied
song
tröstete.
comforted.
‘(that) Iris comforted the boy with the song.’
In verb final sentences (which occur as subordinate clauses),
the NP and the PP precede the verb (see (2)). As sentence
processing is incremental, this means that an attachment de-
cision has to be made before parser reaches the verb (and the
frequency information associated with it). These structures
therefore provide an interesting challenge for probabilistic
models of sentence processing.
Reading studies (e.g., Konieczny et al. 1997, whose mate-
rials we use) have shown that in verb second sentences, the
PP is preferredly attached according to the subcategorization
bias of the verb (as in English). In verb final sentences, where
verb frame information cannot be accessed until the end of
the sentence, the PP is preferentially attached to the NP site.
The Model
Our parsing model consists of two modules: one is a syntactic
module based on a probabilistic parser, which also has access
to a probabilistic verb frame lexicon. This module guarantees
broad coverage of language data and a high accuracy in pars-
ing unseen text. The other module is a semantic module that
uses probabilistic information to estimate the plausibility of
the analyses proposed by the syntactic module.
The model uses a syntax-first processing strategy: The syn-
tactic module proposes a set of analyses for the input and
ranks them by probability. The semantic module then com-
putes the semantic plausibility of the analyses and ranks them
by plausibility score. If there is a conflict between the deci-
sions made by the two modules (i.e., the top-ranked analyses
differ), this is interpreted as a conflict between syntactic pref-
erence and semantic plausibility and increased processing ef-
fort is predicted.
Syntactic Module
Modeling Syntactic Preferences The syntactic module
consists of a probabilistic left-corner parser which relies on a
probabilistic context free grammar (PCFG) as its backbone. A
PCFG consists of a set of context-free rules, where each rule
LHS → RHS is annotated with a probability P(RHS|LHS).
This probability represents the likelihood of expanding the
category LHS to the categories RHS. In order to obtain a
mathematically sound model, the probabilities for all rules
with the same left hand side have to sum to one. The proba-
bility of a parse tree T is defined as the product of the proba-
bilities of all rules applied in generating T .
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S → NE VVFIN.n.p NP PP .3
S → NE VVFIN.n NP .7
NP → ART NN .4
NP → ART NN PP .6
PP → APPR ART NP 1.0
VVFIN.n → tröstete .8
VVFIN.n.p → tröstete .2
ART → den .5
ART → dem .5
NE → Iris 1.0
NN → Jungen .6
NN → Lied .4
APPR → mit 1.0
Figure 1: Example of a PCFG
S
NE
Iris
VVFIN.n.p
tröstete
NP
ART
den
NN
Jungen
PP
APPR
mit
ART
dem
NN
Lied
P(T1) = .3 ·1.0 · .2 · .4 · .5 · .6 ·1.0 ·1.0 · .5 · .4 = .00144
S
NE
Iris
VVFIN.n
tröstete
NP
ART
den
NN
Jungen
PP
APPR
mit
ART
dem
NN
Lied
P(T2) = .7 ·1.0 · .8 · .6 · .5 · .6 ·1.0 ·1.0 · .5 · .4 = .02016
Figure 2: Example of trees generated by a PCFG
An example for a PCFG is given in Figure 1. This grammar
contains the rules required to generate the two readings of (1).
The readings are displayed in Figure 2, which also lists the
parse probabilities, obtained by multiplying the probabilities
of the rules used to generated a given tree.
This examples illustrates how PCFGs can be used for dis-
ambiguation: the two readings involve different rules (and
rule probabilities), and therefore differ in their overall prob-
abilities. In this example, reading T2 is predicted to be pre-
ferred over T1. Note that the grammar in Figure 1 incorporates
verb frame probabilities: tröstete ‘consoled’ can either be a
VVFIN.n (finite verb with an NP complement) or VVFIN.n.p
(finite verb with an NP and a PP complement). The proba-
bilities attached to these lexical items correspond to the psy-
cholinguistic notion of verb frame bias, i.e., the probability of
the verb occurring with a given subcategorization frame. The
overall probability of an analysis is determined not only by
verb frame bias, but also by structural probabilities attached
to the phrase structure rules. This is a way of modeling struc-
tural disambiguation preferences (in this example, there is a
bias for attachment to the NP). A PCFG therefore provides
a principled way of integrating lexical preferences and struc-
tural preference, as argued by Jurafsky (1996).
Training and Test Data A PCFG is typically trained on a
syntactically annotated corpus. For German, a suitable cor-
pus is available in the form of Negra (Skut et al. 1997), a
350,000 word corpus of newspaper text. The Negra annota-
tion scheme assumes flat syntactic structures in order to ac-
count for free word order in German. For example, there is no
VP node dominating the main verb. Instead, subject, objects
and modifiers of the main verb are its sisters, and all are di-
rect daughters of the S node (see Figure 2). This means that
scrambling phenomena simply alter the sequence of sisters in
the tree, and do not involve movement and traces.
We checked the PP attachment preferences in Negra and
found that in 60% of all sentences containing a verb and an
NP object followed by a PP, the PP is attached to the verb.
The corpus therefore reflects a general attachment preference
for verb attachment. Additionally, we found that the subcate-
gorization preferences for the verbs in our materials were re-
versed with regard to the preferences obtained by Konieczny
et al. (1997) in a sentence completion task: the verbs that had
a bias towards the NP-PP frame in the corpus exhibited an
NP frame bias in the completion study, and vice versa.
For all subsequent experiments, Negra was split into three
subsets: the first 90% of the corpus were used as training set,
the remainder was divided into a 5% test set and a 5% de-
velopment set (used during model development). Sentences
with more than 40 words were removed from the data sets (to
increase parsing efficiency).
The syntactic module was realized based on Lopar
(Schmid 2000), a probabilistic parser using a left-corner pars-
ing strategy. A grammar and a lexicon were read off the Ne-
gra training set, after empty categories and function labels
had been removed from the trees. Then the parameters for the
model were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
This means that the probability of a rule LHS → RHS is esti-
mated as P(LHS → RHS) = f (LHS → RHS)/N, which is the
number of times the rule occurs in the training data over the
total number of rules in the training data. Various smoothing
schemes are implemented in Lopar to address data sparse-
ness, see Schmid (2000) for details. We also complemented
the Negra verb frame counts with frame probabilities from an
existing subcategorization lexicon (Schulte im Walde 2002),
as the Negra counts were sparse.
Semantic Module
Modeling Semantic Plausibility The semantic module
determines whether an attachment decision proposed by
the syntactic module is semantically plausible by deciding
whether the PP is more likely to be semantically related to
the preceding verb or to the preceding noun.
Our semantic model rests on the assumption that “semantic
plausibility” or “semantic relatedness” can be approximated
by probabilistic measures estimated from corpus frequen-
cies. Previous work provided evidence for this assumption by
demonstrating that co-occurrence frequencies obtained from
various corpora (including the web) are reliability correlated
with human plausibility judgments (Keller & Lapata 2003).
Training and Test Data Ideally, the same training data
should be used for the syntactic and the semantic module;
however, this was not possible, as the semantic module re-
quires vastly more training data. We therefore used the web to
estimate the parameters of the frequency based measures (see
Keller & Lapata 2003 for a detailed evaluation of the reliabil-
ity of web counts). For the selectional preference method, we
used one year’s worth of text from the ECI Frankfurter Rund-
schau corpus as training data. This unannotated corpus is the
basis for the Negra corpus, but it is much larger (34 million
words). The corpus was parsed using a parser very similar
to the syntactic module. Tuples of verbs and head nouns of
modifying PPs were then extracted according to the structures
assigned by the parser.
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The development and test set for the semantic module were
taken from the set of 156 items from Experiments 1 and 2 of
Konieczny et al. (1997). The development set consists of 68
randomly chosen sentences, the remaining 88 sentences are
used as a test set. The items from Experiment 1 vary word
order (verb second and verb final), verb subcategorization
preference (bias for NP frame or for NP-PP frame), and at-
tachment (to the NP or verb), which is disambiguated by the
semantic implausibility of one alternative. In Experiment 2,
verb subcategorization preference was not varied. The devel-
opment set was used to compare the performance of different
semantic and syntactic models and to set the parameters for
one semantic models. The final performance will be reported
on the unseen test set.1
Plausibility Measures In computational linguistics, a stan-
dard approach to PP attachment disambiguation is the use
of configuration counts from corpora (e.g., Hindle & Rooth
1991). To decide the attachment of nPP, the head noun of the
PP, to one of the attachment sites (the verb v or nNP, the noun
phrase), we compare how probable each attachment is based
on previously seen configurations involving nPP and the at-
tachment sites. In many approaches, the the preposition p is
also taken into account.
As outlined above, we used web counts to mitigate the
data sparseness that such a model is faced with. In this ap-
proach, corpus queries are replaced by queries to a search
engine, based on the assumption that the number of hits that
the search engine returns is an approximation of the web fre-
quency of the word in question (Keller & Lapata 2003). Of
course text on the web is not parsed, which makes it diffi-
cult to identify the correct syntactic configurations. We follow
Volk (2001) in assuming that string adjacency approximates
syntactic attachment reasonably well, and simply use queries
of the form "V PP" and "NP PP". The search engines used
were www.altavista.de and www.google.com (restricted
to German data). Google generally outperformed AltaVista
(presumably because it indexes more pages); the results re-
ported below were obtained using Google counts.
We experimented with a variety of plausibility measures
(site ranges over the two attachment sites, v and nNP):
(a) f (site,p)f (site) , the Lexical Association Score (LA), computes
how likely the attachment site is to be modified by a PP
with the preposition p.
(b) f (site, p,nPP), Model 1 of Volk (2001), relies on the raw
trigram co-occurrence frequencies to decide attachment.
(c) f (site,p,nPP)f (site) , Model 2 of Volk (2001), takes into account
that high-frequency attachment sites are more likely to
co-occur with PPs.
(d) log2
( f (site,nPP)
f (site) f (nPP)
)
, Pointwise Mutual Information (MI)
measures how much information about one of the items
is gained when the other is seen. This measure has pre-
viously been used for the related problem of identifying
collocations (words that appear together more often than
chance, Church & Hanks 1990).
(e) f (site,nPP)f (site) ·
f (site,nPP)
f (nPP) , Combined Conditional Probabilities(CCP) is similar to MI. It squares the joint probability
term to give it more weight.
1Since for all models except one no parameters were set on the
development set, we had to maintain a fixed development-test split
to ensure the test set remained truly unseen.
As will be explained below, we experimented with these mea-
sures in isolation, but we also combined them with Clark &
Weir’s (2002) approach for computing selectional preference
from corpora. This approach relies on a lexical data base to
compute the semantic similarity between lexical items.
Results
Syntactic Module
As mentioned in the introduction, the present modeling effort
was guided by the idea of building a broad coverage model,
i.e., a model that explains why human sentence processing
is effortless and highly accurate for the vast majority of sen-
tences; at the same time, the model should account for psy-
cholinguistically interesting phenomena such as processing
difficulties arising from attachment ambiguities. Incremental-
ity is crucial for predictions of this type. In its original form,
the Lopar parser used for the syntactic module is not incre-
mental and was therefore modified to achieve partial incre-
mentality. It now outputs its ranking of the attachment alter-
natives in two stages: after processing the PP and at the end of
the sentence. This provides a record of incremental changes
in the attachment preferences of the model when processing
the critical region for which Konieczny et al. (1997) report
eye-movement data (the noun of the PP in Experiment 1 and
the PP object in Experiment 2).
To evaluate the broad coverage of the model, we ran the
syntactic module on our unseen Negra corpus test set. The
model was able to assign an analysis to 98% of the sentences.
As is standard in computational linguistics, we tested the ac-
curacy of the model by measuring labeled bracketing: to score
a hit, the parser has to predict both the bracket (the beginning
or end of a phrase) and the category label correctly. We report
labeled recall, the number of correctly labeled brackets found
by the parser divided by the total number of labeled brack-
ets in the test corpus, and labeled precision, the number of
correctly labeled brackets found by the parser divided by the
total number of labeled brackets found by the parser.
The model achieved a labeled recall of 66.65% and a la-
beled precision of 63.92%. It is similar to the baseline model
of Dubey & Keller (2003), who report a maximum labeled
recall and precision of 71.32% and 70.93%.
To further evaluate the syntactic model, we tested it on the
test set generated from Experiments 1 and 2 of Konieczny
et al. (1997). This allows us to determine whether the syn-
tactic module is able to correctly resolve the PP attachment
ambiguities even without access to any semantic information.
Table 1 shows the parser’s decisions at the PP for verb final
and verb second sentences. We report the number and the per-
centage of correct attachments per condition. In the verb final
condition of Experiment 1, the parser always attached the PP
to the verb. No verb frame information is available to guide
the decision when the PP is processed, so the baseline is ran-
dom guessing (50%). In verb second sentences, the parser can
use the subcategorization preference of the verb, which leads
to the correct attachment in 50% of all cases. The parser in-
deed reaches this baseline. In Experiment 2, the parser again
always attaches the PP to the unseen verb in verb final sen-
tences. In the verb second condition, there is a marked prefer-
ence to attach according to verb bias, but only 42% of attach-
ments are correct over both conditions.
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Verb final Verb second
Experiment 1
NP frame, V bias 7 (100%) 2 (29%)
NP frame, NP bias 0 5 (83%)
NP-PP frame, V bias 5 (100%) 3 (60%)
NP-PP frame, NP bias 0 2 (33%)
% correct 50% 50%
Experiment 2
NP frame, V bias 9 (100%) 1 (11%)
NP frame, NP bias 0 5 (56%)
% correct 50% 33%
Baseline 50% 50%
Table 1: Syntactic module: correct attachment decisions at the
PP for the test set from Experiments 1 and 2
Measure CCP MI LA Volk 1 Volk 2
Development Set
# correct 23 22 17 22 21
% correct 67.6% 64.7% 50% 64.7% 61.7%
Test Set
# correct 21 23 – 23 27
% correct 50% 54.8% – 54.8% 64.3%
Baseline 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Table 2: Semantic module, verb second: results of the plausi-
bility measures on the development and test set
Semantic Module
Verb Second Sentences As a next step, we evaluated the
semantic module, again on the data derived from Experi-
ments 1 and 2 of Konieczny et al. (1997). We again used the
chance baseline (50%) that the syntactic module was unable
to outperform.
The verb second sentences arguably constitute the standard
case for PP attachment: Both possible attachment sites have
been seen before the attachment has to be decided. In a first
attempt, the five plausibility measures introduced above were
tested on the development set. Table 2 shows that the CCP
measure performed best, while the Lexical Association mea-
sure failed to beat the baseline. The CCP measure should
therefore be chosen to model semantic attachment in verb
second sentences. However, on the test set (see Table 2), the
best and worst measure changed places. This time, the Volk 2
measure performed best. No measure significantly outper-
formed the others or the baseline.
As the performance of the CCP measure on the test set was
disappointing, we experimented with a second approach that
combines the Volk 2 model of PP attachment with a model
of selectional restrictions. We used Clark & Weir’s (2002)
approach, which was extended to German by Brockmann &
Lapata (2003), whose implementation we used. Relying on a
semantic hierarchy (in our case: GermaNet, Hamp & Feldweg
(1997)), the Clark & Weir algorithm finds the statistically op-
timal superclass (concept) for input nouns given a verb and
the relation between noun and verb. The probability of a con-
cept c given a verb v and relation rel is computed as:
(3) P(c|v,rel) = P(v|c,rel) P(c|rel)P(v|rel)
To find the best concept for a 〈n,v,rel〉 triple, at each step
up the hierarchy, the probability estimate for the new concept
is compared to that of the original concept. When the esti-
mates differ significantly, the lower concept is assumed for
the noun. The parameters of this algorithm are the statistical
test used (χ2 or G2) and the α value which determines the
level of significance required for the test. The G2 test proved
Prior Average
Measure CCP CCP MI Volk1 Volk2
Development Set
# correct 12 11 8 9 11
% correct 60% 55% 40% 45% 55%
Test Set
# correct 24 20 22 23 25
% correct 57.1% 47.6% 52.4% 54.8% 59.5%
Baseline 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Table 3: Semantic Module, verb final: Results on the devel-
opment (Exp. 1) and test set (Exp. 1 and 2)
more suitable for our task, while a variation of α value had no
noticeable effect.
We used the development set to estimate a threshold value
for the attachment decision. Coverage on the test set was only
48% due to sparse data. Whenever the Clark & Weir method
did not return a value, we backed off to the decision made
by the Volk 2 model (which is the most consistently perform-
ing model). Recall that this model has a 64% precision on
the test data while the chance baseline is 50%. The combined
model reaches 67% precision on the same data (precision for
the selectional preference model alone is 70% for 48% of the
data). This model performs best numerically (though not sig-
nificantly so) and was used in the final model.
Verb Final Sentences A particularly interesting case arises
with respect to verb final sentences (see (2)): at the critical
region (once the PP has been processed), the verb is not avail-
able yet, which means that the plausibility of the combination
of the verb with the head noun of the PP cannot be computed
at this point. Konieczny et al. (1997) found processing diffi-
culty in these cases when the PP was an implausible modifier
of the noun, so apparently immediate semantic evaluation sets
in and has to be accounted for.
In the verb final case, we therefore have to estimate the
plausibility of the PP head noun modifying the NP as opposed
to an unseen verb. One way of doing this is to average over the
results for the PP head noun and every possible verb to obtain
a generic value for verb attachment. We restrict ourselves to
just the verbs in the test and development set. This backoff
approach was realized for four models.
An alternative is to use the prior probability of the PP head
noun as an estimate of its conditional probability with every
possible verb. The prior probability of the PP head noun is
its frequency divided by the size of the corpus, f (nPP/N). In
the case of web counts, N is the number of all documents
searched. This figure was empirically estimated as proposed
by Keller & Lapata (2003). Note that this method of backoff is
possible only for the CCP measure, because the probabilities
to be estimated for the other methods are too complex.
Table 3 gives the results on the development set for the
items from Experiment 1. The items from Experiment 2 could
not be tested as the averaging procedure is extremely costly
in terms of web queries. The CCP model with simple backoff
to the prior shows the best results at 60% correct attachments.
We therefore used it for the final evaluation to predict attach-
ments for verb final sentences. Table 3 also lists the results
on the test set for items from Experiments 1 and 2. CCP with
backoff to the prior performed better than most models that
use averaging, and substantially outperforms CCP with av-
eraging. The best model is Volk 2 with averaging. Again, no
measure outperforms the baseline of 50% correct attachments
or the other models.
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Figure 3: Exp. 1, verb second: Predictions of the combined model (left) compared to the Konieczny et al. (1997) data (right)
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Figure 4: Exp. 1, verb final: Predictions of the CCP/Prior model (left) compared to the Konieczny et al. (1997) data (right)
Combined Model
In the previous sections, we evaluated the syntactic and se-
mantic module separately. We found that the syntactic mod-
ule performs at the level of the chance baseline of 50%,
while the semantic module achieves an accuracy of up to
67% for verb initial sentences and 60% for the verb final sen-
tences. A more interesting question is how well the model
accounts for the processing difficulties that are evident in the
eye-movement data reported by Konieczny et al. (1997). As
mentioned at the beginning of the Results Section, our model
makes predictions for the critical region used by Konieczny
et al. (1997) (the PP). Recall also that we assume that a con-
flict between syntactic preference and semantic plausibility
predicts increased processing effort.
As explained in the section on Training and Test Data
above, the subcategorization variable was reversed for our
data: where Konieczny et al. (1997) assume an NP-PP frame
bias, we found a preference for the NP frame in our cor-
pus (and vice versa). Below, our model’s predictions are la-
beled with the preferences found in our data, while data from
Konieczny et al. (1997) are labeled with the preferences they
found. Figure 3 compares the predictions of our model with
Konieczny et al.’s results in Experiment 1 for verb second
sentences.2 The graph for our model gives the percentage of
correct decisions by the semantic module that are in conflict
with the the decisions of the syntactic module. Such con-
flicts predict longer reading times, and the more conflicts in a
condition, the higher we expect the average reading times to
be. The figure shows that our model predicts the data pattern
found by Konieczny et al. (1997) (who report regression path
durations, RPDs).
2Note that our results are on the unseen subset of the items only,
while the reading times are on all items.
In verb final sentences (Figure 4), the syntactic module al-
ways predicts verb attachment, so correct decisions for NP
attachment by the semantic module always lead to a con-
flict. This pattern does not correspond to the Konieczny et al.
(1997) reading data, which show a general preference to at-
tach to the NP. Figure 5 shows a replication in principle of
the reading time data in the verb second case. In Konieczny
et al.’s (1997) pretests, all the verbs subcategorized for an NP
and a PP, while in our data, they preferredly subcategorize
for just an NP. Our model predicts longer reading times for
the NP frame when subcategorization preference and seman-
tic disambiguation are mismatched, which is what Konieczny
et al.’s (1997) show for the NP-PP frame. The verb final
case again fails: Instead of predicting preferred attachment
to the NP (Matched bias for our data, Mismatched bias for
Konieczny et al.’s data), the model predicts verb attachment.
Discussion
While our model replicates Konieczny et al.’s (1997) read-
ing time results for PP attachment in the verb second case, it
fails to account for reading times of verb final sentences. This
failure is caused by the syntactic module which always pre-
dicts verb attachment in verb final sentences, while there is a
human preference for NP attachment in these cases.
The behavior of the syntactic module is influenced by two
factors. One is the probability of phrasal rules such as S →
NE VVFIN.n.p NP PP. The second factor is a verb-specific
frame bias, which manifests itself as probabilities for lexi-
cal rules such as VVFIN.n.p → tröstete. In verb second sen-
tences, the verb’s frame probability together with the phrasal
rule probability determines the analysis proposed by the syn-
tactic module. In verb final sentences, however, only the
phrasal probabilities are used (as the verb is not yet avail-
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Figure 5: Exp. 2: Predictions of the combined model (left) compared to the Konieczny et al. (1997) data (right). Verbs subcate-
gorize for an NP frame in our data and for an NP-PP frame in the Konieczny et al. data.
able), so the syntactic module makes the same prediction for
all verb final sentences. This prediction is incorrect because
the general PP attachment bias in the corpus is to the verb,
rather than to the NP as in the reading time data.
This points to a more general problem with probabilistic
models: They can only be as good as the training data. It
is therefore vital to check relevant properties of the training
corpus in comparison to experimental data when developing
probabilistic models. Balanced corpora that consist of lan-
guage data from different sources are more reliable in this
respect than newspaper corpora such as the Negra corpus.
This means that the failure to model the verb final data
is not a failure of probabilistic models per se; our approach
would be in principle capable of modeling the general attach-
ment preference to the NP in verb final sentences, if the at-
tachment preference in the training data corresponded to that
in the experimental results. Thus, our results strengthen the
case for probabilistic models by showing that they can be ap-
plied even to head final constructions.
It is important to note, however, that our explanation of the
German PP attachment data in terms of biases in the train-
ing corpus is at variance with explanations in the literature.
For instance, Konieczny et al. (1997) proposes a strategy of
Parameterized Head Attachment to explain why the parser
prefers to attach incoming material (such as the PP) to exist-
ing sites (such as the verb). This strategy, which aims at the
immediate semantic evaluation of the input, is designed to
cope with head final structures in general, not only in the case
of PP attachment. A basic PCFG model such as the one used
in this paper is not able to implement such a general strategy.
Conclusions
We have presented a two-stage model parsing model that ac-
counts for PP attachment in German. The model is able to
assign correct sentence structures to unseen text and predicts
average reading times in verb second sentences. For verb fi-
nal sentences, the model fails to correctly predict the reading
time data. The reason is that our training corpus exhibits a
general bias for attaching PPs to the wrong attachment site (to
the verb instead of the NP). In principle, however, our model
would be able to account for the data in the verb final case if
the training data were consistent with experimental findings.
Our findings therefore strengthen the case for probabilistic
models of language processing by showing their applicability
to head final structures. At the same time, they demonstrate
that probabilistic models can be highly sensitive to idiosyn-
crasies in the training data.
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Abstract
Various theories propose that count nouns are distinguished
from mass nouns by their specification of individuation. We
present evidence that, while 3-year-old children acquiring
language extend words differentially on the basis of mass-
count syntax, they quantify over individuals for both novel
mass and count nouns. We suggest that children may begin
acquisition with an underspecified representation of mass
noun semantics, permitting quantification over both
individuals and continuous quantities. Also, children may rely
on ontologically based biases to guide quantification.
Introduction
In English, the specification of number sends a ripple
through the language, determining a word’s status as mass
or count, licensing the use of plural morphology, and
selecting among measure terms such as many and much.
Children begin to show signs of such knowledge early in
language acquisition, with plural production and
comprehension emerging as early as 2 years of age (Brown,
1973; Cazden, 1968; Ferenz & Prasada, 2002; Gordon,
1988), sensitivity to the mass-count distinction evidenced by
around 2;6 years (see Soja, 1992), and the use of measure
terms like more and less emerging between 2;6 and 3 years
of age (Donaldson & Balfour, 1968; Gathercole, 1985;
Palermo, 1973).
The mass-count distinction provides a particularly
interesting case of number specification, because it entrains
important consequences for both the syntax and semantics
of noun phrases. For example, count terms like cat can take
the plural morpheme (e.g., cats) follow cardinal numbers
(e.g., one cat, two cats, three cats), and be modified by
quantifiers like these, those, few and many (e.g., many cats).
Mass terms, on the other hand, can occur in none of these
environments and can be distinguished by their use with
terms like much and little (e.g., I don’t eat much porridge).
According to most accounts, this distributional difference
corresponds to a semantic distinction whereby count nouns
quantify over individuals and mass nouns quantify over
non-individuals (e.g., Bloom, 1994, 1999; Gordon, 1985;
Link, 1998; Quine, 1960; Wisniewski, Casey, & Imai,
1996). For example, Bloom proposed that children might
begin acquisition with bidirectional mappings between
syntax and semantics, as in (1), resulting in a categorical
effect of number specification in noun phrases:
(1) a. count noun ÷ individual
b. mass noun ÷ non-individual
However, such mappings may not provide the full story
of what children know about the mass-count distinction. As
noted by Barner and Snedeker (2004), mass syntax may not
have a strong interpretation like count syntax, but may be
semantically unspecified and allow reference to either
individuals or non-individuals. In their study, Barner and
Snedeker observed that 4-year-old children and adults
interpreted many mass and count nouns in the way predicted
by the mappings in (1). For example, participants judged
three tiny shoes to be more shoes than one giant shoe and
one giant portion of butter to be more butter than three tiny
portions. However, they also based judgments on number
for “object-mass” terms like furniture, jewelry, mail, and
clothing, which children begin to produce by around 4 years
of age. In each case, participants judged six tiny objects to
be more than two giant ones. Thus, count syntax led to
quantification on the basis of number, while mass syntax
quantified over both continuous quantities and certain
individual objects.1 As a result, it was concluded that object-
mass terms like furniture must allow quantification over
individuals due to a lexical specification of number, which
is normally found in count syntax. Expressions that house
this feature quantify over individuals, while those that do
not assume a default interpretation of quantifying over a
continuous extent (see Borer, 2004, for a similar proposal).
This view is schematized in (2):
(2) a. count syntax ’ individual
     b. mass syntax ÷ no number specification
If the dimension of measurement of mass terms is
specified in part by lexical semantics as these results
suggest, children may need some amount of experience with
                                                 
1 But not all objects. Terms that can be used as either mass
or count (e.g., string/s, chocolate/s, paper/s, stone/s)
quantified by number as count nouns and by continuous
extent as mass nouns.
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particular mass terms before using them to specify a
measuring dimension. This raises the question of what mass
syntax contributes to the early interpretation of noun
phrases, and whether children’s interpretation of mass nouns
differs from that of adults at any stage of development. For
example, before acquiring exceptions like mail  and
furniture, do children respect mappings as in (1), or is mass
syntax semantically unspecified throughout development?
Two sources of evidence regarding this question suggest
conflicting conclusions. First, studies of word extension
indicate that children are biased to map novel count terms to
physical objects and mass terms to non-solid substances. In
a study by Soja (1992), English children aged 2;6 extended
novel words on the basis of shape for solid objects 90% of
the time when presented with count syntax, but only 76% of
the time with mass syntax. For non-solid substances,
children extended novel words on the basis of substance
91% of the time when presented with mass syntax, and 51%
of the time when given count syntax (see also Soja, Carey,
& Spelke, 1991, and Imai & Gentner, 1997). Thus, children
in her study shifted their extension of novel terms according
to their use in mass or count syntax.
However, results from Gathercole (1985) suggest that
young children may not distinguish the referential
consequences of mass and count syntax. In her study,
Gathercole found that children aged between 2;6 and 5;6
quantified mostly by number for both count nouns and mass
nouns. In fact, even children as old as 5;6 failed to reliably
quantify by continuous extent for mass nouns, unlike the 4-
year-olds in Barner and Snedeker (2004), who quantified by
continuous extent for both solid and non-solid stimuli
named with mass syntax (e.g., some string; some mustard).
These differences are difficult to interpret, since only
Gathercole tested both mass and count terms within
subjects, and because stimuli used in the studies were
common household objects and may have varied in
familiarity and lexico-semantic properties.
In any case, the results from Gathercole’s study are
difficult to reconcile with those from Soja’s study of word
extension, and thus it remains unclear how children
represent the semantics of the mass-count distinction early
in acquisition. Also unclear is how the different types of
knowledge used in each task are related in young children’s
linguistic representations. While for adults it seems
necessary that word extension should predict quantification
(e.g., only words that refer to discrete things quantify over
individuals) such links between content and quantification
may not yet be established in the minds of 2 or 3-year-olds.
No previous study has explicitly tested the quantification
of mass-count syntax for novel terms (i.e. where prior
lexical knowledge does not play a role). As a result,
previous studies have also not examined the relationship
between quantification judgments and word extension for
the same objects and substances. However, both of these
measures are needed in order to properly assess children’s
early interpretation of mass-count syntax, before lexical
exceptions such as object-mass terms (e.g., mail, silverware)
arise. For this reason, the present study assessed children’s
and adult’s interpretation of novel mass and count terms in
both word extension and quantity judgment paradigms.
Also, it remains an open question how object-mass terms
come to quantify over individuals, and what the precise
nature of lexical information is that distinguishes mass
nouns like mail  from mass nouns like string. Various
researchers have suggested that factors such as complexity
of structure, occurrence of multiple individuals in spatio-
temporal contiguity (Wisniewski, Casey, & Imai, 1997), and
shared function (Prasada, 1999) might characterize object-
mass terms. The present study examined this question via
the manipulation of stimulus complexity and solidity in each
of the testing paradigms.
Experiment 1
The first experiment examined three main questions. First,
does mass syntax have a strong interpretation early in
acquisition, as measured by both word extension and
quantity judgment? To examine this question, participants
were tested with both methods for the same novel objects,
with either mass or count syntax. Second, using this method
we explored how the word extension and quantity judgment
tasks are related, and whether they make use of the same
underlying logical resources. Third and finally, we explored
whether an object’s relative complexity predicts
quantification over individuals when used in mass syntax.
What lexical properties, if any, might characterize object-
mass nouns like mail  and furniture? This question was
tested by varying the shapes and substances of novel
referents in the word extension and quantity judgment tasks,
to include simple and complex solid objects.
Method
Subjects
Participants were 24 Harvard undergraduates and 32
children ranging in age from 3;0 to 3;6 (mean = 3;3).
Procedures and Stimuli
Each testing session comprised four trials. In each trial the
participant was introduced to a novel object and heard the
object named with a novel term at least four times using
either unambiguous mass syntax or unambiguous count
syntax on all four trials. Half of the participants were shown
four simple objects and half were shown four complex
objects, all of which we will call “standard” objects. The
four simple standard objects were: (1) a half egg shape
made of red sculpy; (2) a kidney bean shape made from
painted-green das; (3) a cork shape made from black
Crayola-Magic; (4) an arrow shape made from terracotta.
The four complex standard objects were: (1) a gear made
from orange playdo; (2) a brass t-shaped plumbing fixture;
(3) a suede texture-painted reamer; (4) a clay milk pump
stand. The names for these objects, always presented with
either mass or count syntax (between subjects), were fem,
tannin, dak, and t u l v e r. Thus, for each trial, the
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experimenter introduced the novel object by saying, for
example “Oh look, this is some/a fem. Have you ever seen
any fem(s) before? Do you think you have some fem(s) at
home? That is some/a nice fem isn’t it”.
Stimulus Instructions
Training
Look, this is some
fem!
or,
Look, this is a fem
Word
Extension
Task
Can you point at
the fem?
Quantity
Judgment
Task
Who has more
fem?
or,
Who has more
fems?
Figure 1. An example of a training trial, word extension trial
and quantity judgment trial (shaded oval represents a red
sculpy half-egg, white oval represents a styrofoam shape
alternative, and shaded square represents a red sculpy
substance alternative; small ovals represent mini half-eggs).
Following the naming of each object, participants were
asked two questions, the order of which was varied
systematically (see Figure 1). First, in the word extension
task (see Soja, Carey, & Spelke, 1991), participants were
shown two additional objects, one which matched the
standard in shape, the other in substance, and were asked to
choose which of the two the novel word named: “Show me
some/a fem”. Second, in the quantity judgment task (see
Barner & Snedeker, 2004), participants were shown two
characters (Farmer Brown and Captain Blue), one who was
shown with the standard object and the other who was
shown with three miniature versions of the object. The
standard objects had a greater overall mass and volume than
the three miniature objects, but were otherwise identical in
shape and substance. The side on which the standard or
miniatures were shown was varied systematically.
Participants were told, “Farmer Brown has some/a fem(s)
and Captain Blue has some/a fem(s) too. Who do you think
has more fem(s)?” For both tasks, participants pointed to
indicate their response. Procedures were identical for adults
and children.
Results and Discussion
Word extension trials
Responses for the word extension task were coded in terms
of how many times (out of four) each participant extended a
word on the basis of shape.
For adults, two main results were obtained (see Figure 2).
First, adults used mass-count syntax to guide word
extension, extending count terms by shape 3.5 times on
average (87.5% overall), compared to only 1.08 times on
average (27% overall) for mass syntax, F (1, 16) = 31.1, p <
.001. Second, adults also showed a main effect of stimulus
type, extending novel words for complex objects 2.83 times
on average (71.8%), compared to 1.75 times on average
(43.8% overall) for simple objects, F (1, 16) = 6.3, p < .05.
There were no interactions.
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Figure 2. Word extension by adults for novel mass and
count nouns.
These results indicate that adults use syntax to guide word
extension, but that extension is also influenced to a large
extent by the relative complexity of stimuli. Thus, mass-
count syntax does not appear to be the sole factor
determining word extension behavior for adults. More
general properties of referents appear to play a role.
3-year-olds
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Figure 3. Word extension by 3-year-old children for novel
mass and count nouns.
The children also used mass-count syntax to guide word
extension (see Figure 3). They extended novel count terms
by shape 3.56 times on average (89% overall), compared to
2 times on average (50% overall) for novel mass nouns, F
(1, 24) = 16.9, p < .001. However, children showed no main
effect of stimulus type, and no significant interactions.
Quantity judgment trials
Responses for the quantity judgment task were coded in
terms of how many times (out of four) each participant
chose the array with the greater number of objects. For
adults, two main results were obtained (see Figure 4). First,
as was the case with word extension, adults used mass-count
* *
* *
81
syntax to guide quantity judgment, using count terms to
quantify by number 3.75 times on average (93.8% overall),
compared to .67 times on average (16.8%) for mass nouns,
F (1, 16) = 85.6, p < .001. Second, adults quantified by
number 2.67 times on average (66.8% overall) for complex
items, which was significantly more than the 1.75 times on
average (43.8%) for simple items, F (1,16) = 7.6, p < .05.
This difference appeared to be due in part to adult’s
interpretation of mass syntax. While adults quantified by
number for some mass nouns that named complex objects,
they never did so for mass nouns that named simple objects.
This is interesting, since it suggests that for adults object
complexity may be sufficient to permit individuation using
mass syntax (i.e. the use of object-mass terms).
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Figure 4. Quantity judgment by adults for novel mass and
count nouns.
In contrast to adults, children quantified mostly by
number for both simple and complex objects, for both mass
and count syntax (see Figure 5). As a result, children
showed no significant effect of syntax, F (1, 24) = 2.2, p >
.1, nor of stimulus type, F (1, 24) = .09, p > .8.
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Figure 5. Quantity judgment by 3-year-old children for
novel mass and count nouns.
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that while both
children and adults used mass-count syntax to guide word
extension, only adults appeared to use this information to
guide quantity judgment. This suggests that word extension
and quantity judgment may tap discrete logical resources.
Among the possible explanations for this are: (1) an
incomplete understanding of mass-count syntax, (2) a
problem interpreting the term “more”, or (3) a bias to
quantify by number for discrete physical objects. These
possibilities are examined in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the idea that
the interpretation of mass syntax is unspecified from early in
acquisition, and allows quantification over individuals or
non-individuals. However, the results are also consistent
with several other possibilities, including a response bias to
quantify by number regardless of syntax, or an interpretation
of “more” as quantifying only by number. To rule out these
possibilities, we tested participants with non-solid
substances. If responses in Experiment 1 were due to either
a response bias or a strong interpretation of “more”, then
responding on the basis of number should persist for both
mass and count nouns. However, a change in children’s
quantification for only mass syntax would represent
evidence that children modulate judgments based on mass-
count information, but allow quantification over individuals
when referents are construed as such. This, in turn, would
support the claim that mass syntax, but not count syntax, has
an unspecified interpretation regarding individuation.
Method
Subjects
Participants were 16 Harvard undergraduates and 23
children ranging in age from 3;0 to 3;6 (mean = 3;3).
Procedures and Stimuli
Procedures for Experiment 2 were identical to those used in
Experiment 1. However, solid stimuli were replaced with
non-solid substances. The standard substances were: red
media mixer, green butter, orange paint, and brown hair gel.
Results and Discussion
Results suggest that only the adults used mass-count
syntax to guide word extension (see Figure 6). Adults
extended count nouns by shape 2.57 times on average (64%
overall) and mass nouns 0.5 times on average (13% overall),
a difference that was marginally significant, F (1, 12) = 4.8,
p < .06. Children extended count nouns by shape 1.82 times
on average (46% overall) and mass nouns 1.42 times on
average (36% overall), which was not significant.
However, both the 3-year-olds and adults appeared to use
mass-count syntax to guide quantity judgment (see Figure
7). Adults based judgments on number 3.83 times on
average for count syntax (96% overall) and 0.5 times on
average for mass syntax (13% overall). This difference was
significant, F  (1, 12) = 40, p  < .001. Children based
judgments on number 1.82 times on average for count
syntax (46% overall) and 0.5 times on average for mass
syntax (13% overall), a difference that was marginally
significant, F (1, 23) = 4.1, p < .06. There was also a large
effect of task order, F (1, 23) = 11.7, p < .05, that reflected a
much greater distinction of mass-count syntax when
* *
82
quantity judgment was tested after word extension. Children
who were given the tasks in this order quantified by number
2.67 times on average for count syntax (compared to .8
times in the alternative order) and 0 times on average for
mass syntax (compared to 1 time on average in the
alternative order).
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Figure 6. Word extension by 3-year-olds and adults for mass
and count nouns that label non-solid substances.
A review of the word extension data revealed a similar
trend, where performance on word extension more closely
resembled adult performance when it followed quantity
judgment, suggesting an overall effect of accumulated input
on mass-count sensitivity over the course of the experiment.
Overall, results suggest that children have more than one
interpretation for the word “more”, but that its meaning is
shifted primarily by the ontological category of referents,
rather than mass-count syntax.
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Figure 7. Quantity judgment by 3-year-olds and adults for
mass and count nouns that label non-solid substances.
General Discussion
Experiment 1 revealed two main results. First, for the word
extension task, both children and adults used mass-count
syntax to guide their judgments, extending count terms on
the basis of shape and mass terms on the basis of substance.
This replicates results found for English-speaking 2.5 year
olds (see Soja, 1992). Second, for solid objects, adults used
mass-count syntax to guide quantity judgment and used
mass nouns to quantify over individuals only for complex
objects. Children, however, interpreted both novel mass and
count terms as quantifying by number regardless of referent
type, suggesting a lack of strong quantificational
interpretation for mass syntax.
Results from Experiment 2 indicated that children could
use mass-count syntax to guide quantification for non-solid
substances. Across conditions, children’s interpretation of
mass syntax appeared more affected by referent type than
the interpretation of count syntax. The number bias found in
Experiment 1 disappeared mainly for mass nouns when
referents were changed from discrete physical objects to
non-solid substances.
  Table 1
  Summary of results for Experiments 1 and 2
  (4 = effect of syntax; 8= no effect of syntax)
Solids Non-solids
W.E.1 Q.J.2 W.E. Q.J.
3-year olds 4 8 8 4
Adults 4 4 4 4
1 Word extension
2 Quantity judgment
These results (summarized in Table 1) have three
important consequences. First, children appear to employ
distinct mechanisms for performing quantity judgments and
word extensions. The main source of this difference, and of
the difference between children and adults in this study, was
children’s treatment of simple solid objects. While both
adults and children quantified by number for mass nouns
that referred to complex objects, only children quantified by
number for mass nouns that referred to simple objects and
that were extended by substance. Interestingly, these results
appear to be consistent with observations that young
children are biased to enumerate spatio-temporally defined
individuals when counting segmented objects (e.g., counting
a fork cut in half as two forks; see Shippley & Shepperson,
1990; Wagner & Carey, 2003). In these tasks, children are
unable to use criteria of individuation for specific words,
despite being able to correctly extend them. By analogy,
when performing quantity judgments, children seem to
ignore criteria of individuation for newly learned words and
instead employ the more primitive criteria of the “object”
sortal (Xu, 1997). Children appear to base quantification on
spatio-temporal individuals whenever arrays are composed
of physical objects, and only later in acquisition use specific
sortal information to guide judgments.
It should be noted that although a spatio-temporal bias
may account for the content of individuals that children
quantified (i.e. rather than specific sortal knowledge) it
cannot explain the failure of mass syntax to determine the
dimension of measurement. Our evidence suggests that 3-
year-olds are only beginning to understand the effect of
mass-count syntax on quantification, and that they do not
have strong syntax-semantics mappings of the type
proposed by Bloom (1999). Thus, this study provides
further evidence children never use one-to-one mappings
** p < .06
* p < .06
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between syntax and semantics of the type proposed by
Bloom (1999). Instead, it seems that only count syntax is
ever truly specified for a uniform interpretation (Barner &
Snedeker, 2004).
Given children’s difficulty using syntax to guide quantity
judgment, how do they succeed with word extension?
Minimally, the task requires an ability to distinguish mass
and count distributional frames and to determine a novel
word’s criteria of application, or content. One possibility is
that these two types of knowledge are sufficient for solving
word extension, and may operate somewhat independently
of actual mass-count semantics. For example, children may
observe that a novel term like blicket has been used in the
same syntax as a word like plastic, for which shape is an
irrelevant dimension, and therefore extend the word on the
basis of substance. Novel word extensions may be made on
the basis of correlations between mass-count syntax and
previous extensions, and may be the product of simple
mappings between content and syntax, bypassing noun
phrase quantification altogether.
Based on this, our results suggest an ability to use mass-
count syntax to guide word extension by 2;6 (e.g., Soja,
1992) may not reflect mature knowledge of mass-count
semantics. Even by 3;6, children are only beginning to
understand the full effect of mass-count syntax on
quantification, which arguably defines the distinction. Early
in acquisition, children may approximate adult behavior
conditions by exploiting correlations between content and
distributional frames, and by employing ontologically based
biases for interpreting quantifiers like “more”. Sometime
between 3;6 and 4, children appear to recognize that count
syntax specifies number as a dimension for comparison, and
that in this way it differs from mass syntax (Barner &
Snedeker, 2004). Mass nouns continue to be interpreted
based on lexical properties, as shown by adults in this study,
and never specify a uniform dimension for measurement.
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Abstract
When addressing conditional inducements using a multi-
level approach, several cognitive components appear to
be of basic character: linguistic preferences for either a
promise or threat are connected to the motivational
background; the concepts themselves are unilateral and
complementary; and emotional responses in subsequent
interactions follow appraisal-theoretic predictions.
Whether these apparently essential components really are
basic was examined in a cross-cultural experiment
conducted in Tonga. The results support the conceptual
universality; however, in practice, the Tongan participants
tended to avoid threats in favor of promises and indicated
less anger following broken promises.
Introduction
In pursuing their own individual goals, people occasion-
ally feel a need to change the behavior of others accord-
ingly. When asking to have one’s intentions considered
is not of much use, a strategy often chosen is to formu-
late a conditional promise or threat. For instance, a
mother longing for silence may tell her noisy son: “If
you are quiet for the next hour, I will give you an ice-
cream.” Or, being already unnerved, she may say
instead: “If you are not quiet for the next hour, there will
be no TV this afternoon!” Being intrigued by the pleas-
ant anticipation of an ice-cream the boy might feel moti-
vated to fulfill her request; if she then fails to keep her
promise, his positive affects will turn negative.
Conditional promises and threats operate, as these
introductory examples show, with goals, expectations,
incentives or penalties, and obligations (cf. von Wright,
1962). They express personal motives and are formu-
lated in a specific linguistic manner (Fillenbaum, 1978).
They demand a decision whether or not to cooperate,
and subsequent actions are often followed by emotional
reactions. In order to efficiently work as inducements,
knowledge about these components needs to be – and
usually is – shared among the partners of an interaction.
But is this knowledge also shared across cultures? In
other words, is the understanding of conditional induce-
ments culture-specific or do conditional promises and
threats belong to the core concepts of human thinking
and acting that are universally equal? If the latter is the
case, are there certain aspects of conditional induce-
ments that vary across languages and cultures? Will the
interactions subsequent to inducements universally elicit
emotional reactions, and if so, are the same emotions
then elicited, or will appraisals – and thus the emotional
reactions – differ?
In the reasoning tradition, the analysis of people’s
understanding of conditional promises and threats
focuses on the conditional relation (e.g., Evans & Twy-
man-Musgrove, 1998; Newstead, Ellis, Evans & Dennis,
1997). By evaluating the inferences that people draw
from such statements with the yardstick of propositional
logic, it was possible to identify several extra-logical
factors: the temporal order of the actions, the promisor’s
control of the incentive, and the directionality. While
this approach helps to detect effects of particular con-
tents on reasoning, it is not sufficient to explain them. To
overcome this limitation, a broader multi-level approach
was recently proposed and empirically tested (Beller,
2002; Beller, Bender & Kuhnmünch, 2004; cf. Beller &
Spada, 2003). It builds on a motivational analysis of
why conditional inducements are used, and integrates
linguistic, deontic, behavioral and emotional aspects.
So far, most of the experimental data has been gath-
ered in “Western” cultures, leaving the question of
whether consensus on conditional inducements may
extend beyond cultural boundaries open. To tackle this
question, we therefore replicated one of our German
experiments in a culture that largely differs from our
individualistic Western culture: the Polynesian King-
dom of Tonga. Before presenting the results, we will
address the theoretical background and give a short
description of relevant aspects of Tongan culture.
Components of Conditional Inducements
Conditional promises and threats are speech acts
(Searle, 1969) that are motivated by personal goals (i.e.
to obtain something with another person’s support) and
expectations of this person’s behavior. The speaker (S)
wants an addressee (A) to perform a certain behavior
with a positive value for the speaker (S+: BehaviorA).
The speaker must expect that the addressee is not will-
ing to show this behavior voluntarily (S–: ¬BehaviorA);
otherwise an inducement would not be necessary. Thus,
the speaker has to induce a behavioral change, which
can be motivated in two ways: by promising to reward
the desired behavior (å A+: RewardS) or by threatening
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to punish the undesired behavior (å A–: PunishmentS).
These consequences should be under the speaker’s con-
trol and should not occur for any other reason, as other-
wise they would not be able to develop their
motivational effect. The different motivational back-
ground of promises and threats are summarized in the
following schemas (grey boxes depict the expected
actions without the inducement):
In both cases, the addressee can freely decide whether
to cooperate or not; the speaker then responds to the
addressee’s behavior, that is, the actions are ordered
temporally. Further, the speaker may use a conditional
“If P, then Q” to express the inducement. A conditional
points out a necessary consequence “Q” of an anteced-
ent possibility “P”, and that is exactly what the speaker
intends to do on the motivational level. The canonical
formulations are:
“If you do P [S+], then I will reward you with Q [A+]”
“If you do P [S–], then I will punish you by Q [A–]”.
Due to the temporal order of the events, neither of the
conditionals is reversible, and yet they are tightly inter-
woven. The speaker always announces (explicitly or
implicitly) that he or she will react positively after the
addressee has shown the desired behavior, and nega-
tively otherwise. The threat may thus be interpreted as
implying the complementary promise
“If you refrain from doing P [S+],
then I will not punish you by Q [A+].”
While the addressee can freely decide whether to
cooperate or not, the speaker cannot. If the addressee
cooperates, the speaker is obligated to cooperate as
well, and when intentionally violating this obligation,
the speaker cheats the addressee.
Because the addressee is induced to change a planned
behavior – and may experience a positive or negative
consequence – the respective interaction will most prob-
ably elicit an emotional reaction, as the event has con-
siderable goal relevance (Lazarus, 1991). According to
appraisal theories (cf. Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Rose-
man, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; Scherer, 1997), joy should
be elicited when the addressee obtains what was prom-
ised to him or her, relief in the case of avoided punish-
ment, and anger in the case of being cheated.
These linguistic and emotional predictions were con-
firmed in two studies with German samples (Beller,
2002; Beller, Bender & Kuhnmünch, 2004). Participants
preferred the canonical conditionals as appropriate for-
mulations for an intended promise or threat. These are
understood as not reversible, but as implying the com-
plementary threat (or promise). The emotional reactions
were chosen by the participants as predicted by
appraisal theories. The question remains, though, of
how these components are defined by members of a
completely different culture, particularly one in which
individualism is not as marked as in “Western” culture.
Will their linguistic preferences and emotional reactions
converge with – or diverge from – those obtained in
Germany?
The Context of Social Interactions in Tonga
The Kingdom of Tonga, an island state in the South-
western Pacific with a Polynesian culture, is inhabited
by roughly 100 000 people. The island group of Ha'apai,
where the data was collected, is one of its most tradi-
tional areas with approximately 10 000 people living on
two main islands and fifteen outer islands.
Tongan society is hierarchically structured with older
people having higher rank than younger ones, sisters
higher than brothers, and nobles higher than common-
ers. While this rank is ascribed through birth, status can
be acquired through individual efforts. However, these
individual efforts need to pursue common interests, and
among the most prestigious behavior is therefore engag-
ing in social activities, keeping social ties and comply-
ing with social norms (Bernstein, 1983; Marcus, 1978).
Social harmony is particularly emphasized and conse-
quently, negative emotions such as anger ('ita) or envy
(meheka) as well as open conflicts are disapproved of.
Failing to restrain one’s negative emotions is shameful
and may diminish one’s social status (Morton, 1996).
Cooperation and sharing with others are core values. In
exchange situations, certain (though mostly implicit)
rules apply, depending for instance on the object of the
deal or the participants’ relative social status and rank
(e.g. Bender, 2002; Evans, 2001).
Most of this contextual knowledge still does not
reveal how Tongans understand and deal with condi-
tional promises and threats. In principle, we presumed
that the basic understanding of conditional inducements
does not differ across cultures, but that their use may
differ: depending on what is socially more accepted,
either promises or threats may be preferred. With regard
to appraisal processes, we further presumed a similar
pattern of emotional responses. Taking into account the
disapproval of socially disruptive behavior, however, we
also expected a smaller proportion of both threats and
indication of anger in the Tongan sample.
Experiment
In order to investigate the impact of culture on under-
standing and dealing with conditional inducements, we
replicated a study we had conducted on linguistic pref-
erences and emotional reactions in Germany (Beller,
Bender & Kuhnmünch, 2004, Experiment 1) in Tonga.
S–: ¬BehaviorA PunishmentSå A–:
BehaviorAS+: RewardS
A–: ¬RewardSPromise
å
S–: ¬BehaviorA
A+:
Threat
BehaviorAS+: A+: ¬PunishmentS
{
{
Goal of S
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Method
Participants. Sixty-seven students from two classes of
St. Joseph’s College in Pangai participated in the experi-
ment. St. Joseph’s College is the second largest of four
secondary schools in the district center of the Ha'apai
island group. Thirty-one students were male and thirty-
five female (one did not indicate his or her gender). The
mean age was M = 15.4 years (SD = 0.83; range: 14-17
years). Both classes received a small gift for their partic-
ipation in the form of a contribution (50 pa'anga,
approximately 33 US dollars) to their class funds.
Materials. As in the original study, we used two pairs
of questionnaires that referred to a situation in which a
boy would like to obtain something from a schoolmate.
Sione wants to borrow Finau’s bike, while Finau wants
Sione to help him with his homework. Within each pair,
the speech act was varied. In the first pair, Sione was in
the role of the speaker and used either a promise to
reach his goal (promise version) or a complementary
threat (threat version). In the second pair, the role allo-
cation was switched, with Finau now in the role of the
speaker trying to reach his goal either by a (reversed)
promise or by a complementary threat. Each question-
naire comprised four tasks.
(1) In the formulation task, the individual goals of
both boys were given. For example, the promise version
of Sione’s inducement reads as follows (threat version
printed in square brackets): Usually, Finau doesn’t lend
his bike to his schoolmates. However, Sione wants to
borrow it today. Sione tries to reach this goal by promis-
ing [threatening] Finau [with] something. Sione knows
that Finau would like his help with his homework today,
but usually Sione does not help him [and usually Sione
helps him]. The instructions then required the partici-
pants to choose the most appropriate conditional for the
speaker’s promise [threat] from four possible formula-
tions: the canonical, the complementary, and the two
reversed statements.
Each of the other three tasks first presented the speech
act in canonical form, for example: Sione promised:
“Finau, if you lend me your bike, then I will help you
with your homework” [Sione threatened: “Finau, if you
do not lend me your bike, then I will not help you with
your homework.”] (2) The sequence task asked partici-
pants to identify the typical sequence of actions once the
conditional promise or threat has been uttered: Will
Finau or Sione be the first to decide to act? (3) The
inference task asked participants to draw the most prob-
able conclusion from the given canonical conditional:
What follows – the complementary, the reversed, or the
reversed-complementary conditional? (4) The emotion
task stated that the addressee has fulfilled the speaker’s
goal. The instruction then required participants to indi-
cate first the speaker’s action when “keeping the rule”
(vs. “not keeping the rule”) and second, the addressee’s
feeling towards the speaker afterwards. Four critical
emotions were given (Tongan translation in brackets):
joy (fiefia), relief (fiemalie), sadness (loto-mamahi), and
anger ('ita). For exploratory purposes, we also included
shame (ma), un-amusement (ta'eoli) and anxiety (mana-
vahe), as these emotions seem to be particularly salient
in the Tongan context. Participants were instructed to
choose the most appropriate emotion.
All materials were presented in the participants’
native language, that is Tongan in this study and German
in the original study. Both languages have close equiva-
lents to the English terms “promise” and “threat”, and
the situations described are familiar in both cultures.
Design and procedure. A between-subject design
was used. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the four experimental conditions (n = 16 or 17 for each)
corresponding to the four questionnaires. The data col-
lection took place in the classrooms. Each participant
received a booklet with a general instruction and the
four tasks in the following order: formulation, sequence,
inference, and emotion task. Participants were instructed
to answer all questions in the given order, and they were
granted as much time as they needed.
Results
As we found only marginal differences between the two
promise versions and between the two threat versions,
the data is reported in aggregated form. The comparative
data of the German study is taken from Beller, Bender
and Kuhnmünch (2004, Experiment 1).
Formulation task: We expected participants to
choose the canonical promise or threat. The formulation
preferences are shown in Table 1. In the German sam-
ple, on average 89.2 % of the participants chose the
canonical form equally for promises and threats
(χ2(1, N = 65) = 1.34; p = .247). The Tongan results dif-
fered from this in two respects. First, the canonical con-
ditional was chosen less frequently (52.2 % on average),
and second, this difference mainly resulted from a spe-
cific formulation preference: while most Tongan partici-
pants also preferred the canonical promise, many of
them indicated that, when a threat was to be made, the
speaker should rather use the complementary promise
instead (χ2(1, n = 52) = 6.10; p = .014).
Sequence task: We expected both conditional prom-
ises and threats to be understood as unilateral speech
acts that imply a typical action sequence: the addressee
Table 1: Proportions of choosing each conditional as the
speaker’s adequate promise or threat.
Germany Tonga
Conditional
Promise
(n = 32)
Threat
(n = 33)
Promise
(n = 33)
Threat
(n = 34)
Canonical .94 .85 .64 .41
Complementary .06 .15 .12 .38
Reversed – – .18 –
Rev.-complementary – – .06 .21
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first decides whether or not to cooperate. The predicted
sequence was chosen by 87.8% of the participants in the
German sample (N = 66) and by 74.6% in the Tongan
sample (N = 67) aggregated across all four task versions
(p < 0.001 based on the binomial distribution with
r = 1/2 being the probability of guessing).
Inference task: We expected participants to choose
the complementary conditional “If not-P then not-Q” as
the most appropriate inference from a given canonical
promise or threat “If P then Q”. The results are shown in
Table 2. In the German sample, 85.9 % of the partici-
pants inferred the predicted conditional on average.
There was no significant difference between promises
and threats (χ2(1, n = 63) = .648; p = .421). Again, the
Tongan data differed from the German data – the com-
plementary conditional was chosen less frequently
(56.7 % on average) – and this difference again resulted
from a specific inferential preference. While most Ton-
gan participants also preferred the complementary con-
ditional as the most reasonable inference from a threat,
many of them – consistent with their formulation prefer-
ence – avoided inferring the complementary threat from
a promise in favor of the reversed promise (χ2(1, n = 60)
= 3.79; p = .051).
Emotion task: Participants were first required to
decide which action the speaker has to take in order to
keep “the rule” (i.e., to cooperate given that the
addressee cooperated before) or not to keep “the rule”
(i.e., to react defectively even though the addressee ful-
filled the speaker’s goal). Almost all participants indi-
cated the appropriate action (all participants in the
German sample and 96.3% in the Tongan sample, aggre-
gated over both questions; n = 134 answers).
How does the addressee respond emotionally after the
speaker did or did not keep “the rule”? The results of the
emotion tasks are shown in Table 3. In line with
appraisal theories of emotion, the addressee was said to
feel a positive emotion if the speaker kept the rule
(85.8 % positive vs. 14.2 % negative), and a negative
emotion was said to result if the speaker did not keep the
rule (3.0 % positive vs. 97.0 % negative; χ2(1, n = 267
answers) = 185.3; p < 0.001).
Separate analyses were performed for the cooperative
and the non-cooperative situation in both samples. The
dependent variable “emotion” was classified into three
categories in both cases: relief, joy, and all other emo-
tions in the cooperative situation, and sadness, anger,
and all other emotions in the uncooperative situation.
In the German sample, keeping the promise resulted
in joy (joy: 66.7 %; relief: 27.3 %), while in the case of
an avoided threat, relief predominated (joy: 18.2 %;
relief: 51.5 %; χ2(1, n = 54) = 10.65; p = 0.001). Inter-
estingly, 24.2 % of the participants indicated that the
addressee feels angry, apparently because the addressee
was “forced” to cooperate by a threat, as described by
Heilmann and Garner (1975). In the Tongan sample, the
addressee was quite uniformly said to feel joy (joy:
65.7 %; relief: 25.4 % on average), independent of the
speech act (χ2(1, n = 61) = 0.604; p = 0.437).
In cases where the speaker did not keep the rule, we
expected a difference between the two cultures with
regard to the attribution of anger. The data supports this
prediction. While the German participants predomi-
nantly ascribed anger (anger: 92.4 %; sadness: 7.6 %),
half of the Tongan participants indicated that the
addressee will feel sad in this situation (anger: 26.9 %;
sadness: 50.7 %; χ2(1, n = 118) = 43.9; p < 0.001).
Discussion
The cultural comparison revealed many commonalities
in the understanding of conditional promises and
threats, but also some characteristic differences.
First, both German and Tongan participants chose for-
mulations and inferences with the addressee’s action in
the antecedent proposition in accordance with the typi-
cal action sequence “addressee first”. The Tongan par-
ticipants, however, tended to avoid explicit threats and
preferred to use promises instead.
Second, conditional inducements have a potential for
emotional interactions in both cultures. Positive and
Table 2: Proportions of choosing the most adequate
implication of a given promise or threat.
Germany Tonga
Conditional
Promise
(n = 33)
Threat
(n = 31)
Promise
(n = 33)
Threat
(n = 34)
Canonical given given given given
Complementary .88 .84 .48 .65
Reversed .09 .16 .45 .21
Rev.-complementary .03 – .06 .15
Table 3: Proportions of choosing emotional reactions of
the addressee (+ positive; – negative) when the speaker
did vs. did not keep the rule.
Germany Tonga
Emotion
Promise
(n = 33)a
a Due to missing/double answers, the proportions
do not always add up to 1.00 in these columns.
Threat
(n = 33)a
Promise
(n = 33)
Threat
(n = 34)
The Speaker Kept the Rule
Relief (+) .27 .52 .21 .29
Joy (+) .67 .18 .70 .62
Others (–) .09 .30 .09 .09
The Speaker Did Not Keep the Rule
Sadness (–) .09 .06 .48 .53
Anger (–) .94 .91 .27 .26
Others (+/–) – – .24 .21
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negative emotions were generally attributed in line with
appraisal-theoretic predictions. Consistent with findings
from another domain (Bender, 2001), indication of
angry reactions is largely reduced in Tonga: in Germany,
anger clearly predominated over sadness after the
speaker’s defection, while the Tongan sample showed
the reversed pattern, with sadness twice as frequent as
anger. While we had expected a difference for the nega-
tive emotions, we had not expected any difference for
the positive ones, but found that the German students
distinguished between joy and relief depending on the
speech act whereas the Tongan participants did not.
In general, the differences found in the Tongan sam-
ple can be explained by the cultural background.
The tendency of roughly half of the participants to
avoid threats in favor of promises is in accordance with
respective social rules. In addition, as cooperation and
particularly sharing with others are core values in Ton-
gan society, threats may simply be not appropriate as a
means of initiating an exchange.
A conclusion from the affective differences is not as
easy to draw. With regard to the emotional reaction upon
the speaker’s non-cooperation, two explanations are con-
ceivable: the lack of anger indication may either be due
to the fact that anger is socially not acceptable or that it
arises less often in such situations. The latter could be
the case if not fulfilling one’s obligation to reciprocate is
regarded as so unusual that this failure is appraised dif-
ferently, thus giving rise to different emotions.
Taking together findings from other domains allows
us to presume that our Tongan participants may indeed
have appraised the described event differently from the
German sample. Several studies have indicated that –
despite the culture independence of most appraisal
dimensions – cultural differences do occur with regard
to goals and values and with regard to certain appraisals
that involve rather complex concepts such as causation
or responsibility (e.g., Mauro, Sato & Tucker, 1992;
Norenzayan, Choi & Nisbett, 1999). The latter concepts
are directly relevant for anger as this emotion is elicited
if another person is held personally responsible for a
negative event. Personal responsibility, however, is not
as easily ascribed in some cultures as it is in Western
ones. Particularly in cultures with an interdependent
self-concept (cf. Markus & Kitayama, 1991), causal
attributions are more often also made in view of the cir-
cumstances (cf. Morris, Nisbett & Peng, 1995). The
ambivalent or rather open description of the experimen-
tal scenario may thus lead to two different interpreta-
tions of the speaker’s non-cooperation: in Germany,
participants may interpret the scenario as involving a
rather high level of personal responsibility, while the
Tongan participants may also take circumstances into
account. This difference would then result in diverging
emotional responses: a dominance of angry reactions in
Germany, but one of sad reactions in Tonga. This inter-
pretation is supported by findings from a subsequent
experiment in Germany (Beller, Bender & Kuhnmünch,
2004, Experiment 2) in which we varied personal
responsibility: Anger dominated in situations with high
personal responsibility and decreased in favor of sad
reactions in situations with low responsibility.
The different indications of joy versus relief upon
mutual cooperation after a threat also reflect cultural dif-
ferences. On the one hand, this may again be due to differ-
ent appraisal patterns. Focusing on the positive outcome of
cooperation elicits joy (as in the Tongan sample), while
focusing on the transition from an expected negative out-
come to the final positive one elicits relief (as in the Ger-
man sample). On the other hand, the difference may also
have lexical origins. There is no Tongan word that pre-
cisely translates as “relief”. The word we chose (after dis-
cussing the content scenarios with our Tongan partners)
was fiemalie. This comes closest to “relief”, but also
encompasses “to be easy in mind, contented, satisfied, free
from pain, discomfort or sorrow”. These connotations
could also be the reason why some of our Tongan partici-
pants did not choose fiemalie in the particular situation.
This last point highlights a particular difficulty of lan-
guage-based cross-cultural research: even if terms exist
that have the same core meaning across languages, they
often contain a spectrum of connotations that do not
map. Although well known (e.g., Tihanyi, 2002), this
problem is not easy to resolve. While a linguistic tool
has been developed in recent years for identifying and
describing such differences in meaning (Wierzbicka,
1993, 1999), there is no way to circumvent them. Data
interpretation thus requires the differences in meaning to
be noted, and may indeed even profit from this insight
into different semantic fields of a concept.
As we have seen, conditional inducements are fairly
complex concepts as they involve personal values and
goals, a social consensus on reciprocity and obligations,
the consideration of the situational context, and an esti-
mation of the addressee’s goals and the appropriateness
of the chosen inducement. Complex concepts by no
means generally converge across cultures, as has been
shown to be the case, for instance, with concepts of cau-
sality (Boyer, 1996; Morris, Menon & Ames, 2001),
concepts of the self (Kanagawa, Cross & Markus,
2001), or even spatial concepts (Levinson, 1996). Our
cross-cultural comparisons suggest, though, that con-
cepts of deontic social norms (Bender & Beller, 2003)
and of promises and threats comparable to ours do exist
in a completely different culture. When used to induce
an exchange, however, they are used somewhat differ-
ently, and subsequent interactions may result in different
emotional responses.
In a certain sense, the results of the study produced
more questions than they answered. For this reason, a
replication of the second experiment by Beller, Bender
and Kuhnmünch (2004), which addresses the ascription
of responsibility more thoroughly and includes deontic
aspects, is being conducted in Tonga. As it is part of an
anthropological inquiry into the cultural context of
promises and threats, participant observation and in-
depth interviewing will provide further data that may
bolster the ecological validity of our present results.
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Abstract
The aim of this study was to investigate the construction
of a retrieval structure during reading, according to the
hypothesis that text macrostructure is used in Long-term
working memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) to maintain
encoded information in an accessible format. We first
designed an experiment for testing the hypothesis that
retrieval structure is a macrostructure of the text. Then,
we conceived and run a model inspired by  CI-LSA
Framework (Kintsch, Patel & Ericsson, 1999) in which a
generalization process create macropropositions. Results
are that simulation data were found to be highly
correlated with participants' data.
Macrostructure as Retrieval structure
Classical view of working memory assumes that during
reading relevant information is stored in a Short Term
Memory Buffer (STMB; Baddeley, 2000; Kintsch,
1988). In contrast, Ericsson & Kintsch (1995) argued
that during reading, readers could encode information
in an accessible format in a retrieval structure in long-
term working memory (LTWM) consisting of retrieval
cues associated with encoded information in Long Term
Memory (LTM). Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) showed
that clearing STMB by using a reading interruption
procedure (Glanzer, Fisher & Dorfman, 1984) does not
lead to comprehension impairment. We have also
shown that the more a text is familiar, the more readers
can construct an efficient LTM retrieval structure based
on the content of the text (Bellissens & Denhière, 1998;
Denhière & Bellissens, 1999).
A CI-LSA Framework has been proposed (Kintsch,
1998 ; Kintsch, Patel & Ericsson, 1999) to explain LT-
WM intervention in the comprehension process. The
main characteristic of this framework is the
combination of a model of semantic memory, LSA
(Landauer & Dumais, 1997), and of a model of
comprehension, CI (Kintsch, 1988).
LSA represents potential signification of words
belonging to a textual corpus in a semantic space. In the
semantic space, vectors represent the words and the
cosine of the contained angle of two vectors is an
estimation of their respective words similarity. The
more the cosine is close to 1, the more the two words
are considered as semantically similar. The cosine
similarity can be used to weight links in an associative
network in which each node is a word. In CI, the use of
associative network is the way to represent activated
knowledge associated with concepts and propositions
derived from text processing. Hence, architecture of a
text segment representation in CI-LSA is a network that
comprehends propositions and concepts (nodes) linked
with each other by relations (links) weighted by LSA
cosine. This CI-LSA combination improves the
previous comprehension model proposed by Kintsch
(1988) by the fact that LSA can model knowledge base
in CI.
While Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) assumed that the
episodic structure of a text could be a retrieval
structure, Kintsch, Patel and Ericsson (1999) did not
explain exactly how the CI-LSA framework simulates
the construction of a retrieval structure. We assume that
each text segment processing results in an individual
episodic trace. We propose that the set of episodic
traces generated by the text processing is replaced by a
macrostructure, resulting from the application of a
generalization process (O'Reilly & Rudy, 2000). This
generalization process generates macropropositions that
are associated with the encoded information for further
use as semantic retrieval cues. We argue that if two
relevant segments of a text, associated with such
retrieval cues, are given after a reading interruption,
readers should easily reinstate these retrieval cues and
counteract the interruption effect. For example, imagine
an individual reads a text about the invention of a
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machine. He/she reads that the machine has a particular
function. Then, the text says that the machine includes
one component with a specific function, then a second
component with an other specific function. At this
moment, the reading is interrupted and then resumed
after the presentation of a probe sentence. After
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) and Bellissens and
Denhière (2003), the probe sentence should help reader
for reinstated semantic cues in STM associated with
information encoded in LTM when the previous text
has been processed.
The present paper tries to explain how this
reinstatement usually occurs and how the reinstatement
depends on the organization of the retrieval structure.
As we assume that the construction of the retrieval
structure is a generalization process, we predict that a
sentence mentioning the two components of the
machine is a better probe sentence than a sentence
comprising two distinct facts: the machine function and
the function of a machine component; Indeed, the first
type of probe sentence relies on a particular part of the
retrieval structure of the text, a macroproposition:
machine usually possesses components. The second
relies on two separated parts of the macrostructure: the
functions of the machine and its component.
What we have just described is a formal view of the
conditions we constructed for the following experiment.
We predict that if a categorical probe sentence (CAT) is
inserted after a reading interruption, readers should
resume the reading faster than with a functional probe
sentence (FUN).
Table 1: Texts facts
Nb Sentence
Title The /Machine/
1 The /Machine/ was invented in /Date/ by
/Inventor/
2 The /Machine/ possesses a /Component 1/ to
/Component 1 Function /.
3 The /Machine/ is mainly used to /Main
Function of the Machine/.
4 The /Machine/ possesses a /Component 2/ to
/Component 2 Function /.
5 This component thus contributes to the function
of the /Machine/.
6 Since its invention, the /Machine/ is an
equipment that was modernized.
7 The modernization of the /Machine/ was useful
for the development of /Human Domain/.
CAT The /Machine/ possesses a /Component 1/ and a
/component 2/ to /Component 2 Function /.
FUN The /Machine/ is used to /Main Function of the
Machine/ and possesses a /Component 2/ to
/Component 2 Function /.
ORI The /Machine/ possesses a /Component 2/ to
/Component 2 Function/.
Experiment
Participants
Participants were 64 students from Université de
Provence, Aix-en-Provence, France.
Materials and Procedure
Twelve pairs of experimental texts and eight pairs of
filler texts were generated. A text pair consisted of a
main text, an interrupting text, and five comprehension
questions. The main experimental texts and the main
filler texts described a machine (e.g., the automobile,
the elevator, the phonograph, etc.). The main
experimental texts all had the same structure (see, Table
1) but the main filler texts did not. The interrupting
texts were stories totally unrelated to the main texts.
An experimental trial included the presentation of the
main text, the interrupting text, and five text
comprehension questions. It began with the self-paced
display of the main text, sentence by sentence. An
experimental trial included the presentation of a main
text, an interrupting text, and five text comprehension
questions. It began with the self-paced display of the
main text, sentence by sentence. To go on to the next
sentence, the reader had to press the space bar on the
keyboard. Sentence 2 of the main texts mentioned a
machine component and its particular function.
Sentence 3 stated the general function of the machine.
Sentence 4 gave a second machine component and its
particular function. Then a message saying "Attention!
Reading time is limited" ("Attention ! Lecture en temps
fixé") appeared on the screen. This message stayed on
the screen for 1500 ms and meant that the interrupting
text would start on the next page. The interrupting text
was displayed sentence by sentence for a fixed amount
of time (4500 ms per sentence). After the presentation
of the interrupting text, a message saying "Attention!
Reading time no longer limited" ("Attention ! Lecture
en temps libre") appeared on the screen.
Then, one of 4 Probe sentences was displayed: either
(i) the original Probe Sentence that was the sentence 4
of the main text (ORI), or (ii) categorical Probe
Sentence that contained the two machine components
and the second component specific function (CAT), or
(iii) a functional Probe Sentence that contained the
general machine function, the second component and its
specific function (FUN); or (iv) a without Relation
Sentence that was a new sentence (WRE). Following
the display of the probe sentence, a critical sentence 5
was then displayed. Sentence 5 contained an anaphoric
device; the referent was the machine component
mentioned in sentence 4 (see, table 2).
In each list, 50% of the main texts were interrupted:
Filler texts were never interrupted.
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At the end of reading, participants were asked to
answer 4 comprehension questions about the main text
and 2 comprehension questions about the interrupting
text. Second question was the critical question for
assessing understanding because its correct answer
depends on the encoding of the correct antecedent to
anaphora in the fifth sentence.
In the control condition, the first part of the main texts
was not displayed; and in the experimental condition,
all materials were presented.
Results
Control condition. In the control condition, the first
part of the text was not presented. Results are that the
critical sentence was read faster in the cued conditions
than in the without relation condition, 4221 ms vs. 4597
ms, F(1,31) = 3,6 p<.05. The critical sentence was read
at a same rate in the ORI, CAT and FUN conditions.
Note that the sixth sentence was read faster in the probe
sentence conditions than in the WRE condition, 3488
ms vs. 3823 ms, F(1,31) = 4,86 p<.05. Percentage of
correct answers to the critical question was greater in
the FUN condition than in the CAT condition, 85% vs.
55%, F(1,31) = 6,49 p<.05 and was greater in the probe
sentence conditions than in the WRE condition, 76% vs
42 %, F(1,35) = 7,8 p<.01.
Table 2: example of text (translated from French)
Nb Sentence
Title The elevator
1 The elevator was invented in 1859 by the
American Otis.
2 The elevator possesses a sliding door to protect
the users from the outside.
3 The elevator is mainly used to reach the floors
of a building.
4 The elevator comprises a solid winch that
controls the rise of the cabin.
5 This component thus contributes to the utility of
the elevator.
6 Since its invention, the elevator is equipment
that was modernized.
7 The modernization of the elevator was useful
for the development of the residences.
CAT The elevator possesses a sliding door and a
solid winch that controls the rise of the cabin.
FUN The elevator is used to reach the floors of a
building and comprises a solid winch that
controls the rise of the cabin.
ORI The elevator comprises a solid winch that
controls the rise of the cabin.
Experimental condition. The critical sentence was
read faster in the CAT condition than in the FUN
condition, 3869 ms vs. 4437 ms, F(1,31) = 9.33 p<.01.
The percentage of correct answers to the critical
question was greater in the probe sentence condition
than in the WRE condition, 55.6% vs. 36.0%, F(1,31) =
3.9 p<.05., but there was no difference between the
CAT and the FUN conditions.
Simulation with CI-LSA+Generalisation
Framework
Procedure
Construction Phase. We assumed that a text segment
could be represented as an associative network
consisting in an explicit and an implicit representation.
Explicit representation is the result of a predication
analysis of the segment. Implicit representation
contained the assumed activated knowledge associated
with the concepts and the propositions embedded in the
text segments. In the model, the implicit representation
was made of all of the nearest neighbors (n=2), taken in
an LSA space (General reading up to 1st year college),
of each of the concepts and propositions represented in
the explicit network. Explicit network was weighted by
using the rules provided by Kintsch (1988): link
weights between propositions and argument, embedded
propositions, and proposition that shared an argument
were equal to 1 while others were equal to zero.
Implicit network was weighted by using cosine
similarity from LSA space. If between two vectors,
expressing elements of the net, cosine was .20, the
weight of their link in the network was .20.
Integration Phase. This phase is described in Kintsch
(1988). Here, the integration phase simulated activation
spreading in the net. When the network was settled, the
more connected information got the greatest final
activation value and for that reason remained in a short-
term memory buffer, for the next sentence processing.
Short term working memory. Short-term working
memory was involved in the construction and
integration phases and in the accessibility of the most
activated information. Short-term memory in the model
is a temporary memory buffer. It contained the most
activated information at the end of a processing cycle.
We transformed all final activation values in z-notes.
Let a be the average of the activation values, e the
standard deviation of the distribution vi the final
activation value of a node I, the z-note of I is:
zi =(vi –a)/e.
Only the nodes with z-notes above a given constant
were kept in the Short-Term Memory buffer. Hence, the
number of elements in the buffer varied as a function of
a limited amount of activation and of the network
weighting.
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In order to simulate a reading interruption as in the
experiment, we emptied the memory buffer: We did not
keep any nodes of the last processed sentence.
Long-term working memory. Long-term working
memory was a retrieval structure consisting in encoded
information and macropropositions associated with it.
To simulate the construction of a retrieval structure, we
build up a matrix containing in row, all activated
information during the different processing cycles and,
in column, the different processing cycles. Each cell of
the matrix contained the final activation value of an
element in a given cycle. If the element was not
activated in the given cycle, the cell contained a zero.
Hence, this matrix contained all episodic memory
vectors. To this matrix was applied a singular value
decomposition to simulate a generalization process. The
decomposition resulted in three matrices (see, Landauer
& Dumais, 1997) but we use the matrix representing the
coordinates of each element in a memory space. The
elements belonging to that space were projected in a
two-dimensional space by reducing its dimensionality.
The procedure resulted in a two-column matrix. The
macrostructure matrix was the product of the two-
column matrix and its transposed matrix. The
macrostructure matrix was considered as a
generalization of the episodic memory traces encoded
from the text.
Table 3 : reading times (RT) and activation forces (AF)
of the critical sentence and the probe sentence in
Original (ORI), categorical (CAT) and functional
(FUN) conditions.
Critical sentence Probe sentence
ORI CAT FUN ORI CAT FUN
RT 14,29 13,16 15,09 8,96 6,94 6,04
AF 11,36 13,76 11,07 11,80 16,66 17,87
Macropropositions reinstatement and reading
resumption. After a reading interruption, we assume
that readers might be able to readily retrieve mental
representation of the text from long-term working
memory by reinstating cues associated with encoded
information. In the model, macropropositions were
reinstated in the short-term memory buffer and were
used as context to process the next sentence. As in the
experiment above, we used three kind of probe
sentences. In a first step, we constructed for each, an
episodic trace. As they resume some parts of the
previous text, their representation shared information
with previous sentences that now belonged to the
macrostructure matrix. But the shared information was
not as such important for each probe sentence. In the
categorical condition, information given by the probe
sentence referred to a categorical macroproposition
"machine has component", while in the functional
condition, the probe sentence referred to "machine has a
function" and "component has a function". In a second
step, we multiplied the episodic vector trace of the
probe sentence by the macrostructure matrix. The result
of the product was an echo vector. We z-transformed
the coordinates of the echo vector and only kept the z-
notes above 1.5. The respective nodes were taken to
make part of the critical sentence network. In a final
step, activation spread in the critical sentence net.
For each probe sentence, and for the critical sentence,
in each condition, we calculated an activation force.
The final activation values of each sentence were z-
transformed and we summed all the z-values above 0.
Results
We applied this procedure to three experimental texts.
For each sentence, the mean activation force and the
mean reading times per character and proposition are
presented in the table 3. First, for each text, and in each
of the probe conditions, the anaphora antecedent was
retrieved from the macroproposition structure. Second,
the activation force obtained by the model can predict
the reading times obtained by participants. The
correlation between reading times and activation forces
were negative and significantly different to zero, r=-.83,
z (6) =-2.0, p < .05.
Discussion
As predicted, the CAT sentence led to a faster critical
sentence reading time than does the FUN sentence. This
difference is not due to the fact that the CAT sentence
contained two potential antecedents for the anaphora in
critical sentence. First, the difference appeared only
when the first part of the main text was presented.
Second, although in control condition, the percentage of
correct answers was greater in the FUN condition than
in the CAT condition, this difference was not found in
the experimental condition. This result indicates that
without the first part of the text, readers did not
discriminate the right antecedent from the categorical
cue sentence. Moreover, in control condition, the
presentation of the WRE sentence exerted an effect on
the critical sentence 5 and on the sentence 6 reading
times. This indicated that, in the control condition,
subject could not rely on a retrieval structure built in
LTM to counteract irrelevant information effect on text
processing. It results that when the readers have the
opportunity to construct a retrieval structure, a
categorization of two pieces of information (the two
machine components) had occurred during text
processing, based on meaning overlap between the two
learning episodes: sentence 2  and sentence 4.
The CI-LSA+generalisation framework could explain
how a retrieval structure was build up: During reading,
each sentence of the text was processed and stored in
episodic memory. Then, as a function of meaning
overlap between them, sentences representations were
associated to the same semantic macroproposition in
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LTM or were not associated. The remaining question is
when does generalization process occur during reading?
Does it occur during the encoding process or during the
retrieval process ? Research has to answer these
question in the future. Nevertheless, generalization
process and more generally integration process appear
to be necessary processes for building the retrieval
structure that permits texts comprehension.
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Abstract 
Two experiments were conducted in order to test the effects 
of cue predictability on serial dependencies in response times 
and response durations. Predictability in the timing 
(Experiment 1) and identity (Experiment 2) of response cues 
was manipulated. Results of both experiments showed that 
long-range dependencies in response times were stronger 
when cues were predictable versus unpredictable. By contrast, 
long-range dependencies in response durations were 
unaffected by cue predictability. Results are discussed in light 
of five hypotheses about the source of long-range 
dependencies in human behavior. 
Introduction 
In most psychological experiments, the variability in human 
behavior is divided into two categories: some variations in 
measurement are explained by the experimental factors, and 
other variations are not. The latter category is often termed 
error variance, and it usually does not play a role in 
theorizing about the psychological processes under 
examination. One reason why researchers ignore error 
variance is because they often assume that it is effectively 
random, or possibly the product of mundane factors such as 
practice, fatigue, or perseveration. These assumptions lead 
one to think of error variance as uninformative or, at best, 
irrelevant. 
A growing body of experimental results has recently 
prompted some researchers to pay closer attention to the 
ostensibly random fluctuations in human behavior. It 
appears that, contrary to popular belief, these fluctuations 
tend to exhibit patterns that persist over time. A transparent 
way to think about these patterns is through the 
autocorrelation function. Suppose that Xt is a time series of 
measurements taken from a participant in an experiment. 
The autocorrelation of this time series is defined as 
(Wagenmakers, Farrell, & Ratcliff, in press), 
, 
where E[] is expected value, µ is the mean of Xt, and k is 
some number of measurements between the time series and 
an offset copy of itself.  
If measurements are strictly independent of each other, 
then C(k) is zero for all k > 0. The time series is not 
correlated with itself at any offset, and hence, there are no 
persisting patterns in the fluctuations. This condition is 
often referred to as white noise (see top series in Figure 1), 
and it is common to assume that error variance is some type 
of white noise (e.g., Gaussian). However, it turns out that 
measurements of human behavior are often not 
characterized by white noise. Instead, they exhibit serial 
dependencies such that C(k) is positive for some k > 0.  
 
 
Figure 1: Illustrations of white noise (top) and pink noise 
(bottom; from Gilden, 2001). 
 
Serial dependencies have been found in a wide variety of 
human behaviors (for a review, see Van Orden, Holden, & 
Turvey, 2003). With respect to the study of perception and 
cognition, serial dependencies have been found in 
experiments on mental rotation (Gilden, 1997), lexical 
decision (Gilden, 1997), perceptual learning (Wagman, 
Dahle, & Schmidt, 2002), simple reaction time (Ward & 
Richard, 2001), and visual search (Aks, Zelinsky, & Sprott, 
2002). 
A major question about these findings concerns the kind 
of dependencies that were observed. The authors of these 
studies interpreted their findings as evidence for a particular 
kind of serial dependency often referred to as long-range 
dependency, of which 1/f noise or pink noise are special 
cases (see bottom series in Figure 1). In a long-range 
dependent series, C(k) is positive and decreases as a power 
of k,  
 
96
Long-range dependency is of special interest because it 
appears to be ubiquitous in nature (see Van Orden et al., 
2003), and it has some intriguing properties such as fractal 
structure, i.e., a change in the time scale of measurement 
does not affect the distributional properties of a long-range 
dependent time series. Long-range dependencies have 
motivated a number of general theories about the sources of 
fluctuations in human behavior, and these theories were the 
focus of the current experiments. 
However, before the theories are addressed, it must be 
noted that long-range dependencies can be difficult to 
distinguish from short-range dependencies, in which C(k) 
decreases exponentially with k (Wagenmakers et al., in 
press),  
 
where -1 < Φ1 < 1. Although C(k) declines more quickly in 
short-range dependent series compared with long-range 
dependent series (hence their names), the difference in rates 
of decline can be rather small. Nonetheless, short-range 
dependent series have very different properties (e.g., they 
can be generated by simple autoregressive processes), and 
they lead to different kinds of theories about fluctuations in 
human behavior. Therefore, Wagenmakers and his 
colleagues argued that empirical tests of long-range 
dependency must treat short-range dependency, rather than 
white noise, as the null hypothesis. Using this more 
stringent criterion, Wagenmakers et al. still found long-
range dependencies in measurements of human behavior 
under a variety of experimental conditions. Their findings 
and analyses confirm that long-range dependency is a real 
phenomenon. 
Explanations of Long-Range Dependence 
Why do fluctuations in human behavior exhibit long-range 
dependencies? Only certain kinds of processes are known to 
produce long-range dependencies (for a review, see 
Wagenmakers et al., in press). The ostensibly special status 
of long-range dependencies has prompted researchers to 
search for general properties of human behavior that might 
explain their source(s). Here we review five explanations 
that have been offered. 
 
Three Time Scales. Any specific observation of long-range 
dependence can be mimicked mathematically by the 
combination of three sources of white noise that operate on 
different time scales, each scale separated by an order of 
magnitude. In the context of perceptual and cognitive 
processes, Ward (2002) has suggested that unconscious, 
preconscious, and conscious processes may be three such 
sources of white noise whose combination is observed in 
fluctuations of human behavior. 
While the transparency of this explanation is appealing, it 
is somewhat brittle because any three particular scales of 
white noise will mimic long-range dependence only for a 
single, particular scale of measurement (see Van Orden et 
al., 2003). What this means is that three-scale accounts must 
be fit to data posthoc. By contrast, true long-range 
dependence exists over all scales of measurement (within 
the limits of the system in question) due to its fractal 
structure. Long-range dependence in human behavior has, in 
fact, been found across a range of scales of measurement 
(for a review, see Van Orden et al., 2003). 
 
Many Short-Range Dependencies. Granger (1980) showed 
that, under certain circumstances, the summation of many 
short-range dependent series can produce a true long-range 
dependent series. Ding, Chen, and Kelso (2001) proposed 
that long-range correlations found in timing tasks (and, by 
extension, in other kinds of tasks) may be the result of such 
summations. Their argument was based on the premise that 
cognitive processes are supported by large-scale networks of 
neural processes. Ding et al. reasoned that, in at least some 
cases, such neural networks will be characterized by large 
sets of short-range dependent processes. If the timing of 
behavior is driven by the summation of these processes, 
then fluctuations in timing will exhibit long-range 
dependence. 
Ding et al. (2001) made the further statement that more 
difficult tasks require larger numbers of short-range 
dependent processes. This statement leads to the prediction 
that long-range dependencies will be stronger in more 
difficult tasks. In support of this prediction, they reported 
two timing tasks in which participants were asked to match 
their rates of tapping with the beat of a metronome. In one 
condition, participants were asked to tap in synchrony with 
the metronome. In another condition, participants were 
asked to tap at the midpoint between each pair of beats (i.e., 
to syncopate). Syncopation is a more difficult tapping task 
(e.g., less stable; see Kelso, DelColle, & Schner, 1990) 
compared with synchronization, and fluctuations in 
syncopated tapping exhibited stronger evidence of long-
range dependence compared with synchronized tapping. 
 
Mental Set. Gilden (2001) proposed that experimental tasks 
whose demands are relatively consistent across trials invoke 
a “mental set” in the participant. Gilden’s definition of 
mental set entailed the repeated formation of mental 
representations necessary to perform the task. When the task 
is consistent, Gilden proposed that a dynamic of memory is 
created by this repetition such that memory components 
interact on multiple time scales. Under some circumstances, 
interactions of this nature have been shown to generate 
long-range dependencies (e.g., see Jensen, 1998).  
Gilden (2001) left the nature of his proposed memory 
components unspecified, but his hypothesis was nonetheless 
formulated in sufficient detail to make a testable prediction. 
If mental set is broken by sudden changes in task demands, 
then the hypothesized dynamic of memory would not have 
an opportunity to form, and long-range dependencies in 
response fluctuations should disappear. Gilden tested this 
prediction by measuring series of reaction times to color or 
shape discriminations when each of these tasks was 
blocked, compared with a mixed condition in which 
participants had to switch between tasks across trials. 
Gilden found evidence of long-range dependence in the 
blocked conditions, but not the mixed conditions. These 
findings were consistent with his mental set explanation of 
long-range dependence. 
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Strategy Shifts. By definition, a long-range dependent 
series is stationary in the sense that its distributional 
characteristics do not change over time. However, a long-
range dependent series can be difficult to distinguish from 
some kinds of non-stationary series that go through changes 
in their distributional characteristics over time.  
It is probably true that any given experimental task can be 
performed in a number of ways, despite any and all efforts 
to make the task demands as explicit and precise as 
possible. If each means of performing a task is termed a 
“strategy”, then it is very possible that a participant will 
change his or her strategy for performing a task over the 
course of an experiment. If strategy shifts occurred 
repeatedly over the course of measurement, they would have 
the potential to mimic long-range dependence. 
Wagenmakers et al. (in press) presented a computational 
demonstration of how strategy shifts (shifts in response 
criteria, in this case) can create non-stationary fluctuations 
in response times that mimic long-range dependencies.  
 
Interaction-Dominant Dynamics. Van Orden et al. (2003) 
proposed that, at a very general level, humans are composed 
of many component processes that all interact on multiple 
time-scales. Their proposal was based on the fundamental 
idea that the structure and complexity seen in human 
behavior is a phenomenon of self-organization, and that 
self-organizing systems are ones that have interaction-
dominant dynamics. They argued that it is these dynamics, 
intrinsic to human beings (and many other types of 
systems), that give rise to long-range dependencies in 
human behavior. 
As general as they are, the ideas put forth by Van Orden 
and his colleagues (2003) lead to a testable prediction. If 
long-range dependence is the intrinsic signature of self-
organization in human behavior, then any perturbations to 
behavior caused by external factors should disrupt the 
intrinsic dynamics, thereby obscuring their signature. Van 
Orden et al. argued that the results to date on long-range 
dependencies in human behavior (e.g., as cited in the other 
explanations listed here) are consistent with this prediction.  
Current Experiments 
Two experiments are reported here that were designed to 
explore a factor that was predicted to modulate the degree of 
long-range dependence in RT fluctuations. The factor was 
motivated by the explanations just listed. In particular, we 
tested whether sources of variability external to the 
participant would reduce the degree of long-range 
dependence in fluctuations of human behavior. Key presses 
were the measured behaviors, and sources of external 
variability were manipulated by the degree of cue 
predictability. 
In Experiment 1, predictability in the timing of response 
cues was manipulated to be either completely predictable or 
completely unpredictable. When cues were predictable, 
fluctuations in response times were driven primarily by the 
participant. The cues themselves had little bearing on 
behavior because they were entirely redundant; participants 
knew that the next cue would always appear one second 
after the previous response (see Methods section). By 
contrast, when the timing of cues was unpredictable, the 
timing of responses had to be driven primarily by the cue 
itself, rather than any expectancies internalized by the 
participants. 
If long-range dependence is internal to human behavior, 
then external variability should mask it. This idea is 
consistent with some previous explanations of long-range 
dependence (see Discussion section). This idea also leads to 
a further prediction that is quite counterintuitive. 
Participants were asked to press a key as soon as they 
perceived a cue. Thus, the task demands were satisfied when 
the finger moved down and the key made contact with its 
sensor. The task made no demands on when participants 
should lift their finger off the key. Therefore, fluctuations in 
the durations of key presses should be free to reflect internal 
variability, provided that the timing of the downward 
motion can be dissociated from timing of the upward 
motion. If so, we should observe no effect of predictability 
on the degree of long-range dependency in response 
durations.  
In Experiment 2, sources of external variability were 
introduced by a different means. The identity of cues, 
instead of the timing of cues, was manipulated to be 
predictable or unpredictable. Two different cues signaled 
two different responses. Cue identity was made predictable 
or not by giving a preview or not of each upcoming cue. 
Analogous to the manipulation of predictability in 
Experiment 1, the preview manipulated the degree to which 
behavior was driven by the cues themselves, versus 
expectancies about the cues.  
Experiment 1 
Participants. Eighteen participants were recruited for the 
experiment. Sixteen were undergraduates who participated 
for course credit, and two were graduate students who were 
compensated for their participation. 
 
Procedure. Each participant saw one block of predictable 
cues and one block of unpredictable cues, with block order 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants were 
instructed to press the space bar with their dominant hand as 
quickly as possible every time they saw an “X” flash on the 
screen. Demonstrations and practice blocks were given 
before each experimental block. Participants were instructed 
to wait till they saw an “X” before responding; if they 
pressed the space bar before a cue appeared, they heard a 
warning tone. Each block consisted of 1100 cues and took 
about 25 minutes to complete. The experimenter stayed in 
the room with the participant throughout the experiment. 
Participants took a short break between blocks. 
Participants were seated about two feet away from a CRT 
monitor, and each cue appeared for about 50 ms in the 
center of the screen in Times New Roman font. A pair for 
visual flankers appeared immediately following each cue, 
and remained on the screen until the participant pressed the 
space bar. The flankers provided a redundant cue that the 
computer was awaiting a response (in case the participant 
missed a cue by accident). 
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Each subsequent cue was timed relative to the previous 
response. In the predictable condition, the next cue always 
appeared 1 s after the previous response was given. In the 
unpredictable condition, the timing of the next cue was 
sampled randomly from an exponential distribution with a 
mean of 1 s, a minimum of 1 ms and a maximum of 12 s. 
The exponential distribution was used because it has a flat 
hazard function, which means that the probability of 
receiving a cue was constant as a function of wait time 
(Simpson et al., 2000). The time from cue to key press was 
recorded (response time), as well as the length of time that 
participants pressed each key (response duration). 
Results 
To illustrate the time series structures that were typically 
observed, the series of response times for one participant in 
the predictable and unpredictable conditions are shown in 
Figure 2. The series of response durations for this 
participant are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2. Response times for one participant in the 
predictable (top) and unpredictable (bottom) conditions of 
Expt 1 (responses above 500 ms have been truncated). 
 
Averaged across participants, the percentage of 
anticipatory responses was 1.99% in the unpredictable 
condition, and 3.9% in the predictable condition. All 
anticipatory responses were removed from the analyses. The 
mean correlation of response times with response durations 
was r = .02 in the unpredictable condition, and r = -.21 in 
the predictable condition. 
Spectral analyses are standardly used to measure the 
degree of long-range dependence in a time series, and we 
adopted the method of spectral analysis described by 
Holden (unpublished; also see Gilden, 1997). In particular, 
outliers were first removed from each time series (values > 
1000 ms or outside 3 SDs of each participant’s mean for 
each measure in each condition). Then, linear and quadratic 
trends were removed to avoid dependencies caused by 
practice or fatigue. A power spectrum was then computed 
over 1024 of the remaining data points, and log frequency 
was regressed against log power. The slope of this 
regression line in log-log coordinates was used as a measure 
of serial dependence: more negative slopes correspond to 
stronger degrees of serial dependence.  
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Figure 3. Response durations for one participant in the 
predictable and unpredictable conditions of Expt 1. 
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Figure 4. Aggregate spectral plots for Expt 1.  
 
The aggregate power spectra, averaged across participants 
for each condition, are plotted in Figure 4. For response 
times, slopes in the predictable condition were reliably more 
negative than slopes in the unpredictable condition, t(17)= 
4.26, p < .001. For response durations, there was no reliable 
difference in slopes, t(17) < 1. Moreover, slopes for 
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response durations were reliably more negative than slopes 
for response times, t(35) = 7.21, p < .001.  
Experiment 2 
Participants. Eighteen undergraduates participated in the 
experiment in exchange for course credit.  
 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that used in 
Experiment 1, except for the following changes. The 
response cue was either ‘>’ or ‘<’, and participants were 
instructed to press the right arrow key for the former, and 
the left arrow key for the latter. Flankers appeared on either 
side of the response cues as signals to respond, and the 
flankers always appeared 1 s after the previous response 
was given. In the preview condition, the next response cue 
always appeared immediately following the previous 
response; thus, participants had 1 s to process the cue and 
prepare their response. In the no-preview condition, each 
cue appeared in conjunction with its signal to respond; thus, 
participants had to process the cue and choose their 
response as quickly as possible. 
Results 
Averaged across participants, the percentage of 
anticipatory responses was .03% in the unpredictable 
condition, and .45% in the predictable condition. The 
percentage of errors was .80% and .27%, respectively. All 
anticipatory responses were removed from the analyses, but 
the few errors were retained. The mean correlation of 
response times with response durations was r = .05 in the 
unpredictable condition, and r = -.08 in the predictable 
condition. 
The aggregate power spectra are plotted in Figure 5. For 
response times, slopes in the predictable preview condition 
were reliably more negative than slopes in the unpredictable 
no-preview condition, t(17) = 2.31, p < .05. For response 
durations, there was a small but unreliable difference in 
slopes, t(17) = 1.80, p < .09. Moreover, slopes for response 
durations were reliably more negative than slopes for 
response times, t(35) = 3.55, p < .001. 
Discussion 
Two experiments were reported in which long-range 
dependencies were measured as a function of cue 
predictability. Results showed greater degrees of 
dependency in series of response times when the cues were 
predictable, both in terms of timing and identity. By 
contrast, results showed large and comparable degrees of 
dependency in all series of response durations. The observed 
dissociation between response times and response durations 
was consistent with the idea that external sources of 
variability mask the long-range dependence that is intrinsic 
to human behavior.  
It also appeared that the effect of predictability in cue 
timing (Experiment 1) was stronger than that in cue identity 
(Experiment 2), albeit further experiments are necessary to 
bear this out. One possible explanation is unpredictable 
timing introduces more external variability compared with 
unpredictable choice responding. However, to test this 
explanation, one would need to develop a more explicit 
means of parsing internal and external sources of variability. 
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Figure 5. Aggregate spectral plots for Expt 2.   
 
It is important to note that the hypothesis of long-range 
dependence was not explicitly tested against the short-range 
alternative in the current data. We did not conduct these 
tests because the IDD predictions could be tested without 
them. However, the long-range/short-range distinction is 
important, and we plan to address this issue in future work. 
How do the current results bear on the five explanations 
of long-range dependence outlined in the Introduction 
section? We address this question here for each explanation 
in turn. 
 
Three Time Scales. Sources of white noise on three 
different time scales could be used to mimic the long-range 
dependencies (or lack thereof) for each participant in each 
condition of the two reported experiments. However, these 
parameter fits would be posthoc, and they would offer no 
insight into the differences in degree of long-range 
dependence between experimental conditions. 
 
Many Short-Range Dependencies. As noted earlier, this 
explanation leads one to predict that greater degrees of long-
range dependence should be found in more demanding 
tasks. The unpredictable conditions were clearly more 
demanding because their mean RTs were much greater. 
However, the unpredictable conditions showed lesser 
degrees of long-range dependence compared with the 
predictable conditions. Moreover, summations of short-
range dependencies appear to offer no insight into the 
observed differences in dependencies between response 
times and response durations. 
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Mental Set. Gilden (2001) proposed that long-range 
dependencies should be weaker when a person’s mental set 
is repeatedly broken or interrupted. One could imagine that 
participants were able to maintain a more stable mental set 
in the predictable conditions compared with the 
unpredictable conditions, which would make the current 
results consistent with the mental set explanation. It is less 
clear how the mental set explanation would apply to the 
differences in long-range dependence between response 
times and response durations. One would presumably have 
to propose that these behaviors are governed by different 
mental sets, but given the close physical relationship 
between a button press and its release, the idea of different 
mental sets seems implausible. The bottom line is that the 
mental set explanation is not yet formulated to the point 
where it might offer insight into the current results. 
 
Strategy Shifts. Wagenmakers et al. (in press) conjectured 
that participants might be more apt to shift strategies, and 
therefore exhibit long-range dependencies in their 
behaviors, when they are bored. Participants were almost 
certainly bored in all of the current experimental conditions, 
but one could argue that the predictable conditions were 
more boring than the unpredictable ones. If so, the finding 
that long-range dependencies in response times were 
stronger in the predictable conditions is consistent with the 
strategy shifts explanation. However, one would have to 
apply this explanation to response durations as well, and 
there was no such effect on long-range dependencies in this 
measure. It remains to be seen whether a strategy shift 
explanation could be made to account for these results. 
 
Interaction-Dominant Dynamics. This explanation states 
that long-range dependencies come from the interdependent 
dynamics that underlie the self-organization of human 
behavior. These dynamics are hypothesized to be perturbed 
by external forces. If sources of external variability are 
thought of as external forces, then all the results reported 
herein are consistent with the interaction-dominant 
dynamics explanation. Predictability was a force on 
response times, but not response durations, because the task 
made demands on the former but not the latter. 
 
In conclusion, the current results are, for the time being, 
most consistent with the interaction-dominant dynamics 
explanation. Of course, these explanations are all in their 
infancy; it would be an overstatement at this point to refer to 
them as theories. Be that as it may, the results were clear 
and far from trivial to explain. We believe that further 
empirical and theoretical investigations into the sources of 
long-range dependence in human behavior will prove to be 
valuable to studies of perception and cognition. 
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Abstract
This work focuses on the concept of frame of reference.
Levinson (2003) suggested that spatial information encoded
in one frame of reference cannot be translated into another
one. While this is partially true in language, I argue for a
nesting relationship between frames of reference at the
conceptual level. A set of spatial concepts suggested by
Lehman & Bennardo (2003) informs this investigation. In
closing a new typology of frames of reference is proposed.
Introduction
The concept of frame of reference (FOR) is widely used
in the literature about the mental and linguistic
representations of spatial relationships. After a review of
the terminologies used in different disciplines such as
philosophy, linguistics, psycholinguistics, developmental
and behavioral psychology, brain sciences, and vision
theory Levinson (2003) proposed a definition of the
concept and a typology of frames of reference.
A FOR is defined as a system of three coordinated axes
that create a 3-dimensional space within which spatial
relationships are established cognitively and expressed
linguistically. Levinson’s typology of FOR includes three
systems labeled relative, intrinsic, and absolute. When a
FOR is realized linguistically, the information coded in
one FOR (e.g., ‘the ball is behind me’) is not translatable
into another (e.g., ‘the ball is south of me’). While I agree
with most of the discussion presented by Levinson, I find
problematic the untranslatability issue. I suggest that
untranslatability only holds between linguistically
instantiated FORs, while at the conceptual level they are
nested into each other.
This investigation uses a set of spatial concepts found
in Lehman & Bennardo (2003). This conceptual apparatus
is the result of analyses conducted on English spatial
prepositions, and languages like Burmese, Thai, Italian,
and Tongan (Polynesian). After sketching the apparatus,
the three FORs are analyzed ending with a suggestion
about their conceptual contents and a new typology.
The conceptual apparatus
A computational approach to the general architecture of
cognition was adopted to arrive at the set of spatial
concepts suggested by Lehman & Bennardo (2003).
Within this approach, cognition is conceived as
computational (cf. Ballim & Wilks, 1992), thus
generatively ‘abstract’. Only the characteristics of the
computational, or, relational spaces that make up what we
call ‘cognition’ are reiterated in each cognitive module
and not the specific characteristics of the substantive
content that instantiate these ‘abstract’ relationships.1
A computational approach to cognition can be proposed
by accepting compositionality without embracing a
Fregean (logico-positivist) point of view and by turning to
the domain of mathematics (e.g., algebra and geometry).
In mathematics the primitives of a system are a set of
axioms. These axioms generate indefinitely many
theorems and each theorem can establish a foundation for
yet another theorem. Furthermore, theorems may share
parts with other theorems in a redundant manner. The set
of relational properties of any cognitive system could be,
then, nothing but a theorem derived from a set/s of other
theorems. Such a system is compositional by definition.
The linguistic analyses in Lehman & Bennardo (2003)
yielded the following set of spatial concepts.2
State   : Object; Place Or Locus; Neighborhood: Vicinity,
Contact, Interiority;       Motion   : Time; Direction; Path:
Beginning*, Body*, End, (Direction)*;      Verticality   : Angle:
Unit, Quantity (+ or -);     Horizontality   : Visibility, Left or
Right;      Center   ;     Part   . (*conceptual content of Vector)
Some concepts are not primitives, but rely on other
concepts of the same group to function as their axioms.
This is the minimal set of axioms that is necessary to
account for the theorems (e.g. prepositions, directionals,
spatial nouns) that make up the representations of spatial
relationships in the languages analyzed.
The concept of Object is used with the meaning of any
entity existing in a possible world, either concrete or
abstract, e.g. table, idea. The place of an Object is the
actual amount of Space that it occupies. In other words, a
Place is the set of all points within the boundary of an
Object (including the boundary points). The Locus of an
Object in projective geometry is defined as the collapse of
a Place onto any of its interior points. Then, a Locus is a
neighborhood of possible projection points, the lower
limit being one point. Thus, while a Place is defined by
the size, shape, and specific geometry of the Object, a
Locus is not and can be arbitrarily reduced to a point.
The concept of Neighborhood includes the concept of
Vicinity (more than zero distance) between two Objects,
the concept of Contact (zero distance) between them and
the concept of Interiority, or, one Object in the interior of
another. The Neighborhood's border is pragmatically
determined. These concepts make up the concept of State.
The concept of Motion is an ordered sequence
(consequently, with a Direction) of Places (of an Object)
                                                
1Hirschfeld & Gelman (1994) draw a similar distinction
between ‘module’ and ‘domain.’
2 From now on a concept is indicated by initial capital letter.
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2in Time, bounded by two Places without either left or
right directionality in a disjunctive fashion and never
missing both. The concept of Path, instead, is a
geometrical (purely spatial) description of motion
‘abstracted’ from Motion. The focus is not on the moving
Object, but on the ordered sequence of Places, now
considered as Loci. The concept of Motion is inextricably
tied to Time, but the concept of Path is partially free from
it. In fact, we can indicate a Path at Time1 and then
indicate another Path at Time2 and state that they are the
same without incurring a contradiction as would happen if
the two parts of the comparison were two instances of
Motion. The instances of time used in the construction of
a Path are not unique, but they are repeatable.
Two features that Path also shares with Motion are
ordered sequence and boundedness. The interior points of
a Path are an ordered sequence of Loci with a Direction,
that is, they are Vectors with a finite magnitude. This
magnitude we call its Body and consists of a set of Loci
whose members may at a limit be one, thus, overlapping
with the first constitutive Locus. The boundary of a Path
consist of two Loci, a Vector that lacks left directionality
(Beginning), and one that lacks right directionality (End).
Object and Place (axioms of State) participate in the
construction of Motion. Locus, instead, participates only
in the construction of Path. Thus, the difference between
Place and Locus is used to separate the temporally bound
Motion from the spatially bound Path.
Verticality and Horizontality were not analyzed in as
much detail as State and Motion, and only some
conceptual components are indicated. First, Object,
Locus, and Vector (a Beginning, a Body or magnitude,
and a Direction) participate in their composition. The
concepts indicated for Verticality are Angle and Quantity
(Increasing or Decreasing). The instantiation of one or
other type of Quantity will determine the ‘up’ or ‘down’
Direction of a Vector. Angle and Quantity are also part of
the concept of Horizontality together with those of
Visibility and Left or Right. Visibility contributes to the
construction of a ‘front-back axis.’ After this, Left or
Right can be constructed. Finally, the two concepts of
Center and Part were added after the analyses of Tongan
directionals and spatial nouns (Bennardo, 2000).
The conceptual content of the Relative FOR
Levinson (2003) defines a relative FOR in this way:
This [a relative FOR] is roughly equivalent to the various notions of
viewer-centered frame of reference mentioned above (e.g. Marr's
2.5D sketch, or the psycholinguistics' ‘deictic’ frame). But it is not
quite the same. It presupposes a ‘viewpoint’ V (given by the location
of a perceiver in any sensory modality), and a figure and ground
distinct from V. It thus offers a triangulation of three points, and
utilizes co-ordinates fixed on V to assign directions to figure and
ground. (Levinson, 2003, p. 43)
He continues by pointing out that the viewpoint V does
not necessarily coincide with the speaker even though
deictic uses can be considered ‘basic’ or ‘prototypical.’
(Levinson, 2003, p. 43)
The axiomatic distinction between the figure F (sensory
input, Object) and the viewer V (or cognizer in any
sensory channel) is conceivable as a primary one, but the
distinction between viewer V and ground G can be
dispensed with and be regarded as constructed at a later
stage in the ontogenic sequence. Both the research on the
visual system (Marr, 1982) and on the developmental
sequence (Cohen, 1985; Pick, 1993; Bowerman &
Levinson, 2001) point towards the primacy of a stage in
which viewer V and ground G are conflated. It is exactly
the capacity to assign independent sets of coordinates to
objects that marks one of the milestones of cognitive
development (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956). I feel, then,
justified in suggesting this definition for the relative FOR.
A Basic relative FOR is one centered on the speaker,
viewer, cognizer (viewer). From the viewer three axes (or
six vectors) are constructed, one vertically and two on the
horizontal plane (front-back and left-right). In other
words, the viewer can be thought of as a point and as such
it implies a field (space) around it. This field will be
oriented. This orientation process takes into consideration
gravity and several bodily characteristics, both static
(orientation of face, eyes, etc.) and ambulatory (habitual
direction of movement). The viewer necessarily
(ontogenically) maps these axes onto himself/herself, that
is, considers himself/herself the origin of these axes.
Any Object in this field will be described in relation to
the viewer, thus viewer V and ground G are considered as
conflated, rather, they have not yet been cognitively
constructed as separated. If the viewer moves in any
direction, the axes will move accordingly, keeping their
origin on the viewer. These axes are an abstraction from
3-D and conic spaces that originate on the viewer and
where the angular limit is 180˚. Each axis, in fact, stands
for a collection of possible axes whose limits are provided
by the following (on three sides) relevant axes.
The appearance of a second Object in the field of the
viewer creates the double possibility of treating this latter
in direct relationship with the viewer, thus, continuing to
map the axes on the viewer, or relating the second Object
to the first one. This latter case entails the possibility of
assigning orienting axes to the first Object, thus making it
function as if it were the viewer. The orientation of the
axes mapped onto this Object are the same as that of the
axes the viewer had mapped on himself/herself. That is,
the coordinates of the viewer’s field can be kept constant.
The second Object (figure) is described as in relationship
with the first Object (ground). The front or ‘away’ Vector
of the viewer is now divided in two parts by the first
Object. Then, a new possibility is created. The ground
front-back axis may keep the same orientation of the
viewer's field, thus, we get the Translation subtype of
relative FOR (e.g., ‘the ball is in front of [beyond] the
tree’). Or the front and back mapping can be flipped so
that the front of the first Object (ground) faces the viewer,
thus, yielding the Reflection subtype of relative FOR
(e.g., ‘the ball is in front of [facing viewer] the tree’).
Both the Translation and the Reflection subtype of
relative FOR are subtypes of the Basic relative FOR. In
fact, their left and right assignments are congruent with
those of the viewer. In other words, the first Object or
ground is not yet considered as a point with an oriented
field of its own, but is still tied to the field of the viewer.
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3It is not possible to arrive at the construction of the
Translation and Reflection subtypes without using
(consciously or unconsciously) a Basic subtype of relative
FOR. In fact, there would be no axis to ‘translate’ or
‘reflect’ at all without having already constructed one in
advance. And this can only have happened through the
use of a Basic relative FOR.
This typology is suggested: a Basic, a Translation, and
a Reflection relative FOR.3 The label Basic highlights the
ontogenic primacy of the construction in which viewer
and ground G are conflated, that is, a set of coordinates is
mapped onto the viewer by him/herself. The other two
subtypes are derivative from the Basic and represent a
move towards recognizing that Objects have relationships
among themselves and not just with the viewer.
Let us now look into the conceptual content of the
Relative FOR. We already know from the content of the
conceptual apparatus that both vertical and horizontal
axes are only the interaction of a subset, labeled Vector,
of the concept of Path (Beginning, Body and Direction)
with the two concepts of Verticality and Horizontality.
The Beginning of these Vectors is a unique anchoring
point (the viewer) that is a Locus because its geometric
features are not relevant in the construction of the relative
FOR (also, the Beginning of a Path is by definition a
Locus). Another participating concept is Orthogonality
that is the distinguishing factor between vertical and
horizontal axes, and between front-back and left-right
axes. Orthogonality contains Angle and Unit (degree)
with a fixed Quantity attached to this last (90˚ degrees).
All the conceptual content so far listed brings with it
other more finely grained content, and, specifically,
Vector (as a subset of Path) and Locus. Moreover, this
FOR assigns front and back to the Object that becomes
the ground by mapping the viewer's coordinates onto it
(see the Translation and Reflection subtypes). This
mapping can be done by simply applying the ‘repeat
function’ (as for the Translation subtype) or by applying
the ‘repeat function’ and then letting Visibility determine
which side is front or back (as for the Reflection subtype).
The side that is not visible (beyond the Object) is the back
in the same way as it is done for one's body.
The concept of Figure (any possible Object) is also a
participant in this construction. Is this Object to be
considered a Locus or a Place? Do its geometrical
characteristics matter in constructing a FOR? Perceptually
these geometrical characteristics are available, but do they
play a role in the construction of the FOR? The answer is
‘no.’ Knowledge about the geometrical characteristics of
the Figure does not seem to play any role in the
construction of a FOR (see Talmy, 2000). What is
relevant, instead, is the fact that a point, the Object, is
being picked up in the world by means of a ‘choice
function’ (clearly not provided by perception, but by our
intentional thinking) and later put in a spatial relationship
with either oneself or another Object according to a
                                                
3The 180˚ rotation subtype of relative FOR in Levinson (2003)
is not indicated here because within this work that subtype is
considered as an instantiation of an intrinsic FOR.
specific set of coordinates (in this case a relative FOR).
What does it mean to ‘pick an object’ in the world? In
order to ‘see’4 an object our line of sight has to ‘meet’ it
in the world. In order to think of this object as separated
from our self, our line of sight has to be conceived as first
leaving our eyes, then penetrating the outside world and
finally meeting the object. In other words, the actual
construction of any Object requires our use of the concept
of Path, with a Beginning (self), Body (penetration of the
world outside self), and an End (object in the world). It
follows  that Path needs to be postulated as participating
in the construction of the Relative FOR.
The conceptual difference between the Basic and the
Translation and Reflection subtypes of the relative FOR is
the following. The two subtypes consider the viewer and
two Objects (instead of only one), iteratively employing
the concept of Path, a process that needs the use of the
‘repeat’ function. The coordinates of the oriented field of
the viewer are still mapped onto the viewer. In the
Translation type the front Vector is kept constant in
orientation, while in the Reflection type its orientation is
changed as a consequence of the salient use of the concept
of Path (from viewer to Object) and Visibility.
The assignment of front and back that distinguishes
between the Translation and the Reflection subtypes is
left open to cultural variations. Since all the axiomatic
conceptual material is already available (Locus, Path,
Vector, etc.), the ‘repeat’ function can be arbitrarily
applied to any of these concepts. However, minimally, the
Translation subtype is conceptually simpler. In fact, it
does not require the use of the concept of Visibility. Then,
it is the salience of Visibility in specific cultures that may
determine the preferred instantiation of one subtype over
the other. Cases in point are Dutch (and English) speakers
who habitually use the Reflection subtype (Levinson,
2003); Hausa and Tongan speakers who habitually use the
Translation subtype (Hill, 1982; Bennardo, 2000); and
Japanese speakers who use both (Levinson, 2003). This is
a summary of the conceptual content of the Relative FOR.
Object; Locus; Path; Six Vectors, each with a Beginning
(Locus of viewer, or anchor point), Body, Direction;
Verticality; Horizontality; Visibility; Orthogonality, with
an Angle, Unit (degree), Fixed Quantity (90˚ degrees).
To this we need to add the ‘choice function’ used to
construct an Object. For the Translation and Reflection
subtypes, we must add also the ‘repeat function’ yielding
two Objects and the construction of the front and back
Vectors onto one of them. Both functions are axiomatic
cognitive processes. For the Reflection subtype, repeated
use of the concept of Visibility must be added.
The Intrinsic frame of reference
An Intrinsic FOR is one centered on an Object that is not
the viewer. From the Object, three oriented axes (or six
vectors) are constructed, one vertically and two on the
horizontal plane. Any Object in the space defined by these
coordinates is described in relation to the Object from
which the space was constructed. When the Object
                                                
4This discussion is limited to only visual input.
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4moves, the axes will move accordingly keeping their
origin on the Object and the assigned orientation as
well.
What differentiates the Relative and the Intrinsic FORs
is that the Beginning of the Vectors is not from the
viewer, but from an Object other than viewer. We have
already seen that this is also the case for the Translation
and Reflection subtypes of relative FOR. What is it that
distinguishes these latter two FOR from the Intrinsic one?
The difference lies in the quality of the oriented field
that is constructed for the Object or ground. This field is
completely independent in orientation from the viewer; it
is in other words a new separate field from that of the
viewer. This difference has very important consequences,
among which the most relevant is that the description of
the spatial relationship between two Objects will be freed
from references to the viewer. This, however, does not
mean that the field of the viewer has not been used to
construct the new field. Specifically, when we express
linguistically a spatial relationship by utilizing an Intrinsic
FOR, conceptually we must have used a Basic relative
one in order to arrive at the construction of the first
Object (Figure) and the second Object, making this latter
a ground by constructing from it oriented axes.
What remains to be seen is how the axes of this new
field are oriented. Typically the following three concepts
have been associated with the Object that functions as
ground in order to orient the axes mapped onto it:
Animacy, Habitual Direction of Motion, and Habitual Use
(Herskovits, 1986; Talmy, 2000). It is understood then
that these three concepts participate in the construction of
the Intrinsic FOR in a disjunctive fashion. That is, usually
only one is necessary. It is, then, a specific characteristic
of the Object picked to function as ground that determines
the orientation of the axes mapped onto it. Only one axis
need to be oriented, typically the frontal one, and the
orientation of the others will follow.
Regarding the conceptual content of the Intrinsic FOR,
all the content suggested for the Relative FOR needs to be
postulated for the Intrinsic FOR as well. We also have to
include the ‘choice function’ and the ‘repeat function.’
New concepts to be added are Animacy, Habitual
Direction of Motion, Habitual Use (disjunctively used,
even though they may overlap), and finally Part. In fact,
the Object onto which the coordinates are mapped, needs
to be assigned a ‘front.’ That is, a minimal subdivision of
the Object into parts must be done.
The Absolute frame of reference
An Absolute FOR is neither centered on the viewer nor on
an Object. First, the two Vectors related to the vertical
axis are constructed. Second, on the horizontal plane one
or more Objects (e.g., areas, points, landmarks) in the
field of the viewer are chosen as orienting points. Third,
either the viewer or any Object in its field is put into
relationships with these Objects or fixed points.
Two examples of this system are the one that uses
cardinal points, and the one that uses landward-seaward
directions used by the speakers of many Oceanic
languages. In many other cases the environmental features
selected differ profoundly and may range from a
mountain to a lake, or from a river to a building.
The process of selecting fixed orienting points in the
environment requires minimally the activation of the
Relative FOR. Once these fixed points have been
conceptually established and agreed upon socially, these
same points may function as an orienting framework
between either one Object in the field of the viewer and
one of the fixed points (e.g. North) or between any two
Objects in the field of the viewer and one of the fixed
points. We have already seen in the previous discussion of
the other two types of FOR that the process of
selecting/choosing an Object to function either as figure
or ground implies the use of the concept of Path. For the
construction of the absolute FOR, then, we need
minimally either one or two Paths required for the
construction of the Object or Objects to be put into
relationship with any of the orienting fixed points. To
these we have to add two (for the Oceanic system) or four
(for the cardinal points system) Paths for the choice of the
fixed points of reference.
Table 1 summarizes the conceptual content of the
various types of FOR. A capital X indicates the presence
of a concept in the construction of a FOR. For the
concepts of Object, Path and Vector a number indicates
how many times the concept is minimally used.
Table 1: The conceptual content of FORs
Concept/Axiom Relative Intrinsic Absolute
Basic
Transl Reflect
Locus X X X X X
Object 1 + V 2 + V 2 + V 2 + V 1/2+2/4+V
Path 1 2 2 2 3/5 or 4/6
Vector 6 6 6 10 6
Verticality X X X X X
Horizontality X X X X X
Orthogonality X X X X X
Visibility X
Part X
Animacy** X**
Hab Dir Mot** X**
Habitual Use** X**
Choice Funct* X X X X X
Repeat Funct* X X X X
*These two are cognitive processes.
**Only one is necessary.
From Table 1 it can be seen how the conceptual
axiomatic content of the Basic relative FOR is properly
contained in its entirety in all the others, both subtypes
(Translation and Reflection) and types (Intrinsic and
Absolute). The Intrinsic and the Absolute are both derived
from the Relative, although not in an ordered sequence.
The Relative FOR, then, is suggested as an axiom for both
the Intrinsic and the Absolute ones.
The Intrinsic and Absolute FORs are made of two
different sets of concepts. The Intrinsic FOR expresses
more attention to the nature of the Object functioning as
ground (see the participation of the concepts of Part,
Animacy, Habitual Direction of Motion, Habitual Use in
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5Table 1). The Absolute FOR, instead, expresses greater
attention to the nature of the field  (see the participation
of a greater number of Objects and Paths in Table 1).
These findings are perfectly congruent with those of
Baayen & Danziger (1994) and Levinson (2003)
regarding a preferred use of the Intrinsic FOR by speakers
of Mayan languages, where an extremely elaborate
vocabulary also exists for describing parts of objects.
Similar congruency can be highlighted with the findings
of Levinson (2003) concerning the preferred use of the
Absolute FOR by speakers of Australian Aboriginal
languages where a very elaborate system of naming
landmarks in one's environment has also been reported.
Finally, we look closely at the issue of
‘untranslatability’ among the various FORs suggested in
Levinson (2003, p. 57-59). When we consider FORs as
instantiated into linguistic expressions, it is true that in
principle only two cases of translation are possible from
one FOR to another (i.e., from either Absolute or Relative
to Intrinsic). Do we deduce that there is ‘untranslatability’
among FORs at the conceptual level? Our discussion
points towards a negative answer. In fact, the conceptual
content of the Relative FOR has been suggested as an
axiom for the Intrinsic and the Absolute ones. Thus, if at
the linguistic level we find ‘untranslatability’ between
FOR, at the conceptual level we find ‘nesting.’ Besides,
the direction of the translatability from Relative and
Absolute to Intrinsic correlates with one independent field
in the former vs. two independent fields in the latter.
A Radial subtype of the absolute FOR
Bennardo (1996) reported the results of an investigation
of the uses of FORs in Tongan language, spatial
cognition, and culture. During this investigation a Radial
subtype of absolute FOR was suggested as having a
privileged status. This FOR consists in positing a center in
one’s field out of which movement is conceived either
centripetally or centrifugally on any plane. This finding
requires a reexamination of the typology of FORs. In
particular, we need to look closer at the subtypes of the
absolute FOR: Radial, Single Axis, and Cardinal Points.
For each of the three subtypes there are two cases to be
considered. The first is when the ground is the viewer,
e.g. “X is north of me.’ The second is when the ground is
an Object different from the viewer, ‘e.g. X is north of Y.’
Each case yields different conceptual content.
In the first case we need a Center that is the viewer and
an Object (Figure). A Path from the viewer to the Object
is also required as well as (minimally) a Vector made up
of the Body of a Path and its End (centrifugal movement)
or Beginning (centripetal movement). Either the End or
the Beginning of this Path would be co-indexed with the
Center. In the second case we have to add a second
Object, which will function as Center, and a Path that is
used to determine this Center (or second Object). The
difference between the two cases is crucial. Choosing a
Center different from viewer, makes possible the
construction of a second field different from the one
constructed around the viewer.
The conceptual content for the Single Axis subtype
consists, in the first case, of one Object (Figure) plus two
Objects (the two ends of the axis), the viewer, three Paths
(from the viewer to the three Objects), and six Vectors
(up, down, front, back, left, and right). In the second case,
an Object for the new ground Object and a Path for its
construction are added. A new field different from the
viewer's is not constructed.
The conceptual content for a Cardinal Points subtype
consists, in the first case, of one Object (Figure) plus four
Objects (the cardinal points), the viewer, five Paths (from
the viewer to the five Objects), and six Vectors (up,
down, front, back, left, and right). An Object is added for
the new ground Object and a Path for its construction. A
new field different from the viewer's is not constructed.
Table 2: Conceptual content for types of Absolute FOR
Concept
Subtype of Absolute FOR Object Path Vector
Radial 1 1 + V 1 1
Radial 2 2 + V 2 1
Single Axis 1 1 + 2 + V 3 6
Single Axis 2 2 + 2 + V 4 6
Cardinal Points 1 1+ 4 + V 5 6
Cardinal points 2 2 + 4 + V 6 6
In Table 2, the conceptual content of the Radial subtype is
the simplest. The contents of the two Radial subtypes are
also simpler than the content of the Basic subtype of the
relative FOR in Table 1. Consequently, the axiomatic
relation between the Relative, the Intrinsic, and the
Absolute FORs needs some further attention.
A new typology of Frames of Reference
In discussing the relationships between the types and
subtypes of FOR three parameters are considered. The
first is the magnitude of the conceptual content, that is,
the number of concepts necessary to derive each theorem.
The second is the reference that will be made to axiomatic
relationships. When the content of a FOR is completely
contained in another, then the former will be considered
an axiom of the latter. The third is the emergent properties
that each FOR displays. Namely, it must be considered if
a FOR is based on the construction of one or two fields.
The minimal conceptual content and the construction of
only one field associated with the Radial 1 subtype of the
absolute FOR make it the choice as the most basic. This
FOR, then, is an axiom for all the other types and
subtypes. Its great simplicity makes it highly context
bound and hence very unlikely to be the only one that any
individual/culture will have. Nonetheless, it represents a
minimal stage of spatial organization assigned to the
external world. Evidence from languages around the
world suggests that this system is always used, i.e., in
demonstrative systems.
Looking for a FOR at the second stage of complexity,
or more precisely, the first theorem derived from a set of
axioms whose content is at a limit only the Radial 1
axiom, we confront two options. The first is to choose the
Radial 2 subtype of the absolute FOR, simple in
conceptual content, though it uses two fields. The second
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6is the Basic relative FOR that is more complex
conceptually (it needs six Vectors instead of one), but
uses only one field. A decision is not strictly necessary at
this juncture; both options are viable. Empirically, there
are language speakers that choose to use prevalently one
option only (e.g. English speakers choose a Basic relative
FOR), and other that choose both (e.g. Tongan speakers).
We have stated that the Relative FOR functions as an
axiom for the Absolute and the Intrinsic FOR, and for two
subtypes of the Relative FOR. These latter keep the single
field feature, but increase their conceptual content
because of their complex treatment of the front-back axis.
The Single Axis and Cardinal Points subtypes of the
absolute FOR and the Intrinsic FOR are obtained in
substantially different ways. The two Absolute FORs
represent an increased conceptual content from the
Relative FOR and use a single field. This is confirmed by
the fact that they both use the vertical axis. The Radial 1
and 2 subtypes did not have it in their conceptual content.
The intrinsic FOR is obtained by an increased
conceptual complexity due to two other factors (besides
the addition of the vertical axis). The first is a closer
attention devoted to the Object that functions as figure.
The second is the construction of two fields (the viewer's
and the figure's). We have seen that the construction of
two fields is part of the conceptual content of the Radial 2
subtype of the absolute FOR. Then, we suggest that the
conceptual content of the intrinsic FOR is derived from
the Basic subtype of the relative FOR, from the Radial 2
subtype of the absolute FOR, and from conceptual
characteristics of the Object/Figure.
RADIAL 1
RADIAL 2 BASIC RELATIVE
TRANSLATION  RELATIVE
REFLECTION  RELATIVE
INTRINSIC SINGLE AXIS  ABSOLUTE
CARDINAL POINTS ABSOLUTE
Figure 1: A typology of Frames of Reference
The arrows in Figure 1 indicates that the FOR receiving
the content of another FOR treats this latter as an axiom
of its conceptual content. Further conceptual material is
added at each stage. Thus, the necessity of a new label for
that particular type of FOR.
Conclusion
The first part of this work was devoted to the introduction
of the conceptual apparatus that is the major theoretical
tool employed in the analyses of the conceptual content of
FORs. Each member of the typology of FORs suggested
by Levinson (2003) was later analyzed. and a primary
revision was suggested. Nesting of FORs was proposed at
the conceptual level instead of untranslatability.  Then, a
Radial subtype of absolute FOR was introduced. This
made clear that a further revision of the typology was
needed. Finally, the revision resulted in the proposed
typology of FORs in Figure 1. It is believed that this
typology can be useful for further investigation of FORs.
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Abstract 
Various lines of research on language have converged on the 
premise that linguistic knowledge has as its basic unit pairings 
of form and meaning. The precise nature of the meanings 
involved, however, remains subject to the longstanding debate 
between proponents of arbitrary, abstract representations and 
those who argue for more detailed perceptuo-motor 
representations. We propose a model, Embodied Construction 
Grammar (ECG), which integrates these two positions by 
casting meanings as schematic representations embodied in 
human perceptual and motor systems. On this view, 
understanding everyday language entails running mental 
simulations of its perceptual and motor content. Linguistic 
meanings are parameterizations of aspects of such 
simulations; they thus serve as an interface between the 
relatively discrete properties of language and the detailed and 
encyclopedic knowledge needed for simulation. This paper 
assembles evidence from neural imaging and psycholinguistic 
experiments supporting this general approach to language 
understanding. It also introduces ECG as a model that fulfills 
the requisite constraints, and presents two kinds of support for 
the model. First, we describe two verbal matching studies that 
test predictions the model makes about the degree of motor 
detail available in lexical representations. Second, we 
demonstrate the viability and utility of ECG as a grammar 
formalism through its capacity to support computational 
models of language understanding and acquisition. 
Introduction 
Many theories of language take the basic unit of linguistic 
knowledge to be pairings of form and meaning, known as 
symbols or constructions (de Saussure 1916; Pollard & Sag 
1994; Goldberg 1995; Langacker 1987). This view stems 
from the simple observation that language serves to convey 
meaning, using form. A speaker must thus know what 
linguistic forms are appropriate to encode the meanings s/he 
wishes to convey, and vice versa for an understander. 
The nature of the meaning representations of linguistic 
units, however, remains very much at issue. Suggestions in 
the literature range from relatively abstract representations, 
including both feature structures (Pollard & Sag 1994) and 
logical representations (May 1985), to more concrete 
perceptual- or motor-based representations (Langacker 
1987; Barsalou 1999; Glenberg & Robertson 2000). 
Each of these approaches faces difficulties. Abstract 
symbol systems, whether feature-based or logical, invite the 
question of how (or even whether) they are ultimately linked 
to human perceptual, motor, affective, and other sorts of 
experience. There is strong evidence, seen below, that such 
embodied knowledge is automatically and unconsciously 
brought to bear during language understanding. Moreover, 
language users naturally make a broad range of associative 
and causal inferences based on language, a process not 
easily represented in an abstract symbol system. 
Conversely, a theory of linguistic meaning cannot be 
based on perceptuo-motor information alone. Linguistic 
units can be combined in ways that are not strictly 
predictable from their semantic properties. Our ability to 
judge the grammaticality of sentences like Chomsky’s 
(1957) classic Colorless green ideas sleep furiously 
example provides strong evidence of linguistic structure 
distinct from motor, perceptual, or other world knowledge. 
Additionally, our ability to understand sentences like My pet 
chicken kissed me on the cheek (even though chickens don’t 
have lips, presumably a prerequisite for kissing) shows that 
grounded motor knowledge does not suffice to account for 
our ability to extract meaning from language. 
One concrete solution to the drawbacks of purely abstract 
and purely perceptuo-motor approaches is to characterize 
mental representations as schematizations over modal 
knowledge (Fillmore 1982; Langacker 1987; Lakoff 1987; 
Barsalou 1999; Talmy 2000). This compromise view retains 
the best of both worlds: while language use involves the 
activation of perceptual and motor mechanisms, linguistic 
units themselves need only refer to schematic 
representations of these mechanisms. Proposals along these 
lines have inspired work investigating how the perceptual 
and motor structures underlying word meaning might be 
represented and schematized in computational models of 
human language processing (Regier 1996; Bailey 1997; 
Narayanan 1997). But the nature of the lexical and 
grammatical units that link these structures with linguistic 
forms has not yet been articulated precisely enough to 
support formal or computational implementation. 
This paper synthesizes diverse evidence for an integrated 
view of language use and presents Embodied Construction 
Grammar (ECG), a formally specified instantiation of the 
approach. We begin by surveying evidence of the 
importance of perceptual and motor simulation in higher-
level cognition, especially in language use. We then briefly 
outline the ECG formalism and show how it supports a 
model of human language use in which linguistic meanings 
serve to parameterize motor and perceptual structures. The 
remainder of the paper presents two kinds of support for the 
model. First, we describe a pair of verb matching studies 
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that test predictions the model make about the degree of 
simulative detail in lexical representations. Second, we 
demonstrate the viability and utility of ECG as a grammar 
formalism precise enough to support computational models 
of language understanding and acquisition. 
Mental Simulation in Language Use 
Evidence for simulation 
Perceptual and motor systems play an important role in 
higher cognitive functions, like memory and categorization 
(Barsalou 1999; Glenberg & Robertson 2000; Wheeler, 
Petersen & Buckner 2000; Nyberg et al. 2001), as well as 
motor (Lotze et al. 1999) and perceptual (Kosslyn, Ganis & 
Thompson 2001) imagery. It would thus be surprising if 
there were no role for perceptual and motor systems in 
language use as well. 
Some theorists have proposed that perceptual and motor 
systems perform a central function in language production 
and comprehension (Glenberg & Robertson 2000; Barsalou 
1999). In particular, they have suggested that understanding 
a piece of language entails internally simulating, or mentally 
imagining, the described scenario, by activating a subset of 
the neural structures that would be involved in perceiving 
the percepts or performing the motor actions described. 
Several recent studies support this notion of simulation in 
language understanding, based on the activation of motor 
and pre-motor cortex areas associated with specific body 
parts in response to motor language referring to those body 
parts. Using behavioral and neurophysiological methods, 
Pulvermüller, Haerle & Hummel (2001) and Hauk 
Johnsrude & Pulvermüller (2004) found that verbs 
associated with different effectors were processed at 
different rates and in different regions of motor cortex. For 
example (Pulvermüller et al. 2001), when subjects perform a 
lexical decision task with verbs referring to actions 
involving the mouth (e.g. chew), leg (e.g. kick), or hand (e.g. 
grab), areas of motor cortex responsible for mouth/leg/hand 
motion displayed more activation, respectively. Tettamanti 
et al. (ms.) have also shown through an imaging study that 
passive listening to sentences describing mouth/leg/hand 
motions activates different parts of pre-motor cortex (as 
well as other areas, specifically BA 6, 40, and 44). 
Behavioral methodologies also offer convergent evidence 
for the automatic and unconscious use of perceptual and 
motor systems during language use. Recent work on spatial 
language (Richardson et al. 2003; Bergen To Appear) has 
found that sentences with visual semantic components can 
result in selective interference with visual processing. While 
processing sentences that encode upwards motion, like The 
ant climbed, subjects take longer to perform a visual 
categorization task in the upper part of their visual field; the 
same is true of downwards-motion sentences like The ant 
fell and the lower half of the visual field. These results 
imply that language, like memory, evokes visual imagery 
that interferes with visual perception. 
A second experimental method (Glenberg & Kashak 
2002), tests the extent to which motor representations are 
activated for language understanding. The findings from this 
approach have shown that when subjects are asked to 
perform a physical action in response to a sentence, such as 
moving their hand away from or toward their body, it takes 
them longer to perform the action if it is incompatible with 
the motor actions described in the sentence. This suggests 
that while processing language, we perform motor imagery, 
using neural structures dedicated to motor control. 
A third method, used by Stanfield & Zwaan (2001) and 
Zwaan et al. (2002), investigates the nature of visual object 
representations during language understanding. These 
studies have shown that implied orientation of objects in 
sentences (like The man hammered the nail into the floor 
versus The man hammered the nail into the wall) affected 
how long it took subjects to decide whether an image of an 
object (in this case, a nail) had been mentioned in the 
sentence, or even to name that object. It took subjects longer 
to respond to an image that was incompatible with the 
implied orientation or shape of a mentioned object. These 
results imply that not just trajectory and manner of motion, 
but also shape and orientation of objects, are represented in 
mental simulations during language understanding. 
Linguistic knowledge as a simulation interface 
Language understanding seems to entail the activation of 
perceptual and motor systems, which work in a dynamic, 
continuous, context-dependent, and open-ended fashion. 
Linguistic form, by contrast, is predominantly discrete — a 
word either precedes another word or does not; a morpheme 
is either pronounced or not, and so on. How do linguistic 
representations pair relatively discrete linguistic forms with 
continuous, dynamic, modal perceptuo-motor simulations? 
The notion of parameterization offers an answer. 
Grammatical knowledge governing the productive 
combination of linguistic units appears to draw primarily on 
schematic properties of entities and events (Langacker 1987; 
Goldberg 1995), such as whether an entity can exert force or 
move, or whether an action involves the exertion of force or 
causes motion. Thus, for the purposes of language 
understanding, which involves determining what linguistic 
units an utterance uses and how they are combined, it may 
be sufficient for words and morphemes to generalize over 
perceptual or motor detail and encode only the important, 
distinctive aspects of actions and percepts required to 
perform a simulation. These parameterized representations 
are not abstract, amodal symbols, since they are directly 
grounded in action and perception, but they are distinct from 
the simulative content they parameterize.  
This simulation-based view of language understanding 
has immediate consequences for theories of language. Only 
meaning representations that can be usefully fed to the 
simulation are viable; at the same time, constructions are 
freed from having to capture the encyclopedic knowledge 
handled by simulation. This division of labor between the 
meaning representations of linguistic constructions and the 
detailed structures that support simulation provides the 
means for finite, discrete linguistic structures to evoke the 
open-ended, continuous realm of possible meanings that 
language users may communicate. ECG is a theory of 
language that conforms to these constraints. 
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Embodied Construction Grammar 
Embodied Construction Grammar (Bergen & Chang To 
Appear; Chang et al. 2002) aims to be a theory of language 
suitable for integration in a grounded, computationally 
implemented, simulation-based theory of human language 
use. It resembles other Construction Grammars (Kay & 
Fillmore 1999; Goldberg 1995; Croft 2001) in counting 
form-meaning pairings as the basic linguistic unit, and in 
aiming for full coverage of linguistic behavior. But ECG 
also serves as precisely the interface between language and 
simulation described above. It thus differs from other 
grammatical theories in emphasizing the embodiment of the 
grammatical system: constructions pair schematic form 
representations with schematic meaning representations, 
which are further constrained to be abstractions over 
perceptual and motor representations that can be simulated, 
or over characteristics of simulations in general. 
A detailed description of the formalism is given in Bergen 
& Chang (To Appear); ECG has also been applied to a wide 
range of linguistic phenomena, including argument 
structure, reference, predication, and morphology, in a 
variety of languages. We concentrate here on showing how 
the representational tools of ECG satisfy and exploit the 
constraints of a simulation-based approach to language 
understanding. We first describe the high-level interactions 
posited in the model between linguistic constructions and 
the dynamic processes of language understanding they 
support, and then illustrate these with a simple example.  
The Language Understanding Process 
Figure 1. Language understanding in ECG. 
The main source of linguistic knowledge in ECG is a large 
repository of constructions that express generalizations 
linking the domains of form (typically, phonological 
schemas and relations) and meaning (conceptual schemas 
and relations). Some constructions directly specify which 
perceptual and motor mechanisms to deploy, while others 
(especially larger phrasal and clausal constructions) specify 
how to combine the parameterized representations 
corresponding to different kinds of imagery. Still other 
constructions may affect the mode of simulation itself; the 
passive construction, for example, modulates what 
perspective is to be taken in the simulation of a given action. 
There are also two main dynamic processes (large arrows 
in Figure 1) that interact with constructional knowledge 
during language comprehension. The first is the analysis 
process, which takes an input utterance in context and 
determines the set or sets of constructions most likely to be 
responsible for it. This process is thus roughly analogous to 
parsing, though it additionally incorporates contextual 
information, following Tanenhaus et al. (1995) and Spivey 
et al. (2001). The product of the analysis process is a 
structure called the semantic specification (or semspec), 
which specifies the conceptual schemas evoked by the 
constructions and how they are related. The second process 
is simulation, which takes the semspec as input and exploits 
representations underlying action and perception to simulate 
the specified events, actions, objects, relations, and states. 
The resultant inferences shape subsequent processing and 
provide the basis for the language user’s response.  
Embodied Construction Grammar in action 
This section shows how the process just described would 
produce the appropriate simulation and resulting inferences 
for the sentence Mary bit John. The understander first tries 
to recognize the sequence of sounds in terms of form 
schemas. In speech or in sentences with novel or ambiguous 
word forms, this may require sophisticated categorization. 
Here, the forms are straightforwardly recognized as three 
form schemas (‘Mary’, ‘bit’, and ‘John’) with the 
appropriate temporal ordering relations among them, shown 
as vertical arrows on the left-hand side of Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The (simplified) analysis of Mary bit John. 
Next, the analysis process hypothesizes which 
constructions (instantiated as constructs) could account for 
the utterance; these are constructions whose form elements 
are present in the utterance. The four constructions relevant 
for this utterance are shown in the middle column of Figure 
2. The JOHN and MARY constructions each bind some 
phonological form (on the left) with a particular schema for 
its referent (on the right). The BIT construction binds its 
phonological form with a predication that features a schema 
called Bite, which is the schematization of perceptual and 
motor knowledge about biting. Additionally, the predication 
is specified as being about the past, which will become 
relevant when inferences are propagated, after simulation. 
The clausal TRANSITIVE construction binds together the 
forms and the meanings of the three lexical constructions, 
which serve as its constituents. On the form side, it specifies 
an ordering relation (Agent precedes Verb precedes Patient), 
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while on the meaning side, the clause is linked to a 
predication that encodes the application of force by some 
means, where that means is bound to the Bite schema, the 
agent is Mary, and the patient is John. The clausal 
construction thus contributes its own structure and 
schematic meanings, and effects bindings among these and 
those of its constituents. In our example, the analysis 
process succeeds in finding a set of constructions that match 
the utterance and whose different constraints fit together, or 
unify, in all three domains: form, meaning and construction. 
The completed analysis process produces a semspec 
(consisting of the meaning schemas and bindings, shown in 
the right-hand column in Figure 2), which is used as input 
for the next step, the mental simulation of the described 
scene. The semspec indicates which perceptual and motor 
structures should be activated and how they are related. It 
might also specify other parameters of the simulation, such 
as the perspective from which to simulate. Our example is in 
the active voice, not passive (e.g. John was bitten by Mary), 
so would by default be simulated from Mary’s perspective, 
resulting in the activation of a motor schema for biting 
(though features of the surrounding context could result in 
an “experiencer” simulation perspective instead). 
Although our example omits many details of analysis and 
simulation (including how the model supports, e.g., 
reference resolution, construal, and sense disambiguation 
(for a discussion of these, see Bergen and Chang (To 
Appear)), it nonetheless demonstrates how ECG captures 
the idea of parameterization or schematization. A verb form 
like ‘bit’ centrally includes a Bite schema in its meaning; 
this schema is a parameterization over perceptual and motor 
knowledge about biting. To figure out who is biting whom 
— that is, to understand how the meaning of ‘bit’ relates to 
the meanings of the other words in the utterance — only 
very general knowledge about biting (that it is an action in 
which force is exerted by one participant on another) is 
required. The simulation process makes use of the 
perceptual and motor knowledge underlying this schematic 
representation, and provides detailed perceptual and motor 
content that can support inference and, on the current 
account, constitutes understanding. 
The remainder of the paper offers support for the ECG 
model from two different sources: a pair of behavioral 
experiments testing a prediction of the model, and the 
implementation of the formalism within computational 
models of language acquisition and understanding.  
Experiment: Embodied Verbal Representation 
The ECG approach to language claims that verbal semantics 
involves the activation of detailed motor knowledge about 
performing or perceiving the relevant action. One reflection 
of this prediction might be in the representation of the 
effector used to perform the action described by a verb. To 
test this hypothesis, we performed two related behavioral 
experiments. In the first, subjects were shown a picture and 
then a verb, and asked to decide whether the word correctly 
described the picture.  In the second, subjects were asked to 
decide whether two verbs had nearly the same meaning. We 
predicted that subjects would take longer to reject as 
matches an image-verb or verb-verb pair that depicted 
different actions using the same effector, compared to the 
case when the two non-matches used different effectors.  
Method  
Study 1.  39 native English speakers participated for course 
credit. They were told that they would see a picture of a 
person performing an action on a screen, followed by a 
verb, and were instructed to decide as quickly as possible 
whether the verb was a good description of the picture. 
During each trial, subjects were presented a stick figure of a 
person carrying out an action for 1 sec, a visual mask for 
450 msec, and a blank screen for 50 msec. Then the verb 
was displayed, and stayed on the screen until the subject 
pressed “yes” or “no”. All verbs were presented in the 
center of the screen.  All actions were predominantly 
performed using one of three effectors: foot, hand or mouth. 
More detailed discussion of the methodology can be found 
in Bergen, Feldman & Narayan (2003). 
Study 2. 53 native English speakers participated on a 
volunteer basis or for course credit. They were told that they 
would see a word appear on a screen and were instructed to 
decide as quickly as possible whether a second word that 
appeared meant more or less the same as the first word.  
During each trial, subjects were presented with a fixation 
cross in the center of the screen for 2 sec, followed by an 
English action verb for 1 sec, a visual mask for 450 msec, 
and a blank screen for 50 msec. Then the second verb was 
displayed, and stayed on the screen until the subject pressed 
“yes” or “no”. All verbs were capitalized and presented in 
the center of the screen. Verb pairs in critical trials pertained 
to motor actions of the following categories: 
Matching: Near-synonyms, e.g. 
SCREAM and SHRIEK; DANCE and WALTZ 
Non-matching, same effector: Verbs with clearly different 
meanings, using the same effector, e.g. 
SCREAM and LICK; DANCE and LIMP 
Non-matching, different effector: Verbs with clearly 
different meanings, using different effectors, e.g. 
SCREAM and STEP; DANCE and YELL 
More detailed discussion of the methodology can be found 
in Narayan, Bergen & Weinberg (2004).  
Results 
Study 1. Counting only replies that were correct and within 
2s.d. of the mean for a given subject, mean reaction times 
were 751ms for different-effector mismatches, 799ms for 
same-effector mismatches, and 741ms for matches. Using a 
standard ANOVA, the difference between the mismatching 
conditions was found to be significant (p<.0001). 
 
Study 2. Counting only replies that were correct and within 
3s.d. of the mean for a given subject, mean reaction times 
were 930ms for different-effector mismatches, 1030ms for 
same-effector mismatches, and 1070ms for near-synonyms. 
Following Clark (1973), we performed two ANOVAs, 
with subjects and items as nested random factors, and from 
these determined that the RT difference between the 
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mismatch conditions is significant (minF’(1,126)=9.0808, 
p<0.005). Post hoc tests showed that the non-matching 
different-effector condition is significantly different from 
the matching condition (minF’(1,126)=9.781), and the non-
matching same-effector condition is not significantly 
different (minF’(1,126)=2.0002). 
Discussion. Subjects took significantly longer to reject 
either a picture-verb pair as matches or a verb pair as near-
synonyms when the two actions shared an effector than 
when they did not. Since this effect occurred when part of 
the task was non-linguistic (Study 1), this is unlikely to be a 
mere lexical effect. Moreover, the presence of the effect 
with purely linguistic stimuli (Study 2) means it is not due 
to strictly visual properties of the stimuli, either. Instead, 
these results suggest that understanding motion verbs goes 
beyond accessing abstract structures; modal information 
about bodily action, such as the effector used, is involved.  
Importantly, the results imply that verb meaning does 
involve evoking modal motor representations: words 
encoding particular motor actions (kick, chew) contribute to 
the perceptuo-motor content of mental simulations. 
ECG computational implementation 
ECG is compatible in its broad outlines with a large body of 
linguistic and psycholinguistic research. But it is subject to 
the important additional constraint of being computationally 
precise. As we have described it, understanding even the 
simplest utterance involves multiple dynamic processes 
interacting with a variety of linguistic and embodied 
representations. Many of these are inspired by ideas from 
cognitive linguistics that have not been previously 
formalized, let alone used in any implemented system. It is 
thus crucial that we validate the framework by offering 
concrete implementations. In this section we briefly 
describe how the formalism serves as the lynchpin for 
computational models of linguistic use and acquisition. 
Formally, the ECG construction and schema formalisms 
have much in common with other unification-based 
grammars (e.g., Pollard & Sag 1994), including notations 
for expressing features, inheritance, typing, and 
unification/coindexation; it also has additional mechanisms 
that increase its expressivity and flexibility.  
As described earlier, the ECG formalism is designed to 
play a role in language understanding as the key interface 
between constructional analysis and the embodied 
simulation. Bryant (2003) describes an implemented 
construction analyzer that takes as input a grammar of ECG 
constructions and a sentence, and produces a semspec that 
provides the parameters for a simulation. The analyzer 
extends methods from syntactic parsing (particularly partial 
parsing and unification-based chart parsing) to 
accommodate and exploit the dual form-meaning nature of 
constructions. Specifically, it consists of a set of 
construction recognizers; each recognizer seeks the 
particular input form (or constraints) of its corresponding 
construction, and upon finding it checks the relevant 
semantic constraints. If multiple analyses are possible, the 
analyzer uses a semantic density metric to choose the 
analysis whose semspec is the most semantically coherent 
and complete. Thus, in constrast with typical language 
understanding systems in which syntactic parsing precedes 
semantic interpretation, the construction-based analyzer 
incorporates semantic constraints in parallel, reflecting the 
central role played by meaning in the ECG formalism. 
The semspec produced by the analyzer provides 
parameters for simulation using active, modal structures. A 
broad range of embodied meanings have been modeled 
using executing schemas (x-schemas), a dynamic 
representation motivated in part by motor and perceptual 
systems (Narayanan 1997; Bailey 1997). X-schemas can 
model sequential, concurrent, and asynchronous events. The 
Bite schema, for example, parameterizes a Bite x-schema 
that captures the continuous mouth actions culminating in a 
particular forceful application of the teeth of the Biter to the 
Bitten. A simulation engine based on x-schemas has been 
implemented (Narayanan 1997) and applied to model the 
semantics of several domains, including verbal (Bailey 
1997) and aspectual semantics (Chang, Gildea & Narayanan 
1998), metaphorical inference (Narayanan 1999), and 
frame-based perspectival inference (Chang et al. 2002).  
Although we have focused so far on language 
understanding, the ECG formalism is also designed to 
support a computational model of the acquisition of early 
phrasal and clausal constructions (Chang & Maia 2001; 
Chang 2004). This model takes ECG as the target 
representation to be learned from a sequence of utterances in 
context. Learning is usage-based in that utterances are first 
analyzed using the process described above; the resulting 
(partial) semspec is used along with context to prompt the 
formation of new constructions. The model has been applied 
to learn simple English motion constructions from a corpus 
of child-directed utterances, paired with situation 
representations. The resulting learning trends reflect cross-
linguistic acquisition patterns, in particular the learning of 
lexically specific verb island constructions before more 
abstract grammatical patterns (Tomasello 1992). They also 
demonstrate how the ECG formalism serves as an interface 
between language comprehension and acquisition. 
The implementations described here do not provide direct 
evidence of the cognitive reality of ECG. But they do 
demonstrate its utility and flexibility, and, by offering an 
integrated and precisely specified instantiation of 
simulation-based language understanding and use, serve as 
an existence proof for the overall approach. 
Conclusions 
If the embodied view presented above is correct, then the 
human capacity for language understanding relies on 
activating internal motor and perceptual simulations on the 
basis of linguistic input. These simulations can serve any of 
the purposes that linguistic information is conventionally 
put to — their content can be stored, thereby updating the 
internal knowledge base; their inferences can be propagated 
such that the understander can draw conclusions needed in 
discourse; or the actions they include can be performed in 
cases where the language involves instructions or requests.  
The computationally viable and empirically supported 
model described above views linguistic units as pairings 
between schematic representations of form and schematic 
112
representations of meaning. Those representations are not 
abstract and arbitrary; rather, they are tightly bound to the 
perceptual and motor substrates over which they generalize. 
This approach permits insights into how language is 
integrated with perceptual and motor knowledge in the 
cognitive system, and sheds light on what meaning means. 
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Abstract 
We study how students hedge and express affect when 
interacting with both humans and computer systems, 
during keyboard-mediated natural language tutoring 
sessions in medicine.  We found significant 
differences in such student behavior linked to whether 
the tutor was human or a computer.  Students hedge 
and apologize often to human tutors, but very rarely to 
computer tutors.  The type of expressions also 
differed—overt hostility was not encountered in 
human tutoring sessions, but was a major component 
in computer-tutored sessions.  Little gender-linking of 
hedging behavior was found, contrary to expectations 
based on prior studies.  A weak gender-linked effect 
was found for affect in human tutored sessions. 
Introduction 
How people interact with computers is of clear 
importance to the design of effective computer 
interfaces.  The book The Media Equation 
(Reeves & Nass 1996) claims that people treat 
computer systems essentially the same as they 
treat people, though more recent work (Shecht-
man & Horowitz 2003;  Goldstein et al., 2002) 
has raised serious questions about this conclu-
sion.  Differences between how people respond 
to human beings and how they respond to com-
puters have been informally documented since 
the first experiments with natural language inter-
faces (Thompson, 1980).  A better elucidation of 
the issues may improve intelligent systems de-
sign. 
 Specifically, understanding these issues bet-
ter may aid in the development of more effective 
tutoring systems.  In this paper, we study the 
differences between student reactions to our In-
telligent Tutoring System (ITS), CIRCSIM-
Tutor  (Michael et al., 2003), and the human tu-
tors on which it was modeled.  Our goal is to 
characterize student hedges and expressions of 
affect and try to determine how our ITS could 
understand them and respond effectively.  
 We are motivated by experiments (Fox 
1993) that suggest such differences for ITSs that 
carry out a natural language dialogue with the 
student.  Fox carried out a “Wizard-of-Oz” ex-
periment which showed students to be polite and 
friendly to human tutors when they met with 
them face-to-face, but decidedly rude to the same 
tutors when communicating with them over a 
slow computer link and told that a machine was 
tutoring them.   
 The current study has potentially important 
implications for the future development of our 
ITS.  Investigation of how human tutors respond 
to student misery, frustration, and rage is the first 
step toward making systems more friendly and 
responsive.   By contrast, our system's current 
response to student hedges and expressions of 
affect (as to any input it does not understand) is 
to tell the student what kind of input it is expect-
ing.  The result is dialogue like this:  
 
Student: Clueless! 
Tutor:    Please respond with prediction table  
parameters.  
 
Better understanding of how and when students 
express affect in tutoring sessions and the func-
tions of such expressions in the discourse may 
lead to improvements in student modeling and 
hence tutoring effectiveness. 
Background 
Thompson’s (1980) system was a pioneering 
natural-language interface designed to help U.S. 
Navy personnel load cargo onto ships.  It thus 
attempted to delete all affective remarks, to 
avoid confusing the parser.   Although the sys-
tem was quite effective at its task, most of its 
affective input consisted of curses.  By contrast, 
chat-oriented natural language interaction pro-
grams like ELIZA (Weizenbaum, 1966) and 
PARRY (Colby, 1975), can impress their users 
with simulated charm and  intelligence, despite a 
lack of any deep understanding.  Similarly, phy-
sicians experienced the natural language 
interface of  Shortliffe's (1982) MYCIN and 
ONCOCIN programs as attractive, even though 
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input was restricted to one-word answers to 
questions. 
 The specific question of how to properly 
interpret student hedging in tutoring sessions was 
raised at the  NAACL Workshop on Adaptation in 
Dialogue Systems, held as part of the 2001 meet-
ing of the Association for Computational 
Linguistics.  It was suggested that student hedges 
might provide useful information by reliably 
signaling student misconceptions.  Our collabo-
rators on the CIRCSIM-Tutor project at Rush 
Medical College are dubious about this sugges-
tion, however.  Ten years ago, after their first 
experiments with tutoring in cardiovascular 
physiology they resolved to stop commenting on 
hedges, because they felt that student hedging 
reflects personal communication styles more 
than any real confusion.  Further experience has 
not changed their minds, although they respond 
with help and encouragement whenever they 
believe the student to be experiencing real dis-
tress (Bhatt 2004).   
 As well, there is an increasing recognition in 
the ITS community of the importance of affect.  
A full session at Intelligent Tutoring Systems 
2002 was devoted to such issues (Aist et al. 
2002; Kort & Reilly 2002; Vicente & Pain 
2002).  These papers all argue for the importance 
of responding to evidence of student distress.  
Our study is the first, to our knowledge, that ex-
plicitly studies student hedging of answers and 
expressions of affect by comparing human and 
computer tutorial sessions.  Relevant in this con-
text also is the recent general trend towards 
greater concern in the AI community with emo-
tional aspects of intelligence, sparked mainly by 
the work of Breazeal and Brooks (Brooks et al. 
1998; Breazeal 1998).   
Goals and Hypotheses 
We study response hedging and expressions of 
affect in human and machine tutoring sessions.  
This study incorporates both exploratory and 
hypothesis testing goals.  The main exploratory 
questions that we investigated are as follows: 
 
What kinds of hedged responses and expres-
sions of affect do we see in human tutoring 
sessions?  
What kinds of hedged responses and expres-
sions of affect do we see in machine tutoring 
sessions?  
How might the two kinds of tutoring interac-
tions differ regarding student use of hedged 
responses and expressions of affect? 
 
In addition, based on results in human/computer 
interaction (primarily Fox (1993) and Thompson 
(1980)), we formulate our main hypotheses: 
H1a (Hedging Differs):  Student use of hedg-
ing differs depending on whether the tutor is a 
human or a computer system.   
H1b (Affect Differs):  Student use of affect dif-
fers depending on whether the tutor is a 
human or a computer system.   
The workshop discussion mentioned above also 
prompted us to investigate two subsidiary hy-
potheses about hedging, and how it may prove 
useful for student modeling: 
H2a (Hedges Inform): The presence of a 
hedge provides information regarding whether 
a student answer is right or wrong. 
H2b (Hedges Wrong): Hedged answers are 
almost always wrong and so provide near cer-
tain feedback for student modeling. 
Regarding the relevance of H2b, note that most 
computer tutoring systems cannot currently 
make use of ‘weak’ probabilistic information for 
student modeling, such as “hedged answers are 
20% more likely to be wrong than non-hedged 
answers”, but only more certain statements, such 
as “hedged answers are almost always wrong”. 
Gender-linked variation 
Many previous studies, including Lakoff (1975) 
and Aries (1989), have reported that women 
hedge more than men, although interpretation of 
such claims is complex (Holmes 1984), since 
hedging can be a politeness or face-saving strat-
egy, and not necessarily an expression of 
uncertainty.  Of particular relevance are recent 
results on hedging in tutoring systems (Shah et 
al., 2002), which found that women hedge sig-
nificantly more often than men when making 
initiatives in tutoring dialogues.  If such differ-
ences are consistent, it should influence how 
tutoring systems interact with male and female 
students.  We thus formulate: 
H3a (Women Hedge): Women hedge answers 
more often than men in tutoring interactions. 
Aries, Lakoff (1990) and Tannen (1990) all de-
scribe women as more likely to express emotion 
than men.   Hence: 
H3b (Women are Affectual): Women use 
more affective expressions than men in tutor-
ing interactions. 
Furthermore, Lakoff (1975) also describes 
women as apologizing more often.  Thus we also 
consider whether: 
H3c (Women Apologize):  Women apologize 
more often than men in tutoring interactions. 
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Data Collection 
Human/Human Tutoring Sessions 
We collected transcripts of keyboard-to-
keyboard human tutoring sessions (henceforth, 
H/H sessions) between students and their expert 
tutors on the subject of the baroreceptor reflex 
during November 1999.  Sessions took place 
with the student and the tutor in separate rooms, 
communicating only via keyboard.  The tutor for 
each session was either  Joel Michael or  Allen 
Rovick (both professors of physiology, the same 
tutor throughout each session), and the 25 sub-
jects were paid volunteers, first year students at 
Rush Medical College enrolled in a physiology 
course.  The data examined consists of over 
51,000 words (over 12,000 lines) of student-tutor 
dialogue, from hour-long sessions (numbered 
K52-K76 in our corpus).  
 
Human/Computer Tutoring Sessions 
In November 2002, most of the first year class at 
Rush Medical College used CIRCSIM-Tutor 
(Michael et al., 2003) for one hour in a regularly 
scheduled laboratory session.  Some students 
worked in pairs, some alone, so we wound up 
with only 66 transcripts (the H/C sessions), 
which we used as the basis for our findings about 
machine tutoring sessions.  The system presents 
the same problems about the baroreceptor reflex 
as the human tutors and attempts to emulate their 
tutoring strategies.   We have not yet attempted 
to analyze the differences between the single-
user and paired sessions.  
Methodology 
Coding of Hedges  
Hedges in the transcripts were hand-coded using 
a coding scheme based on the hedge types de-
scribed in Shah’s (2002) study of hedged 
initiatives.  The first step was to examine tran-
scripts of four H/H sessions (K52-K55) and to 
establish an initial categorization.  This phase 
was performed collectively by  Bhatt and  Evens.  
Subsequently, the remaining twenty-two sessions 
were coded by each researcher independently.  
Each hedged instance was classed by one of the 
predefined types (Table 1).  Inter-rater reliability 
was excellent, with a kappa of  0.97.   
 Following this initial coding and coder com-
parison, some hedge types were eliminated or 
aggregated into other types, and coding was 
standardized in all transcripts.  Transcripts were 
electronically marked up using SGML tags, to 
facitlitate subsequent counting of hedges and 
hedge types for statistical analysis.  The final list 
of hedge types, along with counts and examples 
of usage, is given in Table 1. 
 
Coding of Affect 
For coding affect a similar procedure to that 
above was followed.  Evens and Bhatt scanned 
the text comprising the sessions K52-K55 and 
searched for instances of student affect together, 
discussing potential instances.  A set of catego-
ries was derived from these initial analyses, and 
the remaining sessions (K56-K76) were then 
coded independently by both researchers.  The 
results were then discussed until a consensus was 
Table 1: Final list of hedge categories with defi-
nitions or examples of usage, with counts of 
occurrences as answers (A) and initiatives (I). 
 
Hedge Type A I Example 
BELIEVE 6 0 I believe 
EITHER_OR 2 0 Either X orY 
EQUIVALENT 3 1 it sounds as 
though 
EXPECT 12 0 probably 
GUESS 10 1 I guess 
KIND_OF 7 0 Kind of 
MAYBE 4 4 Maybe 
NOT_SURE 9 3 I’m not sure 
Q1 61 11 Question mark 
after a statement 
Q2 2 1 Question syntax 
with no “?” 
SHOULD 1 0 X should increase 
TAG 2 2 It shouldn’t X, 
should it? 
THINK 44 11 I think 
THOUGHT 21 4 I thought 
TRY 3 0 I can try 
 
 
Table 2: Types of affect expressions in student 
responses and examples of usage, with counts of 
occurrences as answers (A) and initiatives (I). 
Affect type A I Example 
AMAZEMENT 0 1 Wow 
AMUSEMENT 0 1 Ha ha 
APOLOGY 4 14 Sorry 
COMPREHENSION 6 6 I get it 
CONFUSION 1 7 I'm a bit confused 
CONTEMPLATION 14 5 Hmmm 
CURIOSITY 0 2 I'm curious 
DIFFICULTY 0 2 I'm having difficulty 
FEEDBACK 0 6 That was helpful 
GRATITUDE 0 14 Thank you 
GREETING 0 1 Good morning 
PAIN 0 1 Ouch 
REALIZATION 5 9 Ahh 
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reached on each instance.  Table 2 lists the final 
categorization of the types of affect found in the 
data, with counts and examples.  Transcripts 
were electronically marked up using SGML tags 
as above. 
 Parenthetically, identifying affect in student 
responses was quite straightforward.  In fact, 
almost every expression of affect was explicitly 
signaled by the student.  This is encouraging for 
the use of affectual cues by computer tutoring 
systems, since in a text-based medium it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to deduce students’ 
emotional states from implicit cues (such as sar-
casm). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Hedging in Human Tutoring  
Hedged answers occur on average 6.04 times per 
session (=3.77).  The different kinds of hedges 
are given in Table 1.  The two most common 
types by far (together accounting for more than 
half of all occurrences) are Q1, adding a question 
mark to an answer otherwise in statement form 
(possibly expressing a sort of “questioning into-
nation”), and THINK, expressing a modal 
likelihood assessment via grammatical metaphor. 
 The majority of hedged answers are correct 
(57.6%, N=151), and so hedging does not pro-
vide a clear-cut signal of misunderstanding on 
the part of the student, so the data do not support 
H2b: Hedges Wrong.  However, an even larger 
majority of non-hedged answers are correct 
(80.1%, N=359).  This difference is significant 
(one-sided p<0.001), supporting H2a: Hedges 
Inform.  Indeed, wrong answers are almost twice 
as likely to be hedged than correct answers 
(42.7% versus 26.3%).   
 In contrast to other work, we found gender 
to make no significant difference in hedging an-
swers, as women hedge answers an average of 
5.46 times per session, whereas men do so 6.66 
times, well within the statistical variation of our 
sample.  Hence H3c: Women Hedge is not sup-
ported.  No gender-linked difference was found 
for correctness of hedged answers either, with 
women and men averaging 59.1% and 56.2% 
correct for hedged responses, respectively.     
 
Hedging in Machine Tutoring 
Surprisingly, there was only a single hedge in all 
66 H/C sessions, clearly supporting H1a: Hedg-
ing Differs.  In this sole example the student 
hedges an answer with a spurious statistic “9/10” 
when “all”, or no marker at all, would have been 
more correct: 
 
S: 9/10 times the dr will dominate because 
the rr can't bring all the way back   
 
Affect in Human Tutoring 
Expressions of affect are fairly common in the 
H/H sessions; with large variations, however, 
between different students.  Out of twenty-five 
sessions, twenty-two contained at least one in-
stance of student affect, while three had none at 
all.  The most common type is APOLOGY, with 
eighteen occurrences overall.  Instances of affect 
occur 3.52 times per session  (=2.65), with a 
very high level of variation between students.   
 Men and women express affect at similar 
overall rates, with average numbers of 3.66 and 
3.38 occurrences per student, respectively, so 
H3b: Women are Affectual is not supported.  On 
the other hand, although all thirteen of the ses-
sions involving female students include at least 
one expression of affect, three of the male-
student sessions do not.  Fisher’s exact test  on 
these data gives p=0.096, so that we may 
(barely) reject the null hypothesis that the same 
fraction of men as women are likely to express 
affect in tutorial sessions.  This supports a 
weaker version of H3b—although some men 
express a lot of affect, men are more likely than 
women to show no affect at all.  
 Considering just apologies (the overall most 
frequent expression of affect), 2 testing for two 
independent samples gives p=0.12, so the data 
do not permit rejection of the null hypothesis that 
men and women apologize at similar rates, and 
so we cannot support H3c: Women Apologize. 
Affect in Machine Tutoring 
There were more examples of affect than of 
hedging in the H/C sessions, but the 20 instances 
of affect found in 66 H/C sessions are still far 
fewer than the 88 instances found in just 25 H/H 
sessions.  Moreover, only 12 sessions (18%) 
contained any affect at all, as opposed to 22 
(88%) of the H/H sessions.  Thus we find that 
our data clearly support H1b: Affect Differs.   
 Even more significant than the large differ-
ence in frequency of affect is the difference in 
the kinds of affect that students expressed when 
interacting with a computer system.  We saw 
none of the kinds of affect listed in Table 2 that 
we found in the H/H sessions—affect-related 
expressions in the H/C sessions tended to be 
more confrontational  than with a human tutor.  
Although some instances of affect did seem to be 
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genuine expressions of feeling, some seemed 
more designed to push and test the system.  
Glass (1999) reported even more hostile input to 
an earlier version of the system.  We therefore 
classed such responses into 3 categories: Hostile 
(5 responses), Testing (4 responses), and Re-
fusal-To-Answer (11 responses).  For example, 
student T48 seemed to get annoyed with the sys-
tem as these two “Hostile” excerpts indicate: 
 
       T: Why did you enter 'no change' for TPR?  
       S: you know why. 
        .  . . .  
       T: Why is MAP still decreased?  
       S: I don't want to tell you. 
 
T74 seems pretty annoyed too: 
      
T: Why is MAP still decreased?  
      S: blalaal  
 
However, student T60 is clearly trying to “test” 
the system: 
 
T: Why did MAP change in the manner that 
you predicted? 
S: In other words, <student's name> knows 
all...  
 
So is T81, we think, but perhaps this was simple 
honesty: 
 
     T: Why did you enter 'no change' for TPR?  
     S: Nimesh said so  
 
Conclusions 
Our results clearly show strong differences in 
student use of hedges and expressions of affect, 
depending on whether they are being tutored by 
a human or a computer ITS.  While all students 
hedge in sessions with human tutors, they do not 
hedge at all in the machine sessions (with one 
exception).   This conclusion is also supported 
by experience with the Why2-ATLAS system 
(Rosé et al. 2002); Carolyn Rosé told us that they 
do not see hedging either, though they looked for 
it since they had also observed it frequently in 
human tutoring sessions (Rosé, personal com-
munication). The progress of speech-enabled 
tutoring (Bratt et al. 2002) is of great interest; it 
is possible that a difference in communication 
modality can affect student hedging behavior.  
As well, decoding students’ affect may be easier 
from speech, due to tonal and prosody cues 
(Forbes-Riley & Litman 2004). 
 One specific result of importance to ITS is 
that hedging is not a clear indication of student 
uncertainty or misunderstanding, as had been 
believed.  Indeed, examination of the types of 
hedges most used by students leads us to believe 
that hedges are more connected to issues of con-
versational flow and politeness, rather than 
expression of uncertainty.  This interpretation is 
implied by the two most common forms of 
hedges in our data; Q1 uses a question mark to 
demand a response (confirmation?) from the 
tutor, while THINK expresses a modal assess-
ment via a subjective metaphor, rather than a 
more direct modal verb or adjunct, thus request-
ing that the tutor respond to the student’s mental 
state.  Further research will be needed to exam-
ine this interpretation more closely. 
 As opposed to hedging, students do express 
affect to machines, though far less often than to 
humans.  The real difference is in the kind of 
affect expressed, though—students do not apolo-
gize to computers, nor do they thank them or 
give them direct feedback; they do, however, 
express confusion and frustration.  Together with 
our results on hedging, this leads us to suspect 
that the fact that students know they are interact-
ing with a computer changes their attitude 
towards the conversation, contra Reeves and 
Nass (1996), and they are less concerned with 
helping to keep the flow going than they are in 
‘normal’ conversation (Sacks et al. 1974).  
 In future work, we will look at hedging and 
affect in more human tutoring sessions.  We 
wonder if the fact that Michael and Rovick   
practice the motivational techniques described by 
Lepper et al. (1993) influences the fact that they 
receive more positive affective input. This will 
help us to better understand how tutor style 
might encourage more useful hedging and ex-
pression of affect.  Currently, we are 
concentrating on investigating the responses 
made by human tutors to student expressions of 
distress, in order to develop rules to make 
CIRCSIM-Tutor more friendly and responsive.   
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Abstract 
This paper discusses Betty’s Brain, a teachable agent in the 
domain of ecosystems that combines learning by teaching 
with self-regulation mentoring to promote deep learning and 
understanding. Two studies demonstrate the effectiveness of 
this system. The first study focused on components that define 
student-teacher interactions in the learning by teaching task. 
The second study examined the value of adding meta-
cognitive strategies that governed Betty’s behavior and self-
regulation hints provided by a mentor agent. The study com-
pared three versions: an intelligent tutoring version, a learning 
by teaching version, and a learning by teaching plus self-
regulation strategies. Results indicate that the addition of the 
self-regulation mentor better prepared students to learn new 
concepts later, even when they no longer had access to the 
self-regulation environment. 
Introduction 
The recent proliferation in computer-based learning envi-
ronments has produced a number of tutoring systems 
(Wenger, 1987) and pedagogical agents (Johnson, et al., 
2000). The typical intelligent tutoring system curriculum is 
problem-driven. The system selects problems for the user to 
solve, and provides feedback on the solutions generated. 
The tutoring paradigm has been very successful. At the 
same time, it often emphasizes localized feedback, and does 
not always help students practice higher-order cognitive 
skills especially in complex domains (e.g., picking what 
questions to ask or how to examine resources for learning). 
Problem solving in complex domains requires active deci-
sion-making by learners in terms of setting learning goals 
and applying strategies for achieving these goals. The cur-
rent paper examines ways to address these latter goals using 
an “intelligent” learning environment. 
Our goal has been to introduce effective learning para-
digms that advance the state of the art in computer-based 
learning systems and support students’ abilities to learn, 
even after they leave the computer environment. Our ap-
proach has been to create environments where students 
teach computer agents.  This paper reports the results of 
two studies. One study explored different features of a 
specific learning by teaching environment, Betty’s Brain. 
The second study manipulated the metacognitive support 
students received when teaching “Betty” and measured 
its effects on the students’ abilities to subsequently learn 
new content several weeks later.  
The cognitive science and education research literature 
supports the idea that teaching others is a powerful way 
to learn. Research in reciprocal teaching, peer-assisted 
tutoring, programming, small-group interaction, and self-
explanation hint at the potential of learning by teaching 
(Palinscar & Brown, 1984; Cohen, et al. 1982; Papert, 
1993; Chi, et al., 1994). Bargh and Schul (1980) found 
that people who prepared to teach others to take a quiz on 
a passage learned better than those who prepared to take 
the quiz themselves. The literature on tutoring has shown 
that tutors benefit as much from tutoring as their tutees 
(Chi, et al., 2001; Graesser, et al., 1995). Biswas et al. 
(2001) report that students preparing to teach made 
statements about how the responsibility to teach forced 
them to gain deeper understanding of the materials. Other 
students focused on the importance of having a clear 
conceptual organization of the materials. Additionally, 
teachers can provide explanations and demonstrations 
during teaching and receive questions and feedback from 
students. These activities seem significant from the 
standpoint of their cognitive consequences in improving 
understanding of complex concepts. 
A key benefit of the learning by teaching process focuses 
on the need to structure knowledge in a compact and com-
municable format.  This requires a level of abstraction that 
may help the teacher develop important explanatory struc-
tures for the domain.  For example, many people find that 
preparing a conference presentation helps them decide 
which concepts deserve the “high level” status of introduc-
tory framing.  The need to structure ideas not only occurs in 
preparation for teaching, but can also occur when teaching. 
Good learners bring structure to a domain by asking the 
right questions to develop a systematic flow for their rea-
soning.  Good teachers build on the learners’ knowledge to 
organize information, and in the process, they find new 
knowledge organizations, and better ways for interpreting 
and using these organizations in problem solving tasks.  
   Despite its potential benefits, learning-by-teaching can 
initially seem inefficient.  For example, students may need 
to learn the right way to teach, which can slow down their 
learning of the subject matter in the short run. At the same 
time, learning-by-teaching may have long-term benefits in 
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that it helps students appreciate what a complete and com-
municable answer needs to look like, and they may learn 
how to consult resources to understand deeply enough that 
they can teach well.  In this case, it seems important to 
evaluate not only how well students learn the target knowl-
edge of the teaching episode, but also how well they are 
prepared to learn in the future as a result of learning-by-
teaching (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999).   
We have adopted a new approach to designing learning-
by-teaching environments that ideally supports the learning 
outcomes described above, provide tools that enable users to 
visually organize and reason about their domain knowledge 
as they teach a computer agent, and include feedback to 
promote better self-regulation during the learning and teach-
ing processes. A key challenge to the learning-by-teaching 
approach is that students are usually novices with regard to 
domain content and teaching tasks. To help with the domain 
content, our design includes content-integrated instruction 
that encourages students to access and think about re-
sources, and check their reasoning during the teaching (and 
learning) process by interacting with the teachable agent and 
assessing its performance. To help with the teaching and 
learning aspects, we have made the computer agent more 
participatory in the learning process, and developed a Men-
tor agent that acts as a “meta-cognitive” coach, and provides 
strategy and content feedback about teaching with under-
standing, while avoiding the very specific localized feed-
back that is characteristic of many tutoring systems. Ideally 
the combination of the two can help students not only learn 
the content of a specific lesson, but also prepare students to 
learn in the future when they no longer have access to the 
system. 
Implementing Learning by Teaching Systems 
   Our teachable agents (TAs) provide important structures 
to help shape the thinking of the learner-as-teacher.  Each 
agent manifests a visual structure that is tailored to a spe-
cific form of knowledge organization and inference.  In 
general, our agents try to embody four principles of design: 
• Teach through visual representations that organize the 
reasoning structures of the domain (e.g., directed graphs 
and matrices). 
• Build on well-known teaching interactions to organize 
student activity (e.g., teaching by “laying out,” teaching 
by example, teaching by telling, teaching by modeling). 
• Ensure the agents have independent performances that 
provide feedback on how well they have been taught 
(each agent uses a distinct AI reasoning technique, such 
as qualitative reasoning, logic, and genetic algorithms). 
• Keep the start-up costs of teaching the agent very low 
(as compared to programming).  This occurs by only im-
plementing one modeling structure with its associated 
reasoning mechanisms. 
Betty’s Brain makes her qualitative reasoning visible 
through a dynamic, directed graph called a concept map 
(Novak, 1996). The fact that TAs represent knowledge 
structures rather than the referent domain is a departure 
from many simulation-based learning environments.  Simu-
lations often show the behavior of a physical system, for 
example, how an algal bloom increases the death of fish.  
On the other hand, TAs simulate the behavior of a person’s 
thoughts about a system. Learning empirical facts is impor-
tant, but learning to use the expert structure that organizes 
those facts is equally important. Therefore, we have struc-
tured the agents to simulate particular forms of thought that 
may help teacher-students structure their thinking about a 
domain. 
   Fig. 1 illustrates the interface of Betty’s Brain. Stu-
dents explicitly teach Betty using a graphical drag and drop 
interface to create and modify their concept maps in the top 
pane of the window. They use the Teach Concept button to 
create new concepts, and the Teach Link button to create 
relations between concepts. When teaching the agent about 
relationships, students use a popup template to specify the 
name (e.g., breathe, produce, helps) and type of relation-
ship (causal, type of, and descriptive). For causal relations, 
students indicate whether the relation implies an increase 
(++) or decrease (−−). For example, in the map in Fig.1, 
the concept map implies an increase in fish will result in a 
decrease in dissolved oxygen. Note that the student gener-
ates all concept and relationship names. They are not cho-
sen from a menu. 
Figure 1: Betty’s Brain Interface 
Once taught, Betty reasons with her knowledge and an-
swers questions. Users can formulate their own queries us-
ing the Ask button, and observe the effects of their teaching 
by analyzing Betty’s responses. Templates are provided to 
ask Betty two kinds of questions: (i) If <concept A> in-
creases (decreases) what happens to <concept B>? and (ii) 
Tell me all you know about <concept A>. For the latter 
question, Betty enumerates all the concepts that are directly 
linked to <concept A>. For the former question, Betty uses 
qualitative reasoning methods to derive her answers to 
question through a chain of causal inferences. For example, 
using the concept map in Fig. 1, Betty can conclude that an 
increase in algae will cause fish to increase.  
Betty also provides explanations for how she derives her 
answers by depicting the derivation process using multiple 
modalities: text, animation, and speech. Details of the rea-
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soning and explanation mechanisms in Betty’s Brain are 
presented elsewhere (Leelawong, et al., 2001). 
 We should clarify that Betty does not use machine learn-
ing algorithms to achieve automated learning from exam-
ples, explanations, and induction. Our focus is on the well-
defined schemes associated with teaching that support a 
process of instruction, assessment, and remediation.  These 
schemas help organize student interaction with the com-
puter, much as people’s well-defined schemas for spatial 
organizations helped to create the desktop metaphor for 
windows-based computer systems. 
  The system also includes sets of teacher-generated quiz 
questions. Betty can take the quiz, and students see how she 
performs and receive the correct answer. The quiz questions 
are structured to provide students cues on concepts and rela-
tions that are important in the domain of study. Examples of 
some quiz questions are shown in Fig. 2.  
A Prior Study without a Self-Regulation Mentor 
To study the effectiveness of Betty’s Brain we con-
ducted an experiment on 50 high-achieving fifth grade 
students from a science class in an urban public school 
located in a southeastern US city. The students were 
asked to teach Betty about river ecosystems. We exam-
ined the effects of the interactive features of the teach-
able agent environment using a  between-subjects 
design. One group of students could submit their agent to 
take a Quiz (and receive feedback on the correct answer).  
A second group could Query their agent by generating 
their own questions and seeing how Betty chains through 
her map to reach the answer (there was no expert feed-
back on the answer). The third condition, which could 
neither Query nor Quiz the agent, was basically using a 
graphing package. Students who had both Query and 
Quiz features could ask Betty questions and see her per-
formance on the quiz questions. Students were given in-
structions on how to use the system, and then they used 
the software for 3 one-hour sessions. To help students 
learn what to teach, reference materials were made avail-
able during and in between their teaching sessions with 
Betty.  
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We hypothesized that having the query feature would 
help students debug their own thinking and reasoning in 
the problem domain, and this would result in maps with 
more inter-linked concepts. Betty’s answers and her ex-
planations would make explicit the process of reasoning 
across chains of links in a concept map. For the Quiz 
condition, we expected that students would map back-
ward from the quiz questions and use the feedback they 
received about her answers to produce more accurate 
concept maps.   
Analysis of the scope of students’ maps and the types 
and accuracy of links contained therein are presented in 
(Leelawong, et al., 2002).  On the positive side, students 
who used the Query and/or Quiz mechanisms understood 
causal relations better than the students who did not. This 
was reflected in their concept maps, which had a larger 
proportion of causal links than the No Quiz and No 
Query group. As predicted, students who had access to 
the Query feature had the most inter-linked maps and 
most elaborate reasoning chains. The Quiz feature was 
effective in helping students decide the important domain 
concepts and types of relationships to teach Betty.  
We also noted some negative aspects to our system. 
Our observations of students during the study suggested 
that students who had the quiz feature were too focused 
on “getting the quiz questions correct” rather than “mak-
ing sure that Betty (and they themselves) understood the 
information” (Davis, et al., 2003). The activity logs of 
the students who used the quiz showed a pattern of quick 
one-link corrections followed by a retake of the quiz. The 
query mechanism and resources were used sparsely, and 
it is unlikely they gained a deep understanding of causal 
structures. On the other hand, the Query-only group spent 
more time with Betty’s explanations and reading re-
sources. Surprisingly, students who had the query feature 
without the benefit of quiz feedback produced as many 
valid relevant causal links as the conditions with the quiz 
and quiz and query feature. This demonstrated the value 
of explicitly illustrating the reasoning process (by having 
Betty explain her answers) so that students understand 
causal structures.  
Figure 2: Quiz Questions 
Reflections on these results made us rethink our design 
and implementation of TA environments. A primary con-
cern was the student’s focus on getting quiz questions 
right without trying to gain an understanding of interde-
pendence and balance in river ecosystems. We realized 
that interactions between the student-as-teacher, Betty, 
and the quiz feature had to be improved to facilitate bet-
ter learning. Further, in exit interviews, students empha-
sized that they would have liked Betty to be more active 
and exhibit characteristics of a good student during the 
teaching phase (Davis, et al., 2003). Several students 
suggested that we should “do some sort of game or some-
thing and make the system more interactive,” and “Betty 
should react to what she was being taught, and take the 
initiative and ask more questions on her own.” Consistent 
with this feedback, we noted that the first version of 
Betty was passive and only responded when asked ques-
tions.  We believed that to create a true learning by 
teaching environment, Betty needed to better demonstrate 
qualities of human students.  A tutor gains deeper under-
standing from interactions with a tutee ( Chi, et al., 2001) 
that includes answering the tutee’s questions, explaining 
materials, and discovering misconceptions.  Betty should 
be designed to benefit her users in the same way.  
Self-Regulated Learning and Betty’s Brain 
As mentioned earlier, an important realization from 
this first study was that we were dealing with young chil-
dren who were novices in teaching practice and in do-
main knowledge content. To accommodate this, the 
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learning environment was redesigned to provide appro-
priate scaffolds and proper feedback mechanisms to help 
students overcome their initial difficulties in learning and 
teaching about a complex domain. The scaffolds took on 
three primary forms. First, we made improvements in the 
online resources available for learning about river eco-
systems. We reorganized the resources to emphasize the 
concepts of interdependence and balance. This changed 
the partitioning of the resources to the three primary cy-
cles that govern ecosystem behavior: (i) the oxy-
gen/carbon dioxide cycle, (ii) the food chain, and (iii) the 
decomposition cycle. A hypertext implementation al-
lowed direct access to sections and subsections. An ad-
vanced keyword search technique provided access to in-
formation using keywords. (Students in the study below 
found the resources to be much more useful, and used 
them extensively while teaching Betty.) 
 The second change is that we redesigned the quiz so 
that the questions would support users in systematically 
building their knowledge about river eco-systems. The 
questions were no longer randomly sampled from the full 
domain, but they gradually introduced more complex 
questions. Furthermore, the first item in each quiz was a 
comprehensive question that covered all of the domain 
concepts and relations associated with a particular cycle. 
This prevented students from taking a sequential ap-
proach of building the concept map to answer one ques-
tion at a time. We also improved the feedback the stu-
dents received. 
These two changes were important, but we doubted 
they would be sufficient in supporting users in becoming 
better learners and teachers, nor did they address our us-
ers requests for a more “life like” Betty. Therefore, our 
third change, and most relevant to the study below, was 
to make Betty more reactive to what she was being 
taught, as well as to use self-regulation strategies in her 
interactions with her student-teacher. Along with this, we 
added a mentor agent to the system to help users observe 
and develop metacognitive and self-regulation strategies 
to support active and independent learning. Self-
regulated learning should be an effective framework for 
providing feedback because it promotes the development 
of higher-order cognitive skills (Corno & Mandinach, 
1983), and it is critical to the development of problem 
solving ability (Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990). 
Our new design adopted some aspects of the frame-
work of self-regulated learning, described by Zimmer-
man (1989) as situations where students are “metacogni-
tively, motivationally, and behaviorally participants in 
their own learning process.” Self-regulated learning 
strategies involve actions and processes that can help one 
to acquire knowledge and develop problem solving skills 
(Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990).  Zimmerman describes a 
number of self-regulated learning skills that include goal 
setting and planning, seeking and organizing information, 
keeping records and monitoring, and self-evaluation. We 
developed mechanisms by which Betty forced the student 
to conform to the self-regulation strategies. In parallel, 
the Mentor agent included resources that helped students 
develop these skills during their learning and teaching. 
This resulted in a number of changes to Betty’s Brain.  
For example, when a student begins the teach phase by 
constructing the initial concept map, both the Mentor and 
Betty make suggestions that the student set goals about 
what to teach, and make efforts to gain the relevant 
knowledge by studying the river ecosystem resources.  
The Mentor continues to emphasize the reading and un-
derstanding of resources, whenever the student has ques-
tions on how to improve their learning.  The user is given 
the opportunity to evaluate her knowledge while study-
ing.  If she is not satisfied with her understanding, she 
may seek further information by asking the Mentor for 
additional help. While teaching, the student as teacher 
can interact with Betty in many ways, such as asking her 
questions (querying), and getting her to take quizzes to 
evaluate her performance.  Users are given a chance to 
predict how Betty will answer a question so they can 
check what Betty learned against what they were trying 
to teach.  
Some of the self-regulation strategies manifest through 
Betty’s persona. These strategies make Betty more in-
volved during the teach phase, and drive her interactions 
and dialog with the student. For example, during concept 
map creation, Betty spontaneously tries to demonstrate 
chains of reasoning, and the conclusions she draws from 
this reasoning process. She may query the user, and 
sometimes remark (right or wrong) that an answer she is 
deriving does not seem to make sense. This is likely to 
make users reflect on what they are teaching, and per-
haps, like good teachers they will assess Betty’s learning 
progress more often. At other times, Betty will prompt 
the user to formulate queries to check if her reasoning 
with the concept map produces correct results. There are 
situations when Betty emphatically refuses to take a quiz 
because she feels that she has not been taught enough, or 
that the student has not given her sufficient practice by 
asking queries before making her take a quiz. 
After Betty takes a quiz offered by the Mentor agent, 
she discusses the results with the user.  Betty reports: (i) 
her view of her performance on the particular quiz, and if 
her performance has improved or deteriorated from the 
last time she took the quiz, and (ii) the Mentor’s com-
ments on Betty’s performance in the quiz, such as: “Hi, 
I’m back. I’m feeling bad because I could not answer 
some questions in the quiz. Mr. Davis said that you can 
ask him if you need more information about river eco-
systems.”) The Mentor agent’s initial comments are gen-
eral, but they become more specific if errors persist, or if 
the student seeks further help (“You may want to study 
the role of bacteria in the river”). 
In addition to self-regulation advice that included in-
formation on how to be a better learner and better 
teacher, the domain content feedback from the Mentor 
agent was directed to make the student think more about 
interdependence among concepts. Students seeking spe-
cific help were first directed to relevant sections in the 
resources for further study and reflection, rather than 
being told what was wrong in their concept maps. When 
the Mentor provided specific feedback, it was about 
chains of events to help students better understand 
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chains of events to help students better understand 
Betty’s reasoning processes.  
Overall, we believe that the introduction of self-
regulation strategies provides useful scaffolds to help 
students learn about a complex domain, while also devel-
oping metacognitive strategies that promote deep under-
standing and abilities to learn in the future.  One of the 
achievements of the new system is that students retain 
control rather than being told what to do (e.g., they need 
to request help from the mentor and they teach Betty). 
Only when the student seems to be hopelessly stuck, does 
the Mentor spontaneously intervene to help students ad-
vance in their learning (and teaching) task. 
A Study of the Added-Value of Self-Regulation  
A new experiment with fifth graders was designed to 
compare the Teachable Agent system with the self regu-
lation mentor (SRL) against two other approaches: (i) A 
learning by teaching (LBT) version that was similar to 
the Query & Quiz version before, and (ii) An externally-
guided learning system (ITS) designed with a pedagogi-
cal agent. In the ITS version, the pedagogical agent asked 
students to create concept maps that could answer a set of 
quiz questions (therefore, there was no teaching compo-
nent), and the agent would provide feedback on how to 
correct their map when their quiz answers had errors. All 
three groups had access to identical resources on river 
ecosystems and the same query and quiz features.  To 
evaluate student learning, we examined pre-posttest 
scores, how they used the system, the quality of their 
final maps, and their ability to reproduce the maps subse-
quently. Importantly, several weeks later, we asked the 
students to learn about the Nitrogen cycle, which had not 
been covered during the initial instruction. This permitted 
us to determine which group had been better prepared to 
learn, once they no longer could rely on the scaffolds of 
their respective version.  Our expectation was that the 
SRL students would do better on this latter measure of 
preparation for future learning (Bransford & Schwartz, 
1999), because they had learned how to “take charge” of 
their own learning.   
Experimental Procedure 
A fifth grade classroom was divided into three equal 
groups of 15 students each using a stratified sampling 
method based on standard achievement scores in mathe-
matics and language. The students worked on a pretest 
with twelve questions before they were separately intro-
duced to their particular versions of the system. The three 
groups worked for six 45-minute sessions over a period 
of three weeks to create their concept maps. All groups 
had access to the online resources while they worked on 
the system.  
All three conditions had the same quiz questions while 
working with the system, and they had access to the 
query feature and Mentor agent (Mr. Davis), though he 
appeared with different capacities. The task given to the 
ITS group was to create concept maps that correctly an-
swered the 16 questions that were divided up into three 
quizzes. They had the same interface to create and mod-
ify their concept maps as the other groups, but Betty did 
not exist in the ITS system. The ITS feedback came from 
the Mentor, who told students if their map held the cor-
rect answers to the quiz questions and provided hints on 
how the students could correct their maps. The two other 
groups, LBT and SRL, were told to teach Betty and help 
her pass a test so she could become a member of the 
school Science club. Both of these groups had access to 
the three quizzes. The LBT group only received mentor 
feedback about the quality of Betty’s specific answers to 
the quiz. The SRL group received more extensive feed-
back from the Mentor, but only when they queried him. 
Coupled with the Mentor, the SRL Betty was also en-
dowed with self-regulation strategies that governed her 
behavior. Therefore, the SRL condition was set up to 
develop more active learners by promoting the use of 
self-regulation strategies. 
At the end of the six sessions, every student took a 
post-test that was identical to the pretest. Two other de-
layed post-tests were conducted about seven weeks after 
the initial experiment: (i) a memory test, where students 
were asked to recreate their ecosystem concept maps 
from memory (there was no help or intervention when 
performing this task), and (ii) a preparation for future 
learning transfer test, where they were asked to construct 
a concept map using on-line resources and answer ques-
tions about the land-based nitrogen cycle. Students had 
not been taught about the nitrogen cycle, so they would 
have to learn from resources during the transfer phase.  
(All three conditions simply used the concept mapping 
interface, resources, and “correct/incorrect” feedback 
from the mentor on several quiz questions.)   
For learning about river ecosystems, students in all 
conditions improved from pre- to posttest on their 
knowledge of interdependence (p’s<.01, paired T-tests), 
but not ecosystem balance. There were few differences 
between conditions in terms of the quality of their maps. 
However, there were notable differences in their use of 
the system during the initial learning phase.  Fig. 3 shows 
Queries composed
Resource requests 
Quizzes requested 
Figure 3: Resource Requests (RR), Queries Com-
posed (QC), & Quizzes Requested QR) per session.
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the average number of resource, query, and quiz requests 
per session by the three groups. It is clear from the plots 
that the SRL group made a slow start as compared to the 
other two groups. This can primarily be attributed to the 
nature of the feedback; i.e., the ITS and LBT groups re-
ceived specific content feedback after a quiz, whereas the 
SRL group tended to receive more generic feedback that 
focused on self-regulation strategies.  Moreover, in the 
SRL condition, Betty would refuse to take a quiz unless 
she felt the user had taught her enough, and prepared her 
for the quiz by asking questions. After a couple of ses-
sions the SRL group showed a surge in map creation and 
map analysis activities, and their final concept maps and 
quiz performance were comparable to the other groups. It 
seems the SRL group spent their first few sessions in 
learning self-regulation strategies, but once they learned 
them their performance improved significantly. 
For the delayed memory test, the table below presents 
the mean number of expert causal links and concepts in 
the student maps. Results of ANOVAs using Tukey's 
LSD to make pairwise comparisons showed that the SRL 
group recalled significantly more links that were also in 
the expert map (which nobody actually saw). 
Student Map 
Included: 
SRL 
Mean (se) 
LBT 
Mean (se) 
ITS 
Mean (se) 
Expert Concepts 6.7  (.6) 6.4  (.5) 5.8  (.6) 
Expert Causal 
Links 3.3
a  (.6) 1.7  (.6) 2.0  (.6) 
a Significantly greater than LBT, p < .05 
We thought that the effect of SRL would not be to im-
prove memory, but rather to provide students with more 
skills for learning subsequently. When one looks at the 
results of the test of preparation for future learning, the 
differences between the SRL group and the other two 
groups are significant. The table below summarizes the 
results of the transfer test, where students read resources 
and created a concept map for the land-based nitrogen 
cycle. There are significant differences in the number of 
expert concepts in the SRL versus ITS group maps, and 
the SRL group had significantly more expert causal links 
than the LBT and ITS groups. When learning about the 
river ecology, the SRL students had received some guid-
ance in how to use resources productively and how to 
think about the quality of their map.  This guidance trans-
ferred to learning about the nitrogen cycle. 
 
Student Map 
Included: 
SRL 
Mean (sd) 
LBT 
Mean (sd) 
ITS 
Mean (sd) 
Expert Concepts 6.1 a   (.6) 5.2    (.5) 4.1    (.6) 
Expert Causal 
Links 1.1
ab   (.3) 0.1   (.3) 0.2    (.3) 
a Significantly greater than ITS, p < .05; 
b Significantly greater than LBT, p < .05 
Conclusions 
The results demonstrate the significant positive effects 
of SRL strategies in understanding and transfer in a 
learning by teaching environment. Students in all three 
groups demonstrated the same learning performance in 
traditional learning tasks, but the SRL group outper-
formed the other two in the far transfer test. We believe 
that the differences between the SRL and the other two 
groups would have been more pronounced if the transfer 
test study had been conducted over a longer period of 
time. Lastly, we believe that the concept map and reason-
ing schemes have to be extended to include temporal rea-
soning and cycles of behavior to facilitate students’ 
learning about the concept of balance in ecosystems. 
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Abstract
Studies of real world experts show that they use different and
subtler regularities than novices to make effective
classifications. In laboratory studies of learning however,
participants have a strong preference for simple cue sets, even
at the expense of accuracy. The present experiments
investigate participants’ ability to use subtle stimulus
dimensions in order to eliminate category exceptions. Results
show that some participants were able to use the optimal 3-
cue set, but many could not. When there were two optimal
cue sets, one with 2 dimensions and one with 3, participants
favored the simpler set, even though it meant ignoring an
obvious and diagnostic cue. Overall there were wide
individual differences, with almost every cue set adopted by
some participants. Current theories of attention that posit
rapid shifts of learned attention offer promise in accounting
for the results.
For any organism to adapt successfully it must become
sensitive to meaningful regularities in the environment.
Humans have developed flexible learning systems, allowing
them to rapidly adjust to changing environments. Learning
concepts, representations of classes of stimuli that 4require
an equivalent response, conserves resources by reducing the
amount of information that needs to be processed from the
environment, and also allows for generalization to related,
novel circumstances. Representing a complex environment,
with abundant interdependencies and subtle regularities
requires a rich set of concepts.
To perform this function, the human perceptual system
can attend selectively, become sensitized to highly complex
stimulus dimensions, and even create novel functional
features. These processes affect the perception of a stimulus
and therefore alter the representation of that stimulus.
Differences in cue use and representation across experts and
novices appear in many areas such as biology (Boster &
Johnson, 1989), physics (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981),
computer programming (Davies, 1994), wine tasting
(Solomon, 1997), bird identification (Johnson & Mervis,
1997) and pocket billiards (Blair & McBeath, 2001).
Despite an abundance of differences between expert and
novice differences in cue use, laboratory studies of learning
(specifically “knowledge restructuring”) have shown that
participants have had a strong resistance to using new
information and more complicated cue sets, even though
they would afford better performance (Lewandowsky,
Kalish & Griffiths, 2000).
To the extent that learning is error driven, exceptions in
the cue set provide a powerful motivator to incorporate new
dimensions, however, there is also a pressure toward
simplicity. Additional dimensions, which may a space in
which the categories separate, can be expensive to represent.
Completely altering the dimensions used for categorization
can require more energy than using unique stimulus-level
elements to classify exceptions. This leads to the
memorization of exceptions, rather than a refining of the cue
set. It is clear that category learning is influenced by
opposing forces; one to enlarge, and one to reduce the
dimensionality of the cue set.
The present research examines the complementary
processes of the expansion and reduction of the cue set
toward effective and efficient representation. The goal of the
present study is to verify that participants can and do
optimize their cue sets using both expansion and reduction
when learning categories with subtle dimensions. Previous
research has demonstrated these complimentary processes
by manipulating the stimulus set to provide a new
dimension (Blair & Homa, 2003b). These studies produced
wide individual differences, with many participants
incorporating new dimensions to eliminate category
exceptions, and many others choosing to rely on simple cue
sets which result in many exceptions and significant error.
The Blair and Homa (2003b) studies also showed that
participants can shift to optimal spaces if they are less
complex. Overall, in these studies participants demonstrated
both the flexibility found in studies of expertise and the
insistence on simplicity found in studies of knowledge
restructuring.
Many real world category learning problems do not
involve learning new information never experienced before,
but rather involve learning to be sensitive to stimulus
features that have existed all along, but may have been
overlooked for more salient dimensions. For example in
bird identification, color is an obvious perceptual cue, used
by experts and novices alike. To tell the difference between
a Hepatic Tanager and a Summer Tanager, both of which
are predominantly red, one must notice the color of the bill
and whether the bird has a gray ear patch or not. These are
features that novices are prone to miss. The present studies
use two obvious dimensions as well as a subtle third
dimension as a direct analogy to those cases.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, a sequential presentation same-different
task was employed to examine the discriminability of the
three dimensions used in the remaining experiments, and an
additional dimension (color) used in a related set of studies
(Blair & Homa, 2003b). If the stimuli are to be used in later
experiments, they should be of roughly equal
discriminability, with the exception of tail bumpiness,
which should be significantly less discriminable than the
other three dimensions.
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Method
Participants Participants were 26 undergraduates from
Arizona State University who participated for course credit.
All participants were naïve as to the purpose of the test.
Stimuli Examples of the stimuli are shown in Figure 1.
These stimuli were created in the graphics program Adobe
Photoshop. Designed to look like something seen under a
microscope, these fictitious microorganisms offer a ready
analogy to expertise domains such as medical diagnostics.
Stimuli varied in one of four different dimensions: head
diameter, tail angle, color, and tail bumpiness. Head
diameter varied from 25 to 100 pixels. Tail angle varied
from 0 to 90 degrees. Color, in RGB values, ranged from
65-75-230 to 139-75-30. These colors were set so that they
were of equivalent luminosity, that is, they look the same
shade of gray if viewed as a black and white image. The tail
bumpiness was created by using brushes with “spacing” set
from 60 to 90. The full range of the variation was broken up
into 11 equal sized steps, thus dimensions were always one
of those 11 values. In addition to possible variations in the
four principle dimensions, the tail of each microorganism
was hand drawn on top of a line of the correct angle and
thus represented a source of stimulus-specific variation. A
Gaussian noise filter (30-unit) was also applied to each
stimulus. Afterward, a “crystallization” filter (3-pixel) was
applied to the stimulus area around, but not including, the
microorganism.
Procedure  The entire experimental task, including
instructions, was displayed on computer. The experimental
task was a sequential same-different task in which
participants were shown two stimuli, one at a time, and
asked to judge whether they were the same or different.
Participants were shown two example stimuli and the four
main dimensions of variation were indicated. Participants
were instructed that only variations on the four
consequential dimensions should elicit a ‘different’
response, any other variations were to be ignored. On each
trial, the first stimulus was shown for 2000 msec, and then
the screen went blank for 1000 msec. Finally, the second
stimulus appeared, and remained on screen until the
participant responded. There were 144 trials and of the 144
stimulus pairs, 72 were ‘same’ pairs and 72 were ‘different’.
Of the 72 ‘same’ trials, 36 were pairs showing exactly the
same stimulus and 36 were pairs of stimuli that had the
same values on the consequential dimensions, but were
created separately. Of the 72 ‘different’ pairs, there were
three stimuli from each of three levels of variation (1, 2 and
4 units) from each of the four main dimensions (head
diameter, tail angle, color, and tail bumpiness). The lower,
upper and middle parts of the range of variation were used
for each trio of stimuli associated with a level of variation.
For example, for 1 unit variations on head diameter, the
three stimulus pairs might include a pair with 25 and 32-
pixel heads, a pair with 93 and 86-pixel heads and a pair
with 48 and 54-pixel heads. The values of the remaining
three dimensions, which did not vary between members of a
stimulus pair, were randomly assigned. They were
approximately equally distributed across the possible range
of values.
Results and Discussion
To establish that the three primary dimensions are of
roughly equal discriminability and that they are all more
discriminable than the subtle dimension, a single-factor
repeated measures ANOVA was run, using change type
(diameter, angle, color, bumpiness, values and same).
Results, depicted in Figure 2, showed a significant main
effect of change type, F(5,120)=104.80, p<.0001. Scheffe
post-hoc tests revealed that color was not significantly
different from either angle or diameter, but that performance
on differences in angle were detected significantly more
often than differences in diameter, showing that these three
dimensions are roughly, but not perfectly equal. The
Figure 1: Two Example Stimuli. Tail angle, head diameter,
and bumpiness of the tail are the three primary dimensions
of variation. Stimuli could take on any one of 11 values on
or between the two extremes shown here.
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Figure 2: Data from Experiment 1.  Groups with different
numbers above the bar are significantly different from one
another. The striped bars indicate trial blocks where a
‘different’ was incorrect.
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proportions of ‘different’ responses for each of these three
dimensions were significantly higher than for ‘same’ trials,
establishing that participants have the ability to detect these
changes. Performance on these three dimensions was also
significantly better than on bumpiness, thus, supporting its
classification as a subtle dimension. Despite worse
performance on the subtle dimension, participants
responded ‘different’ significantly more frequently on trials
with changes on this dimension, than on ‘same’ trials.
Finally, performance on ‘bumpiness’ trials did not differ
significantly from performance on ‘values’ trials, where
changes in the way the stimuli were drawn preserved the
values of the four key dimensions. Because participants
were instructed to ignore the kinds of changes that occur on
‘values’ trials, they were likely responding without being
aware of what kind of changes they saw. The equivalence of
performance on these two trial types suggests that
participants may be responding with an equivalent lack of
awareness on ‘bumpiness’ trials. This further supports the
classification of the bumpiness dimension as subtle.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 used the subtle dimension of tail bumpiness.
This procedure makes this experiment an apt analog to real
world categories that experts must master. The effect of
pointing out the subtle dimension to participants was
investigated using three between-subjects conditions: Help,
No-Help (NH) and No-Help/Help (NH-H). In the Help
condition participants were told in the instructions at the
beginning of the experiment that tail bumpiness is an
important cue in helping to classify the stimuli correctly. In
the NH condition, participants were never told about tail
bumpiness. In the NH-H condition, participants were given
this information at the beginning of Stage 2.
Method
Participants Participants were 83 Arizona State University
undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology
course. They participated for course credit. They were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Help (n=33),
NH (n=24), NH-H (n=26).
Stimuli The stimuli had three principal dimensions of
variation: head size, tail angle and tail bumpiness as
described in Experiment 1.
Structure The two categories used were linearly separable
only in three dimensions; therefore the best lower
dimensional bounds always had exceptions. The best two-
dimensional linear decision boundary left 14% of the
exemplars as exceptions and the best single dimension
linear decision boundary left 30% as exceptions. Figure 3
shows the training stimuli plotted in the angle/diameter
space and also bumpiness/angle/diameter space.
Procedure The experiment had two stages with each stage
consisting of a learning phase and a transfer phase. The
learning phase included four blocks of 56 trials. Within a
trial block every stimulus in the learning set was presented
once. The presentation order was randomized for each trial
block, and for each participant. On each trial, the participant
was shown a stimulus and asked to classify it as ‘normal’ or
‘deviant’. Once the participants indicated their choice by
pressing the appropriate key (‘n’ or ‘d’) on the keyboard, the
correct answer was presented next to the stimulus for 2000
msec. If the participant answered incorrectly, the feedback
was red instead of black. After the learning phase,
participants performed a transfer task in which they
classified two cycles of 16 novel stimuli. The transfer set
presented after the three-dimensional stimulus set consisted
of 8 stimuli on either side of the best three-dimensional
linear decision boundary at a range of values. These values
were such that if participants were using the best
combination of angle and diameter dimensions, or any one
of the three dimensions alone, they would achieve 50%
correct. Participants were not given feedback during the
transfer task. Stage 2 was a repetition of Stage 1, except for
the instructions, as determined by the condition. For all
conditions, the instructions encouraged participants to
achieve perfect classification for both Stage 1 and Stage 2.
Results and Discussion
Overall performance was equally good whether or not
participants were told about the usefulness of the subtle
dimension (Help, M=87%; NH, M=88%; NH-H, M=88%).
The dimension of primary interest is tail bumpiness. Single
group t-tests against zero revealed that NH-H condition
showed significant increase in the use of tail bumpiness in
the second stage, t(25)=2.34, p<.05, but the other conditions
showed no significant change in tail bumpiness from Stage
1 to Stage 2. The instructions clearly increased the use of
tail bumpiness. The NH group had the lowest use of tail
bumpiness, with the NH-H group significantly increasing
their use of tail bumpiness, after being instructed to do so.
Figure 3: The stimulus space used in Experiment 2,
plotted for stimuli with and without the subtle
bumpiness dimension.
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Table 1: Percentages of participants for which each cue set
accounts for most of the transfer test responses from
Experiment 2.
Condition Stage Bump Angle Diam D/A B/D/A
NH 1 36% 11% 18% 29% 7%
NH-H 1 29% 14% 14% 32% 11%
H 1 43% 14% 6% 26% 11%
NH 2 16% 32% 13% 26% 13%
NH-H 2 56% 11% 11% 4% 19%
H 2 32% 22% 7% 15% 24%
Individual differences in the adoption of the various cue
sets were assessed by the transfer test. Participants were
sorted according to the cue set that best matched their
responses. Because all dimensions were present in the
transfer stimuli, it was possible for a participant’s responses
to fit two different cue sets equally well. In such cases both
cue sets were counted and the percentage reported was
calculated across all preferences not all participants. That
said, the large majority of participants preferred only one
cue set. The percentages of preferences for each cue set are
reported in Table 1.
Overall, many participants seemed to make use of the
subtle dimension of tail bumpiness early in training; even
without having it brought to their attention. Use of the
subtle dimension was increased by instructions however,
and though participants in the NH condition showed no
performance deficit by the end of Stage 2, the transfer test
reveals that they used tail bumpiness least. The general
findings of this experiment mirror the Blair & Homa
(2003b) studies using an obvious 3rd dimension, instead of
the subtle one, namely some participants incorporated the
3rd dimension while others stuck with one or two sub-
optimal dimensions. One question still open is whether or
not more participants would adopt a cue set which separates
the categories if it had fewer dimensions. This question is
addressed in Experiment 3.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 2, it was shown that many participants
rapidly detected and used diagnostic information, even
though it was subtle. Some participants can readily use a
three-dimensional cue set if the categories are made
separable. For Experiment 3, a new stimulus space was
created by changing the values on the subtle dimension.
Like the space in Experiment 2, this space was not linearly
separable using the two regular dimensions (head diameter
and tail angle) but was separable by also considering the
subtle dimension (tail bumpiness). Unlike the space for
Experiment 2, this space was also separable when
considering only head diameter and tail bumpiness. The
separable 2-D and 3-D spaces are shown in Figure 4. These
categories allow participants to collapse their cue set to only
two dimensions with no loss of accuracy. The primary
objective of this experiment was to assess the degree to
which participants are able find the most efficient cue set if
it required using fewer dimensions.
The instruction manipulation was dropped for this
experiment; all participants were in the equivalent of the NH
condition. Also, individual differences in this experiment
were expected to be more important because there were
multiple effective strategies. Accordingly, a larger number
of participants were tested.
Method
Participants  Participants were 96 Arizona State University
undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology
course. They participated in the experiment to fulfill a
course requirement.
Structure  In order to detect the use of the various possible
2-D spaces during transfer, the stimulus values for the
training and transfer stimulus spaces were altered from
Experiment 2. As in the Experiment 2 space, individually,
diameter and angle were 70% predictive. The bumpiness
dimension was 73% predictive. In 2-D space (head diameter
and tail angle) this stimulus space is identical to the
Experiment 2 space, that is, 8 of the 56 stimuli (14%) were
exceptions. In 3-D space, the two categories were linearly
separable. Also, in the 2-D space defined by head diameter
and tail bumpiness the categories were linearly separable.
The two spaces where the categories are linearly separable
are shown in Figure 4. The category structure (mean within-
category distance divided by mean between-category
distance) was .60 for the categories represented in the
diameter/bumpiness space and .66 for the categories when
represented in the 3-D space.
Procedure The procedure was identical to Experiment 2
except the transfer tasks, which involved 2 cycles through a
transfer set with 12 stimuli.
Figure 4: This stimulus space used for Experiment 3. This
space was modified from the space for Experiment 2 so
that the categories are separable in both the B/A/D space
(plotted on the left) and the B/D space (plotted on the
right).
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Results and Discussion
Overall, performance improved across trial blocks and
participants averaged 83% correct on the final trial block. In
the transfer task, the measures of the three single dimension
cues (bumpiness, angle and head diameter) and three two
dimension cue sets (bumpiness/angle, bumpiness/diameter
and diameter/angle) are not independent and require some
explanation. Dimension use, as in Experiment 2, is
measured as the proportion of trials that would be supported
by that dimension or pair of dimensions. For each of the six
cues, 8 of the 12 transfer trials present a stimulus on which
the values of the cues suggest one category over another,
and 4 of the 12 transfer trials present a stimulus for which
the cue is neutral. Each single dimension and its dual-
dimension opposite (e.g., diameter and bumpiness/angle)
use the identical eight trials, and so are perfectly negatively
correlated. This means that if a participant chose according
to the value of tail bumpiness on .88 proportion of the trials,
then they must also have chosen according to head/angle on
the remaining .12 proportion of the trials. The other cues are
only partially correlated. The overall attention use is forced
to sum to 1.5 for the three single dimension cues and to 3.0
for all six dimensions. As an example, a participant might
have a balanced attentional profile, equally distributing
attention to all dimensions in combination (the 3-D
solution). This profile would conform to each cue set on .50
proportion of the trials. A different participant might not use
the subtle tail bumpiness cue at all. This profile would yield
a 1.0 proportion for D/A (and 0 for bumpiness) and,
assuming equal weight to the remaining dimensions, .25 for
B/A and B/D (and therefore .75 for diameter and angle
individually).
In the first transfer task, the use of the head dimension is
consistent with the highest proportion of trials (.63) with
D/A (.61) and B/D (.52) the next two highest. The emphasis
on these three dimensions increased after the second stage
of training (.70, .62 and .58 respectively). Both the increase
in head and the increase in B/D (or, alternatively, the
decrease in use of angle) were significantly different than
chance, t(95)=2.89, p<.01 and t(95)=3.20, p<.01.
Participants seem to increasingly ignore the information
given by angle in favor of reliance on head diameter, even
though angle provides easier discriminations (Experiment
1).
As in Experiment 2, a table summarizing individual data
was created. The number of participants for which a cue or
cue set received the highest use during the final transfer test
was recorded. Twelve participants had equal endorsement
Table 2: Percentages of participants for which each cue set
accounts for most of the transfer test responses from
Experiment 3.
Stage Bump Angle Diam D/A B/D B/A B/D/A
1 6% 16% 29% 24% 17% 4% 5%
2 1% 6% 38% 23% 23% 1% 8%
for two different cue sets. In these cases, each cue was given
credit, so the total number of endorsements is 108, even
though there were only 96 participants. The percentage of
the total number of preferences is shown for each cue in
Table 2.
This tabulation reveals that 30% of the participants used a
space in which the categories were separable, with nearly
three times as many preferring the simpler B/D space to the
B/D/A space by the end of training. This more than the 13%
in the equivalent condition from Experiment 2. The
reduction in angle use that is equivalent to the adoption of
the B/D cue set is made more dramatic in that the angle
dimension yielded the most accurate discriminations in
Experiment 1. Further, both tail angle and tail bumpiness are
features of the same component of the stimulus. On the
other hand, there were still two thirds of the participants
who used only obvious dimensions and failed to adopt a cue
set which separates the categories. The preference for
simplicity may extend to the discriminability of the cues as
well as their number.
General Discussion
 The experiments reported here investigated participants’
ability to use subtle perceptual cues to disambiguate
overlapping categories. In Experiment 1, it was established
that the primary dimensions of variation, head diameter and
tail angle, were roughly equated for discriminability, and the
subtle dimension of tail bumpiness was much less
discriminable. Experiment 2 demonstrated that some, but
not all participants were able to use the subtle dimension in
conjunction with the other dimensions to eliminate
exceptions to the obvious dimensions. Experiment 3 showed
that participants favored using a 2-cue optimal cue set over
a 3-cue one.
There are two aspects of the present data that are
challenging from a modeling perspective. The first is the
widespread disregard for diagnostic cues. In some
participants, this shows up as an inability to use the
bumpiness cue or perhaps even a total reliance on just one
obvious cue. These expedient cue sets could not yield
enough information to result in perfect performance without
additional memorization of exceptions. Even for participants
who chose one of the cue sets that separated the categories,
there was a strong preference for the simpler (2-d) set. Use
of the angle dimension, which was part of the optimal 3d
cue set, and which was independently diagnostic, decreased
with training. The second aspect of the data that is
challenging is the broad individual differences. Nearly every
possible cue set was used in all phases of the reported
experiments. Category learning models which adjust
attention weights based on gradient descent on error (i.e.,
the backprop algorithm) will tend to converge on a set of
optimal weights, rather than showing dramatic differences
in predicted performance (see discussion in Kruschke,
2001). These optimal weights will also be positive for any
informative dimensions. More recent models of attention in
associative learning that incorporate rapid shifts of attention
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in conjunction with annealed learning rates show more
promise of fitting our data. The rapid shifts of attention can
lead to shifts away from dimensions before associations can
form, and the annealed learning results in a progressive
discounting of error, leading to participants getting frozen in
a sub-optimal space. Kruschke and Johansen’s (1999)
RASHNL model has fit similar data in probabilistic
category learning task.
The present study is related to recent work on human
concept learning that is based on a simplicity principle
(Feldman, 2003). This principle suggests that the ease with
which categories can be learned is related to how
incompressible or complex the categories are, that is, the
length of its minimum description. Maximally complex
categories, for example one consisting of a mailman, a
speedboat, and a jelly doughnut, have no regularities at all,
and the minimum description is simply a list of its members.
Simpler categories, for example: big blue triangle, big red
circle, and big yellow square, can be compressed down to
exclude some of the data from the examples, leaving a
smaller description, in this case “big” things. In the context
of the current work, it could be said that incorporating the
information from the bumpiness dimension, while
increasing the number of dimensions, decreases the overall
category description length, because the exceptions do not
have to be explicitly encoded. Participants in Experiment 2,
some of who showed increasing use of the bumpiness
dimension, but also decreasing use of the angle dimension,
also seemed to use a simplicity principle. Angle use
decreased not because it was uninformative, but because it
was not part of the minimal description. In addition to
reworking their description of their overall category
regularities, participants can and do augment their category
representation by identifying and memorizing specific
exception stimuli. In other words, simply adding any
exceptions to the representation they have already formed.
Several results, including the present data, suggest that this
strategy is not uncommon in some typical category learning
paradigms (Blair & Homa, 2001). This focus on individuals
rather than on category level regularities seems to occur
even in some separable categories if they are small and
weakly structured (Blair & Homa, 2003). These results
highlight the potential disparity between mathematical
complexity and psychological complexity, and emphasize
the importance of understanding how the cognitive system
implements complexity minimization. A precise account of
the relative costs of adding or shifting dimensions versus
memorizing exceptions will certainly involve a better
understanding of how attentional, perceptual, and memorial
processes interact as classification expertise develops.
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Abstract 
The studies reported here investigate the interaction between 
probability and delay. In the first study, the fits of a range of 
high and low probability words were calculated for numerical 
probabilities presented with either a short or long delay. 
Results show that participants in the long delay condition felt 
that high probability words fit small numerical probabilities 
better and that low probability words fit large numerical 
probabilities better than did participants in the short delay 
condition. In a second study, participants were presented with 
money offers that were both delayed and risky. Findings 
indicate that delay is given less weight at low probabilities, 
and probability is given less weight at large delays when 
probabilities are mid-range. Combined, these data suggest that 
a trade-off occurs between giving attention to delay and 
giving attention to probability in judgments. One component 
of this arises from long time delays “dampening down” the 
influence of probability level, but the complete nature of the 
interaction between probability and delay remains to be 
explored. 
Introduction 
In everyday decision making, individuals must determine 
the value that various outcomes have for them. Often, even 
if people have a clear idea of the value that an outcome has 
for them in general (such as a week in Paris), they must 
assess its value in terms of different types of uncertainty 
associated with the outcome. One type of uncertainty arises 
from the outcome having a less than 100% likelihood of 
occurring (i.e., it is probabilistic). This type of uncertainty is 
normatively applied by translating an outcome into its 
expected value (EV): multiplying the value of the outcome 
by its probability of occurring. Another type of uncertainty 
associated with outcomes is temporal delay. Adjustment of 
an outcome due to temporal delay is referred to as temporal 
discounting.  
Choice involving risk (i.e., probabilistic outcomes) and 
intertemporal choice have several parallel anomalies (Prelec 
& Loewenstein, 1991). These anomalies include common 
difference and ratio effects, immediacy and certainty effects, 
magnitude effects and sign effects. Common difference 
effect occurs when a pair of delayed outcomes which an 
individual is indifferent between produce a decisive 
preference for him or her when a common delay is added to 
both. For instance, a person might be indifferent between 
$25 now and $40 is one week, but may express a preference 
for the $40 if a one-week delay is added to both options. 
Similarly, common ratio effect occurs when two 
probabilistic options which a person is indifferent between 
produce a solid preference when their probabilities are 
multiplied by a common probability. A person might be 
indifferent between a 5% chance of $10 and 2% chance of 
$15, but prefer the $15 option if both probabilities are 
multiplied by 50%. Immediacy and certainty effects involve 
the overweighting of immediate outcomes in intertemporal 
choice and the overweighting of certain outcomes in risky 
choice. Magnitude effects occur when large amounts are 
discounted to a lesser (temporal discounting) or greater 
(discounting for risk) degree than are small amounts. Sign 
effects involve a tendency towards risk-aversion for gains 
and risk-seeking for losses in risky choice, and a steeper 
discounting of gains than losses in intertemporal choice. 
Given these parallels, it is not surprising that some 
researchers have suggested that discounting for risk and 
discounting for delay arise from the same source. For 
instance, Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil (1989) argue that, in 
addition to the time value of money (characterized as the 
accepted interest rate) delay introduces a risk premium, 
which arises from the implicit risk associated with delay. By 
this interpretation, the temporal discounting stems from 
implicit risk combined with the rational time value of 
money. Alternatively, Rachlin and Raineri (1992) argue that 
probability can be expressed as waiting time, by estimating 
the number of trials until a win (60% chance ≈ 6 out of 10 
trials are wins), and adding together the amount of time 
between each trial preceding the first win to calculate 
overall waiting time. These two ideas both argue for a 
fundamental source of uncertainty (either risk or delay) that 
leads to both types of discounting. 
It is likely that because of the focus on equating 
probability and delay little attention has been paid to how 
they affect each other, both in determining the value of 
outcomes and directly. Only a few studies have actually 
presented participants with outcomes that are both delayed 
and probabilistic. Keren and Roelofsma (1995) argue for 
two different types of uncertainty present in intertemporal 
choice: internal (involving doubts about one’s ability to 
predict future tastes/needs) and external (concerning doubts 
about whether promised future payments will be honored). 
Internal uncertainty is the type of uncertainty typically 
associated with intertemporal choice. External uncertainty is 
probabilistic uncertainty, which they argue is also a 
component of any temporal delay. They found that the 
immediacy effect could be derailed by making the options 
probabilistic (the immediate option was no longer over-
weighted), and that adding a delay to a certain option 
weakened the certainty effect (the certain option was no 
longer as over-weighted, and more people preferred a risky 
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option that had a higher payoff). Keren and Roelofsma did 
not find a significant interaction of delay and probability, 
and suggested that the two factors are additive. However, 
they used only two levels of probability in their experiment 
examining the immediacy effect, and only one level of 
temporal delay when examining the certainty effect.  
Keren and Roelofsma’s (1995) description of the external 
uncertainty component of delay does suggest that the 
subjective interpretation of a given probability when a delay 
is introduced should be lower, because the uncertainty 
associated with a delay should make the relevant outcome 
seem even less likely to be received. While Keren and 
Roelofsma only used delay and probability to make 
qualitative departures from certainty and immediacy, 
respectively, a more continuous effect of delay on 
probability should be evident if external uncertainty 
increases with delay.  
In the following studies, the effect of delay on the 
interpretation of probability is explored. In the first study, a 
range of probabilities are paired with one of two levels of 
delay for all participants, and 10 probability words are rated 
as to their fit of each of the numerical probabilities. In the 
second study, multiple levels of probability and delay are 
combined to examine their effects on the value of two 
different monetary outcomes. 
 
Study 1 
In Study 1, a direct method of examining the influence of 
delay on probability was employed. This design was based 
on past work by Budescu, Karelitz and Wallsten (2003) 
examining how numerical probabilities are mapped on to 
linguistic probability words/phrases. The method of 
presentation was reversed, so that participants were asked to 
rate degree of fit of 10 probability words for each of 10 
numerical probabilities. It was predicted that, if there is an 
external uncertainty component of delay, this would lead to 
numerical probabilities presented with the longer temporal 
delay to elicit higher fit ratings for the low probability 
words and lower fit ratings for the high probability words. 
 
Methods 
Materials 
Instructions Participants were asked to respond to each 
numerical probability item by rating each probability word 
for that numerical probability on a scale from 1 to 8, with 1 
indicating that the word fit the numerical probability “not at 
all” and 8 indicating that the word “absolutely” fit the 
numerical probability. 
Stimuli Participants were randomly assigned to receive 
all numerical probability statements with either a short (6 
months) or long (3 years) delay. Participants were presented 
with 10 numerical probabilities (5% - 95% in steps of 10%) 
embedded in the following statement: “If someone told you 
‘you have a _% chance of winning $9,864 in 6 months/3 
years,’ to what degree do you feel each of the following 
words fits the probability this person stated?” For each 
statement, participants rated 10 probability words on the 
basis of their fit. The probability words, (from lowest to 
highest probability-mapping, according to Budescu, et al., 
2003) were: Impossible, Improbable, Unlikely, Doubtful, 
Toss-up, Possible, Probable, Good chance, Likely and 
Certain. The numerical probabilities were presented in a 
different randomized order for each participant. 
Procedure Participants received the instructions for the 
task and responded to the test items via computer. During 
the task, participants were presented with each numerical 
probability statement followed by the 10 probability words. 
Participants typed in their rating for each word on the 
keyboard. After responding to all 10 numerical probability 
statements, participants were presented with the debriefing. 
 
Participants Participants were 32 Northwestern 
undergraduates who participated to fulfill partial course 
requirement (17 in the 6 month delay condition, 15 in the 3 
year delay condition).  
 
Results 
The mean rating of each probability word for each 
numerical probability in the two conditions was translated 
into proportion of total fit (by dividing the mean score by 
eight). These proportions were then collapsed across the 
three low probability words, not including impossibility 
(Improbable, Unlikely, and Doubtful) and the three high 
probability words, not including certainty (Probable, Good 
chance and Likely) to create a composite Overall-Low and 
Overall-High fit for each numerical probability. 
A regression performed on the Overall-Low composite 
fits revealed a significant effect of probability (t(19) = -
24.94, B = -.979, p<.001), a marginally significant effect of 
condition (t(19) = 2.05, B = .080, p = .058) and a significant 
interaction between probability and condition (t(19) = 2.51, 
B = .099, p<.05). Figure 1 displays the Overall-Low fits for 
the 6 month and 3 year conditions across numerical 
probabilities.  
Overall-Low fits decreased as probability increased (as 
Figure 1: Overall-Low Proportions Across Probabilities 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
5% 15% 25% 35% 45% 55% 65% 75% 85% 95%
Probability
A
ve
ra
ge
 F
it
3 yrs
6 mos
133
would be expected), and were higher for the 3-year delay 
condition (as was predicted). However, the interaction 
between condition and probability reveals a more 
complicated picture: While participants in the 3 year delay 
condition have higher Overall-Low fits for the higher 
numerical probabilities than do participants in the 6 month 
delay condition, there is also a tendency for these 
participants to rate the fit of low probability words as lower 
for the smaller numerical probabilities. 
A regression performed on the Overall-High composite 
fits revealed a significant effect of probability (t(19) =25.47, 
B = .981, p<.001) and a significant interaction between 
probability and condition (t(19) = -2.90, B = -.111, p<.05). 
Figure 2 presents the Overall-High fits across probabilities 
for both conditions. For the Overall-High ratings, the nature 
of the interaction between condition and probability is more 
pronounced. Participants in the 3-year condition provided 
lower fit ratings of the high probability words for the higher 
numerical probabilities and higher fit ratings for the lower 
numerical probabilities.   
The findings of Study 1 suggest that delay does not have a 
uniform effect on the interpretation of probabilities. Rather, 
the effect of delay is determined by both the level of the 
numerical probability and the “level” of the probability 
word. The longer delay increases the fit of the low 
probability words to the numerical probabilities, as 
predicted, but only for those probabilities in the mid-range 
or higher. For smaller numerical probabilities, the longer 
delay decreases the participants’ ratings of low probability 
words. Similarly, the longer delay decreases participants’ 
ratings of high probability words for probabilities in the 
mid-range or higher, as predicted, but increases these 
ratings for the lower numerical probabilities.  It seems that a 
longer delay decreases the “positive-ness” of the high 
probabilities but also the “negative-ness” of the low 
probabilities.  At long delay, participants do not seem to 
uniformly interpret probabilities as lower, but do seem to 
uniformly interpret probabilities as less extreme. 
Given the findings of Study 1, it is apparent that delay 
does influence how numerical probabilities are understood, 
and the direction of this effect depends on the level of the 
numerical probability. Because this interaction exists, it is 
important to look at how probability and delay combine in 
determining the value of outcomes that are both delayed and 
probabilistic. In Study 2, the effects of delay and 
probability, and the interaction between the two, on the 
value of monetary outcomes are investigated. 
Study 2 
Methods 
Materials 
Instructions Participants were instructed to respond to 
each item by providing a certainty equivalent (CE) for the 
money offer. A certainty equivalent is an amount that will 
be received immediately and for certain, such that 
participants feel they would be indifferent between this 
amount and the presented money offer.  
Stimuli Participants responded to a total of 70 money 
offers. For each of two payoff amounts ($10,000 and $1 
million) participants responded to five gambles with one of 
five probabilities (5%, 30%, 55%, 80% or 95%), five 
delayed payments with one of five time delays (6 months, 1 
year, 3 years, 5 years or 10 years) and 25 delayed gambles, 
combining each probability level with each delay level once. 
Gambles, delayed payments and delayed gambles for both 
payoffs were presented in a different random order for each 
participant. 
Procedure Participants received the instructions for the 
task and responded to the test items via computer. During 
the task, participants were presented with each money offer 
and typed in a certainty equivalent using the keyboard. 
Participants were not given any feedback on their 
performance. At the end of the 70 money offers, participants 
were read debriefing information by the experimenter. 
Participants Participants were 18 Northwestern 
undergraduates who participated to fulfill partial course 
requirement. The data from two additional participants was 
excluded due to a failure to follow directions (more than ¼ 
of their responses were greater than the payoff of the money 
offer or they responded “0” to one or more items).  
Results 
Because several participants had one or two responses that 
were greater than the payoff amount (errors occurring from 
accidentally typing an extra “0” into the computer), all 
analyses were performed on median responses as opposed to 
mean responses. 
 
Weighting and Discounting Factors Using the responses 
to the delayed payments, it was possible to calculate the 
temporal discounting factor (k) for each participant. This 
factor represents the extent to which, for each day of delay, 
an individual devalued the payoff amount. The formula for k Figure 2: Overall-High Proportions Across Probabilities 
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is derived from the formula for temporal discounting 
developed by Mazur (1987): k = (V/dv)-(1/d), where V is 
the undiscounted value of the outcome, d is the delay in 
days and v is the provided subjective value of the outcome. 
A k of 0 implies no discounting of the outcome for delay.  
For each participant, the median k across all delayed 
payments was obtained.   
There was a significant effect of amount on the median k 
values: participants tended to have larger ks for payoffs of 
$10,000 than for payoffs of $1 million (t(17) = 2.85, p < 
.05). The mean k for the $10,000 delayed payments was 
.0005, while that for the $1 million delayed payments was 
.0002. Larger ks imply greater temporal discounting, and 
greater discounting of smaller payoffs is consistent with the 
magnitude effect discussed in Prelec and Loewenstein 
(1991). Although the difference between the k factors for 
the two amounts seems quite small, such a difference would 
result in an 8% decrease in value for $10,000 delayed by 6 
months compared to only a 4% decrease for $1 million 
delayed by 6 months. 
Using the responses to the gambles, the probability 
weighting factor (h) was calculated for each participant. 
This factor represents the extent to which an individual’s 
weighting of probabilities in their responses corresponds to 
expected value (h = 1 means responses are perfectly in line 
with expected value). An h greater than 1 demonstrates risk-
aversion (the certainty equivalent is less than the expected 
value of the gamble), while an h between 0 and 1 shows 
risk-seeking (the CE is more than the gamble’s expected 
value). The formula used to calculate h was derived from 
the probability weighting formula provided by Rachlin and 
Raineri (1991): h = pV/v(1-p) – p/(1-p). Here, p is the 
probability of acquiring the outcome amount V, and v is the 
provided subjective value of the outcome. For each 
participant, a median h was obtained. 
There was no significant effect of amount on h, (t(17) = 
1.51, p > .05). The mean h for $10,000 gambles was 1.66, 
and 5.62 for the $1 million gambles. The large difference is 
due to one participants’ extremely risk-averse responses for 
the $1 million gambles (median h for $10,000 = 1; for $1 
million, median h = 1.11). This is consistent with Green, 
Myerson and Ostaszewski (1999), who found that 
magnitude effects in probability discounting are often small 
or non-existent. However, it is worth mentioning that, of the 
14 participants that had different probability weighting 
factors for the $10,000 and $1 million gambles, 10 had 
larger h values for the $1 million gambles, which is 
consistent with the discussion of Prelec and Loewenstein 
(1991). 
 
Overall Analyses for Delayed Gambles Participants’ 
certainty equivalents were transformed to proportion of 
payoff amount (e.g., $5000 for a $10,000 payoff was .50) 
for overall data analyses. Again, the median rather than the 
mean of these proportions was used for analyses to control 
for extreme responses. A regression with amount, 
probability and delay as predictors revealed significant 
effects of probability (t(49) = 23.15, B = .95, p<.001)  and 
delay (t(49) = -2.97, B = -.12, p<.01), and a marginally 
significant interaction between probability and delay (t(49) 
= -1.88, B = -.08, p = .068), on the median proportion CE. 
The effect of probability on response was as expected 
(greater CEs provided for larger probabilities), although 
participants over-weighted 5% to a far greater degree than 
has been found in past studies. Delay also had the predicted 
effect, with smaller CEs provided for larger delays. Figure 3 
displays the overall findings of proportion CE for the five 
delays and the five probabilities. Because amount had no 
significant influence on proportion CEs, they are collapsed 
across amount.  
The delay by probability interaction is most apparent for 
the two longest delays (5 and 10 years). Participants show 
little increase in proportion CE with the increase from 30% 
to 55% probability for delayed gambles at a 5 or 10 year 
delay. In addition, participants show little sensitivity to 
delay at the two smallest probabilities. 
These findings suggest an interaction between probability 
and delay of the type found in Study 1. Probability appears 
to be given less weight at longer delays. While the lines 
representing gambles at 5 and 10 year delays show no 
increase in CEs between 30% and 55%, the lines for 
gambles at 6 month, 1 year and 3 year delays show a 
relatively constant increase with probability. The influence 
of delay on probability is not evident until delay reaches 
high levels.  
The findings of Study 2 are not so one-sided, however. In 
deciding the value of delayed and probabilistic outcomes, 
participants seem to be dividing their attention between 
probability and delay. It is not simply that probability is 
given less weight when longer delays are present: 
probability levels are given less weight at long delays when 
probabilities are small. Further, as is evident from 
examining the points at 5% and 30%, little attention is given 
Figure 3: Proportion Certainty Equivalents by Delay and 
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to delay at the two smallest probability levels (it is not until 
a 55% probability of winning that participants really begin 
to differentiate between the delay levels in their responses). 
This interpretation does not necessarily require that long 
delays induce smaller subjective probabilities. Rather, in the 
influence of delay on probability, at long delays participants 
could simply be using probability less in determining their 
responses. This idea of trading off attention between option 
components is supported by analyses performed for the 
$10,000 and $1 million gambles separately: delay was not a 
significant predictor for the $1 million gambles (t(24) = -
1.61, B = -.09, p > .10, but was significant for the $10,000 
gambles (t(24) = -2.67, B = -.15, p < .05). This could 
indicate that, when outcome amount was large, participants 
devoted attention to the amount and the probability level in 
their figuring of a certainty equivalent, leaving no attention 
for delay. 
The present interaction demonstrates that probability is 
weighted less when a long delay is associated with the 
gamble, and that delay is weighted less when probability of 
winning is low. Study 2 provides evidence that probability 
and delay influence each other in determining the value of 
payoffs.  
Discussion 
Study 1’s findings indicate that delay influences the 
interpretation of probability, such that low probabilities are 
interpreted as less unlikely, improbable and doubtful, and 
high probabilities are interpreted as less probable, 
representative of a “good chance,” and likely. A large delay 
seems to take attention away from probability at both high 
and low levels, suppressing the negative-ness of the low 
probabilities, and the positive-ness of the high probabilities 
(in effect, “dampening ” the impact of probability).  
Study 2’s findings support the idea that delay influences 
the interpretation of probability: Probability (when it is mid-
range) is given less weight in participants’ judgments when 
delays are long. However, the relationship between delay 
and probability seems to be more complicated: delay is also 
given little weight when probability is very small. This 
suggests that what may actually be going on in the 
evaluation of the delayed gambles is a tradeoff between the 
attention given to probability and the attention given to 
delay. Thus, when delay is very large, and probability is 
mid-range, probability is given less attention than at smaller 
delays. Conversely, when probability is small, delay is 
given less attention than when probability is higher. The 
finding that delay is not a significant predictor for $1 
million gambles also suggests that when amount is very 
high, there may not be enough attention left over for delay 
to figure into participants’ responses. 
Whether or not the “dampening” effect was present in 
Study 2 is not completely clear. Although the interaction of 
delay and probability can be interpreted as less attention 
given to probability when delay is very long, the effect of 
probability level on the weight given to delay was 
unanticipated. Further, if the dampening effect of large 
delays on probability was present one would have expected 
to see less weight given to probability, not just for the mid-
range probabilities, but for the higher probabilities as well. 
However, if the interaction of delay and probability arises 
largely from the influence of delay on probability, it would 
be extremely difficult to see in the data from Study 2. As 
was pointed out above, probability had a much greater 
impact on responses than either delay or the interaction of 
delay and probability. In fact, it was not unusual for 
participants to show no sensitivity to delay at all in 
responding to the delayed gambles, but rather simply 
respond in accordance with expected value.  
Past studies have demonstrated that outcome amount and 
probability have a dominant/subordinate relationship, with 
outcome amount taking precedence (Liberman & Trope, 
1998; Sagristano, Trope, & Liberman, 2002). Although 
Study 2 did not provide any way of looking at that particular 
relationship, its findings do suggest that a similar 
relationship may exist between probability and delay. 
Probability accounted for most of the variance across both 
outcome amounts, and was significant within both outcome 
amounts. Delay, on the other hand, accounted for a small 
amount of variance across amounts, and ceased to be a 
significant predictor when only the $1 million gambles were 
considered. This makes sense if payoff is more important to 
participants than probability, which is more important than 
delay. The possibility of a dominant/subordinate 
relationship between probability and delay should be more 
directly examined in future studies using a method similar 
to that used by Liberman and Trope (1998). 
If probability is indeed more important to participants 
making decisions about delayed gambles than is delay, 
techniques to highlight delay could be used. In Study 2, for 
all delayed gambles, participants were given the probability 
information first. This could have decreased the role of 
delay in participants’ responses. Further, payoff amounts 
were expressed as round numbers ($10,000 and $1 million) 
for which it would be relatively easy to calculate expected 
value. A current study is investigating the influence between 
delay and probability when items are counterbalanced as to 
which information is presented first, and when payoffs are 
not round (e.g., $10,135). It is hoped that this study will 
produce responses that are more sensitive to delay, and 
allow a clearer picture of the interaction between delay and 
probability. 
Another question that remains unanswered is the manner 
in which probability level influences the interpretation of a 
given delay. Study 2’s findings suggest that the effect of 
delay may be dampened by the presence of a small 
probability. If the external uncertainty portion of the 
temporal delay affects probability interpretations, perhaps 
the external uncertainty associated with risk changes the 
interpretation of delays, by highlighting the delay’s external 
uncertainty. Although it is difficult to find a factor to pair 
with delay that will parallel the relationship between 
numerical probabilities and probability words, one could be 
constructed presenting linguistic descriptions of durations 
136
(e.g., “brief time” or “very long wait”) to examine the 
influence of small and large probability levels on the 
interpretation of delays associated with monetary outcomes. 
It is possible that for a very small probability people will not 
differentiate as much between different levels of delays as 
they do with a large probability.  
A final area yet to be examined is that the two uncertainty 
components of delay (internal and external) mentioned in 
Keren and Roelofsma (1995) may be able to be separately 
manipulated. For instance, it is easy to imagine situations 
where a delay could imply greater external uncertainty (e.g., 
a promise from an unreliable source), but not necessarily 
greater internal uncertainty. Conversely, while a spring 
vacation in Cancun might seem very valuable to me now, I 
have good reason to believe that it will have less value for 
me when I am ten years older, though I have no reason to 
think that I am less likely to receive that trip in ten years as 
opposed to a trip to Spain. Looking at how delay influences 
the value of different outcomes which emphasize or increase 
its internal or external uncertainty component is necessary 
to fully understand why delay decreases value. 
Conclusion 
The present studies demonstrate that there is an effect of 
delay on the interpretation of probabilities and an interaction 
between delay and probability on the value of monetary 
outcomes. When delay is longer, probabilities are 
interpreted as less extreme, at both higher and lower levels. 
Further, mid-range probabilities are weighted less at longer 
delays when valuing monetary outcomes, and delay is 
weighted very little when probabilities are small, suggesting 
that attention is traded off between delay and probability, 
depending on the levels of each. Because choices in life 
often involve delays and likelihoods less that 100%, it is 
worthwhile to explore the way people combine these two 
types of uncertainty and, especially for temporal delay, to 
gain a better understanding of the roots of delay’s influence 
on value. 
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Abstract 
Discovery learning with computer simulations is a demanding 
task for many learners. Frequently, even fostering systematic 
and goal-oriented learning behavior does not lead to better 
learning outcomes. This can be due to missing prerequisites 
such as the coherent mental integration of different types of 
representations comprised in the simulations and in the 
surrounding learning environment. Prior studies indicated that 
learning performances can be enhanced by encouraging 
learners to interactively and externally relate different static 
sources of information to each other before exploring 
dynamic and interactive visualizations. In an experimental 
study addressing the domain of mechanics it was largely 
confirmed that the active external integration of representa-
tions can improve simulation-based learning outcomes. 
Introduction 
Computer-based learning environments increasingly 
comprise simulations in terms of dynamic and interactive 
visualizations to illustrate complex processes and abstract 
concepts. These simulations may be highly interactive in 
that they allow learners to change input variables by 
entering data or by manipulating visual objects and to 
observe the consequences of these changes in the dynamic 
visualizations as well as in additional representations such 
as numeric displays, formulas or text labels. 
The conceptual model underlying the simulations has 
frequently to be inferred by the learners in processes of 
discovery learning, which correspond to the steps of scien-
tific reasoning: defining a problem, stating a hypothesis 
about the problem, designing an experiment to test the 
hypothesis, carrying out the experiment and collecting data, 
evaluating the data, and (re-)formulate a hypothesis. The use 
of simulations frequently aims at inducing active learner 
behavior and constructive learning processes (e.g., de Jong 
& van Joolingen, 1998; Rieber, Tzeng & Tribble, in press). 
Learners have to self-regulate their learning behavior in 
order to discover the underlying conceptual model, which is 
assumed to lead to the acquisition of deeper domain 
knowledge (e.g., Schnotz, Boeckheler, & Grzondziel, 1999). 
However, it has shown that learners encounter difficulties in 
all phases of the discovery learning process. For example, 
learners have problems formulating useful hypotheses, 
designing appropriate experiments, and evaluating the 
output variables adequately (e.g., de Jong & van Joolingen, 
1998; Njoo & de Jong, 1993; Reigeluth & Schwartz, 1989; 
Reimann, 1991). Moreover, many learners have difficulties 
in planning their experiments in a systematic and goal-
oriented way and therefore interact with the simulations 
rather randomly (e.g., de Jong & van Joolingen, 1998; 
Schauble, Glaser, Raghavan, & Reiner, 1991). 
Additional problems may be caused by the dynamic 
visualization of the simulated concepts. On the one hand the 
externalization of dynamic processes may prevent learners 
from performing cognitive processes relevant to learning on 
their own (e.g., Schnotz et al., 1999). On the other hand 
dynamic visualizations may overburden the learners’ 
cognitive capabilities due to large amounts of continuously 
changing information, particularly if the output variables are 
represented as non-interactive animations that do not 
provide learners with the possibility to adjust the playback 
speed or to watch single frames (e.g., Lowe, 1999). In order 
to cope with these requirements, learners frequently make 
use of a strategy that limits their processing to selected 
aspects of a dynamic visualization, which are often not the 
most relevant aspects of the visualization, but rather those 
that are most perceptually compelling (cf. Lowe, 2003). 
In order to support simulation-based discovery learning it 
has been suggested to structure the learners’ interactions 
with the learning environment (e.g., van Joolingen & de 
Jong, 1991). Typically, these support methods guide 
learners to focus on specific variables of the underlying 
model, to generate hypotheses about relationships between 
these variables, to conduct experiments in order to test the 
hypotheses, and to evaluate the hypotheses in light of the 
observed results. Furthermore, various instructional support 
methods have been developed to facilitate specific processes 
of discovery learning, such as offering predefined hypothe-
ses or providing experimentation hints (e.g., Leutner, 1993; 
Njoo & de Jong, 1993; Swaak, van Joolingen & de Jong, 
1998). However, empirical results regarding these methods 
of instructional guidance are ambiguous (cf. de Jong & van 
Joolingen, 1998). Learners frequently did not make 
sufficient use of the instructional support to increase their 
learning outcomes. 
One way to explain these findings is that learners lack 
prior knowledge necessary to benefit from complex visuali-
zations. Learners who do not know enough about the 
domain of the visualized and simulated concept have 
problems processing complex dynamic visualizations and to 
interact with them in a goal-oriented way, even if they have 
enough information about useful learning behavior (cf. 
Leutner, 1993; Lowe, 1999; Schauble et al., 1991). Another 
reason – which is not independent from prior knowledge – 
is the difficulty of interconnecting multiple representations. 
Usually, simulations are embedded in multimedia learning 
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environments and presented in combination with symbolic 
external representations such as text and formulas. These 
different kinds of representations may complement each 
other, resulting in a more complete representation of the 
illustrated concept (e.g., Ainsworth, 1999; Larkin & Simon, 
1987). Both Mayer (1997, 2001) in his theory of multimedia 
learning and Schnotz and Bannert (1999, 2003) in their 
integrative model of text and picture comprehension place 
emphasis on the importance of integrating textual and 
pictorial information into coherent mental representations 
during multimedia learning. However, learners are fre-
quently not able to systematically relate multiple external 
representations to each other. As a consequence, these 
learners fail to integrate the different external representa-
tions into coherent mental representations, resulting in 
fragmentary and disjointed knowledge structures (e.g., 
Ainsworth, Bibby, & Wood, 2002; Seufert, 2003). Accord-
ingly, to facilitate simulation-based learning it seems to be 
important not only to support learners in dealing with the 
dynamics and the interactivity of the simulations, but also to 
help them in relating the dynamically visualized information 
to corresponding information of other external representa-
tions.  
To facilitate learning with multiple external representa-
tions it has been repeatedly suggested to present textual and 
pictorial information in a spatially integrated format instead 
of presenting them separately from each other in a “split-
source” format (e.g., Chandler & Sweller, 1991, 1992; 
Mayer, 1997, 2001; Tarmizi & Sweller, 1988). According to 
cognitive load theory (Sweller, 1988; Sweller, van Merriën-
boer, & Paas, 1998) this can reduce unnecessary visual 
search resulting in a decrease of cognitive load and thus 
better learning. Another suggested method to support 
learners in making connections between different sources of 
information is to link the features of multiple representa-
tions by various symbolic conventions such as using the 
same color for corresponding entities in different represen-
tations (e.g., Kalyuga, Chandler, & Sweller, 1999; Kozma, 
2003; Kozma, Russell, Jones, Marx, & Davis, 1996). While 
these instructional suggestions have the potential to reduce 
cognitive load, they do not directly support learners in 
constructing meaningful knowledge. Learners may never-
theless remain rather passive, concentrating on surface 
features of the visualizations and they may still be unable to 
mentally process and integrate the represented information 
in an adequate way (cf. Ploetzner, Bodemer & Feuerlein, 
2001; Seufert, 2003). 
Bodemer, Ploetzner, Feuerlein & Spada (in press) tried to 
initiate more active processes of coherence formation by 
encouraging learners to systematically and interactively 
integrate different multiple representations in the external 
environment. Learners were provided with spatially separa-
ted pictorial and symbolic representations on the screen and 
were asked to relate components of familiar representations 
to components of unfamiliar representations by dragging the 
symbolic represented elements and dropping them within 
the visualizations (see Figure 1). 
This external process corresponds largely to the mental 
process of structure mapping as described by Gentner 
(1983; Gentner & Markman, 1997) and Schnotz and 
Bannert (1999). While (inter-)actively relating different 
sources of information is intended to directly support 
coherence formation, the simultaneous construction of an 
integrated format is supposed to gradually reduce unneces-
sary cognitive load (e.g., Chandler & Sweller, 1991, 1992). 
Bodemer et al. (in press) were able to demonstrate that – 
compared to the presentation of information in a pre-
integrated or in a split-source format – learning outcomes 
can be improved significantly when learners actively 
integrate static information before interacting with dynamic 
visualizations 
 
 
Figure 1:  Active integration of information while learning 
statistics (cf. Bodemer et al., in press). 
 
Bodemer et al. (in press) found the largest benefit of 
active integration when teaching extremely complex 
statistics concepts. In this paper an experimental study will 
be described which investigates possible benefits of active 
integration in another application domain with a slightly 
lower degree of complexity. It is hypothesized that also in 
less complex domains learners who actively integrate 
multiple representations will outperform those learning with 
a pre-integrated format. However, the advantage of active 
integration should rise with the degree of complexity of the 
learning material. 
In order to avoid influences of assessment on the proc-
esses of discovery learning, Bodemer and his colleagues 
assessed the learning outcomes only after the learners had 
interacted with the dynamic visualizations. Thus they could 
not identify if knowledge has been acquired already during 
the process of active integration or afterwards during the 
process of discovery learning or both. In the study described 
below the learners’ knowledge has been assessed both after 
integrating static representations and after interacting with 
dynamic visualizations. It is hypothesized that already the 
active integration of static representations can lead to better  
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learning outcomes. Additionally, learners who integrate 
multiple representations actively should improve compara-
tively more during simulation-based discovery learning. 
Method 
In this experimental study the participants learned various 
mechanics concepts in two consecutive learning phases. In 
the first learning phase they were provided with symbolic 
representations and static versions of dynamic and interac-
tive visualizations. In the second learning phase they 
explored dynamic and interactive visualizations in a self-
guided way. 
Design  
The experiment used a 2 x 2 factorial design with repeated 
measures on the second factor. The first factor addressed 
two levels of information integration, which was varied in 
learning phase 1: (1) presentation of the information in a 
pre-integrated format and (2) active integration of informa-
tion. In the first condition the learners had to deal with 
visualizations that were already labeled while in the second 
condition the learners had to establish a relationship 
between the symbolic representation and the visualizations 
by dragging and dropping the symbolic representations onto 
the visualizations. The within-subjects factor was time of 
assessment: After the integration of multiple representations 
(test 1) and after the exploration of dynamic and interactive 
visualizations (test 2). 
Participants  
Forty-eight students (22 males and 26 females, aged 19 to 
31) of the University of Tuebingen were randomly assigned 
to each of the two experimental conditions. They were paid 
for their participation. To prevent a high level of prior 
knowledge students of Mathematics and Physics were 
excluded as participants. 
Figure 2:  Active integration of information about mechanics concepts (learning phase 1). 
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Material 
The application domain was comprised of various mecha-
nics concepts, such as uniform and accelerated motion in 
one dimension. The instructional material consisted of two 
parts corresponding to the two learning phases: 
(1) an instructional text accompanied by static visuali-
zations, presented in the first learning phase on a computer 
(cf. Figure 2). The instructional text covered the left side of 
the screen and comprised three pages between which the 
learners could switch back and forth. The right half of the 
screen showed static versions of dynamic and interactive 
visualizations comprising the sketch of a moving car with 
corresponding velocity and acceleration vectors, a position-
time graph, a velocity-time graph, and an acceleration-time 
graph. The presentation differed according to the two 
experimental groups of the first factor. In the group with 
pre-integrated information components of the visualizations 
were labeled with textual and algebraic information; 
whereas in the active integration group the learners inter-
actively related the textual and algebraical information from 
the instructional text to the visualizations and thus created 
an integrated format on their own.  
(2) dynamic and interactive visualizations, which were 
presented in the second learning phase (cf. Fig. 4). The 
visualizations were taken from the interactive learning 
environment PAKMA (Blaschke & Heuer, 2000). They 
correspond to the graphs of learning phase 1 with the 
addition that they could be modified by interactively 
changing variables and by running animated motion 
sequences. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Dynamic simulation displaying motion in one 
dimension (learning phase 2). 
The test material consisted of a knowledge test, given to 
the learners prior to the first learning phase, and two tests, 
which assessed the knowledge after each of the two learning 
phases. The tests were made up of different types of 
questions, which all required reasoning and transfer, and 
contained graphical elements in either the question or the 
answer or both: (1) questions which addressed transforma-
tions from textual to graphical representations, (2) questions 
which addressed transformations from graphical to textual 
representations, and (3) questions which addressed trans-
formations within graphical representations. The pre-test 
and the first post-test consisted of six questions (two of each 
type); the second post-test consisted of 12 questions (four of 
each type). The participants’ answers were scored by two 
independent raters. 
Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants took the 
pre-test (20 minutes). Thereafter, learners of the condition 
active integration of information could train dragging and 
dropping of objects in a neutral domain (2 minutes). In 
learning phase 1 the participants were provided with the 
static versions of the dynamic and interactive visualizations 
accompanied by the instructional text (30 minutes). The 
information was either provided in a pre-integrated format 
or required learners to actively integrate it on their own. 
Then the learners took post-test 1 (20 minutes), followed by 
learning phase 2, in which the participants explored the 
dynamic and interactive visualizations without instructional 
guidance (15 minutes). Finally, the learners took post-test 2 
(40 minutes). All participants had to spend the same time on 
the tasks. 
Results 
With regard to the pre-test there were no statistically 
significant differences between the groups for any of the test 
categories. The results of the post-tests are presented in the 
following. Table 1 shows the means and the standard 
deviations for the three types of questions: textual-graphical, 
graphical-textual, and graphical-graphical. Table 2 shows 
the results of a multivariate (Wilks-Lambda) and univariate 
two-way analyses of variance with repeated measures on the 
factor time of assessment. 
The analyses of variance revealed a significant effect of 
information integration for those test questions which 
addressed transformations from graphical to textual 
representations. Learners with active integration performed 
better than with pre-integrated information in all categories 
of both tests; however, with regard to the two other types of 
questions the comparisons failed to reach statistical 
significance. The factor time of assessment had a significant 
effect on the test categories graphical-textual and graphical-
graphical as well as across all types of questions. However, 
there were no interaction effects indicating that learners of 
both groups improved their knowledge during the explora-
tion of the dynamic and interactive visualizations to 
approximately the same degree. 
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Additionally performed t-tests revealed that, on average, 
learners with active integration already achieved better 
learning outcomes after the first learning phase. Against the 
expectations, these differences between the groups slightly 
diminished in the second assessment after learning phase 2. 
 
Table 1:  Relative solution frequencies and standard 
deviations in both post-tests for the different questions. 
 
textual-graphical graphical-textual graphical-graphic.Information 
integration Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2
Pre-
integrated 
M 
SD 
.74 
.26 
.71 
.28 
.21 
.28 
.40 
.26 
.55 
.26 
.66 
.28 
Actively 
integrated 
M 
SD 
.84 
.24 
.78 
.26 
.37 
.26 
.52 
.23 
.67 
.29 
.69 
.22 
Overall M SD 
.79 
.25 
.74 
.27 
.29 
.28 
.46 
.25 
.61 
.28 
.67 
.25 
 
Table 2:  The results of the multivariate and univariate 
two-way analyses of variance. 
 
Source of variance Dependent variable df F 
Between subjects 
Information integration Across all types of questions  
textual-graphical 
graphical-textual 
graphical-graphical 
3, 44 
1, 46 
1, 46 
1, 46 
1.48 
1.83 
4.32* 
1.07 
Within subjects 
Time of assessment Across all types of questions  
textual-graphical 
graphical-textual 
graphical-graphical 
3, 44 
1, 46 
1, 46 
1, 46 
10.05**
1.48 
27.91**
4.05* 
Time of assessment x  
Information integration 
Across all types of questions  
textual-graphical 
graphical-textual 
graphical-graphical 
3, 44 
1, 46 
1, 46 
1, 46 
.56 
.13 
.39 
1.51 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
Discussion 
This paper investigated the benefit of an instructional 
support method to support learning with dynamic simula-
tions in multimedia learning environments. Learners were 
encouraged to interactively and externally relate different 
static sources of information to each other before exploring 
dynamic simulations. In an experimental study the active 
integration of multiple representations was compared to the 
presentation of information in a pre-integrated format as 
suggested by Chandler and Sweller (1991, 1992) and Mayer 
(1997, 2001). The application domain was mechanics. It 
was hypothesized that learners who initially integrate 
multiple representations actively achieve better learning 
outcomes as found by Bodemer et al. (in press) for the 
domain of statistics. 
The results largely confirmed that encouraging learners to 
actively integrate symbolic and static representations during 
multimedia learning can improve learning. Moreover, it 
 
shows that active integration of information – compared to 
the presentation of information in a pre-integrated format – 
can lead to the acquisition of knowledge already during 
learning with static symbolic and pictorial representations, 
and not only in combination with dynamic and interactive 
visualizations.  
Contrary to expectations learners who actively integrated 
different representations were not able to improve compara-
tively more during simulation-based discovery learning. 
This may be due to the relatively low amount of additional 
information provided by the dynamic and interactive 
visualizations compared to their static versions. The static 
graphs already contained dynamic information by repre-
senting time on one axis. Ainsworth and van Labeke (2003) 
state that dynamic representations that express the relation 
between a variable and time do not contain more informa-
tion than the same representation in a static form. Except for 
the illustration of the car with the corresponding velocity 
and acceleration vectors this applies to the dynamics of the 
simulation used in this study. However, the simulations 
contained additional information by providing the possibil-
ity to change variables interactively. But the number of 
changing options was very limited compared to the dynamic 
and interactive visualizations used by Bodemer et al. (in 
press). 
The results differed with respect to the codalities of the 
test items. It appeared, that not only the retrieval cue 
codalities have to be considered (cf. Brünken, Steinbacher, 
Schnotz & Leutner, 2001); but also the codality of the 
learners’ response effects the test result. Active integration 
of information was particularly helpful for answering 
questions that required transformations from graphical to 
textual representations.  
Future research should consider the different codalities of 
test items as well as differences of visualizations and 
simulations with respect to the dynamics and the interactiv-
ity. Moreover, the learners’ prior knowledge and the 
complexity of the learning task have to be accurately 
analyzed in further studies because they seem to signifi-
cantly affect the use of actively integrating multiple 
representations. 
Acknowledgements 
The work reported in this paper was supported by the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). 
References 
Ainsworth, S. (1999). The functions of multiple representa-
tions. Computers and Education, 33, 131-152. 
Ainsworth, S., Bibby, P. A., & Wood, D. J. (2002). 
Examining the effects of different multiple representa-
tional systems in learning primary mathematics. Journal 
of the Learning Sciences, 11(1), 25-62. 
Ainsworth, S. & van Labeke, N. (in press). Multiple forms 
of dynamic representation. Learning and Instruction. 
  
142
Blaschke, K., & Heuer, D. (2000). Dynamik-Lernen mit 
multimedial-experimentell unterstütztem Werkstatt-
Unterricht [Learning dynamics in multimedia projects]. 
Physik in der Schule, 38(2), 1-6. 
Bodemer, D., Ploetzner, R. Feuerlein, I. & Spada, H. (in 
press). The active integration of information during 
learning with dynamic and interactive visualizations. 
Learning and Instruction. 
Brünken, R., Steinbacher, S., Schnotz, W., & Leutner, D. 
(2001). Mentale Modelle und Effekte der Präsentations- 
und Abrufkodalität beim Lernen mit Multimedia [Mental 
models and the effects of presentation and retrieval mode 
in multimedia learning]. Zeitschrift für Pädagogische 
Psychologie, 15, 15-27. 
Chandler, P., & Sweller, J. (1991). Cognitive load theory 
and the format of instruction. Cognition and Instruction, 
8(4), 293-332. 
Chandler, P., & Sweller, J. (1992). The split-attention effect 
as a factor in the design of instruction. British Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 62, 233-246. 
de Jong, T., & van Joolingen, W. R. (1998). Scientific 
discovery learning with computer simulations of concep-
tual domains. Review of Educational Research, 68(2), 
179-201. 
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical 
framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 155-170. 
Gentner, D., & Markman, A. B. (1997). Structure mapping 
in analogy and similarity. American Psychologist, 52(1), 
45-56. 
Kalyuga, S., Chandler, P., & Sweller, J. (1999). Managing 
split-attention and redundancy in multimedia instruction. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 13, 351-371. 
Kozma, R. (2003). The material features of multiple 
representations and their cognitive and social affordances 
for science understanding. Learning and Instruction, 
13(2), 205-226. 
Kozma, R.B., Russell, J., Jones, T., Marx, N., & Davis, J. 
(1996). The use of multiple, linked representations to 
facilitate science understanding. In S. Vosniadou, E. De 
Corte, R. Glaser & H. Mandl (Eds.), International per-
spectives on the design of technology supported learning 
environments (pp. 41-61). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Larkin, J.H., & Simon, H.A. (1987). Why a diagram is 
(sometimes) worth ten thousands words. Cognitive Sci-
ence, 11, 65-99. 
Leutner, D. (1993). Guided discovery learning with 
computer-based simulation games: effects of adaptive and 
non-adaptive instructional support. Learning and Instruc-
tion, 3, 113-132. 
Lowe, R. K. (1999). Extracting information from an 
animation during complex visual learning. European 
Journal of Psychology of Education, 14(2), 225-244. 
Lowe, R. K. (2003). Animation and learning: Selective 
processing of information in dynamic graphics. Learning 
and Instruction, 13(2), 157-176. 
Mayer, R. E. (1997). Multimedia learning: Are we asking 
the right questions? Educational Psychologist, 32(1), 
1-19. 
Mayer, R. E. (2001). Multimedia learning. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Njoo, M., & de Jong, T. (1993). Supporting exploratory 
learning by offering structured overviews of hypotheses. 
In D. M. Towne & T. de Jong & H. Spada (Eds.), Simula-
tion-based experiential learning (pp. 207-223). Berlin: 
Springer Publishers. 
Ploetzner, R., Bodemer, D., & Feuerlein, I. (2001). 
Facilitating the mental integration of multiple sources of 
information in multimedia learning environments. In C. 
Montgomerie & J. Viteli (Eds.), Proceedings of the World 
Conference on Educational Multimedia, Hypermedia & 
Telecommunications (pp. 1501-1506). Norfolk, VA: 
Association for the Advancement of Computing in Edu-
cation. 
Reigeluth, C. M., & Schwartz, E. (1989). An instructional 
theory for the design of computer-based simulations. 
Journal of Computer-Based Instruction, 16(1), 1-10. 
Reimann, P. (1991). Detecting functional relations in a 
computerized discovery environment. Learning and 
Instruction, 1, 45-65. 
Rieber, L. P., Tzeng, S.-C. & Tribble, K. (in press). 
Discovery learning, representation, and explanation 
within a computer-based simulation: Finding the right 
mix. Learning and Instruction. 
Schauble, L., Glaser, R., Raghavan, K., & Reiner, M. 
(1991). Causal models and experimentation strategies in 
scientific reasoning. The Journal of the Learning Sci-
ences, 1, 201-239. 
Schnotz, W., & Bannert, M. (1999). Einflüsse der Visuali-
sierungsform auf die Konstruktion mentaler Modelle beim 
Text- und Bildverstehen [Influence of the type of 
visualization on the construction of mental models during 
picture and text comprehension]. Zeitschrift für 
Experimentelle Psychologie, 46(3), 217-236. 
Schnotz, W., & Bannert, M. (2003). Construction and 
interference in learning from multiple representation. 
Learning and Instruction, 13(2), 141-156. 
Schnotz, W., Boeckheler, J., & Grzondziel, H. (1999). 
Individual and co-operative learning with interactive 
animated pictures. European Journal of Psychology of 
Education, 14(2), 245-265. 
Seufert, T. (2003). Supporting coherence formation in 
learning from multiple representations. Learning and 
Instruction, 13(2), 227-237. 
Swaak, J., van Joolingen, W. R., & de Jong, T. (1998). 
Supporting simulation-based learning: The effects of 
model progression and assignments on definitional and 
intuitive knowledge. Learning and Instruction, 8(3), 235-
252. 
Sweller, J. (1988). Cognitive load during problem solving: 
Effects on learning. Cognitive Science, 12, 257-285. 
Sweller, J., van Merriënboer, J. J. G., & Paas, F. G. W. C. 
(1998). Cognitive architecture and instructional design. 
Educational Psychology Review, 10(3), 251-296. 
Tarmizi, R. A., & Sweller, J. (1988). Guidance during 
mathematical problem solving. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 80(4), 424-436. 
van Joolingen, W. R. & de Jong, T. (1991). Supporting 
hypothesis generation by learners exploring an interactive 
computer simulation. Instructional Science, 20(5-6), 389-
404. 
143
 
Simple and Complex Extralinguistic Communicative Acts 
 
Francesca M. Bosco (bosco@psych.unito.it) 
Katiuscia Sacco (sacco@psych.unito.it) 
Livia Colle (colle@psych.unito.it) 
Romina Angeleri (angeleri@psych.unito.it) 
Ivan Enrici (enrici@psych.unito.it) 
Gianluca Bo (gianluca.bo@metis-ricerche.it) 
Bruno G. Bara (bara@psych.unito.it) 
Centro di Scienza Cognitiva e Dipartimento di Psicologia, Università di Torino 
via Po 14 - 10123 Torino, Italia 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The present research aims to investigate the distinction 
between simple and complex communicative acts in the 
context of extralinguistic communication. We propose that, 
within the same pragmatic phenomena studied - which are 
standard communicative acts, deceit and irony - a simple 
communicative act is easier to comprehend than a complex 
one. Our proposal is based on the different complexity of 
inferential processes involved in comprehending 
communicative acts. We provide empirical evidence in 
support to our hypothesis with an experiment on children 
aged 5;5 to 8;6 years. We consider our results as favoring a 
unitary model of communication, where ‘linguistic’ and 
‘extralinguistic’ are similar expressive channels underlying 
the same cognitive faculty. 
 
Introduction 
Philosopher John Searle (1975) introduced the classical 
distinction between direct and indirect speech acts. A direct 
speech act consists of a sentence where a speaker means 
exactly and literally what she is saying, for instance [1] 
'Please pass me the salt', proffered by the speaker to obtain 
the salt, located on the table, from her table-companion. On 
the contrary, an indirect speech act consists of a sentence by 
which the speaker communicates to the hearer more than 
what she is actually saying. For instance [2] ‘Do you mind 
passing me the salt?’ or [3] ‘My soup is lacking in salt’, 
proffered by a speaker in order to obtain the same goal as in 
the previous example.  
Searle claims that the primary illocutionary force of an 
indirect speech act is derived from the literal meaning via a 
series of inferential steps. The hearer's inferential process is 
triggered by the assumption that the speaker is following the 
Principle of Cooperation (Grice, 1975), together with the 
evidence of an inconsistency between the utterance and the 
context of enunciation. According to Searle, the hearer tries 
first to interpret the utterance literally, and only after the 
failure of this attempt, due to the irrelevance of the literal 
meaning, does he look for a different one, which conveys 
the primary illocutionary force. In this view, an indirect 
speech act is intrinsically harder to comprehend than a 
direct one. Indeed, understanding a direct speech act such as 
[1] is straightforward, that is, it does not require inferences, 
while understanding indirect speech acts, such as [2] and [3] 
relies on some kind of common knowledge. However, the 
length of the inferential path is not the same for each 
indirect speech act. For instance [3], an example of non 
conventional indirect speech act, requires a greater number 
of inferences than [2], an example of conventional direct 
speech act. 
Some authors have criticized this position for different 
reasons (Clark, 1979; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Recanati, 
1995). In particular, Gibbs (1986; 1994) shows that a 
speaker can use an indirect act when she thinks that there 
might be obstacles against the request she intends to 
formulate: for example, when the speaker does not know 
whether the hearer owns the object she desires, he can use a 
conventional indirect request. The context specifies the 
necessity of using a conventional indirect and thus helps the 
hearer to understand the intended meaning more quickly. 
Gibbs suggests that, in such a circumstance, the partner 
infers the meaning of a conventional indirect speech act via 
an habitual shortcut that facilitates its comprehension.  
In addition, Bara and Bucciarelli (1998) point out that for 
2;6-3 year old children conventional indirects, such as 
‘Would you like to sit down?’, compared to direct speech 
acts, such as ‘What is your name?’, are equally easy to 
comprehend. On the contrary, the same children have 
difficulties with non-conventional indirects: for instance 
they find it hard to understand that the answer ‘It's raining’ 
to the proposal ‘Let's go out and play’ corresponds to a 
refusal. 
On the basis of the Cognitive Pragmatics theory, by 
Airenti, Bara and Colombetti (1993a), Bara, Bosco and 
Bucciarelli (1999) advanced an alternative explanation that 
constitutes the theoretical basis for the present research. The 
authors propose to abandon the distinction between direct 
and indirect speech acts and to adopt a new one between 
simple and complex speech acts, based on the increasing 
complexity of the inferential processes underlying their 
comprehension. This distinction has the distinct advantage 
of applying not only to standard speech acts, but also to non 
standard ones, like irony and deceit.  
 
144
The aim of the present research is to extend the 
distinction between simple and complex speech acts to 
extralinguistic communication, and to provide empirical 
evidence in support of our hypothesis.  
 
Cognitive Pragmatics theory 
Airenti et al. (1993a) have presented the bases for a theory 
of the cognitive processes underlying human 
communication that holds for both linguistic and extra-
linguistic communication. A major assumption of Cognitive 
Pragmatics is that intentional communication requires 
behavioral cooperation between two agents; this means that 
when two agents communicate they are acting on the basis 
of a plan that is at least partially shared. The authors call 
this plan a behavior game. The behavior game is a social 
structure mutually shared by the participants of the 
dialogue. Each communicative action performed by the 
agents realizes the moves of the behavior game they are 
playing. The meaning of a communicative act (either 
linguistic or extralinguistic or a mix of the two) is fully 
understood only when it is clear what move of what 
behavior game it realizes. Consider for example the 
following communicative exchange:  
[4]   Susan: “Do you have 10 dollars?” 
   Mark: “Oh, I forgot my wallet” 
Mark understands that Susan is asking him to lend her 
some money on the basis of the behavior game they are 
mutually sharing: 
[5]   [LEND-MONEY]: 
  • A gives money to B; 
  • B returns money to A. 
A game provides a context for the assignment of meaning 
to a communicative action (Bosco, Bucciarelli & Bara, 
2004). It is the sharedness of these knowledge structures 
that allows them to maintain conversational cooperation in 
spite of Mark's refusal to cooperate on the behavior level.  
 
Simple and complex standard speech acts 
The comprehension of any kind of speech act depends on 
the comprehension of the behavioral game bid by the actor1. 
Unless a communicative failure occurs, each participant in a 
dialogue interprets the utterances of the interlocutor on the 
ground she gives as shared between them. According to 
such a perspective, the difficulty in comprehension of 
different types of speech acts depends on the chain of 
inferences required to pass from the utterance to the game it 
refers to. Direct and conventional indirect speech acts do 
immediately make reference to the game, and thus they are 
defined as simple speech acts. On the contrary, non 
conventional indirect speech acts can be referred to as 
complex speech acts in that they require a chain of 
inferential steps, since the specific behavior game of which 
they are a move is not immediately identifiable (Bara & 
                                                 
1 Since the theory holds both for linguistic and extralinguistic 
communication, we prefer to use the terms actor and partner 
instead the classical speaker and hearer. 
Bucciarelli, 1998). For example, to understand [1] and [2] it 
is sufficient for the partner to refer to the game [ASK-FOR-
OBJECT]. In order to understand [3], a more complex 
inferential process is necessary: the partner needs to share 
with the speaker the belief that if the soup is lacking salt it is 
not good to eat and that if there is some salt on the table and 
somebody proffers [3] she probably wants it. Only then, can 
the partner attribute to the utterance the value of a move of 
the game [ASK-FOR-OBJECT].  
In other words, if the problem is how to access the game, 
the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts is 
irrelevant. The comprehension of a speech act requires the 
comprehension of the game of which it is part: in order to 
understand the actor's communicative intentions, the partner 
has to find a meaningful connection between the actor's 
utterance and the behavioral game they are playing. In the 
case of simple speech acts there is an immediate 
correspondence between the utterance and the game, that is 
the utterance straightforwardly refers to the game. On the 
contrary, in the case of complex speech acts the 
comprehension of the link between the speech act and the 
game requires the partner to make longer inferential 
processes. The bigger the distance between the utterance 
and the communicative context shared by actor and partner, 
the more difficult the comprehension of the utterance itself. 
In sum, the difference in the difficulty of comprehension 
between simple and complex acts depends on the steps 
needed to refer the utterance to the game bid by the actor or 
already shared by the participants. 
We find the notion of simple and complex speech act 
more useful rather than the one of direct and indirect speech 
act because, as Bara et al. (1999) propose, it can be 
extended to other non standard pragmatic phenomena, in 
particular irony and deceit.  
  
Simple and complex deceits and ironies 
A deceit occurs when the mental states that the actor 
entertains are covertly different from those she 
communicates. Bara et al. (1999) propose that the difficulty 
in its comprehension can vary depending on the complexity 
of the inferential chain necessary to refer the utterance to the 
behavioral game. Consider the following example: 
[6] Andrew is eating some biscuits from a plate in front of 
him. He hears Julia arriving, and then he pushes away the 
empty plate in front of him. Julia sees the empty plate and 
asks: “Who has finished my biscuits?”. Andrew answers… 
(a) Simple: “I don’t have the slightest idea” 
(b) Complex: “I’m on a diet”  
In our example, the deceitful speech act [6a] is simple 
because it consists in an utterance which denies the actor's 
private (and true) belief (not-p), that would allow the partner 
to immediately refer to the game [BISCUIT-STEALING] 
that the actor wishes to conceal from the partner. Instead, a 
complex deceitful speech act, such as [6b], consists in an 
utterance which leads to the inference: if he is on a diet, he 
cannot eat biscuits, that is inconsistent with the game 
[BISCUIT-STEALING] that the actor wishes to deny. Thus, 
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to comprehend a complex deceit, an agent needs a longer 
inferential chain.  
Cognitive Pragmatics theory claims that irony can be 
understood when compared with the belief provided by the 
behavior game shared between actor and partner (Airenti, 
Bara & Colombetti, 1993b; Bara, in press). According to 
Bara et al. (1999), bearing in mind the complexity of the 
inferential chain necessary to refer the utterance to the game 
bid by the interlocutors, it is possible to distinguish two 
kinds of irony, simple and complex. Consider the following 
example: 
[7] Alex takes out from a toaster two completely burned 
pieces of toast. Mary arrives and Alex asks with a puzzled 
expression: “Am I a good cook?” Mary answers… 
(a) Simple : “The best cook in the world!” 
(b) Complex: “I’ll hire you in my restaurant”  
A simple ironic speech act, such as [7a], corresponds to the 
antiphrastic theory of irony (Grice, 1989): an actor 
expresses p to mean not-p. Thus, a simple irony 
immediately contrasts with a belief shared between the 
agents, in our example that Alex is not a good cook. On the 
contrary, a complex ironic speech act requires a series of 
inferences in order to detect its contrast with the belief 
shared by the agents. Consider our example, by producing 
the complex irony [7b], an actor proffers an utterance which 
implies the belief p (to employ someone in a restaurant, s/he 
has to be a good cook), contrasting with the belief not-p (the 
guy is not a good cook), shared between the two agents. 
Thus, a person needs a longer inferential chain to 
comprehend a complex deceit rather than a simple one. 
Bosco and Bucciarelli (submitted) empirically supported 
the distinction between simple and complex speech acts: 
children aged from 6;7 to 10 years, find it easier to 
comprehend simple speech acts, rather than complex ones, 
within the same pragmatic phenomena investigated, i.e. 
standard speech acts, deceits and ironies.  
The present research focuses on the difference of the 
inferential processes between communicative acts 
pertaining to the same pragmatic category and it did not 
analyze the difference among inferential processes existent 
among various kind of pragmatic phenomena. Details about 
how different types of mental representations underlie the 
comprehension of standard communicative acts, deceits and 
ironies can be found elsewhere, e.g. Bucciarelli, Colle and 
Bara (2003): such a work focuses on the type of inference 
underlying specific kinds of pragmatic phenomena; for 
instance, understanding an ironic act requires the detection 
of a contrast between the speech act and the background 
knowledge shared by the interlocutors. The present research 
deals instead with the length of the inferential processes 
underlying the comprehension of communicative acts within 
the same pragmatic phenomenon, i.e. simple vs. complex 
standard acts, simple vs. complex deceits, simple vs. 
complex ironies. 
 
 
 
Experiment: simple vs. complex extralinguistic 
communication 
As we have shown in the previous paragraphs, the 
difference between simple and complex acts has been 
demonstrated in the context of linguistic communication. 
Let us now focus on extralinguistic communication. By 
extralinguistic communication we refer to actions such as 
facial expressions, hand gestures and body movements 
when they are intentionally performed to share a 
communicative meaning. These means of expression are of 
special importance in that communication, in the first 
phases of life, heavily relies on such kinds of actions. Also, 
persons who have lost the ability to communicate through 
language, e.g. patients with aphasia, have to resort to 
extralinguistic means. Not to mention the various kinds of 
situations in which normal adults need to communicate but 
are forced not to use speech. For all these sort of reasons, 
we conducted a study in the context of extralinguistic 
communication. In particular, our aim is to analyze whether 
the distinction between simple and complex acts holds also 
in such a context: if language and gestures are comparable 
ways of communication, we should expect that the 
distinctions made in linguistic contexts holds also for 
extralinguistic communication.  
According to Cognitive Pragmatics theory, 
communication is indeed a unitary cognitive faculty aimed 
at modifying and sharing mental states, while ‘linguistic’ 
and ‘extralinguistic’ are means of expression that an agent 
may use indifferently in order manifest to and share her 
communicative intentions. For instance, waving a hand or 
saying ‘Hello’ are two ways of greeting that are only 
superficially different; at a deeper level, they can be seen as 
two different realizations of a greeting act. Thus, as Bara 
and Tirassa (1999; 2000) propose, the difference between 
‘linguistic’ and ‘extralinguistic’ communicative acts turns 
out to be a matter of cognitive processing rather than of 
intrinsic nature. Within such a perspective Bucciarelli et al.  
(2003) assume that the construction of the meaning of a 
communicative act is independent of the input modalities2. 
Empirically, they tested the prediction that a communicative 
act has in principle the same difficulty of comprehension, 
whether performed through speech or gestures. Their results 
show that children of different age groups comprehend each 
pragmatic phenomenon (simple and complex standard 
communicative acts, simple deceits and simple ironies) 
equally well in the two modalities.  
The present experiment investigates the comprehension of 
different extralinguistic communicative acts. It consists of 
two experimental conditions: simple and complex. In both 
conditions, participants have to attribute communicative 
                                                 
2 Note that on the bases of other theoretical approaches (Burling, 
1993; Chomsky, 1987), nonverbal and verbal communication do 
have separate roots in phylogenies; on such basis, the prediction 
that what holds for linguistic communication holds also for 
extralinguistic communication would be false. 
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intentions to actors in videotaped stories. Our analysis 
focuses on a perspective of a third person who observes an 
actor and a partner in a communicative interaction. We now 
report one example for each of the investigated pragmatic 
phenomena. They are all extracted from our experimental 
protocol. 
 
Standard extralinguistic communication 
[8] Ann has just finished preparing dinner and walks out of 
the kitchen holding a dish of pasta. In order to call Bob, 
who is listening to loud music, Ann moves her head as if to 
say ‘Come on! Dinner’s ready’.  
In the simple version of the task, Bob [8a] nods to show that 
he is coming. In the complex version of the task, Bob [8b] 
places his hand on his stomach as if to say ‘I’m hungry’. 
The request of coming for dinner is part of the behavior 
game [FAMILY-DINNER], in which Ann prepares dinner, 
calls Bob when dinner is ready, and B answers. Bob's [8a] 
nodding is a simple standard communicative act because it 
is a straightforward answer to Ann’s question and, thus, 
immediately relies on the game shared between the two 
agents. On the contrary, to understand that the complex 
standard gesture [8b] for ‘I’m hungry’ implies an 
acceptance, a person has to assume that if one is hungry 
then he wants to eat and that if one wants to eat then he has 
the intention of coming to dinner. 
 
Extralinguistic deceit 
[9] Bill and his brother are playing with cushions in their 
room, when a lamp falls down and breaks into pieces. Mum 
comes into the room and, standing with her hands on her 
hips, she assumes a severe and questioning look as if to ask 
‘Who broke the lamp?’.  
In the simple version of the task, Bill [9a] opens his arms in 
order to state his innocence. In the complex version of the 
task, Bill [9b] takes a book and shows it to Mum in order to 
convince her he was reading. Bill's [9a] gesture is a simple 
deceit because it immediately denies the actor's private 
belief, allowing the partner to refer to the game 
[DOMESTIC-MISDEED]. On the contrary, [9b] is a 
complex deceit because it implies a belief (if one is reading 
a book he is not moving, then he cannot cause any damage) 
that is inconsistent with the game [DOMESTIC-
MISDEED]. Thus, in order to understand this sort of deceit 
one needs to make a more complex inferential chain. 
 
Extralinguistic irony 
[10] Alice pours some soup into her and Ben’s plates and 
both assume a disgusted look. Alice looks at Ben as if she is 
waiting for a comment.  
In the simple version of the task, Ben, with an ironic 
expression [10a] licks his lips as if to say ‘It’s delicious!’. In 
the complex version of the task, Ben with an ironic 
expression, [10b] gives his plate to Alice as to ask to have 
some more soup. Ben's [10a] gesture is a simple irony 
because it immediately contrasts with the belief (the soup is 
not good) which is part of the game [HOME-COOKING] 
shared between Alice and Ben. On the contrary, the 
complex irony [10b] implies a belief (if one asks for more 
food, it is because the food is good) that contrasts with the 
belief ‘the soup is not good’ shared between the two agents. 
 
In conclusion, within the same pragmatic category, 
comprehending a simple communicative act requires an 
easier inferential chain than that required for a complex act. 
Indeed, simple acts immediately refer to the behavior game 
shared by actor and partner, while complex acts do not. 
Thus, for each of the investigated pragmatic phenomena, we 
predict that simple communicative acts are easier to 
comprehend than complex communicative acts.  
Our study was conducted on children of different age 
groups. Indeed, adult subjects possess a fully developed 
cognitive system and communicative competence, and thus 
should not show any interesting errors in comprehending the 
different kinds of pragmatic tasks. On the contrary, within a 
developmental perspective, we expect that the ability to 
comprehend each kind of communicative act improves with 
children's age. 
  
Material and Procedures 
The experimental material comprised 12 videotaped scenes, 
each lasting 20-25 seconds and showing two characters 
engaged in a communicative interaction. All communicative 
acts were completely extralinguistic, performed only 
through gestures. Of these 12 scenes, 4 represented standard 
communicative acts, 4 deceiving acts and 4 ironic acts. Each 
scene has been recorded in two versions, one simple and 
one complex (see the examples described in the previous 
paragraph). Thus we devised two experimental protocols, A 
and B. Each protocol contains only one version for each 
scene. In each protocol the scenes are represented in a 
different random order. Half of the participants dealt with 
protocol A, while the other half dealt with protocol B. Each 
child was randomly assigned to protocol A or B. Every 
child saw 4 scenes representing a standard communicative 
act (2 simple + 2 complex), 4 scenes representing a 
deceiving communicative act (2 simple + 2 complex) and 4 
scenes representing an ironic act (2 simple + 2 complex).  
At the end of each scene, children had to show that they 
had understood the communicative interaction by explaining 
to the examiner what had happened and what the actor’s 
communicative intention was. Participants’ responses were 
rated by 2 independent judges. For each item, judges 
assigned a score of Ø (completely wrong answer), 1 (only 
partially correct answer) or 2 (correct answer).  
 
Participants 
The protocol was administered individually to 300 children, 
divided into three age groups: 100 children ranging from 5 
to 5;6 (mean age = 5;3 years), 100 children ranging from 6;6 
to 7 (mean age = 6;9 years), and 100 children ranging from 
8 to 8;6 (mean age = 8;2). Within each age group, there 
were 50 males and 50 females. Children came from nursery 
and primary schools of Turin. 
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Results 
Our hypotheses were globally confirmed. Figure 1 shows 
the mean percentages of the correct responses over all 
children to the simple and complex items: in every type of 
investigated phenomena (standards, deceits and ironies), 
subjects understand the simple communicative acts better 
than the complex ones. More in detail, overall children 
understand simple standard communicative acts more easily 
than the complex ones (T Test: t = 5.55; p < .0001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Histogram of the mean percentages of correct 
responses over all children. 
As shown in Table 1, the same result holds for 5-year-
olds (T Test: t = 3.20; p < .002), for 6-year-olds (T Test: t = 
2.67; p < .009) and for 8-year-olds (T Test: t = 3.76; p < 
.0001). The same pattern of results holds also for simple and 
complex deceits. Simple deceits are easier, both overall 
subjects (T Test: t = 10.19; p < .0001), and within the 
various groups: for 5-year-olds (T Test: t = 5.63; p < .0001), 
for 6-year-olds (T Test: t = 5.98; p < .0001) and for 8-year-
olds (T Test: t = 6.15; p < .0001). Finally, for ironic acts, 
simple ones are easier than complex ones over all subjects 
(T Test: t = 3.26; p < .001), for 6-year-olds (T Test: t = 2.24; 
p < .03) and for 8-year-olds (T Test: t = 3.11; p < .003), 
whereas there is no significant difference for 5-year-olds (T 
Test: t = 0.65; p < .52). 
 
Table 1: Mean percentages of correct responses over all 
children and for single age groups. 
 
Standard Deceit Irony Age 
groups Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex
5-5;6 67 50 70 42 37 34 
6;6-7 79 65 83 53 56 39 
8-8;6 86 68 83 56 64 46 
Global 78 61 79 50 51 39 
 
We also found significant data concerning children’s 
performance improvement, in understanding every kind of 
task, in accordance with the increase of their age. 
Differences in performance among the three groups have 
resulted in both simple and complex standard speech acts 
(Anova: F ranging from 6.53 to 10.36; p ranging from .002 
to .0001). Also the performances in comprehension of deceit 
improve as the age of the subjects increase, both for simple 
and complex deceits (Anova: F ranging from 3.32 to 6.44; p 
ranging from .002 to .03). The same result holds for simple 
ironies (Anova: F = 13.23; p < .0001) and for complex 
ironies (Anova: F = 3.1; p < 0.05).  
 
Conclusions 
In the present study we aimed to extend the analysis on 
simple vs. complex communicative acts to the domain of 
extralinguistic communication. The results globally confirm 
our predictions. Simple communicative acts are easier to 
comprehend than complex ones in all pragmatic phenomena 
investigated. This is true of all subjects, even within age 
groups. We explain such data considering the cognitive 
processes underlying the comprehension of the investigated 
tasks: in order to be understood complex communicative 
acts involve a higher inferential load than simple ones. 
Furthermore, as predicted, children’s improve their 
performance in all investigated tasks, in accordance with the 
increase of their age. 
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Only in one case our data are not in line with our 
expectations: we did not detect significant differences in the 
comprehension of simple vs. complex ironies in the 
youngest group of 5-year-olds. A possible explanation is 
that irony is a too difficult pragmatic phenomenon to be 
fully understood by children of that age. For this reason 
irony comprehension results difficult in both cases (simple 
and complex): children gave such a few correct answers, 
that no significant difference emerged. This interpretation is 
consistent with results in literature which showed that only 
6 year-old-children seem to fully grasp the intentions of 
ironic exchanges (Lucariello & Mindolovich, 1995). In line 
with such data Bucciarelli et al. (2003) found that irony – 
expressed both by linguistic speech acts and by gestures – is 
the most difficult pragmatic phenomena to comprehend, in 
comparison to standard communicative acts and deceits, for 
children aged 2;6 to 7 years. In addition, though still in line 
with our results, the authors found that only a small 
percentage (38%) of the 4;6-5;6 children in their study 
understood ironic gestures in an experimental setting. 
Our results on children’s ability to interpret 
extralinguistic gesture with a deceitful intent are in line with 
other experimental studies. For example Shulz and 
Cloghesy (1981) showed that only from 5 years of age 
children start to interpret pointing gestures with a deceitful 
intent, and that such an ability improves with the age. A 
related task has been studied by Call and Tomasello (1999). 
The authors investigated children’s ability to deal with 
deceits - with the classic false belief task - in an 
extralinguistic form. The results are consistent with the 
verbal version of the task: only a few 4 year olds are able to 
complete the task, whereas most 5 year olds succeed.  
Let us now consider our results in a wider perspective. 
Our main prediction was to detect an increasing difficulty in 
comprehension between simple and complex extra-
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linguistic communicative acts in different pragmatic tasks. 
Such a prediction was grounded on the assumption that 
comprehension of simple and complex communicative acts 
can be explained by the complexity of the inferential chain 
involved in each of them, despite the communicative 
channel used to express them, i.e. linguistic or 
extralinguistic. Our results confirm such a perspective: we 
find the same trend of difficulty between simple and 
complex communicative acts that other studies underlined 
in linguistic comprehension (see Bucciarelli et al., 2003; 
Bosco & Bucciarelli, submitted). These similarities between 
linguistic and extralinguistic comprehension, which we 
found in each of the investigated pragmatic phenomenon, 
confirm that speech acts and extralinguistic communicative 
acts share the most relevant mental processes. Opposing 
viewpoints (e.g. Chomsky, 1987; Burling, 1993) consider 
linguistic and extralinguistic communication as two distinct 
phenomena, different in their intrinsic nature, and having 
separate roots in phylogenies. According to such a view, 
language is a complex module, independently evolved due 
to a non-finalized, genetic mutation. Our data seem to 
falsify the hypothesis of a separated line of development of 
language and communication, in favor of a unified 
theoretical framework in which linguistic and extralinguistic 
communication develop in parallel as different aspects of a 
unique communicative competence (Bara, in press). 
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Abstract 
Dissociations between similarity and categorization have 
constituted critical counter-evidence to the view that 
categorization is similarity-based.  However, there have 
been difficulties in replicating such dissociations.  This 
paper reports three experiments.  The first provides 
evidence of a double dissociation between similarity and 
categorization.  The second and third show that by 
asking participants to make their judgments from 
particular perspectives, this dissociation disappears or is 
much reduced.  It is argued that these data support a 
perspectival view of concepts, in which categorization is 
similarity-based, but where the dimensions used to make 
similarity and categorization judgments are partially 
fixed by perspective. 
Introduction 
Explanations of categorisation have undergone a 
number of theoretical shifts (Medin, 1989), from 
classical to prototype models, and from prototype to 
theory-based models (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985).  
One of the key pieces of evidence against similarity-
based models has been the finding that similarity and 
categorisation judgments can dissociate.  For example, 
Rips (1989) found that participants judged an unknown 
item more similar to a coin yet more likely to be a 
pizza; and a bird transformed to look like an insect as 
more similar to an insect, yet more likely to be a bird. 
Dissociations between similarity and categorization 
judgments appear directly to undermine similarity-
based models of categorization.  Prototype models, for 
example, assume that categorisation involves a 
similarity comparison between an object and a 
prototype in memory (e.g., Hampton, 1995).  Exemplar-
based models assume that a similarity comparison is 
made between an object and sets of exemplars in 
memory.  In both kinds of model, categorization is 
taken to be a monotonic increasing function of 
similarity.  That is, according to similarity-based 
models, it should not be possible for categorization to 
increase without a corresponding increase in similarity.  
These models thus deny the possibility of two kinds of 
change: i) a decrease in categorization accompanied by 
an increase in similarity; and ii) a decrease in 
categorization accompanied by no change in similarity. 
In spite of the evidence and arguments in support of 
similarity-categorisation dissociations (henceforth, 
SCD), similarity-based models have maintained their 
appeal.  Some of this can be attributed to the apparent 
success of similarity-based models in explaining much 
categorization data (cf. Hampton, 1998) even if SCDs 
remain as recalcitrant cases.  But similarity-based 
models have also retained their appeal because the 
existence of SCDs has been questioned (despite other 
apparent demonstrations – e.g., Kroska & Goldstone, 
1996; Roberson, Davidoff & Braisby, 1999).  Smith & 
Sloman (1994), in seeking to replicate Rips’ results, 
were able only to produce a SCD when participants 
were required to operate in a reflective, rule-based 
mode, by giving a concurrent verbal protocol.  
Similarly, Estes & Hampton (2002) only obtained a 
SCD when using a within-participants design; a 
between-participants design failed to show a 
dissociation.  In contrast, Thibaut, Dupont & Anselme 
(2002) obtained SCDs in two experiments.  Their 
participants were required to learn two artificial 
categories, exemplars of which were novel shapes.  
They found that participants tended to judge category 
membership according to the presence of a necessary 
feature, but similarity according to the presence of a 
salient characteristic feature. 
Thibaut et al.’s results show that SCDs can arise 
without participants entering a reflective mode of 
categorization.  However, they do not demonstrate that 
natural (as opposed to artificial) categories give rise to 
SCDs.  That is, they have shown that participants can 
learn and use non-similarity-based categories, but not 
that natural categories are not similarity-based. 
This paper seeks to add to this debate concerning 
SCDs and, more widely, similarity-based models of 
concepts by i) attempting to demonstrate a double 
similarity-categorisation dissociation; and ii) showing 
that such dissociations can be eliminated or diminished 
when judgments are given in context or perspective. 
Previous work (e.g., Thibaut et al.) has shown that 
stimuli defined by the presence of both necessary and 
characteristic features may be categorized according to 
the necessary feature, and rated for similarity according 
to the characteristic feature.  Of course, such work also 
implies the existence of two kinds of (potentially) 
borderline case: (a) an exemplar possessing the 
necessary but not the characteristic feature (N+CíDQG
(b) an exemplar possessing the characteristic but not the 
necessary feature (Ní& $FFRUGLQJWR WKHUDWLRQDOH
extended by Thibaut et al., exemplar (a) should receive 
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a high categorisation but low similarity rating, and (b) 
should receive a low categorization but high similarity 
rating.  Together these borderline cases could provide a 
double dissociation, and potentially more robust 
evidence of SCDs. 
This paper also seeks to establish whether SCDs are 
context-sensitive.  That is, it is possible that in context, 
categorization judgments are similarity-based, but that 
dissociations arise when categorization and similarity 
judgments are elicited in the absence of any specific 
context.  If so, then the mixed evidence reported in the 
literature may stem from minor variations in task 
presentation, and it might be possible to retain a 
similarity-based model in which the weighting of 
features varies with context. 
Experiment 1 
This experiment sought to establish whether similarity 
and categorization judgments for biological categories 
dissociate for two kinds of borderline case: 
Appearance+GeneticsíDQG$SSHDUDQFHí*HQHWLFV 
Design 
Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance (A+,Aí
and Genetics (G+,GíZHUHZLWKLQ-participants factors. 
Method 
Participants 40 undergraduate psychology students 
attending an Open University residential school 
volunteered to participate. 
 
Materials Four food categories were chosen based on 
previous work (Braisby, 2001): salmon, apple, potato 
and chicken.  Sixteen scenarios were constructed, as 
described below, so that there were four exemplars per 
category defined by the presence or absence of 
appearance and genetic properties: A+G+; A+Gí
Aí*DQG$í*í7KHIROORZLQJVKRZVKRZVFHQDULRV
were constructed for the category ‘apple’; the first set of 
brackets indicates wordings for G+ and GíFRQGLWLRQV
and the second set indicates the A+ and AíZRUGLQJV 
“You have just bought an apple from a reputable 
retailer.  On examining its packaging closely, you find 
that it has been genetically modified [but it retains 
ALL/so that it has NONE] of the genetic properties 
specific to apples.  On closer examination, you find that 
it [looks, feels, smells and even tastes JUST/does NOT 
look, feel, smell or even taste] like an apple.” 
 
Procedure All scenarios were presented and responses 
recorded using E-prime (Schneider, Eschman & 
Zuccolotto, 2002). Participants were given a practice 
example, and then asked to read the 16 scenarios.  After 
each, participants first judged the category membership 
of the exemplar given the category label (e.g., apple), 
choosing either a Yes or No judgment.  They then rated 
the exemplar for typicality on a 7-point scale relative to 
the category label.  The typicality question is taken to 
be an index of similarity (cf. Hampton, 1998).  Order of 
presentation of scenarios was random. 
Results 
Responses to the categorization question were summed 
over the four categories, yielding a scale of 0 to 4; the 
typicality question was transformed to the same scale 
(high scores imply high typicality and high 
categorization probability). Both typicality and 
categorization scores were analysed using ANOVA 
with Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance 
(+,íDQG*HQHWLFVíDOOZLWKLQ-participant factors. 
There was no effect of Task (p = 0.61), but main 
HIIHFWVRI$SSHDUDQFH>) S2 
 @DQG*HQHWLFV>) S2 = 
0.74], interactions between Task and Appearance 
>)    S   2 = 0.27], Task and 
*HQHWLFV >)    S   2 = 0.23], 
Appearance and Genetics [F(1,39) = 21.17, p < 0.001; 
2 = 0.35], all subsumed by a marginal three-way 
interaction between Task, Appearance and Genetics 
>)    S    2 = 0.09].  The key 
interactions between Appearance and Genetics, and 
between Task, Appearance and Genetics, are shown in 
Figures 1, and 2 and 3 respectively. 
Pair-wise comparisons were conducted to examine 
the locus of the three-way interaction between Task, 
Appearance and Genetics.  There was no effect of Task 
for either of the clear cases, i.e., either the Aí*íRUWKH
A+G+ cases.  However, there was an effect of Task, 
though in opposite directions, for the two borderlines.  
For the A+Gí FDVH 7\SLFDOLW\ VFRUHV ZHUHPDUNHGO\
higher than Categorisation scores (Typicality = 1.93, 
categorization = 1.03, t(39) = 3.21, p < 0.01) while for 
the Aí*FDVH7\SLFDOLW\VFRUHVZHUHPDUNHGO\lower 
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Figure 1. Overall ratings by Appearance and 
Genetics. 
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than Categorisation scores (Typicality = 0.83, 
categorisation = 1.65, t(39) = 2.69, p < 0.05). 
Both Thibaut et al. and Estes & Hampton found that 
SCDs were due to only a subset of participants 
dissociatin their judgments.  To examine this 
possibility, the number of times each participant gave 
dissociated pairs of judgments for the borderline items 
was calculated.  A dissociated pair of judgments was 
defined in terms of differences between typicality and 
categorization responses for two borderline items 
within the same category, where the differences in the 
scores have different sign.  For example, a participant 
might rate an A+GíDVPRUHW\SLFDOWKDQDQ$í*EXW
categorise the former negatively and the latter 
positively.  Though the difference in typicality scores is 
positive, the difference in categorization will be 
negative.  Dissociations were also defined to include 
cases where participants gave differing categorization 
responses to the two borderlines within the same 
category, but gave the same typicality judgments.  Each 
of these types of dissociation undermines the suggestion 
that categorization is a function of similarity. 
Of the 40 participants, 25 (63%) gave no dissociated 
pair of judgments to the four pairs of borderlines with 
which they were presented; however, 5 (13%) gave 
dissociated judgments to all four pairs of borderlines. 
Discussion of Experiment 1 
Although previous research has claimed evidence of 
such dissociations, largely these have been single 
dissociations, i.e., items for which categorization points 
to category A and similarity to category B.  In contrast, 
the present research dissociates these judgments in two 
ways.  First, for A+Gí items, typicality scores are 
higher than their corresponding categorization scores.  
For AíG+ items, typicality scores are lower than the 
corresponding categorization scores.  Moreover, A+Gí 
items are judged more typical than Aí*LWHPV
and 0.83 respectively, t(39) = 3.94, p < 0.001); yet 
A+GíLWHPVDUHMXGJHGOHVVOLNHO\WREHLQWKHFDWHJRU\
than Aí* LWHPV DQGUHVSHFWLYHO\ W 
1.73, p = 0.09).  Taken together, these findings present 
a challenge for similarity-based models, for it should 
not be possible for an item A to be more typical than 
item B and yet less likely to be a category member than 
item B. 
It should also be noted that these materials do not 
present participants with fantastical transformations or 
discoveries.  Nor do they tap artificial categories.  
Moreover,  these data do not provide support for the 
idea that dissociations arise only under an especially 
reflective mode of categorisation.  Response times were 
collected for both typicality and categorisation 
judgments.  Typicality is often taken to be an index of 
an initial similarity computation, which can be over-
ridden by a subsequent reflective categorisation.  
However, the response times in this experiment provide 
no support for this thesis: typicality response times 
averaged 5.13 seconds (including the time taken to read 
each scenario), yet categorisation averaged 3.86 
seconds (again including reading time), a statistically 
significant difference [t(39) = 5.40, p < 0.001]. 
Lastly, though, it should be noted that the 
dissociations arise because of a subset of the 
participants, corroborating the findings of Estes & 
Hampton, and Thibaut et al. 
In spite of not supporting similarity-based models, 
there is the possibility that categorisation and similarity 
judgments may align in context.  That is, when in a 
specific context, it may be that participants make 
similarity-based categorisations, and dissociations arise 
only because these judgments are elicited out of 
context. The next two experiments sought to investigate 
this possibility by eliciting judgments in contexts 
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Figure 2. Typicality ratings by Appearance and 
Genetics. 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Apearance + Appearance-
Genetics+ Genetics-
Figure 3. Categorisation ratings by Appearance 
and Genetics. 
 
152
thought to emphasise either appearance or genetic 
properties.  Both require participants to adopt a 
perspective in making their categorisation and typicality 
judgments (cf. Barsalou & Sewell, 1984) 
Experiment 2 
This experiment sought to establish whether similarity 
and categorization judgments dissociate for the two 
kinds of borderline, A+Gí DQG $í* ZKHQ
participants are asked to adopt a perspective that 
emphasizes appearance properties. 
Design 
Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance (A+,Aí
and Genetics (G+,GíZHUHZLWKLQ-participants factors. 
 
Participants 33 undergraduate psychology students 
attending an Open University residential school 
volunteered to participate. 
 
Materials The same categories in experiment 1 were 
used.  Scenarios were as in experiment 1, but were 
prefaced by the clause “Imagine that you are a 
Sculptor…”.  It was assumed, based on previous work, 
that participants would take this profession to signal the 
enhanced relevance of appearance properties. 
 
Procedure An identical procedure to experiment 1 was 
followed.  However, categorization and typicality 
questions were prefaced by the clause “Imagining 
yourself to be a sculptor…”. 
Results 
Responses to the categorization and typicality questions 
(transformed as before) were analysed using ANOVA 
with Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance 
(+,íDQG*enetics (+,íDVZLWKLQ-subject factors. 
There was no effect of Task (p = 0.96), but main 
HIIHFWVRI$SSHDUDQFH>) S2 
 @DQG*HQHWLFV>) S2 = 
0.53], interactions between Task and Genetics [F1,32) = 
S2 = 0.18] and between Appearance and 
*HQHWLFV >)    S   2 = 0.12].  
However, there was no three-way interaction between 
Task, Appearance and Genetics (p = 0.20).  The 
interaction between Appearance and Genetics is shown 
in Figure 4. 
Although no three-way interaction was found, pair-
wise comparisons were performed to examine the 
possibility that there might be differences between the 
Tasks for the two borderline items (since these were the 
source of the three-way interaction in experiment 1).  
Unlike experiment 1, there was no effect of Task for the 
Aí* ERUGHUOLQH WKRXJK WKHUHZDVDPDUJLQDO HIIHFW
for the A+Gí ERUGHUOLQH &DWHJRULVDWLRQ   
typicality = 3.17, t(32) = 2.03, p = 0.05). 
As before, the response patterns of individual 
participants were examined to see how many gave 
dissociated judgments.  Of the 33 participants, 23 
(70%) gave no dissociated pair of judgments to the four 
pairs of borderlines with which they were presented; no 
participants gave dissociated judgments to all four pairs 
of borderlines. 
Discussion of Experiment 2 
Unlike experiment 1, these results provide no evidence 
of a dissociation between categorisation and similarity 
judgments.  That is, the dissociation appears to have 
been eliminated by ensuring participants give their 
judgments from a specific perspective or context.  The 
pairwise comparisons support this interpretation.  
Critically, the typicality and categorization scores do 
not violate the assumptions of similarity-based models: 
both A+Gí DQG $í* FDVHV GLIIHU LQ FDWHJRULVDWLRQ
(2.64 and 0.94 respectively, t(32) = 4.29, p < 0.001) but 
also in typicality (3.17 and 0.56 respectively, t(32) = 
10.12, p < 0.001).  Hence the borderlines here do not 
provide evidence of dissociation – the increase in 
categorization is matched by an increase in typicality. 
Experiment 3 seeks to establish whether the salience 
of genetic properties can be enhanced sufficiently to 
eliminate the dissociation in experiment 1. 
Experiment 3 
This experiment sought to establish whether similarity 
and categorization judgments dissociate for the two 
kinds of borderline, A+Gí DQG $í* ZKHQ
participants are asked to make adopt a perspective that 
emphasizes genetic or biological properties. 
Design 
Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance (A+,Aí
and Genetics (G+,GíZHUHZLWKLQ-participants factors. 
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under a ‘Sculptor’ perspective. 
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Participants 35 undergraduate psychology students 
attending an Open University residential school 
volunteered to participate. 
 
Materials The same categories in experiment 1 were 
used.  Scenarios were as in experiment 1, but were 
prefaced by the clause “Imagine that you are a 
Biologist…”.  It was assumed, based on previous work, 
that participants would take this profession to signal the 
enhanced relevance of biological properties. 
 
Procedure An identical procedure to experiment 1 was 
followed.  However, categorization and typicality 
questions were prefaced by the clause “Imagining 
yourself to be a biologist…”. 
Results 
Responses to the categorization and typicality questions 
(transformed as before) were analysed using ANOVA 
with Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance 
(+,íDQG*HQHWLFVíDVZLWKLQ-subject factors. 
The pattern of results from the ANOVA exactly 
replicates that of experiment 2.  There was no effect of 
Task (p = 0.53), but main effects of Appearance 
>)   S2 = 0.72] and Genetics 
>) S2 = 0.79], an interaction 
between Task and Genetics [F(1,33) = 13.93, p < 0.01; 
2 = 0.30] and between Appearance and Genetics 
>) S2 = 0.19].  As in experiment 
2, there was no three-way interaction between Task, 
Appearance and Genetics. The interaction between 
Appearance and Genetics is shown in Figure 5. 
As in experiment 2, although no three-way 
interaction was found, pair-wise comparisons were 
performed to examine the possibility that there might be 
differences between the Tasks for the two borderline 
items. As before, there was no effect of Task for the 
Aí*ERUGHUOLQH EXW DQHIIHFWRI7DVNIRU WKH$*í
borderline (Categorisation = 1.03, typicality = 1.72, 
t(34) = 2.51, p < 0.05). 
19 participants (54%) gave no dissociated pair of 
judgments to the four pairs of borderlines with which 
they were presented; only 1 (3%) participant gave 
dissociated judgments to all four pairs of borderlines. 
Discussion of Experiment 3 
As in experiment 2, this experiment suggests that the 
dissociation between categorization and similarity 
judgments reported in experiment 1 can be eliminated 
when judgments are given under a specific perspective. 
While the pairwise comparisons support this 
interpretation, other comparisons suggest that the 
perspective has not exerted such a strong influence in 
this experiment as in experiment 2.  Overall, the 
typicality scores do not differ significantly for the two 
borderlines cases, A+Gí DQG $í*  DQG 
respectively, p = 0.96); however, the two borderlines do 
differ in their categorization scores: 1.03 and 2.09 
respectively, t(34) = 2.55, p < 0.05).  Hence the 
borderlines in this experiment provide evidence 
contrary to similarity-based models, i.e., an increase in 
categorization is not matched by an increase in 
similarity.  Nevertheless, relative to experiment 1, the 
perspective has served to eliminate the differences in 
typicality between the borderlines, even though 
differences in categorization remain. 
General Discussion 
This paper provides evidence to support two main 
claims.  The first is that similarity and categorization 
judgments dissociate for natural categories.  The second 
is that such dissociations are perspective-dependent. 
The data in experiment 1 reflect a double dissociation 
between similarity and categorization judgments, and 
serve to undermine similarity-based models of 
categorization.  Though previous research has also 
uncovered dissociations, these have been single 
dissociations, and there have been difficulties in 
replicating those findings.  Indeed, suggestions have 
been made that such dissociations arise only when 
categorization is highly reflective, only when designs 
are within-participant, and only for certain participants. 
The data reported here contradict the first of these 
claims.  That is, the categorization judgments obtained 
in these experiments have not been sought under a 
reflective mode – indeed response times show that 
participants take considerably less time to make these 
judgments than they do the corresponding typicality 
judgments.  So, there is little evidence for these 
categorization judgments being particularly reflective. 
These data confirm previous findings that 
dissociations arise because of a minority of participants.  
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The data do not speak to the claim that dissociations 
only arise in within-participant designs, although 
Thibaut et al.’s evidence contradicts such a claim.  
However, Thibaut et al.’s study arguably shows only 
that people can learn artificial categories for which 
similarity and categorization dissociations arise, not that 
these arise also for natural categories.  This study 
appears to provide strong evidence that even for 
everyday, natural kind categories such dissociations 
arise.  Moreover, the work presented here does not rely 
on identifying features that could be considered 
necessary or characteristic, a problem Thibaut et al. 
identify in previous work – indeed, the stimuli used 
here are defined without reference to particular features. 
The second main claim is that by fixing perspective, 
dissociations between similarity and categorization 
judgments are reduced or eliminated.  In experiment 2, 
making judgments from a ‘sculptor’ perspective 
eliminated the dissociation, whereas it was reduced in 
experiment 3. 
How might these findings of perspective-dependence 
be explained?  One possibility is that similarity-based 
models should be seen as models of categorization-in-
context.  Categorization and typicality judgments are 
often elicited out of context.  Without the constraint of 
context, participants may call on different kinds of 
information to make the two kinds of judgment.  In 
other words, models of categorization should first seek 
to model categorization-in-context and then attempt to 
explicate context-free categorization judgments.  One 
possibility for such a perspectival account of concepts 
allows that categorization is similarity-based, but that 
the current perspective fixes the relevant dimensions to 
be used in the similarity computation (Braisby, 1998). 
Another possible explanation is that in experiments 2 
and 3, dissociations do not appear because the 
instructions used for categorization and similarity do 
not elicit those judgments.  For example, it could be 
that both sets of instructions actually elicit a 
categorization judgment, and participants respond in the 
typicality task as best they can given that their judgment 
reflects a categorization, rather than an overt judgment 
of typicality.  However, such an explanation is fraught 
with problems – for example, if conventional 
instructions do not determine the kind of judgment 
people make, then there is no obvious basis for deciding 
whether any previous research has really elicited 
categorization or typicality judgments. 
In conclusion, the data reported here suggest that a 
simple similarity-based view of categorization is not 
right.  However, when context is fixed, then the 
similarity-based models may fare much better.  What is 
needed to augment such models is a mechanism by 
which the current perspective or context fixes the 
relevant dimensions on which categorizations and 
similarity judgments are made. 
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Abstract
Though we take mainly a philosophical approach, we hope
that the results of our work will be useful to researchers on
consciousness who take other approaches. Everyone agrees,
no matter what their point of view on consciousness, that
consciousness has a representational base. However, there
have been relatively few well-worked-out attempts to say
what this base might be like. The two best developed are
perhaps the higher-order thought (HOT) and the transpar-
ency approaches. Both are lacking. Starting from the notion
of a self-presenting representation, we develop an alternative
view. In our view, a representation, a completely normal
representation, is the representational base for not just for
consciousness of its object (if it has one), but also itself and
oneself as its subject. The unified picture of consciousness
that results should assist research on consciousness. 
Introduction
Though we take mainly a philosophical approach, we hope
that the results of our work will be useful to researchers on
consciousness using other approaches. Current views on
consciousness can be divided by whether the theorist ac-
cepts or rejects cognitivism about consciousness. Cognitiv-
ism is the view that consciousness is just a form of repre-
sentation or a property of information-processing systems
that have representations (e.g., focussed attention). Anti-
cognitivists deny this, claiming that inverted spectrum and
zombie thought experiments show that consciousness could
change while everything cognitive or representational stays
the same. Whatever, researchers on both sides of this fence
agrees that consciousness has a representational base.
Whether or not consciousness simply is representational or
cognitive, it at least requires representation and cognition. 
However, there have been few well-worked out at-
tempts to say what this representational base might be like.
The two best developed are perhaps the higher-order
thought (HOT) approach, in which the representational
base of consciousness is a thought directed at one’s own
psychological state(s), and the transparency theory, in
which one’s conscious states are said to be, not objects of
representation, but things that one knows about by infer-
ence from consciousness of the world around one, one’s
body, and so on. 
As we will see, both approaches are lacking. We then
introduce a notion of a self-presenting representation and
attempt to build a better alternative around this notion. On
our view, representations are self-presenting but more than
that. A single representation is the basis not just of consci-
ousness of the world and itself but also of oneself as its sub-
ject. This notion leads to a unified picture of consciousness. 
The standard picture of representation 
Many consciousness researchers accept the following as a
principle of representation: 
RP: Representations represent something other than
themselves and only something other than themselves.
If RP is right, our view is wrong and something like a HOT
model or transparency model has to be right. 
There are a host of problems facing HOT models (see
Raymont, forthcoming). Perhaps the most serious arises
from its separation of the representing state that confers
consciousness from the state on which consciousness is
conferred. The problem is that a representation can exist in
the absence of its object. If so, a HOT that represents pain
should be able to make things seem subjectively just as they
would if one really were in pain – with no real pain. Rosen-
thal (1997, p. 744) at least bites this bullet but it is a pretty
tough chew. Moreover, since in this case what is represented
is not real, it is the representing state that has to be the con-
scious state. If so, there is nothing higher-order about con-
sciousness. Indeed, the resulting conscious state would look
remarkably like our self-presenting state.
So what about the transparency alternative? The basic
idea behind transparency theory is that one is directly con-
scious only of what a representation represents and not the
representation itself. We are conscious via representations,
not of representations. Representations are transparent to us. 
If so, consciousness of representing is an inference from
the fact that we are conscious of what is represented. As
Dretske puts it,
You cannot represent something as F without, necessar-
ily, occupying a state that carries the information that it
is F (not G or H) that you are representing something
as. [1995, p. 56]
All we know about our representing is what we can infer
from how represented items appear. Dretske (p. 40 ) calls
the resulting consciousness of our representing states dis-
placed perception. The perception of an object is displaced
by an inference onto the perception itself. 
The transparency thesis faces some problems. First
problem: when one is conscious of something by means of a
given representation, one is thereby conscious of that repre-
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sentation’s content, i.e., of how that thing is represented by
one’s representation (visually, aurally, and so on). It is a
very small step from this to consciousness of the represen-
tation. To take this step, various things may be needed but
an inference from what one is representing does not seem to
be one of them. One is conscious of not only what is repre-
sented but also how it’s represented. The latter is an aspect
of the representation itself.
Second problem: when one is conscious of how one is
representing given contents (seeing them, imagining them,
doubting them, remembering them), even Dretske allows
that this knowledge does not come by way of an inference
from representing something (1995, p. 57-8), though he
does not say where it does come from. If transparency is not
the case here, why anywhere? 
Third problem: itches, pains and other bodily sensa-
tions. On the transparency view, feeling a pain, hurting,
has to be nothing more than an inference from what the
pain represents – some bodily damage or whatever. This is
extremely implausible. (Dretske recognizes that he has a
problem about pains, etc.: “this is a topic that I have neither
the time nor (I admit) the resources to effectively pursue”
[1995, p. 103].) All who accept RP face this problem. 
Indeed, about the only phenomenon for which a trans-
parency claim seems at all plausible is perception, espe-
cially vision, though even here transparency might have
trouble with the difference between, say, seeing a corner
and feeling it, in general with situations in which there is
one content, two or more modes of representation. Put
bluntly, the transparency thesis seems simply to be false, at
least for most of consciousness. 
As we said, if RP is right, something like a HOT model
or transparency model are the only alternatives. If accept-
ing RP leads to such problems, what happens if we deny it?
It is not obviously true. Think again of pains and itches and
other bodily sensations, not to mention feelings of tension
and tiredness, mood states such as aimless anxiety or eu-
phoria, and so on. What (other than themselves) are states
like these about? Then there are altered states of conscious-
ness. When consciousness is altered, what it is like to have
those states certainly changes but there is no obvious candi-
date, other than the conscious states themselves, for what
they are about. 
There are two ways to reject RP. One would be to say
that pains, etc., are not representations at all. This move is
hopeless. In having pains (and mood states, altered states of
consciousness, and so on), one is clearly aware of some-
thing, something about which a pain, for example, carries
information. These are marks of representing. But what one
becomes aware of in having a pain, what this state carries
information about, is itself. Pains are representational by
being self-representational; the qualities of which one be-
comes conscious by having these states are mainly qualities
of the states themselves. So the other way of rejecting RP is
to say that some representations at least are self-presenting. 
Not only do we think that RP is false but our version of
the opposing idea that representations can be self-present-
ing is fairly radical. Here is how our story goes.
Self-presenting Representations: The Represen-
tational Base of Consciousness
On our view, having a representation is all the represen-
tation that one needs to become conscious not only of what
the representation is about and the representation itself, the
standard view of self-presenting representations, but some-
thing more.  Consider the following sentence as uttered by1
MM: 
1. I am reading the words on the screen in front of me. 
Having the representation expressed by (1) can make MM
conscious of the words on the screen, obviously. It can also
make her conscious of the representation itself, that the
words are being seen (not heard, imagined, touched, and so
on). In addition, having this representation can make MM
conscious of who is seeing the words, namely, herself. An
ordinary single representation is all the representation that
one needs to become conscious of that representation and
also oneself as the subject of it. Let us call such a representa-
tion the representational base of becoming conscious of
these items. 
Representational base – an act of representing that is
all the representation that one needs to be conscious of it
and of oneself as its subject
Almost any representation will do. 
Imagining something unreal such as Pegasus will do
just as well as perceiving an external object such as a com-
puter screen. Indeed, even a representational state that had
no object, and therefore could not make us conscious of
anything other than itself, could still be the basis of becom-
ing conscious of that state and of oneself. Moreover, a repre-
sentation need not itself actually be recognized in order to
provide a representational base for self-consciousness. Just
recognizing what is represented in it would be an adequate
representational base for one to be conscious of oneself (as
conscious of that object). 
Note carefully the term representational base. We are
not saying that to have a representation is to be conscious of
it. That would be a crazy view to hold. What we are saying
is that having a representation provides everything represen-
tational needed to become conscious of having it and of
oneself. Other things may be needed, too, shift of attention
for example, or the conceptual resources to go from con-
sciousness of something to consciousness of representing it. 
Lest it be thought that the idea of a self-presenting rep-
resentations is exotic, note that something as lowly as a bar
code can be run quite a long way as an analogy. A bar code
contains information about what it is ‘about’, usually the
item’s nature and price. But it also contains information
about itself – a few of the bars are an integrity check on the
 Among others, James held the standard view, as more recently1.
have Kriegel (2003) and Tye (2003).
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bar code itself. And it contains information about the thing
that has it – it is physically mounted on the thing that has
it. How far the analogy can be run does not matter here.
What matters is that even a representation as simple as a
bar code can be self-presenting. 
   Another homely example, a gauge, shows how our story
goes.  A gauge presents information about something other2
than itself, namely, whatever it has the function of indicat-
ing information about. For example, an altimeter presents
information about the distance to the earth’s surface. How-
ever, an altimeter also presents information about itself,
how far it is from earth, for example. And it is the gauge
that presents this information about the gauge, not some
higher-order gauge pointed at it! This is how we see con-
scious states. To be conscious of having a representation,
all the representation that one needs is the state itself. 
For the analogy of the gauge to be complete, the gauge
would have to have one more function, It would have to
represent the system that has it. Not a problem. Suppose
that to provide information about altitude and itself, an
altimeter has to port itself to a system. And suppose that to
do so correctly, it has to recognize what sort of system it
has been installed in. (‘Ah, this is a Cessna Skylane.’) Now
we have at least a rough analogue of a representation pre-
senting not just its object and itself but also its subject, the
person who has it.
We don’t have room to mount the full case for our
notion of the representational base of consciousness but
notice, if it is right, it would do some real work for us. 
• It would entail that RP is false. 
• It would entail that the idea behind transparency and
displaced perception, the idea that we are not conscious
of our own conscious states, is false and that the dis-
placed perception move is unnecessary – the conscious-
ness one has of one’s own representations by having
them is as direct and non-inferential as any conscious-
ness of anything. 
And, 
• It would show that the HOT move is unnecessary. If a
representation itself is all the representation we need to
become conscious of that representation, there is no
need for a higher-order representation of any kind.
 
Global Representation
Our notion of the representational base gives a single, uni-
fied account of the basis of three forms of consciousness – 
consciousness of the world, consciousness of one’s own
states, and consciousness of oneself. This nicely unified
account is progress. Progress – but not the whole story. 
So far we have talked exclusively about individual
representations as understood by the tradition. As Kant
already knew, however, the representations that serve as the
representational base of consciousness are usually much
‘bigger’ than individual representations traditionally con-
ceived. Indeed, in complex beings like us, we do not believe
that there are any individual representations as traditionally
conceived; but we will not go into that here.
The representations serving as the representational base
of consciousness usually have multiple objects and encom-
pass multiple representations (as traditionally conceived).
Let us call such a representation a global representation. In
a global representation, one is conscious of many objects
and/or many representations as traditionally conceived, and
one is conscious of them as a single complex object and/or a
single complex representation. 
Global representation – representing many objects
and/or many representations as traditionally conceived
as a single complex object and/or a single representa-
tion. 
Our points about the representational base can now be made
using this notion. A global representation is all the represen-
tation that one needs to be conscious not just of its complex
object, if it has one , but also of the representation itself, and3
of oneself as the ‘the single common subject’ of the elements
of this representation (Kant, 1781/7, A350). 
The structure of a global representation is complicated.
Suppose that at the same time as one has the representation
expressed by (1),
1. I am reading the words on the screen in front of me,
one also has representations expressed by,
2. I am puzzled by your comments
3. I am enjoying the music I hear outside
4. I believe our agreement was to meet at 6:00
5. Yesterday I thought I understood Kant's notion of the
object
6. I wish the world were a fairer place
There are three elements of (1)-(6) that could be united in a
single global representation. 
• One could be conscious of the various represented ob-
jects here as a single complex object. 
• One could be conscious of the various ways in which
these objects are being represented as a single complex
representation. 
And,
• One could be conscious of oneself, the subject, as the
single common subject of the whole business.
The next question is, How does a global representation serve
as the representational base of consciousness of its complex
object, itself, and its subject, the person who has it?
Joint Consciousness 
Central to a global representation of objects is what we will
 A gauge is one of Dretske’s favourite examples.2.
 Must global representations have objects (other than them-3.
selves)? Nice question; but not one for us here.
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call joint consciousness:
Joint consciousness – to be conscious of any of the
objects of a global representation is to be conscious of
other such objects.
It seems obvious that joint consciousness is a distinctive
feature of a global representation. The notion of joint con-
sciousness just stated clearly applies to consciousness of the
world (plus such things as one’s own bodily states), more
exactly, to consciousness of intentional objects. What about
consciousness of one’s global representation and of oneself
as its subject? 
When one is conscious of representing in a global
representation, here too there will be joint consciousness –
to be conscious of some representings is to be conscious of
others. And conscious of self? Here the idea that is plausi-
ble is a bit different. When one is conscious of oneself as
subject of one bit of representing, one will usually be con-
scious of oneself as the subject of other representings, as
their ‘single, common subject’, to use Kant’s words again.
The next question. How could a global representation
serve as the representational base of joint consciousness of
representings and of oneself as their common subject? It
seems plausible to hold that only certain elements of a
global representation are needed for one to have an ade-
quate representational base for consciousness of a single
representing and of oneself as its subject. One will be con-
scious of doing an act of seeing by doing that act of seeing,
whatever the rest of one’s current global representation is
like. And one will conscious of oneself seeing, which
makes it likely that the act of seeing is the basis of this
consciousness of oneself. If so, what is the representational
base of joint consciousness of objects, of being jointly con-
scious of various representings, of being conscious of one-
self as the common subject of a number of acts of represent-
ing? 
Here we can only sketch what would have to happen
for these forms of joint consciousness to occur. In the same
way as an act of representing is the representational base
for consciousness of that act and of oneself, it will have to
be the representational base for consciousness of doing
other acts of representing and of oneself as their common
subject. 
Moreover, the relationship will be symmetrical. One is
not ‘located’ at any given representing. When conscious-
ness of a representing carries one to consciousness of other
representings, one has all the representings concerned
equally. So it would be better to say that representings in
general are the base for consciousness of representings in
general. It is not any given representing that is the base of
consciousness of oneself as common subject but represen-
tings in general. 
Thinking of representations in the traditional way, it is
hard to make sense of what we just said. But that may be
the fault of the traditional conception. There is another way
to think about representation within which what we just
said makes fine sense. 
Structure of a Global Representation
Instead of trying to make sense of the base of joint consci-
ousness of representing and of oneself as subject in terms of
relations among representations, let us try out the idea that
these forms of consciousness are something that obtains
within a single complex representation. 
Our test case will be a person seeing something, hearing
something, and tasting something, all parts of a global rep-
resentation and global object, where the person is jointly
conscious of the objects, the representings, and herself as
subject. To be the base for such consciousness, how are the
three acts of representing brought together in a global repre-
sentation? Here are three possibilities:
1. The three acts and their objects become the object of a
fourth, higher-order representation.
2. The three acts and their objects become parts of a
single subsuming representation.
3. While their contents are taken up in a global repre-
sentation, the three acts of representing do not survive
even as parts of this state, though their objects remain
distinct. They become three (for the moment let us call
them) modalities of a single representation. 
How might (3) work? 
Consider what happens if one goes from a situation, at
time t, that has objects o1 and o2 to a situation that has o1
but not o2. We could try to capture the change in two ways.
We could say that where once there were two representa-
tions, r(o1) and r(o2), which were bundled in a mental struc-
ture of some kind, [r(o1) & r(o2)], we now have only the one
representation, r(o1); one representation has been dropped
from the bundle that existed at t. Or we could say that there
was just one representation, r(o1 & o2), at t and it has been
replaced by another single representation, r(o1). 
The second view is simpler, since it does not involve
postulating representations as parts of an encompassing
representation. According to it, at t there was one represen-
tation that had a complex content. The content was complex
because it had multiple contents, o1 and o2, as its parts. If it
were a conscious representation, what would make it one
representation is that to be conscious of any of its objects by
means of it is to be conscious of other of its objects, too.
Here, the part-whole relation obtains among objects, but
there is no parallel multiplicity of representational states. On
this approach, unlike the first, the representing state does
not have ‘smaller’ or less complex representing states as
parts.  4
On this picture, globality obtains within a representation
but not among representations. It does obtain among objects.
Returning to the joint consciousness condition, where to be
conscious of one thing is to be conscious of others, on our
picture joint consciousness of objects can be present or ab-
sent but it is trivially present in a global representation,
 If the representing state is a brain state, then it will have parts,4.
but these parts will not be representing states.
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simply because a global representation is a single represent-
ing state, r(o1 & o2). For conscious representing states of
of this form, to be conscious of o1 by means of this state is
also, by that very same act, to be conscious of o2. One rep-
resentational state-token provides consciousness of both o1
and o2.
Consider an act of reference as an analogy. Suppose I
refer to Toronto. Scarborough is part of that city; it is a part
of the thing to which I referred. It does not follow that my
act of referring to Toronto contains a numerically distinct
reference to Scarborough. It was of course possible for me
to refer simply to Scarborough, and thus to refer to part of
the thing to which I actually referred, but it does not follow
that I actually did so. The mere fact that Scarborough is
part of the thing to which I referred does not entail that a
reference to that borough figures as part of my act of refer-
ring. Similarly, the mere fact that o1 is part of (o1 & o2)
does not entail that a distinct representation of o1 must
figure as part of my act of representing (o1 & o2). 
It may be objected that in advancing these observations
and contrary to our intentions, we actually provide the
resources for showing that a subject’s global representation
will contain parts that are themselves representations. Did-
n’t we ourselves just say that representations are individu-
ated by their objects? This suggests that for each object that
we can individuate, including objects that are parts of a
global object, there will be a corresponding representation
individuated by that object. 
This objection does not work. If we have relied on a
claim that each representation is individuated by an object,
we have not said how objects individuate a representation.
What if only some objects individuate a representation? Let
us introduce the idea of a global object. 
Global object – a group of represented objects that is
the single complex object of a global representation
If we now say that only a global object individuates at least
a conscious representation, we are clear of the objection. 
To capture these claims about singularity of representa-
tion, let us generalize (3),
3. While their contents are taken up in a global repre-
sentation, the three acts of representing [viz., seeing
something, hearing something, and tasting something]
do not survive even as parts of this state, though their
objects remain distinct. They become three modalities
of a single representation. 
into (3'),
3'. A global representation at a given moment is a
single representation not made up of multiple distinct
representations and it has a complex object.5
Now that we have said what we mean by (3) and (3'),
what about (1) and (2)? Though most philosophers hold to
(1) or (2), they do so uncritically and seldom offer any
support for the views. We do not know of any good argu-
ment for either one of them. To see where those adopting (1)
or (2) might go wrong, recall the representation, r(o1 & o2). 
Suppose that this representation occurs at t. Supporters
of (1) and/or (2) may confuse the untokened (at t) represen-
tational type that would take part of r(o1 & o2)’s object (viz.
o1) as its object, with a representational token, r(o1), held to
be part of r(o1 & o2) and to have one of the latter state’s
objects as its sole object. There is no reason to suppose that
there actually is such a distinct representational state nestled
within r(o1 & o2). There could have been such a token at t,
but the mere fact that we can entertain such a possibility –
that is, the mere fact that we can think of an instantiation at
t of that type – is no reason to conclude that there actually
exists a token of that type at t. 
Conclusion: (3'), the idea that at a given moment a
global representation is not a group of representations but a
single representation with a complex object, is a perfectly
coherent point of view, one well supported by examples and
analogies. Before we leave it, however, there are some objec-
tions that we need to answer. One of them is so obvious that
it has probably occurred to most readers already. 
Single Representation View: Objections
The obvious objection is this. In a global representation, we
are conscious, within a single unified representation, of
several sensory modalities. The phenomenal field is poly-
modal: it involves tactual data, visual data, auditory data,
and so on. 
(1) or (2) would try to account for the contributions of
the different modalities to consciousness by saying that there
are several distinct representations here – visual representa-
tions, auditory representations, and so on – that come to-
gether as parts of an encompassing global representation. On
this view, the cognitive system constructs a variety of repre-
sentations in different modalities. These representations are
not simply superseded by a global state that combines their
informational contributions in one representation. Instead,
they are preserved as distinct representations within it. The
polymodal complexity of the resulting global state is due to
the presence in it of this range of representations.
Against this, we offer the following picture: we do not
have several visual, aural, etc. representations, not conscious
ones anyway. Rather, the information we represent is for-
matted visually, aurally, etc. The cognitive system receives
some information in a visual format (reflecting, perhaps, the
wave length of incoming energy) or tagged as visual, some
formatted or tagged as aural, and so on. When this informa-
tion appears in a global representation, its modality appears
with it. But there is just one representation, the global repre-
sentation. In this one state, diverse bits of information are
formatted in a variety of modalities.
This view has the twin virtues of adequacy and parsi-
mony. The onus rests with proponents of the more compli-
cated view, in which a global representation is held to be an
assemblage of other representations, to show that our ac-
count has failed to account for something. It is difficult to James (1890, vol. 1, pp. 145-61) held something like this view. 5.
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see what that could be. 
Suppose that one is consciously representing things
both visually and aurally. What accounts for something
there being aural? This question must be answered either in
terms of how the representation represents or in terms of
what it represents. There are no other ways to specify the
modality of a representation. But a global representation
can incorporate either of these ways. There can be a diver-
sity in what it represents; it can represent many things
having many properties. And it can represent these con-
tents in a variety of ways, visually, aurally, and so on. 
In support of this contention, note that we are com-
pelled to postulate a plurality of representations only when
there is a particularly strong sort of incompatibility in how
or what a cognitive system represents, that is, only when
the system represents in ways that exclude one another. For
example, theorists tend to attribute distinct representations
(not all of which are held to be conscious) to a system in
such cases as binocular rivalry, or to explain the fact that
consciously seeing the Necker Cube in one way precludes
consciously seeing it in the alternative way. 
These cases and all others that we’ve been able to think
of are not problems for us. To be a counter-example to our
single representation/complex object picture, the elements
would have to be: all conscious, and all available simultan-
eously to one conscious subject. The cases we’ve just con-
sidered do not meet these conditions. 
In the Necker cube case, the conflicting representations
are successive. In binocular rivalry, the representations may
be simultaneous but one is not simultaneously conscious of
them (Baars 1988, pp. 82-3; see p. 126). So even when we
are driven to multiply representations in a subject at a time,
the results are not a problem for our view. 
Notice that cases such as binocular rivalry and the
Necker cube arise within a modality. It is not clear that
there are any strong incompatibilities across modalities.
Certainly there aren’t many. In the absence of strong in-
compatibilities, nothing compels us to posit more than one
representation to make a place for different perceptual
modalities. 
Second objection. Think of a picture of a car in front of
a house. It is plausible to say that this picture includes a
picture of the car and a picture of the house, that the bigger
picture of the car and house together contains little pictures
of the car and of the house. 
Is it so clear, though, that the picture of house and car
together literally contains several distinct pictures, one for
each item depicted? The belief that it does threatens to
introduce an implausible multiplication of pictures. If one
can discern ten thousand blades of grass in front of the
house, then there would have to be ten thousand pictures in
the larger picture. Clearly, at some level of decomposition,
we stop positing a distinct picture for each part of the con-
tent that we are able to distinguish. Why not stop at the
whole picture and say that it is the only picture, with no
smaller pictures in it? 
Third objection: If conscious representation consists of
one big, non-compositional representation, how are acts of
judging particular bits of content, forming beliefs about
things based on particular bits of content, possible? Re-
sponse: In the same way as information in the complex
global object of a global representation can come ‘marked’
with various modalities (aural, visual, etc.), particular bits of
the information in a complex global object can enter into
particular information-processing activities: judging, re-
membering, and so on. These activities do not need to merge
into a single representation and they can pick and choose
information to work on ad libitum.
Even after responding to these objections, the support
we have offered for (3') is not decisive. It is strong, however,
certainly strong enough to justify acceptance of the view. 
Our theory that a single global representation is the
representational base of consciousness has real potential. As
we have seen, it provides a unified account of three major
kinds of consciousness, consciousness of world, one’s own
representations, and oneself as subject. Though we can’t
show this here, it also opens the way to a nice account of: the
unity of consciousness; the special features of consciousness
of self; and the subject of consciousness (Brook and Ray-
mont, forthcoming). 
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Abstract 
 
When decision makers perceive all issues related to a decision 
as being consistent with their choice, they achieve coherence. 
Participants rated their agreement with different views of 
various issues related to a couple’s relationship. Those who 
later decided whether the couple would get engaged or break 
up subsequently reinterpreted the issues to be consistent with 
their decision. Increasing the importance of the decision, 
highlighting coherent perspectives, or giving participants a 
prior preference did not strengthen the coherence shift, but 
coherence shifts did not occur without the chance to decide, 
suggesting that they occur in an all or nothing fashion. 
Individuals with higher need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982) achieved a greater degree of coherence among facts 
associated with the relationship but not among more general 
beliefs about relationships.  
 
Introduction  
Early social psychologists attempted to develop a general 
model of cognitive functioning based on consistency 
maintenance (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1946; Osgood & 
Tannenbaum, 1955; Newcomb, 1953). Those theories 
shared the assumption that cognition involves the 
interaction among elements, and that those elements tend to 
settle into stable states characterized by some type of good 
form, in which similar elements are interconnected and 
segregated from dissimilar elements. However, early 
consistency theories narrowly focused on small sets of two 
(Festinger, 1957) or three (Heider, 1946) elements at a time, 
and so were unable to represent the larger, more complex 
situations that people often encounter in their daily lives.  
More recently, computer based models of multiple 
constraint satisfaction systems have begun to provide a 
mechanism for simulating maintenance of consistency 
throughout large, complex systems (Holyoak & Simon, 
1999; Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997; Simon, Snow, & 
Read, in press). In these models, units represent cognitive 
elements and links between units represent relations 
between elements, with excitatory links representing 
consistent relations and inhibitory links representing 
inconsistent relations. Dynamic processing is simulated by 
allowing units connected by excitatory links to increase 
each other’s activation and units connected by inhibitory 
links to decrease each other’s activation until the system 
settles in to a stable state of coherence, a kind of good form 
in which a subset of mutually consistent elements are highly 
activated.  
Drawing on constraint satisfaction systems, researchers 
have begun to show that cognition involves imposing 
consistency on related concepts. Simon and colleagues 
(Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 
2001; Simon, Snow, & Read, in press) developed a 
paradigm showing how, when people think about the issues 
related to a legal case and then render a verdict, their 
perceptions of the issues shift to become consistent with 
their eventual verdict, thereby achieving a coherent 
understanding of the whole case.  
The finding that perceptions of issues shift to become 
consistent with an emerging decision violates two important 
assumptions of algebraic models of information integration, 
such as Bayes theorem and Anderson’s (1962) Information 
Integration Theory. Those models assume that (1) the value 
of one element is not affected by the values of other 
elements and that (2) the value of an element is not changed 
when it is integrated with other elements to arrive at a 
conclusion. Nevertheless, Simon and colleagues found that 
during decision making, evaluations of issues related to a 
legal case shift to become consistent with the emerging 
decision and with each other. 
The present research adapts Simon and colleagues’ 
paradigm to test for coherence outside the legal context. In 
the first phase (pretest) participants read vignettes 
describing different couples and ambiguous events in their 
relationships, and then rated their agreement with statements 
giving different interpretations of the events. Some of the 
statements were factual items that involved interpreting the 
meaning of an event and others were belief items that 
involved interpreting the general implications of an event. 
For example, one vignette described how Eric and Daniella 
spent a day with Daniella’s aunt Rachel, enabling her to 
observe the couple’s interactions and subsequently report 
that she thought their relationship was going well. A factual 
item related to that vignette asks participants to rate the 
extent to which they think Aunt Rachel’s optimistic 
impression was correct and a belief item asks them to rate 
the extent to which they think that, in general, it is possible 
to get a good sense of a couple’s relationship by observing 
them for a day.  
In the second phase participants read a longer story about 
a couple, Jenny and Mark, that combined all of the issues 
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raised separately in the pretest. For example, one part of the 
story involved Jenny and Mark spending a day with Jenny’s 
aunt Rose, so that the aunt formed an impression that the 
relationship was going well. In the third phase (posttest) 
participants decided whether Jenny and Mark would get 
engaged or break up and then rated their agreement with the 
different interpretations of the issues, now that they were all 
embedded in the context of a single story. For example, on 
the posttest a factual item asked participants to rate the 
extent to which they thought Aunt Rose’s optimistic 
impression of Jenny and Mark’s relationship was correct 
and a belief item asked them to rate the extent to which they 
think it is possible to get a good sense of a couple’s 
relationship by observing them for a day.  
We predicted a coherence shift, so that from pretest to 
posttest interpretations of ambiguous issues would shift to 
become consistent with the decision. Thus, we expected 
participants who decided that Jenny and Mark would get 
engaged to be increasingly likely to interpret issues in a 
manner suggesting that they would stay together, and we 
expected participants who decided that they would break up 
to be increasingly likely to interpret issues in a manner 
suggesting that they would not stay together. 
Simon, Snow, & Read (in press) tested several variations 
on their paradigm in a legal context, but could not affect the 
strength of the coherence shift, so in the present research we 
introduced four manipulations designed to moderate the 
strength of the coherence shift. First, we tried to increase the 
strength of the coherence shift by increasing the perceived 
importance of the decision. In a decision (control) condition, 
participants simply read about Jenny and Mark’s 
relationship and indicated whether they thought the couple 
would get engaged or break up. To increase the perceived 
importance of the decision, we asked participants in a gift 
condition to decide not simply whether they thought the 
couple would get engaged or break up, but whether they 
would spend a substantial amount of money to buy an 
engagement present. We predicted that the added 
importance associated with the decision would induce 
participants to think about the choice more extensively, 
leading to stronger coherence shifts than in the control 
condition.  
The second way we tried to increase the strength of the 
coherence shift was by outlining the two coherent 
perspectives on the story. As in the control condition, 
participants were asked to decide whether they thought the 
couple would get engaged or break up, but in an outline 
condition they were also asked to imagine that they had 
talked to two friends who gave their perspectives on the 
couple’s relationship. The friends’ perspectives were 
presented in two lists, with one interpreting each of the 
ambiguous issues as suggesting that the couple would get 
engaged and the other interpreting each issue as suggesting 
that they would break up. We predicted that outlining the 
two coherent perspectives would help participants reach 
their own coherent perspective more quickly and proceed to 
achieve more extensive coherence shifts than participants in 
the control condition.  
The third way we tried to increase the coherence shift was 
by giving participants a prior preference for one of the 
alternatives. Russo, Medvec, and Meloy (1996) gave 
participants an extraneous reason to prefer one of a pair of 
alternatives (called an “endowment”) and then presented 
information on the alternatives one attribute at a time, 
asking participants to rate the extent to which it favored one 
alternative or the other, until they were ready to choose one. 
Russo, Medvec, and Meloy found that participants 
“distorted” the attribute information so that it favored the 
endowed alternative, thereby further increasing their 
preference for it until they chose it. We thought that if 
decision makers distort information to favor a prior 
preference within the pre-decision phase, their attitudes 
might also start shifting to become consistent with a prior 
preference within the pre-decision phase, producing a 
stronger coherence shift by the time they reach the post-
decision phase. Therefore, we introduced two new 
conditions in which participants were given a prior 
preference for one alternative. As in the control condition, 
participants were asked to decide whether they thought the 
couple would get engaged or break up, but in an 
endowment-engage condition they were also asked to 
imagine that they knew Jenny and Mark and thought they 
should stay together, while in an endowment-breakup 
condition they were asked to assume that they thought 
Jenny and Mark should break up. We predicted that, 
compared to participants in the control condition, 
participants in the endowment-engage condition would be 
more likely to decide that the couple would in fact get 
engaged, participants in the endowment-breakup condition 
would be more likely to decide that the couple would break 
up, and that participants in both endowment conditions 
would report stronger coherence shifts.  
A fourth manipulation was designed to decrease the 
strength of the coherence shift. We thought that, just as the 
degree of importance of a decision may affect the amount of 
processing, the degree of involvement in a decision task 
may also affect the amount of processing and the strength of 
the coherence shift. Therefore, we predicted that decreasing 
participants’ involvement in the decision task would 
decrease the strength of the coherence shift. In a pair of 
assigned decision conditions participants were asked to 
think about whether to buy an engagement present (as in the 
gift condition), but they were not allowed to make their own 
choices; instead, participants in an assigned-buy condition 
were asked to assume that they had decided to buy the 
necklace and participants in an assigned-not-buy condition 
were asked to assume that they had decided not to buy the 
necklace. We predicted that depriving participants of the 
ability to reach their own decisions would decrease their 
involvement and amount of processing, leading to weaker 
coherence shifts in the assigned decision conditions than in 
the gift condition.  
We also tested whether two personality dimensions 
moderate the strength of the coherence shift. First, need for 
cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) involves 
individual differences in the “tendency to engage in and 
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enjoy thinking” (p. 116). We thought that participants with 
greater NFC would think about the experimental materials 
more extensively, leading them to report stronger coherence 
shifts than participants with lower NFC. Second, personal 
need for structure (PNS; Neuberg & Newsom. 1993) may 
involve individual differences in desire for simple structure. 
We thought that participants with greater NFS would be 
more likely to impose a coherent good form on the 
information given to them, thereby achieving greater 
coherence than participants with lower NFS.  
 
Methods  
P articipants and Design 
This experiment ran on the Internet. Participants were 
recruited by e-mailing notices to people who asked to be 
notified of new experiments and giving each participant an 
entry in a lottery for a cash prize. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the decision (n = 134 usable data 
sets), gift (108), outline (118), assigned-buy (105), 
assigned-not-buy (132), endowment-engaged (110), and 
endowment-breakup (98) conditions.  
 
M aterials and Procedure 
The pre-test had 12 vignettes, including seven that involved 
romantic relationships and five that involved legal cases 
(distracters). The seven relationship vignettes concerned (1) 
a woman (Michelle) who had broken off several previous 
relationships and may appear to have “a problem with 
commitment,” (2) a woman (Joanne) who declined to talk to 
her boyfriend about the future of their relationship, (3) a 
woman (Aunt Rachel) who spent a day with her niece and 
her niece’s boyfriend and thought that their relationship was 
going well, (4) a woman (Lisa) who was two hours late for a 
date with her current boyfriend because she was consoling a 
previous boyfriend who was upset about his mother’s 
illness, (5) a woman (Suzy) who was too busy at work to 
join her boyfriend and his parents for dinner, (6) a woman 
(Candice) who joined a gym after her boyfriend disparaged 
people who don’t exercise, and (7) a woman (Rona) who 
brought her boyfriend to a family party.  
After each vignette, there were 1 to 4 statements 
interpreting the facts in the vignette or expressing related 
beliefs. Some of the statements expressed attitudes 
consistent with the view that the couple in the vignette 
would stay together (e.g. Aunt Rachel’s favorable view of 
the relationship was correct) and other statements expressed 
attitudes consistent with the view that they would break up 
(e.g. Aunt Rachel’s favorable view of the relationship was 
influenced by the fact that on that day Daniella displayed 
particular affection towards Eric). Participants rated the 
extent to which they agreed with each statement on an 11-
point scale ranging from -5 (strongly disagree) to 0 (neutral) 
to 5 (strongly agree).  
The next page presented a set of analogy word games 
(distracter task) and the following page introduced the 
experimental manipulations. In the decision condition, 
participants were asked to imagine that “Mark and Jenny 
live in your town and are pretty close friends of yours. They 
have been involved in a relationship for over a year….” 
Participants were also informed that “after reading some 
information about the relationship, you will be asked to 
decide whether you think Jenny and Mark will get engaged 
or break up, and then to make some evaluations about the 
relationship….” Participants then read the story of Jenny 
and Mark, which combined the seven issues that had been 
raised in separate vignettes in the pretest. For example, the 
story described one incident when Jenny was too busy at 
work to join Mark and his parents for dinner and another 
incident when she brought him to a family party. After 
reading the story participants indicated whether they thought 
Jenny and Mark would get engaged or break up (by clicking 
on one of two radio buttons) and rated their confidence that 
they had made the best possible decision (5-point scale). 
The posttest appeared next; participants were asked to give 
their “impressions of the issues in Jenny and Mark’s 
relationship” and then there was a list of statements 
interpreting the facts in the story or expressing related 
beliefs. Some of the statements expressed attitudes 
consistent with the view that Jenny and Mark would stay 
together (e.g. Aunt Rose’s favorable view of the relationship 
was correct) and other statements expressed attitudes 
consistent with the view that they would break up (e.g. Aunt 
Rose’s favorable view of the relationship was influenced by 
the fact that on that day Jenny displayed particular affection 
towards Mark). Participants rated the extent to which they 
agreed with each statement on an 11-point scale. The order 
of items in the posttest was counterbalanced between 
participants. The posttest was followed by self-report 
measures of NFC (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and NFS 
(Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), and demographic questions. 
The outline condition was the same as the decision 
condition, except that after reading the story participants 
were asked to imagine that, “you have talked to two other 
mutual friends and found that they have very different views 
on Jenny and Mark’s relationship.” The instructions 
continued, “Caitlin doesn’t think Jenny and Mark will get 
engaged. When you talked to Caitlin, she explained why she 
thinks Jenny and Mark are headed for a breakup” and then 
there was a bullet-list of statements interpreting the seven 
issues in a manner suggesting that the couple would break 
up. The instructions then continued, “Unlike Caitlin, Brian 
thinks Jenny and Mark will get engaged. When you talked 
to Brian, he explained why he thinks they will get engaged,” 
and then there was a list of statements interpreting the seven 
issues as suggesting that the couple would stay together. 
After reading the lists, participants made their decisions, 
confidence ratings, posttest ratings, and personality ratings.  
The endowment conditions were the same as the decision 
condition, except that before reading the story participants 
were told that “we’re going to ask you to get more 
‘involved’ with the story, by imagining that you know the 
people and playing a small role yourself.” Participants in the 
endowment-engage condition were told that “although they 
have had some problems (as most couples do), you think 
they are good for each other and you hope they work things 
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out,” while participants in the endowment-breakup 
condition were told that “although they have been fairy 
happy together until now, you think that they may be 
growing apart and it wouldn’t be a good idea for them to 
rush into a commitment.” After reading the story 
participants in the endowment-engaged condition were 
reminded, “you don’t know whether Jenny and Mark will 
get engaged or break up, but you think they are good for 
each other and you’d like to see their relationship work out” 
while participants in the endowment-breakup condition 
were reminded, “you don’t know whether Jenny and Mark 
will get engaged or break up, but you think that they are 
growing apart and shouldn’t rush into a commitment.” 
Participants in both conditions then went on to make their 
decisions, confidence ratings, posttest ratings, and 
personality ratings.  
In the gift condition, participants were told that Jenny 
loved Zapotec jewelry, which was available in Cancun, 
where the participant was vacationing, so the decision was 
framed in terms of whether to buy a $150 Zapotec necklace 
as an engagement present for Jenny; since “the necklace 
cannot be returned and you cannot think of anything else to 
do with it,” the participant should only buy the necklace if 
an engagement seemed likely. After reading the story, 
participants were reminded of their dilemma – whether the 
probability of an engagement was high enough to justify 
buying an expensive necklace as an engagement present for 
Jenny – and then they indicated whether they would buy the 
necklace. After that, participants made their confidence 
ratings, posttest ratings, and personality ratings.  
The assigned decision conditions were the same as the 
gift condition, except that before reading the story, 
participants were asked to “get more ‘involved’ with the 
story, by imagining that you know the people and playing a 
small role yourself” and were instructed, “while you’re 
reading, think about your character’s dilemma – whether to 
buy the necklace for Jenny. At the end of the story we’ll tell 
you what your character decided.” After reading the story, 
participants were reminded of their character’s dilemma and 
those in the assigned-buy condition were asked to imagine 
that “you finally decided to go ahead and buy the 
necklace…. your sense was that they probably will get 
engaged, so it was worth it to buy Jenny an engagement gift 
you know she’ll love” while those in the assigned-not-buy 
condition were asked to imagine that “you finally decided 
against buying the necklace… your sense was that they 
probably won’t get engaged, so it wasn’t worth it to spend 
so much money on a necklace you have no use for.” 
Participants in both conditions then completed the posttest 
and personality measures.  
 
Results and Discussion  
Collapsing across all conditions (excluding the assigned 
decision conditions), participants were evenly split between 
deciding that Jenny and Mark would get engaged (49.5%) or 
that they would break up (49.8%), suggesting that the story 
was highly ambiguous. Average confidence ratings were 
fairly high among participants who decided that the couple 
would get engaged (3.52) and those who decided they 
would break up (3.77). High confidence in a decision about 
an ambiguous situation is consistent with constraint 
satisfaction models, in which activation spreads until the 
system reaches a stable state of coherence.  
In the control condition participants were evenly split 
between the alternatives (50.7% chose the engaged 
alternative). In the outline condition there was a tendency to 
favor engaged (61.0%) but the change from the control 
condition was not significant. Participants in the gift 
condition were significantly less likely to choose engaged 
(36.1%) than participants in the control condition, X2 (1, 
239) = 4.90, p < .03, suggesting that people become more 
cautious when a decision has financial implications. 
Participants who were given an endowment favoring 
engagement were more likely to choose engaged (65.4%) 
than participants who were given an endowment favoring 
breakup (40.8%), X2 (1, 207) = 4.72, p < .04, suggesting that 
the endowment manipulation was effective, though the 
probability of choosing engaged was not significantly 
different in the endowment conditions than in the control 
condition. Scores on the NFC, p = .55, and PNS, p = .98, 
were not significantly correlated with decisions.  
We first tested for an overall coherence shift by running a 
2(pretest, posttest, within Ss) by 2(engagement, breakup 
items, within Ss) by 2(engage, breakup decision, between 
Ss) ANOVA, collapsing across the experimental conditions. 
We found a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 799) = 
84.51, p < .001, suggesting that after participants decided 
whether they thought Jenny and Mark would get engaged or 
break up, their attitudes shifted to be more consistent with 
their decision. As shown in Figure 1, among participants 
who decided that the couple would get engaged, agreement 
with statements suggesting that the couple would get 
engaged increased from pretest to posttest, t(385) = 3.94, p 
< .001, and agreement with statements suggesting they 
would break up decreased, t(385) = 4.46, p < .001. In 
contrast, among participants who decided that the couple 
would break up, agreement with engagement statements 
decreased, t(414) = 6.47, p < .001, and agreement with 
breakup statements increased, t(414) = 5.86, p < .001.  
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Figure 1: Agreement with Engage and Breakup items at 
Pretest and Posttest among participants who decided Engage 
(left) and participants who decided Breakup (right).  
 
This pattern of results suggests that as participants 
thought about the story and made their decisions, their 
attitudes about the issues shifted to become more consistent 
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The unexpected difference in the patterns of results for 
facts and beliefs reveals that when people consider the facts 
of a specific couple’s relationship they are initially 
optimistic about their future together, and those who go on 
to decide that the couple will get engaged become 
increasingly optimistic, but those who decide that the couple 
will break up become less optimistic. However, when it 
comes to abstract beliefs about relationships in general, 
people are initially pessimistic, and if they decide that a 
specific couple is likely to break up their beliefs become 
even more pessimistic, but if they decide that they are likely 
to get engaged their pessimism decreases. These data 
suggest that people are initially pessimistic about 
relationships in general but initially assume an optimistic 
outlook on specific cases. The data also suggest that 
regardless of initial attitude, when people reach a decision 
about a specific case their attitudes toward facts related to 
the case as well as their general beliefs about relationships 
shift in a coherent manner.   
with their emerging decision and with each other. This 
would not have been predicted by algebraic information 
integration models (e.g. Anderson, 1962; Bayes’ theorem), 
which assume that the value of an element is not affected by 
the values of other elements and does not change when it is 
integrated with other elements.  
We then ran the analysis separately for items relating to 
facts and items relating to beliefs. For facts the three-way 
interaction was significant, F(1, 799) = 73.75, p < .001, and 
the pattern was similar to the overall analysis (Figure 2). 
Agreement with engagement items was initially higher than 
agreement with breakup items among participants who 
chose engage, t(385) = 15.80, p < .001, and among 
participants who chose breakup, t(414) = 9.75, p < .001, but 
among participants who chose engage agreement with the 
two types of items spread apart from pretest to posttest, 
while among participants who chose breakup agreement 
with the two types of items converged.  
 
To test whether the experimental manipulations affected 
the strength of the coherence shift, we added a variable 
representing experimental condition, but did not find that it 
moderated the three-way interaction. We found three-way 
interactions of similar magnitude within the control, F(1, 
131) = 47.44, p < .001, gift, F(1, 104) = 23.98, p < .001, and 
outline conditions, F(1, 116) = 18.83, p < .001, suggesting 
that increasing the material importance of a decision or 
outlining the coherent perspectives does not increase the 
strength of the coherence shift. The three-way interaction 
was significant in the endowment-engage, F(1, 108) = 9.29, 
p > .01, and endowment-breakup, F(1, 95) = 14.45, p < .001 
conditions, suggesting that giving participants a prior 
preference within the pre-decision phase did not increase the 
strength of the coherence shift. The finding that introducing 
a prior preference within the pre-decision phase did not 
increase coherence shifts suggests that coherence seeking 
may generally operate within the pre-decision phase, even 
when there is no prior preference. Indeed, Simon and 
colleagues have found coherence shifts among participants 
who had not yet reached decisions (Holyoak & Simon, 
1999; Simon et al., 2001; Simon, Snow, & Read, in press).  
Decision: Engage
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Pretest Posttest
Rating Time
A
gr
ee
m
en
t
Engage Items
Breakup Items
Decision: Breakup
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Pretest Posttest
Rating Time
Ag
re
em
en
t
 
 
Figure 2: Agreement with Engage and Breakup fact items at 
Pretest and Posttest among participants who decided Engage 
(left) and participants who decided Breakup (right). 
 
For beliefs the three-way interaction was significant, F(1, 
797) = 30.97, p < .001, indicating the predicted coherence 
shift, but the pattern was somewhat different than for the 
facts (Figure 3). Agreement with engagement items was 
initially lower than agreement with breakup items among 
participants who chose engage, t(385) = 6.60, p < .001, and 
among participants who chose breakup, t(414) = 6.72, p < 
.001. Among participants who chose engage agreement with 
the two types of items converged, while among participants 
who chose breakup agreement with the two types of items 
spread apart.  
When we analyzed data from the two assigned decision 
conditions the three-way interaction was not significant, p = 
.45. The task in the assigned decision conditions was 
intended to minimize participants’ involvement in the task, 
since they were simply waiting to be told what their 
character had decided. Thus, unlike Simon and colleagues’ 
previous research on coherence shifts, in which participants 
expected to make a decision or had a memorization or 
communication goal (Simon et al., 2001), participants in the 
assigned decision conditions of the present research had no 
active processing goal. Our finding that participants in the 
assigned decision conditions were less likely to show 
coherence shifts, then, suggests that under minimal 
conditions, where participants think about a complex 
situation without any active processing goal, they may not 
achieve coherence.  
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Figure 3: Agreement with Engage and Breakup belief items 
at Pretest and Posttest among participants who decided 
Engage (left) and participants who decided Breakup (right). 
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Considering the results of the present research with those 
of previous research using the same type of paradigm in a 
legal context (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2001; 
Simon, Snow, & Read, in press) suggests that coherence 
shifts may occur in an all or nothing fashion. When 
participants think about a situation without an active 
processing goal (as in the forced decision conditions of the 
present research) they may not achieve coherence. However, 
if they do have an active processing goal (involving 
memorization, communication, or decision making) they are 
likely to report coherence shifts, and increasing the 
importance of the decision, outlining coherent perspectives, 
giving them a prior preference (as in the present research) or 
manipulating other aspects of the context (as in previous 
research) does not substantially affect the strength of the 
coherence shift. It appears, then, that whenever there is an 
active processing goal coherence shifts occur and that it may 
not be possible to further adjust their strength. 
To test whether personality moderated the strength of the 
coherence shift, we added a variable representing 
personality measure. We found that PNS did not moderate 
the three-way interaction, p < .5, but NFC had a marginal 
effect overall, F(1, 794) = 3.41, p < .07, and a significant 
effect on fact items, F(1, 794) = 4.39, p < .04. Inspecting the 
means revealed that among participants who chose engage, 
those with higher NFC scores rated engagement facts higher 
at posttest than at pretest, t(188) = 2.19, p < .04, but those 
with lower NFC did not, p < .3. This finding suggests that 
people who have a greater “tendency to engage in and enjoy 
thinking” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116) may achieve a 
greater degree of coherence, though increased thought may 
only affect coherence among the facts of the issue currently 
being considered and may not affect more general beliefs.  
 
Summary and Conclusions  
We extended Simon et al.’s (2001; Simon, Snow, & Read, 
in press) paradigm to test for coherence shifts in perceptions 
of a romantic relationship. When participants thought about 
a couple’s future and decided whether they would get 
engaged or break up, their attitudes about facts in the 
relationship and their general beliefs about relationships 
shifted to become coherent with their decision. When 
participants were not able to make their own decisions 
coherence shifts did not occur, suggesting that an active 
processing goal may be necessary to activate coherence 
mechanisms. Increasing the importance of the decision, 
increasing the ease of perceiving coherent perspectives, and 
introducing a prior preference within the pre-decision phase 
did not increase the strength of coherence shifts, suggesting 
that once there is an active processing goal and coherence 
mechanisms are activated it may not be possible to alter 
their intensity. Together with previous research in legal 
contexts (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon et al.; Simon, 
Snow, & Read, in press), these findings suggest that 
coherence seeking mechanisms operate within the pre-
decision phase in an all or nothing fashion, being activated 
any time there is an active processing goal. Finally, we 
found that individuals with higher need for cognition, who 
chronically engage in more cognitive processing, reported 
stronger coherence shifts in attitudes about facts of the 
current case, suggesting that individuals with higher NFC 
may achieve a greater degree of coherence across a broad 
range of situations in their daily lives.  
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Abstract 
Spatial prepositions work as pointers to localize objects in 
space. For instance “The book is over the table” indicates that 
the located object (LO) is somewhere “over” the reference 
object (RO). To understand where the LO is people need to 
assign direction to space (selecting a reference frame). Three 
experiments are reported which investigated the reference 
frame conflict between LO and RO. We found that when the 
LO was not vertically aligned, the appropriateness for a given 
spatial preposition (above, below, over and under) changes. In 
general scenes with the LO pointing at the RO were judged 
less acceptable than scenes with the LO vertically oriented. 
These results suggest that reference frames for both LO and 
RO are accessed before direction can be assigned for spatial 
prepositions. Modifications to Multiple Frame Activation 
theory (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1994) are discussed.  
Introduction 
Spatial language forms an essential part of the lexicon for a 
competent speaker of a language. In English, spatial 
prepositions work as pointers to localize objects in space. 
For instance “The book is over the table” indicates that the 
located object (“the book”) is somewhere “over” the 
reference object (“the table”). Prepositions like “over” and 
“behind” (the so-called projective prepositions) are 
particularly interesting as they require the selection of a 
reference frame before the assignment of a direction to 
space specified by the preposition can be established. 
Levinson (1996) distinguishes between the intrinsic (object-
centred), relative (or viewer-centred/deictic), or absolute 
(environment-centred/extrinsic) reference frames. For 
example, “the car is behind the house” used intrinsically 
locates the car in relation to the opposite wall from where 
the salient front of the house is (which is where the back 
door is).  The relative use of the same expression locates the 
car directly behind the opposite wall to where the speaker 
and hearer are standing. The absolute frame locates an 
object with respect to a salient feature of the environment, 
such as the gravitational plane or cardinal directions (e.g., 
North, South, etc.). 
Carlson-Radvansky and Logan (1997) have argued that  
spatial apprehension occurs in a series of stages as follows; 
(1) identify the reference object (e.g., the house), (2) 
superimpose multiple reference frames (relative and 
intrinsic), (3) construct spatial templates and align them to 
the relevant reference frames, (4) select a reference frame, 
(5) combine templates into a composite template, (6) search 
the composite template that fits best with the located object 
for each position within the template, (7) calculate whether 
the goodness of fit measure for the located object is high 
(good or acceptable region) or low (bad region). In this 
paper we focus on the process underlying the orientation of 
space and the consequent reference frames selection. 
Experimental evidence has demonstrated that by rotating 
the reference object by 90º (noncanonical orientation), 
acceptability ratings for above mirror the new spatial 
template that is the sum of all the reference frames active in 
that moment (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1994). The 
acceptability for the given spatial preposition varies as a 
function of the reference frame activated. Consider the 
scenes in Figure 1. In the canonical orientation the absolute, 
relative and intrinsic reference frames overlap. In the 
noncanonical orientation the absolute reference frame is 
dissociated from the intrinsic. This produces a lower 
acceptability for the given spatial preposition because a 
conflict emerges between all the reference frames activated 
in that moment (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1994; 
Carlson, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Canonical absolute/intrinsic “above” (left picture), 
noncanonical absolute “above” (middle picture) and 
noncanonical intrinsic “above” (right picture). 
 
Although there is evidence that reference frame activation is 
important, to date studies have only focused on the 
reference frame generated from the reference object 
(Carlson & Logan, 2001; Carlson, 1999; Carlson-
Radvansky & Logan, 1997). Furthermore, theories of spatial 
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language largely assume that the assignment of direction is 
generated from the reference object to the located object. 
For example, in the Attentional Vector-Sum model (Regier 
& Carlson, 2001) the direction indicated by a spatial relation 
is defined as a sum over a population of vectors that are 
weighted by attention. An attentional beam is focused on the 
reference object (at the point that is vertically aligned with 
the closest part of the located object) and separated in a 
population of vectors pointing toward the located object. 
But other experiments suggest that both objects (even 
distractors or those not relevant for the task) require 
allocation of attention to be processed (Lavie, 1995; Lavie 
& Cox, 1997). This suggests that both objects could play a 
role in the spatial apprehension process. 
There is much evidence indicating that the LO is 
important in establishing the acceptability of a range of 
spatial prepositions (see Coventry & Garrod, 2004 for a 
review). For example, Coventry, Prat-Sala and Richards 
(2001) found that the appropriateness of a spatial 
preposition is correlated with the functional relation 
between located and reference object. For example, an 
umbrella is regarded as being more over a person if it is 
shown to protect that person from rain than when the rain is 
shown to hit the person. Furthermore, Coventry et al. found 
that the acceptability ratings for over and under were more 
influenced by the function of the object than by the relative 
positions of LO and RO, while conversely above and below 
were more influenced by geometry than function. 
Additionally, in a study which manipulated reference frame 
conflicts with function present (e.g., the man holding the 
umbrella in the gravitational plane was either upright, lying 
down, or upside down), Coventry et al. found that reference 
frame conflicts influenced the acceptability of above and 
below more than over and under.  
 
 
    (1)        a         (2) a  
       b   b  
 
 
Figure 2: Reference frame conflicts between LO and RO. 
However, although there is much evidence that the located 
object does influence the acceptability of a range of 
prepositions, no studies to date have examined whether the 
located object contributes to reference frame assignment, 
and hence the assignment of direction to space. This paper 
reports three experiments employing an acceptability rating 
task where possible reference frame conflicts for both the 
located object and reference object are manipulated. For 
example, consider the scene in Figure 2, and the 
acceptability of man [a] is above man [b]. In (1), the 
reference frame of man in location [a] is aligned with the 
reference frame of man [b] (the reference object), but not in 
(2) where their intrinsic reference frames are in conflict. We 
predicted that rotating the LO in this way would influence 
the appropriateness of over, under, above and below 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment we tested the hypothesis that the 
reference frame(s) associated with the located object would 
affect acceptability of over, under, above and below to 
describe the position of the LO in relation to a RO. 
Method 
Participants & Procedure 
Twenty-three undergraduate students from the University of 
Plymouth participated in this investigation for course credit. 
All the participants were English native speakers. 
Participants had to judge the appropriateness of a spatial 
preposition (above, below, over or under) to describe 
pictures using a scale from 1 to 9 (where 1 = not at all 
acceptable and 9 = perfectly acceptable). All trials showed 
the located object in a “good” or “acceptable” location, 
never in a “bad” location (following Carlson-Radvansky 
and Logan’s definitions, 1997). 
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Figure 3: Location for the located object with respect to 
the reference object (indicated here with a “plus”). 
 
The located object could appear in 10 different locations 
around the reference object (see Figure 3). The sentences 
were shown before the scene and in this form; <The 
“located object” is PREPOSITION the “reference object”>. 
The prepositions tested were above, below, under or over.  
Two orientations for the located object were used: “vertical” 
and “pointing at”. In the “pointing at” condition the axis of 
the located object was pointing exactly towards the center-
of-mass of the reference object. 
 
Materials 
The materials consisted of three stimuli; a circle, an 
hourglass and a stickman. These objects were selected as the 
circle does not have an oriented axis, while the hourglass 
has a salient axis but not an intrinsic top and bottom, and the 
stickman has a salient axis and an intrinsic top and bottom.  
We will use the following labels to classify the objects; “no 
axis” (circle), “ambiguous axis” (hourglass) and “intrinsic 
axis” (stickman). All the objects employed were presented 
at the same size and distance from the reference object 
regardless of the orientation. This is because it has been 
found that proximity, center-of-mass orientation and 
distance affect the appropriateness of spatial preposition 
(Regier & Carlson, 2001).The objects could appear as 
reference objects or as located objects, but the same object 
was never shown as LO and RO at the same time. 
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Design 
The experiment consisted of 480 trials constructed from the 
following variables: 4 spatial prepositions X 10 locations X 
3 objects X 2 orientations (“vertical” and “pointing at”). The 
locations were collapsed in two factors; high vs. low 
location (2 levels) and proximity (3 levels) as follows; far 
misaligned (locations 1, 6 and 5, 10) versus near misaligned 
(locations 2 and 4) versus aligned (central location). All the 
trials were presented in a randomized order. 
 
Results 
A 4-way within subjects ANOVA was performed on the 
rating data. The variables included in the analysis were; 2 
located objects (hourglass versus stickman) x 2 preposition 
set (above-below vs. over-under) x 2 superior versus inferior 
prepositions (above-over vs. below- under) x 2 orientations 
of LO (vertical and pointing at). The division between 
spatial prepositions has been employed following the 
Coventry et al. findings summarized above (Coventry, Prat-
Sala and Richards, 2001). 
 
 Above-Over
 
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
6.0
vertical pointing
 Below-Under
vertical pointing
Hourglass
Stickman
 
Figure 4: 3-way interaction between superior versus inferior 
prepositions (above/below vs. over/under), located object 
and orientation of LO (collapsed over locations). 
 
Trials with the circle as the located object were excluded 
from the analysis since this kind of object does not have an 
axis. Furthermore we analyzed only the trials with a circle 
as the reference object because it has no axis. A main effect 
of preposition set (above-below vs. over-under) was found, 
[F(1, 22) = 7.21, p < .05]. Higher ratings were given for 
Above-Below (M = 6.526) than for Over-Under (M = 
5.192). This is unsurprising as it known that these spatial 
prepositions have larger areas of acceptability. No other 
significant main effects were found. There was a significant 
3-way interaction between superior versus inferior spatial 
prepositions, located object and orientation of LO [F(1, 22)  = 
6.694, p < .05 ], displayed in Figure 4. It is interesting to 
note that objects with a top/bottom orientation such as a 
stickman are rated less acceptable when pointing (M = 5.42) 
than when vertical (M = 5.65) for trials with above-over, 
although this was not the case for below-under (Mvertical = 
5.58; Mpointing = 5.72). None of the other interactions were 
significant.  
Discussion 
An interesting difference was found between trials with the 
stickman and trials with the hourglass as LOs. The stickman 
trials generate a reference frame conflict in the pointing 
condition but the hourglass did not. This could be explained 
by a preferential assignation of a top/bottom orientation 
based on the vertical plane. In other words an hourglass 
could not be seen as upside down but always as pointing 
away from the reference object.  
Acceptability rating showed that for inferior spatial 
prepositions (below-under) the pointing condition was more 
acceptable than the vertical one. All these results can be 
explained by the activation of an intrinsic reference frame 
on the located object that in the case of under-below 
produces facilitation and with above-below produces 
conflict. Therefore the results seem to suggest that the 
orientation of the located object is important in establishing 
the appropriateness of projective prepositions. However, 
this experiment only used two located objects (an hourglass 
and a stickman), so there is an issue regarding the extent to 
which the results can be generalized. For this reason the aim 
of the next experiment is to try to replicate the effect of the 
orientation of the LO using a wider range of LOs and 
orientations of LO.  
Experiment 2 
The second experiment utilized the same design and 
procedure as the first experiment, except that more materials 
and orientations of LO were included.  
Method 
Participants & Procedure  
Twenty-nine undergraduate students from the University of 
Plymouth participated in this investigation for course credit. 
All the participants were English native speakers and none 
of them took part in the previous experiment. The procedure 
was the same procedure used for the previous experiment 
based on the acceptability rating task of the given spatial 
prepositions; above, below, over and under. 
 
Materials 
This experiment involved a wider number of located objects 
and two more orientations; “pointing away” from the 
reference object and “upside down”. The reference object in 
this experiment was always a picture of a football. The 
located objects were picked from two sets; the first 
consisted of objects with a distinctive top-bottom (8 new 
objects “with an intrinsic axis”) and the second one of 
objects with “an ambiguous axis” (7 new objects plus the 
hourglass). All the stimuli were hand-drawn and 
transformed to electronic format by a computer scanner.  
 
Design 
There were 384 trials constructed from the following 
variables: 8 located objects X 3 locations (collapsed over 
side) X 4 spatial preposition X 4 orientations (“vertical”, 
“upside down”, “pointing at” and “pointing away”). All the 
trials were presented in a randomized order. We added 192 
distractors where the LOs were objects without salient axes, 
meaning that a total of 576 trials were presented.  
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Results 
A full factorial ANOVA was chosen to analyze the data. In 
this analysis we focus on trials where the LO had an 
intrinsic axis (following the results of Experiment 1). A 
significant main effect was found for preposition type 
(above-below vs. over-under), [F(1,28) = 15.44, p < .001], for 
superior versus inferior prepositions, [F(1,28) = 10.72, p < 
.005], for location [F(1,28) = 80.17 p <.0001] and for 
direction [F(1,84) = 3.35, p < .05].  Objects vertically oriented 
(M = 5.75) were judged more acceptable than the other 
levels of orientation. In particular the “upside down” (M = 
5.6) and “pointing at” (M = 5.55) orientations produced the 
lowest ratings (and indeed generated the highest reference 
frame conflict).  The analysis also revealed significant 2-
way interactions between preposition set and location [F(1,28) 
= 10.96, p < .005], between preposition set and direction 
[F(1,84) = 3.23. p < .05] and between superior versus inferior 
prepositions and direction [F(1,84) = 2.82, p < .05].  
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Figure 5. 3-way interaction between orientation of LO, 
superior-inferior prepositions and preposition set.  
 
Finally, there was also a significant 3-way interaction 
between superior-inferior prepositions, preposition set and 
location, [F(1,28) = 5.45, p < .05], and between preposition 
set, superior-inferior preposition and direction [F(1,84) = 3.99, 
p < .01]. This interaction is displayed in Figure 5. As can be 
seen in Figure 5, the results of the orientation of LO are 
clearest for above, which exhibited a reliable difference 
between the vertical orientation of LO and all the other 
levels of LO. For over, pointing away from the RO is also 
associated with higher acceptability ratings. The results are 
less clear for inferior prepositions.   
Discussion 
The pattern of results in this second experiment confirms 
the hypothesis that the orientation of the located object 
influences acceptability ratings, although there are clear 
differences between prepositions. However, in the first two 
experiments the reference objects were objects without a 
salient axis. It is therefore possible that the activation of the 
located object reference frame could depend on the features 
of the reference object. The next experiment tested whether 
the effects of the orientation of LO were present across a 
wider range of ROs.  
Experiment 3 
This experiment used the same basic methodology as 
before, but this time with a range of reference objects 
including ROs without a salient axis, with an ambiguous 
axis, and with an intrinsic axis.   
Method 
Participants& procedure 
Twenty-three undergraduate students from the University of 
Plymouth participated in this investigation for course credit. 
All the participants were English native speakers and they 
did not take part in any of the previous experiments. The 
procedure was the same as that used in Experiments 1 and 2.  
 
Materials 
For this experiment we used a set of 24 objects (8 “without 
a salient axis”, 8 “with an ambiguous axis” and 8 “with an 
intrinsic axis”). The objects “with an ambiguous axis” and 
“with an intrinsic axis” were the same as those used in 
Experiment 2. We drew 8 new objects “without a salient 
axis”. Thus we were able to study the effect of the reference 
frame activation on the located object in scenes with 
different kinds of reference object. 
 
Design 
The experiment was composed of 576 trials with the 
following factors: 8 located objects with an intrinsic axis 
(treated as random factor), X 3 reference objects (picked up 
from a set of 24 objects, 8 with no axis, 8 with an 
ambiguous axis, and 8 with an intrinsic axis; within subjects 
factor), X 2 prepositions set (between subjects factor), X 2 
superior-inferior preposition (within subjects), X 3 locations 
for the probe (within subjects) and 4 directions for the 
located object (within subjects). This time preposition set 
was between subjects; half the participants received above 
and below and the other half received over and under.  
 
Results 
We performed two analyses; one by subjects (F1) and one 
by materials (F2). The results were similar for both analyses, 
so here we report the F1 analyses alone. The means for all 
the conditions can be found in Table 1. Significant main 
effects were found for superior-inferior prepositions [F(1,22) 
= 18.74, p < .001], for location [F(1,22) = 69.14, p < .0001] 
and for orientation of LO [F(1,44) = 5.25, p < .005]. 
Furthermore we found several significant 2-way 
interactions; between preposition set and RO [F(1,44) = 3.61, 
p < .05], between location and RO [F(1,44) = 4.45, p < .05], 
between superior-inferior prepositions and orientation of LO 
[F(1,66) = 4.93, p < .005] and between location and 
orientation of LO [F(1,66) = 3.12, p < .05].  
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Reference Object Located Object 
(intrinsic) No axis Ambig. Intrin. 
vertical 6.281 6.307 6.375 
inverted 5.560 5.542 5.490 
point at 5.524 5.670 5.644 
Above 
point away 6.047 6.026 5.974 
vertical 5.797 6.036 6.167 
inverted 5.411 5.604 5.453 
point at 5.786 5.823 5.754 
Below 
point away 5.387 5.536 5.578 
vertical 5.419 5.084 5.479 
inverted 5.047 4.823 5.220 
point at 5.182 5.115 5.188 
Over 
point away 5.785 5.366 5.335 
vertical 5.131 5.058 5.162 
inverted 4.691 4.901 4.889 
point at 5.335 5.073 5.156 
Under 
point away 4.698 4.693 4.901 
 
Table 1. Means for conditions across the four spatial 
prepositions (above, below, over and under). 
 
A 3-way interaction was also significant between superior-
inferior prepositions, location and orientation of LO [F(1,66) 
= 3.93, p < .05] and a 4-way interaction between superior-
inferior prepositions, location, RO and orientation of LO 
[F(1,132) = 2.74, p < .05]. Follow-up analysis revealed 
significant differences in orientation between prepositions 
and locations, but the effects of orientation were present at 
all levels of RO.  
Discussion 
The outcome from this experiment supports the idea that the 
orientation of the located object affects acceptability ratings 
even when the reference object has an intrinsic orientation. 
The results for this experiment mirror the results of the 
previous experiment, but extend the results to show that the 
activation of reference frame for the LO is not restricted to 
cases where the RO does not provide sufficient information 
to cue a reference frame.   
General Discussion 
The series of experiments explored the hypothesis that the 
spatial apprehension process computes a composite template 
for a given spatial preposition making use of the located 
object reference frame as well as the reference object 
reference frame. The results of the experiments confirmed 
this hypothesis showing that the orientation of the located 
object affects acceptability ratings for projective 
prepositions. 
The results suggest necessary extensions to the idea of 
Multiple Frame Activation (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 
1994) where it is suggested that in comprehending a scene 
multiple frames are available. However, we found that an 
additional reference frame is generated from the located 
object as well as from the reference object and the final 
template generated is influenced by its orientation.   
In addition to the reliable effects of the orientation of LO 
for intrinsic objects, the results of Experiment 1 showed 
some interesting differences between intrinsic objects and 
objects such as an hourglass with a salient axis, but without 
an intrinsic axis. For the objects like an hourglass,  the 
“pointing at” condition was considered more acceptable 
than the vertical condition. A possible explanation is that 
people assign a subjective top/bottom orientation to 
“ambiguous” objects. Thus the hourglass in trials with 
above-over should be seen as pointing away from the 
reference object instead of pointing at the RO.  
The last experiment provided evidence that the conflict 
among reference frames emerges across a range of reference 
objects, including those that are more “real” with a 
top/bottom orientation. So the effect of the located object is 
not exclusive for circle-like reference objects but it is part of 
a more general process.  
But why should we activate the located object reference 
frame when the reference frame of the RO should be 
sufficient to localize the objects in the scene? An 
explanation is that objects not vertically oriented suggest 
that there is something implausible in the scene. A cat 
upside down is not a “plausible” stereotypical mental 
representation. Thus the knowledge revision function 
(Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard, 1986, Wason, 1960) 
should look for an explanation; this activates the located 
object reference frame to process every possible orientation 
that fits with the whole scene. Another possible explanation 
is based on the concept of direction of potential motion 
(Regier, 1996). People perceive objects rotated away from 
the gravitational plane as falling. So a located object 
oriented at 90º may be perceived as moving downwards on 
a path to the left of/right of and away from the reference 
object.  
 
Implication for existing models 
The results found suggest a review of the key characteristics 
of the spatial apprehension process Carlson-Radvansky & 
Irwin, 1994; Carlson & Logan, 2001; Hayward & Tarr, 
1995; Logan & Sadler, 1996). We found evidence of an 
involvement of the located object reference frame in the 
process of assigning direction to space. Therefore evaluating 
the process of goodness of fit of the spatial preposition 
involves the located object as well and future studies should 
take this into account. The finding that the located object 
interacts with the spatial apprehension process has some 
repercussions for models of spatial language as well. 
Models such as the Attentional-Vector-Sum model (Regier 
& Carlson, 2001) simulate attentional processes, but thus far 
does not deal with attentional processing of the LO (but see 
Regier, Carlson & Corrigan, 2004, for a modification of 
AVS to deal with processing of function). It may be 
possible to develop the AVS model to deal with the 
projection of vectors from the LO to the RO as well as the 
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other way round (see Coventry and Garrod, 2004, for a 
discussion).   
 
Limitations and future developments  
This investigation brings experimental evidence in support 
of the hypothesis that the located object, in a scene with two 
objects, takes part in the spatial apprehension process. 
Future investigations should attempt to ascertain the degree 
to which features of the LO influence the spatial 
apprehension process further. For example, in some 
contexts the LO may be more important than the RO, and 
vice versa for other contexts. In addition, the present 
experiments do not tell us anything about the time course of 
processing of LO reference frames. Studies underway are 
testing the conflict among reference frames using a reaction 
time paradigm. Finally, we should consider how these 
findings can be implemented within frameworks such as the 
AVS model.   
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Abstract 
Multiple Session Masked Priming was used to investigate 
differences between individuals in the fine-tuning of their 
lexical representations.  The form-priming effects were 
determined separately for each of the 50 participants, from 
the patterning of masked priming effects over three 
neighbourhood (N) levels.  At each N level, primes varied 
in their orthographic similarity to the target - Identity, One-
Letter-Different and All-Letters-Different.  An analysis of 
the pooled data showed patterns of masked priming 
consistent with other group studies, but considered 
separately, an array of individual differences in the tuning 
of lexical representations was observed. 
 
Inconsistent findings and conflicting evidence characterise 
much of the word recognition literature, and have lead to a 
plethora of theories on many aspects of word recognition.  
One explanation for the conflicting evidence regarding 
theories of word recognition, is the possibility that it reflects 
individual differences.  The problem here lies in the fact that 
support for one model or another has generally been drawn 
from standard group studies, where outcomes are averaged 
over the sample of participants.  Averaged outcomes may 
show what is generally true for that sample, but fail to 
capture the critical variations between individuals. 
In order to study individual differences a task must be 
found that will provide reliable data concerning the 
processing capacities of each participant.  There are two 
issues here.  First, the task used must reflect the automatic 
processes of lexical access, and second, the task must 
generate sufficient data on each participant to enable stable 
conclusions to be drawn about their individual performance; 
that is, we need to be able to generate reliable individual 
profiles of lexical processing. 
Although there is some debate (e.g. Bodner & Masson, 
1997; Bodner & Masson, 2001), Forster and Davis’ (1984) 
Masked Priming paradigm is widely considered to be an 
ideal tool for examining automatic lexical processing.  In 
masked priming, a prime word/nonword is presented very 
briefly (50-60ms), forward masked (for 500ms) by a row of 
hash marks (######) and backward masked by an upper 
case target (500ms), to which a timed lexical decision 
response is made.  The relationship between prime and 
target is manipulated in some way and if performance on the 
target is enhanced by a particular prime-target relationship, 
relative to a control condition, this relationship is taken to 
reflect the properties of written words important for lexical 
access.  Masked priming has been argued to enable the 
investigation of lexical access processes free from any 
influence of more central and strategic processes (e.g. 
Forster, 1998).  This is achieved in the way the prime is 
presented, making it typically unavailable for conscious 
report by participants.  Critically, while the masked prime is 
not available for conscious report, a variety of priming 
effects are consistently observed.  Such facilitatory priming 
effects include repetition-priming (e.g. Forster & Davis, 
1984) where prime and target are the same word (e.g. farm – 
FARM) and form-priming (e.g. Forster, Davis, Schocknect 
& Carter, 1987; Forster & Veres, 1998) where the prime is 
of similar orthographic form (e.g. firm – FARM).  The 
absence of both expectancy effects (e.g. Forster, 1998) and 
priming for nonwords (e.g. Forster & Davis, 1984; Forster 
et al., 1987; cf. Bodner & Masson, 1997), in addition to the 
existence of semantic- (e.g. Perea & Gotor, 1997) and cross-
language translation-priming (e.g. Kim & Davis, 2003) 
indicate that masked priming effects reflect lexical level 
processing. 
While the masked priming task provides a means of 
examining the automatic processes of lexical access, a new 
variant of this task was required to enable the collection of 
sufficient data from each participant that they could stand as 
an experiment in their own right.  The Multiple Session 
Masked Priming paradigm (e.g. Byrne, Yelland, Johnston & 
Pratt, 2000; Yelland & Byrne, 2001) achieves this by 
repeatedly testing each participant on the same experiment.  
Since participants are unaware of the primes, the prime-
target relationship cannot be realised, even over repeated 
test sessions.  Thus, in the Multiple Session Masked 
Priming paradigm, the participant’s experience is simply 
one of repeated exposure to the target items. 
Used previously to reveal marked individual variation in 
the use of orthographic and phonological input codes for 
lexical access (e.g. Byrne, Yelland, Johnston & Pratt, 2000; 
Yelland & Byrne, 2001), the Multiple Session Masked 
Priming paradigm has proved useful for investigating 
individual differences in lexical processing.  This study 
aims to look at the use of this new technique in other areas 
of the word recognition literature, namely orthographic 
neighbourhood effects. 
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The neighbourhood effect was first investigated by 
Coltheart, Davelaar, Jonasson and Besner (1977), who 
coined the term neighbourhood (N) density.  A word’s N 
density is simply the number of words that can be made 
from it by changing one letter.  For instance, a high N word 
like torn has many neighbours – corn, born, turn, town, tore 
etc.  In this way, N provides a rough index of a word’s 
similarity to other words.  The effects of such orthographic 
similarity have been used by researchers to model 
constraints on, and organisation of, the internal word-
recognition system.  Previous experiments looking at the 
effects of N density have shown form-priming effects when 
using word or nonword primes that are one-letter-different 
from their word targets, however, such effects are present 
for low N density words only, not high N (e.g. Forster et al., 
1987).  The form-priming effects seen at the low N density 
are reported consistently, albeit are smaller in magnitude 
than those observed in repetition-priming (e.g. Andrews, 
1997).  The lack of form-priming effects in high N words is 
usually described as an increased tuning of these lexical 
representations.  Forster et al. (1987) first proposed a now 
commonly used explanation for this change in tuning, 
whereby a word’s lexical representation becomes more 
finely tuned in response to increasing N density.  A word 
with many neighbours needs to ensure only exact matches 
can activate its representation, otherwise a large number of 
these neighbours will need to be considered and errors in 
activation are more likely.  In contrast, a word with only 
few neighbours can afford to be less stringent (i.e. it can be 
activated by a one-letter-different neighbour) as there are 
only a small number of possible lexical candidates.  A range 
of word recognition theories and models have been provided 
for these results.  Such accounts, however, will only prove 
useful if either, all readers show the same pattern of priming 
effects as a function of N density, or they are able to account 
for individual variation in sensitivity to N levels .  The 
question addressed in this study is whether there are 
individual differences in the priming effects for similar 
form, indicating differences in the fine-tuning of lexical 
representations. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-one undergraduates, graduates and staff from 
Monash University, Australia, volunteered to complete the 
experiment. All were aged between 18 and 33 years with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were paid a token 
amount for their participation. 
Seventeen participants chose not to complete all 12 
sessions, and were therefore excluded from the analyses.  In 
addition, a further four participants were excluded (three on 
the basis of overall error rates exceeding 20%, and one who 
was found to be a non-native speaker of English).  In all, 50 
participants contribute to the final analyses. 
Materials and Design 
One hundred and eight 4-letter words were used as targets.  
All were monosyllabic content words with a mean 
frequency of occurrence of 85.2 (SD=162.9) tokens per 
million in text (Kucera & Francis, 1967).  The target words 
were selected from three (n=36) N levels (i.e. Low, Medium 
and High), with written frequency matched across these 
conditions.  In addition, targets were chosen to ensure they 
did not belong in another target’s neighbourhood.  For each 
target word, primes of three types were constructed: (a) an 
All-Letters-Different (ALD) prime, a nonword which 
differed at each letter position from the target, to be used as 
a baseline control; (b) an Identity (ID) prime, which was the 
exact same word as the target, to measure the maximum 
priming effect; and (c) a One-Letter-Different (1-LD) prime, 
a nonword which differed from the target in one letter 
position, to examine any form-priming effects.  The letter 
position at which the 1-LD prime differed from the target 
was varied evenly within the three N levels.  Primes were 
matched to targets on N and consonant-vowel patterns 
within neighbourhood conditions. 
An equivalent set of nonword items was constructed to 
act as foils in the lexical decision task.  All matching 
procedures undertaken for the selection of word targets and 
primes was repeated for the nonword items, with the 
exception of written frequency matching.  Some 
characteristics of the target items are shown in Table 1, 
while example items are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the Masked Priming Target Items 
 
 N  Frequency 
 Range Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
Words     
Low N   1 -  3 2.1 (0.8)  84.3 (153.7) 
Med N   6 -  7 6.5 (0.5)  85.3 (173.0) 
High N 12 -15 13.9 (1.1)  85.9 (165.9) 
Nonwords     
Low N   1 -  3 2.3 (0.8)  N/A 
Med N   6 -  7 6.5 (0.5)  N/A 
High N 10 -15 11.9 (1.5)  N/A 
Note.  N = Neighbourhood size 
 
Table 2: Example Targets and Primes 
 
 Target ID 
Prime 
1-LD 
Prime 
ALD 
Prime 
Words     
Low N FREE Free frue merp 
Med N HELP Help hulp vand 
High N WIDE Wide kide barp 
Nonwords     
Low N NORL Norl norf vube 
Med N PALD Pald peld bist 
High N BAFE Bafe bape fook 
Note.  N = Neighbourhood size; ID = Identity; 1-LD = One-Letter-
Different; ALD = All-Letters-Different 
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All targets were presented as UPPER CASE letter 
strings, while primes were presented in lower case.  This 
reduced the possibility that any observed priming effects 
could be the result of priming by virtue of visual features 
rather than orthographic form.  Three different, 
counterbalanced versions of the experiment were 
constructed so that all targets appeared with each of their 
primes, but only once in each version.  Practice items (one 
exemplar of each word and nonword condition) were 
constructed and placed at the beginning of each version. 
Procedure 
For each of the 12 masked priming sessions, participants 
were seated in a sound attenuated booth where items were 
displayed on a 15" flat screen, fast decay monitor, 
controlled by an IBM compatible computer operating 
DMDX presentation software (developed at Monash 
University and at the University of Arizona by K.I. Forster 
and J.C. Forster).  Participants began the experiment by 
pressing a foot pedal, which initiated the presentation of the 
instructions in the centre of the screen.  The practice items 
were then shown, followed by the experimental items.  
Progress through the experiment was self-paced with a press 
of the foot pedal initiating each item.  Participants took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete each session. 
Each item was presented in the centre of the screen in 
the following sequence.  First, the forward mask, a row of 
six hash marks (e.g. ######) was presented for 500ms.  
This was replaced by the 54ms presentation of the lower 
case prime, which was in turn replaced by the upper case 
target for 500ms.  Participants made a timed lexical decision 
response to each target, pressing a blue button with their 
preferred hand if the target was a word of English and a red 
button with their other hand if it was not.  Participants 
received response time (RT) and accuracy feedback after 
each response.  RT was measured from the onset of the 
target display to the button-press response.  Both response 
latencies and errors were recorded for each item by the 
computer. 
Participants were asked to complete 12 masked priming 
sessions to ensure that each prime-target pair were tested 
enough to gain sufficient data for every item.  Therefore, the 
three counterbalanced versions were completed four times 
each. The participants completed the sessions on a roughly 
daily basis, according to their availability. 
Results and Discussion 
In order to determine whether the group study approach was 
masking quite disparate patterns of individual difference 
amongst participants, analysis of the patterning of the group 
data was needed to provide a baseline against which the 
individual differences could be examined. 
Group Analyses 
The data entered into the group analyses were the condition 
means for both session and item based data for each of the 
50 participants.  Analyses of the data from word targets 
comprised three planned comparison ANOVAs at each of 
the three N levels, conducted over both participant (F1) and 
item (F2) based data.  The first compared the ID and ALD 
prime conditions, to confirm the existence of a repetition-
priming effect.  The subsequent analyses looked for 
orthographic form-priming (1-LD vs ALD) and whether 
form-priming was equal in magnitude to the repetition-
priming effect  (ID vs 1-LD)1. In the interests of brevity, 
only the significance level of F1 and F2 will be reported.  
The group mean RTs and error data obtained from 
participant-based data for word targets are shown in Table 
3. 
 
Table 3: Group mean response time (RT), percentage error 
rate (+/- SE) and priming effects (∆), as a function of prime 
type and neighbourhood (N) level for word targets. 
 
N level Prime   RT (ms) ∆    % Error    ∆ 
Low ID 418 (7.1) 56 3.0 (0.02) 6.8 
 1-LD 448 (8.1) 26 7.4 (0.52) 2.4 
 ALD 474 (7.3) - 9.8 (0.40) - 
Medium ID 419 (7.5) 52 3.9 (0.35) 5.6 
 1-LD 449 (8.3) 22 7.7 (0.46) 1.8 
 ALD 471 (7.8) - 9.5 (0.55) - 
High ID 432 (7.4) 41 6.2 (0.66) 5.7 
 1-LD 469 (8.9) 4 12.6 (1.02) -0.7 
 ALD 473 (7.6) - 11.9 (1.00) - 
Note. ID = Identity; 1-LD = One-Letter-Different; ALD = All-
Letters-Different 
 
As can be seen in the summary of RT data (Table 3), 
participants responded more rapidly to word targets 
preceded by their ID prime than their ALD prime, yielding 
significant repetition-priming effects at each of the N levels 
[F1 & F2, p < 0.01].  Repetition effects were found in the 
error data also [F1 & F2, p < 0.01].  These results indicate 
that the ID primes facilitate faster and more accurate lexical 
access for their targets at each N level. 
A comparison between the mean RT for the 1-LD and 
ALD prime conditions showed significant orthographic 
form-priming effects at the Low and Medium N levels [F1 & 
F2, p < 0.01], while at the High N level this comparison was 
not significant [F1 & F2, p > 0.05].  This pattern was 
mirrored in the error data, with a significant decrease in 
errors for 1-LD primes over ALD primes for Low and 
Medium N targets [F1 & F2, p < 0.01], but not for High N 
targets [F1 & F2, p > 0.05]. 
As expected for masked priming studies with group data, 
the orthographic form-priming effects, seen in the Medium 
and Low N conditions, were significantly reduced in 
magnitude relative to those seen with repetition-priming, for 
both RT [F1 & F2, p < 0.01] and accuracy [F1 & F2, p < 
0.01] (i.e. ID vs 1-LD).  For the High N targets, this 
                                                          
1 While not orthogonal, these comparisons are meaningful, an 
attribute Keppel (1991) believes is more important than a set of 
purely orthogonal comparisons without such meaning. 
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comparison was also significant [F1 & F2, p < 0.01], 
however, this was in the absence of a 1-LD prime 
advantage. 
Overall, the group analyses for the word targets provide 
results which are comparable with other masked priming 
studies in this area.  It would seem from these results that, 
on average, only words with High N density become finely 
tuned, while words without such neighbourhoods (i.e. Low 
and Medium) are open to activation by close relatives. 
In order to complete the traditional group analyses, an 
investigation of nonword effects was undertaken.  An 
omnibus analysis of the group nonword data revealed 
significant main effects of N Level [F1 & F2, p < 0.01] and 
Prime Type [F1 & F2, p < 0.01] but no interaction between 
them [F1 & F2, p > 0.05].  Subanalyses were then conducted 
to examine the within factor effects, separately for N level 
and Prime Type.  The group mean RTs and error data, 
obtained from participant-based analyses of the nonwords, 
are shown in Table 4 for the three N levels (collapsed over 
prime type) and the three prime types (collapsed over N 
level). 
 
Table 4: Group mean response time (RT) and percentage 
error rate (+/- SE) by prime type and neighbourhood (N) 
level for nonword targets. 
 
 RT (ms) % Error 
N Level   
 Low 471 (  8.4) 4.2 (0.42) 
 Medium 493 (10.1) 9.5 (0.52) 
 High 500 (11.7) 9.7 (0.78) 
Prime Type   
 ID 483 (10.9) 7.9 (0.95) 
 1-LD 486 (10.4) 7.5 (0.93) 
 ALD 495 (10.7) 8.0 (1.00) 
Note. ID = Identity; 1-LD = One-Letter-Different; ALD = All-
Letters-Different 
 
As seen in Table 4, the Low N nonword targets were 
responded to significantly faster and more accurately than 
both the High N [RT: F1 & F2, p < 0.01; % Error: F1 & F2, p 
< 0.01] and Medium N targets [RT: F1 & F2, p < 0.01; % 
Error: F1 & F2, p < 0.01].  This difference was also evident 
between the Low and Medium N targets [RT F1 & F2, p < 
0.01; % Error: F1 & F2, p < 0.01].  However, no such 
differences were found between the Medium and High N 
targets [RT: F1, p < 0.05, F2, p > 0.05; % Error: F1 & F2, p > 
0.05].  These results show that only the Low N words had 
an RT and accuracy advantage, an expected effect in 
nonwords, as a nonword with more neighbours has a larger 
number of words to eliminate before concluding that the 
target is in fact not a word. 
Somewhat surprising were nonword priming effects in 
the group RT data.  From Table 4 it can be seen that the ID 
primed target has a small, but secure, 12ms facilitation 
relative to the ALD baseline [F1 & F2, p < 0.01].  A similar 
sized (9ms) significant facilitation effect was afforded the 1-
LD over ALD primes [F1 & F2, p < 0.01].  Indeed, the 3ms 
advantage ID primes have over 1-LD primes proved to be 
significant [F1 & F2, p < 0.01].  Nonword effects of these 
magnitudes are not uncommon in group studies; however, 
they rarely prove significant (Forster, 1998).  They do so 
here due to the power afforded the group analyses with 
7,200 data points per condition.  Although the absence of 
nonword effects is usually taken to indicate that masked 
priming effects for words are showing lexical level 
processes, the nonword priming effects found here do not 
contradict this conclusion.  As only a lexical representation 
can be tuned by its N density, the modulation of priming 
effects by N density shown for words, but not nonwords, 
would indicate that the word priming effects are lexical in 
nature.  In additon, the large reduction in magnitude of the 
nonword priming, compared to the word priming, would 
also indicate different mechanisms were involved in 
priming for these targets.  Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the priming effects seen for word targets can 
still be considered lexical in nature, but may contain a small 
pre-lexical, graphemic priming component. 
The critical issue, however, is whether these patterns of 
outcomes for the group data are an accurate characterisation 
of the lexical processes of all skilled readers, or the average 
of individual differences in the nature of lexical tuning 
across skilled readers. 
Individual Analyses 
The Multiple Session Masked Priming procedure yields 
sufficient data for each participant to be considered an 
experiment in their own right.  That is, each of the 50 
participants were the equivalent of an experiment, where 
test sessions replace participants.  This gives a fully 
repeated measures design that provides 2,592 points of data 
for every individual (12 sessions over 18 conditions of 12 
items each).  Critically, this provides sufficient data for any 
one person, that the analyses of the type performed on the 
group data can be carried out for each participant separately.  
From this, reliable statements can be made for each 
participant about changes in orthographic form-priming as a 
function of N level. 
Words 
Each participant’s data were analysed in the same way as 
the group data.  A true appreciation of the subtleties of 
individual differences found within the data would require 
consideration of the priming outcomes at each N level, 
separately for each of the 50 participants.  Unfortunately, 
space does not permit this.  Instead, participants were 
classified according to their pattern of significant priming 
effects, as a function of N level.  Priming effects fell into 
four categories.  Three represent different patterns of 
priming effects between the ID, 1-LD and ALD conditions 
that are statistically distinguishable, (a) ALD>1-LD=ID, 
significant orthographic form-priming of the same 
magnitude as the repetition-priming effect; (b) ALD>1-
LD>ID, orthographic form-priming which was significantly 
177
greater than the baseline, but significantly less than the 
repetition-priming effect; and (c) ALD=1-LD>ID, no 
orthographic form-priming, in the presence of secure 
repetition-priming. These patterns of secure priming effects 
are illustrated in Figure 1.  The fourth category contained 
cases where the pattern of priming effects was not secure.  
Each was of the form of (a), (b) or (c) but variability in the 
participants was such that the pattern of effects could not be 
statistically distinguished. This fourth group will not be 
reported on any further here. 
 
ID 
ALD>1-LD=ID ALD>1-LD>ID ALD=1-LD>ID  
Low 
RT 
 
 
 
 
High 
RT 
   
 
Figure 1:  Depiction of the three secure priming patterns 
found within the data.  Dashed lines indicate significant 
differences in response time (RT) between prime conditions. 
 
Table 5 reports the number of participants displaying 
each particular priming pattern as a function of N level.  The 
obvious feature of this data is that at Low and Medium N, 
participants are showing distinctly different patterns of 
performance; that is, the individual data differs from the 
grouped data. 
 
Table 5: Number of participants as a function of priming 
pattern and neighbourhood (N) level. 
 
Priming Pattern Low N Med N High N 
ALD>1-LD=ID 3 4 0 
ALD>1-LD>ID 28 21 1 
ALD=1-LD>ID 14 22 39 
Note. ID = Identity; 1-LD = One-Letter-Different; ALD = All-
Letters-different 
 
At Low N, a small number of participants displayed a 
pattern of priming that would indicate their lexical entries 
for these words were poorly tuned (i.e. ALD>1-LD=ID).  
For these participants, the priming effects of the 1-LD and 
ID primes were of the same magnitude, indicating that these 
words were able to be accessed equally as well by a 
neighbour as the word itself.  The majority of participants 
showed the priming pattern commonly found in group 
studies at similar N densities (i.e. ALD>1-LD>ID) (e.g. 
Andrews, 1997). These participants have slightly better 
lexical tuning than the former group, with lexical entries 
showing sharper but not perfect tuning for the target word.   
In contrast, 14 of the participants at this N level showed a 
finely tuned processor, which would only activate entries 
for an exact word match.  Here the pattern shows no form-
priming, even though repetition-priming was still present 
(i.e. ALD=1-LD>ID). 
For Medium N level words there was a small shift 
towards increased specificity of lexical tuning, with an 
increase in the number of participants showing the highest 
level of tuning (i.e. ALD=1-LD>ID).  More importantly 
though, there were still considerable differences between 
participants in the specificity of their lexical processes.  This 
changed for High N words, with almost all the participants 
displaying finely tuned lexical entries for these targets (i.e. 
ALD=1-LD>ID). 
Overall, the results shown in Table 5 indicate a general 
shift towards more finely tuned lexical processing with 
increasing N densities; a result which ties in with previous 
research (e.g. Forster, 1987).  More importantly, however, 
these results demonstrate the variability between subjects in 
their tuning level, especially at the Low and Medium N 
densities; illustrated by the variation in priming patterns at 
these levels. 
ID ID 1-LD 
In addition to demonstrating an overall shift to fine 
tuning as N increases, the data obtained in this study 
allowed for investigation into the nature of this shift within 
each participant, by looking at their individual patterns of 
effects across N levels.  Although space does not permit a 
full account of this data, three groups accounted for the 
majority of participants.  The largest of these (n=16) 
followed the priming pattern shown in the overall group 
analyses.  That is, these participants showed finely tuned 
entries for High N level targets (i.e. ALD=1-LD>ID) but 
slightly less tuned entries for Medium and Low N words 
(i.e. ALD>1-LD>ID).  The second largest group (n=10) 
showed fine tuning (i.e. ALD=1-LD>ID) which was 
unaffected by changes in N level, while the third (n=6) 
differed from this only by having less tuning for entries at 
Low N densities (i.e. ALD>1-LD>ID).  The remaining 
participants showed variations upon these themes. 
Nonwords 
Each participant’s nonword data was analysed in the same 
manner as the group data, beginning with a single omnibus 
analysis. As with the group analyses; none of the 50 
participants showed an interaction between the N Level and 
Prime Type factors, which was expected given that N 
density only tunes lexical representations.  Forty-six 
participants showed a main effect of N Level and 30 showed 
a main effect of Prime Type.  Again these effects were 
investigated with separate subsequent analyses. 
Forty of the participants’ N level effects followed the 
same pattern as seen in the group analyses, that is, RTs to 
Low N targets were significantly faster than those of the 
Medium or High N targets.  However, there seemed to be at 
least some variation being masked by the group study 
approach.  One participant’s Low and Medium N nonword 
targets showed a response time advantage over High N 
targets, while two further participants showed RT 
differences between each N level (i.e. RTs increasing with 
N level). In addition, two participants had non-secure N 
level effects.  Each of these variations of N level effects 
could be explained by the fact that with increasing N 
density, lexical processes have more competing entries to 
ALD 1-LDALD 
1-LD 
ALD 
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eliminate before concluding a nonword. Perhaps the 
individual pattern variation could be accounted for by 
variations in sensitivity to these competitors. 
Half of the participants with Prime Type effects showed 
a similar pattern to that seen with the group analyses; that is, 
an equivalent RT advantage for both the 1-LD and ID 
conditions.  Three participants showed an RT advantage for 
the ID condition only, while a further 12 had non-secure 
effects.  For these 30 participants, differences between the 
repetition-priming effects for nonwords overall and words at 
each N level were calculated (Low: M=41, SE=3.3; 
Medium: M=36, SE=3.2; High: M=27, SE=3.4).  Consistent 
with the group analyses, these mean differences indicate 
large reductions in the magnitude of nonword priming 
effects, compared to word priming, for these participants.  It 
would seem that individual differences in performance are 
not restricted to lexical processing, but also extend to the 
level of graphemic priming induced by orthographically 
related prime-target pairs. 
Conclusions 
Although space constraints precluded the reporting and 
interpretation of the full data from this study, one major 
conclusion can be drawn.  Although the group data were 
consistent with previous studies of neighbourhood density, 
the Multiple Session Masked Priming results revealed the 
group approach was masking an array of individual 
differences in lexical tuning.  Indeed, individual variation 
was also evident in the existence of  pre-lexical, graphemic 
processing. 
A simple explanation of the source of such variation 
may be that the internal coding of representations are 
handled differently between the lexical processors of 
individuals.  This may be due to some predisposition and/or 
individualised set of experiences, but at this stage far more 
would need to be known about individual differences in 
other aspects of written word recognition in order to make a 
more specific claim. 
The results of this study suggest that future research 
should consider the Multiple Session Masked Priming 
paradigm and look more carefully at other fundamental 
claims about lexical processing drawing solely on group 
outcomes, in the hope of developing more sensitive models 
of lexical access and written word recognition. 
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Abstract 
This paper introduces a new algorithm for calculating 
semantic similarity within and between texts. We refer to this 
algorithm as NLS, for Non-Latent Similarity.  This algorithm 
makes use of a second-order similarity matrix (SOM) based 
on the cosine of the vectors from a first-order (non-latent) 
matrix. This first-order matrix (FOM) could be generated in 
any number of ways; here we used a method modified from 
Lin (1998). Our question regarded the ability of NLS to 
predict word associations.  We compared NLS to both Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA) and the FOM.  Across two sets of 
norms, we found that LSA, NLS, and FOM were equally 
predictive of associates to modifiers and verbs.  However, the 
NLS and FOM algorithms better predicted associates to nouns 
than did LSA.  
Introduction 
Computationally determining the semantic similarity 
between textual units (words, sentences, chapters, etc.) has 
become essential in a variety of applications, including web 
searches and question answering systems. One specific 
example is AutoTutor, an intelligent tutoring system in 
which the meaning of a student answer is compared with the 
meaning of an expert answer (Graesser, P. Wiemer-
Hastings, K. Wiemer-Hastings, Harter, Person, & the TRG, 
2000). In another application, called Coh-Metrix, semantic 
similarity is used to calculate the cohesion in text by 
determining the extent of overlap between sentences and 
paragraphs (Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse & Cai, in 
press; McNamara, Louwerse, & Graesser, 2002). 
Semantic similarity measures can be classified into 
Boolean systems, vector space models, and probabilistic 
models (Baeza-Yates & Ribeiro-Neto, 1999; Manning & 
Schütze, 2002). This paper focuses on vector space models.  
Our specific goal is to compare Latent Semantic Analysis 
(LSA, Landauer & Dumais, 1997) to an alternative 
algorithm called Non-Latent Similarity (NLS).  This NLS 
algorithm makes use of a second-order similarity matrix 
(SOM).  Essentially, a SOM is created using the cosine of 
the vectors from a first-order (non-latent) matrix. This first-
order matrix (FOM) could be generated in any number of 
ways. However, here we used a method modified from Lin 
(1998). In the following sections, we describe the general 
concept behind vector space models, describe the 
differences between the metrics examined, and present an 
evaluation of these metrics’ ability to predict word 
associates.  
Vector Space Models 
The basic assumption behind vector space models is that 
words that share similar contexts will have similar vector 
representations. Since texts consist of words, similar words 
will form similar texts. Therefore, the meaning of a text is 
represented by the sum of the vectors corresponding to the 
words that form the text. Furthermore, the similarity of two 
texts can be measured by the cosine of the angle between 
two vectors representing the two texts (see Figure 1).   
 
 
Word 
Representation 
Corpus 
Text 
Similarity 
Text 
Representation 
 
Figure 1. From Corpus to Text Similarity. 
 
The four items of Figure 1 can be described as follows.  
First, the corpus is the collection of words comprising the 
target texts. Second, word representation is a matrix G used 
to represent all words.  Each word is represented by a row 
vector g of the matrix G.  Each column of G is considered a 
“feature”.  However, it is not always clear what these 
features are. Third, text representation is the vector v = GTa 
representing a given text, where each entry of a is the 
number of occurrences of the corresponding word in the 
text. Fourth, text similarity is represented by a cosine value 
between two vectors. 
More specifically, Equation 1 can be used to measure the 
similarity between two texts represented by a and b, 
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respectively. For reasons of clarity, we do not include word 
weighting in this formula.  
(1) For each word base, form a feature vector.   
(2) For each pair of word bases, find the similarity of 
two word bases from the corresponding two feature 
vectors.   
bGGbaGGa
bGGabasim
TTTT
TT
=),(                 (1) 
In Lin’s algorithm, the similarity is calculated according to 
Equation 2. 
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∩×=            (2) Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) 
LSA is one type of vector-space model that is used to 
represent world knowledge (Landauer & Dumais, 1997).  
LSA extracts quantitative information about the co-
occurrences of words in documents (paragraphs and 
sentences) and translates this into an N-dimensional space. 
The input of LSA is a large co-occurrence matrix that 
specifies the frequency of each word in a document. Using 
singular value decomposition (SVD), LSA maps each 
document and word into a lower dimensional space. In this 
way, the extremely large co-occurrence matrix is typically 
reduced to about 300 dimensions. Each word then becomes 
a weighted vector on K dimensions. The semantic 
relationship between words can be estimated by taking the 
cosine between two vectors.  This algorithm can be briefly 
described as follows. 
F(w) is the set of features possessed by the word w and I(F) 
is the “information” contained in the feature set F: I(F) = ∑ ∈Ff fu )( .  u is the weight function of the feature f.  
 
First-Order Matrix  LSA is referred to as latent because 
the content is not explicit or extractable after SVD. Thus, 
the features that two similar words share are “latent.” In 
contrast, every feature is explicit and directly extractable 
from the matrix using Lin’s (1998) algorithm.  Hence, it is 
non-latent, and can be used as a first-order similarity matrix 
(FOM).  
We created the FOM using a modification of Lin’s 
algorithm with cosines rather than proportions. First, we 
parsed all of the sentences (about 2 million) in the TASA 
corpus using Lin’s MINIPAR parser (Lin, 1998).  This 
provided about 9 million word-relation-word triplets.  Table 
1 shows the triplets extracted for the sentence People did 
live in Asia, however. 
 
(1) Find the word-document occurrence matrix A from a 
corpus1.   
(2) Apply SVD: .   TVUA Σ=
(3) Take the row vectors of the matrix U as the vector 
representations of words.    
Table 1: An example with word-relation-word triplets. 
 Non-Latent Similarity (NLS) Model 
Word1 Relation Word2 
Live V:s:N people 
Live V:aux:Aux do 
Live V:mod:Prep in 
In Prep:pcomp-n:N Asia 
Live V:mod:A however 
NLS is proposed here as an alternative to latent similarity 
models such as LSA.  NLS relies on a first order, non-latent 
matrix that represents the non-latent associations between 
words.  The similarity between words (and documents) is 
calculated based on a second-order matrix.  The second 
order matrix is created from the cosines between the vectors 
for each word drawn from the FOM.  Hence, for NLS, the 
cosines are calculated based on the non-latent similarities 
between the words, whereas for LSA, the similarities are 
based on the cosines between the latent vector 
representations of the words.  The following section 
describes the components and algorithms used in NLS.  
 
A “feature” consists of a word (e.g., Word1 or Word2) 
and a relation that contains a verb (V), noun (N), or modifier 
(A).  For example, the association between the word live 
and its relation to people, which is “V:s:N”, comprises two 
features (live - V:s:N; people - V:s:N).  About 400,000 such 
features were obtained.  Each feature was assigned a weight, 
using Lin’s formula.  We adopted an occurrence frequency 
threshold, which yielded 10363 nouns (occurrence > 50), 
5687 verbs (occurrence > 5), and 6890 modifiers 
(occurrence > 10).  For each of the selected words, a feature 
vector was formed according to the features it involved.   
Lin’s (1998) Algorithm Our starting point for NLS is Lin’s 
(1998) algorithm for extracting the similarity of words. 
Similarity is based upon the syntactic roles words play in 
the corpus.  A syntactic role is designated here as a feature.  
For example, “the Modifier of the NP man” is a feature.  A 
word has this feature if and only if it is used as the modifier 
of man when man is part of an NP in the corpus.  For 
example, if the corpus contains the phrase the rich man, 
then rich has the (adjectival) feature of modifying man.  
Each feature is assigned a weight to indicate the feature’s 
importance.  This algorithm is briefly described as follows. 
We modified Lin’s method in the last step. Specifically, 
rather than applying Equation 2 to the feature vectors, the 
cosine between any two feature vectors was calculated. This 
provided a FOM containing the similarity between all word 
pairs.  In addition, the FOM guarantees a property called 
“decomposability”, which will be addressed in the next 
section. 
                                                           1 Hu et al. (2003, theorem 2) proved that the LSA similarity 
measure is a special case of (1) 
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Non-Latent Similarity (NLS) Algorithm The logic behind 
the use of a second order matrix to represent textual 
similarity relies on a reformulation of the algorithm used in 
general vector models. Specifically, Equation 1 can be 
rewritten as Equation 3. 
The decomposability therefore raises a new question: Is 
there a straightforward way to guarantee both 
decomposability and validity of the similarity matrix S?  An  
easy way of guaranteeing these criteria is by using a word 
similarity matrix to act as a word representation matrix.   
Suppose S is a word similarity matrix regardless of its 
creation method. Then each column vector in S contains the 
similarities of a particular word to all other words.  
Therefore, each column vector can represent the 
corresponding word.  
SbbSaa
Sbabasim
TT
T
=),(               (3) 
When the columns of G are normalized to be unit vectors, S 
becomes a word-similarity matrix 2.  In other words, each 
entry of S, , is the similarity of two words 
represented by row vectors g
T
jiij ggs =
i and gj, respectively. 
Essentially, a word-similarity matrix (S) is used rather than 
word representation vectors (G). 
 
Table 2. A small section of a first order matrix. 
 
 chair table strength 
desk 0.16 0.17 0 
bed 0.14 0.13 0 
speed 0 0 0.14 
success 0 0 0.11 
From Equation 3 we can see that the similarity of two 
texts is determined by two factors: the word occurrences in 
each text and the similarity between words.  Since we can 
do little to the occurrence vectors (other than applying word 
weighting), the word similarity matrix will determine the 
validity of the measure of text similarity.  In other words, 
Equation 3 provides a good measure if and only if similar 
words have similar vector representations.  If similar words 
have dissimilar vector representations or dissimilar words 
have similar representations, then the measure provided by 
Equation 3 is unreliable.  Therefore, the verification of the 
validity of the word representation, at least in terms of text 
similarity comparison, is equivalent to the verification of the 
validity of the word similarity matrix (or FOM in this case).   
 
Table 2 is a small section of our FOM.  It can be seen that 
the column vectors for chair and table are very similar to 
each other, but quite different from that of “strength”. In the 
complete matrix, desk is the 4th nearest neighbor of (i.e., 
most similar to) chair and the 1st nearest neighbor of table.  
In addition, bed is the 2nd nearest neighbor of chair and the 
5th nearest neighbor of table (see 
http://cohmetrix.memphis.edu/wordsim/wf1.aspx).   
If we believe that similar words should share most nearest 
neighbors (a group of words that are most similar to a given 
word), then similar words should have similar column 
vectors in S.  Therefore, we can create a new word similarity 
matrix by the cosine between the column vectors of S, 
SDSDS TT=~ , where D is a diagonal matrix formed by the 
reciprocal of the norms of the column vectors of S.   We call 
S~  the second-order word similarity matrix (SOM) and S the 
first-order similarity matrix (FOM).  This new matrix S~  is 
obviously decomposable and should maintain the validity of 
the original word similarity matrix.   
While it is not possible to directly judge the quality of a 
vector representation, it is possible to judge the validity of 
word similarity. Provisions for such a judgment will be 
made in the next section of this paper. 
Equation 3 raises an important question: Instead of 
creating the similarity matrix S by the word representation 
matrix G, can we find the similarity matrix by any other 
method that provides a better word similarity measure?  One 
of the conditions under which this question may be 
answered is that the similarity matrix S, no matter how it is 
created, must be decomposable.  That is, there exists a 
matrix G (we do not have to find it) such that S = GGT.  This 
condition is necessary to guarantee that the value calculated 
from Equation 3 ranges from -1 to 1.   
If the SOM is valid, then we can form a measure based on 
the FOM:  
    (4) 
SDbSDbSDaSDa
SDbSDabasim
TTTTTT
TTT
=),(
The FOM that we generated by the modified Lin’s 
method is decomposable and can therefore be used in 
Equation 3 for text comparison.  However, that matrix is 
high-dimensional (N by N, where N is the total number of 
words).  This will cause some computational complexity.  
To reduce the number of dimensions, we kept only the 400 
largest similarity values for each word and set the other 
smaller values to be zero.  Thus, the similarity matrix 
became sparse and the computational complexity was 
reduced.  However, this made the similarity matrix un-
decomposable and invalid for Equation 3. 
Text 
Similarity 
Word Similarity Corpus
 
Figure 2.  From Corpus to Text Similarity (SOM). 
 
Equation 4 provides a new algorithm for text comparison, 
which relies solely on the similarity matrix.  We call this 
algorithm the Non-Latent Similarity (NLS) algorithm, 
assuming that the FOM is non-latent.  Figure 2 shows the 
difference between NLS and the general vector-space 
model.  When compared with Figure 1, we can see that the 
“representations” are replaced by the similarity matrix. 
                                                          
2 The normalization guarantees that the similarity between any two 
words will not exceed the similarity of a word to itself and that the 
values are in a known range [-1,1]. 
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Evaluation 
In this section, we compare NLS to LSA to examine the 
differences between the latent analytic method exemplified 
by LSA and the non-latent method of NLS.  We examine 
the validity of these two methods by examining their 
ability to predict word associates obtained from two 
sources of free association norms.  We also examine the 
ability of the FOM to predict these word associates.  The 
ability of FOM and NLS to predict word associates should 
be reflective of the overall validity of NLS to predict 
similarity of text corpora, which is crucial to our new 
algorithm shown in Equation 4. 
We have two concerns. First, is our FOM valid?  Second, 
if our FOM is valid, then will the second order similarity 
matrix (SOM) be valid as well? To answer these questions, 
we compared the validity of the following three similarity 
matrices generated by three different methods.   
- LSA: The similarity matrix created from TASA 
corpus by LSA.   
- FOM: The similarity matrix created from TASA 
corpus using the modified version of Lin’s method.  
- NLS: The second order similarity matrix based on 
the above FOM.  
Our overall question addressed the ability of the three 
similarity metrics (LSA, FOM, and NLS) to correctly list 
word associates.  We were also interested in examining how 
this ability varied as a function of several variables.  First, 
we were interested in whether the results remained stable 
across norming databases.  We chose to use two sets of free 
association norms: the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus 
(EAT; Kiss, Armstrong, Milroy, & Piper, 1973) and the 
University of South Florida Free Association Norms 
(USFFAN; Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998).   
We were also interested in how the results differed across 
word types (i.e., nouns, verbs, vs. adjectival/adverbial 
modifiers).  One difference between the three classes of 
words is the amount of semantic contextualization.  
Specifically, the meaning of verbs and modifiers is usually 
context dependent, whereas the meaning of nouns is less 
dependent on the context (e. g., Graesser, Hopkinson & 
Schmid, 1987).  For example, in the phrase a big house, the 
size of the adjectival modifier big depends on the noun 
house. It could be argued, moreover, that words that are 
more concrete are less context-dependent. Adjectives are 
less concrete than nouns so they would be more context-
dependent. A similar argument could be made for verbs, 
which are more context dependent than nouns. 
 We expected the context-dependency factor to most 
affect the performance of LSA, because the success of LSA 
relies heavily on the occurrence of words in similar 
contexts, and essentially taps into that factor to assess word 
similarity.  The basic assumption behind LSA is that words 
used in similar context have similar representations.  Thus, 
if a word is less context-dependent, LSA may be less able to 
tap into associations.   
While NLS similarly uses semantic context to compute 
similarity, it also uses syntactic context. The word 
similarities are extracted not only from the similar semantic 
context but also from the similar syntactic roles that the 
words play.  That is, the FOM includes syntactic relations as 
features, whereas word order and the relations between 
words are ignored in LSA. Thus, we expected LSA to be 
less successful in identifying the associates of nouns as 
compared to modifiers and verbs.  We did not expect this 
factor to affect the performance of NLS. We expected that 
FOM and NLS would be sensitive to both context based and 
non-context based associations.   
To examine these factors, we randomly selected 135 
common words, composed of 45 modifiers (including 
adjectives and adverbs), 45 nouns, and 45 verbs.  We then 
determined the first most commonly listed and the second 
most commonly listed associate to those words, based on 
the association norms provided by EAT and the USFFAN. 
Finally, we determined whether each of the three similarity 
metrics listed the first and second most commonly listed 
associate from the respective norm database.  A criterion 
was set in the following analyses: A metric identifies an 
associate of a word if, according to the metric, the associate 
is among the top five nearest neighbors of the word.  While 
not extremely strict, the cutoff was intended to be relatively 
conservative compared to setting the cutoff at 20 words. 
Results 
Table 3 shows the proportion associates identified by each 
metric.  A 3 x 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted that included the between-words variable of word 
type (noun, verb, adjectival/adverbial modifier) and the 
within-words variables of associate (first, second) and 
database (EAT, USFFAN).   
 
Table 3: Proportion of correctly identified associates 
listed in the top five nearest neighbors provided by LSA, 
FOM, and NLS as a function of the free association norms 
and word types. 
 
 EAT  USFFAN 
 Mod Noun Verb Mod Noun Verb 
Associate 1       
    LSA 0.40 0.11 0.16 0.31 0.07 0.13 
    FOM 0.40 0.36 0.13 0.31 0.31 0.16 
  NLS 0.38 0.36 0.11 0.27 0.36 0.13 
Associate 2       
  LSA 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.18 
  FOM 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.11 
NLS 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.16 
 
There was a main effect of word type, F(2, 132) = 3.4, 
MSE = .471, p < .05. Bonferroni Means tests indicated that 
the proportion of associates identified for modifiers (M = 
.243) was significantly greater than for verbs (M = .122), 
but not significantly greater than for nouns (M = .187).  
There was an effect of associate, F(1, 131) = 19.5, MSE = 
.330, p<.001, reflecting a greater proportion of first 
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associates identified (M = .250) than second associates (M = 
0.120). There was also an interaction between word type 
and associate, F(2, 131) = 4.2, p < .05. This interaction 
reflected an effect of word type for first associates, F(2,132) 
= 5.5, MSE = .533, p<.01 (Mmodifier = .34 Mnoun = .26 Mverb = 
.14), compared to no differences between word types for 
second associates, F<1, (Mmodifier =.14, Mnoun = .11, Mverb = 
.12). Thus, the metrics were unable to identify the second 
associates, regardless of word type.  
Finally, there was significant effect of similarity metric, 
F(2,264) = 4.6, MSE = .139, p <.05, and an interaction 
between metric and word type, F(4,264) = 4.1, p<.01. This 
interaction is depicted in Figure 3. The interaction reflects 
the finding that the three metrics were equally successful in 
identifying the associates to modifiers and verbs, whereas 
FOM and NLS were significantly more successful in 
identifying the associates to nouns than was LSA, F(2,88)= 
4.1, MSE = .052, p < .05.  
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Figure 3.  Proportion of associates identified (in the top 5 of 
the list) by the three similarity metrics.   
 
These results did not depend on where the cutoff was 
drawn, (e.g., top 5 vs. top 20).  Of course, the means 
increased with a more lax cutoff.  For example, the overall 
accuracy of associate identification for LSA increased from 
20% to 28% when the cutoff was set at 20 (i.e., when 20 of 
the words output by LSA were considered).  Similarly, the 
overall accuracy for NLS increased from 27% to 42% when 
the cutoff was set at 20 words.  Thus, there was a 140% and 
157% increase respectively for LSA and NLS. The results 
also remained the same when word frequency was entered 
as a covariate. Essentially, these trends emerged regardless 
of how we examined the data. 
There were no differences as a function of norming 
database. This indicates that the results we have reported 
should remain stable across norming databases.   
Conclusions 
In summary, we have provided an alternative algorithm, 
NLS, which makes it possible to use any non-latent 
similarity matrix to compare text similarity.  This algorithm 
uses a second-order similarity matrix (SOM) that is created 
using the cosine of the vectors from a first-order (non-latent) 
matrix. This FOM could be generated in any number of 
ways. We used a modified form of Lin’s (1998) algorithm 
to extract non-latent word similarity from corpora.  Our 
evaluation of NLS compared its ability to predict word 
associates to the predictions made by the FOM and LSA.  
The critical difference between the algorithms addressed the 
latency of the word representations.  The use of SVD results 
in latent word representations in LSA, whereas the use of 
the syntax parser in NLS results in a non-latent 
representation.  We found that NLS, using the similarity 
matrix that we generated, identified the associates to 
modifiers and nouns relatively well.  Both LSA and NLS 
were equally able to identify the associations to the 
modifiers.  In contrast, none of the metrics successfully 
identified the associates to the verbs.   
FOM versus NLS 
There were two motivations for examining the results from 
the FOM as well as NLS.  The first was to examine the 
validity of using a FOM. The second was to examine the 
correspondence in results between FOM and NLS. That is, 
if the FOM is valid, is the SOM valid as well? We found 
that NLS and FOM were equally successful in identifying 
all types of associations. This result indicates that SOM 
maintains the validity of FOM.  The result supports the 
validity of using the NLS algorithm.  
One consideration is that the second order similarity 
matrix may reveal new similarity relations which do not 
exist or are weak in the FOM. It is not hard to imagine that 
two words that have weak similarity in FOM may share 
some nearest neighbors and thus reveal a stronger relation 
between the two words in SOM. Nonetheless, we found 
here that the second-order matrix maintains the validity of 
FOM as much as possible, assuming the FOM is valid.  
When the FOM is decomposable, it can be directly used in 
NLS. The SOM is used when FOM is computationally 
heavy or is not decomposable. Our future investigations will 
work toward a better understanding of the situations that 
require a SOM as opposed to a FOM, or vice versa.   
LSA versus NLS and FOM 
We confirmed our predicted results that LSA would be less 
accurate in identifying the associates to context-independent 
nouns than to adjectival or adverbial modifiers, which have 
greater context dependency. We further predicted that this 
difference would not occur for NLS and the FOM.  Indeed, 
NLS and FOM were equally predictive of noun and 
modifier associates.  Thus, one advantage of NLS is that it 
makes use of both semantic and syntactic information 
within the text corpora.  Specifically, the FOM includes 
both syntactic and semantic relations as features.  Here, we 
have documented this advantage solely with respect to word 
similarities.  However, we expect that this advantage will 
also improve the detection of similarity across larger bodies 
of text.   
Verbs versus Nouns and Modifiers 
One result that has baffled us is why NLS and LSA are both 
unable to pick up on the associates to the verbs.  We 
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considered several explanations.  First, one might think that 
the number of forms of the word would be a factor to 
consider. Since verbs tend to have more forms than do 
modifiers (e.g., add has four forms: add, added, adding, 
adds), a typical vector space model would contain relatively 
less information about any one form of the verb. This factor 
may explain the inability of LSA to identify the associates 
to verbs.  However, it cannot do so for NLS because we 
used the word base, not the word itself, when forming the 
matrix.   
We further considered that humans may have produced a 
greater variety of associates to verbs than to nouns or 
modifiers.  If so, then across the two databases (i.e., EAT 
and USFFAN), the match between the associates in one 
database to another should vary as a function of word type.  
However, this was not the case.  The two databases matched 
the first associate for 69% of the words, with no differences 
across word types. There was lower agreement (40%) and 
greater variance for the second associate, but not in the 
expected direction.   
An alternative explanation regards the contextualization 
of verbs as compared to nouns. As we stated earlier, the 
meaning of verbs is more dependent on semantic context 
than are nouns.  In addition, verbs seem to be used in a 
wider variety of contexts. Whereas a person can do only so 
much with a chair, the person can sit just about anywhere 
and anyhow.  One can imagine eating, walking, and 
thinking in any number of contexts, whereas the contexts for 
chairs and cars are more constrained. Hence, semantic 
context is more variable for verbs than for nouns. This 
variability may render models such as NLS or LSA unable 
to determine the ‘meaning’ of verbs.   
This idea is in line with notions of how verbs are 
represented with semantic representations. Generally, verbs 
are treated as the links between the concepts. Verbs 
constitute the relations or links between nodes.  Essentially, 
we see here that vector space models are less able to abstract 
meanings of relations than the meanings of concepts.  
This notion gains clarity when we examine the associates 
to verbs that were provided by LSA and NLS.  The EAT 
associates to try are attempt and again. LSA’s top five 
predictions were do, if, you, can, and way. FOM’s 
predictions were think, say, go, know, and ask.  We can 
provide many examples such as these where the associates 
produced by the metric make little sense.  The associations 
predicted for nouns and modifiers, in contrast, showed 
obvious relationships to the target word.  This observation 
leads us to conclude that these metrics are not able to use 
contextual information of verbs, perhaps because that 
information is not available.   
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Abstract
Do the languages that we speak affect how we experience the
world?  This question was taken up in a linguistic survey and
two non-linguistic psychophysical experiments conducted in
native speakers of  English, Indonesian, Greek, and Spanish.
All four of these languages use spatial metaphors to talk about
time, but the particular metaphoric mappings between time
and space vary across languages.  A linguistic corpus study
revealed that English and Indonesian tend to map duration
onto linear distance (e.g., a long time), whereas Greek and
Spanish preferentially map duration onto quantity (e.g., much
time).  Two psychophysical time estimation experiments were
conducted to determine whether this cross-linguistic
difference has implications for speakers’ temporal thinking.
Performance on the psychophysical tasks reflected the relative
frequencies of the ‘time as distance’ and ‘time as quantity’
metaphors in English, Indonesian, Greek, and Spanish.  This
was true despite the fact that the tasks used entirely non-
linguistic stimuli and responses.  Results suggest that: (1.)
The spatial metaphors in our native language may profoundly
influence the way we mentally represent time. (2.) Language
can shape even primitive, low-level mental processes such as
estimating brief durations – an ability we share with babies
and non-human animals.
Introduction
“Are our own concepts of ‘time,’ ‘space,’ and ‘matter’ given
in substantially the same form by experience to all men, or
are they in part conditioned by the structure of particular
languages?”  (Whorf, 1939/2000, pg. 138.)  This question,
posed by Benjamin Whorf over half a century ago, is
currently the subject of renewed interest and debate.  Does
language shape thought?  The answer yes would call for a
reexamination of some foundational theories that have
guided Cognitive Science for decades, which assume both
the universality and the primacy of non-linguistic concepts
(Chomsky, 1975; Fodor, 1975).   Yet despite unreserved
belief among the general public that people who talk
differently also think differently (ask anyone about the
Eskimos’ words for snow), it has remained widely agreed
among linguists and psychologists that they do not.
Skepticism about some Whorfian claims has been well
founded.  Two crucial kinds of evidence have been missing
from many previous inquiries into relations between
language and thought: objectively evaluable linguistic data,
and language-independent psychological data.  A notorious
fallacy, attributable in part to Whorf, illustrates the need for
methodological rigor. Whorf (1939) argued that Eskimos
must conceive of snow differently than English speakers
because the Eskimo lexicon contains multiple words that
distinguish different types of snow, whereas English has
only one word to describe all types. The exact number of
snow words the Eskimos were purported to have is not
clear.  (This number has now been inflated by the popular
press to as many as two-hundred.)  According to a Western
Greenlandic Eskimo dictionary published in Whorf’s time,
however, Eskimos may have had as few as two distinct
words for snow (Pullum, 1991).
Setting aside Whorf’s imprecision and the media’s
exaggeration, there remain two problems with Whorf’s
argument, which are evident in much subsequent ‘Language
and Thought’ research, as well.  First, although Whorf
asserted an objective difference between Eskimo and
English snow vocabularies, his comparative linguistic data
were subjective and unfalsifiable: it is a matter of opinion
whether any cross-linguistic difference in the number of
snow words existed.  As Geoffrey Pullum (1991) points out,
English could also be argued to have multiple terms for
snow in its various manifestations: slush, sleet, powder,
granular, blizzard, drift, etc.  The problem of unfalsifiability
would be addressed if cross-linguistic differences could be
demonstrated empirically, and ideally, if the magnitude of
the differences could be quantified.
A second problem with Whorf’s argument (and others
like it in the contemporary Cognitive Linguistics literature)
is that it uses purely linguistic data to motivate inferences
about non-linguistic thinking.  Steven Pinker illustrates the
resulting circularity of Whorf’s claim in this parody of his
reasoning:  “[Eskimos] speak differently so they must think
differently.  How do we know that they think differently?
Just listen to the way they speak!” (Pinker, 1994, pg. 61).
This circularity would be escaped if non-linguistic evidence
could be produced to show that two groups of speakers who
talk differently also think differently in corresponding ways.
__________________________________________
†Corresponding author: Daniel Casasanto (djc@mit.edu)
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But what counts as ‘non-linguistic’ evidence?  Recent
studies have tested predictions derived from cross-linguistic
differences using behavioral measures such as accuracy and
reaction time.  Oh (2003) investigated whether Korean and
English speakers would remember motion events
differently, consistent with the way motion is habitually
encoded in their native languages (i.e., in terms of ‘path’ or
‘manner’ of motion).  Participants described videos of
motion events, and then took a surprise memory test probing
small details of the videos.  Oh found that, as expected,
English speakers used more manner-of-motion verbs in their
video descriptions than Korean speakers. English speakers
also performed better than Koreans on the manner-relevant
portion of the memory test.  Oh refers to the memory task as
‘non-linguistic,’ yet the questions were posed using motion
language, and participants may have recalled their own
verbal descriptions of the videos while responding.
Boroditsky (2001) investigated whether speakers of
English and Mandarin think differently about time.  English
typically describes time as horizontal, while Mandarin
commonly uses vertical spatiotemporal metaphors.
Boroditsky found that English speakers were faster to judge
sentences about temporal succession (e.g., March comes
earlier than April) when primed with a horizontal spatial
event, but Mandarin speakers were faster to judge the same
sentences when primed with a vertical spatial stimulus.
This was true despite the fact that all of the sentences were
presented in English.
These studies by Oh and Boroditsky support a version
of the Whorfian hypothesis which Slobin (1986) has termed
thinking for speaking: language can affect thought when we
are thinking with the intent to use language, plausibly by
directing attention to elements of our experience that are
ordinarily encoded in the language we speak.    For instance,
because English tends to encode information about manner
of motion more often than Korean does, Oh’s English
subjects may have automatically attended to the manner
information in the videos more than her Korean subjects
did.  Some researchers have characterized the effects of
thinking for speaking as uninterestingly weak (Pinker, 1994;
Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002).  Results such as
Oh’s and Boroditsky’s suggest otherwise: at minimum,
thinking for speaking appears to influence ubiquitous
cognitive processes such as attention and memory, and is
capable of changing the nature of our abstract mental
representations.  Furthermore, habits formed while thinking
for speaking are likely to be practiced even when people are
not explicitly encoding information for language.  We never
know when we might want to talk about an event at some
later point, so it is in our best interest to encode language-
relevant details as a matter of policy.
Can the influence of language on thought go beyond
thinking for speaking?  Much of our mental life is
unutterable: what words can capture the sound of a clarinet,
or explain the color red  to a blind person (Locke,
1689/1995; Wittgenstein, 1953)?  Can peculiarities of our
native language shape even the deep, primitive kinds of
representations that we share with pre-linguistic infants and
non-human animals?  Previous research suggests that
language can affect our high-level linguistic and symbolic
representations in the abstract domain of time (Boroditsky,
2001).  The goal of the present study was to find out
whether language can also shape our low-level, non-
linguistic, non-symbolic temporal representations.  A
linguistic study was conducted to investigate a previously
unexplored pattern in spatiotemporal metaphors, and to
quantify cross-linguistic differences in the way these
metaphors are used by speakers of English, Indonesian,
Greek, and Spanish (Experiment 1).  To determine whether
these cross-linguistic differences have consequences for
speakers’ non-linguistic time representations, the results of
the linguistic study were used to predict performance on a
pair of psychophysical time estimation tasks, with entirely
non-linguistic stimuli and responses (Experiments 2 and 3).
Experiment 1:
Time in a Bottle or Time on the Line?
Linguists have noted that spatial metaphors are often used to
talk about non-spatial phenomena -- in particular abstract
phenomena such as social rank (e.g., a high position),
mathematics (e.g., a low number), and  time (e.g., a long
vacation) (Clark, 1973; Gibbs, 1994; Jackendoff, 1983;
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  Recently, psychologists have
begun to explore the proposal that these metaphors in
language provide a window on our underlying mental
representations in abstract domains, using the domain of
time as a testbed (Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky &
Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2003; Gentner,
2001).  In general, this work has focused on how time can
be expressed (and by hypothesis conceptualized) in terms of
linear space.  Linear spatiotemporal metaphors are pervasive
in English, and are used to talk about various aspects of
time, including succession (e.g., Monday comes before
Tuesday), motion through time (e.g., Let’s move the
meeting forward), and duration (e.g., a short intermission).
But is time necessarily conceptualized in terms of uni-
dimensional space?  English speakers also talk about oceans
of time, saving time in a bottle, and compare epochs to sand
through the hourglass, apparently mapping time onto
volume.
Experiment 1 compared the use of ‘time as distance’
and ‘time as quantity’ metaphors across languages.  Every
language examined so far uses both distance and quantity
metaphors, but their relative prevalence and productivity
appear to vary markedly.  In English, it is natural to talk
about a long time, borrowing the structure and vocabulary
of a spatial expression like a long rope.  Yet in Spanish, the
direct translation of ‘long time’, largo tiempo, sounds
awkward to speakers of most dialects.  Mucho tiempo,
which means ‘much time’, is preferred.
In Greek, the words makris and kontos are the literal
equivalents of the English spatial terms long and short.
They can be used in spatial contexts much the way long and
short are used in English (e.g., ena makry skoini means ‘a
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long rope’).  In temporal contexts, however, makris and
kontos are dispreferred in instances where long and short
would be used naturally in English.  It would be unnatural to
translate a long meeting literally as mia makria synantisi.
Rather than using distance terms, Greek speakers typically
indicate that an event lasted a long time using megalos,
which in spatial contexts means physically ‘large’ (e.g., a
big building), or using poli, which in spatial contexts means
‘much’ in physical quantity (e.g., much water).  Compare
how English and Greek typically modify the duration of the
following the events (literal translations in parentheses):
1e. long night
1g. megali nychta (big night)
2e. long relationship
2g. megali schesi (big relationship)
3e. long party
3g. parti pou kratise poli (party that lasts much)
4e. long meeting
4g. synantisi pou diekese poli (meeting that lasts much)
In examples 1g. and 2g., the literal translations might
surprise an English speaker, for whom big night is likely to
mean ‘an exciting night’, and big relationship ‘an important
relationship’.  For Greek speakers, however, these phrases
communicate duration, expressing time not in terms of uni-
dimensional space, but rather in terms of physical quantity
(i.e., three-dimensional space).
For Experiment 1, the most natural phrases expressing
the ideas ‘a long time’ and ‘much time’ were elicited from
native speakers of English, Indonesian, Greek, and Spanish
(see table 1).  The frequencies of these expressions were
compared in a very large multilingual text corpus:
www.google.com.  Each expression in table 1 was entered
as a search term.  Google’s language tools were used to find
exact matches for each expression, and to restrict the search
to web pages written only in the appropriate languages.
Table 1:  Distance and quantity metaphors for duration.
Results  The number of google ‘hits’ for each expression
was tabulated, and the percentage of distance hits and
quantity hits was calculated for each pair of expressions, as
a measure of their relative frequency (see figure 1).  Results
showed that in English and Indonesian, distance metaphors
were more frequent than quantity metaphors.  The opposite
pattern was found in Greek and Spanish. A Chi-Square test
showed that the relationship between distance and quantity
metaphors varied significantly across languages
(X2=8.5x105,df=3, p<0.0001). These findings corroborate
native speakers’ intuitions for each language.  Additional
quantitative studies are in progress to validate these results.
Figure 1:  Corpus search results.  Black bars indicate the
percentage of distance metaphors and white bars the
percentage of quantity metaphors found for each language.
Experiments 2 & 3:
Do People Who Talk Differently Think Differently?
How might this difference in the way English, Indonesian,
Greek, and Spanish speakers talk about time affect the way
they think about it?  Linguists and psychologists have
argued that our conception of time is intimately dependent
on our knowledge of space, noting that in many languages,
people can hardly avoid using spatial words when they talk
about time (Clark, 1973; Gibbs, 1994; Jackendoff, 1983;
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Behavioral studies show that
changing someone’s immediate spatial environment or
frame of reference can dramatically change the way they
interpret temporal language (Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky
& Ramscar, 2002).  But does space influence our temporal
thinking even when we are not thinking for speaking?
A recent study by Casasanto & Boroditsky (2003)
shows that space influences even our low-level, non-
linguistic, non-symbolic  representations of time.  English
speakers watched lines ‘growing’ across a computer screen,
one pixel at a time, and estimated either how far they grew
or how much time they remained on the screen.  Estimates
were made by clicking the mouse to indicate the beginning
and end of each spatial or temporal interval.  Line distances
and durations were varied orthogonally, so there was no
correlation between the spatial and temporal components of
the stimuli. As such, one stimulus dimension served as a
distr actor for the other: an irrelevant piece of information
that could potentially interfere with task performance.
Patterns of cross-dimensional interference were analyzed to
reveal relationships between subjects’ representations of
space and time.  Results showed that subjects were unable to
ignore irrelevant spatial information when estimating time
(even when they were encouraged to do so).  Line stimuli of
the same average duration were judged to take a longer time
when they grew a longer distance, and a shorter time when
they grew a shorter distance.  In contrast, line duration did
not affect subjects’ distance estimates.  This asymmetric
relation between space and time was predicted based on
patterns in language: we talk about time in terms of space
more than we talk about space in terms of time (Lakoff  &
Johnson, 1980).
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These findings suggest that the metaphoric relationship
between time and space is not just linguistic, it is also
conceptual.  Not only do people talk about time in terms of
space, they also think about time using spatial
representations.  However, the experiments reported in
Casasanto & Boroditsky (2003)  leave the Whorfian
question unanswered: do metaphors in language merely
reflect underlying conceptual structures, or might the
metaphors we use also play some role in constructing
concepts, or establishing their interrelations?
In the present study speakers of four different languages
performed the same pair of non-linguistic psychophysical
tasks, which required them to estimate time while
overcoming spatial interference.  It was reasoned that if
people’s concepts of time and space are substantially the
same universally, irrespective of the languages they speak,
then performance on these tasks should not differ between
language groups.  If, on the other hand, the spatiotemporal
metaphors people use affect how they represent time and
space non-linguistically, then performance should vary in
ways predicted by participants’ language-particular
metaphors.
For Experiment 2, subjects performed a ‘growing line’
task similar to the task described above.  It was reasoned
that the English participants in our previous study may have
suffered interference of distance on duration estimation, in
part, because these notions are conflated in the English
language.  It is hard to imagine expressing the idea ‘a long
time’ in English without using an adjective that can also
indicate spatial extent.  Piaget (1927) made a similar
suggestion when he observed that young French speaking
children often mistook distance for duration, noting that
both of these concepts are commonly described in French
using the adjective longue.  We predicted that speakers of
‘Distance Languages’ (i.e., English and Indonesian)  would
show a considerable effect of distance on time estimation
when performing the growing line task.
If  conflations in language contribute to confusions in
thought, can distinctions in language help speakers
distinguish closely related concepts?  We reasoned that
speakers of languages that do not ordinarily express
duration in terms of distance might have an easier time
distinguishing the spatial and temporal information
conveyed in our growing line stimuli.  We predicted that
speakers of ‘Quantity Languages’ (i.e., Greek and Spanish)
would show only a mild effect of distance on time
estimation when performing the growing line task.
For Experiment 3, a task complementary to the growing
line task was developed.  Subjects watched a schematically
drawn container of water filling up, one row of pixels at a
time, and estimated either how full it became or how much
time it remained on the computer screen, using mouse
clicks.  We predicted the converse pattern of behavioral
results for the filling container task as for the growing line
task:  speakers of Quantity Languages would show a
considerable influence of ‘fullness’ on time estimation,
whereas speakers of Distance Languages would show a
milder effect.
Methods for Experiment 2: Growing Lines
Subjects  A total of 65 subjects participated in exchange for
payment.  Native English and Spanish speaking participants
were recruited from the Greater Boston community, and
were tested on MIT campus.  Native Indonesian speakers
were recruited from the Jakarta community, and were tested
at the Cognation Outpost in the Jakarta Field Station of the
Max Planck Center for Evolutionary Anthropology.  Native
Greek speakers were recruited from the Thessaloniki
community, and tested at the Aristotle University of
Thessaloniki.
Materials   Lines of varying lengths were presented on a
computer monitor (resolution=1024x768 pixels, dpi=72),
for varying durations.  Durations ranged from 1000
milliseconds to 5000 milliseconds in 500 millisecond
increments.  Displacements ranged from 100 to 500 pixels
in 50 pixel increments.  Nine durations were fully crossed
with nine displacements to produce 81 distinct line types.
Lines started as a single point and ‘grew’ horizontally across
the screen one pixel at a time, from left to right along the
vertical midline.  Each line remained on the screen until its
maximum displacement was reached.
Written instructions were given prior to the start of the
task, in the native language of the participant.  Care was
taken to avoid using distance metaphors for time.  The task
itself was entirely non-linguistic, consisting of lines
(stimuli) and mouse clicks (responses).
Procedure   Participants viewed 162 growing lines, one line
at a time.  Immediately before each trial, a prompt appeared
indicating that the subject should attend either to the line’s
duration or to its spatial displacement.  Space trials and time
trials were randomly intermixed.
To estimate displacement, subjects clicked the mouse
once on the center of an  ‘X’ icon, moved the mouse to the
right in a straight line, and clicked the mouse a second time
to indicate they had moved a distance equal to the maximum
displacement of the stimulus. To estimate duration, subjects
clicked the mouse once on the center of an ‘hourglass’ icon,
waited the appropriate amount of time, and clicked again in
the same spot, to indicate the time it took for the stimulus to
reach its maximum displacement.
All responses were self-paced.  Importantly, for a given
trial, subjects reproduced either the displacement or the
duration of the stimulus, never both.  Response data were
collected for both the trial-relevant and the trial-irrelevant
stimulus dimension, to ensure that subjects were following
instructions.
Methods for Experiment 3: Filling Containers
Subjects  A total of 74 subjects participated in exchange for
payment.  Subjects were recruited at the same time as those
who participated in Experiment 2, from the same
populations.
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Materials and procedure  The filling container task was
closely analogous to the growing line task (Experiment 2).
Participants viewed 162 containers, and were asked to
imagine that each was a tank filling with water.  Containers
were simple line drawings, 600 pixels high and 500 pixels
wide.   Empty containers filled gradually, one row of pixels
at a time, for varying durations and ‘volumes,’ and they
disappeared when they reached their maximum fullness.
Nine durations were fully crossed with nine volumes to
produce 81 distinct trial types. For each trial, participants
estimated either the amount of water in the container (by
clicking the mouse once at the bottom of the container and a
second time at the appropriate ‘water level’), or they
estimated the amount of time that the container took to fill
(by clicking the hourglass icon, waiting the appropriate
time, and clicking it again, as in Experiment 2).  Durations
ranged from 1000 milliseconds to 5000 milliseconds in 500
millisecond increments.  Water levels ranged from 100 to
500 pixels, in 50 pixel increments.
As before, written instructions were given prior to the
start of the task, in the native language of the participant.
Care was taken to avoid using quantity metaphors for time.
The task itself was entirely non-linguistic, consisting of
containers (stimuli) and mouse clicks (responses).
Results for Experiments 2 and 3
Both time estimates and space estimates were collected for
each subject, but since our present hypothesis concerns
effects of language and space on time estimation, only data
for the time estimation trials are reported here.  (See
Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2003 for a discussion of subjects’
space estimation in a related task.)
Time estimation, within-domain effects Overall, for both
Experiments 2 and 3 subjects’ time estimates were highly
accurate across all language groups, as indicated by the
strong correlations between the actual stimulus duration and
subjects’ estimated stimulus duration.  These correlations
did not differ significantly between groups or between tasks
(see table 2).
Table 2:  Time estimation results for Experiments 2 and 3.
Slope and r-square values for the correlation between actual
stimulus duration and subjects’ grand averaged estimates of
stimulus duration.  (Perfect performance would be indicated
by a slope of 1.00 and r2 of 1.00.)
Time estimation, cross-domain effects  The within-
domain results reported in table 2 are important to establish
that subjects were able to estimate time well, and
importantly, that subjects estimated time about equally well
in all groups, and on both tasks.  Of principal interest,
however, are the cross-domain effects (i.e., effects of actual
distance  and actual quantity on estimated time), which are
summarized in figure 2.
To investigate the effect of spatial interference on time
estimation, grand averaged time estimates in milliseconds
were plotted as a function of actual stimulus displacement in
pixels (i.e., line length or water level).  A line of best fit was
computed, and the slope was used as an index of effect
strength.  In our previous experience with similar tasks, we
found the strongest linear effects on the dependent variable
(i.e., estimated time) near the middle of the range of the
independent variable (i.e., actual stimulus displacement),
possibly due to ‘endpoint effects’ commonly observed in
magnitude estimation tasks.  For the analyses reported here,
the outer points were removed, and the middle five points of
the correlations were analyzed.
Cross-domain effects varied markedly across language
groups.  For the growing line task, English and Indonesian
speakers showed a strong effect of distance on time
estimation (English: Slope=1.49, r2=0.98; t=8.5; df=3;
p<0.001;  Indonesian: Slope=1.40, r2=0.80; t=3.4; df=3;
p<0.01).  By contrast, Greek and Spanish speakers showed
weak, non-significant effects of distance on time estimation
(Greek: Slope=0.47, r2=0.33; t=1.2; df=3; ns;  Spanish:
Slope=0.20, r2=0.13; t=0.7; df=3; ns).
For the filling container task, the opposite pattern of
results was found. English and Indonesian speakers showed
a weak, non-significant effect of volume on time estimation
(English: Slope=0.18, r2=0.12; t=0.6; df=3; ns;  Indonesian:
Slope=0.13, r2=0.51; t=1.7; df=3; ns), whereas Greek and
Spanish speakers showed strong effects of volume on time
estimation (Greek: Slope=1.24, r2=0.95; t=6.9; df=3;
p<0.001;  Spanish: Slope=1.16, r2=0.97; t=8.5; df=3;
p<0.001).
Figure 2:  Effects of distance and quantity interference on
time estimation.
A 4 x 2 factorial ANOVA with Language and Task as
between-subject factors revealed a highly significant
Language by Task interaction (F (3,139) = 5.25, p<0.002),
with no main effects, signaling a true crossover interaction.
Linear regression analysis revealed a highly significant
positive relation between the frequency of Distance and
Quantity metaphors in each language (as measured in
Experiment 1) and the amount of Distance and Quantity
interference on time estimation (as measured in Experiments
2 and 3) (Slope=1.62, r2=0.84; t=5.6; df=6; p<0.001).
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General Discussion and Conclusions
Do people who talk differently also think differently?
Performance on a pair of psychophysical time estimation
tasks differed dramatically for speakers of different
languages, in ways predicted by their language-particular
spatiotemporal metaphors.  The effects of  distance
interference  and quantity interference on time estimation in
speakers of English, Indonesian, Greek, and Spanish
corresponded strikingly to the relative prevalence of
distance metaphors and quantity metaphors found in these
languages (compare figures 1 and 2).  This was true despite
the fact that the behavioral tasks comprised entirely non-
linguistic stimuli and responses.
Returning to the question of Whorf’s posed in the
introduction, it is possible that our concepts of time and
space are “given in substantially the same form by
experience” to all of us, and also that they are “in part
conditioned by the structure of particular languages.”
Perhaps people learn associations between time and space
via physical experience (e.g., by observing moving objects
and changing quantities). Since presumably the laws of
physics are the same in all language communities, pre-
linguistic children's conceptual mappings between time,
distance, and quantity could be the same universally. When
children acquire language, these mappings could be
adjusted, plausibly by a process analogous to Hebbian
learning: each time we use a linguistic metaphor, we may
invoke the corresponding conceptual mapping.  Speakers of
Distance Languages then would invoke the time-distance
mapping frequently, eventually strengthening it at the
expense of the time-quantity mapping (and vice-versa for
speakers of Quantity Languages).  Alternatively, experience
may not teach us to map time onto space.  It could be
language that causes us to notice structural parallels
between these domains, in the first place.  On this
possibility, language would be responsible for establishing
the time-distance and time-quantity conceptual mappings
evident in our adult subjects, not just for modifying these
mappings.  Studies are in progress on young learners of
Distance and Quantity languages to explore these
possibilities.
The findings we present here are difficult to reconcile
with a ‘universalist’ view of language-thought relations
according to which language calls upon pre-formed,
antecedently available non-linguistic concepts, which are
presumed to be “universal” (Pinker, 1994, pg. 82) and
“immutable” (Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002, pg.
216).  Rather, these results support what we might call a
deep version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis (to
distinguish it from the so-called weak version which posits
that language affects ‘thinking for speaking,’ and from
strong linguistic determinism).  The particular languages
that we speak can influence not only the representations we
build for the purpose of speaking, but also the non-linguistic
representations we build for remembering, acting on, and
perhaps even perceiving the world around us.
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Abstract 
Although there is considerable evidence that humans use the 
same mechanisms for linguistic and nonlinguistic cognition, 
the thesis of linguistic modularity will remain plausible so 
long as well-established formal properties of syntax remain 
unexplained in terms of domain-general cognitive 
mechanisms.  This paper presents several dualities between 
the formal structure of syntax and cognitive structures used to 
represent the physical world.  These dualities are used to 
construct a cognitive model of syntactic parsing that uses only 
the mechanisms required for infant physical reasoning.  The 
model demonstrates how a formal syntactic constraint, the c-
command condition on binding, can be explained by a 
cognitive process used in physical reasoning.  Several 
consequences for language development and the doctrine of 
linguistic modularity are considered. 
Introduction 
Although there is extensive evidence that humans use the 
same or similar mechanisms for linguistic and nonlinguistic 
cognition, the precise manner in which nonlinguistic 
cognitive processes are related to the formal properties of 
human grammar have yet to be determined. 
In the field of linguistic semantics, several researchers 
have noticed extensive parallels between physical and 
abstract semantic fields.  For example, Jackendoff (1990) 
has formalized the semantics of many verbs with primitive 
conceptual structures such as GO, TO, FROM, PATH, etc.  
Leonard Talmy (1985) has shown that semantic fields for 
psychological, social, argumentative and many other 
domains involve notions of force dynamics that underlie 
semantic fields for physical domains.  Cognitive 
psychologists (e.g, Boroditsky, 2001; Spelke & Tsivkin, 
2001) have found that the way in which language represents 
a concept can influence cognition using that concept.  
Clark’s (1996) work culminates a long tradition beginning 
in the philosophy of language that analyzes language use as 
a species of social interaction.  Bloom (2000) presents 
evidence that children use cognitive abilities that exist for 
nonlinguistic purposes to learn the meaning of words. 
Some researchers (e.g., Langacker, 1999) have explored 
the interaction of grammar and nonlinguistic cognition by 
advancing a “cognitive grammar” research program that 
views the grammatical structure of sentences as the result of 
the process which maps linear sequences of words into 
nonlinear cognitive structures.  Although the research has 
explained many linguistic phenomena, it has not shown in 
detail how this transformation explains specific syntactic 
constraints such as the empty-category principle, subjacency 
and the anaphoric binding principles that occur in some 
form in most mature formal theories of human syntax.  Until 
these apparently peculiar formal properties are accounted 
for using general cognitive mechanisms, the thesis that 
humans use different mechanisms for syntactic and 
nonlinguistic processing remain plausible. 
This paper outlines a mapping of structures in formal 
grammar to cognitive structures used to represent physical 
events, shows how to use this mapping to construct a model 
of human syntactic parsing that uses only the mechanisms 
of a model of infant physical reasoning and demonstrates 
how this model explains a universal, putatively innate and 
language-specific grammatical constraint in terms of 
domain-general cognitive mechanisms. 
 
Grammatical Structure Cognitive structure 
Word, phrase, sentence Event 
Constituency Meronomy 
Phrase structure 
constraints 
Constraints among (parts of) 
events 
Word/phrase category Event category 
Word/phrase order Temporal order 
Phrase attachment Event identity 
Coreference/binding Object identity 
Traces Object permanence 
Short- and long-distance 
dependencies 
Apparent motion and long 
paths. 
Table 1. Dualities between elements  
of physical and grammatical structure.  
Structural Dualities 
The structures of grammar and of naïve physics appear more 
similar when a verbal utterance is conceived as an event that 
is composed of a sequence of word utterance subevents.  
Like physical events, verbal events belong to categories, 
combine to form larger verbal events and are ordered in 
relation to other verbal events according to lawful 
regularities.  This section examines these dualities in detail, 
and shows that many grammatical structures have analogues 
to nonlinguistic cognitive structures.  These dualities are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Notation 
In order to explain the mapping between syntactic structure 
and cognitive structures used to represent the physical 
world, it will be helpful to use a formal notation for 
representing physical events.  This paper uses a notion 
based on the notation Cassimatis (2002) uses to present 
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problems to his model of physical reasoning.  Although 
there is no claim that the notation resembles the mind’s 
representations for syntactic or physical structure, the next 
section will show how to use this formalism to present 
sentences to a model physical reasoning so that the model 
can use its own representations and processes to infer the 
syntactic structure of sentences. 
In this formalism, events, objects and places have names.  
Predicates describe attributes on and relations among named 
entities.   For example, an event in which an object, x, 
moves from p1 to p2 during the temporal interval, t, is 
indicated with the following propositions: Category(e, 
MotionEvent), Agent(e, x), Origin(e, p1), 
Destination(e, p2), Occurs(e, t).  Intervals are 
ordered using Allan’s (1983) temporal relations.  For 
example, Before(t1,t2) indicates that t1 finishes before 
t2 begins and Meets(t1, t2) indicates that t1 ends 
precisely when t2 begins.  Category hierarchies are 
described using subcategory relationships, e.g., 
Subcateogry(Fly, MotionEvent).  PartOf(e1,e2) 
indicates that event e1 is part of event e2.  That two names 
for events, objects or places refer to the same object is 
indicated using an identity relationship.  For example, 
Same(o1,o2) indicates that “o1” and “o2” name the same 
object.  Finally, regularities between physical events can be 
expressed using material implication.  For example, that an 
unsupported object falls is indicated:  
 
Location(o,p1,t1) + Below(p2,p1) + 
Empty(p2,t1)  
Æ  
Category(e,MotionEvent) + Origin(e,p1) 
+ Destination(e,p2) + Occurs(e,t2) + 
Meets(t1,t2).  
 
With this background, it is now possible to describe 
several dualities between syntactic and physical structure. 
Physical and verbal event perception both have a 
linear order. 
Although human vision has two-dimensional access to a 
three-dimensional physical world, there is a linear order to 
human perception.  People can attend to only one region of 
space at a time.  Large, complicated and/or spatially 
distributed visual scenes must be perceived through a series 
of attentional foci.  For example, a person standing between 
two houses, A and B, can perceive that A is to the left of B 
by turning to the left, focusing on house A, turning to the 
right and focusing on house B.  Likewise we perceive verbal 
utterances as a linear sequence of word utterance events. 
Further, such multidimensionality as there is in the visual 
system is not unique to it.  Spoken phonemes have a 
multidimensional character.  In most phonological theories 
phonemes are points in a multi-dimensional vector space 
with dimensions such as “voiced” or “nasal”. 
Thus, both perceiving physical scenarios and perceiving 
spoken utterances involve a linear sequence of foci that each 
integrate multiple dimensions of information. 
Utterances are events. 
The philosophical tradition of “speech act theory”, (which is 
psycholinguistically implemented by Clark (1996)), holds 
that linguistic utterances are actions used to achieve goals.  
In this way, words are similar to other nonlinguistic actions 
such as gesturing or tool use.  Other people’s actions are 
events we must perceive in order to interpret their intent.  
Both verbal and nonverbal events occur over temporal 
intervals.  Like nonverbal events, verbal utterances can be 
executed with various manners (hastily, carefully, loudly, 
softly). 
Thus, the same concepts used to describe physical events 
can be used to describe verbal utterances.  For example, 
using the present notation, the utterance of the word “dog” 
at time, t, may be represented, Category(e, dog-
utterance), Occurs(e, t). 
Word order is temporal order. 
The temporal order of a set of physical events has important 
consequences for their ultimate result.  For example, pulling 
a gun’s trigger before loading it results in a much different 
event from the pulling its trigger after loading it.  This is 
also a fundamental feature of grammar:  the result (in terms 
of its effect on the listener) of uttering “The dog”, uttering 
“bit” and then uttering “John” is much different from the 
result of uttering “John”, “bit” and then “the dog”.  In our 
notation, “John bit the dog” is represented as sequence of 
utterance events:   
 
1. Category(e1, JohnUtterance) 
Occurs(e1, t1) 
2. Category(e2, BitUtterance) 
Occurs(e2, t2) 
Meets(t1, t2) 
Etc. 
Physical and linguistic events both belong to 
categories, which exist in hierarchies. 
Word and phrase categories are an important component of 
almost every serious syntactic theory and especially 
important in some (e.g., Pollard & Sag, 1994).  Categories 
are also an essential part of most every other domain of 
cognition.  The previous subsection demonstrated that the 
same Category predicate that represents the category of a 
physical event can represent the category of a word or 
phrase utterance.  Likewise, just as physical categories exist 
in hierarchies (e.g., Subcategory( RunningEvent, 
MotionEvent), so do verbal and phrasal categories (e.g., 
Subcategory(CommonNoun, Noun) and Subcategory( 
TransitiveVerbPhrase, VerbPhrase)). 
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Just as the category of a physical event determines which 
other events it occurs with (e.g., a gun-firing event tends to 
be preceded by a trigger-pulling event), so does the category 
of a word or phrase determine the distribution of words and 
phrases (e.g., transitive verbs are often followed by noun 
phrases).   
Constituency is a meronomic relationship. 
Physical events combine into larger events, which 
themselves can combine into even larger events.  Word 
utterance events combine into phrase utterance events which 
combine into larger phrase utterance events.  Meronomy1 is 
thus a feature of both physical and verbal events.  Predicates 
for representing physical event meronomy can capture 
phrasal constituency.  For example, the noun phrase “the 
dog” can be represented thus:, Category(e, 
CommonNounPhrase), Category(e1, Determiner), 
Occurs(e1, t1), Category(e2, CommonNoun), 
Occurs(e2, t2), PartOf(e1,e), PartOf(e2,e),  
Meets(e1,e2). 
The same notation for expressing physical regularities can 
be used to represent phrase structure rules and constraints.  
For example, a rule for a transitive verb’s arguments can be 
expressed thus:  
 
Category(verb, TransitiveVerb) + 
Occurs(verb, t-verb)  
Æ  
Exists(object) + Category(object, 
NounPhrase) + Occurs(object, t-object) 
+ Before(t-verb, t-object). 
Coreference and binding are object-identity 
relationships. 
Coreference and binding are perhaps the most obvious 
identity relationships in language. Consider the following 
sentence, where “the dog” refers to an object, d, “the cat” 
refers to an object, c, and “it” refers to an object, i: 
 
The dog chased the cat through the park where it lives. 
 
“it”’s reference is ambiguous.  It can refer to the dog 
(Same(i,d)), to the cat (Same(i,c)) or to some other 
object in the conversation or the environment (Same(i,?)).  
In each case, the coreference is just a special kind of identity 
relationship. 
Identity is an extremely widespread and important 
relationship in everyday physical reasoning.  When we lose 
visual contact with an object because we turn our gaze or 
because it is occluded and then see a similar object, we must 
decide whether the sightings are of the same object.  Many 
infant reasoning experiments test for sensitivity to a 
physical constraint (e.g., continuity (Kestenbaum et al., 
                                                          
1
 Meronomy is the study of the relationships of an entity with its 
parts. 
1987) or category persistence (Xu & Carey, 1999)) by 
testing whether infants are surprised by identities that 
violate those constraints. 
Phrase attachment is an event identity 
relationship. 
The occurrence of a physical event often implies the 
occurrence of another physical event.  For example, when 
an object resting on shelf falls to the floor (event f), there 
must have been an event (p) which pushed the object off the 
shelf.  One can infer the pushing event from the falling 
event even if the pushing event is not visible.  Later, after 
observing marks left by a cat’s claws on the shelf, we can 
infer a cat walking event (w).  If this cat walking event 
occurred near the original location of the object that fell, 
then the cat walking event might be identical to the pushing 
event, i.e., Same(p,w). 
Event identity is an important feature of grammar as well.  
For example, the existence of a prepositional phrase 
utterance within a sentence utterance implies the existence 
of a noun or verb utterance that the prepositional phrase is 
an argument or adjunct of.  For example, in the sentence 
“John saw the man with the telescope”, the “with the 
telescope” utterance event implies the existence of an 
utterance event, pp-head, which takes “with the telescope” 
as an argument or adjunct.  In this case, pp-head might be 
the “John” or “man” utterance event.  More formally, either 
one of the following propositions might be true: 
Same(“John”,pp-head) or Same(“the man”, pp-
head).  Thus phrase attachment and attachment ambiguity 
are instances of event identity and uncertainty about event 
identity. 
Traces and Object Permanence 
In many clauses, the arguments of a word are spoken.  For 
example, in (1), the subject and object phrases of “eats” are 
spoken directly before and after it: 
 
(1) [The man] eats [steak]. 
 
In some cases, however, the argument of a word is not 
spoken near it.  For example, in (2), the subject noun phrase 
of “eats” is not adjacent to it.  Sentence (3) show this 
distance is not an obstacle to “eats” requiring its subject to 
be third-person singular. 
 
(2) The man John said [_ eats [steak]] was wearing a hat. 
(3) *The men John said [_ eats [steak]] was wearing a hat. 
 
Thus, even though the subject of “eats” is a “long 
distance” from it, that subject’s character is constrained by 
or “depends” on “eats”.  Such relationships are often called 
“long-distance dependencies”.  Some grammatical theories 
posit the existence of a “trace” that is the subject of “eats” 
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and is left when “the man” is “moved” out of that subject 
position to another part of the sentence. 
Invisible events such as traces and long-distance 
dependencies are common features of physical inference.  
For example, if a ball is rolled behind a screen on a flat table 
and fails to roll out from the other end of the screen, one can 
posit the existence of a second object behind the screen 
blocking the first object and make inferences about it (for 
example, that it is large and massive enough to stop the 
rolling ball) without ever perceiving the obstacle itself.  
Thus just as understanding language (depending on one’s 
favorite syntactic theory) requires reasoning about 
phonetically unrealized phrases, physical event 
understanding often requires one to reason about events that 
are not “visually realized”, i.e., perceived. 
Long-distance dependencies and apparent motion 
It was just noted that in (2), the number of the phrase “The 
man” is constrained by “eats”, which is grammatically 
distant from it.  Characterizing and inferring these long-
distance dependencies has been a difficult problem for 
linguistic theorists and designers of sentence parsers for 
most of modern linguistic history.  This contrasts with 
“short-distance” dependencies which are much simpler.  
Notice that the subject of “eats” is much closer to and more 
obvious in (4) than it is in (2). 
 
(2) The man John said [_ eats [steak]] was wearing a hat. 
(4) The steak John said [the man eats _] was tender. 
 
A rough way of characterizing the difference between the 
two sentences is that the immediate proximity of “eats” to 
its subject makes their relationship much more obvious. 
In the case of physical inference, the phenomenon of 
object permanence is an example of proximity (in space and 
time) making an identity relationship much more obvious 
than the identity of two objects perceived over a long-
distance.  When people see an object at a particular place 
and time and then in a fraction of a second see an object 
with a similar appearance, the two object sightings are 
perceived as the “apparent motion” of a single object.  
When the distance between the two objects in space and 
time is much larger, the identity is no longer obvious.  For 
example, when a red Toyota drives into a crowded parking 
deck and a red Toyota emerges an hour later, the two car 
sightings might or might not be of the same car.  The 
identity is not so obvious. Thus, long-distance dependencies 
and the problems they pose are a common feature of 
linguistic as well as physical events. 
Infant physical reasoning mechanisms are 
sufficient to infer grammatical structure. 
The dualities between physical and grammatical structure 
suggest that mechanisms for inferring the physical structure 
of the world might be useful for inferring the grammatical 
structure of an utterance.  This section presents a model of 
syntactic understanding that is based on Cassimatis’ (2002) 
model of infant physical reasoning.  The model accounts 
for a wide variety of syntactic phenomena, including 
gapped constructions, long-distance dependencies and 
binding principles, using only the mechanisms included in 
the physical reasoning model. 
Since the central argument of this paper is that human 
physical reasoning mechanisms, whatever they are 
ultimately found to be, are sufficient to parse syntactic 
structure, this paper has only discussed how to formulate 
parsing problems as physical reasoning problems and does 
not discuss in any detail the mechanisms of the physical 
reasoning model. 
Polyscheme contains several modules, called specialists, 
for representing aspects of the physical world.  
Grammatical knowledge was added to Polyscheme using 
the representations of these specialists.  For example, the 
category hierarchy (strictly speaking, a multi-tree) of 
Polyscheme’s category specialist was used to represent 
lexical and phrasal category relationships; its temporal 
specialist was used to represent word order; its meronomic 
specialist was used to represent phrasal constituency and 
Polyscheme’s physical constraint specialist was used to 
represent phrase structure constraints.  No modifications of 
Polyscheme representations were needed to represent 
grammatical knowledge. 
Physical problems are presented to Polyscheme using the 
formal language outlined in the last section.  The structural 
dualities described in that section enable sentences to be 
presented to Polyscheme so that it can use its physical 
reasoning mechanisms to parse them.  For example, the 
sentence, “The dog John bought bit him”, is represented by 
a series of propositions, Category(w1, TheUtterance) 
Occurs(w1, t1), Category(w2, DogUtterance) 
Occurs(w2, t2), Meets(t1,t2), etc. 
Upon receiving sentences in this format Polyscheme 
(using its mechanisms for resolving uncertainties) infers 
that the event w2 is a NounUtteranceEvent and that it 
should be preceded by an event, dogDeterminer, that is a 
DeterminerUtterance event.  Polyscheme’s inference 
that “the” is the determiner of “dog” is represented by the 
proposition: Same(w1,dogDeterminer), which indicates 
that the determiner event implied by “dog” is “the”.  
Polyscheme’s parse of an utterance is represented by a set 
of such propositions.  They represent the identity of heads, 
arguments and adjuncts implied by words and phrases in 
the utterance (e.g., dogDeterminer) to the actual spoken 
words or phrases perceived (e.g., “the”).   These 
propositions constitute a complete description of the 
syntactic structure of a sentence.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
parse of the sentence, “The dog John bought bit him”. 
The crucial point is that once a sentence is represented in 
Polyscheme’s input format, only the mechanisms needed 
for physical inference are necessary to infer the 
grammatical structure of the sentence. 
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Figure 1. The syntactic structure of a sentence represented using concepts from infant physical reasoning.  
 
 
Domain-general cognitive processes can 
enforce grammatical constraints. 
The existence of several language universal constraints on 
syntactic structure is perhaps the most apparently unique 
feature of syntactic theory.  Since they appear so peculiar to 
language, these constraints lend creditability to the thesis of 
linguistic modularity.  This section argues that a supposed 
language-specific constraint, the c-command condition on 
binding, can be represented using the same cognitive 
structures used to represent physical events and that the 
cognitive processes used in the Polyscheme physical 
reasoning model from the last section explain how parsing 
obeys such constraints. 
Radford (1997) formulates the c-command condition on 
binding thus: A bound constituent must be c-commanded by 
an appropriate antecedent.  He defines c-command by 
stating that A node X c-commands Y if the mother of X 
dominates Y, X ≠ Y and neither dominates the other. 
C-command is a constituency relationship and can 
therefore be reformulated using the notation of section 2:  
 
X c-commands Y if PartOf(X,Z) and there is no 
X’ such that PartOf(X,X’) and PartOf(X’,Z) 
(i.e.,“Z is the mother of X”); PartOf(Y,Z) (“Z 
dominates Y”); Same(X,Y) is false (“X≠Y”); and 
PartOf(X,Y) and PartOf(Y,X) are both false 
(“neither dominates the other”). 
 
Having thus reformulated c-command as a meronomic 
relationship, it is possible explain how a cognitive process 
called part inhibition, which Polyscheme uses for physical 
reasoning, forces Polyscheme to observe the c-command 
condition on binding when parsing sentences. 
In most physical interactions, a moving object “stays 
together”.  The parts of the object move together with the 
rest of the whole object.  Spelke (1990) has termed this the 
“Cohesion Principle”.  This principle implies that people 
tracking the motion of an object composed of many smaller 
objects need only track the compound object.  Its 
component objects will be wherever the whole object is.  
This makes, for example, the task of tracking one object 
composed of seven smaller objects generally much less than 
seven times more difficult than tracking one simple object.  
Thus, the Cohesion Principle supports the practice of paying 
more attention to a whole objects than to its parts.  
Markman (1989) found evidence that children do this when 
learning words.  In Polyscheme, this attention preference 
can be implemented with “part inhibition”: 
 
When entities e1, …, en, are learned to be part of a 
larger entity, E, inhibit each of the ei. 
 
Occurs(“the”-
utterance”,t1) 
Occurs(“dog”-
Same(NP1-utterance, 
“bit-subject-utterance”) 
Same(NP1-utterance, 
“bit-subject-utterance”) 
“bought”-subject-utterance “bit”-object-utterance 
Occurs(NP1-utterance,t1-4) 
Occurs(“bit”-utterance,t5) 
Before(t1-4, t5)
“bought”-object-utterance 
(i.e., “trace” or “gap”) 
Same(“john”-utterance, 
“bought-subject-utterance”) 
“bought”-utterance 
PartOf 
(NP1-utterance, 
sentence-utterance)
PartOf 
(“the”-
utterance,  
NP1-utterance) 
relative-clause-utterance 
“the”-utterance “john”-utterance “dog”-utterance “bit”-utterance “him”-utterance 
t1  t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 
NP1- utterance 
sentence-utterance 
“bought”-subject-utterance 
Same(NP1-utterance, 
“bought-object-utterance”) 
196
When active during syntactic parsing in Polyscheme, part 
inhibition suppresses the activation of phrases that are 
forbidden antecedents under the c-command condition of 
binding.  This is illustrated for the sentence, “The doctor 
Mary met at Bill’s house likes herself”.  Notice that by the 
time processing reaches “herself”, the model will have 
inferred that several noun phrases are constituents (directly 
or indirectly) of other noun phrases.  In particular: 
 
• PartOf(“house”, “Bill’s house”). 
• PartOf(“Bill’s house”, “The doctor Mary 
met at Bill’s house”). 
• PartOf(“Mary”, “The doctor Mary met at 
Bill’s house”). 
 
Part inhibition will therefore inhibit (and hence make 
them less likely binding targets) “house”, “Bill’s house” and 
“Mary” because they are each part of at least one larger 
utterance event.  The following rewrite of the sentence 
shows these inhibited noun phrases in light gray: 
 
[The doctor [Mary] met at [[Bill]’s house]]] likes herself. 
 
This example demonstrates that a single cognitive process 
(meronomic inhibition) can help syntactic inference 
conform to a grammatical constraint (on anaphoric binding) 
and on a physical constraint (on object motion).  Although 
this is only one of many language-universal syntactic 
constraints, it raises the possibility that other constraints can 
be so treated.  
Conclusions and future directions 
Considerable work remains to establish that the mechanisms 
underlying physical reasoning also support syntactic parsing 
and that the model this paper presents is on the right track.  
The model must be extended to account for more languages 
and more grammatical phenomena, especially accounts of 
other universal syntactic constraints.  The influence of 
mechanisms such as part inhibition on the observance of 
syntactic constraints must also be empirically confirmed.  
To the extent that the proposed dualities between cognitive 
structures and processes involved in inferring the structure 
of physical events and the syntactic structure of sentences 
are real, several important consequences follow. 
First, the ability of a cognitive process such as part 
inhibition on help inference conform both to syntactic 
binding conditions and to the cohesion constraint on object 
motion is relevant to arguments for the existence of innate 
linguistic knowledge.  These arguments (e.g., Chomsky, 
1975) assert that children’s early linguistic experience is too 
poor for them to learn these grammatical constraints and 
conclude that the constraints must therefore be part of some 
innate linguistic knowledge.  This paper raises the 
possibility that these constraints are the linguistic 
manifestations of cognitive processes involved in cognition 
generally.  These processes themselves may be innate or 
children may develop them as they learn to interact with 
their physical environment.  In either case, since children’s 
physical experience is so much richer than their early 
linguistic experience, this and many issues surrounding a 
putatively innate language faculty cannot therefore be 
resolved through a priori learnability arguments alone. 
Finally, this work raises two methodological 
opportunities.  First, since many other arguments in 
developmental psychology are also of the form, “behavior B 
implies knowledge or mechanism X”, cognitive models 
which display B without X can potentially falsify those 
claims.  Second, if the same mechanisms underlie physical 
reasoning and syntactic parsing, then corresponding to each 
language universal syntactic constraint should be a 
cognitive mechanism that supports the observance of this 
constraint in the same way that supports binding constraints.  
This suggests the potential for the theoretical posits of 
syntactic theory to be used as clues for the discovery of 
cognitive processes and visa versa. 
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Abstract
We provide a computationally tractable model of how
organisms can learn to add structures to the world to reduce
cognitive complexity. This model is then implemented using
two techniques: first using a genetic algorithm, and then using
the Q-learning algorithm. The results clearly show that
organisms with only reactive behavior can learn to
systematically add structures to the world to reduce their
cognitive load. We show that such learning can happen in
both evolutionary time and within an agents lifetime. An
extension of this model (currently being implemented) is then
illustrated, where organisms with just reactive behavior learn
to systematically generate and use internal structures akin to
representations.
Many organisms generate stable structures in the world to
reduce cognitive complexity (minimize search or inference),
for themselves, for others, or both. Wood mice (Apodemus
sylvaticus) distribute small objects, such as leaves or twigs,
as points of reference while foraging. They do this even
under laboratory conditions, using plastic discs. Such way-
marking diminishes the likelihood of losing interesting
locations during foraging (Stopka & MacDonald, 2003).
Red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) use urine to mark food caches
they have emptied. This marking acts as a memory aid and
helps them avoid unnecessary search (Henry, 1977, reported
in Stopka  & MacDonald, 2003). The male bower bird
builds colorful bowers (nest-like structures), which are used
by females to make mating decisions (Zahavi & Zahavi,
1997). Ants drop pheromones to trace a path to a food
source. Many mammals mark their territories.
At the most basic level, cells in the immune system use
antibodies that bind to attacking microbes, thereby
marking them. Macrophages use this marking to identify
and destroy invading microbes.  Bacterial colonies use a
strategy called quorum sensing to know that they have
reached critical mass (to attack, to emit light, etc.). This
strategy involves individual bacteria secreting molecules
known as auto-inducers into the environment. The auto-
inducers accumulate in the environment, and when it
reaches a threshold, the colony moves into action
(Silberman, 2003).
Such doping of the world is commonly seen in lower
animals.  Most large animals (large body & brain size) do
not exploit this strategy. Humans, however, do so to a
tremendous degree. Markers, color-codes, page numbers,
credit-ratings, badges, shelf-talkers, speed bugs, road signs,
post-it notes, the list of epistemic structures used by humans
is almost endless. Humans also add structures to the world
to reduce cognitive complexity for artifacts. Examples
include bar codes (makes check-out machines decisions
easier), content-based tags in web pages (makes Web
agents decisions easier), sensors on roads (helps the traffic
light programs decision-making), etc.
The pervasiveness of such structures across species
indicates that adding structure to the world is a fundamental
cognitive strategy (Kirsh, 1996). Note that these structures
predominantly serve a task-smoothening function  they
make tasks easier for agents. Some of these structures have
referential properties, but they do not exist for the purpose
of reference. From here onwards, we will term such stable
structures that provide cognitive congeniality (Kirsh,
1996), epistemic structures. The term is derived from a
distinction between epistemic and pragmatic action made by
Kirsh (1994).
How do organisms generate and use such structures? Can
this generation of structures be captured computationally?
These are the questions we address in this paper.
A Taxonomy and a Property
Most of the literature on epistemic structures is by David
Kirsh, and from the field of Distributed Cognition in
general. Kirshs work explores the structural and
computational properties of such structures, and how they
function. We are interested in the other half of the problem,
i.e., how such structures are generated and used. We use
Kirshs model to develop a situated cognition model of how
such structures are generated. We then outline two
simulations we implemented to test this model. An
extension of this model (currently in progress) is then
described.
Epistemic structures can be classified into three types,
based on whom they are generated for. (examples of each in
brackets).
1. Structures generated for oneself (Cache marking,
bookmarks)
2. Structures generated for oneself and others
(Pheromones, color codes)
3. Structures generated exclusively for others (Warning
smells, badges)
A central feature of such structures is their task-specificity
(more broadly, function/goal-orientedness).  To illustrate
this concept, consider the following example.  Think of a
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major soccer match in a large city, and thousands of fans
arriving in the city to watch. The organizers put up large
soccer balls on the streets and junctions leading up to the
venue. Fans would then simply follow the balls to the game
venue.  Obviously, the ball reduces the fans cognitive load,
but how? To see how, we have to examine the condition
where big soccer balls don't exist to guide the fans.
Imagine a soccer fan walking from his hotel to the game
venue. She makes iterated queries to the world to find out
her world state (What street is this? Which direction am I
going?), and then does some internal processing on the
information gained through the queries. After every few set
of iterated queries and internal processing, she updates her
world state and mental state, and this continues until she
reaches her destination.
What changes when the ball is put up? The existence of
the big soccer ball cuts out the iterated queries and internal
processing. These are replaced by a single query for the ball,
and its confirmation. The agent just queries for the ball, and
once a confirmation of its presence comes in, she updates
her world state and internal state. The ball allows the agent
to perform in a reactive, or almost-reactive mode, i.e., move
from perception to action directly.  The key advantage is
that almost no (or significantly less) inference or search is
required.
This happens because the ball is a task-specific structure;
it exists to direct soccer fans to the game venue. Other
structures, like street names and landmarks in a city, are
function-neutral or task-neutral structures. The fans have to
access these task-neutral structures and synthesize them to
get the task-specific output they want. Once the huge ball, a
task-specific structure, exists in the world, they can use this
structure directly, and cut out all the synthesizing.  How the
soccer fans manage to discover the ball's task-specificity is a
separate and relevant issue, but we will not address it here.
Task-specificity is a property of all epistemic structures
found in nature, including pheromones and markers.
Kirsh's model of changing the world instead of oneself
(Kirsh, 1996), postulates that such generation of structures
involve task-external actions, and these structures work by
deforming the state space, so that paths in a task
environment are shortened. Such structures also allow new
paths to be formed in the task environment. Kirshs model
tackles only physical structures generated by organisms, like
tools. He does not consider structures generated for
cognitive congeniality.
The Tiredness Model
How are task-specific structures that lower cognitive
complexity generated? In this paper we consider the case of
non-human organisms like ants, wood mice and red foxes.
We will make two reasonable assumptions here. One,
organisms sometimes generate random structures in the
environment (pheromones, urine, leaf piles) as part of their
everyday activity. Two, organisms can track their physical
or cognitive effort (i.e., they get tired), and they have a
built-in tendency to reduce tiredness.
Now, some of the randomly generated structures are
encountered while executing tasks like foraging and cache
retrieval. In some random cases, these structures make the
task easier for the organisms (following pheromones
reduces travel time, avoiding urine makes cache retrieval
faster, avoiding leaf-piles reduce foraging effort).  In other
words, they shorten paths in the task environment. Given
the postulated bias to avoid tiredness, these paths get
preference, and they are reinforced. Since more structure
generation leads to more of these paths, structure generation
behavior is also reinforced.
This theoretical framework gives us the basis for building
artificial agents who also display the ability to learn to
systematically generate useful structures in their
environment.
The Simulation
To test and investigate the above model of epistemic
structure generation, we have developed a computational
model, where simple agents in a simple world, given
feedback only in terms of their tiredness (i.e., the effort
required to perform their task), learn to systematically add
structures to their environment.
The task we have chosen is analogous to foraging
behavior, i.e., navigating from a home location to a target
location and back again. Our environment consists of a
30x30 toroidal grid-world, with one 3x3 square patch
representing the agents home, and another representing the
target.  This target can be thought of as a food source, to
fit with our analogy to foraging behavior.
Agent Actions
At any given time, an agent can do one of five possible
actions.  The first and most basic of these is moving
randomly. This consists of going straight forward, or
turning to the left or right by 45 degrees and then going
forward. The agent does not pick which of these three
possibilities occurs (there is a 1/3 chance of each).
 In deciding the actions available to the agent, we needed
to postulate some basic facilities within each agent.  In our
case, we felt it was reasonable to assume that the agents
could distinguish between their home and their target. To do
this, we added two more actions to the agents repertoire.
These are exactly like the first action, but instead of moving
randomly, the agent would move towards whichever square
is sensed to be the most home-like (or the most target-
like).  Initially, the only things in the environment that are
home-like or target-like are the home and the target
themselves.
One way to think about these actions is to consider the
pheromone-following ability of ants.  Common models of
ant foraging (e.g. Bonabeau et al, 1999) consist of the
automatic release of two pheromones: a home pheromone
and a food pheromone.  The ants go towards the home
pheromone when they are searching for their home, and
they go towards the food pheromone when foraging for
food.  This exactly matches these two actions in our agents.
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The home pheromone would be an example of a home-
like structure in the ant environment.
The fourth and fifth possible actions provide for the
ability to generate these home-like and target-like
structures.  In the standard ant models, this could be thought
of as the releasing of pheromones. However, our simulation
has an important and very key distinction.  Here, this ability
to modify the environment is something the agents can do
instead of moving around.  That is, this generation process
requires time and effort. The best way to envisage this is to
think of an action that a creature might do which
inadvertently modifies its environment in some way.
Examples include standing in one spot and perspiring, or
urinating, or rubbing up against a tree.  These are all actions
which modify the environment in ways that might have
some future effect, but do not provide any sort of immediate
reward for the agent.  Kirsh (1996) terms these task-
external actions.
It must be stressed here that we are not presuming any
sort of long-term planning on the part of the agents.  We are
simply specifying a collection of actions available to them,
and they will choose these actions in a purely reactive
manner (i.e., based entirely on their current sensory state).
It may also be noted that our actions are considered at a
slightly higher level than is common in agent models.  Our
agents are not reacting by turning left or going forward;
they are reacting by following target-like things or
moving randomly. Furthermore, they do not initially have
any sort of association between the action of making home-
like structures and the action of moving towards home-
like things.  Any such association must be learned (either
via evolution, or via some other learning rule).
Also, our agents are not designed to form structures
automatically as they wander around (as is the case in
standard ant models). In our simulation, a creature must
expend extra effort to systematically generate these
structures in the world.  An agent that does this will be
efficient only if the effort spent in generating these
structures is more than compensated for by the effort saved
in having them. Moreover, these are not permanent
structures. The agents world is dynamic and the structures
do not persist forever.  The home-likeness or target-
likeness of the grid squares decrease exponentially over
time. Furthermore, these structures also spread out over
time.  A home-like square will make its neighboring
squares slightly more home-like.  This can be considered
similar to ant pheromones dispersing and evaporating, or
leaf/twig piles being knocked over and blown around by
wind or other passing creatures.
Agent Sensing
Since our agents are reactive creatures and thus do no
long-term planning, they require a reasonably rich set of
sensors.  We have given them four sensors, two external and
two internal, to detect their current situation.  The two
external sensors sense how home-like and how target-
like the current location is (digitized to 4 different levels).
The internal sensors are two simple bits of memory.  One
indicates whether the agent has been to the target yet, and
the other indicates how long it has been since the agent
generated a structure in its environment (up to a maximum
of 5 time units).  This is all that the agents can use to
determine which action to perform.
This configuration gives each agent 192 (4 x 4 x 6 x 2)
possible different sensory states.
The Learning Rules
For a purely reactive agent, we need some way of
determining which action the agent will perform in each of
these 192 states.  We investigated two different methods for
matching sensory states to actions: a Genetic Algorithm, and
Q-Learning.
Stage 1: The Genetic Algorithm
For our first model, we used a genetic algorithm to
determine which action to take in each situation.  The
genome consisted of a simple list of actions, one to perform
in each state.  To evaluate a particular genome, we started
10 agents in the home location and ran the simulation for
1000 time steps.  The evolutionary fitness was the agents
average tiredness (i.e., how long it took each agent to make
it back home from the target).
  
Figure 1: The computer model at 10, 100, and 300 time
steps.  Black dots are the agents.  The shading is darker
the more home-like or target-like a particular square
is.  This run shows typical agent behaviour after 300
generations.
Result: Initially, the agents behaved randomly.  Starting at
the home, they would wander about and might, by chance,
find the target and then, if they were very lucky, their home.
Indeed, most agents did not find the target and make it back
within the 1000 time steps.  On average, we found that each
agent was completing 0.07 foraging trips every 100 time
steps.  After a few hundred generations, the agents were
soon completing an average of 1.9 trips in that same period
of time.  In other words, the agents were able to, on an
evolutionary time scale, learn to make use of their ability to
sense and generate structures in the world.  Furthermore,
this ability provided a very large advantage over completely
random behaviour.
This result confirmed that it is possible for agents to learn
to systematically generate and use structures in the world in
an evolutionary time scale.  It also showed that we had not
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chosen an impossible task for the agents to learn.  However,
for our purposes, we were much more interested in an
individual agent learning to generate epistemic structures
within that agents lifetime. To investigate this, we turned to
the Q-Learning algorithm.
Stage 2: Q-Learning
The heart of our investigation was to determine whether a
simple, general learning algorithm would allow our agents
to discover and make use of the strategy of systematically
adding structures to the world.  In keeping with our
tiredness theory, the only feedback the learning
mechanism had was an indication of the exertion or effort.
The delayed-reinforcement learning rule known as Q-
Learning  (Watkins, 1989) seemed best suited for this task.
(Other similar algorithms will be investigated in future
work). The Q-Learning algorithm1 develops an estimate of
the eventual outcome of performing a given action in a
given situation.  The agent then performs the action with the
highest expected payoff.
Using the Q-Learning algorithm, we again ran 10 agents
for 1000 time steps.  To indicate tiredness, we gave them a
reinforcement value of -1 all the time (indicating a constant
punishment for expending any effort). When they returned
home after finding the target, they were given a
reinforcement of 0, and they were then sent back out again
for another trip.  Each agent independently used the Q-
Learning algorithm, and there was no communication
between the agents.
Result: The dark line in figure 2 shows the results averaged
over 100 separate trials.  We can clearly see that the agents
are improving over time (i.e., they are spending less time to
perform their foraging task).
Stage 3: Confirmation
Although we have observed improvement over time, we still
need to show that it is the agents ability to systematically
add structures to the world that is causing this effect. To
prove this, we re-ran the experiment, this time removing the
agents ability to generate structures in the world.  No other
changes were made.
Result: We found that when the agents were unable to
generate structures in the world, Q-Learning did not provide
as much improvement2. This result is shown in the lighter
line in Figure 2. There is still a small improvement given by
                                                          
1 The estimated reward for performing action a in state s is Q(s,a).
This is increased by α(r+γmax(Q(s’,b))-Q(s,a)), where r is the
immediate reward/punishment, s’ is the resulting state, γ is the
future discounting rate (set to 0.5), and α in the learning rate (0.2).
We used an ε-choice rule with ε set to 0.1, so the agents choose the
action with the highest expected reward 90% of the time, and the
other 10% they perform an action at random.
2 Q-Learning also did not provide significant improvement if the
agents were only able to generate one type of structure, or if any of
the agents sensors were removed.
Q-Learning, but we are able to conclude that the significant
improvement seen in the previous experiment is due to the
agents ability to modify their environment.
Foraging trips per 100 time steps
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Figure 2: The effect of epistemic structure generation.
The foraging rate is measured in trips per 100 time
steps.  A foraging rate of 0.5 means that trips require
an average of 200 time steps to complete.
We can also see from Figure 2 that having these extra
actions available does incur some cost in the early stages.
Initially, the agents perform slightly worse.  However, the
advantage of being able to form epistemic structures quickly
improves the agents performance.  By the end of the
simulation, agents require only around 150 time steps to
make a complete trip (a foraging rate of 0.66 trips in 100
time steps).  This is twice as quick as agents without the
structure-forming ability.
Table 1:  Time spent performing various actions.
Action With
Structure
Generation
Without
Structure
Generation
Move randomly 10% 32%
Toward home-like 19% 36%
Toward target-like 13% 32%
Make home-like 35%
Make target-like 23%
When we analyzed the actions of the agents, we found
that they actually spent 58% of their time generating
structures.  This is striking, since time spent generating
these structures means less time for wandering around
trying to find the target or their home.  Table 1 gives the
breakdown of how time was allocated to different actions.
The data indicates that epistemic structure generation
allowed the agents to go from spending 300 time steps down
to 150 time steps to complete their foraging task, even
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though over half of those 150 time steps are spent standing
still.  There is clearly a large efficiency advantage to making
use of these structures.
There are many Reinforcement Learning algorithms
available other than Q-Learning, and any one of them could
be used in this sort of model.  As we investigate other, more
complex situations, we will try using these alternatives to Q-
Learning, such as actor-critic methods.  All of these models
learn in a similar way, but with rather different details, and
so the resulting high-level behaviour may be different.
Conclusions
The Q-Learning system is a concrete implementation of
our model: a simple learning mechanism that allows agents
with purely reactive behavior to systematically add
structures to the world to lower search.
The tiredness-based learning model implemented in this
simulation can explain the generation of task-specific
structure in cases 1 and 2 (structures for oneself and
structures for oneself & others). Case 2 (structures generated
for oneself & others) is explained by appealing to the
similarity of systems  if a structure provides congeniality
for me, it will provide congeniality for other systems like
me. In our computer model, the agents ended up forming
structures that were useful for everyone, even though they
were just concerned about reducing their own tiredness.
This was possible only because the agents were similar to
each other.  This is similar to how paths are formed in
fields: one person cuts across the field to reduce his physical
effort, others, sharing the same system and wanting to
reduce their effort, find the route optimal. As more people
follow the route, a stable path is formed.
For case 3, (structures generated exclusively for others),
the tiredness model explains only some cases. For
instance, it could explain the generation of warning smells
and colors exclusively for others, because the effect of such
structures could be formulated in terms of tiredness (the
release of some chemical ends up cautioning predators,
which reduces the number of fleeing responses the organism
makes, thus reducing tiredness, which, when fed back,
reinforces the initial action). However, this model, as it
stands, cannot explain the generation of structures like the
bower or the peacocks tail, which do not seem to provide
any tiredness benefit for the generator.
Other Models
It is worth noting that our model presents a novel simulation
of ant behaviour.  The closest existing models are those in
(Bonabeau et al, 1999) which use the home-pheromone
and the food-pheromone.  This is in contrast to such
models as (Nakamura & Kurumatani, 1996), where a land-
based and an airborne pheromone are used, or any models of
the Cataglyphis species of ant, which uses a complex
landmark-navigation scheme which allows it to return
directly to the nest (Miller & Wehner, 1988).
That said, all of these other models assume both that
pheromones are continually being released while the ant
forages, and that there is no learning happening during the
foraging behaviour.  Our Q-Learning model does not make
either of these assumptions.
We were unable to find references indicating that real ants
might, in fact, learn to use pheromones, or any research that
indicates that the effort required to produce these
pheromones might interfere with foraging behaviour. So our
model may not be a good one for understanding ants.
However, the fact that our agents are able to learn to
reflexively generate these cognitively beneficial structures
in the absence of any immediate feedback to their benefit,
indicates a simpler way to model more complex creatures
that exhibit such behaviour.
Future Work
Our current simulation implements a learning process based
on the feedback of tiredness. It leads to organisms
generating task-specific external structures in the world.
These are structures that lower cognitive load, accessed by
organisms at run-time, while they execute tasks.
Interestingly, the same model can explain generation and
tracking of internal structures in organisms.  The actions
which generated structure in our simulation were actions
that affected the environment.  But this does not have to be
the case.  Just as we had both internal and external sensors,
we can have actions which affect either the state of the
world or the state of the agent itself.  In other words, we can
use this model to investigate the generation of internal
structure (i.e., representations).
As an example, consider foraging bees. Suppose that, just
as our agents left traces in the world of their activity via
their structure-generating actions, we have the bees leave a
sequence of internal memory traces corresponding to
landmarks (say a tall tree, a lake, a garden) as a result of
their everyday foraging activity. In some foraging trips of
some bees, the trace sequences match to some degree the
external structures they perceive. Such trips involve less
search, because they lead to food more directly, i.e., they
form shorter paths in the task environment. Over time, using
the exact same learning mechanisms that apply in the
external case, the bias against tiredness leads to such paths
being used more, and so they are reinforced. This leads to
landmark-based navigation, which, in fact, exists in bees
(Gould, 1990). As in the case of external structures, the
generation of such memory traces is reinforced because
more traces lead to more such shorter paths in the task
environment. We are currently working on a computational
model of this example. Interestingly, recent research shows
homing pigeons using human-generated environment
structure in a similar fashion to reduce cognitive load. They
follow highways and railways systematically to reach their
destination (Guilford, 2004).
The above framework presents a situated cognition model
of how memory structures come to be used as task-specific
structures, and why such internal structures are
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systematically generated. If such task-specific memory
structures are considered to be representations (that is, they
stand for something specific in the world), then the model
explains, in a computationally tractable manner, how
organisms with just reactive behavior can learn to generate
and use representations.
The model also explains what such primitive
representations are: they are the internal traces of the world
that allow the agent to shorten paths in a task environment.
Roughly, they are computation-reducing structures (and
equivalently, energy-saving structures). They are internal
stepping stones that allow organisms to efficiently
negotiate the ocean of stimuli they encounter. This means
the traditional cognitive science view, that thinking is
computations happening over representations, presents a
secondary process  it describes a privileged path in the task
environment. In the stepping stone view, representations are
crucial for organisms, but they are just useful, incidental
entities, not fundamental entities by themselves. We are
exploring the philosophical implications of this view.
All source code for the simulations can be found at:
http://www.carleton.ca/iis/TechReports/code/2004-01/
Acknowledgment
Some of the ideas presented in this paper were developed
while the first author worked as a pre-doctoral fellow with
the Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) Group of the
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin. He
acknowledges the group's support, particularly the strong
encouragement and critical feedback from Dr. Peter Todd
and Dr. John Hutchinson.
References
Alcock, J. (1998). Animal Behavior: An evolutionary
approach, Sunderland, Mass., Sinauer Associates.
Bogen, J. (1995). Teleological explanation. In Honderich
(Ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Bonabeau E., Dorigo M. and Theraulaz G. (1999) Swarm
intelligence: From natural to artificial systems. Santa Fe
Institute studies in the sciences of complexity. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. (1997). Being There: putting brain, body, and
world together again, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
Gould, J.L. (1990) Honey bee cognition. Cognition, 37, 83-
103.
Guilford, T., Roberts, S. & Biro, D. Positional entropy
during pigeon homing II: navigational interpretation of
Bayesian latent state models. Journal of Theoretical
Biology, published online, (2004).
Henry, J.D. (1977). The use of urine marking in the
scavenging behaviour of the red fox (Vulpes vulpes).
Behaviour, 62:82-105.
Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1994). On distinguishing epistemic
from pragmatic action. Cognitive Science, 18, 513-549.
Kirsh, D. (1996). Adapting the environment instead of
oneself. Adaptive Behavior, Vol 4, No. 3/4, 415-452.
Miller, M., & R. Wehner (1988). Path integration in desert
ants, Cataglyphis fortis. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences USA 85: 5287-5290.
Nakamura, M., & Kurumatani, K. (1996). Formation
mechanism of pheromone pattern and control of foraging
behavior in an ant colony model. Proceedings of the Fifth
International Conference on Artificial Life, 67-74.
Silberman, S. (2003), The Bacteria Whisperer. Wired, Issue
11.04, April 2003.
Stopka, P. & Macdonald, D. W. (2003) Way-marking
behavior: an aid to spatial navigation in the wood mouse
(Apodemus sylvaticus). BMC Ecology, published online,
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6785/3/3
Watkins, C. (1989). Learning From Delayed Rewards,
Doctoral dissertation, Department of Psychology,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
Zahavi, A., & Zahavi, A. (1997). The Handicap Principle: A
missing piece of Darwin's puzzle. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
203
Context-Driven Construction Learning
Nancy Chang (nchang@icsi.berkeley.edu)
UC Berkeley, Department of Computer Science and
International Computer Science Institute
1947 Center St., Suite 600, Berkeley, CA 94704
Olya Gurevich (olya@socrates.berkeley.edu)
UC Berkeley, Department of Linguistics
1203 Dwinelle Hall, University of California at Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720-2650
Abstract
We present a computational model of how partial comprehen-
sion of utterances in context may drive the acquisition of chil-
dren’s earliest grammatical constructions. The model aims to
satisfy convergent constraints from cognitive linguistics and
crosslinguistic developmental evidence within a statistically
driven computational framework. We examine how the tight
coupling between contextually grounded language comprehen-
sion and learning processes can be exploited to improve the
model’s ability to search the space of possible constructions. In
particular, previously learned constructions may not fully ac-
count for all contextually perceived mappings between forms
and meanings. In the model, these incomplete analyses di-
rectly prompt the formation of new relational mappings that
bridge the gap. We describe an experiiment applying the model
to the acquisition of English verb island constructions and dis-
cuss how the model handles more complex examples involving
Russian morphological constructions. Together these demon-
strate the viability of the overall approach and representational
potential of the model.
Beyond single words
How do children make the leap from single words to complex
combinations? The simple act of putting one word in front
of another to indicate some relation between their meanings
is widely considered the defining characteristic of linguistic
competence and the key to unlocking the combinatorial and
expressive power of language. A viable account of the acqui-
sition of these combinatorial patterns, or grammatical con-
structions, would thus have significant implications for any
theory of language that aspires to cognitive plausibility.
As with most issues impinging on the nature of gram-
mar, linguistic and developmental inquiries into the source
of combinatorial constructions have bifurcated along theoret-
ical lines. These reflect divergent assumptions about, among
other things, what kind of learning bias children bring to the
task, how the target linguistic knowledge should be repre-
sented, what kind of data should be considered part of the
training input, and how (if at all) language learning interacts
with other linguistic and cognitive processes. Theoreticians
within the formalist “learnability” paradigm, for example,
have generally restricted their attention to the form domain,
taking the input for learning to be a set of surface strings (each
a sequence of surface forms) and positing relatively abstract
structures that govern the combination of linguistic units.
This paper takes as starting point the hypothesis that the
learning problem at hand may encompass a broader subset
of the child’s experience, centrally including meaning as it is
communicated in context. We assume along with many the-
ories of language that the basic unit of linguistic knowledge,
for both lexical items and larger phrasal and clausal units,
is a symbolic pairing of form and meaning, or construction
(Langacker, 1987; Goldberg, 1995; Fillmore and Kay, 1999).
Since the target of learning is rooted in both form and mean-
ing domains, the learner should exploit information from both
domains during learning.
Most importantly, we view linguistic constructions as in-
herently dependent on and supportive of dynamic processes
of language use, anchored in a communicative context. A
crucial but often neglected source of bias in learning con-
structions must therefore be how much they help the child
meet her communicative goals.
This paper presents a computational model of construction
learning consistent with these principles, focusing on how
language understanding drives language learning. We de-
scribe a statistically driven machine learning framework that
takes as input a sequence of child-directed utterances paired
with their associated situational context, along with the cur-
rent grammar, or set of constructions; this grammar is ini-
tially restricted to lexical items. The utterances are passed
to a language understanding system (Bryant, 2003) that pro-
duces a partial interpretation, which provides the basis for the
learning model to form new constructions. We present re-
sults showing how the model acquires simple English “verb
island” constructions (Tomasello, 1992), and discuss how the
same mechanisms handle the more complex constructions in-
volved in Russian nominal case marking. These studies lend
support for the larger program of integrating cognitive and
constructional approaches to linguistics, crosslinguistic de-
velopmental evidence, and machine learning techniques to
address the puzzles of language acquisition.
The Construction Learning model
We briefly describe the construction learning model in terms
of (1) the target representation of learning, (2) assumptions
about the child language learning scenario, and (3) the com-
putational learning framework; see (Chang, 2004; Chang and
Maia, 2001) for more details.
Target representation: embodied constructions
Embodied Construction Grammar (Bergen and Chang, in
press; Chang et al., 2002) is a computationally explicit for-
malism for capturing insights from the construction gram-
mar and cognitive linguistics literature. ECG supports an
approach to language understanding based on two linked
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processes: analysis determines what constructions and
schematic meanings are present in an utterance, resulting in a
semantic specification (or semspec); the semspec serves to
parameterize a simulation using active representations (or
embodied schemas) to produce context-sensitive inferences.
Semantic representations in ECG are richly detailed and
cognitively motivated, incorporating image schemas, motor
schemas, force-dynamic schemas, and fine-grained represen-
tations of event and participant structure. But for ease of ex-
position, we omit most of this detail in our simple examples
below, since it is not crucial for our current focus on the acqui-
sition of the earliest constructions with constituent structure.1
We highlight a few aspects of the formalism relevant for
the learning model discussion to follow, exemplified by the
lexically specific clausal Throw-Transitive construction
shown in Figure 1. The formalism draws from both object-
oriented programming languages and constraint-based gram-
mars, including notations for expressing features, inheritance,
typing, and unification/coindexation.
constructionThrow-Transitive
constituents
t1 : Referring-Expression
t2 : Throw
t3 : Referring-Expression
form
t1
f
before t2
f
t2
f
before t3
f
meaning
t2
m
.thrower  ! t1
m
t2
m
.throwee  ! t3
m
Figure 1: Representation of a lexically specific Throw-
Transitive construction, licensing expressions like You
throw the ball, with separate blocks listing constituent con-
structions (t1, t2, t3), form constraints (e.g., the word order
relation before) and meaning constraints (e.g., the identifi-
cation binding  ! ).
All constructions have form and meaning blocks, but the
constituents block appears only in the complex construc-
tions that are the target of the present learning enterprise.
These constituents may be typed as instances of particular
constructions, and their form and meaning components (or
poles) may be referred to (shown with a subscripted f or
m) by the constraints listed in the form and meaning blocks.
Form constraints are used to capture (partial) word order and
other relations between form segments. In the meaning do-
main, the primary relation is identification, or unification, be-
tween two meaning entities. In particular, we will focus on
role-filler bindings, in which a role (or feature) of one con-
stituent is identified with another constituent. The example
construction involves three constituents – two referring ex-
pressions and the verb Throw. Their form poles are con-
strained to come in a specified order, and the meaning poles of
1These features play a key role in the acquisition of argument
structure and grammatical markers; we return to this issue later.
the two referring expressions fill the specified roles (thrower
and throwee) of the verbal constituent’s meaning pole.
Input: modeling the child learning scenario
Children entering the two-word stage (typically toward the
end of the second year) are relatively savvy event participants,
having developed a wealth of structured knowledge about the
participant roles involved in different events and the kinds of
entities likely to fill them (Nelson, 1996; Tomasello, 1992).
Their single-word vocabularies typically include names for
familiar people and objects, as well as some words for ac-
tions. They make use of pragmatic knowledge and joint at-
tention to infer both communicative intentions (Tomasello,
1995) and subtle lexical distinctions (Bloom, 2000), and often
respond appropriately to multi-word comments and queries
from their parents even in the single-word stage (Bloom,
1973). That is, children can robustly interpret utterances be-
yond their productive abilities, using (incomplete) lingustic
knowledge and relatively sophisticated inference abilities.
These findings suggest that grammar learning may, rather
than suffer from the poverty of the stimulus, instead capital-
ize on the opulence of the substrate. Our learning model thus
assumes an ontology of known concepts and an initial lexi-
con of constructions, represented in ECG. Input data reflects
the child’s ability to perceive an utterance with a particular
intonational contour and segment it into a sequence of word
forms, and to pragmatically infer the relevant participants and
events in the accompanying situation, as shown in the exam-
ple input below, where boxed index numbers indicate identi-
fication links between participants:
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
Form :
h
utterance : throw the ball
intonation : falling
i
Participants : Mother 0 , Naomi 1 , Ball 2
Scene :
"
Throw
thrower : Naomi 1
throwee : Ball 2
#
Discourse :
2
6
6
4
speaker : Mother 0
addressee : Naomi 1
speech act : imperative
activity : play
joint attention : Ball 2
3
7
7
5
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
The example input represents a discourse event in which
the mother says “throw the ball” with falling intonation to the
child (Naomi). We assume the child can infer (using prag-
matic cues) that the corresponding main scene concerns a
throwing event to be performed by the child on a particular
ball attended to in context. Note here that the action is the
inferred intent of the mother, and may or may not be car-
ried out by the child. But the (intended) role-filler structure
is assumed in our model to be inferrable in context and thus
available to the learning mechanism.
Besides these assumptions, the learning model also draws
on findings about the developmental course of construction
learning. Early word combinations appear to be lexically spe-
cific, with a gradual transition to more general constructions
(Tomasello, 1992); crosslinguistically they tend to relate to a
small set of basic scenes (Slobin, 1985); and acquisition phe-
205
nomena are sensitive to a number of usage-based consider-
ations (Tomasello, 2003; Clark, 2003) such as the frequency
with which a construction is encountered, the simplicity of its
form and meaning, and how easily a particular utterance can
be analyzed into its component constructions.
In sum, the model incorporates strong assumptions about
the child’s conceptual and lexical knowledge and pragmatic
abilities, based on developmental evidence. Relatively weak
assumptions are made about innate syntactic biases: the ECG
formalism allows word order as a possible form constraint.
Thus most of the learning bias comes from the meaning
domain, and the constructional assumption that forms and
meanings are linked.
Computational learning framework
We now describe a computational model of how constructions
can be learned from experience. The input is a sequence of ut-
terances paired with their meanings in context, as described in
the last section. The learner has access to a language analysis
process like that described earlier, which produces a (partial)
interpretation of the input utterances based on the current (po-
tentially incomplete) set of constructions. The learning task
is then modeled as an incremental search through the space of
possible grammars, where the learner adds new constructions
on the basis of encountered data. As in the child learning sit-
uation, the goal of learning is to converge on an optimal set
of constructions, i.e., a grammar that is both general enough
to encompass significant novel data and specific enough to
accurately predict previously seen data.
A suitable overarching computational framework for guid-
ing the search is provided by the minimum description length
(MDL) heuristic (Rissanen, 1978), which is used to find the
optimal analysis of data in terms of (a) a compact represen-
tation of the data; and (b) a compact means of describing the
original data in terms of the compressed representation. The
MDL heuristic exploits a tradeoff between competing prefer-
ences for smaller grammars (encouraging generalization) and
for simpler analyses of the data (encouraging the retention
of specific/frequent constructions). This is an approxima-
tion of the same tradeoff exploited in previous work apply-
ing Bayesian model merging to learning verbs (Bailey, 1997)
and context-free grammars (Stolcke, 1994). We extend these
approaches to handle the relational structures of the ECG for-
malism and the process-based assumptions of the model.
Learning strategies. The model may acquire new con-
structional mappings in two ways:
relational mapping New relational map(s) are formed to ac-
count for form-meaning mappings present in the input but
unexplained by the current grammar.
reorganization Regularities across known constructions are
exploited, either to merge two similar constructions into
a more general construction, or to compose two construc-
tions that cooccur frequently into a single construction.
Each construction is also associated with a weight that is
incremented as a result of its successful use in analysis.
Algorithms for these operations are given elsewhere
(Chang and Maia, 2001; Chang, 2004); relational mapping
plays the most crucial role in proposing new relational con-
straints among constituents and will be illustrated in more de-
tail in the next section.
Evaluating grammar cost. The strategies above provide
means for updating the current grammar; the model must then
determine which update is optimal at any point in learning,
according to some length-based evaluation criterion. We use
an approximation of the Bayesian posterior probability of the
grammar G given the data D that we call the cost of G:
cost(GjD) = m  size(G) + n  cost(DjG)
size(G) =
X
c2G
size(c)
size(c) = n
c
+ r
c
+
X
e2c
length(e)
cost(DjG) =
X
d2D
score(d)
score(d) =
X
x2d
(weight
x
+ p 
X
t2x
jtype
t
j)
+height
d
+ semfit
d
where m and n are learning parameters that control the rela-
tive bias toward model simplicity and data compactness. The
size(G) is the sum over the size of each construction c in the
grammar (n
c
is the number of constituents in c, r
c
is the num-
ber of constraints in c, and each element reference e in c has a
length, measured as slot chain length). The cost (complexity)
of the data D givenG is the sum of the analysis scores of each
input token d using G. This score sums over the construc-
tions x in the analysis of d, where weight
x
reflects relative
(in)frequency, jtype
t
j (where t ranges over the constituents
of x) denotes the number of ontology items of type t (i.e.,
the number of alternative fillers for the constituent), summed
over all the constituents in the analysis and discounted by pa-
rameter p. The score also includes terms for the height of the
derivation graph and the semantic fit provided by the analyzer
as a measure of semantic coherence.
These criteria favor constructions that are simply described
(relative to the available meaning representations and the cur-
rent set of constructions), frequently useful in analysis, and
specific to the data encountered.
Learning from meaning in context
This section describes in greater detail the integration of the
learning model with an implemented construction analyzer
(Bryant, 2003). We illustrate the analyzer-learner interaction
with an example based on the input data shown earlier.
Constructional analysis. On encountering new data, the
learner first calls a construction analyzer designed to per-
form the analysis process described earlier (Bryant, 2003).
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The analyzer consists of a set of construction recognizers
that recognize the input forms of each construction and check
whether the relevant semantic constraints are satisfied. The
analyzer draws on partial parsing techniques so that utter-
ances not fully covered by known constructions can never-
theless yield partially filled in semantic specifications. More-
over, unknown forms in the input can be skipped, allowing
quite simple constructions to provide at least skeletal inter-
pretations of more complex utterances.
In the example, we assume the current grammar includes
lexical constructions for throw and ball, but no word com-
binations or construction for the article the. The utterance
“throw the ball” at this stage produces a semspec containing
two schemas, corresponding to the meanings of the two rec-
ognized constructions, but no associations between them:
SCHEMA13 (Ball)
SCHEMA3 (Throw)
thrower: SCHEMA4 (Human)
throwee: SCHEMA8 (Physical-Object)
Here, SCHEMA13 corresponds to the meaning pole of the
Ball construction, and SCHEMA3 corresponds to the mean-
ing pole of the Throw construction.
Resolution. We extended the existing analyzer with a res-
olution procedure that matches the output semspec against
the input context. Like other resolution (e.g. reference reso-
lution) procedures, it relies on category/type constraints and
(provisional) identification bindings. The resolution proce-
dure attempts to unify each schema and constraint appearing
in the semspec with some type-compatible entity or relation
in the context. In the example, SCHEMA13 resolves by this
process to the salient Ball in the input, and SCHEMA3 resolves
to the Throw action in context.
Relational mapping. At this point the learner has a par-
tial semspec that through resolution accounts for a subset
of the information available in the input context descrip-
tion (namely, the presence of a throwing event and a ball).
The learner now searches for a candidate relational mapping
present in the input context but not accounted for by the sem-
spec – that is, a form relation that is unused in the current
analysis, paired with a meaning relation that is unaccounted
for in the semspec. These relations must be structurally
isomorphic, that is, their arguments must involve form and
meaning poles of the same constituent constructions. In the
example, the input includes a number of unexplained mean-
ing relations – for example, the identity of the speaker and
addressee, and both Throw schema roles. But only one of
these – the binding between the throwee role and the ball –
involves meanings that are also accounted for in the input,
and for which there is a corresponding form relation over the
form poles of the relevant constructions (i.e., an ordering re-
lation between throw and ball).
The situation is depicted in Figure 2, where the in-
put utterance-context pair are shown as form and meaning
schemas and relations on either side of the figure. Construc-
tions found by the analyzer are shown in the center, account-
UTTERANCE CONTEXTCONSTRUCTS
BALLball
speaker:
temporality:  ongoing
joint attention:
addressee:
speech act:  imperative
Discourse
throw
intonation: falling
activity: play
Ball
throwee
thrower
Throw
Naomi
Mom
Block
HROWT
NEW CONSTRUCTION
Figure 2: Relational mapping in the learning model for the
utterance throw (the) ball. Heavy solid lines indicate struc-
tures matched during analysis; heavy dotted lines indicate the
newly hypothesized mapping.
ing for the form and meaning schemas drawn with solid heavy
lines (i.e., the recognized input and produced semspec). The
discovery of structurally isomorphic relations over the form
and meaning poles of the two recognized constructions leads
to the hypothesis of the new lexically specific Throw-Ball
construction shown in the figure (with heavy dotted lines) and
formally in Figure 3.
constructionThrow-Ball
constituents
t1 : Throw
t2 : Ball
form
t1
f
before t2
f
meaning
t1
m
.throwee  ! t2
m
Figure 3: Example learned construction: Throw-Ball
learned from the utterance-context pair in Figure 2.
This example illustrates the simplest relational mapping
strategy; the requirement of strictly isomorphic form and
meaning relations can also be relaxed to allow more com-
plex relational correspondences (expressed using longer con-
straints). All such mapping strategies are designed to discover
how known constructions may fit together in larger structures,
thus giving rise to constituent structure.
Once these structured (but lexically specific) constructions
are learned, they are subject to reorganization, such that mul-
tiple constructions involving throw and a specific thrown ob-
ject may be merged into a generalized throw-Object construc-
tion (contingent on the MDL learning criteria). We now ex-
plore how the model can learn patterns of this kind from a
corpus of child-directed utterances.
Experiment: English verb island constructions
The construction learning model was tested in an experi-
ment targeting the acquisition of lexically specific, or item-
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based, constructions; we focus on patterns centering on spe-
cific verbs. This task is of cognitive interest, since “verb is-
land” constructions appear to be learned on independent tra-
jectories (i.e., each verb forms its own “island” of organiza-
tion (Tomasello, 1992; Tomasello, 2003)).
Input data. The training corpus for the experiment is a sub-
set of the Sachs corpus of the CHILDES database of parent-
child transcripts (Sachs, 1983; MacWhinney, 1991) annotated
as part of a study of motion utterances (Dan I. Slobin, p.c.).
The transcript data consists of parent and child utterances oc-
curring during a joint background activity (e.g., a meal or
play). All motion expressions were annotated with descrip-
tions of the inferred speaker meaning and the surrounding
discourse and situational context. We used a subset of this
corpus containing 829 labeled motion-related child-directed
utterances spanning the child’s development from 1;3 through
2;6, during which the child makes the transition from the
single-word stage. Parental utterances were extracted into in-
put data of the form shown above.
Evaluation criteria. The goal of language learning in our
framework is to improve language understanding. We thus
defined a quantitative measure intended to gauge how new
constructions incrementally improve the model’s comprehen-
sive capacity. We defined a grammar G’s coverage of data D
as the percentage of total bindings b in the data (i.e., role-
filler bindings relevant to the verb) included in its interpreta-
tion (semspec), and measured coverage at each stage of learn-
ing. The throw subset, for example, contains 45 bindings to
the roles of the Throw schema (thrower, throwee, and goal
location). At the start of learning, the model has no combi-
natorial constructions and can account for none of these, but
as learning progresses, the model should learn constructions
that allow it to cover increasingly more of these bindings.
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Figure 4: Incremental coverage for three verb islands.
(Graphs are scaled relative to subcorpus size.)
Results. Figure 4 shows results for three verb islands: drop
(n=10 examples), throw (n=25), and fall (n=50); other verbs
followed similar patterns. In all cases coverage gradually
improved over the course of learning, as expected, and the
model was able to account for a majority of the bindings in
the data relatively quickly. But as shown by these examples,
the particular learning trajectories were distinct: throw con-
structions show a gradual build-up before plateauing; fall has
a more fitful climb that seems to converge at an upper bound;
and drop has an even more jagged rise. A possible explana-
tion for some of these differences may lie in pragmatic differ-
ences: throw has a much higher percentage of imperative ut-
terances than fall (since throwing is pragmatically more likely
to be done on command). The relational mapping strategy
used in the experiment misses the association of an imper-
ative speech-act with unexpressed agent, which has a more
pronounced effect on the learning of throw constructions.
Also as expected, the earliest constructions are combina-
tions of specific words (e.g, throw-ball, throw-frisbee, you-
throw), giving rise later in learning to more general construc-
tions (e.g., throw-Object and Agent-throw). Figure 5 shows
the number of each type learned.
lexical general total
drop 5 1 6
throw 11 4 15
fall 21 9 30
Figure 5: Number of constructions learned for each verb, in-
cluding both fully lexically specific constructions and verb
island constructions with at least one generalized argument.
Discussion. Despite the small corpus sizes, the results are
indicative of the model’s ability to acquire useful verb-based
constructions. Differences in verb learning lend support to
the verb island hypothesis and illustrate how the particular se-
mantic, pragmatic and statistical properties of different verbs
can affect their learning course.
Case study: Russian
The verb island experiment demonstrates the model’s ability
to acquire constituent structure, an essential step in moving
beyond lexical items. But the child’s learning scenario may
be significantly more complicated. We briefly consider some
problems that arise for learners of comparable Russian con-
structions and how the model addresses them.
In Russian, casemarkers suffixed on nouns indicate the par-
ticipant role played by their associated referents. Word or-
der is thus highly variable: malchik brosaet devochk-e my-
ach (boy-NOM throw-3s girl-DAT ball-ACC) and devochk-
e brosaet myach malchik (girl-DAT throw-3s ball-ACC boy-
NOM) have the same participant structure, glossed as ‘boy
throws ball to girl’. Moreover, the same marker may be am-
biguous over multiple class/case combinations (e.g., -a indi-
cates either Feminine-I/NOM or Masculine-Animate/ACC).
Flexible word order does not in itself pose an obstacle to
the model. Deferring nominal morphology for the moment
(see below), the first multi-word constructions learned by the
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model (via relational mapping) are, like their English equiva-
lents, both verb-specific and fixed-order (e.g., one for each of
the examples above). During construction reorganization, the
model seeks candidates for merging that are similar in both
meaning and form; separate fixed-order constructions involv-
ing the same constituents with equivalent participant struc-
tures are prime candidates. Generalizing over these construc-
tions leads to a new construction that contains all the shared
structure of the original constructions, omitting in this case
the order constraints.
Morphological constructions are similar to word combina-
tions in involving constituency, though word-internal. The
main difference is that casemarkers do not occur indepen-
dently of their nominal contexts, and are first learned as part
of an unstructured larger unit. Thus the relational mapping
strategy for learning constituent structure cannot apply di-
rectly. We assume, however, that over time the child is able
to segment words into stems and endings, based on general
pattern-detection mechanisms (Peters, 1985). Then the model
can merge multiple constructions with the same stem and
different endings (e.g., merging devochk-e (girl-DAT) and
devochk-a (girl-NOM) yields a stem devochk- with no par-
ticipant role specified). Similarly, a particular casemarker oc-
curring on different stems (but the same verbal context) can
be merged to yield a suffix construction whose meaning pole
is associated with a specific participant role (or multiple roles,
since polysemous markers are allowed). The resulting stem
and casemarker constructions may then serve as constituents
for larger morphological constructions.
Conclusion
The work described in this paper are best characterized as first
steps toward concrete computational validation of our broad
research paradigm. The model is intended to offer a detailed
picture of the pivotal role meaning in context plays in the ac-
quisition of grammar. It draws on evidence from across the
cognitive spectrum arguing for a construction-based grammar
formalism, extensive prior knowledge, and a data-driven, in-
cremental learning course.
We have concentrated on the acquisition of constituent
structure, as demonstrated by the verb island learning experi-
ment. Note that we have not addressed how the model learns
constructions that depend on more general semantic cate-
gories; these include both general argument structure con-
structions corresponding to basic scenes (caused motion, ma-
nipulative activity, etc.), and casemarking constructions that
generalize across verbs. These categories are not assumed to
be universal, but rather must be learned based on the fine-
grained semantic structure available in the ECG representa-
tion. In ongoing work we are investigating the conditions and
assumptions that allow such constructions to emerge. We are
also exploring the relative rates of acquisitions of different
classes of verbs and continuing to test the robustness of the
model to crosslinguistic data.
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Abstract
One approach to conceptual change suggests that ontological
barriers may impose beliefs that contribute to learners’
misconceptions and misunderstanding of many science
concepts. Overcoming this hurdle requires ontological
training, which we argue may be possible using concepts and
behaviors related to the discipline of complexity. We
investigated the difficulties related to learning complex
systems concepts, specifically systems exhibiting emergent
causal processes. Results showed that all students acquired
the following three concepts: Multiple Levels of
Organization, Local Interactions, and Probabilistic Behavior.
However, all but one student remained unable to develop and
use a sophisticated understanding of the concepts of
Nonlinearity and Randomness. This suggests that these latter
concepts may be the most deeply rooted and robust of the
ontologically based misconceptions. Further research is
required to investigate if this tendency toward “causal
determinacy” may be modified using other types of
interventions.
Introduction
Beliefs are thought to have substantial affects on how we
interact with and interpret the world. Recent studies in fields
such as theories of self (Dweck, 1999) and epistemological
beliefs (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002) suggest that these ways of
thinking also may affect learners’ ability to perform certain
tasks or construct certain types of knowledge. It is therefore
reasonable to propose that ontological beliefs may play a
significant role in learners’ misunderstanding of concepts
whose mechanisms are unfamiliar or completely unknown.
Chi, Slotta and deLeeuw (1994) put forward the argument
that robust misconceptions associated with the learning of
certain key science concepts1 may be the result of assigning
these concepts to incorrect ontological categories. It is
possible also that lacking knowledge of a specific
ontological category limits learners’ ability to construct
                                                 
1 Conceptual change difficulties reported in learning some
important science concepts such as electricity in physics (Chi,
Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; White, 1993), gas laws and equilibrium
in chemistry (Wilson, 1998), and in the biological sciences such
concepts as diffusion, osmosis (Odom, 1995; Settlage, 1994), and
evolution (Anderson & Bishop 1986; Brumby, 1984; Jacobson &
Archodidou, 2000).
explanatory frameworks for a certain class of science
concept.
The ontological category at the heart of this inquiry is
that of emergent causal processes. It describes the
behavior of phenomenon that rely on the interactions of
multiple agents, all operating under the same
constraints, without centralized control, influenced by
flows of information with feedback loops and selection
mechanisms, which generate multiple levels of
organization within a system. The nonlinear and
probabilistic nature of these complex systems is
responsible for the seemingly magical transformations
that occur between levels of the system. Put simply,
emergence is characterized as the higher-level system’s
behavior, which arises, but cannot be predicted, from
the behavior of individual lower-level entities in the
system.
Conceptual Challenges of Emergence
Although we know a lot about emergent causal
processes, we continue to be challenged by why these
concepts pose obstacles to learners. Duit, Roth,
Komorek and Wilbers (1998), and Penner (2000),
among others, have studied what students learn about
complex systems when provided with different types of
models.  From their work we know that it is possible to
learn some aspects of emergent behaviors, but these
studies have not articulated the dimensions nor have
they looked at the potential for transfer of this
explanatory framework to achieve conceptual change.
Although students may be exposed to the behaviors
and functioning of complex systems in general course
work (e.g., diffusion of gases), it appears that many do
not understand the concepts deeply; and they do not
transfer these explanations to other instances of
emergence (Jacobson, 2000). In fact, Jacobson’s work
shows that novice learners do not correctly attribute
emergent causation to explain the behavior of complex
systems whereas experts in fields such as biology and
economics do so readily. Therefore we know that it is
possible to use this as a generic framework as a generic
to explain novel emergent phenomena. Additionally,
Jacobson’s results provide evidence to support the
claim that expertise in certain fields may be built on a
deep understanding of this emergent ontological
category.
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2Lastly, there are powerful computer models to facilitate
the acquisition of complex systems, however, the literature
tells us that certain beliefs appear to limit how readily
learners “see” and correctly explain the model’s behaviors
(e.g., Resnick & Wilensky, 1997). For instance, Resnick
(1994) identifies the tendency to attribute centralized
control to self-organizing behaviors of multi-agent
computer models in StarLogo™. But we do not know the
impact of simulations and modeling of different types of
complex systems on understanding of emergent behaviors.
Nor do we know if all aspects of emergence as
demonstrated by these models of complex systems are
equally challenging to novice learners.
Our interest in this paper is to take a modest step toward
addressing some of these gaps in understanding how
knowledge of emergent causal processes, as demonstrated
in multi-agent simulations, may affect learning of certain
science concepts. More specifically, we seek to identify and
describe which emergent behaviors can be learned through
simple simulations and modeling of emergent systems and
which are more problematic for learners.
In the following sections we will describe the mixed
method longitudinal case study of nine science students who
participated in five, one-on-one, one-hour long inquiry-
based sessions using simulations designed with StarLogo™.
We will also describe the coding taxonomy (Complex
System’s Taxonomy – CST) which we developed to analyze
the transcribed audio data collected.
Material and Methods
Sample
We recruited science students, between the ages of 17 and
18, in their freshmen year at a pre-university English
college in Quebec (equivalent to grade 12). From this cohort
we selected nine case studies using a purposeful sampling
strategy (Creswell 2002). A major criterion for selection
was the students’ level of motivation and persistence2.
The students’ ages and academic experiences guaranteed
that their formal knowledge of complex systems and
emergent processes was limited or non-existent. However,
we administered a pre-test to establish a baseline of their
entry-level knowledge of these concepts (these data are not
discussed in this paper).
Instruction
The treatment consisted of five, 60 minute one-on-one
inquiry-based sessions. Each session was comprised of two
major components: (a) StarLogo computer simulations, and
(b) cognitive scaffold in the form of coach/interviewer. The
simulations were selected based on the ratings of four
                                                 
2 Learning Approach Questionnaire (LAQ) created by Donn
(1989) was used to assess motivation. We selected participants
with high internal motivation to ensure persistence with the task
over course of this longitudinal study.
subject matter experts. The criteria were that the
simulations should demonstrate emergent causal
processes, and may in fact exhibit other behaviors of
complex dynamic systems. The resulting treatment
consisting of three simulations, and one tutorial, (Slime
- session 1; FreeGas – session 2; StarLogo
programming tutorial – session 3; no simulation –
session 4; Wolf-Sheep – session 5) selected from a bank
of over 12 other existing StarLogo simulations that also
were judged appropriate for grade 12 science students.
The simulations finally selected also have a prior
history of providing learners with opportunities to learn
about concepts of complexity (e.g., Resnick &
Wilensky, 1997). This should not suggest that each
simulation presented the same level of affordance for
learning complexity concepts, however, they all held
the potential to demonstrate some level of the more
anticipated behaviors (i.e., non-isomorphic multiple
levels of organization, decentralized control,
randomness, nonlinearity, probabilistic behavior, and
dynamic homeostatic behaviors). A question of interest
that emerged from the observations was the differential
effects of the different types of complexity represented
in the simulations (i.e., the tightly coupled organization
modeled in Slime simulation, versus the dissipative
systems of FreeGas, and the somewhat in-between
system modeled in Wolf-Sheep). Lastly, we also did not
know the impact of presentation sequence but decided
to keep this constant across learners to reduce the
variability among cases although it prevented us from
learning more about this question.
Procedure
Over the period of five one-hour sessions, spanning a 7-
week period each of the nine learners met individually
with the coach in a research lab and worked with the
simulation assigned for the session (see above). As they
explored the assigned simulation, learners were asked
to describe their observations related to the behaviors of
the agents (i.e., slime mould, gas molecule, turtle, wolf-
sheep) and construct and articulate possible
explanations for these behaviors. The literature suggests
that these causal explanations would reveal the
underlying component beliefs/mental models
(deterministic “clockwork” component beliefs used by
novice learners versus nondeterministic “emergent”
component beliefs used by experts) used to interpret
these phenomena (e.g., Chi, et al, 1994; Jacobson,
2000). These statements could then be coded and
triangulated with data collected relating to shifts in
component ontological beliefs that forms part of a
larger study (Charles, 2003).
Based on the literature (e.g., Resnick, 1994) we
anticipated that learners would be able to identify and
describe behaviors common to complex dynamic
systems during their sessions. Therefore the ability to
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3comply a list of the structural similarities between the
simulations was viewed as the high level objective of this
experience. At the conclusion of each session learners were
asked to attempt to produce a list of behaviors exhibited by
the simulation. If necessary they were reminded of the list
complied from their previous sessions. Lastly, they were
provided with a list of concepts, which may be related to
either complex or simple systems and asked to construct a
concept map. These data are not described in this paper.
Data collection, coding, and analysis
We collected direct observational data (audio and video
tapes of the instructional activities), written documents
(students’ responses at the pretest and posttest), and
interview data. A coding scheme entitled Complex Systems
Taxonomy (CST) was developed to determine students’
conceptual understanding of the various aspects of complex
systems. Adapted from Jacobson (2000), it reflects concepts
presented by Holland (1995), Bar-Yam (1997), and others.
This "fine grain" overly represented coding scheme was
used purposefully to ensure that all articulated observations
of systems’ behaviors could be coded (see Appendix for
complete CST). Post analysis results allowed for narrowing
of the taxonomy for future use.
Results
One of the major themes constructed from the categories to
emerge from the interviews was that the different
simulations facilitated the acquisition of different aspects of
complex systems. The results in Table 1 represent the total
responses aggregated across students. It displays the
percentage of responses within each complex systems
component.
Table 1:  Distribution of responses (percentages) within
Complex Systems Taxonomy (CST) for each simulation.
SimulationsCST
Concept Slime FreeGas Wolf-Sheep
ML 49.1 35.2 32.5
LI 22.4 25.1 35.3
OS 2. 8 14.0 8.6
PR 11.4 19.3 13.4
RB 5.1 3.0 2.3
TA 4.20 0.26 0.19
FL 1.10 0.43 2.90
DE 0.68 1.20 0.70
SR 0.74 0.00 0.13
DC 1.30 0.68 1.40
DI 0.32 0.00 0.38
NL 0.00 0.15 0.38
PA 1.40 0.26 1.00
ML is Multiple Levels of Organization, LI is Local Interactions,
OS is Open Systems, PR  is Probabilistic Behavior, RB  is
Random Behavior, TA is Tags, FL is Flows, DE is Dynamic
Equilibrium, SR  is Simple Rules, D C is Decentralized
Control, DI is Diversity, NL is Nonlinear, PA is Pattern
Recognition
To answer the question what difficulties might
students experience with learning the concepts involved
with emergent causal processes we analyzed the data
both at the level of students and at the level of emergent
causal process concepts. Thereby producing the two
levels of analysis reported below.
Student level analysis
Figure 1 illustrates the combined scores on the CST for
each student across all sessions. On this basis students
could be classified into four groups:
• Sophisticated Emergent Causal Processes (ECP)
Identifier (CST score > 75). This describes Greg who is
considered an outlier at the high end.
• High Moderate Emergent Causal Processes (ECP)
Identifier  (CST score between 60 and 70). This
describes Mitch, Sidney and Sam.
• Moderate Emergent Causal Processes (ECP)
Identifier  (CST score between 40 and 50). This
describes Walter and Norman.
• Novice Emergent Causal Processes (ECP) Identifier
(CST score between 30 and 40). This describes Emilie,
Penny, and Monique (an outlier at the low end).
Figure 1:  Student’s understanding of Complex
Systems concepts over three simulations.
Concepts level analysis
The results of Table 2 show the number of statements
(relative to each student’s total number of statements)
that were coded (using the CST) into each Complex
Systems concept. Thus, it allows us to make a
provisional decision on whether each student observed
and therefore discussed the Complex Systems concepts.
If one arbitrarily, takes a value of 1 as the cutoff point,
we can provisionally conclude that all students
including the three Novice ECP Identifiers (Monique,
Emilie, and Penny) observed and discussed the
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4concepts of  “multiple levels of organization”, “local
interactions”, and “probabilistic causes”. All the other
students also observed and discussed the concept of
“random behavior”. The major difference between the
Moderate ECP Identifiers (Norman and Walter) and the
High ECP Identifiers (Sam, Sidney, and Mitch) was in the
general strength of their responses. On the other hand, the
Sophisticated ECP Identifier (Greg) not only had a greater
response to the latter concepts, he also observed and
discussed more concepts, namely “flows” and “dynamic
equilibrium”
Table 2: Relative number of statements made by each
student coded into Complex Systems concepts over three
simulations.
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ML 6.7 21.0 15.7 16.1 20.9 22.3 30.8 26.0 25.8
LI 3.0 8.5 8.8 11.3 13.0 17.5 17.1 20.6 25.7
OS 0.0 2.2 3.6 2.7 4.1 4.1 2.4 5.4 12.1
PR 2.6 2.3 3.6 5.8 6.7 7.3 10.8 11.6 13.0
RB 0.0 0.5 0.9 3.1 1.0 2.5 3.7 2.7 2.4
TA 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.4 1.5 1.3
FL 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.2
DE 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.0
SR 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4
DC 0.1 0.6 1.9 0.2 0.3 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.3
DI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4
NL 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5
PA 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.8 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.9
ML is Multiple Levels of Organization, LI is Local Interactions,
OS is Open Systems, PR is Probabilistic Behavior, RB is Random
Behavior, TA is Tags, FL is Flows, DE is Dynamic Equilibrium,
SR is Simple Rules, DC is Decentralized Control, DI is Diversity,
NL is Nonlinear, PA is Pattern Recognition
The interpretation that concepts, which had low counts on
the CST scheme (e.g., random behavior, nonlinear effect,
decentralized control, dynamic equilibrium), suggests that
students did not observe them is not the only conclusion to
be drawn from these data. It may indicate that learners
readily recognized the behavior described by the concept
and chose to focus instead on other concepts that were more
challenging or interesting. It may also indicate that the
simulation did not offer sufficient affordances for
learning that concept.
Discussion
Chi and colleagues (e.g., Chi et al., 1994; Chi 2000)
have long proposed that ontological training will
remove ontological barriers, which they speculate
create the misunderstandings observed when learning
certain scientific concepts. Our study shows that not all
of these identified barriers are equally daunting. In fact,
our study confirmed that using the selected
intervention, it was possible to hurdle two of the
barriers (Multiple Levels and Local Interactions)
identified as problematic by Chi (2000). Our results
also suggest that two (Nonlinearity and Random
Behaviors) of a possible six complex systems concepts
are either not affected by this intervention with its
relative affordances for learning complex systems
concepts (i.e., non-isomorphic multiple levels of
organization, decentralized control, probabilistic
behavior, and dynamic homeostatic); or, that these
concepts represent a deeper level of entrenched beliefs
and require some other type of intervention or condition
before substantial change will be observed. The more
important of these two is randomness because it is an
addition to the list of barriers identified by Chi (2000).
Adding to the list of Ontological Barriers - “Causal
Determinacy”
One of the ontological barriers not identified by Chi
(2000) is the attribution of causal determinacy (i.e.,
difficulty in acquiring the concept of random actions).
This current study shows that, possibly because of weak
affordances of the simulations, students experienced
difficulty with the notion of randomness. Klopfer and
Um (2000) in a study of fifth and seventh grade
students using StarLogo in a scaffolded learning
environment called “Adventures in Modeling” also
demonstrated that students experienced difficulties with
learning the concept of random events; although in the
latter portion of their 14 sessions intervention, students
were able to grasp this concept.
The evidence from the study reported here and from
the larger study (Charles, 2003) is that all the learners at
some level were challenged by randomness. In fact, it
was the main stumbling block for Greg who otherwise
acquired an understanding of all the emergent causal
processes without exceptional cognitive struggle. For
example, Greg when provided with an ontological
prompt during session 1, answered with an explicit
statement describing the Slime mould model as being
deterministic. His view was that the computer program
limited the options and therefore the outcome was
determined a priori, therefore predictable.
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5Greg: Yeah, I think it’s more of a deterministic system. Because
like even looking at the way that this is set up there was a
minimum number of turtles that you could have and I think it starts
off as a system that has a plan and that all the other variables just
act on whether like it’s your plan ... so you have a deterministic
system.
What this suggests perhaps is that even though learners
accept the randomness of some happenings, as indicated in
their answers to the question about ants foraging, at a deeper
level they struggle to accept the lack of some means of
predicting future outcomes (even by infinitesimally small or
remote means). This deep level understanding is further
confounded by the limitations of the programmed
environment of the simulations, which indeed may confirm
beliefs that there is some level of predictability because
random number generations machines are behind these
calculations. This is the level of discussion that Greg, Mitch
and Sidney all at some point conducted with the coach.
How then did any of the learners show signs of acquiring
a deeper level understanding of this concept? The evidence
suggests that Greg was the only case to describe random
actions at the deeper level of understanding as an element of
true causal indeterminacy and “noise”. He appeared to
accomplish this as a consequence of both cognitive
scaffolding and his domain knowledge. During the final
interview session, one year after the intervention, Greg was
asked to explain his concept map. In this discussion, he
elaborated on the role played by random actions in the
behavior of systems. This required him to reflect and in
doing so he referenced his course work from biology and
how the “noise” of random events creates the “possibilities”
of the future states.
Greg: ...so that creates um, randomness, and that creates
possibilities, also.  That if there were no random events, then you
wouldn’t have those possibilities.  Um, but all these chance events,
they, when they get absorbed into the complex system, they have
very little effect.  It’s like throwing a pebble into a river.  Sure, you
might course the river in a one in billion chance or something, but
chances are it does nothing.  It’s not going to affect the flow of the
river in any way.  Uh, so, what that means is that complex systems,
they follow more rules of probability, and they, they... so nothing
is for sure I guess, there is always the element of chance involved.
But they’re [complex systems] by and large more predictable than
simple systems.
The attribution of causal determinacy is a key obstacle to
understanding emergent causal process for most learners.
This arises either because of the learners’ component
beliefs, as in the instantiation of the case study Norman, or
because of the confounding of concept and programming
limitations as demonstrated by Sidney, Mitch and overcome
by Greg. The contention may come as no surprise to those
investigating the cognitive processes involved in reasoning
about uncertainty (e.g., Shauhnessy, 1992). Metz (1998)
points to the spurious causal attributions that result
from misunderstanding of randomness and probability.
What is surprising is that this same barrier also may
account for a major difficulty in learning emergent
causal processes such as evolution. This contention is
supported by research from Zaïm-Idrissi, Désautels, and
Larochelle (1993). In their study working with 15
biology students (master’s level) they concluded that
the majority of the sample held deterministic forms of
reasoning about the topic of evolution. Furthermore,
they uncovered several inconsistencies in the belief
systems of the study’s participants, primarily, the
conflict between deterministic and probabilistic
reasoning.
Therefore, it is possible that this causal determinacy
attribution may be one of the most widely
interconnected beliefs that affect other related beliefs
such as probabilistic causes, and even decentralized
control. It may well fit Chinn and Brewer’s (1993)
description of the evidentiary supporting schema. They
state: “It appears, then, that well-developed schemas are
not necessarily entrenched. The key is whether the
schema is also embedded in evidentiary support and is
used to support a wide range of other theories and
observations that the person believes” (p. 17). Future
research is required to try and untangle the possible
confounding of the simulations’ weak affordances and
the students’ ontological belief about randomness.
Conclusions
Using the complex systems’ taxonomy, the results of
this inquiry show that all nine case study students had
little difficulty developing an understanding of three
emergent causal processes: Multiple Levels of
Organization, Local Interactions and Probabilistic
Behavior. However, the emergent component concepts
of Nonlinearity and Randomness were challenging for
all. In fact, only one student, Greg, was capable of
demonstrating a deep conceptual understanding of these
concepts. Furthermore, his understanding grew with
maturation over time, with experience from
complementary content areas, and cognitive scaffolding
from the coach/interviewer. Greg’s persistent attempts
to reason with these concepts and explain phenomena
using these notions (e.g., explaining evolution of a
species as dependent upon random events) may also
account for his ability to acquire this knowledge.
The results of our study also show that the
affordances for learning aspects of emergent causal
processes, and concepts of complexity, offered by
multi-agent simulations and modeling are highly related
to the type of complex system represented and also to
the students’ background understanding of science. In
particular more learners had difficulty learning with
representations (simulations) of dissipative system
complexity (FreeGas) compared to those using
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6representations of tightly coupled organization models of
complexity (Slime).
In summary, this investigation provides evidence that it is
possible, using simple simulations and scaffolding, to
facilitate the learning of some aspects of an emergent causal
explanatory framework. However, other components of
emergence, which are linked to non-deterministic (i.e.,
randomness) and nonlinear conceptions are not easily
acquired and may represent the more deeply entrenched
ontological beliefs. Further research is needed to examine
these specific aspects of emergent causal frameworks and
the effectiveness of other types of instructional simulations
and tools.
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Appendix
COMPLEX SYSTEM CODING TAXONOMY
1. Local interactions.
2. Simple rules
3. Decentralized control
4. Random behavior
5. Tags
6. Flows
7. Internal models
8. Diversity/ variability
9. Modularity
10. Pattern formation
11. Open/closed systems
12. Multiple Levels
13. Probabilistic
14. Nonlinearity
15. Criticality
16. Dynamic equilibrium
17. Adaptation
18. Selection
19. Time scale.
20. Multiple causality
215
A Cross-Linguistic Study of Phonological Units: Syllables Emerge from the Statistics
of Mandarin Chinese, but not from the Statistics of English
Train-Min, Chen (trainmin@alumni.ccu.edu.tw)
Department of Psychology, National Chung Cheng University
160 San-Hsing, Min-Hsiung, Chia-Yi 621 Taiwan, R.O.C.
Gary S. Dell (gdell@s.psych.uiuc.edu)
Beckman Institute, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
405 N. Mathews Ave, Urbana, Illinois 61801 U.S.A.
Jenn-Yeu, Chen (psyjyc@ccu.edu.tw)
Department of Psychology, National Chung Cheng University
160 San-Hsing, Min-Hsiung, Chia-Yi 621 Taiwan, R.O.C.
Abstract
This study explored the statistical patterns of English and
Mandarin Chinese sound sequences, by comparing their
learning in a simple recurrent network. Experiment 1 showed
that vivid syllable structure emerged from the sound sequence
of Mandarin Chinese. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that
the emerged syllable structure of Mandarin Chinese is
considerably more salient than that of English. We claim that
the more salient syllable structure in Mandarin Chinese inputs
is one reason why syllable units are particularly emphasized
in its processing in comparison to English.
Introduction
According to linguistic theory, the sound patterns of all
languages are hierarchical. Segmental speech sounds (or
phonemes) are concatenated into syllabic constituents (onset,
rhyme), which join to form syllables, which, in turn, are the
constituents of larger units such as feet and words. In
psycholinguistic theories of production, each kind of unit
plays a part, but some units are more salient than others. For
example, standard theory (e.g. Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer,
1999) holds that lexical items are stored as sequences of
segments. The organization of these sounds into syllables,
however, is not stored, but rather is computed during
production. Evidence against stored syllables comes from
two principal sources:
(1) The absence of syllabic speech errors. For example,
exchanges of non-morphemic syllables are very rare. You
would never hear “napkin” spoken as “kinnap.”
(2) The absence of syllabic priming effects that cannot be
attributed to segmental units. For example, naming a word
is speeded when a masked orthographic prime syllable that
matches the initial sounds of the word precedes it. In many
such studies, this priming is unaffected by whether or not
the prime syllable corresponds to a whole syllable in the
target word (e.g. Schiller, 2000).
The conclusion that syllables are not units of storage has
been based on studies of Germanic languages such as
English and Dutch. Our own production research has
demonstrated that this conclusion is not warranted for all
languages. Here, we briefly review our studies of production
in Mandarin Chinese, which show that the syllable is far
more unitary than has been found in English and Dutch.
Then, we present two computational studies involving the
learning of Mandarin and English sound sequences. These
studies suggest that cross-linguistic differences in the
salience of the syllable in production emerge from the
statistics of the sequences.
Speech Error Data Psycholinguists believe that the
commonness of slips of units such as segments or words
provides evidence that these units are psychologically real.
Research has shown that whole syllables, in contrast, rarely
move, at least in English and in related languages, and the
few apparent cases can be otherwise explained as
morphemic or segmental slips (Chen, 2000). However, this
is not the case for Mandarin Chinese. Chen (2000)
demonstrated that syllable movement errors indeed happen
in the natural speech of Mandarin Chinese at a rate of
10,000 times greater than would be expected if these errors
were the result of independent segmental slips. Importantly,
these sylable errors “strand” tone; only the segmental part 
of the syllable moves. One such example is that the word
[ching1zhuo2du4] ( 清 濁 度 ’clarity’) slipped to
[ching1du2du4], an anticipation of the third syllable [du].
This stranding of tone rules out the explanation that these
are slips of morphemes or characters.
Masked Priming Data Studies of masked priming of word
naming in Mandarin Chinese also point to the syllable as a
unit. Chen, Lin, and Ferrand (2003) found that when the
segmental overlap between the target word to be produced
and a preceding character prime constituted a complete
syllable, the response time was faster than when it did not.
This result was obtained for both CVC and CV-glide
syllables (Lin & Chen, 2003).
Implicit Priming Data The implicit priming paradigm is a
production task that is useful for discovering relevant
phonological units. Participants learn several cue-target
word pairs, and later must say the target member of the pair
as quickly and correctly as possible upon seeing its paired
cue word. Using this task in Dutch, Meyer (1991) showed
that when target words in a set shared their initial portions,
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responses were faster than when they did not. Moreover,
when the shared initial portions did not constitute a syllable,
priming was still observed and correlated positively with the
number of shared segments. Hence, the observed priming
effects seem to derive from shared segments. Implicit
priming in Mandarin Chinese was quite different from that
in Dutch (Chen, Chen, & Dell, 2002). Crucially, priming
was only found when target words shared the segments of
entire first syllable, or the segments and the tone together.
Accordingly, the priming effects in Mandarin Chinese
derive from syllable rather than segment sized units.
Why are Mandarin Chinese speakers more
sensitive to syllable units than other speakers?
We believe that the production system reflects the language.
Relative to English, Mandarin Chinese has few syllable
types. English has more than 10,000 syllables, and
Mandarin only around 400 (without counting the tone) or
1,200 (when tones are considered). In addition, re-
syllabification commonly occurs in English speech, e.g.
‘demand it’becomes ‘de-man-dit’, but not in Mandarin
(Kuo, 1994). Moreover, English, but not Mandarin, involves
ambisyllabicity, the apparent membership of a consonant in
more than one syllable e.g.‘hap-py’. These properties make
the syllable a more efficient planning unit for Mandarin
Chinese. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that these
properties lead to sound sequences whose statistical
structure favors syllabic, as opposed to word and segmental,
units. More generally, we claim that the relative importance
of various unit types is a product of experience and test this
claim by adopting the computational approach of Elman
(1990) to phonological sequences.
Analysis of Sequences by Simple Recurrent
Network
The Simple Recurrent Network (Elman, 1990)
A simple recurrent network (see Figure 1) is a three-layer
feedforward network, in which input, hidden and output
Figure 1. Elman’s(1990) simple recurrent network, in
which activations are copied from hidden layer to context
layer on a one-for-one basis, with fixed weight of 1.0.
Dotted lines represent trainable connections.
layers are linked by forward trainable connections in a
distributed fashion, i.e. fully connected. Crucially, the
network includes another input layer, the context layer,
which serves as the dynamic memory of the network. The
connections from context layer to hidden layer are trainable
and distributed, but the recurrent connections from hidden
layer to context have fixed weights of 1.0 and are one-to-
one. Functionally, the recurrent connections behave much
like a copier, which duplicate the activation pattern of
hidden layer at a particular time step on the context layer.
Hence, output at any given time step is shaped by the
network’s previous internal state together with its current
input. These properties make simple recurrent networks
useful models of how people implicitly learn the structure of
sequences.
Word Structure in a Letter Sequence
Elman (1990) examined the statistical structure of English
letter sequences by having the simple recurrent network
predict the letter that follows the current input letter.
Trainable weights were changed to the extent that the
prediction was incorrect. The degree of prediction error was
highly correlated with word boundaries. Error tended to
spike up for word-initial letters, and declined as a function
of the serial position for letters within words (see Figure 2).
Hence, the relatively higher error for word-initial letters
successfully demonstrated that the simple recurrent network
discerns the word structure in the letter sequence without
providing it with any word boundary cue during training. It
appears that the word is the dominant unit, at least in
English letter sequences. Next, we perform the same
analysis on spoken Mandarin Chinese input.
Figure 2. Graph of root mean squared error plotted over
time in the letter prediction task (Elman, 1990, Figure 6).
The letter to be predicted each time is shown in parenthesis.
Experiment 1: Exploring the Syllable Structure
in Mandarin Chinese Inputs
In this experiment, Mandarin Chinese input was assessed by
inspecting the relative performance of the network on
predicting (1) word-initial sounds, (2) syllable-initial sounds
that are not also word initial, and (3) the sounds within the
syllable (hereafter, within-syllable sounds). If predicting
syllable-initial sounds is harder than predicting within-
syllable sounds, syllable boundaries will be protruded, that
Input Units Context Units
Output Units
Hidden Units
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is, syllable units will show up. Besides, if predicting the
syllable-initial sound is as difficult as predicting the word-
initial sound, it suggests that the syllable is the sole
emergent unit. This is because word-initial sounds
themselves are also syllable-initial, and the syllable unit
alone could explain the pattern without postulating a word
level.
Method
Simulation Materials and Sound Representation The
simulation material came from a 30-minute stretch of a
children’s radio broadcast program (for ages 6 and upward)
downloaded from the “National Education Radio”website
at http://www.ner.gov.tw. It contained 5,394 sounds
(sounds differing only in nasal features were regarded as
different sounds), comprising 2,072 syllables and 1,300
words. For the simulation, each sound was represented as a
52-bit binary vector, 47-bit for the segment (because 47
different segments were involved) and 5-bit for the tone
(because there are five lexical tones in Mandarin Chinese).
Simulation Design and Network Training The
performance of the network on predicting the word-initial,
syllable-initial, and within-syllable sounds was examined
under 18 conditions created by crossing three factors: (1)
tonal information (Syllable condition: tone distributed to
each sound of the syllable; Rhyme condition: tone only
distributed to sounds of the rhyme; Without condition: no
tonal information), (2) the number of training epochs (20,
40), (3) the number of hidden units (25, 100, 200).
Performance of the network was evaluated by two kinds of
scores: (1) the Error Rate, calculated by regarding the output
vector incorrect if the proposed target vector was not its
closest vector, and (2) the Euclidian Distance between the
actual output vector and its target vector. For both ways of
scoring, the larger scores index greater unpredictability and,
hence, a more salient boundary.
Before training, the connection weights were initialized
randomly in the range of 0.5. Training began with
presenting the network a sequence of input vectors one at a
time, and having the network learn to predict the next by
adjusting the connection weights with the backpropagation
algorithm. Leaning rate and momentum were set to 0.3 and
0.9 respectively.
Results and Discussion
Throughout the study, the Error Rate and Euclidian Distance
displayed the same pattern. We present only the latter
measure in Figure 3, which illustrates the results of single,
but typical, condition. Sounds at word and syllable
boundaries were much more difficult to predict than within-
syllable sounds. The difficulty of predicting the syllable-
initial sounds, however, was quite similar to that of the
word-initial sounds. This pattern held no matter how many
hidden units the network was equipped with, how many
epochs of training had passed, and how (or even whether)
the tone was represented. These findings strongly suggest
that the syllable is functioning as a unit. Predictability is
very high within the syllable, and the word boundary does
little to increase uncertainty beyond that associated with the
syllable boundary. Whether any word structure exists will
be statistically examined in Experiment 2 when we directly
compare Mandarin Chinese with English.
Figure 3. Average Euclidian Distance for predicting sounds
in different positions. (Simulation condition: 100 hidden
units, 20 epochs, tone was distributed to each sound of the
syllable)
An important side result of this experiment is that the
pattern shown in Figure 3 was, for the most part,
independent of how we represented tone, or even whether
we represented it at all. For example, if tone was not
represented, the condition corresponding to the one
illustrated in Figure 3 led to distances of 1.00, 0.94, and
0.56 for word-initial, syllable-initial, and within-syllable
sounds, respectively. Thus, the segmental pattern alone is
more than enough to motivate dominant syllable-sized units.
In fact, the speech error study of Chen (2000), the implicit
priming study of Chen, Chen, and Dell (2002), and the
masked priming study of Chen, Lin and Ferrand (2003) all
suggested that tone-less or segmental syllables as well as
syllables with tone function as important production units in
Mandarin. The findings of Experiment 1 are quite consistent
with these data.
Experiment 2: Comparing Sound Patterns in
English and Mandarin Chinese
The second experiment compared the sound distributions in
English and Mandarin Chinese inputs directly. This was
achieved by replicating the prior experiment using English
and Mandarin Chinese versions of comparable simulation
materials. The experiment also manipulated the nature of the
representation of diphthongs, that is, whether they are
considered to be one or two sounds. Because the prior
experiment had shown that the supra-segmental (tone)
information, the number of the hidden units, and the number
of training epochs did not matter, the present experiment
was conducted without supra-segmental information (tone
or stress), and with a constant 100 hidden-unit network
trained for 20 epochs.
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Method
Simulation Materials The simulation materials consisted of
10 short English-Mandarin Chinese bilingual children’s
stories, downloaded from the “Mandarin Daily News”
website at http://www.mdnkids.org.tw/. The English
versions contained a total of 6,511 sounds when diphthongs
were counted as two sounds and 6,243 sounds when
diphthongs were counted as one sound, 2,482 syllables and
1,949 words. The Mandarin Chinese versions contained
7,116 sounds when diphthongs were counted as two sounds
and 6,472 sounds when diphthongs were counted as one
sound, 2,743 syllables and 1,860 words. The principle of
representing the sounds for simulation was identical to the
prior experiment.
Simulation Design Four conditions were created by
crossing two factors: (1) the number of sounds that
diphthongs denote (one, two), and (2) languages (English,
Mandarin Chinese). Aside from the Error Rate and
Euclidian Distance, another score, Syllabic Saliency, was
created for representing the degree of saliency of syllable
structure. It was defined as where, in percentage terms, the
performance of predicting the syllable-initial sound locates
on a scale that is maximal at the performance of predicting
the word-initial sound and minimal at the performance of
predicting the within-syllable sound.
Results
The results with Euclidian Distance and Error Rate were
statistically indistinguishable and so we continue to report
only the distance measure. The main finding from the
experiment was that, as expected, Mandarin Chinese
differed considerable from English. Treating the 10 stories
as “subjects” in an analysis of variance with language, type 
of boundary, and diphthong representation as independent
variables yielded a strong interaction between language and
boundary type, F (1,18) = 197.2, p < .0001. Figure 4 shows
the findings from the diphthong-as-two-sounds condition. In
Mandarin the predictability at syllable and word boundaries
was nearly identical. The Syllable Saliency here was 96%,
that is, predicting sounds at syllable boundaries was almost
as inaccurate as predicting them at word boundaries. For
English, the Syllable Salience in this condition was 35%,
much lower than in Mandarin, F (1,9) = 25.9, p < .001. In
fact, for English, syllable-initial prediction accuracy was
actually closer to within-syllable than word-initial accuracy.
The results were similar, but less dramatic, when the
diphthong was treated as a single sound. The Syllable
Saliencies for Mandarin and English were 88% and 43%,
respectively, F (1,9) = 19.4, p< .002. Pooling across the
diphthong treatment yielded a strong effect of language on
this measure, F (1,9) = 24.6, p < .001.
Clearly, in Mandarin, the predictability was close for
word-initial and syllable-initial sounds. Were word-initial
sounds any less predictable than syllable-initial ones? For
English, they definitely were, F (1,9) = 28.7, p < .001. For
Mandarin, the very small effect was not significant in the
diphthong-as-two-sounds condition, but it was in the
diphthong -as-one-sound condition, F (1,9) = 4.4, p < .03.
Figure 4. Average Euclidian Distance for predicting sounds
in different positions in Mandarin Chinese and English
(Simulation condition: diphthong as 2 sounds, 100 hidden
units, 20 training epochs, without tonal information)
Discussion
To summarize, three major findings were obtained. First,
vivid syllable structure emerged from the sound sequence of
Mandarin Chinese. Second, the emerged syllable structure is
more salient in Mandarin Chinese than in English. Third,
equivalent syllable structure was found even when supra-
segmental information was removed from the sound
sequence. Implications of these results are discussed below.
As described in the introduction, psycholinguistic studies
demonstrated that the role of the syllable is not equally
emphasized in the production of English and Mandarin
Chinese, a finding that hints that the sound patterns the
language presents should reflect such difference. This is
exactly what we demonstrated in this experiment. In
Mandarin, the predictability of a sound was almost entirely
determined by whether or not it is at a syllable boundary. In
English, word structure was more salient, and the
predictability within a syllable was not that much greater
than that at syllable boundaries that are not word boundaries.
A stronger, but more speculative, interpretation of our
findings makes reference to the particular kind of model that
we used to assess predictability, the simple recurrent
network. This network architecture has been offered as an
account of phonological retrieval in production (e.g. Dell,
Juliano, & Govindjee, 1993). One of the advantages of such
an account is that one does not need to explicitly include or
exclude particular kinds of units. Rather, the weights
acquired through learning lead to activation states with
greater or lesser correspondence to discrete units at several
levels. Hence, the learner is not faced with the all-or-none
decision as to whether to have a syllable level in the system.
To the extent that different languages possess gradations in
the salience of units such as the syllable, this connectionist
approach may help explain the cross-linguistic variation
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Another finding of note was that a strong syllable
structure emerged in Mandarin Chinese even when supra-
segmental (tone) information was not considered. This
suggests that the segmental syllable, i.e. the syllable without
the tone, has statistical support in the input, and may
function as a processing unit. Psycholinguistic studies of
Mandarin support this hypothesis. For instance, analysis of
natural speech errors indicated that sometimes a syllable
moves to a new location, leaving its tone behind (Chen,
2000). That is, the slipping unit was a segmental syllable.
Pan, Chen, and Chen (1999) demonstrated this effect with
experimentally generated slips. Furthermore, implicit
priming and masked priming findings are robust both for
syllables with tones and for segmental syllables (Chen,
Chen & Dell, 2002; Chen, Lin & Ferrand, 2003).
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Abstract 
A model of the effects of distribution density on evaluations 
of attribute values is proposed in which biases created by 
language-expressible magnitude comparisons (e.g., “I waited 
longer for the bus today than I did yesterday”) serve as the 
mediating mechanism. The biases created by comparisons as 
well as the mechanisms by which comparison-induced biases 
could produce density effects are described. Simulation data 
demonstrate signature characteristics of comparison-induced 
density effects. An experiment found preliminary evidence in 
support of the view that some density effects might be 
comparison-induced. 
Density Effects 
Evaluations of attribute values such as grades (Wedell, 
Parducci, & Roman, 1989), taste (Riskey, Parducci, & 
Beauchamp, 1979), visual velocity (Sokolov, Pavlova, & 
Ehrenstein, 2000), prices (Niedrich, Sharma, & Wedell, 
2001), income (Hagerty, 2000) and so forth often depend 
upon the density—or frequency—of the distribution from 
which judged values are drawn (Krumhansl, 1978; Parducci, 
1965, 1995).  In particular, evaluation functions are 
typically concave (downward) for positively skewed 
distributions and convex (concave upward) for negatively 
skewed distributions. Values drawn from positively skewed 
distributions are also often judged larger than are values 
drawn from negatively skewed distributions. 
Several explanations for these effects have been proposed. 
Parducci’s (1965) Range-Frequency Theory assumes that 
people are aware of and use percentile rank information to 
evaluate attribute values. Range-Frequency Theory explains 
the finding that evaluation functions are often concave for 
positively skewed distributions, because the density at the 
lower end of positively skewed distributions gives low 
values larger percentile rank scores than they would have 
had otherwise.  The slope of the function becomes shallow 
at the sparse upper end of the distribution where percentile 
rank scores increase at a slower rate. The reverse pattern of 
changes in percentile rank scores in negatively skewed 
distributions explains the finding that evaluation functions 
are often convex for negatively skewed distributions. 
Haubensak (1992) suggested an alternative explanation 
for density effects on evaluations of sequentially presented 
values. He argued that since people do not know the 
distribution density and range in advance, they tend to 
assume that early values are typical or average and assign 
them intermediate verbal labels or category ratings. After 
these initial labels or category ratings have been assigned, 
people are obliged to use them consistently. Since early 
values are most likely to come from the dense portion of 
skewed distributions, the portion of the range at the dense 
end of these distributions will be smaller than the portion of 
the range at the sparse end. To cover the entire range of 
values the remaining verbal labels or category ratings would 
have to be assigned asymmetrically. 
In this paper, I propose yet another possible explanation 
for density effects. Namely, that some density effects might 
be comparison-induced (Choplin & Hummel, 2002). Verbal 
comparisons will tend to bias values apart in dense regions 
making the slope of the evaluation function steep and bias 
values together in sparse regions making the slope of the 
evaluation function shallow. These biases would make 
evaluation functions concave for positively skewed 
distributions and convex for negatively skewed 
distributions. The assignment of verbal labels or category 
ratings to these biased values might explain why values 
drawn from positively skewed distributions are often judged 
larger than are values drawn from negatively skewed 
distributions. 
I start by reviewing the basic tenets of Comparison-
Induced Distortion Theory (Choplin & Hummel, 2002) and 
describing how comparisons could produce density effects. I 
present simulation data to demonstrate signature 
characteristics of comparison-induced density effects and 
how they differ from density effects produced by other 
mechanisms. I then describe an experiment in which I found 
preliminary support for the view that some density effects 
might be comparison-induced. 
Comparison-Induced Distortion Theory 
The basic idea behind Comparison-Induced Distortion 
Theory (Choplin & Hummel, 2002) is that language-
expressible magnitude comparisons suggest quantitative 
values. To investigate the meanings of English age 
comparisons Rusiecki (1985) gave his participants sentences 
such as “Mary is older than Jane” and “Martin’s wife is 
older than Ken’s wife” and asked them to report the ages 
they imagined. Rusiecki found considerable agreement in 
the values imagined by his participants. In response to the 
comparison “Mary is older than Jane” participants imagined 
Mary to be 20.2 years on average and Jane to be 17.9 years 
on average. In response to the comparison “Martin’s wife is 
older than Ken’s wife” participants imagined Martin’s wife 
to be 37.2 years on average and Ken’s wife to be 33.0 years 
on average. 
Of particular interest to the current discussion, the age 
differences imagined by Rusiecki’s (1985) participants were 
remarkably similar. Regardless of the particular ages they 
imagined, participants imagined a difference between the 
ages of approximately 2 to 5 years (slightly larger for larger 
values)—not 1 month or 30 years. Inspired by these results, 
Rusiecki argued that comparisons suggest quantitative 
differences between compared values. I will henceforth call 
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these quantitative differences “comparison-suggested 
differences,” because they are the differences suggested by 
comparisons. In the case of age comparisons, for example, 
Rusiecki’s results demonstrate that comparison-suggested 
differences are approximately 2 to 5 years (for ease of 
discussion I operationally define the comparison-suggested 
difference implied by age comparisons to be 3.5 years). 
Choplin and Hummel (2002) proposed a model of 
attribute evaluation in which magnitude comparisons (like 
those investigated by Rusiecki, 1985) bias evaluations of 
magnitude values. In particular, they suggested that 
evaluations of magnitude values might be vulnerable to bias 
whenever values differ from the values suggested by 
comparisons. For example, if the actual age difference 
between two people were 1.5 years (i.e., less than the 
comparison-suggested difference of 3.5 years), then a 
comparison would tend to bias evaluations of their ages 
apart—toward a difference of 3.5 years. The younger person 
would be evaluated younger than she or he would have been 
evaluated otherwise and the older person would be 
evaluated older than she or he would have been evaluated 
otherwise. If the actual age difference between two people 
were 5.5 years (i.e., more than the comparison-suggested 
difference of 3.5 years), then a comparison would tend to 
bias evaluations of their ages together—again toward a 
difference of 3.5 years. The younger person would be 
evaluated older than she or he would have been evaluated 
otherwise and the older person would be evaluated younger 
than she or he would have been evaluated otherwise. 
Formally, the comparison-suggested value of the smaller 
of two compared values (ES; E for Expected) and the 
comparison-suggested value of the larger of two compared 
values (EL) can be calculated from the comparison-
suggested difference, D: 
ES = SL – D  
EL = SS + D 
(1a) 
(1b) 
where SL and SS (S for Stimulus values) are the values of 
the larger and smaller values unbiased by comparisons 
respectively. Represented values are assumed to be a 
weighted mean of the values unbiased by comparisons and 
the comparison-suggested values: 
RS = wES + (1-w)SS  
RL = wEL + (1-w)SL 
(2a) 
(2b) 
where w is the relative weights of the two values, is bound 
between 0 and 1, and is constrained so as to prevent 
impossible values (e.g., negative years or sizes of geometric 
figures) from being represented. For example, assuming a 
comparison-suggested difference, D, of 3.5 years, a 
comparison between a 22-year old and a 28-year old would 
bias evaluations of their ages toward each other. If the 
weight given to comparison-suggested values were .2, then 
the represented age of the 22-year old would be 22.5 years 
and the represented age of the 28-year old would be 27.5 
years. That is, the age of the 22 year old would be evaluated, 
i.e., treated, as if it were half a year older and the age of the 
28 year old would be evaluated as if it were half a year 
younger. 
Comparisons Might Create Density Effects 
Comparison-induced biases like those just described might 
produce density effects. Consider, for example, the 
positively skewed distribution of ages presented in Figure 1 
which might be approximately representative of the ages of 
students in a typical undergraduate classroom. Filled-in 
arrows represent biases created by comparisons between 
values that are closer together than the comparison-
suggested difference and that are, therefore, biased apart by 
comparisons. Outlined arrows represent biases created by 
comparisons between values that are farther apart than the 
comparison-suggested difference and that are, therefore, 
biased together by comparisons. Values in dense regions 
(i.e., 18 – 22 years in Figure 1) are more likely to be closer 
together than the comparison-suggested difference and as a 
result comparisons will more likely bias evaluations apart. 
Values in sparse regions (i.e., 22 – 28 years) are more likely 
to be farther apart than the comparison-suggested difference 
and as a result comparisons will more likely bias 
evaluations together. I propose that this difference in the 
effects of comparisons within dense regions versus the 
effects of comparisons within sparse regions might produce 
comparison-induced density effects. 
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Figure 1: Comparison-induced biases that might occur in a 
positively skewed distribution of ages. 
Modeling Density Effects 
To model comparison-induced density effects, Comparison-
Induced Distortion Theory requires several assumptions. 
First, an operational definition of the comparison-suggested 
difference (D) is required. In the preceding sections, for 
example, an adequate operational definition of the 
difference suggested by age comparisons was obtained from 
Rusiecki’s (1985) study in which he queried his participants 
as to the differences they imagined. Alternatively, an 
adequate operational definition might be obtained from 
common real-world differences. 
Second, because the number of comparisons people could 
hypothetically articulate as well as the sequences in which 
they could hypothetically articulate them is—in most 
cases—indefinite, assumptions about which comparisons 
get articulated are required. Almost any comparison scheme 
would produce density effects. Comparing each value to the 
value presented one item back, for example, would produce 
density effects. In the modeling presented below, I assumed 
that the to-be-judged item is only compared to one other 
item. Additionally, I assumed two constraints on the 
selection of this comparison item: the similarity between the 
to-be-judged item and candidate comparison items and the 
sequence in which values were presented. Although these 
assumptions were optional, I utilized them because they are 
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psychologically realistic and they have a long history in 
models of categorization and the psychology of judgment 
(see, for example, Haubensak, 1992; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 
1997; Smith & Zarate, 1992). 
To model the constraint of similarity on the selection of 
comparison items, I (along with Shepard, 1987) assumed 
that similarity is an exponentially decreasing function of the 
distance between item values. For every recently presented 
item j, it’s similarity to i, the to-be-judged item, (ηij) is 
calculated as: 
ijcd
ij e
−=η  (3) 
where c is a sensitivity parameter and dij is the weighted 
distance between i and j in similarity space across all 
relevant dimensions weighted by the importance of each 
dimension (see, for example, Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). 
To model the constraint provided by the sequence in 
which items are presented, I calculated the activation (aij) of 
each candidate comparison item j as: 
ijjij ηMa =  (4) 
where M is the memory strength of exemplar j and is given 
by: Mj = αt(i) – t(j) where α represents the memory decay on 
each trial and is bound between 0 and 1 and where t(i) and 
t(j) are the trials on which i and j were presented 
respectively (see Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). Selection of 
the item to which the to-be-judged item is compared could 
be accomplished a number of different ways. The choice 
axiom might be used to make selection stochastic. In the 
simulations below, maximum activation (aij) was used to 
make selection deterministic. 
Simulation Using Artificial Values 
The purpose of this simulation was to demonstrate how the 
model proposed above might create density effects and to 
point out signature characteristics of comparison-induced 
density effects that differentiate them from density effects 
created by other mechanisms. To demonstrate how the 
model presented above would create density effects, a 
computer-generated sequence of 500 values drawn from a 
log-normal distribution was created from equations 5 and 6. 
)2sin(log2 21 RRVnormal π−=  (5)
normalV
normal eV
σ=−log  (6)
where R1 and R2 are random, computer-generated values 
between 0 and 1. Equation 5 produced a normally 
distributed sequence and Equation 6 changed that sequence 
into a log-normally distributed sequence. To skew the log-
normal distribution, σ was set at .9. 
To model recall of the item to which the to-be-judged 
item was compared, the parameter α, representing memory 
decay, was arbitrarily set at .985 thereby minimizing 
memory losses. The parameter c, representing sensitivity to 
differences, was set at 0.3. Within the sequence, the second 
value was compared to the first value; the third value was 
compared to whichever of the first or the second value had 
the highest activation (a; see Equation 4); the fourth value 
was compared to whichever of the first, second, or third 
value had the highest activation, and so forth. In these 
simulations, only the most recent 7 values were candidates 
for comparison. Recalled values were biased by the 
comparison on the trial on which they were judged, but were 
not biased further by subsequent comparisons. 
To model comparison-induced distortions, the 
comparison-suggested difference, D, was set at 0.38 and the 
weight given the comparison-suggested values, w, was .5. 
As suggested in Figure 1, values from the dense region were 
more likely to be compared to values that were less than a 
comparison-suggested difference away than were values 
from the sparse region. The values that were smaller than 
1.5 (the dense lower region) were most similar to a value 
that was less than a comparison-suggested difference away 
86.1% of the time (329/382). By contrast, the values that 
were larger than 1.5 (the sparse upper region) were most 
similar to a value that was less than a comparison-suggested 
difference away 40.2% of the time (47/117). 
The results are presented in Figure 2. Generated values 
are plotted along the horizontal axis. The value of each item 
is plotted on the vertical axis. The filled-in squares represent 
comparison-biased values and the outlined circles represent 
unbiased values. 
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Figure 2:  Simulation Results. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, comparisons between each value 
and the most recent similar value created biases. Consistent 
with previous research using category ratings as the 
dependent measure, these biases produced a concave 
evaluation function. Seemingly contrary to previous 
research, however, comparisons had a tendency to bias 
values downward instead of upward. 
This seeming contradiction can be reconciled by noting 
that category ratings depend not only upon representations 
of values but also upon the function mapping 
representations to category ratings. A number of functions 
could produce high category ratings.  For example, if people 
were to use the range of values to make category ratings as 
proposed by Volkmann (1951), then even if comparisons 
biased representations in one direction (perhaps, as 
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measured by reproduction), category ratings could be biased 
in the other direction (see Biernat, Manis, & Kobrynowicz, 
1997). 
To demonstrate this possibility, range scores (i.e., [value 
on trial t minus smallest value up to trial t] divided by 
[largest value up to trial t minus smallest value up to trial t]) 
were calculated from the comparison-biased values. The 
results—after the initial 35 trials in which the range was 
established—are plotted in Figure 3. Filled-in squares 
represent comparison-biased range scores. The range 
transformation makes comparison-biased values comparable 
to the predictions of Range-Frequency Theory and so range-
frequency compromise values (with the weight given to 
frequency set at .35) are also plotted in Figure 3 and 
represented as outlined triangles (see Parducci, 1965). The 
comparison-biased range scores mirrored the unbiased 
range-frequency compromise scores, suggesting that in 
some cases the effects of density on people’s category 
ratings might be comparison-induced. 
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Figure 3:  Simulation Data.  Range scores on 
comparison-biased values mirror Parducci’s (1965) 
range-frequency compromise scores. 
 
Mirroring range-frequency compromise scores, the 
generated values in this simulation had comparison-biased 
range scores that were larger than their unbiased range 
scores 97.4% (487/500) of the time. I have successfully fit 
the model of comparison-induced density effects presented 
here to the results of several published density effect studies 
(e.g., Riskey et al., 1979) under the assumption that the 
comparison-biased represented values are mapped to 
category ratings using Volkmann’s (1951) range function. 
This modeling points out several signature characteristics 
of comparison-induced density effects that differentiate 
them from density effects produced by other mechanisms 
(e.g., range-frequency compromise). The comparison-
induced biases in this simulation depended solely upon the 
model’s knowledge of the comparison-suggested difference 
(D), the importance of the comparison (w), and the value 
retrieved for comparison. The model has no knowledge of 
the density of the distribution or of the percentile ranks of 
values and so the percentile ranks of values do not affect the 
model’s judgments on individual trials. Rather, density 
affects aggregate data, because values in dense regions are 
more likely to be compared to values that differ from them 
by less than a comparison-suggested difference (and less 
likely to be compared to values that differ from them by 
more than a comparison-suggested difference) than are 
values in sparse regions. By contrast, Range-Frequency 
Theory assumes that people have implicit knowledge of 
percentile rank information and use that knowledge in 
making judgments on individual trials. Due to this 
difference, Range-Frequency Theory predicts that density 
effects ought to be observable on individual trials and 
Comparison-Induced Distortion Theory predicts that they 
ought not to be. 
Experiment 
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate whether 
the signature characteristics of comparison-induced density 
effects demonstrated in the modeling presented above could 
be observed empirically. Participants imagined that they 
were spending 25 days in rural Minnesota during the middle 
of winter and had to rely upon public transportation. The 
length of time they had to wait for the bus varied each 
simulated day and they indicated how aversive the wait 
would be. Half of the participants judged wait times drawn 
from a negatively skewed distribution and the other half 
judged wait times drawn from a positively skewed 
distribution. 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-three people volunteered to 
participate after being approached by the experimenter on 
the University of California, Los Angeles campus or in the 
surrounding community (36 in the positively skewed 
condition and 37 in the negatively skewed condition). 
 
Materials and Procedure. A random sequence of 10 wait 
times drawn from a negatively skewed (7, 10, 13, 16, 16, 
16, 19, 19, 19, and 19 minutes) or a positively skewed (7, 7, 
7, 7, 10, 10, 10, 13, 16, and 19 minutes) distribution was 
created for each participant. Each participant’s sequence 
was presented twice. An initial sequence of 5 days was 
inserted at the start of the sequence to control for primacy 
effects, introduce participants to the range of values they 
would see in the experiment, and to measure participants’ 
baseline evaluations prior to being exposed to the density 
manipulation. The wait times on these 5 days were 7, 19, 
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13, 19, and 7 respectively and were the same for all 
participants. On each simulated day (simulated within a 
single session), the experimenter verbally told participants 
how long the fictitious wait for the bus was that day. 
Participants indicated how aversive they imagined that wait 
would be using a line-analogue measure in which they 
placed a tick at the spot along the line that was analogous to 
how aversive the wait was (see Schifferstein & Frijters, 
1992). A stop mark on the left-hand side of the line was 
labeled 0=not bad and a stop mark on the right-hand side of 
the line was labeled 10=extremely bad. The 25 lines were 
presented on a single, one-page experimental handout and 
labeled Day 1 through Day 25. 
Results and Discussion 
To reduce variance caused by idiosyncratic reactions to wait 
times, participants’ judgments during the initial sequence 
were used as a baseline. Each participant’s judgments on 
trials 6 through 25 were divided by the average of her or his 
judgments on trials 4, 5, and 6. 
Distribution density effects were revealed by differences 
between judgments in sparse regions versus differences 
between judgments in dense regions. Among participants 
whose wait times were drawn from the negatively skewed 
distribution, the difference between judgments of 7-minute 
wait times and judgments of 13-minute wait times (i.e., the 
sparse region) was reliably smaller than the difference 
between judgments of 13-minute wait times and judgments 
of 19-minute wait times (i.e., the dense region), t(36) = 3.99, 
p < .01. Among participants whose wait times were drawn 
from the positively skewed distribution, the difference 
between judgments of 7-minute wait times and judgments of 
13-minute wait times (i.e., the sparse region) was 
approximately the same size as the difference between 
judgments of 13-minute wait times and judgments of 19-
minute wait times (i.e., the dense region), t < 1. A 2 
(distribution) x 2 (region) Mixed-Factors ANOVA found 
that this interaction was significant [F(1,71) = 6.11, MSE = 
0.22, p = .01]. 
Because the initial sequence of 5 days inserted at the start 
of the experiment introduced participants to the entire range 
of wait times and was the same for all participants, 
Haubensak’s (1992) model is not a viable model of the 
observed density effects (but note that the density effects 
observed in this experiment were smaller than the density 
effects often observed). Range-Frequency Theory and 
Comparison-Induced Distortion Theory remain as viable 
models of the observed density effects. 
Range-Frequency Theory assumes that people have 
implicit knowledge about the percentile ranks of stimulus 
values and use that knowledge to judge stimulus values on 
particular trials. It, therefore, predicts density effects on 
individual trials. By contrast, Comparison-Induced 
Distortion Theory assumes that comparisons produce the 
same biases regardless of the type of distribution from 
which values are drawn (as long as D, w, and the values to 
which they are compared remain constant). It predicts 
density effects not on individual trials, but rather only in the 
aggregate and it does so only because the values to which 
judged values are compared differ across distributions. 
The predictions of Range-Frequency Theory and 
Comparison-Induced Distortion Theory were tested by 
concentrating on differences between successive wait times 
of 3 minutes. At 3-minute differences the stimulus one back 
will likely be the most similar recent value, although 
occasionally the identical value 2 trials back may be the 
most similar recent value. To-be judged values drawn from 
the negatively skewed distribution were preceded by a value 
that was 3 minutes away 41.5% of the time (292/703). Of 
these to-be-judged values, 69.9% (204/292) were larger than 
13, i.e., were in the dense region, and 14.7% (43/292) were 
smaller than 13, i.e., were in the sparse region. The to-be-
judged values drawn from the positively skewed distribution 
were preceded by a value that was 3 minutes away 40.6% of 
the time (278/684). Of these to-be-judged values, 72.7% 
(202/278) were smaller than 13, i.e., were in the dense 
region, and 12.2% (34/278) were larger than 13, i.e., were in 
the sparse region. 
Contrary to the predictions of Range-Frequency Theory 
and consistent with the predictions of Comparison-Induced 
Distortion Theory, differences between successive 
judgments (when actual differences were 3 minutes) were 
not correlated with differences in percentile rank. These 
correlations were not significant for descending (r = .065, F 
< 1) or ascending (r = -.030, F < 1) pairs from the positively 
skewed distribution or for descending (r = -.047, F < 1) or 
ascending (r = -.050, F < 1) pairs from the negatively 
skewed distribution.  
Consistent with the predictions of Comparison-Induced 
Distortion Theory and not predicted by Range-Frequency 
Theory, the differences between judgments of successive 
wait times that were different by 3 minutes were biased 
apart, i.e., larger than their rightful proportion of 25% of the 
range (using participants’ responses on trials 4, the large end 
of the range, and 5, the small end of the range, as the 
baseline). The differences between judgments of values that 
differed by 3 minutes were 33.2% of the range on average 
(SD = 25.1%) in the positively skewed distribution [which 
was significantly larger than their rightful proportion of 
25%, t(277) = 5.46, p < .01] and were 44.6% of the range on 
average (SD = 49.6%) in the positively skewed distribution 
[which was also significantly larger than their rightful 
proportion of 25%, t(291) = 6.77, p < .01]. Further analyses 
did not find differences between the two distributions or 
between regions within the two distributions, or interactions 
between them. The differences between judgments of values 
that differed by 6, 9, and 12 minutes did not differ from 
their rightful proportions of the range (all t’s < 1), perhaps 
because more similar recent items were recalled instead. 
General Discussion 
A model of distribution density effects in which verbal 
comparisons such as “I waited longer for the bus today than 
I did yesterday” create the observed biases was proposed. 
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Modeling demonstrated that comparisons might produce 
density effects. An experiment found preliminary empirical 
support for this proposal. 
Future research will investigate density effects using 
reproduction dependent measures and investigate the 
predicted disassociation between representations of values 
(perhaps as measured by reproduction, see Figure 2) and 
category ratings (see Figure 3, Biernat et al., 1997).  Future 
work will also investigate effects of distribution density on 
recall of values from memory. Comparison-Induced 
Distortion Theory predicts density effects on recall of values 
from memory and Range-Frequency Theory does not (see 
Choplin & Hummel, 2002, for a discussion). 
Although in my view many density effects are likely to be 
comparison-induced, I do not assume that all density effects 
are comparison-induced. Density effects observed when all 
values are presented simultaneously in ascending or 
descending order (e.g., Wedell et al., 1989) strike me as 
cases where density effects are particularly likely to be 
categorization-induced as Parducci (1965) suggested.  
Additionally, even if density effects are found to be 
comparison-induced, the equations used to formalize 
Range-Frequency Theory will likely still provide a useful 
heuristic for predicting effects of density on judgment. 
Conclusions 
Some density effects might be comparison-induced. 
Comparisons of values in dense regions will tend to bias 
values away from each other, while comparisons of values 
in sparse regions will tend to bias values toward each other. 
These biases could produce density effects. 
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Abstract
This paper reports an experiment designed to evaluate the
efficacy of visual cues as error “interventions” in computer-
based routine procedural tasks. Using two separate tasks with
a well-documented error prone step, the effects of several
visual cues were compared. The findings provide support for
goal selection driven by environmental cues in routine
procedural tasks. The importance of cue timing and
movement and meaningfulness characteristics, particularly in
dynamic tasks with external pressures, is demonstrated.
Introduction
History and Motivation
With the introduction of automation and computers, an
outstanding arena for human error has been established.
Subsequently, much effort has been given to categorize
errors occurring in such situations, yet for the most part
understanding of this very human phenomenon remains
fairly nebulous. As John and Kieras (1996) stated in the 90s,
“No methodology for predicting when and what errors users
will make as a function of interface design has yet been
developed and recognized as satisfactory…even the
theoretical analysis of human error is still in its infancy.”
Over the years, several elaborate models and taxonomies
of human error have been developed for the purpose of
qualitative diagnosis (e.g., Reason, 1990). Although useful
for post hoc explanations, the predictive power of these is
quite limited. Results from controlled studies with various
error “interventions” may extend our understanding of why
such cognitive errors arise, helping us not only evaluate
(post hoc) but also design (predict) safer machines.
Application areas to benefit abound, from aerospace to
medicine.
Postcompletion Errors
Noting the general lack of specificity in the existing
theories of human error, Byrne and Bovair (1997) moved to
develop a computational theory for one widely cited (e.g.,
Rasmussen, 1982; Young, 1994) omission error,
postcompletion error. Postcompletion errors can be broadly
defined as errors that occur when the task structure demands
“that some action…is required after the main goal of the
task…has been satisfied or completed,” (Byrne & Bovair,
1997, p. 32). With this particular class of error, the actor
possesses the correct knowledge necessary to execute the
task, usually performed frequently and correctly. Yet, for
even operators highly familiar with the task, the isolation of
a postcompletion step within the task structure makes
omissions there not unlikely. This is particularly true when
the actor is further affected by external factors such as a
working memory load and/or fatigue, as well as internal
tendencies such as hillclimbing (Gray, 2000; Polson &
Lewis, 1990).
Some commonplace examples include forgetting to
remove the original after making a photocopy, leaving a
card in the ATM after withdrawing cash, and failing to
replace the gas cap after filling up a car. Byrne and Bovair
(1997) hypothesized that these errors were due to excessive
working memory load leading to goal loss, or an omission
of a step from the task at hand. Since with postcompletion
errors the actor omits a specific subgoal rather than
forgetting what to do altogether (the overlying main task
goal), the source of the error was thought to more likely be
working memory than long-term memory. A more recent
study by Reason (2002) examined the photocopy example in
detail, finding postcompletion errors to be the most common
type of omission in that task (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Photocopy task structure.
Three high-level explanatory observations were provided:
1. The emergence of the last copy generates a strong
but false completion signal since the main goal of
copying is achieved before all necessary steps
(subgoals) are complete.
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2. The proximity of this false signal to the end of the
main task allows for the attention to be
increasingly diverted to the subsequent task.
3. The emergence of the last copy indicates that it is
no longer necessary to put in another original
leaving it functionally isolated.
Hierarchical Control Structures and Goal
Management
Many of the assumptions behind the current theory of
postcompletion error reside on the foundational concept of
hierarchical control structures and their retention by skilled
operators. In previous studies by Byrne and Bovair (1997)
and Serig (2001), participants reliably generated errors at
the postcompletion steps both within subtasks as well as
within the larger task, in keeping with the idea of a
hierarchical task structure. Cognitive modeling work by
Kieras, Wood, and Meyer (1997) has also provided strong
evidence to suggest that even well practiced experts, such as
telephone assistance operators, do not abandon such task
hierarchies.
As Altmann and Trafton (1999) propose, the ability to
break down complex tasks and problems into hierarchies
and subgoals, “may be to complex cognition what the
opposable thumb is to complex action.” Traditionally, these
types of goal-based processing strategies have relied solely
on a “task-goal” stack that essentially predicts perfect
memory for old goals. However, their activation-based
model of memory for goals (MAGS) offers an alternative
account to this approach that provides a more
straightforward account for the types of errors found in
human behavior.
In essence memory and the environment (i.e., dual-space,
Rieman & Young, 1996; internal and external
representations, Zhang & Norman, 1994) are substituted for
a goal stack, and task goals are considered as ordinary
memory elements with encoding and retrieval processes that
must overcome noise and decay. Retrieval cues from the
environment dictate the reactivation of suspended goals
(e.g., Figure 1, in grey) with perceptual heuristics acting as a
substitute for the stack-native last in, first out rule. This
model makes several predictions about postcompletion
errors and the characteristics of a successful cue:
1. Any salient cue (e.g., a loud beep) should be
sufficient to prime a postcompletion action
(suspended goal).
2. It should n o t be necessary to put the
postcompletion action on the critical path.
3. Reminders at the start will not help a PCE at the
end (masked by other goals).
4. Just-in-time priming from environmental cues are
the only reliable reminder.
Previous Study
A previous experiment (Chung, 2004) examined the
effects of a simple visual cue (red singleton onset) and a
downstream error cost (in the form of a resultant mode
error) on postcompletion error commission. Although
neither was found to cause significant change in reaction
times or error commission at the postcompletion step, the
results did generate some valuable implications. First, the
fact that the visual cue did not significantly reduce the
number of postcompletion errors committed by the
participants suggested that the cue lacked sufficient salience
to prime the suspended postcompletion goal. While the
sudden onset of a large red dot (against a black and white
console) next to the button that needed to be pressed seemed
informative enough, omissions were made regardless.
Undoubtedly, participants had sufficient understanding of
the task and scenario, since they could not proceed to testing
without completing extensive training.
Neither did the downstream error cost (resulting in a
mode error) bring about a significant change in behavior at
the postcompletion step for participants. While it was
expected that the visual cue would be more effective
between the two treatments, it was also hypothesized that
the downstream error cost would cause a change in
behavior. However, the number of postcompletion errors in
this condition was not significantly different from the
control group, suggesting that it did not provide any
significant advantage (or disadvantage) for participants.
This perhaps follows findings by Serig (2001) that
demonstrated error commission to be relatively independent
of negative or positive feedback.
Experiment
Two tasks
Along with the original Tactical task introduced in the
study by Byrne and Bovair (1997), a separate Medical task
was added to distinguish the effects of the interventions.
The task also included a potential postcompletion step
(determined via task analysis) where the interventions could
be implemented, as with the Tactical task.
Intervention Implementation
Two different interventions were introduced in this
experiment: an enhanced visual cue (see Figure 2) and a
mode indicator (Figure 3). These were developed
specifically to address issues brought up by the findings in
previous work (Chung, 2004), help pinpoint the
characteristics of a successful intervention, and evaluate the
predictions of MAGS (Altmann & Trafton, 1999), should
one or both have a significant effect.
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Figure 2: Tactical interface with cue (two arrows).
Intervention Attributes
In a study by Monk (1986), auditory cues were employed
to drastically reduce the occurrence of mode errors. Monk
(1986) notes that display changes are similarly effective
when the person is required to look at the relevant parts of
the display at the appropriate moment in the dialogue. The
related automatic processing of novel peripheral cues
regardless of whether or not they are informative has been
well documented (e.g., Remington, Johnston, & Yantis,
1992). Colorful visual cues are known to be effective and
necessary in guiding individuals to select points of activity,
such as the push plate on a door (Norman, 1988).
Research (Sutcliffe, 1995) and real-world practice
indicates that the visual attributes most effective for
attracting attention (warnings and indicators) on a computer
interface, in order, are as follows: movement (blinking or
change of position), shape and size (character font, shape of
symbols, text size, size of symbols), color, brightness,
shading and texture (different texture or pattern), and
surroundings (borders, background color). Sutcliffe (1995)
advises that these should be applied sparingly, however, as
the presence of many conflicting stimuli can essentially dull
their individual effectiveness. Red, green, and yellow are
recommended as the optimal colors for status indicators,
each corresponding to its meaning on a traffic light. To draw
attention, white, yellow, and red are most effective,
although yellow offers the best visibility.
Based on these recommendations and the characteristics
of the failed cue from previous work (Chung, 2004),
alternating red and yellow blinking arrows (Figure 2) were
used for the visual cue. As per the Altmann and Trafton’s
(1999) predictions, the cue appeared “just-in-time” at the
postcompletion step. In contrast, the mode indicator
consisted of green and yellow highlighting on the
“Tracking” button along with other contextual indication
appearing before the postcompletion step. When combined
with the given if-then rule at training (i.e., “If you see a
mode indicator light and message, the system is on”), the
mode indicator was expected to prime the corresponding
goal (the postcompletion step) of turning off the Tracking
system. Once the participant finishes the intermediate steps
and hits the “Tracking” button a second time, the indicator
disappears to indicate that the Tracking mode has ended.
Exact placement of the interventions was determined
through pilot studies.
Method
Participants
Ninety-one undergraduate and graduate students from
Rice University aged 18 to 35 participated for course credit
in a psychology course and additional cash prizes ranging
from $10 to $40.
Materials
Materials consisted of a short paper-based quiz, paper-
based instruction manuals for each of the four tasks
(Tactical, Medical, and two filler tasks), Apple iMac
computers running the Tactical and Medical applications
written in Macintosh Common Lisp, stereo headphones, and
a web-based general questionnaire for demographic
information.
Design
This study used a two-factor between participants design
with two independent variables, task and intervention. Task
consisted of two conditions (Tactical and Medical) to
compare the effectiveness of the interventions across task
and interface. Intervention consisted of three conditions:
control (no intervention), visual cue (alternating red and
yellow blinking arrows), and mode indicator (mode
indication for the system state change). Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the six groups.
The primary dependent measure was the number of
postcompletion errors made during the Tactical and Medical
tasks. Other dependent measures of interest included the
overall number of errors per task and performance on a
Figure 3: Mode indicator (highlighting on “Tracking”
and “Tracking Mode Enabled” message).
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concurrent working memory task (described in Byrne &
Bovair, 1997).
Procedure
Participants were run in two sessions spaced two days
apart. The first session served as a training session using
written documentation for each of the tasks. The major steps
of the two target tasks (Tactical or Medical) are outlined in
Table 1 and essentially consist of a series of key presses and
mouse clicks and movements. Order of training and group
assignment were randomized for every participant. Once
participants successfully completed the training trial with
the manual and logged three subsequent error-free trials,
they were allowed to move on to the next task.
Table 1: Steps in each task.
Tactical Medical
Charge Phaser (5 substeps) Insert Cassette (1 substep)
Set Focus (3 substeps) Program Rate (2 substeps)
Track Target (3 substeps) Program Vol (2 substeps)
Fire Phaser (4 substeps) Start Flow (2 substeps)
Return to Main Control (1 substep)
Errors resulted in warning beeps and messages and
participants were returned to the main control to restart the
task. This was to prevent participants from completing
training without having gone through each of the tasks at
least four times with all steps done correctly and
completely. When training was complete, they were
reminded that they would compete for prizes in two days
and given a short quiz to ensure that they had accurate
working knowledge of the tasks.
The second session consisted of the test trials for both the
Tactical and Medical tasks. In random order, participants
completed seventeen trials of their assigned postcompletion
task (Tactical or Medical) and eleven trials for each of the
two filler tasks, for a total of thirty-nine trials on the test
day. At testing, the experiment program emitted beeps on
error commission to warn individuals but did not
immediately return them to the main control or provide
warning messages, as in training. Participants were
encouraged to work both accurately and quickly by means
of a scoring system, prizes, and an onscreen timer. A three-
letter span auditory working memory task was introduced in
all task conditions at testing.
Results
Data from 82 of the original 91 participants was used in
the final analysis. The primary reason for the loss of data
was participant failure to show up at their assigned testing
date. Only one participant was removed as an outlier
(Medical, cue condition). Groups broke down as shown in
Table 2 below.
Table 2: Participants per group.
Condition Control Cue Mode
Tactical 14 16 13
Medical 14 12 13
Postcompletion Error Frequency
Figure 4: Postcompletion error frequency (std. error bars).
Cue condition is 0% for both Tactical and Medical tasks.
Our primary measure of interest was the frequency of
errors at the postcompletion step (out of seventeen trials) in
both tasks. This is the step immediately following
completion of the main task goal. For the Tactical task,
mean postcompletion error frequencies were 6.81%, 0%,
and 6.21% for the control, cued, and mode indicator
conditions, respectively (Figure 4).
Analysis of variance showed the effect of intervention to
be reliable, F(2, 76) = 4.061, p  = .021, but not the
interaction of intervention by task, F(2, 76) = 1.86, p = .162.
Planned comparisons confirmed our hypothesis, as
participants made significantly less errors in the cued
condition versus the control, t(76) = 3.14, p = .002, and even
versus the mode indicator group, t(76) = 2.81, p = .006. In
comparison, the mode indicator failed to produce reliable
differences with the control group, t(76) = .263, p = .793.
In the simpler Medical task, mean errors at the
postcompletion step were very low: 0.82%, 0%, and 1.99%
for the control, cue and mode indicator conditions,
respectively. Again, none of the twelve participants in the
Medical cued condition made a single postcompletion error
in all seventeen of their trials. The same planned
comparisons done on the Tactical task revealed no reliable
differences across intervention and task.
Total Errors
The average number of total errors (out of all possible
steps) was found to be higher for the Tactical task than the
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Medical: 0.67 in the Tactical versus 0.28 in the simpler
Medical task, F(1, 76) = 14.60, p < .001. Differences across
intervention were not reliable, F(2, 76) = 2.24, p = .113,
although it should be noted that the total number of errors
was slightly higher for both the cue and mode indicator
conditions in both tasks.
Working Memory Task
Participants showed no reliable differences in working
memory task performance regardless of task F(1, 76) =
3.47, p = .07 or intervention, F(2, 76) = 1.09, p = .342.
Discussion
Our findings generally corroborate our hypothesis for the
visual cue. As reported, all sixteen participants in the just-
in-time cue condition of the Tactical task exhibited error-
free performance at the postcompletion step on all seventeen
of their trials. In contrast, the control and mode indicator
groups showed mean postcompletion error frequencies
between six and seven percent. Given the lack of reliable
differences across intervention for overall error rates and
performance on the working memory task, there seems to be
no reason not to attribute the difference in postcompletion
error frequency to the success of the intervention.
Nevertheless, our expectations for the mode indicator
were not met. While the just-in-time cue reduced the
postcompletion error mean to nil, the mode indicator had
hardly any effect relative to the control. This was despite the
fact that all participants were given equal training and the
mode indicator was made as large, if not larger, than the
flashing arrows in the cued condition. With the additional
novel appearance of the crosshairs (Tactical) and display
information (Medical), the state change should have been
noticeable. Thus, its failure does not seem attributable to a
lack of knowledge or relative visibility.
The Medical task was ineffective as a parallel of the
Tactical task, perhaps primarily due to its substantially
shorter length (see Table 1). It took participants nearly one
quarter of the time taken to finish the Tactical task and
simply failed to generate sufficient error rates to prove
useful for comparing the effects of the interventions.
However, it is notable that the visual cue also completely
eliminated postcompletion errors in the Medical task as in
the Tactical task.
Validation of MAGS
Our findings generally fell in line with the predictions of
Altmann and Trafton (1999), given that the cue in the
previous experiment (Chung, 2004) failed from a lack of
salience. As claimed, the new (“just-in-time”) cue was
sufficient to prime the postcompletion step, making it
unnecessary to place the postcompletion action on the
critical path. Moreover, the mode indicator (a state change
“at the start”) did not sufficiently prime the postcompletion
step that followed. It was likely “masked” by the
intermediate steps or goals, as they explained.
These results support the idea of goal selection in tasks as
a product of environmental cues. Hence, it follows that
postcompletion errors are often generated by “false
completion signals” (Reason, 2002), such as the emergence
of the copy in the photocopy task. Likewise, the visual cue
implemented here, in the form of two blinking arrows, was
able to prime the postcompletion goal sufficiently to be
correctly retrieved.
Conclusion
Several guidelines for the design of safe interfaces used in
routine procedural tasks can be gleaned from this work.
Interventions should be made to appear “just-in-time,” as to
reduce demands on memory. Asynchronous cues like the
mode indicator place their own demands on memory, since
there are steps intermediate to the step they are meant to
prime. Even negative feedback (after the postcompletion
step), as a downstream error cost (Chung, 2004) or as a
reprimand from an “overseer” (Serig, 2001), has
demonstrated no reliable reduction in the frequency of
errors. Postcompletion errors cannot simply be willed away.
Also, it seems that movement and/or shape (meaning) are
strong determinates of whether or not a cue is attended to
(Sutcliffe, 1995). A cue (a simple red singleton) used in
previous work (Chung, 2004) appeared at the same exact
location as the just-in-time cue in this experiment, yet
generated no significant reduction in error frequency. The
mode indicator, which relied on static contextual cues, also
had no reliable effect. It was made static (as in most real-
world applications) since the nature of such cues is that
there are intermediate steps between their onset and the step
they are meant to prime. Blinking would unnecessarily
attract visual attention to an inactive control.
Implementing a successful error intervention may not,
however, be so simple as merely adding visual cues with
these properties to the interface. Differences in task (e.g.,
length) and interface (e.g., background color) characteristics
also attenuate the effectiveness of these cues, as
demonstrated by the Medical task. Additionally, the fact that
our participants had explicit training on the meaning of the
cue must be considered. Simply placing blinking arrows or
other novel cues on the interface would affect naïve users
differently from those who had been trained.
The failure of a singleton onset (Chung, 2004) and
subsequent success of two blinking arrows in this
experiment may at least partially be explained by the speed
at which our visual attention shifts in procedural tasks with
medium to high level of skill and external pressures. Hence,
while the cue used in the previous experiment also appeared
in temporal conjunction with the completion of the previous
step and in spatial proximity to the targeting window, it was
overlooked. In contrast, the successful blinking cue
continued to generate attention-capturing movement until
the postcompletion step was satisfied. Moreover, it offered
immediate information (arrows pointing to the correct
button) about its meaning.
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Hence, these findings come as further empirical evidence
for cue-driven goal selection in procedural tasks. More
specifically, they highlight the importance of cue timing and
the visual properties of movement and meaningfulness.
Follow up inquiry is underway to determine the individual
strengths of these properties. Such data will be vital for any
truly predictive theory of human error.
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Abstract
The classical theory of analogical reasoning focuses on mappings
between discrete symbols as the mechanism of analogy evaluation
and transfer. This paper introduces several other analogy
evaluation strategies discovered in expert reasoning protocols:
bridging analogies, conserving transformations, dual simulations
used to detect perceptual-motor similarity, and overlay
simulations. These findings provide evidence for the hypothesis
that certain analogical reasoning processes can be imagery based.
  Earlier work on higher order reasoning has indicated that
expert subjects use various methods to generate analogies
spontaneously when solving difficult problems (Clement,
1988), and that evaluating the validity of such analogies is
essential to using them (Clement, 1989). That is, even if one
has generated a confidently understood analogous case, one
must evaluate one’s confidence in the validity of the
analogy relation to have confidence in transferring results to
the target. The classical theory of analogical reasoning
(Gentner, 1983; Holyoke and Thagard, 1989; Forbus, et al,
1997) focuses on mappings between discrete symbols as the
mechanism of analogy evaluation and transfer. This paper
examines several other analogy evaluation strategies
observed in expert think aloud protocols. The data base for
the study comes from professors and advanced graduate
students in scientific fields who were asked to think aloud
about a variety of problems. This paper focuses on two
mathematicians solving physics problems they found
difficult.  By focusing on problems with which they were
unfamiliar (i.e., a problem on the frontier of their own
personal knowledge). it is plausible that the thought
processes analyzed will share some characteristics with
hypothesis formation and model construction processes used
on the frontiers of science.
   An example of a problem where analogy evaluation is
important is the “Sisyphus problem” in Figure 1A: “You are
given the task of rolling a heavy wheel up a hill. Does it
take more, less, or the same amount of force to roll the
wheel when you push at x, rather than at y? Assume that
you apply a force parallel to the slope at one of the two
points shown, and that there are no problems with
positioning or gripping the wheel. Assume that the wheel
can be rolled without slipping by pushing it at either point.”
   One expert subject proposed the analogy that the wheel
acts like a heavy lever perpendicular to the slope, with its
fulcrum at the point of contact. Intuitively, the lever would
be easier to move by pushing at X, suggesting that the same
would be true for the wheel. But in the wheel the point of
contact is moving, and ordinarily lever fulcrums do not
move. In addition some subjects assume that the fulcrum
should instead be at the wheel’s center. Therefore the
evaluation of the validity of the analogy relation (shown as
the dotted line between A and B in Figure 1) was in
question. This is distinguished from the subject’s confidence
in his understanding of the analogous case B itself, which
was quite high in this case.
1
1C
1A 1B
.X
Y
X
Y
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Figure 1:  S2’s lever analogy for the wheel
Bridging Analogies
 One method for evaluating this analogy used by this subject
was the bridging analogy shown in Figure 1C of a spoked
wheel without a rim. By breaking the problem of confirming
a “farther” analogy into the problem of confirming two
“closer” analogies. such a bridge can make it easier to
develop confidence that the wheel does work like the lever
in Figure 1B (a correct analysis). Bridging analogies are
defined as occurring when the subject finds or generates an
intermediate case which shares features with both the target
and source analog. Their value has been documented
previously in a number of expert problem contexts and in
instructional applications (Clement, 1986). While it can be
very helpful to subjects, bridging in itself is an incomplete
strategy for analogy evaluation, since each half of the bridge
must itself be evaluated. Therefore bridging is most useful
in conjunction with other evaluation methods and it adds to,
rather than reduces, the number of tasks to be performed.
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This raises the problem of why experts bother to consider
bridging cases at all, since they seem to create more work.    
Conserving Transformations
   In this section I present examples of a second evaluation
strategy called conserving transformations and argue that it
is distinctly different from the commonly cited method of
matching discrete features for evaluating an analogical
relationship. A paradigmatic case of a conserving
transformation (although he did not identify it as such) is
Wertheimer's method for determining the area of a
parallelogram by cutting one end off and moving it to the
other end to form a rectangle. A transformation is an action
that changes a system 1 to system 2.  If 2 is the same as 1
with respect to a feature or relationship R, then the
transformation conserves R.  An example of a conserving
transformation in the Sisyphus problem occurred when
subject S7 changed the problem to an analogous one
involving an almost-vertical cliff with gear teeth:
x
y
.. .p x
2A 2C Pull on Wheel,
Like a Pulley
Push on Wheel 2B Steep Slope,
Gear Teeth
x
y y
Figure 2:  Wheel analogy series of S7
(Brackets in transcripts denote interpretations from viewing
tape, while parentheses denote observed actions.)
 01 S: “Suppose it were tilted steeply and you did that; so
steep as to be almost vertical. (Draws Figure 2B). It
seems like it [the wheel] would skid out from under you
the other way [down along the cliff]. This (moves hands
as if turning an object clockwise) would get away from
you here [at point p]. Let's assume it's gear toothed [gear
teeth on the wheel and the cliff] and that it won't slip. “
The change from situation A to B in Figure 2  appears to be
a double transformation consisting of: the change of slope,
and the addition of gear teeth. One can define the "targeted
relationship" as the one for which an explanation or
prediction is sought in the target situation (e.g. the relation
between the force required and its location on the wheel). In
his further work on the problem S7 never questions the
validity of these transformations, and assumes that the
targeted relationship in the problem situation is not affected
by them. One can surmise that this occurs because the gear
teeth transformation is a standardized one in physics and
both are intuited to be irrelevant to the relationship of
interest in the problem, i.e. they are conserving
transformations. The origins of this kind of intuition have
been studied since Piaget’s early conservation experiments
but are still poorly understood. (Case 2C will be discussed
later.)
  The hand motions over the drawing here provide one
source of evidence on the use of dynamic imagery.
Although the drawing can be an external support for a static
visual representation, it does not depict movements, so it is
reasonable to hypothesize that the subject is performing a
mental imagistic simulation of the wheel slipping down on
the cliff. The change in slope simplifies the problem by
changing it to one in which forces act mostly along only one
dimension.: upward and downward. Since the problem
already specified no slipping, the gear teeth do not add new
information but may help in imagistically simulating what
will happen in the analogous case. Thus they may be an
example of what I have called an “imagery enhancement”
strategy (Clement, 1994, 2003).
  The transformations appear in this case to be a means of
both generating and evaluating the new analogy. Clement
(1988) found that of a collection of 31 spontaneous
analogies generated by ten experts, a greater number of
analogies were generated via such transformations than
those generated via an association to another case already in
memory. However, the present paper focuses on the
possible analogy evaluation function of transformations
rather than on their analogy generation function.
Spring problem. A more substantial transformation is
illustrated by the passage below from S2's solution to the
following spring problem: “A weight is hung on a spring.
The original spring is replaced with a spring made of the
same kind of wire, with the same number of coils, but with
coils that are twice as wide in diameter. Will the spring
stretch from its natural length more, less, or the same
amount under the same weight? (Assume the mass of the
spring is negligible.) Why do you think so?”  Earlier this
subject has considered long and short horizontal bending
rods made of the same wire as the spring and bent by
hanging the same amount of weight on one end as an
analogy for the spring problem (Figure 3B). Knowing that
the longer rod will bend more suggests to him that the wider
spring stretches more. In the following passage he evaluates
that analogy by speaking of rolling up the bending rod into a
spring (Figure 3C is discussed later):
3A 3B
3C
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Figure 3:  Rod analogy and zigzag bridge of S2
102 S: “You can imagine a spring...and you
know...there's no difference between the top and the
bottom. It's a symmetric situation…
105 S: You take your [straight, horizontal] wire, you say
'OK, you think it's the bending that does it. Well, then
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let's bend it [by pulling down on one end of the straight
wire]. And then let's roll it up [around a vertical axis] to
make the spring. And you get a spring which stretches
more and more at the bottom. The loops are wider apart!
107 S: Stretch it [a normal spring]: you don't get this
increase of the distance between the loops toward the
bottom. You just get a uniform stretching. And therefore
the stretched spring cannot be understood as a rolled up
bent spring.”
This argues against bending as the source of stretching.
Here the subject describes a very explicit spatial
transformation between the spring and the rod. The
sequence is:  he generates the rod analogy; he simulates
bending in the rod; he evaluates the analogy by transforming
it back into a spring; there is a conflict with a known
property of the spring, and he discounts the rod analogy.
This evaluation is extremely valuable in that it gives him
information arguing that the conjectured mechanism of
bending is invalid. (In fact springs stretch primarily via
twisting in the wire, not bending. ) Note the imagery report
in line 102. These passages suggest the attempt to use a
visual transformation to evaluate the validity of a tentative
analogy.  The evaluation is influential in that it leads to
discounting the validity of the analogy. Griffith, Nersessian,
and A. Goel (2000) have also designed and investigated a
computer program which successfully accounts for a
number of features of this protocol and others collected for
the spring problem. Transformations played an important
role in modifying and improving faulty analogies or models
in their program. However, they did not examine the role of
conserving transformations as a means for analogy
evaluation.
   Prior to these sequences the subject had generated not
only the analogous rod case, but what appeared to be a
complete mapping of symbolic features between the rod
case and the spring case. Bending, length, and slope, in the
rod were mapped onto stretching, width, and slope in the
spring. The relation of <greater length causes greater
bending in the rod> had been mapped to the sought-after
relation of <greater width causes greater stretch in the
spring>. Therefore the transformations above do not appear
to be adding any new elements to the mappings. Rather,
they seem to be increasing the subject's confidence that he
has found an important visual mismatch in the slope feature.
They are new ways to arrive at the same mappings. That is,
the transformations are a means to determining a match or a
mismatch as the outcome, not just the notation for a
mismatch as read off from two different lists.  The notion
that the transformation should be conserving is quite
plausible. If the main mechanism is bending, this "winding
up" transformation is locally perpendicular to the bending,
therefore it could very well be a conserving transformation.
Instead of transferring the “result” from the base to the
target by using an explicit set of correspondences, in the
present model this can be simply “read off” from an image
derived from the imagistic results simulated in the base
being transformed back to the target. Thus the conserving
transformation strategy is a process that can work
independently from an explicit feature matching process.
   A traditional approach to analogy evaluation focuses on
determining that multiple similarities between the base and
target are sufficiently important. In contrast, a conserving
transformation strategy need only focus on determining that
a single transformation from base to target is sufficiently
unimportant (irrelevant to the targeted relationship). This
may mean that confirmation of an analogy via a conserving
transformation can require considerably less work than
confirmation via mapping.
Dual Simulation
Case 1 . There is evidence in the protocols for a very direct
strategy for analogy relation evaluation termed "dual
simulation". A brief example that hints at this possibility
follows where S2 says:
(Line 23) "Surely you could coil a spring in squares,
let's say, and it would behave more or less the same".
There is not very much data in this statement, but it is
plausible that the subject created an image of a square
spring, simulated the effect of hanging a weight on it, and
found this to be similar to the image of hanging a weight on
a normal spring. However, the resolution of the perceived
similarity appears to be at a low level of detail.
   It is doubtful that his conclusion here is from "looking up
a fact in memory", because of the novelty of the square
case. (Later simulations by S2 with the square coil lead to
imagining one side acting like a wrench to twist the next
side. This produces an Aha episode with the insight that
torsion is a major mechanism of stretching in the spring, and
predicts correctly that the wider spring will stretch more, but
that is the topic of another study (Clement, 1989)).
   Dual simulation  depends upon the process of imagistic
simulation discussed in Clement (2003). That article found
evidence for such an internal process from several
observation categories for external behavior: personal
action projections (spontaneously redescribing a system
action in terms of a human action, consistent with the use of
kinesthetic imagery), depictive hand motions, and imagery
reports. The latter occurs when a subject spontaneously
uses terms like "imagining," "picturing," a situation, or
"feeling what it's like to manipulate" a situation. In several
of the present cases one sees dynamic imagery reports
(involving movement or forces). None of these observations
are infallible indicators on their own, but as multiple
instances accumulate, they can be taken as evidence for
imagery.  Taken together with the subject’s new predictions,
the observations above can be explained via imagistic
simulations wherein a somewhat general perceptual motor
schema assimilates the image of a particular object and
produces expectations about its behavior in a subsequent
dynamic image, or simulation.
  The process of dual simulation can be summarized as
follows. Imagistic simulations of the target and the
analogous case are each run in as much detail as possible.
The dynamic images of the behavior of each system are then
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compared; and they may be inspected for certain aspects. If
their behavior "appears" to be the same, the analogy relation
receives some support, depending on the level of certainty
in the comparison.
Case 2.  More data is present in the following episode of an
analogy to a two-dimensional spring made of zig-zagging
wire that lies in a single vertical plane, shown in Figure 3C.
23  S2: “I wonder if I can make the spring..which is a 2
dimensional spring..but where the action ..isn't at the
angles...it's distributed along the length… I have a
visualization... Here's a .. a bendable bar, and then we
have a rigid connector...(draws more bars connected in a
zig zag, two dimensional shape). And when we do this
what bends...is the bendable bars...and that would behave
like a spring. I can imagine that it would.... it would
stretch, and you let it go and it bounces up and down. It
does all the things.”
   Here the conjunction of the dynamic imagery reports and
the comparison of the two systems gives more support to the
hypothesis that a dual simulation is occurring to compare
the target and the zig zag cases. The dual simulation appears
to establish the analogous case as being relevant and
plausibly analogous in that its behavior is similar, at least at
a gross level of qualitative behavior, to the target. But this
does not tell the subject whether the two systems exhibit the
same relationship between width and stretch. Thus in the
above cases dual simulation appeared to serve only as a
check on the initial plausibility of the analogy.
 One then needs to be clear that dual simulation as an
analogy evaluation strategy does not necessarily mean
confidently simulating the targeted relationship in both base
and target. In that case there would be no need for an
analogy because the target could have been directly
simulated on its own. However, the examples presented
indicate that dual simulation can still help one determine
whether the target and base are similar with respect to other
important behaviors, thereby increasing one's confidence
that the analogy is sound (or eliminating the analogy from
consideration).
Overlay Simulation
Lever case :  There is evidence for the existence of a more
precise type of dual simulation that I term "overlay
simulation" where the image of one simulation takes place
“on top of” a second image. Although I have separated them
in Figure 1 for clarity, S2 actually drew his lever analogy
(Figure 1B) directly on top of the wheel (Figure 1A) and
compared the movement of the wheel and the lever. This
meant that the arrow symbolizing the application of a force
by pointing to the top of the wheel was also pointing to the
top of the lever. When two separate systems are represented
as overlapping in the same external diagram with salient
features aligned I term this an overlay diagram. This
supports the interpretation that internal dynamic images of
the two systems and their actions were overlapping in the
same way. I call this hypothesized internal aspect here an
overlay simulation as a special type of dual simulation.
Presumably the alignment of key features made it easier for
him to compare the expected movements and resistances of
the wheel and the lever as he simulated each of them.
Spokes case: Overlay simulation may also be responsible
for the power of S2’s "spoked wheel without a rim"
bridging analogy shown in Figure 1C.  For the spoke that is
touching the ground, the spoke can be seen as a lever with
its fulcrum at the ground. This means that the entire wheel
of spokes can be seen at any one time as equivalent to a
single lever, supporting the analogy on the right hand side
of the bridge BC in Figure 1. This subject spoke of a
tireless, rimless wheel. Again this is shown separately in
figure 1C for clarity, but in fact the spokes were inscribed
within the rim of a circular wheel in the subject’s drawing.
So on the other side of the bridge AC, the spokes are
envisioned at the same size as the original wheel, and this
may make it easy to sense via dual simulation that they
behave in the same way as the wheel when a force is
applied. In particular, the way the rimless spoked wheel
"rocks" on each spoke over a short distance can be seen as
similar to the way the original wheel rolls. That is, it
appears, especially with many spokes, to have the same kind
of motion in a mental simulation and therefore be amenable
to the same type of analysis with respect to the causes of
motion. Although such arguments must be bolstered
mathematically to make them rigorous, as a form of
heuristic reasoning, this type of qualitative argument can be
quite compelling.
Pulley case: As a third example the case of the pulley
analogy in Figure 2C was also used by S7 in the Sisyphus
problem. He believes that perhaps the push needed at X on
the wheel is smaller than at Y, similar to a pulley where the
force applied to the end of the rope need only be half of the
weight of the wheel. As part of an attempt to evaluate that
analogy, S7 speaks and gestures as if alternating between
seeing the same drawing (Figure 2C) as a wheel and a
pulley, referring to it differently as one or the other in
alternate fashion. Continuing from segment 01 above:
05 S7:  What it feels like is the weight of it [wheel in
Figure 2B]-; is pretty close to parallel with what you’ve
got if you go roll it with  a complete vertical. It now
begins to feel like a pulley...(Draws Figure 2C) What the
vertical is over here no longer matters perhaps but we'll
say it's er, gear toothed again.
06 S: ...And you're over here pulling like this [at x]. That
feels like you're on the outside of a pulley pulling up.
07 S: And since you say it doesn't slip, then this thing
over here (points to line in upper right of Figure 2C and
adds upward pointing arrowhead to it) must be providing
the other half of it, something it feels, in which case it's a
classic pulley; no, it can't be classic pulley. But it's, like a
classic pulley in which now you only need half of the
force. If the weight of the thing is 10 lbs. here, it feels
like 5 would work here (writes 5 on upper left of C) and 5
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over here (writes 5 on upper right) as though it were a
pulley… So let's imagine it is a pulley.
08 S: [In] this new point of view, it feels like working at
X [on the edge of the wheel] is better [than at the center].
The personal action projections and alternating references to
both the wheel and the pulley systems while staring at the
same diagram 2C provide initial evidence for an overlay
simulation here that compares the system of rolling the
wheel straight up a vertical cliff to the pulley system.
Presumably it is easy in an overlay simulation to switch
rapidly between simulations of the two cases, (which
happens at least five times above).  Again, although the
imagery is probably assisted in this case by the drawings,
the drawing cannot be providing perceptions of forces or
motions involved, and so I hypothesize that these are
imagined via imagistic simulations. Some evidence for
kinesthetic imagery is indicated by personal action
projection phrases like “feels like you’re on the outside of a
pulley pulling up” and “you’re over here pulling” in the
transcript, and such imagery is clearly not already enacted in
the static drawings.
   Later he expresses some reservations about the pulley
analogy however: “This rope wrapping around here..doesn’t
feel to me necessarily like...pushing (moves hand . to r.) on
the outside of a wheel.” But in the passage below he appears
to reevaluate the analogy positively by (1) generating a
bridging analogy; and (2) using overlay simulations by
simulating different systems in alternating fashion using the
original wheel drawing. Therefore this final example is
more complicated because it combines these two strategies.
4A
4C
4BPulley Rope
Around Wheel
Bridging Analogy of
Rope Pulling Wheel
Push on Wheel
x
y
.
x
y
.
x
y
.
Figure 4:  Second analogy series of S7
162 S7: (Looking at Figure 4A) I’ve got my full (holds
both hands out as if pulling a rope and shakes them
slightly) power available- and where would I apply that?
My instinct tells me [it is easier to apply force at] X again
but that er, but again it's in terms of a pull and not a push.
I'd have to get a grip.(closes eyes) Assuming that’s not a
problem, then pulling should be the same as pushing..
Seems clear that- (silently holds both hands out as if
pulling a rope for 4 sec.)...So we attach a rope to one of
the teeth [as in 4C but staring at the same Figure 4A],
now it becomes more like the pulley problem (holds r.
hand out as if pulling a rope for 3 sec)…the teeth at the
bottom are playing the role of-; the pulley doesn't look so
bad after all. And you hang on for all you’re worth up
there, to keep it from rolling; to keep it balanced.
Figure 4C shows how a rope attached to the edge of the
wheel at X can be seen as an intermediate bridging case
between the original problem and the pulley case in 4B.
Although I have drawn three cases in Figure 4 for clarity, in
fact S7 used only Figure 4A while talking about the three
cases: the pushed wheel, the pulley, and the rope attached to
the tooth at X on the wheel.  One can hypothesize that the
internal overlay simulations create a context whereby the
alignment between trajectories and forces in imagistic
simulations of different cases, as well as the evaluation of
the validity of the analogies between the cases, can be more
easily made.
163 S7: Seems a lot easier than getting down here behind
it [at "Y" in Figure 4A] and pushing. Why? because of
that coupling pulley effect. It seems like it would be a lot
easier to hold it here [at "X"] for a few minutes (Holds
hands in “pulling” position) than it would be to get
behind it… yeah, my confidence here is much higher
now, that it's right… [easier to push at X] And so the
pull--it just felt right with the pulley feeling. Now
pushing (lays extended finger on paper pointing up slope
at X in Figure 4A and moves it toward X) uh,.. it’s got to
be the same problem…
178 I: Do you have a sense of where your increased
confidence is coming from?
179 S: It’s the pulley analogy starting to feel right.
The subject’s thinking here appears to determine whether
the forces on the edge of the wheel and on the rope from the
pulley “feel” the same as he performs an imagistic
simulation of each case.  The bridging case in Figure 4C of
a rope tied to the wheel at point X appears to serve the
purpose of setting up two pairs of cases (base:bridge B:C
and bridge:target C:A ) that are “closer” to each other than
AB. In other words the bridging case creates two analogy
pairs that are more perceptually similar. This may be an
important advantage if the evaluation of each pair is being
done via a dual simulation of the cases. This provides one
answer to the earlier question of why bridging can be useful
to a subject even though it seems to add more work in
creating additional analogy relations.
   In fact the underlined references to feeling forces,
personal action projections, and hand motions in the above
passages provide evidence for the involvement of
kinesthetic imagery and for dual imagistic simulations when
he is comparing two cases. One can hypothesize that Figure
4A is acting as an overlay diagram for an overlay
simulation. The use of an overlay diagram and references
that the wheel problem solution “felt right with the pulley
feeling.” supports the hypothesis that dual simulations are
being used to evaluate these analogies. Thus this last
example illustrates the combined use of overlay simulation
(as a special kind of dual simulation) and bridging as
analogy evaluation strategies.
Conclusion
In summary, rather than a single process for mapping
elements in a discrete symbolic representation, a number of
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additional processes for evaluating an analogy relation have
been identified, namely: bridging analogies, conserving
transformations, dual simulations to detect dynamic
similarity, and overlay simulations. Roughly, conserving
transformations work by allowing the subject to detect the
causal, perceptual motor irrelevance to a targeted
relationship, of making a transformation on a case. Dual
simulations work by allowing the subject to detect a causal,
perceptual motor similarity between base and target.
Overlay simulations are a special type of dual simulation in
which the image of one case is overlaid and aligned on top
of the other case to make comparisons more precise. An
intermediate bridging case is a higher order strategy that can
facilitate making one of the above processes easier to
perform. The relationship of these strategies to discrete
feature mappings is still unclear, but when subjects can
articulate such mappings, that may add another important
kind of precision to the process of analogy evaluation.
Implications. These findings add to previous evidence
(Casakin and Goldschmidt 1999; Clement 1994, 2003:
Craig, Nersessian and Catrambone, 2002; Croft and
Thagard, 2002; Trickett and Trafton, 2002) for formulating
the general hypothesis that many analogical reasoning
processes can be imagery based. Also, the wheel problem
transcript provides evidence that imagery and runnability
are transferred from base to target. Clement (2003) extended
this theme by examining evidence for the transfer of
imagery and runnability from source analogues to
explanatory models and hypothesized that this may be an
important source of model flexibility, providing an
argument for the importance of such processes. The
importance of bridging analogies as an instructional
technique has been documented previously (Clement, 1989),
and the same may very well be true for conserving
transformations (Wertheimer, 1959), and overlay
simulations/animations. Thus much work remains to be
done in this area.
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Abstract
There is an ongoing debate on the nature of the processes
and knowledge involved in learning language. On one side of
the debate, people argue that children learn words through
deliberative processes that use propositional conceptual
knowledge; on the opposing side, people argue that children
learn words through automatic processes and knowledge
based on learned associations among perceptual features. In
this paper we concentrate on the Animate/Inanimate
distinction as evidenced in children’s novel noun
generalizations. The results of two experiments with 3-year-
olds and adults suggest that 1) automatic processing guides
children’s generalizations of novel nouns and 2) “conceptual”
knowledge may be formed as a web of learned correlations.
Background
The nature of the processes and knowledge involved in
children’s learning of new nouns is a highly contentious
issue. Children generalize names for things in appropriate
ways depending on the kind of thing being named. For
example they generalize names for artifacts by their shape;
names for non-solid substances by their material; and names
for animates by their shape and texture. The debate centers
on the nature of the processes and knowledge involved in
this behavior. On one side of the debate, people argue that
children reason about category membership using slow,
deliberative, conscious processes and propositional beliefs
about categories and category structure (Gelman &
Markman, 1987; Keil, 1994; Kemler-Nelson, Russell, Duke
& Jones, 2000). On the opposite side, people support fast,
unconscious, automatic processes and knowledge in the
form of correlations among perceptual features (Smith,
1995; Smith, 2000; Smith, Colunga & Yoshida, 2003).
Sometimes this debate has been framed in terms of whether
children’s early word learning is “smart” (reflective,
conceptual) or “dumb” (built from more basic general and
automatic processes). In this paper we concentrate on the
Animate/Inanimate distinction as shown in children’s novel
noun generalizations. We show evidence that automatic
processing guides children’s generalizations of novel nouns,
and suggest that the “conceptual” knowledge that enters
word learning, even in adults, may be me made out of
correlations of perceptual features.
One widely used task to study children’s word learning
biases is the novel noun generalization task. In this
generalization task, children are shown an exemplar like
those in Figure 1. They are told its name, and then asked
what other things have the same name. When shown an
exemplar like that in Figure 1a, with cues indicating it is a
depiction of an animate thing, children systematically
generalize its name only to new instances that match in both
shape and texture, but not to things that match in shape only
or texture only. When shown an entity without such
features, children systematically generalize the name to new
instances that match in shape, whether they match in other
properties or not, as shown in Figure 1b. Jones & Smith,
(1991) and others have suggested that children learn
correlations between features and category structure  --
between having eyes and being in a category organized by
shape and texture, and between being angular (and without
animacy features) and being in a category organized by
shape. Consistent with theories and evidence on attentional
learning, they suggest that in the novel noun generalization
task, these features automatically increase attention to
relevant properties, enabling children to attend to the right
similarities according to the kind of the object at hand. This
correlational learning account has been supported by
showing that the requisite correlations between features and
category organization exist across the first 300 nouns that
children learn (Samuelson & Smith, 1999).
Figure 1. Examples of an exemplar with cues indicating it
is a depiction of an animate thing, and an exemplar with
artifact cues.
Recently, Booth and Waxman (2002) provided support
for the alternative “smart” interpretation of children’s
performance in this task. Booth and Waxman presented
exemplars in a context that construed them as animate or
inanimate. The disambiguating context consisted of brief
stories in which the experimenter gave the child information
about the exemplar. For example, in the animate condition,
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the experimenter introduced an exemplar as a Teema and
explained that the Teema has a mommy and a daddy that
love it very much and gave it hugs and kisses. Similarly, in
the inanimate condition, the experimenters showed the same
exemplar but this time introduced it as a Teema which is
used by astronauts in their trips and will be replaced if it
breaks. Their results showed that 3-year-olds can use the
information in the stories to guide their generalizations of
the novel noun – in the Animate condition, children
generalized the novel name for the exemplar to other objects
matching in shape and texture, but in the Artifact condition
they generalized the novel name to any object that matched
the exemplar on shape. Booth and Waxman take this result
to mean that children word learning is “smart”, a result of
deliberative processes operating on conceptual knowledge
in the form of an unitary concept of animacy. Their account
is illustrated in Figure 2a.
Figure 2. In Booth & Waxman’s account, eyes, like
vignettes, serve as a gateways to children’s concept of
animacy. In the correlational learning account, eyes and
words like “she” or “mommy” are part of a web of
correlations that is learned from the regularities that exist in
animate categories in the world.
According to Booth and Waxman, the stories affect
children’s extension of novel nouns because they provide
conceptual information relevant to the exemplar’s
ontological kind. That is, the Animate story identifies the
exemplar as an animate, and the Artifact story identifies the
exemplar as an artifact. Once children know the ontological
kind of the exemplar, they have access to all the knowledge
regarding that ontological kind, including the fact that shape
and texture are central features for Animates and shape is
the central feature for Artifacts.
The correlational learning account can also explain Booth
and Waxman’s findings. Novel nouns are extended on the
basis of learned correlations among perceptible properties.
Having eyes correlates with having a mouth, correlates with
being called “he” or “she”, correlates with animate-like
motion patterns, correlates with attention to shape and
texture. This web of correlations is the “knowledge” used in
the novel noun generalization task through automatic
processes, rather than through deliberative reasoning.
Importantly, by this account any one cue can activate any
other part of the web, depending on the degree to which they
have been correlated  in the learner’s experience.  Under
this view, Booth and Waxman’s results can be explained as
a consequence of learned correlations among perceptible
properties, including words. The vignettes shift children’s
attention because they are made out of words – words that
correlate with categories of animates that are organized by
shape and texture (like zebra, or snake) and words that
correlate with categories of artifacts that are organized by
shape (like hammer, or cup).
If the correlational story is correct, these words should
cue attention to shape and texture in the Animate condition
and attention to shape in the Artifact condition
automatically, and without being strung together to form a
coherent story about the exemplar. A strong test of this
prediction would be to prime the children with animate-
correlating or artifact-correlating words presented merely as
a list and measure how this affects their performance in the
novel noun generalization task. Under Booth and Waxman’s
explanation, reading children these words in a list should
not have an effect since they are not put together into a
coherent story that presents conceptual information
regarding ontological status, nor are they presented as
referring in any way to the exemplar. Thus, if children’s
novel noun generalizations are shifted by this priming, this
attentional shift will not be attributable to any kind of
deliberative process that reasons about the ontological status
of the exemplar using the information given by the
experimenter. Experiment 1 tests this prediction.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants. 24 3-year-old children with a mean age of
42.6 months (range: 38.4-45-5 months) participated.
Materials. The stimuli consisted of two sets of eight
abstract objects that could be construed as either animate or
inanimate. Each set consisted of an exemplar object and 7
test objects that matched the exemplar in none, one, or more
features of shape, texture or color. Figure 3 shows the
diagnostic items, the ID test object matched the exemplar in
all shape, color and texture features (but was different in
size), there were also test objects that matched the exemplar
in shape only, color only, texture only, shape + texture,
shape + color, color + texture, and none of these features.
Two lists of words, one of animate-correlating words, the
other of artifact-correlating words, were selected from the
Animate and Artifact vignettes in Booth and Waxman
(2002). Table 1 shows the words used.
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Table 1:  List of animate-correlating and artifact-
correlating words selected from Booth & Waxman (2002).
Animate Artifact
mommy take
daddy worn
love break
sleep make
hugs bought
kisses use
hungry
walking
gobbled
happy
Procedure. Children were randomly assigned to either
the Animate or Artifact condition. During the Priming
Phase, the child and the parent were asked to repeat the
words said by the experimenter. The experimenter then went
through the corresponding list saying each word once and
letting parent and child repeat it. None of the test objects or
exemplars were in view during the Priming phase. The
Priming Phase was followed by the Testing Phase. The list
of words was put away and children were informed that now
they were going to play a different game and they were
introduced to one of the exemplars “This is a Teema.” and
then asked for each of the test objects in that set “Is this a
Teema?”. Each of the test objects were presented twice in
one of two previously generated random orders. Then the
second set was presented, preceded by a second Priming
Phase, for a total of 28 trials. The order of the sets was
counterbalanced across conditions.
Figure 3. The two exemplars and some of their
corresponding test items.
Results
The number of “yes” responses (the name applies) was
submitted to a 2(Priming List)x7(Test Item) repeated
measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of
Priming List (F(1,22) = 5.38, P  < .05). That is, children
overall said “yes” more when primed with the Artifact list
of words than when primed with the Animate list. There was
also a main effect of Test Item (F(1,22) = 37.21, P < .001). No
interactions were significant.
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Figure 4. Results for Experiment 1.
Furthermore, post-hoc analysis revealed different patterns
of noun extension in the two conditions. As shown in
Figure 4, children in the Animate condition extend the name
to the ID test object and to the shape+texture match,
whereas children in the Artifact condition extend the name
to the ID test object, the shape-only, the shape+texture and
the shape+color matches. We counted the number of
children who said “yes” more than expected by chance on
each condition. On the critical test item, the shape-only
match, there was a significant difference on the number of
children who said “yes” more than expected by chance in
the Animate versus the Artifact condition (χ2(1,N=24) =
4.19, P <0.05). That is, children in the Artifact condition
extended the name of the exemplar to all the test objects that
matched it in shape, regardless of their size, color or texture,
but children in the Animate condition extended the name of
the exemplar more conservatively, only to those test objects
that matched it in both shape and texture.
Discussion
At the very least, the results of Experiment 1 showed
where the Animacy/Artifact information in Booth and
Waxman’s vignettes comes from. Just hearing these words,
without weaving them into a coherent story, was enough to
shift children’s attention to features typical of animate vs.
artifact categories – shape only for artifacts, shape+texture
for animates. But more importantly, children’s novel noun
generalizations were influenced by these words in a priming
paradigm, without these words being heard at the same time
that the exemplar or test objects were present.  Apparently,
these words automatically activate the attentional biases
with which they are associated, a fact consistent with well-
supported ideas about memory processes (). The result thus
supports the idea that children’s novel noun generalizations
depend on automatic processes that operate on learned
correlations.
But is it possible that the concept of animacy is nothing
but learned correlations of perceptible features? At least
intuitively, it would seem that adults have a concept of
animacy that corresponds to the kind of conceptual
knowledge Booth and Waxman are talking about. Certainly,
adults know the word “animate” and understand the words
“living thing”. Do these concepts enter into their
generalizations of novel nouns? Will adults differentially
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generalize names for ambiguous stimuli if told the exemplar
represents an animate entity vs. an artifact? One reason to
believe they may not is that “animate” – the word – as such,
is probably not very correlated with perceptual category
formation, that is, with deciding the range of instances that
go in a category. If the knowledge used in this task comes
from learned correlations, the word “animate” in and of
itself may not be potent enough to activate attention to
shape and texture. A better cue would be one that is strongly
associated with perceptual category decision and category
name extensions.
In contrast, by Booth and Waxman’s account, the word
“animate” should directly activate adults’ concept of
animacy, indeed, and should therefore direct adults to the
relevant knowledge within that concept, enabling them to
reason that the relevant properties for categorization are
shape and texture.
Experiment 2 tests these ideas using two experimental
conditions. In one, adults were told the exemplar is an
animate or an artifact; in the other, they were given
additional perceptual cues (motion) correlated with animates
or artifacts.
Experiment 2
Methods
Participants. 40 undergraduate students participated in
this experiment.
Stimuli. The two sets of objects used in Experiment 1
were used in this experiment.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of 4 conditions: WordOnly-Animate, WordOnly-Artifact,
Word+motion-Animate, and Word+motion-Artifact.
Participants were introduced to the exemplar of a set and
told “This is a Teema. It is an animate. It is a living thing”
in the WordOnly-Animate condition; “This is a Teema. It is
an artifact. It was made in a factory” in the WordOnly-
Artifact condition. In the Word+motion condition, the
exemplar was presented with the corresponding phrases but
they were also moved in a walking or slithering motion in
the Animate condition or in a rolling or hammering motion
in the Artifact condition. Each participant saw both sets and
the order of the sets was counterbalanced across conditions.
As in Experiment 1, each participant was queried on each of
the 7 test-objects twice, for a total of 28 trials.
Results.
We first consider performance in the WordOnly conditions
(Figure 5). The number of “yes” responses was submitted to
a 2(Kind) x 7(TestItem) repeated measures ANOVA. The
analysis revealed a main effect of TestItem (F(1,18) = 41.763,
P < 0.001) and no other main effects or interactions. There
was no significant effect of Kind, that is of hearing Animate
versus Artifact instructions (F(1,18) = 1.153, P > 0.2). Post-
hoc analysis on the critical test item, the shape-only match,
also yielded no significant difference between conditions
(χ2(1,N=20) =  .2197, P >0.05). In short, when the
ontological kind information consisted solely of words like
“animate” and “artifact”, attention was not shifted
consistently with ontological kind.
Figure 5. Results for the Word Only condition in
Experiment 2.
Figure 6 shows adults’ performance in the Word+motion
conditions. Again, the number of “yes” responses was
submitted to a 2(Kind) x 7(TestItem) repeated measures
ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of TestItem
(F(1,18) = 26.543, P < 0.001) and a significant interaction
between Kind and TestItem (F(2,18) = 3.024, P < 0.01). Post-
hoc analysis confirmed a different pattern of responses in
the Animate and Artifact conditions for the shape match.
There was a significant difference on the number of adults
who said “yes” more than expected by chance on the shape-
only match in the Animate versus the Artifact condition
(χ2(1,N=20) =  5.4945, P <0.025). As predicted, participants
were more likely to accept the shape only match in the
Artifact than in the Animate condition. Thus, adult’s novel
noun generalizations, when given additional perceptual cues
highly correlated with ontological status, did generalize
names according to kind – by shape and texture for
Animates and by shape for Artifacts.
Figure 6. Results for the Word + motion condition in
Experiment 2.
Discussion
As expected from the correlational learning account,
adults do not show evidence of the animate/artifact
distinction in their novel noun generalizations when the only
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information they get about the kind of the exemplar is in the
form of phrases like “is an animate” and “is a living thing”.
They do, however, show differing patterns of
generalizations when perceptual correlations, in the form of
motion cues, are added. This result suggests that, although
adults most likely understand what the word “animate” and
what the phrase “living thing” mean, this may not be the
kind of information that enters in generalizing a novel noun.
It also suggests that reasoning about the implication of the
ontological status of the exemplar is not the kind of process
that primarily guides the extension of novel nouns. Instead,
this result suggests that the knowledge that constrains novel
noun generalizations is formed by learned correlations of
perceptual features and category structure.
General Discussion
Put together, the results of the two experiments support
the idea that automatic processes operating on learned
correlations of perceptual information can guide word
learning. The results of Experiment 1 showed that just
listening to a list of words correlated with animates (or a list
of words correlated with artifacts) is enough to shift
children’s attention to the features that typically organize
categories of animates (or artifacts). The fact that the lists of
words -- without forming complete sentences, without
referring to the exemplar, without even co-occurring with
the exemplar – can shift attention in kind-specific ways
suggests an explanation to Booth and Waxman’s results that
does not need to appeal to any form of deliberative
reasoning on the party of the child. It could be, however,
that when given complete sentences forming coherent
stories, children do take advantage of that information and
more deliberative processes that work on this more
propositional information are invoked, but the results in
Booth and Waxman (2002) and the results in Experiment 1
can be explained as simple priming, operating on previously
learned associations. Further experiments are necessary to
determine when this more “conceptual” knowledge is used
in extending a novel noun.
Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that
what we think of as more “conceptual” knowledge may be,
at the end, nothing more than a web of correlations,
including perceptual features, words, category structure,
contexts, and so on. The adults in this experiment failed to
shift their attention when explicitly told that the exemplar
was animate or artifact, but had no problem doing so when
given further correlational support, like watching the to-be-
construed-as-animate exemplar “walk” or used as a
hammer. Clearly, adults do have highly abstract knowledge
about animates and artifacts, and in a different task they
might show this. For example, if the task were to make
inferences about the exemplar, being told that it is to be
construed as an animate might lead to more sound reasoning
than watching it “slither”. However, it seems that when it
comes to extending a novel noun, adults, like children, rely
on automatic processes guided by learned correlations.
Conclusion
Extending a novel noun in ways consistent with the
ontological kind of its referent is certainly a “smart” thing to
do – it allows word learning to proceed quickly and carves
the world into useful partitions. However, this “smartness”
may be the product of rather “dumb” processes such as
associative learning and generalization by similarity.
Through the application of these dumb mechanisms in a
world that presents regularities we may create smart
concepts.
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Abstract
Whenever we must evaluate a theory, consider an
excuse, or appraise a situation, we must judge how
plausible things appear to us.  In short, plausibility
judgement occupies a central position in human
cognitive life.  Recently, it has been shown that the
plausibility of a scenario depends on how its events can
be connected (Connell & Keane, in press).  In this paper,
two experiments examine how a normally implausible
scenario can be made to seem plausible by forcing a
connection between its events.  Results show that
people’s perceptions of a scenario’s plausibility can be
manipulated by encouraging them to represent events in
a causal chain or temporal sequence.
Introduction
Every day, in many different situations, we judge
plausibility.  Whether evaluating a theory, considering
the plot quality of a movie, or listening to child explain
how a dish came to be broken, we are assessing how
plausible a scenario seems to us.
Across the cognitive science and cognitive
psychology literature, plausibility judgement has been
shown to be useful in a diverse range of cognitive tasks.
People often use plausibility judgements in place of
costly retrieval from long-term memory, especially
when verbatim memory has faded (Lemaire & Fayol,
1995; Reder, 1982; Reder, Wible & Martin, 1986).
Plausibility is also used as a kind of cognitive shortcut
in reading, to speed parsing and resolve ambiguities
(Pickering & Traxler, 1998; Speer & Clifton, 1998).  In
everyday thinking, plausible reasoning that uses prior
knowledge appears to be commonplace (Collins &
Michalski, 1989), and can even aid people in making
inductive inferences about familiar topics (Smith, Shafir
& Osherson, 1993).  It has also been argued that
plausibility plays a fundamental role in understanding
novel word combinations by helping to constrain the
interpretations produced (Costello & Keane, 2000;
Lynott, Tagalakis & Keane, in press).  Yet, despite its
apparent usefulness in cognitive life, the study of
plausibility judgement in its own right has been
neglected in cognitive science until recently.
The Knowledge-Fitting Theory of Plausibility
Recently, Connell and Keane have proposed the
Knowledge-Fitting Theory of Plausibility (2003a,
2003b, in prep; Connell, 2004) to rectify this oversight.
According to the Knowledge-Fitting Theory, a plausible
scenario is one that fits well with our knowledge of the
world.  In other words, a plausible scenario has good
concept-coherence.  A concept-coherence view of
plausibility suggests that when people make a
plausibility judgement, they relate the current scenario
to their prior experience, and in some way assess
whether it fits in with what they have experienced in the
past.  For example, take the scenario “The bottle rolled
off the shelf and smashed on the floor.”  People might
understand this scenario by drawing a causal inference
between the events – that is, the bottle falling caused it
to smash on the floor.  This might lead them to judge
this scenario as being highly plausible because prior
experience tells them that fragile things often break
when they fall on hard surfaces.  Put simply, the
scenario has a certain concept-coherence.  In contrast, if
the scenario was “The bottle rolled off the shelf and
melted on the floor”, people might consider it less
plausible because they cannot connect the events, as
their past experience has few examples of falling fragile
objects melting on contact with floors.  In other words,
this scenario lacks a certain concept-coherence.
The Knowledge-Fitting Theory is supported by a
number of empirical findings.  For example, Black,
Freeman and Johnson-Laird (1986) disrupted the
sequence of events in short stories and found that
people’s plausibility ratings were sensitive to the degree
to which the overall concept-coherence of the story had
been altered; when people could no longer infer
connections between events, they no longer considered
the stories plausible.  Connell and Keane (in press;
Connell, 2004) investigated this issue further, and found
that the plausibility of a scenario is not only affected by
whether the events can be connected, but also by how
the events are connected.  For example, events linked
by causal inferences (i.e., X was caused by Y) were
judged to be more plausible than events linked by
temporal inferences (i.e., X  happens after Y).  These
types of scenario were both considered more plausible
than scenarios where the events could not be connected
at all (i.e., unrelated events).  Connell and Keane
(2003a, 2003b, in prep.) suggest that causal connections
have better concept-coherence than temporal
connections because they fit more closely with prior
experience, and this makes causal scenarios seem more
plausible.
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The Current Study
When we judge the plausibility of some scenario in
everyday life, it is often with the objective of accepting
or rejecting the presented scenario.  For example, we
may choose to accept or reject an excuse based on
whether we find it plausible or not.  However,
plausibility is not always a binary variable (i.e., a
choice between plausible and implausible) (e.g., Black
et al., 1986; Connell & Keane, in press).  Rather, it may
sometimes be considered as a sliding scale between
plausibility and implausibility, and we may judge a
particular scenario as lying somewhere along this scale.
In addition, the plausibility of a particular scenario may
not have a constant value: for example, temporal
scenarios can be made to seem less plausible when
attention is drawn to their non-causal nature (Keane,
Connell & O’Donoghue, in prep.).
This paper investigates whether an implausible
scenario can be made seem plausible by forcing a
particular connection between its events.  The
Knowledge-Fitting Theory holds that if we cannot
connect the events in scenario, we will find it
implausible.  However, it is possible that if we manage
to connect unrelated events in some way, then the
plausibility of the scenario might increase.  For
example, the scenario “The bottle rolled off the shelf
and melted on the floor” seems generally implausible,
but it is possible to construct some set of circumstances
that makes it appear more plausible (e.g., the bottle
melted because the floor was very hot, because the
house was on fire).  This suggests that the concept-
coherence and plausibility of a normally implausible
scenario could be manipulated by encouraging people
to make particular connections between events.
Therefore, the first experiment asks people to make
specific causal or temporal connections between
unrelated events, and examines how this influences
their decision to accept or reject the scenario.  In the
second experiment, the same manipulation is used to
show how different connections also influence people’s
plausibility ratings.  These results are then related back
to the Knowledge-Fitting Theory, and are used to
examine what kind of relationship exists between
binary and scale plausibility judgements.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, participants are presented with
implausible scenarios and are asked to judge whether
each scenario is plausible or not.  Connell and Keane
(in press) show that scenarios with no connection
between events are considered implausible, while those
with causal and temporal connections are considered
plausible.  This experiment leads people to think about
how the events in a scenario may be causally or
temporally connected, and examines how these
different connections can make people accept as
plausible a scenario that would normally be rejected as
implausible.  For example, take this scenario: “The
teacher misspelled a word.  The vase smashed.”  If
people are encouraged to represent this normally
implausible scenario with a causal or temporal
connection between events, then this may lead them to
perceive the scenario as plausible.  For example, if this
scenario was represented within a specific temporal
frame (e.g., the vase smashed a second or two after the
teacher misspelled a word), then it may have sufficient
concept-coherence to appear plausible to some people.
Alternatively, if this scenario was represented with a
causal chain between events (e.g., the vase smashed
because the teacher bumped against it when taking a
step back to examine the misspelled word), then it may
have sufficient concept-coherence to appear plausible to
many people.
This experiment uses different types of question to
encourage people to make particular connections
between events.  In the no-connection control condition,
participants judged the plausibility of the scenario
directly after reading it, and were not asked to connect
the events in any particular way.  In the other
conditions, participants had to answer a question that
encouraged them to represent the scenario in a
particular way before judging its plausibility; the causal
condition required participants to connect the events as
cause and effect, while the temporal condition required
participants to connect the events as a temporal
sequence.  In short, people are expected to find few
scenarios plausible in the no-connection condition (poor
concept-coherence), more scenarios plausible in the
temporal condition (better concept-coherence), and
most scenarios plausible in the causal condition (best
concept-coherence).
Method
Materials & Design.  Materials consisted of twenty
“implausible” scenarios, each consisting of two
sentences describing unrelated events.  The materials
were constructed by creating twenty causal scenarios
(e.g., “The surgeon performed the operation.  The
patient recovered.”) and then randomizing the
combinations of first and second sentences (e.g., “The
surgeon performed the operation.  The candle
flickered.”).  Thus, each scenario contained two events
where the cause (Event A) was followed by a different,
unrelated effect (Event B).  The experimental design
was a single between-participants factor (connection
type), with three conditions (causal, temporal, no-
connection).  A between-participants design was chosen
to avoid possible confounds (e.g., participants forming
a causal connections in all presented scenarios).
Participants.  Thirty-six student volunteers from
University College Dublin participated in this
experiment.
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Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned, in
equal numbers, to one of the conditions in the
experiment.
Instructions stated that each scenario was taken from
a story and consisted of two events: Event A and Event
B.  An example not used in the materials was given:
Event A:  The boy kicked the football.
Event B:  The branch snapped.
In the causal condition, participants were asked to write
down their answer to the question “Why do you think
Event B happened?” and were presented with a sample
answer “The branch snapped because the football hit it
hard, because the boy was aiming at the tree.”  In the
temporal condition, participants were asked to write
down their answer to the question “How long after
Event A do you think Event B happened?” and were
presented with a sample answer “The branch snapped 2
or 3 seconds later.”  In all conditions, participants were
then given a forced-choice plausibility judgement “Do
you find this scenario plausible?” and asked to circle
“Yes” if they would accept the scenario as plausible,
and to circle “No’ if they would reject the scenario as
implausible.  The scenarios were presented on separate
pages in random order, resampled for each participant.
Figure 1:  Percentage of scenarios accepted as plausible
for each connection type in Experiment 1.
Results & Discussion
The results were in line with predictions, and are shown
in Figure 1.  Three scenarios were considered plausible
by more than 80% of participants in the no-connection
control condition, and these were excluded from the
analysis in all conditions.  While this paper lacks
sufficient space to discuss participants’ answers in
detail, people reported little difficulty in making the
connections in the temporal condition, and only
occasional difficulty in the causal condition.
People’s willingness to accept the scenarios as
plausible was influenced by how they had been
encouraged to represent the connections between
events, as shown by chi-squared analysis, χ2 = 47.74, df
= 2, p < 0.0001.  When asked to represent the events as
a specific temporal sequence, people accepted
significantly more scenarios as plausible (42%,
compared to 31% control), χ2 = 5.31, df = 1, p < 0.05.
However, the greatest change occurred when people
were asked to represent a causal chain between the
events, with over twice the number of scenarios being
perceived as plausible  (65%, compared to 31%
control), χ2 = 45.77, df = 1, p  < 0.0001.  In this way,
causal connections were reliably better than temporal
connections at making scenarios appear plausible (65%
compared to 42%), χ2 = 20.71, df = 1, p < 0.0001.
So what makes implausible scenarios suddenly
appear plausible?  Why do people perceive the
plausibility of a scenario differently when they are
asked why or when events happened?  After all, the
actual connection made between unrelated events is
arbitrary: people are free to come up with any
explanation or time frame they choose to connect the
events.  There is nothing stopping people from causally
connecting the events in the no-connection control
condition, nor is anything stopping them from causally
representing the scenario when answering the temporal
question.  Indeed, it could be argued that the 31%
plausible responses in the no-connection control
condition result from the times that people managed to
make a causal connection between events without any
guidance.  In effect, the pattern of results suggests that a
kind of “cognitive laziness” is at play, and that people
do not put any more effort into representing the
scenarios than is absolutely necessary.  In the no-
connection control condition, most scenarios are judged
as implausible because no obvious connection between
the events comes to mind.  However, in order to be able
to answer the temporal question, a certain amount of
extra effort must go into connecting the events.  If the
resulting representation has sufficient concept-
coherence, the scenario then seems plausible.  Lastly,
answering the causal question requires quite a lot of
effort, as people must explicitly lay out the
circumstances that brought about the second event.  The
resulting causal representation is likely to have good
concept-coherence, and so the scenario is likely to
appear plausible.  This “cognitive laziness” view is
consistent with other studies that have demonstrated
people’s reluctance to infer causal relations unless
prompted to do so  (e.g., Keane, 1997; McKoon &
Ratcliff, 1992).
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This experiment shows that people will accept an
implausible scenario as plausible if they are encouraged
to connect events in a certain way.  However, it is also
possible to elicit a more fine-grained judgement of
plausibility.  When people accept a scenario, is it
because they judge it to be very plausible or just
moderately plausible?  This question is addressed in the
next experiment.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 is identical to Experiment 1, except
participants are asked to rate the plausibility of
scenarios on a scale from 0-10 instead of simply
choosing whether the scenario seems plausible or
implausible.  In other words, participants are presented
with implausible scenarios and are asked to judge how
plausible they find each scenario.  As with Experiment
1, scenarios in the causal and temporal conditions are
expected to be rated as more plausible than those in the
no-connection control condition because of their greater
concept-coherence.  However, there are two
possibilities for how the causal and temporal conditions
may be distinguished.
The first possibility is that when people in the causal
condition accept a scenario as plausible, they actually
consider it to be highly plausible.  This means that
causal connections between unrelated events would be
considered to have very good concept-coherence;
indeed, just as good as for more straightforward causal
scenarios.  If this were the case, the results would
mirror those of Connell and Keane (in press,
experiment 1), where causal scenarios were rated as
highly plausible (7.8 out of 10) and temporal scenarios
were rated as only moderately plausible (4.2 out of 10).
The second possibility is that, although implausible
scenarios may become acceptably plausible in the
causal condition, they will never seem highly plausible.
This means that people will perceive causal connections
between unrelated events to be of a lower quality (i.e.,
have poorer concept-coherence) than more
straightforward causal scenarios (as in Connell and
Keane’s study).  If this were the case, then ratings in the
causal and temporal conditions would be expected to be
capped at a level of moderate plausibility.
Method
Materials & Design.  The materials and design were
the same as in Experiment 1.
Participants.  Thirty-six student volunteers from
University College Dublin, who had not taken part in
Experiment 1, participated in this experiment.
Procedure.   The procedure was the same as in
Experiment 1, except that participants were asked for a
plausibility rating rather than a forced choice
judgement.  In all conditions, participants were asked
“How plausible do you find this scenario?” and asked to
circle a rating on a scale from 0 – 10.  A rating of 0 was
described as meaning the scenario was “not at all
plausible”, while 5 meant “moderately plausible” and
10 meant “completely plausible”.
Figure 2:  Mean scenario plausibility ratings for each
connection type in Experiment 2.
Results & Discussion
The results were in line with predictions, and are shown
in Figure 2.  As before, three scenarios that were
considered plausible by more than 80% of participants
in Experiment 1’s no-connection control condition were
excluded from the analysis in all conditions.  Analyses
of variance are performed by-participants (F1) and by-
items (F2), treating participants and items as random
factors, respectively.
People’s plausibility ratings were influenced by how
they had been encouraged to represent the connections
between events, as shown by the main effect of
connection type, F1(2, 33) = 6.30, p < 0.005; F2(2, 32) =
31.36, p < 0.0001.  Planned comparisons showed that,
when asked to represent the events as a specific
temporal sequence, people judged the scenarios to be
significantly more plausible (5.0, compared to 3.5
control), F1(1, 22) = 9.53, p < 0.005; F2(1, 16) = 50.58,
p < 0.0001.  Similarly, when people were asked to
represent a causal chain between the events, they
perceived the scenarios as being significantly more
plausible  (5.2, compared to 3.5 control), F1(1, 22) =
11.74, p  < 0.005; F2(1, 16) = 53.23, p  < 0.0001.
However, there was no difference between the temporal
and causal conditions; people did not consider causal
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connections between events to be any more plausible
than temporal connections, F1 < 1; F2(1, 16) = 1.30, p >
0.25.
This experiment shows that, although implausible
scenarios may become acceptably plausible in the
causal condition, they can never seem highly plausible.
In other words, while unrelated events can be causally
connected, they do not fit with prior knowledge quite as
well as more obvious causal connections.  For example,
we may causally connect the events in the scenario
“The teacher misspelled a word.  The vase smashed.”
by assuming that the vase smashed because the teacher
bumped against it when taking a step back to examine
the misspelled word.  While this scenario may just
about seem acceptably plausible, it does not seem
highly plausible.  It certainly does not seem as plausible
as a more straightforward causal scenario like “The cat
knocked over a vase.  The vase smashed.”  Similarly,
for the temporal condition, the results show that
connecting events in a specific time frame (e.g., the
vase smashed seconds after the teacher misspelled a
word) makes a scenario seem somewhat plausible.
However, temporal scenarios are considered only
moderately plausible at best (Connell & Keane, in
press), which suggests that a temporal connection
between unrelated events fits with prior knowledge
about as well as any other temporal connection.  In
short, the concept-coherence and plausibility of a
normally implausible scenario can be manipulated by
encouraging people to make particular connections
between events, but the scenario will generally not be
judged more than moderately plausible.
So what is the relationship between judging whether
a scenario is plausible and judging how plausible it is?
In Experiment 1, we saw that 65% of scenarios in the
causal condition were considered acceptably plausible,
but yet in Experiment 2, these same scenarios received
a plausibility rating of only 5.2 / 10.  Similarly, 42% of
scenarios in the temporal condition were considered
acceptably plausible, and yet were also rated at 5.0 / 10.
Analysis of the percentage of plausible responses in
Experiments 1 and the mean plausibility ratings in
Experiment 2, for each scenario in each condition,
shows a direct linear relationship between a scenario’s
plausibility rating and its acceptability (see Figure 3).
This relationship has a significant correlation of r =
0.88, N = 60, p < 0.0001.  In short, scenarios with a
high plausibility rating will be accepted by most people,
while scenarios with a low plausibility rating will be
rejected by most people.  This suggests that there is no
absolute plausibility threshold, above which a scenario
will be accepted by everyone as completely plausible.
Rather, it depends on what level of acceptability is
desired.  For example, if we wish 90% of people to
accept a scenario, then it should have a mean
plausibility rating of approximately 7 out of 10.
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Figure 3:  Relationship between scenarios’ plausibility
ratings and their frequency of acceptance.
General Discussion
This paper shows that an implausible scenario can be
made seem plausible by forcing a particular connection
between its events.  Encouraging people to represent
events in a causal chain or temporal sequence, without
specifying what the connection should be, alters their
perceptions of a scenario’s plausibility.  In Experiment
1, people are shown to accept 65% of scenarios as
plausible once they had explicitly noted a possible
causal chain, and 42% of scenarios once they had
explicitly noted a possible temporal frame for the
events.  This compares to a low rate of acceptance for
the same scenarios when people are free to make any
connections they choose.  In Experiment 2, people are
shown to consider scenarios as moderately plausible
when they are guided into connecting events causally or
temporally.  In contrast, the same scenarios receive low
plausibility ratings when people are free to make any
connections they choose.  Thus, the novel empirical
work reported here demonstrates how people’s
perceptions of plausibility can be influenced by the
circumstances surrounding the task.  These findings
have implications for any research making use of
plausibility judgements, in fields including memory,
discourse comprehension, reasoning and conceptual
combination.
According to the Knowledge-Fitting Theory of
Plausibility (Connell & Keane, 2003a, 2003b, in prep;
Connell, 2004), plausibility judgement is about
assessing concept-coherence.  This view holds that
when people make a plausibility judgement, they relate
the current scenario to their prior experience, and in
some way assess whether it fits in with what they have
experienced in the past.  Depending on how we
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represent a scenario in the first place (i.e., how we
connect its events) will therefore determine how well it
fits with our prior knowledge.  What this paper
demonstrates is that the representation of a scenario
varies according to how we are encouraged to connect
the events.  In other words, the concept-coherence and
plausibility of a scenario can be manipulated by guiding
people towards certain kinds of representation.
The results reported here suggest that people judge
plausibility with a certain “cognitive laziness”.  This
means that they do not put any more effort into
representing the scenarios than is absolutely necessary.
When presented with a scenario, if a possible
connection between events does not immediately leap
out, then people do not take the trouble to connect the
events and instead dismiss the scenario as implausible.
However, if circumstances require, people are perfectly
capable of connecting even the most disparate events in
a coherent manner.  For example, the scenario “The
teacher misspelled a word.  The vase smashed.”
contains events that are quite difficult to connect.
However, people were well able to connect these
unrelated events in the causal condition of both
experiments, as evinced by the wide and creative
variety of causal chains given – e.g., the vase smashed
because the teacher bumped against it when stepping
back from the blackboard, or because the teacher
smashed it in a temper after realising the mistake, or
because it was knocked over by a student eager to
correct the teacher’s error.  It is only when
circumstances demand it that people overcome their
cognitive laziness and take the trouble to reason out a
possible connection between events.  Indeed, this
“cognitive laziness” view is not without its advantages.
As well as allowing people to judge plausibility with
the least amount of computational expense, it is also
tends towards false negatives rather than false positives.
This makes it quite a sound approach, as it is safer to
reject a scenario that later proves viable than to accept
one that later proves unviable.
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Abstract
Falsification may demarcate science from non-science as the
rational way to test the truth of hypotheses. But experimental
evidence from studies of reasoning shows that people often
find falsification difficult. We suggest that domain expertise
may facilitate falsification. We consider new experimental
data about chess experts’ hypothesis testing. The results show
that chess masters were readily able to falsify their plans. They
generated move sequences that falsified their plans more
readily than novice players, who tended to confirm their plans.
The finding that experts in a domain are more likely to falsify
their hypotheses has important implications for the debate
about human rationality.
Hypothesis Testing
People understand everyday and scientific phenomena by
generating hypotheses to explain them. They achieve a true
understanding only by testing hypotheses by searching for
proof. There are two main ways people can test the truth of
their hypotheses. They can either seek confirmation:
evidence that is consistent with a hypothesis, or
falsification: evidence that is inconsistent with a hypothesis.
Falsification is generally considered better than
confirmation: no matter how much evidence is gathered to
confirm a hypothesis, there remains the possibility of
refutation later (Popper, 1959). Confirmation could lead to
the endorsement of untrue ideas and so if people are
rational, they should attempt to falsify their hypotheses.
Many cognitive scientists have interpreted experimental
findings on hypothesis testing within the framework of
falsification (e.g., Wason, 1960). The conclusion has
sometimes been reached that when people fail to attempt to
falsify, they fail to think rationally.
 Early research on hypothesis testing found that people were
prone to a confirmation bias: they tended to search for
confirming evidence and avoid falsifying evidence (e.g.,
Wason, 1960). Confirmation bias has sometimes been
viewed as evidence of human irrationality, for example, it
may lead people to form prejudiced beliefs (e.g., Aronson,
1995). But the idea that human hypothesis testing is
irrational presents a paradox: How can it be flawed given
that it has led to important civil, technological and scientific
discoveries? There are two possible answers: one possibility
is that testing hypotheses through confirmation is more
useful than indicated by a Popperian analysis, and a second
possibility is that people are more capable of falsification
than experimental evidence has revealed so far. We will first
outline the view that confirmation is a useful strategy to test
hypotheses and the view that falsification may be
conceptually impossible (e.g., Poletiek, 1996). Then we will
show that falsification is in fact possible in a domain that
has been a trusted test-bed for theories of cognition for
almost forty years: chess problem solving. We will consider
experimental results that testify to high levels of
falsification in the hypothesis testing of chess masters
(Cowley & Byrne, 2004).
Confirmation: Vice or Virtue?
Irrational hypothesis testing in the form of confirmation bias
was first reported in the 2-4-6 task (Wason, 1960).
Participants in this task are required to discover the rule to
which the number triple 2-4-6 conforms. The participants
are analogous to scientists and the rule is analogous to a law
of nature to be discovered. Participants test their hypotheses
by generating other number triples and they are told by the
experimenter whether each triple conforms to the rule or
not. The rule in the 2-4-6 task is the deliberately general rule
of ‘any ascending numbers’. The salient features of the 2-4-
6 triple tend to induce incorrect hypotheses, for example,
participants tend to focus on its properties of even numbers
and numbers ascending in twos. Participants who generate
these hypotheses, ‘ascending even numbers’ or ‘numbers
ascending in twos’ can discover the real rule ‘any ascending
numbers’ in only one way: by generating triples that falsify
their hypothesis. For example, a participant could try to
falsify the ‘ascending even numbers’ hypothesis by
generating the triple '3-5-7'. They would discover their
hypothesis is false when the experimenter tells them that '3-
5-7' is consistent with the real rule. But participants
overwhelmingly generated confirming triples such as  '10-
12-14'. The triple confirms their hypothesis and it is also
consistent with the real rule and so the experimenter tells
them '10-12-14' is consistent. They announce their incorrect
hypothesis as the rule and fail to solve the task correctly.
 Confirmation bias has been demonstrated many times in the
2-4-6 task and in other related laboratory tasks, for example,
in a task in which participants are required to discover the
law governing the motion of particles in an artificial
universe displayed on a computer screen (e.g., Mynatt,
Doherty, & Tweney, 1978).
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But do people confirm their hypotheses only in artificial
laboratory tasks? Perhaps they are better able to falsify in
real world contexts where they can access their knowledge
about the task? In fact, the tendency to confirm has been
observed in NASA Apollo mission scientists (Mitroff,
1974), and in the notes of scientists such as Alexander
Graham Bell (Gorman, 1995). It is possible that
confirmation is useful. For example, the participants who
successfully discovered the rule in the complex artificial
universe task tended to be those who confirmed their
hypotheses in the early stages of their attempted discovery
of the rule, and then tried to falsify when they had a well-
corroborated hypothesis (Mynatt et al., 1978). Perhaps it is
only when a hypothesis worth testing has been established
that it is necessary to attempt to falsify it. Confirmation and
falsification may be complementary strategies for successful
hypothesis testing.
 But it is also possible that people do not falsify because
they cannot (Poletiek, 1996). According to this view when
people generate a hypothesis it is their best guess about the
truth, and it does not make sense for them to try to show that
their best guess is wrong. In a version of the 2-4-6 task,
participants were encouraged to generate their best guess
about what the rule might be and then they were instructed
to perform falsifying tests on it. The instruction to falsify
decreased the number of positive triples, such as '10-12-14',
which is consistent with the best guess ‘even ascending
numbers’. The instruction to falsify also increased the
generation of negative test triples, such as '3-5-7' which is
inconsistent with the best guess ‘even ascending numbers’.
However, this test is only a falsifying one if the participant
expects the experimenter to say that the triple is consistent
with the real rule (and then the participant would know that
the hypothesis ‘even ascending numbers’ was wrong
because ascending odd numbers are consistent too). But if
the participant generates the inconsistent '3-5-7' triple and
expects the experimenter to say that it is not consistent with
the real rule, then they have attempted to confirm their
hypothesis (albeit with a negative triple). In fact,
participants generated triples that were inconsistent with
their hypothesis (negative triples) but they expected them to
be inconsistent with the experimenter’s rule. The
participants could not seem to make sense of the instruction
to falsify. The instruction to falsify may be impossible to
carry out (Poletiek, 1996).
 Given the ideas that confirmation is useful and falsification
is impossible, does it follow that the normative prescription
of falsification is flawed, rather than human rationality?
Perhaps, not. Even when a hypothesis is the best guess it is
not necessarily an accurate representation of the truth. We
turn to the case for falsification next.
Falsification and the Path to Truth
Consider the following example:
You are a scientist and your job is to identify the cause of
a dangerous new disease. You identify a previously
unrecognized virus in tissue samples of symptomatic
patients and your hypothesis is that this 'new virus' is the
cause of the disease. However, other scientists have
identified two viruses, including your new virus in their
tissue samples. They hypothesize that it is the 'other virus'
and not the new virus that is the cause. Both hypotheses
have confirming evidence. A case is reported where the
new virus is present and the other virus is absent. What
should you conclude?
A situation similar to this one faced scientists working on
the cause of the SARS epidemic. They concluded that the
'new virus' hypothesis was correct. The case where the
'other virus' was absent falsified the 'other virus' hypothesis
and corroborated the 'new virus' hypothesis. The example
illustrates how important falsification can be.
 There are many situations in which it is helpful to anticipate
the ways in which a hypothesis or plan could go wrong. For
example, it may be helpful to falsify in interactions with a
collaborator or opponent, whether in contexts such as
political or social engagement, or in games such as tic-tac-
toe or poker. The importance of considering what might go
wrong is observed in cases of military strategy, for example,
in Northern Ireland (Mallie, 2001). Attempts to falsify
hypotheses, particularly plans of action, could help reduce
costly mistakes.
 The merits of falsification are not lost on experts, as the
SARS example illustrates. It may even be the case that the
ability to falsify is part of what makes an expert (Cowley &
Byrne, 2004). The competitive nature of science may ensure
that different groups of scientists attempt to falsify their
opponent’s theories even if they only attempt to confirm
their own. The refutation of a theory is often discovered by
someone who did not invent the theory (Kuhn, 1996).
Hypothesis testing in scientific discovery may benefit from
a strategy of attempting to confirm a hypothesis until there
is sufficient corroboration for it to be considered seriously,
and then attempting to falsify it, just as in the ‘artificial
universe’ task (Mynatt et al., 1978). Perhaps more
importantly, experts may generate high quality hypotheses
from the outset. An exceptional scientist such as Alexander
Graham Bell may have tended to confirm rather than falsify
his hypotheses because his expertise ensured that his
hypotheses were exceptionally good (and there is a smaller
potential set of falsifying evidence for a good quality
hypothesis than for a poor one).
 As these observations suggest, a more systematic study of
expert hypothesis testing is warranted. We chose the game
of chess as our expert domain because it meets the essential
criteria: it is possible to identify a large sample of experts
whose expertise is objectively defined and categorised
relative to each other, and it is a task that draws directly on
participants’ expert knowledge and experience.
Chess and Hypothesis Testing
Studies of chess have contributed substantially to
understanding cognition, including problem solving (Newell
& Simon, 1972), chunking in working memory (Chase &
Simon, 1973), and expertise (De Groot, 1965). Findings
from research on chess have successfully explained
expertise in non-game domains such as physics (e.g.,
Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980). Chess offers
great potential for an investigation of expert hypothesis
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testing. Of course, choosing a move in chess may depend on
a variety of processes including accessing a large repository
of chunked domain knowledge about possible opponent
moves (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1998a). Our
suggestion is that hypothesis testing may be one of several
important processes for selecting a move in chess. We
expect that expert master players will be better than novices
at falsifying their planned moves by thinking about
opponent moves that could ruin their plan (for details see
Cowley & Byrne, 2004).
 Our key research question is, do experts and novices differ
in their ability to find refutations to lines of play in chess?
We conceptualize hypothesis falsification in chess as
finding opponent moves that refute the moves a player
examines for play. The opponent moves could ruin the
player’s plan and worsen the player’s position. We address
an important aspect of choosing a move that has never been
systematically investigated: the evaluation of move
sequences.
Hypothesis Testing in Chess
The overall goal of chess is to checkmate the opponent by
attacking the opponent king and eliminating all the possible
ways the opponent king can escape the attack. Chess
thinking may consist of exploring different alternative paths
in a ‘problem space’ (Newell and Simon, 1972). The
problem space consists of the initial problem state, that is,
the start of the game, intermediate problem states, for
example, capturing an opponent piece, and the end state
(checkmate). Progress from state to state is achieved
through operators, that is, in chess the way chess pieces are
allowed to move. For example, a bishop operates diagonally
backwards and forwards and captures on the square it lands
on for any one move.
 At the beginning of a game of chess the two players have
equal numbers of pieces and theoretically equal chances of
securing a win, loss or draw. To secure the best possible
result the players must play moves they hypothesize to be so
good that they cannot be refuted (Saariluoma, 1995).
Refutation (that is, hypothesis falsification) occurs when the
opponent plays a move that results in a worsening of the
player’s position. For example, a player may play a move
that he or she plans to be a good move, but the opponent
replies with a move that stops the player’s plan. The
opponent’s play worsens the player’s position and reduces
the player’s chance of a win.
 There may be three major processes in the choice of a chess
move: exploration, elaboration and proof (DeGroot, 1965).
Evidence of hypothesis testing is available in the proof
process. A chess player tests how good a move is by
mentally generating move sequences following on from that
move. For example, a move sequence might be: “If I move
my knight to that square, you might move your pawn to
attack my knight, and then I will have to retreat, and that is
really bad for me…”. In this example, the move sequence is
evaluated as leading to a negative outcome: a falsification
has been found for the knight move. Move sequences can be
evaluated as leading to either a positive, negative or neutral
outcome for a chess position. We conceptualize move
sequences that are judged to lead to a positive outcome as
akin to evidence confirming that a particular move is a good
move. Move sequences evaluated as leading to a negative
outcome are akin to evidence falsifying a move that was
thought initially to be a good move. Move sequences
evaluated as leading to a neutral outcome are neutral
evidence.
Accessing Hypothesis Testing in Chess
We carried out an experiment on hypothesis testing in chess
players (see Cowley & Byrne, 2004, for details). The 20
participants (19 men and 1 woman) were registered
members of the Irish Chess Union. The participants were
classified according to the Elo system, which calculates
expected playing strength value on the basis of tournament
and league results, and the value varies from approximately
1000 for an absolute novice and over 2800 for the world
champion. We tested experienced novices (mean rating of
1509) and experts (mean rating 2240). The expert group
included experts from different Elo categories of expertise,
including one grandmaster (Irish Elo >2500) two
international masters (Irish Elo > 2300), three Fide masters
(Irish Elo > 2200, i.e. International Chess Federation
masters), and four initial category experts (Irish Elo >
2000). All international class masters living in Ireland at the
time participated in the study (for further information on
participant details see Cowley & Byrne, 2004).
 We presented the participants with six board positions,
three normal and three random (as well as an initial practice
position). The board positions were chosen from games in
chess periodicals. They were middle game positions with
22-26 pieces to ensure complexity and to rule out the
chances that the masters’ had seen them before. Importantly,
they were ‘equality outcome’ positions, where there were
equal chances with best play for both black and white
pieces. This constraint ensured that there would be no
obvious confirming or falsifying move sequences. The
positions were chosen with the assistance of a chess expert
(who was not a participant in the study). See figure 1 for an
example of a chess position used.
Figure 1: Position 1 with white to play (and the co-ordinate
a1 is also illustrated in this diagram).
The participants’ task was to, “choose a move you would
play in the way you are used to going about choosing a
move in a real game”. They were given instructions to think
aloud, and their verbalizations were recorded by dictaphone.
It is instructive to focus on the master level players (for
a1
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comparison with masters studied in the chess literature
previously) and to this end we selected the think-aloud
protocols of five master level players (i.e. 1 Grandmaster, 2
International Masters, and 2 Fide International Chess
Federation Masters), and compared them to the think-aloud
protocols of five novice chess players, chosen at random
from the full sample of novices (for other analyses see
Cowley & Byrne, 2004).
 Moves examined by the player during think-aloud are
verbalized using algebraic chess notation, for example a
sequence of moves verbalized was: f5 exf5 gxf5 Bh5 Qg2
Rh4. This notation describes each piece and the location of
the square it will go to on the chess board. Each square on a
board has a location name called an algebraic coordinate.
The letters a-h are horizontally along the bottom of the
board. The numbers 1-8 are vertically up the board. Each
type of piece is given a letter in upper case format. Each
coordinate is given a letter in lower case format alongside a
number. So for example, the move ‘Ra1’ refers to a rook
piece (R) moving to the a1 square. Or, the rook could go to
the b1 square to the right of a1 (Rb1). A sequence of such
moves is a move sequence. All of the players were
sufficiently fluent with algebraic notation to be able to
‘think aloud’ using it. Three minutes thinking time was
allotted for choosing a move as it is just over the average
time per move in tournament play. Exposure for each board
position was timed using a standard tournament chess clock,
each clock was set at three minutes and when the clock’s
flag fell participants were told that their time was up.
 To accurately access hypothesis testing we also needed
participants to provide us with an evaluation of each move
sequence that they examined. However, spontaneous
evaluation in chess has a low probability of verbalization
(Newell & Simon, 1972). Accordingly we used a combined
methodology of think-aloud followed by retrospective
evaluation. Verbalized move sequences were recorded not
only by dictaphone but also by the experimenter (the first
author) in algebraic notation concurrent with think-aloud.
The experimenter asked the participants for their evaluation
of each move sequence, by first saying back the move
sequence immediately after each chess problem to reduce
retrospective error and interference (Ericsson & Simon,
1993). The participants were then asked to evaluate each
move sequence as having lead to a positive, negative or
neutral outcome for their positions.
Scoring confirming and falsifying hypothesis tests
The transcribed think-aloud protocols for the responses to
the normal board positions were segmented into episodes,
move by move. We constructed ‘problem behavior graphs’
(using Newell and Simon’s guidelines) for the responses to
the three normal board positions for each of the ten selected
participants (thirty problem behavior graphs in total). These
graphs plot each move sequence and its corresponding
retrospective evaluation. To illustrate we present in Figure 2
a small fragment of a master’s problem behaviour graph for
one board position.
Figure 2: A fragment of a problem behaviour graph
constructed from a chess master’s protocol.
Each line across represents a move sequence. The order of
search is from left to right, then down. Each circle (i.e.
node) represents a new position following a move made in
the problem space. For example, Qg2 means the player
thought aloud about the possibility of moving his queen to
the g2 square. Next the player thought aloud about a
possible reply from his opponent to his Qg2 move, that is,
the move Rxa3 where the opponent moves their rook to the
a3 square, and the x indicates that the rook captures a piece,
in this case a pawn. Next the player thought aloud about his
reply to this opponent’s move, that is, bxa3 where he would
move his pawn on the b file to a3 (pawn moves do not have
a P in front of them), and capture the opponent’s rook. The
plus sign shows that the player evaluated this move
sequence as positive for him. The next line sequence begins
with the player thinking about f5, that is, a pawn moves to
the f5 square. The next utterance the player makes is gxf5,
that is, the pawn on the g file of the board captures a pawn
on the square f5. This move is only possible for the player
and not his opponent. The player has generated a move
sequence that mentions only his own moves and does not
mention opponent moves. The dashed line captures these
skipped moves. The minus shows a negative evaluation.
Each problem behavior graph incorporates the think-aloud
move sequences with the retrospective evaluation (positive,
negative, or neutral).
 We used Fritz 8 (one of the most powerful current chess
programs) to obtain an objective evaluation of the chess
position that occurs at the final move of each sequence (i.e.
terminal node). For readers familiar with Fritz 8, we used
the infinite analysis module, in which each move sequence
is evaluated at least from 11ply from the terminal node (see
Chabris & Hearst, 2003). The evaluations provided by Fritz
8  enable us to identify move sequences that would
genuinely be positive or negative for a player. We could
distinguish between the move sequences that a player
indicated as leading to a positive outcome for their position
and that the program established would lead to a positive
outcome if played, from the move sequences that a player
identified as positive, but that the program established
would in fact lead to a negative outcome. We conceptualize
confirmation bias as a move sequence that a player
evaluates as leading to a positive outcome for them, when in
 Qg2         Rxa3        bxa3
 f5                            gxf5    
 Bc3
+
-
-
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fact it leads to a negative outcome. Likewise, we were able
to distinguish the move sequences that a player identified as
leading to a negative outcome and that the program
established would be negative if played, from move
sequences that the player identified as negative, but that the
program established were in fact positive for them. We
conceptualize falsification as a move sequence that a player
evaluates as leading to a negative outcome for them, when
in fact it leads to a negative outcome.
Hypotheses Testing in Chess Masters’ Thinking
Masters tended to think about 8 move sequences on average
for each board position, and experienced novices tended to
think about 6 move sequences. A total of 218 move
sequences were generated by the 10 players for the three
normal board positions (N = 122, M = 8.1 for each board
position for the masters, N= 96, M = 6.4 for novices).
 Four types of move sequences were identified from the
problem behaviour graphs. (1) 50% were complete move
sequences where every move for the player and his or her
opponent was articulated along the move sequence. (2) 25%
were skipped move sequences where an essential move was
not mentioned somewhere in the move sequence. (3) 19%
were base skip sequences where the first move or ‘base
move’ of the sequence was not mentioned. (4) 6% were
ambiguous move sequences where the move sequence could
not be interpreted. Only the complete move sequences lend
themselves to objective evaluation by Fritz 8, so we
concentrate our analysis here on these hypothesis tests (see
Cowley & Byrne, 2004 for further details).
 A complete move sequence is scored using the following
criteria: (a) whether it is predicted by the player to lead to a
positive, negative, or neutral outcome, and (b) whether it is
evaluated objectively by Fritz 8 as leading to a positive,
negative or neutral outcome. Thus there are nine possible
hypothesis tests for complete move sequences, as Table 1
illustrates. Confirmation bias corresponds to the '+/-' cell in
Table 1, and falsification corresponds to the '-/-' cell. These
two types of evaluation accounted for 42% of all
evaluations.
Table 1: Objective and subjective evaluations of move
sequences ('+' refers to a positive evaluation, '-' to a negative
one, '=' to a neutral one; '+/-' means the player’s evaluation
was positive and the program’s evaluation was negative).
Fritz 8’s evaluations
Positive negative neutral
Player’s evaluations
Positive +/+ +/- +/=
Negative -/+ -/- -/=
Neutral =/+ =/- =/=
Falsification In three of the cells of Table 1 (the three on
the diagonal from upper left to lower right), the subjective
evaluation of the player matches the objective evaluation of
the computer program. One of these matching cells is
particularly important for our prediction that experts falsify
more than novices: genuine falsification occurs in the
situation captured by the '-/-' cell in Table 1, in which the
player and the program both evaluated the outcome of the
move sequence as negative. Chess masters generated more
of these falsifying move sequences than novices (M = 3.2
for masters, M = 1.2 for novices) and this difference was
reliable (t (8) =2.02, p = .039).
 The result indicates that chess masters are capable of
falsifying their plans by identifying opponent moves that
would worsen the master’s position. People are able to
falsify (pace Poletiek, 2000). Domain expertise may
facilitate this falsification. Moreover, the moves chosen by
chess masters for play at the end of each of the three board
positions were evaluated by Fritz 8 as objectively better
moves than novices (the quality of moves is measured in
terms of ‘pawn advantage’ or ‘pawn disadvantage’, and it
was +0.309 pawn advantage for masters compared to –1.2
pawn disadvantage for experienced novices). The result is
consistent with the idea that the ability to falsify may
contribute to making better moves in chess.
Confirmation Bias Confirmation bias occurs when a move
sequence is evaluated subjectively by the participant as
leading to a positive outcome, but evaluated objectively by
the computer program as leading to a negative outcome (the
'+/-' cell in Table 1). The results show that novices
produced somewhat more instances of confirmation bias
than masters (M = 2.6 for novices and M = 1.6 for masters).
Although the difference was in the predicted direction it was
not reliable (t (8) = 1.443, p = .094).
Positive and Negative Testing The nine test types in Table
1 can be categorized into three groups: (1) Objective tests:
the player’s positive, negative and neutral evaluations
matched Fritz 8’s evaluations (the three cells on the
diagonal from upper left to lower right mentioned earlier),
and this category includes the falsification tests. (2) Positive
bias tests: the player’s evaluation was more positive than
Fritz 8’s. The three cells in this category include the second
and third cells in the first row ('+/-', '+/='), and the middle
cell in the third row ('=/-'), and this category includes the
confirmation bias tests. (3) Negative bias tests: the player’s
evaluation was more negative than Fritz 8’s. The three cells
in this category include the second and third cells in the first
column ('-/+', '=/+'), and the middle cell in the third column
('-/=').
 Chess masters generated reliably more objective tests than
novices (M = 6.6 for masters and M = 2.4 for novices).
Novices generated somewhat more positive bias tests than
the masters (M = 5 for novices and M = 3.4 for masters), but
the difference was not reliable. They generated a similar
amount of negative bias tests (M = 1.8 for masters, M = 1.2
for novices), as Figure 3 shows.
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Figure 3: The mean number of objective tests, positive bias
tests and negative bias tests generated by masters and
novices. (Instances of falsification and confirmation bias are
included in these categories).
Conclusions
People are capable of falsifying their hypotheses. Our
experimental results show that chess masters falsified their
hypotheses: they thought about how their opponent might
refute their plan in their move sequences. Chess masters
tended to evaluate their moves as good or bad for them more
realistically than experienced novices: their judgments
matched the objective evaluations of one of the most highly
advanced chess computer programs, Fritz 8. Experienced
novices exhibited something of a confirmation bias: they
tended to think about how their opponent would play moves
that fit in with their plan, somewhat more than chess masters
did. Novices, somewhat more than masters, tended to
evaluate their moves as better for them than they were
objectively. The evidence that chess masters can falsify
suggests that it may be premature to conclude that the
normative prescription of falsification is flawed. In this case
falsification can be considered a useful and rational strategy.
 Hypothesis testing may be influenced by domain expertise.
How does domain knowledge affect the ability to falsify by
chess experts? We plan to explore this question by
examining how masters test their hypotheses for random
board positions compared to novices. If falsification relies
on domain knowledge, then masters should tend not to
falsify their hypotheses about move sequences in the
random board positions as often as they do in the normal
board positions. Nonetheless, they may attempt to falsify
more than experienced novices, if their expertise has helped
them to develop a strategy of falsification in this domain.
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Abstract
A recent method for restricting inessential variation in
speech is presented. Synchronous Speech is obtained by
having two subjects read a prepared text in synchrony.
Past results demonstrate that this is easy for subjects to
do, and that some prosodic variability is greatly reduced
when reading synchronously. Particular advantage has
been found in the analysis of pauses and fundamental
frequency variation, where synchronous speech has been
demonstrated to exhibit markedly less inessential vari-
ability, thus furthering analysis and modeling. Here,
duration ratios within a phrase are compared across
synchronous and solo conditions. Variables associated
with global timing and with the relationships between
phrases are shown to be more consistent in the syn-
chronous condition, while smaller units are not notice-
ably affected by the speaking condition. No systematic
artifacts are found to be introduced by asking subjects
to read in synchrony.
A Method for Restricting Variability
Synchronous Speech is obtained with the simple expedi-
ent of having two subjects read a prepared text together,
with the minimal instruction to attempt to maintain syn-
chrony (Cummins, 2002). The reason for constraining
subjects in this manner is perhaps best appreciated by
analogy with the difficult task of attempting to recon-
struct a musical score, based only on a recording of a
specific musician (Heijink et al., 2000). This task is inter-
estingly similar to the work of the theoretically minded
phonetician who attempts to uncover control and tim-
ing information, along with combinatorial units, from
the continuous stream of speech.
If one were faced with this task, it is worth consider-
ing which musician would give one more tractable data:
the soloist, or the 14th violin player in the string section.
Neither will reproduce the durations (or pitches) speci-
fied in their score exactly, of course, due to the inherent
underspecification of the score. Both players will overlay
some inherent biophysical noise, along with conventional
timing variability, such as the predictable decellerando
at the end of a phrase. The soloist will add additional
complexity, however, in keeping with her role as the ex-
pressive focus in performance, making the inverse map-
ping from the recording to the score considerably more
difficult.
Now return to the position of the laboratory phonol-
ogist (or theoretical phonetician). An overarching goal
is to deduce the units of control which relate to the lin-
guistic message being uttered, and to uncover their mu-
tual relations. This is not so different in kind from the
above musical analog, though additional levels of com-
plexity undoubtedly arise. Signal variability which is
related to the linguistic content is relevant, while (for
many purposes) one might like to find a way to reduce
or exclude variability of para- or non-linguistic origin.
The approach which I and colleagues have recently been
following is to constrain the speaker to speak in time
with another co-speaker. For this purpose, speakers read
through a given text silently to familiarize themselves
with it, and then commence reading together on a sig-
nal from the investigator. For many purposes, recording
using near field head-mounted microphones onto the left
and right channels of a single stereo file is sufficient to
separate the two speakers while preserving the relative
temporal alignment of speech events.
We call speech collected in this manner Synchronous
Speech, and both the task and the product have provided
us with much food for thought (Cummins, 2001; Cum-
mins, 2002; Cummins and Roy, 2001; Cummins, 2003).
In this paper, I will summarize those findings which have
best revealed the advantages of this novel method, then
provide some new results which examine the variability
of intervals below the whole phrase, and finally provide
pointers to areas I believe might benefit from adoption
of the method.
Properties of Synchronous Speech
Synchronizing with a co-speaker, without extensive prac-
tice, turns out to be simple for subjects to do (Cummins,
2002; Cummins, 2003). After reading through a simple
text once, and being given a start signal, subjects typ-
ically manage to keep inter-speaker lags to average val-
ues of around 60 ms at phrase onsets, and 40 ms or less
after the first syllable or so. Rather surprisingly, exten-
sive practice at the task does not improve the degree of
synchrony significantly (Cummins, 2003), although with
repeated readings of the same text, and with the same
co-speaker, a slight improvement may be detected. Vi-
sual contact with the co-speaker does seem to have a
small beneficial effect on synchrony, even though sub-
jects are typically attending to a read text in front of
them (Cummins, 2003).
In experiments done to date, speakers have not been
carefully matched for familiarity, intrinsic speaking rate
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or volume. Among the heterogeneous pairs of speakers
we have studied to date, most appear to be collaborating,
producing speech at a relatively slow rate (but faster
than some of the slowest speakers’ natural reading rate).
We have not yet (in over 60 pairs of speakers) found a
speaking pair in which one speaker consistently lagged
behind the other. Rather, they seem to genuinely speak
together, with a high degree of synchrony.
Phrasing and Pauses
One of the first properties of Synchronous Speech we
noticed, was that phrasing, i.e. the division of a long
stretch of speech into intonational units separated by
pauses, appeared to be much more consistent in Syn-
chronous Speech than in control readings done alone.
In an initial pilot with 4 speakers, we found that in 48
‘solo’ readings, pauses occurred at points other than ma-
jor expected phrase breaks 48 times (Cummins, 2002).
By contrast, in Synchronous Speech, there were only 4
such idiosyncratic pauses in 24 paired readings.
These findings have been extended in the studies of
pauses in Synchronous Speech (Zvonik and Cummins,
2002; Zvonik and Cummins, 2003), who found that inter-
speaker variability in pause duration was greatly reduced
in Synchronous Speech, compared with ‘solo’ speech.
The reduced variability allowed the identification of a
quantitative relationship between pause duration and
the length (in syllables) of the preceding phrase—a re-
lationship which was obscured in the rather more vari-
able solo data. Specifically, we found a restricted dis-
tribution of clauses of less than 300 ms length. These
pauses were far more likely to occur when the preced-
ing phrase was relatively short (less than 11 syllables
long)1. We examined pause duration in readings by 6
speakers (3 pairs) of 19 short texts (13 distinct authors).
Table 1 shows the proportion of pauses in each environ-
ment (preceding phrase long or short, following phrase
long or short) which were below 300 ms. The preponder-
ance of short pauses in an environment following a short
phrase is clear.
Table 1: Number of pauses of duration less than 300 ms
as a function of the length of the surrounding Intona-
tional Phrases. For IPs, ‘short’ is here taken to mean less
than or equal to 10 syllables. Reproduced from Zvonik
(2004, unpublished PhD thesis).
Preceding IP Following IP Proportion of
Short pauses
short long 0.32
short short 0.39
long short 0.11
long long 0.06
1An earlier observation in Zvonick and Cummins (2003)
that a similar relationship obtained between pauses and fol-
lowing phrases is probably an artifact of the idiosyncratic
text used in that study
Fundamental Frequency Variability
Figure 1: Difference in F0 peaks (HPP, top) and val-
leys (LPP, bottom) between speakers in a pair in solo
and synchronous readings. All F0 values converted to
semitones before analysis.
Given the above findings on phrasing and pauses, it
seemed natural to examine the effect of speaking syn-
chronously on other prosodic variables. To this end, we
recorded six pairs of female speakers reading simple fairy
tales (Wang and Cummins, 2003). We identified peaks
and valleys in the intonation contour (HPP: High Point
of Pitch, LPP: Low Point of Pitch), and looked to see
whether these variables were affected by speaking syn-
chronously. We found that the peaks were considerably
more highly correlated across speakers within a pair in
the synchronous condition (mean r = 0.72, s.d = 0.08)
than in the solo condition (mean r = 0.59, s.d.=0.07).
This did not hold for valleys (Synchronous: mean r =
0.43, s.d.=0.08; Solo: mean r = 0.30, s.d.=0.17). Fig-
ure 1 shows the differences in pitch between speakers of a
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pair for both conditions. From the peaks (top panel), it
can clearly be seen that there is a substantial reduction
in inter-speaker differences in the synchronous condition,
while the difference is slight or nonexistent for the val-
leys. This suggests that there might be a difference in
the amount of free variability which speakers may em-
ploy in the absolute placement of H and L tones, a possi-
bility which has been suggested independently elsewhere
(Liberman and Pierrehumbert, 1984).
On Synchronization
How do speakers manage to synchronize so efficiently?
One possibility which can be discounted already is that
one speaker provides the lead, and the other follows. As
mentioned above, we have yet to find a dyad in which
a single leader could be identified. The very short lags
between speakers also seem to preclude an explanation
along these lines, as the typical lag of 40 ms is simply
too short to allow perceptually guided correction while
speaking.
Most mathematical models we have of synchroniza-
tion are based on populations of oscillators (Glass and
Mackey, 1988; Strogatz and Stewart, 1993). The math-
ematics of coupling among periodic sources is complex,
but by and large tractable. Powerful predictive models
have been constructed of such phenomena as juggling
(Beek and Lewbel, 1995), heart cells (Mirollo and Stro-
gatz, 1990), etc. Some have chosen to restrict the term
‘synchronization’ to the “adjustment of rhythms of oscil-
lating objects due to their weak interaction” (Pikovsky
et al., 2001, p. 8). Certainly, speech production is not
oscillatory or periodic in anything but the loosest sense,
and so the known mechanisms of entrainment among pe-
riodic sources can not be invoked here.
The answer, it seems to us, must lie in the shared
knowledge speakers have of what is essential and what is
redundant, or optional, in the modulation of the speech
organs. Speakers of the same dialect must have con-
trol structures in common that govern the production
of, and temporal relations among, the discrete units of
speech. Little has yet been ascertained about the degree
to which these putative control structures must coin-
cide among such speakers. Certainly, many of the pro-
cesses of diachronic change in language which have been
described suggest that differences among speakers are
not particularly rare, e.g. the age-related differences ob-
served among speakers of Brazilian Portuguese by Ma-
jor (1981). Nonetheless, the efficiency of communication
dictates that most such structures must be shared among
speakers. Although we do not have privileged access to
the units and processes of speech production, speakers do
seem to be able to modify their speech in direct response
to the task demands, suggesting that the method of syn-
chronous speech elicitation is a promising technique for
tapping speakers’ unconscious knowledge of the process
of speaking.
An acknowledged limitation of the present is that
much of the prosodic richness of spontaneous speech,
specifically that associated with information manage-
ment, speaker’s attitudes, etc, is clearly not present in
Synchronous Speech. The method requires the reading
of a prepared text, and the additional constraint of syn-
chrony places strict limits on the degree of personal in-
terpretation and expression which a speaker can employ.
Some of what is shorn away can correctly be considered
to be meaningful prosodic structure. This limitation has
an upside, however, as the timing which remains is still
an immensely rich object of study, and those aspects of
speech timing which are preserved (very many!) can be
seen more clearly in the absence of the other additional
sources of variation in speech.
The closest parallels to the demands of the Syn-
chronous Speech task appear to be met in studies of syn-
chronization among ensemble musicians (Rasch, 1979;
Rasch, 1988), and the largely unstudied process of syn-
chronization among dancers. In studying ensemble play-
ing, Rasch (1979; 1988) used the standard deviation of
differences in onset time of simultaneous notes in many
voices as an index of asynchrony and noted typical val-
ues of 30 to 50 ms. The more direct measure of mean lag
used in our studies of two voices at a time have provided
values of approximately 40 ms.
Effect of Synchronization on
Proportional Durations
An important question about the process of synchroniza-
tion is whether it introduces artifacts into the tempo-
ral structure of speech, or conversely, whether it merely
serves to reduce variability and reveal a shared under-
standing of temporal structure among speakers. Arti-
facts might be revealed in the systematic alteration of
proportional durations, as would be the case if, e.g., un-
stressed syllables were found to be less reduced, and
hence longer compared with stressed syllables. Any
such systematic alteration of the durational properties of
speech would severely limit the potential of Synchronous
Speech to inform researchers about the properties of
speech in the more general case.
As one way to investigate this, we here examine means
and variances of a variety of interval ratios. By looking
at ratios rather than durations, we better capture the
relational properties of speech, and simultaneously avoid
the difficult issue of rate normalization.
Methods
Readings of the first paragraph of the Rainbow Text were
obtained from 27 pairs of speakers, as described in Cum-
mins (2003). Each subject provided one reading alone
and one with a co-speaker, obtained during a larger cor-
pus collection exercise. The second sentence of the pas-
sage was chosen for detailed analysis. It reads “The rain-
bow is a division of white light into many beautiful col-
ors”. Reliably identifiable points in the waveform were
chosen for measurement (stop releases, V-nasal transi-
tions, etc). Figure 2 illustrates a representative set of
measurement points for one recording.
Each variable studied was a ratio of two intervals, and
comparisons were made of both mean values (using t-
tests) and variability (F-test, one-sided, with the hypoth-
esis of reduced variability in Synchronous Speech). Each
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Figure 2: Measurement points for a single recording.
Table 2: Comparison of interval ratios in Synchronous Speech and Solo Speech. Intervals are taken from the sentence
“The rainbow is a division of white light into many beautiful colors”. Segments at measurement points are capitalized
and intervals used are in bold face.
No. Variable Type Interval 1 Interval 2 t (df) p(t) F (df) p(F )
1 juncture/phrase lighT into Many raiNbow...lighT 0.15 (93) n.s. 1.67 (50,45) < 0.05
2 juncture/phrase1 lighT into Many Many...colorS 0.36 (90) n.s. 2.0 (50,45) < 0.01
3 phrase/phrase Many...colorS raiNbow...lighT -0.27 (89) n.s. 2.16 (50,45) < 0.01
4 unstressed/stressed NY MA 1.66 (92) n.s. 1.06 (47,45) n.s.
syllables
5 onset segment/word Colors ColorS 0.7 (94) n.s. 1.04 (50,45) n.s.
6 stressed vowel/word divIsion DivisioN -0.56 (79) n.s. 0.56 (43,42) n.s.
ratio was expressed as the smaller value divided by the
larger, and distributions were checked visually for ap-
proximate normality. Adjustment to degrees of freedom
as appropriate for distributions of unequal variance was
made using the Welch approximation.
Previous results had demonstrated that macroscopic
phrasing (the division of an utterance into intonation
phrases, the placement and duration of pauses) was sig-
nificantly less variable in Synchronous Speech. No anal-
ysis of the durations of shorter intervals had yet been
done. The possibility that duration ratios might be
significantly different in Synchronous Speech was of in-
terest, as this would suggest that the process of syn-
chronization introduces artifacts into speech timing, and
speech so obtained cannot be considered as unproblem-
atically related to conventional speech. On the other
hand, it was of interest to see whether the previous in-
dications of reduced inter-speaker variability would be
found with shorter, intra-phrasal, units also.
Results
Major Syntactic Juncture: The sentence studied
contains one major syntactic juncture, between “white
light” and “into many”. The most reliably measurable
interval spanning this juncture was delimited by the ob-
struent occlusion at the end of “light” and the first nasal
onset of “many”. We examined the ratio of this inter-
val to the duration of each of the surrounding phrases
(From the onset of “many” to the fricative onset in “col-
ors” and from the nasal of the initial “rainbow” to the
obstruent closure in “light”). Rows 1 and 2 of Table 2
show that the relative duration of the interval spanning
the juncture is similar across conditions, whether one
takes the preceding or the following phrase as a referent,
but the variability of this ratio is substantially reduced
in Synchronous Speech.
Phrase Length: The durations of the two major
phrases (“The rainbow is a division of white light” and
“into many beautiful colors”) were compared. No dif-
ference in the ratios was discernible, but the variability
of the ratio was greatly reduced in Synchronous Speech
(Row 3, Table 2). This result may be attributable to
a greater constancy of speaking rate in the synchronous
condition.
Stressed and Unstressed Syllables: The word
“many” provides unambiguous measurement points
which make a comparison of the duration ratio of an
unstressed to a stressed syllable within the same word
possible. Row 4 of Table 2 provides the results of the
analysis in which no significant differences in either ra-
tios or ratio variability was found across conditions.
Segment 1: Onset. The length of the initial conso-
nant (closure to voicing onset) in “colors” as a propor-
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tion of the word length (/k/ closure to /z/ onset) was
examined. Row 5 in Table 2 shows that mean ratio was
not different across conditions, nor was ratio variability
different in Synchronous Speech.
Segment 2: Vowel: The length of the stressed vowel
/I/ in “division”, expressed as a proportion of the word
duration (stop closure to nasal release) was also studied.
Again, neither ratio means nor variability was signifi-
cantly different across conditions.
Discussion
The variables examined in the present study spanned
a range of temporal scales and phonological struc-
tures. Those variables which were most directly re-
lated to macroscopic temporal structure (i.e. phrasing)
all showed significant reduction in Synchronous Speech
without any discernible change in mean values. The vari-
ables which describe smaller intervals showed no effects.
In none of these cases was the proportional duration in-
dexed by the ratio found to differ in its mean value be-
tween Synchronous Speech and solo speech, nor was the
variability affected by speaking condition.
These results accord well with previous findings on
Synchronous Speech and suggest areas for further study.
No evidence has yet been found that speaking syn-
chronously produced durational artifacts. The only
properties of Synchronous Speech which have been re-
liably identified to date are a demonstrable increase
in the consistency of global timing and phrasing (in-
cluding intonation) across speakers. Those variables
which exhibit substantially reduced variability in the
Synchronous Speech condition are those most closely tied
to timing at a global level, in which whole phrases are
coordinated with respect to one another. Neither the un-
stressed/stressed syllable comparison, nor the segmental
variables exhibited any difference in mean value or vari-
ability, suggesting that at a finer timescale there is little
if any change to speakers’ timing when speaking in syn-
chrony with another person.
Some of the reduction in variability which is observed
may be due to the forced maintenance of a constant
speech rate. The indexing of speech rate is a notori-
ously difficult problem. Crude indices such as articula-
tion rate, measured in number of syllables or segments
per second, do little to match speakers’ intuitions of a
continuous abstract ‘rate’ of speaking. The constraint
of speaking together with another speaker places severe
limits on the freedom of the speaker to continuously
modulate this abstract speaking rate, as any modifica-
tion must be predictable for the co-speaker also.
2Alone among the distributions used herein, the ratios
of the juncture to the second phrase were not normally dis-
tributed in the solo condition, but were skewed right. A
Wilcox rank sum test substantiated the findings of the para-
metric test.
Further Exploitation of Synchronous
Speech
The earlier examples of studies of pauses and intona-
tion illustrate two different ways in which Synchronous
Speech offers a novel approach to the analysis of variabil-
ity in speech. In the former case, Synchronous Speech
provided cleaner data than solo read speech, allowing
the identification of temporal regularities which would
otherwise be obscured. Synchronization among speakers
is a simple and effective way of obtaining high-quality
spoken data which is stripped of inessential sources of
variability. This interpretation of the character of Syn-
chronous Speech is supported by the durational mea-
surements reported here for the first time. No difference
in the fine structure of speech was observed, but vari-
ability associated with macroscopic timing was reduced.
Future work should also examine finer gradations in the
prosodic hierarchy: are there changes at levels between
the intonational phrase and the syllable?
In the intonation study, the difference between solo
speech and Synchronous Speech was itself a source of
information about essential variability. By compar-
ing Synchronous Speech with solo speech, we obtain
a partition of variability into essential and inessential
parts. It is tempting to associate the essential vari-
ability, preserved in Synchronous Speech, with linguis-
tic sources, and inessential variability, absent in Syn-
chronous Speech, with para- and non-linguistic sources,
but this step is probably premature at this stage. To
gauge the reliability of this attribution of the source of
variation to linguistic or nonlinguistic origins will require
further targeted research. However, the prospect of ob-
taining this partition potentially opens up new avenues
of exploration for both kinds of variation.
Important information about the quality of Syn-
chronous Speech will come from testing to see if subjects
can perceive artifacts in Synchronous Speech, or indeed
distinguish it from normal speech in perception tests.
This work is ongoing.
One tantalizing possibility is the identification of pa-
rameters of free variability which might be exploited in
the synthesis of expressive or characterful voices. Syn-
thetic voices are bland, while carefully tailored voices
which convey some sense of personality (emotion, ex-
pression) are laborious to construct. Adding random
variation to synthesis parameters does nothing but re-
duce intelligibility. However an analysis of the proper-
ties of Synchronous Speech and a comparison with solo
speech may inform voice designers about those parame-
ters which they are relatively free to vary for expressive
purposes. For example, the above study on intonation
strongly suggested that an excitable voice might result
from an expanded dynamic range of intonation in which
the high targets are modified, but not the low targets.
Obtaining synchronous speech is not difficult. All
studies of the properties of Synchronous Speech to date
have suggested that the principal effect of the constraint
of speaking together is to reduce idiosyncratic variabil-
ity, leaving the essential quality of the speech untouched.
This seems to offer two things to the experimental pho-
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netician. Firstly, it provides an easy route to cleaner
(less variable) data, for studies in which non-linguistic
variability is unwanted. Secondly, it may provide a prin-
cipled manner of partitioning variability, so that intrin-
sic variability which cannot be voluntarily avoided is re-
tained, while superfluous variability is removed, thus al-
lowing the differentiation of two kinds of variability in
speech.
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Abstract
Language is immersed in a rich and active environment. One
general dimension of that environment, feedback, may
contribute greatly to learning language structure. Artificial-
grammar learning offers an experimental means of exploring
different kinds of potential feedback. In this paper, two
experiments sought to investigate the role of feedback in an
artificial-grammar learning task designed to resemble some
aspects of language acquisition. An artificial language
composed of auditory nonsense syllables and an
accompanying visual semantics were created. Participants
faced the task of mapping a sample sentence to a visual
semantic scene. Results indicated that feedback is highly
useful, allows participants to reach a high level of competence
in the language, and also helps the acquisition of detailed
aspects of the artificial grammar. Implications for language
acquisition are discussed, and future directions considered.
Introduction
That humans can learn without any direct feedback has been
well established for decades. From basic information
extraction in perceptual processes (Gibson & Gibson, 1955),
to social facilitation of a choice task (Bandura & Mischel,
1965), it seems that learning can occur passively and
observationally across multiple levels of cognitive
complexity.
One particular area of research with similar findings has
been that of implicit learning or artificial grammar learning
(AGL; Reber, 1967), in which subjects become sensitive to
the regularities of a simple artificial grammar through
passive exposure to sample sentences. A considerable
amount of this research has been directed towards
uncovering the mechanisms of this learning (e.g., Reber,
1967; Reber & Lewis, 1977; Vokey & Brooks, 1992;
Redington & Chater, 1996; Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, &
Boyer, 1998; Pathos & Bailey, 2000).
Learning through passive exposure to these grammars,
however, is usually defined as performance at above-chance
levels. Therefore, to gain further insight into language
acquisition, theoretical and empirical bridges are needed
between what may be called passive structural learning in
these cases and the natural world, in which a learner
acquires a firm competence with sequential structures in a
meaningful, interactive context (e.g., see Berry, 1991, for an
investigation of action in learning a probabilistic system). In
pursuit of this, some research has been guided by questions
about the possible connections between this kind of learning
and real-world tasks, in particular language acquisition (e.g.,
Saffran, Aslin & Newport, 1996; Christiansen & Ellefson,
2002; Lupyan, 2002; Saffran, 2003). AGL can be used for
studying the kinds of structural regularities that children
discover while learning language (Saffran, 2003). The goal
of this work has mostly involved exploring learning under
passive observational exposure. Indeed, these experiments
have demonstrated the richness of statistical learning under
such circumstances.
However, language acquisition does not take place in a
social vacuum. Instead, children are acquiring their native
language while interacting with both people and things in
the environment (e.g., Snow, 1999; Chouinard & Clark,
2003; Moerk, 1992; and even before two-word production;
see Tomasello, 2003, for a review). In this context, and
others in the natural world, relevant sequential behavioral
structure has a function or serves a purpose, socially or
otherwise, and its acquisition is immersed in this interactive
context. What kind of information in the environment, and
possible mechanisms in the learner, can supplement passive
exposure to sequential structure in order to obtain a
competence over what is to be learned? This paper presents
a first step toward identifying one such dimension of
learning. By using an AGL procedure, we explore the role
of one kind of feedback that may be present in language
acquisition.
We first offer a brief summary and review of this source
of feedback in language acquisition. The potential for
exploring this dimension is then presented in two
experiments, demonstrating how an interactive task can
bring a learner to a strong level of competence. In addition,
we demonstrate that detailed aspects of an artificial
grammar can be acquired in the context of feedback. We
end with a discussion of implications, especially in view of
language acquisition, and future directions this research may
take.
Feedback in Language and AGL
Although the child may not be told explicitly that a given
utterance or word is incorrect (also referred to as the lack of
“negative feedback”; Saxton, 1997), the child does get other
types of evidence or feedback.
1
 For example, a mother may
1
 For simplicity, we do not consider the difference between
negative feedback and negative evidence, though the distinction is
important and may be explored by the experimental means
presented here.  See Saxton, 1997, for further discussion.
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ask her child to pick up a particular toy, say a little plastic
pig, from among several other toys. When the child
successfully picks up the right toy, the mother may
emphatically repeat the name of the target object: The pig!
Yes, that's the pig. Once the child chooses the right toy, the
mother repeats the label (e.g., the pig) and thus provides
positive feedback on the child’s correct mapping of the
linguistic label to the appropriate object. Although there is
considerable and continuing debate on the cultural
variability of such practices (see Lieven, 1994, for a review
and discussion), it is nevertheless possible that feedback of
this nature may be present and useful in language
acquisition (e.g., see Peters and Boggs, 1986, for a
discussion of interactional routines across cultures).
Here we take a first step toward assessing the potential
usefulness of such feedback in an AGL task meant to model
the learning of sequential structure and how it maps to the
non-linguistic world – a task not unlike what the child faces.
It should be noted that the role of feedback in language
acquisition is highly controversial (see, for example,
Morgan, Bonamo & Travis, 1995; Valian, 1999; Moerk,
2000; Saxton, 1997, 2000). It has perhaps for this reason not
been extensively investigated in AGL research, where the
focus has been on training techniques that largely parallel
the kind of passive input considered central during language
acquisition. Nevertheless, the role of feedback is widely
acknowledged in such areas as skill acquisition (Moerk,
1992), learning theory (Rescorla, 1968), and reinforcement-
learning models (Sutton & Barto, 1998).
There are therefore two primary objectives of the
following experiments. A basic empirical objective is to
consider the influence of feedback on AGL in a training
procedure that resembles a natural-world context. To meet
this goal, an experimental paradigm has been designed to
resemble a kind of task faced by the child during language
acquisition, adapted from Lupyan (2002; also, see Billman,
1989 and Morgan, Meier & Newport, 1987 for similar
techniques).
Another objective is primarily theoretical: How does
learning sequential structure get immersed in an interactive
context and lead to competence? These experiments
approach one aspect of an answer by considering how
interactive feedback in a sequential learning task might
bring the learner to a competent level of performance.
Experiment 1
This experiment is a first demonstration of the influence of
feedback on learning an artificial grammar. The conditions
in this experiment focus on the consistency of forms of
feedback, and the extent to which the feedback is a salient,
meaningful aspect of the learning task.
Method
Participants 51 college students were recruited for extra
credit.  Participation required approximately 20 minutes.
Materials A simple artificial grammar was created for the
experiment, illustrated in Figure 1. Each category (e.g., N,
noun) was instantiated by a set of nonsense syllables (e.g.,
voop or jux; see Table 1).
An elementary visual “semantics” was created for this
language. Each noun was randomly assigned an animal
referent, and each verb had as its “meaning” a simple shape.
Each nonsense syllable in the language had a referent of this
kind in the visual semantics (Fig. 2).
Although the extent to which the visual scene contains a
“subject” or “object” or “verb” is abstract, the language and
its semantics are meant to capture structure-world
correspondences not entirely unlike what might be seen in
natural language structure.
Fifty random sentences were constructed for the
experiment, and an incorrect visual semantic scene for each
sentence was created (see Figs. 3 and 4). This incorrect
scene was paired, as a foil, with the correct scene in
training, as described below.
Table 1: Classes and assigned syllables
class sounds class sounds
N kav Intran V voop
jux poox
ruj Tran V sook
hep lem
pel Ditran V rud
hes jove
Procedure In every trial, participants saw two visual
semantic scenes side by side then heard a sample sentence
from the grammar. Their task was to select the appropriate
visual semantics for the sentence heard. The task therefore
involved learning the sequential structure of the grammar,
and learning to map each sound to its semantic animal or
shape.
Figure 2: An example stimulus from one trial
S Æ  N1     VP
 intransitive-V
 N2     transitive-V
 N2     N3    ditransitive-V
VPÆ
Figure 1: The artificial grammar
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A positive feedback event was defined as a repetition of
the sentence when the participants selected the appropriate
visual semantic scene.
Two feedback conditions were investigated. Some
subjects received only consistent feedback, occurring with
50% probability on any correct trial. Other subjects
received 40% random repetitions, not contingent on the
correctness of their selection (these probabilities were
chosen so that all participants heard approximately the same
number of repetitions).
Two further conditions were defined in terms of the kinds
of instructions provided to subjects. In one condition,
subjects were not informed about the meaningfulness of the
repetitions (as positive feedback); in a second condition,
subjects were explicitly informed that feedback would
occur.
Out of the four possible subject groups, three were used in
the experiment. One group received no instruction about
the feedback but received it consistently. A second received
no instruction, but the feedback occurred randomly. A third
group of subjects received both consistent feedback and
instructions about the presence of feedback during training.
Performance on the final 10 items of training served as
the measure of learning. These items were new to the
subjects. This permitted observation of performance in a
continuous learning task without interruption. There was
therefore no distinction between training and testing.
Results
No main effect for condition was found (corrected F(2, 50)
= 1.65, p = .21). However, due to the probabilistic nature of
the training phase, an additional planned regression analysis
on each condition was conducted (because, by chance, some
subjects may experience less consistent positive feedback
than others). This was meant to investigate the number of
actual feedback events experienced during the first 40 trials
of training, and how it might predict performance on the
final 10 items.
The only condition that produced a reliable predictive
relationship was that in which subjects received information
about the presence of feedback (r = .65, p < .05). Although
the consistent feedback without instruction condition had a
positive slope, the coefficient was not significant (r = .28, p
= .26).
Discussion
This preliminary experiment offers some important
observations. First, inconsistent feedback present in training
did indeed stultify learning, even when the subjects were not
certain about the significance of the sentence repetitions.
We may tentatively contend that even contingent events in
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Figure 5: Regression analyses of different conditions.  Each point represents a subject.
Figure 3: The structure of the visual scene and foils
kav voop kav jux sook kav jux pel rud
Figure 4: Example sentences
Foils created by exchanging:
ß N1 with N2 or N3
ß V with an incorrect
referent
ß N2 and N3
ß N1/N2/N3 with an
incorrect referent
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the learning environment can help or hinder learning
sequential structure. It was not the case that learners simply
ignored the repetitions and extracted the sequential
invariants across the training trials.
Second, when participants were informed about the
presence of feedback, the repetitions served as significant
elements of acquiring the structure. It appears that subject
performance became highly reliant upon even occasional,
contingent repetitions of sentences as positive feedback,
especially when the feedback was made meaningful to
subjects. There is evidence that perceiving the import of
such events may have an important influence on language
acquisition (Saxton, 1997; Tomasello, 2003).
Despite these positive results, the learning that took place
in the experiment hardly exhibits competence of the kind
described in the introductory discussion. We therefore
conducted a second experiment to address this and other
questions. First, we enhanced the salience of the feedback
event by changing the training environment. Second, we
devised a separate test phase to explore the learning of
specific kinds of structures in the grammar. Finally, we
tracked learning of the grammar over time to observe the
effect of feedback across training.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 changed the nature of the feedback event to
render it more salient. This involved not merely repeating
the sentence, but also changing the visual environment
selected by the participants. In addition, we explored how
participants learned different aspects of the grammar, such
as the abstract verb-argument structure.
Method
Participants 34 college-age participants were recruited for
extra credit. Participation required approximately 20
minutes.
Materials The artificial grammar used was the same as in
the first experiment. We created an additional 30 sentences
to be used in a test phase without feedback. The paired
incorrect visual scenes in these test items were constructed
so as to sample across all possible grammatical errors.
These included exchanging nominal shapes with an
incorrect shape, inverting nominal shapes, and exchanging
verbal shapes with incorrect shapes (see Fig. 3 for the kinds
of foils used).
Once again, 50 sentences were presented randomly in a
training phase. Feedback again was defined as a repetition
of the spoken sentence.
Procedure Similarly to the first experiment, participants
selected one of two visual scenes in response to a heard
sentence of the grammar. This training once again consisted
of 50 trials. Half the subjects received 60% feedback
consistently, the other half hearing random feedback with
50% probability (these were selected once again so that all
subjects heard approximately the same number of
repetitions).
Given the results of the first experiment, it seems that
salience of such feedback is a crucial property of using it in
the task. To enhance this effect, we added a feature to the
feedback event: When a correct visual scene was selected,
the incorrect scene would be removed and the sentence
would be repeated to the participant. This served to make
these events as informative as possible to the participants.
Also, this event may bear some resemblance to social
interaction between the child and caregiver. When the child
correctly interprets a lexical item, the caregiver may
emphasize its referent object, thereby focusing the child’s
attention on it.
Following this training procedure, 30 trials were
presented to participants without feedback in either
condition. Performance on these 30 items served as the
basic comparison between groups (consistent vs. random
feedback), and item analyses allow us to investigate the role
of feedback in acquiring more detailed aspects of the
grammar (e.g., verb argument structure).
An additional control condition was conducted in which
participants only experienced the test phase of the
experiment.
Results
A main effect of condition (positive feedback, random
feedback, control) was found (F(2, 31) = 7.1, p < .01).
Subsequent comparisons among the groups indicated that
only the positive feedback condition differed significantly
from the random feedback and control groups (p < .05 in
both cases; see Fig. 6). In fact, participants in the random
feedback condition did not differ significantly from the
control group (p = .28).
We further conducted item analyses within the positive
and random feedback conditions to find wherein their
performance differences lie (see Table 2). A repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted over the different kinds
of items within subjects, and found that the primary
differences in performance were in verb exchanges, the
“subject” shape being exchanged, and a marginally
significant result for identifying inversions in the argument
structure of the verbal shapes.
By looking at the overall performance of participants,
graphed over time, we get an interesting illustration of
learning under the condition of consistent feedback (Fig. 7).
The final 4 points include performance during the training
stage.
Table 2: Number correct on different foils, and
significance of the comparisons
Type of error in scene Pos Ran Out of p
Verbs different 5.2 3.8 6 < .05
Nouns different 3.8 3.8 5 .88
Sub exchanged w/ obj 12 8.8 14 < .01
Objects exchanged 3.2 2.4 5 .07
265
Discussion
These results further indicate that the salience of positive
feedback in a sequential learning task of this kind can
strongly influence performance. Participants in this task
were performing almost perfectly in the positive feedback
condition, even in the test phase, during which feedback was
no longer issued.
Moreover, item analyses indicated that even subtle
structure-world correspondences as the idealized “verb
argument” structure in this artificial grammar was being
learned more effectively under the condition of feedback.
General Discussion
Although we feel the current experiments hold considerable
promise, they do have limitations. First, although they more
closely resemble natural-world contexts than previous
research, they are still quite simple. Future experiments will
address this issue by incorporating an even more interactive
experimental task. Second, the grammar itself is quite
simple, and mere passive exposure may be sufficient to
learn it. Experiments are currently being conducted that
directly compare passive exposure to scene-sentence pairs
and the active selection task used here.
These limitations notwithstanding, the experiments have
provided a first step towards investigating how feedback in
an interactive task can bring performance in AGL to a more
competent level than typically observed. The language
acquisition literature itself has been deeply involved in
debate for decades about the nature of feedback and
evidence to children. For example, one may argue that the
issue of positive and negative feedback has been resolved
since Brown and Hanlon (1970), who demonstrated quite
clearly that commonplace conceptions of feedback to a
language learner are incorrect. Nevertheless, many continue
to tease apart the negative and positive function of different
types of input to children (e.g., Saxton, 1997; Saxton, 2000;
Chouinard & Clark, 2003).
The experiments here can contribute to this endeavor.
They may offer empirical means by which different kinds of
feedback and their effects can be investigated
experimentally, albeit here in college-aged subjects. The
technique could be modified for children, and many of its
dimensions explored in experiments with both children and
adults. Some have pursued similar techniques such as
“human simulations” (e.g., Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman &
Lederer 1999; Snedecker, Gleitman & Brent, 1999). For
example, Snedecker et al. (1999) used college-aged subjects
to explore the role of ambient social and environmental
input to support a noun bias during language acquisition.
This idea is not unlike what is being argued here (see
Snedecker et al. for an interesting exploration and
discussion of feedback in word learning).
More importantly, these experiments are intended to
support a perspective in “ecological” sequential learning,
and particularly language learning, that sees the task facing
a learner as an active and interactive one. We would
contend that such learning cannot only involve passively
extracting statistical regularities from different modalities.
Instead, sequential structure in the natural world, linguistic
or otherwise, is used in an interactive environment – these
uses generate consequences in the environment that impinge
upon a learner’s expectations and help carry the learner into
a world of meaningful sequential structure.
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Abstract
The semantic priming effect is shown to be modulated by the
instruction to maintain the prime word while conducting a
lexical decision to the target. Specifically, the priming effect
is absent in situations of prime-retention. An extended version
of Dagenbach and Carr’s (1994) Center-Surround hypothesis
is proposed, in which the prime-retention effect, the absence
of priming under prime-retention, can be accommodated. This
extended hypothesis suggests that under prime-retention,
activation remains centered on the prime, preventing
unwanted spread of activation. This impact of the on-center-
off-surround mechanism increases over time, making it
sensitive to manipulations of stimulus duration.
Introduction
In the field of memory, semantic priming is a basic
paradigm used to investigate the processes that inter-relate
conceptual representations in long-term memory. The basic
result is reduced lexical decision times or naming latencies
and improved accuracy to words (i.e., targets), when they
are preceded by a related word (i.e., the prime) relative to
control. The semantic priming effect is such a robust
phenomenon that even the absence of priming is
theoretically relevant, as can be seen by the large literature
on the prime-task effect (the absence of priming when
attention is allocated away from the semantic level, but is
still within the verbal domain) (see for a review, Maxfield,
1997). The implied assumption in the priming literature
seems to be that the more attention the prime word receives,
the more priming is expected. This paper focuses on the
counterintuitive observation that the semantic priming effect
is absent when in a standard priming paradigm the prime
has to be reported after making a lexical decision to a target.
This observation will be referred to as the prime-retention
effect, as it is the active retention of the prime in short-term
memory that modulates the priming effect.
Controlled Center-Surround Hypothesis
There are a number of theories and models of priming, but
for the present purposes the spreading-activation view of
semantic priming will be addressed to highlight the need for
auxiliary mechanisms to accommodate the to-be-presented
data. In the standard spreading-activation theory, concepts
in semantic memory are linked together to form a semantic
network, with the strength of the connection between two
concepts representing the strength of association. Extensive
investigations into the nature of the semantic priming effect
has led to the view that the semantic priming effect is due to
a fast-acting automatic process and a slow-acting controlled
process (Neely, 1976, 1977, 1991). By varying the stimulus-
onset-asynchrony (SOA) between the prime and the target,
the relative contributions of these processes can be
modulated. It is therefore assumed that with short SOAs the
priming effect is predominantly due to automatic processes.
However, this assumption has been challenged by
behavioural and neuroimaging studies that show context
effects at short SOAs (e.g., Mummery, Shallice & Price,
1999; Smith, Besner & Miyoshi, 1994).
One theory that specifically addresses the possibility of
controlling the spread of activation is the Center-Surround
hypothesis by Dagenbach and Carr (1994). In a nutshell, the
hypothesis states that there exists a mechanism that
facilitates “the semantic code on which it is focused or
centered while inhibiting surrounding codes, codes that are
similar to but different from the desired code and are
competing with it for retrieval” (p.328, italicised words
were between quotes in original). Dagenbach and Carr’s
work was mainly focused on priming effects found at the
threshold of subjective and objective awareness and was
applied quite successfully in a model of negative priming
(Houghton & Tipper, 1994). However, in the standard
supra-threshold priming paradigm, the data does not seem to
demand such on-center-off-surround mechanism. This may
be because the prime word does not have to be actively
maintained. An on-center-off-surround mechanism would
be necessary under conditions of prime-retention. For
example, when a task requires focusing on a particular
word, the increased activation to that word would lead to
more spread of activation, which would in turn compromise
the attentional focus on the word, due to the now-activated
distractors. Intuitively, we are able to focus on the word
‘doctor’ for several seconds without strongly activating
related concepts like ‘nurse’, ‘patient’, ‘hospital’,
‘medicine’ and so on. Besides preventing a situation where
the whole lexicon becomes activated, inhibitory
mechanisms seem particularly relevant in situations of
short-term retention where a robust focus is necessary (e.g.,
Grossberg, 1978).
The view that will be pursued here is that there exists a
trade-off between prime-activation and activation-spread, of
which the balance depends on the task requirements. This
hypothesis will be referred to as the Controlled Center-
Surround hypothesis, implying that a controlled effort (i.e.,
deliberate active maintenance) needs to be made in order to
observe the on-center-off-surround mechanism at supra-
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threshold SOAs. In the prime-retention paradigm used here,
the participant is presented with the prime and has to
maintain it while making a lexical decision to a target. The
Controlled Center-Surround hypothesis would predict that
normal priming effects are found when the prime need not
be retained (as the on-center-off-surround mechanism is not
fully operational), while in the retention condition the off-
surround component nullifies (or even reverses) the priming
effect.
Before presenting the experiments that were designed
to address the Controlled Center-Surround hypothesis, the
next section will highlight two earlier reports that presented
hints of a prime-retention effect.
Earlier reports
A prime-retention effect, the absence of a priming effect
when the prime is actively maintained during lexical
decision, can be observed in reports from at least two
research groups (Fischler & Goodman, 1978; Henik,
Friedrich, Tzelgov & Tramer, 1994). In a study by Fischler
and Goodman (1978), participants were tested on a masked
priming paradigm in which the prime was presented very
briefly (50 ms) with a visual mask preceding and succeeding
it. They asked participants to report the prime word after
making a lexical decision to the target string. Participants
were able to report the prime in about 50 % of the trials.
Semantic priming was only found when the prime could not
be reported; the priming effect was absent when participants
could correctly report the prime word. A second example of
the prime-retention effect can be found in one of the
conditions in a study by Henik, Friedrich, Tzelgov and
Tramer (1994). These authors were interested in the time-
course of the prime-task effect (the finding that the priming
effect is eliminated when the prime word is processed on a
non-semantic level). Participants had to read the prime out
loud and make a lexical decision to a target word. In one
particular condition (in their experiment 3), the SOA was
relatively short (240 ms) and therefore participants had to
report the prime word after the lexical decision was made,
thus actively maintaining it during the lexical decision. No
priming effect was found in this condition. Henik et. al.
(1994) explained the lack of priming in terms of the prime
being processed at a shallow (e.g., phonological) level and
thereby preventing resources to be allocated to the semantic
level. However, this idea was not elaborated further.
The results by Fischler and Goodman (1978) and
Henik, et. al. (1994) suggest at the very least that
maintaining the prime modulates the priming effect and that
the underlying mechanism may be inhibitory in nature.
However, the results indicating this were tangential to the
main focus of their investigations and did not receive
enough attention. Therefore it is possible that their results,
indicating a prime-retention effect, may have been a chance-
finding. For example, in Fischler and Goodman’s (1978)
study, the results strongly depended on the erroneous recall
performance of the participants (50 % error rate), making
the data sensitive to participants’ idiosyncratic biases (see
for discussion, Holender, 1986). In addition, the results
obtained by Henik, et. al. (1994) were not replicated without
participants completing several other experimental
conditions, which could have led to carry-over effects.
Experiments
Here, three experiments are reported that were specifically
designed to address the prime-retention effect. The
experiments involved two blocks of prime-target pairs in a
standard lexical decision paradigm. The first block was
always the control condition, in which participants did not
need to maintain the prime word. In the second block,
participants were required to maintain the prime and give a
verbal report (in Experiment 1) or recognise it from four
alternatives (in Experiment 2 and 3) after the lexical
decision. In order to assess whether the prime has been
processed on the semantic level, the association strength
between prime and target was taken into account in the
analyses. Any modulation with associative strength would
counter an explanation based purely on shallow non-
semantic processing.
According to the Controlled Center-Surround
hypothesis, in the control condition, normal priming effects
are expected for strongly and weakly related targets at both
short and long SOAs, as the activation of the prime is
allowed to decay after presentation. However, in the
retention condition, it is expected that only strongly related
targets show priming effects at both SOAs (controlled on-
center), but that weakly related targets show less or even no
priming effect (controlled off-surround).
Experiment 1
Participants. Twenty volunteers from the University of
London participated in the experiment in exchange for £5.
All participants had English as their first language, were
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Design. The experiment conformed to a 3 x 2 within-subject
design, with Relatedness (unrelated, low-related, high-
related) and Retention as independent variables. Lexical
decision times and accuracy were measured.
Materials. Eighty-four word pairs were selected from the
MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981). The
word pairs had a word frequency ranging from 10 to 660 per
million (Kucera & Francis, 1967). The association strengths
between the prime and target word ranged from 12.5 to 73.8
(M=34.5; Moss & Older, 1996). A median split divided the
targets in the high and low association trials. All words and
pseudohomophones were one syllable long. Unrelated trials
were formed by rearranging the related pairs. Each
participant saw each word only once, but target words
rotated across participants in all conditions.
Apparatus. The experiment was run on an IBM-compatible
PC using Micro Experimental Laboratory (MEL)
Professional software (Schneider, 1995). Letter size was
approximately 0.5 cm and average viewing distance was
about 50 cm.
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Procedure. Participants were given the instructions on the
screen as well as verbally by the experimenter. The
experiment had a total of 168 trials grouped into two blocks;
the ‘no retention’ block was always followed by the
retention block. After the instructions for each block,
subjects practised 8 trials. On each trial, a fixation stimulus
was presented for one second in the center of a computer
screen, followed by a word in lowercase white letters that
remained for one second. After a 250 ms interval (blank
screen) a target was presented (in uppercase yellow letters)
that remained on the screen until a lexical decision was
made. In the control condition, the next trial started after a
500 ms delay, whereas in the retention condition a question
mark prompted the participant to recall the prime word. The
experimenter recorded the recall. Participants got feedback
whenever an error was made.
Results and discussion
The mean median reaction times and error rates for all
conditions are presented in Table 1. Performance on naming
the prime was at ceiling (100% correct), discounting an
explanation based on some form of speed-accuracy trade-
off. Because of the large differences in standard deviations
between the control and the retention condition, log-
transformed RTs were used in the analyses with the
Retention-variable, while untransformed RTs were used in
the pairwise within-block comparisons.
An overall ANOVA on the lexical decision times
revealed a main effect of Retention [F(1,19)=40.35,
MSe=0.04, p<.001] and a marginal effect of Relatedness
[F(2,38)=2.55, MSe=0.02, p=.091]. The interaction did not
reach significance. A similar ANOVA on the response
accuracy only revealed a marginal effect of Relatedness
[F(2,38)=2.64, MSe=0.001, p=.084].
Pairwise comparisons were conducted to specifically
address the predictions made by the Controlled Center-
Surround hypothesis. This analysis revealed that priming
effects were only obtained for the strongly related prime-
target pairs in the no-retention control condition both for
RTs [t(19)=2.48, p<.05] and error rates [t(19)=2.42, p<.05].
Experiment 1 replicates the failure to obtain a priming
effect when the prime word needs to be retained. Although
several methodology-related explanations could be given for
the absence of priming, the mere observation of a lack of
priming due to an experimental manipulation begs further
inquiry. One possibility for the lack of priming in the
retention condition could be that participants were preparing
the articulatory response while making the lexical decision.
This could lead to a form of response interference, where
both verbal and manual responses are prepared and
executed. Therefore, Experiments 2 and 3 employed a
recognition task on the prime word instead of a verbal
response. It was hoped that this would ‘clean up’ the
processes during the lexical decision.
Experiment 2
Participants. Twenty-four volunteers from the University of
London participated in the experiment. All participants had
English as their first language, were right-handed and had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Design. The experiment conformed to a 3 x 2 within-subject
design, with Relatedness (unrelated, low-related, high-
related) and Retention as independent variables. Lexical
decision times and accuracy were measured.
Materials. 112 word pairs were selected from the MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981). The word pairs
had a word frequency ranging from 10 to 660 per million
(Kucera & Francis, 1967). The association strengths
between the prime and target word ranged from 5.4 to 66.7
(M=34.5; Moss & Older, 1996). A median split divided the
words in high and low association-trials. All words and
pseudohomophones were one syllable long. Unrelated trials
were formed by rearranging the related pairs. Each
participant saw each word only once, but target words
rotated across participants in all conditions.
Apparatus. The apparatus as in Experiment 1 was used.
Procedure. Participants were given the instructions on the
screen as well as verbally by the experimenter. The
experiment had a total of 224 trials grouped into two blocks;
the ‘no retention’ block was always followed by the
retention block. After the instructions for each block,
subjects practised 8 trials. On each trial, a fixation stimulus
was presented for one second in the centre of a computer
screen, followed by a word in lowercase white letters that
remained for one second. After a 250 ms interval (blank
screen) a target was presented (in uppercase yellow letters)
that remained on the screen until a lexical decision was
made. In the control condition, the next trial started after a
500 ms delay, whereas in the retention condition a list of
four words appeared (the prime and three distractors) and
the participant had to indicate by pressing one of four keys
which one was the prime word. Participants got feedback
whenever an error was made.
Results and discussion
The mean median reaction times and error rates for all
conditions are presented in Table 1. Performance on
recognising the prime was at ceiling (99% correct) and did
not show an effect of Relatedness.
An overall ANOVA on the (log-transformed) lexical
decision times revealed a main effect of Retention
[F(1,23)=43.34, MSe=0.0056, p<.001] and a main effect of
Relatedness [F(2,46)=11.61, MSe=0.004, p<.001]. The
interaction did not reach significance. A similar ANOVA on
the response accuracy only revealed a main effect of
Relatedness [F(2,46)=3.97, MSe=0.001, p<.05] and a
marginal Retention x Relatedness interaction [F(2,46)=2.59,
MSe=0.001, p=.086].
Pairwise comparisons revealed that priming effects
were only obtained for the strongly related prime-target
pairs in the no-retention control condition for RTs
[t(23)=3.90, p=.001]. Priming effects in the error rates were
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found for strongly related prime-target pairs in both
Retention conditions [control: t(23)=2.10, p<.05; retention:
t(23)=2.40, p<.05] and for weakly related prime-target pairs
in the retention condition [t(23)=2.81, p=.01].
Experiment 2 replicates the findings of Experiment 1 in
showing priming effects only in the control condition and
only for the strongly related prime-target pairs. A between-
experiment analysis further revealed that the reaction times
between the two groups did not differ (all ps>.15),
suggesting that the type of memory task did not have a
noticeable impact on performance.
Given the possibility that the amount of priming is
affected by the increased attentional focus, a Controlled
Center-Surround hypothesis would have to predict that the
off-surround component exerts more influence the more
attention is paid to the prime word. It is therefore expected
that at shorter SOAs, priming will be observed in the
retention condition, even when the prime can be reported
after the lexical decision. Experiment 3 tests this
assumption.
Experiment 3
Thirty-two volunteers from the University of London
participated in the experiment. All participants had English
as their first language, were right-handed and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. The design, materials and
procedure were the same as in experiment 2, with the
difference that the prime was presented for 250 ms and was
immediately followed by the target.
Results and discussion
The mean median reaction times and error rates for both
conditions are presented in Table 1. Performance on
recognising the prime was at ceiling (98% correct) and did
not show an effect of Relatedness. The data from one
participant were excluded from the analysis due to extreme
long RTs.
An overall ANOVA on the (log-transformed) lexical
decision times revealed a main effect of Retention
[F(1,30)=75.14, MSe=0.06, p<.001] and a main effect of
Relatedness [F(2,60)=8.15, MSe=0.005, p=.001]. The
interaction did not reach significance. A similar ANOVA on
the response accuracy also revealed a marginal effect of
Retention [F(1,30)=3.51, MSe=0.002, p=.071] and a
marginal effect of Relatedness [F(2,60)=2.62, MSe=0.001,
p=.081].
Pairwise comparisons revealed that, for RTs, priming
effects were obtained for the strongly related prime-target
pairs in both the control [t(30)=3.46, p<.005] and the
retention [t(30)=2.20, p<.05] condition. Weakly related
prime-target pairs showed a priming effect only in the
retention condition [t(30)=2.15, p<.05]. Priming effects in
the error rates were found only for strongly related prime-
target pairs in the no-retention control condition
[t(30)=2.43, p<.05].
Experiment 3 confirms the assumption that the
mechanism responsible for the absence of priming in
Experiments 1 and 2 develops over time. Interestingly, in
contrast to the findings with long SOA, with short SOA, the
numerical values of the RT-priming effect are larger in the
retention than in the control condition.
Table 1: Results of Experiments 1, 2 and 3. RTs in ms and
proportion correct within brackets.
Unrelated Weak-
related
Strong-
related
Experiment 1 (N=20): recall + long SOA
Control 606 (.95) 587 (.98) 576 (.98)
Retention 759 (.96) 769 (.98) 736 (.96)
Experiment 2 (N=24): recognition + long SOA
Control 633 (.96) 631 (.99) 597 (1.0)
Retention 816 (.98) 828 (1.0) 788 (1.0)
Experiment 3 (N=31): recognition + short SOA
Control 755 (.97) 741 (.96) 722 (.99)
Retention 1070 (.98) 1015 (.98) 1012 (.99)
General Discussion
The three experiments provided further insight into the
observation that priming effects are absent when the prime
word is actively maintained during lexical decision to the
target. In all three experiments, reaction times in the
retention condition were slower than in the standard control
condition, which merely reflects the increase in cognitive
demand in this dual-task situation. The effect of relatedness
was only significant in Experiments 2 and 3, which
employed a recognition task on the prime word. Although
the interaction between Retention and Relatedness was not
significant in any of the experiments, based on previous
reports, pilot studies and the predictions from the Controlled
Center-Surround hypothesis, pairwise comparisons revealed
an interesting picture. With long SOA (1250ms), priming
was only found for strongly related targets and only in the
control condition, the prime-retention effect. With short
SOA (250 ms), priming was found for weakly and strongly
related targets in the retention condition and for strongly
related targets in the control condition.
Although further studies are required to investigate this
pattern in more depth, the present set of experiments already
rules out two alternative explanations for the absence of a
priming effect in the retention condition. First, in Fischler
and Goodman (1978), Henik et. al. (1994) and Experiment
1, a verbal report had to be given after the lexical decision
task. It is possible that the absence of semantic priming does
not originate at a memory level, but instead may be due to
some form of interference between executing the lexical
decision and preparing the articulatory response for
reporting the prime. However, the fact that the main results
did not change when a recognition task was used instead of
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a recall task, suggest that the retention of the prime and not
the articulatory preparation of the prime was crucial.
Second, Henik, et. al. (1994) suggested that the absence of
priming in their experiment was due to the prime word
being held at a shallow level of processing (e.g.,
phonological code) preventing “the needed attentional
resources from being allocated at the semantic level” (p.
165). However, in the experiments reported here, the
strength of the prime-target association modulated the
effect. This also indicates that the prime-retention effect and
the prime-task effect are different phenomena. The former
requires full processing and active maintenance of the prime
word, whereas the latter requires allocating attention away
from the semantic level (but remaining within the same
processing domain; Chiappe, Smith & Besner, 1996).
In awaiting more conclusive evidence, the current
results support the proposal that the center-surround
mechanism, which is assumed to be a structural component
of the semantic memory system, dominates when more
attention is directed to the prime word. In such situations
prime-activation and activation-spread may trade off. To
illustrate the Controlled Center-Surround hypothesis,
consider Figure 1. In this figure, the strength of association
between prime and target are set on the abscissa with the
weakest strength to the right. On the ordinate the priming
effect (RTunrelated – RTrelated) is set out for the long SOA
(averaged over Experiments 1 and 2) and for the control and
retention condition. The ‘priming effect’ for the ‘prime’ is a
linear extrapolation of the values for the strong and weak
associates. This figure makes two points. First, it makes the
intuitive prediction that when the prime is in short-term
memory, a decision on the prime itself is speeded up.
Second, the overall pattern resembles the textbook example
of an attentional on-center-off-surround ‘Mexican hat’
receptive field in the visual domain.
Figure 1: Priming effect as function of the strength of the
prime-target association for long SOA. The values for the
‘prime’ are linear extrapolations from the values at strong
and weak strength.
The figure for the short SOA is more complex (see
Figure 2). The same prediction for identity priming is made,
with larger ‘priming’ in the retention condition compared to
control. However, the priming effect at short SOA seems
larger in the retention condition than in the control
condition. This pattern was replicated in a follow-up study
(not reported here) and if this holds true in future studies, it
would mirror the two-stage activation process proposed in
the literature using homographs (words that have multiple
meanings). In this two-stage process, an initial (automatic)
activation of all meanings of a word is followed by a stage
in which non-dominant or incongruent meanings are
suppressed (Simpson & Burgess, 1985; Simpson & Kang,
1994). According to the hypothesis proposed here, the
suppression in the second stage is a result of biased
competition, where a deliberate directed attention to
relevant word meanings makes them win this competition.
Figure 2: Priming effect as function of the strength of the
prime-target association for short SOA. The values for the
‘prime’ are linear extrapolations from the values at strong
and weak strength.
Although not predicted initially, the numerically larger
priming effect with short SOA is not inconsistent with the
Controlled Center-Surround hypothesis. The initial
activation of the prime facilitates strong and weak related
targets, but the inhibitory influence is only felt after the
prime has received a large amount of activation (as is the
case with long SOA). When the prime needs to be retained,
the prime is activated very strongly, leading to larger
priming effects for both weak- and strong-related targets at
short SOA, but at long SOAs the off-surround component
depresses both targets below the point where priming effects
are obtained (or even a trend for a negative priming is
observed). This attentional tuning on semantic concepts is
only suggested by the presented dataset. A series of
experiments are being prepared to address other
methodological and theoretical issues. Nevertheless, the
mere observation that the priming effect is modulated by
short-term retention of the prime word poses interesting
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constraints on existing and future computational models of
priming.
The finding of a prime-retention effect motivates taking
a closer look at the structure of semantic memory and the
influence of controlled attention on its internal dynamics.
Understanding these characteristics may provide valuable
contributions to debates on the automaticity assumption of
the spread of activation and resource limitations in
language/cognitive processing. For example, an initial step
in modelling the prime-retention effect (Davelaar, 2004),
suggests ways to account for a variety of empirical findings
on the interaction between attention and memory, such as
hyperpriming in thought-disordered schizophrenic patients
(e.g., Spitzer, et. al., 1993), individual differences in
negative priming and presentation rate effects in false
memory (McDermott & Watson, 2001).
Dagenbach and Carr (1994) proposed the Center-
Surround hypothesis to account for the strategic carry-over
effects in masked priming experiments. Here, the prime-
retention effect suggests that (1) the center-surround
mechanism can be observed in the behavioural data when
attention is allocated to parts of the semantic system and (2)
has a specific time-course. Future research, using the prime-
retention paradigm, could provide detailed information on
the structure of semantic memory and the temporal
dynamics of the processes that control the spread of
activation.
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Abstract 
A recent line of research suggests that an event’s temporal 
distance from the present has an effect on the way in which it 
is likely to be construed.  Specifically, more distant events are 
proposed to be represented primarily in terms of abstract, 
decontextualized information, while events in the near future 
tend to produce relatively more concrete, situation-specific 
construals.  In the current study, we examine the extent to 
which this sort of effect can differentially emphasize 
commonalities between two events.  Similarity ratings were 
collected for pairs of events sharing either high-level or low-
level commonalities, and described as occurring in either the 
near or distant future.  Consistent with predictions, an 
interaction was observed between temporal distance and 
commonality level.  Broader implications for cognitive 
processing are discussed. 
Introduction 
One of the remarkable strengths of the human cognitive 
system is its flexibility.  Not only are we able to store vast 
amounts of information about our world, organized into 
categories, scripts and schemas, we also seem particularly 
proficient at tailoring that information to fit the current 
demands of our environment.  In particular, we seem 
capable of representing the same entity or event in a wide 
variety of ways.  In addition to taxonomic organizations that 
can differentially emphasize various aspects of the same 
individual (e.g., animal / mammal / dog / collie / Rover), we 
appear to fluently cross-classify things based on goals, 
scripts, and evaluations (Barsalou, 1983, 1985; Ross & 
Murphy, 1999).  Further, activation and retrieval of specific 
information can be highly subject to effects of general 
context (e.g., Tulving, 1972; Godden & Baddeley, 1975).  
Similarly, contextual or top-down effects may have a 
substantial impact on how new experiences are perceived 
and encoded (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Bransford & 
Johnson, 1972).  An important implication of this variation 
in representation concerns the impact that it may have on 
the processes that operate this activated information. 
An intriguing recent body of research demonstrates an 
additional factor which may broadly affect event 
representations:  temporal distance.  Given the importance 
of our perceptions of the future for our ability to plan, to set 
and pursue goals, and to generally make long-term 
judgments, predictions, and choices, these effects have 
received surprisingly little attention in cognitive science on 
the whole.  In the current paper, we examine the impact of 
such temporally-based construals on the ubiquitous process 
of similarity judgment.  A demonstration that these 
construal effects may influence similarity—which is widely 
implicated in such fundamental cognitive processes as 
retrieval, categorization and inference—could serve to 
emphasize the expansive role that this kind of context-based 
effect plays throughout cognition. 
Temporal Construal Theory 
A recent set of studies in the judgment and decision 
making literature suggests that the way a person construes 
an event can be influenced by the temporal context in which 
that event takes place.  According to Temporal Construal 
Theory (TCT) (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Sagristano, Trope, 
& Liberman, 2002; Trope & Liberman, 2000), events in the 
near future are likely to be represented largely in terms of 
concrete, circumstantial, and goal-irrelevant features, while 
the representations of events in the distant future tend to 
emphasize features that are more abstract, central, and goal-
relevant.  Trope and Liberman refer to these sparser, less 
contextualized representations characteristic of the distant 
future as high-level construals, and to the more enriched and 
highly contextualized representations more common in near 
future events as low-level construals. 
These differences in representation can have behavioral 
consequences.  For instance, one might agree to give a talk 
at a conference on some date in the distant future, perhaps 
focusing almost exclusively on the event’s abstract, positive 
aspects: the opportunity to receive feedback on one’s work, 
the opportunity for public exposure, and so on.  As the date 
of the conference approaches, however, one’s focus may 
begin to shift to some of the contextualized details that were 
absent in the initial representation.  For instance, the time 
demands one faces in preparing for the presentation might 
become more salient, making the whole experience seem 
more effortful.  The net effect, in this case, would be that the 
presentation loses some of the positive valence it once had. 
These proposed differences in event representations can 
lead to changes in preference, depending on whether an 
event is described as being in the near or distant future.  In 
one set of studies (Liberman & Trope, 1998), participants 
were given descriptions of events which, like the conference 
example, had opposite evaluative valences for high- versus 
low-level construals.  For instance, one set of participants 
was asked to judge their likelihood of attending a lecture 
that was described as relevant and interesting but scheduled 
at an inconvenient time of day, while another set considered 
the case of a less interesting lecture, but one which was 
scheduled for a more convenient time.  In the first group, 
the high-level construal was assumed to be positive 
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(relevant, pleasant experience) and the low-level construal 
negative (the logistics of fitting it into one’s schedule).  The 
second group was expected to have the opposite pattern of 
appraisal: a more negative impression of the abstract details 
of the situation, but a more positive sense of the low-level 
procedures involved in participating.  While participants 
were more likely to attend the interesting lecture overall, 
this difference was more pronounced when the lecture was 
described as taking place a year from now rather than 
tomorrow.  In other words, the decision pertaining to the 
near future seemed to give significantly more weight to the 
concrete, contextual aspects of the situation.  The overall 
preference for the interesting lecture is also relevant, since it 
is consistent with the theory’s suggestion that more 
proximal events are represented by some combination of 
contextual and abstract information, while distant events are 
primarily abstractly represented.   
Note, however, that in these studies, the focus is on shifts 
in preference; representation is just a tool for the 
demonstrations.  As such, this and all of their evidence 
concerning how we represent events is second-order, in that 
we have to infer differences in event representation from 
people’s choices, or from people’s preferred descriptions of 
events (see Liberman & Trope, 1998).  One purpose of the 
present study was to seek more direct evidence for 
differences in event representation as a function of temporal 
context.   
Similarity and Representational Level 
Similarity is widely held to be one of the most critical 
concepts in cognition, and there are few aspects of mental 
life that do not seem to depend on it in one way or another.  
Similarity is seen as playing a vital role in recall through 
reminding (Hintzman, 1984; Ross, 1984); most theories of 
categorization rely heavily on the concept of similarity to 
determine category membership of a new item (Hintzman, 
1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984); similarity 
is proposed to be fundamental in making generalizations, 
inferences and knowledge transfer (e.g., Novick, 1988; 
Osherson, et al, 1990; Ross, 1984). 
It has been demonstrated that judgments of similarity are 
not simply a function of low-level featural overlap, but also 
depend on structural relationships between representations 
(Gentner & Markman, 1997; Markman & Gentner, 1993).  
This is true not only in terms of the impact of 
commonalities in the relations and relational systems 
themselves, but also in the way that attributes in 
corresponding roles that are defined by those structures are 
emphasized.   
These “deeper” commonalities of relational systems are 
extraordinarily useful for generating new knowledge and for 
applying existing knowledge to new situations.  For 
example, recognition of a common causal structure in two 
ostensibly different systems may lead to a deeper 
understanding of one system via analogical inferences from 
the other (see Gentner, 1983; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997). 
Thus, the similarity rating task seems particularly apt in 
the current context, first because it acts as a connection to 
deeper aspects of cognition in general, and also because it 
may provide added insight into situations in which high-
level, relational commonalities may be highlighted in 
comparison. 
Experiment 
The primary goal of this study was to determine whether 
temporal distance could affect event representations in such 
a way as to alter the perceived similarity between events.  
There are two significant motivations for this approach.  
First, it would provide a fairly direct way of assessing 
representation that would not need to rely on complex 
secondary tasks.  Second, and perhaps more important, it 
would provide a bridge linking temporal effects such as 
these to a much broader set of cognitive issues.  The critical 
role that similarity is proposed to play in so many mental 
activities suggests that observed systematic changes in 
similarity should have a relevant and far-reaching impact on 
cognition generally. 
 Just as any entity or event may be represented in a wide 
variety of ways, so may any pair of things share a great 
number of commonalities.  Some have gone so far as to 
suggest that this robs similarity of any explanatory power 
(Goodman, 1972), since all pairs of items are potentially 
infinitely similar to one another (e.g., two things may both 
have mass, may both be smaller than the sun, etc.).  A more 
measured and practical approach has been to emphasize the 
relative salience of the various pieces of information in each 
entity’s representation.  This salience could vary as a 
function of things such as prior knowledge, recent exposure 
or priming, and even the nature of the comparison context 
itself (Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993; Tversky, 1977; 
Gentner & Markman, 1997; Gentner, Rattermann & Forbus, 
1993).  Information that is more salient in a representation is 
assumed to be given more weight in judgments of similarity.  
Importantly, as previously noted, the properties that 
contribute to similarity judgments are not limited to 
concrete perceptual features, but also include the more 
abstract, relational concepts that structure and bind those 
features together (Gentner & Markman, 1997). 
 The predictions for the current study are straightforward.  
If the representations of two events are composed primarily 
of high-level, abstract descriptions of those events, then 
commonalities (or lack of commonalities) at that level of 
analysis should play a major role in their perceived 
similarity.  That is, we would expect similarity ratings to be 
driven significantly by abstract, structuring information 
such as goals, causes and relationships.  If, on the other 
hand, the representations also contain information involving 
low-level concrete and perceptual aspects of the situations, 
an impact of the commonalities at that situation-specific 
level should also be observed. 
 Consider for a moment your representation of visiting a 
dentist’s office.  This representation could include fairly 
high-level information pertaining to conscientiousness and 
long-term health benefits, as well as more concrete 
situational information about the particular setting and 
sensations involved.  Now consider two different events to 
which this situation could be compared: the act of joining a 
health club, or the act of getting a tattoo.  The health club 
event seems to share a number of abstract characteristics 
with the dentist visit (the goal of health benefits, etc.), but 
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appears quite different in terms of the situation-specific 
details.  The tattoo, on the other hand, shares a surprising 
number of low-level, concrete features (reclining chair, 
needles, physical pain), but little in the way of high-level 
commonalities.  The important outcome of this is that the 
abstraction level at which the dentist event is construed 
should have significant (and opposite) effects on the 
outcomes of these two comparisons. 
 This is exactly the situation that we created in our study.  
Participants were asked to give similarity ratings for pairs of 
events that shared primarily either high-level or low-level 
commonalities.  Further, these events could be described as 
taking place in either the near future or the distant future.  If, 
in fact, the temporal relationship of the events to the present 
time has an impact on their level of construal, then we 
should expect to see an interaction between temporal 
distance and level of commonality, such that pairs with 
high-level commonalities should be perceived as more 
similar in the distant than the near future, while pairs 
sharing low-level features should become less similar in the 
distant future relative to the near future. 
Participants 
 Twenty-three Northwestern University undergraduates 
participated in this study for partial course credit. 
Materials and Procedure 
 The materials for this experiment consisted of sentence 
pairs describing two events that a fictitious character was 
planning to undertake in the future.  Each test item included 
a standard sentence, and one of two comparison sentences.  
These comparison sentences were constructed to share 
either high-level or low-level commonalities with the 
standard, but not both.  In addition to these test items, the 
material set included several filler sentence pairs, which 
were either literally similar, sharing both high- and low-
level features, or non-similar, sharing neither. 
 Additionally, these events were described as taking place 
either in the near future (“this week”) or the distance future 
(“next year”).  This distinction acted as a between-subjects 
factor, with all events for a particular participant being 
described at the same temporal distance.  Commonality 
level served as a within-subjects factor, with half of the 
standards randomly being paired with high-level 
comparison sentences and the other half with low.  Thus, the 
experiment was a 2 (temporal distance: near vs. distant 
future) × 2 (commonality level: high vs. low pairing) mixed 
design.   
In total, 10 test items (five at each commonality level) and 
13 filler items were presented in a completely randomized 
order (different for each participant), with the exception that 
all participants were given the same two initial items (one 
literally similar, and one non-similar) to help “anchor” their 
rating range and reduce variability.  Within each item, 
sentence order was randomized, with the standard appearing 
first in approximately half of the pairs.  A typical test item 
might read as follows: “Tomorrow, Karen will go to the 
dentist.  Tomorrow she also will join a health club.”  
Sample materials are given in Table 1. 
 The experiment was implemented as a computer-based 
task.  After instructions, the first sentence pair appeared on 
the screen, followed by the prompt “How similar do you 
think these activities are to each other?”  Beneath this 
prompt was a horizontal bar, with endpoints labeled “very 
dissimilar” and “very similar”.  Participants were instructed 
to click a location on this bar to indicate their perception of 
the similarity of the two events.  This response was 
normalized to a value between 0 and 1, for the “dissimilar” 
and “similar” endpoints, respectively.  To ensure that 
participants were attending to the task, response latencies of 
less than 3 seconds for any item resulted in the warning 
“Too Fast” appearing on the screen, followed by a delay of 
several seconds before proceeding to the subsequent item. 
 
 
Table 1.  Sample events.  Low-level comparison sentences were designed to share concrete features and procedures  
with the standard, while High-level comparisons share more abstract commonalities. 
Event Standard Low-level comparison High-level comparison 
Reading and coding completed 
research questionnaires Doing taxes Conducting telephone surveys 
Going door-to-door distributing 
leaflets about the environment 
 
Going trick-or-treating with daughter 
 
Writing letters to congressmen and 
local council members 
Going to the dentist Getting a tattoo Joining a health club 
Buying diamond necklace for wife Buying expensive watch for self Taking wife out for gourmet meal 
Calling colleges requesting 
information packets 
Calling hotels to arrange Summer trip 
to Mexico Taking the SAT 
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Results 
Consistent with predictions, a 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed an 
interaction between temporal distance and commonality 
level, F (1, 21) = 8.60, p < .01.  Participants rated high-level 
pairs as more similar in the distant future condition (M = 
0.63, SD = 0.11) than in the near future condition (M = 0.58, 
SD = 0.10).  Conversely, low-level pairs were rated as more 
similar in the near future condition (M = 0.54, SD = 0.10) 
than in the distant future condition (M = 0.40, SD = 0.09). 
A main effect of commonality level was also observed.  
Participants rated high-level pairs as more similar (M = 
0.60, SD = 0.11) than low-level pairs (M = 0.47, SD = 0.12) 
overall, F (1, 21) = 18.84, p < .001.  Additionally, there was 
a marginal trend for participants to rate near future events as 
more similar than distant future events (p = .092).  This 
latter effect is more pronounced in the across-item analyses:  
a 2 × 2 ANOVA run across items revealed the same 
interaction between temporal distance and commonality 
level, F (1, 18) = 7.77, p = .012, the same main effect of 
commonality level, F (1, 18) = 9.96, p = .005, and a 
significant effect of temporal distance, F (1, 18) = 4.73, p < 
.05.  This final effect reflects the fact that the low-level 
comparisons showed a more dramatic decrease with 
temporal distance than the corresponding increase in the 
high-level comparisons.  In fact, post-hoc t-tests indicated 
that only the low-level comparisons changed significantly 
across distances (t (1,22) = 3.67, p < .01) (see discussion 
below). 
Discussion 
 The primary predictions of the experiment were 
confirmed.  Participants judged event pairs with abstract, 
high-level commonalities to be more similar in the distant 
future than the near future, while pairs sharing more 
concrete and low-level procedural features showed the 
opposite pattern.  This supports the proposal that temporal 
distance is in fact influencing the level at which events are 
construed, and that these representational differences are 
stable enough to be reflected in perceived similarity.   
 The two observed main effects, while not predicted, are in 
retrospect completely consistent with the assumptions of 
temporal construal theory.  While distant events are 
assumed to be represented primarily in terms of their 
abstract characteristics, proximal events are suggested to 
have more “enriched” representations that combine some 
contextual and some abstract information.  Consistent with 
this characterization, the greatest observed effect was the 
drop in the similarity of low-level pairs between close and 
distant conditions, contributing to both of these additional 
effects.  As noted above, although both low- and high-level 
comparisons changed in the predicted direction with 
temporal distance, this change was only statistically 
significant for the low-level pairs.    
The second main effect—the overall preference for high-
level commonalities—has been replicated in more recent 
pilot data, and is consistent with prior research showing a 
preference for relational over attributional similarity 
(Gentner & Clement, 1988; Goldstone, Medin, & Gentner, 
1991). 
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Figure 1. Interaction between commonality level  
and temporal distance. 
 
The most immediate implication of these findings is that  
this sort of temporally-based context effect should now be 
predicted to influence many of the other cognitive processes 
in which similarity participates.  For instance, it is possible 
that categorization of events and entities considered as being 
in the distant future may be based on somewhat more  
abstract dimensions than those considered in the immediate 
present.  This categorization would in turn affect the 
inferences that an individual is likely to make in the absence 
of explicit knowledge, and their confidence in the accuracy 
 of those inferences.  One interesting prediction is that these 
perceived similarities may influence the extent to which 
knowledge is successfully transferred from one domain to 
another.  Moreover, this knowledge transfer—which is seen 
as relying on the mapping of structural commonalities—
might benefit more generally from the abstract 
representations characteristic of temporal distance.  
 Preliminary pilot data collected by the authors suggest 
that temporal context may have an effect on cued retrieval.  
That is, the perceived increase in similarity associated with 
an “appropriate” encoding situation (temporally close for 
low-level commonalities, temporally distant for high-level 
commonalities) may improve the probability of retrieving 
an event from memory when cued with the previously 
compared event. 
 The results suggest a number of avenues for future 
research.  One important direction would involve varying 
the kind of high-level commonalities involved in the 
comparisons to include abstract characteristics other than 
those emphasizing individual plans and goals.  While this 
proved to be a useful way of describing future events for our 
experimental purposes, it could potentially lead to 
confounds such as attribution of particular personality traits 
to the characters (e.g., planning to do x is consistent with 
planning to do y), and the use of a broader set of abstract 
event commonalities would help to address this.   
Another interesting approach would be the examination of 
temporal distance in the opposite direction, seeing whether 
similar results could be obtained with events that occurred 
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in the recent or distant past.  Taking this a step further, it 
may be the case that the important dimension in these 
effects is psychological distance rather than simply 
temporal distance.  If this were the case, we might expect to 
find similar effects by varying dimensions such as similarity 
of the character to the participant, or the probability of a 
future event occurring. 
Conclusions 
We spend a great deal of time thinking about the future.  
In fact, this capacity seems to be a defining and distinctive 
characteristic of human cognition.  We consider possible 
outcomes, evaluate potential alternatives, and pursue distant 
goals that may take years or even decades to achieve.  
Because our mental focus is so often situated in the future, it 
seems particularly relevant to consider the influence of 
temporal distance on cognition.  The current study, though 
modest, highlights just how far-reaching these effects may 
be.  
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Abstract
In Dutch matrix clauses the verb is not in its base position, but
has been moved from the end of the clause to second position.
Three Cross-Modal Priming experiments showed that the on-
line activation pattern for moved verbs in Dutch differs
significantly from the pattern for moved nouns in English.
Whereas in wh-movement reactivation of moved nouns is
found at their base position, the current results suggest that
moved verbs are maintained active during the entire clause.
The results are discussed in light of a gap-filling account, and
three proposals are given to explain the long-lasting activation
of the verb.
Introduction
Cross-Modal Priming (CMP) studies (e.g. Love &
Swinney, 1996; Swinney, Ford, Bresnan, & Frauenfelder,
1988) have shown that in complex sentences where the
object is not in its base position the meaning of this moved
constituent is reactivated at its original position, directly
after the verb. Swinney et al. (1988) tested reactivation of
moved wh-phrases in sentences such as:
(1) The cop saw the boyi whoi the crowd at the party
accused ti of the crime.1
Since boy is the direct object of accused in base structure2,
and English is an SVO language, the base position of boy is
to the right of the verb accused. Therefore, it is assumed that
                                                          
1 Following the traditions in processing research, the t refers to the
gap position (trace) and co-indexation indicates the relationship
between filler and gap.
2 Strictly speaking, ‘who’ is the direct object of ‘accused’ and not
‘boy’, but it is assumed that ‘who’, because of its coreference with
‘boy’, has inherited the semantic characteristics of ‘boy’.
a trace (or gap) is postulated after accused. Using the CMP
task3 priming effects were found for probes related to the
antecedent boy when presented at the gap position (directly
after the verb). Importantly, no priming was found at a
control position before the verb. In other words, it appears
that listeners reactivate the meaning of the moved
constituent when they encounter the gap. This finding has
been replicated many times (for an overview see
Featherston, 2001; Love & Swinney, 1996).
Several explanations have been given for this
phenomenon. Swinney and colleagues (1988) provide a
structural account: the meaning of the moved object is
recovered in its base position to regain the canonical
sentence structure. This would suggest a close
correspondence between linguistic theory (or at least the
generative approach) and psychological reality (the
functioning of the human parser). Others (e.g. Pickering &
Barry, 1991) came up with a verb-centered, semantic,
account: the meaning of the moved object is reactivated
because after processing the verb a dependency relation is
established between the verb and its dependents, that is, its
arguments (see also Nicol, 1993).
The current paper is an attempt to broaden this research
area by extending the topic of research to the activation
                                                          
3 The CMP task is a dual task in which participants listen to
sentences and make a lexical decision to a visual probe presented
at a particular point during each sentence. Faster reaction times to a
probe that is associatively related to a particular word in the
sentence as compared to reaction times to a probe that is unrelated
(but otherwise comparable to the related probe) is attributed to
priming effects. If priming is found at a certain point during the
sentence, this is taken as evidence that the meaning of the relevant
word in the sentence is activated.
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pattern of verbs. It is unknown whether verbs that are not in
their base position are reactivated at this position. If moved
verbs show reactivation at their base position, then a strong
case can be made for the possibility that listeners attempt to
recover base word order whenever they encounter a
structure that is non-canonical. However, some
characteristics of verbs suggest that moved verbs might
behave differently from moved noun constituents.
Linguistic Background
Whereas in wh- and NP-movement whole sentence
constituents (XPs) are moved, in verb movement it is only
the verb itself (the head, X0) that moves. Linguists (e.g.
Chomsky, 1995) stress that movement of syntactic heads is
radically different from movement of syntactic phrases,
having for example no effect on interpretation.
In English, the language in which most studies on gap-
filling have been performed, verb movement only occurs in
negative inversion structures and in questions, where the
auxiliary moves. In Dutch, however, verb movement is an
omnipresent phenomenon. Dutch is generally agreed to be
an SOV language (Koster, 1975, but see Zwart, 1997), but
in a matrix clause the finite verb moves from its basic,
clause-final, position to the second position in the clause
(Verb Second or V2).
Psycholinguistic Background
Verbs play a central and binding role in the sentence: they
not only determine the event of the sentence, but they are
also linked to all other main constituents of the sentence (the
arguments) and assign thematic roles to these constituents.
Psycholinguistic studies suggest that these differences
between nouns and verbs may matter in sentence
processing: influences of argument structure have been
found at different levels of sentence processing (for
interference effects see Shapiro, Zurif, & Grimshaw, 1987;
for syntactic priming effects, see Trueswell & Kim, 1998).
It is unknown what role the characteristics of verbs play
in on-line processing of moved verbs, although two
unpublished studies suggest that the patterns for verb
movement might differ from those found in wh-movement.
Muckel, Urban and Heartl (p.c.) examined split particle
verbs in German SVO sentences in which the matrix verb
had been moved to V2 and the particle remained in the base
position of the verb (German is an SOV language).
Responses to identical probes were faster than responses to
control probes at the control probe point (which was placed
in front of the word preceding the particle, so two words
before the gap) as well as at the experimental probe point.
No interaction between probe point and probe type was
found, so no evidence was found for reactivation.
Basilico, Piñar and Antón-Méndez (1995) ran a CMP-
study that focused on moved verbs in Spanish. They used
declarative sentences with two different word orders (VSO
and VOS) and concluded that in the sentences where the
verb was moved (VSO) the verb was activated at the gap.
Conclusions about reactivation cannot be drawn, however,
because no pre-gap control probe-point was included in the
design.
Experiment 1 & 2
In two consecutive CMP experiments, the question was
addressed whether or not verb movement has processing
consequences similar to wh-movement. The experimental
sentences in these experiments are Dutch matrix clauses in
which the verb has been moved from its base clause-final
position to V2 position, leaving behind a gap. If verb
movement and wh-movement are processed similarly, we
expect to find activation of the verb directly after the verb
(direct priming), deactivation of the verb in between the
overt verb position and the gap, and finally reactivation at
the gap (gap-filling).
Method
Participants 44 Participants were tested in experiment 1
and 60 in experiment 2.
Materials Sentences consisting of a matrix clause (SVO)
followed by an embedded clause were auditorily presented.
In both experiments the matrix clause ended after the direct
object. In experiment 1 the direct object occurred directly
after the verb (see example sentence 2), in experiment 2 an
adjunct preceded the direct object (see example sentence 3).
 (2) De kleine jongens imitereni [1] hun fanatieke [2] rood-
aangelopen voetbaltrainer ti, omdat [3] ze later
allemaal profvoetballer willen worden.
The little boys imitatei [1] their fanatical [2] red-faced
soccer coach ti, because [3] they all want to be
professional soccer players when they grow up
(3) De trouwe volgelingen wijzigeni [1] eens in de zoveel
tijd hun altijd [2] controversiële mening ti [3], want [4]
hun leider is een wispelturig man.
The faithful followers changei [1] once in a while their
always [2] controversial opinion ti [3], because [4]
their leader is a rather fickle man.
The probes that were presented during the experimental
sentences were verbs that were either associatively related
to the finite verb or unrelated but matched to the related
probe for baseline lexical decision time, frequency, length
and argument structure. Both probe types were pre-tested
off-line for any possible inadvertent source of priming. The
same prime - unrelated probe - related probe triads were
used in both experiments.4
Probes were presented at four different positions (see
example sentences 2 and 3):
1. verb probe point: indicated as [1], placed directly
after the verb
                                                          
4 Two triads were excluded in experiment 2 for counterbalancing
reasons (we used 4 probe points instead of 3, so the number of
experimental sentences had to be dividable by 4).
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2. control probe point: indicated as [2], presented at
700 ms after [1] in experiment 1 and at 1500 ms
after [1] in experiment 2
3. end-of-clause probe point: measured in experiment
2 only and indicated as [3], presented at the end of
the clause (offset object head noun)
4. conjunction probe point: indicated as [3] in
experiment 1 and as [4] in experiment 2, presented
at the offset of the conjunction.
In experiment 1 42 experimental sentences were used, in
experiment 2 there were 40 experimental sentences. In each
experiment, an equal number of pseudo-experimental
sentences (sentences with the same structure as the
experimental sentences) were added and combined with
non-words, to prevent any correlation between sentence
type and response type. In addition, 20 filler sentences of
different structures (10 words, 10 non-words) and 15 yes/no
comprehension questions were added (to encourage
participants to pay attention to the spoken sentences).
Probe point and probe type were both within-participants
factors. All sentences were ordered pseudo-randomly. A
completely counterbalanced design was created to assure
that all participants saw both related and control probes, and
saw probes at all three probe points. Each participant was
tested twice, on the same list, but with related and control
probes shifted.
Procedures The participants were tested individually in a
sound-proof room with no visual distractors. The sentences
were presented over headphones with an interval of 1500
ms. The probes were presented on a standard computer
screen. The experimental software Tempo (designed at the
University of California, San Diego, for running CMP-
studies), combined with a response box with two buttons,
was used to present the items and register the accuracy and
RTs of the responses. Each probe was presented for 300 ms
and a response could be given within a 2000 ms interval
from stimulus onset. Importantly, the sentences continued
without interruption during visual presentation of the probe.
Participants were instructed to listen carefully to the
sentences and to expect comprehension questions about
some sentences, but only about the sentence immediately
prior to the question. Questions were answered and lexical
decisions were made by pressing the left button on the
button box for no and non-word and the right button for yes
and word. Participants were instructed to answer as quickly
and accurately as possible.
Results
Participants were excluded from further analysis 1) if their
error score on the lexical decision task was greater than
10%, 2) if their mean or SD RT deviated from the overall
mean or SD by more than 2.5 SD, or 3) if less than 67% of
the comprehension questions were answered correctly. Data
from three participants were excluded in both experiments.
Error rates were low (1.4% and 1.8%, respectively) and
equally distributed across related and control probes and
across probe points. The exclusion of errors and outliers (all
values deviating from the participants and item mean for the
particular data point with more than 2.5 SD were excluded)
resulted in 2.7 and 3.1 percent data loss, respectively.
The mean RTs for all probe points and probe types are
presented in Table 1 (the values that are presented here and
in the following tables are derived from the subject-
analyses; the item-analysis revealed very similar data).
The subject-based ANOVAs revealed a significant main
effect of probe type in both experiments; overall, the related
probes generated shorter RTs than the control probes (exp 1:
F1 (1,40) = 7.91, p = .008; exp 2: F1 (1,56) = 4.61, p =
.036). The item-based ANOVA was marginally significant
in experiment 1 (F2 (1,41) = 3.43, p = .07), but did not reach
significance in experiment 2 (F2 (1,39) = .98, p > .3).
Paired t-tests showed significant5 faster responses to
related than to control probes (priming) at the verb probe
point in experiment 1 (t1 (40) = 2.53, p = .008; t2 (41) =
1.75, p = .044), but not in experiment 2 (t1(56) =  .15, p >
.4; t2 (39) = .29, p > .3). At the control probe point priming
was found in both experiments (this effect was significant in
the subject analysis (exp 1: t1 (40) = 2.64, p = .006; exp 2:
t1 (56) = 2.49, p = .008), but in the item-analysis only a
trend was found (exp 1: t2 (41) = 1.40, p = .085; exp 2: t2
(39) = 1.37, p = .09). Furthermore, priming was found at the
end-of-clause probe point in experiment 2 (t1 (56) = 2.08, p
= .021; t2 (39) = 1.76, p = .043). Neither of the experiments,
however, showed a priming effect at the conjunction probe
point (exp 1: t1 (40) = .81 p > .2; t2 (41) = .82, p > .2; exp 2:
t1 (56) = -.98, p > .15; t2 (39) = -.95, p > .15).
Table 1:  Mean RTs (and SDs) to probe type
as a function of probe position in experiment 1 and 2.
probe type verb control end-of-
clause
conjunction
Experiment 1
control 633  (68) 635  (61) - 626  (72)
related 617  (65) 621  (66) - 620  (73)
difference 16  (41) 14  (33) - 6  (47)
Experiment 2
control 663  (94) 671  (99) 668   (95) 666   (88)
related 662  (91) 657  (84) 654 (101) 672 (103)
difference 1  (49) 15  (45) 14   (51) -6   (42)
Conclusion and Discussion
These experiments did not provide evidence for reactivation
of the verb at its base position. Both experiments converge
on a pattern of activation of the verb at the control probe
points (700 and 1500 ms after the actual occurrence of the
verb in the sentence) and deactivation of the verb
immediately following the conjunction linking the matrix to
the second clause. The second experiment further shows that
the verb is active at the end of the clause. The results for the
                                                          
5 As no inhibition effects were expected all t-tests are 1-tailed.
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verb probe point, where priming of the verb was expected
directly after its occurrence, are less clear. Although
significant facilitation of the related probe compared to the
control probe was found in experiment 1, experiment 2
surprisingly showed a null-effect at this probe position. 6
An important question that remains to be answered after
these experiments is: Why do verbs remain active for such
an extended period of time? One possible reason is that
verbs stay active to 'find' their arguments in order to theta-
mark them (Argument Structure Hypothesis).7 According to
this hypothesis continued activation is predicted up to the
final argument. As all verbs that were used in the current
experiments were two-place verbs, the final argument was
always the direct object, which occurred at the end of the
matrix clause in both experiments.
Experiment 3
To test the Argument Structure Hypothesis, an experiment
was run that employed an adjunct immediately after the
second argument. This allowed investigation of whether
saturation of the argument structure of the verb is the basis
for discontinued activation of the verb, or whether the verb
always remains active up till the end of the clause.
Method
Materials The same primes, related probe and control
probes were used in experiment 3, but the sentences were
slightly altered. The experimental sentences still consisted
of a matrix clause followed by an embedded clause, but
after the Object Noun Phrase an adjunct was inserted (4).
The adjuncts that were used were Adverbial Phrases of
Time.
(4) De domme gedetineerden beroven [1] vijftien rijke
bejaarden tijdens hun [2] eerste proefverlof [3], dus
vrijlating zit er voorlopig niet in.
The stupid detainees rob [1] fifteen rich seniors during
their [2] first parole [3], so release seems to be out of
the question for now.
The verb probe point (see [1]) was presented slightly later
than in experiment 1 and 2: at the onset of the first word
following the verb, and if this point could not be measured
adequately, at the onset of the first vowel of this word. The
control probe point [2] was now at 700 ms after the onset of
the adjunct. The final probe point was at the end of the
clause, directly at the offset of the final word of the adjunct
[3].
                                                          
6 Phonological assimilation made it impossible to place all probe
points exactly at the onset of the next word. Post hoc analyses
showed that probes that were placed too early had a low
probability to show faster RTs to related probes than to control
probes, whereas the majority of probes that were presented exactly
at the onset of the word following the verb showed facilitation for
the related probe (χ2 (1) = 17.4, p < .001). Part of the third
experiment focuses on this observation.
7  More accounts will be discussed in the General Discussion.
Participants and Procedures 48 Participants were tested
following the same procedure as in experiment 1 and 2.
Results
The data were handled in the same way as in experiment 1
and 2. Three participants were excluded from further
analysis and exclusion of errors and outliers resulted in 3.0
percent data loss.
The RTs for this experiment are presented in table 2 and
show faster responses to related probes than control probes
at all probe points (F1 (1,44) = 24.35, p < .001; F2 (1,41) =
6.38, p = .016). So, first of all, directly after the verb, a
significant priming effect is obtained again, which indicates
that a small adaptation in probe placement (consistently at
the onset of the first word following the verb or slightly
later) resulted in stable priming effects at this probe point
(t1 (44) = 3.08, p = .002; t2 (41) = 1.75, p = .044). But more
interestingly, activation of the verb was still evident after all
arguments were processed, 700 ms into the adjunct (t1 (44)
= 2.35, p = .012; t2 (41) = 2.39, p = .011), as well as at the
end of the clause (t1 (44) = 2.59, p = .007; t2 (41) = 1.77, p
= .042).
Table 2:  Mean RTs (and SDs) to probe type
as a function of probe position in experiment 3.
probe type verb control end-of-
clause
conjunction
control 721  (86) 723  (95) 712  (89) -
related 697  (89) 706  (96) 693  (88) -
difference 24  (53) 17  (48) 19  (48) -
Conclusion
The current experiment shows that verbs in Dutch
declarative matrix clauses are maintained active throughout
their entire clause, even after all arguments have been
encountered.
General Discussion
The aim of the first two experiments was to evaluate
whether moved verbs (in Dutch) behave similarly to moved
nouns, which show reactivation of the moved constituent at
the location of the gap. The results show that, at least in
Dutch, processing of moved verbs is different from that of
moved noun constituents in English. No evidence was
provided for reactivation of the verb at its base (clause-
final) position. Instead, the experiments demonstrated that
the verb remains active from the point where it is first
encountered up to the offset of the object head noun, clause-
finally. So even though activation of the verb at the site of
the gap was found in the second experiment, the verb was
also active at the control probe points, unlike in the gap-
filling studies in English (Love & Swinney, 1996).
The question whether verb movement is reflected in
psychological reality cannot be answered on the basis of
these data. Although we did not find evidence for
reactivation, a syntactically based Gap-Filling Account can
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still hold for the data; the verb was indeed active at the gap.
It is possible that, instead of being reactivated, verbs are
maintained active until the gap (and because of the gap).
The studies by Basilico et al. (1995) and Muckel et al.
(p.c.) show that the present results do not stand alone. The
results from both studies can be interpreted in different
ways, but their findings might well be in line with ours.
Muckel et al. found activation of a split particle verb at a
control probe point and at the particle. Since they did not
test for priming directly after the verb and do not present
baseline reaction times for the two probe types the results
are suggestive of either continued activation of the verb or
no activation at all8. Basilico et al. found activation of the
verb at the site of the assumed gap (VS*O) in Spanish
sentences with non-basic word order. However, they did not
test directly after the verb, neither did they use a control
probe point to check whether the activation of the verb had
faded in between. It is possible, therefore, that a moved verb
in Spanish also remains active.
As far as the third experiment is concerned, current
linguistics theories disagree about the position of adjuncts
and therefore it remains unclear whether the base position of
the verb should be postulated at the end of the clause (after
the adjunct) or after the direct object (in front of the
adjunct). If the verb gap is posited in front of the adjunct in
sentences like the ones used in experiment 3, the results of
this particular experiment show activation of the verb even
after the gap and thus provide evidence against the Gap-
Filling Account as an explanation for our data.
It is not inconceivable that movement of verbs is not
reflected in psychological reality. In wh-extraction, all
linguistic theories accept some kind of relation between the
wh-constituent and the verb later in the sentence. In
movement of noun constituents, gap-filling is necessary to
assign thematic roles to constituents that are detached from
their subcategorizer. In contrast, the assumption of verb
movement is very theory-internal to generative linguistics
(Chomsky, 1995). Also, where verb movement is
concerned, gap-filling is not necessary for sentence
interpretation but only for structural, syntactic reasons: to
fulfill requirements formulated by formal syntactic theory.
The Gap-Filling Account can definitely be rejected if non-
moved verbs are also found to remain active in English. A
study in English will be performed by Lewis Shapiro and
David Swinney. In this study sentences similar to the ones
used in the present experiments will be used. In English, the
finite verb is in base position, and there is no gap at the end
of the clause. If the verb does not remain active in English,
the present results are most likely to be due to restoration of
the base word order (gap-filling). If, however, the results for
the study on English are similar to the results of the
experiments discussed in this paper, other accounts will gain
in credibility.
                                                          
8 In this case, the priming effects can be explained by the
materials: identical probes are generally more 'sensitive to priming'
than associatively related primes.
Three possible alternative accounts will be discussed in
the final section of this paper.9 The first account is the
Argument Structure Account which was tested in experiment
3. According to this explanation, verbs remain active to be
able to assign theta roles to their arguments. This hypothesis
was falsified in experiment 3 where activation of the verb
was found during an adjunct phrase placed after the final
argument.
An alternative syntactic explanation for the present data is
the VP-shell Theory (Larson, 1988). According to the
variant of Van Zonneveld & Bastiaanse (2000), both
arguments and adjuncts are in SpecVP positions. This is
only possible when the VP is recursive: it takes a VP as a
complement. The VP-shell theory thus predicts a sentence
structure with as many VPs as there are specifiers
(arguments and adjuncts). The VP-shell in itself is a
complement of IP. An example of sentences as used in
experiment 2 can illustrate this (figure 1).
 
        IP 
         /  \ 
    the girls     I' 
         / \ 
       kissi  VP 
          /  \ 
      every day  V' 
               /  \ 
           ti    VP 
             /  \ 
         the boys   V' 
              /  \ 
         ti         
  
Figure 1:  Syntactic representation for Dutch, according to
VP-shell theory (simplified version of an experimental
sentence from experiment 2).
As this figure shows, there is an empty V0 position in the
first and second VP. According to Van Zonneveld &
Bastiaanse (2000) the verb is not ‘moved’ to the head of I',
but it is ‘lexicalized’ or ‘activated’ again in each head
position of V'. This means that the verb is active during the
entire clause and, unlike nouns, does not need to be
reactivated at the gap position.
                                                          
9 These accounts are all based on the assumption that only verbs
show long-lasting activation. Although no continued activation for
wh-constituents was found in CMP experiments within the
standard wh-movement paradigms, Nicol (1993) could not exclude
a pattern of maintained activation of PPs in sentences with
ditransitive verbs, where the PP was fronted, and of subjects in S -
relative clause - V - O sentences, where priming of the subject was
found after the verb. Nevertheless, other explanations could apply
to these data as well (or even better), suggesting that detailed
studies on the activation pattern of nouns need to be done as well.
We are currently preparing a study on the activation pattern of
nouns.
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The verb thus remains active within its own clause
boundary. Only when a new CP or IP is encountered, with a
new VP-shell structure as its complement, the activation of
the verb is no longer necessary and will therefore disappear.
This is exactly what was found in the present experiments.
Interestingly, unlike the Gap-filling Account, VP-shell
theory predicts similar verb-activation patterns for both
English and Dutch matrix clauses, because in both cases the
verb c-commands the entire VP-shell.
A third theory (Semantic Account) is deduced from
studies that show that verbs are more polysemous than
nouns (Fellbaum, 1993; Gentner & France, 1988) and are
more adjustable and mutable. In a paper-and-pencil task,
Gentner & France (1988) found that if the meaning of a verb
does not fit with the noun that it co-occurs with, participants
are more eager to change the meaning of the verb than the
meaning of the noun. Interestingly, these mutability effects
are seen in on-line processing as well: an eye-tracking study
by Pickering and Frisson (Pickering & Frisson, 2001)
showed that lexical ambiguity resolution for verbs is
delayed compared to nouns. The suggestion of these authors
is that the interpretation of a verb is highly dependent on the
arguments with which it combines in a particular sentence.
Interestingly, this is also the case for non-ambiguous verbs
that have multiple senses. To understand the full meaning
of, for example, the verb open, one needs to know whether
it concerns opening a door, or a file. According to the
“underspecification model” (Frisson & Pickering, 1999)
“the processor activates a single underspecified meaning for
a verb with multiple senses and uses evidence from context
to home in on the appropriate sense” (Pickering & Frisson,
2001, p. 564). Therefore, also in the case of unambiguous
verbs, delaying the interpretation process until the
arguments are processed seems to make sense.
Although Pickering and Frisson focus on the role of
arguments, it is possible that adjuncts play a role in the
interpretation of the verb, too. Actually, one should notice
that verb-interpretation and sentence-interpretation are
intermingled and can be seen as ongoing processes, which
possibly only stop at clause boundaries. This also suggests
that the VP-shell Account and the Semantic Account might
be difficult to tease apart and should perhaps be interpreted
as accounts that explain the same phenomena, but do so at a
different linguistic level.
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Abstract 
 
The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is a striking 
example of the human tendency to base probability 
judgment on intuitive, erroneous heuristics instead 
of an analytic, normative reasoning process. Two 
experiments tested the claim (e.g., Stanovich & 
West, 2000) that correct, normative reasoning draws 
on executive, working memory resources (WM) 
whereas heuristic reasoning would be purely 
automatic. Experiment 1A examined the link 
between MHD-reasoning and WM-capacity. 
Participants that solved the MHD correctly had a 
significantly higher WM-capacity. Experiment 1B 
presents a new approach to test the role of the WM-
resources experimentally. Participants solved the 
MHD while WM-resources were burdened by a 
secondary task. Correct responses decreased under 
load. The results provide new evidence for the 
differential role of executive resources in heuristic 
and analytic reasoning.  
 
Introduction 
 
A main theme of cognitive reasoning research over 
the last decades is that human judgment frequently 
violates traditional normative standards. In a wide 
range of reasoning tasks most people do not give 
the answer that is correct according to logic or 
probability theory. The discrepancy between 
normative models and peoples actual performance 
has been labeled the “normative/descriptive gap” 
(Stanovich, 1999). The present study focuses on 
one of the most striking examples of this 
discrepancy: The Monty Hall Dilemma.  
The notorious, counterintuitive Monty Hall 
Dilemma was adapted from a popular TV game 
show (Friedman, 1998). Host Monty Hall asks his 
final guest to choose one of three doors. One of the 
doors conceals a valuable prize and the other two 
contain worthless prizes such as goats or a bunch of 
toilet paper. After the guest makes a selection, the 
host, who knows where the prize is, opens one of 
the non-chosen doors to show that it contains a dud. 
The guests are then asked if they want to stay with 
their first choice or switch to the other unopened 
door. 
Most people have the strong intuition that 
whether they switch or not the probability of 
winning remains 50% either way. However, from a 
normative point of view, the best strategy is to 
switch to the other door. Indeed, switching yields a 
2/3 chance of winning. The solution hinges on the 
crucial fact that the host will never open the door 
concealing the prize, and obviously, he will not 
open the guest’s door either. Taking into account 
that two thirds of the times the prize will be in 
one of the non-chosen doors, the non-chosen 
door that is still closed will hide the prize in two 
thirds of the trials (Tubau & Alonso, 2003). 
Empirical studies of the Monty Hall Dilemma 
consistently showed that the vast majority of 
college students fails to give the correct response 
(switching rates ranging from 9% to 21%, e.g., 
Burns & Wieth, 2000, 2003; Friedman, 1998; 
Granberg & Brown, 1995; Krauss & Wang, 
2003; Tubau & Alonso, 2003). Likewise, vos 
Savant (1997) reports that after she discussed the 
problem in a weekly magazine column she 
received up to 10,000 letters in response. Ninety-
two percent of the writers from the general 
public disagreed with the switching answer. To 
paraphrase Friedman (1998), it seems that 
because of peoples poor MHD reasoning 
“millions of dollars were left on Monty’s table”. 
Research indicates that the typical MHD 
response can be attributed to the operation of 
erroneous but very powerful intuitions or 
heuristics. For example, Shimojo and Ichikawa 
(1989) found that most people base their answer 
on the so called number-of-cases heuristic (“if 
the number of alternatives is N, then the 
probability of each one is 1/N”). Thus, since 
only two doors remain people will automatically 
assign a 50% chance to each door and fail to take 
the “knowledgeable host” information into 
account. Similar claims can be found in Falk 
(1992) and Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, 
Legrenzi, and Caverni (1999).  
It has been argued that human thinking in 
general typically relies on the operation of 
intuitive, prepotent heuristics instead of a 
deliberate, controlled reasoning process. The 
primacy of these heuristics has been called the 
fundamental computational bias in human 
cognition (Stanovich, 1999). Whereas the fast 
and undemanding heuristics provide us with 
useful responses in many situations they can bias 
reasoning in tasks that require more elaborate, 
analytic processing (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;. Sloman, 
1996; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Stanovich and West (e.g., 2000) stressed that 
although the modal response is often erroneous 
in many reasoning tasks, a small proportion of 
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the participants does give responses that are in line 
with the normative standards. Their research on 
individual differences showed that participants that 
gave the normative response on classic reasoning 
tasks such as the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983) and the Wason (1966) selection 
task were disproportionally those highest in 
cognitive (working memory) capacity. According to 
Stanovich and West’s dual process framework (see 
also Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996) correct 
normative responding requires that an analytic, 
controlled reasoning process overrides the prepotent 
heuristics. The inhibition of the heuristic system 
and the computations of the analytic system would 
draw on limited, executive working memory 
resources. The more resources that are available, 
the more likely that the analytic system will be 
successfully engaged and the correct response 
calculated. 
The Stanovich and West (2000) findings suggest 
that a possible antidote to erroneous MHD 
reasoning might be a high working memory span. If 
correct normative reasoning requires executive 
working memory (WM) resources, then participants 
with a higher WM-span should be more likely to 
select the switching response. Bluntly put, the 
guests that win the prize in the game show will not 
only be richer but also “smarter”1. The link between 
MHD-reasoning and WM-capacity was examined 
in Experiment 1A. 
The Stanovich and West framework and related 
dual process theories have been severely criticized 
(e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000). One important 
issue concerns the central assumption about the role 
of controlled, executive resources. Both the claim 
that correct, normative reasoning depends on the 
executive system and the characterization of the 
heuristic system as automatic and independent from 
executive control have been questioned (e.g., 
Handley, Feeney, Harper, 2002; Klaczynski, 2000, 
2001; Osman, 2002) 
Experiment 1B presents a new approach in the 
dual process field. The experiment adopted 
secondary task methodology to burden the 
executive WM-resources while participants were 
solving the MHD. If correct responding in the 
MHD draws on WM-resources, performance should 
decrease under load since less resources will be 
available for inhibition of the prepotent “50%-
heuristic” and subsequent analytic computations. 
On the other hand, if the heuristic processing would 
not be automatic and would draw on WM, it will 
also become harder for people to come up with the 
“equal probability” answer. The procedure thereby 
                                                 
1 The term « smarter » refers of course to the tight 
connection between executive WM-capacity and general 
cognitive ability (e.g., Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & 
Conway, 1999).  
allows a direct, experimental test of the basic 
executive processing assumptions. 
 
Experiment 1A 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 236 first-year psychology students 
from the Unversity of Leuven, Belgium, 
participated in return for psychology course 
credit. 
 
Material 
Working memory measure. Participants’ working 
memory capacity was measured using a version 
of the Operation Span task (Ospan, La Pointe & 
Engle, 1990) adapted for group testing (Gospan, 
for details see De Neys, d’Ydewalle, Schaeken, 
& Vos, 2002). In the Ospan-task participants 
solve series of simple mathematical operations 
while attempting to remember a list of unrelated 
words The main adaptation in the Gospan is that 
the operation from an operation-word pair is first 
presented separately on screen (e.g., ‘IS (4/2) – 1 
= 5 ?’). Participants read the operation silently 
and press a key to indicate whether the answer is 
correct or not. Responses and response latencies 
are recorded. After the participant has typed 
down the response, the corresponding word (e.g., 
‘BALL’) from the operation-word string is 
presented for 800 ms. As in the standard Ospan 
three sets of each length (from two to six 
operation-word pairs) are tested and set size 
varies in the same randomly chosen order for 
each participant. The Gospan-score is the sum of 
the recalled words for all sets recalled 
completely and in correct order.  
 Participants who made more than 15% math 
errors or whose mean operation response 
latencies deviated by more than 2.5 standard 
deviations of the sample mean were discarded 
(participants already in the bottom quartile of the 
Gospan-score distribution were not discarded 
based on the latency criterion). De Neys et al. 
(2002) reported an internal reliability coefficient 
alpha of .74 for the Gospan. The corrected 
correlation between standard Ospan and Gospan-
score reached .70. 
 
Monty Hall Dilemma. Participants were 
presented a standard version of the MHD taken 
from Krauss and Wang (2003). The formulation 
tried to avoid possible ambiguities (e.g., the 
random placement of the prize and duds behind 
the doors and the knowledge of the host were 
explicitly mentioned). The text stated (translated 
from Dutch):  
 
Suppose you’re on a game show and you’re 
given the choice of three doors. Behind one door 
286
is the main prize (a car) and behind the other two 
doors there are dud prizes (a bunch of toilet paper). 
The car and the dud prizes are placed randomly 
behind the doors before the show. The rules of the 
game are as follows: After you have chosen a door, 
the door remains closed for the time being. The 
game show host, Monty Hall, who knows what is 
behind the doors, then opens one of the two 
remaining doors which always reveals a dud. After 
he has opened one of the doors with a dud, Monty 
Hall asks the participant whether he/she wants to 
stay with his/her first choice or to switch to the last 
remaining door. Suppose that you chose door 1 and 
the host opens door 3, which has a dud.  
 
The host now asks you whether you want to switch 
to door 2. What should you do to have most chance 
of winning the main prize? 
 
a. Stick with your first choice, door 1. 
b. Switch to door 2. 
c. It does not matter. Chances are even. 
 
The MHD was presented on computer. Participants 
were instructed to carefully read the basic problem 
information (text in italics), first. When they were 
finished reading they pressed the ENTER-key and 
then the question and answer-alternatives 
(underlined text) appeared on the screen (text in 
italics remained on the screen). Participants typed 
their response (a, b, or c) on the keyboard. 
Instructions stated there were no time limits.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment was run on computer. Participants 
were tested in groups of 21 to 48. Participants 
completed the Gospan and MHD in a one-hour 
session, in which they also completed some other 
tasks not part of the present investigation. The 
MHD was presented after the Gospan task.  
 
Results and discussion 
 
Six participants were discarded because they did 
not meet the operation correctness or latency 
requirements of the WM-measure. Mean Gospan-
score of the remaining 230 participants was 32.26 
(SD = 10.45). 
Consistent with previous MHD-studies only a 
small minority of the participants (5.2%) gave the 
correct switching answer. The vast majority 
(85.7%) believed that switching and sticking were 
equally good strategies. However, the crucial 
finding is that the participants that did give the 
correct response had a significantly larger WM-
capacity. Mean Gospan-score of the participants 
that gave the correct response was 38.08 vs. only 
31.94 for the incorrect responders, t(228) = 2, n1 = 
12, n2 = 218, p < .05. In terms of effect sizes, 
Cohen’s d reached .59. Such an effect is classified 
as “moderate” (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) and 
corresponds to the effect sizes reported by 
Stanovich and West (1998a, 1998b) for the impact 
of executive capacity on the reasoning tasks in 
their studies. 
The present association between MHD-
performance and WM-capacity supports 
Stanovich and West’s basic claim concerning the 
involvement of executive resources in normative 
reasoning. However, the evidence remains 
purely correlational. More direct evidence for the 
mediating role of the executive resources is 
needed (Klaczynski, 2000). Experiment 1B 
introduces secondary task methodology to test 
the basic processing claims experimentally.  
 
Experiment 1B 
 
A major problem for Stanovich and West (2000) 
and related dual processing frameworks is that 
the basic processing assumption, the different 
involvement of controlled, executive resources 
in heuristic and analytic reasoning, is disputed. 
On one hand, available (correlational) evidence 
for the role of executive resources in analytic, 
normative reasoning has been questioned (e.g., 
Klaczynski, 2000). On the other hand, the 
proposed characterization of the heuristic system 
as automatic and independent from executive 
control has been challenged (e.g., Handley, 
Feeney, Harper, 2002; Klaczynski, 2001; 
Osman, 2002). Experiment 1B presents a new 
approach to test the basic processing claims.  
Participants solved the MHD while they 
performed a secondary task that burdened the 
executive WM-resources. If correct responding 
in the MHD draws on WM-resources, 
performance should decrease under load since 
less resources will be available for inhibition of 
the dominant “50%-heuristic” and subsequent 
analytic computations. On the other hand, if 
heuristic processing would not be automatic and 
would draw on WM, it will also become harder 
for people to come up with the “equal 
probability” answer and we would expect a 
decrease in “50%” responses. In case both the 
heuristic and normative response would draw on 
executive resources the computation of any 
single response should be hindered and we might 
expect a random guessing pattern under 
secondary task load. 
The secondary task was adopted from Kane 
and Engle (2000). Participants were requested to 
continuously tap a novel, complex finger pattern 
(e.g., index finger/ring finger/ middle finger/ 
pinkie) with their non-dominant hand while 
reasoning. The task was selected because 
previous studies (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2000; 
Moscovitch, 1994) consistently showed that it 
put a premium on efficient executive WM-
functioning. 
 
Method 
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Participants 
Forty-one first-year psychology students from the 
Unversity of Leuven, Belgium, participated in 
return for psychology course credit. None of the 
participants had participated in Experiment 1A. All 
participants had taken the Gospan-test prior to 
Experiment 1B. Between 13 to 46 days intervened 
between participation in the Gospan-test and 
Experiment 1B.  
 
Materials 
Monty Hall Dilemma. Participants were presented 
the same version of the MHD as in Experiment 1A. 
 
WM-load task. A program executed by a second 
computer collected the finger-tapping data. All 
participants tapped on the “V”, “B”, “N”, and “M” 
keys on the QUERTY-keyboard of the second 
computer. 
 
Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. 
Participants were instructed to tap the index-ring-
middle-pinkie pattern with their non-dominant 
hand. The experiment started with five 30s practice 
tapping trials. Participants always received on-line 
accuracy feedback: Whenever a wrong finger (key) 
was tapped the computer emitted a 300 ms, low 
pitch tone. During the first three practice trials the 
program also calculated the mean tapping speed for 
each participant. If any one intertap interval in the 
subsequent trials was more than 150 ms slower than 
the established mean, the computer emitted a 600 
ms, high pitch tone. The online monitoring served 
to assure that the tapping task was properly 
performed. 
After the tapping practice, the experimenter 
explained that the practice tapping speed had to be 
maintained in the upcoming reasoning task. 
Participants then read the basic MHD problem 
information (underlined text) on the screen. When 
they were finished reading they pressed the 
ENTER-key and started tapping. Then the question 
and answer-alternatives (text in bold) were 
presented and participants continuously tapped the 
finger pattern (with online response time and 
accuracy feedback) until they gave their response. 
Participants said out loud the letter (a, b, or c) 
corresponding to their answer. Instructions stated 
there were no time limits. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Performance of the participants in Experiment 1A 
was used as a baseline to evaluate the impact of the 
WM-load. A control analysis established that the 
WM-capacity of the participants in Experiment 1A 
(Mean Gospan-score = 32.26, SD = 10.45) and 1B 
(Mean Gospan-score = 33.1, SD = 10.88) did not 
differ, F(1, 269) < 1.  
Burdening the executive resources with the 
tapping task affected participants’ performance. 
As Table 1 shows the response pattern was 
clearly not random. The switching rate under the 
secondary task load decreased to 0%. This 
decrease in the proportion of correct responses 
reached marginal significance, p1 = 5.22%, p2 = 
0%, n1 = 230, n2 = 41, t(269) = 1.50, p < .07, 
one-tailed. The finding supports the claim that 
correct normative reasoning in the MHD draws 
on executive WM-resources. Burdening the 
executive resources did not decrease the rate of 
“equal probability” answers. Indeed, there was a 
slight tendency in the opposite direction. This 
suggests that the central MHD intuition to assign 
a 50% chance to the two remaining doors is an 
automatic, heuristic response that does not  
 
Table 1: Percentage of Different Responses in 
Experiment 1A and 1B 
 Experiment 
Answer 1A: No load 1B: Load 
Stick 9.1 (21) 7.3 (3) 
Switch 5.2 (12) 0.0 (0) 
Equal 85.7 (197) 92.7 (38) 
Note. Raw frequencies in parentheses. 
 
involve executive processing.  
 
General Discussion 
 
The present study focused on the Monty Hall 
Dilemma because it is one of the most striking 
examples of the “normative/descriptive” gap in 
the literature (Friedman, 1998). As in previous 
MHD studies only a small proportion of 
participants gave the correct, normative 
switching response. However, Experiment 1A 
established that the participants that did give the 
correct response had a significantly larger 
working memory capacity. This finding 
complements the work of Stanovich and West 
(2000) on individual differences in executive 
resources with related reasoning tasks.  
According to the Stanovich and West (2000) 
framework and associated dual process theories 
(e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996) 
correct normative responding requires that an 
analytic, controlled reasoning process overrides 
prepotent heuristics. The inhibition of the 
heuristic system and the computations of the 
analytic system would draw on limited 
executive, working memory resources. The more 
resources that are available, the more likely that 
the analytic system will be successfully engaged 
and the correct response calculated. Experiment 
1B provided experimental evidence for this 
view. Burdening the executive resources with a 
secondary task while participants were solving 
the MHD tended to decrease the rate of correct, 
288
switching responses: Although the participants in 
Experiment 1A and 1B had comparable span sizes, 
non of the participants in Experiment 1B managed 
to solve the MHD correctly under WM-load. 
Indeed, more people tended to commit the intuitive 
tendency to assign a 50% chance to the two 
remaining doors. These findings support the basic 
claim of dual process theories concerning the 
differential involvement of executive resources in 
analytic and heuristic reasoning. 
As in most MHD-studies, the proportion of 
correct responses under “standard” conditions in the 
present study was very low. A consequence of this 
low figure is that the study inevitably suffers from a 
floor-effect. The decrease in correct performance 
under executive load in Experiment 1B still reached 
marginal significance but the decrease could never 
be large. One possible solution for the floor-effect 
is adopting some of the manipulations known to 
increase MHD performance. Previous studies 
indicated that practice with the task, training 
procedures and simple clarifications of the causal 
structure of the task (e.g., Burns & Wieth, 2000, 
2003; Krauss & Wang, 2003; Tubau & Alonso, 
2003) increase performance. Thus, testing the 
impact of the WM-load with such modified MHD 
versions might suffer less from a floor-effect. In 
addition, it might be especially enlightening to 
examine how different span groups benefit from the 
increased performance manipulations. 
The present findings indicate that executive 
resources are necessary for correct, normative 
reasoning. However, by no means this implies that 
a large resource pool is also sufficient for correct 
reasoning. The relation between WM-capacity and 
reasoning performance is not absolute. Although 
participants that solved the MHD correctly in 
Experiment 1A had a larger WM-span, numerous 
“high spans” nevertheless answered erroneously. 
To illustrate this point MHD-performance of 
participants in the top and bottom quartile of the 
WM-capacity distribution in Experiment 1A was 
compared. Consistent with the previous findings 
high spans gave significantly more switching 
responses2. But even among the 25% most 
cognitively gifted college students only 10% gave 
the correct response. Clearly, factors outside the 
cognitive WM-ability spectrum will also affect 
performance (e.g., “epistemic thinking 
dispositions”, see Stanovich, 1999). Thus, in 
pointing out the necessary role of executive, WM-
resources for correct reasoning the present study 
does not minimize the role of other mediating 
factors.  
The present study demonstrated the potential of a 
dual task approach to test the central processing 
claims of dual process theories. In principle, future 
                                                 
2 p1 = 10%, p2 = 1%, n1 =70, n2= 70, t(138) = 2.21, p  < 
.03. 
studies could adopt this procedure with all the 
classic tasks studied in the field (e.g., 
conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect, selection 
task). Of course, the final empirical evaluation of 
the executive processing claims of dual process 
theories will depend on the generalization of the 
present findings.  
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Abstract 
 
We examined whether individual differences in 
WM-capacity affected the acceptance of an extended 
MP problem that explicitly mentioned a possible 
disabler. The explicit disabler presentation was 
assumed to stimulate the spontaneous disabler search 
process. Two experiments showed that the 
acceptance ratings of the extended MP problems 
followed a U-shaped, quadratic trend with low and 
high spans showing the highest MP acceptance. 
Contrasting performance with extended and standard 
MP problems indicated that all span groups showed 
the standard suppression effect. Findings support the 
claim that high spans manage to inhibit the 
spontaneous disabler search and underline the 
generality and robustness of this inhibition 
phenomenon.  
Introduction 
 
Suppose that on a hot, summer day you hear 
someone claiming “If Jenny turns on the air 
conditioner, then she will feel cool”. Next, you hear 
that Jenny did turn the air conditioner on. It is likely 
that you will conclude that Jenny will feel cool. This 
inference (‘If P then Q. P. Therefore, Q’) is known 
as the Modus Ponens (MP). The MP inference is 
considered valid in standard logic. Now, suppose 
that you would also have been reminded of the fact 
that the air conditioner might be broken or that 
Jenny might have a fever. In this case you would 
probably have been rather reluctant to accept the 
standard MP inference that turning on the air 
conditioner will make Jenny feeling cool. Thereby, 
the additional information would have tempted you 
to commit a fallacy.  
Cognitive scientists have spent a great deal of 
research to establish how people reason with ‘if, 
then’ sentences or conditionals. One of the main 
findings is that additional, ‘background’ knowledge 
about the conditional relation affects the inferences 
people are willing to draw (Evans, Newstead, & 
Byrne, 1993; Manktelow, 1999). The crucial kind of 
background knowledge for the evaluation of the MP 
inference is referred to as ‘disabling conditions’. A 
disabling condition (also ‘disabler’ or ‘additional 
requirement’) is a condition that prevents the 
antecedent specified in the conditional (e.g., turning 
on the air conditioner or the P part) from bringing 
about the consequent (e.g., feeling cool or the Q 
part). In the introductory example a broken air 
conditioner or Jenny having a fever will both 
function as disablers.  
In a pioneering study Byrne (1989) showed that 
when a possible disabler was explicitly presented to 
participants (e.g., If she has an essay to write, then 
she will study late in the library. If the library is 
open, then she will study late in the library. She has 
an essay to write. Thus, she will study late in the 
library?) the MP inference was less frequently 
accepted compared to the standard MP condition 
without presented disabler. Further studies 
established that during conditional reasoning people 
spontaneously search their long-term memory for 
stored disablers. Cummins (1995) used causal 
conditionals for which a pilot group could retrieve 
many (e.g., If you put fertilizer on plants, then they 
grow well) or only few (e.g., If Tom grasps the glass 
with his bare hands, then his fingerprints are on it) 
disablers. Cummins reasoned that for conditionals 
with many (vs. few) disablers spontaneous retrieval 
of a disabler would be more likely. Although no 
specific disablers were explicitly presented, the 
results indeed showed that MP inferences based on 
conditionals with many disablers were rejected more 
frequently. Numerous studies confirmed these 
findings (e.g., Bonnefon & Hilton, 2002; Byrne, 
Espino, & Santamaria, 1999; Thompson, 1994; De 
Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2002; Stevenson & 
Over, 1995; George, 1997; see Politzer & 
Bourmaud, 2002 for a review). Thus, it is well 
established that finding a disabler (either 
spontaneously or presented by the experimenter) 
will result in a decreased MP acceptance. This 
impact of disablers on the MP inference acceptance 
is known as the suppression effect. 
In the present study we present the first 
experiments that look at individual differences in the 
suppression impact. More precisely, we will 
examine whether differences in working memory 
(WM) capacity affect the acceptance of MP 
problems when a possible disabler is explicitly 
presented. Such WM-mediation could be expected 
on the basis of recent findings pointing to the role of 
WM in the retrieval and inhibition of stored 
disablers (e.g., De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 
2003a, 2003b; Markovits, Doyon, & Simoneau, 
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2002; Simoneau & Markovits, 2003; Verschueren, 
De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2002).  
De Neys et al. (2003a) and Verschueren et al. 
(2002) established that the efficiency of the disabler 
retrieval process is mediated by WM-capacity. In a 
task where people were asked to generate disablers 
for a set of conditionals in limited time, participants 
higher in WM-capacity retrieved more disablers. 
Putting a load on WM also reduced the efficiency of 
the retrieval process. In a further experiment, De 
Neys et al. (2003b) tested a group of low, medium, 
and high spans (participants in the bottom, middle 
and top quintile of first-year psychology students’ 
WM-capacity distribution, respectively) in an 
everyday conditional reasoning task. Consistent with 
the more efficient disabler retrieval, medium spans 
were more likely to reject the MP inference than low 
spans. On the other hand, despite the intrinsic 
superior retrieval capacity high spans showed 
nevertheless higher MP acceptance ratings than the 
medium spans (see also Markovits et al., 2002).  
Based on findings of Stanovich and West (2000), 
it was assumed that a basic decontextualization 
ability would allow high spans to put background 
knowledge aside when it conflicts with the logical 
standards. Remember that in standard logic MP is a 
valid inference. Since disabler retrieval will result in 
the rejection of MP, a basic validity notion will 
conflict with the disabler retrieval process. De Neys 
et al. reasoned that high spans would therefore use 
their WM-resources for an active inhibition of the 
disabler search.  
Simoneau and Markovits (2003) showed that more 
efficient inhibitory processing (as measured by a 
negative priming task) was indeed linked with 
higher MP acceptance. In a related dual-task study 
De Neys et al. found additional support for the 
inhibition hypothesis. The basic assumption states 
that lower spans allocate WM-capacity to the 
disabler retrieval, while high spans allocate WM-
capacity primordially to the retrieval inhibition. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the dual-task study 
showed that a less efficient disabler retrieval under 
WM-load resulted in higher MP acceptance ratings 
under load (vs. no load) for low spans, while the less 
efficient inhibition resulted in lower MP ratings 
under load (vs. no load) for high spans.  
 In sum, there is evidence for the claim that high 
spans are inhibiting the disabler retrieval process 
during conditional reasoning. Inhibition of cognitive 
processes deemed inappropriate is indeed one of the 
key executive working memory functions (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1996; Levy & Anderson, 2002; Miyake & 
Shah, 1999).  
 The present study will allow a further test of the 
disabler inhibition hypothesis. Presenting extended 
MP problems where a possible disabler is explicitly 
mentioned will push the inhibition demands to the 
limit. The explicit disabler presentation will 
stimulate the search process. Note that one of the 
difficulties of retrieving disablers in a reasoning task 
is that there is no explicit retrieval cue (e.g., 
Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002; Markovits & Quinn, 
2002). The standard MP premises do not tell you 
what kind of information you should look for. If a 
possible disabler is added, it will be incorporated in 
the elementary mental representation of the 
inference problem. It is assumed that this 
representation is held in working memory. As 
suggested by many authors, activation will 
automatically start to spread from the information 
stored in WM (or “the focus of attention” see 
Cowan, 1995) to related long-term memory elements 
(Anderson, 1993; Cowan, 1995; see also Markovits 
& Barrouillet, 2002 for an integrated account). 
Therefore, stored disablers will receive more 
activation by the explicit presentation of a possible 
disabler with the MP inference. Consequently, it will 
be more likely that additional stored disablers will 
be automatically retrieved.  
In Experiment 1 participants were given a measure 
of WM-capacity and extended MP problems that 
mentioned a possible disabler. If the high spans still 
manage to inhibit the stimulated disabler search we 
expect to see a U-shaped, quadratic trend in the 
acceptance ratings in function of WM-capacity. Low 
spans were expected to show high MP acceptance 
ratings because of the inefficient disabler retrieval. 
Medium spans should show lower MP ratings 
because the search will be more efficient. If high 
spans still manage to inhibit the disabler retrieval, 
acceptance ratings should increase again for the high 
spans.  
In Experiment 2 we compared the acceptance 
ratings of standard and extended MP problems for 
different WM-span groups.  
Experiment 1 
 
M ethod 
Participants 
A total of 105 first-year psychology students from 
the University of Leuven (Belgium) participated in 
the experiment in return for course credit. None of 
the students had had any training in formal logic. 
 
Material 
Working memory task. Participants’ working 
memory capacity was measured using a version of 
the Operation span task (Ospan, La Pointe & Engle, 
1990) adapted for group testing (Gospan, for details 
see De Neys, d’Ydewalle, Schaeken, & Vos, 2002). 
In the Ospan-task participants solve series of simple 
mathematical operations while attempting to 
remember a list of unrelated words The main 
adaptation in the Gospan is that the operation from 
an operation-word pair is first presented separately 
on screen (e.g., ‘IS (4/2) – 1 = 5 ?’). Participants 
read the operation silently and press a key to indicate 
whether the answer is correct or not. Responses and 
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response latencies are recorded. After the participant 
has typed down the response, the corresponding 
word (e.g., ‘BALL’) from the operation-word string 
is presented for 800 ms. As in the standard Ospan 
three sets of each length (from two to six operation-
word pairs) are tested and set size varies in the same 
randomly chosen order for each participant. The 
Gospan-score is the sum of the recalled words for all 
sets recalled completely and in correct order.  
 Participants were tested in groups of 21 to 48 at 
the same time. Participants who made more than 
15% math errors or whose mean operation response 
latencies deviated by more than 2.5 standard 
deviations of the sample mean were discarded 
(participants already in the bottom quartile of the 
Gospan-score distribution were not discarded based 
on the latency criterion). De Neys, d’Ydewalle et al. 
(2002) reported an internal reliability coefficient 
alpha of .74 for the Gospan. The corrected 
correlation between standard Ospan and Gospan-
score reached .70. 
 
Reasoning task. Participants received three extended 
MP problems. These were Dutch translations of the 
three Byrne (1989) MP problems (see Dieussaert, 
Schaeken, Schroyens, & d’Ydewalle, 2000). The 
following item format was used: 
 
Rule: If she has an essay to write, then she will stay  
  late in the library. 
         If the library stays open, then she will stay late in  
         the library. 
Fact: She has an essay to write 
Conclusion: She will stay late in the library. 
 
All three MP problems were presented on a separate 
page of a booklet together with a 7-point rating scale 
ranging from 1 (Very certain that I cannot draw this 
conclusion) to 7 (Very certain that I can draw this 
conclusion) with 4 representing can’t tell. 
Participants placed a mark on the number of the 
scale that best reflected their evaluation of the 
conclusion.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of 21 to 42 at the 
same time in a large computer room with an 
individual booth for every participant. All 
participants started with the Gospan task that was 
run on computer. After all participants of a group 
had finished the Gospan-task the extended MP 
evaluation task was presented. The three items were 
presented on separate pages of a booklet. The first 
page of the booklet included the task instructions. 
They showed an example item that explained the 
specific task format. Participants were told that the 
task was to decide whether or not they could accept 
the conclusions. Care was taken to make sure 
participants understood the precise nature of the 
rating scale. The task instructions did not mention to 
accept the premises as true or to endorse conclusions 
that follow necessarily. Instead participants were 
told they could evaluate the conclusions by the 
criteria they personally judged relevant (see 
Cummins, 1995). 
 
R esults and discussion 
Rejection probability for all reported statistical 
analyses was .05. For completeness, we always 
report the individual estimated p-values. 
 Three participants were discarded because they 
did not meet the operation correctness or latency 
requirements of the WM-task (see De Neys, 
d’Ydewalle et al., 2002). The remaining 102 
participants were split in three span groups of equal 
n based on the boundaries of the Gospan-score 
distribution. Mean Gospan-score for the three 
successive span groups was 23.27 (SD = 4.34, low 
span), 35.15 (SD = 2.79, medium span), and 45.89 
(SD = 4.97, high span).  
 For every participant we calculated the mean 
acceptance rating for the three extended MP 
problems. The means were subjected to an ANOVA 
with span group as between-subject variable. There 
was a significant effect of span group, F(2, 99) = 
5.55, MSE = 1.23, p < .01. The acceptance rating 
showed the expected pattern: Medium spans (M = 
3.84, SD = 4.67) showed lower MP acceptance 
ratings than the low (M = 4.56, SD = 1.11) and high 
spans (M = 4.67, SD = .99). A trend analysis 
confirmed that there was a significant U-shaped, 
quadratic trend, F(1, 99) = 10.85, MSE = 1.23, p < 
.005 without mediation of a linear trend, F(1, 99) < 
1.  
 Thus, even when the disabler search was 
specifically stimulated high spans showed the 
highest levels of MP acceptance. This is consistent 
with the claim that high spans are inhibiting the 
disabler search and underlines the generality and 
robustness of the inhibition phenomenon.  
Experiment 2 
 
The first experiment showed that the acceptance 
ratings for the extended MP problems differed for 
participants of different WM-capacity. In 
Experiment 2 we compare the acceptance ratings of 
standard vs. extended MP problems in function of 
WM-span. This allows us to establish the impact of 
the explicit disabler presentation per se. For the 
validity of our framework it is crucial that the 
acceptance ratings decrease when a disabler is 
explicitly presented.  
 First, for low spans it is assumed that the disabler 
search with standard MP problems will not be very 
successful. Although low spans’ limited resources 
will restrict the impact of the extra search 
stimulation, the extended disabler manipulation does 
present low spans a disabler they will probably not 
retrieve in the standard condition. Therefore, low 
spans’ inference acceptance should decrease for the 
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extended MP problems. Second, because of the more 
efficient retrieval, medium spans in the standard 
condition will probably retrieve the disabler 
presented in the extended MP condition themselves. 
Hence, the mere presentation of the disabler should 
not affect medium spans. Nevertheless, if we are 
right that the search process is stimulated by the 
disabler presentation one should expect that 
additional disablers will be retrieved in the extended 
condition and this should further decrease the MP 
acceptance (see De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 
2003c, for a study on the effect of the number of 
retrieved disablers on MP acceptance). High spans 
are expected to inhibit the search both for the 
standard and extended problems. However, it is 
explicitly assumed that the inhibition is not 
automatic, but draws on WM-resources. Therefore, 
the inhibition should be less successful when the 
process is more demanding. De Neys et al. (2003a) 
already observed that the increasing inhibition 
demands caused by an increasing number of 
available disablers resulted in a less efficient 
disabler inhibition. Hence, although the high spans 
should overall show a high MP acceptance, their 
acceptance level should nevertheless be affected by 
the stimulated disabler search.  
 In sum, we expected a standard suppression effect 
for all span groups: Acceptance ratings should be 
lower for the extended (vs. standard) MP problems. 
In addition, overall  MP acceptance ratings should 
be affected by WM-span: Extended and standard MP 
acceptance in the successive span groups should 
follow the U-shaped trend observed in Experiment 
1. 
 
M ethod 
Design 
As standard condition or baseline we used the MP 
evaluations of the 282 participants in the study of De 
Neys et al. (2003b). In this study participants were 
presented a standard conditional inference task with 
causal conditionals and a measure of WM-capacity. 
We calculated the mean MP acceptance for different 
span groups and used this as a baseline to compare 
the MP acceptance of matched span groups with 
similar extended causal MP problems. 
 
Participants 
All 105 participants of Experiment 1 evaluated the 
extended MP inferences in the present experiment. 
The data for the standard MP condition were taken 
from the study of De Neys et al. (2003b) where 282 
first-year psychology students evaluated standard 
conditional inferences. 
 
Material 
Working memory task. All participants’ working 
memory capacity was measured with the Gospan-
task (see De Neys, d’Ydewalle et al., 2002). 
 
Reasoning tasks. All conditionals were selected from 
the generation studies of De Neys et al. (2002) and 
Verschueren et al. (2002). Eight causal conditionals 
were used for the standard condition and six causal 
conditionals for the extended condition. Half of the 
conditionals in each condition were previously 
classified as having many possible disablers, while 
the other half had only few possible disablers. The 
number of possible alternative causes (see Cummins, 
1995) of the selected conditionals with few and 
many disablers was kept constant. The item format 
for the extended and standard task was similar to the 
format used in Experiment 1, except that for the 
extended items a possible disabler was mentioned. 
We always presented the disabler that was most 
frequently generated for that conditional in the 
generation task (e.g., see De Neys et al., 2002). As 
in Byrne (1989) the disablers (e.g., engine broken) 
were always presented as an additional requirement, 
embedded in a conditional (e.g., If the engine works, 
then the car starts). This resulted in the following 
format: 
 
 Rule: If the ignition key is turned, then the car starts. 
 If the engine works, then the car starts. 
Fact: The ignition key is turned. 
Conclusion: The car starts. 
 
 It should be noted that the set of conditionals in 
the standard and extended condition was not 
completely similar. Although both conditions used 
causal conditionals with a comparable number of 
possible disablers, the standard condition should 
therefore not be conceived as a control condition per 
se. Rather, the standard condition serves as a 
baseline against which the performance of the 
different WM-span groups can be compared.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of 21 to 48 at the 
same time in a large computer room with an 
individual booth for every participant. All 
participants started with the Gospan task that was 
run on computer. After all participants of the group 
had finished the Gospan-task the extended MP 
evaluation task or the standard conditional inference 
task was presented. The standard task was run on 
computer. Participants evaluated eight standard MP 
inferences mixed with other conditional inferences. 
The six items of the extended MP task were 
presented on separate pages of a booklet. This 
booklet was presented before the booklet with the 
items of Experiment 1. Task instructions for the 
standard and extended MP task were similar to the 
instructions given in Experiment 1. 
 
R esults and discussion 
In order to match the span groups in the extended 
and standard conditions as closely as possible we 
decided to split both samples up in five span groups 
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each, based on the quintile boundaries of the 
Gospan-score distribution of the 282 participants in 
the standard condition. A 5 (span group, between-
subjects) x 2 (MP task, between-subjects) ANOVA 
on the Gospan-scores established that there were no 
WM-capacity differences for participants in both 
task conditions [effect of MP task, F(1, 374) < 1; 
interaction MP task x Span-group, F(4, 374) = 1.84, 
MSE = 10.91]. 
 Each participant evaluated eight or six MP 
evaluations. The mean of these ratings was 
calculated and subjected to a 5 (WM-span, between-
subjects) x 2 (MP task, between-subjects) ANOVA.  
 
Figure 1. Mean MP acceptance rating in function of 
WM-capacity with (extended) and without 
(standard) explicitly presented disabler. The rating 
scale ranged from 1 (very sure cannot draw this 
conclusion) to 7 (very sure can draw this 
conclusion). 
 
 Explicitly presenting a disabler clearly decreased 
the MP acceptance, F(4, 374) = 37.56, MSE = .72, p 
< .0001. Figure 1 shows that, as expected, this effect 
was present for all WM-span groups, span group x 
MP task interaction, F(4, 374) < 1. There was also a 
marginal main effect of WM-span, F(4, 374) = 2.28, 
MSE = .72, p < .06. As Figure 1 indicates, a trend 
analysis clearly established that the MP ratings 
followed a U-shaped, quadratic trend in function of 
WM-span, F(1, 374) = 6.77, MSE = .72, p < .01. 
There was no sign of a linear trend, F(1, 374) < 1, 
and the quadratic trend did not differ for the standard 
and extended MP problems, F(1, 374) = 1.07, MSE 
= .71, p > .35. Thus, as expected, all span groups 
showed an impact of the explicit disabler 
presentation, but both on the standard and extended 
problems the MP acceptance ratings were affected 
by WM-capacity.  
 Finally, one might note that the number of 
disablers of the adopted conditionals in the present 
experiment varied systematically (e.g., half of the 
conditionals had few vs. many possible disablers). 
We had no specific hypotheses concerning the 
impact of this factor on the manipulations. For 
completeness, the variable was entered as a within-
subjects factor in the ANOVA. We replicated the 
traditional (e.g., Cummins, 1995) main effect of the 
number factor: MP acceptance was always lower for 
conditionals with many disablers than for 
conditionals with few disablers, F(1, 374) = 139.40, 
MSE = .51, p < .0001. However, none of the 
interactions with the other factors reached 
significance. Thus, the crucial effects of span group 
and the explicit disabler presentation were not 
affected by the number factor.  
 
General Discussion 
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The two experiments clearly established that even 
when a disabler is explicitly presented MP 
acceptance ratings of the successive working 
memory (WM)-span groups follow a U-shaped 
trend. Previous studies already suggested that the 
higher MP acceptance ratings of high vs. medium 
spans, despite high spans’ superior retrieval 
capacities, result from an active inhibition of the 
disabler search. The fact that in the present study the 
same pattern is found under conditions that can be 
assumed to stimulate the search process points to the 
robustness and generality of the inhibition 
phenomenon.  
 As De Neys et al. (2003a, 2003b) we hypothesized 
that the disabler inhibition is not occurring in a 
cognitive vacuum but draws on working memory 
resources. Therefore, higher inhibition requirements 
were expected to result in a less efficient inhibition 
process. The goal of the search stimulation by the 
explicit disabler presentation was precisely to 
increase the inhibition demands. Disablers that 
would be inhibited under less demanding inhibition 
conditions could ‘slip through’ the filter and 
decrease the MP acceptance. Consistent with these 
hypotheses Experiment 2 clearly showed that even 
high spans’ MP acceptance decreased for the 
extended MP problems.  
 The present findings have implications for 
traditional suppression studies. The results indicate 
that Byrne’s (1989) findings can be generalized over 
the whole WM-capacity distribution: For all WM-
span groups MP acceptance decreased when a 
possible disabler was explicitly presented. Thus, all 
WM-span groups show the basic suppression effect. 
However, it is important to note that the final 
acceptance level is systematically affected by WM-
capacity: Reasoners with an inefficient disabler 
retrieval and reasoners that inhibit the retrieval show 
the highest levels of MP acceptance. These people 
will be typically situated in the bottom and top levels 
of the WM-capacity distribution, respectively. 
Reasoner that can allocate sufficient resources to the 
retrieval and do not inhibit the search process, 
typically people with medium sized WM-span, will 
be most likely to reject MP. These findings further 
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emphasize the role of WM-capacity in the retrieval 
and inhibition of disablers during conditional 
reasoning. 
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Abstract
A computational  model  of  children's  semantic  memory  is
built  from  the  Latent  Semantic  Analysis  (LSA)  of  a
multisource  child  corpus.  Three  tests  of  the  model  are
described,  simulating a  vocabulary  test,  an  association  test
and a recall task. For each one, results from experiments with
children  are  presented  and  compared  to  the  model  data.
Adequacy  is  correct,  which  means  that  this  simulation  of
children's semantic memory can be used to simulate a variety
of children's cognitive processes.
Introduction
Models of human language processing are usually based on
a layer of basic semantic representations on top of which
cognitive  processes  are  described.  For  instance,  the
construction-integration  model  (Kintsch,  1998)  describes
processes that operate on a network of propositions. These
basic  representations can just be descriptions  of  what  the
human memory looks like, in order for the upper models to
be explicitly stated, but they can also be operationalized so
that the model can be tested on a computer. In the first case,
these representations are usually designed by hand, but this
method prevents large-scale simulations. 
This was the case with Kintsch's construction-integration
model  until  1998.  Before  that,  researchers  had  to  code
propositions by hand and guess relevant values to code the
strength of links between nodes. Then Kintsch (1998) used
the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) model (Deerwester et
al., 1990; Landauer et al., 1998) which provides a way to
automatically build these basic representations. This was a
major  step  since  the  construction-integration  processes
could then be tested on a large variety of inputs, while being
less dependent on idiosyncratic codings. Such a mechanism
for  automatically  constructing  basic  semantic  represen-
tations should be carefully designed and tested in order to
simulate as good as possible human semantic memory.
LSA is  nowadays  considered  as  a  good  candidate  for
modeling  an  adult  semantic  memory  based  on  a  large
corpora  of  representative  texts:  Bellissens  et  al.  (2002),
Kintsch (2000) and Lemaire & Bianco (2003) used it for
modeling metaphor comprehension; Pariollaud et al. (2002)
used  it  for  modeling  the  comprehension  of  idiomatic
expressions; Howard & Kahana (2002) relied on it to model
free recall and episodic memory retrieval; Laham (1997) did
the same for  modeling  categorization processes; Landauer
&  Dumais  (1997)  designed  a  model  of  vocabulary
acquisition  based  on  LSA;  Lemaire  &  Dessus  (2001),
Rehder et al.  (1998)  and Wolfe  et  al.  (1998) used it  for
modeling  knowledge  assessment;  Quesada  et  al.  (2001)
modeled complex problem solving by means of LSA basic
representations;  Wolfe  &  Goldman  (2003)  worked  on  a
model of reasoning about historical accounts based on LSA.
However,  to  our  knowledge,  no  computational  basic
representations  were  made  that  mimic  full  children's
semantic memory.
This  paper  aims  at  presenting such  a  model.  First,  we
present  LSA.  We  then  describe  our  corpus,  which  is
supposed to mimic the kind of texts children are exposed to.
Finally,  we  present  three  experiments  which  aim  at
validating the model. 
Latent Semantic Analysis
Basic semantic representations
There  are  many  ways  of  constructing  basic  semantic
representations that can be processed by a computer. The
first one is to build them by hand. Powerful formalisms like
description  logic  (Borgida,  1996)  or  semantic  networks
(Sowa, 1991) have been designed to accurately represent
concepts,  properties  and  relations.  However,  in  spite  of
huge efforts (Lenat, 1995), no full set of symbolic represen-
tations has been made that can be considered a reasonable
model of human semantic memory. Hand-coding semantic
information is tedious and, as we mention later,  symbolic
representations might not be the best formalism for that.
Another strategy is to rely on corpora to get the semantic
information.  Artificial  intelligence  researchers  have
designed  sophisticated  syntactic  processing  tools  for
automatically describing the  knowledge using the kind of
symbolic formalisms mentioned earlier. They usually refer
to them as ontologies or knowledge bases (Vossen, 2003).
However, in spite of great strides, this approach still cannot
be the means to form the basic semantic representations that
cognitive  researchers  need.  First,  it  cannot  be  fully
automatized,  except  for specific domains,  thus  preventing
complete  descriptions  of  the  language.  Second  and  quite
paradoxically, since the descriptions are quite elaborated, it
is very hard to design reasoning processes on top of them.
For instance, a simple process like estimating the degree of
semantic  association  is  very  hard  to  operationalize  on
complex structures like semantic networks. 
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Instead  of  relying  on  symbolic  representations,  a  third
approach  consists  in  (1)  analyzing  the  co-occurrence  of
words in large corpora in order to draw semantic similarities
and  (2)  relying  on  very  simple  structures,  namely  high-
dimensional  vectors,  to  represent  meanings.  In  this
approach, the unit is the word. The meaning of a word is not
defined per  se,  but  rather  determined by its relationships
with  all  others.  For  instance,  instead  of  defining  the
meaning of bicycle in an absolute manner (by its properties,
function, role, etc.), it is defined by its degree of association
to other words (i.e., very close to bike, close to pedals, ride,
wheel,  but  far  from  duck,  eat,  etc.).  This  semantic
information can be established from raw texts, provided that
enough  input  is  available.  This  is  exactly  what  human
people do: it seems that most of the words we know, we
learn by reading (Landauer & Dumais, 1997). The reason is
that most words appear almost only in written form and that
direct instruction seems to play a limited role. Therefore, we
would learn the meaning of words mainly from raw texts,
by  mentally  constructing  their  meaning  through  repeated
exposure to appropriate contexts.
Relying on direct co-occurrence
One way to mimic this powerful mechanism would be to
rely on direct co-occurrences within a given context unit. A
usual unit is the paragraph which is both computationally
easy to identify and of reasonable size. We would say that:
R1: words are similar if they occur in the same paragraphs.
Therefore, we would count the  number of occurrences of
each  word  in  each  paragraph.  Suppose  we  use  a  5,000-
paragraph  corpus.  Each  word  would  be  represented  by
5,000  values,  that  is  by  a  5,000  dimension  vector.  For
instance:
avalanche: (0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,2,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0…)
snow:    (0,2,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,2,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0…)
This means that the word avalanche appears once in the 2nd
paragraph, once in 7th, twice in the 9th, etc. One could see
that, given the previous rule, both words are quite similar:
they co-occur quite often. A simple cosine between the two
vectors can measure the degree of similarity. However, this
rule does not work well (Perfetti,  1998; Landauer, 2002):
two words should be considered similar even if they do not
co-occur.  French  & Labiouse  (2002)  think  that  this  rule
might still work for synonyms because writers tend not to
repeat words, but use synonyms instead. However, defining
semantic  similarity  only  from  direct  co-occurrence  is
probably a serious restriction.
Relying on higher-order co-occurrence
Therefore, another rule would be:
R1*: words are similar if they occur in similar paragraphs.
This  is  a  much  better  rule.  Consider  the  following  two
paragraphs:
Bicycling is a very pleasant sport. It helps keeping a good
health.
For your fitness, you can practice bike. It is very nice and
good to your body.
Bicycling and  bike appear in similar paragraphs. If this is
repeated  over  a  large  corpus,  it  would  be  reasonable  to
consider  them similar, even if they never co-occur within
the  same  paragraph.  Now  we  need  to  define  paragraph
similarity.  We  could  say  that  two  paragraphs  would  be
similar if they share words, but that would be restrictive: as
illustrated in the previous example, two paragraphs should
be considered similar although they do not have words in
common  (functional  words  are  usually  not  taken  into
account). Therefore, the rule is:
R2: paragraphs are similar if they contain similar words.
Rules  1*  and  2  constitute  a  circularity,  but  this  can  be
solved by a specific mathematical procedure called singular
value  decomposition,  which  is  applied  to  the  occurrence
matrix. This is exactly what LSA does. To state it in other
words, LSA is not only based on direct co-occurrence, but
rather  on  higher-order  co-occurrence.  Kontostahis  &
Pottenger  (2002)  have  shown that  these  higher-order  co-
occurrences do appear in large corpora.
LSA  consists  in  reducing  the  huge  dimensionality  of
direct  word  co-occurrences to its  best  N dimensions.  All
words  are  then  represented  as  N-dimensional  vectors.
Empirical tests have shown that performance is maximal for
N  around  300  for  the  whole  general  English  language
(Landauer et al., 1998; Bellegarda, 2000) but this value can
be smaller  for  specific domains (Dumais, 2003).  We will
not describe the mathematical procedure which is presented
in  details  elsewhere  (Deerwester,  1990;  Landauer  et
al., 1998). The fact that word meanings are represented as
vectors  leads  to  two  consequences.  First,  it  is  straight-
forward to compute the semantic similarity between words,
which  is  usually  the  cosine  between  the  corresponding
vectors, although others similarity measures can  be  used.
Examples  of  semantic  similarities between  words  from a
12.6 million word corpus are (Landauer, 2002): 
cosine(doctor, physician) = .61
cosine(red, orange) = .64
Second, sentences or  texts can be assigned a vector, by a
simple weighted linear combination of their word vectors.
This is a powerful feature of a semantic representation to be
able  to  go  easily  from  words  to  texts.  An  example  of
semantic similarity between sentences is:
 cosine(the cat was lost in the forest, my little feline
disappeared in the trees) = .66
Modeling children's semantic memory
Semantic space
As we mentioned before, our goal was to rely on LSA to
define  a  reasonable  approximation  of  children's  semantic
memory. This is a necessary step for simulating a variety of
children cognitive processes.
LSA itself obviously cannot form such a model: it needs
to be  applied to a corpus. We gathered French texts that
approximately correspond to  what  a  child is  exposed  to:
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stories and tales for children (~1,6 million words), children's
productions (~800,000 words), reading textbooks (~400,000
words) and children's encyclopedia (~400,000 words). This
corpus is composed of 57,878 paragraphs for a total of 3.2
million word occurrences. All punctuation signs were ruled
out, capital letters were transformed to lower cases, dashes
were ruled out except when forming a composed word (like
tire-bouchon). This corpus was analyzed by means of LSA
and  the  occurrence  matrix  reduced  to  400  dimensions,
which appears to be an optimal value as we will see later.
The  resulting  semantic  space  contains  40,588  different
words. This step took 15 minutes on a 2.4 Ghz computer
with 2 Gb RAM. 
Tests
In  order  to  test  whether  this  semantic  space  can  be  an
acceptable  approximation  of  the  semantic  memory  of
children, we tested three features: its extent, its organization
and its  use. For each one, we relied on a specific task and
compared the data from the simulation of the task to data
obtained from children on the exact same task.
The  extent feature  has  to  do  with  the  size  of  lexical
knowledge.  Does  our  semantic  space  knows the  kind  of
words that a child knows? We used a vocabulary task for
that: given a word, the goal is to find the correct definition
from  four  of  them.  By  comparing  the  model  data  with
children's data at various ages, our goal is to approximately
identify the kind of children we are mimicking.
The  organization feature  concerns  the  way  words  are
associated to others in memory. Do we correctly mimic the
semantic  neighborhood  of  words?  The  task  we used  for
testing that feature is an association task :given a word, the
goal is to provide the most associated one. We will compare
children's association norms to association measures in the
semantic space. 
The use feature has to do with the way semantic memory
is used. Is our semantic space adequate enough so that it can
account for a process that uses it? We used a recall task for
studying the text  comprehension process which obviously
largely relies on semantic representations. 
These  three  experiments  cover  different  tasks  and
different  grain  sizes  of  language  entities,  from  words  to
texts: the first one consists of word comparisons, the second
one  compares  a  word  and  a  sentence  and  the  third  one
compares texts. We expect a good match between human
data and model data. In addition, we hypothesize that results
will  be  higher  with  our  children  corpus  than  with  adult
corpora.
Experiment 1
The first experiment, which aims at validating the model,
involves a vocabulary task. The design of  the material  as
well  as  the  experiments  with  children  were  realized  by
Denhière  et  al.  (in  preparation).  Material  consists of  120
questions,  each  one  composed  of  a  word  and  four
definitions:  the  correct  one,  a  close  definition,  a  far
definition and an unrelated definition. For instance, given
the  word  nourriture (food),  translations  of  the  four
definitions are:
- what is used to feed the body (correct);
- what can be eaten (close);
- matter which is being spoiled (far);
- letter exchange (unrelated).
Participants were asked to select what they thought was the
correct definition. This task was performed by four groups
of  children:  2nd grade,  3rd grade,  4th grade and  5th grade.
These  data  were  compared  with the  cosines  between  the
given word and each of the four definitions. For instance,
the  four  cosines  on  the  previous  examples  were:  .38
(correct),  .24  (close),  .16  (far)  and  .04  (unrelated).  116
questions  were  used  because  the  semantic  space  did  not
contain four rare words.
The first measure we used was the percentage of correct
answers.  Figure  1 displays  the  results.  The percentage of
correct answers is .53 for the model, which is exactly the
same value as the 2nd grade children. Except for unrelated
answers, the model data globally follow the same pattern as
the children's data. 
Figure 1: Percentage of answers for different types of
definitions
In order to compare our semantic spaces with adult semantic
spaces,  we  defined  a  measure  which  integrates  the  four
values.  We  used  a  d  measure,  which  is  a  normalized
difference  between  the  cosines  for  correct  and  close
definitions  together  and the  cosines for  far  and unrelated
definitions together. The higher this measure, the better the
result. Given a word W, four definitions (correct, close, far
and  unrelated)  and  a  global  standard  deviation  S,  the
formula is the following:
We also compared these results with several adult corpora,
in order to test whether our semantic space was specific to
children.  We  used  five  corpora:  a  literature  corpus,
composed of novels from the XIXth and XXth centuries and
four corpora from the French daily newspaper Le Monde, of
the years 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999. Table 1 shows the
results.
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Table 1: Comparison between children's semantic space
and adult semantic spaces
Semantic space Size (in
million words)
Percentage of
correct answers
d
Children 3.2 .53 .69
Literature 14.1 .38 .52
Le Monde 1993 19.3 .44 .23
Le Monde 1995 20.6 .37 .21
Le Monde 1997 24.7 .40 .28
Le Monde 1999 24.2 .34 .25
In accordance with the previous experiment, the children's
semantic  space has the  better  results,  although  its size  is
much smaller.  Student  tests have shown that the  children
semantic  space  is  significantly  different  from  others
(p < .05) except for the percentage of correct answers when
compared to the Le Monde 1993 corpus (p < .1).
Experiment 2
This  second  experiment  is  based  on  verbal  association
norms  published  by  de  La  Haye  (2003).  Two-hundred
inducing  words  (144  nouns,  28  verbs  and  28  adjectives)
were proposed to 9 to 11-year-old children. For each word,
participants had to provide the first word that came to their
mind. This resulted in a list of words, ranked by frequency.
For instance, given the word cartable (satchel), results are
the following for 9-year-old children:
- école (school): 51%
- sac (bag): 12%
- affaires (stuff): 6%
...
- classe (class): 1%
- sacoche (satchel): 1%
- vieux (old): 1%
This  means  that  51% of the children answered the  word
école (school) when given the word cartable (satchel). The
two words are therefore strongly associated for 9-year-old
children. These association values were compared with the
LSA cosine  between word vectors:  we selected  the  three
best-ranked words as well as the three worst-ranked (like in
the  previous  example).  We  then  measured  the  cosines
between the inducing word and the best ranked, the 2nd best-
ranked, the 3rd best ranked, and the mean cosine between the
inducing  word  and  the  three  worst-ranked.  Results  are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Mean cosine between inducing word and various
associated words for 9-years-old children
Words Mean cosine with inducing word
Best-ranked words .26
2nd best-ranked words .23
3rd best ranked-words .19
3 worst-ranked words .11
Student  tests  show  that  all  differences  are  significant
(p < .03). This means that  our semantic space is not only
able to distinguish between the strong and weak associates,
but can also discriminate the first-ranked from the second-
ranked and the latter from the third-ranked.
Measure of correlation with human data is also significant
(r(1184 =.39,  p<.001).  Actually,  two  factors  might  have
lowered this result. First, although we tried to mimic what a
child has been exposed to, we could not control all word
frequencies within the corpus. Therefore, some words might
have occurred with a low frequency in the corpus, leading
to an inaccurate semantic representation. When the previous
comparison  was  performed  on  the  20%  most  frequent
words,  the  correlation  was  much  higher  (r(234 =.57,
p<.001).
The  second  factor  is  the  participant  agreement:  when
most children provide the same answer to an inducing word,
there is a high agreement, which means that both words are
very  strongly  associated.  However,  there  are  cases  when
there  is  almost  no agreement:  for  instance the  three  first
answers to the word bruit (noise) are crier (to shout) (9%),
entendre (to hear) (7%) and silence (silence) (6%). It is not
surprising that the model corresponds better to the children
data in case of a high agreement, since this denotes a strong
association that should be reflected in the corpus. In order to
select answers whose agreement was higher, we measured
their entropy. The formula is the following:
A low entropy corresponds to a high agreement and vice
versa.  When  we  selected  the  20% items with the  lowest
entropy, the correlation also raises (r(234)=.48, p<.001).
All these results show that the association degree between
words defined by the cosine measure  within the semantic
space  seems  to  correspond  quite  well  to  children's
judgement of association.
We also compared these results with the previous adult
semantic spaces. Results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Correlations between participant child data and
different kinds of semantic spaces
Semantic space Size (in million
words)
Correlation with
child data
Children 3.2 .39
Literature 14.1 .34
Le Monde 1993 19.3 .31
Le Monde 1995 20.6 .26
Le Monde 1997 24.7 .26
Le Monde 1999 24.2 .24
In  spite  of  much  larger  sizes,  all  adult  semantic  spaces
correlate worse than the children's semantic space with the
data of the participants in the study. Statistical tests show
that all differences between the child model and the other
semantic spaces are significant (p<.03). 
Experiment 3
The third experiment is based on recall or summary tasks.
Children were asked to read a text and write out as much as
they could recall, immediately after reading or after a fixed
entropy   item 
answer
freq   answer  . log   1
freq   answer 

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delay. We used 7 texts. We tested the ability of the semantic
representations  to  estimate  the  amount  of  knowledge
recalled. This amount is classically estimated by means of a
propositional  analysis:  first,  the  text  as  well  as  the
participant production are coded as propositions. Then, the
number of text propositions that occur in the production is
calculated.  This  measure  is  a  good  estimate  of  the
knowledge  recalled.  Using  our  semantic  memory  model,
this  is  accounted  for  by  the  cosine  between  the  vector
representing  the  text  and  the  vector  representing  the
participant production.
Table  4  displays  all  correlations  between  these  two
measures. They range from .45 to .92, which means that the
LSA cosine applied to  our children's  semantic space is a
good estimate of the knowledge recalled.
Table 4: Correlations between LSA cosines and number
of propositions recalled for different texts.
Story Task Number of
participants
Correlations
Poule Immediate recall 52 .45
Dragon Delayed recall 44 .55
Dragon Summary 56 .71
Araignée Immediate recall 41 .65
Clown Immediate recall 56 .67
Clown Summary 24 .92
Ourson Immediate recall 44 .62
Taureau Delayed recall 23 .69
Géant Summary 105 .58
In an experiment with adults, Foltz et al. (1996) have shown
that LSA measures can be used to predict comprehension.
Besides  validating  our  model  of  semantic  memory,  this
experiment shows that an appropriate semantic space can be
used to assess text comprehension in a much faster way than
propositional analysis, which is a very tedious task.
Conclusion
A model of the development of children's semantic
memory
Our model is not only a computational model of children's
semantic  memory,  but  of  its  development.  Other
computational  models  of  human  memory  have  been
developed but some of them are based on inputs that do not
correspond to what humans are exposed to. They are good
models  of  the  memory  itself,  but  not  of  the  way  it  is
mentally constructed. In order to be cognitively plausible,
models of the construction of semantic memory need to be
approximately based on the kind of input to humans. 
LSA is such model. Its performance is similar to those of
human people. It  needs an input of  a  few million words,
which  is  comparable  to  what  humans  are  exposed  to
(Landauer  &  Dumais,  1997).  On  the  contrary,  PMI-IR
(Turney,  2001)  is  a  good model  of  semantic  similarities,
even  better  than  LSA in  modeling  human  judgement  of
synonymy,  but  it  is  based  on  an  input  of  thousands  of
millions of words, since it relies on all the texts published
on the web. This is of course cognitively unplausible. HAL
(Burgess, 1998) is another model of human memory. It is
quite  similar  to  LSA  except  that  it  does  not  rely  on  a
dimension reduction step. It is currently based on a corpus
of 300 million words, which is closer to the human inputs
than  PMI-IR,  although  this  could  be  considered  quite
overestimated.
Further investigations
Our  semantic  space  provides  a  means  for  researchers
studying  children's  cognitive  processes  to  design  and
simulate  computational  models  on  top  of  these  basic
representations. In particular, computational models of text
comprehension  could  be  tested  using  the  basic  semantic
similarities that the space provides. It would also be possible
to  investigate  the  development  of  semantic  memory  by
looking  at  the  evolution  of  various  semantic  similarities
according to the size of the corpus in detail. In particular,
Landauer & Dumais (1997) claim that we learn the meaning
of a word through the exposition to texts that do not contain
it.  Our  semantic  space  gives  the  opportunity  to  test  this
assertion by checking the kind of paragraphs that cause an
increase of similarity through incremental exposure to the
corpus. 
Improvements
Our semantic space could be improved in many ways. Its
composition (50% stories, 25% production, 12.5% reading
textbooks, 12.5% encyclopedia) is very rough and work has
to be done to better know the amount and nature of texts
that children are exposed to. Several studies led us to think
that lemmatization could significantly improve the results,
especially for the French language that has so many forms
for some verbs. We did perform the previous experiments
on  a  lemmatized  version  of  the  corpus  (using  the  Brill
tagger on the  French  files  developed  by ATILF,  and  the
Flemm  lemmatizer  written  by  Fiametta  Namer).  Results
were worse than with the non-lemmatized version. In order
to know more about this surprising result, we distinguished
between  verbs  and  nouns.  We  found  that  the  overall
decrease  is mainly due to a  decrease  for  the  nouns.  One
reason could be that the singular and plural forms of a noun
are not arguments of the same predicates. For instance, the
word vague (wave) is generally used in its plural form in the
context of the sea, but more frequently in the singular form
in its metaphorical meaning (a wave of success). Therefore,
if both forms are grouped into the same one, this affects the
co-occurrence  relations  and  modifies  the  semantic
representations.
Another way of  improvement  would have to  deal  with
syntax. LSA does not take any syntactic information into
account:  all  paragraphs  are  just  bags  of  words.  A slight
improvement would consist in considering a more precise
unit of context than a whole paragraph. A sliding context
window (like  in the HAL model for  instance) would take
into  account  the  local  context  of  each  word.  This  might
improve  the  semantic  representations,  while  being
cognitively  more  plausible.  We  are  working  in  that
direction.
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For  the  moment,  our  model  is  an  estimation.  We cannot
precisely identify to which age it corresponds. Our goal is to
stratify  it  so  that  we would  have a  model  for  each  age.
Developmental models would then be able to be simulated.
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Abstract 
People interpret noun-noun compounds like wind power by 
inferring a relational link between the compounds two 
constituent concepts. Various studies have examined how 
people select the best relation for a compound from a set of 
candidate relations. However, few studies have investigated 
how people learn such relations in the first place. This paper 
describes an experiment examining how people learn which 
relations are possible between concepts. Participants in this 
experiment learned artificial, laboratory controlled relations 
between pairs of items and then judged how likely those 
relations were for new pairs of items. The results showed that 
peoples judgement of relation likelihood was reliably 
influenced by the presence of facilitating features for relations 
and by the diagnosticity of features for relations. A simple 
exemplar-based model of classification, using both diagnostic 
and facilitating features, was applied to peoples judgements of 
relation likelihood. This model accurately predicted peoples 
judgements of relation likelihood in the experiment, using no 
free parameters to fit the data. 
Introduction 
When, in everyday discourse, people encounter noun-noun 
compounds such as mountain stream or lake boat, they 
interpret those compounds by inferring a relation that can be 
used to combine the two constituent concepts (inferring that a 
mountain stream is a stream that flows down a mountain, 
that a lake boat is a boat that sails on a lake). In theoretical 
accounts of conceptual combination, this process involves 
selecting the best relation for a compound from a set of 
candidate relations. Some theories give a standard set of 
candidate relations to be used in all compounds (Gagné & 
Shoben, 1997), while others derive candidate relations from 
the internal structure of the concepts being combined 
(Costello & Keane, 2000; Wisniewski, 1997). Many studies 
have investigated how people select the best relation for a 
given compound (e.g. Costello & Keane, 2001, Wisniewski, 
1996). However, there have been very few studies 
investigating how people learn and form these relations in the 
first place. In this paper we aim to fill this gap. 
The paper describes an experiment investigating how 
people learn relations between two sets of novel concepts. In 
the experiment we designed four different relations that could 
hold between artificial, laboratory-generated beetle and 
plant concepts. Participants learned these relations from sets 
of examples, with each example showing one sort of relation 
holding between one type of plant and one type of beetle. 
After learning, participants were shown new pairs of plants 
and beetles, and asked to say which of the four learned 
relations could hold between those two items. 
This experiment was designed to examine two different 
possible factors in peoples learning of relations between 
concepts: the presence of diagnostic features for those 
relations, and the presence of facilitating features. By 
diagnostic features for a relation we mean features of a 
constituent concept that are strongly associated with a 
particular relation. Diagnostic features are most familiar in 
the case of single concepts: for example has four legs and 
is made of wood are diagnostic features for the single 
concept chair: most things that are chairs have those features, 
and most things that are not chairs do not. Similarly, the 
feature has a flat surface raised off the ground might be 
diagnostic for the relation is-sat-on-by: most instances of the 
is-sat-on-by relation have that feature; most instances of other 
relations do not. In the experiment we asked whether people 
would use the diagnostic features for relations when selecting 
likely relations for beetle-plant pairs.  
By facilitating features we mean the features of a pair of 
concepts that are necessary for a given relation to be possible, 
and without which that relation cannot hold. For example, 
while the compound steel chair can easily be interpreted 
using the made-of relation, the compound kitchen chair 
cannot possibly be interpreted as a chair made of kitchens 
simply because kitchens are not a type of substance. Being a 
substance is a necessary facilitating feature for an item to take 
part in the made-of relation. Again, in the experiment we 
asked how people would use such facilitating features when 
selecting likely relations for beetle-plant pairs. 
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we 
discuss the representation of relations in terms of sets of 
examples, as used in our experiment. We then describe the 
experiment in detail. To foreshadow the results, we found that 
both diagnostic and facilitating features had a reliable 
influence on peoples selection of likely relations for pairs of 
items. We then describe how an exemplar-based model of 
concept conjunction (Costello, 2000, 2001) can be applied to 
the results of this experiment, giving a close fit to peoples 
judgements of relation likelihood. Finally, we conclude by 
discussing the implications of our findings for theories of 
conceptual combination.  
Learning Relations from Exemplars 
Our primary assumption is that the relations selected during 
conceptual combination are essentially categories, just as the 
concepts that they link are essentially categories. We use an 
exemplar representation to describe these relational 
categories. Exemplar theories of classification, which propose 
that a category is represented as the set of remembered 
instances of that category and that new items are classified on 
the basis of their similarity to those instances (e.g. Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984), have successfully accounted 
for a number of patterns seen in peoples learning of single 
categories. We extend the exemplar approach to allow both 
relations and the concepts that they link to be represented by 
sets of instances. 
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In a category representing a single concept, each exemplar 
consists simply of a single set of features. For a category 
representing a relation, however, each exemplar consists of 
two sets of features: the features of the two single-category 
exemplars that are being linked by that relation. For example, 
suppose we have two categories A and B consisting of the set 
of exemplars {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6} and {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5} 
respectively. Each category represents a single concept, and 
each exemplar contains features describing one example of 
that concept. We can compute the membership of a given 
item in category A, for example, by comparing that item to 
the set of stored exemplars of category A. Then a relation R 
linking the concepts A and B might be represented as the set 
of exemplars of that relation, for example {(a1, b1), (a1, b2), 
(a3, b3), (a4, b4), (a4, b5)}. Regarding R as a category, we can 
compute the membership of any pair of items (x, y) in the 
relation R by comparing that pair to the set of exemplars of 
that relation. If more than one relation is defined, we can 
compute membership in each of the relations and make 
assertions about which relation the given pair of items is most 
likely to belong to. 
This representation of relations in terms of a collection of 
pairs of category exemplars is motivated by how 
mathematical relations are defined in set theory. In set theory, 
binary relations are defined as sets of ordered pairs. To take a 
well-known example, the is equal to relation is a set 
denoted by =, and is defined on the integers to be the set {, 
(-1, -1), (0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 2), }. Thus the is equal to 
relation holds between two integers x and y if and only if the 
ordered pair (x, y) is a member of the set denoted =. We 
extend this set-theoretic idea of relations and propose that a 
relation between two concepts can be represented as a set of 
relation exemplars, where each of these relation exemplars is 
an ordered pair of category exemplars. Membership of a pair 
of items in a relational category is then computed by 
comparing that pair of items to the stored exemplars of that 
relational category, as is precisely the case for exemplar 
models of simple categories. 
This approach assumes that when people are selecting the 
correct relation for a pair of items they may be performing a 
classification task in which they compare that pair of items to 
various sets of relation exemplars. What factors would we 
expect people to be influenced by in such a classification 
task? First, we would expect people pay attention to the 
features in items that are diagnostic for particular relations 
(that is, features that are present in most of the items that take 
part in the relation, and absent in most items that do not take 
part in the relation). If a particular feature is diagnostic for a 
relation, people should use that feature to identify new items 
likely to take part in that relation. Such a result would be 
consistent with other results in the classification literature, 
which reveal that people are attentive to diagnostic features 
when making determinations of category membership. 
 Second, we would expect people to pay attention to 
whether or not a given item has the facilitating features 
required for a given relation (as in our kitchen chair 
example). If a particular feature is present in every item that 
takes part in a certain relation, then we can assume that that 
feature may be necessary for that relation to take place: the 
feature may facilitate that relation. When confronted with a 
new pair of items which do not possess that facilitating 
feature, we would expect people not to select that relation for 
that pair of items. Note that a facilitating feature for a given 
relation may also be a diagnostic feature for that relation (if it 
occurs in every item that takes part in that relation and in no 
items that do not take part in that relation). However, a 
facilitating feature for a relation may also be non-diagnostic 
for that relation (if the feature occurs in every item that takes 
part in that relation, but also occurs in many items that do not 
take part in that relation). Next we describe an experiment 
examining the influence that facilitating and diagnostic 
features have on peoples selection of relations for pairs of 
items. 
A Categorisation Experiment 
This experiment aims to test three hypotheses: that people can 
learn relations from sets of examples of those relations; that 
diagnostic features are important in peoples selection of 
relations for pairs of items; and that facilitating features are 
also important in relation selection. The design of the 
experiment is essentially the same as other experiments in the 
category learning literature: a preliminary training phase 
where participants are exposed to exemplars of different 
artificial, laboratory controlled categories is followed by a test 
phase where participants are presented with new items and 
are asked to make judgements of category membership. The 
categories in this experiment are four different relations that 
can hold between pairs of objects. Each of the training items 
consists of two objects linked by one of these relations. The 
test items also consist of two objects; however these objects 
are not linked by any relation, and participants are asked to 
judge the likelihood of different relations holding between 
these items. 
To examine the role of facilitating features in relation 
selection, the training items were designed so that two of the 
learned relations had facilitating features: we called these two 
relations the facilitated relations. Every time one of these 
relations occurred in the set of training items, a particular 
beetle or plant feature (the facilitating feature) was also 
present in that item. The other two relations did not have 
facilitating features: we called these two relations the 
independent relations. Similarly, the training items were 
designed so that some beetle and plant features were 
particularly diagnostic for some relations, and some features 
were not. In the training items, the diagnostic features for a 
particular relation occurred most frequently in beetle or plants 
taking part in that relation, and occurred rarely in other 
relations. The pairs of objects used in the test phase of the 
experiment consisted of various combinations of facilitating 
and diagnostic features for different relations. By examining 
participants choice of relations to link the objects in these 
test items, we can then assess the influence of facilitating and 
diagnostic features in relation selection.  
Method 
Participants. 16 postgraduate students or recent college 
graduates volunteered to take part in the experiment. All were 
native speakers of English. 
 
Materials.  The materials for the training phase consisted of 
18 visual stimuli on an A5-sized card depicting a cartoon 
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 Figure 1: Two training phase stimuli. 
 
beetle eating a plant. The beetles varied on three quaternary-
valued feature dimensions: color of the shell, pattern on the 
shell, and facial expression. The plants varied on four feature 
dimensions: color of the leaves (quaternary-valued), shape of 
the leaves (quaternary-valued), droop of the branches (binary-
valued), and whether there were buds or thorns on the trunk 
(binary-valued). There were four possible ways in which a 
beetle could eat a plant, corresponding to the four relational 
categories: the beetle could land on a leaf of a plant and eat 
the leaf (an independent relation), the beetle could eat from 
the top of the trunk of the plant (an independent relation), the 
beetle could eat from the trunk of the plant if there were buds 
rather than thorns on the trunk (a facilitated relation), or the 
beetle could stand on the ground and eat the leaf of a plant 
that had drooping branches (a facilitated relation). Underneath 
each picture was a sentence describing the eating behaviour 
that was talking place. Examples of the training phases 
stimuli are presented in Figure 1. 
 These 18 items described a category structure for four 
relations, each relation being one of the different ways in 
which a beetle could eat a plant. The distribution of beetle and 
plant features was controlled so that some features would be 
facilitating for relations and so that some features would be 
diagnostic for relations. The distribution of beetle and plant 
features across the four different relation categories is shown 
in abstract form in Table 1. The numerical values in columns 
B1, B2 and B3 represent the different possible features that 
beetles could have; the values in columns P1, P2, P3, and P4 
similarly represent the different possible features of plants. 
Each row in this table represents a different particular 
exemplar of one of the four relations R1, R2, R3 and R4. 
 In this experiment, we were interested in the influence 
which the distribution of features across items would have on 
peoples selection of relations between items. We were not 
concerned with any effect which the physical properties of 
stimuli (e.g. the salience of different colours, the 
distinctiveness of different shapes) would have on peoples
 
Table 1: The abstract relational category structures used in 
the training phase. 
 
Item Relation Insect Features  Plant Features 
    B1 B2 B3  P1 P2 P3 P4 
1 R1 1 1 1  1 1 1 2 
2 R1 4 1 1  1 1 1 1 
3 R1 2 2 2  4 1 1 2 
4 R1 3 4 2  1 4 2 1 
5 R1 3 3 3  1 1 1 1 
6 R2 1 1 2  3 2 1 2 
7 R2 2 2 2  3 2 1 1 
8 R2 2 3 4  1 1 1 1 
9 R2 3 4 3  2 3 2 2 
10 R3 1 4 1  4 2 2 1 
11 R3 1 1 4  2 2 2 1 
12 R3 2 2 2  2 3 2 2 
13 R3 3 2 4  2 3 2 1 
14 R3 2 2 3  3 2 2 1 
15 R4 1 3 1  4 3 2 2 
16 R4 2 3 3  2 2 1 2 
17 R4 3 2 3  3 3 1 2 
18 R4 3 3 3  3 3 1 2 
 
relation selection. Thus, while each participants set of 
training items had the abstract structure shown in Table 1, 
each participant saw a unique set of physical stimuli. The 
abstract-to-physical mappings for the category dimensions 
and values for the two independent relations and for the two 
facilitated relations were balanced across participants. This 
was done so that the physical dimensions, values and relations 
would not be confounded with their abstract counterparts. 
 
Facilitating and Diagnostic Features.  The four relations in 
Table 1 were designed so that two relations had facilitating 
features (R3 and R4) and two did not (R1 and R2), and two 
relations had highly diagnostic features (R1 and R3) and two 
had less diagnostic features (R2 and R4). Relations R1 and 
R2 were the independent relations, while relations R3 and R4 
were the facilitated ones. P3 is the facilitating dimension for 
relation R3: every exemplar of R3 involves an item with a 
value of 2 on dimension P3. Similarly P4 is the facilitating 
dimension for relation R4: every exemplar of R4 involves an 
item with a value of 2 on dimension P4. (In the experimental 
materials, the facilitating features were instantiated in a 
causally meaningful way. For example, the physical relation 
the beetle stands on the ground and eats the leaf had the 
facilitating feature drooping branches on the plant). 
Of the two independent relations, R1 has highly diagnostic 
features while R2 has less diagnostic features. Relation R1 
has two highly diagnostic features: a 1 on P1 and a 1 on P2. 
Relation R2, however, has no particularly diagnostic features. 
(R2 is therefore a very vague category, not well distinguished 
by either diagnosticity or facilitating features). Of the two 
facilitated relations, R3 has highly diagnostic features while 
R4 has less diagnostic features. For relation R3, a 2 on 
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dimension P3 is a highly diagnostic feature for that relation, 
occurring five out of five times in examples of that relation 
and only three times outside it. (Note that this feature, a 2 on 
P3, is also the facilitating feature for relation R3). Relation 
R4, however, has no such highly diagnostic feature, although 
a 3 on B2 and a 3 on B3 are both moderately diagnostic for 
that relation. (R4s facilitating feature is not very diagnostic, 
occurring four times within the category and five times 
outside it.) 
The materials for the test phase consisted of more visual 
stimuli depicting beetles and plants; however in these pictures 
the beetles and plants were shown separately, without any 
eating or any other interaction taking place. Underneath each 
test picture was the question How likely are the different 
types of eating behavior?, followed by the four relation 
description sentences, each of which was accompanied by a 
7-point scale ranging from -3 (labelled not at all likely) to 
+3 (extremely likely). The order in which the four scales 
were presented was balanced across participants. 
The test phase consisted of 29 beetle-plant pairs. Of these, 
nine pairs were selected from the 18 beetle-plant pairs that 
had been presented in the training phase, but now without the 
eating behaviour shown. These nine previously-seen pairs 
were used to assess how accurately participants learned the 
training items they had studied. The remaining 20 test items 
(beetle-plant pairs) had not been seen previously by 
participants. For these items the properties of interest are 
whether or not the facilitating feature of relation R3 or of 
relation R4 is present, and whether or not the item had 
features diagnostic for particular relations. 
 
Procedure.  The experiment consisted of two sections: a 
training phase where participants studied the training items 
(pairs of beetles and plants taking part in particular relations), 
and a test phase where they had to rate the likelihood of the 
different possible relations for a sequence of beetle-plant 
pairs. Participants were asked to pretend to be biologists 
interested in learning about imaginary plants and beetles and 
the relationship between them. The seven dimensions on 
which the beetles and plants could vary were explicitly 
pointed out to participants. It was pointed out to participants 
that they might find it useful to try to learn about the eating 
behaviour by looking for relationships between features and 
types of eating, or by learning the features of individual 
examples and remembering the type of eating occurring with 
them. Participants spent about five minutes reading the 
instructions, during which time the experimenter answered 
any questions they had. After reading the instructions 
participants were presented with the 18 training items at a 
large desk area. Participants were given 12 to 15 minutes to 
study the training items.  
After the training phase, the 18 training items were removed 
and participants were given the 29 test items. Participants 
were first shown the nine test items corresponding to items 
they had studied in the first part of the experiment. 
Participants were told to mark an integer value on each of the 
four scales describing how likely they felt the four possible 
types of eating behaviour were. Following these nine items 20 
new test items were presented to the participants. The order in 
which the items were presented was randomized for each 
participant, and participants were allowed to rate the items at 
their own pace. 
Results 
Participants’ learning of the training items.  For these nine 
items there was a correct relation (each item was a member 
of one category during the learning phase) and three 
incorrect relations (corresponding to the other three 
categories). The responses for each relation and each 
experimental item were classified as either positive ( > 0) or 
non-positive ( ≤  0), depending on how the participant 
responded on each scale. On average, participants gave a 
positive rating to correct relations 71% of the time and a 
positive rating to incorrect relations 33% of the time. Two 
participants gave a positive score to only four correct 
relations; these two participants were excluded from the 
analysis. The remaining 14 participants gave a positive rating 
to correct relations 75% of the time and a positive rating to 
incorrect relations only 25% of the time. These results 
indicate that participants learned to distinguish between the 
categories in the training phase. 
 
Participants’ sensitivity to facilitating features.  One-tailed 
binomial tests with α = 0.05 were used to identify whether the 
presence or absence of the facilitating features for a relation 
had an effect on how participants responded when grading the 
likelihood of that relation. The proportion of positive 
responses for each of the four relations was the statistic of 
interest.  
First we considered the items in which the facilitating 
features for a given relation were absent. Of the 29 test items, 
16 were items for which the facilitating feature for relation R3 
was absent and 16 were items for which the facilitating 
feature for relation R4 was absent. For relation R3, the 
binomial test was significant for 13 of the 14 participants; in 
other words, 13 of the 14 participants were significantly more 
likely to produce a non-positive rather than a positive 
response to relation R3 when the facilitating feature for 
relation R3 was absent. (Indeed, 10 participants never 
produced a positive response). For relation R4, 10 of the 14 
participants were significantly more likely to produce a non-
positive rather than a positive response. (Here, five 
participants never produced a positive response).  
A similar analysis was performed looking at the items 
where the facilitating feature was present. Of the 29 test 
items, 13 were items for which the facilitating feature for 
relation R3 was present and 13 were items for which the 
facilitating feature for relation R4 was present. For relation 
R3, 8 of the 14 participants were significantly more likely to 
produce a positive rather than a non-positive response. For 
relation R4, 7 of the 14 participants were significantly more 
likely to produce a positive rather than a non-positive 
response. These results are sensible considering that in many 
cases participants will rate a relation as having low likelihood 
for a given item, even when that relations facilitating feature 
is present in the item: the facilitating feature doesnt mean 
that the relation must be selected for this item, only that it is a 
possibility. The difference in these results between items that 
had and items that had not the facilitating feature for a 
relation indicate that participants were highly sensitive to the 
presence and absence of those features. 
 
Participants’ sensitivity to diagnostic features.  The 
diagnosticity of a feature for a category is a measure of how 
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good that feature is at identifying membership of that 
category. If a feature appears in many items in a category and 
few items outside a category then that feature will have high 
diagnosticity. More formally, we can define the diagnosticity 
of a feature f for a category C to be 
 
   
                                                                                       (Eq. 1)     . 
 
 
where Ef denotes the set of exemplars that have feature f. 
Using this formula we calculated the average diagnosticity of 
the features of each of the 29 test items for each of the four 
relational categories and compared this to the observed data. 
For two of the four relations, the amount of diagnosticity for 
items had a high correlation with the observed membership 
ratings for the items (for R1, r = 0.83, p < 0.01, %var = 69%; 
for R4, r = 0.81, p < 0.01, %var = 65%). For the other two 
relations, the correlation was less strong though still 
significant (for R2, r = 0.66, p < 0.01, %var = 43%; for R3, r 
= 0.70, p < 0.01, %var = 49%). These results indicate that 
participants were sensitive to diagnostic features when 
making their category judgements.  
 
Diagnostic and facilitating features.  Relations R1 and R2 
were the independent relations: membership in these relations 
did not depend on facilitating features. Diagnosticity was very 
important for identifying members of R1 but was not very 
important for identifying members of R2. We would therefore 
expect the correlation of diagnosticity to the observed 
memberships to be higher for relation R1 than relation R2; 
this is the case in the above analysis of the effect of diagnostic 
features.  
Relations R3 and R4 were the facilitated relations: 
membership in these relations depended on both diagnostic 
features and facilitating features. R3 was designed to have 
highly diagnostic features, while R4 was designed to have 
less diagnostic features. The diagnosticity analysis above, 
however, shows that the correlation of the observed 
memberships with diagnosticity was lower for R3 than for 
R4. The divergence between diagnosticity and membership 
ratings for these relations suggests an interaction between 
diagnosticity and facilitating features.  
As a way of examining this interaction we looked at the 
total number of positive and non-positive responses across all 
participants for relations R3 and R4; they are presented in 
Table 2. For cases where the facilitating feature is present, 
there are less positive responses for R4 than for R3 and more 
non-positive responses for R4 than R3. Conversely, for cases 
where the facilitating feature is absent, there are less positive 
responses for R3 than for R4 and more non-positive responses 
for R3 than R4. These data suggest that participants are more 
sensitive to the presence or absence of the facilitating feature 
for R3 than they are for R4. This is consistent with the fact 
that the facilitating feature for R3 is more diagnostic for R3 
than the facilitating feature for R4 is diagnostic for R4. In 
other words, people seem to be using both the facilitating 
nature and the diagnosticity of features together in deciding 
relation likelihood for these relations. In the next section we 
investigate this interaction between diagnosticity and 
facilitating features in more detail by applying a model of 
classification to our data. 
 
Table 2: Total number of positive and non-positive 
responses across all participants 
 
 Facilitating Feature Present 
Facilitating Feature 
Absent 
 Positive Non-positive Positive Non-positive 
R3 130 52 14 210 
R4 123 59 30 194 
 
Modelling Relation Selection 
We are interested in how people used facilitating and 
diagnostic features when making judgements of relation 
likelihood in our experiment. As we have seen, our results 
indicate an interaction between diagnosticity and facilitating 
features. We are also interested in whether or not our view of 
relations in terms of exemplar-represented categories can 
successfully account for the results of the above experiment. 
To explore these issues, we examined whether an exemplar 
model of categorization could be used to model participants 
responses of how likely each relation is for each item in the 
experiment. We used as our starting point Costellos (2000, 
2001) Diagnostic Evidence Model (DEM) which uses 
diagnostic features to model classification in concept 
combination. This model calculates an evidence score for an 
item x in a category C using the diagnosticity of each feature 
of the item for that category according to the formula 
 
   (Eq. 2) 
 
 
where Fx is the set of features of x and D( f, C) is computed as 
in Equation 1. (Equation 2 essentially sees category 
membership as a disjunction of the feature diagnosticities and 
is not dissimilar to simply averaging the diagnosticities as we 
did in the previous section). As a preliminary step we applied 
this model to the experimental data without using any 
information about facilitating features: the model is only 
sensitive to features diagnosticity. In this form the model still 
produces a reasonable fit to the data (for R1, r = 0.88, p < 
0.01, %var = 78%; for R2, r = 0.63, p < 0.01, %var = 40%; 
for R3, r = 0.73, p < 0.01, %var = 53%; for R4, r = 0.72, p < 
0.01, %var = 52%), with no free parameters. 
 The model in this form uses diagnostic information alone. 
However, the results of our experiment indicate that people 
make use of both diagnosticity and facilitating features in 
determining the relations. One possible account of how 
people use both these types of information is that people are 
applying diagnosticity information after they have been 
constrained by the presence or absence of the facilitating 
features. Perhaps people check if an item has the necessary 
facilitating features for a particular relation and then, if it 
does, use the diagnostic evidence of the features. In 
modifying the model we therefore assume that participants 
do not use known exemplars which depict a relation that is 
impossible for the test item at hand: facilitating features 
restrict the universe of discourse so that membership of an 
item in a relational category is a calculation across the subset 
of the learned exemplars that belong to relational categories 
that are possible for the current item. Our formula for 
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diagnosticity then becomes 
 
                                    (Eq. 3)    . 
 
 
where Rx is the set of known exemplars that belong to 
relations that are not impossible given the features of x. This 
modified model gives a much closer fit to the observed 
relation selection ratings (for R1, r = 0.89, p < 0.01, %var = 
79%; for R2, r = 0.78, p < 0.01, %var = 61%; for R3, r = 
0.98, p < 0.01, %var = 0.96; for R4, r = 0.96, p < 0.01, %var 
= 0.92), again with no free parameters. Clearly, both 
information about the diagnosticity of features and 
information about the presence or absence of facilitating 
features are required to accurately model the experimental 
data. 
Though this modified DEM model may not be the best way 
of modelling the data, it does suggest that using information 
about both the facilitating features and diagnosticity of 
features of an item are important in selecting relations. The 
fact that an exemplar model of classification can predict how 
people rate the likelihood of different relations linking pairs 
of items is also evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
relations can be represented as categories. This suggests that 
relation selection can be thought of as a kind of classification 
task. 
Conclusions and Discussion 
Our study yields three findings. First, people can learn which 
relations are possible between concepts from sets of examples 
of those relations. Second, people pay attention to facilitating 
features for those relations and use those features when 
judging relation likelihood for new examples. Third, people 
also pay attention to, and use, diagnostic features for those 
relations. Such findings are consistent with our hypothesis 
that relations can be represented with an exemplar category 
structure, and that the selection of a relation between two 
constituents can be seen as a categorisation task. These 
findings have implications for current theories of how 
relational links are used in conceptual combination. In 
particular, these findings may be problematic for Gagné & 
Shobens (1997) CARIN model, which proposes that in 
conceptual combination people select the correct relational 
link between two concepts from a fixed set of 16 relational 
links called thematic relations. First, the thematic relations 
used in the CARIN model have no internal structure: there is 
no way, in that model, in which facilitating or diagnostic 
features could be associated with those relations (for 
example, the MADE-OF relation in the CARIN model how has 
no way of requiring that a concept taking part in it is type of 
substance). Furthermore, the four different relations we used 
in our experiment do not occur in the CARIN models fixed set 
of thematic relations: it would be hard for that model to 
explain how people used these relations in our experiment. 
 Our findings are consistent with other theories of 
conceptual combination (e.g. Costello and Keane, 2000; 
Murphy, 1988; Wisniewski, 1997) which do allow internal 
conceptual structure to influence relation selection. These 
theories use some variation of the idea that a concept 
representation can contain slots such as MADE-OF or 
LOCATED and that conceptual combination involves one 
concept filling a slot in another concept (so that kitchen 
chair, for example, would involve the kitchen concept 
filling the LOCATED slot in chair). The exemplar-based 
model of relation selection described in this paper provides an 
alternative to this slot-based representation of relations, 
showing that relations can be represented as sets of paired-
item exemplars, rather than as slots in concepts. This 
exemplar-based model has the advantage of giving a simple 
account of how people learn which facilitating and diagnostic 
properties are associated with each relation. 
As for future work: in our experiment, participants learned 
relational categories only, and did not learn conceptual 
categories (they did not learn different categories of beetle or 
plant, for example). A possible extension of this work would 
be to have participants learn, from sets of exemplars, both 
conceptual categories and the relational categories that link 
them. This experiment could reveal more both about how 
relations are learned and used, and about how exemplar-level 
and conceptual-level information interact in conceptual 
combination. 
Acknowledgements 
This research was supported by a grant from the Irish 
Research Council for Science, Engineering and Technology, 
funded by the National Development Plan. 
References 
Costello, F. J. (2000). An exemplar model of classification in 
simple and combined categories. Proceedings of the 22nd 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, (pp 
95-100). Mahwah, N. J.: Erlbaum. 
Costello, F. J. (2001) A computational model of 
categorisation and category combination: Identifying 
diseases and new disease combinations, Proceedings of the 
23rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 
(pp. 238-243). University of Edinburgh: Erlbaum. 
Costello, F., & Keane, M.T. (2000). Efficient Creativity: 
Constraints on conceptual combination. Cognitive Science, 
24, 299-349. 
Costello, F. J., and Keane, M. T. (2001) Testing two theories 
of conceptual combination: Alignment versus diagnosticity 
in the comprehension and production of combined 
concepts, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory & Cognition, 27, 255-271. 
Gagné, C. L., & Shoben, E. J. (1997). Influence of thematic 
relations on the comprehension of modifier-noun 
combinations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory and Cognition, 23 (1), 71-87. 
Medin, D. L. & Schaffer, M. M. (1978). Context theory of 
classification learning. Psychological Review, 85 (3), 207-
238. 
Murphy, G. L. (1988). Comprehending complex concepts. 
Cognitive Science, 12, 529-562. 
Nosofsky, R. (1984). Choice, similarity, and the context 
theory of classification. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10, (1), 
104 114. 
Wisniewski, E. J. (1996). Construal and similarity in 
conceptual combination. Journal of Memory and Language, 
35, 434-453. 
Wisniewski, E. J. (1997). When concepts combine. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4(2), 167-183. 
( ) ( ), ,
f x
f x
C E R
D f x C
C E R
∩ ∩
=
∪ ∩
308
Simple Ways to Construct Search Orders 
 
Anja Dieckmann (dieckmann@mpib-berlin.mpg.de) 
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 
14195 Berlin, Germany 
 
Peter M. Todd (ptodd@mpib-berlin.mpg.de) 
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 
14195 Berlin, Germany 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Simple decision heuristics that process cues in a particular 
order and stop considering cues as soon as a decision can be 
made have been shown to be both accurate and quick. But one 
criticism of heuristics such as Take The Best is that these owe 
much of their simplicity and success to the not inconsiderable 
computations necessary for setting up the cue search order 
before the heuristic can be used. The criticism, though, can be 
countered in two ways: First, there are typically many cue 
orders possible that will achieve good performance in a given 
problem domain. And second, as we will show here, there are 
simple learning rules that can quickly converge on one of 
these useful cue orders through exposure to just a small 
number of decisions. We conclude by arguing for the need to 
take into account the computation necessary for not only the 
application but also the setup of a heuristic when talking 
about its simplicity. 
One-Reason Decision Making and Ordered 
Search 
In the book Simple heuristics that make us smart, 
Gigerenzer and colleagues (1999) propose several decision 
making heuristics for predicting which of two objects or 
options, described by multiple binary cues, scores higher on 
some quantitative criterion. These heuristics have in 
common that information search is stopped once one cue is 
found that discriminates between the alternatives and thus 
allows an informed decision. No integration of information 
is involved, leading these heuristics to be termed “one-
reason” decision mechanisms. These heuristics differ only 
in the search rule that determines the order in which 
information is searched. But where do these search orders 
come from? 
“Take the Best” (TTB; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, 
1999) is the heuristic that has received most attention to 
date, both theoretically and empirically. TTB consists of 
three building blocks: 
 
1. Search rule: Search through cues in the order of their 
validity. Validity is the proportion of correct 
decisions made by a cue out of all the times that cue 
discriminates between pairs of options.  
 
2. Stopping rule: Stop search as soon as one cue is 
found that discriminates between the two options.  
3. Decision rule: Select the option to which the 
discriminating cue points, that is, the option that has 
the cue value associated with higher criterion values.  
 
The performance of TTB has been tested on several real-
world data sets, ranging from professors’ salaries to fish 
fertility (Czerlinski, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). Cross-
validation comparisons have been made against other more 
complex strategies, such as multiple linear regression, by 
training on half of the items in each data set to get estimates 
of the relevant parameters (e.g., cue order based on 
validities for TTB, beta-weights for multiple linear 
regression) and testing on the other half of the data. Despite 
only using on average a third of the information employed 
by multiple linear regression, TTB outperformed regression 
in accuracy when generalizing to the test set (71% vs. 68%). 
The even simpler heuristic Minimalist was tested in the 
same way. It is another one-reason decision making 
heuristic that differs from TTB only in its search rule. 
Minimalist searches through cues randomly, and thus 
requires even less knowledge and precomputation than TTB 
– all it needs to know are the directions in which the cues 
point. Again it was surprising that this heuristic performed 
reasonably close to multiple regression (65%). But the fact 
that Minimalist lagged behind TTB by a noticeable margin 
of 6 percentage points indicates that part of the secret of 
TTB’s success lies in its ordered search. 
In this paper, we explore how such useful cue orders can 
be constructed in the first place, by testing a variety of 
simple order-learning rules in simulation. We find that 
simple mechanisms at the learning stage can enable simple 
mechanisms at the decision stage, such as one-reason 
decision heuristics, to perform well. 
Experimental Evidence for Ordered Search 
From an adaptive point of view, the combination of 
simplicity and accuracy makes one-reason decision making 
with ordered search, as in TTB, a plausible candidate for 
human decision processes.  Consequently, TTB has been 
subjected to several empirical tests. Because TTB explicitly 
specifies information search as one aspect of decision 
making, it must be tested in situations in which cue 
information is not laid out all at once, but has to be searched 
for one cue at a time, either in the external environment or 
in memory (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).  
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In situations where information must be searched for 
sequentially in the external environment, particularly when 
there are direct search costs for accessing each successive 
cue, considerable use of TTB has been demonstrated 
(Bröder, 2000, experiments 3 & 4; Bröder, 2003). This also 
holds for indirect costs, such as from time pressure 
(Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999), as well as for internal search 
in memory (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). The particular search 
order used has not always been tested separately, but when 
such an analysis at the level of building blocks has been 
done, search by cue validity order has received support 
(Newell & Shanks, 2003; Newell, Weston & Shanks, 2003). 
However, none of these experiments tested search rules 
other than validity ordering. One other very important 
dimension on which cues can be ordered is discrimination 
rate, which refers to the proportion of all possible decision 
pairs in which a cue has different values for (i.e., 
discriminates between) the two alternatives1. A closer look 
into the experimental designs of the studies cited above 
reveals that they all used systematically constructed 
environments in which discrimination rates of the cues were 
held constant. Now, when the discrimination rates of cues 
are all the same, there are not many orders besides validity 
that make sense. To put it differently, identical 
discrimination rates make several alternative ordering 
criteria that combine discrimination rate and validity (e.g., 
Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002) all lead to the same (validity) 
order. Examples for such criteria are success, which is the 
proportion of correct discriminations that a cue makes plus 
the proportion of correct decisions expected from guessing 
in the non-discriminating trials (success = v·d + 0.5·(1-d), 
where v = validity and d = discrimination rate of the cue), 
and usefulness, the portion of correct decisions not 
including guessing (usefulness = v·d).  
Because these criteria collapse to a single order (validity) 
in the reported experiments, nothing can be said about how 
validity and discrimination rate may interact to determine 
the search orders that participants apply. It remains unclear 
what information participants would base their decisions on 
when both validity and discrimination rate vary. There are 
hints that when information is costly, making it sensible to 
consider both how often a cue will enable a decision (i.e., its 
discrimination rate) and the validity of those decisions, other 
criteria such as success that combine the two measures show 
a better fit to empirical data (e.g., Newell, Rakow, Weston 
& Shanks, in press; Läge, Hausmann, Christen & Daub, 
submitted). But these studies, too, remain silent about how 
these criteria, or an order based on these criteria, could 
possibly be derived by participants.  
In sum, despite accumulating evidence for the use of one-
reason decision making heuristics, the basic processes that 
underlie people’s search through information when 
employing such heuristics remain a mystery. While some 
clues can be had by considering the size of the overlap or 
correlations between the search orders people use and 
various standard search orders (as reported by Newell et al., 
                                                          
1
 Other dimensions for ordering are possible, such as the temporal 
order of previous cue use, but we will not consider them here. 
in press, and Läge et al., submitted), they do not come close 
to telling us how cue orders could possibly be learned. 
Search Order Construction – the Hard Way 
But how can the search order of TTB be constructed? 
Although TTB is a very simple heuristic to apply, the set-up 
of its search rule requires knowledge of the ecological 
validities of cues. This knowledge is probably not usually 
available in an explicit precomputed form in the 
environment, and so must be computed from stored or 
ongoing experience. Gigerenzer at al. (1999) have been 
relatively silent about the process by which people might 
derive validities and other search orders, a shortfall several 
peers have commented on (e.g., Lipshitz, 2000; Wallin & 
Gärdenfors, 2000). The criticism that TTB owes much of its 
strength to rather comprehensive computations necessary 
for deriving the search order cannot easily be dismissed. 
Juslin and Persson (2002) pay special attention to the 
question of how simple and informationally frugal TTB 
actually is, debating how to take into account the 
computation of cue validities for deriving the search order. 
They differentiate two main possibilities on the basis of 
when cue validities are computed: precomputation during 
experience, and calculation from memory when needed. 
When potential decision criteria are already known at the 
time objects are encountered in the environment, then 
relevant validities can be continuously computed and 
updated with each new object seen. But if it is difficult to 
predict what decision tasks may arise in the future, this pre-
computation of cue validities runs into problems. In that 
case, at the time of object exposure, all attributes should be 
treated the same, because any one could later be either a 
criterion or a cue depending on the decision being made. To 
use the well-known domain of German cities (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996, 1999), the task that one encounters need 
not be the usual prediction of city populations based on cues 
such as train connections, but could just as well be which of 
two cities has an intercity train line based on cues that 
include city population. To keep track of all possible 
validities indicating how accurately one attribute can decide 
about another, the number of precomputed validities would 
have to be C2 - C, with C denoting to the number of 
attributes available. In the German cities example, there are 
10 attributes (9 cues plus the criterion population size), thus 
90 validities would have to be pre-computed. This number 
rises rapidly with increasing number of attributes. Even 
ignoring computational complexity, this precomputation 
approach is not frugal in terms of information storage.  
As a second possibility, Juslin and Persson (2002) 
consider storing all objects (exemplars) encountered along 
with their attribute values and postponing computation of 
validities to the point in time when an actual judgment is 
required. This, however, makes TTB considerably less 
frugal during its application. The number of pieces of 
information that would have to be accessed at the time of 
judgment is the number of attributes times the number of 
stored objects; in our city example, it is 10 times the number 
of known objects. With regard to computing validities for 
each of the N·(N-1)/2 possible pairs that can be formed 
between the N known objects, each of the C cues has to be 
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checked to see if it discriminated, and did so correctly. Thus 
the number of checks to be performed before a decision can 
be made is C·N·(N-1)/2, which grows with the square of the 
number of objects. 
Although Juslin and Persson assume worst case scenarios 
in terms of computational complexity for the sake of their 
argument, they raise an important point, showing that one of 
the fundamental questions within the framework of the ABC 
research group (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) remains open: How 
can search orders be derived in relatively simple ways?  
Many Roads Lead (Close) to Rome 
From what we have said so far, the situation does not look 
too good for validity either in terms of empirical evidence or 
psychological feasibility. But what would be the 
consequence in terms of loss in accuracy if we drop the 
assumption that cue search follows the validity order? 
Simulation results can provide an answer. First of all, 
validity is usually not the best cue ordering that can be 
achieved. For the German city data set, Martignon and 
Hoffrage (2002) computed the performance of all possible 
orderings, assuming one-reason stopping and decision 
building blocks. The number of possible orders was 362,880 
(9! orders of 9 cues). The mean accuracy of the resulting 
distribution corresponded to the performance expected from 
Minimalist, 70%, which was considerable above the worst 
ordering at 62%. Ordering cues by validity led to an 
accuracy of 74.2%, while the optimal ordering yielded 
75.8% accuracy. More than half of all possible cue orders 
do better than the random order used by Minimalist, and 
6,532 (1.8%) do better than the validity order. We can 
therefore conclude that many good orders exist. But how 
can one of these many reasonably good cue orders be 
constructed in a psychologically plausible way?  
Search Order Construction – the Simple Way 
A variety of simple approaches to deriving and continuously 
updating search orders can be proposed. Indeed, computer 
scientists have explored a number of self-organizing 
sequential search heuristics for the purpose of speeding 
retrieval of items from a sequential list when the relative 
importance of the items is not known a priori (Rivest, 1976; 
Bentley & McGeoch, 1985). The mechanisms they have 
focused on use transposition of nearby items and counting 
of instances of retrieval.  Our problem of cue ordering is 
slightly different from that of the standard sequential list 
ordering, because cues can fail in ways that retrieved items 
cannot: a cue may not discriminate (necessitating the search 
for another cue before a decision can be made), or it may 
lead to a wrong decision. Still, the mechanisms of 
transposition and counting will be central to the heuristics 
we propose. 
We focus on search order construction processes that are 
psychologically plausible by being frugal both in terms of 
information storage and in terms of computation. The 
decision situation we explore is different from the one 
assumed by Juslin and Persson (2002) who strongly 
 
differentiate between learning of (or about) objects and 
making decisions. Instead of assuming this unnecessary 
separation, we will explore a learning-while-doing situation. 
Certainly there are many occasions akin to Juslin and 
Persson’s situation where individuals have to make 
decisions based on knowledge they have learned about 
objects encountered previously and in a different task 
context. But perhaps more common are tasks that have to be 
done repeatedly with feedback being obtained after each 
trial about the adequacy of one’s decision. For instance, we 
can observe on multiple occasions which of two 
supermarket checkout lines, the one we have chosen or 
(more likely) another one, is faster, and associate this 
outcome with cues including the lines’ lengths and the ages 
of their respective cashiers. In such situations, one can learn 
about the differential usefulness of cues for solving the task 
via the feedback received over time. It is this case – 
decisions made repeatedly with the same cues and criterion 
and the opportunity to learn from outcome feedback – which 
we will now look at more closely. 
We consider several explicitly defined cue order learning 
rules that are designed to deal with probabilistic inference 
tasks. In particular, the task we use is forced choice paired 
comparison, in which a decision maker has to infer which of 
two objects, each described by a set of binary cues, is 
“bigger” on a criterion – the task for which TTB was 
formulated. Thus, in contrast to Juslin and Persson (2002), 
we assume individuals encounter decision situations instead 
of objects. After an inference has been made, feedback is 
given about whether a decision was right or wrong. 
Therefore, the learning algorithm has information about 
which cues were looked up, whether a cue discriminated, 
and whether a discriminating cue led to the right or wrong 
decision. There are different possibilities for taking these 
pieces of information into account. For example, correct 
decisions could be counted up for each cue (essentially 
keeping tallies). Or the information could be used to 
compute cue validities and discrimination rates based on the 
cases in which the cue has actually been looked up so far. 
These tallies, validity estimates, etc., would then be used for 
creating and adjusting the current cue order. 
The rules we propose differ in the pieces of information 
they use and how they use them. We classify the learning 
rules based on their memory requirement – high versus low 
– and their computational requirements (see Table 1). The 
computational requirements include whether the entire set of 
cues is completely reordered after each decision or only 
adjusted locally via swapping of neighboring cue positions, 
and whether reordering is done on the basis of measures 
involving division, such as validity, or simple tallying.  
The validity rule is the most demanding of the rules we 
consider in terms of both memory requirements and 
computational complexity. It keeps a count of all 
discriminations made by a cue so far (in all the times that 
the cue was looked up) and a separate count of all the 
correct discriminations. Therefore, memory load is 
comparatively high. The validity of each cue is determined 
by dividing its current correct discrimination count by its
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Table 1: Learning rules classified according to memory and computational requirements 
 
 
total discrimination count. Based on these values computed 
after each decision, the rule reorders the whole set of cues 
from highest to lowest validity.  
The tally rule only keeps one count per cue, storing the 
number of correct decisions made by that cue so far minus 
the number of incorrect decisions. So if a cue discriminates 
correctly on a given trial, one point is added to its tally. If it 
leads to an incorrect decision, one point is subtracted from 
its tally. The tally rule is less demanding both in terms of 
memory and computation: Only one count is kept, and no 
division is required.  
While the validity and tally rules rely on a counting 
mechanism, the simple swap rule uses the principle of 
transposition (cf. Bentley & McGeoch, 1985). This rule has 
no memory of cue performance other than an ordered list of 
all cues, and just moves a cue up one position in this list 
whenever it leads to a correct decision, and down if it leads 
to an incorrect decision. In other words, a correctly deciding 
cue swaps positions with its nearest neighbor upwards in the 
cue order, and an incorrectly deciding cue swaps positions 
with its nearest neighbor downwards. 
The tally swap rule is a hybrid of the simple swap rule 
and the tally rule. It keeps a tally of correct minus incorrect 
discriminations per cue so far (so memory load is high) but 
only locally swaps cues: When a cue makes a correct 
decision and its tally is greater than or equal to that of its 
upward neighbor, the two cues swap positions. When a cue 
makes an incorrect decision and its tally is smaller than or 
equal to that of its downward neighbor, the two cues also 
swap positions. 
As indicated in table 1, many variants of these basic types 
of learning rules are possible. Here we will focus on these 
four rules spanning the space of possibilities, and look at 
how they perform in simulations. Elsewhere we consider 
evidence for their use in experimental decision settings, and 
use these simulation results to assess human performance. 
Simulation Study of Simple Ordering Rules 
To test the performance of these order learning rules, we use 
the German cities data set (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996),  
 
consisting of the 83 highest-population German cities 
described on 9 cues. The question we want to address is, 
what would happen if a decision-maker does not search for 
cues in validity order from the beginning, but instead must 
construct a search order using feedback received about each 
decision made? We assume that cue directions are known. 
Furthermore, instead of allowing the decision maker to look 
up information about all 9 cues in each pair comparison, we 
assume that TTB’s stopping and decision rule are used on 
all decisions. We do this because it is more natural to 
assume that learning happens in the ongoing context of 
decision making, which does not necessarily involve 
exhaustive information search. This runs counter the 
approach taken by Juslin and Persson (2002) who in their 
worst case scenarios assume exhaustive information search 
for validity computations. In our approach, only the limited 
information gathered until the first discriminating cue is 
found can be taken into account.  
We simulated 10,000 learning trials for each rule, starting 
from random initial cue orders. Each trial consisted of 100 
decisions between randomly selected decision pairs. Below 
we report average values across the 10,000 trials. 
Results 
We start by considering the cumulative accuracies (i.e., 
online or amortized performance – Bentley & McGeoch, 
1985) of the rules, defined as the total percentage of correct 
decisions made so far at any point in the learning process. 
(The contrasting measure of offline accuracy – how well the 
current learned cue order would do if it were applied to the 
entire test set – is a less psychologically useful indication of 
a real decision maker’s performance using some rule.) The 
mean cumulative accuracies of the different search order 
learning rules when used with one-reason decision making 
are shown in Figure 1. Cumulative accuracies soon rise 
above that of the Minimalist heuristic (proportion correct = 
0.70) which looks up cues in random order and thus serves 
as a lower benchmark. However, at least throughout the first 
100 decisions, cumulative accuracies stay well below the 
(offline) accuracy that would be achieved by using TTB for 
High memory load, 
complete reordering 
High memory load, 
local reordering 
Low memory load, 
local reordering 
 
Validity: reorders cues based on 
their current validity 
 
Tally: reorders cues by number 
of correct minus incorrect 
decisions made so far 
 
 
 
Variants: 
- reorder based on tally of 
discriminations so far 
- reorder based on tally of 
correct decisions only 
 
 
Tally swap: moves cue up 
(down) one position if it has 
made a correct (incorrect) 
decision if its tally of correct 
minus incorrect decisions is  
() that of next higher 
(lower) cue 
 
Variants: 
- only upward swapping after 
correct decisions 
- tally of correct decisions only 
 
Simple swap: moves cue up one 
position if it has made a 
correct decision, and down if 
it has made an incorrect 
decision 
 
 
 
Variants: 
- moving cues more than one 
position  
- only upward swapping after 
correct decisions 
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all decisions (proportion correct = 0.74), looking up cues in 
the true order of their ecological validities.  
The four learning rules all perform on a surprisingly 
similar level, with less than one percentage point difference 
in favor of the most demanding rule (i.e., validity) compared 
to the least (i.e., simple swap; mean proportion correct in 
100 decisions: validity learning rule: 0.719; tally: 0.716; 
tally swap: 0.715; simple swap: 0.711). Importantly, though, 
the more demanding learning rules outperform Minimalist 
earlier. Whereas the tally swap and simple swap rule lead to 
accuracies that are significantly higher than Minimalist only 
after 48 and 61 decisions, respectively, the validity learning 
rule does significantly better already after 37 decisions, and 
the tally rule after 35 decisions (z = 1.65, p = 0.05). 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean cumulative accuracy of order learning rules 
 
These four learning rules are, however, all more frugal 
than TTB, and even more frugal than Minimalist. On 
average, they look up fewer cues before reaching a decision 
(see Figure 2). Again, there is little difference between the 
rules (mean number of cues looked up in 100 decisions: 
validity learning rule: 3.17; tally: 3.07; tally swap: 3.13; 
simple swap: 3.18). The validity learning rule and the tally 
rule lead to cue orders that are significantly more frugal than 
Minimalist very early (after 16 and 14 decisions, 
respectively), whereas the two swapping rules take longer: 
The tally swap rule takes 27 decisions, and the simple swap 
rule 32 decisions.  
Consistent with this finding, all of the learning rules lead 
to cue orders that show positive correlations with the 
discrimination rate cue order (reaching the following values 
after 100 decisions: validity learning rule: r = 0.18; tally: r = 
0.29; tally swap: r = 0.24; simple swap: r = 0.18). This 
means that cues that often lead to discriminations are more 
likely to end up in the first positions of the order. In 
contrast, the cue orders resulting from all learning rules but 
the validity learning rule do not correlate with the validity 
cue order, and even the correlations of the cue orders 
resulting from the validity learning rule after 100 decisions 
only reach an average r = 0.12.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean cumulative frugality of order learning rules 
 
But why would the discrimination rates of cues exert 
more of a pull on cue order than validity, even when the 
validity learning rule is applied? Part of the explanation 
comes from the fact that in the city data set we used for the 
simulations, validity and discrimination rate of cues are 
negatively correlated. Having a low discrimination rate 
means that a cue has little chance to be used and hence to 
demonstrate its high validity. Whatever learning rule is 
used, if such a cue is displaced downward to the lower end 
of the order by other cues, it may never be able to escape to 
the higher ranks where it belongs. The problem is that when 
a decision pair is finally encountered for which that cue 
would lead to a correct decision, it is unlikely to be checked 
because other, more discriminating although less valid, cues 
are looked up before and already bring about a decision. 
Thus, because one-reason decision making is intertwined 
with the learning mechanism and so influences which cues 
can be learned about, what mainly makes a cue come early 
in the order is producing a high number of correct decisions 
and not so much a high ratio of correct discriminations to 
total discriminations regardless of base rates. 
In sum, all of the learning rules lead to accuracies 
between that of the heuristics TTB and Minimalist, but 
some rules reach orders that are better than Minimalist 
sooner. The rules are highly frugal, with a (slight) tendency 
to change the order in the direction of discrimination rate.  
Discussion 
The simpler cue order learning rules we have proposed do 
not fall far behind a validity learning rule in accuracy. This 
holds even for the simplest rule, which only requires 
memory of the last cue order used and moves a cue one 
position up in that order if it made a correct decision, and 
down if it made an incorrect decision. All of the rules 
considered here make one-reason decision heuristics 
perform above the level of Minimalist in the long run.  
On the other hand, the four rules, even the validity 
learning rule, stay below TTB’s accuracy across a relatively 
high number of decisions. But often it is necessary to make 
good decisions without much experience. Therefore, 
learning rules should be preferred that quickly lead to orders 
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with good performance. Both the validity and tally learning 
rules quickly beat Minimalist. At the same time, the tally 
rule leads to considerably more frugal cue orders. 
Remember that the tally rule assumes full memory of all 
correct minus incorrect decisions made by a cue so far. But 
this does not make the rule implausible. There is 
considerable evidence that people are actually very good at 
remembering the frequencies of events. Hasher and Zacks 
(1984) conclude from a wide range of studies that 
frequencies are encoded in an automatic way, implying that 
people are sensitive to this information without intention or 
special effort. Estes (1976) pointed out the role frequencies 
play in decision making as a shortcut for probabilities. 
Further, the tally rule is comparatively simple, not having to 
keep track of base rates or perform divisions as does the 
validity rule. From the other side, the simple swap rule may 
not be much simpler, because storing a cue order may be 
about as demanding as storing a set of tallies. We therefore 
conclude that the tally rule should not be discounted on 
grounds of implausibility without further empirical 
evidence. Of course, a necessary next step (currently 
underway) will be to test how well these and other rules 
predict people’s information search when they have to make 
cue-based inferences without knowing validities. 
Our goal in this paper was to argue for the necessity of 
taking into account the set-up costs of a heuristic in addition 
to its application costs when considering the mechanism’s 
overall simplicity. As we have seen from the example of the 
validity search order of TTB, what is easy to apply may not 
necessarily be so easy to set up. But simple rules can also be 
at work in the construction of a heuristic’s building blocks. 
We have proposed such rules for the construction of one 
building block, the search order. We have seen that these 
simple learning rules enable a one-reason decision heuristic 
to perform only slightly worse than if it had full knowledge 
of cue validities from the very beginning. Giving up the 
assumption of full a priori knowledge for the slight decrease 
in accuracy seems like a reasonable bargain: Through the 
addition of learning rules, one-reason decision heuristics 
might lose some of their appeal to decision theorists who 
were surprised by the performance of such simple 
mechanisms compared to more complex algorithms, but 
they gain psychological plausibility and thus become more 
attractive as explanations for human decision behavior. 
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Abstract 
Despite the current belief that much common sense reasoning 
is nonmonotonic in nature, research indicates that only a 
limited percentage of people are good at nonmonotonic 
reasoning. Good nonmonotonic reasoners recognize the 
logical strengths and weaknesses of some arguments. In the 
present study, we focus on differences in the probabilistic 
interpretation of the modifiers typically and usually and on the 
resulting differences in the strengths and weaknesses of 
arguments. We show that these implicit probabilistic strengths 
influence the reasoning process of good nonmonotonic 
reasoners. 
Introduction 
Most AI logicians and logic programmers, as well as 
philosophical logicians, ground their interest in 
nonmonotonic reasoning on the observation that common 
sense reasoning is largely nonmonotonic in nature. Ginsberg 
(1994, p.2), for example, states that: “… flexibility is 
intimately connected with the defeasible nature of 
commonsense inference … we are all capable of drawing 
conclusions, acting on them, and then retracting them if 
necessary in the face of new evidence. If our computer 
programs are to act intelligently, they will need to be 
similarly flexible”. 
Pelletier and Elio (1997) argue that researchers like 
Ginsberg are right in grounding their research on human 
reasoning, but they also argue that AI researchers should 
bear the consequences of it. 
As a first consequence, Pelletier and Elio (1997) argue for a 
more systematic study of human inferences. They plead 
against the use of the intuitions of a small group of AI 
researchers to decide on the acceptable answers to some 
‘benchmark’ problems (e.g. Lifschitz, 1988). Within the AI 
community, at least some researchers are also supportive of 
this point of view (e.g. Schurz, 2001; Benferhat, Bonnefon, 
& Da Silva Neves, 2002). 
The second consequence of grounding default reasoning 
research on human common sense reasoning is more severe. 
Contrary to deductive reasoning, where classical logic is 
considered to be the norm, there is no standard norm for 
default reasoning. Since the long-term goal of most AI 
researchers is to simulate human reasoning, and since we do 
not have an objective theory of what rational default 
reasoning is, Pelletier and Elio (1997) argue that a 
psychologistic view of default reasoning should be adopted. 
Thus, the data that any default system should cover should 
be determined by the practices of ordinary people.  
We agree with the importance of investigating human 
reasoning by controlled experimental research to gain more 
insight into the process of human reasoning. However, we 
also argue that it is important for AI not to develop a formal 
nonmonotonic logic or automated reasoning system on the 
basis of flawed reasoning.  
Ford and Billington (2000) took the need for AI researchers 
to study human reasoning seriously and systematically 
investigated human nonmonotonic reasoning with abstract 
material. This way, participants could not rely on 
background knowledge, as they can do in daily life. 
To clarify the discussion, we present an example of one 
problem, with a well-known Tweety-bird like structure: 
 
Hittas are usually not waffs.  
 
Penguins do not fly 
All of the hittas are oxers. 
 
All penguins are birds  
Oxers are usually waffs. Birds fly 
Jukk is a hitta. Tweety is a Penguin 
Is Jukk a waff?    Does Tweety fly? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               H(j)       O               
 
 
 
   W                                             W(j)? 
Ford and Billington (2000) summed up their main finding 
by presenting five negative (N) and three positive (P) factors 
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that influenced people’s reasoning about nonmonotonic 
problems: 
(N1) Most participants were not willing to draw a tentative 
conclusion when faced with conflict and with non-strict 
rules. (N2) Some participants weighed up the perceived 
number of relevant positive and negative paths, though the 
perceived paths were not paths. (N3) Some participants 
considered path length regardless of the ordering of rule 
types. Most participants preferred the shorter path to the 
longer path. (N4) Some participants gave weight to the 
presence of the universal quantifier, even when this was 
inappropriate. (N5) Some participants interpreted ‘usually 
not’ as evidence that ‘some are’ and thus gave preference to 
a positive conclusion.  (See Hewson & Vogel, 1994, and 
Vogel & Tonhauser, 1996, for more evidence that many 
people have difficulty with nonmonotonic reasoning 
problems). 
Besides these negative factors, Ford and Billington (2000) 
also extracted some positive factors from their experiment. 
(P1) Some participants recognized the relevance of the fact 
that if all of the Xs are Ys there might be Ys that are not Xs. 
(P2) Some participants recognized the relevance of the fact 
that if all of the Ys are Zs then any Xs that are Ys are also 
Zs. (P3) Some participants recognized that given a sentence 
Xs are usually Ys there are potentially many Ys that are not 
Xs. 
People who recognize these positive points are able to see 
differences in the logical strength of arguments. Consider 
the following:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An appreciation of P2 allows people to recognize the 
strength of (b): for (b), it must be the case that Xs are 
usually Zs because the Xs that are Ys must also be Zs. In 
contrast, an appreciation of P1 and P3 allows people to see 
the weakness of (a) and (c), respectively: for (a) and (c), it 
might be that none of the Xs are Zs because it could be that 
the Ys that are not Xs are not Zs. 
Ford (2004, In Press) argues that people who see the 
differences in the logical strength of arguments are more 
likely to give logically justifiable answers on nonmonotonic 
reasoning problems, since they rely on logically valid 
principles to form their answers. For example, with 
problems such as (1), they answer ‘unlikely’ more 
frequently and more strongly than people who do not see 
differences in the logical strength of arguments. They give 
this answer because of their recognition of the weakness of 
(a).  
Note that these reasoners are not relying on a notion of 
‘specificity’, where information stemming from a subclass 
overrides information from a superclass; Ford and 
Billington’s (2000) subjects did not articulate this notion of 
specificity as it is used in AI and the three P factors they 
identified make no mention of such specificity. The subjects 
instead rely on the logical strength of conflicting paths in an 
argument.  
In this manuscript, we investigate further the nature of the 
logical strengths and weaknesses that reasoners who 
appreciate P2 and P3 use.  We will argue for differences in 
the probabilistic interpretation of the modifiers usually and 
typically and consequent differences in the logical strengths 
and weaknesses of arguments. Given the results of Ford 
(2004, In Press), we would thus expect variations in 
conclusions given by reasoners who appreciate P2 and P3, 
with these reasoners giving more weight to the stronger side 
of an argument. 
In a pilot experiment, we will extend a former study in 
which it was shown that researchers should be careful how 
to phrase their ‘default relations’ (Dieussaert, 2003). 
Researchers do not seem to make a distinction between 
sentences such as ‘birds fly’, ‘birds normally fly’, ‘birds 
usually fly’, ‘birds typically fly’ and so on. However, 
Dieussaert showed that the interpretation of these sentences, 
and the inferences yielded from them, differ greatly.  
For the present study, we focus on the difference between 
usually and typically. We confirm the finding that typically 
is interpreted as indicating more instantiations of a type than 
usually. This implies that ‘birds typically fly’ represents a 
stronger relation than ‘birds usually fly’ since more 
instances of ‘bird’ are supposed to fly in the former case.  
X    Y    Z  (a) 
(all of the Xs are Ys, Ys are usually Zs) 
X    Y    Z (b) 
(Xs are usually Ys, all of the Ys are Zs) 
X    Y    Z (c) 
(Xs are usually Ys, Ys are usually Zs) 
In a second experiment, we use this finding to show how the 
strengths and weaknesses of arguments can influence 
nonmonotonic reasoning. Reasoners who are shown to 
appreciate P2 and P3 are given problems with relations 
phrased with typically and usually. The data show clearly 
that the strength of arguments influences the nonmonotonic 
reasoning process for these subjects.  
 
Pilot Experiment 
In an earlier experiment (Dieussaert, 2003), the influence of 
phrasing on the interpretation of default sentences was 
shown. In a within subjects design, participants estimated 
the positive outcome of a sequence such as ‘Hilo are 
typically waff. Jukk is a hilo. Is Jukk a waff?’ significantly 
higher than for sequences like ‘Brant are usually glent. 
Kerdo is a brant. Is Kerdo a glent?’  
To obtain confirmatory evidence, we extended the earlier 
experiment.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Ninety-nine first year students in Psychology at the 
University of Leuven, who had not taken a logic course, 
participated as a partial fulfillment of a course requirement.  
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Design 
The design was completely within subjects. The dependent 
variable was the percentage entered per item. 
 
Material and Procedure 
Each participant received a booklet with written instructions 
and 18 items in randomized order. Each participant solved 
18 problems: 9 positive items and 9 negative items. They 
solved this paper-and-pencil task individually and in a self-
paced manner.  
Here, we focus only on the difference between typically and 
usually, since these terms form the core of the main 
experiment. 
The relevant material was: 
• Nagdals are usually pirasos.  
• Hittas are typically waffs 
• Nilo are usually not riza 
• Koki are typically not liri 
The instructions for the positive items were as follows:  
On each of the following pages a sentence will be presented. 
We ask you to mark how you interpret the underlined word 
within this sentence. To clarify the task, we give you an 
example.  
The sentence: JY members are normally singers.  
The question: Does the word ‘normally’ mean that: 
Mark one or more answers:  
0 A certain percentage of JY members have features that 
characterise singers. If so, given the sentence, what would 
you assume would be the approximate % (0-100) of JY 
members that have features that characterize singers. 
..........%   [further referred to as: Feature] 
0 A certain percentage of time JY members are singers. If 
so, given the sentence, what would you assume would be 
the approximate % (0-100) of time JY members are singers. 
..........%   [further referred to as: Time] 
0 A certain percentage of JY members are singers. If so, 
given the sentence, what would you assume would be the 
approximate % (0-100) of JY members that are singers. 
..........%   [further referred to as: Number] 
For the negative items, the task were rephrased in a negative 
form e.g.: ...% (0-100) of JY members that are not singers. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1: Mean percentages given for Feature, Time, and 
Number (see Material).a 
Problem Feature Time Number Mean 
Typically 91.8 
(N=85) 
65.0 
(N=01) 
92.3 
(N=24) 
91.8 
[SD=11.7] 
Usually 77.9 
(N=31) 
74.3 
(N=17) 
79.6 
(N=70) 
78.4 
[SD=12.5] 
Typically not 87.5 
(N=73) 
88.3 
(N=04) 
89.1 
(N=36) 
87.3 
[SD=17.9] 
Usually not 77.2 
(N=27) 
76.8 
(N=38) 
76.4 
(N=52) 
77.4 
[SD=14.3] 
aThe number of responses (N) do not add up to 99 because participants 
were allowed to mark 1-3 answers. Some participants marked only the 
answers and did not enter a percentage. 
 
Overall percentages entered for typically are higher than 
percentages entered for usually (91.8 vs. 78.4; t (92) =7.82, 
p < .00001). Percentages entered for typically not are higher 
than percentages entered for usually not (87.3 vs. 77.4; t 
(46) =4.8, p < .00001).  
If we take into account only the single choices of 
participants (and remove items for which more than one 
answer was marked): Feature is the preferred category for 
typically, while Number is the preferred category for 
usually. A Sign test shows a higher number of Feature 
choices for typically (73) than for usually (17; Sign test, 
non-ties = 63, Z = 6.3, p < .00001). The same pattern is 
found for typically not (59) versus usually not (15; Sign test, 
non-ties = 70, Z = 8.3, p < .00001). A Sign test shows a 
higher number of Number choices for usually (55) than for 
typically (13; Sign test, non-ties = 56, Z = 5.5, p < .00001). 
A similar pattern is found for usually not (39) versus 
typically not (23; Sign test, non-ties = 33, Z = 2.4, p < 
.00005).   
 
Discussion 
This experiment confirms the results of Dieussaert (2003): 
typically and usually are interpreted somewhat differently. 
Most importantly for our purposes, having typically in a 
sentence is associated with higher percentages than having 
usually, with the former term thus being considered 
stronger.  
Main Experiment 
The pilot experiment provides confirmatory evidence for the 
stronger relation between two propositions A and B when 
they are connected in a default sentence with typically than 
with usually.  
Having established this firmly, we can now investigate how 
the strength of this relation influences the nonmonotonic 
reasoning process. In this experiment, reasoners who 
appreciate Ford and Billington’s (2000) P2 and P3 are 
tested.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Twenty-seven first year students in Psychology from the 
University of Leuven, who had not taken a logic course, 
participated as a partial fulfillment of a course requirement.  
 
Design 
The design was completely within subjects. The dependent 
variable was the score on a seven-point scale. 
 
Material and Procedure 
Each participant first received two critical questions (Ford, 
2004) to see if they recognized Ford and Billington’s (2000) 
P2 and P3.  
They were told that there were no time limits. The questions 
were:  
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1) Given the following two statements: 
Mary’s friends are usually Ann’s friends.  
All of Ann’s friends are Sue’s friends. 
Could it be the case that none of Mary’s friends are Sue’s 
friends? (Yes/No) 
 
Given the following two statements: 
Jim’s friends are usually Tom’s friends.   
Tom’s friends are usually Fred’s friends. 
Could it be the case that none of Jim’s friends are Fred’s 
friends? (Yes/No) 
 
The first question contains the strong argument, with P2 
relevant:  
X  Y  Z 
while the second question contains the weak argument, with 
P3 relevant: 
X  Y  Z 
 
Only participants who answered the critical questions 
correctly (No on the first, Yes on the second) proceeded to 
the second part of the experiment, leaving 11 subjects. 
These participants received a booklet with written 
instructions and 18 problems (1 per page). Each participant 
gave their answer to each problem verbally and then 
indicated a likelihood estimation on a seven point scale.  
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, estimate the likelihood of Z(x). 
 
extremely            extremely 
unlikely      likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Problems in which the modifier typically (t) was used for 
the positive arguments and in which the modifier usually (u) 
was used for the negative arguments will be referred to as 
TU problems. Problems in which the modifier usually (u) 
was used for the positive arguments and in which the 
modifier typically (t) was used for the negative arguments 
will be referred to as UT problems.  
Six differently structured problems can be distinguished. 
Participants received two examples of each of two versions 
of the following 3-argument structures, thus making 12 
problems: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) [Small size] t/u [Large size] 
 A(x)    B 
u/t    t/u 
 
 
 C    C(x)? 
 
 
 
 
Participants also received one example of each of the two 
versions of the following 4-argument structures, making a 
further 6 problems:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It should perhaps be noted here that of the six structures 
studied here, the notion of specificity, if it were used, could 
only be applied to Problems 2 and 3, where information 
from a subclass (A) conflicts with information from its 
superclass (B).  The good reasoners we are using, however, 
would be expected to use P2 and P3 to compare the strength 
of the conflicting arguments in all the problems.   
Problems usually requiring ‘Can’t tell’ 
Problem 1 represents a strong positive versus a strong 
negative argument. The expected response when the 
modifier phrase is the same for both sides of the argument is 
thus around 4, meaning ‘can’t tell’. However, an additional 
manipulation was added.  
(1)  t/u 
 A(x)   B 
u/t 
 
 
 C    C(x)? 
(2)  t/u 
 A(x)   B 
u/t    t/u 
 
 
 C    C(x)? 
(4)  t/u 
 A(x)   B 
      
 
  u/t 
 C(x)   D  D(x)? 
(5)  t/u 
 A(x)   B 
       t/u 
 
  u/t 
 C(x)   D  D(x)? 
(6)  [Small size] t/u [Large size] 
 A(x)   B 
       t/u 
 
   u/t 
 C(x)   D  D(x)? 
 [Small size] 
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In 1a, the positive non-strict relation was phrased with 
typically (t; As are typically Bs), while the negative non-
strict relation was phrased with usually (u; As are usually 
not Cs). For problem 1b, the phrasing was vice versa 
(usually for the positive relation and typically for the 
negative one). 
Problem 4 represents a similar problem to (1), but with four 
propositions involved. The expected response here is also 4, 
meaning ‘can’t tell’, when the modifiers are the same, but 
again TU and UT versions were given. 
Given that typically is stronger than usually, the TU 
versions would be expected to result in a higher rating 
(more positive) than the UT versions. 
 
Problems usually indicating ‘unlikely’ 
Problem 2 represents a weak positive versus a strong 
negative argument. The expected response when the 
modifier phrase is the same for both sides of the argument is 
thus lower than 4, meaning ‘unlikely’. However, the 
phrasing manipulation could be expected to have an 
additional influence on the final rating.    
Problem 5 is similar to Problem 2, with a weak positive 
versus a strong negative argument, and with the phrasing 
manipulation expected to influence the final rating. 
Problems 3 and 6 differ from 2 and 5, respectively, in that 
information is given on the relative subset/superset sizes to 
which the respective items belong: a small subset for A and 
a large one for B. It seems (Ford, In Press) that relative size 
information can sometimes help good reasoners in their 
reasoning. 
For problems 2, 3, 5 and 6, the ratings for the TU versions 
would be expected to move higher, becoming more positive 
than would otherwise be expected.   With the UT versions, 
the ratings would be expected to move lower, becoming 
even less positive than would otherwise be expected. 
 
Results 
 
Table 2: The mean likelihood ratings as a function of 
modifiers used in the positive and negative arguments. 
Standard deviations are given in square brackets. 
(N = 11) Problem TU UT 
3-arg  (1) 4.3 [1.2] 3.7 [0.8] 
 w/o relative size (2) 3.9 [1.1] 2.7 [0.8] 
  with relative size (3) 4.2 [1.1] 2.5 [0.9] 
4-arg  (4) 5.0 [1.7] 3.4 [1.2] 
 w/o relative size (5) 4.2 [1.7] 2.5 [0.8] 
 with relative size (6) 4.2 [1.3] 3.4 [1.4] 
 
3-argument problems.  
The mean likelihood rating was higher for TU problems 
than for UT problems (4.1 vs. 3.0; F(1,10) = 17.5, MSE = 
1.2, p < .005). Planned comparisons showed that TU ratings 
are higher than UT ratings for Problem 1 (4.3 vs. 3.7; 
F(1,10) = 7.7, MSE = .2, p < .05), for Problem 2 (3.9 vs. 
2.7; F(1,10) = 10.1, MSE = .7, p < .01), and for Problem 3 
(4.2 vs. 2.5; F(1,10) = 14.4, MSE = 1.1, p < .005).  
No difference between the problems was observed (p = .08). 
However, an interaction between problem and modifier was 
observed (F(2,20) = 4.4, MSE = .4, p <.05). A planned 
comparison shows only a significant difference for UT 
between Problem 1 and 2 (3.7 vs. 2.7; F(1,10) = 6.9, MSE = 
.8, p < .05) and between Problem 1 and 3 (3.7 vs. 2.5; 
F(1,10) = 31.0, MSE = .3, p < .0005). This difference is due 
to the particularly low ratings of UT Problem 2 and 3. 
Notice, too, that relative size information did not influence 
the ratings. 
 
4-argument problems.  
A similar pattern is found for 4-argument problems. The 
mean likelihood rating was higher for TU problems than for 
UT problems (4.5 vs. 3.1; F(1,10) = 7.0, MSE = 4.5, p < 
.05). Planned comparisons showed that TU ratings are 
higher than UT ratings for Problem 4 (5.0 vs. 3.4; F(1,10) = 
5.2, MSE = 2.8, p < .05), for Problem 5 (4.2 vs. 2.5; F(1,10) 
= 6.8, MSE = 2.4, p < .05), but not for Problem 6 (4.2 vs. 
3.4; p =.2).  
No difference between the problems was observed (p = 0.5). 
No interaction between problem and modifier was observed.  
 
Discussion 
This study was set up to gain more insight into the role that 
modifiers of non-strict relations play in the nonmonotonic 
reasoning process. Generally, researchers do not pay much 
attention to the specific wording of default expressions. We 
showed in a pilot experiment that this neglect is undeserved: 
default expressions vary in interpretation.  However, only if 
this interpretation also affects the nonmonotonic reasoning 
process does the topic become particularly noteworthy for 
AI researchers and philosophical logicians doing research 
on nonmonotonic reasoning.  
In the main experiment we showed that the use of different 
modifiers in non-strict relations does indeed lead to a 
variation in nonmonotonic reasoning, more precisely in 
likelihood ratings on nonmonotonic reasoning problems.  
We presented reasoners who appreciate P2 and P3, with 
problems of two kinds:  problems with structures where we 
would normally expect them to give a ‘can’t tell’ answer 
and problems where we normally expect them to give an 
‘unlikely’ answer. So, if participants bore only the structure 
of the problem in mind, we would expect a ‘can’t tell’ 
answer for Problems 1 and 4, and an ‘unlikely’ answer for 
Problem 2-3 and 5-6, despite the modifier manipulation. 
However, if the reasoning process was influenced by the 
modifier used, we would see a shift in answers, depending 
on the specific modifier used to express the positive and 
negative non-strict relations. 
The data show clearly that reasoners who appreciate P2 and 
P3 are influenced by the modifier used. Ratings on TU 
problems differ significantly from ratings on UT problems. 
With the ‘can’t tell’ Problem 1, we observed ratings staying 
close to the ‘can’t tell’ rating, although a positive shift was 
noted for TU problems, while a slightly negative shift was 
noted for UT problems, resulting in an overall difference. 
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With the ‘can’t tell’ Problem 4, the pattern was more 
extremely pronounced, with a large positive shift for TU 
problems and a large negative shift for UT problems. 
The TU versions of problems 2-3 and 5-6 are lifted up to a 
‘can’t tell’ level, while UT versions receive an ‘unlikely’ 
rating. While adding relative size information has been 
shown to sometimes help good nonmonotonic reasoners 
(Ford, In Press), it did not affect the reasoning process in 
our experiment, possibly because these subjects did not 
need this help. 
It is clear that although the matching TU and UT versions of 
problems have the same structure, they are not considered as 
being equivalent. The modifier typically or typically not 
makes a non-strict relation stronger compared with its 
counterpart usually or usually not.  
It is clear that people who show an appreciation of P2 and 
P3 and who solve nonmonotonic problems by comparing 
the logical strength of conflicting arguments, rather than by 
using a notion of specificity, also use the strength of 
modifiers to guide their reasoning.  Just as it is rational to 
take the logical strength of conflicting arguments into 
account, rather than using a notion of specificity, so too it is 
rational to take into account modifier strength in conflicting 
arguments.   
 
Conclusion 
Ford (2004, In Press) has shown that good reasoners use the 
logical strength of different sides of an argument to guide 
their reasoning. The present study adds credence to this 
effect of weighing up the strengths of the different sides of 
an argument. The study shows that different modifiers can 
differentially weaken or strengthen an argument and that 
they thereby influence reasoning.   
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Abstract 
Three experiments on property induction were conducted to 
explore whether an incoherent premise discounted the 
believability of the conclusion when there were two premises. 
In all three experiments, a single premise increased or 
decreased the likelihood of the conclusion depending on the 
nature of explanatory coherence of a premise and a 
conclusion. However, when there were two premises, one that 
shared the reason with the conclusion (coherent premise), and 
one that does not (incoherent premise), the believability of the 
conclusion was affected differently in three experiments. 
When two premises and the conclusion were presented 
simultaneously in Experiment 1, the believability of the 
conclusion was increased. That is, an incoherent premise did 
not seem to affect the believability of the conclusion as much 
as the coherent premise. The incoherent premise seemed to 
decrease the believability of the conclusion a little bit when 
the two premises and the conclusion were presented 
sequentially so that each premise was not ignored in 
Experiment 2. The incoherent premise decreased the 
believability of the conclusion below the baseline condition in 
Experiment 3, where participants were asked to write down 
reasons for each premise being true. Results of three 
experiments suggested that only the confirming evidences 
were processed under natural conditions. A few possible 
theoretical implications were considered.  
 
Introduction 
When someone asks a question whether a target object has a 
certain property (target property), such as “Does an ostrich 
lay eggs?”, and you do not know the answer, you might 
induce the answer by checking whether some object (source 
object), usually objects that are similar to the target object, 
has the target property. In the ostrich example, you would 
answer “yes” if you think ostriches are similar to geese and 
know that geese lay eggs. As this example shows, what 
conclusion you make depends on what objects are used as 
source objects. 
What object is an effective source object in property 
induction depends on a number of factors: The nature of the 
target property, the level of knowledge of the person, and 
the cultural background of the person, to name a few. 
People used different source objects depending on their 
knowledge and occupation (Proffitt, Coley, & Medin, 2000). 
Also there seems to be a culture difference in property 
induction (Choi, Nisbett, & Smith, 1997). Even though the 
level of knowledge and the cultural background of the 
person affect the property induction, the effect of the nature 
of the target property on property induction has been the 
focus of most research. More specifically, what objects are 
effective as source objects in inducing two types of 
properties, and how the information of the source objects 
are used for property induction have been more widely 
investigated. 
There are two types of target properties, blank properties 
and nonblank properties, and the effectiveness of source 
objects seems to differ between the two types. The 
effectiveness of a source object seems to depend on the 
similarity between the target object and the source object for 
blank properties for which we do not have any other 
information to rely on (e.g., 'have BCC in blood') (Osherson, 
Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990; Rips, 1975; Sloman, 
1993). However, the similarity between the target object and 
the source object does not seem to work for nonblank 
properties for which we have other information to infer 
about the target object having the target property (e.g., 'can 
cut the wire') (Smith, Shafir, & Osherson, 1993). As the 
relationship between objects and the target property are 
diverse (Murphy & Medin, 1985), there are many ways of 
inducing nonblank properties: People seem to use other 
relevant information, such as body size or strength, in 
inducing nonblank properties (Smith et al., 1993). People 
rated the believability of the conclusion differently when the 
target property is about shape from when the target property 
is about behavior (Heit & Rubinstein, 1994). 
One way of inducing nonblank properties is comparing 
the reason for the target object having the target property 
with the reason for the source object having the target 
property.  Sloman (1994, 1997) proposed that the 
explanation coherence between the premise and the 
conclusion affect the plausibility of the conclusion. If the 
target object and the source object share the same 
explanation, informing the participants that the source 
object has the target property increases the believability of 
the conclusion that the target object has the target property. 
For instance, computer programmers and secretaries have 
bad backs because they sit all day long. Therefore, 
informing the participants that “Computer programmers 
have bad backs” would make the conclusion “Secretaries 
have bad backs” more plausible than when the participants 
are not informed about the computer programmers having 
bad backs. However, if the target object and the source 
object do not share the same reason, informing the 
participants that the source object has the target property 
decreases the believability of the conclusion that the target 
object has the target property. In the bad back example, for 
instance, furniture movers had bad backs because they lift 
heavy things. Therefore, informing that “Furniture movers 
had bad backs” would make the conclusion “Secretaries 
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have bad backs” less plausible. That is, premises that have 
different explanations seem to discount the plausibility of 
the conclusion. Sloman called this the explanation 
discounting principle. 
As has been described, the explanation discounting 
principle explains empirical results quite well when there is 
just one piece of relevant information. However, it is not 
specific about how it works when there are multiple pieces 
of relevant information, especially when there is conflicting 
information. There can be a few modified versions of the 
explanation discounting principle. The most extreme form 
of the explanation discounting principle would assume that 
the participants use all the information in inducing 
properties in equal degree (equivalence hypothesis, but 
hereafter I use equivalence hypothesis and the explanation 
discounting principle interchangeably). However, the 
equivalence hypothesis needs to be tested, because when 
there is more than one piece of relevant information, people 
do not use all the information they have. People are known 
to be cognitive misers (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). They seem to 
use information that confirms their predictions or 
hypotheses, but ignore information that disconfirms. They 
produced cases that confirmed their hypotheses (Wason, 
1960) or they were more willing to search information that 
confirms than information that is likely to disconfirm 
(Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982). Therefore if the confirmation 
strategy is the default way of using information, then it is 
quite likely that the explanation discounting principle may 
not apply when there is more than one piece of relevant 
information. 
In this paper, we intend to explore whether the 
explanation discounting principle works when there are two 
premises in property induction tasks. There are two kinds of 
premises: “Same” premises, in which the source object has 
the target property for the same reason as the target object, 
and “Different” premises, in which the source object has the 
target property for reasons different from that of the target. 
In three experiments, we are mainly interested in the 
believability of the conclusion of the mixed conditions 
where one Same premise and one Different premise are 
presented. If the implicit equivalence hypothesis of the 
explanation discounting principle was correct, the 
conclusion in the mixed conditions should be rated not 
higher than that of the baseline condition, where the 
conclusion is presented without any premises. On the other 
hand, if the confirmation strategy is the default mode of 
using multiple pieces of information in property induction, 
the conclusion in the mixed conditions should be rated not 
lower than that of the baseline condition. 
The premises and the conclusion were presented 
simultaneously in Experiment 1 to explore whether the 
explanation discounting principle applies when there are 
two premises. Experiment 1 is regarded as a natural 
condition because we did not try any manipulation to make 
the premises being processed. Experiments 2 and 3 were 
intended to find the boundary condition where the 
explanation discounting principle applies. Each premise and 
the conclusion were presented successively in Experiment 2 
to make each premise salient and not be ignored. In 
Experiment 3, participants were asked to write down the 
reason why the object has the target property for each 
premise. 
Experiment 1 
There were two goals for Experiment 1. First, we wanted to 
replicate Sloman’s (1994, 1997) finding that one Same 
premise increased the plausibility of the conclusion, and one 
Different premise decreased the plausibility of the 
conclusion. Second, we wanted to compare the explanation 
discounting principle against the confirmation strategy by 
presenting two premises, one Same premise and one 
Different premise. 
Method 
 
Design There were five experimental conditions in 
Experiment 1. In two single-premise conditions, one 
premise was presented on top of the conclusion. There was a 
horizontal line between premises and the conclusion. In the 
Same condition, one Same premise was presented, and in 
the Different condition, one Different premise was 
presented. Two premises were presented with the 
conclusion in the remaining three two-premises conditions: 
In the S+S condition, two Same premises were presented on 
top of the conclusion. In the S+D condition, the Same 
premise was presented on the top line and the Different 
premise was presented on the next line. In the D+S 
condition, the Different premise was presented on the top 
line and the Same premise was presented on the next line. 
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the five 
experimental conditions. Therefore, the premise condition 
was a between subjects variable. 
 
Participants Ninety-five Sungkyunkwan University 
students who attended an "Introduction to Psychology" 
course participated as a requirement for the course. Nineteen 
participants were randomly assigned to each experimental 
condition. None of them had participated in property 
induction experiments prior to the current experiment. 
 
Material Twelve properties were used in the experiment as 
the target property. The target properties and the 
corresponding occupations were selected based on the 
results of an item selection experiment. In the item selection 
experiment, two hundred Sungkyunkwan University 
students were asked to write down at least two occupations 
that have the target property and the reasons they have the 
target properties over 24 properties. The 24 properties were 
selected from 32 items used in Sloman (1994, 1997) and 
judged appropriate in Korea. Of the 24, 12 properties were 
selected as experimental material. All premises and 
conclusions took the form of an occupation or class of 
people having the target property, such as "Veterans have 
problems getting jobs." 
 
Procedure There were three stages in the experiment. At 
Stage 1, participants were presented only the conclusion of 
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twelve induction problems, and were asked to rate the 
probability of each conclusion. Each conclusion was 
presented on a computer monitor screen one at a time. The 
presentation order of the twelve conclusions was 
randomized within a subject. The rating at Stage 1 was used 
as a baseline rating of the participant. After they finished 
baseline estimation, they did an intervening task for more 
than five minutes (Stage 2). The intervening task was not 
related with property induction, or any of the properties or 
the occupations used in the experiment. After the 
participants completed the intervening task, they were 
presented twelve experimental property induction problems 
and asked to rate the probability of each conclusion 
considering the premises. After they finished rating twelve 
induction problems, they were given the induction problems 
and their ratings for each problem and were asked to type in 
the reason for their response. The presentation order of the 
twelve induction problems was randomized within a subject. 
Presentation of the items and recording of responses in 
Stages 1 and 3 were manipulated by a program written in 
Visual Basic 6.0. Pentium-class PCs and computer monitors 
were used in Stages 1 and 3. 
Results and discussion 
 
Rating Average ratings of the baseline (Stage 1) and the 
experiment phase (Stage 3) for each premise condition are 
presented in Fig. 1. As the difference between the rating in 
the baseline phase and that of the experiment phase was the 
main interest, ratings in the baseline phase and that of the 
experiment phase were regarded as a within-subjects 
variable, and one factor within-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted for each premise condition. 
In single-premise conditions, presenting a Same premise 
increased the rating in the Same condition, F(1, 18) = 4.87, 
p < .05, MSE = 92.96, and presenting a Different premise 
decreased the rating in the Different condition, F(1, 18) = 
51.93, p < .001, MSE = 21.92. Results in the single-premise 
conditions replicated Sloman's (1994) results and 
corroborated the explanation discounting principle. 
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Figure 1. Average ratings of the conclusion: Experiment 1. 
(S: Same; D: Different) 
 
However, the explanation discounting principle did not 
seem to apply in the two-premises conditions. Presenting 
two premises increased the rating of the conclusion in the 
S+S condition, F(1, 18) = 21.92, p < .001, MSE = 13.25, 
and in the S+D condition, F(1, 18) = 11.09, p < .001, MSE = 
17.54, and did not affect the rating of the conclusion in the 
D+S condition, F(1, 18) = 2.14, ns. According to the 
explanation discounting principle, the conclusion in the S+D 
and D+S conditions, in which there was a premise that has 
the target property for reasons different from that of the 
target object, was expected to yield ratings at least not 
higher than that of the baseline phase. However, even in the 
D+S condition, where the difference from the baseline is 
smaller than the S+D condition, the average rating for the 
experiment phase was a little larger than that of the baseline, 
though not statistically significant. Thus, the results in S+S, 
S+D, D+S conditions seemed to fair better with the 
confirmation strategy. That is, participants might have 
processed only the information that can confirm or 
strengthen the plausibility of the conclusion when there are 
two pieces of conflicting information. The possibility of 
adopting the confirmation strategy got further support from 
participants' subjective reasons for their responses. 
 
Subjective report The reasons participants wrote down for 
their conclusions in the experiment were classified into 11 
possible categories in the single-premise condition and 20 
possible categories in the two-premises conditions. 
In the single-premise conditions, participants seemed to 
use the information in the premise. More specifically, in the 
Same condition, about 65% of the reasons matched that of 
the experimenter. In the Different condition, about 35% 
reported that the reasons for the premise and the conclusion 
did not agree. In general, results in the single-premise 
conditions suggested the explanation discounting principle 
seemed to apply when there is just one piece of relevant 
information. 
However, participants seemed to mainly use confirming 
information and ignore disconfirming information when 
there were two premises. More specifically, in the S+S 
condition, 58% of the responses mentioned the premises and 
the conclusion had the same reason. In the S+D and D+S 
conditions, 29% of the responses mentioned only the Same 
premise, and 21% mentioned reasons they spontaneously 
made to make both the premise and the conclusion shared 
the same reason. In other words, in about half of the 
responses, participants searched for reasons that are the 
same as the conclusion. Of the remaining 50%, 22% of the 
response mentioned only the conclusion. As a whole, 
participants' subjective reports in two-premises conditions 
strongly suggested that they adopted the confirmation 
strategy. 
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 strongly suggested that 
participants processed only a part of the information given 
to them. That is, they seemed to use information that gave 
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support for the conclusion, and ignore information that was 
incoherent with the conclusion. Experiments 2 and 3 were 
intended to test this possibility of non-use of disconfirming 
information by making premises salient so that 
disconfirming information was not to be ignored. In 
Experiment 2, premises were made salient by presenting the 
premise(s) and the conclusion one after the other. 
Method 
 
Participants Ninety-five Sungkyunkwan University 
students participated in Experiment 2. They were recruited 
in the same way as that of Experiment 1. Nineteen 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the five 
premise conditions. 
 
Material The materials of Experiment 2 were identical to 
that of Experiment 1. 
 
Procedures The procedures of Experiment 2 were identical 
to that of Experiment 1, except for the following changes in 
the temporal order of presenting premises and conclusion at 
Stage 3. At Stage 3 of Experiment 2, the premise on the top 
line of the screen appeared and remained visible until 
participants made responses indicating their rating of the 
conclusion. The second premise, if there was one, appeared 
on the screen 3 seconds after the start of the first premise 
and remained visible until participants made responses. 
Finally, the conclusion appeared on the screen 3 seconds 
after the onset of the last premise, and remained visible until 
the response. The sequential presentation of the premises 
and the conclusion was intended to make sure that the 
premises not be ignored. 
Results and Discussion 
 
Rating Average ratings of the baseline and the experiment 
phase for each premise condition are presented in Fig. 2. In 
single-premise conditions, presenting a Same premise 
increased the rating in the Same condition, F(1, 18) = 6.00, 
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Figure 2. Average ratings of the conclusion: Experiment 2. 
(S: Same; D: Different) 
p < .001, MSE = 21.92, and presenting a Different premise 
decreased the rating in the Different condition, F(1, 18) = 
16.29, p < .001, MSE = 133.96. 
Presenting two premises increased the rating of the 
conclusion in the S+S condition F(1, 18) = 14.15, p < .001, 
MSE = 29.26, but did not affect the rating of the conclusion 
in the S+D condition, F(1, 18) = 1.50, ns, and in the D+S 
condition, F(1, 18) = .79, ns. Different from Experiment 1, 
the ratings of the two mixed conditions, the S+D and the 
D+S conditions, were not different from that of a baseline, 
which suggested that making premises not ignored by 
presenting one after the other makes all the information 
attended and as a consequence can exert both facilitating 
and discounting effect on property induction, even though 
the discounting effect seems not as strong as the facilitating 
effect. 
 
Subjective report As in Experiment 1, participants seemed 
to use the information in the premise in the single-premise 
conditions. More specifically, in the Same condition, about 
73% of the reasons matched that of the experimenter. In the 
Different condition, about 44% reported that the reasons for 
the premise and the conclusion did not agree. 
The pattern of responses in the two-premises conditions 
of Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1. 52% of 
the responses mentioned that the premises and the 
conclusion had the same reason in the S+S condition. In the 
S+D and D+S conditions, 28% of the responses mentioned 
only the Same premise, and 22% mentioned reasons they 
spontaneously made to make both the premise and the 
conclusion share the same reason. Furthermore, 26% of the 
responses mentioned only the conclusion. 
In general, results of Experiment 2 were quite similar to 
that of Experiment 1, but sequentially presenting premises 
did at least partially succeed to make information that 
disconfirms the conclusion affect the believability of the 
conclusion. 
Experiment 3 
Presenting the premises and the conclusion successively 
changed the pattern of results a little in Experiment 2. In 
Experiment 3, the disconfirming premise was forced to be 
processed by asking participants to write down reasons why 
each premise could be true. 
Method 
 
Participants Ninety-five Sungkyunkwan University 
students participated in Experiment 3. They were recruited 
in the same way as that of Experiment 1. Nineteen 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the five 
premise conditions. 
 
Material The materials of Experiment 3 were identical to 
that of Experiment 1. 
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Procedures The procedures of Experiment 3 were identical 
to that of Experiment 1, except for the following three 
changes. First, in Experiment 3, participants were tested in 
groups. Nineteen participants in each premise condition 
were seated in a large class room. They were seated in a 
way such that there was at least one seat unoccupied in all 
directions. Second, participants were given a small booklet. 
Third, participants were asked to write down the reasons for 
the premises being true and the believability rating of the 
conclusion. Separate booklets were given at each stage, so 
that participants could not look at their baseline ratings 
when they did induction problems. In the booklet for Stage 
3, the conclusion was printed in a page following the page 
where premises and their responses for the premises were 
written, so that participants could not read their reasons for 
the premises. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Rating Average ratings of the baseline and the experiment 
phase for each premise condition are presented in Fig. 3. In 
single-premise conditions, presenting a Same premise 
increased the rating in the Same condition, F(1, 18) = 8.03, 
p < .05, MSE = 61.53, and presenting a Different premise 
decreased the rating in the Different condition, F(1, 18) = 
38.02, p < .001, MSE = 78.76. 
Presenting two premises increased the rating of the 
conclusion in the S+S condition F(1, 18) = 9.55, p < .01, 
MSE = 74.76, but decreased the rating of the conclusion in 
the S+D condition, F(1, 18) = 8.70, p < .01, MSE = 38.00, 
and D+S condition, F(1, 18) = 9.71, p < .01, MSE = 65.67. 
In general, making premises salient by writing down 
reasons why they can be true did not affect the effects of 
confirming information, probably because the confirming 
information had already exerted its influence due to the 
confirmation strategy people spontaneously use in most 
situations. However, presenting a disconfirming premise 
decreased the rating of the conclusion in Experiment 3 in a  
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Figure 3. Average ratings of the conclusion: Experiment 3. 
(S: Same; D: Different) 
much larger degree, and succeeded to give very strong 
support for the explanation discounting principle when there 
were two conflicting premises. 
As a whole, the results of the three experiments seemed to 
suggest that the explanation discounting principle seemed to 
work only when the disconfirming information became 
salient by either being presented one by one or by forcing 
respondents to think about the reasons. 
General Discussion 
Three experiments were conducted to explore whether the 
explanation discounting principle works when there are two 
conflicting premises. The results of the three experiments 
can be summarized as follows: (1) Both the confirmation 
strategy and the explanation discounting principle seemed to 
work when there was just one premise. In three experiments, 
it has been consistently observed that the Same premise 
increased the rating of the conclusion, supporting the 
confirmation strategy, and that the Different premise 
decreased the rating of the conclusion, supporting the 
explanation discounting principle. Results of the single-
premise conditions suggested that people seemed to search 
for relevant information and use it when they had just one 
piece of relevant information. (2) However, only the Same 
premise(s) seemed to affect the plausibility of the 
conclusion when there were two premises under natural 
conditions. Ratings in the two mixed conditions were higher 
than or equal to the baseline in Experiment 1, but got equal 
or lower than the baseline when the premises were forced to 
be processed in Experiments 2 & 3. Our interpretation that 
only the confirming information seemed to influence the 
judgments and decisions is in good agreement with the 
information processing strategies generally accepted in 
cognitive psychology, such as Johnson-Laird & Byrne 
(1991) and Nisbett & Ross (1980). 
    However, the explanation discounting principle can 
explain the results of the three experiments if the implicit 
assumption that all information is processed in the same 
degree was modified. First, as I mentioned in the 
Introduction, the explanation discounting principle did not 
make any explicit assumption concerning the fate of 
conflicting information. Therefore, our interpretation of the 
discounting principle might be an unfair test of the 
discounting principle. Second, the relevance of the 
confirming premise and the disconfirming premise might be 
different. For instance, if we adopt the coherence of  
Thagard (1992), confirming premises share more attributes 
with the conclusion than the disconfirming premises. More 
specifically, the confirming premise shares the reason and 
the consequences of the reason with the conclusion (e.g., in 
the bad back example, both programmers and secretaries 
share two attributes, sit all day long and have bad backs), 
whereas the disconfirming premise shares only the 
consequences (e.g., furniture movers and secretaries have 
one attributes in common, they have bad backs). Therefore, 
the explanation discounting principle can explain the results 
of current experiments if their relevance were used as 
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relative weights of each premise. However, the explanation 
discounting principle still has problems explaining why 
making premises salient decreased the believability of the 
conclusion below the baseline in Experiment 3. 
One aspect that has to be solved in the preceding 
argument is who, what, or when determines the processing 
order of the information. That is, deciding whether certain 
information is confirming or disconfirming to the 
conclusion can be solved only after we figure out the 
conclusion in the property induction tasks. Therefore the 
order of processing information might be different from the 
order the information is given. If this is the case, then there 
have to be multiple stages of processing. For instance, a 
primitive assessment of the relevance/confirmation of 
premises to the conclusion precedes the detailed processing 
of the relevant or confirming information. 
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Abstract
Human mental representations are both structure-sensitive
(i.e., symbolic) and semantically rich.  Connectionist models
have well-known limitations in capturing the structure-
sensitivity of mental representations, while traditional
symbolic models based on varieties of symbol-argument-
argument notation (SAA) have difficulty capturing their
semantic richness.  We argue that this limitation of SAA is
fundamental and cannot be alleviated in the notational format
of SAA itself. Finally, we review an approach to human
mental representation that captures both its structure-
sensitivity and semantic richness.
Relational reasoning—reasoning constrained by the
relational roles that objects play, rather than just the features
of the objects themselves—is ubiquitous in human mental
life, and includes analogical inference, schema induction,
and the application of explicit rules (Gentner, 1983;
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995).  In order to support human-like
relational thinking, a representational system must meet two
general requirements (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997):  First, it
must represent relations independently of their fillers and
simultaneously specify how fillers are bound to relational
roles (i.e., it must be a symbol system; Newell, 1990).
Second, it must explicitly specify the semantic content of
relational roles and their fillers.  In this paper, we consider
in detail the implications of the latter requirement, with an
emphasis on symbol-argument-argument notation (SAA),
which includes propositional notation, high-rank tensors,
and many varieties of labeled graphs.
Properties of Relational Representations
Human Relational Representations are Symbolic
Symbolic representations have the property that symbols
are invariant with their role in an expression1, and the
meaning of the expression as a whole is a function of both
                                                 
1 This is not to say that symbols may not have shades of meaning
that vary from one context to another.  For example, the symbol
“loves” suggests different relations in loves (Mary, John) vs. loves
(Mary, Chocolate).  However, as noted by Hummel and Holyoak
(2003a), this kind of contextual shading must be a function of the
system’s knowledge, rather than an inevitable consequence of the
way in which it binds relational roles to their fillers.
the symbols and their arrangement (i.e., role-filler bindings).
For example, the expressions chase (Pat, Don) and chase
(Don, Pat) mean different things, but Pat, Don, and chase
mean the same things in both expressions.  Formal symbol
systems have this property by assumption:  It is given in the
definition of the system that symbols retain their meanings
across different expressions, and that the meaning of an
expression is a function of both its constituent symbols and
their arrangement.  Physical symbol systems (Newell,
1990)—such as digital computers and human
brains—cannot simply “assume” these properties, but
instead must actively work to ensure that both are satisfied.
The claim that human mental representations are symbolic
in this sense is controversial (e.g., Elman et al., 1996),
however, relational generalization has proved unattainable
for non-symbolic models of cognition, and there is reason to
believe it is fundamentally unattainable for such models (see
Doumas & Hummel, in press; Halford, Wilson, & Phillips,
1998; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003a; Marcus, 1998).
Human Relational Representations Specify the
Semantic Content of Objects and Relational Roles
A second important property of human relational
representations is that they explicitly specify the semantic
content of objects and relational roles (e.g., the lover and
beloved roles of love (x, y) or the killer and killed roles of
murder (x, y)): We know what it means to be a lover or a
killer, and that knowledge is part of our representation of the
relation itself (as opposed to being specified in a lookup
table, a set of inference rules, or some other external
structure).  As a result, it is easy to appreciate that the
patient (i.e., killed) role of murder (x, y) is like the patient
role of manslaughter (x, y), even though the agent roles
differ (i.e., the act is intentional in the former case but not
the latter); and the agent (i.e., killer) role of murder (x, y) is
similar to the agent role of attempted-murder (x, y), even
though the patient roles differ.
More evidence that we represent the semantics of
relational roles explicitly is that we can easily solve
mappings that violate the “n-ary” restriction (Hummel &
Holyoak, 1997).  That is, we can map n-place predicates
onto m-place predicates where n ≠ m .  For instance, given
statements such as taller-than (Abe, Bill), tall (Chad) and
short (Dave), it is easy to map Abe to Chad and Bill to
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Dave.  Given shorter-than (Eric, Fred), it is also easy to
map Eric to Bill (and Dave) and Fred to Abe (and Chad).
These mappings are based on the semantics of the individual
relational roles rather than the formal syntax of
propositional notation, or, say, the fact that taller-than and
shorter-than are logical opposites: love (x, y) is in some
sense the opposite of hate (x, y), but in contrast to taller-
than and shorter-than (in which the first role of one relation
maps to the second role of the other) the first role of love (x,
y) more naturally maps to the first role of hate (x, y).   In
short, the similarity and/or mappings of various relational
roles are idiosyncratic, based on the semantic content of the
individual roles in question.  The semantics of relational
roles matter, and are an explicit part of the mental
representation of relations.
The semantic properties of relational roles are also
evidenced in numerous other ways in human cognition,
including memory retrieval (e.g., Gentner, Ratterman &
Forbus, 1993; Ross, 1989), and analogical mapping and
inference (Bassok, Wu & Olseth, 1995; Kubose, Holyoak &
Hummel, 2002; Krawczyk, Holyoak & Hummel, in press;
Ross, 1987).  Indeed, the meanings of relational roles
influence relational thinking even when they are irrelevant
or misleading (e.g., Bassok et al., 1995; Ross, 1989),
suggesting that access to and use of role-based semantic
information is quite automatic.  This information appears to
be an integral part of the mental representation of relations.
Given its centrality in human cognition, an important
criterion for a general account of human mental
representation is that it must represent relations in a way
that captures the semantics of their roles.
SAA Accounts of Relational Representations
Numerous models of human cognition account for the
symbolic nature of relational representations by postulating
representations based on varieties of symbol-argument-
argument notation (SAA). These include propositional
notation, varieties of labeled graphs, and high-rank tensor
products (e.g., Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Eliasmith &
Thagard, 2001; Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989;
Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995; Halford et al., 1998;
Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Keane, Ledgeway, & Duff,
1994; Ramscar & Yartlett, 2003; Salvucci & Anderson,
2001).  In SAA notation relations and their fillers are
represented as independent symbolic units, which are bound
together to form larger relational structures.  For example, in
propositional notation the statement “John loves Mary” is
represented by binding the symbol for the predicate love to a
list of its arguments, here John and Mary, forming the
proposition love (John, Mary).  By virtue of their positions
in the list of arguments, John is taken to be the filler of the
first role of the loves relation (i.e., the lover), and Mary is
the filler of the second role (i.e., the beloved).  Labeled
graphs use location in the graph to indicate relational
bindings in much the same way: Relations are represented
independently of their arguments (fillers), and relation-filler
bindings are represented in terms of the fillers’ locations in
the graph.  As such, SAA is meaningfully symbolic in the
sense described above.
Because SAA systems are meaningfully symbolic they
naturally support operations that require relational
representations, such as structure mapping (a.k.a., analogical
mapping; see e.g., Falkenhainer et al., 1989; Forbus et al.,
1995) and matching symbolic rules (see Anderson &
Lebiere, 1998).  This is no small accomplishment.
Numerous representational schemes, including traditional
distributed connectionist representations (e.g., Elman, et al.,
1996) and the kinds of representations formed by latent
semantic analysis (e.g., Landauer & Dumais, 1997) have not
succeeded in modeling relational perception or cognition,
and, as noted above, there are compelling reasons to believe
they are fundamentally ill-suited for doing so.
The successes of SAA notation as a model of human
mental representation are thus decidedly non-trivial.  At the
same time, however, SAA notation has greater difficulty
capturing the semantic content of human mental
representations.  Indeed, this limitation was a central part of
the criticisms leveled against symbolic modeling by the
connectionists in the mid-1980s (e.g., Rumelhart,
McClelland, & the PDP Research Group, 1986; for a more
recent treatment, see Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).  One of
the strengths of distributed connectionist representations is
their natural ability to capture the semantic content of the
objects they represent.  By contrast, propositional notation
and labeled graphs have difficulty making this semantic
content explicit.  As a result, symbolic models based on
SAA notation often resort to a patchwork of external fixes
such as look-up tables, inference rules and arbitrary, hand-
coded similarity matrices (e.g., Salvucci & Anderson, 2001;
high-rank tensors, e.g., Halford et al., 1998, are a notable
exception, but see Doumas & Hummel, in press, and
Holyoak and Hummel, 2000, for detailed treatments of the
limitations of this approach).
Importantly, these fixes are external to the relational
representations themselves: They are not instantiated in the
notation of the representations that encode relations, but
rather only at the level of the system that processes these
representations.  This separation is fine for accounts of
cognition at Marr’s (1982) level of computational theory,
but for accounts at the level of representation and algorithm
such fixes entail specifying multiple sets of representations
(at minimum one for the notational system capturing the
relations and a second for the system that captures the
relations between different relations and/or semantics of
those relations), and an interface for moving between them.
Moreover, relations in SAA are represented as indivisible
wholes, leaving the roles implicit as semantically empty
place-holders or arcs in a graph.  For example, the love (x, y)
relation is represented by a single symbol (in propositional
notation), a single vector (in high-rank tensor products), or a
single node (in a labeled graph)2, and its roles, lover (x) and
                                                 
2 Not all models that employ labeled-graphs are based on SAA
(e.g., Larkey & Love, 2003), although most are.
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beloved (y), are not represented explicitly at all.  As such,
even if a relational symbol (as a whole) is assumed to have
semantic content, SAA notation itself does not specify how
this content is differentially applicable to its arguments.  It is
this limitation that gives rise to the n-ary restriction: Even if
the symbol taller-than is assumed to have meaning, the
expression taller-than (x, y) does not explicitly specify how
the role filled by x is semantically similar to tall (z), so it
provides no basis for mapping taller-than (x, y) onto tall (z).
Recall the semantic relations between the roles of murder
(x , y), manslaughter (x, y), and attempted-murder (x, y).
SAA notation can, at best, treat the entire relations as simply
“similar” or “different”.  High-rank tensor systems, for
instance, represent entire relations (but not their roles) as
vectors, and compute the similarities between relations
based on the similarities of their vectors.  Models using
propositional notation and labeled graphs can “recast”
predicates into more abstract forms (e.g., coding both
murder (x, y) and manslaughter (x, y) as commit-violence-
against (x, y)).  Neither of these approaches expresses the
similarity relations between the individual roles of relations,
however, because they fail to make individual relational
roles (and thus their semantic content) explicit.  As a result,
they do not make clear how the roles of manslaughter (x, y)
and attempted-murder (x, y) are related to the roles of
murder (x, y), nor how they differ.
It is easy to imagine a look-up table or set of inference
rules that would supply this information, but the number of
rules required to specify the similarity relations between all
relational roles would scale minimally with (n2 – n)/2 (or n2
- n if equivalent bidirectional similarity is not assumed),
where n is the number of relational roles in the system.
Worse, these rules would be external to the system’s SAA-
based representational system, so an account of how the
system operates at the level of representation and algorithm
requires a description of the rule set, and an additional
control structure to read the SAA and access the rules as
necessary.  All of this is obviated in a system that simply
codes the semantic content of individual relational roles
explicitly in the notation of the relational representations.
The convenience of “postulate them as you need them”
inference rules makes it is tempting to assume that the lack
of role-specific semantic information in SAA is merely a
thorny inconvenience: Surely the problem of role-based
semantics in SAA is solvable, and will be solved as soon as
it becomes important enough for someone to give it
attention.  In the meantime, it is certainly no reason to
abandon SAA as a model of mental representation,
especially if the only alternatives are non-symbolic
representational schemes (to anticipate, they are not).
But it turns out that the problem is more than just a thorny
inconvenience.  As elaborated in the next section, role-
specific semantic information cannot be made internal to
(i.e., explicit in) the notation of SAA.  Instead, the
knowledge of the semantics of individual roles can only be
specified at the level of the whole system, instantiated in
external routines or representational structures.  As a result,
systems employing SAA (i.e., traditional symbolic models)
are at best incomplete as algorithmic accounts of human
cognition.
Representing Relational Roles in SAA
In a symbol system, representing something explicitly
means representing it as a structure (e.g., a proposition).
Thus, to represent relational roles and their semantic content
explicitly in SAA, it is necessary to represent them
structurally (i.e., to predicate them).  For example, to
represent the murder (x, y) relation in terms of its killer (x)
and victim (y) roles, SAA must represent killer (x) and
victim (y) as propositions (or tensors, or nodes), and
simultaneously represent the fact that together they compose
the murder (x, y) relation.
A relation specifies that its arguments are engaged in
certain specific functions or states.  For instance, the
statement drive (Brutus, the Honda) specifies that Brutus is
playing the role of the individual driving, and that the
Honda is playing the role of the thing being driven.  This
information is entailed by the relational statement itself.  As
a separate matter, the relation may also imply or suggest
other relations (e.g., that Brutus knows how to drive, that
the Honda is in running condition, etc.), but it directly
entails only the driver and driven-object roles, and the
binding of Brutus and the Honda to these roles.
A relation does more than simply imply its roles (just as
the roles do more than simply imply their parent relation), it
consists of them: Collectively, the roles, along with their
linkage to one another, are the relation.  Imagine a relation
R (p, q), with roles R1(p) and R2(q), that implies relation S
(p, q), with roles S1(p) and S2(q).  Although R (p, q) entails
or implies a total of four roles (i.e., those of R and those of
S), only two (R 1 and R 2) compose R itself.  Therefore,
representing relational roles explicitly requires explicitly
specifying which relations consist of which roles.
As summarized above, this information seems to come
gratis (i.e., without computational cost) as an integral
component of human relational representations.  An
adequate model of human relational representations should,
therefore, capture this information in its relational
representations, rather than relegating it to the processes that
operate on these representations or to external
representational systems.  This distinction is subtle, but
important. It is not enough that the system as a whole
capture this information; instead the same representations
that encode the relations should capture it.  That is, the
information should be captured at the level of the notation,
or language, of the system rather than in an external system
of inference rules, look-up tables, etc.
However, it is not possible to capture relations, their roles
and the relation between them in the notation of SAA. In
SAA representing a relation explicitly requires instantiating
a proposition.  If representing a relation implies representing
its roles, and representing a relation’s roles requires
representing the relation between the relation and its roles,
then representing any given relation implies a second
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proposition representing the relation between the first
relation and its roles.  This second proposition contains a
new relation, though, which implies roles of its own that
must be related back to it in a third proposition, which also
contains a new relation with roles that must be related back
to it, and so on.
For example, imagine the propositions love (John, Mary)
and love (Bill, Sally) and their role bindings, lover (John),
beloved (Mary), lover  (Bill) and beloved (Sally).  The
representations must specify which role bindings go
together to form which relations (e.g., that lover (John) goes
with beloved (Mary) – as opposed to beloved (Sally) or
lover (Bill) – to form the complete relation love (John,
Mary)). Specifying this composition relation in SAA
notation requires a proposition of the form consists-of (love
(John, Mary), lover (John), beloved (Mary))3.  The predicate
consists-of, however, is itself a relation, and so specifies a
set of role bindings of its own, which must be explicitly
represented and linked back to the original consists-of
relation with a second consists-of relation.  This second
consists-of is also a relation and so specifies a set of role
bindings of its own that must be linked back to it via a third
consists-of relation, and so on.4  The consequence is an
infinite regress that can render the resulting representational
system ill-typed (Manzano, 1996).
In other words, it is not possible to represent the relation
between relational roles and complete relations explicitly in
the notation of SAA.  For the same reason, it is not possible
to specify the semantic content of relational roles explicitly
in SAA.  As noted previously, this information can be
specified in a complete system based on SAA (after all,
many such systems are Turing complete), but it is not
possible to capture this information in the SAA notation
itself.  Instead, the knowledge is necessarily contained in the
processes that operate on the SAA representations, or in
external representational systems that must be interfaced
with the SAA notation.  This property renders SAA notation
fundamentally inadequate as a model of human mental
representations.  It does not imply that representing the
semantic content of relational roles explicitly is impossible
in an SAA based system; it simply indicates that such
systems cannot capture this content in the same way that
people seem to—i.e., as an integral part of the relational
representation itself.
It is important to emphasize that the problem of infinite
regress is by no means an argument against the general
utility of SAA.  On the contrary, propositional notation, for
                                                 
3 Naming the relation that specifies the relation of a relation to its
roles consists-of is, of course, completely arbitrary.
4 One might argue that this problem could be solved by using
binary rather than unary representations of roles.  For example,
representing lover (John) as lover (John, loves (John, Mary)), thus
representing the role, its filler, and the relation to which it belongs.
The problem with this approach is that it simply transfers the same
problem to a new representation.  In SAA binary predicates dictate
relations.  As a result, the system would still have to specify the
roles of this binary predicate and how they relate back to it.
example, is an extremely useful tool for the purpose for
which it was created, namely theorem proving.  For this
purpose, semantic emptiness is a virtue.  It just happens that
the design requirements for a representational system for
theorem proving differ markedly from the design
requirements for a representational system for supporting
perception and cognition in living, behaving systems: While
the former requires pristine semantic emptiness, the latter
must deal with the semantically-rich, sometimes ugly
realities of the world as it is.  Given this, it is not surprising
that a representational system designed for theorem proving
should prove inadequate as a model of human mental
representation.
Possible Objections and Responses
We are arguing that SAA is ill-suited for modeling human
mental representations, including relational representations,
for which it appears at first to be ideally suited.  Proponents
of traditional symbolic models of cognition are likely to
object strenuously to our arguments.  We shall try to
anticipate some of these objections and respond to them.
One potential objection is that the infinite regress is
irrelevant because it is a trivial matter to simply terminate
the regress at any arbitrary point and declare it done.  The
problem with this objection is that the system does not
finish the process it began. Once the progress halts, the
relation between roles and relations remains unspecified.
Another potential objection is that although role-specific
information cannot be specified in the SAA notation itself, it
might be adequate to have the information specified at the
level of the system as a whole.  The problem with this
objection is that it is an appeal to the status quo: Using
lookup tables, etc., is precisely what current SAA-based
models are forced to do.  As we have argued, the data on the
role of semantics in human cognition suggest that this
approach is not adequate.  Among other problems, it is too
deliberate: The data on the role of semantics in memory
retrieval, analogical mapping, etc., suggest that people use
role-based semantic information automatically and without
computational cost.  Specifying information at multiple
levels of representations and postulating routines for
moving between the two is computationally costly.
Although it is impossible, given the current state of our
knowledge, to rule such an account out definitively, it
certainly seems more plausible to assume that role-based
information is simply a part of relational representations
than to assume that the mind is equipped with a complex
system of look-up tables.  Indeed, the use of lookup tables is
perhaps even more awkward than it appears at first blush.
Without an explicit representation of role-specific semantics
in its representations, an SAA system must use an external
meta-system to interpret its SAA representations, decide
when the look-up table (another representational system
external to SAA) should be accessed, retrieve the relevant
role information, translate that information into SAA, and
insert it into the original SAA format.  Importantly, the
external control structure could not, itself, utilize SAA: if it
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did, then it too would require an external meta-system to
keep it’s own relation and role information straight.  This
solution is thus both inelegant and impractical, and in the
limit results in a regress, not of nested “consists-of”
relations, but of external control structures.
A third objection to our argument concerns the n-ary
restriction.  This problem might be solved simply by
postulating that all n-place predicates (where n  is free to
vary) be replaced by m-place predicates (where m  is a
constant, say, 3).  For example, tall (x) would be recast as
tall (x , -, -), and taller-than (x, y) as taller-than (x, y, -),
where “-“ denotes a permanently empty “dummy” slot.  In
this way, tall (x, -, -) could be mapped to taller-than (x, y, -)
by virtue of their both taking three “arguments”.  One
problem with this proposal is that it assumes some
procedure for deciding how to recast the predicates.  For
example, should short (y) be recast as shorter-than (y, -, -)
(the intuitive recasting) or as taller-than (-, y, -)?  Note that
this question must be answered prior to discovering the very
mapping(s) the recasting is supposed to permit. A second
problem with this proposal is that it still leaves the problem
of mapping non-identical predicates: How should the
system map the arguments of taller-than (x, y, -) to those of
shorter-than (x, y, -) without knowing what the roles of each
relation “mean”?
Semantically Rich Representations of
Relational Roles
We have argued that SAA is at best incomplete as a
model of human mental representation.  However, this
limitation does not by any means imply that we must
abandon symbolic accounts of mental representation.
Rather, what is needed is a representational system that
makes relational roles, their semantics, their bindings to
their fillers and their composition into complete relations all
explicit.  This approach is commonly known as role-filler
binding (e.g., Halford, et al. 1998).
 In a role-filler binding system roles are represented
explicitly and bound to their fillers.  Relations are composed
of linked role-filler bindings.  One example is the
representational system employed by Hummel and
Holyoak’s (1997, 2003a) LISA model.  LISA uses a
hierarchy of distributed and localist codes to represent
relational structures.  At the bottom, “semantic” units
represent objects and roles in a distributed fashion (e.g., for
the relation love (John, Mary) “John” might be represented
as human, adult, male, etc., and Mary by human , adult,
female, etc.; similarly, the lover and beloved roles of the
love relation would be represented by units capturing their
semantic content).  At the next level, these distributed
representations are connected to localist units representing
individual objects and relational roles. Above the object and
role units, localist role-binding units (SPs) link object and
role units into specific role-filler bindings.  At the top of the
hierarchy, localist P units link SPs into entire propositions.
In this representation, the long-term binding of roles to
their fillers is captured by the conjunctive SP units, thus
violating the role-filler independence required for symbolic
representation.  However, when a proposition becomes
active, its role-filler bindings are also represented
dynamically by synchrony of firing: SP units in the same
proposition fire out of synchrony with one another, causing
object and predicate units, along with their corresponding
semantics, to fire in synchrony with each other if they are
bound together, and out of synchrony with other bound roles
and objects.  On the semantic units, the result is a collection
of mutually desynchronized patterns of activation, one for
each role-filler binding.  Thus, when a proposition is active,
role-filler independence is maintained on its object,
predicate and semantic units, with the role-filler bindings
carried by the synchrony relations among these units.
This is only one way to represent relational knowledge in
a role-filler binding scheme (see also Halford et al, 1998,
Smolensky, 1990).  As demonstrated by Hummel, Holyoak
and their colleagues (see Hummel & Holyoak, 2003b for a
review), however, it is a very useful one.  LISA has been
shown to simulate aspects of memory retrieval, analogical
mapping, analogical inference, schema induction, and the
relations between them.  It also provides a natural account
of the capacity limits of human working memory, the effects
of brain damage and normal aging on reasoning, the relation
between effortless (“reflexive”) and more effortful
(“reflective”) reasoning, and aspects of the perceptual-
cognitive interface.  It inherits these abilities from its ability
to capture both the relational structure and the semantic
richness of human mental representations.
Conclusion
Few would claim that people literally think in the
predicate calculus.  However, many researchers have argued
that SAA-based representations serve at least as a plausible
shorthand for human mental representations.  We have
argued that SAA notation is at most a shorthand for human
relational representations—a shorthand that must
necessarily leave the messy business of the semantics of
relational roles to fundamentally external representations
and processes.  Inasmuch as the semantics of roles are an
important internal component of human mental
representation, as we, and others, have argued they are, this
fact leaves an important facet of human mental
representation necessarily beyond the reach of SAA-based
models.  The solution to this problem is not to abandon
symbolic representations altogether, as proposed by some,
but rather to replace SAA with a role-filler binding approach
to the representation of relational knowledge in models of
cognition.  Doing so provides a natural basis for capturing
both the symbolic structure of human mental representations
and their semantic richness.
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Abstract
Relations play a central role in human perception and
cognition, but little is known about how relational concepts
are acquired and predicated.  For example, how do we come
to understand that physical force is a higher-order
multiplicative relation between mass and acceleration?  We
report an experiment demonstrating that structure mapping
(a.k.a., analogical mapping) plays a key role in the predication
of novel higher-order relations. This finding suggests that
structure mapping—i.e., the appreciation of analogies—may
play a pivotal role in the acquisition and predication of novel
relational concepts.
Relational Reasoning
The processing of relations plays a central role in human
perception and thought.  It permits us to perceive and
understand the spatial relations among an object’s parts
(Hummel, 2000; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Hummel &
Stankewicz, 1996), comprehend arrangements of objects in
scenes (see Green & Hummel, 2004, for a review), and
comprehend abstract analogies between otherwise very
different situations or systems of knowledge (e.g., between
the structure of the solar system and the structure of the
atom; Gentner, 1983; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983;
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995).  The power of relational
thinking resides in its ability to generate inferences and
generalizations that are constrained by the roles that
elements play, rather than strictly the properties of the
elements themselves: The sun is similar to the nucleus of an
atom, not because of its literal features, but because of their
shared relations to planets and electrons, respectively.
Experience can cause profound changes in the way we
process relations.  The difference between an expert chess
player and a novice, for example, lies in the ability to
quickly perceive and reason about the meaningful relations
among the pieces on the board (and relations among those
relations).  Relational learning is central to both the most
abstract and uniquely human cognitive abilities (including
mathematical and scientific reasoning), and the most
"everyday" reasoning using analogies, schemas and rules
(Gentner, 1983; Holland, et al., 1986; Hummel & Holyoak,
1997, 2003).
In order to reason explicitly about a relation it is
necessary to predicate that relation, that is, to represent it as
an explicit predicate that takes arguments.  Consider an
example.  In a match-to-sample task, an animal is shown a
sample stimulus (e.g., a red square), and two alternatives,
one that matches the sample (another red square) and one
that does not (e.g., a green square).  The animal’s task is to
indicate which alternative matches the sample.  Many
animals, including honeybees (Giurfa et al., 2001), can learn
to perform this task with simple stimuli such as colors and
shapes (see Holyoak & Thagard, 1995, Thompson & Oden,
2000).  The computational requirements for performing this
task include the ability to explicitly represent values of the
relevant feature dimension (e.g., “red” for the dimension
“color”), and the ability to remember the value of that
dimension in the sample for the purposes of choosing the
correct alternative.  Despite initial appearances, the task
does not require the animal to explicitly appreciate that the
correct choice item is in any way the "same" as the sample.
For example, if color is the relevant dimension, then after
the presentation of a red sample, the animal need only
maintain a representation of “red” until the choice items
appear.  The animal need never reflect explicitly on the fact
that the sample and the correct choice are the same color
(Thompson & Oden, 2000).
However, the task can be generalized to require an
explicit appreciation of “sameness.”  Consider a relational
match-to-sample task, in which the sample depicts two
triangles, alternative A depicts of circle and a diamond, and
alternative B depicts two squares.  Choosing B as the correct
match to the sample requires the reasoner to represent B and
the sample in terms of their shared relation (i.e., same-shape
(x , y)). College students find this comparison trivial, yet
only humans and symbol-trained chimpanzees are known to
be able to perform this task reliably (Thompson & Oden,
2000). (Fagot, Wasserman & Young, 2001, claim to show
relational matching to sample in the baboon, Papio papio.
However, their data—in particular, the baboons' failure to
learn the task when the sample and choice options each
contained only two objects—are more consistent with the
baboons’ responding to stimulus entropy as a holistic
perceptual feature, akin to color, rather than same as an
explicit relation; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003.)
The assumption that people represent the relation same-
shape in the same way for the squares as for the triangles
provides an intuitive account of our ability to perform the
relational match to sample, but it begs the question of why
we see the relation “same shape” in the squares, whereas
most other animals only see squares.  What are the mental
operations that allow us to discover and predicate same-
shape as an explicit relation that retains its properties over
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the sameness of squares to squares and the sameness of
triangles to triangles?
The question of how we discover and predicate new
relations is central to cognitive science because the kinds of
problems a person (or cognitive model) can solve, and the
characteristics of its solutions, depend critically on the
relations the person (or model) does and does not represent
explicitly.  Models of human perception and cognition that
represent relations explicitly (i.e., as predicates that take
arguments) can solve problems far beyond the scope of
models that do not represent relations explicitly (e.g.,
traditional connectionist models, which represent all
concepts as simple lists of features; for reviews see Doumas
& Hummel, in press; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003;
Marcus, 1998).  But to date, all the models that do represent
relations are simply given, by the modeler, a vocabulary of
relational concepts with which to reason (examples include
ACT-R [Anderson & Lebiere, 1998], LISA [Hummel &
Holyoak, 1997, 2003], SME [Falhenhainer, Forbus &
Gentner, 1989] and, SOAR [Rosenbloom, Newell, & Laird,
1991], among many others).  The question of where these
concepts come from, and the related question of how we
know which relations to predicate in which contexts, is
rarely if ever addressed, and the answer to this question is
far from well understood.  Understanding how the mind
comes to represent relations as explicit predicates would
contribute substantially to our understanding of the origins
of human perception and thinking, and to the development
of symbolic thought (Smith, 1989).
Relational Predication
The question of relational predication subsumes at least
two related questions: First, how do we recognize and
predicate familiar relations for use in novel situations?  It is
one thing to understand abstract relational notions such as
same-as, threatens  or covaries-with ; it is another to
recognize that a relation applies in a given situation and to
explicitly predicate it in the service of understanding that
situation.  Second, how do we discover new relations?  For
example, what happens in the mind of a child between the
time when she does not understand the relation same-shape
(x, y), and the time when she does?  Inasmuch as new
relations are learned as combinations of familiar relations,
or as familiar relations applied to novel dimensions, the
question of relational discovery is clearly related to the
question of predication: Especially for adults, discovering
new relations may often be a process of discovering which
familiar relations apply in a novel situation, and discovering
how they are linked together by higher-order relations.
Consider, for example, the physics student who is first
learning to reason about force as a relation between mass, a
basic property of an object, and acceleration, itself a relation
between velocity and time.  It is this version of the relation
discovery question—how do we discover novel higher-order
relations among familiar relations—that is the focus of the
present paper.
Our ability to appreciate that the relation between the
squares in the relational match to sample task is the same as
the relation between the triangles—and to choose a pair of
squares over a circle and a diamond as the correct match to
a pair of triangles on the basis of that relation—illustrates
that relations are invariant with their arguments (Hummel &
Holyoak, 2003): same-shape (x , y ) is the same relation,
regardless of the particular shapes that happen to be bound
to x and y at the time.  It is precisely this invariance that
allows us to appreciate what same-shape (triangle1,
triangle2) has in common with same-shape (square1,
square2).  As a result of this invariance, same-shape ranges
over all possible shapes, so it is not learnable in terms of the
perceptual features of any particular pair of shapes (see
Kellman, Burke, & Hummel, 1999).  The ability to perform
tasks based on such relations—and to discover and predicate
them—is therefore fundamentally beyond the reach of any
learning algorithm based strictly on the statistical
regularities among the elements of the stimuli in its training
set—i.e., the vast majority of all theories of learning (see
Hummel & Holyoak, 2003).
The problem of relational learning and predication is
further complicated by the sheer number of potentially
relevant relations present in any given situation.  The
number of first-order relations among n items increases
minimally with (n2 – n )/2 (and this assuming that all
relations are commutative, which is not the case for most
relations).  Worse yet, the number of higher-order relations
over these first-order relations is literally unbounded.  Any
task (e.g., category learning, problem solving, etc.) that calls
for the discovery of new higher-order relations is therefore
functionally impossible without additional constraints on the
selection of which relations to predicate.
Given this, how do people discover and predicate new
relations?  An important theme that has emerged in the
literature on relational reasoning is that structure mapping
(a.k.a. analogical mapping)—the process of finding
relational correspondences between the elements of two
systems—plays a central role in all forms of relational
reasoning (see Hofstadter, 2001; Holyoak & Thagard,
1995).  A primary hypothesis motivating the present
research is that structure mapping may also play a central
role in discovery and predication of new relations.  The
reason is that structure mapping is driven more by the
relational roles that objects play than by the features of the
objects themselves.  By revealing relational similarities
between otherwise different-seeming systems, structure-
mapping may bootstrap the discovery of any higher-order
relations the two systems have in common.  Consistent with
this hypothesis, several previous studies have demonstrated
that structure mapping bootstraps the induction of abstract
relational schemas (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Ratterman
& Gentner, 1998; Sandhofer & Smith, 2001; Yamauchi &
Markman, 2000), and that comparison helps people
appreciate what lower-order relations might be relevant to a
specific task (Gentner & Namy, 1999; Namy & Gentner,
2002; Yamauchi & Markman, 1998).
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The current experiment was designed to investigate
whether analogical mapping may also help people to
discover the higher-order relations that analogous systems
have in common—that is, whether analogical mapping may
bootstrap the discovery of novel higher-order relations.  If it
does, then analogical mapping may not only be a process
that depends on the relations we can predicate, but may also
be a process that aids us in the predication of new relations.
Experiment
The experiment used a category-learning paradigm to
measure relational predication.  Categories were defined by
an unfamiliar higher-order relation between the elements of
exemplars.  Each exemplar consisted of drawings of three
simple “cells” inside a circular frame (see Figure 1).  Within
an exemplar, the cells varied in their location in the frame,
their shape, the thickness of their membrane, the roundness
of their nucleus, and the number of organelles.  Categories
were defined by a higher-order relation between the cells’
membrane thickness and the roundness of their nuclei: In
Category A, the thicker a cell’s membrane, the rounder its
nucleus; in Category B, the thicker the membrane the more
elliptical its nucleus.  The cells’ locations in the frame,
shape, and number of organelles varied randomly and were
uncorrelated with category membership.
Figure 1.  Two stimuli from Category A and two from
Category B.
The exemplars were designed to make category learning
impossible without discovering the higher-order relation
between relative membrane thickness and nucleus
roundness.  Absolute thickness and roundness were non-
predictive of category membership because the thinnest
membrane (or least round nucleus) in one exemplar of a
category was potentially the thickest (or roundest) in
another exemplar of the same category.  For the same
reason, conjunctions of specific roundnesses and thicknesses
were also non-predictive.  Every exemplar, regardless of
category, had three cells, one of which had a thickest
membrane and another of which had a thinnest (with the
third in between), so the categories were not learnable in
terms of relative (or absolute) membrane thickness.
Likewise, every exemplar, regardless of category, had one
cell with a more round nucleus than the others and one with
a more elliptical nucleus (with the third in between).  In
other words, the categories were not definable, or learnable,
in terms of any basic features or even first-order relations.
For this reason the category structure is unlearnable by
any model that codes exemplars in terms of their features
(e.g., location, color, width, orientation, etc.) or
conjunctions of their features, but cannot explicitly
represent relations among those features and relations
among relations.  Such models constitute the vast majority
of mathematical and computational models of category
learning (e.g., Krushke, 1992, 2001; Nosofski, 1988;
Nosofski & Palmeri 1998), including all connectionist
models (see Doumas & Hummel, in press; Hummel &
Holyoak, 2003; Marcus, 1998).
By contrast, the categories are learnable in the space of
conjunctions of relative membrane thickness and relative
nucleus roundness—that is, in terms of a higher-order
relation between the first-order relations of relative
thickness and relative roundness (which is simply a
restatement of the category-defining higher-order relation).
Two groups of subjects were trained to categorize
exemplars into the two categories.  One group (the Map
group) performed a mapping task halfway through the
category-learning task; the other group (the No Map group)
did not. Subjects in the No Map condition simply studied a
pair of exemplars from the same category (either A or B,
counterbalanced); subjects in the Map condition viewed a
pair of exemplars from the same category and were asked to
indicate which cell in one exemplar corresponded to which
in the other and why.
Our predictions were as follows: (1) To the extent that the
category-relevant higher-order relation between cells’
relative membrane thickness and relative nucleus roundness
is unfamiliar to our subjects, categorization performance on
the pre-mapping trials ought to be near chance.  (2) To the
extent that mapping helps subjects to predicate this relation,
post-mapping categorization performance of subjects who
map correctly in the Map condition should jump abruptly to
ceiling (as a result of predicating the category-defining
relation), but performance in the No Map condition, and the
performance of those who map incorrectly in the Map
condition, should remain near chance.
Methods
Participants:  20 UCLA undergraduates participated for
course credit.
Materials:  Each exemplar consisted of three drawings of
simple cells in a circular frame.  The cells differed in their
shapes, location, membrane thickness, nucleus roundness,
and number of organelles (see Figure 1).
Seven membrane thicknesses and seven nucleus
roundnesses were used to construct the stimuli, making it
possible for the thickest membrane (or roundest nucleus) in
one exemplar of a category to be the thinnest (or most
elliptical) in another exemplar of the same category, thus
making it impossible for subjects to categorize correctly
based on absolute thickness or roundness (i.e., it is
necessary to respond on the basis of relative thickness and
roundness between cells in an exemplar).
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The locations, shapes, and number of organelles of the
cells in an exemplar varied randomly, subject to the
constraint that no cells ever overlapped in the frame.  Each
cell was one of 6 different shapes and contained between 1
and 6 organelles.
We created exemplars used in the pre-mapping, post-
mapping, and mapping phase of the experiment (described
more fully below) withholding membrane thicknesses 3 and
7 (the thickest), and nucleus roundnesses 1 (least round) and
5 for construction of transfer exemplars.  The exemplars
used in the transfer phase were created under the constraints
described above, with the additional constraints that at least
one novel thicknesses and one novel roundness appeared in
each exemplar, and each novel thickness and roundness
appear in at least three of the six transfer exemplars (see
below).  The withheld thicknesses and roundnesses
consisted of values both within the bounds of the values
seen by subjects during the training and test phases of the
experiment and values outside those bounds.  Thus, transfer
trials required subjects to both interpolate and extrapolate
learning to new values.
The exemplars used during the mapping phase consisted
of two exemplars from the same category placed side by
side.
(a) 40 pre-mapping category learning trials
(b) mapping:  map or study
(c) 40 post-mapping
category learning  trials
(d) 6 post-mapping
transfer trials
Figure 2.  Structure of the experimental procedure.  (a)
Training phase, 40 trials; (b) mapping phase; (c) test phase,
40 trials; (d) transfer phase, 6 trials.
Procedure:  Ten subjects were randomly assigned to each
experimental condition.  All stimuli were presented on a
computer screen.  All subjects received 40 pre-mapping
training exemplars (20 A’s and 20 B’s) in a random order
(Figure 2a).  Their task was to indicate (with a key press)
whether each exemplar belonged to Category A or B.   Each
response was followed by accuracy feedback.  Following
the initial training phase, subjects were presented with one
of the two mapping sets (either two As or two Bs; Figure
2b).  Subjects were informed that both exemplars belonged
to the same category but they were not told which category
they belonged to.  Subjects in the No Map condition were
instructed to study the mapping set for one minute.  Subjects
in the Map condition were asked to indicate which cell in
the exemplar on the left corresponded to each cell in the
exemplar on the right, and to state the reason or reasons for
each correspondence.  Conditions and mapping sets were
fully counter-balanced.  All subjects then received 40 post-
mapping training trials (20 A’s and 20 B’s) in a random
order (Figure 2c).  Responses were followed by accuracy
feedback as before.  In the final transfer stage of the
experiment subjects were presented with the six transfer
exemplars (3 A’s and 3 B’s) in random order and their task
was to categorize each (Figure 2d).  They received no
accuracy feedback during this part of the experiment.
Scoring:  All participants were scored for number of
correct responses in the pre- and post-mapping trials
(maximum 40 correct for each) and the transfer trials
(maximum 6 correct).  We also recorded the mappings made
by participants in the Map condition.  At the end of the
experiment all subjects were also asked to state the rule(s)
they had used to categorize the exemplars.
Results
The results of the experiment were exactly as predicted.
An independent-samples t-test showed no main effects for
mapping, t(18) = 1.13, p > .25, on the pre-mapping training
trials (mean-proportion-correctMAP = .52, mean-propotion-
correctNO-MAP = .47), which is expected, as the groups
received exactly the same treatment prior to mapping.
Performance in neither group differed significantly from
chance (50% correct).
A second independent-samples t-test was run for
performance on the post-mapping trials (Figure 3a).  Post-
mapping, categorization performance in the Map condition
was significantly more accurate (mean-proportion-
correctMAP = .77) than in No Map (mean-propotion-
correctNO-MAP = .48), t(18) = 3.84, p < .01.  Accuracy in the
No Map group did not differ from chance.
A similar pattern of results obtained on the transfer trials
(Figure 3b).  Subjects in the map condition performed
significantly more accurately (mean-proportion-correctMAP =
.83) than those in the no map condition (mean-propotion-
correctNO-MAP = .42), t(18) = 4.16, p < .01.  Performance of
the No Map group on the transfer trials did not differ from
chance.
The participants’ reports of their mappings and rule use
also revealed interesting patterns.  First, none of the 10
subjects in the No Map group, and 7 of the 10 subjects in
the Map group correctly stated the rule defining category
membership at the end of the experiment.  Second, there
was a perfect 1:1 correspondence between subjects who
correctly mapped the cells during the mapping phase and
those who correctly stated the rule: All and only those
subjects who identified the correct mappings were able to
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state the category-defining rule at the end of the experiment.
All other subjects either missed the relevant dimensions
completely or mapped based on absolute membrane width
and absolute nucleus roundness, which, as stated previously,
were not sufficient for correct categorization.
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Map
Figure 3.  (a) Mean number of correct responses on post-
mapping trials as a function of condition.  (b) Mean number
of correct responses on transfer trials as a function of
condition.  The dashed line indicates chance.
Discussion
Relations play a central role in human perception and
thinking, yet little is known about how relational concepts
are acquired and predicated.  The problem of relational
predication is especially difficult because it is
underconstrained.  We hypothesized that structure mapping
might aid in the discovery and predication of novel higher-
order relations.
The results of a category learning experiment support this
hypothesis.  Subjects who mapped exemplars from the same
category onto one another were much better able to learn the
novel, category-defining higher-order relation than subjects
who did not map.  Indeed, performance of the latter group
never got above chance.
Additionally, subjects who mapped were able to both
interpolate and extrapolate learning to new exemplars with
novel stimulus values (i.e., novel membrane thicknesses and
nucleus roundnesses) and to verbally state the relational rule
that defined category membership.  Subjects who did not
map were unable to either transfer to new stimuli or to state
the category-defining rule.  These findings suggest that
mapping aids in the predication of novel relations, and that
the resulting relations are explicit, in the sense of being
available to bind to novel inputs (recall the transfer trials;
also, see Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003).
More broadly, the findings reported here suggest that the
same cognitive mechanisms that underlie our ability to
make analogies—namely, those underlying structure
mapping—may also underlie our ability to discover and
predicate new relational concepts.  If this suggestion is
correct, then the evolution of the capacity for generalized
structure mapping may well be the “great leap forward”
(Newell, 1990) that ultimately gave rise to our capacity for
generalized symbolic thought.
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Abstract 
Two experiments tracked the emergence of lexical 
competition effects for newly learnt spoken words (e.g., 
"cathedruke"). Experiment 1 compared form-only learning 
with learning in semantically rich sentence contexts. In both 
cases, although immediate explicit recognition of the novel 
words was good, lexical competition effects (e.g., 
"cathedruke-cathedral") emerged only after a delay of at least 
24 hours. Experiment 2 evaluated the timecourse of learning 
in more detail and used embedding (rather than cohort) new 
competitors (e.g., "shadowks"). Again results showed no 
evidence of lexicalization immediately after exposure, but 
clear lexical competition effects after 24 hours. Furthermore, 
recognition and free recall improved over time. These results 
are interpreted in terms of a consolidation process that 
integrates words into the mental lexicon over a relatively 
protracted period of time. 
1. Introduction 
Our knowledge about what information is relevant for 
language acquisition has increased greatly in the last decade. 
Factors such as statistical properties of the input (Saffran, 
Aslin, & Newport, 1996) and current lexical knowledge 
(Dahan & Brent, 1999) have been shown to influence 
lexical development. However, less is known about exactly 
how new vocabulary items are integrated into one's mental 
lexicon, a process called "lexicalization". The main reason 
for this state of affairs is that studies on word acquisition 
have typically used only direct measures of learning, such as 
the performance in familiarity judgment or recollection 
tasks. Yet, such measures only tell us about the strength of 
the traces left by exposure, not whether a new lexical entry 
per se has been created. 
A critical methodology for addressing the lexicalization 
issue looks at whether newly learnt words influence how the 
learner recognizes preexisting words. For models of spoken 
word recognition, a key feature of a lexical entry is its 
ability to be evoked when compatible with the input, and to 
compete with similar-sounding entities for identification 
(e.g., McClelland & Elman, 1986). Therefore, a strong test 
of whether a speech sequence has been lexicalized is 
whether it engages in lexical competition, and thereby 
affects the activity within the mental lexicon. 
In a recent study (Gaskell & Dumay, 2003), we began to 
explore how and when newly learnt spoken words become 
involved in the lexical competition process, or in our terms, 
produce a "lexical footprint". Adults were familiarized with 
made-up words that overlapped strongly with existing 
words (such as "cathedruke" for "cathedral"), through 
repeated presentation in a phoneme-monitoring task. In one 
experiment, good explicit knowledge of the novel words 
was obtained after only one training session (i.e., 12 
presentations of each item), whereas the inhibitory influence 
of these new competitors on the identification of existing 
words in a lexical decision task (LD) required three 
(successive) days of exposure to emerge. 
In another experiment, we disentangled the roles of time 
and level of exposure in the lexicalization process, using a 
single training session at a high exposure rate (i.e., 36 
presentations). We also swapped LD with a more implicit 
test of lexical activity, the pause detection task. Here, 
participants made speeded decisions as to whether a short 
silence was present towards the offset of the existing words 
(e.g., "cathedr_al"). As Mattys and Clark (2002) showed, 
pause detection latencies are positively correlated with the 
amount of lexical activity elicited by the portion of speech 
preceding the pause. They hypothesized that the activation 
of lexical candidates involves the use of processing 
resources that would otherwise be allocated to pause 
detection. Our experiment showed good explicit recognition 
of the novel items right after exposure. In contrast, an 
increase in lexical activity as indexed by longer pause 
detection latencies when a new competitor had been learnt 
was not immediately observed, but had emerged when re-
tested a week later. 
So, in contrast to phonological storage, lexicalization is 
apparently not instantaneous and in fact may require a 
substantial amount of time, possibly to allow the 
consolidation of episodic traces (cf. O'Reilly & Norman, 
2002). Nonetheless, on the basis of the above findings, it is 
not possible to tell how long it takes after a sufficient level 
of exposure has been reached for a newly learnt word to be 
lexically operational. 
Furthermore, in Gaskell and Dumay (2003) participants 
had to learn only the sound-form of the novel words in quite 
an artificial situation, i.e., phoneme monitoring. Therefore, 
whether these data give us a good picture of what happens 
in more normal circumstances when semantic and thematic 
information are usually available must be addressed. In 
particular, the delay observed in the emergence of lexical 
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footprint could well result from the relatively impoverished 
conditions in which the novel words were acquired. Word 
learning, as measured by recognition and recall, is often 
improved when a meaning is available to attach to the novel 
phonological form (e.g., Rueckl & Olds, 1993; Whittlesea & 
Cantwell, 1987). On these grounds, linking the form of the 
novel words to some semantic representations during 
encoding may give rise to a faster lexicalization and, 
potentially, to a "deeper" lexical footprint. 
Finally, so far the onset-matched competitors that have 
been used to test for the emergence of lexical competition 
were cohort competitors, i.e., novel and existing items that 
mismatch towards their offset. Therefore, we do not know 
whether these effects can be extended to a more general 
view of lexical competition encompassing all words that 
overlap to any degree (cf. McQueen, Norris, & Cutler, 
1994). The following experiments address these issues. 
2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 examined whether providing some semantic 
information along with the form of the novel words during 
exposure would result in a deeper lexical footprint and/or 
the faster emergence of this effect. On two successive days 
of learning, novel words (e.g., "cathedruke" for "cathedral") 
were heard 12 times either in isolation, as carriers in a 
phoneme monitoring task, or in a sentential context during a 
semantic verification task. Here, they were associated with 
the name of a conceptual category (e.g., "vegetable"). The 
effect of exposure to these new cohort competitors on 
identification of the base words was evaluated immediately, 
24 hours later (before the second exposure) and after a 
week, using a LD task. In addition, whether the novel words 
learnt under semantic exposure had acquired a meaning was 
tested in two ways. First, during the LD task, we also 
presented each novel word followed directly by their 
category name, and measured the extent to which the former 
could speed up responses to the latter (cf. Dagenbach, Horst, 
& Carr, 1990). Second, we looked at how much the novel 
words would elicit production of a word related to the 
meaning of the category name in a free association task. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants. Thirty native British English speakers 
with no known auditory or language impairment were 
tested. They were students at the University of York (UK) 
or lived in the surrounding area, and were all paid for their 
participation. 
 
2.1.2. Materials and Design. The key materials contained 
12 bisyllabic and 24 trisyllabic item triplets (based on 
Gaskell & Dumay, 2003, Experiment 2). Each triplet 
included a base word, such as "cathedral", and two 
nonwords, such as "cathedruke" and "cathedruce". The 
nonwords diverged from the base word at the final vowel 
and from each other at the final consonant or consonant 
cluster. One nonword (e.g., "cathedruke") was presented as 
novel word, whereas the other one was used as alternative 
choice in a recognition test. Base words were 
monomorphemic nouns that ranged in frequency between 2 
and 19 occurrences per million and had their uniqueness 
point (UP) located at or before the final vowel. Hence, if 
exposure led to lexicalization of the novel word, the latter 
was expected to become the main competitor of the base 
word, shifting its UP towards its offset. 
For the semantic exposure phase, each novel word was 
assigned a meaning, based on a conceptual category 
unrelated the base word (cf. Battig & Montague, 1969). For 
example, "cathedruke" was associated with "vegetable". 
Two sentences in which each novel word appeared were 
then constructed. One explicitly conveyed information 
about the category membership of the novel word, such as 
"A cathedruke is a variety of vegetable"; the other provided 
a more general semantic context, such as "The cook served 
the boiled cathedruke with a steak and baked potatoes". 
The test items were divided into three groups, as were the 
participants. During exposure, a given group of participants 
heard 12 novel words in a phoneme monitoring task and 12 
others in a semantic verification task, the items being 
assigned to a different exposure condition (phonological, 
semantic or unexposed) across the three alternative versions 
of the experiment. Participants were presented with all base 
words during the LD lexicalization test. Thus, for any 
participant, new competitors were potentially acquired for 
2/3 of the existing words, and overall each item was equally 
represented at the three levels of the factor "exposure". 
Base words, novel words, alternative nonwords, category 
names and sentences were produced in a soundproof booth 
by a male native speaker of British English, recorded onto 
CD, and stored as separate files using CoolEdit. 
 
2.1.3. Procedure. On day 1, participants were exposed to 
the novel words through the phoneme monitoring and 
semantic verification tasks, with task order counterbalanced 
across participants. Next, they were tested for lexicalization 
effects in a LD task, followed by a two-alternative forced 
choice (2-AFC) recognition test which assessed explicit 
knowledge of the novel words, and, finally, a free 
association task. On day 2, participants performed the LD 
task, the 2-AFC recognition test and the free association 
task before a second exposure phase took place. On day 8, 
the procedure was the same as on day 2 except that there 
was no further exposure. 
The phoneme monitoring component of the exposure 
phase involved 12 novel words and consisted of 12 blocks 
in which each novel word occurred once. A target phoneme 
was specified for each block, and in all 6 phonemes were 
used (/n/, /d/, /t/, /s/, /p/ and /m/). Participants had to make 
speeded decisions as to whether the target was present or 
absent in the word, by pressing one of two buttons. The 
semantic verification component used 12 other novel words, 
each presented 6 times by way of their "category 
membership" sentence, and 6 times by way of their 
"semantic context" sentence. On each trial of a given block, 
participants had to make a yes/no judgment about the 
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meaning of the novel word. In all 6 questions were used, 
asking whether the novel word referred to something that 
was (1) man-made, (2) alive, (3) edible, (4) audible, (5) 
touchable, or (6) liked by the participant. 
The lexicalization test required making timed LD to all 
the base words, the novel words and their associated 
category names intermixed with a large set of fillers (i.e., 64 
words, 102 nonwords). The order of stimulus presentation 
was the same for each participant but varied every day. It 
was pseudorandomized such that each base word (e.g., 
"cathedral") occurred at least 20 trials before its related 
novel word (e.g., "cathedruke"), which was then 
immediately followed by the associated category name (e.g., 
"vegetable"). The proportion of semantically related pairs, 
i.e., a novel word followed by its category name, was 4.4%. 
Participants were instructed to press "yes" only to the 
existing real words, and had 3 s. from stimulus onset to 
respond. The inter-trial interval was 1 s. The LD latencies to 
the base words allowed us to estimate the amount of lexical 
competition induced by prior exposure to the novel words 
during the training phase. The LD latencies to the category 
names allowed an estimate of the extent to which these 
words were semantically associated with the immediately 
preceding novel word (which could act as a prime). 
In the 2-AFC recognition test, novel words and alternative 
nonwords were presented in pairs (e.g., "cathedruke-
cathedruce"), and participants had to press a button to 
indicate the item they had to learn. The acoustic exemplar of 
the newly learnt words was the one presented at exposure. 
Finally, in the free association task, only the novel words 
presented during the semantic exposure phase were played. 
After each item, participants had to write down the first 
word that came to mind. This gave us a second measure of 
how strongly the novel word was linked to the category 
name or its meaning. 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
Table 1. Top: Correct response rate in 2-AFC recognition. 
Bottom: Response probability in the free association task. 
 
Day 
1 2 8
2-AFC recognition
Phonological exposure 93.6 91.9 97.5 
Semantic exposure 86.4 91.7 95.8 
Free association
Novel word meaning .30 .31 .44 
Base word .38 .47 .38 
Base word meaning .08 .06 .06 
Other .24 .16 .11 
Performance in the 2-AFC recognition test was good, with a 
rate of correct responses of at least 90% on each session (see 
Table 1). Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) showed an effect 
of day (F1(2,58) =14.7, p <.01; F2(2,66) =12.9, p <.01), 
an effect of exposure, though marginally significant by 
participant (F1(1,29) =3.9, p <.06; F2(1,33) =6.6, p <.05), 
and a day x exposure interaction (F1(2,58) =5.1, p <.01; 
F2(2,66) =5.6, p <.01). As planned comparisons revealed, 
the performance was better on day 8 than on days 1 and 2 
(ps <.01), which did not differ from each other. More 
interestingly, only on day 1 was the performance better for 
phonological than semantic exposure (ps <.01). 
In the LD lexicalization test (see Figure 1), latencies to 
the base words revealed an interaction between day and 
exposure (F1(4,108) = 2.6, p <.05; F2(4,132) = 3.0, 
p <.05). Here, the important thing was to assess the 
occurrence of reliable priming effects. Planned comparisons 
examined the difference between the unprimed condition 
and both the phonological and semantic conditions. No sign 
of delayed recognition caused by competition with the novel 
words was found right after exposure. However, 24 hours 
later, a clear inhibitory effect had emerged for the novel 
words trained phonologically (F1(1,28) = 5.0, p <.05; 
F2(1,33) =7.9, p <.01), but still no significant effect was 
found in the semantic encoding condition. Finally, on day 8, 
both phonologically and semantically trained novel words 
induced inhibition of the base word recognition (F1(1,28) =
4.1, p =.052; F2(1,33) = 9.3, p <.01; F1(1,28) = 6.8, 
p <.05; F2(1,33) =7.4, p <.05). Analyses of errors (2.8%) 
revealed no significant effect or interaction. 
LD latencies to the category names also showed an 
interaction between day and exposure to the preceding novel 
word (i.e., untrained, phonologically trained vs. 
semantically trained), although marginally significant by 
participant (F1(4,108) = 2.1, p =.081; F2(4,132) = 3.7, 
p <.01). Planned comparisons revealed no effect of 
exposure on day 1. On day 2, an inhibitory effect was found 
unexpectedly for the phonological condition (F1(1,28) =
4.3, p <.05; F2(1,33) = 8.3, p <.01), whereas there no 
effect for the semantic condition. On day 8, the inhibitory 
effect in the phonological condition had disappeared, and a 
facilitatory effect only significant by item had emerged for 
the semantically trained novel words (F1(1,28) = 2.3, 
p <.15; F2(1,33) =6.8, p <.05). Analyses of errors (2.2%) 
revealed no significant effect or interaction. 
Responses in the free association task were classified 
using the taxonomy presented in Table 1. Base words and 
words related to the meaning of the novel words represented 
the majority of the responses (overall 76%). More 
interestingly, response probability showed an interaction 
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Figure 1. (Exp. 1) Left: Mean lexical decision latency to the base 
word. Right: Mean lexical decision latency to the category name. 
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between day and response type (F1(8,232) =5.3, p <.01; 
F2(8,264) = 14.7, p <.01). From day 1 to day 2, the 
probability of producing the base word increased with no 
parallel reduction in that of producing the meaning of the 
novel word. By contrast, from day 2 to day 8, there was an 
increase in the probability of producing the meaning of the 
novel word, clearly to the detriment of the probability of 
producing the base word. 
Taken together, these results suggest that exposure to a 
novel word in a meaningful semantic context does not result 
in faster or deeper lexicalization compared to simple 
exposure to its phonological form. On day 2, only the 
competitors learnt on the basis of just their sound-form were 
able to delay recognition of the existing words, and on day 
8, the two conditions of exposure did not differ in terms 
their lexical footprint effects. Interestingly, the emergence 
of competition effects on day 8 for the novel words learnt 
through semantic exposure coincided with a significant 
change in the ability of these words to prime their related 
category name, both in the semantically primed LD and in 
the free association task. 
3. Experiment 2 
The finding of a lexical footprint effect in the form-only 
condition after only 24 hours and 12 exposures in 
Experiment 1 stands in contrast with the late emergence of 
this effect after three days of exposure under similar 
conditions in Gaskell and Dumay's (2003) Experiment 2. 
This new result suggests that lexicalization may take place 
during the first 24 hours following exposure. To gain further 
evidence that this really is the case, the present experiment 
examined more closely the timecourse of lexicalization for 
phonologically trained novel words using another paradigm 
than LD as lexicalization test: pause detection. Contrary to 
LD, this paradigm provides a measure of lexical activity 
without requiring participants to make any judgment about 
the lexical properties of the input. Examination of the 
lexical footprint effect induced by a single massed exposure 
phase was performed at three time points: immediately after 
exposure, 24 hours later and a week later. To test whether 
the lexical footprint would generalize to the level of 
competition for segmentation, embedding rather than cohort 
competitors (e.g., "shadowks") were used. 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants. Thirty-two native British English 
speakers with no known auditory or language impairment 
were tested. They were all students at the University of 
York (UK), and none had taken part in Experiment 1. They 
received course credits or were paid for their participation. 
 
3.1.2. Materials and Design. The key materials consisted 
of 72 bisyllabic item triplets. Each included a base word 
ending in an unreduced vowel, such as "shadow", and two 
nonwords such as "shadowks" and "shadowkt", derived 
from the base word by adding a consonant cluster and which 
differed from each other in one of the final consonants. As 
in Experiment 1, one nonword (e.g., "shadowks") was 
presented as novel word, whereas the other one was used as 
alternative choice in a recognition test. 
Base words were stress-initial morphologically simple 
nouns that ranged in frequency between 0 and 403 
occurrences per million and had their UP located before or 
at the final vowel. Here, in contrast to Experiment 1 which 
used cohort competitors, the novel word, if lexicalized, 
would be the only longer (embedding) competitor of the 
base word. To have a better chance to index lexicalization of 
this longer word, base words were therefore not presented in 
isolation during the pause detection paradigm but in longer 
carriers, such as "shadowk" or "shadow_k", derived from 
the new competitor itself (e.g., "shadowks"). 
In addition, 12 other novel words along with their 
alternative nonwords were devised, such as "trogist" and 
"trogisk". They were used as fillers to increase the amount 
of materials to be learnt, and potentially enhance the 
sensitivity of the 2-AFC recognition test. 
All speech materials were produced by the same speaker 
and acquired using the same procedure as for Experiment 1. 
The test items were divided into four groups, as were the 
participants. In the lexicalization test (i.e., pause detection) 
half of the carriers contained a short silence (e.g., 
"shadow_k"), whereas the other half did not, and within 
each of these groups, half of the items had potentially a 
longer competitor as a result of exposure, and the other did 
not. Four versions of the experiment allowed each item to 
be equally represented in the four (exposure x pause 
occurrence) subcells of the design. 
 
3.1.3. Procedure. On day 1 participants were exposed to the 
novel words through a phoneme monitoring task. Then, the 
immediate effect of exposure on lexical activity was 
assessed using the pause detection paradigm. Finally, 
explicit knowledge of the novel words was examined in a 
free recall task and a 2-AFC recognition test. The effect of 
exposure on lexical activity and explicit knowledge of the 
novel words were re-tested on two subsequent occasions: 24 
hours after exposure, and one week later. On each occasion, 
the pause detection task was administered first, followed by 
the free recall task and the 2-AFC recognition test. 
The exposure phase was similar to the phoneme 
monitoring component of Experiment 1. Here, the 36 test 
novel words and the 12 lexically unrelated fillers were 
involved. Each of them was presented 36 times over 12 
blocks of trials. The 6 target phonemes were /n/, /d/, /k/, /l/, 
/t/ and /s/. 
The lexicalization test used the pause detection task. On 
each trial, participants had to decide by pressing one of two 
buttons whether a short silence (of 200 ms) was present in 
any location within a bisyllabic spoken item. On the pause-
present trials, base word carriers had the silence inserted just 
before the final consonant (e.g., "shadow_k"). Fillers were 
144 bisyllabic words ending in a consonant or consonant 
cluster, half of which contained a pause. The pause was 
inserted just before or after the first or second vowel. 
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In the free recall task, participants had 3 min. to recall 
orally as many novel words as they could from the exposure 
phase. Finally, the 2-AFC recognition test, similar to that of 
Experiment 1, involved all the 48 novel words presented 
during exposure, along with their choice (e.g., "shadowks-
shadowkt"). 
3.2. Results and Discussion 
Performance in the 2-AFC recognition test was good, with a 
rate of correct responses of at least 80% on each session (see 
Figure 2). ANOVAs taking into account day and whether 
the item had been disrupted by a pause during the 
lexicalization test revealed that the main effects were 
significant (day: F1(2,56) = 6.1, p <.01; F2(2,136) =6.2, 
p <.01; pause: F1(1,28) = 6.9, p <.05; F2(1,68) = 7.9, 
p <.01), but did not interact with one another (Fs close to 
1). As planned comparisons showed, performance increased 
from day 1 to day 2 (ps <.05), but not from day 2 to day 8. 
In the (pause detection) lexicalization test, latencies 
revealed a clear-cut interaction between day and exposure 
(F1(2,56) =6.4, p <.01; F2(2,114) =6.9, p <.01). On day 
1, the immediate effect of exposure to a novel competitor 
was to speed-up the pause detection performance, although 
this effect was only marginally significant by participant 
(F1(1,28) =4.0, p <.06; F2(1,57) =1.9, p <.2). In contrast, 
24 hours after exposure as well as one week later, the 
performance on the carriers for which a longer competitor 
had been learnt was clearly inhibited (F1(1,28) = 5.7, 
p <.05; F2(1,57) = 7.0, p =.01; F1(1,28) = 9.0, p <.01; 
F2(1,57) =14.0, p <.01). There was no effect of exposure 
or interaction involving exposure and day on errors (7.4%). 
In the free recall task, an ANOVA with day and presence 
or absence of a pause during the lexicalization test only 
revealed a significant effect of day (F1(2,56) = 27.8, 
p <.01; F2(2,136) =64.5, p <.01), with better performance 
on day 2 than on day 1 (F1(1,28) =18.7, p <.01; F2(1,68) =
21.7, p <.01), and better performance on day 8 than on day 
2 (F1(1,28) =21.3, p <.01; F2(1,68) =51.1, p <.01). 
On the basis of these results, it thus seems that following 
a sufficient amount of exposure, lexicalization of the novel 
word occurs within the next 24 hours, but not immediately. 
Whereas, on day 1, pause detection was facilitated by prior 
exposure to a new longer competitor of the base word, on 
day 2 (as on day 8), there was clear evidence that the new 
competitor was now contributing to lexical activity. 
Interestingly, the performance in direct recognition and free 
recall gradually increased over time. 
4. General Discussion 
The two experiments reported above allow us to make 
substantial progress in understanding the full range of 
factors involved in lexicalization of novel words. Gaskell 
and Dumay (2003) showed that when words are learned on 
the basis of only their phonological form, there is a delay 
associated with their engagement in lexical competition. 
Experiment 1 looked at whether this delay was eliminated 
when a richer linguistic context was available during 
learning. We found no evidence of any earlier or deeper 
lexicalization using a richer learning environment; if 
anything, the meaning and sentential context available at 
encoding led to an increased delay in lexicalization. This 
result suggests that exposure to a phonological form is both 
necessary and sufficient for normal engagement in lexical 
competition, supporting models of language acquisition that 
have a similar focus on phonological form (e.g., Saffran, 
Aslin, & Newport, 1996). 
Experiment 1 also examined another hallmark of lexical 
processing: semantic/associative priming. The results 
suggest that this aspect of lexicalization emerges hand-in-
hand with engagement in lexical competition. As for the 
lexical footprint in the semantic condition, a significant 
priming effect was observed on day 8, but not at the two 
preceding test points. We should be careful in interpreting 
this effect, since the associate of the novel item was 
repeatedly presented during the exposure session. It is 
possible that this exposure induced a repetition priming 
effect instead of, or in addition to, the associative 
facilitation caused by the pairing of novel items and their 
associates in LD (e.g., "cathedruke-vegetable). Yet, this 
account would predict that priming should be just as 
apparent on days 1 and 2 (cf. Tenpenny, 1995), whereas no 
such effects were found. Thus, the data do seem to be best 
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explained in terms of the emergence of a lexical link 
between the novel items and their associated superordinates. 
This link appears to rely on the establishment of a lexical 
entry capable of engaging in competition rather than simply 
a phonological trace. 
Experiment 2 widened the domain of reference for our 
lexical footprint test. Previously we had employed standard 
“cohort” competitors, in which the novel and existing items 
mismatch towards the end of the word. In Experiment 2 the 
novel items had no segmental mismatch with the existing 
items, but instead they were embedding competitors (e.g., 
"shadowks"). This experiment marks the beginning of an 
extension of our research to lexical competition at the level 
of lexical segmentation. These items appeared to behave in 
a very similar way to standard cohort competitors, 
strengthening the general conceptualization of lexical 
competition as involving lexical items with any degree of 
overlap (cf. McQueen et al., 1994). 
Experiment 2 had the further advantage of involving a 
larger set of stimuli with more sensitive measures of explicit 
recall and recognition performance. The explicit measures 
demonstrate that even in the absence of further exposure to 
the novel sequences, recall and recognition performance 
improves. One potential explanation of this finding is that 
the processes that operate to engage the novel 
representations in lexical competition also refine or focus 
the phonological representations. This interpretation has 
some support from developmental studies suggesting that 
well-established lexical representations are more clearly 
specified in terms of phonological form than newly learnt 
ones (Stager & Werker, 1997; Swingley & Aslin, 2000). 
Perhaps the most conspicuous finding relates to the 
timecourse of lexicalization. In the phonological condition 
of Experiment 1, and more crucially in Experiment 2, we 
found a clear profile of lexical competition effects across the 
three testing occasions. Immediately after learning, there 
was no evidence that lexicalization had emerged, as defined 
by engagement in lexical competition. However, without 
further exposure, this lexical competition effect was 
observed 24 hours later, and was essentially unchanged by 
day 8. We can therefore narrow down the critical time 
period for emergence of lexical competition to somewhere 
between 1 and 24 hours after exposure. This suggests that 
under normal circumstances, lexicalization will not be 
hurried. This profile of learning fits in with the idea that 
engagement in lexical competition requires the new 
information to be interleaved with existing representation as 
is the case for distributed connectionist networks (O’Reilly 
& Norman, 2002). Our current research effort is focused on 
whether lexicalization is reliant on the kind of memory 
consolidation thought to occur during sleep (Walker, in 
press). 
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Abstract
We compare our model of unsupervised learning of linguistic
structures, ADIOS [1, 2, 3], to some recent work in computa-
tional linguistics and in grammar theory. Our approach resem-
bles the Construction Grammar in its general philosophy (e.g.,
in its reliance on structural generalizations rather than on syn-
tax projected by the lexicon, as in the current generative the-
ories), and the Tree Adjoining Grammar in its computational
characteristics (e.g., in its apparent affinity with Mildly Con-
text Sensitive Languages). The representations learned by our
algorithm are truly emergent from the (unannotated) corpus
data, whereas those found in published works on cognitive and
construction grammars and on TAGs are hand-tailored. Thus,
our results complement and extend both the computational and
the more linguistically oriented research into language acqui-
sition. We conclude by suggesting how empirical and formal
study of language can be best integrated.
The empirical problem of language acquisition
The acquisition of language by children — a largely unsuper-
vised, amazingly fast and almost invariably successful learn-
ing stint — has long been the envy of natural language en-
gineers [4, 5, 6] and a daunting enigma for cognitive scien-
tists [7, 8]. Computational models of language acquisition or
“grammar induction” are usually divided into two categories,
depending on whether they subscribe to the classical gener-
ative theory of syntax, or invoke “general-purpose” statisti-
cal learning mechanisms. We believe that polarization be-
tween classical and statistical approaches to syntax hampers
the integration of the stronger aspects of each method into a
common powerful framework. On the one hand, the statisti-
cal approach is geared to take advantage of the considerable
progress made to date in the areas of distributed represen-
tation, probabilistic learning, and “connectionist” modeling,
yet generic connectionist architectures are ill-suited to the ab-
straction and processing of symbolic information. On the
other hand, classical rule-based systems excel in just those
tasks, yet are brittle and difficult to train.
We are developing an approach to the acquisition of distri-
butional information from raw input (e.g., transcribed speech
corpora) that also supports the distillation of structural reg-
ularities comparable to those captured by Context Sensitive
Grammars out of the accrued statistical knowledge. In think-
ing about such regularities, we adopt Langacker’s notion of
grammar as “simply an inventory of linguistic units” ([9],
p.63). To detect potentially useful units, we identify and pro-
cess partially redundant sentences that share the same word
sequences. We note that the detection of paradigmatic vari-
ation within a slot in a set of otherwise identical aligned se-
quences (syntagms) is the basis for the classical distributional
theory of language [10], as well as for some modern works
[11]. Likewise, the pattern — the syntagm and the equiva-
lence class of complementary-distribution symbols that may
appear in its open slot — is the main representational build-
ing block of our system, ADIOS (for Automatic DIstillation
Of Structure).
Our goal in the present paper is to help bridge statistical
and formal approaches to language [12] by placing our work
on the unsupervised learning of structure in the context of
current research in grammar acquisition in computational lin-
guistics, and at the same time to link it to certain formal theo-
ries of grammar. Consequently, the following sections outline
the main computational principles behind the ADIOS model,
and compare these to select approaches from computational
and formal linguistics. The algorithmic details of our ap-
proach and accounts of its learning from CHILDES corpora
and performance in various tests appear elsewhere [1, 2, 3].
In this paper, we chose to exert a tight control over the tar-
get language by using a context-free grammar (Figure 1) to
generate the learning and testing corpora.
Figure 1: the context free grammar used to generate the cor-
pora for the acquisition tests described here.
The principles behind the ADIOS algorithm
The representational power of ADIOS and its capacity for un-
supervised learning rest on three principles: (1) probabilistic
inference of pattern significance, (2) context-sensitive gener-
alization, and (3) recursive construction of complex patterns.
Each of these is described briefly below.
Probabilistic inference of pattern significance. ADIOS rep-
resents a corpus of sentences as an initially highly redundant
directed graph, in which the vertices are the lexicon entries
and the paths correspond, prior to running the algorithm, to
corpus sentences. The graph can be informally visualized as
a tangle of strands that are partially segregated into bundles.
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P84 "that" P58 P63
E63 E64 P48
E64 "Beth" | "Cindy" | "George" | "Jim" | "Joe" | "Pam" | P49 | P51
P48 "," "doesn't" "it"
P51 "the" E50
P49 "a" E50
E50 "bird" | "cat" | "cow" | "dog" | "horse" | "rabbit"
P61 "who" E62
E62 "adores" | "loves" | "scolds" | "worships"
E53 "Beth" | "Cindy" | "George" | "Jim" | "Joe" | "Pam"
E85 "annoyes" | "bothers" | "disturbes" | "worries"
P58 E60 E64
E60 "flies" | "jumps" | "laughs"
Long Range Dependency
Figure 2: Left: a pattern (presented in a tree form), capturing a long range dependency (equivalence class labels are under-
scored). This and other examples here were distilled from a 400-sentence corpus generated by the grammar of Figure 1. Right:
the same pattern recast as a set of rewriting rules that can be seen as a Context Free Grammar fragment.
Each of these consists of some strands clumped together; a
bundle is formed when two or more strands join together and
run in parallel, and is dissolved when more strands leave the
bundle than stay in. In a given corpus, there will be many bun-
dles, with each strand (sentence) possibly participating in sev-
eral. Our algorithm, described in detail elsewhere [3],1 iden-
tifies significant bundles iteratively, using a context-sensitive
probabilistic criterion defined in terms of local flow quantities
in the graph. The outcome is a set of patterns, each of which
is an abstraction of a bundle of sentences that are identical
up to variation in one place, where one of several symbols
(the members of the equivalence class associated with the
pattern) may appear (Figure 2). This representation balances
high compression (small size of the pattern lexicon) against
good generalization (the ability to generate new grammatical
sentences from the acquired patterns).
Context sensitivity of patterns. Because an equivalence
class is only defined in the context specified by its parent
pattern, the generalization afforded by a set of patterns is
inherently safer than in approaches that posit globally valid
categories (“parts of speech”) and rules (“grammar”). The
reliance of ADIOS on many context-sensitive patterns rather
than on traditional rules can be compared to the Construc-
tion Grammar idea (discussed later), and is in line with Lan-
gacker’s conception of grammar as a collection of “patterns
of all intermediate degrees of generality” ([9], p.46).
Hierarchical structure of patterns. The ADIOS graph is
rewired every time a new pattern is detected, so that a bundle
of strings subsumed by it is represented by a single new edge.
Following the rewiring, which is context-specific, potentially
far-apart symbols that used to straddle the newly abstracted
pattern become close neighbors. Patterns thus become hi-
erarchically structured in that their elements may be either
terminals (i.e., fully specified strings) or other patterns. The
ability of new patterns and equivalence classes to incorporate
those added previously leads to the emergence of recursively
structured units that support generalization (by opening paths
that do not exist in the original corpus). Moreover, patterns
may refer to themselves, which opens the door for true recur-
sion (Figure 3, right; automatic detection of recursion is not
1The relevant publications can be found online at
http://kybele.psych.cornell.edu/∼edelman/archive.html.
currently implemented).
Two experiments in grammar induction
The results outlined next focus on the power of the ADIOS
algorithm, which we assessed by examining the (so-called
“weak”) generativity of the representations it learns.
Experiment 1. In the first of the two studies described here,
we trained ADIOS on 400 sentences produced by the context
free grammar shown in Figure 1. We then compared a cor-
pus Ctarget of 3, 607, 240 sentences generated by this CFG
(with up to three levels of recursion) with a corpus Clearned
of 1, 916, 061 sentences generated by the patterns that had
been learned by ADIOS from the 400-sentence training set. In
both cases the sentences were generated randomly in batches
of size 1.5·107 and merged until convergence, defined as 95%
overlap between new and existing data. With these data, we
obtained precision of 97%, with a recall value of 53% (as cus-
tomary in computational linguistics, we define recall as the
proportion of Ctarget sentences appearing in Clearned, and
precision as the proportion of Clearned appearing in Ctarget).
In this demonstration, no attempt was made to optimize the
two parameters that control pattern acquisition.
Experiment 2. The second experiment involved two ADIOS
instances: a teacher and a student. In each of the four runs,
the teacher was pre-loaded with a ready-made context free
grammar (using the straightforward translation of CFG rules
into patterns), then used to generate a series of training cor-
pora with up to 6400 sentences, each with up to seven lev-
els of recursion. After training in each run i (i = [1 . . . 4]),
a student-generated test corpus C(i)learned of size 10000 was
used in conjunction with a test corpus C(i)target of the same
size produced by the teacher, to calculate precision and re-
call. This was done by running the teacher as a parser on
C
(i)
learned and the student – as a parser on C
(i)
target. The re-
sults, plotted in Figure 4, indicate a substantial capacity for
unsupervised induction of context-free grammars even from
very small corpora.
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Joe thinks that George thinks that Cindy believes that George thinks that Pam thinks that ...
that the bird jumps disturbes Jim who adores the cat, doesn't it?
Figure 3: Left: because ADIOS does not rewire all the occurrences of a specific pattern, but only those that share the same
context, its power is comparable to that of Context Sensitive Grammars. In this example, equivalence class #75 is not extended
to subsume the subject position, because that position appears in a different context (e.g., immediately to the right of the
symbol BEGIN). Thus, long-range agreement is enforced and over-generalization prevented. The context-sensitive “rules”
corresponding to pattern #210 appear above it. Right: the ADIOS pattern representation facilitates the detection of recursive
structure, exemplifi here by the correspondence between equivalence classes #52 and #54.
Figure 4: the results of Experiment 2; precision (squares) and
recall (diamonds), plotted vs. the size of the training corpus;
the error bars are std. dev. computed over four separate train-
ing/testing runs. Note that even the largest training corpus
size, 6400 sentences, is a tiny proportion of the approximately
1.6 · 108 sentences that can be generated by the target gram-
mar under the chosen depth constraint (7).
Related computational and linguistic
formalisms and psycholinguistic findings
Unlike ADIOS, very few existing algorithms for unsupervised
language acquisition use raw, unannotated corpus data (as
opposed, say, to sentences converted into sequences of POS
tags). The only work described in a recent review [6] as com-
pletely unsupervised — the GraSp model [13] — does at-
tempt to induce syntax from raw transcribed speech, yet it is
not completely data-driven in that it makes a prior commit-
ment to a particular theory of syntax (Categorial Grammar,
complete with a pre-specified set of allowed categories). Be-
cause of the unique nature of our chosen challenge — finding
structure in language rather than imposing it — the follow-
ing brief survey of grammar induction focuses on contrasts
and comparisons to approaches that generally stop short of
attempting to do what our algorithm does. We distinguish
below between approaches that are motivated by computa-
tional considerations (Local Grammar and Variable Order
Markov models, and Tre Adjoining Grammar), and those
whose main motivation is linguistic and cognitive psycholog-
ical (Cognitive and Constructi n grammars).
Local Grammar and Markov models. In capturing the
regularities inherent in multiple criss-crossing paths through
a corpus, ADIOS superficially resembles finite-state Local
Grammars [14] and Variable Order Markov (VOM) mod-
els [15] that aim to produce a minimum-entropy finite-
state encoding of a corpus. There are, however, crucial
differences, as explained below. Our pattern significance
criteria [3] involve conditional probabilities of the form
P (en|e1, e2, e3, . . . , en−1), which does bring to mind an
n’th-order Markov chain, with the (variable) n correspond-
ing roughly to the length of the sentences we deal with. The
VOM approach starts out by postulating a maximum-n VOM
structure, which is then fitted to the data. The maximum
VOM order n, which effectively determines the size of the
window under consideration, is in practice much smaller than
in our approach, because of computational complexity limi-
tations of the VOM algorithms. The final parameters of the
VOM are set by a maximum likelihood condition, fitting the
model to the training data. The ADIOS philosophy differs
from the VOM approach in several key respects. First, rather
than fitting a model to the data, we use the data to construct
a (recursively structured) graph. Thus, our algorithm natu-
rally addresses the inference of the graph’s structure, a task
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that is more difficult than the estimation of parameters for a
given configuration. Second, because ADIOS works from the
bottom up in a data-driven fashion, it is not hindered by com-
plexity issues, and can be used on huge graphs, with very
large windows sizes. Third, ADIOS transcends the idea of
VOM structure, in the following sense. Consider a set of pat-
terns of the form b1[c1]b2[c2]b3, etc. The equivalence classes
[·] may include vertices of the graph (both words and word
patterns turned into nodes), wild cards (i.e., any node), as well
as ambivalent cards (any node or no node). This means that
the terminal-level length of the string represented by a pat-
tern does not have to be of a fixed length. This goes concep-
tually beyond the variable order Markov structure: b2[c2]b3
do not have to appear in a Markov chain of a finite order
||b2|| + ||c2|| + ||b3|| because the size of [c2] is ill-defined,
as explained above. Fourth, as we showed earlier (Figure 3),
ADIOS incorporates both context-sensitive substitution and
recursion.
Tree Adjoining Grammar. The proper place in the Chom-
sky hierarchy for the class of strings accepted by our model is
between Context Free and Context Sensitive Languages. The
pattern-based representations employed by ADIOS have coun-
terparts for each of the two composition operations, substitu-
tion and adjoining, that characterize a Tree Adjoining Gram-
mar, or TAG, developed by Joshi and others [16]. Specifi-
cally, both substitution and adjoining are subsumed in the re-
lationships that hold among ADIOS patterns, such as the mem-
bership of one pattern in another. Consider a pattern Pi and
its equivalence class E(Pi); any other pattern Pj ∈ E(Pi)
can be seen as substitutable in Pi. Likewise, if Pj ∈ E(Pi),
Pk ∈ E(Pi) and Pk ∈ E(Pj), then the pattern Pj can be
seen as adjoinable to Pi. Because of this correspondence be-
tween the TAG operations and the ADIOS patterns, we believe
that the latter represent regularities that are best described by
Mildly Context-Sensitive Language formalism [16]. Impor-
tantly, because the ADIOS patterns are learned from data, they
already incorporate the constraints on substitution and ad-
joining that in the original TAG framework must be specified
manually.
Psychological and linguistic evidence for pattern-based
representations. Recent advances in understanding the
psychological role of representations based on what we call
patterns, or constructions [17], focus on the use of statisti-
cal cues such as conditional probabilities in pattern learning
[18, 19], and on the importance of exemplars and construc-
tions in children’s language acquisition [20]. Converging
evidence for the centrality of pattern-like structures is pro-
vided by corpus-based studies of the prevalence of “prefabri-
cated” sequences of words [21], and of the entrenchment of
such sequences in the lexicon [22]. Similar ideas concern-
ing the ubiquity in syntax of structural peculiarities hitherto
marginalized as “exceptions” are now being voiced by lin-
guists [23, 24].
Cognitive Grammar; Construction Grammar. The main
methodological tenets of ADIOS — populating the lexicon
with “units” of varying complexity and degree of entrench-
ment, and using cognition-general mechanisms for learning
and representation — fit the spirit of the foundations of Cog-
nitive Grammar [9]. At the same time, whereas the cognitive
grammarians typically face the chore of hand-crafting struc-
tures that would reflect the logic of language as they perceive
it, ADIOS discovers the primitives of grammar empirically
and autonomously. The same is true also for the compari-
son between ADIOS and the various Construction Grammars
[17, 24], which are all hand-crafted. A construction gram-
mar consists of elements that differ in their complexity and in
the degree to which they are specified: an idiom such as “big
deal” is a fully specified, immutable construction, whereas
the expression “the X, the Y” – as in “the more, the better”
[25] – is a partially specified template. The patterns learned
by ADIOS likewise vary along the dimensions of complex-
ity and specificity (e.g., not every pattern has an equivalence
class).2
Related computational work on grammar
induction
In natural language processing, a distinction is usually made
between unsupervised learning methods that attempt to find
good structural primitives and those that merely seek good
parameter settings for predefined primitives. ADIOS, which
clearly belongs to the first category, is also capable of learn-
ing from raw data, whereas most other systems start with cor-
pora annotated by part of speech tags [26], or even rely on
treebanks, or collections of hand-parsed sentences [4]. Of the
many such methods, we can mention here only a few.
Global grammar optimization using tagged data. Stol-
cke and Omohundro (1994) learn structure (the topology of
a Hidden Markov Model, or the productions of a Stochastic
Context Free Grammar), by iteratively maximizing the prob-
ability of the current approximation to the target grammar,
given the data. In contrast to this approach, which is global in
that all the data contribute to the figure of merit at each itera-
tion, ADIOS is local in the sense that its inferences only apply
to the current bundle candidate. Another important difference
is that instead of general-scope rules stated in terms of parts of
speech, we seek context-specific patterns. Perhaps because of
its globality and unrestricted-scope rules, Stolcke and Omo-
hundro’s method has “difficulties with large-scale natural lan-
guage applications” [27]. Similar conclusions are reached by
Clark, who observes that POS tags are not enough to learn
syntax from (“a lot of syntax depends on the idiosyncratic
properties of particular words.” [5], p.36). His algorithm at-
tempts to learn a phrase-structure grammar from tagged text,
by starting with local distributional cues, then filtering spu-
rious non-terminals using a mutual information criterion. In
the final stage, his algorithm clusters the results to achieve a
minimum description length (MDL) representation, by start-
ing with maximum likelihood grammar, then greedily select-
ing the candidate for abstraction that would maximally reduce
the description length. In its greedy approach to optimization
(but not in its local search for good patterns or its ability to
deal with untagged data), our approach resembles Clark’s.
2Similarly to constructions, the ADIOS patterns carry semantic,
and not just syntactic, information — an important issue that is out-
side the scope of the present paper.
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Probabilistic treebank-based learning. Bod, whose algo-
rithm learns by gathering information about corpus probabil-
ities of potentially complex trees, observes that “[. . . ] the
knowledge of a speaker-hearer cannot be understood as a
grammar, but as a statistical ensemble of language experi-
ences that changes slightly every time a new utterance is
perceived or produced. The regularities we observe in lan-
guage may be viewed as emergent phenomena, but they can-
not be summarized into a consistent non-redundant system
that unequivocally defines the structures of new utterances.”
[4], p.145. This memory- or analogy-based language model,
which is not a typical example of unsupervised learning, is
mentioned here mainly because of the parallels between its
data representation, Stochastic Tree-Substitution Grammar,
and some of the formalisms discussed earlier.
Split and merge pattern learning. The unsupervised
structure learning algorithm developed by Wolff between
1970 and 1985 stands out in that it does not need the cor-
pus to be tagged. An excellent survey of his own and earlier
attempts at unsupervised learning of language, and of much
relevant behavioral data, can be found in [28]. His repre-
sentations consist of SYN (syntagmatic), PAR (paradigmatic)
and M (terminal) elements. Although our patterns and equiv-
alence classes can be seen as analogous to the first two of
these, Wolff’s learning criterion is much simpler than that of
ADIOS: in each iteration, the most frequent pair of contigu-
ous SYN elements are joined together.3 His system, however,
had a unique provision for countering the usual propensity
of unsupervised algorithms for overgeneralization: PAR el-
ements that did not admit free substitution among all their
members in some context were rebuilt in a context-specific
manner. Unfortunately, Wolff’s system has not been tested
on unconstrained natural language.
Summary, prospects and challenges
The ADIOS approach to the representation of linguistic
knowledge resembles the Construction Grammar in its gen-
eral philosophy (e.g., in its reliance on structural generaliza-
tions rather than on syntax projected by the lexicon), and
the Tree Adjoining Grammar in its computational capacity
(e.g., in its apparent ability to accept Mildly Context Sensi-
tive Languages). The representations learned by the ADIOS
algorithm are truly emergent from the (unannotated) corpus
data, whereas those found in published works on cognitive
and construction grammars and on TAGs are hand-tailored.
Thus, our results complement and extend both the computa-
tional and the more linguistically oriented research into cog-
nitive/construction grammar.
To further the cause of an integrated understanding of lan-
guage, a crucial challenge must be met: a viable approach to
the evaluation of performance of an unsupervised language
learner must be developed, allowing testing both (1) neutral
with respect to the linguistic dogma, and (2) cognizant of
the plethora of phenomena documented by linguists over the
course of the past half century (see, e.g., Figure 5).
3An even simpler criterion, that of mere repetition, is employed
by the related approach of [29], resulting in a rule set that appears
to grow linearly with the size of the corpus, rather than reaching an
asymptote as in our case.
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Figure 5: As a token of our intention to account, eventually,
for the entire spectrum of English syntax-related phenomena
described in the textbooks — agreement, anaphora, auxil-
iaries, wh-questions, passive, control, etc. [30] — we illus-
trate here the manner in which ADIOS treats tough movement
(another phenomenon, long-range agreement, was discussed
in Figure 2). When trained on sentences exemplifying “tough
movement”, ADIOS forms patterns that represent the correct
phrases (. . . is easy to read, is easy to please, is eager to
read, is eager to please, to read is easy and to please is
easy), but does not over-generalize to the incorrect ones (*to
read is eager or *to please is eager).
Unsupervised grammar induction algorithms that work
from raw data are in principle difficult to test, because any
“gold standard” to which the acquired representation can be
compared (such as the Penn Treebank [31]) invariably reflects
its designers’ preconceptions about language, which may not
be valid, and which usually are controversial among linguists
themselves [32]. Moreover a child “. . . must generalize from
the sample to the language without overgeneralizing into the
area of utterances which are not in the language. What makes
the problem tricky is that both kinds of generalization, by def-
inition, have zero frequency in the child’s experience.” ([28],
p.183, italics in the original). Instead of shifting the onus of
explanation for this “miracle” onto some unspecified evolu-
tionary processes (which is what the innate grammar hypoth-
esis amounts to), we suggest that a system such as ADIOS
should be tested by monitoring its acceptance of massive
amounts of human-generated data, and at the same time by
getting human subjects to evaluate sentences generated by the
system (note that this makes psycholinguistics a crucial com-
ponent in the entire undertaking).
A purely empirical approach to the evaluation problem
would, however, waste the many valuable insights into the
regularities of language accrued by the linguists over decades.
Although some empiricists would consider this a fair price
for quarantining what they perceive as a runaway theory that
got out of touch with psychological and computational real-
ity, we believe that searching for a middle way is a better
idea, and that the middle way can be found, if the linguists
can be persuaded to try and present their main findings in a
theory-neutral manner. From recent reviews of syntax that do
attempt to reach out to non-linguists (e.g., [33]), it appears
that the core issues on which every designer of a language ac-
quisition system should be focusing are dependencies (such
as co-reference) and constraints (such as islands), especially
as seen in a typological (cross-linguistic) perspective [24].
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Abstract
This paper describes how a program that learns to solve
hard problems has been enhanced with fast and frugal, rec-
ognition-based reasoning methods. The program uses these
methods to help manage its own heuristics for solving con-
straint satisfaction problems. The result is a constraint
solver that reasons quickly, much the way people appear to
induce reasonable decisions in real-world situations. Em-
pirical evidence on a variety of problems indicates that fast
and frugal reasoning can accelerate the solution of very dif-
ficult problems, often without introducing additional error.
The thesis of this work is that the same fast and frugal
reasoning which people use to formulate decisions in real-
world situations (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research
Group, 1999) can accelerate autonomous decision makers
without endangering their reliability. We investigate this
premise with a program that learns how to combine heu-
ristics to solve constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs).
The principal result reported here is that, on difficult
CSPs, when recognition alone is not sufficient, fast and
frugal, recognition-based reasoning enhances the solver.
This is particularly noteworthy because the program first
learns how to apply its CSP heuristics within its problem
environment, and then hones its performance using fast
and frugal reasoning. We believe this to be the first explo-
ration of fast and frugal reasoning on a large body of
challenging problems whose difficulty can be explicitly
characterized and whose solution can be incisively as-
sessed.
Many large-scale, real-world problems in areas such as
design and configuration, planning and scheduling, and
diagnosis and testing are readily understood, represented,
and solved as CSPs. CSP solution is, in general, not
known to be solvable by algorithms of any but exponen-
tial complexity. Thus the effectiveness of fast and frugal
reasoning on these problems is counterintuitive.
Fast and frugal reasoning assumes pre-acquired, accu-
rate, problem-area knowledge (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The
ABC Research Group, 1999). In real-world decisions, fast
and frugal reasoning adaptively exploits the environ-
ment’s structure. A program provided with heuristics
must learn their accuracy before turning to fast and frugal
decision making. The first sections of this paper provide
background information on fast and frugal reasoning, and
on CSP. Subsequent sections describe how we addressed
these ideas in a program that learns, describe the experi-
mental design, discuss the results, and sketch future work.
Background
As often happens in interdisciplinary work, terminology
overlaps here, but meaning does not. Thus we alert the
reader to the fact that, although “domain” means “prob-
lem area” in some fields, it has a different connotation
(described below) in constraint solving, for which we re-
serve it. Similarly, fast and frugal researchers generally
refer to their general problem-solving methods (e.g.,
Minimalist, Take the Last, Take the Best) as heuristics,
but so too do CSP researchers, and again we take the CSP
definition. As a result, we describe fast and frugal meth-
ods as “strategies that consult heuristics” rather than “heu-
ristics that consult cues.” Finally, the notion of recogni-
tion, which underlies the fast and frugal strategies, is itself
a heuristic, albeit a more general one, defined below.
Fast and frugal reasoning
Under limited time, there exists a trade-off between deci-
sion making speed and correctness. When pressed for
time, people may limit their search for information to
guide them in the decision process with non-
compensatory strategies, strategies that use a single heu-
ristic to prefer a single option (Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
1996). People appear to work from an adaptive toolbox, a
collection of cognitive mechanisms for inference in spe-
cific problem areas (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Re-
search Group, 1999). This adaptive toolbox includes low-
order perceptual and memory processes, including fast
and frugal strategies that may be combined to account for
higher-level mental processes. Such a model of cognitive
heuristics is ecologically rational, grounded in environ-
ment-specific structure and characteristics (Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001;
Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research Group, 1999).
In one-reason decision making, a set of heuristics is
consulted one at a time, until some heuristic is able to dis-
criminate, that is, able to select a single option. Recogni-
tion is the foundation heuristic for fast and frugal reason-
ing: it favors recognized options over unrecognized ones.
Recognition discriminates if and only if exactly one op-
tion is recognized (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). In that
case, it is sufficient for one-reason decision making, and
no further computation is required.
When recognition alone does not discriminate, each
strategy considered here may be thought of as a meta-
heuristic that speeds the selection of the next heuristic. All
three strategies initially try recognition on all the available
options. If more than one option is recognized, other heu-
ristics are consulted, one at a time, on a randomly-
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selected pair of recognized options, until some heuristic
does discriminate. The preferred option is then selected.
The way these ÒotherÓ heuristics are chosen defines the
decision-making strategy. The following are drawn from
Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group (1999):
•  Minimalist: Select a heuristic at random, until one dis-
criminates among the options and a decision is made.
•  Take the Last: Use the last heuristic, the one that dis-
criminated the last time a decision was made, when
recognition did not. This captures the human tendency
to re-use the most recent successful strategy.
•   Take the Best: Use the heuristic known to work best in
a specific environment. The insightfulness of a heuristic
on a set of problems is called its ecological validity.
Constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs)
CSPs are a good vehicle with which to explore fast and
frugal reasoning. They arise in classes whose difficulty
has a mathematical characterization, and many examples
can be readily generated within each class. Furthermore,
well-established criteria exist with which to gauge the
performance of a program that solves them.
A CSP consists of a set of variables, each associated
with a domain of possible values for assignment, and a set
of constraints that specify which combinations of values
are allowed. To represent a real-world problem as a CSP,
one casts the entities involved as variables, and expresses
the relationships required among these variables as con-
straints. A simple example appears in Figure 1. Real-
world CSPs, however, involve many more variables, sub-
stantial domains, and a broad variety of interacting, more
sophisticated restrictions as constraints. A solution for a
CSP is one value for each variable such that all con-
straints are satisfied. Every CSP has an underlying con-
straint graph that represents each variable by a vertex. An
edge in the graph represents a constraint between the cor-
responding variables, and is labeled by their permissible
pairs of values. The degree of a variable is the number of
edges to it in the graph. (For simplicity we restrict discus-
sion here to binary CSPs.)
How hard a CSP is to solve is determined by how diffi-
cult it is to find values that satisfy all its constraints at
once. A class of CSPs groups together problems with four
parameters thought to estimate their difficulty. A CSP
class may be described by <n,k,d,t>, where n is its number
of variables and k its maximum domain size. The density
d is the fraction of possible edges in the underlying con-
straint graph. The tightness t is the percentage of possible
value pairs the constraints exclude. Thus in
<30,8,.26,.66> every problem has 20 variables, each with
domain size at most 8, and 308 possible value assign-
ments. In a given class, every CSP has the same values
for n, k, d, and t, and the same minimal number of deci-
sions for solution.
To solve a CSP, one can repeatedly select a variable
and assigns it a value consistent with its constraints. For
example, Figure 2 represents a possible search for a solu-
tion to the problem in Figure 1. Reading from top to bot-
tom and from left to right, each circle (node) represents a
decision. There, Variable A was selected first, and as-
signed the value 2, then D was selected, and both its val-
ues (1 and 3) were tried without success. Therefore,
search backed up, the value 2 was withdrawn (retracted)
from A, and the value 1 was assigned to A instead.
The black nodes in Figure 2 represent the correct deci-
sions, and the solid path on the right represents the solu-
tion. When a value assignment is inconsistent with the
constraints, it is retracted and another assignment is tried.
In Figure 2, white nodes are errors, assignments that
cause subsequent decisions (the gray nodes) to be re-
tracted, so that an error can be corrected. For example, the
assignment D = 1 is inconsistent because it leaves no val-
ues for C. When that happens, values are retracted until
all current assignments are once again consistent, and new
values tried. Finding a single solution to a solvable prob-
lem this way requires at least n assignments.
Although CSP solution is NP-hard, some problem
classes surrender readily to heuristics. For a solvable CSP,
the order in which one selects variables (variable order-
ing, e.g., A, D, C, B in Figure 2) can speed solution, as
can the order in which one assigns a value to a just-
selected variable (value ordering, e.g., 2, 1 for A in Fig-
ure 2). There are dozens of variable-ordering and value-
ordering heuristics in the CSP literature, but their interac-
tions are ill-understood. The best approximation for CSP
problem difficulty is currently kappa, which is defined as
a function of n, k, d, and t (Gent, MacIntyre, Prosser, &
Walsh, 1996). Nonetheless, two problems from the same
class may still require different amounts of effort to solve.
During search, a CSP solver can apply a variety of in-
ference and retraction methods. When a partial solution
(a set of values assigned to a proper subset of the vari-
ables) is incompatible with the constraints, all the nodes
that include it (e.g., gray in Figure 2) may be eliminated.
An inference method can propagate the implications of a
newly-assigned value on to the remainder of the as-yet-
unassigned variables. Different amounts of inference are
possible, and there are tradeoffs between inference effort
and search savings. A specific inference method (the cen-
tral one is arc consistency) can be carried out to varying
degrees (Sabin & Freuder, 1994) and with different algo-
rithms (Bessire & Rgin, 2001). A retraction method re-
(1 1) (1 3)
(1 1) (2 2) 
A B
DC
(1 3) (2 3) 
Variables: A, B, C, D
Domains: A is 1 or 2
B is 1, 2, or 3
C is 1, 2, or 4
D is 1 or 3
Constraints : A = B
C < D
D — A is even
Figure 1: A simple constraint satisfaction problem and its
underlying constraint graph. Edges in the graph are la-
beled with acceptable value pairs, computed from the
domains and the constraints.
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sponds to an inconsistent partial solution (a subtree of
discarded nodes rooted at an error node in Figure 2). The
standard retraction method is chronological backtracking,
withdrawal of the most recent assignment(s).
ACE
ACE (the Adaptive Constraint Engine) is an autonomous
system that learns to solve classes of CSPs (Epstein,
Freuder, Wallace, Morozov, & Samuels, 2002). ACE is
based on FORR (FOr the Right Reasons), a cognitively-
oriented architecture for learning and problem solving
that supports the development of expertise (Epstein,
1994). Here, “cognitively-oriented” means that FORR’s
reasoning structure emulates approaches readily observ-
able in human problem solving, highly-effective ap-
proaches not always found in traditional AI artifacts
(Biswas, Goldman, Fisher, Bhuva, & Glewwe, 1995;
Crowley & Siegler, 1993; Klein & Calderwood, 1991;
Kojima & Yoshikawa, 1998; Novick & Coté, 1992;
Schraagen, 1993). FORR is based on the premise that de-
cisions are composed from more and less trustworthy ra-
tionales. One constructs a FORR-based program by speci-
fying heuristics that underlie decision making in a par-
ticular problem area.
ACE is an ambitious program – armed with many heu-
ristics, it can tackle difficult problems. The version we
used here begins with 40 CSP heuristics which are ini-
tially classified into a hierarchy of three tiers by the user.
ACE moves through those tiers to make a decision. The
heuristics in tiers 1 and 2 are consulted sequentially; the
heuristics in tier 3 are consulted (effectively) in parallel.
Tier 1 consists of perfect (i.e., error-free) heuristics
consulted sequentially. If any heuristic supports an action,
that action is executed without reference to any subse-
quent heuristics. Consulting perfect heuristics first en-
sures that obvious correct decisions (e.g., a checkmate at
chess) will be reached without devoting resources to
other, less reliable heuristics. A perfect heuristic that op-
poses an action (e.g., “don’t move into checkmate”) re-
moves that action from consideration by all subsequent
heuristics, thereby preventing obvious errors. Thus plac-
ing perfect heuristics in tier 1 permits easy problems to be
solved easily, a feature all too rare in complex systems.
(The second tier is not applicable to the work reported
here; the interested reader is referred to (Epstein, 1998)).
Tier-3 heuristics are the ordinary ones; they produce
single-action comments that are not guaranteed to be cor-
rect. All but two of the ACE heuristics in this version lie
in tier 3. Because they are fallible, their comments are
combined to select the next action in a process called
voting. Each heuristic may vote on different actions with
different strengths, or it may remain silent. ACE’s tier 3
heuristics were, for the most part, drawn from the CSP
expert community. In every case, however, the dual of a
popular heuristic was also implemented. For example, the
CSP literature suggests that the next variable to have a
value assigned to it should have a minimum dynamic do-
main size (set of values that would still be consistent with
existing variable assignments). ACE therefore has a heu-
ristic that comments in favor of such variables, but it also
has its dual, a heuristic to maximize the dynamic domain
size of a variable.
One-Reason Decision Making in ACE
ACE learns to solve CSPs efficiently by winnowing
through its heuristics and balancing them appropriately.
Laden with CSP knowledge, ACE’s decisions are care-
fully reasoned but time-consuming. Fast and frugal, one-
reason decision making seemed a reasonable enhance-
ment, but its adaptation for ACE required careful thought
about recognition, ecological rationality, ecological va-
lidity, and preference functions.
Recognition in ACE
Recognition is familiarity with something previously ex-
perienced. Recall that, during CSP solution, there are only
two kinds of experience: variable selection and value se-
lection. Therefore, we define recognition to be the identi-
fication of a current option as one previously selected
during search in the current problem. Note that recogni-
tion for ACE is a selection heuristic rather than a trigger
for situation assessment and re-evaluation, because mere
recognition of a single option is sufficient for decision
making without any consideration of the similarities of
the different search states (situations) in which it previ-
ously occurred. For example, in Figure 2 assigning 1 to
Variable D after Variable A is set to 1, eventually proves
to be an error, since all possible assignments to Variable
C are then incompatible with the constraints. In response
to the detected error, the gray nodes corresponding to the
selection of Variable C and the values tried for it are re-
tracted. The decisions made in this subtree, excluding the
error node, will be recognized during subsequent search.
Effectively, later in search, a decision point that includes
Variable D
3    
Key  
correct decision  
error  
underlying perfect 
path  
digression  
discarded node  
Variable A
Variable D
Variable C   
2    1
1
2    
Variable C    
1    
1 3
1 2 4
Variable B    
Figure 2: A search tree for solution to the simple CSP in
Figure 1, depicted here as alternating variable selections
and value selections. When a value selection violates some
constraint, that decision is retracted, and search backtracks.
New values are assigned until all variables have a value
consistent with the constraints.
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options previously found attractive will find them attrac-
tive again.
A counterargument to the role of recognition in human
reasoning is that recognition is often associated with other
cues to obtain a given judgment, and is thus compensatory
(Oppenheimer, 2003). When an object is recognized,
other information about that object is also recalled at the
moment of recognition. If this “extra” information is rele-
vant to the judgment being made, it will be taken into ac-
count while making the decision. The relevant informa-
tion may support or oppose the judgment about the recog-
nized object. Although the additional information may be
contradictory, for our purposes, the influence it has on
recognition is considered as a whole. Recognition may
have an attached positive or negative correlation with re-
spect to the judgment being made.
For ACE, recognition always has a positive correlation,
because it treats a previous decision as one it wants to
make again. The idea here is that, if no further knowledge
about ACE’s tier 3 heuristics has been acquired during
search on the current problem, and consulting these same
heuristics previously led to making certain decisions, they
should remain valid, if the option is still available. (Con-
sistency checking may have eliminated it.) By “recogniz-
ing” such previously-computed but subsequently-retracted
decisions, ACE can avoid reconsulting all its heuristics on
the same (or most of the same) options. For example, in
Figure 2, ACE initially assigned 2 to A and then chose
Variable D. Later, when 2 is retracted and 1 assigned to
A, the next variable must be selected. At that point D is
recognized and so need not be recomputed. Note too that
recognition can lead ACE to repeat an error. It tries 1 be-
fore 3 for D on both sides of the search tree in Figure 2.
Ecological rationality and ecological validity
ACE must have acquired problem-class-specific knowl-
edge before it attempts speed-up through one-reason deci-
sion making. Tier-3 heuristics are ACE’s version of the
adaptive toolbox, its knowledge about how CSP works.
ACE’s heuristics, however, are not all of equal signifi-
cance or reliability in a particular problem class. There-
fore, ACE learns weights to combine them.
DWL (Digression-based Weight Learning) learns
problem-class-specific weights for tier-3 heuristics
(Epstein et al., 2002). It is specifically designed to mini-
mize errors during solution (and therefore minimize the
number of nodes in the tree of Figure 2). After ACE
solves a problem, DWL examines the solution trace, and
adjusts the weight of each heuristic according to whether
or not it supported the correct decisions. All heuristics
start with the same weight. DWL provides the ecological
validity for the heuristics in a given problem class.
DWL also employs non-voting, baseline heuristics that
discriminate with randomly-generated strength on ran-
domly-chosen options. DWL uses them to gauge ACE’s
own heuristics, so that ACE learns to value only those
heuristics that make comments more valuable than ran-
dom ones. These baseline heuristics provide ACE’s eco-
logical rationality.
From preference to binary decisions
The one-reason decision-making model assumes binary
heuristics, ones that vote either in favor of or against an
option. Recall that, if recognition does not discriminate,
the model considers other heuristics on randomly-selected
pairs of options, until some heuristic discriminates. Rec-
ognition is a binary heuristic, and we translate it as such
for ACE: a decision was either previously made or not. A
tier-3 heuristic, however, expresses its preference for, or
opposition to, an option in a comment whose strength lies
between 0 and 10. To adapt ACE for one-reason decision
making, the option with the higher strength is deemed the
positive one. If a heuristic comments on both options with
the same strength, or it does not comment at all, the heu-
ristic does not discriminate, and another heuristic is con-
sulted, depending upon the particular strategy in use.
Experimental Design
The ACE project maintains a large library of problem
classes, each with many examples. In each experiment
here, ACE learned by attempting to solve at most 600
problems (the learning phase) and then was tested on 200
different problems from the same class, with learning
turned off (the testing phase). This learn-and-then-test ap-
proach was repeated 10 times, each time with different
learning problems but the same testing problems. Fast and
frugal reasoning was applied only in the testing phase.
ACE’s performance here is evaluated by three standard
CSP criteria: average number of nodes in the decision tree
(e.g. Figure 2), average number of mistakes during solu-
tion (number of retractions), and average computation
time (in seconds). Any differences identified in the fol-
lowing discussion are statistically significant at the .95
level. Learning was terminated early if the heuristics’
weights stabilized (did not vary in their standard deviation
by more than 0.1 over the most recent 20 problems) be-
fore 600 problems. ACE used chronological backtracking
for retraction and MAC3 (Mackworth, 1977) for consis-
tency checking. What we varied in our experiments was
the problem class, and which non-compensatory search
strategy was used in the testing phase.
Results
We tested ACE alone, and then with each of the fast
and frugal strategies on each of three problem classes.
The results appear in Table 1. The first class of problems
was <30, 8, .26, .66>, an extremely difficult set of ran-
domly-generated CSPs. (The state of the CSP art does not
yet support labeling them “the most difficult” for their
size, but these are certainly “exceptionally difficult.”) On
this class, each of the three non-compensatory strategies,
combined with recognition significantly improved overall
execution time. Speed-up came with a price, however.
Although ACE solved every problem, it made more (al-
beit relatively trivial) errors, and explored more nodes
during search. The most reasoned and ecologically ra-
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tional strategy (Take the Best) outperformed the other
two.
The next class of problems on which we tested this ap-
proach was <30, 8, .12, .5>, a somewhat easier set. Here
again, all three strategies achieved significant speedup,
this time without increasing the number of errors or the
size of the search tree. Finally, we tested our approach on
a relatively easy class, <30, 8, .1, .5> (results not shown)
where no changes could be detected.
Discussion
ACE is complete, that is, as constructed it is guaranteed to
solve any solvable CSP — eventually. Expertise, how-
ever, requires that one solves problems efficiently. (All
solutions to a CSP are defined to be equally good. When
CSP researchers talk about optimal search, they refer one
that does the least work, as measured by propagation.)
Although extensive computation can minimize, or even
eliminate, incorrect value selection, such computation
may simply not be worth the time. Indeed, a solver that
makes many inexpensive mistakes may actually arrive at
a solution more quickly, despite a somewhat larger search
tree. In this sense, ACE is a satisficer — it makes “good
enough” decisions (Simon, 1981). Even when fast and
frugal reasoning introduces additional error, the program
solves problems faster. Both satisficing and our imple-
mentation of recognition, it should be noted, are tolerable
only on problems where errors are relatively harmless.
The results of these experiments indicate that enhancing
an intelligent and ecologically rational system with fast
and frugal reasoning can save computation time, but is not
guaranteed to do so. Because recognition, as we have im-
plemented it, is a consequence of previous errors on the
current problem, performance on these three problem
classes requires individual explanations. On the relatively
easy problems of <30, 8, .1, .5>, fast and frugal reasoning
does not improve performance because there are not
enough retractions during search to support subsequent
recognition.
Fast and frugal reasoning that is also ecologically ra-
tional (i.e., Take the Best) provided more speed-up here
than the other strategies. Recognition serves as a filter for
the best of the options; it recycles earlier reasoning inher-
ently. Nonetheless, ACE still needs to select from among
the recognized options the one which is likely to be the
most productive, and Take the Best is one way to do that.
On the problems of medium difficulty of <30, 8, .12,
.5>, fast and frugal reasoning achieves speedup because it
avoids some repeated computation. It also does so without
significantly introducing more error, because recognition
forces persistence by attempting to restrict ACE to previ-
ously-chosen options. Even if these “recycled decisions”
are wrong, there are simply not enough wrong ones to in-
troduce many new retractions.
On the very difficult problems of <30, 8, .26, .66>,
Take the Best introduces significantly less error and does
less work than the other fast and frugal strategies do. The
additional errors on these problems suggest that accurate
decision making here is more subtle and complex than a
single heuristic can support, and certainly more than rec-
ognition alone can handle. Even without fast and frugal
methods, ACE makes more mistakes solving these prob-
lems, simply because the problems are harder, Therefore
there are more errors that may be recycled by recognition,
as well as simply more recognized options to choose
from. Take the Best introduces significantly fewer errors
because it uses ecological rationality to avoid recycling
some of them. Here again the speedup is achieved through
the tradeoff between inexpensive errors and savings in
computation time.
ACE’s version of recognition is not the situation-based
recognition described in (Klein & Calderwood, 1991). In
that work, particular features of a situation bring to mind
possible solution approaches, approaches that may require
adaptation for the current situation. There, recognition
may be paraphrased as “I was once in a similar situation
where this sequence of decisions worked well, so I will
see if I can adapt it to work again here, testing it first in
simulation.” ACE’s recognition, in contrast, may be para-
phrased as “I have seen that option before, considered it
carefully (perhaps with different alternatives and in a
somewhat different context at the time), and have decided
to prefer it once again, without considering any potential
consequences.” ACE’s recognition applies only to a sin-
gle decision, not to a sequence; it does not permit adapta-
Table 1: Performance of ACE alone and with the recognition heuristic guided by three different non-compensatory, one-
reason decision making strategies, on two classes of CSPs: < 30, 8, .26, .66> and < 30, 8, .12, .5>. Time (in seconds), er-
rors and nodes are per problem. Figures in bold represent a statistically significant improvement over ACE without recog-
nition.
Class Criterion ACE Minimalist Take the Last Take the Best
Overall time 3.10 (3.04) 2.72 (2.57) 2.85 (2.73) 2.37 (2.19)
Tier 3 time 1.41 (1.51) 0.70 (0.62) 0.75 (0.68) 0.61 (0.68)
Errors 105.11 (107.64) 119.12 (134.69) 116.97 (129.27) 113.77 (127.33)
30-8-.26-.66
Nodes 165.11 (107.64) 179.12 (134.69) 176.97 (129.27) 173.77 (127.33)
Overall time 0.76 (0.57) 0.71 (0.49) 0.71 (0.42) 0.66 (0.44)
Tier 3 time 0.44 (0.38) 0.37 (0.31) 0.37 (0.28) 0.36 (0.34)
Errors 13.80 (15.52) 13.38 (15.26) 14.12 (16.17) 12.97 (14.36)
30-8-.12-.5
Nodes 73.80 (15.52) 73.38 (15.26) 74.12 (16.17) 72.97 (14.36)
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tion; it makes no situation assessment; and it relates to
previous experience in the same problem.
To make use of fast and frugal reasoning, as we have
implemented it, a system needs to have a body of heuris-
tics with which to make decisions and, if it is to take the
best, it needs a metric on those heuristics. Furthermore,
since recognition, as we have interpreted it, requires deci-
sions that are made under some erroneous circumstances
and then withdrawn (gray nodes in Figure 2), the system
must not have perfected decision making, or there will be
no prior, within-problem decisions to recycle. Thus, fast
and frugal reasoning can improve mediocre or even fairly
reputable performance, but cannot improve flawless per-
formance, for without errors there can be no recognition.
Future Work and Conclusion
Previously-made decisions are here recycled through the
recognition heuristic. Whether or not ACE would have
remade those decisions, and in the same sequence, with-
out recognition remains to be determined. Future work
will examine ACE’s decisions at the same level but in dif-
ferent branches of the search tree, with and without fast
and frugal reasoning.
Although we did not use it in these experiments, ACE
can partition its tier-3 heuristics into any number of sub-
classes. We intend to compare ACE’s performance with
different numbers of tier-3 subclasses to ACE’s perform-
ance with Take the Best, which can be thought of as a
“one heuristic to a subclass” partition.
Fast and frugal reasoning has been shown here to have
a significant impact on an already competent CSP solver.
The premise that attractive options remain attractive as
problem solving progresses enables at least this program
to solve problems better. Furthermore, the problems we
have used here are sufficiently general to suggest that our
results have a potentially broad impact. We are optimistic
that, in problem areas that tolerate errors, fast and frugal
reasoning, as implemented here, can make an important
contribution to problem solving.
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Abstract
Vergence eye-movements occur not only in real environ-
ments, but also in virtual 3D environments. Autostere-
ograms can cover large visual angles without requiring
vergence beyond natural parameters and are thus well-
suited for the investigation of vergence movements in
virtual 3D images. We developed an anaglyph-based
3D calibration procedure and used a parametrized self-
organizing map (PSOM) to approximate the 3D gaze
point from a subject’s binocular eye-movement data.
Besides analyzing the general pattern of vergence eye-
movements in autostereogram images, the present study
examined the influence of image granularity on these
movements. Unlike previous research on random-dot
stereograms, we found substantially overshooting con-
vergence eye-movements, especially for medium gran-
ularities. Moreover, divergence movements were com-
pleted more quickly for coarse than for fine granularities.
Results are discussed in the context of granularity effects
on autostereogram perception and the dissociation be-
tween convergence and divergence eye-movements.
Vergence Eye-Movements in
Autostereograms
In everyday life, we employ vergence eye-movements to
successively fixate objects at different distances. It is in-
teresting to note that these movements are also produced
in virtual 3D environments. Some work has been done
on the analysis of vergence movements occurring while
viewing Random-Dot Stereograms (RDS). For RDS two
slightly different images for the left and the right eye seen
through a special device, a so-called stereoscope, lead to
the perception of 3D information. Mowforth, Mayhew
and Frisby (1981) found that RDS are perceptually fil-
tered by spatial frequencies. Low frequencies enable the
3D perception of RDS with larger disparities and lead
to faster vergence movements than do high frequencies.
Furthermore, vergence velocities were found to be faster
for convergent than for divergent eye movements.
In another study, Rashbass and Westheimer (1961)
found reaction times of about 160 ms for both conver-
gent and divergent eye movements in response to sud-
denly introduced target vergence changes. The authors
reported start velocity varying with stimulus amplitude,
and vergence reaching asymptotically its final level af-
ter approximately 800 msec without any overshoots or a
prolonged period of oscillations. They also found turn-
abouts in the response before the target vergence change
reaches zero, showing the anticipatory behavior of the
eye-vergence system.
For our experiment, however, instead of RDS we used
Single Image Random Dot Stereograms (SIRDS), also
called autostereograms. The difference between RDS and
SIRDS is that in SIRDS the two slightly different im-
ages of the RDS are combined into a single image. No
stereoscope is necessary to perceive the 3D information
in a SIRDS. To achieve the 3D perception of a SIRDS,
observers have to combine the information of the two
images for the left and the right eye to one depth per-
ception by focusing a point before (cross-eyed method)
or behind (wide-eyed method) the image plane, whereby
our preliminary studies (Essig, 1998) demonstrated that
the later method leads to a more stable perception of
the depth information and was therefore used for the
reported experiments. Once the observers perceive the
3D scene, they may move their gaze to any position in
the image without losing the 3D impression. Most im-
portant in the present context, SIRDS can cover large
visual angles without requiring vergence beyond natural
parameters, which makes them appropriate stimuli for
studying vergence movements in virtual 3D images.
In our natural environment, and when looking at RDS,
we move our eyes inward (convergence) to inspect near
objects and outward (divergence) to inspect distant ob-
jects. An obvious question is: Do these vergence move-
ments also occur during the observation of autostereo-
gram images? Belopolskii and Logvinenko (1994) found
that vergence movements are not necessary to get the
3D perception of an autostereogram. However, in recent
experiments (Essig, 1998) we found that in fact vergence
eye-movements are executed during the examination of
autostereogram images. These results encouraged us
to conduct further experiments investigating stereogram
parameters that are likely to influence vergence move-
ments.
A distinguishing feature of autostereogram images is
their grain size (granularity). Figure 1 shows examples
for autostereogram images with small (upper panel) and
big grain sizes (lower panel). The reported experiment
used autostereogram images with different grain sizes to
systematically investigate the influence of this parame-
ter on the vergence movements. According to Mowforth
et al. (1981), overshoots and oscillations should be more
likely for autostereogram images with coarser granulari-
ties, i.e. lower spatial frequencies, which, however, is in-
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Figure 1: Autostereogram images with granularities 1
(upper panel) and 12 (lower panel).
consistent with the findings of Rashbass and Westheimer
(1961). For a clarifying analysis of this issue, we mea-
sured vergence eye-movements with a modern binocular
eye tracker with a sampling rate of 250 Hertz. For in-
creased precision of vergence and 3D gaze-position mea-
surement, we developed and applied a novel neural-net
based calibration interface, which is described in the fol-
lowing section.
A Neural Approach to 3D Gaze-Point
Calculation
During the examination of autostereograms shown on
the computer screen, the intersection of the viewing axes
is in general in front of or behind the screen plane, de-
pending on the 3D gaze position. As a consequence, the
correct coordinates for the actual gaze position are dif-
ferent from the screen coordinates which the eye tracker
provides, because the system uses a 2D calibration to cal-
culate the relation between the pupil positions and the
gaze point on the screen. We tackled this problem by de-
veloping a 3D calibration that precedes the experiment
and uses a parametrized self-organizing map (PSOM) to
approximate the 3D gaze point from a subject’s binocu-
lar eye-movement data.
Since the experimental conditions change from sub-
ject to subject (e.g. subjects have physical differences,
their gaze characteristics are individually different, and
the eye-tracker setup varies across sessions), it is clearly
advantageous to use a method which is able to “learn”
these individual parameters. Additionally, we have to
take into consideration that the mapping from pupil to
screen coordinates is non-linear. Hence neural nets are
suitable for the solution of these problems, because they
are able to “learn” nonlinear functions. Kohonen (1990)
developed the so-called self-organizing maps (SOMs),
which could learn the correct mapping from the pupil
to the screen coordinates. However, SOMs have two
disadvantages: They supply only the position of the
most stimulated neuron in a “neuron lattice” instead
of a continuous output, and they usually require thou-
sands of training examples. Therefore, we use a variant
of SOMs, namely a so-called parametrized self-organizing
map (PSOM) (Ritter, 1993). This variant does not have
the disadvantages mentioned above, because it provides
the demanded continuous output and gets only some se-
lected input/output pairs as parameters, i.e. the coordi-
nates of the calibration points and the related positions
of the pupils measured by the eye tracker.
A 2D version of the PSOM was already used in (Pom-
plun, Velichkovsky & Ritter, 1994), reducing the average
calibration error to about 30% of its previous value. In
opposition, our “new” PSOM does not only enhance the
accuracy of measurement, it also approximates the sub-
ject’s 3D gaze position from the two 2D coordinates of
the eye tracker system.
A PSOM can be considered as a recursive neural net
that realizes a distinct, mostly multi-dimensional pro-
jection f. The input data of this projection consist of
the “correct” coordinates of 27 calibration points k ∈ A
(standardized in the interval from 0 to 2 by the PSOM),
where A = {kxyz|kxyz = xeˆx + yeˆy + zeˆz;x, y, z = 0...2}
Figure 2: The calibration points in the virtual 3 x 3 x 3
cuboid. For the PSOM the coordinates are standardized
in such a way that they only have the values 0, 1, and 2.
(see Figure 2) arranged in a 3 x 3 x 3 grid and presented
to the subjects during the calibration procedure. In or-
der to create a virtual 3D perception, the calibration grid
was presented as an anaglyph image, viewed through
red-green glasses. The calibration points were drawn on
the planes of a cuboid, where the planes before and be-
hind the screen plane formed its surfaces. This made it
perceptually easier for the subjects to locate the stimuli
on one of the three planes of the cuboid. For each of these
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27 calibration markers, we have the associated gaze coor-
dinates measured by the eye tracker and the x-divergence
between the gaze positions of the left and right eye on
the screen calculated from this data. Thus, the reference
vector is wk = (xplk, yplk, xprk, yprk, xdk) ∈ IR5. xplk
is the x-coordinate for the left eye, and yplk the corre-
sponding y-coordinate for the left eye belonging to the
vector wk. For the right eye the corresponding values
are xprk and yprk. The fifth element of wk results from
xdk := xprk − xplk.
We introduce the divergence (xdk) as the fifth dimen-
sion of wk because the z-coordinate of the 3D gaze-
position mainly depends on this divergence. Since the
differences in the divergence are smaller than those in the
x- and y-directions, the divergence has to be weighted by
a specific factor. This method leads to a faster termi-
nation of the PSOM-calculations. Hence, every fixation
point k ∈ A is associated with a corresponding refer-
ence vector wk ∈ IR5. With the reference vectors wk we
could already construct a SOM which could enable the
projection from the 2D coordinates of the system to the
“correct” 3D coordinates. This SOM would only enable
a crude approximation to the real 3D coordinates, be-
cause it could only choose one of the calibration points
as a possible output. In the present context, however,
we are looking for a projection which can interpolate be-
tween the vectors wk. This projection can be done by a
PSOM.
The desired interpolation function f(s) can be con-
structed from the superposition of a suitable number of
simpler basis functions H(.,.) as follows:
f(s) =
∑
k∈A
H(s, k)wk (1)
The values of the basis functions are within the in-
terval [0,1] depending on different values s, so that the
coordinates of a calibration point, which is close to the
desired gaze position, is weighted strongly (near 1) and
points which are far away are weighted weakly (near 0).
The basis functions H : IR3 × A → IR have to comply
with the requirement
H(s, k) = δs,k ∀ s, k ∈ A (2)
where δ represents the Kronecker symbol. It is defined
as: δij =
{
1 : i = j
0 : i 6= j ∀ i, j = 0, 1, 2
(in this special case). This ensures that
f(s) = ws ∀ s ∈ A
Thus, it is guaranteed that the interpolation function
passes through the given points. But how can we choose
suitable functions H that obey equation (2), that are
smooth and simple to handle?
One convenient solution is to make a product ansatz
and to derive the suitable function by combining three
1D functions (one in each case for every coordinate di-
rection x, y, and z). The new 1D functions must then
have the property H(1) : IR× {0, 1, 2} → IR:
H(1)(q, n) = δq,n ∀ q ∈ IR, n ∈ {0, 1, 2} (3)
Because n has only three possible values (0, 1, and
2), it is sufficient to choose an account of three basis
functions IR→ IR. For this purpose, polynomials of sec-
ond degree are especially suitable, because they have no
redundant degrees of freedom.
Now we have built a function which projects 3D coor-
dinates onto 2D gaze-positions for both eyes. Our final
aim is to find a function which does just the opposite
though, namely to approximate the 3D gaze-position of
the subject from the system’s 2D measurements. There-
fore, we have to calculate the inverse function f−1 of f.
The non-linearity of f forces us to use a numerical pro-
cedure. Thus we have to create an error function E(s),
which is defined as:
E(s) =
1
2
(f(s)− fet)2 (4)
i.e. the deviation of the pupil coordinates provided by
the eye tracker (fet) from the eye tracker data calculated
by the PSOM f(s) for the actually assigned two screen
points.
If this difference exceeds a specified threshold, the co-
ordinates of these points are modified in an iterative
gradient-descent procedure until the results of Equation
(1) closely approximate the actual eye tracker data pro-
vided by the system:
s(t+ 1) = s(t)− ² · δE(s)
δs
,with ² > 0 (5)
This means that the iteration process stops if E(s(t))
falls below the threshold, which we should adapt to the
screen resolution. In this way, an exact 3D gaze position
of the subject during the examination of a 3D stimulus
is assigned to the 2D eye tracker data for the left and
right eye.
We conducted an experiment in which the accuracy
of the PSOM gaze-point calculation is compared to one
provided by a geometrical solution. Subjects had to vi-
sually track a dot that appeared at positions of a 4 x 4 x
4 grid in 3D space in a random sequence. In the geome-
trical method the equations for the right and left visual
axes are calculated on the basis of both the measured
gaze-positions on the screen and the subjects’ (assumed)
constant head position. The gaze point is determined as
the point where the visual axes are closest to one an-
other. It results as the center of the shortest straight
link between the visual axes.
The results show that the neural net calculates gaze
positions from the eye tracker data which are nearly 46%
closer to the actual gaze positions than those of the geo-
metrical solution. The average total error for all sub-
jects, separated for the individual coordinates, is shown
in Table 1 (the values for the geometrical method and the
neural net show the average total error and the standard
error).
It is obvious that the z-error is always higher than the
x− and y−errors, because the z-coordinate is much more
sensitive to small changes in the binocular gaze position
than the x− and y−coordinates. We also found that the
measurement errors decrease from the back to the front
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Table 1: Average total error for individual coordinates.
both
methods
geometrical
method
neural
net
coordinate average to-
tal error
average to-
tal error
average to-
tal error
x 0.97cm 1.41cm ±
0.04cm
0.52cm ±
0.05cm
y 1.03cm 1.24cm ±
0.05cm
0.82cm ±
0.05cm
z 4.16cm 5.79cm ±
0.36cm
2.53cm ±
0.11cm
plane. The neural net compensates the errors in the back
plane better than the geometrical method, because small
changes in the gaze position at the back plane lead to
severe inaccuracies. Obviously, the precision of our novel
method of 3D gaze-position measurement provided an
appropriate basis for the autostereogram study.
The Autostereogram Experiment
Method
Subjects. Eight paid subjects (1 female, 7 male), all
of them were students at the University of Bielefeld,
participated in this experiment. They had normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity and were experienced
in viewing autostereogram images.
Stimuli. The stimuli in this experiment were auto-
stereogram images whose depth impression arose from
two horizontally divided half planes, which were recog-
nized at different virtual distances. The autostereogram
images used in the experiment varied in their granulari-
ties. Using the autostereogram generation program rds-
gen V1.2b by Frederic N. Feucht1, we produced different
autostereogram images in which one dot of the auto-
stereogram image corresponded to one, two, four, eight,
or twelve screen pixels in height and width. The sub-
jects always got the spatial perception that the lower
plane was nearer than the upper one. The depth differ-
ence between the two planes corresponded to a vergence
angle difference of 0.859o.
By using rdsgen we created two autostereogram im-
ages for each of the granularities 1, 2, 4, 8, and 122.
These 10 autostereogram images were presented to the
subjects in a random order on a 20-inch screen and a spa-
tial resolution of 640x480 pixels. The images consisted
of black and blue (luminance: 24 cd/m2) points, where
one pixel corresponded to 4.17 min arc. The distance
from the subject to the screen was 50 cm.
1http://www.bcc.cc.nc.us/graphics/g2c.html.
2We first changed the distance between the repeating pat-
terns of the autostereogram image and magnified it with the
corresponding “enlargement factor” (grain size) to keep the
distance between the repeating patterns (and therefore the
depth impression) constant.
Apparatus. We used an SMI EyeLink eye tracker for
the experiments. This system employs a headset with
two cameras to enable binocular eye-movement record-
ing. Further features of the EyeLink system are a high
sampling rate of 250 Hz and an average on-screen gaze
position error between 0.5o and 1.0o.
Procedure. Prior to the experiment, subjects were
presented with autostereogram images without using the
eye tracker. This way the subjects could practice the per-
ception of the depth information. A lamp fixed behind
the subjects to create reflections on the screen helped
the subjects to fixate a virtual point behind the screen
plane, facilitating the 3D perception of the autostereo-
gram image. When the subject got the 3D impression,
the light from behind was switched off.
At the beginning of every trial the light was switched
on as soon as the autostereogram image appeared on
the screen. When the subject got the 3D impression of
the image, the experimenter switched off the light and
started the eye-movement recording. It was the subjects’
task to change their view from the front plane to the back
plane and vice versa (every few seconds). Between these
eye movements subjects kept their view on one plane for
a while before changing their view to the other one. The
vergence movements were recorded over a duration of 1
minute per image. If subjects “lost” the 3D impression
during the recording interval, they had to press the right
mouse button, recover the 3D impression, and press the
left button to continue recording. Ten autostereogram
images were shown to the subject in a random order so
that every granularity appeared twice.
Data Analysis. In general, the vergence angle α is
used to make statements about a subject’s vergence. The
bigger the vergence angle is, the stronger the eyes con-
verge, i.e. the nearer the (virtual) surface fixated by the
subject. The time course of vergence movements was
the most important data to be analyzed in this experi-
ment, especially during the period right before and after
subjects changed their gaze point from one plane to an-
other. We distinguished between eye movements from
the near to the far plane and vice versa. For the evalua-
tion process we summarized the data of all subjects and
calculated the arithmetic mean and the standard error
of the vergence angle as a function of time relative to
gaze transitions between the two depth planes.
There were two criteria for the presence of a gaze tran-
sition between planes: First, there had to be a change in
the measured y-value that indicated a crossing of the hor-
izontal boundary. Second, any such change from plane A
to plane B had to be preceded by a contiguous sequence
of 50 measured gaze positions (200 msec) on plane A,
and succeeded by a contiguous sequence of 250 gaze po-
sitions (1000 ms) on plane B. To account for a small
fraction of measurement errors, we allowed a maximum
of 4 violations of these conditions among the 300 mea-
surements. After detecting a plane transition, the time
course of vergence from 200 ms before to 1000 ms after
the transition was calculated.
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Results and Discussion
Our first observation was that subjects had problems to
achieve a stable 3D perception of autostereogram im-
ages with large grain size (granularities 8 and 12). Once
achieved, it was difficult for them to maintain the sta-
ble depth impression when changing their gaze point
from one plane to the other. Subjects classified the au-
tostereogram images with the granularities 2 and 4 as
most pleasant to view. Figure 3 shows the temporal
progress of the convergence and divergence movements
during the examination of autostereogram images across
granularities. The vergence angles are standardized, i.e.
0 corresponds to the back and 1 to the front plane. In
the figures the value 0 on the time axis signals the time
of plane transition. Each panel shows the vergence data
from 200 ms before to 1 s after an eye movement be-
tween the two planes. Figure 3 also illustrates that, for
all granularities, the convergence movements are obvi-
ously faster than the divergence movements. This is in
line with the observations in Mowforth, Mayhew and
Frisby (1981). The final values are reached after a pe-
riod of about 800 ms, as stated in Rashbass and West-
heimer (1961). As can clearly be seen, both convergence
and divergence movements already start before the onset
of an eye movement between planes, suggesting that the
imagination of the target distance is already sufficient for
the execution of vergence eye-movements (proximal ver-
gence). Similar results were already obtained by Yarbus
(1967).
The high overshoot of the convergence movements
(Figure 3, upper panel) for the granularities 2 and 4
is very obvious. Both show an overshoot of 1.8 and ap-
proach the end value at nearly 900 ms. The similarity
between those vergence movements is in line with the
subjects reporting that it is easier to get and stabilize
the 3D illusion of these two types of autostereogram im-
ages. One reason could be that the perception of the
depth planes is particularly stable for these granular-
ities. Subjects can perceive the near plane very well,
even if they fixate a point on the back plane. As a con-
sequence, the visual system might perform a particularly
fast, overshooting vergence movement towards an angle
that would project the pattern of the near plane to corre-
sponding points on the retina. This mechanism allows us
a fast focussing of near or approaching objects, which is
an important capability to react in dangerous situations.
The vergence movements during the observation of
the autostereogram image with granularity 1 are sim-
ilar to those for granularities 2 and 4. It is obvious,
though, that the overshoot of the convergence move-
ments for granularity 1 is smaller (1.5) than for gran-
ularities 2 and 4 (granularity 1 seems too fine for a sta-
ble extrafoveal perception). Also the approaching to the
end value is shorter (nearly 750 ms instead of approx.
900 ms). These results further support the finding that
vergence movements can clearly be driven by relatively
high spatial frequencies (fine granularities), as stated in
Mowforth, Mayhew and Frisby (1981).
The data for the coarse granularities 8 and 12 are
clearly different from those for 1, 2, and 4. Hence it
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Figure 3: Convergence (upper panel) and divergence
movements (lower panel) occurring during the exami-
nation of autostereogram images with different granu-
larities.
is much more difficult for the subjects to perceive both
planes simultaneously in those autostereogram images,
which is consistent with the subjects’ impressions. An
important point is that the overshoot of the convergence
movements is substantially weaker (1.4) than for those
occurring in the images with finer granularities. The
standard error for the convergence as well as for the di-
vergence movement is high. This can be interpreted as
indicating an instable perception of the depth planes.
Furthermore, the progress of the divergence movements
is faster and finishes sooner than 600 ms after the gaze
shift.
The finding of overshoots for convergence movements
is inconsistent with the results obtained by Rashbass and
Westheimer (1961). It is possible that either the appa-
ratus used in their study did not allow the detection
of these overshoots, or that vergence eye-movements in
RDS – in contrast to those in SIRDS – do not show
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overshoots. Rashbass and Westheimer describe the ver-
gence system as a damped system, because it does not
show any oscillations. In the present study, however, we
found overshoots, but no following undershoots or any
kind of oscillations. It seems therefore correct to speak
of a damped system but with a strong tendency towards
overshoots for convergence movements in SIRDS.
With regard to divergence movements (Figure 3, lower
panel), we found faster approximation of the target an-
gle for the autostereogram images with coarser granular-
ities than for those with finer granularities. This is just
the opposite of the results we got for the convergence
movements. A possible explanation is a fundamental
difference in nature between convergence and divergence
movements, as can be seen from Figure 3. Convergence
movements are fast and impulse-like, whereas divergence
movements are slower and smoother. From an evolu-
tionary standpoint, since distant or vanishing objects
are less dangerous, there is no need for fast divergence
eye-movement mechanisms. Instead, this divergence re-
sembles more a relaxation process. And this relaxation
might be facilitated by easily losing the perception of the
near plane. In other words, for the finer granularities 1,
2, and 4, the continuous stable perception of the front
plane might impede the subjects’ effort to focus atten-
tion – and consequently vergence – on the far plane.
All in all, some findings for the RDS were confirmed in
our experiments with SIRDS, in particular that conver-
gence is faster than divergence, that the vergence mech-
anism can clearly be driven by relatively high spatial fre-
quencies, and that vergence response occurs even before
the disparity reaches zero. Inconsistent with previous
studies, however, our experiment demonstrates substan-
tial differences in vergence movements between SIRDS
and previously investigated RDS, especially with regard
to the overshoot for convergence movements. This differ-
ence, however, might have been caused by the possibly
low resolution of the apparatus used in the RDS study
(Rashbass & Westheimer, 1961).
Furthermore, our experiments show a clear influence
of granularity on vergence movements. The pattern of
influence seems to be more complex than described in
Mowforth, Mayhew and Frisby (1981), because, accord-
ing to our results, lower frequencies (coarser granulari-
ties) do not always lead to faster vergence movements.
One reason might be the more difficult simultaneous per-
ception of different depth planes in the stimuli of very
low frequencies. At any rate, these complex granular-
ity effects on vergence eye-movements in autostereogram
images indicate that there may be rather non-intuitive
factors that can have a significant impact on the coordi-
nation of both eyes. Future research will have to address
further issues, such as the timing of coordinated binocu-
lar saccades and its dependence on various pattern fea-
tures. This is a research area that so far has been ex-
plored very little, and the rather recent possibility of fast
and accurate binocular eye tracking, combined with ap-
propriate techniques for 3D gaze measurement like the
approach presented here, will greatly contribute to its
advancement.
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Abstract
To study the development of graphical conventions we
had members of a simulated community play a series of
graphical interaction games with partners drawn from the
same pool (Experiment 1).  Once the community was
established, a conventional graphical referring scheme
emerged that facilitated high levels of semantic
coordination, with reduced communicative effort.  Next,
a forced choice reaction time study (Experiment 2)
demonstrated that the graphical conventions developed
in the simulated community offer distinct processing
advantages when compared with those developed by
isolated pairs (i.e. participants who always interact with
the same partner).  This is interpreted as evidence that
the graphical conventions that evolve within a closed
community constitute higher order cognitions, the whole
being greater than the sum of its parts.
Background
Vygotsky (1981) claims that higher order cognition is a
product of social interaction, that novel structures
emerge as a consequence of interpersonal, as opposed
to intrapersonal, communication. Hutchins (1995)
shares this view, arguing that higher order cognition is a
cultural product, a consequence of interaction (human-
environment and human-human) that is distributed
across time and space.  According to Hutchins, higher
order cognitions emerge from “an adaptive process that
accumulates partial solutions to frequently encountered
problems” (p.354).  Lewis (1969, 1975) defines
conventions in a related way, as arising from situations
where a community faces the recurrent problem of
coordination.
If we agree that conventions are cultural
products, should we accept that they represent higher
order cognitions?  Using Chinese characters as an
example (Figure 1), we argue that conventions are
culturally evolved higher order cognitions.
Over several thousand years the original
Chinese character that represents mountain (left) has
evolved into its current, less complex, form (right).  We
argue that this change is not arbitrary; it is a result of
global coordination that took place over time and space,
culminating in a refined, conventional form that
promotes rapid communication with reduced effort.
This is an example of an evolutionary process where the
whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Figure 1.  The changing form of the Chinese character
that represents mountain (Vacarri & Vacarri, 1961;
cited in Arbib, in press)
Having partners collaborate on a graphical referential
communication task, Fay, Garrod, Lee and Oberlander
(2003) studied the influence of interaction upon
representational form.  The task requires pairs of
participants to graphically communicate a series of
recurring concepts.  Figure 2 illustrates the changing
representation of the concept ‘Clint Eastwood’ over 6
games, where partners’ drawing and identifying roles
alternated from game to game.
What is initially a designed, iconic
representation of Clint Eastwood, develops, through a
process of adaptation and entrainment, into a simplified,
symbolic form (an arrow pointing East).  Although
there are obvious similarities between this process and
the evolution of Chinese characters, the derived
representation of Clint Eastwood does not constitute a
convention in Lewis’ terms.  According to Lewis, a
convention must be common knowledge within the
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wider community.  At best, Figure 2 illustrates the
development of a ‘local’ convention.
Figure 2.  Partners’ changing representation of the
concept ‘Clint Eastwood’ over 6 games
Garrod & Doherty (1994) distinguish this ‘local’
process from the ‘global’ coordination process that
produces conventions.  To study the development of
linguistic conventions, Garrod et. al. had members of a
simulated community play a series of computerized
maze games with partners drawn from the same pool.
After several games, community members
demonstrated higher maze description scheme
convergence and more closely coordinated linguistic
entrainment when compared with interacting pairs, or
participants drawn from a non-community (i.e.
interacting partners not drawn from the same pool).
This effect was interpreted as indicating the
establishment of the community, and the development
of a robust referring convention.  Garrod et. al. argue
that referring conventions emerge on account of a
global coordination constraint based upon two factors;
pressure to converge upon the most popular description
scheme with each new partner, and the consequent
polarization of this scheme throughout the community.
This is contrasted with the local coordination process
evident among pair and non-community members, a
process based upon the less stable heuristics of salience
(pressure to choose the most salient description scheme)
and precedence (pressure to choose the previously used
scheme).
In much the same way that Garrod et. al.
studied the development of linguistic conventions, we
investigate the development of graphical conventions
(Experiment 1).  Furthermore, we demonstrate that
these cultural products represent higher order
cognitions (Experiment 2).
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 investigates the development of graphical
conventions within a simulated community of drawers.
Task and Procedure
Fay et. al.’s (2003) graphical referential communication
task was employed.  This task requires pairs of
participants to communicate a series of concepts using
only graphical means.  Like the game ‘Pictionary’,
participants are not allowed to speak or use text in their
drawings.  Concepts are drawn from a list of 16 items
that are known to both partners.  The list was designed
to contain a set of graphically confusable concepts
(theatre, art gallery, museum, parliament, Robert De
Niro, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Clint Eastwood, drama,
soap opera, cartoon, television, computer monitor,
microwave, loud, homesick, poverty).
Participants played six consecutive games,
using the same item set, with their partner.  On each
game the director, or drawer, depicted the first 12 items
from an ordered list (12 items plus 4 distracters) such
that their partner, the matcher, could identify each
drawing from their unordered list.  Item order was
randomized on each game.  Partners’ roles, as drawer or
matcher, alternated from game to game, although
participants were permitted to draw in either role.
Drawing took place on a standard whiteboard.  The
completed drawings were recorded on digital camera
for later analysis.
Subjects
The community was composed of 8 undergraduate
students who were paid to participate in the study.
Community Design
A simulated community was created through a series of
one-to-one interactions among partners drawn from the
same pool.  Over 7 rounds, each participant interacted
with the other members of the community.  As
discussed, participants completed a series of 6
consecutive graphical interaction games with each
partner.  The structure of the community is illustrated in
Figure 3.
It was so designed that community could first
establish itself at Round 4.  This was the earliest point
the community could converge upon a conventional
graphical description scheme.  For example, if person 1
influences person 2 (Round 1), person 2 influences
person 3 (Round 2), and person 3 influences person 8
(Round 3), person 1 and 8 will share some interactive
history upon meeting in Round 4.  Thus, Rounds 1-3
represent pre convergence games, whereas Rounds 4-7
represent post convergence games.
Figure 3.  Structure of the simulated community
Three independent measures were employed to
determine the establishment of a conventional graphical
referring scheme: identification accuracy (i.e.
participants’ ability to more successfully identify
conventional graphical representations), graphical
complexity (i.e. the reduced effort required to negotiate
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the meaning of conventional graphical representations)
and graphical convergence (i.e. the greater uniformity
of a conventional graphical description scheme).
Results
Identification Accuracy.  Figure 4 details the
identification rate (proportion of items correctly
identified by matchers) of pre convergence (Rounds 1-
3) and post convergence representations (Rounds 4-7)
over the six games played by each pair.  In pre
convergence rounds there is a steady improvement in
identification accuracy from games 1 to 3.  After this
identification rates reach ceiling level.  In contrast, post
convergence identification rates begin from, and are
maintained at, ceiling level across games.  Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) confirms these observations.
Figure 4.  Mean proportion of items correctly identified
by matchers in games 1 to 6 during Rounds 1-3 (pre
convergence) and 4-7 (post convergence)
Proportion scores were entered into a 2 x 6 ANOVA.
Analyses were conducted by subject (F1) and by item
(F2).  By subject tests used a mixed design, treating
Game (1 to 6) as a within subject factor and Round (1-3
and 4-7) as between.  Item tests used a within subject
design.  A main effect of Game F1(5, 130) = 6.78, F2(5,
55) = 4.51, and Round F1(1, 26) = 8.69, F2(1, 11) =
5.97, p<.05, was qualified by their interaction F1(5,
130) = 7.14, F2(5, 55) = 6.68 (for all results reported
p<.01 unless otherwise stated).  Tests of simple effects
corroborate the observations made above; identification
accuracy improves in the pre convergence rounds (1-3),
F1(5, 130) = 11.07, F2(5, 55) = 8.17, but not in the later
post convergence rounds (4-7) where identification rate
is maintained at ceiling from game 1 onwards, Fs<1.48.
The consistently high identification rate in
Rounds 4 to 7 indicates the establishment of the
community and the emergence of a robust referring
scheme.
Graphical Refinement.  Through interaction partners
minimize their collaborative effort, stripping away
unnecessary graphical information, leaving only the
salient properties of the image (Fay et. al., 2003).  As a
result, what is initially an iconic representation becomes
increasingly symbolic (see Figure 2).  Comparable
graphical refinement was evident in the community
members’ drawings.
Drawing complexity was measured using the
Perimetric Complexity formula developed by Pelli,
Burns, Farrell and Moore (accepted with minor
revisions) to measure the visual complexity of letters,
Complexity = Perimeter2/Ink.  This measure compares
favorably with human judgments of drawing
complexity (Fay et. al., 2003).
Figure 5 illustrates the mean complexity of
drawings made in games 1 to 6 during Rounds 1-3 and
4-7.  Mean complexity scores were calculated after the
removal of scores 2.5 standard deviations (SD) from the
condition mean.  Extreme values were replaced with
values corresponding to the mean plus or minus 2.5
SDs.  Such cases accounted for 2.4% of the data.
In both the pre and post convergence rounds
(Rounds 1-3 and 4-7 respectively) the complexity of
community members’ drawings is reduced across
games.  However, this effect is more marked in the
early, pre convergence rounds.  This observation is
corroborated by ANOVA.
Figure 5.  Mean Complexity (Perimeter2/Ink) of pre
and post convergence drawings (Rounds 1-3 and 4-7
respectively) in games 1 to 6
As before, complexity scores were entered into a 2 x 6
ANOVA.  This returned a main effect of Game F1(5,
130) = 58.57, F2(5, 55) = 34.48, and Round F1(1, 26) =
13.01, F2(1, 11) = 39.11, that was qualified by their
interaction F1(5, 130) = 15.35, F2(5, 55) = 12.43.  Tests
of simple effects show that graphical complexity is
reduced across games in both the pre convergence
rounds F1(5, 130) = 58.33, F2(5, 55) = 39.34, and post
convergence rounds F1(5, 130) = 8.48, F2(5, 55) = 4.24,
(Rounds 1-3 and 4-7 respectively).  Between condition
differences in drawing complexity in games 1 to 4,
ps<.05, and the comparable complexity of drawings at
games 5 and 6, Fs<1.07, explain the interaction.
Results support Garrod and Doherty’s (1994)
distinction between local and global coordination
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processes, signaled by the emergence of a conventional
graphical referring scheme during Rounds 4-7.  Unlike
the initial exchanges in Rounds 1-3, where partners
must negotiate a common description scheme, the
establishment of a conventional referring scheme from
Round 4 requires considerably less local negotiation.
Graphical Convergence.  Graphical convergence
concerns the degree to which community members’
drawings converge, or become more similar, as a
consequence of their interaction.  To investigate the
emergence of a common referring scheme, the
similarity of the first drawings of each concept
produced by community members at Rounds 1, 4 and 7
(i.e. pre convergence, convergence and post
convergence rounds) was compared.
Figures 6, 7 and 8 illustrate the 8 community
members’ changing representation of the concept
‘cartoon’ at Rounds 1, 4 and 7 respectively.  In addition
to the reduction in graphical complexity across rounds,
observe the community members’ convergence upon a
conventional description scheme for cartoon, in this
case a Mickey Mouse-like depiction, characterized two
large circular ears above the head.
Figure 6.  Community members’ drawings of the
concept ‘cartoon’ at Round 1
Figure 7.  Community members’ drawings of the
concept ‘cartoon’ at Round 4
Figure 8.  Community members’ drawings of the
concept ‘cartoon’ at Round 7
Graphical convergence was analyzed by having 12
subjects, who had no experience of the graphical
communication task, rank sets of images in terms of
similarity.  Each subject individually ranked three sets
of 8 images (e.g. Round 1, 4 and 7 drawings of the
concept ‘cartoon’ produced by each of the 8 community
members) in terms of similarity.  This was done for
each of the 12 target items drawn by community
members.  The set of images thought to be most similar
was given a rank of 1; those deemed least similar a rank
of 3.  The presentation order of item type (e.g.
television, cartoon etc.) and round (Rounds 1, 4 or 7)
was randomized.
Graphical convergence was measured by calculating the
proportion of Round 1, 4 and 7 images ranked as most
similar.  As can be seen from Figure 9, graphical
convergence increased across Rounds.  A substantially
higher proportion of Round 4 images were ranked as
most similar when compared with Round 1 images.  In
addition, more Round 7 images were ranked as most
similar when compared with Round 4 images.
Figure 9.  Mean proportion of drawings ranked most
similar in Rounds 1, 4 and 7 (pre convergence,
convergence and post convergence rounds respectively)
Proportion scores were entered into two repeated
measures t-tests.  Results were as predicted; Round 4
images were ranked as most similar more often than
Round 1 images t1(11) = 5.82, t2(11) = 2.91, p<.05.
This effect was less clear when Round 4 and Round 7
images were compared; by subject tests revealed a
marginal effect t1(11) = 1.84, p<.10, whereas there was
no effect of round when tested by item, p>.10.
Consistent with the previous identification and
complexity analyses, convergence tests indicate the
emergence of a conventional referring scheme at Round
4.  Tests show a large jump in drawing convergence
from Rounds 1 to 4 and a smaller, marginally
significant, increase in graphical convergence from
Rounds 4 to 7.  This indicates the establishment of a
conventional graphical referring scheme at Round 4,
and its continued development in the later rounds.
Experiment 2
Having detailed the emergence of a conventional
graphical description scheme in Experiment 1,
Experiment 2 demonstrates that these graphical
productions constitute higher order cognitions.
Experiment 2 contrasts representations that
emerge as a product of design, local coordination and
global coordination processes.  Pre interaction drawings
(i.e. subjects’ first drawing of each item) represent pure
design, an intrapersonal process whereby the drawer
designs a representation to meet the needs of his/her
partner.  This is consistent with the notion of ‘audience
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design’ (Isaacs & Clark, 1987).  Local coordination, or
adaptation, is illustrated in the interacting pair’s final
drawing of Clint Eastwood in Figure 2.  In this example
partners’ drawings serve their local needs.  Global
coordination, or evolution, is exemplified by the
development of a conventional referring scheme that
meets the needs of the wider community (see Figure 8).
A forced choice reaction time (RT) experiment
was designed to compare the processing efficiency of
graphical representations that are a product of design,
local coordination and global coordination processes.  If
graphical conventions constitute higher order cognitions
they will provide a processing advantage when
compared with designed or locally developed
representations.
Task and Procedure
The RT experiment required subjects to make binary
judgments regarding a set of learnt images.  Community
(Experiment 1) and isolated pair images (from Fay et.
al., 2003) were used as stimuli, presented on a computer
screen using PsyScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt &
Provost, 1993).
24 undergraduate students, who were
unfamiliar with the graphical communication
experiment, were paid to act as subjects.  Prior to taking
part in the RT experiment, subjects learnt the identity of
48 images (50% community generated and 50% pair
generated).  Each image set (community and pair) was
composed of 50% pre interaction images (i.e. the first
drawing of each item) and 50% post interaction images
(i.e. the last drawing of each item).  Pre and post
interaction drawings (matched by drawer) were
sampled quasi-randomly from the community and
isolated pair conditions.  Although pre interaction
drawings were more complex than post interaction
drawings, there was no difference between community
and isolated pair drawings (Community, M pre = 1796,
M  post = 906; Pair, M  pre = 1669, M  post = 932).
Participants were judged to have learnt the images
when each drawing could be identified on three
consecutive presentations of the set.
Each experimental trial consisted of the
following sequence; a fixation point (a small cross
presented in the middle of the screen for 25 msecs), the
learnt image (50 msecs), a mask (the screen was
blacked out for 25 msecs) and a forced choice (text that
either matched or mismatched the presented image, e.g.
a cartoon image followed by the text ‘drama’).  The
time required to make a match/mismatch judgment, by
key press, was recorded.  Subjects completed 384 trials,
with each drawing appearing 4 times in each condition.
Results
There was a 4.8% error rate on match/mismatch
questions, suggesting that participants had adequately
learnt the task materials.  Mean RTs were calculated
after the removal of times 2.5 SDs from the population
mean.  These extremes were replaced with values
corresponding to the mean plus or minus 2.5 SDs.  This
accounted for 2.5% of the data.
Mean RTs for matching image and text
judgments are shown in Figure 10.   As predicted, the
community generated graphical conventions (post
interaction) were processed more rapidly than the
designed (pre interaction) or locally developed pair
representations (post interaction).  The same pattern is
evident in the mismatching text condition, but at a
slower response rate (M  match = 781 msecs; M
mismatch = 884 msecs).
RTs were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA,
treating Communication (Community or Pair), Image
(Pre and Post) and Text (Match or Mismatch) as within
subject factors.  Analyses returned a main effect of Text
F1(1, 23) = 43.79, F2(1, 11) = 65.26, indicating subjects’
faster response times when the image and text stimuli
matched.  There was also a reliable interaction between
Communication and Image F1(1, 23)  = 10.08, F2(1, 11)
= 3.16, p = .10.  Tests of simple effects confirmed that
community generated representations were processed
more rapidly than those developed in isolated pairs
F1(1, 23)  = 5.63, p<.05, F2(1, 11) = 6.34, p<.05.  Pre
interaction images and post interaction pair
representations were processed at a comparable rate,
Fs<1.
The RT experiment distinguishes between
representations that emerge as a product of design, local
coordination and global coordination processes.  The
graphical conventions that evolved within the simulated
community, a society composed of the pairwise
interactions of its members, outperformed those
produced by pairs who interacted in isolation.  These
graphical productions provide a clear example of higher
order cognition, where the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts.
Figure 10.  Mean time required to process pre and post
interaction community and pair representations in the
matching text condition (image and text match)
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Discussion
Experiment 1 details the emergence of a conventional
graphical description scheme within a simulated
community of drawers.  Once established, community
members exhibit near perfect semantic coordination
(identification accuracy) with reduced communicative
effort (graphical complexity).  This is a consequence of
the development of a conventional graphical description
scheme (convergence).  Experiment 2 distinguishes
between graphical productions that develop as a product
of design, local coordination and global coordination.
The graphical productions that evolved within the
simulated community offer substantial processing
advantages when compared with designed or locally
developed representations. Thus, conventional
graphical representations constitute higher order
cognitions, the whole being greater than the sum of its
parts.
However, there are two potentially
confounding factors in Experiment 2.  Community
members played more games with more partners (42
games; 6 games with each of 7 partners) than pair
members (6 games with 1 partner), exposing them to a
greater variety of description schemes.  Number of
games played can be discounted for the simple reason
that isolated pairs rapidly negotiate and maintain a
locally stable description scheme (Fay et. al., 2003;
Garrod & Doherty, 1994).  Community members’
exposure to a greater number of exemplars is likely to
have a profound effect, as people are better able to learn
a prototype when exposed to its variants (Posner &
Keele, 1968).  However, number of exemplars alone is
not enough; global coordination is necessary to derive a
stable underlying representation (Garrod & Doherty,
1994).
So what is ‘better’ about the graphical
conventions developed in the simulated community?
We believe there are two factors at play; iconicity and
systematicity.   Like the present day Chinese character
for mountain (Figure 1), community representations
retain a degree of iconicity, i.e. once told what a
drawing represents it can be ‘seen’ as such.  Again, like
Chinese characters, community drawings exhibit a
degree of systematicity that makes them easily
differentiable.  We believe these factors explain the RT
advantage for graphical conventions found in
Experiment 2.  At present this is pure conjecture.
Further testing is required.
As the saying goes, ‘A picture is worth a
thousand words’.  That pictures have advantages over
words is supported by research showing that meaning is
extracted more quickly from pictures than from text
(Smith & McGee, 1980).  The current study
demonstrates that some pictures do this better than
others.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the nature of verbal working memory
(WM) in sentence comprehension and provides evidence for
overlapping pools of verbal WM resources between on-line
sentence comprehension and other verbally-mediated tasks.
We report the results of two dual-task experiments.  In
Experiment 1, participants simultaneously performed a self-
paced reading task and a self-paced arithmetic addition task in
a 2x2 design crossing syntactic complexity (low, high) and
arithmetic complexity (low, high).  In addition to two main
effects, the most interesting result was a significant
interaction between syntactic and arithmetic complexity
during the critical region of the linguistic materials:
participants processed the complex/complex condition more
slowly than would be expected if the two tasks relied on
independent resource pools.  To address a potential confound
of shared attentional resources, Experiment 2 was conducted,
where participants simultaneously performed a self-paced
reading task and a self-paced spatial-rotation task in a similar
2x2 design crossing syntactic complexity with the complexity
of the spatial task.  As in Experiment 1, there were two main
effects of complexity in the critical region.  However, in
contrast to Experiment 1, these effects were strictly additive,
with no trace of interaction.  The results of the two
experiments therefore support a WM framework where on-
line linguistic processing and on-line arithmetic processing
rely on overlapping pools of verbal WM resources.
Introduction
A major question in psycholinguistic research concerns the
nature of the working memory (WM) resources used in
language processing.  Empirical research has suggested that
different pools of WM resources are used for processing
visuo-spatial information and verbal information (e.g.,
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986; Vallar &
Shallice, 1990; Hanley et al., 1991; Jonides et al., 1993;
Shah & Miyake, 1996).  Some researchers (Caplan &
Waters, 1999; cf. Just & Carpenter, 1992) have
hypothesized that the verbal WM pool can be further
divided into two sub-pools: (1) verbal WM for natural
language comprehension and production; and (2) verbal
WM for non-linguistic verbally-mediated cognitive tasks.
This paper attempts to empirically evaluate this hypothesis.
One way to address this question is via dual-task
paradigms in which participants perform two tasks
simultaneously: (1) on-line sentence processing, and (2) a
non-linguistic verbally-mediated task.  The underlying
assumption is that we should observe a super-additive
interaction when the complexity of both tasks is high only if
the two tasks rely on overlapping pools of resources.
Previous dual-task experiments found either no
interaction or only a suggestion of one (e.g. King & Just,
1991; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Caplan & Waters, 1999;
Gordon et al., 2002).  In all of the previous experiments,
however, the secondary task involved storage of words or
digits across the sentence-processing task.  Although storage
– in a very general sense of keeping track of previously
encountered information – plays an important role in on-line
sentence comprehension (e.g., Chomsky & Miller, 1963;
Kimball, 1973; Gibson, 1991; 1998; Lewis, 1996), it may be
qualitatively different from the kind of storage involved in
the secondary tasks in the earlier experiments.
According to one recent resource-based theory of on-line
syntactic processing, the dependency locality theory (DLT;
Gibson, 1998, 2000), there are two working memory
components to sentence comprehension: storage and
integration.  The storage component involves keeping track
of partially processed syntactic dependencies that are still
awaiting their second element in order for the sentence to be
grammatical, whereas the integration component involves
connecting a newly input word into the structure that has
been built so far.  Critically, the storage component of on-
line sentence comprehension is unlike the storage involved
in keeping track of a list of unconnected items.
Consequently, it is possible that the lack of on-line
interactions between syntactic complexity and memory load
in earlier studies could be a result of the distinct nature of
the storage processes involved.  Moreover, there have been
no previous attempts to explore the potential interaction
between integration processes in sentence comprehension
and secondary verbally-mediated tasks, which involve
similar but non-linguistic on-line integration processes.  In
the current paper, we propose a novel paradigm to address
this issue.
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Experiment 1
This experiment had a dual-task design, in which
participants read sentences phrase-by-phrase, and at the
same time were required to perform simple additions.  The
on-line addition task is similar to on-line sentence
comprehension in that an incoming element – a number –
must be integrated into (i.e., added to) the representation
constructed thus far: the working sum.  Both tasks had two
levels of complexity, resulting in a 2x2 design.  Critically,
there was no difference in linguistic complexity between the
easy and hard arithmetic conditions: the complexity of the
arithmetic task was manipulated in terms of the difficulty of
the arithmetic operations (by making the addends larger),
while keeping the linguistic form of the two conditions
identical  (number + number + number, etc.).  Therefore, if
we observe a super-additive interaction between the two
tasks when the complexity of both tasks is high, then we
may infer that the verbal WM resources that are involved in
performing the arithmetic task overlap with those that are
involved in syntactic integration processes.  In contrast, if
language processing relies on an independent verbal WM
resource pool, there should be no such interaction.
Methods
Partic ipants  Forty participants from MIT and the
surrounding community were paid for their participation.
All were native speakers of English and were naive as to the
purposes of the study.
Design and materials The experiment had a 2x2 design,
crossing syntactic complexity (subject-extracted relative
clauses (RCs), object-extracted RCs) with arithmetic
complexity (simple additions (low initial addend,
consequent addends between 1 and 3) vs. complex additions
(higher initial addend, consequent addends between 4 and
6)).
The language materials consisted of 32 sets of sentences,
having four different versions as in (1):
(1) a. Subject-extracted, version 1:
The janitor | who frustrated the plumber | lost the key |
on the street.
b. Subject-extracted, version 2:
The plumber | who frustrated the janitor | lost the key |
on the street.
c. Object-extracted, version 1:
The janitor | who the plumber frustrated | lost the key |
on the street.
d. Object-extracted, version 2:
The plumber | who the janitor frustrated | lost the key |
on the street.
As described above, there were only two levels of
syntactic complexity – subject- and object-extractions – but
there were four versions of each sentence in order to control
for potential plausibility differences between the subject-
and object-extracted versions of each sentence.  As a result,
no independent plausibility control is needed in this design.
Each participant saw only one version of each sentence,
following a Latin-Square design.
The numbers for the addition task were randomly
generated online for each participant with the following
constraints:  (1) the value of the initial addend in the easy-
math condition varied from 1 to 10, whereas the value of the
initial addend in the hard-math condition varied from 11 to
20, and (2) the addends varied from 1 to 3 in the easy-math
condition and from 4 to 6 in the hard-math condition.
In addition to the target sentences, 40 filler sentences with
various syntactic structures other than relative clauses were
included.  The length and syntactic complexity of the filler
sentences was similar to that of the target sentences.  The
stimuli were pseudo-randomized separately for each
participant, with at least one filler separating the target
sentences.
Procedure The task was self-paced phrase-by-phrase
reading with a moving-window display (Just, Carpenter &
Woolley, 1982).  The experiment was run using the Linger
2.85 software by Doug Rohde.  Each experimental sentence
had four regions (as shown in (1a)-(1d)):  (1) a noun phrase,
(2) an RC (subject-/object-extracted), (3) a main verb with a
direct object (an inanimate noun phrase) and (4) an adjunct
prepositional phrase.  The addends for the addition task
were presented simultaneously with the sentence fragments,
above and aligned with the second character of each
fragment.  The first sentence region had a number above it
(e.g. “12”) and all the consequent regions had a plus sign
followed by a number (e.g. “+4”), as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Sample frame-by-frame presentation of an item.
Each trial began with a series of dashes marking the length
and position of the words in the sentence.  Participants
pressed the spacebar to reveal each region of the sentence.
As each new region appeared, the preceding region
disappeared along with the number above it.  The amount of
time the participant spent reading each region and
performing the accompanying arithmetic task, was recorded
as the time between key-presses.
To make sure the participants performed the arithmetic
task, a window appeared at the center of the screen at the
end of each sentence and the participants were asked to type
in the sum of their calculations.  If the answer was correct,
the word “CORRECT” flashed briefly on the screen, if the
answer differed by up to 2 from the correct sum, the word
“CLOSE” flashed briefly, and if the answer was off by more
than 2, the word “INCORRECT” flashed briefly on the
screen.  To assure that the participants read the sentences for
meaning, two true-or-false statements were presented
Time 1:    12
The janitor ---  ----------  ---   ------- ---- --- --- -- --- ------.
Time 2:     +4
---  -------  who frustrated the plumber ---- --- --- -- --- ------.
Time 3:    +5
---  -------  ---   ----------   ---   -------     lost the key  -- --- ------.
Time 4:    +4
---  -------  ---   ----------   ---   -------     ----  ---  ---  on the street.
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sequentially after the sum question, asking about the
propositional content of the sentence they just read.
Participants pressed one of two keys to respond “true” or
“false” to the statements.  After a correct answer, the word
“CORRECT” flashed briefly on the screen, and after an
incorrect answer, the word “INCORRECT” flashed briefly.
Participants were instructed not to concentrate on one task
(reading or additions) more than the other.  They were asked
to read sentences silently at a natural pace and to be sure
that they understood what they read.  They were also told to
answer the math and sentence questions as quickly and
accurately as they could, and to take wrong answers as an
indication to be more careful.
Before the experiment started, a short list of practice
items and questions was presented in order to familiarize the
participants with the task.  Participants took approximately
35 minutes to complete the experiment.
Results
Arithmetic accuracy Participants answered the arithmetic
sum correctly 88.7% of the time.  A two-factor ANOVA
crossing arithmetic complexity (easy, hard) and syntactic
complexity (easy, hard) on these question-answering data
revealed a main effect of arithmetic complexity
(F1(1,39)=9.45; MSe=0.120; p < .005; F2(1,31)=7.21;
MSe=0.087; p < .02), but no other significant effects.
Comprehension question performance There were two
comprehension questions following each experimental trial.
Participants answered the first question correctly 80.2% of
the time, and the second question 78.1% of the time.  The
percentages of correct answers by condition were very
similar for the two questions, so we collapsed the results in
our analyses.  A two-factor ANOVA crossing arithmetic
complexity (easy, hard) and syntactic complexity (easy,
hard) on the responses to the two comprehension questions
revealed a main effect of syntactic complexity
(F1(1,39)=9.8; MS=0.1; p < .005; F2(1,31)=4.04;
MS=0.074; p=.05) and a main effect of arithmetic
complexity in the participants analysis (F1(1,39)=4.31;
MS=0.047; p <.05; F2(1,31)=2.9; MS=0.042; p =.10), but
no significant interaction (Fs < 1).
Reaction times Because participants had to answer three
questions (one math, two language) for each sentence, the
odds of getting all three correct were not very high overall
(55.6%).  As a result, we analyzed all trials, regardless of
how the comprehension questions were answered.  The data
patterns were very similar in analyses of smaller amounts of
data, in which we analyzed (1) trials in which one or both of
the language comprehension questions were answered
correctly, or (2) trials in which the math question was
answered correctly. To adjust for differences in word length
as well as overall differences in participants’ reading rates, a
regression equation predicting reading times from word
length was derived for each participant, using all filler and
target items (Ferreira & Clifton, 1986; see Trueswell,
Tanenhaus & Garnsey, 1994, for discussion).  At each word
position, the reaction time predicted by the participant’s
regression equation was subtracted from the actual
measured reaction time to obtain a residual reaction time.
The statistical analyses gave the same numerical patterns for
analyses of raw reaction times.  Reaction time data points
that were less than 100 msec in the raw data (indicating
erroneous key presses) or more than 2.5 standard deviations
away from the mean residual RT for a position within a
condition were excluded from the analysis, affecting 3.3%
of the data.  Figure 2 presents the mean residual RTs per
region across the four conditions of the experiment.
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Figure 2: Reaction times per region in the four conditions
of Experiment 1.  The critical region is circled.
We present the analysis of the critical region (Region 2)
first, followed by the analyses of the other regions.  The
critical region included the RC (“who frustrated the
plumber” / “who the plumber frustrated”).   A 2x2 ANOVA
(easy-math / hard-math, subject-extracted RC / object-
extracted RC) in this region revealed two significant main
effects and a significant interaction.  First, the hard-math
conditions were read significantly slower than the easy-math
conditions (F1(1,39)=47.26; MSe=7641827; p < .001;
F2(1,31)=42.58; MSe=5880083; p < .001).  Second, the
syntactically more complex object-extracted RC conditions
were read significantly slower than the subject-extracted
conditions (F1(1,39)=38.74; MSe=5283587; p < .001;
F2(1,31)=33.4; MSe=4072481; p < .001).  Third, and most
interestingly, there was a significant interaction, such that in
the hard math conditions, the difference between subject-
and object-extracted RCs was larger than in the easy math
conditions (F1(1,39)=4.74; MSe=623599; p < .05;
F2(1,31)=7.15; MSe=526415; p < .02).  This interaction is
predicted by the hypothesis whereby sentence processing
and arithmetic processing rely on overlapping pools of
resources, but not by the hypothesis that the pools of
resources are independent.
In Region 1, consisting of the main clause subject (e.g.,
“The janitor”) together with the initial addend, a 2x2
ANOVA revealed a main effect of arithmetic complexity
(marginal in the items analysis), but no other significant
effects.  The hard-math conditions were read slower than the
easy-math conditions (F1(1,39)=5.08; MSe=245326; p <
.05; F2(1,31)=3.62; MSe=149836; p = .067).  In Region 3,
the top-level verb and its object (“lost the key”), a 2x2
ANOVA revealed a main effect of arithmetic complexity
(F1(1,39)=30.21; MSe=5726294; p < .001; F2(1,31)=33.32;
MSe=3978352; p < .001), but no other effects.  Finally, in
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Region 4, the sentence-final prepositional phrase (“on the
street”), there was again an effect of arithmetic complexity
(F1(1,39)=72.58; MSe=13066602; p < .001; F2(1,31)=
105.06; MSe=10545386; p < .001), but no other effects.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with a WM
framework where online sentence comprehension and
arithmetic processing rely on overlapping resource pools.
Most importantly, there was an interaction between
syntactic complexity and arithmetic complexity in the
critical region of the linguistic materials, where syntactic
complexity was manipulated between subject-extracted RCs
(low complexity) and object-extracted RCs (high
complexity).  There was no evidence of any interaction of
this kind in any of the other three regions.  Critically,
linguistic complexity was not varied in the arithmetic task,
so the observed interaction is not due to an overlap in the
linguistic processes that are involved in the two tasks.
It should be noted, however, that there is an alternative
explanation for the observed pattern of results in terms of
attentional resources required for the simultaneous
performance of the two tasks.  In dual-task paradigms,
resources are needed in order to direct attention to one task
or another.  It is possible that in the difficult conditions,
more attention switches are required, or the switches
between tasks are more costly.  The observed interaction
could therefore be a result of additional task-switching costs
in the high syntactic complexity / high arithmetic
complexity condition.  Experiment 2 was designed to
address this issue.
Experiment 2
This experiment used a similar dual-task paradigm as the
first experiment.  In contrast to Experiment 1, however, the
secondary task was a spatial-rotation task matched for
difficulty with the addition task used in Experiment 1.  In
this task, participants were instructed to visually imagine
adding different-size sectors of a circle and to keep track of
the angle subtended by the combined segments.  The most
natural way to solve this task is to mentally rotate each
incoming sector until it abuts the estimated sum of the
previous sectors.  The on-line spatial-rotation task is similar
to the addition task in that an incoming element – a sector –
must be integrated into, or added to, the representation
constructed thus far.  Critically though, the spatial-rotation
task does not rely on verbal WM resources, and should not
therefore interact with the sentence-processing task if the
cause for the observed interaction in Experiment 1 is an
overlap in the use of verbal WM resources.  However, if the
attentional costs are responsible for the interaction, we
should observe a similar interaction, regardless of the nature
of the secondary task.
Methods
Participants Twenty-four participants from MIT and the
surrounding community were paid for their participation.
All were native speakers of English and were naive as to the
purposes of the study.  None of the participants took part in
Experiment 1.
Design and materials The experiment had a 2x2 design,
crossing syntactic complexity (subject-/ object-extracted
RCs) with the complexity of the spatial-rotation task (simple
rotations with small-angle sectors/ complex rotations with
larger-angle sectors).  The language materials were exactly
the same as those used in Experiment 1.
The sectors for the spatial-rotation task were randomly
generated online for each participant in the following way:
the size of the sectors for the easy condition varied from 5 to
90 degrees, whereas the size of the sectors for the hard
condition varied from 30 to 180 degrees.  As a result, it was
more likely in the hard condition for the sum of sectors to be
more than 360 degrees, thus “wrapping around” the circle.
Pilot testing of the pie task by itself suggested that the task
is easier to perform with smaller sectors.
As in Experiment 1, 40 filler sentences with various
syntactic structures other than relative clauses were
included, and the stimuli were pseudo-randomized
separately for each participant, with at least one filler
separating the target sentences.
Procedure The procedure was identical to that of
Experiment 1, except for substituting the spatial-rotation
task for the arithmetic task.  Above each sentence fragment,
participants saw a small circle.  They were instructed to
think of it as a plate for a pie.  On each “plate”, there was a
“pie-slice” shown in blue.  The size of the “pie-slices”
varied (as described in Materials and Design above), but
they all started at the 12:00 position, as shown in Figure 3.
                                   
Figure 3: Sample figure of the spatial-rotation task.
Participants were instructed to visually imagine adding
each new “pie-slice” to the previous one(s) by mentally
“putting” them next to each other.  To assure that the
participants performed the task, at the end of each trial a
large blank circle appeared at the center of the screen with a
vertically-pointing radius.  Participants were instructed to
drag this radius (by using the mouse) to the end-point where
all the “pie-slices” they just saw would come to when
placed next to each other.  If the answer was within 10
degrees of the correct answer, the words “Very Close!”
flashed briefly on the screen; if the answer was within 35
degrees, the words “Pretty Good” flashed briefly; if the
answer was within 90 degrees, the words “In The Ballpark”
flashed briefly; finally, if the answer was not within 90
degrees, the words “Not Very Good” flashed briefly on the
screen.  The participants were warned that sometimes the
“pie-slices”, when added together, would form more than a
complete pie.  In such cases, they were told to assume that
the slices “wrapped around” and to ignore the complete
portion of the pie.
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As in Experiment 1, this task was followed by two
comprehension questions about the content of the sentences.
Results
Spatial-rotation task accuracy On average, participants’
estimates were 30.3 degrees off of the correct answer.  A
two-factor ANOVA crossing spatial-rotation task
complexity (easy, hard) and syntactic complexity (easy,
hard) revealed a main effect of complexity of the spatial-
rotation task (F1(1,23)=18.36; MSe=2676; p < .0005;
F2(1,31)=22.28; MSe=3568; p < .0005), but no other
significant effects.  It is worth noting that this pattern of
results for the spatial-rotation task accuracy is parallel to
that of the results for the arithmetic task accuracy in
Experiment 1.
Comprehension question performance There were two
comprehension questions following each experimental trial.
The percentages of correct answers by condition were very
similar for the two questions, so we collapsed the results in
our analyses.  Across conditions, participants answered the
questions correctly 83% of the time.  A 2x2 ANOVA
crossing spatial-rotation task complexity (easy, hard) and
syntactic complexity (easy, hard) on the responses to the
comprehension questions revealed no significant effects or
interactions (Fs<1).  This pattern of results differs slightly
from that in Experiment 1 in that there was no effect of
syntactic complexity in Experiment 2.  Note, however, that
overall, subjects performed better on comprehension
questions in Experiment 2 (83% across conditions),
compared with Experiment 1 (79% across conditions).  This
accuracy difference across the experiments may have
resulted from greater interference of the secondary task in
Experiment 1 with subjects’ memory of the propositional
content of the sentences, due to its verbal nature.  The lack
of syntactic complexity effect in Experiment 2 could then be
explained by a possible ceiling effect in the comprehension
performance: without a verbally interfering task, people
perform well on both the subject- and object-extracted
relative clause sentence types.
Reaction times As in Experiment 1, we analyzed all trials,
regardless of how the comprehension questions were
answered.  Also, as in Experiment 1, reaction time data
points that were more than 2.5 standard deviations away
from the mean residual RT for a position within a condition
or less than 100 msec in the raw data were excluded from
the analyses, affecting 3.7% of the data.  Figure 4 presents
the mean reaction times per region across the four
conditions in the experiment.
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Figure 4: Reaction times per region in the four conditions
of Experiment 2.  The critical region is circled.
We first present the analysis of the critical region, Region
2, which included the RC (“who frustrated the plumber” /
“who the plumber frustrated”).  A 2x2 ANOVA conducted
on this region revealed two significant main effects.  First,
the hard-spatial-task conditions were read significantly
slower than the easy-spatial-task conditions
(F1(1,23)=22.98; MSe=5451605; p < .001; F2(1,31)=40.08;
MSe=6428277; p < .001).  Second, the syntactically more
complex object-extracted RC conditions were read
significantly slower than the subject-extracted RC
conditions (F1(1,23)=15.59; MSe=3791349; p < .001;
F2(1,31)=22.94; MSe=4675397; p < .001).  Critically, there
was no trace of an interaction between syntactic complexity
and the complexity of the spatial task (Fs<1).  Moreover, the
effect of syntactic complexity in the hard-spatial-task
conditions was numerically smaller than that in the easy-
spatial-task conditions.  This result rules out the attentional
explanation of the interaction that was observed in
Experiment 1.
In Region 1, consisting of the main clause subject (e.g.,
“The janitor”) together with the initial “pie-slice”, a 2x2
ANOVA revealed no significant effects.  In Region 3, the
top-level verb and its object (“lost the key”), a 2x2 ANOVA
revealed a main effect of spatial task complexity
(F1(1,23)=39.36; MSe=9601145; p < .001; F2(1,31)=62.5;
MSe=12710598; p < .001), but no other effects.  Finally, in
Region 4, the sentence-final prepositional phrase (“on the
street”), there was again an effect of spatial task complexity
(F1(1,23)=16.1; MSe=2925378; p < .001; F2(1,31)=45.2;
MSe=4061993; p < .001), but no other effects.
Discussion
The attentional account of the interaction between syntactic
and arithmetic complexity that was observed in Experiment
1 predicted a similar interaction between syntactic and
spatial-rotation complexity in Experiment 2.  No such
interaction was observed.  In fact, the numerical trend was
in the reverse direction.  The lack of such an interaction
therefore argues against the attentional account of the
interaction observed in Experiment 1.
In general, the lack of an interaction between the
complexity of two tasks could arise for at least two different
reasons: (1) independent resource pools required for each
task; or (2) ceiling or floor effects on one or both of the
tasks, such that resources are either abundant or insufficient.
Hence, in order to argue that the results of Experiment 2 are
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due to independent resource pools for the two tasks, we
need to be confident that the secondary task is neither too
complex nor too simple.  It is unlikely that the spatial-
rotation task is too simple, because we observed a highly
significant complexity effect for this task.  Neither is it
likely that the spatial-rotation task is too complex for the
following reasons. First, the performance on the spatial-
rotation task was extremely good, averaging only 30.3
degrees off from the target position. Second, the range of
the reaction times across conditions for the two experiments
was almost identical, suggesting that the arithmetic and
spatial-rotation tasks were comparable in difficulty.
Conclusions
In summary, using a dual-task paradigm, we have
demonstrated an on-line interaction between syntactic
complexity and arithmetic complexity in Experiment 1
suggesting that these two cognitive functions rely on
overlapping pools of verbal WM resources.  Furthermore, in
Experiment 2, we have ruled out an attentional account of
the observed interaction by showing that a spatial task,
which does not rely on verbal WM resources, does not
interact with on-line sentence comprehension.  These results
therefore support a WM framework in which sentence
processing and arithmetic processing overlap in the use of
verbal WM resources.  The results are not consistent with
the hypothesis whereby sentence processing relies on an
independent pool of verbal WM resources (Caplan &
Waters, 1999).
An open question that we have not yet addressed is the
exact nature of the overlap in verbal working memory
resources for sentence and arithmetic processing.  One
possibility is that both syntactic and arithmetic processes
involve a subservant mechanism for integrating verbal
symbolic information units.  In this mechanism, the
difficulty of integrating linguistic elements depends on the
distance between elements to be connected.  Relatedly, the
difficulty of adding numbers depends on the distance
between the initial addend and the resulting sum in the
computation on the number line. We leave it to future work
to distinguish this hypothesis from other possibilities.
Acknowledgments
DLT Rohde was supported by NIH NRSA 1-F32-
MH65105-02.
References
Baddeley, A. D. & Hitch, G. (1974). Working Memory. In
G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and
motivation (Vol. 8, pp. 47-89). New York: Academic
Press.
Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working Memory. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Caplan, D. & Waters, G. S. (1999). Verbal working memory
and sentence comprehension. Brain & Behavioral
Sciences, 22, 77-126.
Chomsky, N. & Miller, G.A. (1963). Introduction to the
formal analysis of natural languages. In: Luce, R.D.,
Bush, R.R., Galanter, E. (Eds.), Handbook of
Mathematical Psychology, vol. 2. Wiley, New York, pp.
269–321.
Ferreira, F. & Clifton, C., Jr. (1986). The independence of
syntactic processing. Journal of Memory and Language,
25, 348-368.
Gibson, E. (1991). A computational theory of human
linguistic processing: Memory limitations and processing
breakdown.  Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Carnegie
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA.
Gibson, E. (1998). Linguistic complexity: Locality of
syntactic dependencies. Cognition, 68, 1-76.
Gibson, E. (2000). The dependency locality theory: A
distance-based theory of linguistic complexity. In
Miyashita, Y., Marantz, A., & O’Neil, W. (Eds.), Image,
language, brain. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Gordon, P. C., Hendrick, R., & Johnson, M. (2001).
Memory interference during language processing. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, &
Cognition, 27(6), 1411-1423.
Gordon, P. C., Hendrick, R., & Levine, W. H. (2002).
Memory-load interference in syntactic processing.
Psychological Science, 13, 425-430.
Hanley, J. R., Young, A., & Pearson, N. A. (1991).
Impairment of the visuo-spatial scratchpad.  Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43A, 101-125.
Jonides, J., Smith, E. E., Koeppe, R. A., Awh, E.,
Minoshima, S., & Mintun, M. A. (1993). Spatial working
memory in humans as revealed by PET. Nature, 363, 623-
625.
Just, M.A. & Carpenter, P.A. (1992). A capacity theory of
comprehension: Individual differences in working
memory. Psychological Review, 99, 122-149.
Just, M.A., Carpenter, P.A., & Woolley, J.D. (1982).
Paradigms and processing in reading comprehension.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 111, 228-
238.
Kimball, J. (1973). Seven Principles of Surface Structure
Parsing in Natural Language. Cognition, 2, 15-47.
King, J. & Just, M. A. (1991). Individual differences in
syntactic processing: the role of working memory.
Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 580-602.
Lewis, R., (1996). A theory of grammatical but
unacceptable embeddings. Journal of Psycholinguistic
Research, 25, 93–116.
Shah, P. & Miyake, A. (1996). The Separabillity of
Working Memory Resources for Spatial Thinking and
Language Processing: An Individual Differences
Approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
125 (1), 4-27.
Trueswell, J.C., Tanenhaus, M.K. & Garnsey, S.M. (1994).
Semantic influences on parsing: use of thematic role
information in syntactic disambiguation. Journal of
Memory and Language, 33, 285-318.
Vallar, G. & Shallice, T. (Eds.). (1990). Neuropsychological
Impairments of short-term memory. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
374
Talking about space:  A cross-linguistic perspective 
 
Michele I. Feist (m-feist@ northwestern.edu) 
Department of Psychology, Northwestern University 
2029 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208 USA 
 
 
 
Abstract 
What do people attend to when describing the locations 
of objects in space?  This paper describes a study of the 
ways in which speakers of seventeen languages describe 
static spatial relations, delving into the meanings of two 
kinds of spatial relational terms evident cross-
linguistically:  specific spatial terms and generalized 
spatial terms.    The findings provide support for the 
importance of geometry, function, and qualitative 
physics to the meanings of specific spatial terms and 
suggest an interplay between semantic and pragmatic 
elements of meaning for generalized spatial terms. 
 
Introduction 
Multiple times each day, speakers make use of a 
relatively small set of spatial relational terms (Landau 
& Jackendoff, 1993) in order to localize themselves and 
the entities with which they interact.  Use of these terms 
is practically automatic; from the point of view of the 
native speaker, they are simple, clear, and obvious.  
However, the difficulty that spatial terms present to 
second language learners belies this apparent 
simplicity.  Furthermore, the prodigious cross-linguistic 
variability in spatial terms (cf, Levinson, Meira, & The 
Language and Cognition Group, 2003) suggests that 
they are anything but simple, clear, and obvious.     
The variability evident in spatial language takes on 
many different forms.  As Bowerman and her 
colleagues have shown, distinctions that are drawn in 
one language may not be drawn in another.  For 
example, while English distinguishes between support 
and contact, on the one hand, and containment, on the 
other, this distinction does not appear in Korean spatial 
terms (Bowerman & Choi, 2001).  Instead, Korean 
distinguishes between a tight fit and a loose fit between 
two objects, a distinction not evident in English spatial 
terms.  Thus, in Korean, the act of putting a Lego onto a 
stack of Legos would be described by the same term as 
the act of putting a book into its sleeve:  both are 
instances of tight fit.  Further, the act of putting a Lego 
onto a stack of Legos is distinguished from the act of 
putting a book onto a desk:  while the former is a tight 
fit relation, the latter represents loose fit.   
Even closely related languages are not immune from 
such differences in the distinctions drawn between 
spatial relational terms.  For example, as Bowerman has 
pointed out (Bowerman, 1996; Bowerman & Pederson, 
1992, 1996; Gentner & Bowerman, 2000), Dutch makes 
a three-way distinction where English does not:  
between a cup on a table (Dutch op), a picture on a wall 
(Dutch aan), and a ring on a finger (Dutch om).   
Even if two languages appear to draw the same 
distinction, the boundaries between the contrasting 
categories often differ.  For example, both English and 
Finnish mark a distinction between a very intimate 
relation such as containment and a less intimate relation 
such as surface contact, but the set of configurations 
placed in each group differs dramatically between the 
two languages (Table 1):  rather than categorizing a 
handle on a pan as an instance of the less intimate 
relation, along with a cup on a table and a picture on a 
wall (as English does), Finnish places this configuration 
in the more intimate category along with an apple in a 
bowl (Bowerman, 1996). 
A similar example comes from a comparison of 
English and Berber spatial terms.  Spatial relational 
terms in Berber fail to make a distinction between 
inclusion and contact with/support via an external 
surface of the Ground (Bowerman & Choi, 2001) akin 
to the English in-on distinction.  Rather, reminiscent of 
the case in Finnish, the distinction is between “being 
loosely in contact” and “being ‘incorporated’ into” the 
Ground, with “incorporation” including both being 
inside and being tightly attached to an external surface 
or point (Bowerman & Choi, 2001). 
Table 1:  English and Finnish categorizations of some Figure-Ground relations (adapted from Bowerman, 1996, 
Figure 4). 
 Apple in bowl 
Handle on 
pan 
Bandaid on 
leg 
Ring on 
finger 
Fly on 
door 
Picture on 
wall 
Cup on table 
English In On On On On On On 
Finnish Inessive 
case 
Inessive 
case 
Inessive 
case 
Inessive 
case 
Inessive 
case 
Adessive 
case 
Adessive 
case 
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Despite this variability, all humans have the same 
ability to perceive spatial relations.  As suggested by 
the cross-linguistic variability, spatial relational terms 
encode a variety of factors of the scenes they are used 
to describe (Bowerman, 1996; Levinson, 1996; Sinha & 
Thorseng, 1995), including geometric, functional, and 
qualitative physical factors.  Furthermore, there is 
evidence from studies of English spatial prepositions 
that the influences of the factors interact, leading to 
complex meanings (Feist, 2002; Feist & Gentner, 
2003).  What are the roles of these factors in the spatial 
terms of a diverse set of languages?  Are there some 
factors that recur in spatial meaning across languages?  
If so, these factors could underlie our conception of 
space in general. 
How Do Speakers of Different Languages 
Talk About Space? 
In a wide-reaching cross-linguistic survey, Bowerman 
and Pederson (1992, 1996) presented a set of carefully 
drawn pictures to speakers of thirty-four languages.  
Each picture depicts a spatial relation, with the Figure 
colored in yellow and the Ground in black and white.  
Informants provided descriptions of the pictures, 
including the spatial relational term that would most 
naturally be used to describe the relation depicted. 
Bowerman and Pederson examined the ways in 
which the languages in their survey grouped the spatial 
relations in their pictures, as defined by description by 
the same term.  This led to the discovery of a 
“similarity gradient” (Bowerman & Choi, 2001) along 
which they could arrange the scenes from their study.  
At one end of the gradient lie configurations in which a 
Figure is supported from below by a Ground (e.g., a 
cup on a table); at the other end lie configurations in 
which a Figure is completely included within a Ground 
(e.g., a pear in an otherwise empty bowl).  In between 
lie configurations bearing similarities to both endpoints, 
arranged according to whether they are more similar to 
support from below or to complete inclusion. 
Although Bowerman and Pederson found variation in 
how linguistic terms grouped spatial configurations, 
this variation was systematic.  In particular, all of the 
languages in their sample respected the similarity 
gradient that Bowerman and Pederson had identified, 
only describing non-adjacent configurations with the 
same term if all configurations that lie between them 
are also described by the term.  In other words, the 
ranges of use of spatial terms were found to be 
continuous with respect to the similarity gradient. 
I borrowed Bowerman and Pederson’s pictorial 
elicitation technique for collecting spatial terms, asking 
speakers of seventeen languages to describe a single set 
of simple pictures taken from the larger set used by 
Bowerman and Pederson.  This resulted in the 
elicitation of a narrow set of spatial relational terms 
across a diverse set of languages.  The ranges of use of 
the elicited terms illuminated the importance of a few 
attributes of spatial scenes instantiating relations along 
Bowerman and Pederson’s similarity gradient, 
providing clues to the likely organizing dimensions of 
spatial terminology. 
Method 
 
Informants Twenty-eight speakers of seventeen 
languages (representing twelve language families, with 
1-4 participants per language) were recruited from 
around the Northwestern University/Evanston 
community; one additional informant was recruited 
from the New York area.  Informants ranged in age 
from 18 to 69 and were all native speakers of the 
languages in which they participated. 
 
Stimuli The stimulus set consisted of twenty-nine line 
drawings, each depicting two objects in a simple spatial 
relation.  The relations depicted span the similarity 
gradient described by Bowerman and Pederson (1992, 
1996; Bowerman & Choi, 2001).  Following their 
methodology, one of the objects in each picture, the 
Figure, was colored yellow; and the other, the Ground, 
was black and white.  Twenty-seven of the twenty-nine 
drawings were borrowed from Melissa Bowerman and 
Eric Pederson’s Topological Picture Series (cf., 
Bowerman & Pederson, 1992, 1996; Gentner & 
Bowerman, 1996, 2000; Levinson et al., 2003); one of 
the remaining two, a picture of an address on an 
envelope, was modified from a picture in the 
Topological Picture Series, and the other, a picture of 
flowers in a vase, was borrowed from an example in 
Coventry (1998).   
 
Procedure Each informant participated individually in 
a session lasting an average of one hour.  In the first 
part of the session, informants were shown each picture 
in the set individually.  They were asked to provide a 
description in their native language of the location of 
the yellow object with respect to the other object.  
Responses were both tape-recorded and phonetically 
transcribed.  After all of the pictures had been 
described, informants provided as close to a morpheme-
by-morpheme translation as could be elicited.1  Finally, 
informants for languages using the same orthography as 
English were asked to provide a written transcription of 
their responses. 
 
                                                          
1 Variation in the exactness of the morpheme-by-morpheme 
translations resulted from informants’ inability and/or 
unwillingness to provide translations below the level of the 
word. 
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Picture coding In previous work, there are numerous 
arguments for the importance of geometry (e.g., 
Bennett, 1975; Feist & Gentner, 1997, 1998, 2003; 
Herskovits, 1986; Landau, 1996; Miller & Johnson-
Laird, 1976), function (Coventry, 1998; Coventry, 
Carmichael, & Garrod, 1994; Feist & Gentner, 1998, 
2003; Vandeloise, 1991, 1994), and qualitative physics 
(Bowerman & Choi, 2001; Feist & Gentner, 2003; 
Forbus, 1983, 1984; Talmy, 1988) to spatial relational 
meaning.  In order to determine whether there are 
attributes of spatial scenes that figure in the meanings 
of spatial relational terms across a range of languages2, 
I coded each of the pictures for whether it matched each 
of a small set of attributes related to geometry, function, 
and qualitative physics.   
For geometry, I coded for a difference in vertical 
position (important to terms such as above, below, over, 
and under (O’Keefe, 1996)), contact (important to 
terms such as on (Cienki, 1989; Herskovits, 1986; 
Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976)), and inclusion 
(important to terms such as in (Cienki, 1989; 
Herskovits, 1986; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976)), as 
well as for relative size.  Although not argued for in 
previous work, relative size was coded because a larger 
Ground might facilitate the matching of other attribute 
values, such as support or inclusion of the Figure, thus 
influencing spatial term use.  
For function, I coded for the functional relatedness of 
the Figure and the Ground – the likely interaction 
resulting from an object’s function (cf, Coventry, 1998; 
Coventry et al., 1994; Vandeloise, 1991, 1994 on the 
importance of function in general).  For example, a 
lamp and a table are functionally related; a cloud and a 
mountain are not. 
For qualitative physics, I coded for support by the 
Ground (important to terms such as on (Bowerman & 
Pederson, 1992, 1996; Herskovits, 1986; Miller & 
Johnson-Laird, 1976)).  In addition, I coded for 
animacy3 and the ability of the Ground to constrain the 
location of the Figure, which both influence what 
predictions can reasonably be made about the 
qualitative physics of a scene.  Specifically, if a Ground 
can constrain the location of a Figure, the configuration 
may seem less subject to outside forces and thus more 
likely to remain as pictured.  In addition, animacy of the 
Figure and the Ground was found in past research to 
influence speakers’ choice between English in and on 
(Feist & Gentner, 1998, 2003).  In addition, constraint 
                                                          
(1) 
(2) 
                                                          
2 Here I consider only those terms whose distribution suggests 
that they are specific spatial terms (see below). 
3 I used a fairly broad definition of animacy, namely, things 
that are capable of self-determination (e.g., human legs, cats) 
were taken as animate, while objects incapable of self-
determination (e.g., jackets, doors) were not.  Looking across 
languages, this is not the only way to look at the notion of 
animacy.  
of location may be important to some functional 
relations (such as functional containment; see Coventry 
et al., 1994), prompting its inclusion as an independent 
factor.   
Results 
Two kinds of spatial relational terms appeared in the 
elicited descriptions.  The first, specific spatial terms, 
occur only in limited contexts and impart relatively 
specific information about the location of the Figure4.  
This kind of term can be exemplified by the English 
prepositions in and on and by the terms in examples (1) 
(from Croatian) and (2) (from Swedish).   
Jabuka je v  zdjeli. 
apple   is  in bowl 
The apple is in the bowl. 
Koppen        står      på bordet. 
cup-definite stands on  table-definite 
The cup is on the table. 
The second kind of term, generalized spatial terms, 
occur in all spatial descriptions and impart no specific 
information about the location of the Figure.  Rather, 
these terms just serve to relate the Figure to the Ground.  
Such terms do not occur in English, but can be 
exemplified by terms such as Japanese ni (example (3)) 
and Indonesian di (example (4)), both glossed simply as 
LOC (locative).   
(3) Kaban no          naka5    ni     haite  iru hako. 
bag      genitive inside  LOC put-in is   box 
The box is in the bag. 
(4) Cincin itu   di      jari. 
        ring    that LOC finger 
        The ring is on the finger. 
Although generalized spatial terms are often glossed 
as at, in, or on, such glosses are hardly appropriate 
characterizations of the meanings of the terms, as will 
become clear below.  In particular, generalized spatial 
terms appear in environments where the glosses would 
be unacceptable, raising questions about whether the 
glosses can capture the true meaning of the generalized 
spatial term.  
 
Specific spatial terms For each specific spatial term 
collected, I grouped together the pictures that the term 
had been used to describe.  Then, for each group, I 
isolated the attributes that were common to all of the 
pictures in the group.  Only four of the attributes coded 
4 I include here spatial nominals and locative cases along with 
adpositions, as both occur (in languages using them) as 
answers to where-questions, and neither is expected to display 
semantic patterns different from those of adpositions 
(Levinson et al., 2003). 
5 Specific spatial terms like the Japanese spatial nominal naka 
often appear in spatial descriptions with generalized spatial 
terms, as will be discussed further below. 
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appeared as unifying factors for the ranges of use of the 
terms I collected:  difference in vertical position of the 
Figure and the Ground, contact, support of the Figure 
by the Ground, and inclusion of the Figure within the 
Ground.  This is exemplified by the terms in Table 26; 
each term listed is marked with a plus under those 
attributes that must be true of scenes described by the 
term and a minus under those that may not be true.  
Attributes with neither a plus nor a minus may, but 
need not, be true of scenes described by the term.  For 
example, the Polish term na requires that the Figure and 
the Ground be in contact and that the Ground support 
the Figure, regardless of which, if either, is higher, and 
regardless of whether the Figure might be included in 
the Ground7. 
Table 2:  Example terms and the attributes 
characterizing them. 
Example 
terms 
Figure 
higher 
than 
Ground 
Contact Ground 
supports 
Figure 
Inclusion 
ue 
(Japanese) 
+ 
 
   
taas 
(Tagalog) 
+ 
 
   
[nad]8 
(Russian) 
+ 
 
-   
[upar] 
(Hindi) 
+ 
 
-   
na (Polish)  + +  
på 
(Swedish) 
 + 
 
+ 
 
 
sur  
(French) 
 + 
 
+ 
 
 
auf 
(German) 
 + 
 
  
an 
(German) 
 + 
 
  
u (Croatian)    + 
-bVn 
(Hungarian) 
   + 
 
iqinde 
(Turkish) 
   + 
 
These four attributes highlight the importance of 
geometry, function, and qualitative physics (cf., Feist & 
Gentner, 2003).  The first two, difference in vertical 
position of the Figure and the Ground and contact, both 
encode information about the geometry of the relation 
between the Figure and the Ground.  The next attribute, 
support, encodes information about the physics of the 
interaction (the Ground is constraining the location of 
the Figure in one dimension) and about the function of 
the Ground.  Lastly, inclusion provides information 
about geometry, function, and physics, as the typical 
situation when a Figure is geometrically included in a 
Ground is that the Ground functions as a container for 
the Figure and thereby constrains the location of the 
Figure in more than one dimension. 
In addition to highlighting the importance of 
geometry, function, and qualitative physics across a 
sizable sample of languages and spatial terms, this data 
demonstrates that important similarities co-exist with 
cross-linguistic variation (cf., Bowerman & Pederson, 
1992, 1996; Levinson et al., 2003; Regier, 1996).   
(6)     Parmen itu   di     kotak. 
 candy   that LOC box 
 The candy is in the box. 
 ⇒ di dalam may be substituted for di 
(7)     Meja itu   di     bawah   lampu. 
 table  that LOC beneath lamp   The table is under the lamp. Generalized spatial terms The criterial factor for 
identifying generalized spatial terms is that they occur 
in all spatial descriptions.  These terms can either 
appear alone or in combination with a more specific 
term, as exemplified by the Indonesian examples in (5) 
– (7).  
 ⇒ di may not occur alone 
As mentioned earlier, generalized spatial terms such 
as Indonesian di are often glossed as at, in, or on (e.g., 
Macdonald, 1976).  However, examination of the range 
of uses evident for di reveals that no single English 
preposition can occur in the entire range.  Although di 
may occur alone in situations where English uses at, in, 
or on, it also appears in combination with locational 
nouns in situations where the English glosses are 
unacceptable (e.g., example (7)).  Thus, glosses – which 
are a function of both the scene and the sentence as a 
whole (Ameka, 1995) – fail to capture their meaning.   
(5)  Buku itu   di     meja. 
 book that LOC table 
 The book is on the table. 
 ⇒ di atas may be substituted for di 
                                                          
6 Due to space constraints, I only present a representative 
subset of the terms collected. What then is the meaning of the generalized spatial 
term?  To account for both classes of use, I propose one 
basic element of meaning appropriate to all uses (8) and 
two pragmatically licensed elements of meaning (9).     
7 Although the norm when the Figure is included in the 
Ground is to use a term marking inclusion, such as Polish w, 
terms such as na may be used to describe configurations such 
as a face on a stamp, in which the Figure may be conceived of 
as included in the Ground. (8) di = location of the Figure in the region of 
interaction of the Ground 8 Terms from languages that do not use the English alphabet 
are presented as phonetic transcriptions in square brackets. 
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(9) (a)  the Figure is in contact with the Ground. 
 (b)  the Figure-Ground relation is canonical.  
 The element of meaning in (8) serves to unite the 
disparate range of uses of di without falsely implying 
equivalence between di and its English prepositional 
glosses.  Additionally, the pragmatically licensed 
elements of meaning proposed in (9) make a clear 
prediction about when di felicitously appears alone and 
when the addition of a locational noun is preferred.  
The default assumption when di appears alone is that 
the elements in (9) are true, although this is not always 
the case (see (11) and (12)).  The use of a locational 
noun emphasizes the specifics of the relation and 
highlights any deviations from this assumption. 
To test this analysis, I created spatial descriptions 
that violate each of the proposed elements of meaning 
(example (10) violated (8); (11) violated (9a); and (12) 
violated (9b)).  Each sentence involved a use of di 
without the addition of a more specific term.  
  (10) *Buku  itu    di     meja, tapi bukan dekatnya. 
        Book  that LOC  table  but  not     near-  
        possessive  
        The book is on the table but not near it. 
  (11) Buku itu   di     meja tapi tidak menyentuh. 
      Book that LOC table but  not   touching 
      The book is on the table but it’s not touching it. 
  (12) Buku itu   di     meja tapi menempel dengan aneh. 
      Book that LOC table but  stuck        manner weird 
 The book is on the table but it’s attached in a       
weird manner.   
            
Whereas specific spatial terms have received a fair 
amount of attention in linguistics and cognitive science, 
the attention accorded generalized spatial terms has 
been far sparser.  However, an understanding of the 
uses of generalized spatial terms, both with and without 
accompanying specific spatial terms, is integral to an 
understanding of the range of spatial meanings evident 
in human language.  The analysis of Indonesian di 
presented here provides a step towards a comprehensive 
account.  Further testing of this analysis, including a 
study of the applicability of sentences without specific 
terms as descriptions of a variety of pictures, will be 
necessary to solidify the conclusions reached here.  In 
addition, in order to arrive at a descriptively adequate 
account of generalized spatial terms, these studies will 
need to be repeated for generalized spatial terms of 
further languages. 
Eleven speakers of Indonesian were asked to assess 
the acceptability of the created sentences.  The different 
violations resulted in quite different acceptability 
judgments:  violations of (8) were rarely accepted (9%); 
violations of (9), while odd, were more acceptable 
(55% for (9a); 73% for (9b)), F(2,32) = 6.09, p < .01.  
These data support the hypothesis that (8) is part of the 
semantics of di, while the elements in (9) are 
pragmatically licensed.   
Discussion 
Analysis of the terms used to describe spatial locations 
across seventeen languages revealed spatial terms that 
fall into two classes:  specific spatial terms, which 
provide semi-precise information about the location of 
a Figure; and generalized spatial terms, which simply 
serve to locate the Figure in the region of interaction of 
a named Ground. 
By investigating spatial semantics in many 
languages, we can gain insights into the range of 
attributes of spatial scenes to which humans attend 
when localizing objects.  By grouping pictures 
described by each individual specific spatial term, it 
was possible to isolate those attributes of the spatial 
scenes described that are important to the use of each 
term.  Across seventeen languages, four attributes 
recurred in the meanings of specific spatial terms:  a 
difference in vertical position, contact, support, and 
inclusion.  This finding corroborates recent work by 
Levinson and his colleagues (Levinson et al., 2003) 
suggesting the importance of attachment, a difference 
in vertical position (both super- and subadjacency), 
proximity, and containment to spatial meanings across 
languages.  These attributes together highlight the 
importance of geometric, functional, and qualitative 
physical factors, all of which have been argued in 
previous work to be important to spatial relational 
meaning in a small set of languages, to the meanings of 
spatial relational terms more generally.   
  Although more work, including the examination of 
a wider range of languages, is necessary to completely 
understand the factors influencing how humans talk 
about locations in space, I have presented here two 
windows into spatial relational meaning.  The view 
from these windows, illuminating both cross-linguistic 
variation and commonalities in specific spatial terms 
through one, and a coherent meaning for a previously 
misunderstood set of terms through the other, furthers 
our understanding of cross-linguistic variation and 
linguistic universals in the semantics of space. 
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Abstract
Some researchers have proposed that what accounts for
children’s earlier ability to reason by means of desire
compared to reasoning by means of belief is the fact that
desires do not necessarily invoke the ability to metarep-
resent. In this paper, I argue that this is a miscon-
ception stemming from the confusion between desire as-
cription and simple desire states. In other words, there
would be no way to entertain a thought about some-
one’s desire without metarepresenting, in Leslie’s (1991)
terms. I provide some empirical evidence in the fashion
of Bartsch and Wellman (1995) that also points in this
direction.
The problem
Although the concept of desire is at least as important as
the concept of belief for describing, explaining and pre-
dicting the behavior of different entities (Fodor, 1987;
Dennett, 1978b, 1987), substantially more attention has
been paid to the development of the concept of belief
in Theory-Theory of Mind research (henceforth, TToM)
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Astington, 2001). In
fact, quite often, metarepresentation (defined here as the
internal representation of an epistemic relation (Leslie,
1991), a “second-order” representation (Sperber, 1999))
has been somewhat fused with the child’s ability to en-
tertain/ascribe a belief that stands for a counterfactual
state of affairs (Dennett, 1978a; Davies & Stone, 1995),
without any reference to the explanatory power of the
concept of desire or to its being an epistemic relation
itself.
This incipient collapsing of metarepresentation and
reasoning by false beliefs (beliefs that stand for coun-
terfactual states of affairs) in TToM research is due, in
part, to the assumption that the concept of belief, and
especially that of false belief, taps the child’s metarep-
resentational capacities; while, arguably, the concept of
desire does not. This is a common assumption despite
the fact that beliefs and desires share several important
characteristics (such as defining opaque contexts, being
intentional in the philosophical sense, being subject and
object specific (Wellman & Woolley, 1990), etc. to name
but a few). In the developmental literature, more often
than not, desires have been understood as a special case
of mental state ascription; namely, one that does not de-
mand of the agent doing the ascription (a child in our
case), that he or she be able to metarepresent.
The previous assumption appears to have been
brought about by a body of evidence that suggests that
the concept of desire is acquired around a year before
the concept of belief (Wellman, 1991; Tan & Harris,
1991; Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Harris, 1996; Bartsch
& Wellman, 1995). Thus, in order to make it fit the
evidence available from research on the concept of be-
lief, it has been claimed that at least until three or four
years of age –that is, until they acquire the concept of
belief– desire ascriptions are to be thought of as non-
metarepresentational. The reasoning behind this claim,
I presume, goes along the following lines: on the one
hand, a) reasoning by means of beliefs taps an organ-
ism’s (children’s, for example) metarepresentational ca-
pacities; on the other hand, b) the capacity to reason by
means of beliefs is acquired at age X. Thus, if (a) and
(b) hold, then c) metarepresentation should be acquired
at age X, and not before X. Now, because of this con-
clusion, the rest of the argument tells us that if (c) is
the case, then e) reasoning by means of desires taps an
organism’s metarepresentational capacities if and only if
f) the capacity to reason by means of beliefs is acquired
at age X. However, it is not the case that (f). There-
fore, the argument goes on to say, reasoning by means
desire does not tap an organism’s metarepresentational
capacities.
However, characterizing reasoning by means of the
concept of desire as non-metarepresentational simply be-
cause it is acquired before the concept of belief and the
latter is, only by assumption (as we saw a couple of para-
graphs above), the flagship of the child’s metarepresenta-
tional capacities is, at all extents, an ad hoc solution. In
these pages, I will take position against the conclusion of
the argument that reasoning by means of desire does not
tap on metarepresentational capacities. In other words,
it is, I will argue, far from clear that reasoning by means
of the concept of desire is non-metarepresentational in
nature, even though it is acquired a year before the con-
cept of belief.
Desires as Metarepresentational
For reasoning by means of desires to be non-
metarepresentational at ages younger than four years
means that a child at those ages does not represent other
people (or even themselves) as representing the desired
object as part of the desire relation. Thus, these children
are supposed to be merely in some sort of “connection”
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to the desired object. According to this view, then, when
a two-year-old child says something like “Peter wants a
car”, he or she is not ascribing Peter (representing Pe-
ter as entertaining) a desire for a given car, but merely
putting Peter in some sort of connection to either the
car he wants (Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Bartsch, 1994;
Bartsch & Wellman, 1995) or to a hypothetical situation
in which Peter has the car (Perner, 1991). Consider the
following proposition as a state of affairs in the world;
that is, a proposition that holds:
Loreto wants to be in Chile. [1]
Within the general Theory of Mind (ToM) framework,
there are two ways to interpret this proposition, and they
have usually been confounded. In a first, trivial inter-
pretation, Loreto is just in a state such that she wants
to be in Chile. That merely means that she has tokened
the proposition “I am in Chile” in her desire box (Fodor,
1975) and will take action to bring it about that she is
in Chile. This interpretation is useless at the time of
explaining behavior because the agent trying to explain
Loreto’s behavior (maybe Loreto herself) may not know
that that is the proposition she is tokening in her desire
box. The second interpretation, however, is the non-
trivial interpretation that to be able to explain some-
one else’s (even one’s own) behavior in terms of desires,
one must entertain a belief about the organism’s desire
state (Davies & Stone, 1995). To explain or predict be-
haviors and actions, it is not enough that we are able
to be in desire states (unlike, for example, the case of
Simulation-Theory of Mind, see Gordon (1995)). What
is a conditio sine qua non is that we are able to enter-
tain beliefs about an organism’s desire states (Dennett,
1987; Sperber, 1999). For example, one way to explain
why Loreto is buying a ticket to Chile this morning is
to entertain a belief with the embedded proposition in
[1] above. Thus, in order to engage in folk psychological
practice (Davies & Stone, 1995), we need to entertain a
thought along the following lines:
Bu[D(Loreto, P ) ∧ ¬P ] [2]
where Bu stands for the agent’s belief state at the time of
ascription of the desire state, D stands for the “desire”
predicate which takes two arguments, the organism to
which the agent is ascribing the desire (Loreto, in [2])
and the organism’s desired state of affairs (the variable
P in [2] or “I am in Chile” or any other proposition).
For this quasi-formalization of desire ascription to work,
P should also be part of the belief state as a proposition
that does not hold; since, for something to be a desire, it
is by definition that the conditions are false. Simplifying
the issue slightly, it would indeed be a contradiction to
desire something that one already has.
Notice further that there is in fact no way to formalize
the first (trivial) interpretation of [1] above in the TToM
framework. You may be able to formalize it for logical
purposes as something like D(Loreto, P )∧¬P , but that
will be of no use to someone trying to explain behavior.
The proposition in [1] is independent of any folk psy-
chological theory-theory because it is not tokened as a
belief about the world in the mind of a particular agent
engaging in folk psychological practice. It is just a true
proposition (of the external world) at time T . Thus, part
of the argument here is that if it is so difficult for us as
adults to imagine a non-metarepresentational account
of desire at early ages, then it might be the case that
this non-metarepresentational characterization is wrong
(Astington & Gopnik, 1991).
There seems to be no obvious alternative formaliz-
ing of desire ascription (not desire states) except for
[2] above. Thus, even at younger ages, every time chil-
dren talk about their own or other people’s desires, they
should be entertaining a thought along the lines of [2].
It is hard to characterize the thoughts the child is enter-
taining when explaining or reporting behaviors by means
of desires when the latter are merely understood as “sub-
jective connections” to objects. Suppose for the sake of
argument, that children do in fact see desires as a “sub-
jective connection” between the organism they are try-
ing to explain the behavior of and the object that this
organism desires. This could be relatively easy to see
for desire ascription to organisms other than self. How-
ever, it would be hard to believe that when talking about
their own desires and explaining their own behaviors by
means of desires (“because I wanted to go to the park”),
children think of themselves as just holding a subjective
connection to a state of affairs that does not hold. It is
in fact very hard to believe that when reasoning about
their own behaviors by means of desires, children are not
representing themselves as wanting something in partic-
ular; to be in the park, for example. But suppose fur-
ther that they do not representing themselves as wanting
something in particular. It is undeniable that the very
act of communicating those desires involve a metarepre-
sentation of both the communicator and the person the
speaker is talking to. When communicating, and more
so when communicating mental states, there should be
mutual metarepresentation of the communicator and the
addressee (Sperber, 1999).
Given the arguments above, it is hard to take desire
ascriptions to either other people (“Peter wants to have
a car”) or to oneself (“I want to be in Chile”) as non-
metarepresentational (at least) in Leslie’s (1991) terms.
Now, assuming desire talk stands proxy for desire rea-
soning about the behavior of other people (see, for ex-
ample, Dennett (1978a), Bretherton and Beeghly (1982),
Tager-Flusberg (1993), Bartsch and Wellman (1995) and
the literature spawned by these studies), then we would
expect desire talk to actually tap on the child’s metarep-
resentational capacities, albeit indirectly. One way to
look at this is to follow Wellman and Bartsch (1994)
and Bartsch and Wellman (1995). If we were able to
tell genuine psychological references to desire apart from
mere communicative uses of particular words associated
to the expression of desire, then we should find differ-
ence between talk about desires and talk about other
communicative uses of these words. Specifically, while
genuine psychological references to desire should change
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as a function of age (because they are presumably tap-
ping on metarepresentational abilities), communicative
uses should not. They should not because there is no
need to be in a belief state about an epistemic state
when using a mental state term for mere communica-
tive purposes. If a child repeats an adult’s utterance,
for example, it may be that he or she is just repeat-
ing it for the sake of not being silent during an inter-
action, but without having analyzed the utterance it-
self. More arguably, when a child says something like
“I want a cookie” while the cookie is in plain view, the
child might be actually saying something like “pass me
the cookie”, without imputing a mental state either to
self or to someone else. Instead of entertaining a thought
such as Bu[D(self, IHaveACookie)∧¬IHaveACookie],
the child is simply in a desire state, maybe, such that
Du(self, IHaveACookie) ∧ ¬IHaveACookie. But that
does not qualify as a metarepresentational state in our
terms here. The following study tests the prediction that
there should be a difference between communicative uses
of “want” (the desire term par excellance (Wellman &
Bartsch, 1994; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995)) and its gen-
uinely psychological uses.
Method
Data. A total of 14,896 child utterances were taken from
the Wells corpus (Wells, 1981) in the CHILDES database
(MacWhinney, 2000). These data come from the lon-
gitudinal observation of spontaneous speech production
of 12 children (6 boys and 6 girls) whose ages ranged
from 18 months at the time of the first observation to 60
months at the time of the last observation and who were
acquiring English as their mother tongue. Each child
was observed a total of 10 times, for about 40 minutes
each, in 3-month intervals. Since the objective of Well’s
(1981) research was to obtain spontaneous speech sam-
ples, a timing mechanism was devised to set off a tape
recorder – connected to a wireless microphone in the
child’s garment – at different times between 9am and
6pm, to prevent parents from planning activities, for ex-
ample. Twenty-four 90-second samples were recorded in
each observation. These were later transcribed into sev-
eral files using normal English orthography. Table 1 in
page 3 gives some general information about the samples,
where Ages(mo.) means ages in months, N means num-
ber of participants in each age group (all twelve partici-
pants are the same children at different ages), #TotUtt
means the total number of utterances in the samples,
MLU(x) means the average mean length of utterance
for that age group, and MLU(SD) means the standard
deviation of the mean for the MLU values for that group.
Procedure. The first step was to identify all and
only the instances of the term “want” in all and only
the target child’s exchanges. Once the “want” utter-
ances were identified and cleaned for false positives, they
were coded as belonging to one of five mutually exclu-
sive categories: genuine psychological references to de-
sire (GPRDs), behavioral requests(BRs), direct repeti-
tions (DRs), idiomatic expressions (IEs) and uncodable
utterances (UUs). While GPRDs refer to mental states,
Table 1: Information on the samples.
Ages (mo.) N #TotUtt MLU(x) MLU(SD)
18-24 12 3483 1.480 0.252
25-28 12 1830 1.697 0.430
29-32 12 2694 2.246 0.566
33-36 12 2972 2.709 0.446
37-40 12 2041 2.981 0.390
41-44 12 1876 3.202 0.425
the other three categories do not, they fulfill a mostly
communicative function.
Genuine psychological references to desire (henceforth,
GPRDs) are instances of children’s unequivocally refer-
ring to themselves or other people as being in a men-
tal state of desire. Behavioral requests, in turn, (hence-
forth, BRs) are ‘unadorned’ instances in which the child
uses a desire term to fulfill an immediate goal, like re-
ceiving something that is beyond her reach but in plain
view. Bartsch and Wellman (1995) take these instances
to mean nothing more than “give me x”. Direct repe-
titions (henceforth, DRs) are dialog turns in which the
child merely repeats the adult (or his own) utterance. Id-
iomatic expressions (henceforth, IEs) are high-frequency
collocation of words in the particular language. This is
the case of Spanish “I don’t want to” or “I want more”,
when they appear without an object. Uncodable ut-
terances (henceforth, UU) are instances of the desire
term “want” for which categorization was impossible,
due mainly to failure in retrieving contextual informa-
tion from the dialog.
To code each of them into one of the five mutually
exclusive categories, child utterances containing “want”
were not taken in isolation, but embedded in a window
of the four previous and the four following utterances of
the whole sample. However, sometimes this short con-
text did not help defining which category the utterance
belonged to. Thus, the whole transcript had to be an-
alyzed in order to assign a category to the utterance in
question. An independent rater, unaware of the hypoth-
esis of the study rated a subset of the data (10%=60 ut-
terances, Cohen’s κ=.85). Disagreements were resolved
by discussion and, in the light of the discussions, there
was a second coding pass to the whole data set.
Results
There were a total of 602 “want” utterances in the an-
alyzed corpus. 347 (57.35%) were GPRDs, 145 (23.96)
were other communicative uses of “want”. Of those 145
communicative uses, 37 (6.11% of total “want” utter-
ances) were behavioral requests, 92 (15.20%) were di-
rect repetitions and 16 (2.65%) were idiomatic expres-
sions. Figure 1 below shows the average frequency of
talk about genuine desires as a percentage of the total
number of utterances for each particular child at each
particular age. It is evident that the developmental pic-
ture I have obtained resembles the one in Bartsch and
Wellman (1995) very closely, even the ranges of the per-
centages are similar (see Bartsch and Wellman (1995),
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p. 73, Figure 4.2B). Talk about genuine desire seems
to be present at the first age analyzed (AGE1, 18-24
months), to increase slowly by AGE2 (25-28 months
of age) and then more drastically again at AGE3 (29-
32 months). The frequency of genuine talk about de-
sires seems to peak at around AGE4 (33-36 months)
to drop and stabilize thereafter. In order to test for
significant differences in children’s talk about desires at
any given age group, a repeated measures ANOVA with
age as a 6-level variable was used. There was an over-
all significant main effect F (5, 55)=6.72, p<.000. Post
hoc analyses using the Bonferroni criterion for signifi-
cance indicated that the average frequency of GPRDs
for AGE1 (M=0.51, SD=0.55) and AGE2 (M=0.96,
SD=0.80) were significantly lower than frequency of talk
about GPRDs at AGE4 (M=4.28, SD=2.24) and AGE6
(M=3.54, SD=2.10).
Figure 1: GPRDs by age as a percentage of the total num-
ber of utterances for that child at that age, error bars are
standard errors.
Figure 2 below shows the development of children’s
communicative uses of “want” as a function of age. Ex-
cept for direct repetitions, both idiomatic expressions
and behavioral requests do not appear in the first age
stage sampled (AGE1=18-24). By AGE2, all three cat-
egories of communicative uses are present, although not
extremely different from the previous age. The frequency
of DRs seems to grow and separate from the main trend
at AGE3 and then again at AGE4, while at AGE3 both
BRs and IEs are at the same level. Something indeed
seems to happen at AGE4, when all three categories
seem quite different in their frequencies, with DRs lead-
ing the frequency count, followed by BRs and IE in the
last place. Both AGE5 and AGE5 seem to show the new
convergence of these categories. It seems then that after
AGE4, all three kinds of communicative uses of “want”
stabilize. To test for significant effects, a repeated mea-
sures ANOVA with age as the within-subject variable
was carried out for each communicative use of “want”.
The tests show that, taken one by one, there is no sig-
nificant effects for age and each of the communicative
uses of “want”, p > .05. However, a repeated measures
ANOVA with age and communicative uses as within-
subjects variables yielded a significant effect for both
age F (2.96, 32.61)1=3.174, p=.038 and communicative
uses F (2, 22)=12.708, p<.000. No main effect was found
for the interaction between age and communicative uses
F (3.36, 36.97)1=0.682, p>.05, n.s.
Figure 2: Communicative uses of “want” by age as a per-
centage of the total number of utterances for that child at
that age.
Figure 3 shows quite clearly that although both
GPRDs and all communicative uses start at roughly the
same frequency, it is only GPRDs that increase the fre-
quency significantly, while the other communicative uses
of “want” stay roughly the same across ages. A repeated
measures ANOVA with AGE as a 6-level variable (Ages
1 through 6) and communicative uses as a 4-level vari-
able (GPRDs, BRs, IE, DRs) was used to test for dif-
ferences. As expected from the previous analyses, there
was an overall significant main effect of communicative
uses, F (3, 33)=59.545, p<.000, a significant main effect
for age, F (5, 55)=7.444, p<.000 and a significant inter-
action of Age and Communicative uses, F (3, 33)=4.861,
p<.000.
Discussion
From the theoretical discussion above, we concluded that
if children undergo some metarepresentational change of
the concept of desire as a function of age, then while
the developmental picture of GPRDs reflect this change,
communicative uses of “want” should stay relatively the
same across ages.
The analyses carried out yield some results that point
towards this direction. Although there are differences
among the communicative uses themselves (that is, there
are differences between DRs and IEs, for instance, at
33 months, see Figure 2), there is no main effect for
1
F corrected for sphericity by Greenhouse-Geisser.
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Figure 3: Communicative uses of “want” by age as a per-
centage of the total number of utterances for that child at
that age.
age for each of these communicative uses taken in iso-
lation. However, there is a main effect for GPRDs be-
tween the first age analyzed (18-24 months) and AGE4
(33-36 months) and AGE6 (41-44 months). This, ob-
viously, draws a difference between the communicative
uses of “want” and genuine psychological references to
desire. This difference, I am inclined to say, may be
related to metarepresentational issues during the acqui-
sition of the concept of desire. If it were not about mat-
ters metarepresentational, it would be very difficult to
explain why the other communicative uses (BRs, in par-
ticular), which are morphosyntactically very similar to
GPRDs, do not provide a main effect for age.
This paper is not calling into question the hypothe-
sis that belief (and particularly false belief) taps an or-
ganism’s representational capacities, nor that belief is
acquired at whatever age (probably, on all conservative
accounts, at 4 years of age). What is being questioned
here is the working assumption that if belief taps on rep-
resentation and belief is acquired at 4 years of age, then
metarepresentation is acquired at 4 years of age.
The argument that uses the premise above seems to
be, at least, enthymematic. It could be said that rea-
soning by means of belief is tapping certain kinds of
metarepresentational abilities, the kinds for which many
computational resources have to be in place (Wimmer,
Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988; Leslie, 1988; Davies & Stone,
1995). As an analogy, you can take the difference that
exists between a belief attribution such as “Loreto be-
lieves there’s a blue car outside school” and “Loreto be-
lieves Namic thinks there’s a blue car outside school”.
Terminological differences aside, children seem to acquire
the ability to solve problems like the latter by around 6
years of age (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), two years after
they have allegedly acquired the ability to metarepresent
(metarepresent by false belief, that is). However, just be-
cause of this empirical fact, one would not argue that by
passing this more complicated task, the child has now
acquired another ability, one different from the metarep-
resentational abilities acquired two years earlier. The
same argument holds for desires: just because children
talk and reason by means of desired a year before they do
so with belief, that does not mean that a new ability has
been acquired. That children are able to calculate this
double-embedding of the same belief concept a couple of
years later than 4 years of age points in the direction of
problems with some of the computational mechanisms
that help children deal with metarepresentation (Fodor,
1992), but not with the ability to metarepresent itself.
General conclusions and future work
The main point of this paper is that it is extremely hard
to consider reasoning by means of desire (at any age
stage) as a non-metarepresentational endeavor. This hy-
pothesis has been analyzed in two ways: a) by means of a
logical analysis of what is involved during desire reason-
ing and communication and b) by providing some pre-
liminary empirical evidence that even talk (as a proxy
for reasoning) about desire shows a clear developmental
trend when compared to communicative uses of the same
words used to talk about desire (“want”, in this case).
If the main point of this paper is right, then the most
pressing issue to deal with is the lag between the ac-
quisition of the concept of belief and that of desire. In
other words, if metarepresentation lies in the nature of
both belief and desire but children have less difficulty
understanding the representational nature of the latter
while failing to understand the equivalent metarepresen-
tational character of the former (Astington & Gopnik,
1991), then again it may be the case that something
other than metarepresentation is at stake. Of course,
much more work is needed in this area. Nonetheless, I
would like to propose that the answer to this riddle lies
in the computational mechanisms dealing with metarep-
resentation at the different stages. Not with metarepre-
sentational abilities themselves. In other words, I would
like to propose that the ability to metarepresent is ac-
quired as soon as children start talking about and reli-
ably communicating their own and other people’s mental
states, starting with desire at around the 30th month of
life. This is somewhat earlier than previously thought,
but it would help explain and make sense of the whole
philosophical tradition of belief and desires as belonging
to roughly the same theoretical arena as the rest of the
propositional attitudes.
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Abstract 
False recognition of verbal information has long been 
established with word lists.  Current research examines the 
phenomenon of false recognition with pictorial stimuli. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that similar to word-lists, 
pictorially presented information elicits memory intrusions, 
and that rates of intrusions differ across stimuli sets.  
Experiment 2 investigated the effects of focusing on 
category-level versus item-specific information on the rates 
of false recognition.  Results of Experiment 2 suggest that 
memory accuracy decreases dramatically when participants 
perform category-based processing compared to item-based 
processing. Experiment 3 confirmed that processing 
manipulations rather than other extraneous factors influence 
levels of false recognition in Experiment 2.  
Introduction 
People strive for accurate and reliable memories; however 
their memories often get distorted.  Although forgetting is 
one of the most obvious types of memory distortions, it is 
not the only one. There is much research demonstrating that 
people often distort memories in systematic and predictable 
ways.  For example, prior knowledge has previously been 
implicated in memory distortions: people often falsely 
recognize new information when it is consistent with their 
knowledge (e.g., Alba & Hasher, 1983). For instance, after 
reading a story describing a famous person, participants 
tended to falsely recognize statements that were not part of 
the story they had read, but were thematically related to this 
person. (Sulin & Dooling, 1974).   
Systematic memory distortions are not limited to sentence 
information, and are often found with word lists.  These 
types of memory distortions were first demonstrated by 
Deese (1959), who presented participants with word-lists 
(e.g., “bed”, “rest”, and “awake”) consisting of associates of 
a single non-presented word (e.g., “sleep”).  When asked to 
recall the words from the list, participants often erroneously 
recalled words consistent with the overall theme of the list, 
which was never actually presented.  Deese’s fundings were 
followed up by Roediger and McDermott (1995), who 
replicated Deese’s results, demonstrating that memory 
intrusions of non-presented words persist in recall as well as 
in recognition, thus giving the name of DRM (for Deese-
Roediger-McDermott) to this phenomenon.  However, the 
nature of the phenomenon is still unclear. 
According to one explanation, during recognition, 
participants perceive both studied items, and semantically 
related critical lures, to be more familiar than unrelated 
distracters.  Because familiarity strongly affects the decision 
criterion for accepting items as studied or “old”, those items 
that have elevated familiarity are more likely to be accepted 
both correctly and erroneously. This increased familiarity 
may stem from a summary or “gist” representation that 
reflects the general meaning of the list (in addition to 
representing individual items in the list), with critical lures 
being consistent with the gist (Brainerd, Reyna, & 
Mojardin, 1999).  Therefore, on a recognition test, item-
specific representations drive hits or correct acceptance of 
studied items, whereas “gist” representations drive both hits 
and false alarms on critical lures (i.e., erroneous acceptance 
of items semantically related to studied items).  
According to another explanation, processing of items 
(either at study or at test) activates a critical lure, an item 
strongly associated with studied items.  However, during 
recognition participants fail to monitor the source of this 
activated information, and as a result of confusing internally 
generated and externally presented information, participants 
falsely recognize critical lures (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; 
Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Roediger, et al., 2001).  
If participants can represent both the “gist” and individual 
items (Brainerd, et al., 1999), and distortions (or false 
alarms) are driven by the gist representations, then it should 
be possible to facilitate the formation of either 
representation by focusing participants on the overall theme 
or on individual items.  If our contention is correct, then a 
manipulation focusing on a gist representation should lead 
to elevated memory distortions (due to an elevated level of 
false alarms on critical lures).  
This manipulation can generate evidence capable of 
distinguishing between the two theoretical positions because 
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the source confusion explanation does not predict these 
effects.  
Note, however that much of DRM-based research has 
been based on word-lists rather than pictures (see Koutstaal 
& Schacter, 1997; Seamon Luo, Schlegel, Greene, & 
Goldenberg, 2000, for notable exceptions).  At the same 
time, pictures are well suited for this manipulation: 
participants could be focused on an entire category (e.g., 
Cats) or on individual items, such as a picture of a particular 
cat. 
Another advantage of pictorially presented information is 
that pictures can drastically decrease the tendency to make 
source monitoring errors: it is highly unlikely that one 
would spontaneously generate a particular unique picture 
serving as a critical lure (see Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997, 
for related arguments).  Therefore, persistence of memory 
intrusions with pictures would further suggest that these 
intrusions do not stem solely from source monitoring errors. 
It has been previously demonstrated that pictures do 
generate memory intrusions (Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; 
Seamon, et al., 2000).  However some of these findings are 
based on a procedure that used large 120-study-item stimuli 
sets, and a 3-day delay between the study and the 
recognition phases.  In this research, we will use the 
procedure that follows more closely the DRM procedure 
with word lists: we present participants with a reasonably 
small stimulus set, and impose no delays between the study 
and recognition phases.  We have demonstrated elsewhere 
(Sloutsky & Fisher, in press) that false recognition of 
information presented pictorially can be obtained in a 
procedure that closely follows the original DRM task.  
However, these results were obtained with a single picture 
set, and it is unclear how well they can be generalized to a 
greater number of categories. 
Overall, the reported research has two goals: (1) to 
examine whether or not pictorially-presented information 
can generate DRM-type phenomena and, if yes, then (2) 
whether false recognition in DRM stems from source-
monitoring errors or from gist representation of information. 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to replicate these findings 
using multiple categories.  Experiment 2 had a more 
theoretically important goal: to generate evidence capable of 
distinguishing among the proposed theoretical accounts of 
the DRM-effect.  Recall that finding increased memory 
intrusions as a result of processing manipulations would 
support the position that DRM-type memory intrusions stem 
from gist-type representations, while weakening the position 
that these intrusions stem from source-monitoring errors. 
Experiment 1 
Method  
Participants Participants were introductory psychology 
students at a large Midwestern university (N = 103, M age= 
19.7 years, SD = 1.8 years; 51 women and 52 men) who 
received a partial course credit for participation. 
Design, Materials and Procedure Materials were 90 color 
photographs of animals presented against a white 
background.  The photographs represented five different 
animal categories (Cats, Bears, Squirrels, Fish, and Birds) 
with 18 photographs per category. 
The task consisted of a study and a recognition phase.  
During the study phase participants were presented with 30 
pictures from three different animal categories: 10 items 
from the Target category, and 20 items from the two Filler 
categories.  Participants were instructed to remember the 
presented pictures as accurately as possible for a f  uture 
recognition test.  During the recognition phase, which 
immediately followed the study phase, participants were 
presented with 28 pictures: 14 previously studied pictures (7 
from the Target category and 7 from one of the Filler 
categories), and 14 new pictures (7 new pictures from the 
Target category, and 7 pictures from a novel category, 
which served as control items).  Participants were asked to 
determine whether each picture presented during the 
recognition phase was “old” (i.e., exactly the same as 
previously seen in the study phase) or “new”.  
The categories that were designated to be Targets were 
rotated such that Cats, Bears, Squirrels, Fish, and Birds 
served as Targets in one of five between-subject conditions.  
All participants were tested individually, and had all 
instructions and stimuli presented to them on a computer 
screen in a self-paced manner. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Some participants did not reliably reject control items (i.e., 
at least 5 out of 7 correct), and their data were excluded 
from further analyses; 11 participants were excluded 
overall.  The rest of the participants were very accurate in 
recognizing previously studied items (on average over 88% 
of correct recognitions across the target categories) and in 
rejecting items from novel categories (over 97% of correct 
rejections across categories).   
Most importantly, participants often mistakenly 
recognized new items from the Target category, or critical 
lures.  Proportions of “old” responses to previously studied 
items from the Target category (Hits), to new items from the 
Target category (False Alarms), and to novel items from a 
novel category (Control Items) are presented in Figure 1. 
Data in the figure indicate that (a) although for all 
categories, the proportion of Hits was significantly higher 
than the proportion of False Alarms (FA), all paired-sample 
ts > 6, ps < .0001, some pictorially presented categories 
(e.g., Bears) elicited sizable memory intrusions (Hits = .86, 
FA = .54, Hits –FA = .32), and (b) proportions of memory 
intrusions varied across the categories, ranging from 
relatively high for Bears to almost non-existent for Birds.  
To examine the significance of differences across 
categories, accuracy measures (i.e., Hits – FA) were 
subjected to a one-way between-subjects ANOVA with 
Target category as a factor.  The results point to significant 
differences in accuracy across the Target categories, F (4, 
91) = 27.3, MSE = 0.04, p < .0001, with the following 
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pattern of accuracy Birds > Fish = Squirrels = Cats > 
Bears, post-hoc Tukey test, for all differences ps < .05. 
Therefore, major DRM phenomena that were previously 
found with word-lists are replicable with pictures.  First, 
pictures generated substantial levels of memory intrusions.  
And second, similar to word-lists, pictures elicited different 
levels of memory intrusions across different target 
conditions: while little false recognition occurred for the 
Target category Birds, other Target categories (Bears, Cats, 
Fish, and Squirrels) elicited sizeable levels of false 
recognition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean proportions of “Old” responses across target 
types in the recognition memory test of Experiment 1 
 
It could be argued, however, that Birds were an odd 
category that stood out in the context of mammals, which 
resulted in a more accurate processing of this odd category.  
To test this alternative, we conducted an additional 
experiment, using Cats as the Target category presented in 
the context of reptiles, with Frogs and Alligators used as 
Filler Categories.  When Cats were an odd category, the 
level of false recognition of critical lures was statistically 
equivalent to that in Experiment 1 (42% versus 39%, 
respectively). 
It is also possible that during the study phase, participants 
spontaneously labeled species of birds (but not cats, 
squirrels, fish, or bears), which dramatically reduced 
memory intrusions for the Target category Birds.  To rule 
out this possibility we asked 23 undergraduates to label 
pictures of birds used in Experiment 1: no more than 4 out 
of 18 birds received unique labels, which was comparable to 
the labeling of cats. 
Overall, these results suggest that DRM-type memory 
distortions are a robust phenomenon independent of the 
mode of presentation.  More importantly, the fact that 
patterns of memory intrusions are similar for verbally and 
pictorially presented stimuli suggests that DRM-type 
memory intrusions do not stem solely from source 
monitoring errors.  The goal of Experiment 2 was to 
examine directly whether a task that facilitates category-
level processing will lead to an increase in memory 
intrusions compared to the baseline of Experiment 1.  
Experiment 2 
Method  
Participants Participants were introductory psychology 
students at a large Midwestern university (N = 134, M age= 
20.26 years, SD = 2.5 years; 64 women and 70 men) who 
received a partial credit for participation. 
 
Design, Materials and Procedure Materials in Experiment 
2 were identical to Experiment 1, however the study phase 
of the experiment was different. Participants were first 
presented with a picture of an animal from a Target 
category, and informed that the animal had “beta-cells 
inside its body”. Participants were then presented with 30 
pictures (10 from the Target category and 20 from two Filler 
categories), and asked to determine whether each presented 
animal also had beta-cells inside. Participants were provided 
with feedback, which indicated that only animals from the 
Target category had the property in question, whereas 
animals from the Filler categories did not. Participants were 
not warned about an upcoming recognition test. 
Similar to Experiment 1, during the recognition phase 
participants were presented with 28 pictures: 14 previously 
studied pictures (7 from the Target category and 7 from one 
of the Filler categories), and 14 new pictures (7 new pictures 
from the Target category, and 7 pictures from a novel 
category).  Participants were asked to determine whether 
each picture presented during the recognition phase was 
“old” (i.e., exactly the same as previously seen in the study 
phase) or “new”. 
The categories that were designated to be Targets were 
rotated such that Cats, Bears, Squirrels, Fish, and Birds 
served as Targets in one of five between-subject conditions.  
All participants were tested individually, and had all 
instructions and stimuli presented to them on a computer 
screen in a self-paced manner. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Some participants did not reliably reject control items (i.e., 
at least 5 out of 7 correct), and their data were excluded 
from further analyses; 35 participants were excluded 
overall.  The rest of the participants were very accurate in 
recognizing previously studied items (on average over 83% 
of correct recognitions across the target categories) and in 
rejecting items from novel categories (over 97% of correct 
rejections across categories).  
However, the rates of false recognition in each target 
condition increased substantially, compared to the baseline 
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in Experiment 1. Proportions of hits (i.e., correct 
recognitions), false alarms on Target distracters (FA), and 
accuracy scores (Hits – FA) for each target category are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Proportions of false alarms (FA), and 
Accuracy scores (Hits – FA) across target categories in 
Experiment 2. 
 
Target 
Category 
 
Hits 
 
FA 
Accuracy 
(Hits – FA) 
 
Birds 
 
.84 
 
.50 
 
.34 
 
Fish 
 
.80 
 
.47 
 
.33 
 
Squirrels 
 
.80 
 
.61 
 
.19 
 
Cats 
 
.80 
 
.62 
 
.18 
 
Bears 
 
.88 
 
.79 
 
.09 
 
Overall results of Experiments 1 and 2 are presented in 
Figure 2. Data in the figure indicate that recognition 
accuracy markedly decreased in Experiment 2 compared to 
Experiment 1. This differential accuracy was the result of a 
processing manipulation introduced in Experiment 2 (i.e., an 
induction task) that focused participants on the category-
level properties of stimuli, as opposed to item-specific 
properties in Experiment 1. Data in the figure also suggest 
that the decrease in accuracy in Experiment 2 was not 
proportional to the level of performance in Experiment 1. 
This task by condition interaction, F (4, 181) = 3.7, MSE = 
.21, p < .05, suggests that when participants are focused on 
category-level properties, they form mainly category-level 
representations, as opposed to mainly item-level 
representation in the Baseline. However, it is possible that 
decrease in memory accuracy obtained in Experiment 2 can 
be explained by increased task demands of Experiment 2 
compared to Experiment 1 (performing an induction task 
versus no task during the study phase). It is also possible 
that overall accuracy in Experiment 2 decreased because 
participants were not warned about a subsequent memory 
test. Experiment 3 was designed to test these alternative 
explanations.  
Experiment 3 
The goal of Experiment 3 was to eliminate potential 
confounds of Experiment 2 by introducing a task that would 
force participants to engage in item-based processing. 
Similar to Experiment 2 participants were not warned about 
a subsequent memory test. Therefore, if accurate memory 
performance is obtained in Experiment 3, both of alternative 
explanations for the results of Experiment 2 will be 
eliminated.  
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Figure 2: Mean accuracy (Hits – FA) across target 
categories in Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
Method  
Participants Participants were introductory psychology 
students at a large Midwestern university (N = 24, M age= 
20.2 years, SD = 1.6 years; 9 women and 15 men) who 
received a partial credit for participation. 
 
Design, Materials and Procedure Overall structure of the 
task was similar to Experiment 2, however only one target 
category (Cats) was tested, and participants were presented 
with a different question during the study phase.  
Participants were first presented with a picture of a cat, and 
told the animal was young. Then they were presented with 
30 pictures of animals from 3 different categories (10 cats, 
10 bears, and 10 birds), and asked to determine whether 
each animal was young or mature. Participants received 
random feedback, thus blocking any possible categorization. 
Similar to Experiment 2, participants were not warned about 
a subsequent memory test.  
During the recognition phase participants were presented 
with 28 pictures: 14 previously studied pictures (7 cats and 
7 bears), and 14 new pictures (7 novel cats and 7 squirrels, 
which served as control items).  Participants were asked to 
determine whether each picture presented during the 
recognition phase was “old” (i.e., exactly the same as 
previously seen in the study phase) or “new”. 
All participants were tested individually, and had all 
instructions and stimuli presented to them on a computer 
screen in a self-paced manner. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Three participants did not reliably reject control items (i.e., 
at least 5 out of 7 correct), and their data were excluded 
from further analyses. The rest of the participants were very 
accurate in recognizing previously studied items (over 87% 
of correct recognitions versus 86% in Experiment 1), and in 
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rejecting items from novel categories (95% and 99% of 
correct rejections respectively). Levels of false recognitions 
were also comparable to the baseline in Experiment 1 (38% 
and 33% respectively). Results of Experiment 3 suggest that 
differential accuracy on a recognition memory test in 
Experiment 1 and 2 cannot by attributed to the difference in 
task demands or difference in instruction, since memory 
performance in Experiments 3 was very close to 
performance in Experiment 1, despite a task added to the 
study phase, and a lack of warning about a subsequent 
memory test. These findings indicate that the level of 
processing required by a task (item-specific versus category-
specific) influences the level of false recognition on a 
recognition memory test.  
 
General Discussion 
The present study replicated earlier findings that DRM-type 
intrusions are possible with pictorially presented stimuli, 
and generalized these earlier findings to multiple categories. 
The study also demonstrated that processing manipulations 
(rather than differential task demands) influence the levels 
of false recognition. Specifically, tasks that focus 
participants on category-level properties result in category-
level representations, and lead to decreased memory 
accuracy compared to the tasks that focus participants on the 
item-specific properties of stimuli. This decrease, however, 
is not proportional to the level of memory performance in 
the Baseline condition: as a result of performing induction, 
memory accuracy decreases drastically, and becomes more 
comparable for all types of Targets.  
The reported findings, indicating that DRM-type memory 
intrusions persist even with pictures, seem to weaken the 
source monitoring explanation of memory intrusions.  Even 
if source-monitoring errors play a role in memory intrusions 
with word-lists, these errors are highly unlikely to generate 
recognition errors when stimuli are presented pictorially.  
Therefore, assuming that the same mechanism underlies 
DRM-type intrusion with verbally and pictorially presented 
materials, it seems reasonable to conclude that monitoring 
errors are unlikely to be the only source of DRM-type 
intrusions with verbally presented materials.  Given that 
memory intrusions with pictures are isomorphic to those 
with word-lists (i.e., both modes of presentation elicit high 
levels of false recognition and different intrusion rates 
across different lists), the assumption does not seem 
unreasonable.  Therefore, the reported results seem to 
support the idea that that DRM-type intrusions stem from 
category-level or “gist” representations rather than from 
source monitoring errors. 
The finding that performance on an induction task results 
in an increased level of memory intrusions is theoretically 
important for the study of inductive reasoning as well as 
memory. In particular, researchers debate whether or not 
induction is category-based at different points of 
development (see Sloutsky, 2003), and the study of effects 
of induction on memory accuracy may bring critical 
evidence to this debate. 
In short, the reported research brings new evidence to 
research on memory and induction: category-based 
induction results in the formation of category-level or “gist” 
representations, which in turn increase false recognition of 
new items from studied categories.  
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Abstract 
The ability to perform inductive generalizations has been 
demonstrated to develop very early in life. We argue that while 
adults use their conceptual knowledge when performing 
induction, young children perform induction by computing the 
similarity among presented entities. We further argue that this 
differential processing underlying children’s and adults’ 
induction results in different memory traces, and affects 
accuracy on a subsequent memory test. Experiment 1 
demonstrates that while performing induction decreases memory 
accuracy of adults and 12-year-olds, it does not affect memory 
accuracy of 5-, and 7-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 5- and 7-year-
olds were trained to perform category-based induction, which 
resulted in a decrease of their memory accuracy. In Experiment 
3, a delayed transfer task was used to examine whether 5- and 7-
year-olds could retain their learning over time. Overall, results 
of the reported experiments point to a developmental trend from 
similarity-based to category-based induction. 
Introduction 
The ability to make inductive generalizations is undoubtedly 
crucial for humans, for not only does it facilitate acquisition 
of new knowledge and skills, but also aids survival: “our 
knowledge that leopards can be dangerous leads us to keep a 
safe distance from jaguars” (Sloman, 1993, p.321).  
It has been demonstrated that infants and very young 
children can perform simple induction tasks (Gelman & 
Markman, 1986; Sloutsky, Lo, & Fisher, 2001, Welder & 
Graham, 2001). The process underlying this basic ability is, 
however, still open to debate.  
According to one view, children’s inductive 
generalizations are driven by a priori conceptual 
assumptions (Keil, Smith, Simons, & Levin, 1998, Gelman 
& Hirschfeld, 1999). Under this view, which has 
traditionally been referred to as a naïve theory position, 
even early in development, induction is driven by the 
category assumption – a belief that entities are members of 
categories, and members of the same category have much in 
common. Thus, in the course of induction, children first 
identify presented entities as members of categories, and 
then perform inductive inferences on the basis of this 
categorization, because they presumably believe that 
members of the same categories share many unobservable 
properties.  
According to another position, young children perform 
induction (as well as categorization) by detecting multiple 
correspondences, or similarities, among presented entities 
(e.g., see Jones & Smith, 2002; McClelland & Rogers, 
2003; Sloutsky & Fisher, in press-a; Sloutsky, 2003).  
Because members of a category often happen to be more 
similar to each other than they are to nonmembers, young 
children are more likely to induce unobserved properties to 
members of the category.  One such similarity-based model, 
SINC (abbreviated for Similarity, Induction, and 
Categorization) was proposed recently by Sloutsky and 
colleagues (Sloutsky et al., 2001; Sloutsky, 2003, Sloutsky 
& Fisher, in press-a). Under this view, conceptual 
knowledge (i.e., knowledge that that members of the same 
category share many unobservable properties) is a product 
of learning and development rather than an a priori 
assumption. 
In short, under the former view, induction is category-
based (i.e., it is a product of categorization), whereas under 
the latter view, induction is a product of computation of 
similarity.  One of the goals of this research is to distinguish 
between these positions. 
Traditionally, inductive inference in children has been 
studied directly, by asking participants to perform inductive 
generalizations and assessing their performance. However, 
this approach may not be an optimal way of examining 
representations underlying performance on induction tasks. 
An alternative framework has been recently suggested 
(Sloutsky & Fisher, in press-b). In this framework, 
representations underlying induction performance are 
studied by examining memory traces formed in the course 
of Induction. Participants are first presented with sets of 
pictures of familiar animals, and are asked to make 
inductive inferences about these animals. Later participants 
are given a surprise recognition memory test, in which they 
are presented with some old pictures (i.e., pictures they had 
previously reasoned about in the induction task), and some 
Critical Lures (i.e., “new” pictures that belong to the same 
category as “old” pictures).  If participants perform 
induction in a similarity-based manner, they should form 
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item-specific representations, and exhibit high accuracy on a 
recognition test.  At the same time, if participants form 
category-level representations (which might be the case if 
induction is category-based), they should poorly distinguish 
between Old Targets and Critical Lures. 
Results reported by Sloutsky and Fisher (in press-b) 
indicate that young children exhibit high recognition 
accuracy for Critical Lures (thus pointing to similarity-
based induction), whereas adults exhibit low recognition 
accuracy for Critical Lures (thus suggesting category-based 
induction). It has also been demonstrated that adults’ 
category-based induction results in a decrease in memory 
accuracy compared to the Baseline memory tasks, while 
young children’s similarity-based induction does not.  
The goal of the series of experiments presented below is 
to compare the two theoretical positions by examining the 
pattern of development of inductive inference. The 
similarity-based position assumes a gradual transition from 
similarity-based to category-based induction in the course of 
learning and development, whereas no such transition is 
predicted by the naïve theory position.  According to this 
position, even young children perform category-based 
induction.  Another goal is to provide a learning account of 
the transition from similarity-based to category-based 
induction. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants Participants were 45 5 year-olds (19 girls, 26 
boys, M age= 5.2 years, SD = .32 years), 35 7 year-olds (21 
girls, 14 boys, M age= 7.9 years, SD = .54 years), 39 12 
year-olds, (18 girls, 21 boys, M age = 12.1 years, SD = .48), 
and 30 introductory psychology students at a large 
Midwestern university (12 women and 18 men, M age= 19.5 
years, SD = .99 years). 
 
Materials, Design and Procedure Materials were 44 color 
photographs of animals presented against the white 
background.  All animals were highly familiar to both 
children and adults, with familiarity established in a 
separate experiment (Sloutsky & Fisher, in press-b). 
Examples of the photographs used are presented in Figure 1. 
During the study phase, participants were presented with 30 
pictures, one picture at a time, from three different 
categories (10 cats, 10 bears, and 10 birds).  During the 
recognition phase, they were presented with 28 pictures, one 
picture at a time, and were asked whether they had seen 
each picture during the study phase.  Half of the recognition 
pictures were previously presented during the study phase, 
and the other half were new pictures.  The recognition 
pictures represented animals from three different categories: 
cats (7 of which were old and 7 were new), bears (all 7 of 
which were old), and squirrels (all 7 of which were new).   
The experiment included two between-subject conditions: 
Baseline and Induction. The recognition phase was identical 
in both conditions, whereas the study phase differed across 
conditions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Examples of stimuli in Experiment 1. 
 
In the study phase of the Baseline condition participants 
were presented with 30 pictures of animals, and their task 
was to remember these pictures for a subsequent recognition 
test. In the study phase of the Induction condition 
participants were first presented with a picture of a cat, and 
informed that it had “beta-cells inside its body”.  
Participants were then presented with 30 pictures of animals 
(identical to those presented in the Baseline condition), and 
asked whether each of the animals also had beta-cells inside.  
After responding, participants were provided with “yes/no” 
feedback, indicating that only cats, but not bears or birds, 
had beta-cells.  The recognition test was not mentioned in 
the study phase of this condition.   
During the recognition phase, which immediately 
followed the study phase, participants were presented with 
28 pictures and were asked to determine whether each was 
“old” (i.e., exactly the one presented during the study phase) 
or “new.”  No feedback was provided during the recognition 
phase 
Children were tested individually in their day care centers 
by female hypothesis-blind experimenters.  Undergraduate 
students were tested individually in a laboratory on campus.  
For all participants, stimuli were presented on a computer 
screen, and stimuli presentation was controlled by Super 
Lab Pro 2 software (Cedrus Corporation, 1999).   
 
Results and Discussion 
Although participants in every age group were very accurate 
in the study phase of the Induction condition, adults and 12 
year-olds were somewhat more accurate (averaging 91% 
and 94% of correct inductions respectively) than 5- and 7-
year-olds (74% and 84% of correct inductions respectively), 
F (3, 78) = 5.9, p < .01, post-hoc Tukey test, ps < .05 for all 
differences. 
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In the recognition phase of the experiment all participants 
were highly accurate in rejecting non-target distracters (i.e., 
squirrels), averaging over 91% of correct responses across 
conditions.   
However, participants exhibited differential accuracy for 
the Targets (items previously presented during the study 
phase, i.e. old cats and bears) and Critical Lures (new items 
from the same category as the Targets, i.e., new cats) in the 
Induction and the Baseline. To examine the ability of 
participants to discriminate previously presented Targets 
from Critical Lures, memory sensitivity A-prime scores 
were computed.  A-prime is a non-parametric analogue of 
the signal-detection statistics d-prime (Snodgrass & Corwin, 
1988).  If participants do not discriminate old Targets from 
Critical Lures, A-prime is at or below 0.5.  The greater the 
discrimination accuracy, the closer A-prime scores are to 1.  
Proportions of hits (i.e., correct recognitions), false alarms 
on Critical Lures (FA), and A-prime scores by age group 
and condition are presented in Table 1.  
Data in the table indicate that 5-, 7- and 12-year-olds 
well discriminated old items from Critical Lures in the 
Induction as well as the Baseline condition (A-primes > 0.5, 
one-sample ts > 2.8, ps < .01).  At the same time, adults 
were accurate in the Baseline condition (A-primes > .5, one-
sample t (14) 16.1, p < .001), whereas they were not 
accurate in the Induction condition: unlike children, adults’ 
A-primes in this condition were not different from 0.5, one-
sample t < 1, indicating no discrimination between old items 
and Critical Lures.  Furthermore, adults’ accuracy was 
lower than that of 5-year-olds or 7-year-olds, both 
independent sample ts > 2, ps <.05. 
 
Table 1: Proportions of Hits, False Alarms (FA) and A-
prime scores by age group and condition. 
 
Baseline Induction Age group 
Hits FA A-
prime 
Hits FA A-
prime 
 
5 year-olds 
 
.82 
 
.59 
 
.66 
 
.71 
 
.56 
 
.69 
 
7 year-olds 
 
.75 
 
.40 
 
.72 
 
.77 
 
.45 
 
.74 
 
12 year-olds 
 
.79 
 
.39 
 
.78 
 
.79 
 
.59 
 
.63 
 
Adults 
 
.88 
 
.40 .84 
 
.81 
 
.74 .54 
 
These findings are summarized in Figure 2, which 
presents a change in the A-prime scores in the Induction 
condition compared to the Baseline. Data in the figure 
indicate that in the Induction condition recognition memory 
was somewhat reduced in 12 year-olds and dramatically 
attenuated in adults, while Induction had virtually no effect 
on the recognition accuracy of 5- and 7-year-olds. The 
significant age by condition interaction was confirmed by 
the two-way (age by experimental condition) ANOVA 
performed on the A-prime scores, F (3, 141) = 5.7, p < .001.  
We argue that high recognition accuracy of younger 
participants of Experiment 1 was due to the fact that they 
were engaged in item-specific processing regardless of the 
experimental condition. Adult participants, on the contrary, 
demonstrated high memory accuracy only in the task that 
forced them to perform item-based processing, the Baseline 
condition. In the Induction condition, however, adults 
demonstrated low memory accuracy, due to engagement in 
category-level processing. Results of Experiment 1 therefore 
point to a developmental trend from similarity-based to 
category-based induction: memory sensitivity of younger 
children does not decrease at all in the Induction compared 
to the Baseline, while sensitivity of 12 year-olds decreases 
somewhat, and sensitivity of adults reduces dramatically.  
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Figure 2: Change in the A-prime scores in the Induction 
condition compared to the Baseline across age groups. 
 
Experiment 2 was designed to provide a learning account 
of the category-based induction found in adults, by training 
5- and 7-year-olds to perform induction in the category-
based manner. If training is successful, that is if memory 
accuracy of younger children can be reduced to the level of 
adults, this would further undermine the claim that 
reasoning in young children is a priori conceptually 
constrained.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants Participants were 27 5 year-olds (16 girls, 11 
boys, M age= 5.2 years, SD = .26 years), and 15 7 year-olds 
(11 girls, 4 boys, M age= 7.6 years, SD = .44 years). 
 
Materials, Design and Procedure Materials were identical 
to those of Experiment 1, however, participants were tested 
in the Induction condition only. The procedure of 
Experiment 2 was different from Experiment 1 in that prior 
to the study phase, participants were trained to perform 
category-based induction. Children were taught that animals 
that have the same names belong to the same category, and 
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that animals that belong to the same category share 
unobservable properties. Picture cards representing rabbits, 
dogs, and lions were used for the training procedure; none 
of these categories of animals were used in the experiment 
proper.  
Upon completing the training, participants were presented 
with the experimental task, which was identical to the 
Induction condition of Experiment 1. Hypothesis-blind 
female experimenters tested children individually in their 
schools and child care centers.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Overall participants were highly accurate during the study 
phase of Experiment 2, averaging over 92% of correct 
inductions. Similar to Experiment 1, participants were also 
very accurate in rejecting non-target distracters (i.e. 
squirrels), giving on average 98% of correct responses.  
However, unlike Experiment 1, memory sensitivity of 
participants in both age groups, as indicated by the A-
primes scores, did not differ from chance, both one-sample 
ts < 1.7, ps > .1. Proportions of hits, false alarms on Critical 
Lures, and A-prime scores are presented in Table 2.  
Results of Experiment 2 indicate that training to perform 
category-based induction significantly reduced memory 
accuracy of both 5- and 7-year-olds, bringing their 
recognition performance to chance and making it 
comparable to the performance of adult participants in 
Experiment 1. 
Could it be that training had a non-specific effect on 
memory accuracy, such that, regardless of the experimental 
task, children participating in the training experiment 
exhibited reduced memory accuracy?  This issue was 
addressed by Sloutsky and Fisher (in press-b), who 
demonstrated that training had no adverse effects on 
children’s memory in the Baseline condition. 
 
Table 2: Proportions of Hits, False Alarms (FA) and A-
prime scores by age group in Experiment 2. 
 
Training Condition  Age group 
Hits FA A-prime 
 
5 year-
olds 
 
.82 
 
.65 
 
.58 
 
7 year-
olds 
 
.73 
 
.59 
 
.57 
 
While demonstrating that both 5- and 7-year-olds were 
successful in learning to perform category-based induction, 
the experiments left an important question unanswered.  In 
particular, it remained unclear whether effects of this 
training would be retained over time. Results of Experiment 
2 together with the developmental trend found in 
Experiment 1 suggest that older children should be better 
able to retain what they learned during training over a time 
delay. Experiment 3 was designed to investigate the ability 
of 5- and 7-year-olds to retain this new knowledge over a 
time delay.  
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants Participants were 17 5 year-olds (11 girls, 7 
boys, M age= 5.3 years, SD = .17 years), and 19 7 year-olds 
(4 girls, 15 boys, M age= 7.6 years, SD = .44 years). 
 
Materials, Design and Procedure Materials and procedure 
were identical to those of Experiment 2 with one important 
difference: there was a delay between training to perform 
category-based induction and the experiment proper. The 
delay was on average 14.6 days (SD = 1.5 days, range 14 – 
18 days). As in the previous experiments hypothesis-blind 
female experimenters tested children individually in their 
schools and child care centers.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Similar to previous experiments participants were highly 
accurate both in rejecting non-target distracters (averaging 
over 96% of correct rejections), and making correct 
inductions during the study phase (84% and 86 % of correct 
inductions in the groups of 5- and 7-year-olds respectively). 
However, in contrast to Experiment 2, participants 
demonstrated differential memory accuracy for Critical 
Lures.  Proportions of hits, false alarms on Critical Lures, 
and A-prime scores are presented in Table 3. Memory 
accuracy of 7 year-olds indexed by the A-prime scores was 
close to chance (which was similar to their accuracy in 
Experiment 2), one-sample t (18) = 1.9, p > .07. On the 
other hand, recognition memory of 5 year-olds was clearly 
above chance, one-sample t (16) = 4.9, p < .0001.  
 
Table 3: Proportions of Hits, False Alarms (FA) and A-
prime scores by age group in Experiment 3. 
 
Delayed Transfer Condition Age group 
Hits FA A-prime 
 
5 year-
olds 
 
.82 
 
.59 
 
.67 
 
7 year-
olds 
 
.91 
 
.75 
 
.59 
 
Thus, results of Experiment 3 indicate that while 7 year-
olds retained what they had learned during training over a 
two-week delay, 5 year-olds were unable to do so.  
Therefore, retaining of the learned ability to perform 
induction in a category-based manner seems to be a function 
of age.  
Memory accuracy of 5- and 7-year-olds across three 
reported experiments is presented in Figure 3. Results 
presented in Figure 3 point to an interesting developmental 
pattern: while both 5- and 7-year-olds do not perform 
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category-based induction spontaneously (i.e., under the no-
training condition of Experiment 1, their accuracy is high), 
children in both age groups can be successfully trained to 
perform category-based induction (as evidenced by their 
reduced accuracy in the training condition of Experiment 2). 
However, only 7 year-olds are able to retain the results of 
training over longer periods of time (i.e., after the delayed 
condition in Experiment 3, their accuracy remained low).  
At the same time, 5-year-olds reverted back to similarity-
based induction (i.e., after the delayed condition in 
Experiment 3, their memory accuracy returned to the high 
pre-training level).  
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Figure 3: A-prime scores for 5- and 7-year-olds in the 
Induction task across Experiments 1 – 3. 
General Discussion 
Several important findings stem from the three reported 
experiments.  First, there is a clear trend in the development 
of induction: induction task attenuates memory accuracy for 
individual items of 12-year-olds and adults, whereas 5- and 
7-year-olds exhibit accurate memory for individual items.  
Furthermore, in the Induction (but not in the Baseline) 
condition younger participants exhibit greater memory 
accuracy than older participants or adults.  Second, training 
to perform category-based induction leads to a decrease in 
memory accuracy of 5- and 7-year-olds to the level of 
adults.  And third, 7-year-olds retain training over longer 
periods of time than 5-year-olds: 5-year-olds sooner than 7-
year-olds exhibit high levels of memory accuracy for 
individual items, returning to their pre-training high 
accuracy. 
These results indicate that: (1) while 12-year-olds and 
adults perform category-based induction (which results in 
mostly category-level representations), 5- and 7-year-olds 
perform similarity-based induction (which results in item-
level representations); (2) there is a gradual developmental 
transition from similarity-based to category-based 
induction; and (3) category-based induction does not have to 
be a priori, it can be learned and retained over time 
(although the length of retention is a function of age).  
These results support predictions of the similarity-based 
account of induction, while presenting challenges to the 
naïve theory approach.  In what follows, we consider 
theoretical implication of these results. 
 
Induction and Memory Accuracy Across 
Development  
The results support the contention of the similarity-based 
approach that early in development children perform 
induction by computing similarity among compared entities.  
As a result, these participants form item-specific 
representations, and accurately remember individual items 
encountered in the course of induction.  At the same time, 
older children and adults perform category-based induction 
(i.e., they first categorize entities, and then generalize 
properties to members of the same category), and as a result 
they form category-level, but not item-specific 
representation, thus exhibiting poor memory for individual 
items encountered in the course of induction.  Note that 
older children and adults have no difficulty remembering 
individual items, in the Baseline condition, in which they 
are not required to perform induction.  Furthermore, there is 
additional evidence that category-based induction affects 
memory accuracy for individual items: when younger 
participants were trained to perform category-based 
induction, their memory accuracy in the Induction (but not 
in the Baseline) condition dropped to the level of adults.   
Taken together, these findings do not support the 
contention of the naïve theory position that induction in 
young children is category-based, but they rather support 
the contention of SINC that induction in young children is 
similarity-based. 
 
The Development and Learning of Category-Based 
Induction  
The reported results also present developmental and 
learning accounts of category-based induction. First, 
category-based induction gradually emerges in the course of 
development: there is little evidence that 5- or 7-year-olds 
spontaneously perform category-based induction, whereas 
12-year-olds are more likely to perform it than younger 
children, and adults are more likely to perform it than 12-
year-olds.  Second, people do not need a priori category 
assumption – young children can be trained to perform 
category-based induction. However, the retention of this 
training is a function of age – 7-year-olds are more likely to 
retain training over time than younger children.  Therefore, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that (a) there is a transition 
from similarity-based to category-based induction, and this 
transition is gradual; (b) category-based induction can be 
successfully learned; and (c) the retention of learning is a 
function of age. These findings provide a learning account 
of category-based induction suggesting that it is 
unnecessary to posit that conceptual knowledge is a priori.  
Recall that in Experiment 2, participants were taught that (a) 
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similar things that have the same name belong to the same 
kind, (b) things that belong to the same kind share many 
non-observable properties, and (c) things that have the same 
name share many non-observable properties. It is possible 
that (a) and (b) are taught in school, whereas (c) is a direct 
consequence of (a) and (b). Therefore, results of Experiment 
2 may explain the transition from the similarity-based 
induction exhibited by children to category-based induction 
exhibited by adults, suggesting that category-based 
induction and requisite conceptual knowledge could be a 
product of feedback-based learning.  While presenting a 
learning account of category-based induction, these findings 
seriously challenge the contention of the naïve theory 
position that category-based induction has to be based on a 
priori assumptions. 
 
Conclusion  
Overall, results of the three reported experiments represent 
novel findings indicating that (a) early in development 
people spontaneously perform similarity-based rather than 
category-based induction; (b) there is a gradual transition 
from similarity-based to category-based induction; and (c) 
category-based induction is a product of learning.  These 
results support the similarity-based account of young 
children’s induction, while presenting challenges to the 
naïve theory approach. 
Acknowledgments 
This research is supported by grants from the National 
Science Foundation (BCS # 0078945 and REC # 0208103) 
to Vladimir M. Sloutsky. 
References 
Gelman, S. A., & Markman, E. (1986).  Categories and 
induction in young children.  Cognition, 23, 183-209. 
Gelman, S. A. & Hirschfeld, L. A. (1999).  How biological 
is essentialism?  In S. Atran & D. Medin (Eds.).  
Folkbiology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Jones, S. S., & Smith, L. B. (2002).  How children know the 
relevant properties for generalizing object names. 
Developmental Science, 5, 219-232. 
Keil, F. C., Smith, W. C., Simons, D. J., & Levin, D. T. 
(1998).  Two dogmas of conceptual empiricism: 
Implications for hybrid models of the structure of 
knowledge.  Cognition, 65, 103-135. 
McClelland, J. L., & Rogers, T. T. (2003).  The parallel 
distributed processing approach to semantic cognition. 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 310-322. 
Sloman, S. A. (1993). Feature-based induction. Cognitive 
psychology, 25, 231 – 280. 
Sloutsky, V. M., Lo, Y.-F., & Fisher, A. V. (2001). How 
much does a shared name make things similar? Linguistic 
labels and the development of inductive inference. Child 
Development, 72, 1695-1709. 
Sloutsky, V. M. (2003).  The role of similarity in the 
development of categorization.  Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 7, 246-251. 
Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A. V. (In press-a). Induction and 
categorization in young children: A similarity-based 
model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 
Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A. V. (In press-b). When 
development and learning decrease memory: Evidence 
against category-based induction in children. 
Psychological Science. 
Snodgrass, J. G., & Corwin, J. (1988). Pragmatics of 
measuring recognition memory: Applications to dementia 
and amnesia. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 117, 34-50. 
Welder, A. N., & Graham, S. A. (2001). The influences of 
shape similarity and shared labels on infants' inductive 
inferences about nonobvious object properties. Child 
Development, 72, 1653-1673. 
397
Sensitivity to Confounding in Causal Inference: From Childhood to Adulthood 
 
E. Christina Ford (christis@ucla.edu) 
Department of Psychology,  Box 951563 
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563 USA 
 
Patricia W. Cheng (cheng@psych.ucla.edu) 
Department of Psychology,  Box 951563 
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563 USA 
 
 
Abstract 
A necessary condition for correctly assessing causality is the 
absence of confounding causes. This paper reports a pair of 
experiments that investigate whether people are sensitive to 
confounding when they infer causation.  Two stories were 
constructed, one in which two candidate causes perfectly 
covaried with each other (confounded), and another in which 
the two candidate causes occurred independently of each 
other (unconfounded). In the confounded story, both causes 
covaried perfectly with an outcome; in the unconfounded 
story, only one of the two candidates covaried with the 
outcome.  If people control for alternative causes while they 
evaluate a candidate cause, then subjects in the confounded 
condition should indicate that it is impossible to determine 
causality for either candidate alone, whereas those in the 
unconfounded condition should be able to judge that one of 
the candidates is causal and the other not.  If people are not 
sensitive to confounding, however, subjects in the confounded 
condition should attribute causality to both candidates, and 
their judgments for these candidates should be the same as 
those for the target causal candidate in the unconfounded 
condition. Two experiments were conducted respectively with 
children and adults: Children received one or the other story, 
while adults received both. Both children and adults 
distinguished between confounded and unconfounded 
candidate causes when making attributions of causality.  Our 
results show that children are able to state the indeterminacy 
of confounded candidate causes at an age much earlier than 
previously documented. 
Introduction 
      One view of how children learn is that they approach the 
world as scientists and form theories about the world  using 
information about variation and covariation to establish 
causal connections (e.g. Gelman, 1996; Gopnik, Glymour, 
Sobel, Schulz, Kushnir, & Danks, 2004; Gopnik, Sobel, & 
Schulz, 2001).  Further, they intervene upon the world in 
order to discover these relationships (Schulz, 2003).  
Although children may have misconceptions in their 
explanations, as when a child states that he thinks God made 
the sun out of gold and lit it with fire (Siegler, 1998), the 
presence of such misconceptions does not mean that 
children are unable to use the data present in the 
environment to form correct causal attributions. Given that 
adults have had many more experiences than children, we 
should not expect childrens theories to be the same as 
adults theories, especially for complex phenomena.  What 
is important is whether the same process is utilized when 
determining causality. In particular, this paper seeks to 
examine whether both children and adults are sensitive to 
confounding when there are two candidate causes for a 
novel outcome.  
   In addition to the potential implications for improving 
science instruction, assessing childrens sensitivity to 
confounding is also important for differentiating between 
two types of models of causal learning.  The first type is 
instantiated in the unconditional ∆P model (Jenkins & 
Ward, 1965); the second type consists of models that tease 
apart the influence of a candidate cause from the influences 
of alternative causes (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 
1992; Glymour, 2001; Gopnik et al., 2004; Novick & 
Cheng, 2004; Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 
2000; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001).   
   Under the unconditional ∆P model, people contrast the 
frequency of e, an effect of interest, when c, a potential 
cause, is present, with the frequency of e when c is absent: 
 
∆P = P(e|c)  P(e|~c) 
 
If ∆P is equal or close to 0, then c is considered noncausal; 
if it is noticeably greater than 0, then c is thought to cause e, 
and if it is noticeably less than 0, c is thought to prevent e. 
The unconditional ∆P model implies that people ignore 
confounding and pool over all the information known about 
the candidate cause. Thus, if two candidate causes perfectly 
covary with each other and the effect, then both candidates 
will be judged as causal.  
   Under the alternative approach, a definite causal judgment 
can result from the above contrast only when alternative 
causes are controlled (i.e., they occur independently of the 
candidate cause).  One simple variant of this approach is the 
conditional ∆P model:  the same ∆P formula is applied to a 
focal set of events in which alternative causes occur 
independently of the candidate (Cheng & Novick, 1992).  
For example, if there is a situation in which there are two 
possible causes of an event, one way in which a person 
could determine the causality of the individual candidates 
would be to compare the frequency of e in the situation in 
which only one candidate is present to a situation in which 
no candidate is present, holding the other candidate 
constantly absent. If people utilize conditional ∆P, they 
would be unable to draw a definite causal conclusion when 
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there is confounding because no focal set of events could be 
formed.    
   Although unconditional ∆P has fallen into disfavor in the 
adult causal learning literature,  previous studies of children 
suggest that they do not withhold judgments of causality in 
the presence of confounded variables (e.g., Kuhn, Amsel, & 
OLoughlin, 1988).  In other words, they seem to behave as 
predicted by the unconditional ∆P model. Our study 
focusses on young children.  If the ability to reason causally 
is an unlearned fundamental human process, then it should 
be present at an age much earlier than indicated by prior 
research.  
   One study looking at third, sixth and ninth graders, as well 
as non-college young adults and undergraduate college 
students found that before the ninth grade, students were 
unlikely to state that there was insufficient evidence to 
determine causality when there is confounding (Kuhn, 
Amsel, & OLoughlin, 1988). In fact, not a single subject 
suggested indeterminacy as the correct answer until the 9th 
grade. In one condition, 20 subjects in each age group was 
asked to determine the whether a feature of a ball (namely, 
texture) caused a ball to be bouncier in the presence of a 
perfectly confounded covariate (namely, color). None of the 
3rd or 6th graders, one 9th grader, 2 non-college adults, and 5 
college subjects proposed indeterminacy as the correct 
answer. But, these experiments involved causes for which 
the students were likely to have prior theories, and people 
interpret ambiguous data in ways that are consistent with 
their prior beliefs (Darley & Gross, 1983). Kuhn et al. 
(1988) do not indicate whether students who did not notice 
the indeterminacy were answering in a manner consistent 
with their prior theory. Also, because their studies focus on 
the coordination of theory and evidence, one of criteria used 
for assessing students answers was their ability to justify 
their responses.  But, if causal learning is an unconscious 
process, students might be sensitive to confounding, yet 
unable to justify their responses.  In the present study, the 
task is made simpler, by presenting subjects with a novel 
effect, thereby reducing the relevance of prior causal beliefs, 
and by measuring subjects causal attribution without asking 
for a justification.   
   Data from two pilot experiments are presented.  Both 
experiments test whether people differentiate between 
confounded and unconfounded candidate causes. In one 
experiment, the subjects were undergraduates, while in the 
other the subjects were pre-school age children.  In both 
experiments, participants were presented with two possible 
causes for a novel event, and were asked to determine the 
cause of that event.  In one condition the two possible 
causes were independently occurring, while in the other 
condition the two candidate causes always occurred 
together.  If people are sensitive to confounding they should 
be able to make a causal attribution in the first condition but 
not the second.  
Methods 
These experiments were designed to test whether people are 
sensitive to the independent occurrence of potential causes 
of an effect when making judgments of causality.  The first 
experiment was conducted on adults. Even if adults are able 
to succeed in this task, however, their success might well be 
due to prior training. The second experiment was therefore 
conducted on children.  Similar materials were used for both 
experiments. 
  The second experiment was actually conducted first.  
Because the data with the children was not very clean, in 
order to develop a better protocol the materials were piloted 
with adults.  The small sample sizes in both experiments are 
due to the preliminary nature of the data. Also, the adult 
pilot was ended when the adult answers became consistent.  
Both experiments will be re-run with larger sample sizes 
using the final adult version of the stimuli.   Below we 
describe the methods for both experiments before reporting 
the results.  
Experiment 1 
Participants 10 undergraduates at the University of 
California, Los Angles enrolled in an Introduction to 
Psychology Course participated in the study.  Students 
received class credit for participating in the study and were 
recruited using an on-line bulletin board for this course.  
 
Design This experiment had two conditions and utilized a 
within-subjects design.  In one condition, the two possible 
causes of an unusual event were perfectly correlated 
(confounded).  In the other condition, the same two possible 
causes occurred independently of one another 
(unconfounded).  Subjects were asked about the causality of 
the candidate causes in turn. The ordering of the stories, as 
well as the order in which the subject was asked about each 
candidate cause, was counterbalanced across subjects. 
 
Materials Two passages of approximately the same length 
were constructed (one story was 668 words and the other 
was 681 words).  Both passages tell the story of bunny 
rabbits that went to two different parties.   
   In both stories, the parties occur at the same time and on 
the same day.  On the day of the party, the bunnies are 
randomly assigned to a party via a coin toss.  Half of the 
bunnies ate candy before going to the party.  At one of the 
parties the bunnies ate cake, while at the other party they did 
not. In the confounded condition all the bunnies who ate 
candy also ate cake, whereas in the unconfounded condition 
half of the bunnies who ate candy also ate cake, and vice 
versa. All the bunnies at the cake party grew new pink 
wings; none of the bunnies at the no cake party did.  To 
avoid confusion between the two stories, in one story, the 
bunnies ate green grass candy and yellow cheesecake; in the 
other story the bunnies ate blue berry candy and orangey 
orange cake.   
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   At the end of the story, participants were asked about the 
causality of each of the causal candidates in the story:  
1)   Does Yellow Cheese Cake/ Blue Berry Cake all by 
itself make bunnies grow new pink wings? Yes, 
No, or Impossible to tell? 
2)   Does Green Grass Candy/ Orangey Orange Candy 
all by itself make bunnies grow new pink wings? 
Yes, No, or Impossible to tell? 
   The text of the story was accompanied by illustrations. An 
appropriately colored wedge in the bunnies stomachs 
represented the cake, and a candy shaped object in the 
bunnies stomach represented the candy. 
   Because we were attempting to revise the stimuli in order 
to make the directions clearer for the children, the stimuli 
underwent slight modification across the 10 subjects.  The 
conditions remained the same, but there were slight changes 
in wording and pictorial presentation across groups. The 
most significant wording change was that the story narrative 
was condensed, leaving only a concise explanation of the 
meaning of the symbols that  represented the outcomes as 
well as the candidate causes.  The most significant pictorial 
modifications occurred in the confounded condition. In the 
original stimuli, the bunnies were in two groups (the cake 
group and the no cake group), with the bunnies who ate 
candy evenly distributed throughout each group.  In the final 
stimuli, the bunnies were arranged into four groups of 
bunnies that underwent each treatment (i.e., one group had 
cake and candy, one group had only candy, one group had 
only cake, and one group had neither cake nor candy).  Both 
of these changes served to make the experiment easier for 
the subjects to understand and interpret. 
   The stories were shown as a power point presentation.  
The power point presentation was presented on a 15 
computer screen.    
 
Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions that differed on the ordering of the stories and 
assessment questions.  Participants were then told that they 
were going to hear a story about bunny rabbits in two little 
bunny towns.  They were told that something interesting 
was going to happen to these bunny rabbits, and that it was 
their job to try to figure out what happened.   
   Participants looked at the illustrations on the screen as the 
experimenter read the story aloud. At the end of the story, 
participants were asked about the causality of each of the 
causal candidates in the story. The experimenter wrote down 
their answers on an answer sheet as they progressed through 
the story.   
Experiment 2 
Participants Sixteen pre-school children from the Bellagio 
daycare center at the University of California, Los Angeles 
participated in the study.  Nine male and seven female 
children between the ages of 4;5 and 5;7, with a mean age of 
4;11 participated in the study. One child was excluded from 
the analysis for answering incorrectly factual questions 
about the stories presented.  The rest of the children 
answered all of these questions correctly (as explained 
later).   
 
Design This experiment had the same two conditions as 
Experiment 1 but utilized a between-subjects design.    The 
order in which children were asked about each candidate 
cause was counterbalanced across conditions. 
 
Materials The stories presented to the children had the 
same content as the stories presented to the adults, with 
three differences. First, the childrens protocols did not 
undergo significant changes.  The initial adult protocols 
(with the distributed confounding variable and long 
narrative) are the same as the child protocol.  Second, in 
both conditions, children saw green grass candy and yellow 
cheesecake.  (This was possible because subjects only saw 
one story, which ruled out the possibility of carryover 
between stories.) The childrens assessment procedure also 
differed from that of the adults. 
   Children were first asked for their spontaneous attribution. 
Do you think that it is possible to figure out why the 
bunnies grew new pink wings?  If the child answered yes 
then the following questions were asked:     
1)  Why do you think these bunnies [pointing to those 
who went to the cake party] grew new pink wings? 
2)  Why do you think these bunnies [pointing to those 
who went to the no cake party] did not grow new 
pink wings? The ordering of these two questions 
was counterbalanced across conditions. 
   Because children sometimes did not give a free response, 
did not address both of the causal candidates, or did not 
address the causal candidates in their responses (e.g., 
Bunnies grew wings because they wanted to), additional 
probes were added, asking about each of the candidate 
causes separately.  Children were told about statements that 
other children had made while reading this story. Children 
were asked whether they thought these statements were 
definitely right, definitely wrong, or impossible to tell.  
The statements they were asked to judge were  
1)  GREEN GRASS candy all by itself makes bunnies 
grow pink wings. 
2) YELLOW CHEESE CAKE all by itself makes 
bunnies grow pink wings. 
3) YELLOW CHEESE CAKE and GREEN GRASS 
candy together make bunnies grow pink wings. 
If the child had previously indicated that the yellow 
cheesecake was causal, they were not asked about the 
yellow cheesecake again (and the same for the other 
candidates). 
 
Procedure Children were randomly assigned to the 
conditions.  They were video taped during the session.  In 
order to accustom children to the camera, they were first 
introduced to the camera and allowed to see themselves on 
the LCD screen.  As with the adults, children were told that 
they would hear a story about bunny rabbits, and that it was 
their job to figure out what happened.   
400
   The children looked at the illustrations on the screen as the 
experimenter read the story aloud. At the end of the story, 
the children were asked four factual questions to assess 
whether they understood and remembered the content of the 
story.  The experimenter pointed to a picture of the bunnies 
with the candy in their tummies and asked, What did these 
bunnies eat?, the correct answer being candy (or cake 
and candy in the confounded condition).  The experimenter 
then pointed to the bunnies without candy in their tummies 
and asked, Did these bunnies eat candy?, the correct 
answer being no. The experimenter then pointed to a 
picture of the bunnies at the cake party and asked, What 
did these bunnies eat at the party? (this question was 
omitted in the confounded condition if children answered 
cake and candy to the first question above), the correct 
answer being cake.  The experimenter then pointed to a 
picture of the bunnies at the no-cake party and asked, Did 
these bunnies eat cake? the correct answer being no.  
Children who did not correctly answer all factual questions 
were excluded from the study.        
    
Results 
Experiment 1  
Adult subjects were sensitive to confounding when they 
made causal judgments.   The data are presented in Tables 1 
and 2 below, with the number who answered correctly in 
bold font for each condition. 
 
Table 1: Cake attributions for adults 
 
 Causal Attribution 
Condition Yes No Can't Tell 
Confounded 0 0 10 
Unconfounded 8 1 1 
  
Table 2: Candy attributions for adults 
 
 Causal Attribution 
 Yes No Can't Tell 
Confounded 0 0 10 
Unconfounded 0 6 4 
   
  Using McNemars test for 2-related samples of categorical 
data, we see that the pattern of responses differed across 
conditions for both of the causal candidates.  Subjects were 
more likely to say the cake was causal in the unconfounded 
condition than in the confounded condition, and conversely, 
more likely to say it was impossible to assess causality in 
the confounded condition than in the unconfounded 
condition (p < 0.05, exact statistic, binomial distribution 
used).  Likewise, subjects were more likely to say that the 
candy was not causal in the unconfounded condition than in 
the confounded condition, and more likely to say it was 
impossible to tell in the confounded condition than in the 
unconfounded condition (p < 0.05, exact statistic, binomial 
distribution used).  In fact, as can be seen in Table 1, for 
both cake and candy in the confounded condition, all 
subjects said that it was impossible to tell if either candidate 
was causal.  In contrast, in the unconfounded condition, 
most subjects said that the cake was causal, and none said 
that the candy was causal.  
  The order of presentation of the conditions had no effect: 
Subjects were just as likely to give a correct response 
whether they received the confounded or unconfounded 
condition first (n.s.).  We were unable to test the effect of 
the ordering of the questions on the two candidate causes 
because some information on the ordering was lost. There 
was no effect of candidate in either condition: subjects were 
just as likely to make the correct causal judgment for the 
candy as they were for the cake (n.s.). 
 
Experiment 2  
Children were also sensitive to confounding when they 
made causal judgments, but this data show more variability 
than the adult data.   
  Children were first categorized into one of five causal 
attribution categories: the cake is causal, the candy is causal, 
both causal (jointly or independently), it is impossible to 
tell, and other causal attribution (Table 3).  Because the 
focus of this paper is on children's ability to determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to attribute causality to 
an individual cause in the case of confounding, the answers 
were collapsed into two groups, either assigning causality to 
individual candidates or not assigning causality to 
individual candidates (Table 4).  If children made a 
spontaneous causal attribution, this was taken as the value 
for the measure.  If a child did not give a spontaneous 
response or gave an ambiguous answer, the value for this 
measure was taken from the childs answers to follow-up 
questions about each individual candidate. 
 
Table 3: Childrens causal responses 
 
 Condition 
Child responses Confounded Unconfounded 
Cake 0 4 
Candy 0 0 
Both 3 2 
Cant Tell 4 1 
Other 0 1 
 
Table 4: Childrens attributions to individual candidates 
 
 Condition 
Causal Category Confounded Unconfounded 
Individual 
Attribution 
2 7 
No Individual 
Attribution 
5 1 
 
   In the confounded condition, 3 children said both 
candidates were causal and 4 said it was impossible to tell.  
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Children in this condition gave no other responses.  All of 
these statements were spontaneous attributions, and their 
answers in the follow-up questioning were consistent with 
their spontaneous answers. If children in the Both 
category had meant that the candy and the cake together 
made the pink wings, but that it was not possible to judge 
either candidate by itself, this would have been a correct 
response. Given these children's pattern of responding, for 
two of the children it is not clear whether they meant the 
two were independently or conjunctively causal. To score 
conservatively, against sensitivity to confounding, we 
counted these as attributions to the individual candidates.  
The third child indicated that she thought the conjunctive 
answer was the best answer despite the fact that she 
answered yes to the probes asking about the causality of 
each candidate individually. This child was recoded as no 
individual attribution in Table 4.  
   In the unconfounded condition, 4 children said cake was 
causal,  2 children said they both were causal, one child 
gave an alternate attribution, and another said that it was 
impossible to establish causality.  Five of these statements 
were spontaneous attributions, only one of which was 
consistent with follow-up questioning. Two children who 
were coded as making a causal cake-attribution initially 
began by giving unclear spontaneous responses.  
   Children were more consistent in their responses across 
question formats in the confounded condition than in the 
unconfounded condition ( Fishers exact test, p < 0.05).   
   Even with our small samples, given the scoring as we just 
explained, individual attribution (see Table 3) was more 
likely in the unconfounded condition than in the confounded 
condition (Fishers exact test, p < 0.05).  Moreover, the 
correct response was the modal response in each condition 
(Table 4).  Even so, given our small sample size, in both the 
confounded and unconfounded conditions childrens ability 
to make a correct causal attribution was not significantly 
different from chance (Fishers exact test, n.s.).      
    
Discussion 
     Like Kuhn et al. (1988), it is likely that this study 
underestimates childrens causal reasoning abilities. The 
correctness of the children's causal attributions, when they 
occurred, where not impressive in this experiment.  These 
results may seem at odds with recent literature suggesting 
that children are often able to make correct causal 
attributions at an early age (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2001).  It is 
likely that the poor performance in Experiment 2 is due to 
an overly confusing experimental protocol, particularly the 
visual presentation of the stimuli.  Because the confounding 
cause was distributed equally across both groups, it was 
difficult to visually isolate the correct focal set.  
  Because the stimuli used were different between the child 
and adult studies, it is impossible to tell what, if anything, 
developed from childhood to adulthood.  Our results do not 
speak to whether adults are better at causal reasoning than 
children.   But, it is clear that both adults and children can 
differentiate situations in which it is possible to make a 
causal determination from those in which it is impossible to 
make a causal determination.  
  One puzzling result is that the adults responded 
unanimously to the confounded condition but less clearly to 
the unconfounded condition, and seemed to be more 
confused about the candy. This difference between 
conditions, however, is likely due to confusion in the 
protocol.  After the assessment, when subjects were asked to 
explain their answers, the two subjects in the unconfounded 
condition who did not answer that the cake was causal cited 
reasons of experimental control.  For example, one subject 
answered, The bunnies at one party could have drank 
something that the bunnies at the other party did not.  
When it was made clear that the bunnies were exactly the 
same, except for whether they had eaten cake or candy, both 
subjects gave the correct response.  Similarly, the subjects 
who said cant tell for the candy in the unconfounded 
condition occurred in the earlier portion of the experiment, 
before the materials were finalized. 
   One might think that the unconfounded condition could 
use a simpler, less confusing, design. But, in order to 
compare the unconditional ∆P model with the conditional 
∆P model regarding confounding, the unconfounded 
condition must present information on all four possible 
combinations of the two candidate causes:   both candidate 
causes are present, neither is present, and only one or the 
other of the candidate causes is present.  To form the 
appropriate focal set for each candidate cause, the subject 
could compare the outcome in a single candidate cell to 
the outcome in the no-candidate-cause cell.  Alternatively, 
the subject could compare the outcome in the combined 
candidate cell to outcomes in each of the single candidate 
cause cells.  
   Let us consider two potential two-cell designs.  In the 
simpler design, there is a single candidate cause.  In one cell 
both the candidate cause and the effect are present, in the 
other cell neither the candidate cause nor the effect is 
present.  In this case, if children attribute causality to the 
candidate cause, it could be due purely to association.  
Furthermore, if fewer children attribute causality in the 
confounded condition, it could be argued that that condition 
is simply more difficult because it involves two candidate 
causes rather than one.   
  In a more complex two-cell design, there are two candidate 
causes:  In one cell candidate cause A is paired with the 
effect, in the other cell candidate cause B occurs without the 
effect.  This situation is, in fact, confounded.  There is a 
perfect (inverse) correlation between the occurrence of 
candidates A and B.  The only appropriate focal set would 
compare the occurrence of the effect before and after the 
introduction of the candidate causes, essentially adding a 
no-candidate-cause cell.  Even if temporal information is 
used, this type of design does not rule out the possibility of 
a third unobserved candidate systematically affecting both 
candidates as well as the effect.  There would be a number 
of correct responses depending on the extraneous 
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assumptions made by the subjects regarding the influence of 
the unobserved candidate. 
 
Conclusion 
Both children and adults distinguish between confounded 
and unconfounded candidate causes when making causal  
inferences.  All adults said that it was impossible to tell 
whether the cake or the candy alone caused the wings in the 
confounded condition.  Because the subjects in the adult 
experiment were UCLA undergraduates and not less well-
educated adults, and because the conditions used in this 
experiment were consistent with examples used in scientific 
methodology classes, it is possible that the adults have had 
prior training that allowed them to say that causal attribution 
was not possible when the causes were confounded. The 
same was not true of the children.   
   The child data suggests that children are able to state, at a 
much earlier age than documented by previous studies, that 
it is impossible to infer causality when two candidate causes 
perfectly covary.  Children as young as 5 years old, less than 
half as old as previously believed, made such judgments.  
Moreover, these judgments were consistent across response 
formats. 
      Despite the variability in the data, and despite the fact 
that the children were presented with a version of the task 
that was more difficult than necessary, more children 
indicated that it was impossible make a causal judgment in 
the confounded condition than in the unconfounded 
condition. As predicted by the conditional ∆P model, 
children (and adults) are sensitive to confounding.    
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Abstract
Card sorts can be used to study the way human subjects
organize conceptual knowledge. In this paper we define
three measures of complexity of card sorts produced by
human subjects. These measures are applied to a partic-
ular data set of subjects (students and experts) collected
in a large, multi-institutional study where the concepts
are taken from a first-year programming course. We
show that certain of these measures are statistically sig-
nificant in discriminating between students and experts
and among students based on their performance levels.
Introduction
Card Sort [5] is a technique that seeks to elicit individual
conceptual frameworks by giving a subject a collection
of cards – each pre-printed, for example, with a word
or phrase – and asking the subject to partition (sort)
the cards into subsets based on the subject’s own cri-
teria. The subject is asked to repeat the process anew
with different criteria until the subject can think of no
additional sorts.
As part of a National Science Foundation (NSF) work-
shop (Grant DUE-0122560, awarded to the Institute of
Technology at the University of Washington–Tacoma),
workshop participants conducted a card sort study [4] on
“first-competency” programmers: those who have typi-
cally completed a second-semester programming course
for computer science majors. This study surveyed 243
student subjects and 33 “expert” subjects drawn from
22 institutions represented by the workshop participants.
The “experts” were chosen for their proven programming
maturity and experience. Both the student and expert
subjects were given twenty-six cards used as stimuli.
Each card was printed with a one-word programming-
related term from the following table:
function method procedure
dependency object decomposition
abstraction if-then-else boolean
scope list recursion
choice state encapsulation
parameter variable constant
type loop expression
tree thread iteration
array event
The data set gathered by the workshop participants
includes 1199 card sorts produced by 276 subjects.
A background questionnaire given to each card sort
subject provided information on the subject’s gender,
age, and self-rating of familiarity with programming lan-
guages from a specified list (Java, C, C++, Ada, Scheme,
Pascal, Visual Basic). At each participating institution,
the institution’s workshop participant ranked each of the
institution’s student card sort subjects on a scale from 1
to 5, with 1 representing low-performance and 5 repre-
senting high-performance.
The NSF workshop study addressed several questions,
including the following:
• Do students and experts organize concepts differently?
• Are there differences between low- and high-
performing students? similar to the differences be-
tween students and experts?
• Are there differences between male and female stu-
dents? Between male and female experts?
In this paper, we describe how to compute numerical
values that measure the “complexity” of the collection of
all the sorts produced by a given card sort subject. These
measures are based solely on how the subject partitions
the cards into different categories and not on the names
the subject gives to the categories nor on the criterion
the subject used to sort the cards. We show that, for the
NSF workshop study, certain of these measures can be
used to distinguish (in a statistically significant sense)
experts from novices and high-performing students from
low-performing ones. We show that there are no signifi-
cant differences between males and females.
The Measures
Following [1], we use the “edit distance” metric to de-
fine the distance between two card sorts. Specifically, if
S1 and S2 are two partitions of the set of 26 cards into
subsets, we define the edit distance d(S1, S2) to be the
minimum number of edit operations on S1 (moving a
card from one partition subset to another, possibly cre-
ating an empty subset and moving a card into it) that
will transform it into the same set of subsets of S2.
As shown in [1], the value of d(S1, S2) can be computed
using an algorithm for finding the maximum matching
weight sum in a bipartite graph [3]: each subset in the
partitions S1 and S2 is a node in the graph, and an
edge between a subset in partition S1 and a subset in
partition S2 has weight equal to the number of cards in
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the intersection of the two subsets. If w is the maximum
matching weight sum in this graph, the edit distance
d(S1, S2) is equal to 26− w.
The edit distance function d satisfies the usual prop-
erties of a metric except that two sorts S1 and S2 can
have a zero edit distance without being the “same” sort
from the point of view of the subject (the subject may
have used different criteria to carry out the two sorts
even though the resulting partitions are identical):
d(S1, S2) >= 0 for all S1, S2
d(S, S) = 0 for all S
d(S1, S2) = d(S2, S1) for all S1, S2
d(S1, S2) ≤ d(S1, S3) + d(S3, S2) for all S1, S2, S3
Definition. Suppose a card sort subject has produced
k sorts represented by the sequence X = (S1, S2, ¢ ¢ ¢Sk).
Construct the complete graph where each node is a sort
from the list X and where the edit distance metric d gives
the weight of the edge between any two nodes (sorts) in
the graph. The minimum spanning tree (MST) measure
µ(X) of X is the sum of the weights of a minimum span-
ning tree of this graph.
This MST measure is based on all the sorts for a given
subject. If a subject produces sorts that are largely sim-
ilar, the pairwise edit distances will be relatively small.
If one sort produced by the subject is quite distant from
all the others, for example, this distance will appear only
once in the minimum spanning tree. We regard the MST
measure as evaluating the complexity of the collection of
sorts produced by a subject. If a subject has produced
a number of sorts that represent sort criteria having a
high degree of “pairwise orthogonality”, we would expect
that two sorts produced by this subject would exhibit
relatively small overlaps and thus a large edit distance.
Consequently the MST measure of the sorts produced
by the subject would be large. Observe that if a subject
identifies two different sort criteria but produces sorts
that are identical (the same number of piles and the
same cards in the piles, up to permutation), the edit
distance between these two sorts will be zero, which will
contribute a zero term in the sum of the weights in the
minimum spanning tree.
As an alternative to the MST measure, we considered
the sum of all the pairwise edit distances between the
sorts of a given subject. However, adding all the pair-
wise edit distances can result in a large value even if there
is just one sort that is distant from several of the others.
For example, consider two graphs representing two pos-
sible configurations of edit distances between four sorts,
illustrated in Figure 1.
The sum of the edit distances in both of these graphs is
30. However, the MST measure of the left-hand graph is
10 while the MST measure of the right-hand graph is 14.
(Minimum spanning trees for these graphs are illustrated
with heavy lines for the edges.) We consider the right-
hand graph in Figure 1 as having more “complexity”
than the left-hand graph, and the MST measure captures
this better than summing all the edit distances.
Definition. Another measure of card sort complexity is
the number of sorts produced by a subject. Specifically,
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Figure 1: Example graphs
if the sorts produced by a subject are represented by
the sequence X = (S1, S2, ¢ ¢ ¢Sk), the number of sorts
(NSORT) measure is k, and we define n(X) = k.
Since each new sort produced by a subject adds one
edge to the minimum spanning tree used to compute the
MST measure, the MST measure will normally increase
as the number of sorts increases. We regard the NSORT
measure as significantly less informative than the MST
measure in taking into account card sort complexity for
a given subject.
Note that if a subject produces just one sort, the un-
derlying graph will have just one node and its spanning
tree will have no edges, so the MST measure will be zero.
Definition. As n(X) increases, we have remarked that
µ(X) generally increases as well (see section ). We de-
fine a measure that “factors out” the number of sorts as
a contribution to the complexity of the set of sorts pro-
duced by a subject. The normalized minimum spanning
tree (NMST) measure is
ν(X) = µ(X)/n(X)
.
Example
We illustrate our MST measure with two subjects in the
study, both of whom produced three sorts. We will call
them A and B (not their real names).
The sorts A1, A2, and A3 produced by subject A have
the following partitions:
Sort Partitions
A1 1,3,4,5,6,7,13,14,15,22,23
2,8,9,10,11,12,16,17,18,19,20,21,24,25,26
A2 1,3,4,6,7,10,13,14,15,18,23,26
2,5,8,9,11,12,16,17,19,20,21,22,24,25
A3 1,2,5,8,9,11,12,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,24,25
3,4,6,7,10,13,14,15,23,26
For subject B, the sorts B1, B2, and B3 are
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Sort Partitions
B1 9,17,18,25
1,3,5,8,12,13,20,26
2,6,7,10,11,15,19,22
4,14,16,21,23
24
B2 12,20
18,25
3,13,19
5,10,15
1,17
8,9
2,4,6,7,11,14,16,21,22,23,24,26
B3 1,3,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,14,15,16,18,19,20,21,25,26
2,4,8,13,17,22,23,24
The edit distances between the sorts for each of these
subjects are given in the following tables:
Subject A
x y d(x, y)
A1 A2 5
A1 A3 5
A2 A3 2
Subject B
x y d(x, y)
B1 B2 15
B1 B3 18
B2 B3 18
The above tables give the pairwise edit distances be-
tween sorts for each subject, from which it is easy to
determine the MST measures µ:
X µ(X)
A 7
B 33
Observe that the MST measure of subject B is much
larger than that of subject A. Visually comparing the
sorts produced by these two subjects, this is not surpris-
ing.
Comparison with number of sorts
The two subjects, A and B, were chosen because their
MST measures were the smallest and largest among all
subjects who produced exactly three sorts. Recalling
that n(X) represents the number of sorts produced by
subject X, the following table gives the range of values
of µ(X) for all values of n(X) in the study. This table
also includes the frequencies of subjects with the given
number of sorts.
n(X) freq. min µ(X) max µ(X)
1 2 0 0
2 30 3 19
3 63 7 33
4 67 13 46
5 40 20 58
6 33 23 69
7 17 30 66
8 12 32 77
9 5 45 72
10 3 35 72
11 2 64 98
13 1 50 50
14 1 79 79
This table shows that the MST measures µ(X) gen-
erally increase as the NSORT measures n(X) increase
and that for a given n(X), there can be large variations
among the values of µ(X).
Comparing Students to Experts
We expect that the greater experience and knowledge
base of an expert will show up by experts produc-
ing larger NSORT values and that their sorts exhibit
greater “orthogonality” (i.e., larger pairwise edit dis-
tances) compared to non-experts, resulting in larger
MST measures.
We use the nonparametric Wilcoxon two-sample test
(also called the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) [2] to
compare observations from two populations, with the
null hypothesis being that the observations come from
the same distribution. We use a one-sided test when
a one-sided alternative hypothesis is supported by the
observed data.
We will examine three measures to compare observa-
tions for students and experts: NSORT, MST, NMST.
NSORT measure
We first examine the numbers of sorts n(X) produced
by students and experts, with 243 student observations
and 33 expert observations. The Wilcoxon two-sample
test using numbers of sorts yields a z score of 1.33. Since
the observed data suggests a one-sided alternative (the
observed number of sorts produced experts is generally
larger than the number of sorts produced by students),
we reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
MST measure
We next examine the MST measures µ(X) produced by
students and experts. The Wilcoxon two-sample test us-
ing MST measure observations yields a z score of 2.48,
and we reject the null hypothesis with a one-sided alter-
native at the 1% level.
NMST measure
Since the MST measure more strongly distinguishes stu-
dents from experts compared to the NSORT measure, we
conjecture that the NMST measure ν(X) will factor out
the less powerful number of sorts and produce a stronger
difference between students and experts. Indeed, using
the NMST measure observations yields a z score of 2.61,
and we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.5% level.
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Summary
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney z scores for the three mea-
sures are given in the following table:
Students & Experts
measure z reject at
NSORT 1.33 10%
MST 2.48 1%
NMST 2.61 0.5%
Student Performance Levels
The researchers in this study were asked to give each
student participant a performance ranking from 1 to 5,
where 1 represents an assessment of low performance and
5 an assessment of high performance. Only 217 of the
243 students appear in the study ranking data, so we
restricted our observations to this subset.
We used the nonparametric Mann-Kendall test (also
called the S-Test in [2]) to test for randomness against
a monotone trend. The “trend” is represented by an in-
crease in student performance levels. Consider the MST
measure, for example. If there is no trend (i.e., a random
trend) relating MST measure and performance level,
then an MST measure for a lower-performing student
would be just as likely to be larger than the MST mea-
sure for a higher-performing student as to be smaller. If
there is a monotone, positive-going trend, then an MST
measure for a lower-performing student would be less
likely to be larger than the MST measure for a higher-
performing student than to be smaller.
As with our comparison of students and experts, we
again examined three measures: NSORT, MST, and
NMST.
NSORT measure
Using NSORT measures to test for a monotone trend,
the Mann-Kendall test produced a z score of 3.40, and
we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.03% level.
MST measure
Using the MST measure µ, the Mann-Kendall test pro-
duced a z score of 3.21, and we reject the null hypothesis
at the 0.06% level.
NMST Measure
Using the NMST measure ν, the Mann-Kendall test pro-
duced a z score of 0.37, which does not support rejecting
the null hypothesis.
Summary and Analysis
The Mann-Kendall z scores for the three measures are
given in the following table:
Monotone Trend
measure z reject at
NSORT 3.40 0.03%
MST 3.21 0.06%
NMST 0.37 not significant
These results show that differences among perfor-
mance levels seem to correlate best with the numbers
of sorts produced by the student subjects (as measured
by n(X)) and not by the complexity of their sorts (as
measured by ν(X)). We suggest that better students
are characterized as being more likely to take risks by
producing a larger number of sorts, but that they do not
have the depth of knowledge of an expert that would be
necessary for their sorts to be highly orthogonal to one
another.
Comparing high performing students to
Experts
If high-performing students tend to have a larger number
of sorts but with relatively little complexity, we predict
that high-performing students will be similar to experts
in numbers of sorts but that experts will have sorts that
are measurably more complex. The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney z scores for the three measures are given in
the following table:
High Performers & Experts
measure z reject at
NSORT 0.35 not significant
MST 0.66 not significant
NMST 1.83 5%
As predicted, the number of sorts for high performing
students and experts are similar, but the NMST mea-
sure – which captures best the complexity of the sorts –
statistically distinguishes experts from high performing
students.
Comparing Females and Males
We conjecture that there are no differences between fe-
male (58) and male (184) subjects in our student pop-
ulations. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney z scores for the
three measures are given in the following table:
Females & Males
measure z reject at
NSORT 0.34 not significant
MST 0.06 not significant
NMST 0.87 not significant
While the statistical results are not conclusive, the
actual observations show that females in the study pro-
duced fewer sorts than their male counterparts, but the
sorts they did produce were more complex. This is an
area of interest for further study.
Since the data available to us did not include gender
information on experts, we were unable to compare fe-
males and males among the experts.
Random sorts
We can expect a human to put cards into categories
based on a sort criterion in a way that is very different
from just throwing cards randomly into piles. On aver-
age, we would expect much larger edit distances between
two random sorts than between two sorts produced by
human subjects. In this section, we show that our MST
and NMST measures distinguish human subjects from
“random” subjects in a statistically significant way.
We first built a table giving the frequency distribution
of the number of sorts for our human subjects. The fre-
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quency data has already been given in a table in section
.
For a given sort, we defined the sort footprint as the list
of the sizes of each of the piles in the sort, in increasing
order. (In mathematical terminology, this list is called a
partition.) We then built a frequency distribution of all
the sort footprints for the human subjects. The following
table illustrates the distribution, displaying only part of
the entire footprint data:
footprint freq.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 12 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 13 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 5 1
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 2
1 1 2 2 3 3 3 5 6 1
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 6 2
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
8 8 10 10
8 9 9 7
9 17 26
Using these frequency distributions, we generated 100
“subjects”. For each generated subject, we randomly
generated the number of sorts for the subject using the
frequency distribution in section from our sample pop-
ulation. To generate a random sort for this subject, we
randomly selected a sort footprint using the frequency
distribution given in this section. Once we identified
a randomly generated footprint, we randomly assigned
cards to piles so that the sizes of the piles matched the
selected footprint. In this way, the “subjects” we gen-
erated have a distribution of number of sorts similar to
that of the human population, and each “subject” has
a distribution of sort footprints similar to that of the
human population.
Because the sorts for the generated “subjects” are ran-
domly generated, we hypothesize that they will exhibit
significant “complexity”, in the sense that their pair-
wise edit distances will be large. Consequently, we ex-
pect that the randomly generated “subjects” will pro-
duce MST measures (both un-normalized and normal-
ized) that are significantly larger than the human sub-
jects.
After generating one such set of “subjects”, we com-
pared them to human subjects using the NSORT, MST,
and NMST measures. The following table summarizes
the results:
Human Subjects & Random Subjects
measure z reject at
NSORT 0.62 not significant
MST 11.07 off the charts
NMST 14.79 off the charts
Observe that the random population of subjects was
generated in such a way that their distribution of number
of sorts should be similar to the distribution of number of
sorts from the human population. Consequently, we ex-
pect that the NSORT measures of these two populations
should not be significantly different. Our statistics show
that this is the case. However, the MST and NMST mea-
sures of human subjects are clearly different from those
of the random subjects.
Conclusions
We conclude that our MST measure µ appropriately
quantifies the combination of number of sorts and the
complexity of these sorts for a subject. Subjects with
larger MST values exhibit greater numbers of sorts with
greater complexity. Since the MST measure, to some
extent, includes a measure of the number of sorts of a
subject, the NMST measure ν factors out the number of
sorts, giving a value that distills the complexity of the
sorts.
Comparing experts to students in the NSF work-
shop population, all the measures (NSORT, MST, and
NMST) are significantly larger for experts compared to
students. The NSORT measure is the least significant
measure, and the NMST measure is the most significant.
Comparing students based on performance level, both
the NSORT and MST measures have significant positive-
going trends compared to performance level, but the
NMST measure is not significant. This suggests that
higher-performing students produce more sorts, but that
because of their lack of experience (in this study, the
student subjects were at the CS2 level), their sorts did
not exhibit greater complexity. High-performing stu-
dents and experts had similar NSORT measures, but the
experts had significantly larger NMST measures, which
gives further evidence to our observations about higher-
performing students in the student population.
Comparing females to males in the student population,
the three measures (NSORT, MST, and NMST) showed
no significant differences. Examining the data, however,
shows that the NSORT values appear to be smaller for
females than males, but that the NMST values appear
to be larger. This is an area that warrants further study.
We have shown that the MST and NMST measures
of card sort complexity are statistically significant in
discriminating between experts and non-experts. These
measures may have broader applicability to other exper-
iments requiring complexity measures.
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Abstract
Hoekstra & Hyams (1998) claim that the overwhelming
majority of Dutch children’s Root Infinitives (RIs) are used to
refer to modal (not realised) events, whereas in English
speaking children, the temporal reference of RIs is free.
Hoekstra & Hyams attribute this difference to qualitative
differences in how temporal reference is carried by the Dutch
infinitive and the English bare form. Ingram & Thompson
(1996) advocate an input-driven account of this difference and
suggest that the modal reading of German (and Dutch) RIs is
caused by the fact that infinitive forms are predominantly
used in modal contexts. This paper investigates whether an
input-driven account can explain the differential reading of
RIs in Dutch and English. To this end, corpora of English and
Dutch Child Directed Speech were fed through MOSAIC, a
computational model that has already been used to simulate
the basic Optional Infinitive phenomenon. Infinitive forms in
the input were tagged for modal or non-modal reference based
on the sentential context in which they appeared. The output
of the model was compared to the results of corpus studies
and recent experimental data which call into question the
strict distinction between Dutch and English advocated by
Hoekstra & Hyams.
Root Infinitives in Child Language
A striking feature of the speech of children who are
acquiring their native language, is that, in many languages,
children go through a stage where they produce Root
Infinitives (non-finite verb forms in contexts that require a
finite verb form). Thus, English-speaking children may
produce utterances such as (1), and Dutch children may
produce utterances such as (2).
(1) Daddy drink coffee
(2) Papa koffie drinken (Daddy coffee drink-inf)
This phenomenon has been subject to considerable linguistic
theorizing, as the fact that it occurs in several languages
(including English, Dutch, Swedish, German and French)
suggests the operation of invariant principles. A particularly
influential Nativist theory has been provided by Wexler
(1994). According to Wexler’s Optional Infinitive (OI)
Hypothesis, by the time children begin to produce multi-
word speech, they have already correctly set all the basic
inflectional and clause structure parameters of their
language. They thus have adult-like knowledge of the word
order and inflectional properties of the language they are
learning. However, there is a stage of development (the
Optional Infinitive stage), during which the abstract features
of Tense (TNS) and Agreement (AGR) can be absent from
the underlying representation of the sentence. This results in
children initially using both finite and non-finite verb forms
in contexts in which a finite form would be obligatory in the
adult language. The great strength of the Optional Infinitive
Hypothesis is that it explains the data from a wide variety of
languages, as well as the relative sparseness of other errors.
However, the theory also has some important weaknesses.
Firstly, the theory assumes a large amount of innate
knowledge and ignores the possibility that the Optional
Infinitive phenomenon may be understood as the result of an
input-driven learning process without the need to assume
large amounts of innate knowledge. Simulations with the
MOSAIC model have already shown that a simple learning
mechanism which is sensitive to the distributional
characteristics of the input can give a close quantitative fit
to the prevalence of the Root Infinitives in English and
Dutch over a range of MLUs (Freudenthal, Pine & Gobet
(2002a, 2003, in preparation).
Secondly, while the Optional Infinitive phenomenon
occurs in several languages, cross-linguistic differences
exist in the finer detail of the phenomenon that are
problematic for Wexler’s theory. One obvious way of
explaining these differences is in terms of differences in the
distributional characteristics of the language being learned.
In this paper we assess the viability of such an explanation
by simulating cross-linguistic differences in the fine detail
of the OI-phenomenon in Dutch and English using
MOSAIC. The central aim of this paper is therefore to
investigate whether the same mechanism that captures one
of the key similarities in the speech of children learning
different languages can also capture differences in the way
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that this phenomenon patterns as a function of differences in
the languages being learned, and hence can provide a
unified account of patterns of cross-linguistic similarity and
difference in children’s early multi-word speech.
The Modal Reference of Root Infinitives
The majority of Root Infinitives that Dutch children produce
carry a modal meaning: they tend to express desires and
wishes, or relate to unrealized events. Hoekstra & Hyams
(1998) have dubbed this the Modal Reference Effect. The
type of verbs that occur as Root Infinitives also differs from
inflected verbs. Dutch speaking children appear to use Root
Infinitives when referring to actions rather than static
situations. This has been called the Eventivity Constraint.
Wijnen (1996), analysed the speech of four Dutch children,
and found that 95% of the children’s Root Infinitives
contained eventive verbs, and 85% of the Root Infinitives
had a modal reference, thus confirming the Modal
Reference Effect and Eventivity Constraint. According to
Hoekstra & Hyams, the Modal Reference Effect and
Eventivity Constraint do not hold for English. They present
data based on an (unpublished) paper by Ud Deen (1997),
who found that only 13% of English Root Infinitives carry a
modal meaning. Ud Deen also found that, while the majority
of English Root Infinitives are eventive in nature, this effect
is less pronounced than it is in Dutch, with 75% of English
RIs containing eventive verbs. Hoekstra & Hyams explain
this cross-linguistic difference by referring to differences
between the English and Dutch infinitive form. The English
infinitive, they claim, is not a true infinitive, but a ‘bare
form’. Dutch has a true infinitive as it has an infinitival
morpheme. This infinitival morpheme is thought to carry an
irrealis feature which is responsible for the modal reference.
This, they argue, is evident from the analysis of the
following utterances:
3. I see John cross the street*
4. I saw John cross the street
5. I see John crossing the street
Utterance (3) is ungrammatical in English, because the
English bare form denotes ‘not only the processual part of
the event, but includes the completion of that event’
(Hoekstra & Hyams 1998, p. 105). A correct description of
an ongoing event in English would therefore require the use
of the past tense as in (4), or the progressive as in (5).
Sentence 6 makes it clear that this constraint does not
operate in Dutch: an ongoing event may be described using
a present tense construction. Apparently, the Dutch
infinitive does not signal completion of the event.
6. Ik zie/zag Jan de straat oversteken
    I see/saw John the street cross-INF
    I see/saw John cross the street.
This difference between the English and Dutch infinitival
form also explains the difference with respect to the
eventivity of Root Infinitives, as, according to Hoekstra &
Hyams it is the modal reading of Dutch Root Infinitives that
forces the selection of an eventive verb. Since English Root
Infinitives are not exclusively modal, they can occur with
stative as well as eventive verbs.
Problems with Hoekstra & Hyams’ Account
While the Hoekstra & Hyams’ account explains the
differential reading of Dutch and English Root Infinitives, it
predicts that the proportion of modal readings of RIs in
Dutch and English is radically different. Theoretically, all
RIs in languages with an infinitival morpheme should be
modal, while the reference of English RIs is free. The
proportion of modal RIs in Dutch and German appears to be
considerably lower than 1.00 however. Wijnen (1996)
reports a proportion of .85 averaged over 4 children, and
Ingram & Thompson (1996) report a proportion of .55 using
a strict criterion and .79 using a lenient criterion.
Ingram & Thompson also suggest that the modal reading
of RIs in German (and Dutch), is caused by the fact that
infinitive forms in adult German and Dutch are typically
used in conjunction with a modal, as in (7) and (8). Since
Dutch-speaking children predominantly hear infinitive
forms in modal contexts in the input, they come to associate
these forms with the modal reading and use them
predominantly to express desires.
7. Ik ga morgen werken (I go-FIN Tomorrow work-INF)
8. Wil je spelen? (Want-FIN you play-INF)
The proportion of modal Root Infinitives in English may
also be considerably higher than the .13 that was found in a
corpus study by Ud Deen. An inherent weakness of corpus
studies is that the modal/nonmodal reading of an utterance is
assigned on the basis of the context in which it is produced.
However, since the corpora are transcripts of spontaneous
speech, the information required to discriminate between
modal and non-modal readings is often lacking. For this
reason, Blom, Krikhaar & Wijnen (2001) conducted an
experiment in which children produced descriptions of
modal and non-modal events. In the experiment, the
majority of Dutch children’s Root Infinitives (68%) were
used to describe modal events. For the English children this
was 44%. While this difference was significant and in the
expected direction, this finding is problematic for Hoekstra
& Hyams, as it suggests that the difference between Dutch
and English is not a qualitative difference, but a graded,
quantitative one which may well be related to the
distributional characteristics of the language rather than
differences in infinitival morphology.
In this paper, MOSAIC will be used to investigate the
source of the differential reading of Dutch and English Root
Infinitives. MOSAIC has a number of characteristics that
make it a suitable candidate for such an investigation.
Firstly, the model has already been shown to successfully
simulate the developmental change in the prevalence of
Root Infinitives in Dutch and English (Freudenthal, Pine &
Gobet 2002a, 2003, in preparation), as well as phenomena
related to Subject Omission in English (Freudenthal, Pine &
Gobet 2002b). The model’s success in simulating the finer
detail of the OI phenomenon therefore provides a strong test
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of an input-driven account of the OI phenomenon.
Secondly, the model learns off Child Directed Speech. The
use of Child Directed Speech ensures a realistic frequency
distribution, so that differences in the surface characteristics
of a language are reflected in the input in a quantitatively
realistic way. This is of particular importance as the practice
of using artificially created input sets (which is common in
simulations of phenomena in child speech) may lead the
researcher to misrepresent the distributional characteristics
responsible for the phenomenon under investigation.
Thirdly, MOSAIC uses no built-in linguistic knowledge.
Whatever representations it builds up during learning are a
result of the interaction between its learning mechanism and
the distribution of the input it sees. This last characteristic is
important because Hoekstra & Hyams’ explanation of the
differential reading of RIs is dependent on the assumption
that the child knows that the infinitival morpheme implies a
modal interpretation (rather than learning the association
through exposure to the input). MOSAIC will be described
below, followed by the details of the simulation.
Simulating Language Acquisition in MOSAIC
Whilst the version used for the simulations discussed here
has changed from the earlier simulations, the main
theoretical underpinning of the model remains the same.
The basic tenet of the model is that the learning of language
is a performance-limited process which is heavily weighted
towards the most recent elements in the speech stream (i.e.,
which has an utterance final bias). Several authors have
argued that children are better at learning material that
occurs towards the end of the utterance (Naigles & Hoff-
Ginsberg, 1998; Shady & Gerken, 1999; Wijnen et al.
2001).
MOSAIC learns from orthographically coded input, with
whole words being the unit of analysis. The model is a
simple discrimination net (an n-ary tree) which is headed by
a root node. At the start of learning the discrimination net
consists of just the root node. More nodes (encoding words
or phrases) are added as the model is shown more
utterances. An important requirement for nodes to be added
is that whatever follows the word to be encoded in the input,
must already have been encoded in the model. That is, the
model will only learn a new word, when it has already
encoded the rest of the utterance. This results in the model
building up its representation of the utterances it is shown
by starting at the end of the utterance, and slowly working
its way to the beginning.
If the model were to see the utterance I go home three
times, it would on its first pass encode the fact it has seen
the word home at the end of an utterance. On the second
pass, it would encode the sequence go home. After a third
pass, it would have encoded the whole utterance. Figure one
gives a graphical representation of the model at this stage.
The fact that MOSAIC builds its representation of an
utterance by starting at the end of the utterance is the major
mechanism responsible for its simulation of the
development of Root Infinitives in Dutch. Early in Dutch
children’s development, 80-90% percent of their utterances
containing verbs are Root Infinitives. This drops to 10-20%
later in development (Wijnen et al, 2001). Early in training,
the model encodes many utterance final phrases. Since the
infinitive takes sentence-final position (as can be seen in
examples 7 and 8), the model produces many utterances
with only non-finite verb forms. As the model encodes
longer and longer phrases, these Root Infinitives are slowly
replaced by auxiliary/modal plus infinitive constructions.
Figure 1: MOSAIC after it has seen the utterance
I go home three times.
In the example illustrated in Figure 1, a (sentence final)
word is encoded after one exposure. In fact, MOSAIC
actually learns much more slowly than this, and the input
corpus is fed through the model several times, so output of
increasing average length can be generated after consecutive
exposures to the input corpus. The probability of creating a
node in MOSAIC is given by the following formula:
€ 
NCP = 1
1+ em−u / c
 
 
 
 
 
 
d
where: NCP = Node Creation Probability
m = a constant, set to 20 for these simulations.
c = corpus size.
u = total number of utterances seen.
  d = distance to the end of the utterance.
The formula results in a basic sigmoid curve. The formula
contains the size of the corpus and total number of
utterances seen. The size of the corpus is included because
the size of the available input corpora differs considerably
(13,000 to 30,000 utterances for the corpora used in these
simulations). The use of the term (m – u/c) ensures that after
n presentations of the complete input corpus the Node
Creation Probability is identical for corpora of different
sizes. The ‘distance to the end of the utterance’ in the
exponent causes material that occurs near the beginning of
the utterance to have a lower likelihood of being encoded
than material that occurs near the end. This effect decreases
as the model sees more input.
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Production of Novel Utterances
Utterance production in MOSAIC involves outputting all
the utterances the model has encoded. However, the output
that MOSAIC produces consists of more than the input it
has seen. MOSAIC has a mechanism for linking words or
phrases that have occurred in similar contexts. When the
overlap between two words is sufficiently high (more than
10% of both the words that preceded and followed the target
words are the same), the two words get linked. Two words
that are linked can be substituted for each other when the
model produces output. This mechanism allows MOSAIC to
produce utterances that were not present in the input.
Redington, Chater & Finch (1998), and Mintz (2003), have
shown that similar mechanisms based on co-occurrence
statistics can be quite effective in grouping words that are of
the same syntactic category.
The model also includes a chunking mechanism, which
results in frequent multi-word phrases being treated as one
unit. Since the chunking mechanism does not play an
important role in these simulations, it is not discussed any
further in this paper.
The Simulations
In order to distinguish modal from non-modal Root
Infinitives in the output of the model, infinitive verb forms
in the input were tagged to reflect the context in which they
occurred. In order to do this, all utterances in the input were
(automatically) searched for words denoting a modal or not-
realised context. These words constituted the standard
modals, as well as some other words denoting a not-realised
context, including want and go. The utterances containing a
word denoting a modal context were then searched for
words that matched an infinitive form. If such a word was
found, it was tagged for having occurred in a modal context
(by adding –MOD to the verb).
For both languages, two input corpora (available through
the CHILDES data base (MacWhinney 2000)) were
selected. For Dutch, these were the corpora of Matthijs
(Simulation1) and Peter (Simulation2). For English the
corpora of Anne (Simulation1) and Becky (Simulation2)
were selected. The size of the corpora was approximately
13,000 utterances for Dutch, and 30,000 utterances for the
English input. Since the input corpora consist of Child
Directed Speech, the distributional characteristics are
representative of the language that children hear. Each input
corpus was fed through the model iteratively until the output
reached a Mean Length of Utterance (MLU) of
approximately 2.5. At this stage, all the utterances the model
could produce were generated. The full output consisted of
approximately 7,500 utterances for the Dutch corpora, and
15,000 for the English corpora. Next, all utterances in which
all verbs matched the infinitive form were selected. The
proportion of these utterances that had the infinitive form
tagged for a modal context (i.e. had been learnt off a modal
context) was then calculated. Table 1 gives the results for
the English and Dutch simulations. For both Dutch
simulations the proportion of modal infinitives is larger than
it is for English. For all four possible comparisons of Dutch
against English simulations, the difference was statistically
significant (χ2(1) > 12.00 p < .001).
Table 1: Proportion of modal infinitives and total number of
infinitives for Dutch and English simulations.
Dutch English
Simulation1 .70 (1447) .47 (1577)
Simulation2 .54 (1474) .48 (2581)
While these values are very close to those reported by
Blom et al., this analysis ignores the complication that
(especially in English) it is difficult to unambiguously
identify the infinitive. In the English present tense, only the
third singular differs from the infinitive. A true Root
Infinitive can therefore only be identified in a third singular
context (since many of the forms resembling the infinitive
may actually be correctly inflected finites).
A second analysis was therefore performed on the subset
of utterances that had a third singular subject (e.g. He go/Hij
gaan). While the Dutch data could be restricted to all
singulars rather than just third singular, it was considered
preferable to use the same restriction for both languages.
The results of these analyses are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Proportion of modal infinitives and total number of
infinitives for Dutch and English simulations,
third singular context only.
Dutch English
Simulation1 .66 (104) .43 (89)
Simulation2 .58 (102) .42 (118)
Again, the proportion of modal RIs is larger in the Dutch
simulations than it is in the English simulations (For all four
possible comparisons, χ2(1) > 4.30, p  < .05). Thus,
MOSAIC clearly captures the difference between the two
languages, suggesting that the differential reading of Root
Infinitives in English and Dutch is related to the surface
characteristics of the languages.
Having established that MOSAIC simulates the
differential reading of RIs, we can now assess whether
MOSAIC simulates the difference in verb types that occur
in Root Infinitives. Hoekstra & Hyams cite a paper by
Wijnen (1996) who found that 95% of Dutch Root
Infinitives contained eventive verbs. In English, Ud Deen
(1997), found that only 75% of Root Infinitives contained
eventive verbs. While a direct comparison between these
numbers is difficult as Wijnen and Ud Deen used a different
set of verbs, stative verbs do appear to be used more often in
English than in Dutch Root Infinitives. In order to perform a
more controlled analysis, all Root Infinitives in Table 2
were coded for whether the main verb denoted an event or
not. As can be seen in Table 3, MOSAIC does simulate the
effect, though only three out of four differences are
413
statistically significant (χ2(1) > 6.20, p < .02). The value of
.92 for Dutch (simulation2) was not significantly different
from .87 (English, simulation2). Inspection of the non-
eventive verbs in simulation2 for Dutch revealed that 5 out
of the 8 instances consisted of the verb zien (see), which
was linked to the verb ki jken  (look), and was thus
substituted in production. It thus appears that the
generativity mechanism may have inflated the proportion of
non-eventive Root Infinitives for this simulation.
Table 3: Proportion of Root Infinitives (third singular
context only) that have an eventive main verb.
Dutch English
Simulation1 .98 .80
Simulation2 .92 .87
What causes the Modal Reference Effect?
The fact that MOSAIC simulates the difference between
Dutch and English for both the modal reading of Root
Infinitives and the eventivity of the main verb, suggests that
these effects are related to differences in the surface
characteristics of the two languages. In order to understand
what these relevant surface characteristics might be, it is
useful to examine more closely in what contexts third
singular subjects are followed by a form resembling the
infinitive. In both Dutch and English, the majority of the
contexts are likely to be questions.  English and Dutch differ
however, in the way questions are formed. Whereas Dutch
uses inversion to transform a declarative into a question, in
English, the auxiliary do is inserted, resulting in phrases
such as Does he go. While the auxiliary do patterns like a
modal, it does not carry a modal or not-realised meaning. In
English, a third singular subject followed by an infinitive
form can therefore occur in both a non-modal (Does he go),
and a modal context (Can he go). In Dutch, a third singular
followed by an infinitive form can occur in double verb
constructions such as Kan hij fietsen (Can he cycle-inf), or
Ik zie Jan lopen (I see John walk-inf). The first of these is
modal, but the second is not. Root Infinitives in the input
are a further source of third singular plus infinitive contexts.
In some situations (for example elliptical answers to
questions) Root Infinitives are allowed in Dutch. In the two
languages, the third singular is thus followed by the
infinitive in different contexts. If a child learns Root
Infinitives off the input, it is likely to produce them in the
context in which they are most frequently encountered. One
way of directly testing such an input-driven account of Root
Infinitives is to search the input for occasions where a third
singular is followed by an infinitive form, and noting
whether the context is modal or not. Table 4 presents the
results of such an analysis (using the most frequent third
singular subjects that were present in the Root Infinitives of
the model’s output). Table 4 shows that in Dutch third
singular plus infinitive constructions occur in a modal
context more often than they do in English (again all four
differences are statistically significant χ2(1) > 6.2, p < .02).
Table 4: Proportion of modal contexts for third singulars
followed by infinitive in English and Dutch input corpora.
Dutch English
Input1 .77 (113) .37 (212)
Input2 .56 (140) .41 (153)
Also of interest now is the question of what the non-
modal contexts are in which these constructions occur. In
English a large majority (90%) of these non-modal contexts
do turn out to be ‘do-questions’. Thus, while third-singular
plus infinitive constructions can occur in modal as well as
non-modal contexts, the dummy modal do alone makes up
close to 40% of these contexts. In the Dutch input, non-
modal contexts are limited in number, and largely confined
to Root Infinitives (though a few double verb constructions
do occur). The majority of non-modal Root Infinitives
therefore appear to be learned off double-verb constructions
in English and off Root Infinitives in Dutch.
Turning to the eventive-stative distinction it now also
becomes apparent why Root Infinitives are more likely to
contain statives in English. In English, stative verbs such as
want or need frequently occur in utterances like Does he
want it. In Dutch such an utterance does not carry the
inflection on the dummy modal, but on the inverted main
verb (Wil hij dat; Wants he that). As a result, statives in
Dutch only occur as infinitives in very infrequent double
verb constructions such as Dat zou hij willen (That would he
want) The higher proportion of statives in English Root
Infinitives can therefore also be explained in terms of the
use of the dummy modal do in the input.
Conclusions
While Wexler’s Optional Infinitive Hypothesis can explain
the cross-linguistic occurrence of Root Infinitives,
additional assumptions are required the explain the cross-
linguistic differences in the fine detail of the phenomenon.
Hoekstra & Hyams (1998), explain some of this fine detail
(the differential temporal reference of Dutch and English
children’s Root Infinitives) by referring to qualitative
differences between the languages. Specifically, they argue
that the English infinitive is a bare form rather than a true
infinitive. They argue that the English bare form does not
carry the irrealis feature, which signals the modal reading of
the infinitive. They therefore postulate qualitative
differences in the fine detail of infinitival morphology
between the two languages. Since children are thought to
know the full grammar, English-speaking children will use
Root Infinitives both in modal and non-modal contexts, and
Dutch children should use Root Infinitives overwhelmingly
in modal contexts. Experimental work by Blom et al. has
shown however, that the difference is not as large as
predicted by Hoekstra & Hyams, suggesting that it is a
graded quantitative, rather than a qualitative difference.
In this paper MOSAIC was used to investigate whether
the difference between Dutch and English could be related
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to the surface characteristics of the two languages. The fact
that MOSAIC has already been used to simulate the
developmental patterning in the prevalence of Root
Infinitives (relative to simple and compound finites) in
English and Dutch lends credence to the basic mechanism
for producing Root Infinitives that MOSAIC employs.
While MOSAIC is clearly insufficient as a full model of the
language acquisition process, it is a valuable tool for
exploring how an utterance final learning bias can interact
with the distributional properties of the input to produce the
phenomena apparent in children.
MOSAIC clearly simulates the difference between
English and Dutch in terms of the modal reading as well as
the eventive/stative nature of the verbs in Root Infinitives.
The fact that both phenomena can be explained by the use of
the dummy modal ‘do’ (which patterns like a modal without
ascribing modal meaning) shows that subtle differences in
the distributional characteristics of languages can have quite
profound effects on the patterning of child data. As these
effects can be quite difficult to predict a priori,
computational modelling can be an invaluable tool for
investigating the complex relations between input
characteristics and child speech.
The analyses reported here also underscore the
importance of using realistic input when simulating child
speech, as some effects are only likely to be simulated when
realistic input is used. While dummy do is only one of many
modals in English, it accounts for 40% of the third singular
+ infinitive contexts. However, do is also responsible for the
occurrence of eventive RIs. Since these occur at a maximum
rate of 20% in these simulations, an underestimation of the
incidence of do in artificial input would likely result in
failure of the model to simulate the effect. This is even more
apparent when one realises that third singular plus infinitive
contexts are largely restricted to questions; it seems unlikely
that without prior knowledge of the importance of questions
a researcher constructing artificial input would include ‘do-
questions’ at a sufficient rate to simulate these effects.
The fact that the interaction between the learning
mechanism and the distributional characteristics of the input
can produce the different levels of modal Root Infinitives in
the two languages strongly suggests that the observed
phenomenon is related to surface characteristics (the
contexts in which infinitives occur), rather than to
differences in the infinitival morphology between the
languages. Since MOSAIC does not have any knowledge of
infinitival morphology (in fact does not employ any built in
linguistic knowledge), these results clearly show that the
Modal Reference Effect can be explained without assuming
that children know the full grammar of their language, or the
fine detail of infinitival morphology.
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Abstract 
The existing procedural learning mechanism in ACT-R 
(Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) has been successful in explaining 
a wide range of adaptive choice behavior. However, the 
existing mechanism is inherently limited to learning from 
binary feedback (i.e. whether a reward is received or not). It is 
thus difficult to capture choice behavior that is sensitive to 
both the probabilities of receiving a reward and the reward 
magnitudes. By modifying the temporal difference learning 
algorithm (Sutton & Barto, 1998), a new procedural learning 
mechanism is implemented that generalizes and extends the 
computational abilities of the current mechanism. Models 
using the new mechanism were fit to three sets of human data 
collected from experiments of probability learning and 
decision making tasks. The new procedural learning 
mechanism fit the data at least as well as the existing 
mechanism, and is able to fit data that are problematic for the 
existing mechanism. This paper also shows how the principle 
of reinforcement learning can be implemented in a production 
system like ACT-R. 
Introduction 
Human choice behavior is often studied under various 
probability learning situations. In a typical probability 
learning situation, participants are asked to select one of the 
many options available, and feedback on whether the choice 
is correct or not is given after the selection. There are 
usually two main manipulations in a probability learning 
task: (1) the probabilities for each of the options being 
correct, and (2) the magnitudes of reward (usually 
monetary) received when the correct option is selected. One 
robust result is that people tend to choose the options a 
proportion of time equal to their probabilities of being 
correct – a phenomenon often called “probability matching” 
(e.g. Friedman et al., 1964). However, when the reward 
magnitudes are varied, the observed choice probabilities are 
sometimes larger or smaller than the outcome probabilities 
(e.g. Myers, Fort, Katz, & Suydam, 1963). These studies 
show consistently that people are sensitive to both outcome 
probabilities and reward magnitudes in making choices. 
One limitation of the current ACT-R procedural learning 
mechanism (Lovett, 1998) is that it requires a pre-
specification of correct and incorrect responses. Besides, 
feedback received is limited to a binary function (i.e. 
whether a reward is received or not). Apparently, a simple 
binary function may not be sufficient to represent the 
feedback from the environment. For example, imagine a 
situation in which there are several possible treatments for a 
particular disease and a physician has to choose a treatment 
that has the highest expected effectiveness. One may have to 
evaluate the effectiveness of each treatment through case-
by-case feedback. For example, consider the case where the 
probabilities of effectiveness of three treatments 1, 2, and 3 
are as shown in Figure 1. Since the effectiveness of each 
treatment follows a continuous distribution, a simple binary 
feedback function is obviously insufficient to represent the 
information received from the feedback. 
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Figure 1. Probability of effectiveness of three treatments. 
Another motivation for extending the current mechanism 
comes from recent findings of the functional role of 
dopaminergic signals in basal ganglia during procedural 
learning.  Research shows that learning is driven by the 
deviation between the expected and actual reward (Schultz 
et al., 1995; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). In other 
words, the reward magnitude is often processed as a scalar 
quantity – depending on whether the magnitude of the 
actual reward is higher or lower than expected, a positive or 
negative reinforcement signal is generated respectively. The 
pre-specification of correct and incorrect responses is 
therefore inconsistent with the current understanding of the 
procedural learning mechanism in basal ganglia. 
The ACT-R 5.0 architecture 
Figure 2 shows the basic architecture of the ACT-R 5.0 
system. The core of the system is a set of production rules 
that represents procedural memory. Production rules 
coordinate actions in each of the separate modules. The 
modules communicate to each other through its buffer, 
which holds information necessary for the interaction 
between the system and the external world. Anderson, Qin, 
Sohn, Stenger, and Carter (2003) showed that the activity in 
these buffers match well to the activities in certain cortical 
areas (see Figure 2). The basal ganglia are hypothesized to 
implement production rules in ACT-R, which match and act 
on patterns of activity in the buffers. This is consistent with 
a typical ACT-R cycle in which production rules are 
matched to the pattern of activity in the buffers, a 
production is selected and fired, and the contents in the 
buffers updated. In ACT-R, when there is more than one 
production matching the pattern of buffer activity, the 
system selects a production based on a conflict resolution 
mechanism. The basis of the conflict resolution mechanism 
is the computation of expected utility, which captures the 
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effectiveness and efficiency of the production in 
accomplishing the goals of the system.  
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Figure 2. The ACT-R 5.0 architecture. 
To adapt to the environment, the system must learn from 
the consequences of its actions so that when the same 
conditions are met in the future, a better choice of 
productions can be made. Procedural learning updates the 
expected utility of a production from the consequences of 
firing the production, and the dopamine systems in basal 
ganglia are believed to be involved in the learning process. 
Specifically, procedural learning appears to be coded by 
dopaminergic signals from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) 
and substatntia nigra to the striatum in basal ganglia 
(Schultz, et al., 1995; Schultz, et al., 1997), and different 
patterns are either reinforced or penalized according to the 
dopaminergic signals. Previous studies (Ljungberg, 
Apicella, & Schultz, 1992; Mirenowicz, Schultz, 1994) 
show that the activation of dopamine neurons depends 
entirely on the difference between the predicted and actual 
rewards. Once an unpredicted reward is perceived, response 
in dopamine neurons is transferred to the earlier reward-
predicting stimulus. Inversely, when a predicted reward fails 
to occur, dopamine neurons are depressed in their activity at 
exactly the time when the reward would have occurred 
(Schultz, Apicella, Ljungberg, 1993). It therefore appears 
that dopamine signals do not simply report the occurrence of 
rewards. Rather, outputs from dopamine neurons appear to 
code for a deviation or error between the actual reward 
received and predictions or expectations of the reward. In 
other words, dopamine neurons seem to be feature detectors 
of the “goodness” of environmental events relative to the 
learned expectations about those events. 
The current procedural learning mechanism 
During each cycle of ACT-R, productions that match the 
contents of the buffer will be put into a conflict set. The 
productions in the conflict set are ordered in terms of their 
expected utility and ACT-R considers them according to 
that ordering. The expected utility of a production is defined 
as E = PG-C, where P is the estimated probability that the 
goal will be achieved if that production is chosen, G is the 
value of the goal, and C is the estimated cost of achieving 
the goal if that production is chosen (see Table 1). 
Procedural learning updates the value of P and C according 
to the following equations: 
failuressuccesses
effortsC
failuressuccesses
successesP
+
=
+
=                 , where 
successes and failures are the number of times the 
production has succeeded or failed to accomplish the current 
goal respectively (i.e. a reward or penalty), and efforts is the 
total amount of time taken over all past uses of the 
production rule, successful or failed. These quantities start 
out with initial values that are updated with experience.  For 
example, if for production n the initial successes equals 1, 
failures equals 1, and efforts equals 0.5, when a pre-
specified success is encountered 0.1 second after k has fired, 
P will change from 0.5 to 0.67 (=2/(2+1)), C will change 
from 0.25 to 0.2 (=(0.5+0.1)/(2+1)). If G equals 20, then the 
expected utility (E=PG-C) will increase from 9.75 
(=0.5*20-0.25) to 13.13 (=0.67*20-0.2). The successful 
experience has thus acted as a reward and reinforced 
production n by increasing its expected utility, and as a 
consequence, n will be more likely to be selected in the 
future..  
Table 1. A list of free parameters and their definitions. 
Parameters Definition (Old mechanism) 
G Value of the goal (measured in seconds) 
successes/ 
failures 
Initial number of times the production has led 
to a success/failure state before the model 
starts 
efforts Total amount of time taken over all past uses 
of the production, successful or failed. 
Parameters Definition (New mechanism) 
rn The actual reward received 
K The discount factor (0 < K ≤ 1). Future 
rewards are discounted by 1/(1+KD), where D 
is the time between the firing of the current 
and the next production. 
a The learning rate. 
Dn+1 The time between the consecutive firing of 
production n and n+1 
 
Although the existing mechanism was able to match to 
human choice behavior, there are aspects in which the 
mechanism can be improved. First, in the existing 
mechanism, learning of P requires pre-specification of 
successful or failure states and the expected utility will 
increase or decrease respectively when the state is reached. 
The use of success and failure states may not be sufficient in 
situations where a continuous feedback function is required. 
From a practical perspective, pre-specification of success 
and failure states could be difficult especially in complex 
tasks, in which some states are often considered “more 
successful” than others. One way to improve the current 
mechanism is to learn from a scalar reward value. Being 
able to assign a scalar reward value to a production 
therefore allows more flexible pre-specification of the 
reward structure of the environment and allows the model to 
adapt to the environment accordingly. Second, the existing 
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procedural learning mechanism will change the expected 
utilities of productions only when the actual outcome is 
experienced, which requires keeping track of the whole 
sequence of previous productions that leads to the outcome. 
This could be computationally expensive especially when 
the number of productions is large. It is therefore desirable 
to have a mechanism that learns from local information 
before the outcomes are known.   
The new procedural learning mechanism 
In the artificial intelligence community, algorithms have 
been developed to allow agents to learn in different 
environments (Sutton & Barto, 1998). One established 
algorithm is the Temporal Difference (TD) algorithm, which 
was originally inspired by behavioral data on how animals 
learn prediction (Sutton & Barto, 1981). Research showed 
that the TD algorithm is well suited to explain the functional 
role of dopaminergic signals (e.g. Houk, et al., 1995; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002, O’Reilly, 2003). The TD algorithm 
is designed to learn to estimate future rewards based on 
experience, and has a built-in credit assignment mechanism 
that reinforces the predicting stimuli.  
In its simplest form, the new mechanism can be 
represented as U’(n) = U(n) + aTD(n), where U’(n) is the 
updated value of the expected utility U(n) of production n 
after an ACT-R cycle, a is the learning rate, and TD(n) is 
the temporal difference error. TD(n) calculates the 
difference between the actual and expected rewards, i.e. 
TD(n) = R(n) – U(n). The basic learning mechanism is 
therefore similar to the learning rule of Rescola and Wagner 
(1972) (e.g. see Sutton & Barto, 1981). The measure of 
future rewards has to take into account long-term as well as 
short-term consequences. It is plausible to weigh immediate 
primary reinforcement more strongly than delayed primary 
reinforcement. We chose to use the hyperbolic function to 
discount delayed reinforcement (the justification of using 
the hyperbolic function is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but see Lowenstein & Prelec, 1991; Mazur, 2001). A good 
estimate of the total future rewards is therefore R(n) ≈ rn + 
U(n+1)/(1+KDn+1), where rn is the immediate reward 
received for production n, U(n+1) is the expected utility of 
the production that fires after production n, K is the discount 
parameter, and Dn+1 is the time lag between the times when 
production n and production n+1 fire. To implement the 
mechanism in ACT-R, the basic algorithm has to be 
modified to take both the reward and cost into account and 
translate them into a single dimension1 – i.e. the 
reinforcement will be the difference between the reward and 
cost (i.e. the net reward). In other words, the estimate 
becomes R(n) ≈ rn – Cn + U(n+1)/(1+KDn+1), where Cn is the 
cost of firing production n. Putting the estimate of R(n) back 
to the equation for U’(n), we have:  
 
                                                           
1 ACT-R takes the agnostic economist’s position of simply 
assuming these map onto some internal values without deeply 
inquiring why. 
U’(n) = U(n) + a[rn – Cn + U(n+1)/(1+KDn+1) - U(n)]         
 
One can see that when the estimate is perfectly accurate, 
TD(n) = 0, or U(n) = rn – Cn + U(n+1) /(1+KDn+1) and 
learning will stop. The value of TD(n) can therefore be 
considered the prediction error (as encoded by dopaminergic 
signals), and the mechanism learns by reducing this 
prediction error. It can easily be seen that once a primary 
reward is received, the expected utility of the productions 
that lead to the reward will be credited with a discounted 
reward, and discounting is heavier the farther away the 
production is from the reward.  
The new mechanism updates the expected utility based on 
the difference between the predicted and actual net reward. 
There are two main differences between the new and 
existing mechanisms. In the new mechanism, the reward is a 
scalar quantity, and the amount of change is determined by 
the difference between the predicted and actual reward, 
which is consistent with the functional role of dopaminergic 
signals. This characteristic allows the new mechanism to 
extend its learning capabilities beyond a binary function as 
in the existing mechanism. Second, in the existing 
mechanism, learning requires keeping track of a long 
sequence of productions that lead to the reward. However, 
in the new mechanism, only the expected utility of the next 
production is required. The reinforcement signal will 
eventually propagate back to the productions that lead to the 
reward. 
Testing the new mechanism 
The goal of this paper is to show the limitations of the 
existing mechanism and how the new mechanism is able to 
extend the learning capabilities of ACT-R.  However, owing 
to space limitation, we are unable to show all properties of 
mechanism. For example, none of the data sets in this paper 
was sensitive to the discount parameter K, so we fixed it at 
1.0 and just varied the value of rn to fit the data2. The 
learning rate a was also fixed at 0.1. We first used the new 
mechanism to fit two data sets from the probability learning 
tasks by Friedman et al. (1964) and Myers et al. (1963). 
Since these two sets of data were also modeled well by the 
existing mechanism (Lovett, 1998), we were able to 
compare the results of the two mechanisms and show that 
the use of TD error to drive the learning process is at least as 
effective as the existing mechanism. Finally, we used the 
new mechanism to fit the data from a decision making task 
studied by Busemeyer and Myung (1992), which we believe 
were problematic for the existing mechanism.  
Probability matching behavior 
In Friedman et al., participants completed more than 1,000 
choice trials over the course of three days. For each trial, a 
signal light was illuminated, participants pressed one of the 
two buttons, and then one of the two outcome lights was 
                                                           
2 Since the delay D is a constant for all data sets, it can be shown 
that the parameter K is absorbed into the value or rn.  
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illuminated. Task instructions encouraged participants to try 
to guess the correct outcome for each trial. The study 
extended the standard probability learning paradigm by 
changing the two buttons’ success probabilities across 48-
trial blocks during the experiment. Specifically, for the odd-
numbered blocks 1-17, the probabilities of success of the 
buttons (p and 1-p) were 0.5. For the even-numbered blocks 
2-16, p took on the values from 0.1, to 0.9 in a random 
order. We focus on the analysis of the even-numbered 
blocks, as they show how people adapted to the outcomes 
with experience. 
Table 2. Observed and predicted choice proportions from 
the experiment by Friedman et al. (1964). Predicted scores 
are in parentheses. Each block has 12 trials. 
 Probabilities 
P Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
0.1 0.34 (0.37) 0.23 (0.24) 0.18 (0.17) 0.15 (0.13) 
0.2 0.37 (0.41) 0.26 (0.26) 0.29 (0.23) 0.31 (0.23) 
0.3 0.49 (0.49) 0.41 (0.41) 0.44 (0.34) 0.35 (0.33) 
0.4 0.46 (0.53) 0.44 (0.50) 0.38 (0.43) 0.38 (0.38) 
0.6 0.56 (0.59) 0.51 (0.59) 0.52 (0.55) 0.52 (0.57) 
0.7 0.50 (0.56) 0.53 (0.64) 0.58 (0.72) 0.62 (0.75) 
0.8 0.50 (0.51) 0.76 (0.71) 0.74 (0.77) 0.73 (0.78) 
0.9 0.66 (0.62) 0.78 (0.79) 0.78 (0.81) 0.79 (0.81) 
 
Table 2 shows the observed and predicted proportion of 
choices in the experiment by Friedman et al. Participants in 
general exhibited probability matching behavior. Across the 
four 12-trial subblock, participants chose the correct buttons 
in roughly 50% of the trials in the first block and 
approached the corresponding p values in each block. The 
predicted proportions were generated by the model, which 
had two critical productions, Choose-Right-Button and 
Choose-Left-Button, and the expected utilities of these 
productions were learned according to the new mechanism. 
The exact sequence of outcomes as reported in Friedman et 
al. was presented to the model. A reward of 3 is obtained 
when the correct button was chosen (i.e. rn=3). The initial 
expected utilities of the two productions were set to 0. The 
fit was good, R2 = 0.97, MSE = 0.003, which was similar to 
the model based on existing procedural learning mechanism. 
We conclude that the new mechanism can represent the 
learning mechanism at least as well as the existing 
mechanism with the same number of free parameters.   
Overmatching behavior  
Myers et al. performed another probability learning 
experiment, but they also varied the amount of monetary 
reward that participants would receive for each correct 
response. Participants would either receive no reward or 
penalty, ±1¢, or ±10¢ for each correct and incorrect 
responses. The probabilities that one of the alternatives was 
correct were p=0.6, p=0.7, and p=0.8. Table 3 shows the 
choice proportions for the participants in each of the 
conditions. When there was no reward, participants seemed 
to be exhibiting probability matching behavior. However, 
when there was a monetary reward, participants seemed to 
be “overmatching”. From the data, it also appears that the 
higher the reward, the more the choice proportion exceeds 
the matching probability. 
Table 3. Observed and predicted choice proportions from 
the experiment by Myers et al. (1963). Predicted scores are 
in parentheses. 
Reward Probabilities 
(cents) p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.8 
0  0.624 (0.612) 0.753 (0.750) 0.869 (0.829) 
1  0.653 (0.676) 0.871 (0.834) 0.925 (0.938) 
10  0.714 (0.711) 0.866 (0.836) 0.951 (0.944) 
 
Since the task is basically the same as in Friedman et al., 
we used the same model to fit the data. We used the same 
set of parameters to fit the data in the no reward conditions 
(i.e. reward = 3). We chose the reward parameters 
(reward=±4.97 and ±5.7 for the ±1¢ and ±10¢ conditions 
respectively3) in the reward conditions to maximize the fit, 
and obtained R2  of 0.98 and MSE of 0.0008, which is 
similar to the fit obtained by the existing procedural 
learning mechanism. However, we had only two free 
parameters in this model, compared to three free parameters 
in the model reported in Lovett (1998). In addition, the new 
mechanism provides a more natural interpretation of the 
overmatching behavior – when the reward was large, 
learning increases the expected utilities of the successful 
productions to higher values (since the deviation was 
larger). As a consequence, the model exhibited 
overmatching behavior. On the other hand, Lovett (1998) 
manipulated the architectural parameter G to fit the data, 
which seems awkward, as G is not supposed to be directly 
under strategic control. 
Learning from normally distributed rewards 
Busemeyer and Myung (1992) conducted an experiment in 
which participants were told to select one of the three 
treatment strategies for patients suffering from a common 
set of symptom patterns. Feedback on the effectiveness 
produced by the treatment was given after each selection. 
For the sake of convenience, the treatment with the highest 
expected effectiveness is called Treatment 3, and the next 
less effective treatment is called Treatment 2, and so on (see 
Figure 1). The effectiveness produced by each treatment 
was normally distributed with equal standard deviation, but 
the mean payoffs are different (as explained below). 
Participants had to evaluate each treatment based on trial-
by-trial feedback. Participants were told to maximize the 
sum of the treatment effects over training and they were 
paid 4¢ per point. The means of the normal distributions are 
m-d, m and m+d for Treatment 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The 
two independent variables were mean difference (d) (i.e. the 
                                                           
3 Since the reward values used in the model reflect subjective 
values, they do not necessarily follow a linear relationship with the 
external reward values.  
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separation of the distributions in Figure 1) and standard 
deviation (s) (which affects the amount of overlap in Figure 
1). The exact values of d and s are shown in Table 4. Each 
participant was given 9 blocks (50 trials per block) of 
training in each condition. The model received the same 
amount of training as the participants. 
From Table 4, we can see that as the mean difference 
increased, the observed choice proportions of the optimal 
treatment increased. As the standard deviation increased, the 
observed choice proportions of the best treatment decreased 
except when the mean difference was 3.0. The results 
showed that participants adapted their choice by learning the 
expected effectiveness of treatments. The results also 
showed that the more distinguishable the distributions were 
(larger mean difference or smaller standard deviation), the 
more likely the participants would choose the best 
treatment.   
Table 4. Observed and predicted choice proportions of the 
optimal treatment from the experiment by Busemeyer & 
Myung (1992). Predicted scores are in parentheses. 
Standard Mean difference (d) 
deviation (s) 2.0 2.5 3.0 
3.0 0.69 (0.74) 0.84 (0.79) 0.85 (0.84) 
4.5 0.69 (0.72) 0.72 (0.76) 0.84 (0.80) 
6.0 0.65 (0.68) 0.63 (0.69) 0.86 (0.83) 
 
To model the data, we built three productions that chose 
each of the treatments. The initial expected utility of each 
production was set to 0. For each trial, the rewards obtained 
by the model were simulated by drawing a sample from the 
normal distribution that represents the effectiveness of the 
treatment chosen by the model. The value of r was chosen to 
be 1.76 to best fit the data. We obtained a fit of R2=0.94, 
RMSE=0.007. The good fit to the data show that the new 
learning mechanism was able to build up the expected 
effectiveness of the treatments from trial-by-trial feedback, 
and was able to exhibit similar sensitivity to the differences 
of the distributions as participants. Since the effectiveness 
was sampled from a normal distribution, it is difficult to 
pre-specify which treatment was successful. It is therefore 
difficult to use the existing learning mechanism to model 
these data. In the new mechanism, however, whenever the 
actual reward was higher than the expected utility of the 
production, the production will be reinforced; otherwise the 
production will be penalized. With the same amount of 
experience (50 trials), the expected utilities of the 
production were able to reflect the actual expected 
effectiveness of the treatments. 
Summary 
We have fit a new procedural learning mechanism of ACT-
R to three separate sets of data with all parameters held 
constant except the reward magnitudes the models received 
after each trial. In the first two cases, the new mechanism 
did at least as well as the existing mechanism in capturing 
the observed choice proportions in different settings. In the 
last case, we showed that the new mechanism fits data that 
are problematic for the existing mechanism. The new 
mechanism learned to probability match the true 
probabilities of outcomes by reducing the difference 
between the expected and actual reward. As the difference 
diminished, the change in the prediction decreased. When 
the reward was large, learning increases the expected 
utilities of the successful productions to higher values (since 
the deviation was larger). As a consequence, the chance of 
selecting the option that had the higher probability of being 
correct increased – i.e. the model exhibited overmatching 
behavior.  
Although the first two sets of data can be modeled by the 
existing learning mechanism, the new mechanism provided 
a more natural explanation to the results. In the final set of 
data, we showed how the new mechanism generalizes and 
extends the computational abilities of the existing 
mechanism. The mechanism was able to learn the expected 
effectiveness of each treatment based on trial-by-trial 
feedback, without the need to pre-specify whether the 
productions had led to successful or failure states.  
Discussion 
We have presented a new procedural learning mechanism in 
ACT-R. The use of the deviation between the expected and 
actual reward values in the new learning mechanism is 
consistent with the current understanding of the functional 
role of VTA dopamine neurons in basal ganglia. We showed 
that the new mechanism generalizes and extends the 
computational abilities of the existing procedural learning 
mechanism. Specifically, the new mechanism is not limited 
to learning from binary feedback functions. Rather, the new 
mechanism is able learn from continuous reward functions 
with similar sensitivity to the variations in the reward 
distributions. The current paper also showed how the 
reinforcement learning mechanism observed in basal 
ganglia can be implemented in production systems such as 
ACT-R. 
In practice, the current mechanism allows the use of a 
scalar reward parameter without the need to pre-specify 
success or failure states in a task. This pre-specification 
could be difficult especially in complex tasks in which a 
state could sometimes be good or bad depending on one’s 
experience with the task, as experience may change one’s 
expectation of different states. In addition, although the 
existing mechanism can adapt to different magnitudes of 
reward, the change of the architectural parameter G (in 
E=PG-C) to fit the data may not be easy in complex tasks 
that has many subgoals, especially when some subgoals 
may be considered “more successful” than the others.  
Owing to space limitations, we are not able to show all 
properties of the mechanism. In fact, we have only tested 
the mechanism in single-choice tasks, which did not depend 
critically on the credit assignment mechanism. The 
discounting of future rewards therefore did not affect 
performance of the models in all three tasks that we have 
presented. However, we believe the discounting mechanism 
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is more plausible than the existing mechanism, in which 
immediate and future rewards are weighted equally.   
In all three data sets, the model had the same amount of 
experiences as the participants and reached the same level of 
asymptotic performance. In the first data set, we also 
showed that the performance of the model in each of the 
four subblocks matched the participants well, suggesting 
that the learning rate of the mechanism is comparable to that 
of the participants. However, it is possible that the 
reinforcement learning mechanism could be slow for more 
complex tasks. It could be problematic, for example, when a 
primary reward is received after a long sequence production 
firings. Since only one production is updated during each 
ACT-R cycle, the primary reward may take several cycles to 
propagate back to the production where the critical decision 
is made. It is not clear how people learn in such situations.  
It is possible that they rely on direct instruction to point out 
such contingencies rather than counting on a automatic 
learning mechanism.  It does not seem that the mechanisms 
behind the dopamine reward system are capable of spanning 
unbounded lengths of time in a way that would lead to rapid 
convergence. 
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Abstract  
The Numerically Driven Inferencing (NDI) paradigm, and 
one of its methods, EPIC (Estimate, Prefer, Incorporate, and 
Change), are used to study both one’s estimates and the 
effects of numeric feedback on one’s personal policies 
(herein, about abortion). Both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
92 undergraduates offered estimates and preferences for the 
legal U.S. abortion rate, explaining and justifying them. After 
receiving the (usually, quite surprising) true rate as feedback, 
they provided another (typically changed) preference-and-
rationale. Results show that people vastly underestimated the 
abortion rate, and largely advocated decreases in it––both pre- 
and post-feedback. Feedback caused most of those who 
initially wanted no change in the abortion rate both to 
abandon the status quo and change preference-justifications; 
after feedback, two thirds of these students preferred a rate 
decrease, while the rest preferred an increase. Although many 
researchers hold that belief revision and conceptual change 
are quite difficult to elicit, these and other results show 
dramatic effects of simple base rate feedback on policy 
evaluation. Our findings highlight the importance of having 
and using data when reasoning about society-engaging topics 
such as abortion rates. This experiment represents a new way 
to study numerically-based reasoning that includes the 
subjective natures of our personal beliefs and social lives. 
 
Please answer this question: “As a percentage of the current 
U.S. population, what is its legal immigration rate?” Does a 
typical response of 10% (Ranney, Cheng, Garcia de Osuna 
& Nelson, 2001) sound right? The true value is about thirty-
fold less––only 0.3%. Does (or ought) this datum alter your 
immigration preference––your personal policy––some? 
Common sense may suggest that beliefs, decisions, and 
rationales will (or should) change with new information, but 
literatures from science learning to attitude change (e.g., 
from evolution or inertia to executions or diversity; Ranney 
et al., 2001), suggest that people are often unmoved by new 
data. Classical economics even suggests that preferences are 
exogenous (e.g., from estimates; Lurie & Ranney, 2003).  
The Theory of Explanatory Coherence and its models 
(e.g., ECHO) describe a set of principles that guide belief 
evaluation and revision. Two such principles are that we (a) 
weigh evidence more strongly than conjecture, and (b) 
accept propositions explained more parsimoniously (Ranney 
& Thagard, 1988; Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993; Schank 
& Ranney, 1991; Thagard, 1989). True base rates, then, 
would seem to represent parsimonious evidence (relative to 
a host of instances or anecdotes) and thus be (1) weighted 
heavily in one’s reasoning about an issue and (2) evaluated 
as quite acceptable. The present paper explores aspects of 
this general hypothesis about (especially surprising) 
minimalist interventions––for instance, that a single, 
germane, critical number may foster conceptual change. 
Some studies have noted that learning related base rate 
values (seeds) affects one’s estimates (e.g., about spatial 
judgments or populations; Brown & Siegler, 1996; Brown, 
2002, etc.). While intuitions about real world quantities are 
often incorrect (Brown, 2002), exposure to base rates 
increases the accuracy of one’s estimates on closely related 
topics, and the benefits of such exposure can have lasting 
effects even months later (Brown & Siegler, 1996). Little is 
known, though, about the effects of base rate queries and 
feedback on preference/policy formation and change, so we 
suggest three “ifs.” 1) If intuitions about real world numbers 
are often flawed, then they are likely being used to create 
anomalous or skewed personal policies among people. 2) If 
feedback can correct these intuitions, such feedback might 
affect individuals’ policies. 3) If people are generally biased 
toward evidence (and they are; e.g., Schank & Ranney, 
1991), then giving them factual, numeric feedback––say, the 
U.S. abortion rate, our main example––should affect 
conceptions and interpretations about the abortion rate, and 
thus affect both personal policies on abortion and the 
explanations supplied when justifying their policies. Among 
other questions, we seek to answer the following: Can 
supplying factual, numeric information about abortion 
markedly change one’s abortion policy? Does receiving the 
actual rate as feedback affect the Points of View (POVs) by 
which people reason about abortion? Most such POVs (see 
below), involve moral or ideological reasoning aspects; 
religion plays a role, as well. (Space constraints prohibit 
reviewing the vast abortion literature here, e.g., Bernas & 
Stein, 2001, and we seek to focus on more paradigm-
relevant aspects, in any case.) 
We explore and measure phenomena of these sorts using 
a novel paradigm, Numerically Driven Inferencing (NDI; 
Ranney et al, 2001), and one of NDI’s central empirical 
methods: EPIC (Estimate, Preference, Incorporate, and 
Change; cf. Lurie & Ranney, 2003, who introduced PEIC 
and IC as complementary methods). Such analytic frames 
allow us to study both estimates of, and dynamically 
changing preferences about, base rates (e.g., Munnich, 
Ranney, Nelson, Garcia de Osuna & Brazil, 2003). NDI also 
represents an emerging coherentist framework in which 
numbers are the “tips of the iceberg” of a person’s thinking 
about a network of (magnitude-relevant) evidential and 
hypothetical propositions. A prime aspect of NDI’s 
paradigmatic novelty is in its elicitation of what people 
prefer a quantity to be; it is further unique in its analysis of 
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 how such individuals’ policies (as base-rate relative 
preferences) evolve in the face of numeric information. 
Using EPIC to study abortion numeracy, we asked each 
individual to Estimate the current legal abortion rate––per 
one million live births––and then offer a Preference (and 
thus a policy, relative to one’s estimate) for what each 
would want the current rate to be (had one the power to 
change the rate), and give reasons for both numbers. They 
then received feedback (the actual abortion rate), which they 
Incorporated into their knowledge of the abortion issue. 
Students then provided a second preference and explanation; 
by contrasting their former and new preferences, estimates, 
and reasons, we can note Changes in preferences and 
policies that resulted from the feedback. Essentially, then, 
EPIC has four queries, about a rate X that has a value Y: (1) 
What is X’s value? (2) What should X’s value be? (3) X’s 
value is actually Y, so (4) Now, what should X’s value be? 
Method 
Participants, Design, Materials, and Procedure 
Psychology pool undergraduates (N = 92) participated, as 
part of their course requirement. (The “N” will often be 
somewhat fewer in our Results, due to occasional missing 
data points.) The experiment used a pre- and post-feedback 
repeated measure, within a 2X2 factorial between-group 
design, although the two independent variables (Ranney et 
al., 2001) are tangential to the present issues and so omitted 
here, due to space constraints. Responses included numeric 
(continuous) estimates and preferences, written explanations 
of the estimates and preferences, and Likert ratings about: 
(a) general preference about a rate change, (b) familiarity 
with the topic, and (c) how much one cared about the topic.  
This paper examines only one topic from a set of 16 
(usually less emotion-laden) randomized topics: the U.S. 
legal abortion rate (which we defined for students––and 
represents the vast majority of abortions). Each person was 
first asked to estimate the current rate––per one million live 
births––and to explain the bases of that estimate. Next, each 
was asked how low and high the true abortion rate would 
have to be to be surprising, and to rate the confidence that 
the rate would fall in one’s “non-surprise interval.” Students 
were then each asked to give a numeric preference for the 
abortion rate, had one the power to change it, and to explain 
the preference. Then, they rated, on a 5-point Likert scale, 
how familiar they were with the topic of abortion rates, and 
how much they cared about the topic (with both ratings in 
contrast to the average American). As another measure of 
rate preference, on a 1-5 scale, students were also asked 
whether they generally preferred (1) a big decrease, (2) a 
decrease, (3) neither an increase nor a decrease, (4) an 
increase, or (5) a big increase. After this, feedback was 
provided––the then-current abortion rate––an often-
shocking 335,000 per million live births (gleaned from 
independent federal agencies, e.g., the CDC & NIH; nb. the 
rate has since dropped some). Each was then asked to 
consider the feedback and again give a numeric preference, 
and to explain that final preference. Finally, the students 
were again asked both to rate how much they cared about 
the topic and to offer a 5-point general preference rating. 
(Our lab has since replicated this abortion item’s results, and 
has noted the effects both of varying how the rate is framed–
–e.g., with respect to a million fertile women, Munnich et 
al., 2003––and of omitting a numeric referent.) 
Coding Scheme for Written Justifications 
As part of NDI’s methodology, the written justifications for 
abortion preferences (before and after feedback) were coded 
qualitatively using verbal analysis methods. We developed a 
14-category coding scheme by extracting major patterns 
from elicited explanations, and then coded all justifications 
with the scheme. A student’s explanation could fit up to 
three of the 14 coding categories, with many requiring more 
than one code. Inter-rater reliability for coding the reasons 
was 90% among three coders. For ease of discussion, the 14 
categories were grouped into six broader categories called 
Points of View (POVs) by which people justified their 
personal abortion rate preferences. These POVs are: (1) 
preferring a utopian world in which abortions are essentially 
unnecessary or moot; (2) that the abortion rate should reflect 
the greater good for society; (3) that abortions should 
always be allowed/legal, regardless of circumstance; (4) that 
abortions should only be allowed in some circumstances; (5) 
that abortions should never be allowed (e.g., illegal) under 
any circumstances; and (6) other/no explanation.2 
Results 
Findings are reported following the EPIC procedure: 
Estimates and Preference (EP), then Incorporation 
(feedback) and Change (IC). We also focus analysis on (a) 
written, post-preference, justifications, (b) correlations 
between preferences and some Likert ratings, and (c), two 
especially interesting subsets of participants: those who 
wanted a rate of zero abortions, and those who notably 
changed the direction of their preferences after feedback. 
(Space limits do not permit us to report all, or even all 
statistically significant, findings; cf. Ranney et al., 2001.) 
                                                          
2 POVs (1-6) map onto the original 14 (a-n) code categories as 
follows. POV-1: (a) “perfect world” in which all pregnancies are 
desired or yield loving adoptions, (b) “birth control,” with perfect 
contraception preventing all unwanted pregnancies, and (c) 
“responsibility” by full abstinence or pregnancy-completion. (I.e., 
a-c respondents wish abortions need never be considered.) POV-2: 
(d) abortions needed to optimize social benefit (e.g., economics, 
improved life-quality for all, and crime reduction). (POVs 3-5 
concern availability or legality.) POV-3: (e) “better for mother or 
unborn child,” as some wish to reserve abortion as perhaps better 
for the mother (e.g., her health) and/or fetus’s predicted life, (f) 
“basic ‘pro-choice’ position,” as some didn’t expand on being pro-
choice, (g) “women’s right,” with which they may choose abortion, 
and (h) “status quo,” such that the abortion rate ought not change. 
(In categories e-h above, rationales include notions that abortions 
ought always be available.) POV-4: (i) “not for contraception,” by 
which some decried abortions-as-birth-control, and (j) “emergency 
only,” with abortions only allowed in extreme cases (e.g., after 
rape or to save a mother’s life). POV-5: (k) “murder/loss of life,” 
in which the fetus’s loss of life is deplored, and/or abortion is seen 
as murder, and (l) the “basic con position,” as some didn’t expand 
on being anti-abortion. (Codes k-l reflect being fully anti-abortion.) 
POV-6: (m) a comment/rationale that was not captured by prior 
codes (e.g., “Why are you asking me this?”) or (n) no explanation. 
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 Estimates and Initial Preference/Policy 
Participants greatly underestimated the abortion rate. The 
median estimate was 5,000 abortions per million live births 
(M=50,479; S.D. = 148,469), much less than the true––and 
often evocative––rate of 335,000. (Due to high variance, we 
focus more on median estimates, as they usually inform 
more than do means.) In general, students’ initial numeric 
preferences differed from what they thought the true rate to 
be (i.e., there was, overall, a significant difference between 
one’s estimate and initial preference; t(88)=-2.62, p=.01). 
The median initial preference was only 100 abortions per 
million live births (M = 19,381; S.D. = 110,372), or 4,900 
less than the median estimate––that is, a policy advocating a 
98% (or fifty-fold) decrease. Thus, most people (62.2%) 
preferred rate decreases, relative to their estimates. Counter-
intuitively, ratings of familiarity and caring about the topic 
did not significantly correlate with estimate accuracies, 
indicative of rather modest metacognition. 
Recall that we also elicited initial general preference 
ratings (from 1-5) for the abortion rate. These ratings tended 
to favor decreasing the abortion rate (M= 2.07), and were 
negatively correlated with initial caring ratings (r(90)=-.32, 
p=.002). The initial numeric preferences of those who 
wanted a general decrease (a “1” or a “2” rating) differed 
significantly (F(1,86) = 4.33; p = .04) from preferences of 
those who did not. The median initial preference was zero 
for those initially wanting a (Likert scale) decrease in 
abortions (n=56, M= 1,337.32; S.D.= 3,577). The median 
initial preference was 2,000 abortions per million live births 
for those who initially preferred either (a) an increase, or (b) 
neither an increase or a decrease on the Likert scale (n=34, 
M= 50,001; S.D.=178,723). Before feedback, the majority 
(62%) chose either “prefer big decrease” or “prefer 
decrease” for the abortion rate, prior to feedback, mirroring 
the numeric preferences. Only two participants wanted an 
“increase,” and none preferred a “big increase.” The rest 
(35.6%) preferred “neither an increase nor a decrease.” As 
expected, given the great tendency to underestimate, initial 
preferences were negatively correlated with later being 
surprised by the feedback (r(89)= -.25, p=.02).  
Of the 67 explanations by those who initially preferred a 
decrease in abortion (relative to their estimate), the bulk of 
them fell into three POVs: 26 explanations held that 
abortions should never be allowed, 24 referred to a utopian 
world in which abortions are unnecessary or moot, and 10 
asserted that abortions should only be allowed in some 
circumstances. For example, one decrease-preferring 
participant (with Estimate: 100,000; Initial Preference: 0) 
wrote, “It would be great if every baby was cherished 
enough to be allowed to live.” Another person preferring a 
decrease (Est: 1,000; Init. Pref: 10) stated, “Because I don’t 
believe women should end a child’s life unless it affected 
their own physical health.” People preferring a rate equal to 
their estimates most often indicated that abortions should 
always be allowed (17 of 29 explanations); the remaining 
justifications were from all other POVs except that for the 
"Other/no explanation" (see Table 1). For example, one of 
these status-quo students (Est: 800; Init. Pref: 800) stated, 
“[I prefer] as many as necessary to not have unwanted 
children. I believe people have the right to have an abortion 
if they cannot have the child for personal reasons.” All three 
people whose preferences exceeded their estimates indicated 
that abortions ought always be allowed. For example, one 
(Est: 20,000; Init. Pref: 1,000,000) stated, "People should 
choose whether or not they can bring a kid to the world." 
Incorporation (of Feedback) & Preference Change  
After feedback, the median numeric preference increased to 
1,000 abortions per one million live births (M = 108,178; 
S.D.= 174,688). However, that median is a larger 99.7% 
decrease-policy from the true abortion rate of 335,000. 
(Recall that the median initial preference called for a 98% 
decrease-policy in the rate, relative to their estimates.) Final 
numeric preferences still significantly differed from the 
feedback value (t(88)=-12.25, p<.001), and represented a 
non-proportionate shift in policy (p < .001 via a Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank test). Mirroring this policy shift toward a 
greater decrease (percentage-wise) in abortions, the mean 
Likert rating for general preference dropped from 2.1 (out of 
5) to 1.8 after feedback (t(89)=3.39, p=.001). After 
feedback, 51.1% preferred a “big decrease,” dramatically up 
from 32.6% (and 25.0% preferred a “decrease,” down 
slightly from 28.3%). This movement is evident in Figure 1, 
which contrasts the distribution of initial Likert ratings for 
general preferences before and after feedback. Those who 
initially chose “neither an increase nor a decrease” most 
notably changed Likert ratings for general preferences; after 
feedback, 66% of them (21 of 32) “moved off the status-quo 
fence,” with five coming to prefer a “big decrease,” nine a 
“decrease,” and the other seven dramatically diverging to 
prefer an “increase.” In Figure 1, this scattering is seen in 
the shrinking of the “Neither” bar and the growth of both the 
“Big Decrease” bar and––more surprisingly––the “Increase” 
bar. (Note that no one in this study ever preferred a “Big 
Increase.”) This striking bifurcation of most of the (initially) 
status-quo group is qualitatively analyzed below. 
Mean care ratings (from 1 to 5: “not at all” to “much 
more than average”), increased significantly after feedback, 
from 3.29 to 3.51 (t(90)=-2.89, p=.005). Numeric and 
(Likert) general preference measures concurred, because 
after feedback, numeric preferences continued to differ 
between those wanting either a “decrease” or “big decrease” 
and those who did not (M= 1,337 and 50,001, respectively 
F(1,87) = 445.8; p<.001). Interestingly, both before and 
after feedback, “care” ratings were negatively correlated 
with general-preference Likert ratings (respectively, r(90)= -
.32, p=.002; r(90)= -.21, p=.047). That is, those “caring” 
more about abortion preferred more of a decrease in its rate. 
Table 1 shows the effect of feedback (i.e., pre- vs. post-) 
on the percentage of each POV mentioned, within the four 
Figure 1: Distributions of general preference ratings 
(Likert; 1-4 out of 1-5), before and after feedback. 
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 levels of general preference Likert ratings that people used. 
Five notable distributional changes are marked by asterisks 
(*s). One such change (from 2.9% to 24.6*%) represents the 
finding that, before feedback, only one of 35 “big decrease” 
justifications was coded as “Abortions should be allowed 
only in some circumstances,” but 14 of 57 “big decrease” 
justifications were so coded after feedback.  
As a rather orthogonal analysis from those above, the 
following set of subsections examine three sets of 
participants and how they were differentially affected by 
feedback: those preferring zero abortions (both before and 
after feedback), those changing their basic position on the 
abortion rate, and the remaining participants.  
Zero Preference Participants Of all students, 34.8% 
initially wanted zero abortions. After feedback, 84.2% of the 
34.8% still preferred zero abortions. Initially, such people 
typically used a utopian world POV (50%), or a POV that 
abortions should never be allowed (41%). Feedback spurred 
only a non-significant drop in the use of a utopian world 
POV (42%), concomitant with a non-significant rise in the 
view that abortions should never be allowed (44%). 
Preferring zero abortions before feedback was correlated 
with initial caring ratings (r(88)=.24, p=.025); there was no 
correlation, though, between preferring zero abortions after 
feedback and final caring ratings (r(88)=.06; p=.60).  
Participants Who Changed Away from "Status Quo" Of 
89 respondents, 24% changed their policy direction––and 
all of these 21 were those who initially preferred neither an 
increase nor a decrease in abortions on the Likert scale, yet 
preferred either an increase or a decrease after feedback. We 
refer to these as “semi-flips,” as no one fully flipped sides 
(e.g., from “increase” to “decrease” or vice versa). Of the 
“semi-flippers,” 14 shifted to preferring a “decrease” (11 of 
whom were “technically surprised” by the feedback, in that 
335,000 fell outside of their non-surprise intervals). 
Remarkably, given that almost everyone underestimated the 
rate (mostly by vast amounts), the other seven changed to 
wanting an increase in the abortion rate (e.g., by concluding 
that numerically unwarranted taboos due to media-skewed 
rate perceptions may be inhibiting abortions); indeed, six of 
the seven were technically surprised by the high feedback. 
For all semi-flippers, as per above, the initial (Likert) 
general preference was “3” (i.e., “neither an increase nor a 
decrease”). The post-feedback mean general preference for 
the semi-flippers dropped to 2.43, but this aggregates a drop 
to 1.64 for “decreasers-come-lately” (DCLs) and a rise to 
4.00 for “increasers-come-lately” (ICLs). 
Table 2 shows the POV distributions for the 21 semi-
flippers, pre- and post-feedback, which significantly 
differed (χ2(5,N=105)=11.88, p=.036). Pre-feedback, most 
of their rationales indicated that abortions should always be 
allowed (12 out of the 21 people, with the other nine being 
grounded in all other POVs). Post-feedback, the POVs these 
students used depended entirely on whether one had semi-
flipped to prefer an abortion-rate increase or a decrease. 
(Note: there were 22 instances, post-feedback, as one person 
used two POVs.) This feedback-driven bifurcation was 
total, as shown in Table 2’s last two columns; note the 
complete lack of overlap, post-feedback, between the first 
two POVs (rows) and the next three (i.e., excluding 
“other/no explanation”). After feedback, four of the seven 
ICLs justified their preferences with “abortions should 
always be allowed,” while the other three justified with 
“abortions should reflect the greater societal good.”  (One 
used both.) However, DCLs didn’t use either of these two 
POVs to justify preferences: Instead, the greatest number of 
Table 1: Percent usage of POVs, from pre-feedback to post-feedback, by general/Likert preference rating.
     
 Big Decrease (1) Decrease (2) Neither (3) Increase (4) 
Point of View (POV) Justification Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
Abortions should never be allowed   48.6      40.4  28.1    21.4     3.5    0         0    0 
Utopian world: abortion as non- issue   40   31.6  31.3   50*     6.9    0    0    0 
Allow abortions only in some circumstances     2.9   24.6*  28.1   25     3.5    0    0    0 
(Other / No Explanation)     0     1.8     0     3.6   17.2  18.2    0  12.5 
Abortion rate ought depend on the greater good      2.9     0    3.1     0   10.3    0    0  37.5* 
Abortions should always be allowed     5.7     1.8    9.4     0   58.6  81.8* 100  50* 
       Totals (i.e., each column sums to 100%) 100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 2: POV changes for semi-flip participants/POV-instances (pre- vs. post-feedback; 21 people vs. 22 POV instances), 
by general preference/Likert ratings (ICL = “increaser-come-lately;” DCL = “decreaser-come-lately”). 
   
 Pre-Feedback (out of 21 semi-flippers) Post-Feedback (of 22 POVs)  
Point of View (POV) Justification  
(Note: the order has changed from Table 1)      Neither an Increase nor Decrease    Increase 
Decrease or 
Big Decrease 
Abortions should always be allowed 12   (8 became DCLs; 4 became ICLs) 5 0 
Abortion rate ought depend on the greater good   2   (both became ICLs) 3 0 
Utopian world where aborting a non-issue   2   (both became DCLs) 0 8 
Abortions should never be allowed   1   (who became a DCL) 0 3 
Allow abortions only in some circumstances   1   (who became a DCL) 0 3 
(Other / No Explanation)   3  (2 became DCLs; 1 became ICL) 0 0 
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 their post-feedback instances involved the utopian POV 
(eight of 14 instances); the remainder of these participants’ 
explanations included the POVs that either abortions should 
never be allowed (three of 12 instances) or should be 
allowed only in some circumstances (three of 12 instances). 
Thus, most semi-flippers initially wrote that abortions 
ought always be allowed, yet not one DCL wrote that belief 
after feedback. Further, semi-flippers were so polarized after 
feedback that there was no overlap at all between the POVs 
of the ICLS and the DCLs. For example, one initially-
status-quo participant who first both estimated and preferred 
a rate of 20,000 (per million live births) wrote, “I think it is 
a good number.” After feedback, the same person changed 
views, preferring an increase in the abortion rate to 500,000, 
stating: “I think there are too many kids being [born] into 
this country, especially since a lot...are being raised by 
teen/bad/druggie parents.” In contrast, a semi-flipper who 
changed to prefer a decrease in the abortion rate post-
feedback, at first both estimated and preferred a rate of 800, 
stating, “[I prefer] as many as necessary to not have 
unwanted children. I believe people have the right to have 
an abortion if they cannot have the child for personal 
reasons.” Post-datum, this person wanted a rate of 200,000 
(again, a decrease from the feedback’s 335,000), stating, “A 
lot of these probably happen because women/men aren’t 
taking the right precautions and with education or birth 
control. I think this number could start to decrease. But I do 
believe women have the right to abortions, but not the right 
to use abortions as a birth control method.” 
Remaining (“Non-Zero, Non-Semi-Flip”) Participants 
The distributional shift in POVs was also significant for the 
rest of the people (χ2 (5, N=80)=139.24, p<.001)––those 
who preferred abortion rates above zero, but did not change 
the direction of their general preference (Likert) rating after 
feedback. Such people were neither semi-flippers nor those 
wanting zero abortions, and so represent a less extreme 
subgroup than those discussed above. It is instructive to note 
how the relative POV use changed for these intermediate 
“non-semi-flip/non-zero-preference” participants: Before 
feedback, the top three abortion POVs for these non-zero, 
non-semi-flip students were equally split (with 23.5% of 
instances apiece) among “allowed in some circumstances,” 
“never allowed,” and “always allowed.” After feedback, 
though, the POV that abortions should be allowed in some 
circumstances represented 33.9% and the two absolute 
POVs that abortions should either always or never be 
allowed––made up 16.9% and 18.6% of the responses, 
respectively. The other POVs’ percentages changed rather 
less (utopian world: 13.8Æ18.6; other/no explanation: 
9.8Æ10.3; should depend on greater good: 5.9Æ1.7). 
Discussion 
Respondents largely estimated the legal U.S. abortion rate to 
be far lower than the true rate––seven times lower in mean, 
and 67 times lower in median. In fact, 79% of students were 
“technically surprised” by the feedback, such that the true 
abortion rate was not contained in their elicited non-surprise 
intervals. Thus, only 21% of our students captured the true 
value (335,000 legal abortions per million live births) in 
their non-surprise intervals––even though their mean 
confidence of doing so, just after offering their intervals, 
was 74%. Thus, participants were roughly 3.5 times less 
likely to capture the true rate than they anticipated. 
The effect of the feedback on one’s preference was likely 
due, in part, to its shocking magnitude. Results show that 
learning the true abortion rate clearly changed reasoning 
about abortions––with regard both to peoples’ preferences 
and the points of view (POVs) by which they justified their 
policies. While the median person went from preferring 100 
abortions per million live births to preferring 1,000, since 
the median estimate was 5,000 and the feedback was 
335,000, students’ new preferences represented a much 
more stringent relative abortion policy (from -98% to           
-99.7%). Indeed, the failure to capture the feedback value in 
one’s non-surprise interval was significantly correlated with 
exhibiting a dramatic (i.e., non-proportionate) change in 
abortion policy (r(54)=.4; p<.01). 
Overall relative policy preferences also became more 
fervently abortion-reducing (constrictive) on other metrics 
post-feedback. There was a significant overall drop in 
general Likert preference ratings for the abortion rate, after 
feedback. Indeed, almost 20% more of the students 
preferred a “big decrease” after learning the true rate (see 
Figure 1). The justifications also changed: Before feedback, 
25.2% of the full set of explanations provided that abortions 
should always be allowed, while only 11.1% stated that 
abortions should be allowed in only some circumstances. 
After feedback, these frequencies were essentially reversed 
(13.5% vs. 20.2%). The only people who showed little shift 
in either their numeric preference or written justifications 
were those who preferred zero abortions––before and/or 
after feedback. Considering that these zero-preferring 
people (a strange-bedfellows group seeming to include 
utopian liberals and abolitionist conservatives; see Results) 
essentially held absolutist policies (for zero abortions), it is 
not surprising that the true rate did little to change that wish. 
In both more quantum and qualitative senses, one of the 
most dramatic of the above results is that those who initially 
adopted a “status quo” policy usually changed their 
positions after seeing the generally surprising base rate 
feedback. Of the 32 respondents who first preferred neither 
an increase nor a decrease in the abortion rate, feedback 
caused 21 of them (66%) to take a directional position, thus 
becoming “semi-flip” participants. Base rate feedback also 
changed the POVs by which semi-flip people justified their 
preferences. While before feedback, most such students 
claimed that abortions should always be allowed, regardless 
of circumstances, these justifications shifted dramatically 
after feedback. The participants who changed to preferring 
decreasing the abortion rate no longer claimed that abortions 
should always be allowed, and instead largely justified their 
new preferences by preferring a utopian world in which 
abortions need never be considered, because either (a) all 
pregnancies would be wanted (or all unwanted pregnancies 
prevented), or (b) all unwanted babies would be readily 
adopted by loving homes. (This is consistent with “Wow! 
That’s too many!” reactions.) Conversely, those semi-
flippers who changed to prefer an increase after feedback 
used none of the justifications eventually used by those who 
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 changed to prefer a decrease, and vice versa. Instead, these 
increasers-come-lately largely continued to claim that 
abortions should always be allowed, regardless of 
circumstances, or that the abortion rate should reflect the 
greater good for society. So, while semi-flip participants 
seemed rather homogenously like-minded before feedback, 
when it caused them to bifurcate into divergent positions (to 
prefer an increase or a decrease) there was no overlap in the 
types of justifications used. This is a dramatic effect, 
considering that the intervention is a single, albeit highly 
reliable, piece of information (i.e., 335,000:1,000,000).  
Some Implications and Extensions 
Our results show some of the effects of numerical 
feedback on personal preferences and policies regarding 
topics such as abortion––that is, topics for which the 
feedback is often surprising and quite far from individuals' 
estimates. More recent work from our laboratory observes 
this phenomenon in many realms, involving dozens of items 
and their rates––about incomes, inflation, executions, home 
ownership, etc.––and even SAT percentile use in college 
admissions. Lurie and Ranney (2003) are extending this 
work even further, into the arena of health-care research 
funding, and have proposed a general model that relates 
numeric estimates, preferences, feedback, and seeds. 
One implication of this work is the need to improve 
citizens’ thinking about critical base rates. For many of the 
topics our Reasoning With Numbers group employs, many 
people are clearly quite unaware of crucial numbers related 
to an issue (Ranney, et al., 2001), and they even have low 
metacognitive knowledge-awareness (e.g., no significant 
correlation, for abortion, between familiarity and accuracy). 
Therefore, our lab has carried out a variety of promising 
classroom-based experiments, from grades 5-12, to foster 
such metacognition (e.g., Munnich, Ranney, & Appel, 
2004). Among other goals, our curricula are meant to 
improve students’ abilities to (a) estimate (e.g., by 
disconfirming sub-par, early, estimate-hypotheses and 
bringing more knowledge and accountability to bear), (b) 
prefer (or justify what they prefer, e.g., by reflecting on 
more dimensions influencing one’s wishes), (c) utilize 
feedback (e.g., by “letting go” of one’s estimate), and (d) 
triangulate or “N-angulate” (e.g., by seeking relevant 
external information sources). Curricular assessments show 
broad numerical reasoning gains over control students (e.g., 
in estimation; Munnich, Ranney, & Appel, 2004). 
Most people use information other than statistics (e.g., 
ethics, pragmatics, and conventions) to form their positions, 
and even use misconceptions of true statistics, at times. Still, 
the actual numbers, especially when surprising, can 
significantly affect how they think about the issue. Thus, 
NDI results contrast with views of scholars in diverse fields 
who suggest that learning, transfer, belief revision, and 
attitudinal (or conceptual) change are quite difficult to foster 
(Munnich, Ranney, & Appel, 2004; Munnich et al, 2003; 
Ranney et al., 2001). Incorporating numeric feedback––even 
just a single, critical, number––can often dramatically 
change how one views an issue and reasons about one’s 
positions. Further, such changes clearly transcend the 
domain of numbers, in that there is much non-numeric 
reasoning that lies beneath the iceberg-tips of estimation and 
quantitative preference. NDI’s methods (e.g., EPIC) 
represent new tools with which science may better probe the 
submerged prominences and embedded fissures of thought. 
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Abstract 
Two studies examine the visual presentation of 
dynamic sequences. Experiment 1 tests if there are 
canonical viewpoints, that are especially appropriate 
for presentation. Participants agreed that viewpoints 
with 90 degree deviation between axis of sight and 
axis of main movement in the sequence are better 
than other viewpoints. Experiment 2 examines if 
these canonical viewpoints weaken the perspective 
deviation effect in a recognition task according to 
their postulated information richness. A perspective 
deviation effect was found both for canonical and 
less canonical views, even if it was weaker for the 
canonical views.  
 
Viewpoint Deviation and Canonicality 
This paper deals with questions concerning the cognitive 
representation of visually presented dynamic sequences, 
specially the role of viewpoint. A first experimental series 
(Garsoffky, Schwan & Hesse, 2002) showed that the 
viewpoint from which one sees a dynamic sequence 
becomes part of the cognitive representation of that 
sequence and therefore influences later memory retrieval 
processes. This viewpoint deviation effect appeared in three 
experiments examining recognition memory for visually 
presented dynamic sequences (Garsoffky et al., 2002) and 
comprises the stable result, that cuttings from sequences are 
best recognized if they are presented in a viewpoint most 
similar to the viewpoint from which participants before saw 
the whole sequence. This means the cognitive representation 
of dynamic sequences is not uncoupled from the viewpoint 
from which one primarily saw the specific sequence and 
therefore influences later memory retrieval processes. The 
question now is, if this viewpoint deviation effect holds for 
all kinds of viewpoints or if the use of special viewpoints 
may reduce this effect. The following studies therefore ask, 
if various viewpoints differ in their qualification to present a 
sequence – i.e. if there exist so called canonical viewpoints 
that could by now only be shown for static objects (e.g. 
Palmer, Rosch & Chase, 1981) (Experiment 1), and further 
it will be investigated, if these canonical viewpoints have an 
influence on the viewpoint deviation effect found by 
Garsoffky et al. (2002) (Experiment 2).  
 The concept of canonicality in connection with 
visual viewpoints was firstly empirically investigated and 
defined by Palmer et al. (1981). They discuss the idea of 
canonical viewpoints from an information-processing 
approach, a categorization perspective, in terms of 
phenomenology, and with regard to the concept of 
affordances (Gibson, 1982) and they conclude, that 
canonical viewpoints compared to other viewpoints contain 
more information as well as information of high salience, 
are the most typical viewpoints of an object, are those 
viewpoints from which an object is most perceivable, and 
are especially qualified to present the affordance structure of 
an object. 
 Empirically canonical viewpoints are defined e.g. 
by asking participants to imagine an object and then to 
describe the viewpoint from which the imagination took 
place, or participants were asked from which viewpoint they 
would make a photo of an object, or participants had to 
choose between photos with varying viewpoints which 
photo in their opinion presented the object best (Blanz, Tarr 
& Bülthoff, 1999; Palmer et al., 1981). Evidence for 
canonical viewpoints is stated if there is high inter- and 
intraindividual agreement. 
  At least for static objects some conclusions about 
the nature of canonicality can be made that do not mutual 
exclude each other. (i) Functionality and familiarity: 
Especially objects of everyday life we often see from a 
specific viewpoint that corresponds with the functionality of 
that object, i.e. when interacting with that object we see the 
object from a specific, i.e. canonical viewpoint that allows 
optimal interaction (Blanz et al., 1999). (ii) Information 
richness: In some studies canonical viewpoints were 
discovered even for abstract or nonsense objects – a fact that 
can not be explained by familiarity or functionality (Cutzu 
& Edelman, 1994; Edelman & Bülthoff, 1992; Perrett & 
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Harries, 1988). It was concluded that canonical viewpoints 
present more information and especially more salient 
information of an object than other, less canonical 
viewpoints. They present a high number of visible surfaces 
of an object, important parts of an object are not covered, 
and they are stable against small variations of the viewpoint, 
i.e. the informational advances of that viewpoint remain the 
same even if the viewpoint is changed slightly (for a 
comprehensive list see Blanz et al., 1999). (iii) 
Discriminability: Cutzu and Edelman (1994) concluded 
from their findings using abstract objects, that because of 
limited cognitive capacity for every specific object only the 
diagnostically valuable attributes are stored, that help to 
distinguish this object from other objects. This means that it 
varies with changing contexts or tasks, which viewpoint is 
more canonical than other viewpoints.  
 This paper investigates if the usage of such high 
informative viewpoints, that allow optimal discrimination, 
leads to a more viewpoint independent cognitive 
representation of visually presented dynamic sequences. I.e. 
the question is if so called canonical viewpoints help to 
recognize sequences better even if they are presented from 
new viewpoints.  
Experiment 1 
In the first study it has to be determined if there exist 
canonical viewpoints not only for static objects but also for 
dynamic sequences and how they can be defined. The study 
picks up one classical way to examine the canonicality of 
different visual viewpoints (Palmer et al., 1981) – namely 
rating measures, i.e. participants judge the goodness of 
various viewpoints for presenting the dynamic sequence. 
 For dynamic sequences, there often is one main direction of 
movement, and it is supposed, that viewpoints are the more 
appropriate to present the sequence the more they allow the 
observer to understand this movement. Moreover it is 
assumed, that viewpoints deliver the more information 
according to this movement the more orthogonal they are to 
the main movement direction of the dynamic sequence. This 
is argued because viewpoints with the axis of sight parallel 
to the main movement direction cause perspective 
shortenings. So it is hypothesized, that viewers prefer 
viewpoints that are as much as possible orthogonal to the 
direction of the main movement and that viewers rate 
viewpoints worse if these viewpoints are more parallel to 
the main movement direction.  
Method 
Participants Six male and ten female students, from the 
University of Tübingen participated in this experiment. 
They were paid for their participation.  
 
Apparatus Experimental procedures were controlled by a 
Microsoft computer and realized by a html-program. Film 
clips were presented on a black background in the left and 
the right half of a color monitor.  
 
Stimulus materials and design Eleven dynamic sequences 
were programmed using xyZET (Härtel & Lüdke, 2000), a 
simulation program to teach physics in school. Each 
dynamic sequence consisted of four spheres (balls) with 
different colors, sizes, starting positions and velocities. All 
balls moved on parallel laps towards a kind of blue goal at 
one end of the rectangular space. So the sequences were 
similar to a kind of race, with the exception that the balls 
did not start at the same line and that not all of them reached 
the goal within the duration of the sequence. Each sequence 
was filmed from 5 different viewpoints: All viewpoints had 
the same height but differed according to the horizontal 
amount of deviation between the axis of sight realized by 
the camera perspective and the axis of movement direction 
of the balls; this amount of deviation could be either 0˚ (i.e. 
parallelism), 22.5˚, 45˚, 67.5˚ or 90˚ (i.e. orthogonality); see 
Figure 1. This resulted in 55 film clips (11 sequences by 5 
viewpoints); three of these sequences, i.e. 15 film clips, 
were used for training, eight sequences, i.e. 40 film clips, in 
the experimental test. This variation resulted in a design 
with the variable "canonicality of presentation" (0˚ / 22.5˚ / 
45˚ / 67.5˚ / 90˚; within-subjects). 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Visual presentations of the ball races used in 
experiment 1 with 0˚/22.5˚/45˚/67.5˚/90˚ amount of 
deviation between axis of ball movement (indicated by the 
little grey arrow) and axis of sight. 
 
Procedure Participants were tested individually. The 
written instructions to the main part of the experiment – 
namely the rating of the film clip presentations at the 
computer - told them that they would see various dynamic 
sequences and that their task would be to rate the goodness 
of the viewpoint to present the dynamic sequence. It was 
explained, that the sequences were similar to races and that 
the relative positions of the objects to one another therefore 
is important when presenting the sequence. Further it was 
explained, that they always would see two film clips in 
succession presenting the same sequence but with different 
viewpoints and that they afterwards always should rate, 
which of the two film clips was the better presentation of 
that dynamic sequence by clicking with the mouse on one of 
two buttons (a button underneath the window of the film 
clip presented in the left half of the screen if they preferred 
this viewpoint or a button underneath the window of the 
film clip presented in the right half of the screen if they 
preferred that viewpoint). If participants had no more 
questions they were seated in front of the computer and a 
training phase started, which introduced some examples of 
the pair comparison task and trained to use the buttons. Data 
of the training phase were not analyzed. 
When the film clip on the left side of the screen 
ended the last picture stayed in the window; after a short 
delay of one second the second film clip started on the right 
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side of the screen. At the end of the film clip also the last 
picture stayed on the screen. Now the participant had to 
made his or her rating by clicking one of two buttons. Then 
a short text note followed on the screen, inviting participants 
to click another button when they wanted to start the 
presentation of the next two film clips.  
The order of the dynamic sequences was 
randomized as well as the order of viewpoint combinations. 
For each dynamic sequence there were 5 different 
viewpoints and each viewpoint was paired two times with 
each other viewpoint of this sequence: one time presented 
on the left half of the screen (i.e. the film clip they saw 
firstly) and one time presented on the right half of the screen 
(i.e. the film clip they saw secondly). So subjects in the 
experimental phase saw eight sequences, each in form of 20 
pairs of film clips. All together subjects had to make 160 
pair decisions; each specific viewpoint could reach a 
maximum of 64 preferences.  
Results 
Ratings  For each participant it was counted, how often he 
or she favored a certain viewpoint compared to another 
viewpoint (number of "preferences"). An ANOVA with 
repeated measurement was performed, including the 
variable "canonicality of presentation" (0˚, 22.5˚, 45˚, 67.5˚ 
or 90˚; within-subjects). There was a significant main effect 
for this variable, F (4, 60) = 8.457, MSE = 227.802, p < .01 
and also a significant linear contrast, F (1, 15) = 17.512, 
MSE = 397.233, p < .05. The viewpoints were rated better, 
the more the axis of camera sight deviated from the axis of 
sequence movement (0˚: 21.375 preferences; 22.5˚: 25.688 
preferences; 45˚: 27.688 preferences; 67.5˚: 36.125 
preferences; 90˚: 49.125 preferences). Single comparisons 
according to Scheffé revealed significant differences 
between 90˚ on the one hand and 0˚, 22.5˚ or 45˚ on the 
other hand.  
Discussion 
The results allow three statements: (i) In presentations of 
dynamic sequences specific viewpoints are preferred against 
other viewpoints. That means there are "canonical 
viewpoints" not only for static object presentations but also 
for sequences presenting dynamic movement. (ii) More than 
that it can be defined, which viewpoints are preferred, 
namely as predicted those viewpoints whose axes of sight 
are orthogonal to the axis of main movement in the 
sequences. (iii) Further it could be shown that viewpoints 
are rated worse the more they differ from this best, i.e. 
canonical viewpoint. The significant linear trend is a hint 
that canonicality – measured by preference judgements - is 
not an all-or-none concept.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 now examines if there is a relation between 
the canonicality of viewpoints found in experiment 1 and 
the viewpoint deviation effect (Garsoffky et al., 2002). A 
recognition task is used and it is investigated if a thoughtful 
choice of viewpoint when presenting a dynamic sequence 
the first time (i.e. canonical viewpoints in the learning 
phase) can lower the effect of viewpoint deviation during 
recognizing cutouts of dynamic sequences (in the test 
phase). The rational for this question is the idea, that 
canonical viewpoints are information richer (Blanz et al., 
1999; Cutzu & Edelman, 1994; Palmer et al., 1981), and 
that therefore it should be easier to recognize cutouts from a 
sequence even from deviating viewpoints, because one has 
more information about the sequence.  
Method 
Participants Eight male and twelve female, from the 
University of Linz, Austria participated in this experiment. 
Because the task was very difficult we tried to motivate the 
participants by informing them that the best three 
participants receive a gift coupon for a local cinema. 
 
Apparatus The experimental procedures were controlled by 
an Apple computer (Power Macintosh 8100/80AV) and 
programmed using PsyScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt & 
Provost, 1993). Film clips and video stills were presented on 
a black background in the middle of a color monitor. 
Reaction times were measured by the computer internal 
clock, thereby resulting in an unsystematic measurement 
inaccuracy of 17 msec.  
 
Stimulus materials and design Sixteen dynamic sequences 
were programmed, now using 3D canvas (amabilis.com) 
because this software offered more different colors than the 
simulation software used in experiment 1. Each of the 
sequences consisted of four balls with different colors, that 
moved on a rectangular plane in a linear parallel manner. 
The balls either moved towards a kind of goal or away from 
this goal and had different starting points. Further the balls 
moved with different and individually varying speed, i.e. 
they accelerated and decelerated – so again some kind of 
"races" resulted. Acceleration and deceleration was 
necessary to prevent that viewers could predict the end of 
the race after seeing only the first parts of the sequences by 
simply extrapolating the starting speed and position of each 
ball. Each sequence was filmed with a desktop camera from 
two different viewpoints (all camera viewpoints were 20˚ 
above the horizontal plane) – with 90˚ deviation between 
axis of ball movement and axis of camera sight 
(hypothesized to be the more canonical viewpoint) and with 
0˚ deviation between the two axes (hypothesized to be the 
less canonical viewpoint). In the 90˚ condition the balls 
moved in 50% of the cases from the left to the right side and 
in 50% of the cases from the right to the left side to preclude 
that the 90˚ viewpoint simply is better, because it realizes 
the familiar reading direction. Accordingly in the 0˚ 
condition, the balls moved in 50% of the cases towards the 
observer and in 50% of the cases away from the observer 
(see Figures 2 and 3). 
For each sequence 5 points of time that were 
evenly distributed throughout the sequences were defined, 
to get enough measurement possibilities. For each of these 
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points of time video stills for the recognition test phase were 
produced. These video stills had varying viewpoints on the 
sequence: All viewpoints had the same camera height (20˚ 
above the horizontal plane) but differed according to their 
horizontal deviation compared to the viewpoints in the film 
clips. This deviation could be 0˚, 45˚ or 135˚. Keep in mind 
that 0˚ does mean two different things for the film clips 
(learning phase) and the video stills (test phase): We speak 
of film clips with a 0˚ viewpoint, if there is no deviation 
between axis of ball movement and axis of sight. In contrast 
a video still with 0˚ is a video still the viewpoint of which 
does not deviate from the formerly presented viewpoint in 
the film clip – may this be a viewpoint with 0˚ or 90˚ 
deviation between axis of sight and axis of ball movement. 
These variations resulted in a design with the 
variables "canonicality" (high / low; within-subjects), and 
"viewpoint deviation" (0˚ / 45˚ / 135˚ deviation between the 
viewpoints in the learning and the test phase; within-
subjects). 
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Figure 2:  Movement directions of the balls in experiment 2 
towards / away from the goal, from the left to the right / 
from the right to the left, towards / away from the viewer, 
and with 0˚/ 90˚ deviation between axis of ball movement 
and axis of sight. 
 
Procedure Again all participants were tested individually 
and received written instructions to the main part of the 
experiment – namely a description of the kind of dynamic 
sequences and their recognition task. First they passed 
through a training phase, the data of which were not 
analyzed. The experimental phase encompassed 8 races, i.e. 
8 blocks. Each block consisted of an initial learning phase 
followed by a test phase. In the learning phase participants 
saw a dynamic sequence twice from either a canonical (90˚) 
or a less canonical (0˚) viewpoint, i.e. they saw the same 
film clip two times in succession from the same viewpoint. 
One second later, they successively saw 15 video stills (five 
points of time of the sequence each presented from three 
different viewpoints) as well as 15 distractor video stills 
which used the same viewpoints but presented other 
sequences, i.e. the sequences showed the same balls (same 
colors) but the video stills stemmed from other races with 
the balls moving with other speeds. So to perform the 
recognition task participants had to decide, if a video still 
showed a moment of the race seen before in the film or 
another race by checking the relative positions of the balls 
to each other. The order of the video stills was randomized. 
Each video still stayed on the screen until the participant 
pressed one of two reaction keys (one marked with "j" for 
the german word "ja" which means "yes", and one marked 
with "n" for the german word "nein" which means "no"). 
After the participant had reacted to a video still there always 
was a short delay of one second before the next video still 
was presented. The order of blocks (i.e. the different 
sequences) was randomized and each sequence was 
presented in the learning phase to half of the participants 
from a canonical viewpoint and to the other half of 
participants from a less canonical viewpoint.  
 
a) b) 
 
Figure 3:  Example pictures of the film clips used in 
experiment 2, arrows indicating direction of ball movement. 
a) shows balls moving towards the goal from the left to the 
right with 90˚ deviation between axis of ball movement and 
axis of sight. b) shows balls moving away from the goal 
towards the observer with 0˚ deviation between the two 
axes. 
Results 
Recognition accuracy For each participant his or her 
number of "hits" (the number of video stills correctly 
recognized as showing a moment from the ball sequence 
which he or she had previously seen) was determined. 
Across all participants and conditions a mean of 67.3 hits% 
resulted. Then an ANOVA with repeated measurement was 
performed, including the variables "canonicality" (high vs. 
low; within subjects), and "viewpoint deviation" (0˚, 45˚ or 
135˚; within subjects). A significant main effect for 
"viewpoint deviation" was found (F (2, 38) = 32.646, MSE 
= 0,006571, p < .01) with 72.9 hits% at 0˚ viewpoint 
deviation between learning and test phase, 69.9 hits% at 45˚ 
viewpoint deviation and 59 hits% at 135˚ viewpoint 
deviation. Single comparisons according to Scheffé revealed 
significant differences between 0˚ and 135˚ viewpoint 
deviation as well as between 45˚ and 135˚ viewpoint 
deviation (p < . 01). Accordingly, there was a significant 
linear effect of viewpoint deviation (F (1, 19) = 52.432, 
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MSE = 0.007386, p < .01), also indicating that recognition 
accuracy becomes worse the more the viewpoint used in the 
test phase differs from the initially presented viewpoint in 
the learning phase. In addition, the interaction (see Figure 4) 
between "viewpoint deviation" and "canonicality" became 
significant (F (2, 38) = 9.364, MSE = 0.004185, p < .01). 
Single comparisons revealed significant differences between 
high and low canonical viewpoints in the learning phase 
only if there was 0˚ viewpoint deviation (p < .01); further if 
the viewpoint in the learning phase was low canonical, there 
were significant differences between 0˚ (77.8 hits%) and 45˚ 
(71.5 hits%) viewpoint deviation (p < .05) as well as 
between 45˚ and 135˚ (57.7 hits%) (p < .01); but if the 
viewpoint in the learning phase was high canonical, there 
was no significant difference between 0˚ (68 hits%) and 45˚ 
(68.3 hits%) deviation, but only between 45˚ and 135˚ (60.3 
hits%) deviation (p < .01). There were no more significant 
effects in this analysis of variance. 
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Figure 4:  In experiment 2 for recognition accuracy there 
was a significant interaction between „viewpoint deviation“ 
and „canonicality“. 
 
Recognition speed As a second dependent variable, 
reaction time was measured, i.e. the lapse of time from the 
beginning of each video still presentation until the 
participant pressed either the "j"- or the "n"-button. The 
following analysis only accounted for reaction times (RTs) 
to "hits" (i.e. correct "j"-reactions). Extreme RTs above 10 
sec (i.e. more than 3 standard deviations above the overall 
mean) were excluded. This resulted in an exclusion of 
1,16% of all RTs. To exclude outliers from analysis is a 
common method when dealing with reaction times (e.g. 
Cameron & Frieske, 1994; Diwadkar & McNamara, 1997; 
Eley, 1982; Hamm & McMullen, 1998; Lawson & 
Humphreys, 1996) because extremely slow responses 
indicate lapses of a participant´s  attention on a particular 
trial. As the distribution of RTs was positively distorted, 
data were transformed by using natural logarithm, and 
analyzed in an ANOVA with the variables "canonicality" 
(high vs. low; within subjects), and "viewpoint deviation" 
(0°, 45° or 135°; within-subjects). For better vividness, the 
means reported in the text and figures are nontransformed 
RTs, despite the fact that the analysis of variance as well as 
the single comparisons were conducted using ln-
transformed data. A significant effect was found for 
"viewpoint deviation" (F (2,38) = 12.194, MSE = 0.01284, p 
< .01). Applying single comparisons there were significant 
differences between 0° (2685 ms) and 45° (2944 ms) 
deviation (p < .01) as well as between 0° and 135° (3041 
ms) deviation (p < .01). Accordingly also the linear trend for 
viewpoint deviation became significant (F (1, 19) = 16.387, 
MSE = 0.0179, p < .05). There were no more significant 
effects in this analysis of variance.  
Discussion 
In first line the results show once more (Garsoffky et al., 
2002) a clear effect of viewpoint deviation: Recognition 
becomes worse the more the viewpoint from which one sees 
a cutout differs from the viewpoint from which one initially 
saw the sequence. This holds for recognition accuracy as 
well as for speed of recognition (see the two significant 
linear effects of viewpoint deviation). But the hypothesis 
that high canonical views in the learning phase weaken this 
viewpoint deviation effect receives only little support: On 
the one hand there is a significant interaction in recognition 
accuracy between canonicality and viewpoint deviation 
which shows that at least between 0° and 45° viewpoint 
deviation recognition accuracy does not become worse if in 
the learning phase a high canonical viewpoint is used. But 
on the other hand the use of a high canonical viewpoint in 
the learning phase does not weaken the viewpoint deviation 
effect between 45° and 135°. And at last there is no 
significant influence of canonicality on the viewpoint 
deviation effect for speed of recognition.  
General Discussion 
The results in the first place again support the stability and 
robustness of the viewpoint deviation effect for dynamic 
sequences (experiment 2): We used viewpoints that before 
(experiment 1) were rated as especially qualified to present 
critical aspects of visual dynamic sequences, namely the 
relative positions of the various balls to each other. I.e. these 
viewpoints were rated as being especially informative for 
this kind of dynamic event and therefore should allow to 
store in memory a maximum of discriminative information 
about the event. We hypothesized that if observers see 
dynamic sequences initially from these information rich 
"canonical" viewpoints, then the cognitive representations 
of the event should encompass more information and should 
therefore be more flexible if one has to rethink the event 
into other viewpoints – as demanded in the recognition task 
of experiment 2. But results show that the recognition 
performance still declines if the viewpoint presented during 
a later memory task differs from the viewpoint used in the 
initial learning phase, even if the observer initially saw the 
event from a canonical, information rich viewpoint. This 
means that the cognitive representation of a dynamic 
sequence still is viewpoint dependent, even if this viewpoint 
is especially information rich, i.e. delivers information about 
all or most important aspects of an event. This once more 
shows, that findings for static objects found by Biederman 
(Biederman, 1987; Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993) 
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cannot simply be assigned to dynamic sequences: According 
to the geon structural description theory (Biederman, 1987) 
the cognitive representations of static objects are viewpoint 
independent, as long as these objects are shown from 
viewpoints that encompass the discriminative details of 
these objects, i.e. the so called "geons", and their relative 
positions to each other. Our findings contradict the 
applicability of this idea for dynamic sequences: Even using 
high discriminative viewpoints does not lead to a viewpoint 
independent cognitive representation; in fact the rethinking 
in other viewpoints still is critical for recognition 
performance. So our present findings rather point out, that 
findings with static objects or static arrangements of objects 
e.g. from Diwadkar and McNamara (1997), Shepard and 
Metzler (1971) and Tarr (1995) are more appropriate to 
predict memory processes of observers watching dynamic 
sequences, namely the formation of a viewpoint dependent 
cognitive representation (see the two significant effects of 
viewpoint deviation in experiment 2 for recognition 
accuracy and speed of recognition) and the occurrence of 
mental rotation processes (see the significant linear trend of 
viewpoint deviation in experiment 2) if new viewpoints are 
brought into play.  
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Abstract
Human language exhibits mainly arbitrary relationships
between the forms and meanings of words. Why would
this be so? In this paper I argue that arbitrariness be-
comes necessary as the number of words increases. I
also discuss the effectiveness of competitive learning for
acquiring lexicons that are arbitrary in this sense. Fi-
nally, I consider some implications of this perspective
for arbitrariness and iconicity in language acquisition.
A Language Design Task
Imagine you are inventing a language. It should asso-
ciate signals (“forms”) that can be produced and per-
ceived by the users of the language with perceptual or
motor categories (“meanings”). Assume that both forms
and meanings are patterns of values across sets of dimen-
sions and that you have been given the form and meaning
dimensions. Assume further that the specific design task
includes a set of meaning categories that need to get reli-
ably conveyed. That is, given a particular pattern across
the meaning dimensions, if it belongs to one of the given
set of categories, a user who knows the language should
be able to assign a form to it, that is, an appropriate pat-
tern across the set of form dimensions. Similarly, given
a pattern across the form dimensions, if it belongs to
one of the set of form categories that you have built into
your language, a user who knows the language should be
able to assign a meaning to it. Furthermore, the form
assigned to an input meaning should be the “right” form;
that is, the form that gets output should pass the com-
prehension test in the reverse direction. Providing this
form to a user who knows the language should result in
an output meaning that is at least closer to the original
meaning than to any of the other meaning categories. In
the same fashion, the meaning assigned to an input form
should pass the production test in the reverse direction.1
Your language is not hard-wired into a user; it must be
learned through a series of presentations. A presentation
consists of a pairing of a form and a meaning selected
randomly from the set of possible form-meaning pairs
that are built into the language, with a small amount
1Note that in this sense, these simple languages deviate
from human languages, which permit multiple forms for the
same meaning and multiple meanings for the same form. But
the constraint has to roughly hold for communication to get
off the ground, and young children learning language seem to
behave as though it does (Markman, 1989).
of noise added to both the form and the meaning. Two
constraints that you need to consider in your design are
ease of learning and ease of storage. Each user has fi-
nite resources for learning and storage, and there is an
advantage to languages that are learned with fewer pre-
sentations.
The main issue of concern in this paper is how the
solution to a language design task of this type is con-
strained by the number of distinct meanings that are to
be conveyed by the language. I will argue that there
are advantages to languages with systematic relation-
ships between forms and meanings and advantages to
languages without such systematicity. I will then discuss
how competitive learning fares at learning both types of
languages. Finally I will discuss the implications for ac-
quisition and evolution of human language.
Iconicity and Arbitrariness
How Iconicity Can Help
Learning the association between forms and meanings
can be facilitated if there is a systematic relationship be-
tween the patterns. A simple example of such a relation-
ship is a correlation between the values on a form dimen-
sion and a meaning dimension. There are two possibili-
ties for where such a correlation might come from. One
is for it to be based on a natural relationship between
the two dimensions, for example, if they are the same di-
mension at a more abstract level. Such relationships are
familiar in human language from onomatopoeia, in which
form imitates meaning on one or more acoustic/auditory
dimensions, for example, pitch. Examples of this type
are more common in sign languages, where a movement
of the hand in signing space may represent a physical
movement of some object in meaning space.
A further possibility is for the relationship between the
correlating dimensions to be completely arbitrary, or at
least opaque to the users. In some sign languages, for
example, American Sign Language and Japanese Sign
Language, movement towards or away from the head
represents the gain or loss of knowledge: learning, re-
membering, forgetting. But the motivation for the asso-
ciation between the form and meaning dimensions in this
case would require that the user know that knowledge is
in some sense in the head. Thus the relationship between
the form and meaning dimensions in this case could be
viewed as arbitrary by a particular learner, though the
learner might still notice the systematicity of the rela-
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tionship, that is, that within this set of signs the head
represents the location of knowledge.
These kinds of systematic relationships between form
and meaning are referred to as iconicity. I’ll return to
the topic of iconicity and arbitrariness, the absence of
iconicity, in human language later in the paper.
In an iconic language, there is less to learn than in a
purely arbitrary language, so learning should be faster
and require less storage. This is easily seen by imagin-
ing a language with five meanings to be conveyed and a
single dimension each for form and meaning. An arbi-
trary language would require storing separately each of
the five form-meaning pairs of values on this dimension,
but a completely iconic language with a perfect correla-
tion between the dimensions would only require a single
value, a correlation of 1.0. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Arbitrariness and iconicity. Two simple languages,
each with one form and one meaning dimension and five
meanings to be conveyed. Noisy form-meaning pairs are in-
dicated by circles in form-meaning space. In an arbitrary
language, there is no correlation between form and meaning.
In a perfectly iconic language, form and meaning correlate.
Iconicity can play a further role in the comprehension
of the language. If an unknown or poorly learned form is
presented in the presence of constraints on the possible
meanings for the form, for example, if several candidate
meanings are present, then iconicity can add further con-
straints. For example, if a user of a language knows that
loudness in forms that refer to emotions tends to corre-
late with the strength of the emotion referred to, then
for a particularly loud novel form, the user can eliminate
candidate emotions that are mild.
How Iconicity Can Interfere
However, this advantage of iconicity should decline as
the number of meanings to be associated with forms in-
creases. Increasing the number of form-meaning pairs
causes the average distance between these pairs in form-
meaning space to decrease. Because of the noise that is
part of form and meaning patterns, each form-meaning
association occupies a region of the space. In other
words, as the number of form-meaning pairs increases,
the likelihood that the form regions for two different
pairs share the same meaning (homophony) or that the
meaning regions for two different pairs share the same
form (ambiguity) increases. Obviously both sorts of
overlap can interfere with communication; a noisy form
pattern might get assigned to more than one meaning
category, for example. They also interfere with learning;
it will be more difficult to make the proper associations
if forms or meanings are sometimes ambiguous.
Now consider how iconicity affects the likelihood of
these sorts of overlap. Because iconicity constrains the
possible form-meaning associations, it results in a nar-
rowing of the space. This is illustrated in Figure 2. If
we imagine the fixed set of meanings that are to be con-
veyed in the language as non-overlapping channels in the
form-meaning space, then the possible forms for each can
be viewed as circles (or hyperspheres in spaces of more
dimensions) that can be slid back and forth in the chan-
nels, resulting in different languages. If we arrange two
of these circles so that a portion of one is above a portion
of another, we have the sort of overlap that represents
ambiguity. There are obviously more ways to arrange
the circles and avoid ambiguity in an arbitrary language
like the one on the left than there are in a highly iconic
language like the one on the right.
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Figure 2: Arbitrariness, iconicity, and vocabulary size. For
relatively large vocabularies, iconicity can interfere with com-
munication because of the greater likelihood of overlap be-
tween form-meaning pairs. For a given vocabulary size, there
are more ways to avoid ambiguity (and homophony) in an ar-
bitrary than an iconic language.
A Simulation
For a learning algorithm that responds to regularities
in the association between form and meaning, then, we
should observe an interaction between vocabulary size
and systematicity in the association (arbitrariness vs.
iconicity), as measured by learning error.
To test this idea, I trained several feedforward con-
nectionist networks to learn the associations from a set
of meanings to a set of forms. The languages differed
on two dimensions, vocabulary size and systematicity in
the association. Both forms and meanings were repre-
sented by values along three dimensions, with ten possi-
ble values for each. Each dimension was represented by
ten units, and each input and target value activated a
gaussian pattern across the units so that there was the
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possibility of some generalization from a value to values
close to it.
The “small” languages contained 15 form-meaning
pairs, while the “large” languages contained 100 form-
meaning pairs. For “iconic” languages, each form-
meaning pair coincided on two of the three dimensions,
which were randomly selected for each pair. For exam-
ple, a possible iconic form-meaning pair was: form {3, 2,
8}, meaning {3, 5, 8}. Note that for the iconic languages,
there is thus a significant correlation across all three pairs
of dimensions. For “arbitrary” languages, the values for
each form-meaning pair were selected completely ran-
domly. For each form-meaning pair, the network saw
five separate presentations, one with the canonical pair,
and four with noisy variations on this pair. For each of
these variations, each dimension value was changed by 1
with a probability of 0.2.
Since these were feed-forward networks, they only
learned the associations in one direction. Each net-
work contained 30 meaning input units, 30 form output
units, and 64 hidden units and was trained using back-
propagation. Figure 3 shows the mean square error as
training progressed. As can be seen, iconic languages
have an early advantage because of the correlations that
back-propagation can easily discover. For the small lan-
guages, this advantage holds throughout training. For
the large languages, however, the network learning the
arbitrary language eventually overtakes the one learning
the iconic language, apparently because of the proximity
of some of the form-meaning pairs to one another and
the resulting confusion in the presence of noise.
Note that the potentially adverse effects of iconicity on
learning depend crucially on the number of dimensions
that are used to represent forms and meanings because
the size of the form-meaning space increases with the
number of dimensions. For a large enough number of di-
mensions, iconicity should be superior to arbitrariness,
even for a relatively large vocabulary. In fact, if we in-
crease the number of dimensions in the simulation from
three to four, the long-term advantage of the arbitrary
over the iconic language disappears.
Arbitrariness and Competitive Learning
Learning Arbitrary Categories
Let us assume that the communicative demands of the
users of the language require forms for a very large
number of meanings and that the number of form and
meaning dimensions available for representing forms and
meanings is small enough that a mostly arbitrary lan-
guage has a clear advantage over a mostly iconic one.
Now suppose we have some control over the kind of
learner that is confronted with this large and mostly
arbitrary language. What sort of learning mechanism
would be best suited for this task? What matters most
is that the different form-meaning pairs be kept distinct
from one another. That is, each of these is in effect a
separate category. (Since we are now dealing with cat-
egories of form-meaning association, it is time to start
calling them “words.”) Since in an arbitrary language
there is little or no regularity to be found between the
Figure 3: Learning of iconic and arbitrary languages by a
feed-forward network. Root mean square error during train-
ing is shown for iconic and arbitrary languages consisting of
15 (small) and 100 (large) form-meaning pairs.
categories, an algorithm that focuses on within-category
regularity, while it ignores between-category regularity,
makes sense. Of course, the categories are not specified
to the learner in advance; the learner neither knows how
many form categories there are nor how many meaning
categories there are. Thus the algorithm must be unsu-
pervised.
Competitive learning (e.g., Grossberg, 1987) is such
an algorithm (or family of algorithms). It seeks to clus-
ter input patterns on the basis of similarity, and it is
oblivious to any regularities that exist between the cat-
egories that it finds. It would seem to be well-suited to
the task of learning words. But how does it respond to
iconicity and arbitrariness?
A competitive learning network has an input layer and
an output layer consisting of potential category units.
The output layer either has a fixed number of units, rep-
resenting an upper bound on the number of categories
that can be learned, or, in a constructive competitive
learning algorithm, the output layer adds new category
units in response to error. In the simple version of com-
petitive learning used here, for each input pattern the
category unit whose weights best match the input pat-
tern is treated as the “winner” for that pattern. It up-
dates its input weights in the direction of the input pat-
tern. The “losing” units also update their weights in the
direction of the input, but with a much smaller step size.
A competitive learning network for the form-meaning
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learning task has both form and meaning as inputs feed-
ing into an output layer of category units. During train-
ing, an input pattern consisting of a form-meaning pair
activates a winning unit, and the weights are updated.
Ideally, a single category unit gets assigned to each form-
meaning category; that is, each unit ends up representing
a word. A single training presentation is illustrated in
Figure 4A.
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Figure 4: Competitive learning of form-meaning pairs. A.
Training. An input pattern, consisting of both form and
meaning patterns, is presented to the network, which selects
a “winning” category unit, and updates its weights and, to a
lesser extent, the weights of other units. In the constructive
version of the algorithm used in the simulation, the category
layer grows during training (indicated by the dashed border);
it adds a new unit whenever error for an input pattern is
above a threshold. B. Comprehension. An input pattern,
consisting of a form pattern only, is fed to the network (1)
and the winning category unit is activated (2). The active
category unit activates a pattern on the meaning units (3).
Following training, the network can perform produc-
tion or comprehension using the trained weights. For
comprehension, a form pattern alone is input to the net-
work, and a winning category unit is selected on this
basis. This unit then activates the meaning units using
the weights learned in the other direction. Production
works in the opposite fashion, with meaning as input and
form as output. Figure 4B shows how comprehension is
implemented.
A Simulation
To test whether competitive learning could elucidate
both the advantages and disadvantages of iconicity, I
trained a competitive learning network of the type de-
scribed above on both a completely arbitrary language
and a maximally iconic language, in which all form di-
mensions correlated with meaning dimensions. There
were four meaning and four form dimensions and 100
form-meaning pairs in the language. In addition to the
form and meaning input layers, the network had a grow-
able layer of category units. At each input presentation,
a new category unit was added with a probability based
on the error for the input pattern (the distance of the
winning category unit from the input). Separate identi-
cal networks were trained for 50 epochs on the two kinds
of languages. Figure 5 shows the results for several kinds
of tests following training.
Figure 5: Competitive learning of arbitrary and iconic lan-
guages. Results are shown for the proportion of words that
are not assigned distinct category units (”LexErr”); the fi-
nal error on training patterns, that is, the average distance
of input patterns from winning category units (”TrainErr”);
the proportion of words in comprehension tests for which the
meaning output was closer to a meaning category other than
the intended one (”CompCat”); and the average distance of
the meaning output in comprehension tests from the intended
meaning (”CompDist”).
The first two columns show tests directly related to the
degree to which the networks mastered the languages.
The first column shows what proportion of the 100 words
became associated with distinct category units during
training. Any category unit that ends up representing
more than one word will obviously interfere with com-
prehension or production. For the iconic language there
are more units doing double duty because of the greater
similarity between the words. The second column shows
another measure of learning, the average distance be-
tween an input pattern and the category unit that wins
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when it is presented following training. The smaller this
number, the more successful the network has been in
handling all of the words. Again the network trained on
the arbitrary language out-performs that trained on the
iconic language.
The third and fourth columns represents tests of com-
prehension of forms, one for each of the words in the
training set. There are two ways to test comprehen-
sion. One determines whether the meaning that is out-
put is closer to the intended meaning (the one actually
associated with the form in the language) than to any
other. The result for this test appears in the third col-
umn. Again the arbitrary language has an advantage. A
second way to test comprehension measures the distance
between the meaning that is output and the intended
meaning. The result for this test appears in the fourth
column. Here the iconic language has a small advantage,
one that holds over a range of parameter settings. This
can be explained by considering what happens when a
noisy or poorly learned form is presented to a network
that has learned the iconic language. Even if the cate-
gory unit that wins for this input is not the appropri-
ate one, that is, the one that would yield the intended
meaning, the meaning that is output will not be far off.
Somewhat surprisingly, then, even though the iconic lan-
guage is less well learned, it is more easily comprehended
in this sense.
Human Language
What does all of this have to do with human language?
Since at least the work of de Saussure (1983), it has
been recognized that the association between form and
meaning in human language is largely arbitrary. How-
ever, in Saussure’s work and in other influential work by
scholars such as Peirce (1998), iconicity and arbitrari-
ness seem never to have been spelled out clearly enough
to admit to any sort of rigorous test. They have always
boiled down to “motivation” or “resemblance” or their
absence.
The discussion above provides both a formalization of
iconicity and arbitrariness and an account of why hu-
man language might have a strong tendency to be arbi-
trary. For whatever reason, we need to distinguish tens
of thousands of categories of objects, attributes, states,
and events, and the associations between these categories
and the forms that convey them in a language need to
be stored in a brain and to be learned through presen-
tations that do not make explicit what the categories
are. Under these circumstances, the arbitrariness of the
form-meaning association helps keep words separate dur-
ing learning.
Another implication of the discussion above is that
word learning and word access in humans is a competi-
tive process, that words are categories. This isn’t a novel
idea at all. In fact models of word recognition (e.g., Nor-
ris et al., 2000) and word access in language production
(e.g., Levelt et al., 1999) that are not competitive are
the exception. And the fact that competitive learning
results in localized representations of words is compati-
ble with the idea that words are the origin of symbolic
behavior (Vygotsky, 1978).
But this brings up more questions. First, what about
iconicity in human language? It is well-known that,
far from being non-existent, iconicity actually thrives
in some corners of language (Hinton, Nichols, & Ohala,
1994). It is a property of so-called expressive words,
which make up an entire grammatical category in a wide
range of languages, including Japanese, Korean, and
many languages spoken in Africa, South Asia, Southeast
Asia, and the Americas. It is also much more common in
sign languages (Taub, 2001) than in spoken languages.
Given what I have claimed, we would expect iconicity
in circumstances where the number of words is unusu-
ally small or in circumstances where the space of possible
distinguishable forms is unusually large. The number of
words is small early in first language acquisition, and
there is some evidence that in at least one language with
a large category of iconic words, Japanese, these words
are relatively common in speech to children and they are
easier for children to map onto meanings than arbitrary
forms are (Yoshida, 2003). That is, they seem to play
the role in comprehension that is suggested by the dis-
cussion above. Another situation in which a vocabulary
is very small is experiments in which which adults have
to communicate with one another without speaking. Not
surprisingly, subjects in such experiments create highly
iconic gestures to represent categories of objects and re-
lations (Oda & Gasser, 2003).
However, expressives survive into the adult language
for speakers of languages like Japanese, Tamil, and Zulu.
One possible explanation is that these categories are
more or less self-contained, existing in a sense in their
own space. They tend to be characterized by particular
formal properties such as reduplication, and they tend to
convey particular categories of meanings such as move-
ments, sounds, and textures. Perhaps expressives fail to
interfere with other words because learners place them
in a category all by themselves.
But what of sign languages? Although there is no evi-
dence yet that the iconicity of sign languages helps young
children pick up the meanings of words, there is lots of
anecdotal evidence that adults learn sign languages rela-
tively rapidly, presumably because of the iconicity. But
how can we account for the pervasiveness of iconicity in
the vocabularies (not to mention the grammars) of these
languages? Although there is an apparent tendency to-
wards somewhat less iconicity as these languages change,
there is no evidence that the iconicity is disappearing
(Taub, 2001). Of course it is possible that sign lan-
guages are more iconic than spoken languages because
there are more ways to be iconic in the spatial than in
the acoustic domain. But that does not explain how all
of the iconicity can be tolerated, how the words keep
from overlapping in the sense I have discussed. One pos-
sibility suggested by the account I’ve sketched is that
the space itself is larger, that the number of dimensions
along which signs vary or the number of distinguishable
values along these dimensions is greater than it is for
spoken word forms. This seems worth investigating.
Finally, how would competitive learning deal with a
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language, or a subset of a language, that exhibited some
iconicity, along with the more normal arbitrariness? The
competitive network discussed above is doomed to be-
ing thrown off by the iconicity. Although it might, in
the short run, perform better on a comprehension task,
as happened in the simulation above, in the long run,
it needs to be able to keep words separate from one
another. However, there is nothing about competitive
learning that restricts it to a single layer of category
units. A more flexible network in fact is one that allows
for different degrees of granularity in how the clustering
of inputs takes place. This is achieved with layers with
different numbers of category units or, for constructive
networks, with different thresholds for the creation of
new category units. The competition among units to
classify inputs is only within, not between the layers.
Such a network is shown in Figure 6. A network like
this was trained on a set of 100 words, again with four
form and four meaning dimensions, in which either the
first form and first meaning dimension correlated or the
second form and second meaning dimension correlated.
The other two dimensions of form and meaning were un-
correlated. The larger category layer learned the set of
words as before (note that the behavior of this layer is
completely unrelated to the behavior of the other), while
the smaller layer divided the patterns into two clusters.
A comprehension task in a network like this relies on
two winning category units, rather than one. That is,
it can combine the correlational information embodied
in the weights to the smaller layer with the arbitrary
associations embodied in the weights to the larger layer.
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Figure 6: Competitive learning with multiple layers of cat-
egory units. The number of category units (or the threshold
for the creation of new units) in a layer governs the number
of categories that it discovers.
Conclusions
Since iconicity seems to make so much sense and since
humans are so good at imitation, it might seem surpris-
ing that human languages exhibit such overwhelming ar-
bitrariness in the form-meaning relationships that define
words. I have tried to show in this paper how the sheer
number of concepts we feel the need to talk about in-
hibits us from making use of this strategy. It’s crucial
that words be kept separate, and it’s easier to do this if
there’s little or no sense to how forms relate to mean-
ings. This arbitrariness in turn favors algorithms that
categorize form-meaning pairings, in short, algorithms
that learn words. On this view, words are the local rep-
resentations that result from the competitive learning of
mainly arbitrary form-meaning associations.
But if this is so, how did it or how does it get that
way? Did the advantage of being a competitive learner
of form-meaning pairings cause our ancestors to evolve
this approach to language? Or is this a mechanism that
develops in children as they are exposed to a system that
mostly fails to be iconic? Investigating the first possibil-
ity using evolutionary algorithms and investigating the
second through the modeling of early word learning in
children are future directions for this project.
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Abstract 
 
The main point of discussion of the present article is the na-
ture of representations, their formal structure and their origin 
and the cognitive role that manipulations of the environment 
can have. After having briefly reviewed the perspective ex-
pressed by the physical symbol system hypothesis, I take into 
account surgery as a case study that points out how many ma-
nipulative actions performed upon the environment have a 
cognitive relevance and the importance that the interaction 
with the environment can have in generating the representa-
tions used in cognitive processes and in giving them a formal 
structure. In the last part of the article I propose a model, that 
I call Double Representation Approach, which tries to give an 
explanation of the nature itself of representations, of the way 
they work in the cognitive processes and of certain important 
human cognitive behaviors. 
 
Physical Symbol System Hypothesis  
When first attempts were made to understand human cogni-
tion, one of the concepts that emerged as central was that of 
representation. A classical paradigm in which the notion of 
representation grew up was the hypothesis that an agent ca-
pable of intelligent action must be a physical symbol system 
(Newell, 1980; Newell & Simon, 1976). 
A physical symbol system is a sort of device that contains 
symbols and symbol structures in memory and can perform 
processes upon these symbol structures. In more detail, ac-
cording to the physical symbol system hypothesis, a physi-
cal symbol system and, thus, cognition performs three func-
tional processes that occur sequentially and that are con-
trolled by a central information processor. The three func-
tional processes are the following: 1) a symbolic representa-
tion of the environment is constructed by means of a percep-
tual process performed by a perception subsystem; 2) the 
symbolic representation that has been constructed is deliv-
ered to the central processor, which processes it in order to 
extract information and to be able to select a symbolic ex-
pression that stands for an action; 3) an action subsystem 
decodes the symbolic description of the action and converts 
it into a concrete action in the environment. 
 It is important to understand what the terms “symbol” 
and “physical” mean. According to the classical definition 
given by Newell (1980), a symbol is an entity that stands for 
another entity. This kind of relation is called designation 
and its definition, with Newell’s words, is: 
 
Designation: An entity X designates an entity Y relative to a 
process P, if, when P takes X as input, its behavior depends 
on Y. (Newell, 1980, p. 156). 
 
Thus, a symbol is a syntactic element of a code and can be 
connected to other symbols to form symbol structures. 
The term “physical” refers to the need for a physical im-
plementation of a symbolic system in order for it to actually 
function and to actually operates upon and affect or be af-
fected by the environment. 
Following these definitions, we can distinguish three lev-
els of organization in which a cognitive system can be di-
vided: the semantic level, the symbol level and the physical 
level (Pylyshyn, 1989). At the semantic level, we have the 
content of knowledge and the goals that a system entertains. 
At the symbol level, the semantic content of the previous 
level is encoded by symbolic expressions. Finally, the 
physical level is constituted by the physical realization of 
the entire symbol system; in the case of humans, this level is 
represented by the biological level. 
The postulation of a cognitive mechanism that works by 
means of symbols and symbol structures strictly implies the 
assumption that cognition takes place by means of internal 
representations and Newell (1980) considers “representa-
tion” as “simply another term to refer to a structure that des-
ignates” (Newell, 1980, p. 176): 
 
X represents Y if X designates aspects of Y, i.e., if there exist 
symbol processes that can take X as input and behave as if 
they had access to some aspects of Y. (Newell, 1980, p. 176). 
 
Thus, according to the classical symbolic perspective, the 
central notion is that of representation. Now what we have 
to pay attention to and to focus on are two characteristics 
that Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) indicate as the ones that 
identify classical symbolic models. Such characteristics are 
the combinatorial syntax and semantics of mental represen-
tations and the structure sensitivity of processes. 
Let us begin with the first concept. Classical symbolic 
theories distinguish between structurally atomic and struc-
turally molecular representations; structurally molecular 
representations are constituted by other representations that 
can be either atomic or molecular and the semantic content 
of a molecular representation is a function of the semantic 
contents of its syntactic constituents. According to this per-
spective, a Language of Thought (Fodor, 1975) is postu-
lated, with syntactic components and structural relations be-
tween these components. 
The second point is the structure sensitivity of processes. 
What this assumption means is that the principles by which 
mental representations are manipulated rely only on the 
structural properties of symbolic representations. More pre-
cisely, the formal, syntactic structure of a representation 
specifies the role of the representation within an inference 
and can cause the inferential process without reference to 
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the semantic content. Hence, the mental operations upon 
symbolic representations are activated only by the form of 
the representations. 
So far, I have tried to delineate the main features of the 
classical physical symbol system hypothesis. In the follow-
ing section, by means of a case study applied to the field of 
surgery, I want to question some aspects that emerge from 
the physical symbol system hypothesis. 
 
A Case Study: Surgery  
The arguments and claims that will be presented in the fol-
lowing two subsections emerge from a case study on sur-
gery that I am conducting in the field in order to analyze the 
cognitive processes that go on in the work of surgeon. In 
particular, this study is devoted to analyze which kinds of 
representations are used in surgery, what the role of physical 
manipulations is, whether they have a cognitive relevance 
and how the distribution is of the cognitive processes in-
volved in surgery. 
In the following two subsections I want to point out two 
important cognitive elements: 1) the physical gestures in-
volved in the processes of perception of data from the envi-
ronment and 2) the formal structure and the origin of the 
representations used in cognitive processes. I will use sur-
gery as a reference case and I will try to point out some 
relevant differences with respect to the classical physical 
symbol system hypothesis. In the first subsection I will take 
into account the case of a generic objective examination of 
the abdomen. In the second subsection, I will consider a 
specific surgical operation: inguinal hernia. 
 
Objective Examination  
The first step in the process that brings to a surgical opera-
tion is the examination that the surgeon conducts on the pa-
tient who feels specific symptoms. After a brief discussion 
to reconstruct the history of the patient, the surgeon begins 
what is called objective examination. Objective examination 
is a process of gathering of diagnostic data from the pa-
tient’s body which is guided by the four evaluation princi-
ples of medical semeiology: inspection, auscultation, palpa-
tion, percussion (DeGowin & DeGowin, 1976; Swartz, 
2002). In this subsection I take into account the case of a 
generic abdominal examination. This kind of examination is 
constituted by a series of evaluation acts that the surgeon 
accomplishes on the patient’s abdomen by means either of 
external instruments or of parts of the body of the surgeon 
herself. In addition, this examination involves the coopera-
tion of the patient, who is sometimes asked to make specific 
actions in interaction with the examination acts of the sur-
geon. 
A generic abdominal examination can be schematized as 
in the following table 1. 
 
Table 1: Abdominal objective examination. 
 
 Evaluation 
action 
Means End 
1 Inspection of 
the abdomen 
as a whole 
Eyes To evaluate 
how the as-
pect and the 
as a whole pect and the 
shape of the 
abdomen are 
2 Inspection of 
the abdomen 
after having 
asked the pa-
tient to pro-
foundly 
breathe 
Eyes To evaluate 
whether the 
abdomen 
moves 
3 Auscultation 
of the ab-
dominal wall 
before stimu-
lating it with 
palpation 
Stethoscope To evaluate if 
there exists 
an intestinal 
peristalsis 
and how it is 
4 Superficial 
palpation of 
the abdomen 
Hands To evaluate if 
there are 
signs of resis-
tance to the 
abdominal 
wall that are 
linked to 
pathological 
situations 
5 Deep palpa-
tion of the 
abdomen 
Hands To catch the 
aspects that 
the various 
parts of the 
abdomen can 
exhibit and 
that are 
linked to the 
contained 
bowels: 
-Consistence 
-Tension 
-Existence of    
masses 
6 Auscultation 
of the ab-
dominal wall 
after the 
stimulation 
by means of 
palpation 
Stethoscope -To evaluate 
whether, after 
having 
touched and 
moved the 
abdominal 
wall, an in-
crease or de-
crease of the 
intestinal 
peristalsis 
has occurred 
-To evaluate 
if there is 
liquid out of 
the intestinal 
loops 
 
The most important element that we can observe in the 
objective examination and that emerges from the scheme 
above is the following one: the surgeon uses specific per-
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ceptive actions in order to catch and gather specific diagnos-
tic data from the body of the patient. The data that the sur-
geon gathers are diagnostic signs that suggest a particular 
diagnosis or several different diagnoses and that help the 
surgeon in her abductive inference toward a final diagnostic 
hypothesis (Magnani, 2001). As diagnostic clues, the signs 
collected by the surgeon can be viewed, from a cognitive 
point of view, as representations that carry information. 
The main feature of these representations is that they are 
constituted by structured sensations that the surgeon re-
ceives in response to her own structured perceptive actions. 
Therefore, two important aspects emerge: 1) the representa-
tions which are the diagnostic signs collected by the surgeon 
are sensations that the surgeon receives from the environ-
ment (the patient’s body); 2) such representations are elic-
ited and constructed by perceptive actions by means of 
which the surgeon interacts with the patient’s body. These 
two points are important because they open the possibility to 
think of representations and cognitive processes in a new 
way which is different from the classical symbolic perspec-
tive. 
According to the physical symbol system perspective, the 
representations that are used in cognitive processes are 
symbolic configurations that are inside the head of the cog-
nitive agent. These representations are completely internal 
and are constituted by the symbols of a single language with 
a specific syntax. The case of medical examination seen 
above seems to lead to a more embodied perspective. It 
seems plausible to state that the representations on which 
the surgeon relies during an objective examination have, as 
formal structure, the one constituted by the sensations them-
selves that the surgeon receives. This formal structure can 
vary across a great range and, hence, is not the single one of 
the symbols of a single symbolic language. 
Embodiment is also present at the level of cognitive proc-
esses. The physical symbol system perspective does not 
seem to give importance to the perceptive process as a mo-
ment in which not only data are simply perceived from the 
environment, but the environment is inspected and manipu-
lated in specific ways in order to elicit more information. 
The perceptive actions that the surgeon performs during an 
objective examination have a strong epistemic value (Kirsh 
& Maglio, 1994), because they are devoted to examine the 
patient’s body in specific ways so as to obtain specific in-
formation. These structured actions structure the sensations 
that the surgeon receives, that is, they structure her own rep-
resentations. 
 
A Surgical Operation: Inguinal Hernia  
In this subsection I take into account a particular surgical 
operation as a case to point out some relevant aspects about 
the formal structure and the origin of the representations 
used by a cognitive agent. The surgical operation that I con-
sider is the one of inguinal hernia in a male patient (Rutkow 
& Robbins, 1995; Shwartz, Spencer, Galloway, Tom Shires, 
Daly & Fisher, 1998; Trabucco & Trabucco, 1998). Inguinal 
hernia occurs when anatomical elements that are naturally 
contained in the abdomen enter the inguinal canal. Table 2 
shows a schematic description of the main steps of an ingui-
nal hernia operation in a male patient. 
 
Table 2: Main steps of an inguinal hernia surgical operation 
 
1 Incision of the cutis at the level of the inguinal canal 
2 Incision of the fascia of the external oblique muscle to 
have access to the inguinal canal 
3 Isolation of the spermatic cord 
4 Isolation of the hernial sac 
5 Rearrangement of the hernial sac into the abdomen 
6 Hernioplasty at the level of the posterior wall of the in-
guinal canal 
7 Suture of the fascia of the external oblique muscle pre-
viously cut 
8 Suture of the cutis 
 
One of the most relevant aspects of the inguinal hernia 
operation is that this operation requires a precise knowledge 
of the anatomy in order to recognize and carefully isolate 
the various anatomical structures that are found in the ingui-
nal canal in an anatomical situation which has been altered 
by the hernia itself. 
The main cognitive process which is involved in this sur-
gical operation is, thus, the process of recognition. I define 
recognition as a matching process in which the real situation 
with which an agent has actually to do matches the salient 
features of an already defined internal representation that the 
agent entertains and that represents that identical situation or 
an analogous situation. Thus, in the case of surgery, a 
mechanism of recognition of an anatomical structure occurs 
when the anatomical configuration that the surgeon is con-
fronting matches the internal representation that the surgeon 
entertains for that anatomical area. 
Now, the first contact that a surgeon has with the external 
aspect of the anatomical structures of the human body is in 
the study of the illustrative anatomical tables on the anat-
omy books. This is the first moment in which the surgeon 
takes an anatomical representation that comes from outside 
and tries to memorize it, i. e., to bring it inside. I call this 
process internalization of an external representation. But 
every surgeon states that there is a difference between the 
book anatomy and the actual anatomical structures encoun-
tered in a real body, especially in those cases in which the 
anatomy has been altered by the pathological event, as it is 
in the case of the inguinal hernia. For this reason every sur-
geon states that recognizing the anatomical structures is a 
fact of experience. 
Experience is a concept that deserves to be analyzed from 
a cognitive point of view. I have said above that the surgeon 
internalizes the anatomical representations that she studies 
on the anatomy books and that there is often a mismatching 
between these representations and the anatomical structures 
encountered in a real situation. Therefore, in order for the 
surgeon to be able to recognize anatomical structures in an 
actual situation, the book representations of the anatomy 
that the surgeon entertained must change in order to be in 
accordance with the anatomical structures actually encoun-
tered. Through the direct contact with the real anatomical 
elements, a process of change and adaptation of the previ-
ously internalized representations occurs. This is another 
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process of internalization, but more complex and slower 
than the previous one and slightly different from it. 
This new process of internalization of external representa-
tions occurs by means of the repeated observation of many 
cases similar to each other and it is similar to a process of 
abstraction, in which, however, the final abstract representa-
tion is constituted by elements that have their deep origin in 
the experienced external elements. I use for this process the 
name of experience and I define experience as the process of 
internalization of external representations and of progressive 
change and adjustment, through the contact with the envi-
ronment, of the internalized representations during which 
such representations acquire a configuration that conveys 
precise information in an unambiguous way and that can fit 
several different particular situations. 
Also in the case of experienced surgeons there can be 
situations in which it is difficult to recognize the anatomical 
structures. This happens when there is such a situation in the 
operating field that a gap is created between internalized 
representations of the surgeon and actual configuration. It is 
in these circumstances that we can see again the cognitive 
role that manipulations can play. When anatomical data are 
confused and, therefore, the mechanism of recognition is 
made difficult, surgeons often make use of manipulations in 
order to find known anatomical reference elements. These 
manipulations are devoted to fill the gap between actual 
situation and internalized representations and, thus, they 
have an important cognitive relevance. The surgeon, for ex-
ample, in front of a situation in which she cannot see an ana-
tomical structure that she can usually see, almost always 
uses her hands to touch in certain areas in order to find ana-
tomical reference elements that she expects on the basis of 
one of her internalized representations. 
In this example is evident the cognitive role played by the 
manipulation, which examines the internal parts of a human 
body to construct an embodied representation which be in 
accordance with the internalized representation of the sur-
geon herself. At the same time, if the internalized represen-
tation of the surgeon is visual, in this example the surgeon is 
bringing into coordination two different representations of 
the same information, a visual representation and a tactile 
representation and this can be taken as an evidence that 
demonstrates that human cognitive agents are able to handle 
and, in fact, handle different representational codes and not 
a single one. 
The case of surgery seems to push toward cognitive hy-
potheses that give the environment and the manipulations 
that humans perform upon it a predominant role as to the 
process of generation of the representations used in cogni-
tive processes and as to their formal structures. 
 
Double Representation Approach  
In the previous section I have presented a case study and I 
have advanced some hypotheses about the origin and the 
formal structure of representations. In the present section I 
propose a model that tries to explain in a more detailed and 
more schematic way the nature and origin of representations 
and some critical cognitive behaviors that we can observe in 
human beings. 
The classical view within cognitive science drew a dis-
tinction between what was called functional architecture and 
what was called anatomical architecture (Pylyshyn, 1989). 
The anatomical architecture can be considered as the im-
plementational basis on which the functional architecture is 
realized. The functional architecture, instead, has to do with 
the algorithms that the mind uses when it carries out cogni-
tive processes. The classical view concentrated its attention 
especially on the functional architecture and, in some cases, 
even argued that the physical level can be considered as a 
matter of implementational details. The functional architec-
ture was described as the place of symbolic processes in 
which internal symbolic representations was processed. The 
symbols had an arbitrary relationship with their referents 
and formed symbolic structures which had a combinatorial 
syntax and semantics. 
I want to revise the distinction anatomical architecture 
versus functional architecture and take into account the rela-
tionships that can take place between anatomical and func-
tional architecture. To do so, I propose an approach that I 
call Double Representation Approach. Such approach lo-
cates two different representations as the components of any 
cognitive process that takes place in the interaction between 
human agent and environment. The idea is as follows: 
 
1) First-Level Representation: this is the pattern of 
neural activation that arises as the result of the inter-
action between body and environment. This is the 
representation at the anatomical level and this is not 
the representation that human agents directly use in 
their cognitive processes. 
2) Second-Level Representation: this is the thing for 
which the pattern of activation stands and this thing is 
the sensation that emerges from the encounter be-
tween our receptors and the structures of the envi-
ronment and that is shaped by the structure itself of 
the environment. This is the representation at the 
functional level and this is the representation used by 
human agents in their cognitive processes. 
 
The First-Level Representation is called representation 
because it is a pattern that has an analogical relationship 
with the structure of the environment and, thus, can be con-
sidered as an analogical representation of the environment. 
The Second-Level Representation could be considered as 
the “face” that we think the world has; in a certain sense it 
could be considered as the world itself. This assertion comes 
from the consideration that the world is always given to us 
through our sensorial perception, which can be considered, 
at last, as the only possible representation in which we can 
receive the physical world and the representation which is 
closest to the physical world. This means that the Second-
Level Representation, even though it cannot be defined ex-
actly as the world itself, has a strict relationship with the 
world. Now, I call representation the Second-Level Repre-
sentation because the structured configurations of the envi-
ronment are used in cognitive processes because of their 
carrying specific information, their representing such infor-
mation. Therefore, the representations are the form of cogni-
tively relevant information, they embody this information. 
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Now I want to explain in more detail what consequences 
the Double Representation Approach has on the way we can 
account for the way human agents reason. The First-Level 
Representation has a twofold influence on the way humans 
reason, the first one is direct, the second one is indirect and 
is mediated by the Second-Level Representation. We pro-
pose the following scheme: 
 
1) The First-Level Representation, as a pattern of neural 
activation, can be assumed to influence the basic 
mechanism that underlies any cognitive process, re-
gardless of the specific kind of representation used 
and of the specific algorithm followed. This basic 
mechanism can be assumed to be the one constituted 
by the construction of a pattern of elements and the 
fixation of this pattern. 
2) Thanks to the analogical relationship between the 
patterns of neural activation (First-Level Representa-
tions) and the structures of the environment, the Sec-
ond-Level Representations which we entertain reflect 
the structures of the environment. Therefore, human 
agents use representations that have several different 
formal structures each of which influences in a dif-
ferent way the reasoning process. 
 
The Double Representation Approach can provide an ac-
count not only of the representations that originate in a di-
rect contact between agent and environment, but also of 
those representations that human agents generate internally 
in the absence of the environment in order to solve a prob-
lem, represent a goal and so forth. The representations that 
originate in the contact between agent and environment 
take, at the first level, the form of patterns of neural activa-
tion and patterns of neural activation, after adequate train-
ing, tend to become stabilized structures and to fix. At this 
stage the patterns of neural activation no longer need a di-
rect stimulus from the environment for their construction 
and fixation. In a certain sense they can be viewed as fixed 
internal records of external structures that can exist also in 
the absence of such external structures. These patterns of 
neural activation that constitute the First-Level Representa-
tions always keep record of the experience that generated 
them and, thus, always carry the Second-Level Representa-
tion associated to them, even if in a different form, the form 
of memory and not the form of a vivid sensorial experience. 
Now, the human agent, via neural mechanisms, can retrieve 
these Second-Level Representations and use them as inter-
nal representations or use parts of them to construct new in-
ternal representations very different from the ones stored in 
memory. 
In the case of human beings, whose neural growth, ac-
cording to the studies in neural constructivism (Clark, 2003; 
Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997), seems to be strongly environ-
ment-dependent, if we assume a strong relationship between 
neural mechanisms and cognitive processes, we are brought 
to the conclusion that the representations used in cognitive 
processes have a deep origin in the experience lived in the 
environment. 
At least three conclusions can be drawn from the discus-
sion above. First, as I have already said, the analogical rela-
tionship between First-Level Representations and environ-
ment causes the representations that human agents use in 
cognitive processes, that is, the Second-Level Representa-
tions, to be able to have various formal structures, we could 
say various types of syntax and not a single one. The Dou-
ble Representation Approach tries to provide an explanation 
of the mechanisms that would occur in those cases in which 
it seems evident that humans are handling various types of 
representations. 
Second, the Double Representation Approach seems to 
explain why human agents accomplish both computations of 
a “connectionist” type, such as pattern completion or image 
recognition and computations that use a combinatorial syn-
tax and semantics, such as the ones exhibited in language 
usage. The First-Level Representation is generated as a pat-
tern of neural activation and, if we assume, as I do, a more 
direct relation between neural basis and mechanism of rea-
soning, the mechanisms of connectionist creation of the neu-
ral pattern that constitutes the First-Level Representation 
could sometimes influence in a direct manner the mecha-
nisms of reasoning carried out by means of the Second-
Level Representation. This would explain the computations 
of a connectionist type. But, on the other hand, the First-
Level Representation, in virtue of its connectionist character 
itself, has an analogical relationship with the environment 
and gives rise to structured sensations, that is, Second-Level 
Representations, that reflect the structures of the environ-
ment. Therefore, the cognitive agent can exploit all the syn-
tactic structures that it finds in the environment and, most 
important, can follow the computations suggested by these 
structures. Now, among the syntactic structures that an 
agent can encounter there are the combinatorial ones and 
this would explain the combinatorial computations we ex-
perience. 
Third, the fact that the Second-Level Representation is di-
rectly connected to the First-Level Representation and, thus, 
emerges from the interaction between body and environ-
ment points out the importance of the manipulative actions 
at the cognitive level. We can say that, in many cases, it is 
the actions of manipulation of the environment that create a 
specific representation that embodies specific information. 
In this sense, the Double Representation Approach could 
give an explanation to all those actions that human beings 
seem to perform not for achieving a physical goal, but for 
gathering specific information. 
 
Conclusion  
In this article I have first reviewed the classical physical 
symbol system hypotesis and I have concentrated on the fact 
that, according to this classical perspective, the representa-
tions that humans use in their cognitive processes would be 
internal symbolic structures of a single language with a spe-
cific syntax. 
Subsequently, I have taken into account surgery as a case 
study to point out that the manipulations that humans use to 
perceive the environment may have a specific cognitive 
value and that the interaction with the environment plays a 
direct role in generating the formal structure of the represen-
tations used by human cognitive agents in their cognitive 
processes. The hypothesis that seems to emerge is that hu-
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man agents use not a single representational code, but repre-
sentations that can have multiple formal structures. 
Finally, I have tried to construct a model that was able to 
explain in a more detailed way such hypothesis about the 
use of representations of multiple formal structures and that 
was able to provide an embryonic hypothesis about the way 
human cognition works. 
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Abstract 
Event Related Potentials (ERPs) were recorded from 20 
young subjects to auditory target stimuli while they were 
performing three different tasks, using an odd-ball paradigm; 
1. Tones: Subjects were instructed to respond to a 2kHz tone, 
and ignore a 1kHz tone. 2. Phonological: Subjects were 
instructed to respond only to words that had a specific ending 
(“f”). 3. Semantic: Subjects were instructed to respond to 
words that belonged to a specific category (name of 
alphabetic letters). EEG was recorded from 19 electrode sites. 
Peak amplitude of the early component (N100) did not differ 
significantly across the three tasks, while peak latency 
differed significantly across stimuli.  In contrast, the later 
endogenous component (P300) was stimulus- and task- 
dependent. P300 latency differed significantly across stimuli 
and tasks; 327 ms to target tones; 668 ms to the phonological 
targets; and 706 ms to target words in the semantic task. P300 
amplitude was significantly larger to tones than to linguistic 
stimuli. P300 peak amplitude recorded from electrode sites 
over the left hemisphere to the tonal target stimuli did not 
differ significantly from that recorded over the right 
hemisphere. In contrast, P300 amplitude recorded to both the 
phonological and semantic targets was significantly larger 
over the left hemisphere than over the right hemisphere. The 
present results can aid in our understanding of how humans 
process linguistic stimuli. These findings emphasize the 
importance of using similar experimental protocols for a 
broad comparison of the ERP response to a variety of stimuli 
and tasks.  
Introduction 
The process of auditory speech perception requires the 
use of sensory information in conjunction with linguistic 
knowledge. Event related potential recordings which have 
been increasingly used in the research of human cognitive 
processes, can provide information on the patterns of 
cortical activity that underlie different modes of processing 
various kinds of auditory and linguistic information. 
The use of P300 for auditory presented tonal stimuli is 
well known. Studies have compared the ERP responses to 
tonal stimuli to vowels (Tiitinen et al 1999), syllables 
(Kayser et al 2001) or words (Lovrich et al 1988) and 
reported prolongation of latency as well as decrease in 
amplitude. These differences reflect the involvement of 
different processes in tonal and speech stimuli. 
Using tonal stimuli Polich (1997)) reported an asymmetry 
in P300 amplitude with right hemisphere dominance 
specifically at the frontal and central electrode sites. They 
interpreted the data as reflecting the allocation of attention. 
Other researchers (Bruder et al 1999, Breier et al 1999) did 
not observe any laterality effect. Using speech stimuli a left 
hemisphere advantage was observed for phonemes, syllables 
(Kayser et al 2001, Alho et al 1998) and word stimuli 
(Breier et al 1999).  
 
Studies have examined ERP morphology and topography 
using linguistic stimuli (Novick et al 1985, Henkin et al 
2002). There seems to be an agreement among researchers 
that while phonological processing is characterized by a left 
hemisphere advantage, semantic processing is less localized, 
since it involves the activation of distributed networks in the 
brain (Lovrich et al 1988, Thierry et al 1998, Angrilli et al 
2000).  
In the present study, we used the oddball paradigm to 
generate a clear P300 component. We suggest that this 
paradigm, and specifically the P300 component, is  
appropriate to compare the ERP to a variety of target stimuli 
that lie along a continuum of auditory processing, from 
basic sensory discrimination of auditory features (tones) to 
cognitive language processing (e.g. phonology and 
semantics).  
Methods 
Subjects: 
Twenty University students ranging in age from 20-26, 
mean age 22.5 (10 male and 10 female) participated in the 
study as part of their course requirement. Written informed 
consent was obtained, and the Bar Ilan University Ethic 
committee approved all experiments.  
 
All subjects reported they were right handed, native 
Hebrew speakers, healthy and had no history of neurological 
or psychiatric disease. All passed a hearing screening test 
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performed in a quiet room using the Madsen OB 822 
audiometer. 
Stimuli: 
Three different auditory tasks were tested using the 
oddball paradigm. One task consisted of tonal stimuli, and 
the other two tasks consisted of speech stimuli: 
 
Tones: Subjects were instructed to respond to a 2kHz 
pure tone target and ignore the standard 1kHz tone. The tone 
duration was 50ms with rise/fall time of 10ms, and an 
interstimulus interval (onset to onset) of 2 sec.  
 
Speech stimuli: High frequency Hebrew monosyllabic 
short words were chosen as stimuli. The duration of word 
stimuli ranged between 450-500ms. The same initial 
phonemes were used for both targets and nontargets so that 
discrimination between the targets and nontargets was only 
possible if the subject attended to the last phoneme. For 
example: If the target was “kaf” (alphabetic letter), the 
nontargets were “kal” (easy) or “kar” (cold). In a series of 
pilot experiments, we attempted to record ERPs using 
11different target stimuli. The waveform in the expected 
P300 window was extremely spread with no clear peak. 
Consequently, in the present experiment we used three 
different targets and twelve nontarget stimuli to generate a 
clear P300 (See figure 1). 
 
Two linguistic tasks were included in the experiment: 
Phonological: Subjects were instructed to respond only to 
words that had a specific ending ("f"). 
Semantic: Subjects were instructed to respond to words 
from a specific category (name of Alphabetic letter). 
 
The exact same target and nontarget words were used in 
the two speech tasks so that we could compare the 
behavioral and ERP responses to the same target stimuli in 
the two different linguistic tasks.  
 
The oddball paradigm was programmed on a PC with the 
Audio task editor, Orgil medical equipment. In all 
experimental tasks conducted, a total of 180-195 stimuli 
were presented, thus the probability that a stimulus would 
be a target was 0.2. Stimuli were presented binaurally at 60 
dBSL. 
Procedure: 
During the experiment subjects were instructed to fixate 
on a point located 1.5meters distant on the wall facing them, 
while keeping eye movement, blinks and general body 
movement to a minimum. 
Subjects were instructed to press a button when detecting 
the target stimuli. A practice run was used to ensure that all 
individuals understood the task. Presentation order of the 
different conditions was counterbalanced across subjects. 
The entire session (of all 11 tasks not all reported here) 
lasted not longer than 3.5 hours.  
The recording system:  
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 19 
sites on the scalp according to the International 10-20 
system referenced to back of neck. A ground electrode was 
placed on the right mastoid. An additional electrode placed 
below the right eye recorded electrooculogram (EOG) to 
monitor eye movement. The impedance measured for each 
electrode was lower than 7k ohm. The EEG program used to 
collect the data was Ceegraph IV Digital EEG system 
Biologic Corp.  Raw data was continuously recorded with a 
band pass filter at 0.1-100Hz, sampling rate was 256Hz. 
Signals were amplified and digitized on line with a 4ms 
step. 
 
All data underwent analysis using BPM Orgil medical 
equipment. Recordings were first segmented into epochs 
that were time locked to the stimuli and extended from 
200ms pre-stimulus to 1800ms post-stimulus. Behavioral 
reaction time and accuracy were measured. The data were 
referenced to a common 100 ms pre-stimulus base line. 
Trials containing eye blinks or movements, excessive 
muscle activity artifacts were corrected or rejected. If more 
than 15 of the 35-40 sweeps of a given target were rejected 
for any reason, then all of the data in that condition for that 
subject was rejected. Thus, each ERP was based on a 
minimum of 20-25 sweeps.  
 
Recordings to the target were averaged separately from 
recordings to the standard stimuli. The responses to 
standards preceding the targets were averaged and used as 
the comparison. ERPs were originally analyzed for correct 
response only. Because there were no differences between 
the averaged ERPs for correctly detected targets and those 
for all targets, further analysis was based on the later.  
 
In a collateral behavioral experiment eight young naive 
subjects were instructed to write down exactly what they 
heard.  Target words were cut and segmented in 25 ms 
intervals from 200ms to 500ms. All the segments were 
rearranged and randomly presented. The earliest cut off 
point where at least six subjects recognized the word 
correctly was defined as the point of identification for that 
word (e.g. "taf" was identified at 300ms). The results 
indicated that although the length of the words in the present 
experiment ranged from 450-500ms, all the words were 
correctly identified within the range of 275-350ms after 
word onset. ERP recording analysis were time-locked both 
to stimulus onset, and also to the point of identification 
based on the behavioral judgments. Using averaging to 
behavioral point of identification rather than to the onset of 
stimuli showed no significant difference in P300 peak 
latency and amplitude.  
 
The measurements: 
Behavioral measures of reaction time and performance 
accuracy were recorded as well as electrophysiologic 
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measures. ERP’s were quantified in terms of peak latencies 
and peak amplitudes of the maximum negative or positive 
values within specific time windows. The time window for 
the different components was determined by visual 
inspection of the grand averages over all subjects. N100 was 
identified as the most negative point between 50 and 180ms 
post-stimulus. P300 peak amplitude was identified as the 
maximum positive point between 250 and 450ms for tones 
and 550 to 900ms for the speech stimuli.  
Statistical analysis 
Latency and amplitude values as well as behavioral 
measures were subjected to repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with 3 levels of task as well as 6 levels 
of electrode site as within subject factors. The level of 
significance was set to p<0.05. 
 
Correlation tests were preformed between tasks, between 
behavioral and electrophysiological components.  
Results: 
Behavioral results: 
The accuracy and reaction time data were analyzed (each 
separately) by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with task as a repeated variable. Accuracy measured as 
percent of target detection was not significantly affected by 
task. Task had a significant effect on reaction times to target 
stimuli (F[2,36]=109.426, p<0.001). Post hoc analysis 
revealed that the response to the target tones was always 
shorter than to the target speech stimuli (p<0.001), with no 
significant differences in RT within the speech stimuli 
(Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Behavioral results of accuracy and reaction time 
averaged from all 20 subjects. 
semantic phonology tone   
90.1 
11.82 
93.94 
9.87 
93.74 
8.04 
Mean 
SD 
Accuracy 
(%) 
869.3 
98.72 
829.67 
92.27 
459.95 
87.46 
Mean 
SD 
Reaction 
time (ms) 
Electrophysiological results: 
Latency: Latency values (N100 and P300) were analyzed 
separately by a repeated measure analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with 3 levels of task as a within subject factor.  
Both N100 and P300 latencies showed a significant main 
effect of task (N100 F[2,38]=12.35, p<0.001; P300 
F[2,38]=217.561, p<0.001) (Table 2). Post Hoc analysis 
showed that N100 latency to the target in the tonal task was 
significantly shorter than to targets in both speech tasks 
(p<0.001). However, there were no significant differences in 
N100 latency to targets in the phonological task versus 
targets in the semantic task. Post hoc analysis revealed that 
P300 peak latency was significantly shortest to tonal stimuli 
(p<0.001), and within the speech stimuli, P300 latency to 
targets in the semantic task was significantly longer than to 
the targets in the phonological task (p<0.044) (Figure 1). 
 
There were no significant correlations between any of the 
behavioral and electrophysiological measurements. 
 
Table 2: N100 and P300 latency results averaged from all 
20 subjects 
semantic phonology tone   
124.4 
22.53 
129.48 
25.51 
91.48 
29.14 
Mean 
SD 
N100 
latency (ms) 
705.58 
74.34 
668.71 
78.4 
327.5 
18.76 
Mean 
SD 
P300 latency 
(ms) 
 
 
Figure 1: Grand average from all 20 subjects for the 3 
tasks recorded at the Pz electrode. As can be seen, N100 
latency was shorter for the tonal targets (dashed line) than 
the phonological (thick) and semantic (thin) targets. The 
P300 was shortest in latency and had larger amplitude to 
tonal targets as compared to speech targets. 
 
Amplitude and Topography: A general repeated 
measure ANOVA with 5 levels for electrode site (frontal, 
central, parietal, occipital and temporal) revealed P300 
amplitude was largest in parietal electrodes (Main effect of 
electrode site F[4,76]=9.023, p<.001). Further statistical 
analyses were performed on selected sets of scalp sites. On 
the basis of the observed distributions, the statistical 
analysis of ERP was limited to the central and parietal 
electrode sites (C4, Cz, C3, P3, Pz, P4).  
Peak amplitude of N100 and P300 were analyzed 
separately by a two-way repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with 6 levels of electrode site and 3 
levels of task as within subject factors.  
 
N100: N100 amplitude showed a main effect of electrode 
site (F[5,92]=144.194, p<0.001) and did not show any 
significant effect of task.  Post hoc analysis indicated that 
N100 peak amplitude was largest over the central electrode 
sites (p<0.001).  
The degree of hemispheric asymmetry was computed by 
subtracting N100 peak amplitude recorded over the right 
hemisphere from that recorded over the left hemisphere (see 
Bellis et al 2000 for use of a similar index). As seen in 
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Figure 2 there was no significant difference in N100 
amplitude recorded from the electrode sites over the left 
hemisphere (c3, p3) as compared to the electrode sites over 
the right hemisphere (c4, p4), for targets in either tonal, 
phonology or semantic tasks. 
  
0
4
-3 0 3
left hemisphere            right hemisphere
tones
phonology
semantic
 
Figure 2: Degree of hemispheric symmetry in N100 
amplitude. Results indicate responses were essentially 
symmetrical across all tasks.  
 
P300: P300 peak amplitude was significantly affected by 
two of the variables, task and electrode site (F[2,38]=21.08, 
p<0.001; F[5,95]=61.256, p<0.001 respectively) as well as a 
two-way  interaction of task X electrode site 
(F[10,195]=3.021,  p<0.001). Post hoc analyses showed that 
the largest P300 amplitude was recorded over the parietal 
sites (p<0.001), and when comparing the tasks the largest 
P300 amplitude was recorded to targets in the tonal task 
(p<0.001).  
 
P300 amplitude to targets in the tonal task were 
distributed symmetrically over the electrode sites. There 
was no significant difference in P300 amplitude recorded to 
tonal targets from the electrode site over the left hemisphere 
as compared to the comparable electrode site over the right 
hemisphere. In contrast, for both the phonological and 
semantic speech tasks, P300 amplitudes recorded from the 
parietal electrode site (p3) over the left hemisphere was 
significantly larger than P300 amplitude recorded from the 
parietal electrode site (p4) over the right hemisphere 
(phonology t[18]=2.551 p<0.02; semantics t[18]=4.392 
p<0.001). ( Figure 3). 
 
0
4
-303
left hemisphere           right hemisphere
tone
phonology
semantic
    Figure 3: Degree of asymmetry for P300 amplitude. 
While for the tonal stimuli responses were essentially 
symmetrical, a significant degree of asymmetry can be seen 
for both speech stimuli, most pronounced in the semantic 
task, favoring the left hemisphere.  
 
At the central electrode sites the distribution of P300 was 
symmetrical. 
Discussion  
Behavioral 
The average accuracy scores for the 3 tasks ranged 
between 90-94% (Table 1). The high level of accuracy may 
have caused a ceiling effect and resulted in the inability to 
differentiate among the three tasks (Henkin et al 2002). In 
contrast, RT was sensitive to the different tasks. RT to 
targets in the tonal task was significantly shorter than to the 
targets in the two speech tasks. Although we did not find 
significant differences in RT to the targets in the 
phonological task versus targets in the semantic task, earlier 
studies did report such a difference (Novick et al 1985, 
Henkin et al 2002). The present study differs from the two 
earlier studies in that the construction of the targets in both 
the phonological and semantic tasks was such that subjects 
could not differentiate targets from nontargets unless they 
attended to the last phoneme. This may have presented a 
more difficult task than either of the earlier studies whose 
stimulus construction allowed for discrimination of targets 
from nontargets at an earlier stage of stimulus processing. 
N100 
The largest N100 peak amplitude was recorded over the 
central electrode sites. There were no significant differences 
between N100 recorded to targets and to nontargets in any 
of the tasks. Furthermore, there was a significant correlation 
between N100 to target and non-target in each of the tasks. 
These findings support the hypothesis that N100 represents 
obligatory primary sensory processing dependant upon the 
arrival of any stimuli at the auditory cortex, but does not by 
itself indicate any sort of discrimination or any of the task 
requirements (Martin et al 1999). 
 
The N100 latency to the tonal stimuli was always shorter 
than to the speech stimuli, but there were no significant 
differences in N100 latency between the two speech stimuli. 
Similar results were previously reported (Wunderlich and 
Cone-Wesson 2001). Since N100 is an exogenous wave, it 
is sensitive to changes in the basic physical characteristics 
of the stimuli. 
P300 
As noted above, the P300 paradigm was chosen as the 
experimental technique so that the same 
electrophysiological components might be compared across 
a variety of stimuli and tasks.   
 
In the present study P300 latency showed significant 
differences between the responses to tones and to the speech 
stimuli (327ms versus 668-706ms). The increase in latency 
for speech stimuli compared to tonal stimuli was reported 
previously (Tiitinen et al 1999, Kayser et al 1998). We 
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tested the hypothesis that the difference in P300 peak 
latency to tonal targets as compared to speech targets was 
due to the specific construction of the speech stimuli which 
required attention to the last phoneme before discrimination 
was possible. Subjects could only discriminate the target 
from the nontargets after hearing the last phoneme of the 
word while they could theoretically begin the process of 
discriminating the tone target from the tone nontargets 
beginning with stimulus onset. Furthermore, the duration of 
the tonal stimuli was 50ms, while the duration of the speech 
stimuli ranged between 450-500ms. This would mean that 
the difference in P300 peak latency to targets in the tonal 
task versus targets in the speech tasks should be directly 
related to the duration of the speech stimuli necessary to 
discriminate the words (Woodward et al 1990). In an 
adjunct experiment, we found that the average word 
identification point ranged between 275-350ms after word 
onset. Note the additional amount of time required for 
identification of speech stimuli (approximately 325ms) 
coincides with the time difference between P300 latency of 
tones (327ms) and P300 latency of speech stimuli (668-
706ms).  
Alternatively, it is possible that processing speech stimuli 
takes longer than processing tones. Therefore, the difference 
in P300 peak latency to tone targets versus speech targets 
also included the differences in processing time to the two 
types of stimuli (Bentin et al 1999). 
 
The present findings can be related to the ongoing debate 
concerning the identity of the late ERP potential recorded to 
speech stimuli within the 500-750 ms time window, the 
“identity” thesis. Coulson et al (1998) argued that ERPs 
recorded in complex cognitive tasks are basically identical 
to (or are just modifications of) waves found in simpler 
conditions. Particularly, the P600 component of the scalp 
recorded event-related brain potential related to syntactic 
violation processing is just a delayed P300 similar to that 
recorded in simple oddball tasks (both are sensitive to 
probability manipulations and are similar in their respective 
scalp distribution).  Kotchoubey and Lang (2001) used a 
paradigm in which subjects discriminated infrequent targets 
from frequent standards based on a semantic feature (e.g. 
animals versus other common nouns), this paradigm elicited 
a positive parietal wave in the 600 ms window frame. They 
argued that the P600 is an oddball delayed P300 component 
elicited in a semantic oddball experiment to more complex 
stimuli.  
 
The alternative view states that there exist specific ERP 
waves manifesting brain mechanisms of language 
processing (Osterhout et al 1994, Frisch et al 2003). The late 
positive wave P600 recorded in response to syntactically 
anomalous words manifests specific brain mechanisms of 
syntactic processing.  
 
Comparison between speech tasks: P300 latency to 
target stimuli in the phonology word tasks was significantly 
shorter than to targets in the semantic tasks.  Similar results 
have been reported (Novick et al 1985, Cobianchi and 
Giaquinto 1997) 
Topographical distribution 
Tones: In our study both N100 and P300 peak amplitude 
in the tonal task were distributed symmetrically over the 
two hemispheres. These results are similar to previous 
reports using pure tones (Breier et al 1999) as well as  
complex tones (Bruder et al 1999, Kayser et al 2001).   
Speech tasks: In the present study, While N100 peak 
amplitude distribution was symmetrical over the two 
hemispheres, P300 peak amplitude to the targets in the two 
speech tasks, was significantly larger when recorded from 
the parietal electrode over the left hemisphere (p3) as 
compared to the right hemisphere (p4). Similar results were 
reported in other studies using phonemes, syllables (Kayser 
et al 2001, Alho et al 1998) and words (Breier et al 1999). It 
is important to note that the change from hemispheric 
symmetry in tonal stimuli to hemispheric asymmetry in 
speech stimuli was found only for the P300 component and 
not for the N100 component (compare Fig 2 and 3). This 
dissociation of the two ERP components further emphasizes 
their different electrophysiological representations and may 
point to a dynamic change of hemispheric interaction in the 
processing of speech stimuli over time. 
 
Phonology vs.  semantics: A number of imaging and 
ERP studies have concluded that while phonological 
processing is more confined to regions of the left 
hemisphere, the semantic processing is less localized, since 
it involves the activation of distributed networks in the 
brain. (Ferlazzo et al 1993, Cobianchi and Giaquinto 1997, 
Thierry et al 1998, Angrilli et al 2000, Connolly et al 2001). 
For example, imaging studies demonstrated that 
phonological processes are related to Broca’s area and the 
left inferior frontal gyrus (Demonet et al 1992, Becker at al 
1999). However, during lexical-semantic tasks there is a 
wider cortical distribution of activation, not confined only to 
the left temporal and inferior frontal areas (Zatorre et al 
1992, Kareken et al 2000, Zahn et al 2000). In the present 
study we found hemispheric asymmetry favoring the left 
hemisphere to targets in both the phonological and semantic 
tasks and did not find a significant difference in the 
hemispheric asymmetry of P300 peak amplitude favoring 
either the targets in the phonological or semantic tasks. 
These results are in line with several imaging studies 
(Poldrack et al 1999, Johnson et al 2001) that point to a 
greater activation of left hemisphere neural systems for both 
semantic and phonological tasks. 
Acknowledgments 
This work is part of the Ph.D. dissertation of the first author, 
was supported by the Schupf scholarship. The study was 
conducted in the Gonda Goldschmied Medical Diagnostic 
Research Center. The authors also thank Shlomo Gilat for 
450
the technical assistance and Yury Kamenir for the statistical 
analysis. 
References 
Alho K., Connolly J.F., Cheour M., Lehtokoski A., 
Huotilainen M., Virtanen J., Aulanko R., Ilmoniemi R.J. 
(1998). Hemispheric lateralization in preattentive 
processing of speech sounds. Neurosc. Lett. 258, 9-12. 
Angrilli A., Dobel C., Rocksroch B., Stegagno L., Elbert T. 
(2000). EEG brain mapping of phonological and semantic 
tasks in Italian and German languages. Clin Neurophysiol. 
111, 706-716.   
Becker J.T., MacAndrew D.K., & Fiez J.A. (1999). A 
comment on the functional localization of the 
phonological storage subsystem of working memory. 
Brain and Cognition 41, 27-38. 
Bellis T.J., Nicol T., Kraus N. (2000). Aging affects 
hemispheric asymmetry in the neural representation of 
speech sounds. J. Neurosc. 15(5), 791-797.  
Bentin S., Mouchetant-Rostaing Y., Giard M.H., Echallier 
J.F., Pernier J. (1999). ERP manifestations of processing 
printed words at different psycholinguistic levels: time 
course and scalp distribution. J Cogn Neurosci. 11(3), 
235-60. 
Breier J.L., Simos P.G., Zouridakis G., Papanicolaou A.C. 
(1999). Lateralization of cerebral activation in auditory 
verbal and non verbal memory tasks using 
magnetoencephalography. Brain Topogr. 12, 89-97. 
Bruder G., Kayser J., Tenke C., Amador X., Friedman M., 
Sharif Z., Gorman J. (1999). Left temporal lobe 
dysfunction in schizophrenia: event related potential and 
    behavioral evidence from phonetic and tonal dichotic    
listening tasks. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 56, 267-276. 
Cobianchi A. and Giaquinto S. (1997): Event related 
potentials in Italian spoken words. EEG Clin. 
Neurophysiol. 104, 213-221. 
Connolly J.F., Service E., D'Arcy R.C., Kujala A., Alho K. 
(2001). Phonological aspects of word recognition as 
revealed by high-resolution spatio-temporal brain 
mapping. Neuroreport. 12(2), 237-43. 
Coulson S., King J.W., Kutas M. (1998). ERPs and domain 
specificity: beating a straw horse. Lang  Cogn Proces 
13(6), 653-72 
Demonet J.F., Chollet F., Ramsay S., Cardebat D., 
Nespoulous J.L., Wise R., Rascol A., Frackowiak R. 
(1992). The anatomy of phonological and semantic 
processing in normal subjects. Brain 115, 1753-68. 
Ferlazzo F., Conte S., Gentilomo A. (1993). Event-related 
potentials and recognition memory within the 'levels of 
processing' framework. Neuroreport 4(6), 667-70. 
Frisch S., Kotz S.A., von Cramon D.Y., Friederici A.D. 
(2003). Why the P600 is not just a P300: the role of the 
basal ganglia. Clin Neurophysiol 114(2), 336-40. 
Henkin Y., Kishon-Rabin L., Gadoth N., Pratt H. (2002). 
Auditory event-related potentials during phonetic and 
semantic processing in children. Audiol Neurootol. 7(4), 
228-39. 
Johnson S.C., Saykin A.J., Flashman L.A., McAllister T.W., 
O'Jile J.R., Sparling M.B., Guerin S.J., Moritz C.H., & 
Mamourian A.C. (2001). Similarities and differences in 
semantic and phonological processing with age: patterns 
of fMRI activation. Aging, Neuropsychology and 
cognition 8(4), 307-20. 
Kareken D.A., Lowe M., Chen S.H., Lurito J., Mathews V. 
(2000). Word rhyming as a probe of hemispheric 
language dominance with functional magnetic resonance 
imaging. Neuropsychiatry Neuropsychol Behav Neurol. 
13(4), 264-70 
Kayser J., Bruder G.E., Tenke C.E., Stuart B.K., Amador 
X.F., Gorman J.M. (2001). Event-related brain potentials 
(ERPs) in schizophrenia for tonal and phonetic oddball 
tasks. Biol Psychiatry. 49(10), 832-47. 
Kotchoubey B., Lang S. (2001). Event-related potentials in 
an auditory semantic oddball task in humans. Neurosci 
Lett. 14, 93-6. 
Lovrich D., Novick B., Vaughan Jr. (1988). Topographic 
analysis of auditory event-related potentials associated 
with acoustic and semantic processing. EEG Clin 
Neurophysiol 71, 40-54. 
Martin B.A., Kurtzberg D., Stapells D.R.(1999). The effects 
of decreased audibility produced by high pass noise 
masking on N1 and the mismatch negativity to speech 
sounds /ba/ and /da/. J Speech Lang Hear Res 42, 271-86. 
Novick B., Lovrich D., Vaughan HG. (1985). Event-related 
potentials associated with the discrimination of acoustic 
and semantic aspects of speech. Neuropsychologia 23(1), 
87-101. 
Osterhout L., Holcomb P.J., Swinney D.A.(1994). Brain 
potentials elicited by garden-path sentences: evidence of 
the application of verb information during parsing. J Exp 
Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 4, 786-803.  
Poldrack R.A., Wagner A.D., Prull M.W., Desmond J.E., 
Glover G.H., Gabrieli J.D. (1999). Functional 
specialization for semantic and phonological 
processing in the left inferior prefrontal cortex. 
Neuroimage 10(1), 15-35. 
Polich  J.(1997). EEG and ERP assessment of normal aging.  
Electroencephalog. Clin. Neurophysiol. 104,  244-256. 
Thierry G., Doyon B., Demonet J.F. (1998). ERP mapping 
in phonological and lexical semantic monitoring tasks: A 
study complementing previous PET results. Neuroimage 
8(4), 391-408 
Tiitinen H., Sivonen P., Alku P., Virtanen J., Naatanen R. 
(1999). Electromagnetic recordings reveal latency 
differences in speech and tone processing in humans. 
Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 8(3), 355-63. 
Woodward S.H., Owens J., Thompson L.W. (1990). Word 
to word variation in ERP components latencies: spoken 
words. Brain Lang 38, 488-503 
Wunderlich J.L., & Cone-Wesson B.K. (2001). Effects of 
stimulus frequency and complexity on the mismatch 
negativity and other components of the cortical auditory 
evoked potential. Acous. Soc Am. 109, 1526-36. 
Zahn R., Huber W., Drews E., Erbrich S., Krings T., 
Willmes K., & Schwarz M. (2000). Hemispheric 
lateralization at different levels of human auditory word 
processing: a functional magnetic resonance imaging 
study. Neurosci lett. 287, 195-198. 
 
 
451
Analogical Encoding: Facilitating Knowledge Transfer and Integration 
 
Dedre Gentner (gentner@northwestern.edu) 
Department of Psychology, 2029 Sheridan Road 
Evanston, IL 60208 USA 
 
Jeffrey Loewenstein (jeffrey.loewenstein@columbia.edu) 
Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway 
New York, NY 10023 USA 
 
Leigh Thompson (leighthompson@kellogg.northwestern.edu) 
Kellogg School of Management, 2001 Sheridan Road 
Evanston, IL 60208 USA 
 
 
Abstract 
People’s ability to recall and use prior experience when faced 
with current problems is surprisingly limited. We suggest that 
one reason is that information is often encoded in a situation-
specific manner, so that subsequent remindings are limited to 
situations that are similar to the original both in content and in 
context.  Analogical encoding—the explicit comparison of 
two partially understood situations—can foster the discovery 
of common principles and allow transfer to new structurally 
similar situations. This paper addresses two new questions: 
(1) whether comparison can also improve people’s ability to 
retrieve examples from long term memory; and (2) whether 
simply providing the common principle would suffice to 
promote transfer. The results show (1) that not only does 
comparing examples facilitate transfer forward to a new  
problem, it can also facilitate transfer backwards to retrieve 
an example from memory; and (2) providing a common 
principle is not sufficient: comparison is still beneficial. 
Introduction 
The ability to transfer relational knowledge across contexts 
is of central importance in human cognition. (Gentner, 
2003). Yet people do not acquire relational abstractions 
effortlessly (Chi, Feltovitch & Glaser, 1981; Chase & 
Simon, 1973), nor do they always apply them when they 
would be helpful (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). Drawing 
analogies during learning can address both of these 
challenges (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gentner, 
Loewenstein & Thompson, 2003). We will also examine 
another role of analogy in learning. Our findings indicate 
that comparing two structurally similar examples 
(analogical encoding) not only facilitates transfer to future 
structurally similar cases, but also the retrieval of prior 
structurally similar examples from memory.   
An important means of learning is analogical transfer—
the use of a prior fami liar situation (the base) to solve a 
novel situation (the target) by mapping the solution from the 
base problem to the target problem. This kind of transfer has 
been shown to occur in reasoning and problem-solving 
(Bassok, 1990; Novick, 1988; Reed, 1987; Ross, 1987). 
Research on analogical transfer also reveals an Achilles’ 
heel. When people succeed in accessing appropriate prior 
examples to inform current problems, they perform well 
(e.g., Pirolli & Andersen, 1985). The importance of prior 
cases in current reasoning has been argued persuasively in 
the case-based reasoning literature (Kolodner, 1993; Schank 
& Riesbeck, 1981). However, people often fail to access 
prior cases  that would be useful, even when they can be 
shown to have retained the material in me mory (Gentner, 
Rattermann & Forbus, 1993; Gick & Holyoak, 1980). 
Indeed, people are often unable to solve a problem after 
having just solved an analogous problem (see Reeves & 
Weisberg, 1994 for a review). 
One way to promote structural transfer is by comparing 
two initial examples (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). This process 
capitalizes on the fact that comparison between two 
exemplars tends to make common relational structure more 
salient (Gentner & Markman, 1997). We call this analogical 
encoding, to emphasize that one can compare two partly  
understood examples to derive a common interpretation 
(Kurtz, Miao & Gentner, 2001). As Gick & Holyoak (1983) 
demonstrated, comparing two initial examples can facilitate 
deriving a schema, which in turn facilitates transfer to a  
structurally-similar problem (Catrambone & Holyoak, 
1989).  In contrast, people learning from a single case tend 
to encode it in a context -specific manner, with the result that 
later remindings are often based on more obvious surface 
aspects (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991). 
We are investigating analogical transfer in the domain of 
negotiation (Loewenstein, Thompson & Gentner, 2003; 
Thompson, Gentner & Loewenstein, 2000). Negotiation is a 
particularly apt arena, for several reasons.  Negotiation 
principles must be applied across many different contexts, 
making transferability essential. Further, the learning must 
be applied in real time, often in stressful, competitive 
situations with the potential for considerable gain or loss. 
Finally, our participants are highly motivated; they are 
studying negotiation with a direct interest in raising their job 
effectiveness.  
In a typical negotiation situation, there is a set of issues in 
which two parties have different preferences, and to which 
they assign different levels of importance. The goal is to 
achieve an agreement, with each participant trying to 
optimize their gain. The negotiation principle we focus on 
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here is the idea of constructing contingent contracts: 
agreements whose terms depend on the outcome of a future 
event (Bazerman & Gillespie, 1999). These contracts allow 
people to reach agreement despite differences in opinion. 
Despite their usefulness, untrained negotiators tend not to 
form contingent contracts. Instead, most negotiators form 
inefficient compro mises (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). 
In our studies, the basic method is as follows. We provide 
highly motivated students (typically MBA students  or 
executives) with materials to prepare for a face-to-face 
negotiation. Before negotiating, all participants read two 
brief cases that illustrate a negotiation principle (e.g., a 
contingent contract) that would be advantageous to use in 
their face-to-face negotiation. Half the participants (the 
comparison group) are told to compare the two cases and 
write out their commonalities; the other half (the separate-
cases group) is told to read each case and write out what is 
important about it. Participants are then paired with 
someone in the same condition to conduct the negotiation, 
which is set in a different context than the study cases. We 
have found that participants who compared the two cases 
are two to three times as likely to use the negotiation 
strategy in their subsequent face-to-face negotiations as 
those who analyzed the same cases one at a time (e.g., 
Thompson, Gentner and Loewenstein, 2000).  
Comparing analogous cases promotes forward transfer. 
That is, it increases the likelihood that the common principle 
will be retrieved when an analogous situation occurs in the 
future. One route that has been proposed for this increased 
transfer may be that schema-abstraction leads to increased 
matching (Ross, 1989). This possibility follows directly 
from the assumptions of schema-abstraction. Comparison 
invites an alignment and re-representation of examples, 
yielding a common representation that is  less context -
specific than the initial ones (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; 
Loewenstein, Thompson & Gentner, 1999). Because this 
new representation has more general  relational 
representations and fewer potentially conflicting object 
matches than the initial cases,  the match with subsequent 
cases will be better, making remindings more likely (Forbus 
et al, 1995; Ross, 1989). However, there is another possible 
reason for the increase in forward transfer, namely, 
learning-to-encode. Having derived a common 
representation, people may encode future cases in the 
domain in a similar manner. (Medin & Ross, 1989). The 
learning-to-encode account predicts that future cases are 
likely to match the schema that resulted from the 
comparison, because they will be encoded in the same way.  
Using retrieval to clarify the transfer process. Although 
most researchers have assumed that both increased matching 
and learning-to-encode are part of the story, the forward-
transfer improvement could be explained solely by learning-
to-encode. However, the learning-to-encode account cannot 
predict any effect on retrieval of cases acquired prior to the 
schema abstraction. Thus, if learning-to-encode is the main  
reason for improved transfer, then the effects of comparison 
should be unidirectional: better learning today will help 
performance tomorrow, but will be of little help in 
retrieving examples that were learned yesterday. In contrast, 
if schema abstraction per se is an important force here, then 
we will see bi-directional effects: abstracting a schema 
should aid in retrieval whether it is forwards or backwards.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we tested whether analogical encoding 
facilitates both forward transfer and backwards retrieval. If 
so, this would suggest a degree of symmetry in the memory 
retrieval process.  That is, it would suggest that an abstract 
relational structure is better retrieved by future cases  and 
also serves as a better probe for prior cases than a specific 
case.  
We gave all participants two analogous examples. We 
asked half to compare them, and half to study the examples 
one at a time. Next, to test whether comparison aids 
memory retrieval, we asked people to recall an example 
from their own experience that illustrated the same principle  
as the initial examples. Finally, to test for transfer, we asked 
whether people would use the principle to form better 
agreements in a subsequent face-to-face negotiation (as in 
our prior studies). 
 Our participants were management consultants  in a 
negotiation training program. Given the amount of money 
and time devoted to this training, there is no question that 
they were highly motivated to learn. They should also be 
professionally predisposed to value learning and 
generalization. 
Method 
Participants  A total of 124 participants aged approximately 
25 to 45 years, all full-time professional management 
consultants working at the same organization, participated 
through a negotiation training seminar. There were 64 in the 
comparison condition and 60 in the separate cases 
condition. 
 
Materials and procedure. Participants read role materials 
to prepare to be either the buyer or seller in a negotiation 
role-playing scenario. Just prior to engaging in the role play, 
participants received a training packet. The first page 
concerned details about their upcoming negotiation. The 
next pages contained two cases exemplifying the contingent 
contract principle. The Comparison group read both cases 
and then was asked “What is going on in these negotiations? 
Think about the similarities between these two cases. What 
are the key parallels in the two negotiations? Please describe 
the solution and say how successful you think it is.” The 
Separate case group received the following question after 
each case: “What is going on in this negotiation? Please 
describe the solution and say how successful you think it 
is.”  
For both groups, the next  page of the training packet 
asked participants to recall an example like those they had 
just read: “Please think of an example, preferably from your 
own exp erience, that embodies the same principle as that on 
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the previous page.” We then asked participants to state the 
source of their examples. Participants were not limited as to 
time and typically spent 45-60 minutes on these three pages 
(an indication of their motivation to learn). We saw no time-
on-task differences by condition. Then they were paired 
with someone from the same condition to negotiate. The 
negotiation case was set in a different context than the 
training cases, and was designed to afford creating a 
mutually beneficial contingent contract. 
 
Scoring The negotiated agreements were scored by blind 
raters as to whether they contained a contingent contract 
(which was, by design, the optimal solution to the 
negotiation dilemma ). Coders also rated the quality of the 
participants’ initial responses concerning the two cases—
that is, the degree to which the contingent contract schema 
was described—using a 3-point scale: 0 = no elements of 
the schema were present, 1 = some elements, and 2 = all 
elements. They also rated whether participants linked the 
case and principle in any way (as a manipulation check on 
the condition difference). Finally, coders also rated whether 
the examples participants recalled were contingent 
contracts , using the same scale as above, and categorized the 
source domains in which participants’ examples were set. 
Overall, there was high agreement (87%); disagreements 
were resolved through discussion. 
Results  
As predicted, the comparison group was superior to the 
separate cases group on all three measures: schema quality, 
likelihood of transfer, and quality of remindings. Making 
comparisons led to grasping the contingency contract 
schema from the original examples, which in turn facilitated 
both linking it to prior examples in memory and using it in a 
new negotiation situation. 
 
Schema understanding Comparison participants (M = 
1.45) articulated the schema better than Separate case 
participants (M = 0.98), t(122) = 2.97, p < .01. Another 
striking finding was that fewer than one in five Separate 
cases participants linked the two cases in any way, despite 
the fact that they occurred contiguously and were analogous. 
 
Transfer In their face-to-face negotiations, Comparison 
participants (59%) were nearly twice as likely to make 
contingent agreements than Separate case participants 
(33%), ?2 (1, N=62) = 4.22, p < .05. As in our previous 
research, this suggests that comparison facilitates transfer. 
 
Remindings Participants in the Comparison condition (M = 
1.25) retrieved better examples of contingency agreements 
than did participants in the Separate cases condition (M = 
0.82), t(122) = 2.65, p < .01. This suggests  that comparison 
aided people’s understanding of the initial cases, thereby 
better guiding participants’ retrievals.  
Participants retrieved examples from their own business 
experience or that of a colleague, and less frequently drew 
upon examples from the popular press. The examples were 
mainly from the business domain (as expected—they were 
in a business training classroom), with the remainder being 
daily life examples such as betting on sports teams, 
uncertainty about the weather affecting a vacation activity, 
arranging a home mortgage, and so forth.  
One source of participants’ examples had a name within 
their organization—value billing. Value billing is a 
particular type of contingent contract wherein a consulting 
firm bills clients a low base fee, with a generous bonus 
structure based on the outcome of the work. Given that 
every participant probably knew about value billing, it is 
striking that most of those who used this example were in 
the Comparison condition.  
 
Cross-measure associations As expected, schema 
understanding predicted retrieval performance. The 
association between articulating the schema and retrieving a 
match was reliable, ?2 (1, N=124) = 8.68, p < .01. In the 
transfer measure there was only a modest trend for the sum 
of a pair’s schema ratings to be associated with their transfer 
?2 (1, N=62) = 1.70, p  = .19. However, “high performance 
pairs” (pairs in which at least one person articulated the 
schema and retrieved a matching example, and the pair 
formed a contingent contract—i.e., transferred) were  
marginally more likely to be in the Comparison condition 
(47%) than the Separate cases condition (23%), ?2 (1, 
N=62) = 3.75, p = .05.  
 
Distinguishing retrieval from invention.  To conclude that 
there is a comparison advantage for retrieval, it is important 
to assess whether participants were simply fabricating 
examples rather than retrieving them. That is, the retrieval 
advantage for the comparison group could stem simply from 
their using the derived schema to invent examples, rather 
than from recalling them. But in this case, we should see the 
highest proportion of structurally correct “retrievals” from 
participants who failed to state a source. In fact, the 32 
people who did not state the source produced the lowest 
proportion of structural remindings (31%). The proportion 
was higher for those who stated non-verifiable sources 
(45%), and highest for those whose source was verifiable 
(and verified) (68%). The opposite would have been 
expected on the ‘fabricating’ account, and hence it seems 
reasonable to take the participants at their word. 
 
Discussion 
Comparing cases yielded consistent advantages for schema 
abstraction, retrieving a matching example from memory, 
and transferring to solve a new problem. Although our 
participants were consultants whose jobs depend on their 
ability to apply their knowledge in new situations, and who 
spent considerable time with the training materials , we saw 
little spontaneous comparison across examples in the group 
not explicitly told to compare. Nonetheless, a brief 
instruction to compare was sufficient to advance the 
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performance of their peers across all three measures of 
learning.  
Another striking pattern is that despite the participants’ 
considerable experience in the business world, over half of 
them did not recall any examples that were contingent 
contracts  (or structural analogs). In fact, 11% failed to write 
down any case at all. Our results underscore that (1) 
transferring from analogous examples can be challenging 
even for sophisticated and motivated learners (Novick, 
1988) (2) analogical encoding can dramatically increase 
transfer; (3) the benefits of analogical encoding derive in 
part from inducing a clearer schema for the common 
principle  (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 
1983) and (4) analogical encoding can lead to increased 
retrieval of prior analogous examples. 
Finally, the fact that analogical encoding aids in memory 
retrieval indicates that the effect of schema abstraction in 
memory access is bidirectional. The representations that 
resulted from comparison were both more readily retrieved 
by future analogs than were the separate cases and more 
effective as probes for prior analogs stored in memory. 
Thus, although we suspect that the transfer benefits of 
comparison derive in part from learning-to-encode—i.e., 
from encoding future examples in a structurally clear 
manner consistent with the schema—our results indicate 
that ease of matching must also play a role. The relatively 
abstract schemas that result from analogical encoding match 
better with prior examples just as they do with future 
examples.  
 
Why not just give them the principle? The results of this 
study and prior work on analogical encoding lead naturally 
to a further question. If the advantage of mutual alignment 
is simply that comparing the two examples leads learners to 
derive the principle, then would learners not fare even better 
if the principle—in this case, the contingent contract 
principle —were simply given to them explicitly?  We 
examine this directly in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we asked Masters of Business 
Administration (MBA) students to read a case and an 
abstract principle. If analyzing the principle and elaborating 
upon it is sufficient for transfer, we should find high rates of 
transfer in all groups. However, if principles need to be 
grounded in examples to be comprehensible and 
generalizable, then those asked to compare the case and 
principle should show a transfer advantage relative to those 
who study the example independently of the principle.   
Method 
Participants A total of 106 MBA students participated in 
the study, resulting in 27 pairs in the Comparison condition, 
and 26 pairs in the Separate condition.  
 
Materials and Procedure The materials and procedure 
were similar to Experiment 1. The training packet did not 
ask for memory retrievals, and instead of two cases 
presented people with one case and an abstract description 
of contingent contracts. Participants in the comparison 
group were asked to compare the case and principle and 
specify commonalities, and then describe implications for 
negotiation. Those in the separate group were asked to read 
the case and the abstract principle separately, and were 
asked after each to state its implications for negotiation. 
Both groups received case and principle on consecutive 
pages. Participants then engaged in the negotiation with 
someone else in the same condition.  
 
Scoring As before, coders rated the quality of the 
contingent contract schemas. They also rated whether 
participants had paraphrased the case in their responses, 
whether their responses contained generic advice about 
negotiation that was unrelated to contingent contracts, and 
whether they linked the case and principle in any way. They 
agreed on 93% of their judgments, and disagreements were 
resolved through discussion.  
Results  
In their initial descriptions, Comparison participants were 
more likely than Separate cases participants  to articulate the 
full schema (74% versus 56%) and they less often failed to 
articulate any of the schema (12% versus 35%), ?2 (N=97, 
2) = 7.36, p < .05. In their face-to-face negotiations, 
participants who compared the case and principle (44%) 
were over twice as likely to form contingent contracts as 
were participants who analyzed the case and principle 
separately (19%), ?2 (N=53, 1) = 3.87, p < .05.  
The additional ratings of people’s individual responses to 
the training materials showed a further surprising and 
consistent pattern. Despite the fact that all participants had 
read and discussed the case and the principle  on consecutive 
pages, almost none of the Separate participants noticed the 
link between them. Thus, the Separate participants did not 
appear to notice that the principle was the general statement 
of what the case exemplified. Comparison participants 
(88%) were also more likely than Separate participants 
(34/47, or 71%) to paraphrase the case as they discussed it, 
?2 (N=97, 1) = 4.24, p < .05. Participants in the Separate 
cases condition were also more likely to give general 
panaceas as advice (e.g., “it helps to have a good 
relationship when you’re negotiating” or “you want to reach 
win-win deals”) (77%) than comparison participants (31%), 
?2 (N=97, 1) = 21.06, p < .001.  
Discussion 
Our results lead to something of a paradox. We find that 
learners who derive a schema through analogical 
encoding—either by comparing cases, or by comparing a 
principle with an example—can readily transfer the schema 
to new cases. Yet learners who are explicitly given the same 
schema—even along with an example case—cannot. Why? 
Can we say anything more specific that that “active learning 
is good”? We suspect that abstract principles are ineffective 
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because they are less well understood than specific cases 
(Forbus & Gentner, 1986; Regehr & Brooks, 1993). Indeed, 
in our study, some people had difficulty re-stating the 
principles. This is partly because learners may fail to 
understand the specific terms used, or how they are meant to 
combine. This is consistent with Ross & Kilbane’s (1997) 
finding that if given an example followed by a principle, 
people remember the example but forget the principle. 
Another difficulty in understanding principles is that there 
are typically many different interpretations of a given 
relational abstraction. Thus, people may encode the 
principle in ways that are incompatible with the later 
example. The joint interpretation of an example and a 
principle helps overcome these limitations. People better 
understand the principle if they apply it to an example.  
General Discussion 
These studies show three learning advantages of analogical 
encoding. First, drawing comparisons facilitates acquiring 
an abstract schema. As Experiment 2 showed, it can do so 
better than studying a statement of the abstraction itself. 
Second, both studies replicated prior research showing that 
comparison facilitates applying derived abstractions to solve 
new problems. Third, analogical encoding of two current 
cases —that is, analogical encoding of a probe—leads to a 
retrieval advantage in accessing structurally matching cases 
from long-term memory. Our findings suggest that the 
second and third of these stem from the first: that it is the 
possession of clear schemas that facilitates both transfer and 
retrieval.   
 
Implications for learning and transfer. Our findings 
have several implications for complex learning. On the dark 
side, the results of Experiment 1 suggest limitations on even 
experts’ analogical thinking. Over half the participants 
failed to recall any structurally similar example from their 
own experience, despite the fact that they had considerable 
experience including specific experience in a particular kind 
of contingent contract (value billing) that would have 
qualified nicely. Prior studies suggest that people show 
more relational transfer in domains that are familiar or in 
which they possess expertise (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001;  
Dunbar, 2001; Novick, 1988). However, as our results 
show, even for experts relational retrieval can be 
problematic.  
A second rather gloomy finding is the failure of our 
(highly motivated) participants to spontaneously compare 
the two cases (Experiment 1) or the case and principle 
(Experiment 2). Here, as in our prior studies, participants in 
the Separate cases group almost never noticed the link 
between the two, despite the fact that they were on 
consecutive pages. The huge advantage found for the 
Comparison group, which did compare the two, makes this 
failure to notice the link all the more telling. It raises the 
question of how many potentially illuminating comparisons 
are missed in the course of learning. On the positive side, 
the relational fluency shown by the Comparison group 
offers a relatively simple technique whereby learners and 
educators can improve their understanding and gain 
relational insight. 
 
Implications for memory retrieval . That analogical 
encoding can facilitate retrieval is consistent with the point 
that the match between a specific case and a general 
abstraction (which has few or no concrete features and 
therefore few mismatches) is better than the match between 
two specific cases (unless, of course, the cases are closely 
similar, with many matches and few mismatches) (Tversky, 
1977). Further, it indicates that this advantage holds whether 
the schema is in the memory bank (as in prior studies of 
analogical transfer) or in the probe position.  
The retrieval effect suggests that people can use a well-
articulated principle to retrieve prior examples and 
reinterpret them as examples of this new abstract structure. 
This  implies a clear mechanism by which reflection can 
reorganize knowledge. A major question in both child 
development and the field of expertise is whether and how 
people’s existing knowledge changes as they understand a 
domain in new depth. To the extent that abstractions can 
call forth matching cases from memory, the learner may 
gain a richer understanding of the new abstraction and a re-
representation of the prior example in light of the new 
abstraction. This suggests a means by which new 
knowledge can connect to existing knowledge and can 
reorganize that knowledge along more expert lines.  
One encouraging implication of our findings is  that 
examples people learn prior to understanding key abstract 
principles in a domain are not necessarily lost or wasted. 
Given the increasing demands for adults to learn, this is 
encouraging news. Teachers can capitalize on people’s prior 
knowledge by encouraging people to recall familiar 
examples of new principles.  We may well rely on learned 
cases every bit as much as researchers on analogy, 
categorization and case-based reasoning suggest, but we 
nonetheless may benefit considerably from interventions in 
how we encode them. 
In conclusion, analogical encoding appears to be a 
powerful starting point for learning. The resulting 
understandings may radiate both backwards and forwards. 
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Abstract
Oppenheimer (2003) challenged the empirical evidence for
the recognition heuristic by pointing to the possibility that
existing demonstrations may have confounded recognition
with a person's existing knowledge. In two experiments we
remove the possibility of such a confound by independently
manipulating recognition in a way similar to the "overnight
fame" paradigm of Jacoby, Kelly, Brown and Jasechko
(1989). We found evidence for a recognition effect, but
neither compensatory nor noncompensatory decision making
strategies seem to be able to completely explain our results.
We discuss what modification to these strategies may be
necessary.
Introduction
Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) proposed that when people
make decisions, rather than using all possible information
that they could, they use "fast and frugal" heuristics selected
from an adaptive toolbox. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996)
showed that such heuristics can lead to decisions as good or
better at achieving the organisms goals as more resource
intensive strategies. This adaptive rationality approach
challenges the traditional approaches to rationality (see
Chater, Oaksford, Nakisa, & Redington, 2003).
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) proposed that the
toolbox includes the recognition heuristic, which can be
applied "If one of two objects is recognized and the other is
not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher
value with respect to the criterion." (p.76) In this sense it is
an example of one-reason decision making, though it can
also act as a subroutine in heuristics that use information
beyond recognition, such as the Take the Best heuristic
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Such heuristics embody
Simon's (1956) concept of bounded rationality, which
suggests organisms seek enough information for a good
decision rather than spending resources on obtaining all
relevant information.
However it is apparent from attempts to gather evidence
for or against the recognition heuristic that there are some
conceptual disagreements. In this paper we present our
understanding of the heuristic and its relationship to other
concepts of how recognition cues are used, and we present a
new methodology for examining recognition as a process.
Previous studies
As evidence for people's use of the recognition heuristic,
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 2002) showed that which
German cities Americans recognized affected their choices
for which of a pair of German cities was larger. However
Oppenheimer (2003) challenged this empirical evidence for
the recognition heuristic by suggested that because
Goldstein and Gigerenzer used the 30 largest German cities,
recognition was confounded with actual city size. Thus
recognition itself may be irrelevant as a cue or combined
with other cues. Such confounds exist in all their
demonstrations because they state that the heuristic should
only be found to be used when recognition has a correlation
with the correct answer via an ecological valid mediator.
To remove this confound Oppenheimer (2003) presented
a cities pairs task, in which recognition could not have a
valid correlation because one city was fictional, and thus
there was no correct answer. Furthermore the real cities,
with which the fictional cities were paired, were either small
or famous for reasons unrelated to size. Two studies tested
the hypothesis that when subjects were presented with a city
they recognized and one they did not, then preference for
the recognized city would not be above chance (specifically,
he tested if more than 50% of participants chose the
recognized city). Both studies found that significantly fewer
than 50% of participants chose the recognized cities.
Oppenheimer (2003) suggests that Goldstein and
Gigerenzer’s (2002) evidence showing that greater than
50% of subjects choose the city they recognized is
consistent with them using the recognition heuristic.
However because other cues may be confounded with
recognition, these results are also consistent with strategies
that combine cues together. For examples these other cues
could be combined in tallying strategies, weighted additive
models, or regression models and produce results consistent
with the recognition heuristic. Oppenheimer claims that by
demonstrating that cues that should be associated with
recognition (cues indicating small in his experiments, those
indicating big in Goldstein & Gigerenzer) influences the
extent to which subjects chose the recognized city, he has
shown that there is no evidence for the recognition
heuristic. This interpretation of the data is disputable, partly
because exactly what question this data addresses is
arguable.
Distinguishing related questions
Experiments on the recognition heuristic have addressed
three questions that are related but not necessarily the same:
1) Are there recognition effects on choice? Demonstrating
this requires showing that people's choices are influenced
by recognizing one option and not the other. This question
generates a testable prediction that Oppenheimer's (2003)
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data addresses: that subjects should prefer the recognized
city at a rate greater than chance. He finds no evidence for
this, and claims that Goldstein and Gigerenzer's (2002)
evidence for it was due to confounds.  However this
question is not equivalent to the second.
2) Do people use the recognition heuristic? Oppenheimer
(2003) states that "The recognition heuristic posits that
individuals will use no information aside from mere
recognition to make city size estimations." Goldstein and
Gigerenzer almost certainly disagree with this statement.
Gigerenzer and Todd (1999, p.32) state that different
heuristics may be applied to a choice between two options,
and which is applied depends on the person's knowledge.
The recognition heuristic is most likely applied when the
decider has no information except recognition. When it is
applied then only recognition information should be used,
but there is no claim in Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002)
that the recognition heuristic is always applied. Their own
data show that the recognition heuristic is not always
applied. Gigerenzer and Todd (1999, p. 32-33) briefly
consider the question of how heuristics are selected and
suggest that task and available cues determine it. Although
their concept of a "toolbox" of heuristics implies that
selection is critical, a valid criticism may be that how this is
done is an under-developed aspect of their approach. In this
they are not unusual as Falk and Konold (1997, p. 305)
point out that it hard to make predictions regarding the
representatives heuristic because "there is no established
procedure for deducing how it will be implemented in a
specific task."
3) Is recognition used in a noncompensatory way?
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) propose that the
recognition heuristic is a noncompensatory algorithm, as are
other algorithms proposed by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999).
A prototypical noncompensatory algorithms is a
lexicographic strategy (see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,
1993). Cues are arranged in a hierarchy based on validity
then starting from the top, one cue at a time is considered
until one is found that discriminates between the options. In
contrast, a compensatory strategy (such as linear regression
or multi-additive models) integrates all cues in making a
choice, although they may be given different weightings. A
flow diagram of a noncompensatory algorithm in which
recognition is the first cue considered is given by
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996, Figure 2). The stopping
rule for such an algorithm is the first cue considered that
distinguishes between options. Characteristic of such
algorithms is that a decision  made on the basis of a higher
cue cannot be reversed by cues lower in the order Goldstein
and Gigerenzer (p. 82). The recognition heursitc is a special
case of a noncompenstory strategy, so recognition need not
be the first cue considered in noncompensatory strategies.
Gigerenzer and Goldstein and Gigerenzer and Todd discuss
various noncompensatory algorithms.
Possibly Oppenheimer's (2003) most interesting claim is
that his data showing that people chose the recognized city
less than 50% of the time shows that recognition is not used
in a noncompensatory way. It is worth examining his
arguments for this claim. He argues that if people are only
sometimes using the recognition heuristics, then the
problematic question of how they decide which heuristic to
use is raised. If the task determines it then why was a
recognition effect in Goldstein and Gigerenzer's (2002)
paired-city task, but not Oppenheimer's (2003)? If the cues
presented in the task determine which algorithm is used,
then all cues have to be considered, undermining the
efficiency of the "one-reason" decision making. Thus it is
not as "frugal" in terms of processing and information as
Goldstein and Gigerenzer claim.
If more than one cue is available then implicit in the
claim that cues are ordered in a hierarchy is that cues must
be considered at some level. The defining characteristic of a
noncompensatory algorithm seems to be how the cues are
combined at the decision point. In compensatory algorithms
all available cues are integrated requiring some form of
trade-off between those that favor different options,
whereas in noncompensatory algorithms at the point of
decision only one cue is considered and there are no trade-
offs. Whether this means that noncompensatory algorithms
are inherently more "frugal" than compensatory algorithms
depends on what sort of assumptions are made about cue
ordering or cue trade-off processes.
 If competing subjective cue validities determine the
order in which cues are considered by noncompensatory
algorithms, then it would be predicted that the nature of the
cues available in addition to recognition would influence the
extent to which recognition determined the choice between
two options. Thus Oppenheimer's (2003) evidence that
other cues may moderate the impact of differential
recognition on a choice does not in itself show that
recognition is used in a compensatory algorithm.
In both Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) and
Oppenheimer (2003) recognition was confounded with
other information. To more effectively test how recognition
is used requires a way to manipulate recognition free of any
confounds.
Manipulating recognition
In existing studies of the heuristic, recognition has always
been a pseudo-independent variable; that is, the studies have
not manipulated recognition but instead examined the
impact of what subjects recognized due to life experience.
We manipulated recognition by pursuing Goldstein and
Gigerenzer's (2002) suggestion that recognition might be
induced in a way analogous to the "overnight fame" effect
found by Jacoby, Kelly, Brown and Jasechko (1989).
Jacoby, et al. presented participants with a list of unfamiliar
names that were included on a later list of names to which
participants were asked to respond: famous or nonfamous?
They were more likely to choose as famous the arbitrary
names from the initial list. We used a similar methodology
with small German cities to examine if induced recognition
could affect the choice of which of two cities was larger.
To induce recognition we gave participants one of two
induction lists consisting of eight German cities or towns
(Zwickau, Leverkusen, Regensburg, Offenbach, Ulm,
Stralsund, Coburg, Dormagen; or, Bochum, Gelsenkirchen,
Darmstadt, Krefeld, Schweinfurt, Goslar, Lingen, Iserlohn)
plus three irrelevant small cities. Participants were asked to
count the number of syllables they thought each city name
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contained. We conducted a pilot experiment to confirm that
these induction lists could induce recognition. Eight
members of the Michigan State University participant pool
were given one of the induction lists, and nine the other list.
After spending 30 minutes on unrelated tasks, participants
were presented with a list of 20 small German cities,
including the 16 from the two induction lists. For each city
they were asked if they remembered seeing the city on the
list they were given earlier. They recognized more cities
from their own induction list (M = 85%) than from the list
they had not been given (M = 11%), t(32) = 18.62, p < .001.
Therefore the pilot experiment supported our assumption
that presenting the syllable list would induce later
recognition.
Aims of the experiments
In two experiments using induced recognition we examined
recognition effects and how other cues may moderate any
effect. This allowed us to address two of the three questions
we outlined regarding recognition
1) Are there recognition effects on choice? Oppenheimer
(2003) claims that the Goldstein and Gigerenzer's (2002)
results are flawed because of confounds, but his
experiments intentionally introduce another confound. To
clearly establish whether there are recognition effects in the
cities-pairs task requires a version with no confounds.
2) Do people use the recognition heuristic? The answer
to this question is clearly "not all the time". A more
reasonable question is what factors influence the degree to
which people use the recognition heuristic? However no
one has specified these factors well enough to examine this.
3) Is recognition used in a noncompensatory way?
Addressing this question requires examining how other cues
moderate the effect of recognition. Goldstein and
Gigerenzer (2002) found that adding other cues did not
affect the size of the recognition effect, whereas
Oppenheimer found that they did. However in neither
experiment were cues systematically manipulated within a
single experiment. In our experiments we varied the amount
of other cues available in order to address how information
moderates recognition effects and thus throw light on the
issue of whether recognition is used in a compensatory or
noncompensatory way.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we induced in Americans recognition of
small German cities from an induction list of eight, then
presented them with each of these cities paired with one
from the alternative list of eight cities. We predicted that
participants would be more likely to select the induced city
in the pair. We also manipulated giving a positive (has a
major league soccer team) or a neutral (the state the city was
in) cue to the size of one city in the pair, either the induced
or noninduced city. The least amount of extra cues was
none, the next least neutral only, the next positive only, and
the most extra cues received was both neutral and positive.
If recognition is a compensatory cue, then the more
information presented, the smaller the effect of recognition
should be.
Method
Participants
A total of 256 members of the Michigan State University
participant pool participated for partial course credit.
Materials
The two induction lists were the same as those described for
the pilot experiment. For the city-size task, the eight cities
from one induction list were paired with the eight from the
other. Thus for each pair, one city was induced (i.e.,
appeared on the participant's induction list) and one was
noninduced (i.e., appeared on the list the participant did not
see). For each pair, participants chose which city they
thought was larger. To obscure the purpose of the task,
Oppenheimer (2003) included some pairs with obvious
answers. Similarly we added three pairs containing a well-
known large city (Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich).
With each city pair extra cues could appear, though cues
were always independent of reality allowing us to freely
manipulate information. (No participants pointed out that
the information was incorrect.) There were four cue
conditions. For the two cue-none pairs it was stated for both
cities that there was no information available regarding
whether it had a soccer team or which state it was in
(Germany consists of 16 states). For the two cue-neutral
pairs soccer team status was said to be unknown but a state
was given for one city. For the two cue-positive pairs state
was said to be unknown but one city was said to have a
soccer team. For the two cue-all pairs for one city a state
was given and it was said to have a soccer team, whereas
this information was said to be unknown for the other city.
Eight pairs for each participant were necessary because for
four pairs the cue conditions were applied to the induced
city, and for the other four pairs the cue conditions were
applied to the noninduced city.
Note that Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) also
conducted an experiment in which a city having a major
soccer team was used as an extra cue to city size. They
taught participants that having a team was indicative of
being a large city, but found that it did not appear to alter
the effect of recognition based on a between experiments
comparison. We did not teach participants about this
relationship but instead relied on participants generalizing
from their likely awareness that the major American
professional sports teams are rarely in small cities.
The same cities were always paired but each pair
appeared equally often in each cue and induced condition.
Cues appeared in two possible orders (maximum
information to none, or vice-versa), and the cities appeared
in two different orders. Thus there were 16 versions of the
city-size task (four cue by two cue-order by two city-order
conditions) that appeared equally often with each induction
list.
Procedure
Participants were first given one of the two induction lists
and told that their task was to write down the number of
syllables in each city name as best they could. They then
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spent 30 minutes doing unrelated tasks until they were
given one version of the city-size task and asked to choose
which city in each pair they thought was larger. After
completing this task they were given a questionnaire that
asked them: 1) Does the last task you completed relate to
any of the previous tasks? 2) Were your responses to the
last task you completed affected by any of the previous
tasks? For each question they had to answer "yes" or "no"
and to explain their answer. These questions were used to
determine if participants were explicitly connecting together
the induction and city size tasks. Participants who said the
syllable task affected them when choosing cities were
replaced in the design. This was to protect against the
possibility that participants might just select cities because
they thought they were supposed to select cities from the
induction list. Fewer than 10% of participants were replaced
and subsequent analyses found no evidence that the
replaced subjects responded differently.
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Figure 1: Mean preference for the induced city for each cue
level (Bars represent one standard error). Above .50
represent preference towards induced cities.
Results
Figure 1 indicates mean preferences for the induced cities
for each cue level. To calculate preferences we examined
the two city pairs in each of the cue conditions. If a
participant chose the induced city in both pairs (i.e., the pair
in which cues were given for the induced city and the pair
in which cues were given for the noninduced city) they
were assigned 1.0, if they chose the induced city once and
the noninduced once then they were assigned 0.5, if they
chose the noninduced city both times then they were
assigned 0.0. Thus mean preferences range from 0.0 to 1.0.
Preferences above .50 indicate a bias towards induced cities,
whereas below .50 indicates a bias towards noninduced
cities.
Participants had preferences for the induced city above
.50 for the cue-none (.62, t[255] = 5.72, p < .001) and cue-
neutral (.57, t[255] = 3.78, p < .001) conditions, but not for
the cue-positive (.52, t[255] = 1.14, p = .258) or cue-both
conditions (.50, t[255] = -0.14, p = .887). Ordering the four
cue condition in terms of amount of extras information
given (none, neutral, positive, all) produced a significant
linear trend, t(765) = 5.38, p < .001. Separately calculating
the proportion of participants choosing the city for which
cues were given, but ignoring whether this was the induced
or noninduced city, we found a strong effect of how much
information participants were given (cue-none .50; cue-
neutral .58; cue-positive .79; cue-all .84), F(3, 576) = 62.8,
p < .001.
Of the 256 participants, 44 indicated that they thought the
city size task related to the syllable task, but they were not
eliminated from the sample because they said that the
syllable task did not affected their responses. However it is
possible that effects were driven by just these participants
who explicitly remembered the syllable task. Analyzing
separately these 44 participants and the other 212, we found
the same pattern of results for both groups as we found for
the whole sample.
Discussion
When recognition was not confounded with any other
information and it was the only cue available, then the city
likely to be recognized was selected more than chance. The
62% selection rate for the cue-none condition was not as
high as Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) report but there
could be several reasons for this. First, we did not test
which cities participants recognized and thus we did not
only analyze pairs for which only one city was recognized,
as Goldstein and Gigerenzer and Oppenheimer (2003) did.
Based on the recognition pilot data, it could be estimated
that this condition would apply for only 77% of our pairs.
(To avoid any possible biases, we analyzed all pairs.)
Second, our induction procedure may produce recognition
that is relatively weak and uncertain compared to that based
on experience. Goldstein and Gigerenzer treat recognition
as a binary, all-or-none distinction; however creating this
distinction is not without error. As the work on eyewitness
testimony has amply shown (Wells & Loftus, 1984),
recognition and can be uncertain and it may be hard for a
person to decide if they recognize something. This may be
especially true for foreign, hard to pronounce words briefly
experienced once. Our induction procedure allowed us to
manipulate recognition, but it may produce recognition with
a different character to that in the previous experiments.
The results also showed that the presence of other cues
can moderate the influence of recognition. Oppenheimer
(2003) suggested that any evidence of such moderation is
evidence against noncompensatory decision making of the
type Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) described. However
evidence that one cue moderates the mean effect of another
cue does not establish that individuals are integrating cues
as in compensatory multi-cue strategies. Our data may be
consistent with Goldstein and Gigerenzer's approach in
which only one cue is applied at a time but cues form a
hierarchy based on validity. When recognition is uncertain
other information may easily be seen as more valid.
Of course there is no true validity for either recognition or
other information in this experiment, as relaxing that
constraint is what allows us to freely manipulate these
factors. We are assuming that participants come to the
experiment with cue validities, thus it is not surprising if
there may be individual differences in how they assign
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validity. There may also be individual differences in
strategy selection (Fasolo, Miscuraca, & McClelland, 2003).
Experiment 2
One way of investigating how recognition is combined (or
not) with other cues is to equalize the amount of extra
information given for each city in a pair. Different
compensatory decision strategies differ in the way in which
they combine cues, but the impact of a cue in these
strategies is greatest when that cue differentiates between
options. Thus cues that provide equivalent information for
both choices should have no impact on decision making.
Therefore the moderating effects of extra cues on
recognition should largely disappear.
As Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) describe
noncompensatory algorithms, cues should continue to be
considered until one is found that differentiates the options.
This stopping rule implies that only differential cues could
moderate the effect of recognition because even if a
nondifferential cue is higher in the validity hierarchy, it can
have no impact on the final decision. Thus a
noncompensatory strategy also predicts that when extra
cues are not differential then the moderating effect of those
cues on the impact of recognition should disappear.
Experiment 2 varied the same cues as in Experiment 1,
but instead of giving cues about just one of the two cities,
we gave equivalent cues for both. Thus the extra cues never
distinguished the two cities, allowing us to test if
undifferentiating information still moderated the recognition
effect. Both compensatory and noncompensatory
approaches make the same prediction: Whatever recognition
effect is found for the cue-none condition, the same
recognition effect should be found for other cue conditions.
If this prediction is violated and cue condition still
moderates the recognition effect, then it can point to
modifications necessary to these approaches.
Method
Participants
A total of 128 members of the Michigan State University
participant pool participated for partial course credit.
Materials and procedure
The exact same procedures and induction lists were used as
in Experiment 1. The city-size task was identical except that
equivalent cues were given for both members of the eight
pairs. Thus for the two pairs in the cue-all condition a state
was given for both cities and both cities were said to have a
major league soccer team. For the two pairs in the cue-
positive condition it was stated that both cities had soccer
teams and that the states were not known. For the two pairs
in the cue-neutral condition a state was given for both cities
and it was stated that whether or not these cities had a
soccer team was unknown. For the two pairs in the cue-
none condition it was stated that neither piece of
information was known. Thus the design of Experiment 2
was simpler than Experiment 1 but eight pairs were still
given. We again counterbalanced the four cue conditions
across the city pairs, used two orders of presentation, and
two city-orders, which yielded sixteen version of the city
task. Each version was presented equally often with each
induction list.
Results & Discussion
Figure 2 presents the mean proportions of participants in
each information condition who selected the induced city.
In the cue-none condition the rate of choosing the induced
city (.63) was significantly above .50, t(127) = 4.29, p <
.001, but this was not the case for the cue-all condition
(.54), t(127) = 1.37, p = .175. Proportions above 50% were
almost statistically significant for both the cue-neutral (.56),
t(127) = 1.78, p = .075, and cue-positive (.56) conditions,
t(127) = 1.91, p = .058. Thus this experiment again found a
clear effect of induced recognition when no prior
knowledge could be confounded with recognition,
especially when no new information about the cities was
given.
Overall, there was a significant linear trend for cue
condition on the proportions of induced cities selected,
t(381) = 2.15, p = .033. Just as in Experiment 1, giving
participants other cues reduced the impact of recognition.
However it appears that the volume of information was
critical, as this information did not differentiate the options.
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Figure 2: Mean proportions of participant in each cue
condition choosing the induced city rather than the
noninduced city (Bars represent one standard error). Above
.50 indicates a preference for the induced city.
General Discussion
Our results show that recognition effects of the type
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) found are not only due to
recognition being confounded with other cues. When
recognition was unconfounded and was the only available
cue the city more likely to be recognized was selected at a
rate above chance.
Using within experiment manipulations our results
supported Oppenheimer's (2003) finding that the presence
of other cues could moderate a recognition effect. However
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the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with recognition
being part of either compensatory or noncompensatory
strategies, as long as recognition is not always the most
valid cue. In contrast, the results of Experiment 2 are
consistent with the predictions of neither type of strategy, as
nondifferential cues should have no impact on decision
making. What assumptions would need to be added to these
approaches in order for them to explain these results?
Whatever function a compensatory strategy applies to
options, the same function would be applied to both cities in
a pair. Thus providing the same cue for both cities should
just add a constant to the evaluation of both cities. Thus the
difference between evaluations will not change. One way to
deal with the evidence from Experiment 2 would be to make
the total amount of information part of the integration
process. Perhaps there is a Weber function for comparing
options like there is for comparing perceptual stimuli. This
would represent a revision to current compensatory
strategies that would yield testable predictions.
Nondifferential cues should be ignored by
noncompensatory strategies. However, they could have an
impact if the algorithm had a stopping rule that may stop
evaluating cues before one is found that differentiates. It
seems consistent with bounded rationality that sometimes
the evaluation is made by an organism that there is little
value in continuing looking for discriminating information.
Thus as each nondifferentiating cue is examined there may
be a nonzero probability that the organism will decide to
stop. If the extra cues may be placed higher in the validity
hierarchy than recognition (as Experiment 1 may suggest)
then such a stopping rule could lead nondifferential cues to
moderate the utilization of differential recognition.
Such a stopping rule might take into account the
anticipated cost of evaluating information. This may be
particular relevant in our paradigm as the type of uncertain
recognition we might have induced may have a cost.
Anderson’s ACT-R framework emphasizes the cost of any
remembering (Anderson, Lebiere, & Lovett, 1998).
Recognition is not necessarily more accurate than recall
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973), and it may be inaccurate and
uncertain (Wells & Loftus, 1984). Thus even a single
nondifferential cue may reduce the impact of recognition if
it can be higher in the cue hierarchy.
Experiments that examine recognition free of confounds
are useful for understanding this heuristic as a processes
rather than just a phenomenon, and the importance of doing
this in general was pointed to by Gigerenzer (1996). Both
the compensatory and noncompensatory approaches to how
multiple cues affect decision-making seem under-specified,
and thus unable to explain the results of Experiment 2. The
paradigm we introduced here has promise for furthering the
understanding of heuristics utilizing recognition and the
process by which recognition affects choices.
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Abstract
We study how Extraversion and Neuroticism influ-
ence people’s language production in interpersonal
interactive situations. A priming study used con-
federate priming methodology to investigate syn-
tactic priming behaviour. We expected that Ex-
travert sociability would be related to the strength
of priming eects, although Neurotic emotionality
might also have an eect. Results indicate that Ex-
traversion has no eect, but Neuroticism does have
an eect. We discuss possible reasons and suggest
further experimentation to investigate this nding.
Implications and applications of this work are out-
lined.
Personality and interaction
Individuals dier in the way they speak and write.
Some of those dierences are systematic, and can
be attributed to apparently deeper dierences, such
as personality traits, like Extraversion and Neuroti-
cism (or Emotional Stability). Level of Extraversion
is intuitively related to sociability and communica-
tion, and this is expressed through interpersonal be-
haviour. However, level of Neuroticism appears to
be more related to anxiety and inward focus, and
thus having greater influence on solo behavior. In
the past, it has been found that both these per-
sonality traits do signicantly influence an individ-
ual’s language production behaviour in a variety of
contexts (Pennebaker and King, 1999; Dewaele and
Furnham, 1999). Recent work has investigated e-
mail text, and suggested that even in that genre,
there are characteristic sequences of words associ-
ated with each end (High or Low) of both dimen-
sions (Extravert or Neurotic) (Gill and Oberlander,
2002, 2003b).
The majority of work on the relations between
personality and language production has studied
monologue only. Yet most everyday language oc-
curs in the context of interpersonal interaction. So
here, we aim to investigate the role of personality
upon language use in a dialogue setting.
Studies of conversational behaviour have demon-
strated that individuals align with their interlocu-
tors on a number of levels (Pickering and Garrod, in
press). The phenomena have been examined from
both social and cognitive perspectives. On the so-
cial side, a key focus of interest is cooperation and
audience design. On the cognitive side, a key focus
is coordination and interpersonal priming.
For example, sociolinguistic studies have shown
that speakers adopt accent or dialectal variation or a
level of lexical density appropriate to their audience.
This variation operates at phonological, lexical, and
syntactic levels (Labov, 1972; Coupland, 1980; Bell,
1984; Bradac and Wisegarver, 1984). Audience de-
sign is regarded as a relatively conscious process over
which the speaker has a certain amount of control.
It may be a result of co-operativity, aliation, or
willingness to take another’s perspective (Haywood,
Pickering, and Branigan, 2003).
By contrast, from a cognitive perspective, coor-
dination is viewed as an artifact of the underlying
language production mechanisms. For example, it
has been argued that references from the compre-
hension system are recycled to provide output for
the production system (Pickering and Garrod, in
press). Alignment is found at the lexical level (Bren-
nan and Clark, 1996; Branigan, Pickering, and Cle-
land, 2000), the conceptual level (Garrod and Do-
herty, 1987), and the syntactic level (Pickering and
Branigan, 1998). Unlike cooperation, such coordi-
nation is considered to be largely subconscious.
Coordination therefore provides a more direct in-
sight into underlying processing abilities, and is less
prone to outside influence. In approaching the study
of personality in dialogue, we therefore use an inter-
personal priming paradigm. At the outset, our ques-
tion is very general: Can dierences in interpersonal
priming be attributed to personality?
To make this question more specic|and to at-
tempt to answer it|the rest of this paper is struc-
tured as follows. First, we introduce a little more
background on personality theory. Then, we frame
a possible explanation of recent ndings on the re-
lations between Extraversion, Neuroticism and lan-
guage production; this leads to two hypotheses con-
cerning the possible relation between personality
and interpersonal priming. We then present the
priming experiment which tested these hypotheses.
The results were somewhat unexpected, and we con-
clude by discussing their implications.
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Overview
There are a number of approaches to personality
(Matthews and Deary, 1998). Two of the most
prominent trait theories are the ve factor model
(Costa and McCrae, 1992), and Eysenck’s three-
factor PEN model (Eysenck, Eysenck, and Barrett,
1985; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1991). These agree that
two main factors are Extraversion (sociability) and
Neuroticism (emotional stability). The Five Fac-
tor Model sees three further dimensions: Consci-
entiousness, Agreeableness and Openness; PEN ar-
guably conflates these into one dimension, Psychoti-
cism (tough mindedness). In what follows, we focus
on the rst two dimensions, common to both models.
The traits can be summarised thus: A typical Ex-
travert tends to be sociable, needs people to talk to,
craves excitement, takes chances, is easy-going, and
optimistic. By contrast, a typical Introvert (Low Ex-
travert) is quiet, retiring, reserved, plans ahead, and
dislikes excitement; A typical High Neurotic tends
to be an anxious, worrying, moody individual. A
typical Low Neurotic tends be calm, even-tempered
and relaxed (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1991).
Personality and language
Work on personality and language behaviour has
studied a range of features. For instance, Ex-
traverts are regarded as talking louder (Scherer,
1978), demonstrating a higher speech rate (Siegman,
1987), and they show less hesitation, but make a
higher proportion of semantic errors (Dewaele and
Furnham, 2000). At a grammatical level, Extraverts
use greater proportions of pronouns, adverbs, verbs
(Cope, 1969), which contrasts with the more explicit
language of the Introverts and their increased use
of nouns, modiers and prepositions (Dewaele and
Furnham, 2000). Additionally, Extraverts demon-
strate lower lexical richness in formal situations (De-
waele and Furnham, 2000), whilst analysis of infor-
mal e-mail communication has shown highly Neu-
rotic language to be more repetitious (Gill, 2003;
Gill and Oberlander, 2003b). At a more content-
oriented level, Pennebaker and King (1999), using
the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count text anal-
ysis program, showed that broad psychological lan-
guage categories are related to dimensions of person-
ality variation. For example, they found that when
writing about thoughts and feelings, high Neurotics
use more negative emotion words and fewer positive
emotion words.
However, our interest here is on interaction: di-
alogue and conversation. Studies using speech act
coding have found that Introverts used more hedges
and problem talk, namely expressing qualication,
and dissatisfaction with one’s own activities, while
Extraverts expressed more pleasure talk, agreement,
and compliments, with content focusing more on ex-
tracurricular activities (Thorne, 1987). Extraverts
have also been shown to use more self-referent state-
ments, and initiate more laughter (Giord and Hine,
1994). Giord and Hine also found that Extraverts
talk more, with other studies nding that they use
a greater total number of words (Campbell and
Rushton, 1978; Carment, Miles, and Cervin, 1965).
As would be expected, Extraverts show greater de-
sire to initiate interactions (McCroskey and Rich-
mond, 1990), even in computer-mediated communi-
cation (Yellen, Winniford, and Sanford, 1995). Also,
Dewaele (2002) nds that in L3 English produc-
tion, Extraversion (and also Psychoticism) showed a
strong negative relationship to communicative anx-
iety, whilst Neuroticism showed a positive relation-
ship.
Studies investigating hemispheric asymmetry pro-
vide a further perspective on this area, for example,
Davidson (2001) proposes the relationship between
Extraversion and positive aect with approach be-
haviours, and Neuroticism and negative aect and
withrawal behaviours. In the following hypotheses,
we explore the implications of personality, aect and
approach/withdrawal on priming behaviour.
Hypotheses for interpersonal priming
The likelihood of priming may be aected by the
tendency to approach or the tendency to withdraw|
or by both.
If Extraversion is associated with approach be-
haviours, it is natural to expect that higher Ex-
traversion will lead to \more approach", and that
this might mean that an individual will coordinate
more with their interlocutor. Furthermore, the Ex-
travert’s higher drive to gain or retain the conver-
sational floor will mean that less eort can be di-
rected towards detailed language planning. Hence, if
their partner has made a lexical or syntactic choice,
the High Extravert is likely to re-use that choice,
rather than explicitly planning a new one (cf. Gill
and Oberlander, 2003a).
If Neuroticism is associated with withdrawal be-
haviours, it could well be that high levels of this
trait result in \more withdrawal" and lower engage-
ment with the interlocutor. Furthermore, the inward
(worrying) focus of a High Neurotic might mean that
more resources are devoted to inner thought, and
fewer to interaction with the environment. Thus, we
might expect that such an individual will coordinate
less with their interlocutor.
Thus, there is a clear prediction for Extraversion,
and a slightly more complex picture for Neuroticism.
Of course, it could be that neither Extraversion nor
Neuroticism have any eect on coordination or prim-
ing.
Method
In syntactic priming, a particular syntactic struc-
ture is more likely to be produced given prior expo-
sure to the same structure (Schenkein, 1980). This
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phenomenon has been replicated under experimen-
tal conditions when speakers say, hear, or read sen-
tences (e.g., Bock, 1986; Pickering and Branigan,
1998; Corley and Scheepers, 2002). Bock and col-
leagues found that people tended to repeat the ac-
tive or passive form of a sentence they had just
read in describing an unrelated picture (Bock, 1986;
Bock, Loebell, and Morey, 1992). In this study we
employ the confederate priming method (Pickering
and Branigan, 1998): The subject of the experiment
takes part in a dialogue game along with a confeder-
ate of the experimenter. The game involves match-
ing and describing pictures. Both participants ap-
parently have the same two tasks: to describe a set
of pictures so that the other participant can match
them, and to verify whether the descriptions that
they hear match the picture that they see. How-
ever, the confederate’s descriptions are scripted.
Participants
Forty University of Edinburgh students who were
self-declared native speakers of English were paid
to participate in this study. Personality information
derived from the NEO-PI questionnaire is as follows:
Extraversion M = 51.75 (SD = 12.82), and Neuroti-
cism M = 54.18 (SD = 12.72).
Materials and Design
We prepared two sets of pictures depicting actions.
Each set included 12 pictures depicting transitive
actions involving an agent and a patient. The en-
tities depicted were chosen to be easily recognisable
and nameable. There were two pictures for each of
12 transitive verbs (bite, chase, dust, hit, kick, lift,
poke, pull, push, shoot, touch, weigh). These 24 pic-
tures comprised the set of targets. The remaining
120 pictures in each set depicted intransitive actions.
There were several pictures for each of 20 intransi-
tive verbs. These comprised the ller pictures.
The appropriate verb was printed under each ac-
tion. Each set of pictures depicted the same range of
entities and actions. However, the pairing of entities
with actions was dierent.
We term one set the Subject’s Description Set and
the other set the Confederate’s Description Set. We
created ordered pairs of prime and target pictures by
pairing each description of a transitive action from
the Confederate’s Description Set (the prime) with
a picture depicting a transitive action from the Sub-
ject’s Description Set (the target picture).
Half of the prime sentences were assigned active
descriptions of the form ‘the X verbing the Y’, and
half were assigned passive descriptions of the form
‘the Y being verbed by the X’. An experimental item
was dened as the confederate’s scripted description
of a prime picture plus the subject’s target picture
paired with it. There were thus two versions of each
item: active confederate description and passive con-
federate description.
We constructed four lists containing 24 experi-
mental items and 120 subject llers. The confeder-
ate llers were randomly distributed in the remain-
ing gaps. The entities depicted in the target picture
were not present in the immediately preceding block
(prime plus subject llers and confederate llers).
The verb also diered between prime and target.
Each picture was assigned to either the match or
the mismatch condition for the matching task. For
the latter, we assigned another picture depicting a
dierent entity doing the same action (thus using
the same verb) was assigned. Each list contained 12
experimental items with active prime descriptions
and 12 with passive prime descriptions. Exactly one
version of each item appeared in each list. Hence,
Prime Type (active vs. passive) was manipulated
within subjects and items. The dependent measure
was the proportion of descriptions of target pictures
produced with a passive structure.
Procedure
The Subject’s Description Set was presented to the
subject via a computer program.The order of the
pictures was randomised for each subject, with be-
tween four and eight ller items intervening between
each experimental item. A divider prevented the
subject from seeing the confederate or his computer
screen. The experimenter told the subject and the
confederate that the experiment was investigating
how well people communicate when they cannot see
each other. Their tasks were alternately to describe
the pictures to the other participant, and to match
their picture to the other participant’s descriptions.
When it was the subject’s turn to match, the con-
federate would see a sentence appear on his screen
which he would read aloud and then press space
bar, at which point a picture would appear on the
subject’s screen. The subject was instructed to say
\yes" or \no" (or ask for repetition) and to press
the Z key for \no" and the M key for \yes" accord-
ing to whether the picture matched or mismatched
the description. When it was the subject’s turn
to describe, a picture would appear on the sub-
ject’s screen and the confederate would say \yes"
or \no" (or ask for repetition) and press the Z key
or the M key according to whether the picture on
his screen matched or mismatched the description.
Throughout the session, the experimenter and con-
federate acted as if the confederate was a genuine
subject (e.g., the confederate asked questions about
the task). Before the experiment, there was a prac-
tice session with two ller items each, after which the
subject could ask for clarication if necessary. The
confederate also gave the rst description. Hence the
confederate’s description of a prime always immedi-
ately preceded the subject’s description of a target.
Both dialogue participants wore a lapel microphone.
The experimental session was recorded on audio tape
and subsequently transcribed.
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Table 1: Proportion of Passive target responses after
active and passive primes and degree of priming
Group Nos. PP AP Priming
Low E 8 .1363 .0300 10.6
Mid E 27 .2015 .0270 17.5
High E 5 .1500 .0480 10.0
Low N 5 .1160 .0480 6.8
Mid N 28 .2271 .0261 20.1
High N 7 .0486 .0343 1.4
Total 40 .1820 .0302 15.2
We coded the rst response that the subject pro-
duced; 3 target responses that described the agent
as the patient and the patient as the agent were
excluded. We coded the remaining target 957 re-
sponses as passive if the patient was described as
being verbed by the agent and as active if the agent
of the action was described as verbing the patient.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted,
with prime type (active vs. passive) as a within
subjects factor and Neuroticism (Low [> −1 s.d. of
the mean], Mid [< 1 s.d. of the mean], High [> +1
s.d. of the mean]) as a between subjects factor.
Results
Proportions of passive target responses following
passive and active primes are reported in Table 1;
these are described by personality type of partici-
pant, and also for the group overall. Here we can
see that in both cases the Mid groups appear to
show greater priming. However the High and Low
Neurotic groups appear to show even lower levels of
priming than for Extraversion.
Turning now to our analysis of variance, and here
the ANOVA revealed a signicant eect of prime
type (active vs. passive) on the proportion of passive
forms used (F1 (1,37) = 6.63; p < 0.05; F2 (1,23) =
97.01; p < 0.05).
A signicant interaction was found between Neu-
roticism (Low, Mid or High) and prime type (F1
(1,37) = 3.68; p < 0.05). Post-hoc Tukey tests
revealed that both the High N and Low N groups
primed signicantly less than the Mid N group (p <
0.05). No interaction was found between Extraver-
sion and prime (F1 (1,37) = 0.60; p >0.1).
Discussion
We found a reliable eect of syntactic priming of ac-
tive and passive structures in a dialogue task. This
conrms our expectations and replicates previous
syntactic priming found in dialogue (e.g., Pickering
and Branigan, 1998) and with active vs. passive
forms (e.g., Bock, 1986).
Additionally, our results demonstrate that Neu-
roticism is related to the degree of syntactic prim-
ing for passive constructions; Extraversion is not.
We now relate these results to our hypotheses. For
Extraversion, we proposed that higher levels of Ex-
traversion would lead to an increase in priming. Here
we found that the Mid group primed more, however
this result was not signicantly dierent to that of
the Low and High groups. In this case we there-
fore accept the null hypothesis that Extraversion is
not related to levels of priming. For Neuroticism,
we nd that the Low and High groups primed sig-
nicantly less than the Mid group. Comparing this
result directly with our Neuroticism hypothesis cre-
ates a tension: We proposed that the High group
would less likely to prime due to an inward focus
and thus withdrawal from their partner. To address
these ndings, we therefore reframe our Neuroticism
hypothesis as follows: as before, we claim that the
High group are less likely to prime due to inward
focus, but that the Low group are also less likely to
prime, since they are less concerned with monitoring
themselves in relation to their interlocutor. In this
case|as in our results|the extreme High and Low
levels of the trait have an inhibitory eect on prim-
ing, and the Mid trait levels represent a facilitating
eect.
We acknowledge that such explanation is rela-
tively speculative, and further experimentation will
be required to test this hypothesis. For example,
the NEO-PI questionnaire divides Neuroticism into
6 facets: anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-
consciousness, impulsivity, vulnerability. It may be
that these may relate more specically to withdrawal
or threat-monitoring, in which case these could be
related to the priming information. However, we ex-
pect that a larger experimental population would be
required for such work. For Extraversion, no signif-
icant pattern emerges, however we propose that the
extremes are similarly inhibited by over- or under-
other-directedness.
Turning now the signicance of our ndings, and
they have several important implications. At a theo-
retical level, they provide more data about personal-
ity behaviour in dialogue contexts, which extend pre-
vious research using monologue data. Additionally
this can better inform our understanding of person-
ality in relation to models of language production.
Our results also contribute to the dialogue and
priming literature which, for example, acknowledge
that individuals often behave dierently, but that
systematic variation has mainly been examined in
sociological terms. Here we have presented data
which shows real and important dierences between
individuals in conversational behaviour, and high-
lights the potential role of personality in priming
experimentation, more generally.
Finally, our ndings can be used to directly in-
form dynamic computer interface technology, which
could allow linguistic alignment in a realistic way.
For example, Nass, Moon, Fogg, and Reeves (1995)
have shown that computer users viewed their ma-
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chine more favourably when it mirrored their per-
sonality. On the basis of work reported here, we are
closer to being able to represent personality at the
conversational, interactive level. We therefore antic-
ipate that this will lead to more convincing articial
agents and intelligent dynamic computer interfaces.
These ndings also nicely complement those pre-
sented by Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, McLean,
and Nass (2003), in which computer users syntac-
tic align with a pre-programmed computer interface,
whether they believed this to be another person or
an ‘unintelligent computer’. Therefore, if such an
‘unintelligent computer’ was to project personality,
we may expect it to vary its degree of priming|in
addition to its lexicon|depending upon the sort of
personality it may wish to project.
Conclusion
We have used experimental priming data to inves-
tigate the influence of personality on interpersonal
language behaviour. Proposing hypotheses which
suggested both Extraversion and Neuroticism influ-
ence linguistic coordination, here we found that the
less interpersonal trait|Neuroticism|surprisingly
influenced priming, whilst Extraversion did not.
Given our nding that priming is facilitated by mod-
erate Neuroticism, but inhibited by more extreme
levels, we explain this in terms of withdrawal by
building upon a previously proposed model of per-
sonality and language production. Issues regarding
the signicance and potential implications of this
study are also discussed.
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Abstract 
Enhanced behavioral performance mediated by 
multisensory stimuli has been shown using a variety of 
measures, including response times, orientation behavior 
and even simple stimulus detection. In the particular case of 
the study of saccadic response to unimodal or bimodal 
stimuli, Corneil et al. (2002) were able to show that the 
bimodal visual-auditory saccades benefited from the 
accuracy of visual saccades at saccadic response time 
(SRTs) typical of auditory saccades. However, there has 
been little evidence of multisensory mediated improvement 
in stimulus localization. Recently, Hairston et al. (2003) 
shows improvement in visual-auditory localization 
performance (variability) for induced myopia while no 
benefit was reported for normal vision. Using a similar 
experimental design, taking into account two space 
dimensions, azimuth vs. elevation, we examined the ability 
of human subjects to localize visual, auditory and combined 
visual-auditory targets for stimuli considered optimal for 
the given task. The results showed significant improvement 
in bimodal localization when compared with the more 
accurate modality, visual, as measured with multi criterion 
data (precision, dispersion and orientation of the response 
patterns). Furthermore, the 2D analysis of combined visual-
auditory target localization performance, for azimuth and 
elevation response components, underlines the role of the 
auditory system in the determination of the response 
characteristics. The data suggested that visual-auditory 
localization performance benefited from the “best of the 
two worlds” (Corneil et al., 2002), in that it was improved 
only in the horizontal plane, and restricted to the response 
criterion where audition is more reliable than vision.  
Introduction 
The literature dealing with intersensory perception first 
dealt with the phenomena of sensory illusions, the most 
well known being the ventriloquism effect (Howard and 
Templeton, 1966) and the McGurk effect (McGurk and 
McDonald, 1976). Both these “on-line” effects result  from 
discrepancies, either spatial and/or temporal between the 
two unimodal components of the stimulation. The much 
more ecological situation, in which visual and auditory 
signals are synergetic, i.e. in terms of spatial and temporal 
congruence, has been rarely investigated systematically in 
a localization task. Furthermore, to our knowledge, taking 
into consideration the two dimensions (azimuth and 
elevation) of the observer’s perceptive field for a 
multimodal localization task was never explored. In 
addition, the simultaneous presentation of spatially 
congruent visual and auditory cues was mostly studied 
considering detection of a target (Frasinetti et al., 2002), 
orientation toward a target (Stein et al., 1988, 1989) or 
reduction in response latencies (Hugues et al., 1994; Frens 
et al., 1995, Colonius & Arndt, 2001) rather than purely 
localization capability. When shown, increase in precision 
of the localization was restricted to the analysis of an 
angular value, expressing the stimulus-response 
discrepancy in polar coordinates. The purpose of this 
experiment was to evaluate multisensory integration in a 
two-dimensional localization task and qualify the nature 
of a cross modal benefit that could be obtained when the 
spatial information in the two modalities was convergent. 
We suggested a separate analysis of the localization 
performance for the azimuth and elevation components of 
the response, as a function of target double pole 
coordinate system in which the origin coincides with the 
center of the head. This procedure should reveal the 
contribution of the auditory modality into the bimodal 
localization performance, given the initial differences in 
coding the position of an auditory target in azimuth 
(Interaural Time and Level differences) and in elevation 
(monaural spectral shape cues). Indeed, as a consequence 
of this specific coding, auditory resolution differs in the 
horizontal and the vertical dimension while the visual 
resolution, associated to a retinotopic coding, is isotropic 
in space. The investigation of criterion we assumed to be 
relevant for the task was performed. Centering, precision, 
dispersion and orientation of the responses were 
successively examined to determine a potential benefit 
and the modal contribution of a bimodal visual-auditory 
target presentation. 
Materia ls and methods 
Participants 
Ten adults, aged 22 to 50 years, took part in the 
experiment. They all had a minimum of 20/20 visual 
acuity (if need be, corrected). Their audiometric capacities 
were also normal, with age related variations. All were 
naïve regarding the setup configuration (number and 
positions of the auditory sources). 
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 Experimental setup 
The participant sat in darkness in the center of an 
acoustically transparent semi-cylindrical vertical screen, 
120 cm in radius and 145 cm high, with the head 
maintained by a chin-rest, as shown in Figure 1. A Liquid 
Crystal Display Philips Hopper SV10 video-projector was 
hung above and behind the observer, 245 cm from the 
screen, providing a 80° horizontal x 60° vertical green 
light field of view of 1.5 cd.m-2 average luminance (Fig. 1). 
The color green (coordinates of the 1931 CIE system 
x = 0.267; y = 0.640) was used for the background and for 
the visual stimulus, and made it possible to obtain a 
maximum signal to noise contrast and maximum 
background homogeneity, given the characteristics of the 
optic device. A PC (Pentium III 300 MHz) equipped with 
a 128 SoundBlaster sound card and a Matrox G400 
(32MB) video card generated the stimuli. It was 
connected to the video-projector on the one hand, and to 
the loudspeakers via an audio switch and its Velleman 
K8000 control module, on the other hand. Thirty five 10-
cm-diameter loudspeakers (Fostex FE103 Sigma) were laid 
out behind the screen in a 7 x 5 matrix, with a 10° step. 
The speaker positions were defined in a two-dimensional 
polar coordinate system with the origin at the straight-
ahead fixation position. Eccentricity in the perceptive field 
was referred in relation to this coordinate system. The 
speakers were positioned at azimuths 0°, ±10°, ±20°, ±30° 
and elevations 0°, ±10°, ±20° (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The experimental setup.  
 
Visual stimuli consisted of a spot of light (100ms, 
20 cd.m-2), subtending a 1° of visual angle and auditory 
stimuli consisted of a pink noise burst (broadband noise, 
constant intensity per octave), 100ms duration (20ms fade-
in and fade-out), at 49dB as measured at the subject’s ear or 
hearing position, against a 38dB background noise 
(precision integrating sound level meter Brüel and Kjaer 
Model 2230). The device allows the precise 
superimposition of the visual and auditory stimulation for a 
combined presentation to the target, where the spot of light 
is exactly located at the center of the loudspeaker’s cone. 
To perform localization judgments, participants used a 
track-ball, allowing for movements along all directions. 
Figure 2 describes the succession of the events in trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Definition of the independent variables used in the 
analyses and characterizing the target position. Eccentricity refers 
to the distance of the target from the center of the 2D perceptive 
field, Direction allow transforming target and response 
Orientation (?) in a two components position (azimuth and 
elevation). 
 
1. At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross was 
presented at the center of the screen, at (0°, 0°) 
coordinates, for 500 to 1500 ms for acquisition. 
2. At the extinction of the cross, the visual, auditory or 
bimodal visual- auditory stimulus was presented 
randomly at one of the 35 positions during 100ms. The 
picture illustrates a - 20° to 0° visual stimuli.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The experimental paradigm. 1. Presentation of a 
fixation cross at the center of the screen. 2. A visual stimulus at 
(-20°, 0° coordinates). 3. All the possible cursor position for the 
-20°, 0° target position. 4. Each dot stem from an individual 
localization response. 
 
3. After the target disappears, a response cursor, 
associated to the further manipulation of the track-ball, 
appears randomly inside a 20° imaginary circle whose 
center is the position of the target with a minimum of 2.5° 
distance from it in both axes (azimuth and elevation). 
 (y)
Azimuth (x)
0° 10° 20° 30°
Direction: Azimuth vs Elevation
Orientation:
g
g
g = 45 °
Eccentricity:
Elevation
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 Subjects were instructed to localize the target as 
accurately as possible while pointing this cursor towards 
the perceived location of the target, the temporal 
constraint being secondary. The picture 4 illustrates the 
response distribution of the 10 subjects and 10 repetitions 
for the given location of the visual stimulation. The 
experiment consisted of 6 experimental sessions with 10 
repetitions of each stimulus combination (3 stimulus 
conditions [Visual, auditory, bimodal] at 35 locations [7 
azimuth values, 5 elevation values] presented in pseudo-
random order) for a total of 175 trials per session, with a 
1.5s inter-trial interval. 
Prior to testing, 20 practice trials were performed to make 
the participant familiar with the task and the manipulation 
of the track-ball. The session lasted about 30 min. and a 
minimum 24-hour delay was observed between two 
sessions. 
Data analysis 
Localization errors were calculated as the difference, in 
degrees, between the localization judgment and the actual 
target location. Taking into consideration the azimuth and 
elevation components of the response, centering and 
precision of the responses were calculated from the raw 
data. Centering refers to the mean response, which the 
sign denotes a tendency to overshoot (positive values 
associated to errors eccentric to the target in reference to 
the reference coordinates) or undershoot (negative values 
associated to errors central to the target). Precision 
evaluate the amount of discrepancy (absolute value) from 
target to designation. The distribution of the response 
patterns were computed using a procedure of regression 
analysis for obtaining the regression slope that determines 
the major orientation of the response distribution. 
Estimation of the maximum and minimum variance of the 
distribution along the slope axis and the perpendicular 
one, respectively noted b and a, were used for dispersion 
analysis. By extension, in reference with Hofman et Van 
Opstal (Hofman et Van Opstal, 1998), a characterization 
of the response patterns under a geometrical 
approximation, i.e. ellipses, did allow a better comparison 
within and between modalities than the traditional 
methods using a two-dimensional discontinuous space 
analysis (Oldfield et Parker, 1984). In this way, the 
analysis of dispersion and orientation of the patterns 
would provide complementary data to those obtained with 
the use of the horizontal and vertical axis of the 2D 
coordinate system. To analyze the data, multiple 2-way 
within subjects ANOVAs were performed according to 
the specific hypothesis: Statistical comparisons were 
structured to examine the main effect of target modality 
(visual, auditory, combined visual-auditory) and target 
location (eccentricity range [0°, 10°, 20° and 30°] and 
direction [azimuth versus elevation]) as well as the 
possible interaction between the variables.  
Results 
The results only consider here the comparison of response 
localization between modalities while a preliminary work  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auditory condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visual condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combined visual-auditory condition 
 
Figure 4: Responses patterns as approximated by ellipses for the 
3 conditions and the 35 target positions. 
 
was performed on unimodal data to ensure the validity of 
the results. We shall now successively describe the data 
using the four variables mentioned in section Data 
Analysis. 
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 Precision of the responses 
A short look at the approximated data for each condition 
of presentation of the target for the 35 positions tested 
(Figure 4) underlines the specificity of the auditory 
system in terms of localization capability and the relative 
similar localization behavior between the visual and the 
bimodal conditions.  
 
Table 1: Precision of localization between conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A more detailed analysis of mean of errors confirmed this 
first impression. A repeated measures ANOVA showed 
that the effect of modality condition is significant in 
azimuth (F2,336=87.2; p <.0001) and in elevation 
(F2,336=23.316 p<.0001). The much more interesting result 
concerned the significant improvement in bimodal 
localization compared to the visual one in azimuth, 
(Scheffe test, p=0.0302) but interestingly, not in elevation 
(Scheffe test, p=0.8355). When looking at the 
within-modality variations between error in azimuth and 
error in elevation, expressed by the Azimuth/Elevation 
precision relationship (A/E in table 1), it appears that the 
gain obtained in the bimodal condition follows the 
difference in precision of the auditory condition (with 
statistically significant values). This result is an argument 
for audition playing a structuring role in intersensory 
processing for a spatial task. 
Centering of the responses 
One of the most well known characteristics of the 
auditory system is concerned with the differences in 
accuracy between azimuth and elevation, in relation to the 
differences in the initial information extraction process in 
the two directions of space (Oldfield & Parker, 1986; 
Hofman & Van Opstal, 1998). As a consequence, there is 
a strong response bias in the elevation responses, with a 
central compression of the auditory space related to a 
systematic undershoot of target eccentricity in this  
direction. No observable or statistical improvement in 
centering was obtained between the visual and the 
combined audio-visual conditions. On the other hand, the 
localization of an auditory target in azimuth is much less 
biased by eccentricity than for the visual and bimodal 
conditions, as illustrated in Figure 5. In this direction, the 
reduction of error is at the maximum when the direction 
of the visual and the auditory biases are in opposition of 
signs. When the sign of the bias is identical, no visible 
effect is observed. A statistical comparison between the 
visual and bimodal results fails to show any improvement, 
probably due to the arithmetic mean performed on data 
expressed in polar coordinates. Despite the lack of 
significance, the results did again suggest that the 
contribution of the auditory modality did enhance 
performance. 
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Figure 5: Centering of the responses for azimuth and elevation 
components of the localization responses. Improvement in 
performance is only visible in the horizontal plane. 
 
Dispersion of the responses 
The diverse responses are compared on the two 
characteristic axis of the responses patterns, a and b (Cf. 
Data analysis).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: left: Decrease in variance in a between the visual and 
bimodal condition for all target locations. Right: Decrease in 
variance in b between the visual and bimodal condition for the 
targets that didn’t belong to the median sagittal plane (0° and 
Elevation). 
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Vertical Orientation / ellipses Orientation 
T34 =0,642; p=0,5252
Vector Orientation / Ellipses Orientation
T34=4,0005; p=0,0003
Vertical Orientation / ellipses Orientation
T3 4= -6,101; p<0,0001
Vector Orientation / Ellipses Orientation
T3 4 = -1,648; p=0,1085
Vertical Orientation / ellipses Orientation
T 34= - 5,563; p<0,0001
Vector Orientation / Ellipses Orientation
T3 4 = -1,932; p=0,0617
Auditory BimodalVisual
 
Figure 8: Orientation of the responses in relation with target location in the 2D perceptive field. In the auditory condition, the response 
patterns are vertically oriented (90°-180° axis) while visual and bimodal response patterns exhibit a vector distribution with the ellipses 
oriented centrifugally (toward the center of the perceptive field).  
 
 
The minimum variance axis, a, diverges significantly 
according to the modality condition for target presentat ion 
(repeated measures ANOVA: (F2,338=43.055 p<.0001), 
with the comparison of visual and bimodal conditions 
being also significant (F1,169=23.356 p<.0001). Similar 
results are obtained for the b axis, with a slightly different 
behavior in relation to target location, expressed by the 
belonging or not to a specific plane (0°, Azimuth, 
Elevation, or combined eccentricity in Azimuth and 
Elevation). Indeed, only the targets that are not located on 
the median sagittal plane (0°and Elevation only) did 
benefit of a significant variance reduction (Figure 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Anisotropy coefficient variations according to target 
modality and location in the 2D perceptive field.  Note that the 
coefficient varies in the same way for auditory and bimodal 
conditions.  
 
We also calculated an anisotropy coefficient, 
corresponding to the a/b ratio (a “1” value corresponding 
to an homogeneous distribution along the two axis), and 
looked at the variations of this coefficient according to the 
target location in space. It can be seen in Figure 7 that the 
value of the coefficient follows the same variations in the 
auditory and the combined visual-auditory condition. 
Once again, these data pointed out the role of the auditory 
modality into the multimodal spatial perception, not only 
in performance improvement, but also in representation 
structuring. 
Orientation of the responses 
At this point, we shall remember that the orientation of 
the responses distributions are determined by the slope of 
the regression analysis computed for the 35 tested target 
positions and the 3 modalities. In each condition, the 
calculated orientation is compared to two models of 
sensory coding: an auditory coding using a Cartesian 
coordinates system on one hand, and a vector coding, 
which can reflect a saccadic component in the response, 
on the other hand. The data shown in Figure 8 allow 
mentioning that auditory response patterns are vertically 
oriented while visual and bimodal response patterns 
exhibit a vector distribution with the ellipses oriented 
centrifugally. These observations could reflect a possible 
different role of the saccadic system according to the 
target modality and the presence vs. absence of visual 
information in the perceptive field.  
Discussion 
This study investigated the localization performance to 
visual, auditory, and bimodal stimuli distributed 
throughout the 2D perceptive field. The result of the 
current study illustrates a significant multisensory 
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 enhancement of localization performance in precision and 
dispersion. Through a quantitative approach, the data 
allowed to parameterize the different dimensions which 
describe the perceptive field of an ideal observer and to 
attest to the relative contribution of each sensory modality 
into the bimodal perception. The results argue for an 
integrative process applying for synergetic presentations 
of visual and auditory stimuli, and cues considered as well 
suited for the given task. For all that, our result did not 
refute the very ecological principle of the “inverse 
effectiveness rule” (Stein & Meredith, 1993). They just 
underline the structuring role of the auditory system only 
when it is more reliable than the visual system, what can 
be shown only by the comparison in performance for the 
two directional components  (azimuth and elevation) of the 
response. It is a strong argument to say that sensory 
integration in a localization (spatial) task rests on a 
tendency to optimization. Looking at the data obtained by 
Corneil et al. (2002), showing that bimodal 
visual-auditory saccades were at least as accurate as 
visual saccades, but also generated at saccadic response 
times (SRTs) shorter typical of auditory saccades, our 
result also go in the way of a very similar neural process 
applying. This tendency to optimize shall be considered as 
an economic and ecological process that drove the Central 
Nervous System (CNS) to use the sensory systems in 
relation with the specific contribution they can have. In 
the case of a localization task (spatial task), and given the 
reliability of each sensory system, we demonstrated an 
improvement in centering and a part correction of the 
variance attributed to audition, an increase in precision 
and possibly in structure of representation for vision. 
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Abstract
Children develop certain abilities related to Theory of Mind
reasoning, particularly concerning the False-belief Task,
between the ages of 3 and 5. This paper investigates whether
there is a corresponding change in the frequency of linguistic
expressions related to knowledge and belief produced by
children around these ages. Automated corpus analysis
techniques are used to tag each expression related to
knowledge and belief in a large corpus of transcripts of
speech from normally developing English-learning children.
Results indicate that the frequency of expressions related to
knowledge and belief increases steadily from the beginning of
children’s language production. Tracking of individual
concepts related to knowledge and belief indicates that there
are no clear qualitative changes in the set of concepts that are
expressed by children of different ages. The implications for
the relationship between language and the development of
Theory of Mind reasoning abilities in children are discussed.
A Developing Theory of Mind
Among the most interesting of human cognitive abilities are
those concerning how we understand and reason about the
minds of others. The term Theory of Mind is used
pervasively throughout the cognitive sciences to refer to the
set of abilities that enable people to reflect introspectively
on their own reasoning, to empathize with other people by
imagining what it would be like to be in their position, and
to generate reasonable expectations and inferences about
mental states and processes.
Within the research area of developmental psychology,
Theory of Mind has been studied as a set of cognitive
abilities that progressively emerge in children. A standard
experimental instrument for studying children's Theory of
Mind abilities is the false-belief task. In a standard version
of this task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), the child is
introduced to two characters, Maxi and his mother. Maxi
places an object of interest into a cupboard, and then leaves
the scene. While he is away, his mother removes the object
from the cupboard and places it in a drawer. The child is
then asked to predict where Maxi will look for the object
when he returns to the scene. Success on this task has been
criticized as neither entirely dependent on Theory of Mind
abilities nor broadly representative of them (Bloom &
German, 2000), however its utility has been in reliably
demonstrating a developmental shift.  Wellman et al. (2001)
analyzed 178 separate studies that employed a version of
this task, finding that 3-year-olds will consistently fail this
task on the majority of trials by indicating that Maxi will
look for the object in the location to which his mother has
moved it. 4-year-olds will succeed on half the trials, while
5-year-olds will succeed on the majority of trials. Call &
Tomasello (1999) demonstrate that these results are
consistent across verbal and non-verbal versions of this task.
Children’s developing performance on the false-belief
task is particularly interesting when couched within the
larger debate concerning maturation and. conceptual change
in cognitive development. Like every other cognitive ability
that emerges in childhood, performance on Theory of Mind
tasks is likely due to a complex combination of maturing
innate abilities and knowledge learned through experience.
Still, understanding the relative importance of these two
factors may have some utility in evaluating two types of
cognitive process models that have been proposed to
account for human Theory of Mind abilities.
First, Theory Theory hypothesizes that Theory of Mind
abilities are computed by prediction and explanation
mechanisms by employing representation-level knowledge
about mental attitudes (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Nichols
& Stich, 2002). Second, Simulation Theory argues that
Theory of Mind abilities are computed by imagining that
you are in the place of the other person, then inferring their
mental states by monitoring the processing that is done by
your own cognitive abilities (Goldman, 2000). With respect
to the development of Theory of Mind abilities in children,
each of these theories would emphasize different things as
most important. Theory Theorists would argue that the
acquisition of mental models of commonsense psychology
would play the most important role, a view consistent with a
conceptual change model of development (e.g. Bartsch &
Wellman, 1995). In contrast, Simulation Theorists would
look instead for a maturational change that enabled children
to take the perspective of other people or in the monitoring
of one’s own mental state, a view consistent with a
modularity model of development (e.g. Scholl & Leslie,
2001).
One approach to investigating this issue is to look for
evidence of the acquisition of mental models of
commonsense psychology in the language that children use
in everyday conversation. The contemporary view of natural
language understanding and generation presupposes that the
meaning of verbal expressions are representational in
nature, and that these underlying representations are the
same ones that would be manipulated for the purposes of
inference (e.g. explanation and prediction). By tracking the
production of children’s speech that references
commonsense psychology concepts, we can look for some
correlation between linguistic competency with
commonsense psychology concepts and emerging Theory of
Mind abilities.
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In this paper, we explore the progressive use of
expressions that reference commonsense psychology
concepts in children’s language. The approach that we take
in this investigation is to employ automated corpus analysis
techniques developed within the computational linguistics
research community, where the aim is to construct computer
programs to reliably recognize every possible way of
expressing a concept within a given language. In using
automated corpus analysis techniques, we were able to
quickly analyze each of the datasets within the CHILDES
linguistic corpus (MacWhinney, 2000) that contained
transcriptions of normally developing, monolingual English-
learning children.
The specific interest that we had in conducting this
research concerned the acquisition of a linguistic
competency for concepts related to knowledge and beliefs,
as they are the most relevant to the false-belief task
described earlier. By examining the correspondences
between these linguistic competencies and the ages in which
children acquire cognitive competencies in Theory of Mind
tasks, our aim is to provide an additional point of evidence
that can be used in arguing for or against the competing
models of the cognitive processes that underlie these
abilities.
The Theory of Mind in Language
The Theory of Mind in Language project at the University
of Southern California is an effort aimed at developing a
large-scale lexical-semantic resource for the automated
annotation of commonsense psychological concepts
expressed in English text. This resource is being authored as
a set of local grammars, encoded as finite-state transducers
that can be applied to large text corpora for concept-level
tagging and markup. Associated with each unique concept
tag in the resource is a local grammar that has been hand-
authored with the aim of recognizing every possible way
that the concept could be expressed in the English language.
The application of these local grammars to text documents
produces an annotated text, where each English expression
that is recognized as referencing a commonsense
psychological concept is tagged. The following paragraph
(from William Makepeace Thackeray’s 1848 novel, Vanity
Fair) provides an example of the output of the application
of this lexical-semantic resource.
Perhaps [partially-justified-proposition] she had
mentioned the fact [proposition] already to Rebecca, but
that young lady did not appear to [partially-justified-
proposition] have remembered it [memory-retrieval];
indeed, vowed and protested that she expected [add-
expectation] to see a number of Amelia's nephews and
nieces.  She was quite disappointed [disappointment-
emotion] that Mr. Sedley was not married; she was sure
[justified-proposition] Amelia had said he was, and she
doted so on [liking-emotion] little children.
The tag set that is being used in this lexical-semantic
resource was developed first through the large-scale analysis
of strategies, defined as the abstract structural
commonalities that exist between analogous planning cases
(Gordon, 2002). 635 concepts resulting from this analysis
(grouped into 30 representational areas) were related to a
Theory of Mind, which constitutes the broadest cognitive
science specification of a representational Theory of Mind
to date. Gordon & Hobbs (2003) describe how this tag set is
modified through the process of examining the breadth of
English language expressions that are related to a given
representational area, among the 30 in the complete set.
Gordon et al. (2003) describes the process of constructing
local grammars for each of the concepts in the revised tag
set, encoded as finite-state transducers, and describes an
evaluation to determine the effectiveness of this approach at
automatically recognizing every English expression that
refers to the concept tag in written text.
One of the 30 representational areas described in this
previous work, Managing Knowledge, specifically deals
Managing knowledge (37 concepts)
He’s got a logical mind (managing-knowledge-ability). She’s very gullible (bias-toward-belief). He’s skeptical by
nature (bias-toward-disbelief). It is the truth (true). That is completely false (false). We need to know whether it is
true or false (truth-value). His claim was bizarre (proposition). I believe what you are saying (belief). I didn’t know
about that (unknown). I used to think like you do (revealed-incorrect-belief). The assumption was widespread
(assumption). There is no reason to think that (unjustified-proposition). There is some evidence you are right
(partially-justified-proposition). The fact is well established (justified-proposition). As a rule, students are generally
bright (inference). The conclusion could not be otherwise (consequence). What was the reason for your suspicion
(justification)? That isn’t a good reason (poor-justification). Your argument is circular (circular-justification). One of
these things must be false (contradiction). His wisdom is vast (knowledge). He knew all about history (knowledge-
domain). I know something about plumbing (partial-knowledge-domain). He’s got a lot of real-world experience
(world-knowledge). He understands the theory behind it (world-model-knowledge). That is just common sense
(shared-knowledge). I’m willing to believe that (add-belief). I stopped believing it after a while (remove-belief). I
assumed you were coming (add-assumption). You can’t make that assumption here (remove-assumption). Let’s see
what follows from that (check-inferences). Disregard the consequences of the assumption (ignore-inference). I tried
not to think about it (suppress-inferences). I concluded that one of them must be wrong (realize-contradiction). I
realized he must have been there (realize). I can’t think straight (knowledge-management-failure). It just confirms
what I knew all along (reaffirm-belief).
Figure 1. Example expressions for 37 concepts related to Managing Knowledge.
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with the concepts surrounding knowledge and belief,
including assumptions, contradictions, justifications, logical
consequences, truth, falsehood, and the mental processes
associated with these commonsense psychological entities.
Gordon et al. (2003) describe 37 concept tags associated
with this area, which is presented here in Figure 1. The
evaluation described in this previous work indicated that the
lexical-semantic resources associated with this specific
subset of the tag set was effective at identifying 83.92% of
the expressions associated with these tags in English written
text (recall score), and that 92.15% of the tagged
expressions would be judged as appropriate by a human
rater (precision score).
References in the CHILDES Corpus
As a corpus of analysis, we utilized the CHILDES database
of children’s speech (MacWhinney, 2000), a collection of
transcripts from a wide variety of psycholinguistic studies
conducted largely in the 1980s. Specifically, we analyzed
the transcripts from the 42 research studies that contributed
data of normally developing monolingual English-learning
children.
To facilitate the analysis of this dataset according to the
age of the children, individual files were generated
containing only the transcripts of speech produced by a
single child for each of the transcript files (a total of 3001
individual files). The total number of words in each file was
calculated and the age of the child (in months) was
recorded. There were 3,347,340 words transcribed in these
files from children ranging in age from 11 to 87 months.
Figure 2 presents a histogram of the number of words in
the files associated with each age of the children. The
notable spike that appears in this figure is due to a large
dataset that exists within the CHILDES database contributed
from a study by Hall et al. (1984). The groups of children
are collectively identified only as being between the ages of
54 and 60 months without differentiation, so all of this
dataset was used for evidence at the low end of this range.
More significantly, Figure 2 reveals that comparatively little
data exists within the CHILDES corpus of normally
developing monolingual English-learning children after the
age of 5 years (60 months). Although the available data
should allow for the observation of some interesting trends
throughout the age range of the corpus, some caution is
necessary when drawing strong conclusions about children
older than 60 months.
In order to enable comparisons between children and
adults, each of the analyses were also conducted on the
CALLHOME American English Speech data collected and
transcribed by the Linguistic Data Consortium (1997). The
CALLHOME database consists of transcripts of 120
unscripted telephone conversations (302,083 words)
between native speakers of English, where the callers
average 38.875 years in age (σ=16.14).
Given these text corpora, two sets of analysis were
conducted. Both of these analyses involved the use of tag
frequency as data points. To compute tag frequency, the
local grammars described in the previous section were
applied to a corpus in order to find every expression within
the corpus that should be tagged with the concept associated
with each local grammar. The number of tagged expressions
was then divided by the number of words that were searched
to compute each frequency data point. In the first analysis,
the frequency of all expressions of the 37 concepts related to
knowledge and belief were tabulated for each of the
datasets. In the second analysis, the frequencies of
expressions related to each individual concept (of the 37
total) were tabulated.
No attempt was made to filter the results of the
application of the local grammars to improve precision, and
no evaluation was conducted to estimate the recall rate on
these corpora. However, after reviewing the resulting tags
we believe that the precision and recall scores obtained on
these corpora are only marginally less than was achieved in
the evaluation of written text tagging conducted by Gordon
et al. (2003) using the same set of local grammars.
Frequency of all expressions related to knowledge
The first analysis that we conducted was to apply all of the
local grammars for the 37 concepts related to knowledge
and belief to each of the data files corresponding to children
of different ages. In all, there were 18,283 tags produced
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Figure 2. Number of words in corpus by age of children in months
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through the application of these local grammars, with only
19 of the 37 tags appearing in the data. Nearly half of these
tags were for the concept of a justified proposition (9113
tags), while the remaining half was dominated by tags to the
concepts of belief (3150 tags), contradictions (3485 tags),
and partially-justified propositions (1483 tags).
Applying the full set of local grammars to the
CALLHOME data set produced 6775 tags, yielding a
frequency of 2.24 reference per 100 words of speech. 21 of
the 37 tags were assigned to this data, with the highest
frequencies going to the concepts of justified proposition
(3172 tags), contradiction (1551 tags), belief (1000 tags),
and partially-justified proposition (493 tags).
Figure 3 presents a graph of the frequency per 100 words
of speech for all expressions related to the concepts of
knowledge and belief based on the age of the children (in
months) of the analyzed data. As a point of comparison, the
frequency for the CALLHOME data (2.24) is also indicated
on the graph as a dashed horizontal line. The data on the
graph can be described by the linear function y=0.0281x –
0.3914, where the correlation statistic (r2) is 0.7021.
The results indicate that expressions related to knowledge
and belief do not appear at the beginning of children’s
speech production, but increase in frequency in a strongly
linear manner from 30 months (2.5 years) until 48 months
(4 years), when the frequencies of these expressions are
roughly half of what is observed in adult conversational
speech.
Frequency of expressions of individual concepts
In the second analysis, we individually applied each of the
19 local grammars that produced at least one tag in the
corpus to each of the transcript data for children of different
ages. The primary purpose of this analysis was to track the
relative increase in frequency for each concept over the
developmental period where a change in Theory of Mind
abilities is evident (between 36 and 60 months of age).
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Figure 3. Frequency of all expressions related to knowledge and belief by age of children
Total tags 24 mo. 30 mo. 36 mo. 42 mo. 48 mo. 54 mo. 60 mo. CallHome
add-assumption 499 0.27 0.65 1.34 3.31 0.91 4.22 2.59 5.16
assumption 22 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0 0.07
belief 3150 0.72 3.21 3.67 17.67 18.71 12.39 24.63 33.1
bias-toward-disbelief 26 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0.65 1.22
check-inferences 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.65 0.23
consequence 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26
contradiction 3485 0 0 0 22.09 29.27 30.43 27.22 51.34
false 69 0 0 0 1.1 0.6 0.37 0.65 0.26
ignore-inference 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0
justified-proposition 9113 2.07 13.02 28.35 51.46 45.87 61.42 73.23 105
knowledge 5 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.53
managing-knowledge 26 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0.36
partial-domain-knowledge 23 0 0 0 0.22 0 0.2 0 0.6
partially-justified-proposition 1483 0.27 0 0 6.85 6.04 7.77 8.43 16.32
reaffirm-belief 19 0 0.26 0 0 0 0.13 0 0.36
realize 229 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.22 1.81 1.3 2.59 5.63
true 67 0 0.07 0 0 0 0.47 0 2.02
unjustified-proposition 51 0 0 0 1.1 0 0.07 0 0.93
world-model-knowledge 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.73
Figure 4. Frequency of expressions of individual concepts related to knowledge and belief (tags per 10,000 words)
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Figure 4 presents a chart of the results of this analysis.
Each concept is listed with the total number of tags assigned
in the corpus and frequencies of occurrence within the data
sets for 24, 30, 36, 42, 48, 54, and 60 month-old children,
along with the CALLHOME frequency for the concept.
Figure 5 further describes the results of this analysis by
charting the growth in frequency of expressions related to
the 5 most frequent concepts tagged in the corpus (add-
assumption, belief, contradiction, justified-proposition, and
partially-justified-proposition) between the ages of 24 and
60 months.
The results indicate that the increases in overall frequency
of expressions related to knowledge and belief can be
attributed to a steady increase in expressions related to a
handful of concepts, particularly the concepts of belief,
contradiction, and justified-propositions. This steady
increase begins at 24 months and continuing past 48
months, when the frequencies of these expressions are
roughly half of what is observed in adult conversational
speech evidenced by the CALLHOME corpus. There is no
evidence of any qualitative change in the sorts of concepts
related to knowledge and belief that are expressed by
children of different ages.
Discussion
The overall purpose of this study was to determine the
relationship between a linguistic competency in the
production of expressions related to knowledge and belief
and children’s developing Theory of Mind abilities,
particularly during the age range where children acquire
competency on the false-belief task (between 3 and 5 years
in age). In this section, we will consider the results of our
analysis with respect to this purpose.
First, there is no evidence to suggest a qualitative change
in the frequencies that children express concepts related to
knowledge and belief between the ages of 3 and 5. Looking
first only at the frequency of all expressions related to
knowledge and belief we see that children between the ages
of 3 and 5 are continuing a steady increase in frequency that
started at the beginning of their speech production. The
sparse data that we have for children older than 60 months
suggests that this gradual increase begins to level off after
this point. If we had seen a non-linear shift in the
frequencies of expression between 3 and 5, then an
argument could have been made relating linguistic
competency to Theory of Mind abilities. Finding no such
shift, one could reasonably infer that the developing
linguistic competencies that children have for expressions
related to knowledge and belief are unrelated to their
reasoning abilities in Theory of Mind tasks.
Second, there is no evidence to suggest a qualitative
change in the concepts that children express related to
knowledge and belief between the ages of 3 and 5. Looking
at the individual frequencies for each of the 19 concept tags
that were assigned to the corpus we see that the handful of
concepts that account for the vast majority of tags increase
in frequency at a constant rate from the very beginning of
children’s speech production. Very few expressions appear
in this data related to other concepts that appear with
slightly higher frequencies in adult discourse, and there is
no evidence that linguistic competency is acquired for these
concepts during this period of time either. If we had seen a
change in the concepts that were being expressed between 3
and 5, then a different argument could have been made
relating linguistic competency to Theory of Mind abilities.
Finding no such change one could again reasonably infer a
lack of a direct relationship between language-use and
acquired reasoning abilities.
Together these two points argue against a strong
relationship between linguistic competencies for expressions
related to knowledge and belief and children’s developing
Theory of Mind abilities. This argument is particularly
important in evaluating cognitive models that assume that
Theory of Mind abilities and language abilities are enabled
by representational mental models of the same type. If we
assume that the sophistication of children’s representational
theories of knowledge and belief is closely related to the
way that children express these concepts in language, then
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there is little evidence to suggest that these representational
theories change at all between ages of 3 and 5, when
competency on the false-belief task develops. Accepting this
assumption, the evidence in this paper would argue against
any strong conceptual change account of Theory of Mind
abilities where competency on the false-belief task is due
solely to the acquisition of more sophisticated
representational mental models. This evidence would argue
instead for a maturational account, where competency on
the false-belief task can be attributed to the development of
new cognitive abilities for taking the perspective of other
people or in the monitoring of one’s own mental state
between the ages of 3 and 5. One strong counterargument
that could be made against this line of reasoning concerns
the differences in the linguistic competencies between
language production and language understanding. In
analyzing transcript data consisting of words uttered by
children, this study can make no claims regarding the
linguistic competency that these children might have for
understanding expressions related to knowledge and belief
during the relevant periods of development.
Conclusions
The availability of large corpora of transcripts of children’s
speech production has afforded researchers the opportunity
to investigate a wide variety of issues related to language
acquisition. This paper has demonstrated that specific issues
related to the acquisition Theory of Mind abilities can also
be addressed using these corpora. By employing automated
techniques for the tagging of expressions related to
commonsense psychology we have been able to efficiently
analyze data sets that are larger than could have been
reasonably tackled given limited resources.
The specific interest of this paper was to determine if
there was evidence for change in the linguistic competency
in expressions related to knowledge and belief during
developmental periods associated with acquired competency
in the false-belief task (between 3 and 5 years of age). By
using automated corpus analysis techniques, expressions
related to knowledge and belief were identified across all
datasets within the CHILDES corpus containing speech
from normally developing monolingual English-learning
children. By charting the frequencies of these expressions at
different ages, it is evident that children steadily increase the
frequency of expressions related to knowledge and belief at
a constant rate from the beginning of their speech
production. By tracking the production of expressions
related to individual concepts, no qualitative changes in the
conceptual content of these expressions over time is evident.
These results argue against a strong relationship between
linguistic competencies for expressions related to
knowledge and belief and children’s developing Theory of
Mind abilities.
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Abstract
Over the last two decades attempts to quantify decision-
making have established that, under a wide range of
conditions, people trade-off effectiveness for efficiency in the
strategies they adopt. However, as interesting, significant, and
influential as this research has been, its scope is limited by
three factors; the coarseness of how effort was measured, the
confounding of the costs of steps in the decision-making
algorithm with the costs of steps in a given task environment,
and the static nature of the decision tasks studied. In the
current study, we embedded a decision-making task in a
dynamic task environment and varied the cost required for the
information access step. Across three conditions, small
changes in the cost of interactive behavior led to changes in
the strategy adopted for decision-making as well as to
differences in how a step in the same strategy was
implemented.
Introduction
In the 80’s and 90’s, Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993)
showed that decision-makers trade-off efficiency of their
decision making strategy for the effort it requires. They
attempted to quantify the cognitive effort of decision
making by counting the number of steps that different
strategies required for the same decision. The conclusion of
this work was that people adapt to a wide variety of
conditions to find a strategy that is about as accurate as it
needs to be for as little cognitive effort as possible.
As interesting, significant, and influential as Payne, et
al.’s work was, its scope was limited by three factors; the
coarseness of how effort was measured, the confounding of
the costs of steps in the decision-making algorithm with the
costs of steps in a given task environment, and the static
nature of the decision tasks studied.
First, the elementary information processes (EIPs) that
Payne et al. used to count steps were neither elementary or
steps. By today’s standards EIPs such as “reading value,
comparing two values or storing a result in long-term
memory” (Todd & Benbasat, 2000) would be analyzed as a
series of more fundamental cognitive, perceptual, and action
operations. Furthermore, the count of steps was not based
on an analysis of the decision-making process executed by a
human, but stemmed from task analyses of the minimum
number of steps a perfect agent would require to execute the
algorithm. The step count did not consider the mis-steps or
re-steps taken by a boundedly rational agent as they skipped
a step or forgot an intermediary product, and then backed up
and redid a number of steps to recover.
Second is the confounding of the costs of a step in the
decision-making algorithm with the costs associated with
how a step is implemented in a given task environment.
Research has shown that the organization, form, and
sequence of information influences strategy selection (for
example, Fennema & Kleinmuntz, 1995; Kleinmuntz &
Schkade, 1993; Schkade & Kleinmuntz, 1994). Other
research has looked at how individual differences in
working memory capacity interact with interface design to
affect performance on decision-making tasks (Lohse, 1997).
Other studies have looked at how the design of decision aids
may have unintended consequences for the decision
strategies that people adopt (Adelman, Miller, & Yeo, 2001;
Benbasat & Todd, 1996; Rose & Wolfe, 2000; Todd &
Benbasat, 1994, 1999, 2000). At least one study has
investigated how the cost of information access affects
strategy selection (Lohse & Johnson, 1996).
The third limit on the scope of Payne, et al.’s pioneering
work is that the decision-making tasks they used were static,
not dynamic. Although time constraints were sometimes
introduced (Payne, Bettman, & Luce, 1996), these were
extrinsic, not intrinsic to the decision-making task. For
example, subjects were told to work quickly, timed, or
rewarded for fast performance. Such extrinsic time pressure
differs from tasks where the information, options, and
criteria for decision-making change over time (Adelman,
Bresnick, Black, Marvin, & Sak, 1996) or in which an early
step in decision-making may result in changes to the task
environment (Ehret, Gray, & Kirschenbaum, 2000). Hastie
(2001) has characterized these dynamic situations as
entailing a series of “linked decisions in a dynamic,
temporally extended future” and has marked understanding
this type of decision making as one of his 16 challenges for
decision-making research in the 21
st
 century.
The current paper reports empirical data from the first of a
planned series of experimental and modeling efforts to
extend the scope of decision-making research. In the study
reported here, decision-making was embedded as an integral
part of a dynamic classification task. Subjects’ goal was to
score as high as possible on the classification task while
maximizing performance on the decision-making task. This
initial study focuses on the ways in which varying the cost
of interactive behavior affects the decision-making process.
Specifically, across three between-subject conditions, we
introduced modest differences in the cost of information
access and studied how these differences affected the mix of
cognitive, perceptual, and action operations for acquiring
and comparing information.
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Method
Subjects
Forty undergraduate students participated for approximately
five hours each. Seven failed to complete the study. Subjects
were either given course credit or were paid $5.00 per hour
of participation and a $5.00 per hour completion bonus.
Subjects were run individually.
Task
The experimental task was a preferential choice decision-
making task embedded in the Argus Prime simulated radar-
operator task environment (Schoelles & Gray, 2001a).
Argus Prime is a complex but tractable simulated task
environment (Gray, 2002) that we have used in a variety of
studies (see, e.g., Gray & Schoelles, 2003; Schoelles, 2002;
Schoelles & Gray, 2001b).
Classification Task. For the classification task, the subject
must assess the threat value of each target in each sector of a
radar screen (depicted in Figure 1). The screen represents an
airborne radar console with ownship at the bottom. Arcs
divide the screen into four sectors; each sector is fifty miles
wide. The task is dynamic since the targets have a speed and
course. A session is scenario driven; that is, the initial time
of appearance, range, bearing, course, speed, and altitude of
each target are read from an experimenter-generated file.
The scenario can contain events that change a target’s
speed, course, or altitude. New targets can appear at any
time during the scenario.
Figure 1: Argus Prime Radar Screen (left) and
Information/Decision Window (upper right).
The subject selects (i.e., hooks) a target by moving the
cursor to its icon (i.e., track number) and clicking. When a
target has been hooked, an information window appears (on
the upper-right of the display) that contains the track
number of the target hooked and the current value of target
attributes such as speed, bearing, altitude, and course. The
subject’s task is to combine these values, using an algorithm
that we have taught them, and to map the result onto a
7–point threat value scale (at the bottom of the information
window).
Targets must be classified once for each sector that they
enter. If a target leaves a sector before the subject can
classify it, it is considered incorrectly classified and a score
of zero is assigned. A running score that indicates
percentage of targets correctly classified is shown in the
upper-left of the display. For this study, each Argus Prime
scenario lasted 12-min. During this period a subject had the
opportunity to calculate the threat value of between 70 and
90 targets.
The Decision–Making Task (DMT). The decision-making
task (DMT) was added to Argus Prime for this study. As
discussed in the Procedure section, subjects were introduced
to the DMT after an hour of training and a second hour of
practice on the classification task.
Each scenario proceeded until the subject had classified 8
targets. At this point, a DMT presented the subject with 4 or
6 targets for which he or she had already calculated the
threat value. All groups were given the identification
number for each of the DMT alternatives in a target-column
that appeared in the lower right of the display (this area is
blank in Figure 1). The subject’s task was to determine
which target had the highest threat value and select that
target by clicking on its number in the target-column. The
DMT ended and the classification task resumed when the
subject clicked the CHOOSE button located below the target-
column.
On making a correct choice, feedback was given via a
simulated explosion, the chosen aircraft was removed from
the radar screen, and the overall percent score for decision-
making on that scenario was increased. If the participant
chose the incorrect target, the participant’s overall percent
score for that scenario was reduced. A running average of
DMT performance was presented to the right of the
classification score. After classifying or re-classifying 8
more aircraft, another DMT was presented. This sequence
continued until the end of each scenario.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three DMT
conditions: Table, 0-Second Lockout (0-Lock), or 2-Second
Lockout (2-Lock). We were most interested in differences
between the two lockout conditions, with the Table
condition providing a measure of how high decision-making
performance could be in this task environment under near
optimal conditions.
As in other Argus Prime studies, subjects were trained for
1-hr on the Argus Prime classification task. They then
practiced this task during their second hour by performing
four scenarios in which the classification task was the only
task. After the fourth scenario, subjects were given a short
break and were then instructed on the DMT task. Training
on the DMT took approximately 10-min. During the last 8
scenarios (5 through 12), subjects continued doing the
classification task while being interrupted to perform the
DMT.
The more time spent on the DMT, the more likely it
would be that a target would cross a sector boundary
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without being classified. Such unclassified targets were
assigned a score of zero. Hence, time on the DMT decreased
time available for classification. This, in turn, placed
pressure on the subjects to perform the DMT quickly.
The three between-subject conditions differed in their
cost of information access. As it was unclear to us how
demanding the DMT would be in the Argus Prime task
environment, the Table condition provided near minimum
access costs. For this condition the numeric threat value for
each target was listed in the target-column next to the
target’s identification number. Subjects simply scanned the
target-column for the highest threat value (a 1–7 scale).
In contrast, to obtain a threat value, the 0-Lock and 2-
Lock groups had to locate the target on the radar screen and
move the cursor to it. Similar to a “tool-tip”, the threat value
then appeared next to the target. For 0-Lock, the threat value
appeared as soon as the cursor moved to the target. For 2-
Lock, the threat value appeared after a 2-s delay.
Results
Our focus is on process measures; namely, how the cost of
information access affects the combination of cognitive,
perceptual, and action operators required to implement the
information access step in decision-making. For these
comparisons, we focus on the two lockout conditions as we
have not yet analyzed the eye movement data required to
infer process in the Table condition. However, before
discussing the process measures we look at outcome
measures for both classification and decision-making. For
these outcome measures, the Table condition provides a
baseline against which to compare the effect of increased
access costs on outcome.
Classification
All subjects received four practice scenarios of Argus Prime
with the classification task only, followed by 8 scenarios
where performance on the classification task was interrupted
by the decision-making task.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) that looked at
classification performance over blocks of scenarios
(scenarios 1–4, 5–8, and 9–12) yielded a significant main
effect of block, F (2, 30) = 3.1, p = 0.0597, MSE = 2313.
Performance improved from a mean of 56% during practice
to 66% in the first four DMT scenarios to 72% in the final
four DMT scenarios (see Figure 2).
All conditions were treated the same through the initial
training and initial four practice scenarios. Hence,
performance on the four practice scenarios provides an
opportunity to determine whether the subjects in the three
conditions were of roughly equal ability (as per the
assumption of random assignment of subjects to condition).
A second ANOVA was conducted on scenarios 1–4. As
judged by the classification scores there were no differences
among the three groups (F < 1). Any difference in
classification performance during the 8 DMT scenarios will
be regarded as due to the DMT manipulation.
A third ANOVA focused on classification performance
during the 8 DMT scenarios (scenarios 5 through 12).
Classification scores varied significantly between conditions
[F (2, 30) = 7.0, p = 0.003, MSE = 3118.9], Table = 79%, 0-
Lock = 64%, and 2-Lock = 65%. Planned comparisons
showed that this difference was localized in the Table versus
0- and 2-Lock comparison (p = .0008) with no difference
between 0-Lock and 2-Lock (F < 1). Performance increased
from scenario 5–8 to 9–12 [F (1, 30) = 33.6, p = .0001, MSE
= 1167] but this effect did not interact with DMT condition
(p = 0.12).
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Figure 2: Classification Score across Practice scenarios (1–4) and
DMT scenarios (5–8 and 9–12). (Error bars show the standard
error.)
Summary of Classification Performance. The three
groups were equal in their classification performance during
practice (scenarios 1–4) and each continued to improve
through the first and then second set of DMT scenarios (5–8
and 9–12). However, once the DMT began, the two lockout
conditions performed lower on the classification task than
the Table condition. As discussed below, the Table
condition spent much less time on the DMT than did the
lockout conditions. Hence, we believe the difference in
classification performance is simply attributable to the
difference in time spent by the three groups on the
classification task.
Decision-Making Task (DMT)
Outcome Measures. Although performance on the
decision-making task was uniformly high (see Figure 3),
there was a significant difference between conditions [F (2,
30) = 10.4, p = .0004, MSE = 0.05] with Table being almost
perfect (0.98) followed by 0-Lock (0.94) and then by 2-
Lock (0.91). Planned comparisons showed the difference
between Table and the two lockout conditions to be
significant (p = .0003) and the difference between 0-Lock
versus 2-Lock to be marginally significant (p = .064). The
influence of number of choices (DMT-4 versus DMT-6)
was also significant [F (1, 20) = 14.25, p = .0007, MSE =
.043]. The interaction of number of choices with condition
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was marginally significant, F (2, 20) = 2.71, p = .08, MSE =
.008.
0.85
0.88
0.91
0.94
0.97
1.00
DMT-4 DMT-6
Number of Alternatives
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
io
n
 C
o
r
r
e
c
t
0-lock 2-lock table
Figure 3: Proportion Correct Choices in Decision Making Task by
Number of Alternatives (DMT-4 and DMT-6) and Interface
Condition. (Error bars show the standard error.)
A second outcome measure is the time per DMT. This
measure yields a significant effect of condition [F (2, 30) =
27.45, p = .0001, MSE = 4953] with Table spending a mere
2.7-s per DMT, 0-Lock spending 16.5-s and 2-Lock
spending 23.6-s per DMT. The effect of number of targets
per DMT was significant (p = .0005); however, this effect is
constrained by a significant interaction of condition by
DMT number [F  (2, 30) = 3.21, p = 0.054, MSE = 83.8].
This interaction reflects the near asymptotic performance of
Table in both DMT-4 (2.6-s) and DMT-6 (2.7-s) whereas
both of the Lock groups showed a healthy increase in time
from DMT-4 to DMT-6 (14.2 to 18.8 for 0-Lock and 20.8 to
26.3 for 2-Lock).
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Figure 4: Number of different targets checked per DMT for 0-Lock
and 2-Lock. (Error bars show the standard error.)
Of course the 2-Lock condition was locked out for 2-s for
each check they made. To determine the contribution of
lockout time to the difference between 0-Lock and 2-Lock
we subtracted 2-s for each check or recheck made by 2-
Lock. With this adjustment, time per 0-Lock versus 2-Lock
was no longer significant (F < 1), leaving only a significant
main effect of DMT target number [F (1, 20) = 15.45, p =
.0008, MSE = 397].
Process Measures. Our first process measure is total
number of targets that were checked at least once per DMT.
Clearly, if subjects were doing a thorough job this number
would be 4 for DMT-4 and 6 for DMT-6. Although we do
not have this information for the Table condition, we do
have it for the two lockout conditions (see Figure 4) and it is
not surprising to find a significant main effect of number of
alternatives [F (1, 20) = 33.87, p = .0001, MSE = 18.34]
with DMT-4 checking an average of 2.82 targets versus 3.74
for DMT-6. However, this absolute increase masks a
relative decrease as DMT-4 checked 72% of their targets
versus 62% for DMT-6.
More interesting for our purposes is the difference in
number checked across the two lockout conditions.
Although 0-Lock checked slightly more targets than 2-Lock
(3.62 versus 2.94) this difference was not significant (p =
.24). No other comparisons were significant.
Our second measure of process is the number of rechecks
per DMT. If a threat value was checked once, how likely
was it to be rechecked? As the proportion correct and
number checked varied between DMT-4 and DMT-6, we
were somewhat surprised that the number of rechecks was
constant (F < 1). It is somewhat less surprising that more
rechecks were done for 0-Lock than for 2-Lock [F (1, 20) =
44.63, p = .0001, MSE = 4.57]. However, it does surprise us
that the 2-Lock condition made almost no rechecks (see
Figure 5). None of the interactions were significant (F < 1).
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Figure 5: Rechecks as a proportion of those checked at least once.
(Error bars show the standard error.)
Our third process measure is the time per check or
recheck. We know from Figure 4 that 0-Lock performed
more checks per DMT than 2-Lock. However, after
subtracting 2-s for each check, the analysis of time per DMT
showed that 0-Lock spent as much time per DMT as did 2-
Lock. Hence, the time per check must be greater for 2-Lock
than 0-Lock. We tested this conjecture in our final process
analysis.
Time per check or recheck (after subtracting 2-s for each
check made by 2-Lock) yielded a significant difference
between lockout conditions [F (1, 20) = 7.98, p = 0.01, MSE
= 374]. Even after subtracting 2-s per check, 2-Lock spent
over twice as much time per check as 0-Lock (7.2-s versus
3.1-s). Interestingly enough, no other comparisons were
significant—neither number of alternatives (DMT-4 versus
DMT-6, F < 1) nor any interactions.
Discussion of Results
The Classification results suggest that the three between-
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subject conditions (Table, 0-Lock, and 2-Lock) were
equivalent as measured by their performance during the four
practice scenarios. Performance on classification increased
across the eight scenarios in the decision making part of the
study. This increase suggests that subjects were still taking
the classification task very seriously.
The classification score differences between conditions
during scenarios 5-12 appear to reflect the differences in
time spent on the decision-making task. As the Table
condition spent < 3-s per DMT compared to 16-s for 0-Lock
and 24-s for 2-Lock they had more time to devote to the
classification task. (Although there were significant
differences between groups on the mean number of DMTs
per scenario, these differences were small – Table = 3.4, 0-
Lock = 2.9, and 2-Lock = 2.7 DMTs per scenario.)
All groups did well on the decision-making task though
the Table group did the best. Table also spent much less
time per decision than did the other two groups. The time to
locate and move the mouse to the screen position of the
target contributed to time spent per check by each of the
Lock groups. However, although the search and movement
costs were similar for 0-Lock and 2-Lock, the 0-Lock group
made more rechecks than did the 2-Lock and this difference
was constant across DMT-4 and DMT-6. Likewise, after
subtracting time for the 2-s lockout, time per check was over
twice as great for 2-Lock than for 0-Lock. What factors can
explain these patterns?
Discussion
The current study addresses three limits to traditional
research on the tradeoff of effectiveness for efficiency in
decision-making. First, rather than counting the steps
required for an expert agent to execute a decision-making
algorithm, we counted the actual steps taken by human
subjects during the process of decision-making and
measured the duration of those steps. This approach
provides better evidence for what people actually do when
they make a decision and exposes important intermediary
steps not captured by the traditional approach. For example,
the current data reveals that the 0-Lock group performs
many rechecks of threat value during decision-making. The
necessity to check a step more than once implies that the
requirement to hold the currently highest threat value in
memory while searching for another target is an important
sub-step that is affected by memory limits.
Second, by varying the interface design of the decision-
making task, we have begun to disentangle the cost of a step
in a decision-making algorithm from the cost due to how a
step is implemented in a given task environment. It is
obvious that the 0-Lock and 2-Lock conditions required
more visual search and more motor movement than did the
Table condition. In addition, the necessity to search for the
next target while holding the currently highest threat value
and its target identification number in memory adds a
significant cognitive cost to the lockout conditions as
compared to the Table.
Of great interest to us is that the additional 2-s per check
imposed on the 2-Lock condition seems responsible for the
vast differences in process and the slight differences in
outcome between lockout conditions. 0-Lock rechecked
more targets per decision-making trial while spending half
as long on each check or recheck than did 2-Lock. Although
there was nothing preventing subjects in the lockout
conditions from rechecking the same number of targets or
spending the same amount of time per check and recheck,
they differed on both of these measures. Apparently
differences in lockout costs led the two groups of subjects to
adopt two different solutions to the problem of comparing a
new threat value to the currently highest threat value.
Encoding of location is a fairly automatic outcome of
locating a target on a screen (Ehret, 2002). For 0-Lock, after
a target had been found once, the cost of reacquiring that
target was relatively low. This low reacquisition cost led 0-
Lock to adopt a strategy of minimum memory encoding (as
judged by the time spent per check) and more reliance on
rechecks. For the 2-Lock group, the 2-s lockout did not
simply add a delay in the time to access threat value, it also
added 2-s to the retention interval for previously encoded
threat values as well as for previously encoded target
locations. As time for retrieving an item from memory
varies with its activation level, we interpret the additional
time per check of 2-Lock over 0-Lock as reflecting
additional time spent retrieving old information from
memory as well as a longer encoding time in anticipation of
a longer retention interval.
Third, our experiment helps to move decision-making
studies from static to more dynamic paradigms. Time spent
on the decision-making task took time away from
performing the classification task. Subjects had spent the
first two hours of the study learning and practicing the
classification task. During the last three hours we
encouraged them to continue working hard on classification
and to attempt to improve their performance. The data
indicate that all groups improved their classification
performance throughout the 8 decision-making scenarios.
The pressure to do well on the classification task
apparently led subjects in the lockout conditions to satisfice
on the decision-making task. As reported earlier, only 72%
of the DMT-4 targets and 62% of the DMT-6 targets were
checked on any given decision-making trial.
Summary & Conclusions
The study shows that small changes in the cost of
interactive behavior may lead to changes in the strategy
adopted for decision-making as well as to differences in
how a step in the same strategy is implemented. The low
cost of scanning the target-column for threat values led the
Table condition to use all of the data to achieve near perfect
performance in decision-making. In contrast, the lockout
conditions satisficed by using less than 100% of the target
data.
Although the two lockout conditions did not differ in the
amount of information accessed, the differences in lockout
time led each group of subjects to implement the
information access step in very different ways. The 0-Lock
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group adopted an interaction-intensive procedure that made
good use of perceptual–motor operations to minimize
memory load. In contrast, the 2-Lock group adopted a
memory-intensive procedure that maximized memory load
and minimized lockout time per alternative. The different
procedures adopted by the different groups reflect an
adaptation of cognition, perception, and action to the cost
structure or soft constraints (Gray & Fu, 2004) of the task
environment.
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Abstract
Two experiments suggest that functional relations influence
the processing of visual stimuli.  Experiment 1 demonstrated
that participants are more accurate to detect targets engaged in
functional interactions with related items than when they are
simply surrounded by those items.  Experiment 2
demonstrated that the accuracy of visual search in a non-scene
display is affected when distractor items can be grouped
functionally versus when distractor items are simply
semantically related to each other.  Overall, these data suggest
that functional relations between objects affect the allocation
of visual attention and by consequence, the processing of
natural scenes and other structured visual stimuli.
Introduction
An important aspect of semantic knowledge about objects
concerns function.  The very identity of an object often
hinges upon its intended use.  The experiments presented
here explore the possibility that participants performing
object search tasks may be sensitive to functional relations
among the objects being searched.  This work is based on
the idea that natural scenes are mentally represented in
terms of the functional groups they comprise (Green &
Hummel, 2004).  For example, a coffee shop may be
defined as a place where it is possible to make, buy, sell,
and drink coffee.  The objects associated with these
activities (a table and chair in certain arrangement suggest
dining) form the basic units of the scene definition.
While scene categories are difficult to define in terms of
the objects present (the same objects may form different
types of scenes by virtue of different arrangements), or in
terms of the spatial layout only (the identities and meanings
of objects have bearing on scene categorization), a function-
based scene representation may provide a consistent,
flexible, and useful definition (see Green & Hummel, 2004,
for a more thorough discussion).
In both experiments presented here, the presence of
functional relations (the presence of meaningful structure) in
the stimulus was expected to improve performance: In
Experiment 1, we expected the processing of a target object
in a functional relation to be facilitated (relative to a target
adjacent to the same objects, but not interacting with any of
them).  In Experiment 2, we expected that functionally
meaningful relations would effectively unitize pairs of
distractor objects, making search more efficient than when
such objects must be rejected one by one.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 investigated whether functional
interactions would affect observers’ ability to detect and
locate target objects in non-scene displays.  The experiment
required observers to indicate whether a named target object
was present in a masked, briefly-presented array of twelve
line-drawn objects.  We manipulated whether the search
array contained a distractor object semantically associated to
the named target, and whether the target and associated
distractor (if both were present) were interacting.
In general, the addition of an associated distractor
object to a search array impairs performance in visual
search.  Moores, Laiti, & Chelazzi (2003) found that when
participants searched for a target, distractor objects
semantically associated with the target had the effect of
reducing accuracy and increasing latency relative to when
distractors were not associated with the target.
In the current experiment, we expected a similar result.
Overall performance should be lower when an associated
distractor object is present in the search array relative to
when no associated distractor is present (though Auckland,
Cave, & Donnelly, 2004, find evidence for the opposite
effect).  However, it remains unclear whether such effects
interact with relational information in guiding visual search.
Specifically, there is reason to believe that the introduction
of functional interactions between targets and associated
distractors will modulate the impairment caused by target-
distractor associations, to some degree.
Riddoch, Humphreys, Edwards, Baker, & Willson
(2003) found that functional interactions facilitated the
processing of the interacting objects.  Their subjects were
parietal patients who showed extinction when trying to
report the names of two simultaneously-presented objects.
When objects were presented together but were not
interacting, the patients could reliably report the name of
one object, but not both.  When the objects were positioned
to interact, patients showed increased ability to accurately
report the name of the second object.  This suggests that
functional relations may in fact play a special role in the
processing of visual stimuli.
Experiment 1 brought together the two results
mentioned above, combining semantic associations between
targets and distractors with functional interactions between
targets and distractors in a single experiment.  Based on the
results of Moores, et al. (2003) and Riddoch, et al. (2003)
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we expected that introducing a semantically associated
distractor to a search array would impair target detection,
but that this effect would be reduced when the target
interacted with the associated distractor.
Method and Materials
Stimuli  All materials were presented on a Macintosh iMac
personal computer running the SuperLab application.
Stimuli were composed of black and white line drawings
(some taken from Snodgrass & Vanderwart (1980), others
created specifically for this work) that depicted everyday
objects.
Figure 1: Typical stimulus from Experiment 1.  Here the
target (hammer) is interacting with a related distractor item
(nail).
All search arrays employed the same basic layout (see
Figure 1). A fixation cross was centered in the stimulus
array.  Twelve objects (each approximately 2.3° visual angle
in width/height) were arranged around the fixation cross in
two concentric circles.  The inner circle had a radius of
approximately 4.5° visual angle, and the outer circle had a
radius of approximately 7.9° visual angle.  Six objects were
centered on the inner circle, with objects located at 45°, 90°,
135°, 225°, 270° and 315° from vertical.  The six remaining
objects were centered on the outer circle.  Objects on the
outer circle were placed horizontally in line with objects on
the inner circle.  In this way, the twelve objects made up six
pairs.  This layout placed paired objects closer to each other
than to any other object in the array.
/\Critically, we manipulated the presence and position of a
related distractor item in the search display.  On target-
present trials, the target could appear with no semantically-
related distractors (the target-only condition), with a
semantically-related distractor in a location not adjacent to
the target (non-adjacent), paired with, but not interacting
with the target (adjacent), or paired with and interacting
with the target (interacting).  Catch trials were presented in
which the related distractor was present without the target
(distractor-only), and in which neither the related distractor
nor the target were present (none).
Each participant completed 24 randomly-ordered trials,
with each trial using a different target object.  Each
participant saw one of 24 counterbalanced sets of stimuli.
Across counterbalancing sets, every target object appeared
in every condition equally often.
Part ic ipants   Participants were 40 undergraduate
psychology students at the University of California, Los
Angeles.  Participants took part in the experiment as part of
a research requirement for a psychology course.
Procedure  Participants were instructed to look for named
target objects and indicate (a) whether the target object was
present and if so, (b) its location in the search display.  The
participant was given a description of how each trial would
proceed and what responses were required.  The participant
viewed a single practice trial, with the experimenter
providing a verbal description of what was happening at
each step and how the participant should respond. The
experimenter emphasized that accuracy was important in all
responses, but that the speed of response mattered only
during the detection task.
Each trial proceeded as follows:  First, a word naming the
target object appeared in the center of the computer screen
in black 24-point Arial font and remained on the screen until
the participant pressed a key.  Then, a fixation cross
appeared in the center of the screen.  After 750ms, the
fixation cross was replaced by a search array.  The search
array was visible for 250ms and was subsequently masked
until response or until the trial timed out (2500ms after
search array onset).
The participant indicated whether or not the target object
was present in the search array by making a key press (yes
or no) as quickly and accurately as possible.  After response,
the participant was presented with an labeled layout of the
search array and was asked to indicate the location of the
target object appeared (or to verify that the target object did
not appear) by pressing a letter on the keyboard.  This
response was not speeded.  A 1000ms inter-trial interval
during which the computer screen was blank preceded the
next trial.
Results
Accuracy and response time (RT) data were analyzed
using within-subjects ANOVAs.  Trials upon which
detection RT exceeded 2500ms were counted as errors.
Error trials were excluded from all RT analyses.
Detection Accuracy  Accuracy data (d’) from the detection
task are presented in Table 1.  The main effect of stimulus
condition on detection accuracy only approached
significance (F(3,117) = 1.927, MSE = 0.621, p = 0.129).
However, planned comparison indicated that mean d’ in the
Interacting condition was significantly higher than mean d’
in the Adjacent condition (t(39) = 3.242, SE = 0.126, p =
0.002).  This comparison is the most revealing with respect
to the effect of functional interactions, as the only difference
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between the Interacting and Adjacent conditions is the
orientation of the associated distractor object.  Of the four
conditions, only the Interacting condition produced
performance significantly different than chance (t(39) =
1.895, SE = 0.168, p = 0.0325 one-tailed).
Detection Response Time  RT data are presented in Table
1.  Mean RT on the detection task did not vary across
conditions (F(3,111) =0.537, MSE = 48600, p =0.658).  No
pair-wise comparisons yielded significant differences.
Table 1: Summary of response time and accuracy data from
Experiment 1.
Condition Detection d’
Detection
RT
Localization
accuracy
Interacting 0.319
(SE = 0.168)
1340 ms
(55)
0.558
(0.048)
Adjacent -0.091
(0.174)
1388
(61)
0.488
(0.062)
Non-
Adjacent
0.024
(0.188)
1398
(54)
0.431
(0.057)
Target Only 0.078
(0.141)
1362
(57)
0.502
(0.061)
Localization Accuracy  Accuracy data for the localization
task are presented in Table 1.  As a measure of localization
accuracy, we report the probability that the correct location
would be chosen given that a target was present and the
observer attempted to localize the target.  That is, we
excluded target-absent trials, and trials where the observer
made a localization response indicating that the target did
not appear in the search array.
There was no main effect of stimulus condition on
localization accuracy (F(3,105) = 0.911, MSE = 0.108, p =
0.439).  No pair-wise comparisons were significant.
Discussion
Though weak, these results do suggest that functional
relations influence the processing of objects in non-scene
displays.  This effect obtained even though the task did not
require participants to use (or even notice) the functional
relations in the stimuli. Indeed, it may be argued that
functional information is not useful in this task.  Only one
sixth of the trials each participant saw contained a
meaningful functional relation between the target and
related distractor item.  One would not expect the pattern of
results observed were the processing of functional relations
effortful.
If functional information influences the allocation of
visual attention during simple search tasks, then it seems
plausible that the guidance of visual attention during search
of natural, structured scenes is also influenced by such
information.  Heuristics about what kinds of objects should
appear together in scene could help the visual system to
efficiently deploy attention, and facilitate the processing of
scene-consistent stimuli.  The finding that functional
relations affect the processing of simple visual stimuli also
suggests that visual representations may include abstract,
functional information.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 suggests that functional relations do
influence the processing of visual stimuli during a search
task.  The presence of a functional relation involving the
target object and an associated distractor object increased
detection accuracy relative to when an associated distractor
was adjacent to, but not interacting with the target.  That
result does little to discriminate between the possibility that
interacting objects are processed more efficiently than other
objects and the possibility that functional interactions
capture visual attention.
Experiment 2 sought to decide between these
explanations.  In this experiment, distractor objects engaged
in functional interactions, and the number of functional
groupings in the search array was varied parametrically.  If
functional groups capture attention, then one would expect
the addition of interacting distractor pairs to impair
performance, performance suffering increasingly as more
interacting pairs are added.  On the other hand, if objects
engaged in functional relations are processed more
efficiently than objects not engaged in functional
interactions, then one would expect performance to improve
as more interactions are introduced to distractor objects.
Search time in non-scene displays is a function of the
number of distractor items present (Biederman, et al., 1988).
If functionally interacting objects form perceptual groups,
then adding interactions among distractors while holding the
total number of display objects constant should effectively
reduce the number of perceptual units that must be searched.
As a result, displays with more interactions should yield
superior search performance.
Method and Materials
Stimuli  All materials were presented on a Macintosh iMac
personal computer running the SuperLab application.
Stimuli were composed of a subset of the black and white
line drawings used in Experiment 1.
The experimental trials were divided into four conditions:
zero functional interactions (the 0i condition), one
interaction (1i), two interactions (2i), or three interactions
(3i).  In addition to the four experimental conditions, two
control conditions were run to provide baseline search
performance measures.  All search arrays in the four
experimental conditions employed the same basic layout
(see Figure 2). A fixation cross was centered in the stimulus
array.  Eight objects (each approx. 2.3° visual angle in
width/height) were arranged around the fixation cross in two
concentric circles. The inner circle had a radius of
approximately 4.5° visual angle, and the outer circle had a
radius of approximately 7.9° visual angle.  Four objects
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were centered on the inner circle, located at 45°, 135°, 225°,
and 315° from vertical.  The four remaining objects were
centered on the outer circle.  Each object on the outer circle
was placed horizontally in line with an object on the inner
circle.  In this way, the eight objects made up four pairs.  As
before, objects within a  pair were closer to each other than
to any other object in the array.
+
Figure 2: Typical stimulus from Experiment 2.  Here, the
target (leaf) is accompanied by seven distractor objects, of
which four are engaged in interactions (lighter-cigarette,
hammer-nail).  The other distractor pair (kettle-cup) is
related but not interacting.  This is an example of a 2 i
stimulus.
The identity and orientation of distractor items in the
search display were manipulated.  In each array, one
distractor object was paired with the target object (or a lure).
The remaining six distractor objects were organized into
three pairs.  The distractor objects in each pair were
semantically associated and capable of entering into a
functional interaction.  In this experiment, participants
performed trials in which there were zero, one, two, or three
of these distractor pairs were actually arranged to interact.
In the control-five object condition (the 5c condition),
the target (or lure) was accompanied by four distractor
objects that were unrelated to the target, and unrelated to
each other, for a total of five objects in each array.  In the
control-eight object condition (8 c), there were seven
distractor objects unrelated to the target and each other, for a
total of eight objects in each search array.  Objects in the 8c
condition were arranged in accordance with the layout
depicted in Figure 2.  Objects in the 5c condition occupied
five of the eight positions (randomly selected) in the
standard search array for this experiment.
Each participant completed 228 randomly-ordered trials.
Each participant saw every target object in every condition,
but no one target appeared with the same distractor objects
in more than one array.
Participants  40 undergraduate psychology students at the
University of California, Los Angeles participated in the
experiment as part of a research requirement for a
psychology course.
Procedure  The procedure in Experiment 2 was identical to
that of Experiment 1.  On each trial participants viewed a
target label and a briefly-presented search array which was
masked.  Participants made a speeded response indicating
the presence or absence of the target object, and then a non-
speeded location response.  Instructions were identical to
those in Experiment 1.
Results
Response time (RT) and accuracy data were analyzed using
within-subjects ANOVAs.  Trials on which detection RT
exceeded 2500ms were counted as errors.  Error trials of all
types were excluded from all RT analyses.
Detection Accuracy  Accuracy data (d’) are presented in
Table 2.  There was a main effect of stimulus condition
(including control conditions) (F(5,195) = 4.750, MSE =
0.17, p < 0.001).  There was also a significant effect of
condition among the four experimental conditions (0i, 1i, 2i,
and 3i) (F(3,117) = 3.485, MSE = 0.164, p=0.018).
Detection accuracy was significantly higher in the 5 c
condition than in the 8c condition (F(1,36) = 4.152, p =
0.04).
Planned comparisons indicated that accuracy in the 1i
condition was significantly worse than in the 0i, and 3i
conditions, but not the 2i condition.  The 0i, 2i, and 3 i
conditions were not significantly different than each other.
Trend analysis indicated that there was a significant
increasing linear trend in detection accuracy across the 1i,
2i, and 3i conditions (F(1,39) = 8.684, MSE = 0.169, p =
0.005).  In addition, there was a significant quadratic trend
across the 0i, 1i, 2i, and 3i conditions (F(1,39) = 6.085,
MSE = 0.151, p = 0.018).
Detection Response Time  RT data are presented in Table
2. There was no significant difference in RT across the six
experimental conditions, (F(5,200) = 1.199, p=0.311).
No pairwise contrasts were significant, but participants
were marginally faster to accurately respond in the 5c
condition, than in the 8c condition (F(1,40) = 3.137, p =
0.084).
Localization Accuracy  Accuracy data for the localization
task are presented in Table 2.  As in Experiment 1, we
report the probability that the correct location would be
chosen given that the target was present and the observer
attempted to localize the target.
There was a significant main effect of stimulus condition
on localization accuracy (F(5,195) = 38.649, MSE = 0.006,
p < 0.001).  There was also a main effect of stimulus
condition across the 0i, 1i, 2i, and 3i conditions (F(3,117) =
3.522, MSE = 0.005, p = 0.017).  Post-hoc analysis
indicated that localization was significantly more accurate in
the 3i  condition than in the 0i  condition, and that a
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significant linear trend existed across the 0i, 1i, 2i, and 3i
conditions (F(3,117) = 9.597, MSE = 0.005, p = 0.004).
Table 2.  Summary of Reaction Time and Accuracy Data for
the Detection Task in Experiment 2.
Condition Detection RT Detection d' Localization
accuracy
0i 812 ms
(SE = 30)
1.40
(.092)
0.845
(.019)
1i 822
(34)
1.17
(.099)
0.880
(.019)
2i 833
(34)
1.36
(.115)
0.872
(.017)
3i 820
(32)
1.44
(.093)
0.899
(.014)
5c 810
(32)
1.61
(.102)
0.676
(.014)
8c 831
(32)
1.42
(.100)
0.825
(.018)
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 suggest several
possibilities.  If the only meaningful difference among the
four experimental conditions is the decrease in accuracy
observed in the 1i condition, then the data support an
attention-capture account.  Specifically, if the presence of a
single functional group among distractors impairs
performance, then it is possible that the participant’s
attention was drawn to the functional interaction (which
never contained the target) and so the actual target was
detected less often.  One could explain the disappearance of
this effect in the 2i and 3i conditions if the ability of a
functional group to capture attention is dependent on its
uniqueness in the display.  Adding multiple functional
interactions among distractors may “wash out” such an
effect by bringing the average salience of the display
elements closer to the maximum salience of any one
element (i.e., the salience of a functionally interacting pair is
farther from the mean salience of the display when one
interaction is present than when multiple interactions are
present).  This explanation is somewhat unsatisfying, and
the trend analyses performed suggest a more interesting
alternative.
There was a significant linear trend among the 1i, 2i,
and 3i conditions, and a significant quadratic trend among
those and the 0i condition.  The shape of these data suggest
that the addition of functional interactions among distractor
objects did not strictly hurt performance (as predicted by an
attention-capture account), nor did the introduction of
interactions strictly improve performance (as predicted by a
grouping account).  It seems possible that functional groups
do capture attention, but that they also facilitate the
processing of the objects they comprise.  The drop in
performance from the 0i to 1i conditions would indicate that
the increase in search efficiency resulting from the inclusion
of a single interacting pair of distractors did not outweigh
the cost incurred by that pair’s tendency to capture attention.
However, as more interacting distractor pairs were added,
the accumulated gains from more efficient processing of
interacting objects improved overall performance.
Performance in the 3i condition was only numerically
superior to that in the 0i condition, but if the linear trend
across the 1i to 3i conditions is extrapolated, then one can
imagine that the continued addition of functional
interactions among distractor would produce performance
reliably exceeding that in the 0i condition.  In fact, in the
extreme case, imagine searching for a random object among
a disorganized array of distractors versus searching for the
same object among distractors organized into a coherent
scene.  Both intuition and empirical evidence suggest that
search will be more efficient in the latter case (Loftus &
Mackworth, 1978; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000).
Finally, localization accuracy data from Experiment 2
suggest that the extraction of spatial information about
objects in a stimulus is more efficient when that stimulus
includes functional relations between objects.  Notably, it
was organization of non-target objects that led to this
advantage.  In Experiment 1, a similar (but unreliable)
advantage was observed for localization of target objects
that engaged in functional interactions.
Conclusions and Future Directions
The current work was motivated by the idea that natural
scenes are mentally represented in terms of the functional
groups they comprise (Green & Hummel, 2004).
Experiment 1 suggested that objects are more easily
detected or identified when they were interacting with
related distractors as compared to when they were not
interacting with related distractors, or when no related
distractors were present.  Experiment 2 showed an
interesting non-monotonic pattern associated with the
introduction of functional interactions to the display.  The
addition of a single interaction seemed to impair detection,
while performance improved with addition of subsequent
interactions.
The data from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that
functional interactions may have two effects on visual
search: 1) single functional groups may capture attention; 2)
objects in functional groups may be processed more
efficiently than objects not engaged in interactions.
Existing data from eye movement studies are not
consistent with the first claim.  A number of studies (De
Graef et al, 1990; Henderson et al., 1999; Loftus &
Mackworth, 1978) suggest that visual information (e.g.,
local contrast, spatial frequency, color) is the main
determinant of fixations early in natural scene viewing.
Evidence indicates that during natural viewing, scene-
consistent objects are fixated more rapidly than inconsistent
objects, but that this type of semantic information only
mediates eye movements after the first several fixations on a
scene (De Graef et al., 1990).  In short, semantic
492
information does not seem to influence early fixations,
playing a role only later in visual scanning.  This suggests
that functional groups (which include abstract semantic
information) should not capture attention.
Alternatively, the data from these experiments may be
explained as an effect of familiarity with canonical
arrangements of objects.  Because people are routinely
exposed to objects arranged in functionally meaningful
ways, some other non-attentional influence may be
involved.  Specifically, the existence mental symbols that
represent entire familiar functional groupings may influence
the preattentive grouping of a visual stimulus array and lead
to faster processing of the objects therein.  The existence of
perceptual groupings based on functional information
(which were not considered in those studies) might affect
early attentional guidance in way that is not easily
understood if one is looking for effects of semantic
consistency only.
Empirical and computational work have been used to
study the effects of perceptual grouping  on visual search
with basic perceptual stimuli (e.g., colored shapes, oriented
lines).  Some models of search account for effects of
perceptual grouping better (and more naturally) than others.
For example, the Spatial and Object Search (SOS) model
(Grossberg, Mignolla, & Ross, 1994) places perceptual
grouping processes at the center of visual search operations.
Grouping processes take place pre-attentively in the SOS
model, an assumption consistent with a number of empirical
results (e.g., Humphreys, et al., 1989).
An important aspect of the SOS model with respect to
the functional grouping hypothesis is that its perceptual
grouping mechanisms are linked to spatially-invariant
representations of objects.  SOS allows knowledge about
objects to influence perceptual grouping (presumably, so
that objects form perceptual units, instead of collections of
object parts or features).  An extension of SOS might
employ representations above the level of objects (e.g.
representations of functional groups) to make contact with
grouping processes as well.  A preattentive grouping
mechanism linked to representations of functional groups
might yield effects like those observed in Experiments 1 and
2.
Whether functional groups are perceptual groups
remains to be established, but the results of Experiments 1
and 2 suggest that familiar functional relations (interactions
between objects in a visual scene) may be an important
component of visual processing.  Current work addresses
the possibility that functional groups are in fact perceptual
objects.
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Abstract 
 
A process model of human memory dynamics is proposed as 
an implementation of Kittur, Green, & Bjork’s (2004) 
mathematical model.  Both models are based on an ideal in-
formation processing approach, in which an item’s 
accessibility is based on the predicted future need of that item.  
The proposed model is an adaptation of the multiple-trace ar-
chitecture of Hintzman’s MINERVA2 model (Hintzman 1984; 
1986; 1988).  We present simulations of complex spacing and 
practice dynamics encompassing the mechanics of Bjork and 
Bjork’s (1992) New Theory of Disuse, which accounts for di-
verse phenomena such as massed vs. spaced practice and 
spontaneous recovery.  In addition, we show how the model 
explains and simulates time-dependent serial position effects 
(such as the shift from recency to primacy with delay and 
time-invariant recency effects).  The model’s potential as a 
tool for exploring the relationship between the content of 
items in memory and more general memory dynamics is also 
discussed. 
 
Memory as a System for Predicting Need 
Kittur, Green, & Bjork (2004) described a mathematical 
model of memory dynamics inspired by Bayesian statistics.  
The model is driven by the assumption that memory ap-
proximates an ideal information processor, keeping memory 
items accessible to the degree that they are likely to be 
needed in the future (see Anderson, 1989 for further ration-
ale on this approach).  The predicted future need for an item 
is computed by the model based on the pattern of past re-
trievals for that item and the time since it was last retrieved.  
This is best illustrated by analogy. 
Imagine that Book A has been checked out of a library 
once a month for the past year.  Book B, on the other hand, 
has been checked out every week for the last month but 
never prior to that.  If the librarian was forced to choose 
which of the two books should be kept readily available, the 
best choice would change over time.  Initially, the librarian 
would probably keep Book B more readily retrievable as it 
has been needed frequently in the recent past (possibly, an 
instructor has assigned reading from this book for a class 
project); however, after a month has passed with neither 
book being required, the librarian would likely decide that 
Book A should be more accessible, given its history of be-
ing required at regular, if infrequent, intervals. 
The Kittur, Green, & Bjork (2004) model functions in a 
similar way.  It calculates the probability that an item will 
be needed given three key pieces of information: the aver-
age interval between past retrievals; the number of times the 
item was retrieved in the past; and the time since it was last 
retrieved.  The use of these elements allows for a distinction 
between item accessibility and item storage, a key insight of 
the New Theory of Disuse (NTD) (Bjork & Bjork, 1992).  
The model was inspired by and provides a potential algo-
rithmic basis for the NTD and the complex memory dynam-
ics it explains. 
 
The New Theory of Disuse 
The NTD accounts for a variety of effects in the human 
memory literature.  The NTD includes the following as-
sumptions about memory (see Bjork & Bjork, 1992): 
1) Memory items are associated with two distinct 
“strengths”: a storage strength (SS) and a retrieval strength 
(RS).  SS indicates how well-learned an item is (that is, the 
accumulated history of an item is reflected in its SS).  RS, 
on the other hand, indicates how readily accessible an item 
is for retrieval.  RS alone determines the probability that an 
item will be successfully recalled from memory.  SS does 
not directly influence memory performance, but has impor-
tant implications for memory dynamics over time1. 
2) SS does not decrease.  SS grows during study or re-
trieval events as a decelerating function of the current SS.  
That is, all else being equal, items with low SS benefit from 
study or retrieval events more than items with high SS.  The 
total storage strength across all items in memory is therefore 
unbounded.  Changes in SS are dependent on both RS and 
SS.  An item gains SS as a decelerating function of its cur-
rent SS, and as a decelerating function of its current RS. 
3) RS increases and decreases.  As with SS, an item gains 
RS as a result of study or retrieval events.  When the item is 
not being studied or retrieved, such as when other items are 
being attended, RS decreases. As a result, gains in RS for 
one item necessarily result in a loss of RS for the other (un-
studied) items in memory, though these are not necessarily 
changes of the same magnitude.  Changes in RS are depend-
ent on both RS and SS: Gain in RS due to a retrieval or 
study event is a decelerating function of current RS, and an 
increasing function of current SS.  Conversely, RS loss in is 
faster the larger the current RS is, and slower with larger SS. 
4) Generally, retrieval events are more potent than study 
events.  Increments in both SS and RS are larger when an 
item is retrieved versus when it is studied. 
                                                 
1 The two-strength theory espoused by NTD and implemented in 
MNEM is an important difference between it and other related 
need-based models, such as Anderson’s ACT-R (1989).  We are 
currently exploring testable differences between the models. 
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The postulation of two separate strengths whose magni-
tudes influence each other is at the core of NTD’s account 
of retrieval and memory dynamics. 
 
The MNEM Model 
Many models of human memory employ a strategy that 
assumes each item stored in memory is represented by a 
single memory trace.  For example, the studied item “horse” 
would be instantiated as a single mental symbol, and further 
exposure to “horse” would serve to strengthen or heighten 
the activation (or gain—i.e. sensitivity to excitation) of that 
symbol.  However, such models struggle with the problem 
that no two exposures to an item are identical: the spatial, 
temporal, or subjective context of encoding is variable.  
Additionally, changes in attention or effort may occur dur-
ing different exposures to an item and attributes of a stimu-
lus that are important at one point may be more or less im-
portant at some point in the future.  Multiple trace models of 
memory are better suited to deal with variable encoding, in 
that they do not assume that all encodings of an item are 
linked to a single representation.  Such models also do not 
assume a mechanism for reconciling variable encodings 
with unitary representation. 
MNEM (Memory Need Expectation Model), like MI-
NERVA2 and other multiple trace models, works on the 
assumption that every instance of encoding lays down a new 
memory trace in the long-term store.  If a single stimulus is 
encoded on multiple occasions (studied and re-studied), then 
MNEM creates and stores separate traces for each encoding 
event.  Because of random information loss during encoding 
events (see below), recording new traces for every instance 
produces variability in the Long Term Memory (LTM) rep-
resentations of a repeated item.  This variability occurs in 
addition to any variability introduced by context, environ-
ment or attention, which may also be introduced to the 
model. 
 
Representation 
The representations upon which MNEM operates are 
simple, and are adapted from Hintzman’s (1984) MI-
NERVA2 model.  Each trace in MNEM is an ordered vector 
of size n, with each element taking on the values of   -1, 0, 
or +1.  The elements can be thought of as corresponding to 
specific feature dimensions (e.g. “redness”, “roundness”, 
“chair-ness”, etc.), with values indicating the absence of a 
specific feature (-1), the presence of the feature (+1), or a 
lack of information about the feature (0).  The format is 
open to other interpretations, of course. 
Consideration of the history of a memory item depends on 
the ability to examine past encodings of that item. It is 
unlikely, however, that any two memory traces are actually 
identical.  That is, identifying instances of trace T is simple 
when literal copies of T are stored in several LTM locations, 
but it is more likely that LTM traces containing the same 
information are encoded with different contexts, or with 
different features emphasized.  Instead of a single strength-
ened trace T, or many literal copies of T, we may store sev-
eral traces similar to T: T’, T”, etc.  As such, it is necessary 
to resolve some ambiguity about which traces in LTM 
should be counted as instances of a single item. 
MNEM uses a specific similarity metric to evaluate the 
similarity of two memory traces.  Borrowing again from the 
MINERVA2 model, the similarity of an LTM trace T to 
some probe trace P is calculated as follows: 
∑
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where n is the number of elements in the trace and NR indi-
cates the number of relevant features in the pair of traces.   
Relevant features are defined as features for which at least 
one of the two traces contains a non-zero value; in other 
words, if neither trace contains any information about the 
presence or absence of a feature, then the feature is not 
counted as relevant.  This similarity function approximates a 
dot product calculated on the feature sets of the two traces, 
T and P. 
This representational format is admittedly simplistic, 
though one advantage of this simplicity is that it requires 
few assumptions.  In fact, the MNEM model requires only 
two key properties of its representations: they must be ame-
nable to some systematic similarity metric, and they must be 
combinable in a systematic way.2
Any representational format that meets these requirements 
is compatible with the MNEM model.  This flexibility 
makes it amenable to incorporation into diverse cognitive 
architectures, where other components of the system might 
necessarily place more serious constraints on the representa-
tional format. (As an example, as ordered one-dimensional 
vectors may be too limiting for representing relational struc-
tures, an alternative and appropriate format could be used 
provided it satisfies the above requirements).  That human 
memory traces satisfy these constraints is a common (if 
sometimes implicit) assumption among cognitive scientists.  
The ability to judge the degree to which two stimuli are 
similar is fundamental to human cognition.  Schema abstrac-
tion, generalization, and conceptual blending are 
psychological phenomena that may involve the combination 
of two or more stimuli to form a composite or abstraction. 
 
Architecture 
Like MINERVA2, MNEM has two components: a work-
ing memory (WM) and a LTM.  WM consists of a buffer 
that holds a single trace.  All inputs to and outputs from 
LTM are buffered by WM.  Traces that are in WM may be 
encoded into LTM, and information retrieved from LTM is 
brought into WM.3
                                                 
2 The second requirement is not important for simulating retrieval 
dynamics, but will be critical in future work when the model is 
used to generate content from a set of memory traces. 
3 The authors have not attempted to model WM except in the sense 
that it is a buffer between the world and LTM.  In MNEM, multi-
ple traces are not maintained simultaneously, and no attention is 
required for WM trace maintenance.  WM traces may be overwrit-
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LTM is simply a collection of memory traces that have 
been encoded from WM.  The current model imposes no 
(theoretical) limit on the capacity of (the number of traces in) 
LTM.  Each LTM trace is associated with an index.  The 
indices are assigned in the order with traces are encoded 
into LTM, so that traces encoded earlier have lower indices.  
The authors consider this equivalent to incorporating spatio-
temporal tags on memory traces.  Extensions of MNEM 
may attempt to use a subtler form of spatio-temporal tag-
ging.4
 
Operations 
Encoding  The encoding operation of the model is rela-
tively simple, and amounts to little more than copying a 
WM trace into LTM.  As discussed, MNEM assumes that 
variability exists in encoding process (i.e. information is 
randomly lost during encoding). 
The accuracy of encoding depends on a learning rate pa-
rameter (L) which indicates the independent probability that 
any trace feature will be properly encoded (where 0 < L ≤ 1).  
For example, when L = 0.7, seven out of ten features in a 
trace are accurately copied into the LTM trace (on average).  
The features that are not properly encoded result in gaps in 
LTM information (zeros are written into the LTM trace 
where 1 or -1 existed in the WM trace).  During the encod-
ing process, information is only lost, not distorted: a 1 in the 
WM trace is never erroneously encoded as a -1 in the LTM 
trace, nor vice versa.  This encoding procedure is taken di-
rectly from MINERVA2. 
Every encoding event yields a new LTM trace, regardless 
of whether the content of the new trace is redundant with 
existing LTM traces.  The similarity of traces is not consid-
ered during the encoding process. 
 
Retrieval  Calculating RS for an item is also relatively 
straightforward.  The main complication arises from deter-
mining which LTM traces should be considered in the RS 
calculation when variability exists among different encod-
ings of an item.  To address this problem, MNEM “marks” 
the traces in LTM whose similarity to the probe item ex-
ceeds a set criterion.  (This criterion similarity, Cs, is a pa-
rameter of the model).  For example, if Cs is set to 0.75, then 
only traces for which S(P,T) ≥ 0.75 will be marked for in-
                                                                                  
ten, but this is the only way that information is “lost” from 
MNEM’s WM. 
4 The authors are currently exploring the incorporation of a context 
vector into encoded representations, or giving individual traces an 
activation value which would be initialized to some maximum at 
encoding, and would decay over time.  In the latter strategy, the 
activation value would represent a trace’s “age” for purposes of 
calculating RS.  The RS calculation would consider the difference 
between the activations of two traces.  This approach remains un-
tested, but seems promising in that the decay function would likely 
be non-linear, decelerating as it approaches zero.  This being the 
case, two traces equally displaced in absolute time would become 
less discriminable with age. 
clusion in the RS calculation.  Once LTM traces are marked, 
the mean retention interval between them is calculated: 
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where P is the item for which RS is being calculated, Mi is 
the ith marked LTM trace, and Nm is the total number of 
marked LTM traces.5  The index() operator simply indicates 
that the model is using the LTM index for a trace and not 
the trace itself. 
This mean interval  is multiplied by the number, or “base 
rate”, of similar instances in LTM.  The base rate (BR(P)) is 
equal to the number of marked traces in LTM: 
mNPBR =)( .                (3) 
The product of the mean retrieval interval and the base 
rate6 is divided by the size of the current retrieval interval, 
which is the number of time steps that have elapsed since 
the last marked item was encoded: 
)()()( maxMindexPindexPCI −= ,      (4) 
where index(Mmax) indicates the index of the timestep during 
which a marked trace was most recently encoded.  Also, 
index(P), the time index for the encoding of the current item, 
is simply set to the index of the current timestep (which is 
equal to the number of traces in LTM plus one: Nltm + 1). 
In summary, RS can be characterized thus: 
)(
)(*)()(
PCI
PBRPRIPRS = .         (5) 
That is, the accessibility of an item P, is equal to the product 
of the average retention interval between instances like P in 
LTM and the number of such instances, divided by the in-
terval that has elapsed since the last instance of P occurred.7
In order to compare forgetting curves, it is necessary to 
normalize RS(P).  This is accomplished by finding the ratio 
of logarithm of RS(P) to the maximum value that RS(P) 
obtains for an item (immediate recall).8  (Because the log 
may be negative, we add one to both numerator and de-
nominator for convenience).  In all simulations, this ratio is 
reported as RS.  That is: 
)1)(log(
)1)(log()(
max +
+=
PRS
PRSPRSreported .       (6) 
                                                 
5 When only a single trace in LTM is marked, the average retention 
interval is defaulted to a value of 1. 
6 This product is the closest analog to SS in MNEM: 
)(*)()( PBRPRIPSS = .  Note that unlike RS, SS is strictly increas-
ing with additional study, and is not subject to decay.  SS influ-
ences changes in RS, most importantly by retarding the loss of RS 
over time (see Figure 3). 
7 This definition of RS is at the core of the Kittur, Green, and Bjork 
(2004) model, which exhibits the same memory dynamics in a 
single-trace architecture. 
8 See Pavlik & Anderson (2003) for rationale on scaling forgetting 
using the maximum (current) activation of a trace. 
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The result of normalization is that immediate recall yields a 
reported RS of 1, and any delay in recall produces an RS 
between 0 and 1.  This allows for comparison of forgetting 
curves in terms of probability of recall. 
 
Trace Composition  The formation of composite traces 
from a set of LTM traces is also important in this model.  
We have specified how one may calculate the RS of a spe-
cific item in LTM, but retrieving useful information from 
the LTM store is another matter entirely.  MINERVA2 in-
cludes a mechanism that uses similarity to weight traces in 
LTM, and forms a composite “echo” by averaging these 
weighted traces.  MNEM employs a similar strategy, but 
instead of all traces in LTM, only those that exceed the 
similarity criterion are weighted and averaged.  While this is 
an important aspect of the model, and may allow simulation 
of important memory phenomena (e.g. encoding specificity, 
context effects, etc.) the details of this operation are not di-
rectly relevant to the retrieval dynamics discussed here, and 
we will leave them for another time. 
 
Simulation Results 
The NTD was conceived to “post-dict” a number of 
memory effects.  In the previous discussion of that theory, 
behavioral correlates of RS and SS were noted.  MNEM 
implements the same relationships between RS and SS and 
its performance is similar to that of humans on a variety of 
memory tasks. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Forgetting curves for items studied three times 
each, with inter-item intervals of 3, 6, 12, 24, or 48 
timesteps. 
 
Forgetting Over Time 
MNEM displays forgetting curves that closely resemble 
those of human subjects.  Behavioral data suggest that the 
probability of recalling a once-studied item declines as a 
function of the retention interval.  More specifically, access 
to an item declines as a function of intervening experience 
(Thorndike, 1914; McGeoch, 1932; Bjork & Bjork, 1992). 
NTD postulates that probability of recall is linked to RS 
only, but that changes in RS are mediated by SS.  The par-
ticular rate of forgetting for an item is influenced by the 
frequency of exposure to an item (Melton, 1967; Krueger, 
1929), as well as the interval between exposures (Peterson, 
Hillner, & Saltzman, 1962; Whitten & Bjork, 1977).  
MNEM captures the general shape of forgetting curves, and 
simulates frequency and spacing effects observed in human 
data. 
In simulation, a single item A is studied according to vari-
ous schedules.  At various delays, the RS of A is calculated, 
which indicates the probability that it would be recalled at 
that interval since last study.  To simulate the passage of 
time without study or retrieval events, a randomly generated 
memory trace is encoded into LTM on each timestep.9  Note 
that in simulation, the calculation of RS does not affect the 
state of LTM. 
The simulated practice schedules vary in the number of 
exposures of A, as well as in the spacing of exposures.  For-
getting curves generated by MNEM for items studied with 
equal frequency, but different inter-item intervals are shown 
in Figure 1.  Figure 2 shows forgetting curves for items 
studied at equal intervals, but with different frequencies. 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Forgetting curves for items studied with equal 
spacing (3 timesteps between exposures) and frequencies of 
1, 5, 10, 20, or 40 exposures. 
 
Spacing and frequency effects are important aspects of 
human memory in that they give rise to more complicated 
phenomena.  For example, in some circumstances an old 
habit may be replaced with a new behavior, only to re-
emerge at a later time, a phenomenon known as spontaneous 
recovery (Estes, 1955; Koppenaal, 1963). 
                                                 
9 It is worthwhile to note that the noise introduced to the LTM 
system is relatively unconstrained.  In fact, the same method that 
generates the “studied” trace for these simulations is used to gener-
ate the “noise” traces that are interpolated between the study event 
and the sampling of RS. 
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NTD and the MNEM model account yield spontaneous 
recovery as a natural consequence of different forgetting 
rates.  Simulation data in Figure 3 show spontaneous recov-
ery.  Item A represents an old response that has been learned 
over a long period of time.  Item B is a new response in-
tended to replace A.  As B is acquired, A’s RS decays 
substantially.  However, we observe that A gains an advan-
tage after a certain delay.  If B is not practiced, the larger SS 
of item A yields a shallower forgetting curve. The decay of 
RS is slower for trace A than for trace B and the curves cross 
over.  The older habit will remain more accessible thereafter. 
 
Primacy & Recency 
Primacy and recency are well-known memory phenomena.  
When a list is studied, items that appeared early in the study 
list are more recallable than items near the middle of the list.  
Primacy effects have been attributed to covert rehearsal be-
tween study presentations (Glenberg et al., 1980).  Effec-
tively, subjects create extra study opportunities in the gaps 
between item exposures. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Spontaneous recovery of response A occurs after 
learning response B.  This is due to a larger increase in re-
sponse A’s SS at reminding, owing to a lower RS at that 
time. 
 
Similarly, items presented near the end of the list are also 
recalled better than mid-list items.  Recency results from the 
relatively short retention interval between study and test.  
Prior work has demonstrated that there is a shift from re-
cency to primacy over increasing retention intervals (Craik, 
1970; Knoedler, Hellwig, & Neath, 1999).  The MNEM 
model shows similar behavior. 
In simulation, a list of 20 items is studied, with five 
timesteps between study events.  Between trials, the simu-
lated subject is assumed to perform covert rehearsal on 
some of the items presented so far, in order, for the duration 
of the interval.  This strategy lasts for a limited number of 
presentations (three, in this simulation), at which point the 
simulated subject is assumed to become overwhelmed by 
the number of items and therefore abandons the covert re-
hearsal strategy.  Beyond this point, inter-trial intervals are 
filled with random traces, as in previous simulations.10
At the end of the study phase, the RS for each of the 20 
items is calculated at five different retrieval intervals.  The 
serial position curves that result are shown in Figure 4.  
Three features are notable: the prominence of recency ef-
fects in immediate recall; the presence of primacy in all se-
rial position curves; the shift of recency to primacy as the 
dominant pattern in the data as the retention interval grows. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Serial position curves at delays of 0, 30, 90, 150, 
and 210 timesteps.  Note the rapid decay of recency effects 
relative to the slower decay of primacy. 
 
The recency effects observed in simulation share a subtle 
property with human behavioral data: time-invariance.  
Some data from humans suggest that the magnitudes of re-
cency effects follow a ratio rule (Glenberg et al, 1980; 1983; 
Bjork & Whitten, 1974).  This phenomenon was described 
mathematically by Bjork & Whitten (1974).  Specifically, 
recency effects scale with the log of the ratio of mean pres-
entation interval divided by the current retention interval: 
)
)(
)(log(
PCI
PRIrecency ∝         (7) 
This behaviorally-derived ratio rule is inherent in the 
MNEM model (see Kittur, Green & Bjork, 2004).  Figure 5 
shows serial position curves for various ratios of mean re-
tentional interval to current retention interval. 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
The model described here shows memory dynamics that 
are consistent with human behavioral data.  Forgetting 
curves, spacing and frequency effects, and serial position 
curves are generated in simulation by following the assump-
                                                 
10 Glenberg, et al., (1980) observed that primacy effects were 
eliminated when participants were prevented from performing 
cumulative rehearsal on early list items. 
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tions of NTD, and allowing items to accumulate independ-
ent SS and RS. 
The relative simplicity of this model (and its more general 
mathematical formulation in Kittur, Green, & Bjork, 2004), 
makes it a useful tool for exploring subtle issues in memory 
and generating concrete experimental predictions.  There is 
potential to extend our understanding of retrieval dynamics 
to a greater diversity of memory phenomena by manipulat-
ing the content of the memory traces used in simulation.  
For example, MNEM provides a natural platform for explor-
ing the influence of inter-item associations on memory dy-
namics.  In addition, MNEM may prove to be informative 
on issues surrounding schema abstraction, categorization, 
and other arenas where knowledge content is an issue.  Con-
text, encoding specificity, and variability effects may also 
be amenable to analysis with this model in the future. 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  The magnitude of recency effects in MNEM scale 
with the ratio of mean retention interval to current retention 
interval.  Serial position curves are shown for spacing to 
retention interval ratios of 1, 0.5, and 0.25. 
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Abstract
We argue that human judgments about hidden
causal structure can be explained as the operation
of domain-general statistical inference over causal
models constructed using domain knowledge. We
present Bayesian models of causal induction in two
previous experiments and a new study. Hypothet-
ical causal models are generated by theories ex-
pressing two essential aspects of abstract knowledge
about causal mechanisms: which causal relations
are plausible, and what functional form they take.
Everyday reasoning draws on notions that go far
beyond the observable world, just as modern sci-
ence draws upon theoretical constructs beyond the
limits of measurement. The richness of our naive
theories is a direct result of our ability to postu-
late hidden causal structure. This capacity to rea-
son about unobserved causes forms an essential part
of cognition from early in life, whether we are rea-
soning about the forces involved in physical systems
(e.g., Shultz, 1982), the mental states of others (e.g.,
Perner, 1991), or the essential properties of natural
kinds (e.g., Gelman & Wellman, 1991).
The central role of hidden causes in naive theories
makes the question of how people infer hidden causal
structure fundamental to understanding human rea-
soning. Psychological research has shown that peo-
ple can infer the existence of hidden causes from oth-
erwise unexplained events (Ahn & Luhmann, 2003),
and determine hidden causal structure from very lit-
tle data (Kushnir, Gopnik, Schulz, & Danks, 2003).
This work has parallels in computer science, where
the development of a formalism for reasoning about
causality – causal graphical models – has led to algo-
rithms that use patterns of dependency to identify
causal relationships (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour,
& Scheines, 1993). It has recently been proposed,
chieﬂy by Gopnik, Glymour, and their colleagues
(Glymour, 2001; Gopnik, Glymour, Sobel, Schulz,
Kushnir, & Danks, 2004), that these algorithms may
also explain how people infer causal structure.
A fundamental issue in explaining how people in-
fer causal relationships is accounting for the interac-
tion between abstract causal knowledge and statisti-
cal inference. The classic debate between approaches
that emphasize cause-eﬀect covariation and those
that emphasize mechanism knowledge (e.g., New-
some, 2003) turns on this issue. Causal graphical
models provide a language in which the problem of
causal induction can be formally expressed. How-
ever, conventional algorithms for inducing causal
structure (e.g., Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al., 1993) do
not provide a satisfying account of either the roles
of causal knowledge or statistical inference, or their
interaction. These algorithms use tests of statisti-
cal independence to establish constraints that must
be satisﬁed by causal structures consistent with the
observed data. No knowledge of how causal mech-
anisms operate, or the functional form of relation-
ships between cause and eﬀect, enters into the in-
ference process. As we argue below, such knowledge
is necessary to explain how people are able to in-
fer causal structure from very small samples, and to
infer hidden causes from purely observational data.
Constraint-based methods are also unable to explain
people’s graded sensitivity to the strength of evi-
dence for a causal structure, because they reason de-
ductively from constraints to consistent structures.
We will present a rational account of human in-
ference, Theory-Based Causal Induction, which em-
phasizes the interaction between causal knowledge
and statistical learning. Causal knowledge appears
in the form of causal theories, specifying the princi-
ples by which causal relationships operate in a given
domain. These theories are used to generate hy-
pothesis spaces of causal models – some with hid-
den causes, some without – that can be evaluated
by domain-general statistical inference. We will use
this framework to develop models of people’s infer-
ences about hidden causes in two physical systems:
a mechanical system called the stick-ball machine
(Kushnir et al., 2003), and a dynamical system in-
volving an explosive compound called Nitro X.
Theory-based causal induction
Our account of causal induction builds on causal
graphical models, extending the formalism to incor-
porate the abstract knowledge about causal mecha-
nism that plays an essential role in human inferences.
We will brieﬂy introduce causal graphical models,
consider how prior knowledge inﬂuences causal in-
duction, and describe how we formalize the contri-
bution of causal theories.
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Causal graphical models
Graphical models represent the dependency struc-
ture of a joint probability distribution using a graph
in which nodes are variables and edges indicate de-
pendence. The graphical structure supports eﬃcient
computation of the probabilities of events involv-
ing these variables. In a causal graphical model the
edges indicate causal dependencies, with the direc-
tion of the arrow indicating the direction of causa-
tion, and they support inferences about the eﬀects
of interventions (Pearl, 2000). An intervention is an
event in which a variable is forced to hold a value,
independent of any other variables on which it might
depend. Intervention on a variable A is denoted
do(A). Probabilistic inference on a modiﬁﬁed graph,
in which incoming edges to A are removed, can be
used to assess the consequences of intervening on A.
The structure of a causal graphical model implies
a pattern of dependency among variables under ob-
servation and intervention. Conventional algorithms
for inferring causal structure use standard statistical
tests, such as Pearson’s χ2 test, to ﬁnd the pattern of
dependencies among variables, and then deductively
identify the structure(s) consistent with that pattern
(e.g., Spirtes et al., 1993). These “constraint-based”
algorithms can also exploit the results of interven-
tions, and often require both observations and in-
terventions in order to identify the hidden causal
structure. Gopnik, Glymour, and colleagues have
suggested that this kind of constraint-based reason-
ing may underlie human causal induction (Glymour,
2001; Gopnik et al., 2004; Kushnir et al., 2003).
The role of causal theories
Constraint-based algorithms for causal induction
make relatively little use of prior knowledge. While
particular causal relationships can be ruled out a pri-
ori, there is no way to represent the belief that one
structure may be more likely than another. Further-
more, the use of statistical tests like χ2 makes only
weak assumptions about the form of causal relation-
ships: these tests simply assess dependency, regard-
less of whether a relationship is positive or negative,
deterministic or probabilistic, strong or weak.
Several researchers (e.g., Shultz, 1982) have ar-
gued that knowledge of causal mechanism plays a
central role in human causal induction. Mechanism
knowledge is usually cited in arguments against sta-
tistical causal induction, but we view it as critical
to explaining how statistical inferences about causal
structure are possible from sparse data. Knowledge
about causal mechanisms provides two kinds of re-
strictions on possible causal models: restrictions on
which relationships are plausible, and restrictions on
the functional form of those relationships. Restric-
tions on plausibility might indicate that one causal
structure is more likely than another, while restric-
tions on functional form might indicate that a par-
ticular relationship should be positive and strong.
These restrictions have important implications for
causal induction algorithms. If all structures are
possible, both observations and interventions are
typically required to identify hidden causes, and
without strong assumptions about the functional
form of causal relationships, samples must be rel-
atively large. With limitations on the set of possible
causal structures and expectations about functional
form, however, it is possible to make causal infer-
ences from just observations and from small samples
– important properties of human causal induction.
Using causal theories in causal induction
The causal mechanism knowledge that is relevant for
statistical causal inference may be quite abstract,
and may also vary across domains. Much of this
knowledge may be represented in intuitive domain
theories. In contrast to Gopnik et al. (2004), who
suggest that causal graphical models are the pri-
mary substrate for intuitive theories, we emphasize
the role of intuitive theories at a more abstract level,
providing restrictions on the set of causal models
under consideration. Such restrictions cannot be
represented as part of a causal graphical model:
causal graphical models express the relations that
hold among a ﬁnite set of propositions, while causal
theories involve statements about all relations that
could hold among entities in a given domain.
Formally, we view causal theories as hypothesis
space generators: a theory is a set of principles that
can be used to generate a hypothesis space of causal
models, which are compared via Bayesian inference.
The principles that comprise a theory specify which
relations are plausible and the functional form of
those relations. These principles articulate how
causal relationships operate in a given domain, but
need not identify the mechanisms underlying such
relationships: all that is necessary for causal induc-
tion is the possibility that some mechanism exists,
and expectations about the functional form associ-
ated with that mechanism. This vague and abstract
mechanism knowledge is consistent with the ﬁnding
that people’s understanding of causal mechanism is
surprisingly shallow (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002).
In the remainder of the paper, we will demonstrate
how Theory-Based Causal Induction can be used to
explain human inferences about hidden causes in
physical systems. Diﬀerent systems require diﬀer-
ent causal theories. We will examine inferences in
a mechanical system, the stick-ball machine (Kush-
nir et al., 2003), and in a dynamical system, Nitro
X, which we explore in a new experiment. When
reasoning about these systems, people infer hidden
causal structure from very few observations, and are
sensitive to graded degrees of evidence.
The stick-ball machine
Kushnir et al. (2003) conducted two experiments in
which participants had to infer the causal structure
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Figure 1: (a) A stick-ball machine. (b) Graphs indi-
cating potential causal structures for the stick-ball
machine. Nodes A and B correspond to the two
balls, nodes marked C are hidden causes.
of a physical system, the “stick-ball machine”, con-
sisting of two colored balls (A and B) mounted on
sticks which could move up and down on a box (see
Figure 1(a)). The mechanical apparatus moving the
balls was concealed, keeping the actual causal re-
lationship unknown. In both experiments, all par-
ticipants were familiarized with the machine, and
told that if one ball caused the other to move it
did so “almost always”. This probabilistic causal
relation was demonstrated by showing the two balls
move together four times, an event we denote 4AB,
and A moving alone twice, 2AB¯. There were three
test conditions in Experiment 1, seen by all partic-
ipants. In the common unobserved cause condition,
participants saw 4AB, and four trials in which the
experimenter intervened, twice moving A with no ef-
fect on B, 2B¯|do(A), and twice moving B with no
eﬀect on A, 2A¯|do(B). In the independent unob-
served cause condition, participants saw 2AB¯, 2A¯B,
1AB, 2A¯|do(B), and 2B¯|do(A). In the one ob-
served cause condition, participants saw 4B|do(A)
and 2B¯|do(A). Experiment 2 replicated the com-
mon unobserved cause condition, and compared this
with a pointing control condition in which interven-
tions were replaced with observations (4AB, 2A¯B,
2AB¯). The order of conditions and trials within
conditions was randomized across participants. In
each condition, participants identiﬁed the underly-
ing causal structure by indicating graphs similar to
those shown in Figure 1(b). The results of both
experiments are combined in Figure 2. One causal
structure was chosen by the majority of people in
each condition – Graph 1 in the common unobserved
cause condition, Graph 0 in the independent unob-
served causes condition, Graph 2 in the one observed
cause condition, and Graph 0 in the pointing control.
The results of these experiments provide two chal-
lenges to constraint-based accounts. First, people
are able to make inferences from small samples – in
many cases, far less data than might be required for
all relevant χ2 tests to yield results consistent with
the appropriate causal structure. Second, people’s
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Figure 2: Results of Kushnir et al. (2003), shown
with predictions of Bayesian models.
judgments reﬂect a sensitivity to graded degrees of
evidence: in the independent unobserved causes con-
dition, over 95% of participants chose Graph 1, while
only 60-80% of people chose the most popular struc-
ture in the other conditions. This was not simply a
consequence of a preference for Graph 0 – the same
structure was less popular in the pointing control
condition, suggesting that there is a diﬀerence in
the evidence that the data provide for Graph 0 in
these two conditions. Constraint-based algorithms
are not sensitive to graded degrees of evidence: a
causal structure is either consistent or inconsistent
with the pattern of dependencies in a dataset.
A theory-based account
Our model of the stick ball machine uses a physical
theory that contains three principles:
1. Balls never move without a cause.
2. A hidden cause moves with probability α.
3. A moving cause moves its eﬀect with probability β.
If we add the restrictions that every ball has a sin-
gle cause and hidden causes never have causes (but
can move themselves, per Principle 2), we obtain the
four structures shown in Figure 1(b). The principles
of the physical theory place strong constraints on the
functional form of the causal relationships identiﬁed
in this structure, allowing us to compute the proba-
bility of events involving A and B for each graphical
structure, as shown in Table 1.
Given a dataset D, we compute a poste-
rior probability distribution over these struc-
tures, P (Graph i|D), combining prior probabilities,
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Table 1: Event probabilities for causal structures
Event Graph 0 Graph 1 Graph 2
AB (αβ)2 αβ2 αβ2
A¯B αβ(1− αβ) αβ(1− β) 0
AB¯ αβ(1− αβ) αβ(1− β) αβ(1− β)
A¯B¯ (1− αβ)2 1− 2αβ + αβ2 1− αβ
A|do(B) αβ αβ αβ
B|do(A) αβ αβ β
Note: Probabilities for Graph 3 are the same as
those for Graph 2, exchanging the roles of A and B.
P (Graph i), with the probability of the observed
data under each structure, P (D|Graph i), using
Bayes’ rule:
P (Graph i|D) ∝ P (D|Graph i)P (Graph i)
P (D|Graph i) is the product of the probabilities of
the individual events making up D, which can be
obtained from Table 1.
If we assume a uniform prior for P (Graph i),
the causal theory leaves two parameters unspeciﬁed:
α, the probability of a hidden cause moving on a
given trial, and β, the probability that a moving
cause moves its eﬀect. We set β empirically, via
a small experiment. We showed 10 participants a
computer simulation of the stick-ball machine, and
reproduced the familiarization trials used by Kush-
nir et al. (2003): participants were told that when
A causes B, it makes it move “almost always”, and
were shown that A moved B on four of six trials. We
then asked them how often they expected A would
move B. The mean and median response was that A
would move B on 75% of trials, so we used β = 0.75.
Figure 2 shows the predictions of the Bayesian
model with α = 0.47. The model gave a correlation
of r = 0.94 with the data, and correctly predicted
the most common response in each condition. The
model also admits graded degrees of evidence, with
the observations and interventions in the indepen-
dent unobserved causes condition providing stronger
evidence for Graph 0 than the observations in the
pointing control. The model departs from people’s
judgments in one case, failing to predict the minor-
ity preference for Graph 0 in the common unobserved
cause condition. This disparity could have many ex-
planations, such as a default preference for indepen-
dence between objects, or diﬀerences in the salience
of diﬀerent data types and causal structure. For in-
stance, interventions may be weighted higher than
observations by a factor of γ, and hidden common
causes may receive only a fraction 1/δ of the prior
probability accorded to other structures. Figure 2
shows an almost-perfect ﬁt (r = 0.99) for such a
model, Bayes (γ,δ), with γ = 4, δ = 2, α = 0.4.
Further experiments will be necessary to determine
whether these sorts of psychological variables play a
role in the process of causal induction.
(b)
(a)
Figure 3: (a) Four cans of the extremely unstable
compound Nitro X. (b) A simultaneous explosion.
Nitro X
To provide a further demonstration of the impor-
tance of graded degrees of evidence and the ability
to infer hidden causes from very little data, we con-
ducted an experiment that tested people’s ability to
infer the causal structure of a dynamical physical
system. Our experiment presents a more severe in-
ductive challenge than the tasks considered by Kush-
nir et al. (2003), as it requires inferring a hidden
common cause from just a single observation, with
no verbal cues that such a structure might exist. In
the experiment, we introduced people to a novel sub-
stance, Nitro X, and illustrated its dynamics: cans
of Nitro X could spontaneously explode, and could
detonate one another after a time delay that was a
linear function of spatial separation, as would be ex-
pected from the slow propagation of pressure waves.
We then presented them with the simultaneous ex-
plosion of several cans, without the delays charac-
teristic of pressure waves propagating from one can
to the next. We expected that people would see
this suspicious coincidence as evidence for some kind
of hidden common cause, such as an external force
shaking the table. We varied the number of cans, m,
to see whether the magnitude of the coincidence had
an eﬀect on people’s inference to a hidden cause.
Method
Participants Participants were 64 members of the
MIT Brain and Cognitive Sciences subject pool, split
evenly over four conditions (m = 2, 3, 4, 6).
Stimuli The stimuli were pictures of cans sitting
on a table, presented on a computer screen. A
new set of cans was shown on each trial, and by
the end of the trial all cans on the screen had ex-
ploded, demonstrated by cartoon explosion graphics
like those shown in Figure 3.
Procedure The experiment consisted of three fa-
miliarization trials and ﬁve test trials. The famil-
iarization trials introduced the participants to Nitro
X. In the ﬁrst trial, participants were told that Ni-
tro X is very unstable, and this was demonstrated
by the experimenter tapping a can and the can ex-
ploding. In the second trial, participants saw two
cans of Nitro X, the experimenter tapped one can,
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Figure 4: Results of the Nitro X experiment.
which exploded, and the can next to it exploded
shortly afterwards. On the third trial, participants
were again reminded about the instability of Nitro
X, and saw a single can explode without any action
by the experimenter, after waiting for a few seconds.
The ﬁrst two test trials were identical for all four
conditions, and both involved four cans exploding
in a causal chain, with a delay between successive
explosions. In the third test trial, the number of cans
in the display was varied, m = 2, 3, 4 or 6, depending
on condition. After a brief delay, all of the cans
exploded simultaneously. The last two test trials
allowed the participants to interact with Nitro X by
tapping, and will not be discussed further here.
After each test trial, participants were given a
sheet of questions for each test trial. These sheets
gave three options:
1. The ﬁrst can exploded spontaneously. That explosion
caused the other cans to explode, in a chain reaction.
2. Each can exploded spontaneously, all on its own.
There was no causal connection between them.
3. Neither of the above is a likely explanation. Please
write a plausible alternative here.
The order of the ﬁrst two options was counterbal-
anced, but the third option was always last.
Results and Discussion
For all trials, two rates examined the written re-
sponses of participants choosing the third option
above, and were in 100% agreement in classifying all
such responses as indicating a hidden cause. Over
95% of participants correctly identiﬁed the causal
chain in the ﬁrst two trials. The proportion of partic-
ipants identifying a hidden cause on the third trial,
with the simultaneous explosion, is shown in Figure
4. There was a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of m,
χ2(3) = 11.36, p < 0.01. The number of cans inﬂu-
enced whether people inferred hidden causal stuc-
ture, with most people seeing two cans as indepen-
dent but six as causally related.
Constraint-based algorithms cannot explain our
results. If we imagine that time is broken into dis-
crete intervals, and a can either explodes or does
not explode in each interval, then we can construct
a contingency table for each pair of cans. Statis-
tical signiﬁcance tests will identify pairwise depen-
dencies among all cans that explode simultaneously,
provided appropriate numbers of non-explosion tri-
als are included. The existence of a hidden common
cause is consistent with such a pattern of depen-
dency. However, as a result of reasoning deductively
from this pattern, the evidence for such a structure
does not increase with m: a hidden common cause
is merely consistent with the pattern for all m > 2.
This experiment also illustrates that people are
willing to infer hidden causal structure from very
small samples – just one datapoint – and from obser-
vations alone. Constraint-based algorithms cannot
solve this problem: while a hidden common cause is
consistent with the observed pattern of dependency,
causal structures in which the cans inﬂuence one an-
other cannot be ruled out without intervention in-
formation. People do not consider this possibility
because they have learned that the mechanism by
which cans inﬂuence one another has a time delay.
Further situations in which the temporal properties
of causal relationships inﬂuence causal induction are
described by Hagmayer and Waldmann (2002).
A theory-based account
The results of the Nitro X experiment are easy to
model: any increasing function of the number of cans
would be suﬃcient. Our goal in modeling these data
is to illustrate how Theory-Based Causal Induction
extends to a system with non-trivial dynamics and
diﬀerent causal mechanisms, and to show that in-
ferences to hidden causes from the smallest possible
sample – a single observation – can have a physically
plausible and statistically rational explanation.
We model the explosion times of cans by assum-
ing that at each inﬁnitesimal moment, there is a cer-
tain probability that the can will explode. This as-
sumption means that the explosion time of each can
follows a Poisson process, with a “rate parameter”
determining the probability of explosion at each mo-
ment. We set the rates using the following principles:
1. A can explodes spontaneously at rate α.
2. A hidden cause becomes active at rate γ.
3. At the moment a hidden cause is active, a can inﬂu-
enced by that cause explodes at rate α + β.
A complete theory of Nitro X would need to include
further principles stating the functional form of the
causal relationship between cans, encoding the fact
that this relationship involves a time delay. We have
omitted these principles because they do not directly
aﬀect the inference to a hidden cause when all ex-
plosions are simultaneous.
This theory generates a large number of possi-
ble causal structures, with hidden causes inﬂuencing
various subsets of the cans. We will focus on the two
structures shown in Figure 5: Graph 0, in which all
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Figure 5: Graphs indicating potential causal struc-
tures for the Nitro X experiment.
cans explode spontaneously, is the “null hypothesis”
for any inference concerning hidden causes, while
Graph 1, in which all cans are also inﬂuenced by
a hidden cause, gives the highest probability to a si-
multaneous explosion. These structures are deﬁned
on variables representing the time at which cans ex-
plode, t1, . . . , tm, and the time the hidden cause be-
comes active, tC . The inference to a hidden common
cause is modeled by computing the posterior prob-
ability P (Graph 1|T ), where T = {t1, . . . , tm}. In a
simultaneous explosion, all ti take the same value, t.
It follows from the theory outlined above that
for Graph 0, each ti is an independent Poisson
process with rate α, which gives P (T |Graph 0) =
αm exp{−mαt}. For Graph 1, tC follows a Poisson
process with rate γ. Conditioned on tC , each ti is a
Poisson process with rate α, except at the moment
when the hidden cause becomes active, at which
point the rate is α + β. Computing P (T |Graph 1)
requires integrating over all values of tC , which we
approximate by choosing tC to maximize P (T |tC):
P (T |Graph 1) =
∫ ∞
0
P (T |tC)P (tC) dtC
≈ γ(α + β)m exp{−mαt− γt}
Applying Bayes’ rule, it follows1 that P (Graph 1|T )
is a sigmoid function of m,
P (Graph 1|T ) =
1
1 + exp{−gm− b}
for g = log α+β
α
and b = log P (Graph 1)
P (Graph 0)
+ log γ − γt.
The model predicts that increasing m should in-
crease P (Graph 1|T ) for any positive values of α and
β, as this results in a positive gain, g. The theory
involves four parameters: α, β, γ, and P (Graph 0).
Since these four parameters are not identiﬁable –
multiple sets of parameter values are consistent with
the same sigmoid function – we set the parameters of
the sigmoid g and b. Using g = 0.58 and b = −2.90
gives r = 0.958, and the predictions shown in Fig-
ure 4. These parameters indicate β = 0.79α and an
initial preference for Graph 0.
Our theory-based approach explains why the num-
ber of cans involved in a simultaneous explosion
1A full derivation of this result is available at
http://www-psych.stanford.edu/∼gruﬀydd/reports/nitrox.pdf
should inﬂuence the evidence for a hidden cause,
but is clearly not the only model compatible with
these data. However, our analysis exposes the ratio-
nal basis for human judgments, and makes further
intuitive predictions that we are in the process of
testing. For example, the −γt term in the expres-
sion for b indicates that, all other things being equal,
decreasing the time before a simultaneous explosion
increases the evidence for a hidden cause.
Conclusion
Explaining human causal induction requires supple-
menting the formal methods developed in computer
science with the causal domain knowledge that peo-
ple possess. We have shown that using physical the-
ories to inform rational statistical inference makes
it possible to explain how people infer hidden causal
structure from such limited data. We anticipate that
the same framework, using appropriately modiﬁed
causal theories, can shed light on inferences about
hidden causes in other domains.
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Abstract 
This experiment examines people’s ability to invent creative 
outcomes to simple event sequences. We report a study where 
participants are given everyday event descriptions and asked 
to describe either a predictable outcome (Predictable group) 
or a creative outcome (Creative group). Following the 
Creative Cognition approach (Finke, Ward & Smith, 1992), 
we expected that though those instructed to be creative might 
generate novel and interesting outcomes, they would also be 
bound by their knowledge of the outcomes that typically 
occur. The results support this prediction, in that while the 
Creative group manifested more inventive variability in their 
outcomes relative to the Predictable group, their proposed 
outcomes still overlapped in part with those of the Predictable 
group. These results show that although creativity may take 
people beyond their knowledge, they can never fully break 
free from that knowledge. 
Introduction 
Creativity is like reaching for the stars with your feet firmly 
stuck in the mud of everyday life. While the creative act 
takes us beyond what an individual or a society has thought 
before, it seems to be inextricably constrained by what is 
known already (see e.g., Boden, 1995; Finke, Ward & 
Smith, 1992; Perkins, 1981; Sternberg, 1999). In science, 
new theories come from reactions to old paradigms, but still 
work from the same methodologies and findings of previous 
decades. In the arts, similar reactions to the conventions of a 
previous age occur, though often themes and materials 
remain the same. In this paper, we examine this interplay 
between creativity and the constraints placed on it by prior 
knowledge by studying people’s generation of novel 
outcomes to conventional event sequences. We often need 
to imagine unconventional or novel outcomes to typical 
happenings (e.g., in launching a new product or assessing 
the impact of new technologies). Yet, we know of little 
work which examines people’s creativity in such situations.  
The idea that creativity is often constrained by prior 
knowledge has been strongly and convincingly argued for in 
Finke et al.’s (1992) Creative Cognition Approach and their 
‘Geneplore model’. This approach has been supported by 
several appropriate empirical demonstrations. For example, 
Ward (1994) asked participants to imagine and then draw 
creatures that live on a distant planet very unlike earth. This 
simple creative task revealed that converse to the 
instructions, almost all the participants produced animals 
very like the ones living on this planet, in that they exhibited 
features such as bilateral symmetry, external organs (e.g. 
eyes, ears) and appendages (e.g. legs, tails). Ward concluded 
that the participants were constrained by their experience of 
real world animals and could not deviate easily from such 
prototypes. This type of influence from background 
knowledge has been subsequently demonstrated in studies 
on the generation of novel product names (Rubin, Stoltzfus 
& Wall, 1991), ideas for traffic improvement (Marsh, 
Landau & Hicks, 1997), and even the generation of non-
words (Marsh, Ward & Landau, 1999). Haught & Johnson-
Laird (2003) have reported similar findings in a task where 
people were asked to come up with a creative sentence 
incorporating two or three specific nouns. They found that 
people were quite restricted in their output; for example, the 
words ‘lion’ ‘strawberry’ and ‘harp’ tended to result in 
similar sentences, such as “The lion was playing the harp 
while eating the strawberry”. In Ward’s (1994) view, these 
“structured imagination” effects occur because, when faced 
with a problem whose solution requires creativity, people 
tend to take the path of least resistance by retrieving domain 
specific information or an existing solution (whether this is 
an experimenter provided example or self-generated from 
previous knowledge) and then attempt to modify the old 
construct in some novel way. 
In the present study, we look at the constraint placed by 
background knowledge in a task that deals with novel 
sentence generation involving script-like scenarios (Bower, 
Black & Turner, 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977). In our 
task, people are presented with typical event sequences that 
have incomplete, but predictable, endings (see Appendix). 
These scenarios either involve conventional events that 
proceed uninterrupted (e.g. “Matthew had wanted to quit his 
job for months. One day he walked into his boss’s 
office…”), or events that are interrupted by some surprising 
event or state (e.g. “The cup of coffee was balanced on the 
arm of the chair. Suddenly, Richard sneezed….”). In both 
cases, the main manipulation was to ask people to come up 
with a creative outcome to the sequence. In the remainder of 
this paper, we detail this study and sketch the properties of a 
computational model that might capture the effects found. 
Proposing Creative Outcomes to Events 
Following the Creative Cognition Approach, we expected 
that our creative-ending generation task would manifest the 
constraining influence of prior, background knowledge in 
our participants. In the experiment, there were two main 
groups, the Predictable and Creative groups. Both groups 
were given the same set of event sequence materials 
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(divided into Unfolding and Surprise scenarios). However, 
the Predictable group was asked to “think of a typical 
ending to the scenario…”, whereas the Creative group was 
asked to “think of a creative ending to the scenario…”. Thus 
the design was a 2 x 2 one, with Group being a between-
participants variable (Predictable or Creative) and Scenario 
being a within-participants variable (Unfolding or Surprise).  
The main prediction was that the Creative group would 
generate many of the same outcomes as the Predictable 
group, as they would be constrained by their background 
knowledge of the typical endings of these events. However, 
we thought that something additional would also be 
included in these endings, giving them an added novel twist. 
So, in the specific measures we used, we expected more 
elaborate endings in the Creative group (i.e., more 
propositions generated), but we also expected that some of 
these propositions would overlap with those produced by 
the Predictable group (i.e., propositions reflecting a 
common ending). To put it another way, the Predictable 
group’s endings should strongly overlap with those 
generated by the Creative group.  
We had no apriori grounds for expecting a difference 
between the Unfolding and Surprise scenarios, though they 
do appear to be distinct categories. In the Unfolding 
scenarios the sequence of actions proceeds unchecked in a 
predictable way. In the Surprise scenarios one state or 
sequence of actions is cut across by another sequence of 
actions. Interestingly though, in the Surprise scenarios the 
interrupting sequence is also predictable, it’s a “typical 
surprise”  (e.g., a poorly balanced object being knocked).    
Experiment 
Method 
Participants Thirty native English-speaking undergraduate 
psychology students from University College Dublin 
volunteered for this experiment. 
Materials Twenty-four scenarios involving typical 
everyday event sequences (see Appendix). All scenarios had 
two sentences and required a third to complete the sequence. 
The 24 materials consisted of three types of sequences: 8 
Unfolding items, 8 Surprise items and 8 filler items.  The 
Unfolding items described two events/states in a typical 
sequence with a predictable outcome (e.g. “Cathy saw the 
cake in the window. She hadn’t had lunch that day…”). The 
Surprise items described one event/state that was interrupted 
by another event/state leading to a predictable outcome 
(e.g., “The little boy played by the edge of the pond. 
Suddenly he slipped on some moss…”).  
Design In the 2 x 2 (Group x Scenario) design, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two between-participant 
groups, Predictable (N=15) and Creative (N=15). All 
participants received the same 24 scenarios, which were 
presented in a different random order to each participant.  
Procedure Each participant was given a booklet containing 
all the materials, the first page of which included 
instructions. The items were presented so that only one 
scenario appeared on each page (one sentence per line with 
a prompt stating ‘your ending:’ in the space below each 
scenario). Participants in the Predictable group were given 
the instructions to “think of a typical ending to the 
scenario”, whilst those in the Creative group were asked to 
“think of a creative ending” to be written as a concluding 
sentence. In the Creative group participants were also asked 
to describe a “creative turn of events, not just the use of 
creative language” so as to avoid a misinterpretation of the 
instructions. An earlier pilot showed that without this 
instruction, some people just produced purple-prose 
versions of typical endings rather than truly novel endings. 
Scoring Participants’ responses in completing the presented 
sentences were firstly rated for level of creativity. Then the 
responses were analysed into propositions. As a further 
measure of creativity, we wished to examine the diversity 
and richness of responses made, but we also examined the 
commonalities between responses to determine if there was 
any overlap across the different conditions.  
To measure creativity, following Haught & Johnson-
Laird’s (2003) procedure, two judges independently rated 
each sentence (blind to condition) on a 7-point scale, with a 
score of 1 denoting a highly uncreative sentence and a score 
of 7 denoting an extremely creative sentence.  
To measure diversity, for each item we categorised the 
distinct propositions used in people’s endings. So for 
example, for the  “Cathy looked at the cake in the shop 
window. She hadn’t had lunch that day…” item, there were 
three distinct classes of responses given as endings: 
(1) Cathy gets the cake. 
(2) Cathy decides not to get the cake for some reason 
(e.g., diet). 
(3) Cathy was hungry. 
To measure the richness of the responses, we scored the 
endings produced for their word length and the number of 
different events mentioned in them. This measure was used 
because, even though people were asked to provide just one 
sentence, in many cases multiple events/states were 
included in the responses. So for example, in the cake-
seeing scenario, the response “But she knew she was on a 
diet so decided to wait until she got back to her office, and 
then ate something less fattening”, was classed as having 
three events/states:  
(1) Attribute of being on a diet  (a state). 
(2) Cathy went back to office (event 1).  
(3) She ate something less fattening (event 2). 
To measure commonality, we noted the most common 
response, i.e. the frequency of occurrence of a given 
response across a given group. In the cake-seeing scenario 
the most common event was “Cathy gets the cake” which 
received 11 counts in the Predictable group and 9 in the 
Creative group. 
For each of these measures, two raters independently 
scored the materials. The inter-rater reliability was 
uniformly high on each; for example, in the diversity 
measure a random sample of ratings showed 94.99% inter-
rater reliability in categorising the different responses.   
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Table 1: Sample responses from two scenarios 
 
“Katie searched everywhere for her little kitten. 
Then she heard a miaow from the bin”
 
Predictable N  Creative N 
 
Katie opened bin 
 
11 
 
Katie opened bin 4 
An explanation that kitten 
was in bin 
 
3 
An explanation that kitten was 
in bin 
 
4 
Kitten walked out of bin 1 Katie found whole cluster of 
kittens 
 
1 
Katie found wrong kitten 1 
Kitten was being carried away  1 
Katie couldn’t understand how 
kitten was in bin 
 
1 
Bin collector came 1 
Katie was relieved 1 
 
Katie was disappointed 1 
 
“The cup of coffee was balanced on the arm of the chair. 
Suddenly Richard sneezed”
 
Predictable N  Creative N 
 
Cup of coffee fell 
 
13 
 
Cup of coffee fell 7 
Richard saved cup from 
falling 
 
1 
Richard saved cup from  
falling 
 
1 
Richard’s snot went into 
coffee 
 
1 
Richard’s snot went into  
coffee 
 
3 
Chair propelled backwards  1 
Friend got shock and dropped 
her cup of hot chocolate  
 
1 
Spaceship flew out of nose 1 
 
A gust of wind went through 
the window 
 
1 
Results & Discussion 
To summarise, analysis of the results showed that, though 
the Creative group produced more creative, diverse and 
richer responses than the Predictable group, they also could 
not avoid the commonly occurring events that were invited 
by the scenario. These results demonstrate that in generating 
novel outcomes, people are restricted by their background 
knowledge. Table 1 illustrates samples of the responses 
made by participants in two scenarios in the experiment. 
 
Creativity of Responses All of the responses were rated 
blind-to-condition by two judges independently on a 7-point 
scale. The judges’ ratings were reliably correlated 
(Pearson’s r = 0.748, p < 0.01). A 2 x 2 ANOVA on these 
ratings for the Group (between-participants) and Scenario 
(within-participants) variables revealed a main effect of 
Group, Materials and a reliable interaction, F(1,478) = 4.65, 
p < 0.05, MSe = 6.01. As expected, responses from the 
Creative group (M = 3.523) were rated as being more 
creative than those of the Predictable group (M = 2.245), 
F(1,478) = 188.82, p < 0.01, MSe = 397.84. It was also 
found that the Unfolding materials were rated as more 
creative (M = 2.96) than the Surprise materials (M = 2.80), 
F(1, 478) = 4.897, p < 0.05, MSe = 6.338. This finding 
suggests that such unfolding events promote greater creative 
products. This was an unexpected result. It may indicate that 
it is harder to break the inevitability of the outcome to a 
surprise scenario because its outcome is much more highly 
determined. However, we should exercise some care in 
making sweeping conclusions about this difference, as it is 
not reflected in any of the other measures. The reliable 
interaction showed that the most creative condition was the 
Creative-Unfolding one (M = 3.68), followed by the 
Creative-Surprise (M = 3.36), Predictable-Unfolding (M = 
2.24) and Predictable-Surprise (M = 2.23) conditions 
respectively.  
 
Diversity of Responses Overall, one would expect a greater 
diversity of responses in the Creative group versus the 
Predictable group.  This is exactly what we found (see 
Figure 1).  A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the diversity scores revealed 
a reliable main effect of Group, with the Creative group 
generating more classes of responses (M = 6.37) than the 
Predictable group (M = 3.5), F(1, 14) = 34.6, p < 0.01, MSe 
=66.13. There was no reliable effect of Scenario and no 
reliable interaction. An indication of the greater diversity in 
Creative responses can be seen in Table 1 where both 
scenarios show more diversity in the Creative condition.  
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Richness of Responses Another index of creativity is the 
elaborateness or richness of the endings generated. In 
general, one would expect a greater richness in the 
responses made by the Creative group than by the 
Predictable group.  Like Haught & Johnson-Laird (2003) we 
tapped this dimension by examining the average sentence 
length of people’s endings. In addition to this we calculated 
the mean number of different events in each response.  
A 2 x 2 ANOVA again revealed a main effect of Group 
but no other reliable effects. The Creative group was more 
likely to provide longer responses (M = 12.5 words) than the 
Predictable group (M = 9.24 words), F (1, 233) = 35.071, p 
< 0.01, MSe=1220.29. An example of a Predictable response 
for the first scenario in Table 1 was “She reached in and 
pulled the kitten out” (word count = 8), a creative response 
for the same scenario was “She pulled a white kitten from 
the bin, her kitten was black so she put the white kitten back 
and carried on looking” (word count = 23). 
Figure 1:  Diversity - the mean number of different 
responses generated for each condition 
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A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the mean number of different events 
in the ending showed a comparable pattern; a reliable main 
effect of Group, but no other effects. The Creative group 
was more likely to include additional events per ending (M 
= 1.8) than the Predictable group (M = 1.46), F(1,233) = 
19.583, p < 0.01, MSe =13.86. Using the example above, the 
predictable response was classed as having one event and 
the creative was classed as having three events. 
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Commonality of Responses The above measures show the 
generativity of the Creative group at work relative to the 
Predictable one, but they do not reveal the constraints we 
expected from background knowledge based on Ward’s 
(1994) proposals. If this constraint is in evidence we should 
see that, in spite of the clear differences in the creativity of 
responses, there should be certain commonalities between 
the Creative and Predictable groups too. Specifically, we 
should see many of the Creative group using the same, 
inevitable events as some part of their endings. As Figure 2 
illustrates, this is exactly what we found. In an analysis of 
the most commonly produced response, we observed that 
while those in the Predictable condition (M = 10.25) were 
more likely to produce the common event, those in the 
Creative condition (M = 6.313) also produced this same 
event to a high degree, F(1, 14) = 31.042, p < 0.01, 
MSe = 124.03). Again an example of this can be seen in the 
second scenario in Table 1: the most common response for 
all participants is that the “cup of coffee fell”, which 
received high counts in both conditions.  
General Discussion 
The aim of this study was to explore how creative 
instructions would influence an individual’s completion of a 
common event sequence. The Creative Cognition approach 
argues that background knowledge can play a constraining 
role in the creative process, a proposal that is confirmed by 
the present results. More specifically this experiment has 
shown that the expectations we have about certain events in 
the world have a profound influence on our thought 
processes. We found that although responses of the Creative 
group were more creative, rich and diverse than those in the 
Predictable group, certain elements of the endings provided 
by both groups overlapped considerably. Thus, it appears 
that whilst creativity in essence involves some degree of 
variability and unpredictability, it is firmly rooted in our 
background knowledge of events. In the remainder of this 
section, we discuss the relationship of these results to the 
literature on comprehension, and how they might be 
modeled computationally. 
Consistency With Theories of Comprehension 
Graesser Singer & Trabasso (1994) stress that knowledge of 
goals, actions and events are deeply embedded in our 
perceptual and social experience. As we interact with the 
environment, we have a strong tendency to interpret event 
sequences as causal seqeunces, and a similar process occurs 
in comprehension by means of inferences (Kintsch, 1998; 
Zwaan, 1999). For example, Duffy (1986) observed that 
when reading, we continually form expectations about 
future events, so as to develop a causal chain of narrative. 
The ‘Situation Model’ of comprehension holds that we 
construct a detailed mental representation of people, objects, 
locations, events and actions described in a text (e.g. Zwaan, 
1999). Consequently, when reading the scenarios of the 
present experiment, it was difficult for participants to avoid 
making rapid, almost automatic inferences about the mental 
states of the characters and/or the events that would 
typically occur. In the scenario where Cathy sees the cake 
for example, it can easily be inferred that Cathy is hungry 
and that she would like to eat the cake. It could be 
hypothesised that in this task, the participants naturally link 
the two sentences together, and in order to provide a 
coherent ending, they must fit their response with the 
depicted events so that it is easily understandable and 
‘makes sense’ when read. It is this fundamental knowledge 
constraint that often overrides instructions to be creative.  
Possible Computational Models 
Connell & Keane (2002, 2003, in press) have developed a 
computational model of plausibility judgements for event 
sequences that is consistent with the above general theory of 
comprehension. At present, this model takes some event 
description and finds alternative possible inferential paths to 
link the events described, this elaborated representation then 
being scored to assess the plausibility of the description. As 
such, this Plausibility Analysis Model (PAM) is one 
possible candidate model that could be extended to deal 
with the present findings. Such an extension would have to 
rely on two significant changes: (i) the generation of further 
possible events to a given sequence based on background 
knowledge and then (ii) the application of some set of 
selection heuristics to rank order these possible outcomes 
for their novelty. As a first pass, such rules could just favour 
less likely outcomes; that is, outcomes that could possibly 
occur but that are not strongly supported by prior 
experience.  Obviously such an extension would invite new 
predictions about the relationship between plausibility and 
creativity too. 
Figure 2: Commonality – count of most common response 
for each scenario across conditions 
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Concluding Comments 
The present paper reports a novel study of people’s ability 
to generate creative endings to sentences describing 
commonplace event sequences. This work connects several 
areas that have previously been quite separate; namely 
creativity, sentence comprehension and plausibility. The 
convergence of these three areas presents a real opportunity 
for understanding this type of creativity in a new and 
computationally well-specified way.  In short, we should be 
able to characterise the mud of everyday knowledge, exactly 
how it glues us to the ground and, yet, the exact nature of 
the way in which we reach for the stars.   
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Appendix: Materials Used in the Study 
Unfolding Scenarios 
1 Cathy looked at the cake in the shop window. She 
hadn’t had lunch that day. 
2 The dog saw the bone in kitchen bin. He wagged his 
tail in anticipation. 
3 Thomas the cat felt bored. He noticed the dangling 
tablecloth. 
4 Katie searched everywhere for her little kitten. Then 
she heard a miaow from the bin. 
5 James wanted to read the paper. He stopped at the shop 
on his way home from work. 
6 Robert hated his old car. He decided to call the bank. 
7 Matthew had wanted to quit his job for months. One 
day he walked into his boss’s office. 
8 Jim felt very cold. He got some coal and firelighters. 
Surprise Scenarios: 
1 John and Pat were kicking a football on the street. A 
speedy car sharply turned the corner. 
2 Michael’s shopping bags were bursting with groceries. 
He felt one of the handles begin to break. 
3 The cup of coffee was balanced on the arm of the chair. 
Suddenly, Richard sneezed. 
4 The yacht sailed on as the crew slept. A rocky reef lay 
directly ahead. 
5 Paul was crossing a busy road. Unexpectedly his 
mobile phone rang. 
6 Peter and Sally ate lunch in the small restaurant. They 
didn’t realise that the meat wasn’t properly defrosted. 
7 The little boy played at the edge of the pond. Suddenly, 
he slipped on some moss. 
8 The sheep were grazing in the field. Suddenly, a wolf 
approached the flock.  
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Abstract 
 
Complex problems have often been described along certain 
dimensions, e.g. complexity, transparency, and dynamics. 
However, problem descriptions of the researcher and 
problem-characteristics perceived by the participant might 
differ. This study investigates subjective task complexity and 
its relationship to complex problem solving performance. 
Research questions are: Do problem perceptions differ a) 
between different complex problems? b) between cultures? 
and c) between participants’ performance? Two hundred 
eighty three students from the US, Brazil, and India 
participated in this study. Participants played the two 
computer simulations, Fire and Coldstore, and filled out a 
problem-characteristics questionnaire after each simulation. 
Factor analysis revealed two factors; one labeled “Task 
Complexity”, the other “Task Difficulty”. Results indicate a) 
that Fire was perceived as more complex and more difficult 
than Coldstore in the Brazilian and US sample. The Indian 
sample perceived both problems as equally complex and 
difficult; b) a significant main effect of culture was found in 
Fire and Coldstore regarding Complexity; c) a significant 
main effect of performance was found for Task Difficulty in 
Fire and Coldstore, but not for Task Complexity. Cultural 
variables that could explain the results, such as uncertainty 
avoidance and differences in computer experience, are 
presented. Results are further discussed under a theoretical 
and applied perspective. 
Complex Problem Solving and Culture 
The study of complex problem solving has increased in the 
last decades especially in Europe (Frensch & Funke, 1995). 
Computer simulations of complex problems have been 
widely used to study human problem solving behavior 
(Brehmer & Dörner, 1993). The researchers were motivated 
to incorporate into their simulations characteristics common 
to real life situations, e.g. complexity, transparency, and 
dynamics (Dörner, 1996). A problems’ complexity is 
derived from the inclusion of many interdependent 
variables. Complex problems are nontransparent in that the 
problem solver initially does not know or understand the 
nature of the hidden variables in the problem situation. The 
situations change dynamically with and without the actions 
of the problem solver. One might derive that the more 
complex, the more non-transparent, and the more dynamic a 
problem objectively is, the more difficult it is. However, the 
described problem characteristics are not objective 
descriptions of complex problems, but are dependent on the 
knowledge and experience of the problem solver. 
Individuals differ in experiences regarding problem-related 
knowledge and strategic knowledge. The complexity, 
transparency, and dynamics of a situation interpreted 
subjectively might be completely different. Therefore, both 
the problem’s specific characteristics and the experience of 
the problem solver will influence the subjective 
interpretation of the problem. This interpretation is a crucial 
aspect of the problem solving process and thus, one might 
expect individual differences.  
Knowledge and experience of the problem solver is 
strongly influenced by one’s cultural environment and 
several studies have shown how problem solving differs 
between cultures (Cole, Gay, Glick, & Sharp, 1971; Güss, 
2002; Strohschneider & Güss, 1999). Culture is a broad 
term that can be defined in many ways (Kroeber & 
Kluckhon, 1963). Under a psychological perspective it can 
refer to implicit and explicit shared knowledge that is 
transmitted from generation to generation (Smith & Bond, 
1998). This knowledge is helpful for a specific group to 
adapt to specific conditions of the environment. Cross 
cultural differences in problem solving strategies validate 
that the people’s knowledge base is strongly influenced and 
shaped by their cultural environment. In essence, the more 
interesting questions is why and how problem solving 
strategies are influenced by culture. 
One aspect of this implicit knowledge are values that 
direct behavior, one such value is called uncertainty 
avoidance. A problem is by definition an uncertain situation 
as the problem solver does not know how to reach a goal 
state. Uncertainty avoidance refers to “the extent to which 
the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or 
unknown situations” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 161). Our 
expectation is that values of uncertainty avoidance influence 
the initial perception of a problem. For example Hofstede 
(2001) studied uncertainty avoidance in 53 countries. In his 
study, India and the United States showed weak uncertainty 
avoidance, whereas Brazil showed high uncertainty 
avoidance.  
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 This study investigates the following questions: Do 
participants perceive different problems in different ways, 
i.e. is one problem regarded as more complex than another 
problem? Do perceived problem-characteristics differ 
between cultural groups? If so, can differences in 
uncertainty avoidance explain differences in problem 
perception? Might it be that those problems are created and 
described with a bias from a western point of view? 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in this study were 283 students from three 
countries. In India (n=96), participants came from the 
University of Kerala in Thiruvananthapuram, and from 
Loyola College, Kerala. In Brazil (n=86), participants were 
from the universities of Gama Filho, Rio de Janeiro and 
Faculdade Roy Barbosa, Salvador da Bahia. In the United 
States (n=101), students were from Northern Illinois 
University and University of North Florida. Participants 
received either course credit or were paid for their 
participation. Students were from the schools of arts and 
sciences, social sciences, and business. None of the 
participants had taken part in other complex problem 
experiments prior to this study. Seventy percent of the 
participants were majors in psychology. One hundred 
seventy-six participants were female, and 107 participants 
were male. Their ages ranged between 18 and 38 years. The 
average age in the US sample was 22.6 years, in the Indian 
sample 23.8 years, and in the Brazilian sample 22.0. The 
mean ages in the three cultural samples were not 
significantly different. Samples were comparable according 
to course or major and gender. Data were collected in group 
sessions (2 hours) and individual sessions where Fire and 
Coldstore simulations were administered (2 hours). 
 
Materials: Fire, Coldstore, and Problem-
characteristics-questionnaire 
Participants played two computer simulations, called “Fire” 
(Gerdes, Dörner, & Pfeiffer, 1993) and “Coldstore” 
(Reichert & Dörner, 1988). Instructions to each simulation 
were provided and test games were played before the actual 
simulation started. After each simulation, a questionnaire 
regarding simulation characteristics was completed. 
Instructions and questionnaires were translated from English 
in translation-backtranslation procedures into Brazilian 
Portuguese with the help of bilingual Brazilians. The 
material was presented in Brazilian Portuguese in Brazil and 
in English in the US and in India. Indian participants, as 
bilinguals, had no difficulties in answering the Likert-scale 
questions. The questionnaires consist of identical items and 
are labeled Fire-characteristics-questionnaire (FCQ) and 
Coldstore-characteristics-questionnaire (CCQ). This 
questionnaire is a modification of the one originally 
developed by Schaub (2001). It consists of 24 items which 
participants rate on a 7-point Likert scale regarding 
complexity, transparency, and dynamics. Examples of 
questions related to complexity are “I find the game 
complex” and “There are many variables in this simulation”. 
Examples of questions related to transparency are “Not 
everything is visible that you would like to see” and “The 
game developments were quite surprising”. Examples of 
questions related to dynamics are “The simulation is 
dynamic with many changes”, “Changes occur often 
without my intervention”. 
In the Fire simulation, the participant assumes the role of 
a fire fighting commander and has to try to protect three 
towns and the forest from approaching fires. In Coldstore, 
the participant takes the role of a supervisor in a grocery 
store with a coldstorage unit. The automatic temperature 
device has broken down and the participant has to manually 
control the temperature until the cooling trucks arrive. The 
goal is to keep the temperature stable at an optimal 
temperature in order to keep products from freezing or 
spoiling. Each simulation lasts about 12 minutes. 
A comparison of the simulation characteristics of Fire and 
Coldstore shows that Fire is more complex and more 
dynamic, yet both are similarly non-transparent. On the 
screen of the Fire simulation, the participant sees the forest, 
three cities, fire fighting trucks, helicopters, water dikes, and 
stone area. In Coldstore, the participant sees the control 
wheel, the actual temperature, and the target temperature on 
the screen. Fire is not just more complex regarding stimuli 
on the screen, but also regarding possible actions. Fire offers 
4 main (and a few other) command options for 3 helicopters 
and 9 fire fighting trucks at any time. These commands can 
be given to individual units or several units at the same 
time. At any given time, a person has the choice of a 
minimum of 4 x (12!) = 312 alternatives. (In fact, the 
participant has still some additional options). On the other 
hand, the participant can also just wait and watch what 
happens. Coldstore offers the participant only one option, a 
control wheel which the participant clicks with the cursor to 
regulate the temperature.  
Although both simulations can be described as highly 
dynamic and changing in a non-linear way, Fire is 
significantly more dynamic than Coldstore. Fires break out 
at certain times in the simulation, in different locations. 
Wind strength, wind direction, and interventions of the 
participant all influence how the fire spreads. Subjectively, 
participants experience time pressure. In Coldstore, the 
development of the temperature changes but with delayed 
effects.  
Both simulations can be described as moderately non-
transparent. In Fire, participants see the fire, and see wind 
direction and strength. However, many participants have 
problems operating the commands. Even if participants have 
played a test game and have read the instructions, many 
don’t understand the impact of the consequences and long-
term effects of some of the commands. In Coldstore, 
transparency is related to delayed feedback. Participants 
have the impression, and are often surprised, that the 
temperature does not immediately react to changes on the 
control wheel. For many participants, the reasons behind the 
temperature fluctuations are hard to understand. Analysis of 
participants’ questionnaire responses will show if Fire is 
indeed described as more complex, more dynamic, and 
similarly non-transparent as Coldstore. Data analysis will 
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 reveal a universal or a culture-relative perception of 
problem characteristics. 
Initially, the reliability of the two game characteristics-
questionnaires (FCQ, CCQ) was studied. Exploratory factor 
analysis was conducted to investigate the underlying 
theoretical structure of the instruments, and measurement 
equivalence was studied with item analysis. Data regarding 
participants’ subjective evaluation of simulation characteris-
tics was then compared between the three cultural groups 
and related to performance in the two simulations.  
Results 
In cross-cultural comparisons, data must be analyzed for 
equivalence before any meaningful cross-cultural 
comparisons can be made. Cronbach’s alpha was used to 
assess the instrument’s reliability. The Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients of 13 complexity items were .632, .552, and 
.802 for the Indian, Brazilian, and US samples respectively. 
The internal consistency for complexity items is adequate 
for the US sample, but not for the Indian and Brazilian 
samples. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of the 7 
transparency items and 4 dynamics items in all three cultural 
samples were relatively low, i.e. between .242 and .551. 
This was the case for the Fire- and the Coldstore-
characteristics-questionnaire (FCQ and CCQ). The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for all 24 items in Fire were 
.762, .691, and .827, for India, Brazil, and the US, and 
indicate a one-dimensional construct. Further investigation 
of the measurement’s structure using exploratory factor 
analysis was conducted for the overall sample and for each 
cultural group. Results indicated two main factors (overall 
and in each cultural sample). The first factor “Task 
Complexity” refers to items indicating complexity, 
transparency, and dynamics. The second factor “Task 
Difficulty” refers to the subjective impression of the 
participant on the situation. To compare the factor structure 
and loadings between the different cultural groups, the 
coefficient of congruence (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & 
Hong, 1999) was calculated. Results indicate a similar 
factor structure in all the cultural samples in both 
simulations. In a next step, item analysis was conducted 
following van de Vijver and Leung (1997) approach. Items 
showing cultural bias were excluded from further analysis.  
Items of Factor 1 and Factor 2 are significantly correlated 
in both simulations (Fire-complexity and Fire-difficulty, r = 
.189**; Coldstore-complexity and Coldstore-difficulty, r = 
.178**. Moreover, items of Factor 1 in both simulations are 
significantly correlated (Fire-complexity and Coldstore-
complexity, r = .361**) and items of Factor 2 in both 
simulations are significantly correlated (Fire-difficulty and 
Coldstore-difficulty, r = .130*). Factor 1 in one simulation 
and Factor 2 in the other simulation are not significantly 
correlated. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the new scales 
“Task Complexity” and “Task Difficulty” were calculated 
for the cultural subgroups and for the overall sample. The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranged between .606 and .833 
in the two Fire item subscales and between .648 and .795 in 
the two Coldstore item subscales. These reliability measures 
can be considered satisfactory considering the small number 
of items in each scale. 
Task Complexity and Task Difficulty in the US, 
Brazilian, and Indian Samples 
In a next step, Fire and Coldstore were compared regarding 
Complexity and Difficulty. Results showed that Fire was 
perceived as more complex and more difficult than 
Coldstore (see Figure 1). Lower mean scores indicate high 
complexity and high difficulty. Dividing the overall score of 
18 by 7 (7 items), gives an average of 2.6 on a scale from 1 
to 7. This means that overall, the Fire simulation was 
considered quite complex and quite difficult [Complexity: 
MF = 17.59, SDF = 6.43; MC = 22.97, SDC = 8.80; F(1, 551) = 
-67.36, p < .001, η2 = .11] and [Difficulty: MF = 18.57, SDF = 
5.98; MC = 21.74, SDC = 6.96; F(1, 557) = 33.25, p < .001, 
η2 = .056].  
Figure 1: Mean values of US, Brazilian, and Indian 
participants in Complexity and Difficulty in Fire and 
Coldstore (Complexity and Difficulty scores are inverted).  
In a next step, Complexity and Difficulty in Fire and 
Coldstore were compared among the three cultural groups 
using ANOVAs. Scheffe post-hoc tests were calculated to 
compare differences in the mean values between the three 
cultures. Comparisons of mean values between cultures in 
Fire showed that the US and Indian samples had 
significantly higher average scores regarding Complexity 
and Difficulty than the Brazilian sample. Brazilian 
participants perceived the Fire simulation as more complex 
and difficult (low scores indicate higher complexity). US 
participants perceived Coldstore as significantly less 
complex and less difficult. Interestingly, Indian participants’ 
ratings in Coldstore did not differ significantly from their 
ratings in Fire. These findings show how participants from 
different cultures view problems quite differently. In the 
following parts, we will analyze Complexity and Difficulty 
in relation to task performance. 
Fire: Task Complexity and Difficulty in Relation to 
Actual Task Performance 
The performance variable in Fire was the percentage of 
protected forest at the end of the simulation. Among all the 
participants, the percentage of protected forest ranged from 
41.97% to 97.45% (M = 63.91%, SD = 19.36). The overall 
scores were distributed in percentile ranks: 25th percentile at 
46.61%, 50th percentile at 52.92%, and 75th percentile at 
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 83.01%. Every participant was assigned a score from 1 to 4 
according to his or her performance, with higher scores 
indicating higher performance. Separate two-way ANOVAs 
were calculated with the two independent variables culture 
(3 levels) and performance score (4 levels). Dependent 
variables were Complexity and Difficulty.  
 
Figure 2: Mean Complexity values of US, Brazilian, and 
Indian participants according to performance in Fire 
(Complexity scores are inverted).  
      
 Figure 3: Mean Difficulty values of US, Brazilian, and 
Indian participants according to performance in Fire 
(Difficulty scores are inverted).  
Regarding the Fire simulation, a significant main effect of 
culture was found in both Complexity, F(2, 260) = 8.66, p < 
.001, η2 = .065, and Difficulty, F(2, 260) = 14.11, p < .001, 
η2 = .10 (see Figures 2 and 3). Post-hoc Scheffe tests 
showed, that Brazilian participants rated the Fire simulation 
as significantly more complex and more difficult than US 
and Indian participants. A significant main effect of 
performance was found for Difficulty, F(3, 259) = 17.69, p 
< .001, η2 = .175, but not Complexity. Those who performed 
better tended to rate the Fire simulation as less difficult. 
However, regardless of their actual performance on the Fire 
task, the Fire simulation was viewed with similar 
complexity. Regarding complexity, interaction effects 
between performance and culture were not significant. 
Coldstore: Task Complexity and Difficulty in 
Relation to Actual Task Performance 
In Coldstore, the sum of the absolute deviations (SAD) from 
the target temperature was the performance criterion. The 
minimum of SAD was 134.82, the maximum 1360.85 (M = 
632.99, SD = 263.71, N = 288). The overall SAD scores 
were distributed in percentile ranks: 25th percentile at 
434.80, 50th percentile at 667.41, and 75th percentile at 
826.29. The SAD was recoded into values of 1 to 4 
according to performance, with higher scores indicating the 
least deviations, and thereby better performance. 
Figure 4: Mean Complexity values of US, Brazilian, and 
Indian participants according to performance in Coldstore 
(Complexity scores are inverted).  
Separate ANOVAs were calculated with the independent 
variables, culture (3 levels) and performance score (4 
levels). Dependent variables were Complexity and 
Difficulty. Again, a high score stands for low complexity 
and low difficulty (inverted, e.g. “I find the game complex” 
1-Yes, 7 -No).  
In the Coldstore simulation, a significant main effect of 
culture was found for Complexity, F(2, 258) = 6.64, p = 
.002, η2 = .051, but not for Difficulty (see Figures 4 and 5). 
US participants found the Coldstore simulation less 
complex compared to Brazilian and Indian participants. A 
significant main effect of performance was only found for 
Difficulty, F(3, 257) = 3.391, p = .019, η2 = .039 but not for 
Complexity. As post hoc Scheffe tests reveal, the American 
participants rated the simulation’s complexity as well as the 
simulation’s difficulty significantly lower than the Brazilian 
and Indian participants. No significant differences between 
the Brazilian and Indian samples were found.  
As evident in Figure 5, the Difficulty scores in Coldstore 
are relatively similar among the low, medium low, and 
medium high performance groups with an unusual pattern in 
the American sample. Only high performing participants 
viewed the simulation as less difficult. This means that 
participants who performed well in Coldstore (group 4), 
rated the simulation as less difficult than those who did not 
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
Low performance Medium low
performance
Medium high
performance
High performance
Fi
re
: C
om
pl
ex
ity
USA
Brasil
India
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
Low performance Medium low
performance
Medium high
performance
High performance
C
ol
ds
to
re
: C
om
pl
ex
ity
USA
Brasil
India
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
Low performance Medium low
performance
Medium high
performance
High performance
Fi
re
: D
iff
ic
ul
ty
USA
Brasil
India
514
 perform as well. We found this trend in the American and 
Brazilian samples, but not in the Indian sample. The 
interaction effect between performance and culture was 
significant for Difficulty, F(6, 254) = 2.585, p = .019, η2 = 
.059.  
Figure 5: Mean Difficulty values of US, Brazilian, and 
Indian participants according to performance in Coldstore 
(Difficulty scores are inverted). 
Discussion 
In this study, we asked whether problem-characteristics-
perceptions differ between complex problems, between 
cultures, and between performance levels. These questions 
were studied by administering the simulations Fire and 
Coldstore and the problem-characteristics-questionnaires to 
US, Brazilian, and Indian participants. The questionnaires 
assessed Task Complexity and Task Difficulty. Overall and 
as expected, Fire was perceived as more complex and more 
difficult than Coldstore.  
In both simulations, no differences were found regarding 
participants’ perception of Task Complexity in relation to 
performance. Regardless of whether a participant performed 
in the low, medium or high level, the perception of the 
simulations’ complexity was relatively similar. However, 
Task Difficulty in both simulations was dependent on 
performance levels. Participants who performed better 
regarded the simulations as less difficult compared to those 
who performed less well. The participant’s perception of the 
task, whether difficult or easy, is related to their actual 
performance.  
This study showed that task complexity and difficulty 
assessment is an essential step if one wants to compare 
performance in specific problems. If these simulations are 
administered in an applied setting or in training programs, it 
is important to know how the characteristics of these 
simulations are perceived. 
Data analysis also revealed interesting cross-cultural 
differences. Brazilian participants, compared to Indian and 
US participants, found the Fire simulation more complex. 
US Americans, compared to Brazilian and Indian 
participants, found Coldstore less complex and less difficult. 
Brazilian and US participants found Fire more complex and 
difficult compared to Coldstore. However, Indian 
participants found Fire and Coldstore equally complex and 
difficult.  
There are several possible explanations for these cross-
cultural differences. One most plausible reason for the 
differences among the three cultures is uncertainty 
avoidance. We expect that low scores in uncertainty 
avoidance will result in low ratings of complexity and 
difficulty. In our study, we assessed uncertainty avoidance 
with the same three questions Hofstede used, but applied 
them to the school context instead of the work context. In 
Hofstede’s study (2001), India and the United States 
showed weak uncertainty avoidance scores, whereas Brazil 
showed high uncertainty avoidance. Surprisingly in our 
samples, India showed the strongest uncertainty avoidance, 
Brazil the least uncertainty avoidance, and the US scores 
were between the Indian and Brazilian ones. The differences 
between the countries were statistically significant. The 
different results of our study and Hofstede’s study might be 
related to the samples. Whereas Hofstede’s samples 
consisted of IBM managers, our samples consisted of 
students. Our participants were also significantly younger 
and Hofstede has shown significant correlations between 
age and uncertainty avoidance. A final reason for the 
different results might be related to changes in cultures. 
Most of Hofstede’s data were collected between 1967 and 
1972, i.e. more than 30 years ago and having undergone 
significant political, economic, and societal development. 
India, for example, underwent many economic and political 
changes, especially since the opening of its borders in the 
1990s to the world market.  
Data analysis revealed that differences in uncertainty 
avoidance cannot explain cultural differences in problem 
perception. Brazilian participants, for example, had the 
lowest uncertainty avoidance scores but the highest 
Complexity and Difficulty scores in Fire.  
A seemingly obvious influence on Complexity and 
Difficulty scores may be attributed to differences in 
computer experiences, familiarity with such computer 
simulations, and motivation to play and succeed in the 
simulations. However, current results show that although 
these variables were assessed, none of them can explain the 
cross-cultural differences in Complexity and Difficulty. The 
correlations between these variables and task Complexity 
and Difficulty were not statistically significant.  
Why do Brazilian participants compared to US and Indian 
participants find Fire more complex and difficult? Brazilians 
perception of Fire as more complex and difficult might be 
related to the Brazilian time-orientation (Milosevic, 2002). 
Cross-cultural studies show lower punctuality in Brazil 
compared to the US (Levine, West, & Reis, 1980) and a 
more impulsive present-orientation in Brazil 
(Strohschneider & Güss, 1998). Dealing with a highly 
dynamic situation like Fire puts the participant under time 
pressure. Thus, Brazilians with a culture of less strict time 
orientation may regard the situation as complex and 
difficult, since their focus is mostly on the immediate, 
current situation and not on actions in a course of time.  
Another question related to the results is why Indian 
participants view Complexity and Difficulty of Fire and 
Coldstore similar and Brazilian and US participants view 
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 Fire more complex and difficult than Coldstore. Some 
studies describe on a general level Western thought as 
analytic and Eastern thought as holistic (Nisbett, Peng, 
Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). A more detailed look at this 
dichotomy in empirical studies about thinking patterns 
might reveal more detailed intra- and cross-cultural 
variations on this general theme. It might be that Brazilian 
and US participants pay more attention to the details and 
characteristics of the problems. In a current study 
(Glencross & Güss, 2004) we find that Indian participants 
inquire less about problem situations and show more 
optimism regarding successful planning than US 
participants. Indians seem to accept the situations as they 
are, without asking many questions. We find this acceptance 
of the problem also in other cross-cultural studies between 
India and Germany (Güss, 2000; Strohschneider & Güss, 
1999). These findings could explain why Fire and Coldstore 
are perceived similarly by the Indian participants.  
To summarize, this study stresses the importance of cross-
cultural research in the field of cognition. This study 
showed how perception of task complexity and difficulty 
can differ between participants of different cultures. For 
further research, these problem-characteristics-perceptions 
could be related to strategies that participants use to deal 
with the complexity and difficulty of the task. It is likely 
that individuals use different strategies to deal with different 
perceptions of task complexity and difficulty. The 
perception of problem characteristics is often the start of the 
problem solving process, and one can expect and be amazed 
by the interesting and relevant cross-cultural differences 
during the next problem solving stages.  
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Abstract
This paper presents a model of human spatial
orientation, using a task that involves locating targets on
a map of the space. The model uses a hierarchical
solution process that was reported by many of the
participants in an empirical study. It encodes the location
of the target in the visual scene by identifying a cluster
of objects that contains the target and then encoding the
position of the target within that cluster. By applying this
description of the target’s location to the representation
on the map of the space, the model is able to correctly
identify the target. Using this general strategy, it
reproduces all of the major trends in the empirical data.
Introduction
The relative ease with which people are able to navigate
through familiar and unfamiliar environments is a
human ability that is not well understood. This process
requires the integration of multiple sources of
information, since immediate visual perception rarely
provides a complete representation of a space. To make
informed decisions, generally additional information is
necessary. When the space is familiar, this information
may be available in memory (e.g., a cognitive map). In
other cases, however, people often use external maps of
a space to facilitate their decision-making.
When external maps are used in conjunction with
visual perception to make spatial judgments, one source
of difficulty is the difference in how spatial information
is represented in the two views of the space. In visual
perception, spatial information is available in
egocentric terms (e.g., Klatzky, 1998). That is, the
locations of objects in the space are encoded in terms of
their distance from the viewer and their bearing relative
to the viewer. So, the viewer serves as the origin and
the direction the viewer is facing defines the
orientation. In contrast, external maps identify the
orientation and origin within an allocentric frame of
reference. These representations are commonly oriented
according to cardinal directions, with north at the top.
When the frames of reference in two representations
of a space are different, they must be brought into
correspondence before they can be used together to
facilitate decision-making (Levine, Jankovic, and Palij,
1982). This process requires the ability to identify a
common point in both views of the space, along with
another piece of information (a second point or a
reference direction) to align the orientations. Once this
is done, information can be shared between the two
views to provide more complete information about the
space. Orientation tasks require individuals to establish
correspondence between two views of a space. Often,
participants are shown a target in one view of a space
and are asked to locate it in the other view. Research
has shown that the difficulty of this kind of task
depends on a number of factors, including the location
of the target object and the difference in the orientations
(misalignment) between the two views of the space
(e.g., Easton and Sholl, 1995; Hintzman, O’Dell, and
Arndt, 1981; Rieser, 1989).
The cognitive model that is presented here illustrates
a perspective for understanding how the results
obtained in studies of orientation tasks arise. The model
was developed in the context of the ACT-R
architecture. The remainder of this paper presents a
brief description of the empirical work on which the
model is based, followed by a description of the model
and its performance.
Experiment
Participants were shown 2 views of a space containing
10 objects. On the left was a visual scene showing the
10 objects, one of which was highlighted to identify it
as the target. On the right side was a map of the space,
indicating the locations of the 10 objects as well as the
viewer’s position. Participants were asked to click on
the object on the map that corresponded to the target
that was indicated in the visual scene. Figure 1 shows a
sample trial.
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Figure 1: Sample trial for the orientation task.
Method
The spaces were created using the Unreal Tournament
game engine (2001), which allows users to create their
own 3-D worlds. The 10 objects in the space for each
trial were placed in clusters, which were centered
around one of 8 positions in the space. In each trial
there were four clusters, containing one, two, three, and
four objects. The positioning of the clusters was such
that on some trials, there were two clusters directly in
front of the viewer (one nearby and one farther away), a
cluster on the left, and a cluster on the right. In the other
trials, there were two clusters on each side of the space
relative to the viewer, one nearby and the other farther
away. The sample trial in Figure 1 shows the latter case.
The configurations and locations of the clusters (in
terms of the number of objects in each one) relative to
the viewer were counterbalanced. This design resulted
in spaces where the objects were not arranged in a well-
defined pattern, making it less likely that participants
would use strategies that have been described for
similar tasks in the past (Gunzelmann and Anderson,
2002).
This experiment varied several factors to closely
examine how they impact human performance on
orientation tasks. First, the target was located in one of
the clusters on each trial. As a result, the target could
have been positioned in any of eight general locations
relative to the viewer on a given trial. In addition, the
target was located in a cluster that contained from one
to four objects. So, the target was located in the vicinity
of zero to three nearby distractors. Finally, this
experiment involved a manipulation of the degree of
misalignment between the two views of the space. The
two perspectives were either aligned, misaligned by 90
degrees (clockwise or counterclockwise), or misaligned
by 180 degrees (maximally misaligned).
There were 20 participants in the experiment. Ten
participants completed one half of the possible trials in
the experiment, while the other ten completed the other
half. When they finished the experiment, participants
completed a version of the Vandenberg and Kuse
Mental Rotations Test, an assessment that measures
spatial ability (Vandenberg and Kuse, 1978).
Participants were ranked based upon their scores on this
task. Using these rankings, participants were matched
between the two conditions and their data were
combined to create “meta-participants”. The data from
these meta-subjects were used in the analyses described
here, although the general conclusions remain the same
if the data from the two conditions are analyzed
independently. Finally, the experiment utilized a drop-
out procedure, such that if a participant made an error,
the trial was repeated later in the experiment. More
complete details concerning the methodology are
available in Gunzelmann and Anderson (submitted).
Results
Response times and accuracy were recorded for each
trial in the experiment. Overall, accuracy was quite high
(96%), and the pattern of errors was quite similar to the
response time data (r=.83). This suggests that the
results were not due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. As a
result of the high degree of accuracy, the data presented
here consider the response times for correct responses
that participants produced as they performed the
experiment.
There are a number of important findings in this
experiment, which are summarized in Figures 2, 3, and
4 below. First, in terms of misalignment, the data
correspond well with previous research (Figures 2 and
4). As the misalignment between the two views
increases, response times increase as well,
F1(3,27)=38.62, p<.001. Next, the local distractors
placed around the target also had an impact on
performance (Figures 2 and 3). These data show that as
more local distractors were present, participants took
longer to identify the correct object on the map,
F1(3,27)=60.67, p<.001. The magnitude of this effect,
however, depended on the degree of misalignment
between the two views (Figure 2). Specifically, the
impact of the number of local distractors increased as
misalignment between the two views increased,
F1(9,81)=8.79, p<.001.
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Figure 2: Response times (sec) as a function of
misalignment and the number of distractors nearby to
the target.
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Figure 3: Response times (sec) as a function of the
target’s location relative to the viewer and the number
of distractors nearby to the target.
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Figure 4: Response times (sec) as a function of the
target’s location relative to the viewer and the
misalignment between the two views.
The impact of the target’s location relative to the
viewer is shown in Figures 3 and 4. The overall effect
was significant, F1(7,63)=11.39, p<.002. This result
contains two major components. Firstly, response times
were fastest when the target was located more directly
in front of the viewer (the first and last points on each
line in Figures 3 and 4). Secondly, difficulty tended to
increase as the target was located farther from the
viewer on one side of the visual scene or the other (the
remaining points in Figures 3 and 4). Importantly, these
trends were produced regardless of the number of
distractors that were located near to the target (Figure
3), and this interaction was not significant,
F1(21,189)=1.79, p>.15. In contrast the target’s
location did have an influence on the impact of
misalignment (Figure 4). This result shows that the
impact of misalignment was diminished when the target
was in line with the viewpoint (the first and last points
on each line in Figure 4). This interaction was
significant in these data, F1(21,189)=3.78, p<.02.
In addition to the response time data, retrospective
verbal reports from participants provided evidence
about how they did the task. In general, participants
indicated that they engaged in a two-step process to
find the answer. The first step involved identifying a
cluster of objects that contained the target so that the
cluster could be found on the map. Once the cluster was
identified, participants determined which of the objects
in the cluster was the correct response.
Discussion
The results of this experiment highlighted several
factors that contribute to difficulty in orientation tasks.
First, misalignment between the two views of the space
impacted difficulty similarly to the results of previous
studies (e.g., Gunzelmann and Anderson, 2002;
Hintzman, et al., 1981; Rieser, 1989; Shepard and
Hurwitz, 1984). Also, the findings show that the
location of the target relative to the viewer within a
space influences how difficult it will be to locate it on a
map. Unlike previous research, this result is
demonstrated without using a highly organized
configuration of objects in the space. As the target was
positioned farther from the viewer, and when the target
was less directly in front of the viewer, difficulty
increased. These findings suggest that participants were
using the viewer’s location in the space as a key
reference feature to help them determine the location of
the target. Response times were faster when the target
was in a location that could be encoded more easily
with respect to the viewer’s position in the space.
This experiment also showed that difficulty increased
as more objects were located in the vicinity of the
target, a factor that previous research has not addressed.
This result suggests that participants were considering
only a portion of the space when trying to locate the
target, since the total number of objects was the same
for all trials. In addition, this effect did not vary as a
function of the particular location of the target. This
outcome suggests that the location of the cluster does
not impact how the target’s location within that cluster
was encoded.
The hierarchical solution process reported by
participants illustrates how they were able to limit their
search to a subset of the items in the space and shows
why more local distractors would result in longer
response times. The presence of more objects near to
the target requires more, or more complex,
transformations to bring the information in the two
views into correspondence, which should take more
time (e.g., Bethell-Fox and Shepard, 1988). It appears
that one can view the process of solving these tasks as
developing a description of the target’s location, which
then has to be transformed to apply to the map. This
description could be verbal, or could involve the
creation of a mental image.
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ACT-R Model
ACT-R is a general theory of cognition that has been
implemented as a running simulation (Anderson and
Lebiere, 1998). It operates as a production system with
several core assumptions related to its operation. First,
there is a division between declarative and procedural
knowledge. Declarative memory contains information
in the form of chunks, while procedural knowledge is
composed of productions, which contain information
about transforming one state into another. The latest
version of ACT-R is composed of a set of modules for
perceptual, motor, and cognitive aspects of human
performance. Information is processed independently
within these modules, allowing them to operate in
parallel. There are buffers associated with each of the
modules that essentially represent working memory.
The contents of these buffers are what drive the
production system. Productions match against the
contents of the buffers, and it is only the contents of
those buffers that can be directly accessed. It is at the
level of production selection and execution that the
system operates in a serial manner.
Because ACT-R includes perceptual and motor
modules, it is able to interact with experimental
software under realistic constraints. Although the
perceptual module currently is not sophisticated enough
to parse the visual scene shown in Figure 1, it does
contribute important timing information to the model’s
performance. The motor module adds additional
constraints to the mouse movements and clicks that the
model executes. The parameters that control these
aspects of ACT-R’s behavior are based on largely on
the EPIC theory (Kieras and Meyer, 1997). At a general
level, the model was implemented within this
architecture to perform the task based on the two-step
process described by the participants in their verbal
reports. There are, however, a number of details that are
important to the model’s performance as it goes through
this general process. These are described next.
Model Design
The model begins each trial by locating the target in the
visual scene. Once this location has been identified, the
model finds other objects that are in the vicinity of the
target. It counts those objects, and encodes the overall
location of the cluster as being in the left, right, or
central portion of the visual scene. Then, to encode the
location of the target in the cluster, the model revisits
the items in the cluster, and encodes the target’s
position relative to the near-far and left-right axes. So,
the model develops a representation of the target’s
location in the visual scene that would be something
like “the leftmost object in the cluster of two on the
right of the visual scene.” This is the target’s position in
the sample trial in Figure 1.
With a representation of the target’s location in the
visual scene, the model shifts its attention to the map of
the space, beginning by locating the viewer’s position,
which is indicated. The next step is to find the correct
cluster. If the cluster was encoded as being in the
middle of the visual scene, the model searches straight
out from the viewer’s location to find it. However,
when the cluster was positioned to one side or the other,
spatial updating is required when the two views are
misaligned so that the correct portion of the map is
searched. This updating consists of a remapping of
“left” and “right” to the corresponding directions on the
map relative to the viewer’s orientation. For instance, in
the sample trial in Figure 1, the right portion of the
visual scene corresponds to the top half of the map.
The updating process is a source of difficulty which
requires extra time. In addition, when the two views of
space are maximally misaligned (the viewer is at the
top of the map), the updated values for the map directly
conflict with the egocentric values. This adds a second
source of difficulty to the updating process, which adds
additional time to its execution. Once the values are
updated, the model is able to search the appropriate
portion of the map for the correct cluster. To perform
this search, the model begins near to the viewer’s
location and searches outward until it finds an object
that is in a cluster of the appropriate size.
Once the first step of finding the appropriate cluster
is completed, the model needs to determine which of
the objects within the cluster on the map is the target.
Like the cluster location, the encoding of the target’s
position is based in the egocentric coordinate system
from the visual scene. So, when the two views are
misaligned, updates to this information are needed to
match the rotated coordinate system of the map. These
updates are similar to those described above.
Misalignment is one source of difficulty, while direct
conflict between the two reference frames is another.
One detail of this process requires some explanation.
In the model, the amount of updating done in the
second step depends on the number of objects in the
cluster. When there are no nearby distractors, this step
is skipped. In this case, when the “cluster of one” is
found, the model is immediately able to respond by
clicking on that object. In cases where there are 2 or 3
objects in the cluster, there is a simple encoding of the
target’s position within the cluster that requires only
one axis. With 2 objects, the target is always on the left
or on the right, and is also always the closest or farthest
object in the cluster. When the cluster has three objects,
the target can also be the one in the middle on each of
the axes. In the model, this possibility is represented by
having the model update only one of the axes in order
to locate the target within the cluster.
When the cluster has 4 objects, the encoding
necessarily becomes more complex. This is represented
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by having the model update both axes when the cluster
has four objects in it. Once again, there is the potential
for direct conflict between the two frames of reference
in these updates, which adds to the difficulty of this
operation. The basic idea is that the complexity of the
description needed to encode the target’s location
increases as the number of objects in the cluster
increases. As a result, the difficulty of transforming this
description so that it applies appropriately to the map
increases as well. This notion is supported by past
research, which has demonstrated that more complex
figures take longer for individuals to mentally rotate
(Bethell-Fox and Shepard, 1988).
The model’s performance is modulated by several
parameters. First, as noted above ACT-R’s perceptual
mechanisms are not currently sophisticated enough to
process a raw image like the one shown in Figure 1.
Thus, as a simplification, the model is presented with a
2-D, egocentrially-oriented representation of the visual
scene, which essentially is another map. So, the model
implicitly embodies the assumption that participants
extract a 2-D representation from the visual scene as
they encode the information from it. A constant of .25
seconds was added to the model on each trial to
represent the cost of extracting such information from
the visual scene.
The second parameter in the model was the retrieval
time, which was set to .11 seconds. As the model does
the task, it requires some declarative information
(mostly related to directional information). Each time a
chunk is retrieved from declarative memory, it takes .11
seconds. However, most of the model’s performance is
driven by the information on the screen, so this
parameter does not play a large role in determining the
model’s predictions.
The only other parameter that was manipulated in the
model controls how long it takes to perform the
operations needed to update the directions (left, right,
up, and down) that it uses to locate the target on the
map. The parameter was set so that each of the updates
requires .60 seconds. This value applies to each
operation that is necessary, and is also applied when
direct conflict arises between the allocentric frame of
reference and the original egocentric reference frame.
This means that if one axis needs to be updated, it will
take .60 seconds. If two axes need to be updated, it will
take 1.20 seconds. However, if in addition to the update
there is direct conflict between the two frames of
reference, these updates take 1.20 and 1.80 seconds
respectively. These costs apply to the updates needed to
locate the cluster and to identify the target within the
cluster. When an update is needed to identify the
portion of the map where the cluster is located, it
involves updating a single axis (left-right). When the
cluster has been located and the search begins for the
target, the update involves one axis when there are one
or two nearby distractors, and two axes when there are
three nearby distractors. Each of these updates may or
may not involve direct conflict that needs to be resolved
in addition to the update.  All of the other parameters in
the model were given their default ACT-R values.
Model Performance
The model captures all of the major trends in the data.
First, the model reproduces the misalignment effect
(Figures 2 and 4). As the misalignment between the two
views increases, the model takes longer to respond. In
the model, this effect comes from the costs of updating
the frame of reference to find the cluster on the map
and to find the target within the cluster. In addition, the
costs associated with the second update depend on the
size of the cluster, producing the interaction between
misalignment and the number of nearby distractors
shown in Figure 2. As the number of nearby distractors
increases, the impact of misalignment increases. This
illustrates the idea that it is more difficult to update the
descriptions of the target locations when those
descriptions are more complex. In the model, it is the
extra cost associated with the spatial updating process
as more nearby distractors are present that produces this
interaction. The mechanisms in the model capture the
effect of both misalignment and the number of
distractors well, with an overall correlation of .992 for
the data shown in Figure 2 (RMSD=.187 seconds).
The model makes predictions about the difficulty of
the task based upon the target’s location in the visual
scene as well. These data are shown in Figures 3 and 4,
along with the empirical results. The model produces a
good qualitative fit to the data, although the particular
values are a little off in some instances. The model’s
predictions arise because it begins its search for the
cluster on the map from the viewer’s position, moving
outward until it locates an object in the cluster. Thus,
when the target is farther from the viewer, it takes the
model longer to locate an object in the cluster. In
addition, the model produces an interaction between
target location and misalignment (Figure 4). The effect
of misalignment is smaller when the target is directly in
front of the viewer (bottom and top target locations)
because no spatial updating is necessary to find the
cluster. As noted above, the same effect appears in the
empirical data, and the model captures the effect well
(r=.954, RMSD=.325 seconds for the data in Figure 4).
Finally, there is no interaction in the model between
the number of nearby distractors and the location of the
target in the visual scene (Figure 3). This corresponds
to the empirical results as well (r=.910, RMSD=.351).
The result is because of the two-step process, reported
by participants, that the model uses to do the task. The
target’s location within the cluster is encoded without
regard to the location of the cluster. So, the impact of
the target’s location results from the search for the
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cluster. Similarly, the number of nearby distractors only
impacts the solution process after the cluster has been
located, when the correct target must be identified.
Conclusions
Overall, the model produces data that are in line with
the performance of the human participants, which lends
support to the conclusion that they were using the
strategy they reported to do the task. The model
produces all of the major trends, in most cases with data
that are very close to the data from the human
participants. In the model, misalignment impacts both
the search for the cluster and the search for the target
within the cluster. In contrast, the location of the target
only influences the search for the cluster, both in terms
of its distance from the viewer and whether or not it is
in line with the viewer’s position. The interaction of
target location with misalignment in the model arises
because no spatial updating is needed when the target is
directly in front of the viewer. Finally, the number of
nearby distractors only impacts the search for the target
within the cluster, interacting with misalignment
because of the different amounts of spatial updating
required based on the number of objects in the cluster.
Note that the location of the target does not interact
with the number of nearby distractors, suggesting that
they affect different aspects of the solution process. The
performance of the model supports the conclusion that
similar processes are being used by the participants.
In conclusion, this model provides a framework for
understanding human performance on spatial tasks. It’s
most important characteristics relate to the hierarchical
encoding of the target’s location in the visual scene.
This encoding allows the model to limit its search to a
portion of the map, ignoring many of the objects in the
space. In addition, the model’s performance assumes
that the two steps in the solution process are
independent. As a result spatial updating that is
performed for step 1 does not carry over to the
execution of step 2. This contributes to the large effect
of misalignment on the model’s performance. Finally,
the model also indicates that perceptual-motor aspects
of performance are important factors in this kind of
task. The time needed to execute shifts of visual
attention contribute to many of the effects described
here, especially the impact of the target’s location and
the impact of the number of local distractors. These
issues deserve careful attention in future research.
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Abstract 
 
The causal impact of an observable cause can only be esti-
mated if assumptions are made about the presence and impact 
of possible additional unobservable causes. Current theories 
of causal reasoning make different assumptions about hidden 
causes. Some views assume that hidden causes are always 
present, others that they are independent of the observed 
causes. In two experiments we assessed people’s assumptions 
about the occurrence and statistical relations involving a hid-
den cause. In the experiments, participants either only ob-
served a cause or actively manipulated it. We assessed par-
ticipants’ assumption online after each learning trial and at 
the end of the learning phase. The results show an interesting 
dissociation. Whereas there was a tendency to assume nega-
tive correlation in the online judgments, the final judgments 
tended more in the direction of an independence assumption. 
It could also be shown that the judgments were generally co-
herent with the learning data. These results are consistent 
with normative theories that drop independence as the default 
assumption. 
Introduction 
Most events are causally influenced by more than a single 
cause. Unfortunately, very often these other causes are un-
known or cannot be easily observed. Therefore we often 
have to rely on the observed statistical relationship between 
cause and effect when assessing causal strength. For exam-
ple, whenever a new influenza virus invades East Asia, 
health representatives try to estimate its health risks, well 
aware of the fact that many other factors determine whether 
a patient will die or not. The question of how to assess 
causal strength when there are hidden causes has challenged 
normative theories of causality and psychological theories of 
causal reasoning for some time. A number of different ac-
counts have been proposed analyzing how the causal impact 
of an observed factor can be accurately estimated if certain 
assumptions are made about potential hidden causes. In this 
report we will first give a brief overview of how two current 
theories of causal reasoning handle hidden causes. In the 
second part of the report we will present two experiments in 
which we assessed the assumptions of learners about the 
impact and probability of hidden causes. In the final section 
we will discuss potential theoretical implications of these 
findings. 
Theoretical Accounts of Hidden Causes 
We are going to focus on a simple causal structure consist-
ing of a single observable cause C and one possible hidden 
cause A both influencing a joint observable effect E. The 
two observable events C and E are statistically related. 
Cause C is neither sufficient nor necessary for the effect, 
P(e|c)<1 and P(e|~c)>0. How can the causal impact of the 
observed and - if possible - the impact of the hidden cause 
be assessed in such a situation?  
Associative Theories and the Constant-Background 
Assumption 
Associative theories, such as the Rescorla-Wagner theory 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), would model this task as learn-
ing about the association between a cue representing the 
observed cause and an outcome representing the effect. 
Along with the cause cue a second background (or context) 
cue would be part of the model. This background cue is as-
sumed to be always present and to represent all other factors 
that might also generate the outcome. Thus, the background 
cue would play the role of representing the hidden cause A 
in the outlined causal model. According to the Rescorla-
Wagner rule, only weights of cues that are present in a cer-
tain trial are being updated. Therefore the permanently pre-
sent background cue will generally compete with the cause 
cue in cases in which the cause cue is present. If the out-
come is also present the associative weights of both cues 
will be raised, if the outcome is absent, the weights will be 
lowered. However, in cases in which the cause cue is absent, 
only the weight of the background cue will be altered. At the 
asymptote of learning the associative weight of the observed 
cause will equal the contingency (i.e., ∆P=P(e|c)–P(e|~c)) of 
the cause cue and the outcome. The associative weight of the 
background cue will correspond to the probability of the 
outcome in the absence of the cause cue. Thus, the more 
often the outcome (=effect) occurs on its own, the higher the 
associative weight of the background cue will be.  
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Power PC Theory and the Independence Assump-
tion 
Cheng’s (1997) Power PC analysis of the causal impact of a 
single cause can be viewed as a special case of a causal 
Bayes net in which two causes independently influence a 
joint common effect (Glymour, 2001, Tenenbaum & Grif-
fiths, 2003). The theory states that the occurrence of the 
effect E is a consequence of the causal powers of the ob-
served cause C and a hidden cause A (pc and pa), and of their 
base rates P(c) and P(a). Formally the probability of the 
effect equals the sum of the base rates of the two causes 
multiplied by their causal power minus the intersection of 
the causes multiplied by both causal powers:  
P(e) = P(c)·pc + P(a)·pa – P(c)·P(a)·pc·pa. 
Therefore the probability of the effect E given that the ob-
served cause C has occurred is 
P(e|c) = pc + P(a|c)·pa – P(a|c)·pc·pa   [1], 
and the probability of the effect given that the observed 
cause is absent is  
P(e|~c) = P(a|~c)·pa     [2]. 
Equations [1] and [2] offer an account for hidden causes 
irrespective of whether they are dependent or independent of 
the observed cause C. However, if they happen to covary, 
the power of the causes cannot directly be estimated by the 
observable data because there are four unknown parameters 
to be estimated by two observable conditional probabilities. 
Therefore Power PC theory makes the assumption that the 
observed and the hidden causes are independent, P(a|c) = 
P(a|~c) = P(a). Based on this assumption the causal power 
of the observable cause can be calculated by 
pi = (P(e|c) – P(e|~c)) / (1-P(e|~c)).  
The independence assumption of Power PC theory implies 
that the probability of the hidden cause stays the same re-
gardless of whether the observed cause has occurred or not. 
If this assumption holds, Equation [2] defines lower bounda-
ries for the base rate and the causal strength of the hidden 
cause. The causal power of the hidden cause and its base 
rate have to be at least as big as the probability of the effect 
in the absence of the observed cause, pa ≥ P(e|~c) and P(a) ≥ 
P(e|~c). Equation [2] also defines a coherence criterion for 
estimates about hidden causes. In order to be compatible 
with the observed data, the estimates must honor this equa-
tion.  
It is important to note that even if independence is not as-
sumed, Equations [1] and [2] still hold and have implica-
tions for the unobservable cause. The power of the hidden 
cause and its probability in the absence of the observed 
cause are still determined by Equation [2]. Therefore esti-
mates for both values should be constrained by P(e|~c). 
Moreover, Equation [1] provides constraints for the admis-
sible probabilities of the hidden cause in the presence of the 
observable one. However, this constraint is fairly complex 
and does not provide the same straightforward implications 
as Equation [2].  
Summary 
Both theories consider hidden causes. Associative theories 
assume that a hidden cause (i.e., the constant background) is 
always present. In contrast, Power PC and other causal 
Bayes net theories assume that the hidden cause is inde-
pendent of the observed cause and that its probability is con-
strained by the data. The probability of the effect in the ab-
sence of the cause marks its lower boundary. These theories 
also permit to model statistical dependence between the ob-
served and the hidden causes. 
Both theoretical accounts agree that P(e|~c) is to a certain 
degree indicative of the causal strength of the hidden cause. 
But whereas associative theories generally regard this prob-
ability as a valid indicator, Power PC and other causal Bayes 
net theories view this conditional probability as a lower 
boundary of the causal impact of the hidden cause. 
Experiments 
The following two experiments explore what assumptions 
participants make about the presence and impact of a hidden 
cause in a trial-by-trial learning task, and whether these as-
sumptions conform to the predictions of any of the discussed 
theoretical models. Thus far very little research has been 
conducted about naïve participants’ assumptions about hid-
den causes. An exception is a study by Luhmann and Ahn 
(2003). They found that participants judged the impact of a 
hidden cause to be higher if P(e|~c) was 0.5 than if it was 
zero. The experiments presented in this report will go be-
yond these findings. In addition to causal strength estimates, 
we collected assessments of the probability of the hidden 
cause using different kinds of measures. We also varied the 
learning conditions.  
In both experiments participants learned about the causal 
relation between an observable cause and a single effect. 
Additionally participants were told that there was one other 
possible but unobservable cause of the effect. The statistical 
relation between the observable cause and the effect was 
manipulated in the two experiments while either keeping the 
contingency (Experiment 1) or the causal power (Experi-
ment 2) constant. In Experiment 1 participants could only 
passively observe the cause, which occurred at its natural 
base rate, in Experiment 2 participants were allowed to ma-
nipulate the cause. A number of dependent variables were 
collected to assess participants’ estimates of the probability 
of the hidden cause and the impact of both the observed and 
the unobserved causes. Participants were asked to guess the 
presence of the hidden cause on each trial during learning, 
and they were asked to give summary estimates after learn-
ing was completed. In one condition (“prediction before 
effect”) participants were first informed about the presence 
or absence of the cause in each trial, and then they were 
asked to guess the presence of the hidden cause without re-
ceiving feedback about this alternative cause. Finally they 
were informed whether the effect has occurred at this par-
ticular trial or not. Predictions of the hidden cause prior to 
effect information can only be guesses based on observed 
frequencies of the effect in past trials. Based on normative 
theories (e.g., Power PC theory) we expected participants to 
generate independence between the causes. In the second 
condition (“prediction after effect”) participants received 
information about the presence of both the cause and the 
effect and then had to predict the hidden cause. As before no 
feedback was provided about the hidden cause. In this situa-
tion participants had complete information about the cause 
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and the effect which should allow them to make more in-
formed guesses about the hidden cause, especially if the 
observed cause is absent: If in this case the effect is present, 
participants should conclude that the hidden cause is also 
present. However if the effect is absent, they should have the 
intuition that the hidden cause is absent. Predictions based 
on the presence of the observed cause are more difficult. If 
in this case the effect is absent, participants should infer that 
the hidden cause is more likely to be absent than present; if 
the effect is present the hidden cause should also be given a 
higher probability of being absent. Based on the theories 
outlined above, we expected that participants in both condi-
tions would generate independence between the causes in 
their trial-by-trial predictions. A third control condition left 
out the trial-by-trial predictions. In this condition partici-
pants rated the causal strength of the observed and the hid-
den cause as well as the probability of the hidden cause in 
the presence and in the absence of the observed cause after 
the learning phase. Again we expected participants to rate 
the causes to be independent. We also expected that the 
strength ratings for the observed cause would be based on 
causal power, and that the ratings for the hidden cause 
would be influenced by P(e|~c). 
Experiment 1 
With Experiment 1 we pursued two goals. The first was to 
investigate whether participants would assume independence 
between the observable and unobservable cause. The second 
goal was to find out whether the power estimates for the 
unobservable cause would be influenced by the probability 
of the effect in the absence of the observed cause. Partici-
pants were given the task to assess the causal relation be-
tween a fictitious microbe (“colorophages”) and the discol-
oration of certain flowers. In addition they were told that 
there was only one other possible cause of the effect, an in-
fection with another fictitious microbe (“mamococcus”), 
which was currently not observable. Participants were then 
directed to a stack of index cards providing information 
about individual flowers. The front side of each index card 
showed whether the flower was infected by colorophages  or 
not, and the backside informed about whether the flower was 
discolored or not. Then participants were instructed about 
the specific learning procedure in their condition. The learn-
ing conditions were manipulated as a between-subjects fac-
tor. In Condition 1 (“prediction before effect”) participants 
were first shown the front side of the card, then they had to 
guess whether the flower was also infected by the other mi-
crobe, and finally the card was turned around by the experi-
menter revealing whether the flower was in fact discolored 
or not. In contrast, in Condition 2 (“prediction after effect”) 
the card was first turned around and then the participant 
made her guess about the hidden cause. Guesses were re-
corded without giving feedback. In the third, control condi-
tion cards were simply shown and turned around by the ex-
perimenter.  
As a second factor the statistical relation between the ob-
served microbe and discoloration was manipulated. Three 
different data sets consisting of 20 cases each were con-
structed. Table 1 summarizes the statistical properties of the 
three data sets. As the table shows, the contingency ∆P was 
constant across the data sets, whereas both P(e|~c) and 
causal power were rising. All three data sets were shown to 
every participant in a within-subjects design. Different data 
sets were introduced as data from different species of flow-
ers. It was pointed out to participants that the effectiveness 
of the microbes might vary depending on the species. The 
order of the presented data sets was counterbalanced. 
 
Table 1: Statistical properties of data sets shown  
in Experiment 1 
 
 Data Set 1 Data Set 2 Data Set 3 
P(c) 0.50 0.50 0.50 
P(e|c) 0.60 0.80 1.00 
P(e|~c) 0.10 0.30 0.50 
∆P  0.50 0.50 0.50 
Power pc 0.56 0.71 1.00 
 
After each learning phase participants were asked to rate 
the causal influence of the observed and the hidden cause on 
a scale ranging from 0 (“no impact”) to 100 (“deterministic 
impact”). Participants were also asked to estimate how many 
of ten flowers that were infected with the observed microbe 
were also infected with the other microbe, and how many of 
ten flowers that were not infected with the observed microbe 
were instead infected with the other microbe. No feedback 
was provided about these assessments. 
36 students from the University of Göttingen were ran-
domly assigned to one of the learning conditions. Figure 1 
shows the mean ratings of the impact of the observed and 
the hidden causes.  
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Figure 1: Mean ratings of causal impact for the observed 
cause (left) and the unobserved cause (right) in Exp. 1. 
 
An analysis of variance revealed a significant increase in 
impact ratings for the observed cause, F(2,66)=12.7, 
MSE=296.6, p<.01, supporting the predictions of Power PC 
theory. The same analysis for the hidden cause resulted also 
in a significant main effect of the factor data set, 
F(2,66)=4.92, MSE=408.1, p<.05, which indicates that with 
increasing P(e|~c) participants tended to assume a stronger 
impact of the hidden cause. This result is in accordance with 
the predictions of all theoretical accounts. However, the 
interaction between data sets and learning condition also 
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turned out to be significant, F(4,66)=4.55, MSE=408.1, 
p<.05. The observed increase was strongest in the ‘predic-
tion after effect’ condition followed by the control condi-
tion. This interaction might be due to the learning procedure. 
In the ‘prediction after effect’ condition participants were 
sensitized to the possible presence and impact of the hidden 
cause more than in the other two conditions. Being informed 
about the occurrence of the effect in the absence of the ob-
servable cause is a strong cue pointing to the presence of the 
hidden cause. 
Table 2 shows the results concerning participants’ as-
sumptions about the dependence between the causes. The 
online predictions of the hidden cause in the presence and 
absence of the target cause were transformed into condi-
tional frequencies, and combined into subjective contingen-
cies, ∆P=P(a|i) – P(a|~i). On the left side of Table 2 the 
generated contingencies underlying online predictions are 
listed, the right hand side shows the corresponding contin-
gencies based on the final probability ratings. 
 
Table 2: Mean estimates of dependence between observed 
and unobserved cause. Numbers indicate contingencies 
(possible range:-100 to +100). 
 
 Generated  
Dependence 
Estimated  
Dependence 
 Data 
Set 1 
Data 
Set 2 
Data 
Set 3 
Data 
Set 1 
Data 
Set 2 
Data 
Set 3 
Before Eff. 33.3 8.3 -21.7 30.0 5.8 -3.3 
After Eff. 17.0 17.5 -28.8 0.8 0.0 -22.6 
Control  - - - 14.4 5.8 -4.2 
 
An analysis of variance of the generated contingencies 
yielded a significant trend from positive to negative assess-
ments which proved independent of learning condition, 
F(2,44)=22.1, MSE=749.8, p<.01. The estimated contingen-
cies showed a similar trend, F(2,66)=4.2, MSE=753.9, 
p<.05. The mean contingencies in the different data sets 
varied slightly across learning conditions, F(2,33)=2.8, 
MSE=1646.4, p<.10. The generated contingencies were sig-
nificantly above zero if P(e|~c) was zero, and significantly 
below zero if P(e|~c) was 0.5. The estimated contingencies 
showed a similar but only marginally significant pattern. 
Thus, there was a hint of a dissociation between online and 
post hoc assessments which will be followed up in Experi-
ment 2. 
These results do not conform to the theoretical assump-
tions of the discussed theories. Participants did not assume 
that the hidden cause was always present or that the two 
causes were independent. 
A closer analysis of the conditional probabilities revealed 
that the negative trend was due to an increase in the gener-
ated and estimated probability of the hidden cause in the 
absence of the observed cause, whereas the subjective prob-
ability of the hidden cause in the presence of the observed 
cause remained relatively stable. This pattern is in part con-
sistent with the analysis outlined in the introduction, P(a|~c) 
seems directly constrained by P(e|~c). In contrast, the con-
straint for P(a|c) is more complex, which may be  the reason 
why participants had more difficulties honoring it. 
Even if participants’ answers did not conform to the inde-
pendence assumption, their answers still might be coherent 
with the observed data. Both Power PC theory and Bayesian 
models can model dependence between observed and hidden 
causes. Although precise power estimates might be impossi-
ble, the data still yields constraints on plausible estimates. 
The most important constraint is that the product of the 
causal power (or strength) of the hidden cause and the prob-
ability of the hidden cause in the absence of the observed 
cause must equal the probability of the effect in the absence 
of the observed cause. To find out whether participants 
honor this constraint we used their ratings to recalculate the 
probability of the effect when cause C was absent:  
P(e|~c)rec = Rating Impact A · Rating P(a|~c). 
The results are shown in Figure 2. It can be seen that the 
recalculated probabilities in the ‘prediction after effect’ con-
dition were surprisingly close to the actually observed prob-
abilities. In contrast, the recalculated probabilities in the 
other two conditions were inaccurate. Apparently, partici-
pants had to be sensitized by the learning procedure to the 
presence and impact of the hidden cause to be able to derive 
coherent estimates. Learning that the effect is present in the 
absence of the target cause apparently provided the neces-
sary information to make educated guesses about the hidden 
cause. Without this information the guesses showed some 
systematicity but did not conform very well to the observed 
data. 
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Figure 2: Mean recalculated probabilities of the effect in 
the absence of the observed cause (Experiment 1).  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 we used a scenario in which the observable 
cause could only be passively observed. Therefore a de-
pendence of the observed and unobserved cause was possi-
ble and maybe for some participants plausible. In Experi-
ment 2 we allowed participants to arbitrarily manipulate the 
observable cause. Since these random interventions cannot 
be based on the presence or absence of the hidden cause, 
they should make the independence between the alternative 
causes more salient than in the observation context. Thus, 
we expected that participants would now assume the causes 
to be independent in all conditions of the present experi-
ment. 
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Participants were instructed to imagine being a captain on 
a pirate ship firing his battery at a fortress. A second ship, 
which cannot be seen, was also firing at the fortress. Partici-
pants had a certain number of shells available and had to 
decide on each trial whether to fire or not. This procedure 
ensured that all participants saw the same data despite the 
fact that they set the cause themselves. The three learning 
conditions of Experiment 1 were used again. Participants 
had to guess whether the other ship currently fires either 
before they were informed about the occurrence of an explo-
sion in the fortress (“prediction before effect”), or they had 
to predict the other ship’s action after they had learned 
whether the fortress was hit (“prediction after effect”). In a 
third, control condition no predictions were requested.  
Three data sets consisting of 60 cases each were con-
structed. Table 3 shows the statistical properties of the data. 
In contrast to Experiment 1 the contingency between the 
observed cause and the effect decreased across the data sets, 
whereas the causal power remained stable. Participants 
learned about all the three data sets with order being coun-
terbalanced. 
 
Table 3: Data shown in Experiment 2 
 
 Data Set 1 Data Set 2 Data Set 3 
P(c) 0.50 0.50 0.50 
P(e|c) 0.70 0.80 0.90 
P(e|~c) 0.00 0.33 0.67 
∆P  0.70 0.47 0.23 
Power  pc 0.70 0.70 0.70 
 
60 students from the University of Göttingen were randomly 
assigned to one of the three learning conditions. The same 
dependent variables as in Experiment 1 were collected. 
Figure 3 shows the results for the estimates of the causal 
impact of the observed and the hidden cause.  
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Figure 3: Mean ratings of causal impact for the observed 
cause (left) and the unobserved cause (right)  
in Experiment 2. 
 
An analysis of variance of the impact ratings for the ob-
served cause yielded no significant effects, which is in line 
with the predictions of Power PC theory. As in Experiment 1 
the estimated impact of the hidden cause rose significantly 
across the data sets, F(2,114)=65.7, MSE=408.2, p<.01. 
This finding is consistent with the predictions of all dis-
cussed theories. There was also a significant difference be-
tween learning conditions, F(2,57)=4.06, MSE=591.8, 
p<.05. Participants in the ‘prediction after effect’ condition 
rated the impact of the hidden cause to be higher than in the 
other two conditions. This results points in the same direc-
tion as the results of Experiment 1 indicating that predic-
tions with effect information may have sensitized partici-
pants to the role of the hidden cause. 
 
Table 4: Mean estimates of dependence between  
observed and unobserved causes.  
The numbers express contingencies. 
 
 Generated  
Dependence 
Estimated  
Dependence 
 Data 
Set 1 
Data 
Set 2 
Data 
Set 3 
Data 
Set 1 
Data 
Set 2 
Data 
Set 3 
Before Eff. -23.8 -33.2 -29.2 -4.1 8.2 -8.2 
After Eff. -3.9 -20.4 -35.4 12.8 -10.8 -1.0 
Control  - - - 9.5 9.2 -6.0 
 
Table 4 shows the results concerning the assumed de-
pendence between the two causes. Although the random 
interventions were expected to increase the salience of inde-
pendence, participants generated a negative dependence 
between the two causes which rose across the data sets, 
F(2,76)=6.97, MSE=510.1, p<.01. The interaction also 
turned out to be significant, F(2,76)=3.57, MSE=510.1, 
p<.05. The negative ratings decreased more strongly when 
participants had received effect information than in the con-
trasting condition (“prediction before effect”). As in Ex-
periment 1 this trend can be traced to an increase in the gen-
erated probability of the hidden cause in the absence of the 
observed cause. In contrast, the estimated dependencies did 
not statistically differ. The results are consistent with an 
independence assumption. Thus, in this experiment there 
was a clear dissociation between online and posthoc judg-
ments. 
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Figure 4:  Mean recalculated probabilities of the effect in the 
absence of the observed cause (Experiment 2). 
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Figure 4 is based on an analysis of the coherence of the es-
timates with the constraints from the learning data (using the 
same method as in Experiment1). It can again be seen that 
participants honored the normative constraints. 
Conclusions 
All current theories of causal reasoning consider hidden 
causes that may also influence observable effects. In most 
theories independence between the observable cause and the 
hidden cause is the default assumption, which is a precondi-
tion for giving precise estimates for the causal strength of 
the observed cause-effect relation. Whereas associative 
theories create independence by assuming constant presence 
of alternative causes, Power PC theory and Bayesian models 
are more flexible. Typically these models assume a varying 
independent hidden cause. However, these theories can also 
model situations violating the independence assumption by 
providing bounds for consistent estimates. All theoretical 
accounts agree that the impact of the hidden cause has to be 
at least as high as P(e|~c). We found evidence in both ex-
periments that participants honored this constraint. More-
over, our analyses showed that participants’ judgments 
about the probability and impact of the hidden cause were in 
most conditions coherent with the data.  
Furthermore, we assessed participants’ assumptions about 
the statistical relation between the observed and the hidden 
causes. In Experiment 1 learners passively observed the 
causal relations. In this experiment participants expressed 
that the causes were positively correlated when P(e|~c) was 
low but they assumed a negative correlation when P(e|~c) 
was high. The generated and estimated probabilities suggest 
that participants may have assumed that P(e|~c) is an indica-
tor of the probability of the hidden cause in the absence of 
the observed cause (P(a|~c)) and an indicator of the impact 
of the hidden cause (pa) but that P(e|c) conveys little infor-
mation about the probability of the hidden cause conditional 
upon the presence of the observed cause (P(a|c)). As a con-
sequence participants only adapted their guesses about 
P(a|~c) to the observed P(e|~c) while sticking with the initial 
assumption about P(a|c) irrespective of P(e|c).  
In Experiment 2 we increased the salience and plausibility 
of independence between the alternative causes by letting 
participants randomly manipulate the observable cause. And 
indeed the final estimates expressed the assumption of inde-
pendence. However, surprisingly participants generated a 
negative correlation in their trial-by-trial predictions. Using 
the explanation we gave for Experiment 1, this pattern im-
plies that the initial assumption of P(a|c) was at a relatively 
low level. People may find it unlikely that two independent 
actions are performed simultaneously by coincidence. In 
addition participants may erroneously overapply the ‘princi-
ple of explaining away’ (Pearl, 1988) in this task. This prin-
ciple states that it is generally true that alternative independ-
ent causes are less likely in the subset of events in which the 
cause and effect are present as compared to the whole set of 
events in which only the effect has occurred. However, in 
the overall set of events causes should still exhibit inde-
pendence regardless of the order in which the causal events 
are experienced. Another related possible explanation might 
be that people are reluctant to consider overdetermination of 
effects. Since one cause suffices to explain the effect, assum-
ing a second hidden cause is not necessary. Intuition tells us 
that one cause is enough for the presence of an effect. It is 
interesting to see that this intuition seems particularly strong 
when participants consider single trials of cause-effect pat-
terns. In this situation learners have to decide whether one or 
two causes generated the effect. Looking back at the learn-
ing set at the end of the learning phase seems to decrease the 
salience of these possible cases of overdetermination, which 
may be the reason for the interesting dissociation between 
the tendency to assume negative correlations in online 
judgments but independence in the summary judgments at 
the end. 
Theoretical Implications 
Our results contradict the assumption of associative theories 
that learners assume constant presence of alternative, hidden 
causes. The results also indicate that independence of vary-
ing causes is not the general default assumption. The online 
predictions revealed a tendency to assume correlations be-
tween alternative causes. Both Power PC theory and causal 
Bayes nets allow modeling this assumption. Although causal 
power may in these cases not always be numerically identi-
fiable, these theories can provide constraints for plausible 
estimates. Future research will have to explore the boundary 
conditions and the generality of people’s assumption across 
different tasks. The observed dissociations in the present 
studies indicate that a simple account may be unlikely. 
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Abstract
Visual search in an important aspect of many tasks, but it is
not well understood how many aspects of layout design affect
visual search. This research investigates, with reaction time
and eye movement data, the effect of local density on the
visual search of structured layouts of words. Layouts were all-
sparse, all-dense, or mixed. Participants found targets in
sparse groups faster even after numerosity effects were
factored out, and searched sparse groups before dense groups.
Participants made slightly more fixations per word in sparse
groups, but these were much shorter fixations. Perhaps most
interesting, roughly halfway through searching each mixed
layout, participants appeared to switch search strategies with
respect to the number of fixations per group of words and
fixation duration. When dense groups were searched early in a
trial, search strategies were more similar to search strategies
in the all-sparse layouts. When searched later in a trial, search
strategies were more similar to search strategies of all-dense
groups. When combining densities in a layout, it may be
beneficial to place important information in sparse groups.
Introduction
It is through visual search that people locate the content and
controls for many tasks. Yet, it is not well understood how
many layout design practices affect visual search. A large
body of basic research on visual search exists in psychology
(for example, Greene & Rayner, 2001; Hayhoe, Lachter, &
Moeller, 1992; Shen, Reingold, & Pomplun, 2000;
Treisman, 1998). Many phenomena have been observed and
many theories have been proposed to explain them.
However, there has been comparably little research on how
to apply basic psychological phenomena in a practical
setting. A good applied theory of visual search is needed.
Previous research has investigated the extent to which
theories from basic research apply to more ecologically
valid tasks in human-computer interaction.  One such line of
research investigated the visual search of hierarchical
layouts with experimentation and cognitive modeling
(Hornof, 2001, in press; Hornof & Halverson, 2003). In
these experiments, participants searched for a precued target
item in labeled or unlabeled layouts. In the labeled layouts,
groups had headings and the participant was precued with
the target group heading as well as the target item. In the
unlabeled layouts, the groups had no headings. It was found
that a useful visual hierarchy motivated fundamentally
different search strategies. That is, when useful group
headings are present, people will first search the headings
and then the group content.
The current study extends the work in Hornof (2001) and
Hornof and Halverson (2003) by investigating the visual
search of more complex non-hierarchical layouts. The
purpose of this research is to (a) further inform the
development of a predictive tool for evaluation of visual
layouts, and (b) contribute to the theories of applied visual
search in human-computer interaction.
Varying the density of text and objects is one common
design practice used to establish grouping and hierarchy in
visual displays (Mullet & Sano, 1995). This paper reports a
study that investigates the effect of varying local density on
visual search strategies of two-dimensional menu-like lists
of words.
The density of items in a display is one factor that has
been shown in effective field of view (EFV) studies to affect
the number of items that can be perceived in a single
fixation.  EFV, also referred to as the useful field of view or
perceptual span, is the region from which the visual
perceptual system processes information in a single fixation.
There have been many studies on EFV for various tasks (for
example, Bertera & Rayner, 2000; Mackworth, 1976;
Rayner & Fisher, 1987; Reingold, Charness, Pomplun, &
Stampe, 2001). These studies have found a limited region in
the visual field that is sufficient for normal perception of
static scenes. This region can be centered on the point of
fixation or can be asymmetric with respect to the point of
fixation. In addition, these studies have found that the EFV
varies in size by type of stimuli, type of task, and task
difficulty.
Bertera and Rayner (2000) varied the spacing (density)
between a fixed number of randomly placed characters in a
search task.  They found that search time decreased and the
estimated number of letters processed per fixation increased
as the density increased. Mackworth (1976) showed similar
results in a study in which participants searched for a square
among uniformly distributed circles on a scrolling vertical
strip. Ojanpää, Näsänen, and Kojo (2002) studied the effect
of spacing on the visual search of word lists, and found that
as the vertical spacing between words increased (i.e. as
density decreased), search time also increased. In general,
research examining the interaction between EFV and
density has found that the visual search of more dense
stimuli is faster per object, with the decrease in the number
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of fixations required to find the target being the largest
factor.
Density may be measured as overall density or local
density. Overall density is the number of items per degree of
visual angle over an entire layout. Local density is the
number of items per degree of visual angle within a visually
distinct group.
Besides affecting the search time and number of items
inspected per fixation, local density may also affect the
order of inspection. Several studies have found that visual
attention is drawn to “more informative” stimuli (for
example, Berlyne, 1958; Mackworth & Morandi, 1967).
“More informative” is often defined as regions having
greater contour in pictorial stimuli. For example, with
geometric shapes, angles are considered more informative
than straight lines. Yet, it is not readily known how to
predict a priori which of two stimuli are more informative.
One plausible factor of “informativeness” is local density. It
may be that regions with a higher local density are more
informative since they are more likely to contain more
angles.
The following hypotheses were tested in this study:
H1: The search time per word is greater in sparse
layouts than in dense layouts.
H2:  Dense regions will be searched before sparse
regions.
The following experiment builds on previous research by
investigating the extent to which previous findings hold in
tasks that are more ecologically valid than those used in
Bertera and Rayner (2000) and Mackworth (1976). While
these previous studies are very informative, the stimuli are
single characters or simple shapes. It is unclear whether the
same phenomena will be seen with stimuli in which the
items are more complex, such as words, or when density
changes within a visual layout. One spatial property – local
density – was manipulated in this study.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four people, 10 female and 14 male, ranging in age
from 18 to 55 years of age (mean = 24.5) from the
University of Oregon and surrounding communities
participated in the experiment. The participants were
screened as follows: 18 years of age and older; experienced
using graphical user interfaces (such as Microsoft Windows
or Macintosh); no learning disability; normal use of both
hands; and normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Participants were paid $10, plus a bonus that ranged from $0
to $4.54 based on their performance.
Apparatus
Visual stimuli were presented on a ViewSonic VE170 LCD
display set to 1280 by 1024 resolution at a distance of 61 cm
that resulted in 40 pixels per degree of visual angle. The
experimental software ran on a 733Mhz Apple Power
Macintosh G4 running OS X 10.2.6. The mouse was an
Apple optical Pro Mouse, and the mouse tracking speed was
set to the fourth highest in the mouse control panel.
Eye movements were recorded using an LC Technologies
Eyegaze System, a 60 Hz pupil-center/corneal-reflection eye
tracker. A chinrest was used to maintain a consistent eye-to-
screen distance.
Stimuli
Figure 1 shows a sample layout from one mixed-density
trial. All trials contained six groups of left-justified,
Figure 1: A mixed-density layout. All angle measurements are in degrees of visual angle.
530
vertically-listed black words on a white background. The
groups were arranged in three columns and two rows.
Columns were 7.5 degrees of visual angle from left edge to
left edge. Rows were separated by 0.65 degrees of visual
angle.
There were two types of groups with different local
densities: Sparse groups contained five words of 18 point
Helvetica font with 0.65 degrees of vertical angle between
the centers of adjacent words (0.45° for word height, and
0.2° for blank space). Dense groups contained 10 words of 9
point Helvetica font with 0.33 degrees of vertical angle
between the centers of adjacent words (0.23° for word
height, and 0.1° for blank space). Both types of groups
subtended the same vertical visual angle.
There were three types of layouts: sparse, dense, and
mixed-density. Sparse layouts contained six sparse groups.
Dense layouts contained six dense groups. Mixed-density
layouts contained three sparse groups and three dense
groups. The arrangement of the groups in the mixed-density
layouts was randomly determined for each trial. Sparse and
dense layouts were identical to the mixed-density layout,
with the exception of group densities.
This experiment was designed, in part, to determine the
effect of combining multiple local densities in a single
layout. Combining multiple local densities necessitated
maintaining the number, size (in degrees of visual angle),
and spacing of groups between layouts. Therefore, text size
and number of words per group were varied to produce
different local densities. Text size often covaries with local
density in real-world tasks.
The words used in each trial were selected randomly from
a list of 765 nouns generated from the MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1988). No word
appeared more than once per trial. The words in the list
were selected as follows: three to eight letters, two to four
phonemes, above-average printed familiarity, and above-
average imagability. Five names of colors and thirteen
emotionally charged words were removed.
The target word was randomly chosen from the list of
words used in each trial. The participant was precued with
the target word before each layout appeared. The precue
appeared at the same location every time, directly above the
top left word in the layout, in 14 point Geneva font.
Procedure
Each trial proceeded as follows: The participant studied the
precue; clicked on the precue to make the precue disappear
and the layout appear; found the target word; moved the
cursor to the target word; and clicked on it.
The trials were blocked by layout type. Each block
contained 30 trials, preceded by five practice trials. The
blocks were fully counterbalanced.
At the start of each experiment, the eye tracker was
calibrated to the user. The calibration procedure required the
participant to fixate a series of nine points until the average
error between the predicted point of gaze and the actual
location of the points fell below an error threshold
(approximately 6.35 mm). During the execution of the
experiment, an objective measure of the eye tracker’s
calibration was taken during each trial as described in
Hornof and Halverson (2002). In short, if the calibration had
deteriorated below a threshold (2.13 cm), a calibration was
automatically initiated before the next trial. In addition, the
trial in which the error was found was not analyzed, and a
new trial was added to the block.
To separate visual search time from mouse pointing time,
the point completion deadline was used (Hornof, 2001). In
short, participants were instructed to not move the mouse
until the target was found. Once the mouse was moved more
than five pixels in any direction, they had a small amount of
time (determined by Fitts' law) to click on the target. If this
time was exceeded, a buzzer sounded and the trial was
recorded as an error. The trial in which the error occurred
was not analyzed, and a new trial was added to the block.
Results
Since dense groups contained more words, the following
analyses were conducted after normalizing for the number
of words per layout. This was accomplished by dividing the
search time and number of fixations per trial by half of the
number of words in the layout.1 Table 1 shows the mean
search time per word, the mean number of fixations per
word, and the mean fixation duration for each layout type.
The mean search time per word, mean fixations per word,
and  mean  fixation  duration  for  each  of  the   twenty-four
_______________________________
1 Measures were divided by half based on the assumption that
participants, on average, searched half of the items. This
assumption is not consequential for analysis purposes.
208.25 49.10 .69 .16 250.44 33.21
253.58 61.78 .70 .14 306.97 48.81
265.11 54.52 .62 .14 369.65 67.89
Layout
Sparse
Mixed
Dense
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Search Time per Word (ms) Fixations per Word Fixation Duration (ms)
n=24
Table 1: Search time per word, fixations per word, and fixation duration for sparse, mixed-density, and dense layouts.
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participants were analyzed using repeated-measures
ANOVAs. Eye movements that started before the precue
was clicked and after the target was clicked are excluded
from all eye movement analysis.  An alpha level of .05 was
used for all statistical tests.
Participants spent, on average, less time per word in
layouts with fewer dense groups, F(2,46) = 13.94, p < .01.
Post-hoc analysis showed that the search time was faster in
the sparse than in the mixed layouts (p < .05) or dense
layouts (p < .05); but not different between the mixed and
dense layouts (p > .05). Participants made slightly fewer
fixations per word in layouts with more dense groups,
F(2,46) = 3.25, p = .05. Post-hoc analysis showed that
participants used fewer fixations per word in the dense
layouts than in the mixed layouts (p = .01). Conversely,
participants’ fixations were longer in layouts with more
dense groups, F(2.46) = 61.82, p < .01. Post-hoc analysis
showed that participants made longer fixations in the dense
layouts than in the mixed layouts (p < .05) and longer
fixations in the mixed layouts than in the sparse layouts (p <
.05).
The search time per trial was analyzed by layout
uniformity (all one density vs. mixed density) and target
group density. Figure 2 shows the results. Locating a target
in dense groups took longer than sparse groups, F(1, 23) =
83.87, p < .01. The mean search time for all-sparse and all-
dense was no different than the mean search time for mixed-
density layouts, F(1,23) = 1.03, p = .32. However, there was
an interaction between layout uniformity and target group
density, F(1,23) = 16.87, p < .01. In other words, when the
target was in a sparse group, participants found the target
faster in all-sparse layouts than in mixed layouts; when the
target was in a dense group, participants found the target
faster in mixed-density layouts than in all-dense layouts.
Further, in mixed density layouts, participants found the
target faster when it was in a sparse group, (p < .01).
Group visitation data were also analyzed. A group was
visited if one or more contiguous fixations fell within 1
degree of visual angle of the group. Group revisits were not
included in the analysis presented here. The order of group
visitation in mixed density layouts was tested by comparing
the percentage of visitations to sparse or dense groups for
the first through sixth group visit, regardless of the position
of each group in the layout. The results are shown in Figure
3. The data show that participants tended to visit sparse
groups before dense groups, χ2(5, N = 24) = 500.04, p < .01.
The mean number of fixations per group and mean
fixation duration per group were analyzed. Group revisits
were not included in the analysis presented here because it
was assumed that the participants’ behavior may differ
within groups already visited.  Additionally, the final groups
visited  were not included because it was assumed that the
participants’ behavior may differ within the group in which
the target was found. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were
conducted to test the effects of group density, layout type
(all one density or mixed density), and order of group visit.
Figure 4 shows the number of fixations per group as a
function of the order in which groups were visited,
regardless of the group position in the layout. Each layout
type is plotted separately. Mixed layouts are further
separated by the visits to dense versus sparse groups. Figure
5 is similar to Figure 4, but shows the mean fixation
duration.
The overall number of fixations in all-dense and all-
sparse layouts was no different than in mixed-density
layouts, F(1,9) = 2.69, p = .14. The fixations in mixed
density layouts are longer than in other layouts, F(1,9) =
11.22, p < .01. Participants used more fixations per group in
dense groups than in sparse groups, F(1,9) = 112.30, p <
.01. Fixation durations were longer in dense groups than in
sparse groups, F(1,9) = 139.36, p < .01.
Figure 2: Search time for trials in which the layout
was sparse, mixed-density, or dense, and the target was
in either a sparse or dense group.  Error bars indicate ±1
standard error.
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Figure 3: The percentage of visits in mixed density
layouts that were to sparse or dense groups, as a
function of the order in which groups were visited.
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Figure 4: Mean number of fixations per group as a
function of layout, the density of the group currently
visited, and order of the visit. Error bars indicate ±1
standard error.
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Participants used more fixations per group as search
progressed, F(5,45) = 8.14, p < .01. Contrast analysis
revealed that the sixth group visited received more fixations
than all other groups (all p’s < .05), but there were no
differences between any other orderings (all p’s > .05).
Fixation durations tended to be longer for groups visited
later than for groups visited earlier, F(5,45) = 4.89, p < .01.
The following interactions were also found in the fixations
per group data: The difference between the number of
fixations in sparse and dense groups was greater in uniform
density layouts than in mixed density layouts, F(1,9) = 5.20,
p = .05. As search progressed (i.e. from left to right in
Figure 4), the number of fixations increased faster in mixed-
density layouts than in all-dense and all-sparse layouts,
F(5,45) = 6.7, p < .01. The number of fixations increased
faster in dense groups than in sparse groups, F(5,45) = 5.05,
p < .01.
Discussion
The data counter the study’s first hypothesis – that the
search time per word is greater for sparse layouts than for
dense layouts. The search time data reported here
demonstrate that people actually spent less time per word
searching sparse layouts. Participants adopted a more
efficient eye movement strategy that used slightly more, but
much shorter, fixations in the sparse groups. This result is
contrary to the search time results found by Bertera and
Rayner (2000) and Ojanpää, et al. (2002) in which the
search time decreased as the density increased. This
discrepancy may be due to the way in which density is
manipulated. In the previous studies, the spacing between
items was varied. This could result in a need for more
saccades, as both Rayner (2000) and Ojanpää, et al. (2002)
found, to move the EFV over the next group of unprocessed
stimuli. In the current study, the size of words (i.e. font size)
was varied. The smaller words were more tightly packed,
which could have made it more difficult for people to fixate
directly on the desired words, requiring more saccades as
found in this study. It may be that although various factors
affect local density, they do not all affect visual search of
those densities in the same way.
The data also counter this study’s second hypothesis –
that participants will search dense groups first. A preference
for search order as a function of group density was found.
However, it was in the opposite direction than predicted.
The search time data show that when the target was in a
sparse group, the mean search time was much closer to that
of the sparse layouts, and that when the target was in a
dense group, the mean search time was much closer to that
of the dense layouts. If one density were consistently
searched before the other, then we would expect the search
time for targets located in groups of a preferred density to be
lower than the search time for targets located in the other
groups, which is what we observed. The data suggest that
the participants tended to search the sparse groups first. This
preference was confirmed with analysis of the eye
movements in the mixed layouts. As is seen in Figure 3,
participants tended to look at sparse groups first.
While the first group visited was quite often a dense
group, as seen in Figure 3, this is expected as the top-left
group in the layout was equally likely to be either sparse or
dense and 89% of all initial fixations were to that group.
These are likely anticipatory fixations, as predicted and
observed by Hornof and Halverson (2003).
A trend that emerged from the data analysis is evidence of
a shift in search strategy between the third and fourth group
visited in mixed layouts, right around the time that
participants tended to switch from sparse groups to dense
groups. When a dense group was one of the first three
groups visited, the participants tended to search the dense
groups in the same manner as sparse groups, with fewer and
shorter fixations. Yet, when the participants searched
Figure 5: Mean fixation duration by group as a
function of layout, the density of the group currently
visited, and the order of visit. Error bars indicate ±1
standard error.
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through the all-dense layouts, all-sparse layouts, or sparse
groups in the mixed-density layouts, no significant changes
in oculomotor programming were found at any point during
the search. This suggests that the participants started
searching mixed-density layouts with a more eager
approach, adopting the search strategy used for the preferred
sparse-density groups; then, as the search progressed and the
target had not been found, participants reverted to a
different strategy for dense groups.
Conclusion
This research investigates the effect of local density on
visual search of structured, two-dimensional layouts. It is
shown that sparse groups of words are searched faster and,
when presented with dense groups, sparse groups are
searched earlier than dense groups. This lends support to the
practice of displaying important information in less dense
groups.
Further, at least in the mixed density task, people appear
to apply local search strategies used for sparse groups to all
groups, regardless of density, early in the task.  At some
point in the unfolding of their visual search, approximately
halfway through, the participants made a global strategy
shift towards a more thorough search of dense groups. This
suggests that care should be taken when combining densities
in a visual layout. Performance in a mixed density task
cannot be predicted by assuming people will search regions
of a given density the same as they will in a layout of
uniform density. Additional research will determine how
these findings generalize to a variety of mixed-density
layouts.
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Abstract 
The present study investigated changes in both the sender’s 
and the receiver’s linguistic style across truthful and deceptive 
dyadic communication.  A computer-based analysis of 242 
transcripts revealed that senders used more words overall, 
increased references to others, and used more sense-based 
descriptions (e.g., seeing, touching) when lying as compared 
to telling the truth.  Receivers naïve to the deception 
manipulation produced more words and sense terms, and 
asked more questions with shorter sentences when they were 
being lied to than when they were being told the truth. These 
findings are discussed in terms of their implications for 
linguistic style matching. 
Introduction 
Maxims such as “honesty is the best policy” and “let the 
truth be told” reinforce the notion that telling the truth is the 
best way to communicate.  When telling everyday lies, then, 
deceivers must be careful to assume a position of sincerity 
in order to make their partners believe them and avoid being 
viewed in a negative light.  In fact, this feat might not be 
very difficult to accomplish. Previous research suggests that 
it is quite difficult to catch a liar as deception detection rates 
in many experiments are not much better than chance (Vrij, 
2000).   
In general, there are three methods for trying to detect 
deceit.  The first method focuses on vocalic and physical 
nonverbal behaviors (e.g., movements, smiles, voice pitch, 
speech rate, stuttering, and eye gaze) (Vrij, 2000).  The 
second method involves measuring physiological responses 
with various technologies, such as polygraph machines 
(Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000).        
The third method is concerned with the content of what is 
said (e.g., verbal behavior, as well as a study of linguistic 
properties of liars’ texts). For example, previous research 
suggests that liars tend to make less sense and tell less 
plausible stories (e.g., making discrepant and ambivalent 
statements), among other verbal characteristics (for review, 
see DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Mulenbruck, Charlton, & 
Cooper, 2003).                                                                                               
The present study employs automated linguistic analysis, 
in which a computer program is used to analyze the 
linguistic properties of texts, to examine the verbal content 
of deceptive and truthful conversations. As Pennebaker, 
Mehl, and Niederhoffer (2003) note, words used in daily 
interactions reveal both psychological and social aspects of 
peoples’ worlds.  Certain words and parts of speech can be 
markers of emotional, psychological, and cognitive states. 
Given that deceiving others likely involves changes in 
emotional or psychological states, linguistic cues detected 
using automated techniques may indicate lying in 
conversation.    
Linguistic Indicators of Deception 
   A review of the relatively small literature concerned with 
automated linguistic analyses of deception indicates that, to 
date, at least four main types of linguistic cues have been 
associated with deception:  1) word counts 2) pronoun 
usage, 3) words pertaining to feelings and the senses, and 4) 
exclusive terms (Burgoon, Buller, Floyd, & Grandpre, 1996; 
Burgoon, Bliar, Qin, & Nunamaker, 2003; Newman, 
Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003; Pennebaker et al., 
2003).  
  Consider first differences in word counts across deceitful 
and truthful messages. Previous studies have found that 
senders offer fewer details when lying than when telling the 
truth (Burgoon et al., 2003; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 
2000). Senders may offer fewer details because they are less 
familiar with what they are discussing, or because they are 
trying to avoid providing details that may be inconsistent 
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with their fabrication. As such, senders may be expected 
that deceptive interactions would be characterized by fewer 
words on the part of the sender.  
   With regard to pronoun usage, Newman et al. (2003) 
observed that individuals consistently used first person 
singular pronouns less frequently when lying than when 
telling the truth.  Using first person pronoun words such as 
“I,” “me,”or “my” involves taking ownership of a statement, 
and deceivers may refrain from using these first person 
pronouns due to either a lack of personal experience or a 
desire to dissociate themselves from the lie being told. The 
findings regarding the use of second and third person 
pronouns are less consistent.   Some studies have found that 
liars are less likely to use second and third person pronouns 
(Newman et al., 2003) while other studies have found that 
liars in fact use more second and third person pronouns 
(Ickes, Reidhead, & Patterson, 1986). According to Ickes et 
al. (1986), senders who are careful about constructing 
deceptive messages will exhibit an increased other-focus 
and therefore a higher use of second and third person 
pronouns.  Finally, DePaulo et al. (2003) also found that 
liars are more likely to use third person pronouns in their 
deceptive interactions.                         
 Research examining verbal cues associated with feelings 
and sense terms (e.g., see, touch, listen, etc.) suggests that 
deceivers tended to use more expressiveness, which 
includes both negative and positive forms of emotion, 
compared to truth-tellers (Burgoon et al., 2003). In addition, 
senders may be more likely to use sense words in an effort 
to create a detailed story to avoid eliciting skepticism from 
the deceiver (Burgoon et al., 2000). 
 Finally, previous research also suggests that liars use 
fewer exclusive words than truth-tellers (Newman et al., 
2003).  Exclusive words include prepositions and 
conjunctions such as “but,” “except,” “without,” and 
“exclude.”  These words require a deceiver to discuss what 
is in a category and what is not.  As such, deceivers may 
find it a more complex task to invent what was done versus 
what was not done (Newman et al., 2003). 
Deception, Conversation and the Receiver 
Although the literature on automated approaches to 
linguistic analysis of deception suggests that word counts, 
pronouns, feeling words, and exclusion words may predict 
deception, previous research is limited in two important 
ways.  First, previous research has been limited primarily to 
analyses of deception in the context of monologues rather 
than in conversational contexts. For example, Newman et al. 
(2003) conducted five studies in which participants 
discussed a given topic by writing about it, talking about it 
to a video camera, or by typing their views on it.  In these 
cases, only the liar’s behavior was analyzed because there 
was no target of those lies present during the studies.  Given 
that most lies tend to occur during conversations with others 
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, & Epstein, 1996), and given 
the fact that language use in conversation differs in 
important ways from language use in monologues (Clark, 
1996; Schober & Clark, 1989), the focus of previous 
research on monologue-based deception may limit its 
applicability to everyday conversation. 
   A second, and related, weakness is that previous research 
on linguistic predictors of deception has focused almost 
exclusively on the sender (i.e., the teller of the deception or 
the truth).  For example, Newman et al. (2003) examined 
only a sender’s handwriting, videotapes, and typed 
transcripts.  In no case were the reactions of receivers (i.e., 
the targets of deceptive messages) studied.  However, in 
conversations there is a reciprocal exchange between 
senders and receivers that can have important effects on 
deceptive behavior (Burgoon et al., 1996; Burgoon, Buller, 
& Floyd, 2001). As such, it may be important to look at 
both parties when examining interactions.  If senders alter 
their behavior in systematic ways when lying versus when 
they are telling the truth, as previous research suggests, then 
an important question that remains to be addressed is 
whether receivers will also behave differently when lied to 
than when they are told the truth. 
  One possible outcome is that receivers will engage in 
linguistic style matching, which refers to the degree to 
which two people in conversation adjust their own speaking 
behavior, or style, to match their partners’ behavior 
(Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002).  The observation that 
people vary their words on a turn-by-turn level when in 
conversations with others is assumed to reflect the 
coordination processes inherent in natural conversations 
(Grice, 1989; Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002).  Indeed, 
participants in conversations have been known to exhibit 
similar types of concurrent behaviors (both vocal and 
nonvocal), kinesics, proxemics, facial expressions, and word 
usage, regardless of topic content (Niederhoffer & 
Pennebaker, 2002).  
   If, as linguistic style matching suggests, people in 
conversation adjust their linguistic behavior to that of their 
partners, then any differences in linguistic behavior by 
senders across deceptive and truthful communication should 
also be observed in the receiver’s behavior. That is, 
receiver’s behavior should mirror the behavior of the sender 
in terms of word usage and linguistic variables across 
deceptive and truthful communication.  If receivers engage 
in linguistic style matching during deceptive interactions, 
then receivers, like senders, should produce fewer words, 
fewer first person pronouns, more second and third 
pronouns, more exclusive words and negations, and more 
words pertaining to the senses. 
    Finally, there may also be receiver activities that do not 
simply match those of the sender. For example, if a receiver 
becomes suspicious of the sender’s truthfulness, the receiver 
may probe their partner more frequently, perhaps by asking 
additional questions.   
 The present study examined the linguistic styles of 
senders and received engaged in truthful and deceitful 
conversations. The conversations were conducted in a text-
based, computer-mediated setting, in which participants 
exchanged synchronous messages. A computer-mediated 
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communication setting was used in the present study for 
several reasons.  The first is that the transcripts were created 
automatically as the participants interacted.  The second is 
that, because the interaction was entirely text-based, all of 
the information exchanged by the participants during their 
interaction was captured in the transcripts (Hancock, in 
press). 
Methods 
Participants (n = 66) were upper-level students at a 
northeastern American university, and they participated for 
credit in various courses. Participants were randomly paired 
to form 33 same-sex, unacquainted dyads (15 male and 18 
female).  
   Participants were recruited for a “study of how 
unacquainted individuals communicate about various 
conversation topics.”  Upon reporting to the laboratory, 
participants were led separately to remote rooms where they 
completed an initial set of forms, including informed 
consent.  
   The general procedure was adapted from Burgoon et al. 
(2001). All participants were told that they would be having 
a conversation with an unknown partner. They were 
instructed that they would discuss 5 topics, which were then 
provided to the participants on a sheet of paper. The first 
topic was always “When I am in a large group, I…” This 
initial topic was designed to allow the participants to 
become comfortable interacting with their partner, and was 
not included in any analyses. After this topic, participants 
began a discussion of the four experimental topics which 
included: “Discuss the most significant person in your life”, 
“Talk about a mistake you made recently”, “Describe the 
most unpleasant job you have ever had to do” and “Talk 
about responsibility.” There was no time limit and 
participants were asked to discuss each topic until they had 
exhausted it and understood each other’s responses. 
   One of the two participants was randomly assigned to the 
role of sender, and the other to the role of receiver. Senders 
were asked to sometimes deceive their partners. In 
particular, they were instructed “to NOT tell ‘the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth’” (Burgoon et al., 
2001) on two topics, and to be truthful on the other two 
topics.  The two topics in which the whole truth was not to 
be told were marked with an asterisk on the sheet of paper 
given to the sender.   
 Examples of lies were given to the senders, and it was 
emphasized that the senders should try to produce lies that 
were fairly substantial (e.g., saying that they went on a 
vacation when in fact they did not) rather than small lies 
(e.g., saying that they went on a vacation from August 4th to 
the 10th when they actually went from August 5th to the 
11th). Senders had approximately five minutes to plan their 
stories. Receivers were blind to the deception manipulation 
and were told that they were going to have a conversation 
with another person and that their role was to keep the 
conversation going.  The same list of topics in the same 
order was given to the receivers but without any asterisks 
marking topics. 
   The sequence in which the topics were discussed, and the 
order in which the sender lied, was counterbalanced across 
16 orders.  After the initial ice-breaking topics, senders were 
instructed to lie on either the next two topics or on the last 
two topics. Half of the senders followed a truth-first, 
deception-second order. The remainder followed a reverse 
order. Because topics followed a diagram-balanced Latin 
square order within truth and within deception, all topics 
appeared within a given time period.  
   Participants discussed the topics in a text-based, 
computer-mediated setting and performed the task at 
isolated computer terminals. Participants used one of two 
desktop computer stations while the experimenter monitored 
and recorded the interaction from a third station. Once 
participants were seated at their terminals, the experimenter 
briefly demonstrated the use of the computer interface, 
Netmeeting, in which participants typed their message in a 
private composition window and hit enter to send their 
message to a shared chat window (see Figure 1). Message 
transmission was virtually instantaneous.   
  Once participants finished the discussion task, they were 
asked to complete a series of questionnaires based on their 
conversation. The data from these questionnaires are not 
reported here. After completing the post-interaction 
questionnaires, each member of the dyad was brought to a 
common room, and introduced to his or her partner and they 
were fully debriefed.  
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of the Netmeeting Interface       
(A= Sender, B= Receiver) 
 
Automated Linguistic Analyses 
 Both sender and receiver transcripts were converted into 
separate text files separated by topic.  Each dyad produced 
eight different transcript files: two deception discussions 
and two truthful discussions for each sender, and two 
deception discussions and two truthful discussions for each 
receiver, which produced a total of 264 transcripts.          
 All transcripts were analyzed using the Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count (LIWC) program (Pennebaker, Francis, & 
Booth, 2001).  This text analysis program was used to create 
empirically derived statistical profiles of deceptive and 
truthful communications (Pennebaker et al., 2003), and it  
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     Table 1. Means and (Standard Errors) of the linguistic output variables by role and truth condition. 
 
  
 
Sender                          Receiver 
 
Lie  
M (SE) 
Truth 
M (SE) 
 
Lie  
M (SE) 
Truth 
M (SE) 
Word Count 156.11 (17.07) 125.08 (11.20)  157.36 (16.56) 119.61 (10.96) 
Words / sentence    10.20 (.97) 9.03 (.53)  8.21 (.42) 9.07 (.59) 
1st  Person Pronouns      8.01 (.35)       8.52 (.34)       8.08 (.45)         8.92 (.41) 
2nd Person Pronouns 2.41 (.31) 2.82 (.32)  2.64 (.32) 2.25 (.22) 
3rd  Person Pronouns 3.30 (.33) 2.46 (.18)  2.57 (.31) 2.43 (.27) 
Negations 2.19 (.21) 1.77 (.16)  2.27 (.19) 2.20 (.21) 
Senses 2.47 (.16) 2.09 (.19)  2.49 (.18) 2.18 (.22) 
Exclusive Words 4.01 (.27) 4.18 (.32)  3.63 (.22) 3.86 (.31) 
Questions 15.88 (2.27) 16.39 (2.32)  15.33 (1.53) 10.84 (1.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Note: all statistics represent the percentage of total words in the transcript, with the exception of Word Count,  
  Word per Sentence and Questions variables, which represent absolute totals. 
 
 
has been used in studies to predict outcome measures like 
social judgments, personality, psychological adjustment, 
and health.  LIWC analyzes transcripts on a word-by-
word basis, including punctuation, and compares words 
against a file of words divided into 74 linguistic 
dimensions.  For the purposes of this study, only variables 
relevant to the hypotheses or of potential interest to 
deception were included, which left 8 variables within the 
four categories mentioned above: word counts; pronouns; 
emotion words and words pertaining to the senses; and 
exclusive words and negations.  In addition, question 
frequency was also analyzed.  
 LIWC produces the percentage of each variable type by 
dividing the frequency of the observed variable by the 
total number of words in the sample. Word counts were 
not reported as percentages, but as frequency totals. 
Results 
 A 2 (discussion type: truthful vs. deceptive) x 2 (role: 
sender vs. receiver) repeated measure type General Linear 
Model (GLM) procedure was conducted on each 
dependent variable.  Table 1 contains the descriptive 
statistics for each variable. 
   Overall, more words were produced during deceptive 
discussions than during truthful discussions F (1,32) = 
7.11, p < .05.  The increase in word count for deception 
was equivalent for both senders and receivers, F (1,32) < 
1, ns, and no interaction was observed, F (1,32) < 1, ns, 
suggesting that both senders and receivers used more 
words when the sender was lying than when the sender 
was telling the truth. 
   An analysis of the number of words used per sentence 
revealed no main effect of discussion type or role. 
However, a significant interaction between discussion 
type and role was observed, F (1,32) =  4.07, p < .05. 
Simple effects analyses conducted at each level of 
discussion type revealed that during truthful discussion 
senders and receivers produced the same number of words 
per sentence, F (1,32) < 1, ns. In contrast, during deceitful 
discussion, receivers used marginally fewer words per 
sentence than senders, F (1,32) = 3.81, p = .06. 
Considered together, these data suggest that receivers 
used shorter utterances when being lied to than when they 
were being told the truth, while senders used the same 
number of words per sentence regardless of discussion 
type.  
   The next set of analyses examined pronoun usage.  No 
significant effects were observed for first person pronouns 
(e.g., “I,” “we,” “self”). Similarly, no effects were 
observed for the usage of second person pronouns (e.g., 
“you”).  An analysis of third person pronouns referring to 
others (e.g., “he,” “she,” “they”), however, revealed a 
main effect of role, F (1,32) = 4.68, p < .05. Senders used 
third person pronouns more frequently than receivers. In 
addition, senders were significantly more likely to discuss 
others when lying as compared to when they were telling 
the truth, F (1,32) = 4.57, p < .05.    
   With regard to the production of exclusive words and 
negations, no reliable effects were observed. Regardless 
of discussion type, senders and receivers produced the 
same number of exclusive words and negations.  
   The next analyses examined the use of words that 
pertained to the senses (e.g., “see,” “touch,” “listen”). 
Participants used significantly more sense words during 
deceptive conversations than during truthful ones, F(1,32) 
= 5.34, p < .05. No effect of role was observed, F(1,32) < 
1, n.s., nor did role interact with discussion type, F(1,32) 
< 1, n.s.   
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 The last analysis was concerned with the number of 
questions asked during the interactions. A main effect of 
discussion type was observed, F(1,32) = 4.02, p < .05. 
More questions were observed during deceptive 
discussions than during truthful discussions. This main 
effect, however, was qualified by a marginally reliable 
interaction between discussion type and role, F(1,32) = 
3.24, p = .08. Simple effects analyses conducted at each 
level of role revealed that while senders asked the same 
number of questions across deceptive and truthful 
discussion types, F(1,32) < 1, ns. , receivers asked more 
questions during deceptive discussions than truthful ones, 
F (1,15) = 9.58, p < .01.  Considered together, these data 
suggest that receivers were more likely to ask questions 
when they were being lied to than when they were being 
told the truth 
Discussion 
 The primary objective of the present study was to 
examine the linguistic behaviors of both senders and 
receivers during dyadic communication that involved both 
deceptive and truthful discussions.  The first question of 
interest was determining whether the senders’ linguistic 
behavior changed when the sender was being deceptive 
relative to when the sender was being truthful. The data 
suggest that, overall, when senders were lying to their 
partners, they 1) produced more words, 2) used more 
“other” pronouns (e.g., “he,” “she,” “they”), and 3) used 
more terms that described the senses (e.g., “see,” “hear,” 
“feel”) than when they were telling the truth.   
 In general, this linguistic profile is consistent with 
previous research suggesting that senders attempt to 
construct a more cohesive and detailed story in order to 
seem believable (Burgoon et al., 1996).  For example, the 
increased number of words observed in the deceptive 
discussions may reflect the senders’ attempts to convey a 
more complete story when attempting to deceive. 
Similarly, senders may have increased their use of sense 
words to enhance the believability of the deception (e.g., 
“He saw her do it.”). Finally, the use of other-focused 
pronouns during deceptive discussions reveals the 
senders’ attempts to shift the focus away from themselves 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Ickes, 1986).  
 The present data, however, differs with previous 
research in several important respects. For example, 
previous research suggests that liars tend to use fewer 
words than truth tellers (Burgoon et al., 2003; DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Vrij, 2000). Why, then, did senders in the 
present study produce more words during deceptive 
discussions than during truthful discussions? One 
possibility is that the senders in the present study were 
engaged in conversation with a partner, whereas previous 
research has focused primarily on deception in 
monologue formats (e.g., Newman et al., 2003). It is 
possible, for instance, that senders engaged in 
conversation used more words in an effort to convince 
suspicious or skeptical receivers (e.g., Burgoon et al., 
2001). Indeed, receivers in the present study asked more 
questions when they were being lied to than when they 
were telling the truth (see below), which may have 
required senders to use more words to address the 
additional questions. 
 Similarly, previous linguistic analyses of deception 
suggest that senders use more negative emotion terms 
(e.g., Newman et al., 2003; Vrij, 2003).  This difference is 
perhaps not surprising given the differences in discussion 
topics between the present study and the Newman et al. 
(2003) study. As noted above, Newman et al. asked 
participants to lie or tell the truth about highly emotional 
topics, such as abortion, which may have been more 
likely to elicit strong emotional verbal content than the 
more mundane topics employed in the present study (e.g., 
“Talk about a mistake you made recently.”). 
 The second question of interest was whether the 
linguistic style of the receivers changed systematically 
according to whether or not their partners were lying. The 
data suggest that, in fact, receivers’ linguistic profile 
changed across deceptive and truthful discussion topics. 
In particular, when being lied to, receivers 1) used more 
words, in shorter sentences, 2) used more sense words, 
and 3) asked more questions than when they were being 
lied to. These observations are particularly striking given 
the fact that receivers were blind to the deception 
manipulation. 
 These data provide relatively robust support for the 
linguistic style matching model (Niederhoffer & 
Pennebaker, 2002). First, receivers matched changes in 
the sender’s total word production and use of sense 
words. Second, like the senders, receivers’ use of emotion 
words and exclusion words did not change across 
deceptive and truthful conditions. Considered together, 
the present data suggest that receivers engaged in 
linguistic style matching. 
 There were, however, a number of linguistic variables 
on which receivers and senders diverged. While senders 
used more other pronouns when lying than when telling 
the truth, the receivers’ use of other pronouns did not 
differ across discussion types. This observation may 
reveal the unique motivation of senders to distance 
themselves from their deception. Perhaps more 
importantly is the observation that receivers asked more 
questions and used fewer words per sentence when they 
were being lied to than when they were being told the 
truth. These surprising data suggest that the receivers 
were skeptical of the senders during deceptive 
conversations.  Because senders did not produce more 
questions when they were being deceptive, the change in 
the receivers’ question-asking behavior does not simply 
reflect linguistic style-matching. Instead, these data 
suggest that although receivers were not explicitly aware 
that their partner was lying to them (i.e., they were blind 
to the deception manipulation), they were implicitly 
aware that they were being lied to. 
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  An important limitation of the present study, however, is 
that participants interacted in a text-based computer-
mediated environment. An important question is how 
these verbal behaviors we observed in text-based 
conversations will be altered when nonverbal channels of 
communication are available. While additional research 
will be required to address this question, communication 
via the Internet is becoming increasingly ubiquitous. 
Indeed, millions of people use text-based forms of 
communication on a daily basis, and previous research 
suggests that people do tell lies during computer-mediated 
interactions, such as Email and Instant Messaging, 
although not as frequently as they do over the phone or in  
face-to-face contexts (Hancock, Thom-Santelli, & 
Ritchie, 2004). As such, the present data provide 
important insights into interpersonal deception in this new 
communication domain. 
 Finally, there may not necessarily be a classification of 
specific words to predict deception, as previous research 
by Pennebaker et al. (2003) and Newman et al. (2003) 
may suggest, but deception may be more reliably 
predicted by looking at the methods of constructing lies.     
The present research advances our understanding of how 
linguistic behavior changes according to the truthfulness 
of the discussion.  Lies that take place during 
conversation tend to include more words, more other-
directed pronouns, and more sense words than truths.  
Equally important, if a receiver is being lied to by 
someone who fits this linguistic profile, he or she may be 
more likely to use more overall words and sense terms, 
and to ask more questions. 
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Abstract
Extending the paradigm introduced by Schraagen (1993),
two near-expert groups and novices completed two
scientific discovery tasks, one from each of the experts’
domains. In this way, both groups designed simulated
experiments from within and outside of their domain. The
role of domain familiarity on the application of general
scientific reasoning skills is explored by contrasting the
performance of the experts in their domain to that in the
unfamiliar domain. Results indicate that at the graduate
level, near-experts are able to apply general scientific
reasoning skills across dissimilar domains, while novices
still have difficulty with the transfer.
Introduction
How common are scientific reasoning skills across
different domains of practice? Schraagen (1993) as well
as Schunn and Anderson (1999) address this issue in their
experiments. Both studies relied on the same basic
paradigm: two groups of expert researchers and one group
of novices were asked to design and conduct a series of
experiments in a scientific discovery task. One of the
expert groups was familiar with the domain that the task
was drawn from (e.g. cognitive psychologists working on
a memory experiment), whereas the other was less
familiar with the domain, but still from the same general
field (e.g. social psychology). The scientific reasoning
skills (e.g. experimental design, hypothesis generation,
and data evaluation) exhibited by both expert groups were
similar and mapped cleanly onto those mentioned in the
literature (e.g. Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Dunbar, 1993;
Chinn & Malhotra, 1999). The novices showed a similar
pattern of failures as those found by other researchers
focusing on non-scientists (e.g. Kuhn, Schauble & Garcia-
Mila, 1992; Klahr, Fay & Dunbar, 1993; Zajchowski &
Martin, 1993).
Almost all studies that have focused on non-scientists
have found remarkably poor performance (see Detterman,
1992 for a review) on scientific reasoning skills.
Fortunately, those that have studied practicing scientists
in their own domain have found just the opposite (e.g.
Dunbar, 1997). Why is it that expert scientists do so well
outside of their domain of expertise, yet novices do so
poorly? Schunn and Anderson (1999), as well as
Schraagen (1993), report that the differences found
between the practicing scientists and the novices could
not be accounted for by general reasoning ability
differences. This leaves two alternative explanations:
context of the problem influencing the transfer of the
skills, and scientific training itself.
While the studies conducted by Schraagen (1993) and
Schunn and Anderson (1999) seem to point towards the
influence of scientific training, there is a problem with
interpreting it in that way. Both of these studies utilized
highly similar groups of experts (all were experimental
psychologists of some sort). The similarity of the domains
of expertise might be confounding the influence of
context on transfer. While the experiments were designed
such that the task would be unfamiliar to one of the expert
groups, it is likely that they were familiar enough to
provide sufficient context cues to trigger the use of the
appropriate scientific strategies. The novices, however,
would not have had the cues to signal which strategies
would be appropriate. If the studies had utilized more
dissimilar experts this would not have been an issue. As it
is, the transfer context remains a confounding factor.
Voss et al. (1986) provide some support for the transfer
hypothesis. Their studies looking at the problem solving
of novices and dissimilar experts found that the quality of
the reasoning was dependent upon the match of the task to
the expert's domain. They report chemists' reasoning
being roughly equivalent to that of the novices when
attempting to solve political science problems, while the
political scientists exhibited a higher quality of reasoning
on the same tasks. However, while the Schraagen and
Schunn & Anderson studies utilized science-based
domains that were overly similar, the Voss, et al. study
utilized a non-science-based domain. This makes
comparisons across the studies problematic.
The difficulty of transferring skills from one context to
another has long been a recognized problem (e.g.
Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901; Singley & Anderson,
1989; Detterman, 1992). Singley and Anderson propose
that transfer can only occur between two situations for
identical elements. This transfer then depends on how the
elements were encoded. If researchers only use scientific
reasoning skills when faced with problems in their
domain, it is possible that they will be coded in a manner
that is specific to that context. It would therefore be
unlikely that they would use the strategies when those
context cues were absent. So in this situation, the
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superficial elements of the unfamiliar task mask the
relevance of using scientific skills. Unless there is a more
abstract understanding of these skills (more general
encoding), they will fail to be used in other scientific
reasoning contexts.
Much like the experiments of Schraagen (1993) and
Schunn and Anderson (1999), this study was designed to
explore the differences in scientific reasoning in novices,
task experts (at experimentation in general) and domain
experts (in the problem domain). The core difference is
that instead of using a single task, there are two
isomorphic discovery tasks from different scientific
domains. Each of the expert groups is a domain expert in
one of the two tasks, making each group task experts for
both and domain experts for only one. This design allows
us to look specifically at the influence of domain
familiarity on the transfer of scientific reasoning. Should
domain familiarity play a key role in the transfer of the
scientific reasoning skills, we would expect the skills to
only manifest themselves when the experts are within
their natural domain. When working in the unfamiliar
domain, their performance would be more like that of the
novices. If, however, they are able to recognize the deeper
scientific structure of the unfamiliar problem, then their
performance should be better than that of the novices and
qualitatively equivalent to that seen in their natural
domain.
Methods
Participants were recruited from two major universities:
33 undergraduates, 16 from one university, and 17 from
the other. The graduate samples were each drawn from a
different university (due to enrollment). 11 biology
graduate students and 17 industrial/organizational
psychology students were recruited, all had completed at
least two years of study. Participants were paid for their
participation.
Participants were asked to complete two isomorphic
experiment-based exploration tasks: they were to
determine how each of six task relevant independent
variables (IV) affects the outcome of the dependent
variable (DV). For example, the biology task had
participants design experiments to determine how each
variable (water temperature, turbidity, dissolved oxygen,
pH, fecal and phosphorus contents) influenced the growth
of a certain bacteria that was responsible for the
development of open sores on fish. The industrial
psychology task had participants design experiments to
determine the role of manager characteristics (e.g.
technical, critical reasoning, writing skills) on the
objectivity of employee appraisals.
Experiments were designed and conducted in a
computer simulated laboratory where participants were
able to manipulate each IV in question; run and view
experiments; take notes on hypotheses, experiments, and
outcomes; as well as assign conclusions as to the
influences of the IVs on the DV. No data analysis or
graphing tools were provided. Each task was self-paced,
allowing participants to conduct as many experiments as
they needed in order to draw their conclusions. The
simulated experiment lab was built with Java™ allowing
the recording of all user actions for playback1.
The task domains were selected based on graduate
enrollment in the domains across two universities. Experts
in the domains (instructors and researchers) were
recruited during the design of the tasks to maximize the
external validity of the tasks. The tasks, from
microbiology and industrial/organization psychology,
were based on experiments found in the literature. The
IVs’ qualitative effects on the DVs were maintained for 4
of the 6 variables. Two IVs from each task were modified
so that they would produce anomalous results. One was
anomalous from a theoretical perspective (TA), which
was merely an inversion of the qualitative trend. The
second was data anomalous (DA) in that a 20% subset of
the variable’s range produced extreme values. The
anomalous variables were added to test the sensitivity of
the participants to data anomalies (e.g. Chinn & Brewer,
1993).
Results
The critical comparisons in this study are two orthogonal
comparisons: the experts vs. novices (graduates and
undergraduates), as well as between the two groups of
experts. The expert analyses are between the experts
within their domain and outside their domain (domain and
task experts respectively). The In-Domain group consists
of the biology graduates working on the biology task and
the psychology graduates solving the psychology task.
The Out-Domain group consists of the same participants,
merely performing the opposite task. Unless otherwise
noted, all tests are repeated measure ANOVAs with the
two tasks as the repeated factor. Specific statistical
measures are reported in table 1; significance is assumed
at p<0.05. Task presentation was counter-balanced, and
there were no significant effects of task order on any of
the reported measures.
Experimental Design Measures
Participants spent on average 43 minutes on each of the
two tasks. While the graduate students spent a little longer
on each task (approx. 47 minutes) than the novices
(approx. 39 minutes), the differences were nonsignificant.
Likewise, the number of experiments designed and
conducted in each task did not differ significantly either
between the novices and the experts (37 and 47
                                                           
1 The experiment can be downloaded from the author’s website
http://simon.lrdc.pitt.edu/~harrison/
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respectively) or within the In-Domain and Out-Domain
groups (48 and 45 respectively).
The next design measure considered the breadth of the
experimental space that the participants searched (Klahr
& Dunbar, 1988). Each IV that they could manipulate had
a fixed range, which were divided into five equally-sized
bins. For each unique experiment that manipulated a
given variable, the total number of bins visited was
computed. The more complete the variable range covered,
the more informative the results will be with respect to
that variable on the whole.
As expected, the novices covered a significantly smaller
range than the graduates (see figure 1).  However, there
were no differences between the In-Domain experts (e.g.
biology graduate students performing the biology task,
and vice versa) and the Out-Domain experts (e.g.
psychology students performing the biology task).
Looking at the breadth of search for the two anomalous
variables yielded similar findings. The novices searched a
much narrower space for the theory anomalous and data
anomalous variables. Likewise, there were no significant
differences between the domain and task experts.
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Figure 1. Breadth of experimental space search for all, theory
anomalous (TA), and data anomalous (DA) variables.
Another design measure looked at the conservativeness
of the experimental designs. With the lack of any data
analysis tools, maximizing the interpretability of each
simulated experiment was very important. Participants
conducted experiments one at a time. The only way to
draw conclusions was to compare outcomes of successive
experiments. If the comparisons were confounded
(multiple IV manipulations), accurate conclusions would
be very difficult to draw. Two versions of a VOTAT
(vary one thing at a time) score were computed for each
task (Tschirgi, 1980). The local VOTAT was computed
by averaging the number of variables manipulated in one
experiment when compared to the immediately previous
experiment. The global VOTAT was computed between
the current experiment and the most similar previous
experiment (regardless of when it occurred).  Since there
were no significant differences between the two measures
across groups and tasks, the two were combined into an
average composite.  The novices consistently manipulated
multiple variables per experiment, averaging 1.42 changes
per experiment, which was significantly more than the
graduate sample’s 1.23. There were no differences
between the experts within or outside their domains.
Conservativeness (VOTAT)
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
In-Domain Out-Domain Novices
Expertise
In
te
r-
ex
pe
rim
en
t 
Ch
an
ge
s
Figure 2. Average number of variables manipulated per
experiment. One change at a time yields optimal interpretability
in this scenario.
Note-taking
It is hard to argue against the importance of meta-
processing skills in scientific reasoning. For this study, we
chose to look at the note taking behavior of the
participants. This is analogous to practice of scientists
keeping a detailed lab notebook (Dunbar, 1997). The first
measure is merely one of length, how much note taking is
going on. Novices took very few notes (if any), which is
in stark contrast to the experts who took significantly
longer notes. For the experts, there were no differences in
note-taking length when in or out of their natural domain.
Notepad Length
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Figure 3. Length of notes (in characters) taken during
experiment. Significant difference between novices and experts,
none between the experts.
Knowing how much note taking was occurring lead us
next to ask how they were utilized. A simple three-
category scheme was developed a priori. Notes could be
categorized as non-existent (including uninterpretable and
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irrelevant notes), effects tracking (documenting variable
values and experiment outcomes, effectively duplicating
the provided experiment log), or hypothesis tracking
(documenting hypotheses, suspected relationships, etc.).
As can be seen in figure 4, all groups did an equal amount
of effects tracking. The significant differences were in the
amount of hypothesis tracking that the experts did.
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Figure 4. Type of notepad usage. Significant difference
between novices and experts, χ2(2,N=61)=5.9, p<0.05. No
significant differences between expert groups.
Data Interpretation
The final set of measures where designed to assess the
participants’ ability to interpret the data and draw
conclusions regarding the relationships between the
independent variables and the outcome measure.
Participants were asked to write out their conclusions for
each variable including the qualitative trend, critical
values, magnitude, and any “strange” properties. One
point was awarded for each property that was correct.
Averaging across each of the variables yielded an overall
interpretation accuracy score. Making it conditional on
the breadth of the experiment space that was searched
further refined each variable’s score. For instance, any
conclusions about critical values would be erroneous if
they had not explored the variable range within which the
values occurred. The left most graphs in figure 5 show
both the raw and the conditional overall interpretation
accuracy scores. Once more the novices scored lower than
the experts with no significant differences between
experts in or out of their domains. The differences
between the raw and conditional scores were
nonsignificant; participants did not appear to be drawing
conclusions beyond what was possible given the data
collected.
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Figure 5. Interpretation accuracy scores, conditional on
breadth of search.
The conditional accuracy scores for the anomalous
variables were also examined (right half of figure 5). For
the theoretically anomalous (TA) variables there were no
differences among the three groups. The difference
between In- and Out-Domain participants for the TA
variable would likely be magnified if established domain
experts had been used instead of the graduate students.
There was a significant difference between novices and
experts for the data anomalous (DA) variables, but this is
directly attributable to the differences in the breadth of
search for the data anomalous variables (see figure 1).
IQ Surrogates
Since this study had to be conducted across multiple
universities, one of the first concerns was general IQ
differences between the sampled populations. Using SAT
and GRE scores as IQ surrogates, simple ANOVAs were
computed. There were no significant differences within
the novice undergraduate samples across the two
universities, allowing the collapsing of the two groups.
There were significant differences between the graduate
samples (one from each university) and the novices. The
post-hoc LSD showed no differences between the two
graduate samples. Figure 6 shows the average combined
SAT/GRE scores of the three groups. Further more,
regression models were run on all the key dependent
measures to test for IQ effects. None of the models
approached even marginal significance: higher IQ
participants did not perform better than the lower IQ
participants. This data suggests that the IQ confound
cannot account for the expertise effects found.
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Figure 6. Combined SAT/GRE scores as IQ surrogates. No
significant effects due to IQ.
Measure Undergraduates
v. Graduates
(p-value)
In-Domain v.
Out-Domain
(p-value)
Breadth of search
Overall
Theory
Data
0.002
0.04
0.02
0.429
0.894
0.987
VOTAT 0.02 0.86
Note length 0.001 0.93
Note usage† 0.05 0.875
Data interpretation
Overall
Theory
Data
0.00
0.41
0.03
0.234
0.301
0.952
IQ surrogates†† 0.000 0.34
Table 1.  Significance of the planned comparisons. All measures
are repeated measure ANOVAs with the tasks as the repeated
factor, except for † Note usage (Chi-squared) and the †† IQ
surrogate (standard ANOVA).
Discussion
Across the board expert groups performed significantly
better than the novices, both inside and out of their
domains. Additionally, there were no significant
differences between the experts in or out of their natural
domains. The findings mirror those of Schunn and
Anderson (1999) and Schraagen (1993), even with the use
of graduate students as opposed to established and
practicing experts. Regardless of the domain, experts used
the same general strategies in solving the discovery
problems. Had the Out-Domain performance been
significantly different from the In-Domain performance,
bringing it closer to that of the novices, we could
conclude that domain familiarity was influencing the
transfer of the scientific reasoning skills.
The only major divergence from the former studies was
the lack of a difference between the experts when it came
time to draw conclusions from the data collected. While
data interpretation per se has nothing to do with a
particular domain, both Schraagen (1993) and Schunn and
Anderson (1999) found qualitative differences between
their task and domain experts. Both expert groups in this
study performed equally poorly (but still significantly
better than the novices). However, this could have been
due to the fact that these tasks produced more data than
those in other studies and lacked any analysis tools, such
as graphs or tables (a common criticism leveled by the
graduate students during the debriefing questionnaire).
Another difference in this study was the inclusion of
anomalous variables (both theoretical and data based).
Given that anomalies often draw the attention of scientists
(Dunbar, 1997; Chinn & Brewer, 1993), it was interesting
to see how sensitive the two expert groups were to them.
One might expect that upon detection of an anomaly, that
participants would search that section of the experimental
space more thoroughly. Unfortunately, this is not seen for
any of the expert groups (see figure 1). There are no
reliably significant differences between the search
patterns in terms of breadth or VOTAT (data not shown).
This is not to say that the experts did not notice the
anomalies; they just didn’t exploit them in their
experiments, in contrast to the findings of Dunbar (1997)
and Tricket, et al (2001). This difference is likely due to
the use of graduate students as opposed to established
researchers.
Summary
Much like the studies of Schunn and Anderson (1999) and
Schraagen (1993), we were interested in exploring the
generality of scientific reasoning skills. Both studies
concluded that while the quality of the reasoning was
domain specific, the processes used were general. As was
seen in these studies there are strong differences between
the experimental skills exhibited by novices and the
experts, or in this case, the developing experts. These
differences cannot be attributed to a simple variable such
as differences in intelligence. What’s more is that the two
expert groups behaved qualitatively the same whether
they are working in their familiar domain or in a novel
one. They were able to transfer the appropriate skills
based on the deeper scientific structure and were not
negatively influenced by the unfamiliar domain. The
bidirectional transfer across a wider context difference is
more evident in this study because of the utilization of
genuinely dissimilar target domains, as opposed to the
psychological domains used by Schunn & Anderson and
Schraagen or the chemistry and (non-scientific) political-
science domains used in the Voss, et al (1986) studies.
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Abstract
It has been well established that collaborative learning is more
effective in producing learning gains than individuals working
alone. The present study investigates three potential
mechanisms responsible for learning from collaborative
problem solving: other-directed explaining, co-construction,
and self-directed explaining. College undergraduates were
trained to criterion on the first four chapters of a popular
physics textbook. They were then asked to collaboratively
solve three physics problems. Preliminary evidence suggests
that other-directed explaining was effective in half of the
cases, whereas co-construction led to proportionally more
generated knowledge. Self-directed explaining was
particularly effective for the individual generating the
solution; however, there was only a modest gain for the
partner who listened to the explanations. The relative impact
of these three mechanisms is compared.
Introduction
Collaboration is a ubiquitous part of life and can be found in
scientists’ laboratories, the business world, the military, and
the classroom. Given its usefulness in the real world, peer
collaboration has become an important instructional
intervention. The literature evaluating the effectiveness of
peer collaboration has generally produced positive results
(Dillenbourg, Baker, Blaye, & O'Malley, 1995); however, it
is far from being an educational panacea (Barron, 2003).
The open question remains, “Why is collaboration
effective?” Prior research implicates three potential
mechanisms responsible for learning during collaboration:
other-directed explaining (Ploetzner, Dillenbourg, Praier, &
Traum, 1999; Roscoe, 2003), co-construction (Damon,
1984; Rafal, 1996), and self-directed explaining (Chi,
Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Chi, DeLeeuw,
Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994). The goal of the present study is
to investigate the relative contributions of all three
mechanisms to individual learning.
The first mechanism, other-directed explaining, occurs
when one peer instructs or explains to another partner how
to solve a problem. Other-directed explaining may benefit
only the speaker, but not the listener because the speaker is
the one actively engaged in conveying the to-be-learned
material (Chi, Siler, Jeong, Yamauchi, & Hausmann, 2001;
Webb, Troper, & Fall, 1995). However, because both
partners have opportunities to explain to their partners, it is
conceivable that other-directed explaining is a mechanism
that accounts for learning during collaboration.
The second hypothesized mechanism for successful
learning from collaborative problem solving is co-
construction. Co-construction is defined as the joint
construction of knowledge. The process of constructing
knowledge may proceed in a variety of ways, but the most
natural is for peers to either elaborate or critically evaluate
their partners’ contributions.
Elaborative co-construction is the generation of
knowledge by extending the ideas of one’s partner (Tao &
Gunstone, 1999) and has been shown to be an effective
dialog pattern (Hogan, Nastasi, & Pressley, 1999; van
Boxtel, van der Linden, & Kanselaar, 2000). Similarly,
knowledge might be constructed through the critical
discussion of ideas. Critical co-construction occurs when
interacting peers critically evaluate each other’s ideas.
Support for this particular type of interaction comes from
the literature on argumentation. Schwartz, Neuman, and
Biezuner (2000) found dyads that successfully solved
fraction problems were most likely to engage in
argumentation.
Co-construction and other-directed explaining are likely
candidates to explain the potential successes of learning
from collaborative problem solving. However, there is
another potentially overlooked mechanism, which is to learn
from listening to someone self-explain (i.e., self-directed
explaining). Learning from another person’s explaining is
analogous to learning from a worked-out example; however,
in a collaborative problem-solving context, the source of the
worked-out example is not a textbook, but a peer. When a
dyad is faced with solving a problem, it is natural for one
person to begin solving, while the other listens to the
ensuing solution attempt (Shirouzu, Miyake, & Masukawa,
2002). The speaker may be talking out loud while solving a
problem while her partner listens. This is a form of self-
directed explaining. As has been shown in prior research,
self-explaining is an effective learning strategy (Chi et al.,
1989). What is unclear, however, is if a partner can benefit
from listening to self-directed explaining. One goal of the
present study is to provide initial evidence for the utility of
self-directed explaining (or self-explaining with an
audience).
The structure for the remainder of the paper is as follows.
First, we will provide a brief description of the study, which
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will then be followed by evidence for the three hypothesized
mechanisms discussed above: other-directed explaining, co-
construction, and self-directed explaining. The final section
will compare the relative impact on learning from the three
mechanisms.
Method
Participants
Students were recruited via advertisements placed in a
university newspaper. The study used a between-subjects
design with a total of ten undergraduate pairs (n=20)
participating in the experimental group (i.e., Collaboration
condition) and a total of ten (n=10) undergraduates in the
control group (i.e., Text-only condition). Upon completion
of the experiment, participants were paid for their time. To
control for prior knowledge, eligible participants were
required to have taken only one high school physics course.
Materials
The domain chosen for the present study was kinematics.
Some of the topics covered were vector addition and
subtraction, average and instantaneous velocity and
acceleration, and an emphasis on Newton’s second and third
laws. The material was taken from the first five chapters of
a popular physics textbook (Halliday & Resnick, 1981).
Measures Four mastery tests were developed to assess
participants’ understanding of each of the first four chapters.
Participants were required to solve 80% of the problems
correctly before advancing to the next chapter. After the
first four chapters were learned to mastery, participants read
the fifth chapter on force. The test administered after the
participants had read the fifth chapter served as the pretest
to the learning intervention.
The pretest consisted of three problems. The three
problems were decomposed into a total of nine solution
steps. Each solution step was then labeled with a concept
from physics. For example, Problem 1 asks the individual to
find the acceleration of two boxes in contact. To correctly
solve the problem, the two boxes should be conceptualized
as a compound body. To demonstrate an understanding of
the compound body concept, the solver is required to sum
the masses. The labeled solution steps will henceforth be
called “concepts” (see Appendix for the mapping between
problems, concepts, and the groups that were assigned to
each problem). There were a total of nine different physics
concepts across all three problems.
The text was available to the participants during the
mastery tests, the pretest, and during the instructional phase,
but it was not available during the posttest. The reason for
making the text available during the pretest, but not the
posttest, was to provide the most stringent test for learning,
in the sense that we did not want our participants’ inability
to remember details of formulas to hinder their performance.
During the collaboration session, each pair was asked to
solve three physics problems. For the present paper, only 18
of the 30 problems were analyzed.1 Nine groups solved the
first problem, which contained 4 different concepts; 5
groups solved the second problem, which contained 3
different concepts; and 4 groups solved the third problem,
which was composed of 2 different concepts. Henceforth,
there were 59 concepts assessed across the three problems
and ten groups.
Finally, a posttest measured the amount of material
learned during the instructional phase (administered M=5.0;
SD=3.6 days after the collaboration session). The posttest
contained three problems, which were isomorphic to the
pretest and collaborative problems (i.e., the same nine
concepts were tested on the posttest).
Procedure
All of the participants were asked to study each of the first
four chapters individually in the way that they found
natural. Participants solved the problems on the mastery
tests either while they read the text or after they were
finished. When the participants were confident in their
solutions, they submitted their answers to the experimenter,
who then immediately scored their performance. If the
student correctly answered 80% or more of the questions,
then he or she was permitted to advance to the next chapter.
If the criterion was not met, then the student was shown
which problems were incorrect and encouraged to read the
text and correct the mistakes. This cycle of reading and
testing continued for the first four chapters until criterion
performance was met. On average, students spent a total of
6.5 hours to reach mastery of the four chapters.
The pretest was administered after the students read
chapter five. Once they were finished with the pretest, an
instructional phase was scheduled. For the Collaborative
condition, the pretest was not scored immediately, so that
the participants were not paired on the basis of their pretest
scores. Dyads were formed under the constraints that they
finished the background material relatively close in time,
and they were the same gender.
During collaboration, the dyads solved three force
problems. They were encouraged to use their partners as a
resource and to work together to understand and solve the
problems. The entire text (chapters 1-5) was available to the
dyads during the collaboration session. The Text-only group
solved the same problems, but did so individually with the
text available. After the instructional phase, the posttest was
individually administered.
The sessions were recorded (both audio and video) and
later transcribed. The transcription was based on the
audiotapes of the dialogues, using information from the
video for interpretations when necessary.
                                                           
1 A subset was used because the performance data for the present study
comes from a larger study in which all of the items were relevant.
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Analyses and Results
Coding scheme
The first coding step was to segment the transcribed
protocols. The segments were taken at the level of problem-
solving episodes (i.e., several turns dedicated to a single
concept). The boundaries of a problem-solving episode
began with a proposed equation, and ended with either the
final solution of the equation or the abandonment of a
solution path altogether. Across all groups and problems,
there were a total of 87 problem-solving episodes.
Episodes were then coded as other-directed explaining
(ODE), self-directed explaining (SDE), or co-construction.
Other-directed explaining occurred when a more-
knowledgeable partner explained a concept to a less-
knowledgeable partner. Pretest performance for each
participant determined his or her knowledgeability status for
each concept. Because each problem was composed of
several concepts, the individual’s status could change from
one problem-solving episode to the next, depending on his
or her pretest performance.
When the less-knowledgeable peer explained a concept
during a problem-solving episode, either to a more-
knowledgeable or equally knowledgeable partner, then the
episode was coded as self-directed explaining. Again,
pretest performance was used to determine
knowledgeability.
Finally, when both partners were being generative in the
conversation by adding significant and relevant
contributions, the episode was coded as co-constructed. Co-
constructed episodes were further decomposed into
elaborative and critical co-construction, which will be
defined shortly.
Once the problem-solving episodes were coded in terms
of the conversational elements, the content (i.e., the physics
concepts) was also coded. The content was then linked to
the episode analysis, which allowed us to track the impact of
dialog on posttest performance. For example, if a more-
knowledgeable peer explains how to solve the compound
body concept to her less-knowledgeable partner, then that
episode was coded as “other-directed explaining about the
compound body.” To measure the learning effect of other-
directed explaining on the listener, we then looked at her
posttest performance on the compound body concept.
Because some problems involved multiple solution
attempts, only the final problem-solving episode was linked
to the posttest concepts (N=59).
Collaborative problem solving resulted in learning
gains
Did the individuals learn from the collaborative problem-
solving session? To answer this question, we calculated gain
scores for each individual, which controlled for pretest
knowledge: g = (post – pre)/(100% - pre) (Crouch & Mazur,
2001). Thus, the gain scores reflect the increase (or
decrease) in learning per concept, per person. Overall, there
was an average net gain of 26% (while controlling for
pretest knowledge), which was significantly different from
zero (p=0.002).
Evidence that individuals learned from collaborative
problem solving can also be found in the analysis of the
control (Text-only) group. The gain from pre- to posttest for
the Collaboration group was significantly greater than zero,
while the gain for the Text-only group was not
(F(1,9)=0.756, p=0.41) even through the two groups did not
differ at pretest.2 This suggests that the learning gains are
due to the activities the dyads engaged in during
collaborative problem solving, which is presented in the
next three sections.
Other-directed explaining during collaborative
problem solving
As stated in the Coding Scheme section, both the content
and episode were coded together to give us a sense of the
impact of other-directed explaining on learning. Table 1
contains an excerpt of one student explaining her reasoning
to another. The example begins with Beth asking Abby3 to
elaborate on a previous line of reasoning. There are two
features to note in this example. First, Abby’s style is
definitely instructional. Her intent is to explain, as clearly as
she can, how to solve the problem (see Appendix problem
1.ii.). Second, Beth does not contribute much to the
conversation, but merely indicates that she is attending to
Abby’s explanation with her use of continuers.
Table 1: Example of other-directed explaining
Beth: So like 14 newtons would be the net force
acting on B?
Abby: No, this-the overall force is ten,
Beth: Mm-hmm.
Abby: but if you split it, if-if-both of the
blocks, as we know, are accelerating at two
meters per second.  If they’re in contact
then they have to be accelerating at the
same, rate.
Beth: Mm-hmm.
Abby And, because, by Newton’s second law F-F
[pause] equals mass times acceleration.  And
we know the acceleration,
Beth: Mm-hmm.
Abby: of each block and we know the mass of each
block.  So you can calculate the force-the
force of each block.  Or the force acting on
each block.
Of the 59 final problem-solving episodes, there were a
total of 11 other-directed explaining episodes (11/59=19%).
On posttest, the listener (i.e., the less-knowledgeable peer)
correctly used 5 concepts that they had previously used
incorrectly on pretest. The data are summarized in the left
segment of Figure 1. The black bars represent the
                                                           
2 The data for the Text-only and Collaboration comparisons is taken from
the full pretest and posttest (see footnote 1).
3 All names are pseudonyms.
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percentage of the corpus dedicated to a particular dialog
type, while the grey bars represent the gain scores of the
listeners (controlling for pretest knowledge). While a gain of
5 concepts is encouraging, especially given that the text was
unavailable during the posttest, the probability of learning
from listening to other-directed explaining is low
(5/11=45%). This is not entirely surprising, given the
finding that receiving elaborated help does not always lead
to learning gains (Webb, 1989).
It is also informative to measure the performance of the
more-knowledgeable speaker. Figure 2 suggests that the
speaker (ODE), who knew the concepts on pretest,
maintained 82% of her knowledge by correctly
demonstrating her knowledge of the concepts on the posttest
(see white bars in Fig. 2).
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Figure 1: Gain scores associated with the absolute frequency
for each dialog pattern.
Partners co-construct answers during collaboration
As stated in the introduction, co-construction is a
hypothesized mechanism that has been proposed to account
for learning from collaborative problem solving. A problem-
solving episode was coded as co-construction when both
partners were actively constructing new knowledge. The co-
constructed solutions were further categorized as elaborative
and critical co-construction. Elaborative co-construction
was defined as one partner adding a significant contribution
to the discourse that develops another person’s idea. Here is
an example of elaborative co-construction (Problem 2.ii.):
Table 3: Example of elaborative co-construction
Ron: It’s the weight of the crate, which is ten,
times gravity right? [R writes
10kg(9.8m/s2)=”]  So it’s, 98N, plus the five
[R writes “98N+5”]-oh no, cause we don’t know
what it is yet, really.  Well I mean, it’s-
Ben: Mg-Mg is the force exerted by the block, on
the Earth.
Ron: Mg, that’s,
Ben: Weight.
Ron: Mass times gravity, right?
Ben: Mm-hmm.
Episodes were coded as critical co-construction when
they contained conflicts between the two partners (Druyan,
2001). The difference between partners’ solutions led to a
discussion where each attempted to convince the other how
to solve the problem.
The following protocol excerpt is taken from Jill and Sara
solving the compound body problem (see Appendix,
Problem 1.i.). The question is difficult because it requires
the solvers to represent the blocks as a single body; neither
student demonstrated an understanding of this on the
pretest. Sara believes the question implies that the
acceleration should be found separately for each block, but
Jill makes a case for the compound body. The conflict is
between treating the blocks separately or jointly.  Here is
their argument:
Table 2: Example of critical co-construction
Sara: Yeah. It’s just-it didn’t say? I thought it
said each of them.  [Reads: Find the
acceleration of the blocks.]  To me that says
find the acceleration of each block.  You
know like, since they’re two different
kilograms.
Jill: It’s going to be, the same though.
Jill: Because like, if we, go like this [pushes a
book and pencil], and I do this, they’re both
moving at the same acceleration.
Sara: [Talks to Experimenter: 4 turns]
Sara: Because if you-well you can get a different
acceleration by breaking it up though.
Jill: Oh wait. You know what? The acceleration will
be the same for both of them.  Acceleration
is the same for both of them. Force acting on
block B, is different from force acting on
block A.
Sara: Ok. Because their mass, is different.
Jill: Yeah. Because-yeah.
The frequency of co-constructive episodes is summarized
in Figure 1 (see the middle bars). Two results are of
particular interest. First, the amount of co-construction is
similar to the frequency of the other-directed explaining
episodes. More importantly, however, is the proportion of
co-construction episodes that led to learning. Of the 12
episodes where the solution was jointly constructed, 8 of
them led to the correct application on posttest (8/12=67%).
Although co-construction was a relatively rare
conversational pattern (12/59=20%), the reported frequency
replicates prior estimates from a different domain
(McGregor & Chi, 2002). Furthermore, the knowledge
produced during collaboration was useful to both the
individuals, which suggests the viability of group-to-
individual transfer. That co-construction lead to a high
proportion of learned concepts further supports the
constructivist perspective that being active, as opposed to
merely listening to a didactic explanation, is important for
learning (Chi et al., 2001; Webb et al., 1995).
Co-construction was further decomposed into elaborative
and critical co-constructive episodes. Of the 12 instances of
co-construction, 5 were elaborative (5/12=42%) and 7 were
Other-directed
Explaining
Self-directed
Explaining
Co-
Construction
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critical (7/12=58%). Elaborative led to a gain of 3 concepts
(3/5=60%), whereas critical co-construction led to the
correct application of 5 concepts on posttest (5/7=71%).
Because of the small numbers, it is difficult to tell if
elaborative or critical co-construction was more effective in
subsequent learning. Follow-up research needs to be done to
gain a better understanding of what drives learning from co-
construction.
Learning occurs from self-directed explaining for
speakers and listeners
Prior research has shown that good students spontaneously
self-explain while learning from worked-out examples (Chi
et al., 1989). Subsequent research has shown that prompting
students to self-explain can lead to learning gains, above
and beyond those who spontaneously self-explain (Chi et
al., 1994).
Figure 1 suggests that self-directed explaining (SDE) also
operates in a collaborative problem-solving context. The
frequency of self-directed explaining is high relative to the
other conversational patterns (i.e., other-directed explaining
and co-construction). We observed 17 episodes of self-
directed explaining, which accounts for 29% of the corpus.
In terms of the average gain, self-directed explaining
episodes lead to a 64% increase (see Fig. 1).
The effects of self-directed explaining can be further
differentiated into the gain observed by the speaker and
listener. In the present context, the listener is also trying to
learn the material; therefore, she has a stake in the problem-
solving process. Instead of being a passive recipient, the
collaborative partner listens to and could potentially monitor
the ensuing self-explanation.
As expected, the gain was proportionally high for the
speaker (71%; see Fig. 2). While self-explaining is effective
for the explainer, the question becomes, does listening to a
self-explanation benefit the listener? The answer to this
question seems to be mixed. To a certain extent, listening to
another person self-explain can produce learning.
Specifically, there was a net gain of 5 concepts for the
listeners (5/17=29%; see Fig. 2). Therefore, it appears that
observing reasoning in action (i.e., being the listener) is
about as effective as listening to other-directed explaining
(ODE). Further coding is needed to gain a better
understanding of what the listener is doing while listening to
a partner self-explain. One might hypothesize that the
listeners benefit only when engaged in a constructive
activity, which has received some empirical support (Webb
et al., 1995).
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Figure 2: Gain scores as a function of dialog pattern and
dominant speaker or listener.
Discussion
The primary goal of the present study was to demonstrate
that several different mechanisms contribute to learning
from collaborative problem solving. These three
mechanisms were other-directed explaining, co-
construction, and self-directed explaining. All of these
mechanisms were associated with learning, but did so to
different degrees. In terms of the overall proportion, self-
directed explaining produced the strongest learning gains,
with the caveat that the learning gains were greatest for the
speakers. Other-directed explaining also lead to learning
gains for the listener, but only to a limited extent. Several
explanations given by the speaker during other-directed
explaining did not translate into increased problem solving
behaviors on posttest. Finally, co-construction, although
relatively infrequent, led to increased problem-solving
performance. Two-thirds of the co-constructed concepts
were correctly used on the posttest.
A secondary goal of the present study was to demonstrate
that multiple mechanisms operate within dyads. That is, one
group may engage in other-directed explaining on a problem
that one person understands (whereas the other does not).
Then on the next problem, the same dyad may have to co-
construct the solution because each individual has a
different solution, and they must resolve their differences.
Most research on collaborative problem solving measures
the influence of one mechanism on learning in isolation of
other potential explanations. The results from this study
suggest that the pattern of communication is largely shaped
by the background knowledge of the participants.
Finally, we attempted to show that self-explaining can
take place in a collaborative context. While effective for the
speaker, there was marginal utility for the listener. The
effect was strongest when the speaker was engaging a
partner with low pretest knowledge, but this effect needs to
be substantiated by further research. The results from this
study agree well with the idea that being constructive while
solving problems leads to better learning and understanding.
ODE
Speaker
ODE
Listener
SDE
Speaker
SDE
Listener
82%
45%
71%
29%
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Appendix
Collaboration Problem Concepts Groups
1. Two blocks A and B are in
contact with each other on a
smooth floor. A force of 10N is
applied to the blocks as shown in
the figure. Masses of the blocks
are 2 Kg and 3 Kg respectively.
(i) Find acceleration of the
blocks. (ii) Find net force acting
on block B. (iii) Find force
exerted by block B on block A.
N2Law
CB
N2Law
N3Law
1,2
3,4
5,6
7,9
10
2. A person pushes a crate on a
smooth floor. He is applying force
at an angle q with the horizontal
as in the figure. If the mass of
the crate is 10 Kg, magnitude of
the force is 5N and q=30 degrees,
what will be the acceleration of
the crate?
VD
W
T
5,6
8,9
10
3. Block A is attached to a string
which is tied to a wall. The block
is resting on a smooth plane
inclined at an angle q with the
horizontal as shown in the figure.
Mass of the block is MA. What is
the tension in the sting?
VD
N2Law
1,2
4,7
Note. N2Law=Newton’ second law; N3Law=Newton’s third Law;
CB=compound body; VD=vector decomposition; W=weight;
T=tension.
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Abstract 
Languages vary in how they encode motion events. For 
example, English motion verbs often encode the manner of 
the motion while Spanish motion verbs encode the path.  
Efficient verb learning has been argued to involve the 
acquisition of language specific lexicalization biases. When 
given a novel verb paired with a single motion event, English 
speakers interpret it as a manner verb, Spanish speakers as a 
path verb. The present study examines the nature and 
plasticity of this lexicalization bias. Do lexicalization biases 
result in a permanent alteration of the semantic interface? Or 
are these biases continually shaped through our experiences 
with word learning? English-speaking adults were taught 12 
motion verbs. The composition of the set of verbs was varied 
from 100% manner to 100% path with 3 levels in between. 
Lexicalization biases were monitored by testing verb 
extension after the first ambiguous exemplar of each verb. 
We replicate the finding that English speakers have an initial 
manner bias. However, we find that this bias changes over 
time in response to the input: Participants who learned path 
verbs developed a path lexicalization bias.  Experiment 2 
replicates this result with a different syntactic frame. 
Introduction 
 Children’s early lexicons are curiously lopsided. Across a 
variety of linguistic environments, nouns dominate early 
vocabularies, while verbs are initially scarce (for a review 
see Gentner & Boroditsky, 2001). There are a number of 
explanations for initial noun dominance, which are by no 
means mutually exclusive.  Verbs differ from nouns in the 
frequency with which they occur in isolation or in salient 
positions within the utterance and they also differ in the 
types of concepts that they encode and the types of entities 
that they pick out in the world. All of these factors have 
been argued to play a role in early noun dominance 
(Gleitman, 1990; Tardif, Shatz & Naigles, 1997; Caselli, 
Casadio & Bates, 1999; Snedeker & Gleitman, 2004).   
Gentner and her colleagues have argued that nouns are 
prominent in the early lexicon because they typically denote 
physical objects which can be individuated (and presumably 
conceptualized) on the basis of the child’s perceptual 
experience of the world (1982; Gentner & Boroditsky, 
2001). Verbs, they argue are more difficult for novice 
language learners because perception does not package 
events into stable individuals.  Instead languages decide 
how to conflate the conceptual components of events into 
lexical items. This results in greater cross-linguistic 
differences in the meanings of verbs than in the meanings of 
nouns. To learn verbs, they argue, children must first 
discover how their language chooses to package events. To 
the extent that lexicalization patterns are systematic within a 
language, children should be able to draw generalizations 
from known instances, developing lexicalization biases 
which allow the pace of verb learning to accelerate. 
 The parade case for systematic cross-linguistic variation 
in lexicalization is the conflation patterns that occur in verbs 
of motion (Talmy, 1975). A motion event consists of a thing 
that is moving (the figure), the location it is moving relative 
to (the ground), the manner in which it is moving and the 
path along which it moves. All languages have ways of 
expressing these elements, but how they do so varies.  
‘Manner’ languages, such as English and Mandarin, 
typically pack manner of motion into the verb, leaving path 
for an optional prepositional phrase (“He ran into the 
store”). In contrast, ‘path’ languages, such as Spanish and 
Greek and typically encode path in the verb and fob off 
manner on an optional gerund (“Él entró en la tienda 
corriendo”). In English, path verbs are relatively scarce 
(Gutiérrez, 2001; Talmy 1975). This cross-linguistic 
difference in verb use shows up in distributional analyses 
and production studies with both children and adults (Aske, 
1989; Jackendoff, 1990; Berman & Slobin, 1994).  
 This systematic difference in lexicalization patterns also 
results in differences in how the speakers of manner and 
path languages learn new motion verbs, consistent with the 
predictions of Gentner’s relational relativity hypothesis 
(1982).  When confronted with a novel verb used to describe 
a single motion event, English speaking adults and seven 
year olds will extend the word to other events with the same 
manner of motion but not to events that have the same path 
(Naigles & Terrazas, 1998; Hohenstein & Naigles, 2000). In 
contrast Spanish speaking adults and seven-year olds extend 
the verb to events that have the same path but not the same 
manner.  Thus each group has developed a lexicalization 
bias that is consistent with the primary verb lexicalization 
pattern in their language.  
  While verb lexicalization biases clearly exist, we know 
little about how they might develop or how they are 
mentally represented.  One intriguing hypothesis comes 
from the literature on the development of the shape bias in 
noun learning. Smith and colleagues have argued that the 
shape bias is a generalization based on the words that the 
child has previously acquired (Smith, Jones, Landau, 
Gershkoff-Stowe & Samuelson, 2002). Children, they 
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claim, are initially unbiased learners who acquire their first 
nouns by patiently waiting for the situational concomitants 
of word use to tease apart the many alternate hypotheses 
about how a word might be extended.  In this way, they 
manage to acquire a sizeable number of nouns, many of 
which are well-organized by shape.  They argue that the 
shape bias is simply a second-order generalization of these 
known words.  This account is supported by two lines of 
evidence.  First, in the studies of Smith and her colleagues 
children fail to show a systematic shape bias until they have 
acquired a substantial number of nouns (but see Waxman, 
1999).  Second, toddlers who are trained on shape-based 
categories develop a shape bias and show accelerated 
acquisition of nouns, while those who are trained on 
substance-based categories or given an unsystematic 
training set do not. 
  While Gentner makes no specific proposal for how verb 
lexicalization biases could be acquired, the mechanism laid 
out by Smith seems consistent with the relational relativity 
hypothesis.  Children learn a number of verbs that follow a 
language specific lexicalization pattern and then form the 
expectation that verbs in the same semantic field will be 
extended in a parallel fashion. But what does this 
expectation consist of?  There are at least three possible 
explanations for how cross-linguistic differences in word 
learning biases could be instantiated.  
 First, children’s word learning experiences could 
permanently alter their conceptual systems resulting in a 
change in the repertoire of possible concepts or in their 
relative salience or stability.  This is an unlikely explanation 
for the manner-path lexicalization bias. Speakers of the two 
languages show similar behavior on nonlinguistic memory 
and categorization tasks, suggesting that verb conflation 
patterns do not affect the accessibility of manner or path 
concepts (Papafragou, Massey & Gleitman, 2002). 
Furthermore, since both languages have ways of expressing 
both manner and path, the linguistic evidence itself radically 
limits the degree to which conceptual alteration can be 
invoked. Thus we have to look to changes in the semantic 
interface which maps between linguistic forms and 
concepts.1  
 Second, lexicalization biases could be permanent 
alterations in the semantic interface.  The mappings between 
linguistic forms and concepts could be altered so that certain 
conceptual dimensions are unavailable as candidates for 
verb meanings, although they might be used in nonlinguistic 
tasks or even as meanings for other terms. This mechanism 
would be the semantic parallel of Werker’s functional 
reorganization hypothesis for phonological development 
(1995). Finally, lexicalization biases may be more plastic 
mappings between linguistic forms and concepts which can 
modified as the child gains access to new information 
sources. Critically, if lexicalization biases are 
generalizations on the basis of known words, then they may 
                                                          
1 We follow Jackendoff’s (2002) suggestion that language specific 
semantics are most parsimoniously described as an interface 
between linguistic forms and conceptual representations, rather 
than as a separate level of representation, but nothing in our 
argument rests upon this distinction. 
be dynamically updated as children learn a larger and more 
varied set of verbs.  To date there has been little work on the 
plasticity of the semantic interface between words and 
concepts. While several studies have examined the effects of 
age of acquisition on semantic processing of a second 
language, the results vary with the measures and contrasts 
that are studied (compare e.g., Weber-Fox and Neville, 1996 
with Munnich, 2002).  To the best of our knowledge no one 
has looked at the plasticity of lexicalization biases.  
Experiment 1 explores the possibility that manner 
lexicalization bias for motion verbs continues to be 
malleable into adulthood and is shaped by the set of verbs 
that a person learns. Experiment 2 replicates this finding 
when the verb is presented in a different syntactic context. 
Experiment 1 
Each participant learned twelve new motion verbs. For each 
novel verb, participants (1) saw a single ambiguous scene 
with a salient path and manner of motion, (2) were tested to 
determine their initial interpretation of the verb, (3) saw five 
additional instances of the new verb which disambiguated 
its meaning (e.g. five scenes with same manner but a novel 
path), and finally, (4) were tested again to ensure that they 
had learned the novel verb. 
 Critically, the proportion of path and manner verbs was 
varied across participants. Some participants learned only 
manner verbs, some learned only path verbs, and others 
received different proportions of both types.  We predicted 
that our adult participants would have little difficulty 
learning either the manner or the path verbs. The critical 
measure was the participants' responses to the initial test 
trials, which followed the first ambiguous scene. Because a 
single verb-scene pair is consistent with either a manner or 
path interpretation, responses to this test sequence reveal the 
participants' verb lexicalization bias. Since our participants 
are English speakers, we expect that they will begin with an 
initial bias to interpret the novel verbs as encoding manner 
of motion.  However, if these estimates of prior probability 
are updated in response to the verbs that the participant has 
learned, then responses on the initial test trials should 
change in response to novel verbs.  Thus we predict that 
over the course of the experiment participants who learn 
path verbs will develop a path bias, while those who learn 
manner verbs will retain the manner bias. 2 
Methods 
Participants 56 adult native English speakers participated 
in this study. Since our goal was to determine how 
previously learned verbs influence the interpretation of 
future verbs, we eliminated all participants who failed to 
                                                          
2 Similar issues have been explored in artificial category learning 
studies.  Critically, Kersten, Goldstone & Schaffert (1998) found 
that adults who learned manner event categories were more likely 
to focus on the manner feature of an ambiguous category.  They 
used simple animated events with bug-like agents and no sentential 
context.  These stimuli did not appear to engage participants’ prior 
lexicalization biases: English speakers showed a strong initial path 
bias. Unlike the present work, the study did not examine 
generalization after a single ambiguous exemplar. 
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learn 5 or more of the verbs after viewing the 
disambiguating scenes. Sixteen participants were excluded 
for this reason. 
Stimuli Participants saw short video clips of motion events.  
Each event depicted an actor moving in a salient manner 
and in a salient path with respect to some reference object 
(e.g., a woman walking tip-toe behind a large sign). Twelve 
manner and twelve path concepts were selected as target 
verb meanings. Some concepts corresponded to English 
verbs, some to English prepositions, and some had no 
monomorphemic English equivalent. The path verb 
meanings were: around, between, down, up, in front of, 
along, in, diagonal to, over, across, and behind.  The 
manner verb meanings were: crab-walk, crawl, twirl, flap-
walk, hop on 1 foot, hop on 2 feet, march, run, skip, stoop-
walk, tiptoe, and walk.   
 Participants were presented with a block of questions and 
videos for each of 12 novel nonce verbs.  Each block was 
identical in layout and was made up of 4 phases: an initial 
ambiguous scene, an initial bias test, training and a final test 
phase. An example test block for a manner verb is shown in 
Table 1 and an example for a path verb is shown in Table 2. 
Table 1: Sample block for a novel manner verb. 
Target Concept: 
Crab-Walk Manner  Path  
Ambiguous Scene Crab-walk Out 
Initial Test: Manner  Crab-walk Behind 
Initial Test: Path  Skip Out 
Training One Crab-walk Front 
Training Two Crab-walk In 
Training Three Crab-walk Between 
Training Four Crab-walk Across 
Training Five Crab-walk Diagonal to 
Final Test: Path  March Out 
Final Test: Manner Crab-Walk Between 
 
Table 2: Sample block for novel path verb. 
Target Concept: 
Out Manner  Path  
Ambiguous Scene Crab-walk Out 
Initial Test: Manner  Crab-walk Behind 
Initial Test: Path  Skip Out 
Training One Hop 2 Feet Out 
Training Two Walk  Out 
Training Three Run  Out 
Training Four Stoop-walk Out 
Training Five Dance  Out 
Final Test: Path  March Out 
Final Test: Manner Crab-Walk Between 
  
 In the ambiguous scene, the participant saw a written 
sentence containing a new nonce verb (e.g. “She is going to 
torg out the door.”) and a video which illustrates the 
sentence (e.g., a woman crab walking out of the door). The 
initial test consists of two clips which are presented 
sequentially.  The participant is asked if clip is an instance 
of the new verb (“Is this torging?”). One test clip matches 
the manner of the ambiguous event but not the path; the 
other matches the path but not the manner. During the 
training phase, participants are presented with 5 video clips 
which disambiguate the meaning of the word.  If the verb is 
being taught as a path verb, then all 5 clips will show the 
same path as the ambiguous training clip but vary in their 
manner. If the word is being taught as a manner verb, the 
reverse will be true. The final test parallels the initial test; 
one video matches the path of the ambiguous clip, the other 
matches it in manner. This test allows us to determine if the 
participant has succeeded in learning the verb. 
Each manner verb was arbitrarily paired with a path verb. 
The paired verbs shared the same initial scene and the same 
test scenes (see Tables 1 & 2). Pairing the items in this way 
allowed us to examine how participants with different verb 
learning experiences responded to identical stimuli. The 
disambiguating videos were different for each member of a 
pair. Subjects were assigned to one of five conditions which 
differed in the proportion of the novel verbs that encoded 
path (0, .25, .50, .75 or 1). The 12 verb pairs were randomly 
ordered and half of the participants in each condition were 
tested with the blocks in reverse order. 
Procedure Stimuli were presented on a computer which 
using custom software. The participants were told that they 
would be watching videos that would teach them new words 
and answering the questions about these words.  
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Figure 1: Path Bias on Final Blocks 
Results 
Responses to the final test questions were used to exclude 
participants who failed to learn the verbs.  Our analyses 
focused entirely on participants responses in the initial test. 
To explore how bias changed over time we examined 
responses to the first four verb blocks and the last four verb 
blocks. The participants’ responses were converted to path 
bias scores by taking the proportion of blocks where the 
subject extended the word to the path match and subtracting 
the proportion of blocks where they extended the word to 
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the manner match.  This number would equal -1 for a 
perfect manner bias and 1 for a perfect path bias. 
 The ANOVA of the first four blocks revealed that these 
English speaking subjects entered the study with a strong 
manner bias (M = -.58, F (1,40) = 145.69, p < .001). 76% of 
the participants responded yes to a manner video while only 
5% responded yes to a path video. However, there were also 
differences between the training condition demonstrating 
that the verbs in the training set were already beginning to 
shape participants interpretations of the initial ambiguous 
scenes (F(4,40) = 12.97, p < .001). This effect was driven by 
participants in the 100% Path Verbs Condition who had no 
systematic bias in these early blocks (M = .08). 
 In the final four blocks of the experiment, the initial bias 
trials are clearly shaped by the set of verbs that the 
participant has learned (see Figure 1, F(4,40) = 45.14, p < 
.001). Participants in the 100% Path Condition have 
developed a strong, consistent path bias in their 
interpretation of new verbs (M = .85). Those in the 0% and 
25% Path Conditions show an equally clear manner bias (M 
= .98, M = .88). In the 50% and 75% Path Conditions 
participants flout the input, continuing to show a mild 
preference to interpret the new word as a manner verb.  
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Figure 2: Change in Path Bias between the First 4 and 
Last 4 blocks. 
 
To further explore how lexicalization biases changed over 
the course of the experiment, we directly compared the 
results of the first and final blocks.  In Figure 2 this is 
graphed as the change in path bias.  There was a substantial 
increase in path bias in the final trials (F(1,40) = 7.45, p < 
.009) and a reliable interaction between the time in the 
experiment and the Training Condition (F(4,40) = 4.75, p < 
.003).  Participants in the 100%, 75% and 50% Conditions 
showed an increase in path bias, while participants in the 
25% and 0% retained or strengthened their manner bias. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, the nonce verbs appeared with 
prepositional phrase arguments. In English, this syntactic 
frame is used more frequently with manner verbs, although 
it can be used colloquially with path verbs as well (e.g. “She 
ran around the tree.” or “She circled around the tree.”). In 
English path verbs are often used in simple transitive frames 
(“She circled the tree.”) and this usage is typically 
considered more proper. Naigles and Terrazas (1998) found 
that both English and Spanish speakers were more likely to 
interpret novel verbs as encoding manner when syntactic 
frames with semantically rich prepositions were used. If the 
participants assume that each component of the motion 
event is encoded in only one word of the sentence, they may 
be reluctant to conflate path in the verb when it is already 
marked in the preposition. In Experiment 2 we used simple 
transitive sentences to explore whether the syntactic context 
influenced participants’ initial lexicalization biases or the 
changes in these biases in response to newly learned words.  
Methods 
Participants 52 English-speaking adults participated in this 
study. Responses from 2 participants were excluded because 
they failed to learn 5 or more target verbs.   
Stimuli, Procedure and Coding Participants were tested on 
the same verbs sets as before (100%, 75%, 50%, 25% or 0% 
Path Verbs). The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 
except that verbs were introduced with simple transitive 
frames. Thus “He torged down the stairs” became “He 
torged the stairs.”  
Results 
When the novel words were presented in transitive frames, 
subjects showed only a weak bias in the first four verb 
blocks (M = -.14, F(4,40) = 3.56, p = .067) which may 
reflect the early effect of Training Condition on path bias 
(F(4,40) = 6.56, p < .001).  Participants in the 0% Path 
Condition show a manner bias (M = -.60) while those in the 
100% Condition have a path bias (M = .28). By the final 
four verb blocks, participants’ initial interpretations of the 
new nonce verbs are essentially categorical and closely 
match the set of words that they have learned (F(4,40) = 
60.17, p < .001).  There is a reliable shift in bias between 
the first and final blocks, which interacts with Training 
Condition (F(4,40) = 21.56, p < .000). Participants who 
learned all path verbs showed an increase in path bias (M = 
.60) while participants who learned all manner verbs 
showed an increase in manner bias (M = -.33).  A direct 
comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrates that 
syntactic frame influenced participants’ performance on 
both the final and first 4 blocks. These differences are 
limited to the 50% and 75% Path conditions, conditions 
where subjects are given weak evidence for a lexicalization 
pattern which differs from the dominant pattern in English.  
General Discussion 
  These experiments 1) replicate Naigles & Terrazas’ 
findings that adult speakers of English have a bias to assume 
that novel verbs encode the manner of motion rather than 
the path; 2) demonstrate that this lexicalization bias remains 
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plastic into adulthood; and 3) demonstrate that this 
lexicalization bias can be influenced by the words that a 
person learns. English speaking adults who were taught new 
motion verbs developed lexicalization biases that matched 
the verbs in their training set.  This pattern was observed 
regardless of whether the ground nominal was presented as 
the object of a preposition (consistent with a manner verb) 
or as the direct object of the verb (consistent with a path 
verb). In the remainder of the discussion we re-examine 
Gentner’s relational relativity hypothesis in the light of 
these findings and discuss the development of verb 
lexicalization biases. 
Reexamining Relational Relativity 
 Gentner’s relational relativity hypothesis proposes that the 
acquisition of verbs is delayed because children must 
discover how their language packages and categorizes 
events (1982). Naigles and colleagues have extended this 
argument by suggesting that efficient verb learning requires 
the acquisition of language-specific semantic patterns, 
which we have called lexicalization biases (Naigles & 
Terrazas, 1998).  The current study demonstrates that 
learners retain a remarkable degree of plasticity in 
lexicalization biases. They can not only learn verbs which 
violate the lexicalization pattern of their language; they can 
actually change their lexicalization biases to reflect the 
patterns in newly acquired words. These results suggest that 
verb lexicalization biases are not the result of permanent 
alterations in conceptual structure or unalterable changes in 
the semantic interface.  Instead these biases appear to be 
plastic generalizations based on the words the learner has 
acquired.  In essence a lexicalization bias results from a 
change in the prior probability of a class of hypotheses 
based on the prior success of hypotheses from that class. 
The flexibility of these biases raises questions about the 
role that they play in potentiating early verb learning.  If 
stable lexicalization patterns are required to repackage 
relational components into the individuated events, then 
why do adults have little difficulty in rapidly and 
spontaneously recombining these components? 3  We would 
argue that this ability is essential for learning the range of 
verbs that exist within any one language. While the 
variability of cross-linguistic encoding of events has 
received much attention, there is considerable variation in 
verbs that can be used to describe a single event within a 
language (Gleitman, 1990).  For example, we can refer to an 
event in which a girl kicks a ball to her mother as giving, 
passing, kicking, rolling, receiving, moving, crossing or 
contacting depending on the components of meaning that 
we wish to include in the verb or the perspective that we are 
                                                          
3 Perhaps that the manner-path distinction is the wrong place to 
search for stable lexicalization biases, since both manner and path 
languages have verbs of each type (Ashe, 1989).  We challenge the 
reader to come up with a better example of a systematic 
lexicalization pattern which applies to a large number of verbs. 
The explanatory potential of the relational relativity hypothesis 
depends on the prevalence of this predictable variation. 
taking on the scene.  In light of such variability, rigid 
lexicalization biases are likely to be counterproductive. 
Within language variation in lexicalization also seriously 
limits the role that these biases can play in constraining 
word learning, and thus limits the explanatory potential of 
the relational relativity hypothesis.   
If language-specific semantic mappings cannot eliminate 
the ambiguity inherent in events, then how do children ever 
become rapid and efficient verb learners?  We believe that 
two factors are at play.  First, children may improve in their 
ability to make use of cross-situational observation. Much 
of the work in early word learning has focused on what 
children are able to learn from a single word-scene pair. In 
the case of nouns it may be possible to make a meaningful 
conjecture about the meaning of a word on the basis of a 
single referent.  Many of children’s early nouns label 
artifacts and natural kinds.  Concepts of these kinds are 
organized in taxonomic hierarchies, which have multiple 
levels (animal, mammal, dog, poodle) and categories which 
are mutually exclusive at a given level (Markman, 1989). 
This conceptual structure helps bridge the gap between 
reference and meaning. Once the observer has correctly 
picked out the referent of an artifact or natural-kind term, 
then its meaning can be limited to concepts on the path from 
the individual exemplar up to the top of the hierarchical 
tree. If there is a conceptually or perceptually privileged 
basic level, then a single referent might provide enough 
information to map the word to the correct node of that tree 
(Rosch et al., 1976; Markman, 1989). 
 But in the case of verbs, cross-situational observation may 
be essential.  There is little evidence that the concepts 
encoded in verbs form complex taxonomic hierarchies. 
Instead most observers have argued that states and events 
are grouped into semantic fields which are organized as a 
cross-cutting lattice of concepts rather than as mutually 
exclusive categories (Talmy, 1985; Behrend, 1995). 
Identifying a single referent event merely identifies a point 
in this multi-dimensional conceptual space but it does not 
tell the observer which dimension(s) of the event are 
encoded in the verb.  Multiple exemplars, however, can be 
used to rule out the relevance of some dimensions and 
provide convergent evidence for the importance of others.  
 Second, children’s verb learning also benefits from their 
increasingly sophisticated representations of the utterances 
in which new verbs appear.  Initially children must learn the 
meanings of new words by observing the nonlinguistic 
contexts in which those words are used.  This initial 
information source provides ample support for noun 
learning but provides inadequate information about 
meanings of many verbs (see e.g., Snedeker & Gleitman, 
2004). More sophisticated learners can use the known words 
which co-occur with novel verbs to focus their attention on 
the relevant events.  As the child gains knowledge about the 
syntax of her language, the structural environments in which 
the verb occurs can also provide increasingly fine-grained 
information about its meaning 
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Examining the Early Development of Verb 
Lexicalization Biases 
 Clearly the present experiments cannot rule out the 
possibility that young language learners have relatively 
inflexible language-specific lexicalization biases which 
serve as sharp constraints on children’s hypotheses about 
verb meaning. Furthermore, even plastic and probabilistic 
biases could provide useful guidance for verb learning.  
Understanding the role of lexicalization biases in early verb 
learning clearly requires studying how these biases develop 
in young children. The limited information that we have 
about the development of the manner-path bias suggests that 
this bias may emerge quite late: Hohenstein and Naigles 
(2000) have found the 3 year old English speakers and 
Spanish speakers show no differences in their extension of 
novel motion verbs (both populations prefer to extend the 
words to events with the same manner of motion).  The 
obvious explanation is that children this age simply lack the 
ability to derive lexicalization biases from the words they 
learn. But this seems unlikely in light of Smith and 
colleagues’ finding (2002) that children under two can 
develop a shape-bias after learning just a handful of 
exemplars. The alternative explanation is that the verbs that 
3-year-olds know simply don’t support this generalization. 
In elicited production tasks English speaking adults show a 
clear preference for manner, however, speakers of path 
languages like Greek and Spanish often produce equal 
numbers of manner and path verbs when describing motion 
events (Papafragou et al., 2002; Naigles et al., 1998), 
suggesting that young Spanish speakers may have little 
evidence for a path lexicalization bias.  To determine 
whether young children can form verb lexicalization biases 
in response to clear category structure, we are currently 
testing three- and five-year old children in a modified 
version of Experiment 1. Our preliminary findings (N = 9) 
suggest that five-year-olds will rapidly form a bias for the 
dimension which has been relevant on previous trials. 
Children who are given six path verbs select path as the 
relevant dimension on 67% of all trials, while those who are 
given manner verbs do so only 25% of the time (p < .05). 
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Abstract  
 
When following a negated matrix clause, adverbial clauses 
(ACs) like “because it was paid very well” in (1) can be 
interpreted as residing within the scope of the negation (1b), 
or outside of it (1).  
 
 
 
  
 (1) a. Peter did not quit his job because it was paid very well 
 b. Peter did not quit his job because it was paid very 
badly.  
  
Depending on the scope of the negative, the interpretation 
differs dramatically: Whereas Peter did in fact not quit his job 
in (1a), he did so in (1b), but for yet unknown reasons. It has 
been shown for English (see Frazier & Clifton, 1996), that 
there is a preference to interpret the adverbial clause outside 
of the scope of the negation so that (1b) appears fairly odd. 
This observation challenges recency based processing 
principles, such as late closure, since the high attachment (to 
IP) appears to be preferred over low attachment (to VP) (see 
figure 1). In this paper, we will present evidence on German 
equivalents of (1a,b), varying the order of the negative and the 
verb (Experiment I), the context in which the ambiguity 
appears (Experiment II), and the position of the adverbial in 
relation to the clause boundary where the negation of the main 
verb is restricted or even retracted (Experiment III). None of 
these variations reduced the preference substantially. Only an 
explicit alternative cause reduced it but even this variation did 
not eliminate the difficulty of the inside scope interpretation. 
We will argue that incremental interpretation as well as 
immediate attribution of prosodic structure determine the 
interpretation of the adverbial clause. 
 
because it was ... 
AC 
IP 
VP 
neg 
Figure 1 
 
However, Frazier and Clifton (1996) found a clear 
preference for an interpretation of the AC outside of the 
negation scope. In their experiments, this preference does 
not show up in early stages of processing, but only in later 
off-line measures.  In the framework of Construal Theory, 
the authors argue that only argument like or primary 
relations are attached to the phrase marker of the sentence 
immediately. Only primary relations are subject to syntactic 
attachment principles like Minimal Attachment or Recency. 
As a non-primary relation, the adverbial clause is only 
construed as part of the maximal projection of the preceding 
thematic domain (i.e. the IP). All kinds of factors (syntactic, 
semantic, pragmatic, or prosodic) jointly determine the final 
interpretation of the clause. 
 In this paper, we do not want to dispute the immediacy of 
the attachment or the interpretation of adverbial clauses. We 
are much more interested in the question of which factors 
are driving this final preference, and how general or 
universal it is.  This means testing this preference in 
different constructions, in different environments, and 
across languages. Therefore, we have been looking at 
German versions of Frazier and Clifton’s materials. In four 
experiments, we tried to find a way to override the 
interpretational preference, by putting the negation in focus 
position (Exp I), varying contextually given presuppositions 
(Exp II), and restricting the negation (Exp III).  Since our 
main interest does not lie in the question of when these 
factors come into play, but only whether they do have an 
effect at all, in all of our experiments, we applied an off-line 
acceptability judgment task.  
Introduction 
Whereas the scope of quantifiers has been the subject of 
substantial research (e.g., Ioup, 1975, Johnson-Laird, 1969; 
Kurtzman & MacDonald, 1996; for an extensive discussion 
see Frazier, 1999) this is much less the case for the scope of 
negations. In this paper, we will look at sentences like (1) 
where an adverbial clause can be interpreted as either being 
within the scope of the negation in the matrix clause or 
outside of it. Structurally, the adverbial clause has to be 
attached to the VP if it is interpreted as residing within the 
scope of the negation whereas it has to be attached to IP if it 
is interpreted outside the scope of the negation.  
 Locality based principles of syntactic attachment as they 
are assumed in most theories of human sentence processing 
(e.g., Frazier, 1978; Gibson, 1991) predict a preference to 
attach the adverbial clause to VP, and thus a preference to 
interpret it inside of the scope of the negation. 
Experiment I 
In Experiment I, we wanted to test whether the preference 
for high attachment of the adverbial clause which has 
559
already been established for English can also be found in 
German. Additionally, we varied the position of the 
negation “nicht” (not). Since the clause final position in 
German is prosodically more dominant than clause internal 
positions, we assumed that an interpretation of the adverbial 
clause inside the scope of the negation might be more viable 
if it is clause final. As a control for lexical effects we 
included  controls without negations. 
Methods 
Materials. Eighteen sentences were constructed, closely 
related to the materials from Frazier and Clifton (1996). 
Each sentence contained a main clause followed by a 
subclause beginning with “weil” (because). The comma 
preceding “weil” is obligatory in German for all possible 
interpretations. It cannot serve as a cue for the interpretation 
of the adverbial clause. In the main clause, a character was 
introduced  as the subject in the default topic position. The 
pronoun in the because-clause was meant to refer to the 
subject of the main clause. This was the most plausible 
reading according to the intuitions of the experimenters and 
qualitative interviews after the experiment showed that 
subjects interpreted the pronouns exactly this way. Six 
versions of each sentence were constructed. In two, the 
negation preceded the clause-final participle (condition VP-
internal, 2a,b). Two versions had the negation as the last 
word of the main clause (VP-final, 2c,d).  Crossed with the 
position of the negation, the because-clause could either be 
plausibly interpreted as being inside of the scope of the 
negation or not. In order to control for potential plausibility 
differences in the adverbial clauses, we included two 
controls (2e,f) which only differed with respect to the 
adverbial clause, but did not have a negation in the matrix 
clause.   
 
(2) a. neg. VP-internal, AC outside negation scope 
Die Sekretärin hat nicht gekündigt, weil sie ein hohes 
Gehalt erhielt. 
The secretary has not quit her job, because she got a high 
salary. 
b. neg. VP-internal, AC in negation scope 
Die Sekretärin hat nicht gekündigt, weil sie ein geringes 
Gehalt  erhielt. 
The secretary has not quit her job, because she got a low 
salary. 
c. neg. VP-final, AC outside negation scope 
Die Sekretärin kündigte nicht, weil sie ein hohes Gehalt 
erhielt. 
The secretary did not quit her job, because she received a 
high salary. 
d. neg. VP-final, AC in negation scope 
Die Sekretärin kündigte nicht, weil sie ein geringes 
Gehalt erhielt. 
The secretary did not quit her job, because she received a 
low salary. 
e. no negation (control-a) 
Die Sekretärin war unbeliebt, weil sie ein hohes Gehalt 
erhielt 
The secretary wasn´t liked very much, because she 
received a high salary. 
f. no negation (control-b) 
Die Sekretärin war unbeliebt, weil sie ein geringes 
Gehalt erhielt. 
The secretary wasn´t liked very much, because she 
received a low salary. 
 
Six counterbalanced forms of the questionnaire were 
constructed. One sixth of the 18 experimental sentences 
appeared in each version in each form of the questionnaire, 
and across the six forms, each experimental sentence 
appeared once in each version. Each sentence was followed 
by a question concerning its acceptability. These 18 
sentences were combined with 36 sentences of various 
forms varying in complexity (simple main clauses, simple 
embeddings and doubly nested embeddings) and plausbility 
(from fully plausible to fairly implausible according to the 
intuitions of the experimenters). One randomization was 
made of each form.  
 
Participants. Eighteen participants, mostly undergraduate 
students from the University of Freiburg,  judged the 
acceptability of sentences presented in a printed 
questionnaire. They either received course credits or they 
were paid for their participation. All subjects´ native 
language was German, none of them was bilingual. 
 
Procedure. The rating technique used was magnitude 
estimation (ME, see Bard et al., 1996). Participants were 
instructed to provide a numeric score that indicates how 
much better (or worse) the current sentence was compared 
to a given reference sentence (Example: If the reference 
sentence was given the reference score of 100, judging a 
target sentence five times better would result in 500, judging 
it five times worse in 20). Judging the acceptability ratio of 
a sentence in this way results in a scale which is open-ended 
on both sides. It has been demonstrated that ME is therefore 
more sensitive than fixed rating-scales, especially for scores 
that would approach the ends of such rating scales (Bard, et 
al., 1996).  
 Each questionnaire began with a written instruction  
where the subject was made familiar with the task based on 
two examples.  After that subjects were presented with a 
reference sentence for which they had to provide a reference 
score. All following sentences had to be judged in relation 
to the reference sentence. 
Results 
Individual judgments were individually standardized and 
logarithmized. Table 1 contains mean judgments in the six 
conditions.  
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Table 1: Acceptability judgments Experiment I 
 
 neg. VP-internal 
neg. VP-
final no negation 
AC within 
scope of 
negation 
-.64 -.79 .24 
AC outside of 
scope of 
negation 
.28 .31 .34 
 
 
Judgments were submitted to a two-factorial MANOVA 
including the factors “negation” (VP-internal, VP-final, no 
negation) and “attachment” (IP, VP). There was a main 
effect of “negation”   (F1(2, 34) = 11.25, p < 0.001; 
F2(2,34) = 10.89, p < 0.001), resulting from the fact that on 
average, sentences without negations were judged more 
acceptable than those containing negations (VP-internal: - 
0,178, VP-final: - 0,240; no negation: 0,287). The main 
effect of “attachment” as well as the interaction 
“negation”*”attachment” reached significance as well 
(“attachment”: F1(1,17) = 51.29, p<0.001; F2(1,17) = 26.00, 
p < 0.001; “negation”*”attachment”: F1(2,34) = 7.26, p 
<0.01; F2(2,34) = 8.64, p < 0.01). Planned comparisons 
show that low attachment was judged less acceptable in 
sentences containing a VP-internal negation (F1(1,17) = 
26,47, p < 0.001, F2(1,17) = 16.20, p < 0.01) as well as in 
sentences containing a VP-final negation (F1(1,17) = 38.31; 
p < 0.001; F2(1,17) = 29.29, p < 0.001), whereas there was 
no difference in acceptability between the control sentences 
(F1(1,17) < 1, ns; F2(1,17) < 1, ns). 
Discussion 
In Experiment I, we clearly replicated the findings Frazier & 
Clifton (1996) report for English. In German as in English it 
is harder to interpret the adverbial clause as residing within 
the scope of the negation. Varying the position of the 
negation, however, did not exert an influence on the 
acceptability of this interpretation. The clause-final focus on 
the negation is obviously not sufficient to render it more 
viable. In the second experiment we tried to put the negated 
sentences in contexts that were supposed to bias for either of 
the two interpretations. 
Experiment II 
For Experiment II, we constructed four different contexts 
for each sentence: A neutral context, leaving open whether 
or not the proposition stated  in the following matrix clause 
holds or not (3), a context biasing an external scope reading 
(4), and two contexts biasing an internal scope reading, with 
one context explicitly stating that the proposition stated in 
the matrix clause should not be negated (5) and another one 
presupposing that e.g. the secretary actually quit her job (6). 
 
(3) Neutral context 
Jeder hat die Neuigkeiten über die Sekretärin gehört. 
Die Sekretärin hat nicht gekündigt, weil sie ein (a) hohes / 
(b) geringes Gehalt erhielt. 
Everybody heard the news about the secretary. 
The secretary did not quit her job, because she got a (a) high 
/ (b) low salary. 
(4) Contextual bias: AC outside neg. scope 
Jeder hat sich gefragt, ob die Sekretärin gekündigt hat. 
Die Sekretärin hat nicht gekündigt, weil sie ein (a) hohes / 
(b) geringes Gehalt erhielt. 
Everybody wondered, whether the secretary had quit her 
job. 
The secretary did not quit her job, because she got a (a) high 
/ (b) low salary. 
(5) Contextual bias: AC within neg. scope (I) 
Jeder hat gehört, dass die Sekretärin gekündigt hat. 
Die Sekretärin hat nicht gekündigt, weil sie ein (a) hohes / 
(b) geringes Gehalt erhielt. 
Everybody heard that the secretary had quit her job. 
The secretary did not quit her job, because she got a (a) high 
/ (b) low salary. 
(6) Contextual bias: AC within neg. scope (II) 
Jeder hat sich gefragt, warum die Sekretärin gekündigt hat. 
Die Sekretärin hat nicht gekündigt, weil sie ein (a) hohes / 
(b) geringes Gehalt erhielt. 
Everybody wondered, why the secretary had quit her job.. 
The secretary did not quit her job, because she got a (a) high 
/ (b) low salary. 
Methods 
We applied the same technique as in the previous 
experiment. 24 subjects, all native German speakers and all 
students from the University of Freiburg participated in the 
experiment. Fillers varied along the full range from fully 
grammatical to ungrammatical, as well as from fully 
plausible to highly implausible. 
Results 
There was a reliable main effect of Scope: sentences for 
which the adverbial clause had to be interpreted inside the 
scope of the negation were judged less acceptable than their 
counterparts (F1(1,23) = 26.25, p < 0.001; F2(1,15) = 53.4, 
p < 0.001).  
 
Table II: Acceptability judgments Experiment II 
 
 Neutral 
Context 
Scope 
external 
Scope 
internal I 
Scope 
internal 
II 
AC inside 
scope of 
negation 
-.54 -.38 -.16 -.44 
AC outside  
scope of 
negation 
.36 .26 .39 .52 
 
No main effect of context was found (F1(3, 69) < 1, ns; 
F2(3,45) = 1.23, ns). Although explicitly stating the fact that 
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the proposition described in the matrix clause should not be 
negated rendered the sentences slightly more acceptable 
numerically, this did not result in an interaction between 
Context and Scope (F1(3,69) = 1,12, ns; F2(3,45) = 1.61, 
ns). 
Discussion 
In all contexts, even in those biasing the inside scope 
reading, interpreting the adverbial clause outside of the 
scope of the negation was judged more acceptable. Before 
we will discuss why this may be the case, we will extend the 
phenomenon by including a temporal adverb as a possible 
domain for the negation. 
Experiment III 
In Experiment III we presented the same ambiguous 
constructions as  in the earlier experiments. However, we 
added two conditions with a temporal adverb between the 
negation and the adverbial clause.  This has the effect that 
now, the adverbial clause in (7d) can easily be interpreted 
outside of the scope of the negation which is restricted by 
the temporal adverb (The secretary quit the job before 
yesterday because of the low salary.). The only viable 
interpretation for (7c), however is an interpretation of the 
adverbial clause inside the scope of the negation (The 
secretary actually quit the job yesterday, but not because she 
got a high salary, but e.g., because she didn’t have another 
job offer before.). The prediction is that we should find the 
same preference for the outside scope reading in these 
constructions. 
 
(7) a. AC outside of neg. scope, no restriction before clause 
boundary 
Die Sekretärin kündigte nicht, weil sie ein hohes Gehalt 
erhielt. 
The secretary did not quit her job, because she got a 
high salary. 
b. AC within neg. scope, no restriction before clause 
boundary 
Die Sekretärin kündigte nicht, weil sie ein geringes 
Gehalt erhielt. 
The secretary did not quit her job, because she got a low 
salary. 
c. AC inside of neg. scope, restriction before clause 
boundary 
Die Sekretärin kündigte nicht erst gestern, weil sie ein 
hohes Gehalt erhielt. 
The secretary did not quit her job only yesterday, 
because she got a high salary. 
d. AC outside of neg. scope, restriction before clause 
boundary 
Die Sekretärin kündigte nicht erst gestern, weil sie ein 
geringes Gehalt erhielt. 
The secretary did not quit her job only yesterday, 
because she got a low salary. 
Methods 
As in the other experiments, subjects judged the 
acceptability of the sentences in relation to a reference 
sentence (Magnitude Estimations). The sixteen experimental 
sentences were randomly mixed with 48 filler sentences of 
varying acceptability (some ungrammatical, some highly 
implausible). Sixteen native German subjects, all students of 
the University of Freiburg, participated in the experiment. 
Results 
The sentences where we included a temporal modifier as a 
possible domain for the negation were generally more 
complex and judged less acceptable than the shorter 
versions 5F1(1,15) = 17.69, p < 0.001; F2(1,15) = 10.07; p 
< 0.01). More importantly though, the interpretation of the 
adverbial clause outside of the scope of the negation was 
clearly preferred in both, the shorter and the longer version 
(F1(1,15) = 45.10, p < 0.001; F2(1,15) = 156.00, p < 0.001). 
The difference between the inside and the outside scope 
reading was, however, somewhat stronger for sentences 
without a temporal adverb as indicated by a reliable 
interaction between the two experimental factors (F1(1,15) 
= 5.71, p < 0.05; F2(1,15) = 7.51; p < 0.05). 
 
Table 3: Acceptability judgments Experiment II 
 
 
Restriction 
before 
clause 
boundary 
No 
restriction 
before 
clause b. 
AC within 
scope of 
negation 
-.54 -.24 
AC outside 
of scope of 
negation 
-.05 .85 
Discussion 
Although the sentences including a temporal modifier were 
somewhat less acceptable than the shorter versions, they 
showed the same preference pattern. Interpretation of the 
adverbial clause inside the scope of the negation is always 
far less acceptable than its outside scope interpretation. The 
interaction between the domain of the scope of the negation 
and the presence of  a temporal modifier can be explained 
by the fact that the sentences including a temporal adverb 
were generally semantically more complex. Assuming a 
preference for incremental interpretation (Konieczny, 
Hemforth, Scheepers, & Strube, 1997; Crocker, 1995), the 
negation in these conditions has to be revised (First the 
secretary did not quit her job, then she did, but not only 
yesterday.).   This local revision is obviously less costly 
than a revision between clause boundaries as in (7b), but it 
may have reduced the difference between the final 
interpretation of (7c) and (7d). 
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Experiment IV 
In our fourth experiment, we presented a continuation of the 
sentence, explicitly providing the alternative cause (8a). 
 
(8) a. Die Sekretaerin hat nicht gekuendigt, weil sie ein 
geringes Gehalt erhielt, sondern weil sie ihre Arbeit 
langweilig fand.  
The secretary did not quit her job because she got a low 
salary bur because she found her work boring. 
b. Die Sekretaerin hat nicht gekuendigt, weil sie ein 
hohes  Gehalt erhielt, obwohl sie ihre Arbeit langweilig 
fand.  
The secretary did not quit her job because she got a 
high salary although she found her job boring. 
 
In this Experiment we found, that although the difference is 
actually strongly reduced, interpreting the “because”-clause 
inside the scope of the negation still causes some difficulties 
(mean ME score: 0.09 for 8a, +0.45 for 8b,  F1(1,15) = 5.83, 
p < 0.05; F2(1,15) = 6.51; p < 0.05). 
General Discussion 
A strong preference to interpret the adverbial outside of the 
negative was established, which turned out to be very stable 
across experiments. It is independent of the ordering of the 
verb and the negative (Experiment I). 
 It shows up even in very strong contexts biasing the inside 
scope reading where the secretary actually quit her job 
(Experiment II), and the same pattern can be established in 
constructions, where the negation can be interpreted as 
restricted by a temporal adverb (Experiment III).  Finally, 
Experiment IV shows that the preference for interpreting the 
adverbial clause outside the scope of the negation is reduced 
but not eliminated by a continuation that provides an 
explicit alternative to the negated because clause. 
 Obviously, the interpretation of the adverbial clause 
inside of the scope of the negation is very hard even in a  
context biasing for this reading. The question is why this is 
the case. One possibility is that the short texts in (5) and (6) 
are still semantically incomplete, since we now know what 
is not the reason for the secretary quitting her job but not 
what the reason for doing so actually is. Since it may be 
assumed that negative information is not as well presented 
as positive information (Legrenz, Girotto, & Johnson-Laird, 
2003)), mental models for texts like these may be 
insufficiently specified und thus less acceptable.  The data 
presented for Experiment IV, on the other hand, suggest that 
this aspect actually plays a major role. However, it does not 
seem to tell the whole story, since even an explicitly given 
alternative does not render the inside scope reading as 
acceptable as the outside scope reading. 
 An further possibility lies in the interaction of semantic 
and prosodic information. Ronat (1984) presents the 
Prosodic Binding hypothesis for French, roughly stating that 
a prosodic boundary delimits the scope of a quantifier or a 
wh-phrase (see also the Scope Correspondence Principle 
(SPC) suggested by Hirotani, 2003, for Japanese).  Note, 
that this is actually a principle of grammar, meant to 
constrain the interpretational domain of quantifiers. 
 Assuming  that even during silent reading, a prosodic 
structure of a sentence is constructed (Implicit Prosody 
Hypothesis; Fodor, 1998), this may play a role in reading as 
well. Since there is a high probability for a prosodic 
boundary between the matrix clause and the adverbial 
clause, the AC cannot  be interpreted inside the scope of the 
negation. The inside scope reading of the adverbial clause is 
actually only viable with a very marked prosodic contour. 
At least intuitively (as stated by several native German and 
English informants), the break before the adverbial clause in 
this marked prosodic contour is strongly reduced. 
Interestingly, this seems to be true even though there still 
has to be a comma in the German clauses. So the comma by 
itself cannot be the major factor. The remaining difficulty in 
interpreting “complete” models may thus result from the 
interaction of semantic and prosodic constraints. This will, 
however,  be a question to be answered in future research 
(Bradley, Fodor, Fernandez, Hemforth, & Pynte, in prep).  
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Abstract
Past research on children’s categorizations has suggested
that children use perceptual and conceptual knowledge
to generalize object names. Especially, some researches
suggested that the relation between ontological cate-
gories and linguistic categories is a critical cue to cate-
gorize objects. However, this mechanism has not been
specified. This paper reports new insights to reveal chil-
dren’s categorizations based on the survey of adults’
knowledge. We estimated the English and Japanese on-
tological spaces from data and used these results to sim-
ulate behavioral experiment of previous research. The
results show a possibility that linguistic cues help chil-
dren to attend specific perceptual properties.
Introduction
Categorization is a form of information compression, one
solution to handle an almost inﬁnite number of entities
eﬃciently. Where do these categories come from and
how do children know which words to map to which cat-
egories?
Quine (1960) pointed to the diﬃculty of word learn-
ing without prior category knowledge. If we hear a novel
word in an unknown language, how do we infer its mean-
ing ? For example, suppose we heard ‘gavagai’ while
looking at a rabbit in a ﬁeld. ‘Gavagai’ might mean rab-
bit, but it could also mean rabbit’s color or an inﬁnite
variety of other possibilities. By Quine’s analysis, word
learning should be highly problematic for ﬁrst language
learners.
Constraints to acquire word meanings
Markman & Hutchinson (1984) among others proposed
that children learn nouns easily because they do have
prior knowledge about kinds of categories. Research
over the past 20 years has indicated that this knowl-
edge is considerable. Children know, for example, that
animal categories are organized by multiple similarities,
that artifact categories are organized by shape, and that
substance categories are organized by material. Given
a single thing of each of these kinds and told its name,
children systematically generalize that name to new in-
stances in ways speciﬁc to the kind of thing it is (Landau,
Smith & Jones, 1988; Soja, Carey & Spelke, 1991, etc.)
One hypothesis is that this knowledge is learned, that
as children learn common nouns, they learn the correla-
tions between properties speciﬁc to diﬀerent kinds and
the similarities relevant to categorizing those kinds - that
things with eyes are classiﬁed by multiple similarities,
things that are solid and rigid are classiﬁed by shape,
and things that are nonsolid and nonrigid are classiﬁed
by material (Jones & Smith, 2002; Yoshida & Smith,
2003). The learning hypothesis is plausible because chil-
dren’s diﬀerential categorizations of animates, objects
and substances emerge only after they have learned some
number of names for these diﬀerent kinds (Samuelson &
Smith 1999), The present paper provides a simulation
model of how this might be learned.
Linguistic categories and ontological categories
The fact that children distinguish animal, object, and
substance categories in noun learning is also interesting
because these ontological categories are often related to
linguistic individuation, to how diﬀerent languages quan-
tify nouns. Most of the world’s languages treat animates
as countable discrete things. Others, like English, also
treat inanimate objects as discrete and countable. Few
(if any languages) individuate substances in these ways.
(Lucy, 1992)
Some have suggested a deep relation between onto-
logical categories and their learning how their language
quantiﬁes entities. For example, Quine (1960) hypothe-
sized that children learning English learn to distinguish
objects and substances by learning the count-mass dis-
tinction. In English, nouns such as “dog” and “cup” that
label individuated things are count nouns and mandato-
rily take the plural if there are more than one instance;
in contrast, nouns such as “sand” that label a substance
are mass nouns and are not pluralized. Thus this lin-
guistic distinction could teach children that there are
two diﬀerent kinds of categories.
Soja, Carey and Spelke (1991) criticized this idea, be-
cause their experiments indicated that 2-year-old chil-
dren who do not use count-mass syntax nonetheless clas-
sify objects by shape and substances by material. Imai
& Gentner (1997) reported supporting results in a study
comparing English and Japanese speakers. Japanese
makes no distinction comparable to the count-mass dis-
tinction in its quantiﬁcation system. Yet Imai and Gen-
tner found that both Japanese- and English-speaking
children categorized objects by shape and substances by
material.
A boundary shift Imai and Genter also found dif-
ferences in the range of things treated as objects versus
substances by speakers of the two languages. Speakers
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of English treated complex and simple solids as objects
categorized by shape and nonsolid forms as substances
categorized by material. In contrast, Japanese speakers
treated complex solids as objects classiﬁable by shape
and treated simple solids and nonsolids as substances
classiﬁable by material. Yoshida and Smith interpreted
these results in terms a boundary shift, suggesting that
count-mass syntax shifted the object boundary in En-
glish relative to that in Japanese so that it also included
simple but solid shapes. If this interpretation is correct
then linguistic contrasts such as count-mass syntax may
play a role in the development of ontological categories.
Yoshida and Smith also predicted and found a cor-
responding boundary shift at the animate-inanimate
boundary. They predicted this from an analysis of
Japanese which distinguishes animates and inanimates
in ways that English does not, through its quantiﬁcation
system and also via the verbs “iru” and “aru” which
mean “exists”. In locative constructions such as “There
is,” animates require the use of iru and inmates require
the use of aru. Yoshida and Smith hypothesized that
this distinction, like the count-mass distinction in En-
glish, would perturb the boundary between animates and
objects. In support of this idea, they showed that the
range of things treated as animates (and classiﬁed by
multiple similarities) was broader for Japanese-speaking
than English-speaking children.
The purpose of the simulations reported here is to ex-
plain the mechanism underlying the boundary shift. Fol-
lowing Yoshida and Smith, we propose that ontological
categories are the product of learned correlations among
the properties such as shape, material and color and also
linguistic contrasts such as the count-mass distinction in
English and the iru-aru distinction in Japanese.
Experiment 1
We measured statistical structure of common noun cat-
egory via adult judgments. We studied the statisti-
cal structure of 48 nouns that name common categories
typically known by 2 year olds (Fenson, Dale, Reznick,
Bates, Thal & Pethick, 1994) 1W˙e did this in two steps.
First, we asked adults to judge how a list of 16 adjectives
taken from some studies using the Semantic Diﬀeren-
tial (the SD; Osgood, 1957) described category relevant
properties such as shape, material, movement. Second,
in vocabulary survey, we asked adults to rate how the 16
adjectives described the 48 noun categories.
Method
Participants In the adjective survey, we recruited 12
volunteers (from 23 to 25 years old) from Kyoto univer-
sity. In the vocabulary survey, we recruited 104 students
(from 18 to 22 years old) from Kyoto Koka women’s uni-
versity who received a class credit for participation.
Stimuli The stimuli consisted of (1) a list of category
relevant perceptual properties: shape, material, color,
1This form of the MCDI is a parental checklist of words
designed to measure the productive vocabulary of children
between 16 and 30 months of age.
texture, sound, temperature, ﬂavor, movement, smell,
and function, (2) 16 adjective pairs: dynamic-static,
wet-dry, light-heavy, large-small, complex-simple, slow-
quick, quiet-noisy, stable-unstable, cool-warm, natural-
artiﬁcial, round-square, weak-strong, rough hewn-ﬁnely
crafted, straight-curved, smooth-bumpy, hard-soft; and
(3) 48 nouns commonly known by young children 2 (see
also Table 1).
Adjective survey Participants were asked - ‘How do
you use these words (adjective pairs) to express familiar
objects’ perceptual features’. Participants made these
judgments using an electronic ﬁle of the 16 (adjectives)
by 10 (properties) cells. The ratings were on a 5 point
scale (1: very inappropriate, 2: inappropriate, 3: nei-
ther, 4: appropriate, 5 :very appropriate).
Vocabulary survey Participants were presented with
one noun at a time and asked to judge the applicability
of the 16 adjective pairs on a 5 point scale. For example,
if the adjective pair was big-small, participants would be
asked the thing labeled by the noun very small, small,
ambiguous, big and very big. Five diﬀerent orders were
used across subjects.
Analysis We used Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) to analyze the vocabulary with mean linguistic-
scale scores of the all participants. PCA is a popular
method to compress information by the least loss of data
variance.
We used the results to estimate the English and
Japanese ontological spaces. We added 1-dimension syn-
tactic cues which was close to ontological categories (Ta-
ble 1) to raw data (16 dimensions), and analyzed the
combined data (17 dimensions). In the English condi-
tion, we added count-mass syntax which was encoded as
1-0. In the Japanese condition, we added iru-aru syntax
just as in the English condition. In the neutral condition,
we added the value 0.5 for all objects. We decided these
parameters of syntactic categories based on the dictio-
naries. We assumed that (1) our ontology space consists
of perceptual and linguistic properties, and that (2) the
most important factor of these space is the variance of
the object’s distribution. These assumptions are reason-
able, because (1) our goal is to estimate children’s on-
tology space in the context of generalizing novel names
and (2) we name entities diﬀerent labels based on not
similar features but diﬀerent properties.
Our another goal is to estimate perceptual weights
in two language conditions. However, principal compo-
nents consist of weights of linguistic scales, so we can
not directly know which perceptual weights the ontology
spaces have. Therefore we deﬁned perceptual weights of
principal components as the equation(1) to analyze per-
ceptual weights in English and Japanese conditions.
Wdp =|
∑
l
CdlMlp | (1)
2The 9 categories are ‘animals’, ‘body parts’, ‘clothing’,
‘food and drink’, ‘furniture and rooms’, ‘outside things’,
‘small household items’, ‘toys’, and ‘vehicles’.
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Table 1: Linguistic categories of 48 nouns in English
and Japanese. E=English, J=Japanese, c=count noun,
m=mass noun, i=with-‘iru’ noun, a=with-‘aru’ noun
E J E J E J
butterfly c i banana c a water m a
cat c i egg c a camera c a
fish c i ice cream c a cup c a
frog c i milk m a key c a
horse c i pizza c a money m a
monkey c i salt m a paper m a
tiger c i toast c a scissors c a
arm c a bed c a plant c a
eye c a chair c a balloon c a
hand c a door c a book c a
knee c a refrigerator c a doll c a
tongue c a table c a glue m a
boots c a rain m a airplane c a
gloves c a snow m a train c a
jeans c a stone c a car c a
shirt c a tree c a bicycle c a
d is a dimension of principal components. l is a index of
16 linguistic scales of the SD (see also Method). p is the
index of the 10 perceptual properties (see also Method).
Wdp is the pth perceptual weight of dth principal com-
ponent. Cdl is the loading of lth linguistic scales of dth
principal component. Mlp is the estimated expressive-
ness of the pth perception of the lth linguistic scales.
Cd∗ is a unit row vector and M∗p is a unit column vec-
tor, so Wdp is the absolute inner product of two vectors,
or | cosθ | (θ is the angle of two vectors).
Results and Discussion
First three and six principal components respectively ac-
counted for more than 70% and 90 % of the variability
in the data.
Estimated ontological spaces The ﬁrst two princi-
pal components of the vocabulary survey data were dis-
played as a 2-dimensional plot (Figure 1 is the result of
neutral condition). In the neutral condition, we found
animates and body parts in upper-right area, vehicles in
upper-left area, furniture in lower-left area and substance
in lower-right area. This distribution of entities leads us
the following interpretation of the ﬁrst two components.
The ﬁrst principal component axis can be interpreted as
‘solidity’, because solid and non-solid entities are located
in the left and right sides, respectively. The second prin-
cipal component axis can be interpreted as ‘animacy’,
because dynamic and static entities are located in the
upper and lower sides, respectively.
There were no clear boundaries in neutral 2-
dimensional space, but we found global boundaries in
the English and Japanese space. Furthermore, the En-
glish and Japanese spaces had a great diﬀerence. The
English space also had ‘solidity’ axis as the ﬁrst princi-
pal component, but the Japanese space had ‘animacy’
axis as the ﬁrst principal component. Therefore, we an-
alyzed these distributions of entities by clustering.
First three principal components (total 70% over) were
enough to analyze global structure of results, so we an-
alyzed this 3-dimensional data by hierarchical cluster-
ing(Figures 2 and 3).
The clustering of the neutral condition showed the
Table 2: The estimated perceptual weights. In the Ex-
periment 2, we used the normalized Wdp (
∑10
p Wdp = 1).
English Japanese
shape 0.091 0.047
color 0.067 0.194
texture 0.086 0.09
clusters like MCDI classes, but did not show any global
boundaries. On the other hand, the analyses of the En-
glish and Japanese conditions showed the global bound-
ary (Figures 2 and 3). There were two global clusters
categorized near by the root of the tree. One cluster
mainly consisted of ‘objects’ category members, and an-
other cluster mainly consisted of ‘substance’ category
members. The second branch occurred in the object
cluster. There was the ‘animates’ cluster near substance
cluster in the part of objects cluster. That is why, En-
glish ontology space seemed deﬁned by ‘individuation’
or ‘solidity’.
In the Japanese condition, there were two global clus-
ters that mainly consisted of ‘animates’ members and
‘inanimates’ members. Despite being inanimates, ve-
hicles(e.g. ‘airplane’, ‘car’) and body parts(e.g. ‘eye’,
‘hand’) were near the animates members. There seemed
an ‘animacy’ boundary in the Japanese ontological space
because animates and dynamic objects make cluster and
inanimates make another cluster.
Perceptual weights of the English and Japanese
spaces We estimated perceptual weight in the English
and Japanese ontological spaces. Tables 2 shows the
results of the estimation.
Compared with the Japanese condition, the English
condition showed higher weight on shape. Contrary to
the English condition, the Japanese condition showed
higher weights on color and texture.
Estimating ontological category One potential
problem with the present experiment is that the percep-
tual ontological space was derived from only Japanese
speaker’s data.
We are currently collecting the English data. Prelim-
inary results indicate that they are extremely similar to
those of Japanese speakers. The Pearson’s correlation
of mean across participants are .79 in vocabulary sur-
vey and .80 in adjective survey. In this work, we have
assumed that the adjective - noun ratings and the adjec-
tives - properties ratings reﬂect the perceptual structure
of the categories. It could be argued that these rating
reﬂect instead how predicates and nouns co-occur in a
language.
Sommers (1963) claimed that knowledge of ontological
categories is intimately related to predicability, that is,
to the knowledge of which predicates in a language can
be combined with which nouns. For example, the pred-
icate ‘is asleep’ distinguishes animals and non-animals.
Furthermore, Keil (1979, 1981) showed that children’s
judgments of predicability, like those of adults, yield an
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Figure 1: The ﬁrst two principal components for the
neutral condition. The ﬁrst principal component (x axis)
was interpreted as ‘solidity’ or ‘size’ of objects. The sec-
ond principal component(y axis) was interpreted as ‘an-
imacy’ or ‘movement’ of objects.
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Figure 2: The result of cluster analysis for the En-
glish condition. We estimated ‘objects’ cluster and ‘sub-
stance’ cluster in superior hierarchy.
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Figure 3: The result of cluster analysis for the Japanese
condition. We estimated ‘animates’ cluster and ‘inani-
mates’ cluster in superior hierarchy.
ontological tree, though a less elaborate one than adults.
The question of whether our judgments reﬂect the struc-
ture of categories in the world or relations among words
is a diﬃcult one. Given our preliminary results from En-
glish, if they do reﬂect relations among words-predicates
and nouns,those relations are nearly identical in the two
language, a fact one might want to explain by the regu-
larities in the world.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 uses the results of Experiment 1 to sim-
ulate the boundary shift reported by Yoshida and Smith.
Experiment to be simulated The speciﬁc goal is to
simulate Yoshida and Smith’s second experiment which
showed a boundary shift in the animate - inanimate
boundary Japanese speakers relative to English speak-
ers. The participants in Yoshida and Smith’s experiment
were 3-year-old English and Japanese monolingual chil-
dren. The experimenters presented children with an am-
biguous entity that could be seen as depictions of ether
animates or inanimates and named it with a novel label
(e.g. in Japanese ‘Kore-wa teema dayo’, in English ‘This
is a teema.’). Experimenters did not provide any cue
such as “iru” or “aru” which might cue these as depic-
tions of animates or inanimates Experimenters then pre-
sented children with test objects and asked them whether
the test object had the same name Exemplars and test
objects matched or did not match in three perceptual
features (Table 3).
The results suggested that Japanese speakers treated
these ambiguous forms as depictions of animates, ex-
tending the name to new instances by multiple simi-
larities. In contrast, English speakers treated them as
inanimates objects, extending the name to new instances
by shape. Thus, Yoshida and Smith proposed that the
Japanese speaking children included a wider range of
kinds in the animate category relative to English speak-
ers just as English speakers include a wider range of in-
stances in the objects category than do Japanese speak-
ers. The question for Experiment 2 is whether we can
use the adult judgments in Experiment 1 to simulate
these results.
Method
Following Yoshida and Smith’s method, we assumed that
objects categories are deﬁned in terms of shape, color
and texture, and that other nonstudied features will have
no eﬀect on the similarity of a test object to the exem-
plar.
We also assume that children’s name extensions are
based on the psychological distance between a test object
and the exemplar. We deﬁned the psychological distance
between stimuli by the equation (3). Probability of ‘yes’
response which means two objects belong to the same
category is deﬁned by the equation (2).
Pyes = exp(−bδ) (2)
δ = (
∑
i⊂perception
Diwil | (ei − si)m |) 1m (3)
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Table 3: Experimental conditions of Yoshida & Smith
(2003). ‘m’ means feature match between exemplar and
test object, and ‘N’ means non-match
condition 1 2 3 4 5 6
shape m m m m N N
texture m m N N m N
color m N m N N m
S+T+C S+T S+C S T C
b > 0 is the scaling parameter of the transfer be-
tween a distance and a yes-response ratio , and m >
0 is the metric parameter. i ⊂ perception =
{shape(S), color(C), texture(T )} means the population
of the perceptual features. ei represents the ith per-
ceptual dimension of the exemplar, and it is a random
value from 0 to 1. si represents the ith perceptual di-
mension of the test stimulus. si is a random value from
0 to 1 in case of feature non-match or the same value
as the exemplar in case of feature match (see also Ta-
ble 3). wil is the value of ith perceptual weight of l
(l ⊂ {English, Japanese}) participant(see also Table
2). Dis are the supplementary terms which represent ith
perceptual bias common in English and Japanese. We
added these terms to the model because the feature dif-
ferences of stimuli were not controlled in the behavioral
experiment. Dis represent the relative mean diﬀerence
of perceptual features. The model have four free param-
eters (b, m, two Dis) ,because Dis are the ratios among
three perceptual features.
Results and Discussion
We simulated the second experiment of Yoshida and
Smith (Figure 4) by the computational model (Figure 5).
We used Monte Carlo simulation to estimate optimal pa-
rameters. In the result, we estimated b = 12, m = 0.8、
(Dshape,Dtexture,Dcolor) = (7, 1, 0.6) (Dtexture = 1 is
constant) and R2 = 0.916 between the response patterns
(12=2 (language of participants)×6 (feature controlled
condition)) of simulation and those of behavior. When
we did not add two parameters Dis, the ﬁtness of the
model was R2 = 0.683. This suggested the methodolog-
ical problem of estimation by the equation (2).
In the behavioral experiment, the English speakers
categorized the stimuli based on their shape and the
Japanese speakers categorized them based on their mul-
tiple features. These results suggested that the English
speakers categorized ambiguous objects as inanimates
whereas Japanese speakers categorize them as animates.
Thus our model ﬁtted the behavioral results well, and
provides a simple account of the crosslinguistic diﬀer-
ence.
General Discussion
Recent studies on early word acquisition have shown that
some biases, such as shape bias, are not so universal,
but dependent on context and language. For example,
Children speaking English show stronger shape bias for
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Figure 4: The behavioral data of Yoshida & Smith (2003).
The English speakers categorize stimuli based on shape, while
the Japanese speakers categorize them based on multiple fea-
tures.
inanimate objects than those speaking Japanese. These
ﬁndings are explained by postulating children’s linguis-
tic, cultural and category knowledge inﬂuences bound-
aries between ontological categories.
The present simulation oﬀers a mechanism. The re-
sults of the simulation suggest that (1) ontological cat-
egories may not be a special nor given but an emer-
gent property derived from multidimensional perceptual
and linguistic features, and (2) crosslinguistic diﬀerences
along this ontological continuum can be explained by a
diﬀerence in the emergent variable due to diﬀerent sta-
tistical structure of linguistic features. Speciﬁcally, we
assumed that the emergent property can be extracted by
information compression of the multidimensional feature
space, such as PCA. To evaluate whether we can account
for the behavioral ﬁndings, we conducted a survey to ob-
tain the multidimensional feature space of objects, and
a series of quantitative analyses to obtain the language
speciﬁc ontological spaces. Without linguistic features,
the compressed perceptual space spanned by two princi-
pal components was organized by objects’ solidity or size.
Thus, a solidity-dominant space can be derived from
the perceptual feature space, but there was no principal
component representing an “individuation continuum”
from animates to objects to substances. More interest-
ingly, addition of linguistic features made the ontologi-
cal space more well-deﬁned, and the estimated language-
speciﬁc ontological spaces are quite consistent with pre-
vious ﬁndings. The estimated English ontological space
was solidity-dominant and shape-weighted. This is con-
sistent with Colunga & Smith (2000) and Samuelson
(2002) showing that American children attended solidity
of objects in object categorization. On the other hand,
the estimated Japanese ontological space is animacy-
dominant and color-and-texture-weighted, which is con-
sistent with Yoshida & Smith (2001, 2003) showing that
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Figure 5: The result of simulation.
The coeﬃcient of determination of 12 responses pattern
(R2) is 0.916
Japanese children attended multiple features of objects.
Furthermore, objects/substance boundary was clearer
in the English space than the Japanese space. This re-
sults is consistent with Imai & Gentner (1997). In ad-
dition to qualitative matches with previous data, our
theory make a good quantitative ﬁt to the behavioral
data of Yoshida & Smith (2003). With a simple com-
putational model that categorization response is based
on similarity derived from a distance on the ontological
space, the behavioral data showing diﬀerence in shape
bias for objects between English and Japanese speaking
children with various diﬀerent stimulus conditions could
be simulated quite well.
Beyond the “boundary shift” Our account ex-
pands the boundary shift hypothesis in the following
senses. First, our theory proposes an underlying mecha-
nism of boundary shift in a quantitative fashion. Second,
the individuation continuum is not a separate dimension,
but a statistical property embedded in the multidimen-
sional feature space. Ontological features such as ani-
macy and solidity may be extracted from perceptual and
linguistic features through statistical learning. This sug-
gests a possibility that more abstract conceptual features
are also formed by statistical learning of basic perceptual
and linguistic features.
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Abstract
Learning is often about prediction. This paper asks whether
perception is also. The main idea is that perception is a stream
and that perceivers learn the trajectory through which one mo-
ment in that stream turns into the next. A behavioral experi-
ment with children is described that tests two hypotheses de-
veloped from this idea.. In the experiment, children briefly
watch a transformation (e.g., a triangle increasing in size
and/or saturation). If children learn the trajectory of change
and if prediction is at the core of perception, then a subsequent
statically presented object should trigger the perceptual system
to anticipate the “next state”. To test this, children were asked
to make same/different judgments that should, by hypothesis,
be interfered with by the learned trajectory. Children became
less able to detect pairs that were the “same” when asked to
make judgments about the dimension that they had seen varied.
Furthermore, there was evidence that two dimensions could be
made more integral by covarying them simultaneously. Both
of these results were simulated with a simple connectionist
model constructed to embody a predictive mechanism. Taken
together, these results lend support to the idea that the percep-
tual system is designed to make predictions in time and that
this architecture gives a “dynamic” aspect to perception.
Introduction
Perception is an interaction in time between a dynamic mind
and a dynamic world. It is crucial to the understanding of
this process that both sides of the relation are changing in
time. This paper examines two key implications of this fact:
1) an element of prediction must be inherent in the perceptual
process, and 2) the system should be adaptable to a changing
environment.
There is ample evidence for the adaptability of the percep-
tual system in the short and long term. In the short term,
the evidence shows up in the form of aftereffects and prim-
ing. For example, motion aftereffects (MAEs), illusions of
motion (without displacement) that occur after viewing real
motion in a certain direction for a short time, are considered
to be perceptual adaptations that serve to keep the system in
balance (Anstis, Verstraten, & Mather, 1998). In the long
term, adaptation shows up as the perceptual learning of new
psychological dimensions and features and the readjustment
of the relative attention paid to existing dimensions (Gold-
stone, 1998). In brief, our perceptual systems constantly tune
themselves to the environment.
Furthermore, our perceptual systems must also be tuned to
anticipate the future. In the short term, the system must be
able to predict, at a very low level, how our environment and
the things in it change and appreciate which changes are nor-
mal and which are unexpected. Normal changes include reg-
ular transformations along dimensions, for example changes
in position, size, orientation, luminance, pitch, and so on.
There is evidence for the predictive capabilities of the sys-
tem in many everyday activities, like tracking moving objects
behind occluders, navigation through crowds, simple eye-
hand coordination, and in several related experimental phe-
nomena where the system exhibits momentum when track-
ing predictable changes. For example, in the phenomenon
known as representational momentum, subjects learn to an-
ticipate the continuation of a transformation, for example an
object moving across a computer screen. When the object
suddenly disappears and subjects are probed about its nal
position, there is evidence that the remembered position is
shifted forward along the path of the trajectory (Freyd, 1992).
This has been taken by some (e.g. Freyd, 1992; Hubbard,
1999) as evidence of a dynamic representation that con-
tinues to move forward after the real object has disappeared.
However, the evidence is also consistent with the possibil-
ity that the trajectory of the object is being perceptually pre-
dicted and thus the perceived position of the object at any
given instant in time is actually ahead of its actual position.1
Such a view would be consistent with an explanation for sev-
eral other perceptual illusions given recently by Changizi and
Widders (2002) and Changizi, Nijhawan, Kanai, and Shimojo
(2003).
This paper will present further empirical evidence of a per-
ceptual adaptation that is triggered by predictable variation.
A simulation of the experiments using a simple model of a
predictive mechanism will then be presented as additional
support for these ideas.
Experiment
If an adaptable, predictive mechanism is built into our low-
level perceptual systems then it should be possible to prime
the system to anticipate and perceive change as in the mo-
mentum effects, even when tested with static objects. If the
primed change is along a dimension, this might disrupt the
perception of the value for this dimension in a subsequently
presented static object. If caused by an adaptable, predictive
mechanism, this disruption would have two characteristics:
1. a perceptual shift in the direction of the primed change;
and
2. less certainty about the precise value of the dimension.2
1 Of course it is possible that both of these theories are operating.
2 This is analogous to uncertainty principles in physics, although
it also stems from the imperfection that will be inherent in any phys-
ical predictive mechanism, especially in circumstances where it has
only had a brief exposure to the trajectory that it is trying to learn to
predict.
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This experiment deals with the second characteristic. It
was designed to test the hypothesis that priming the per-
ceptual system with bidirectional change along a dimension
could lead to perceptual spreading along it. Such an effect
should make it more difcult for perceivers to make accurate
comparisons along this dimension subsequent to experienc-
ing this priming. In particular, the spreading should increase
the likelihood that perceivers will see two things that are ac-
tually the same as being different on the dimension.
In this experiment, this hypothesis was evaluated using a
task where the dimensional change was expansion and con-
traction in size. Thus, it was expected that subjects would
have more difculty judging two shapes as being the same
size after exposure to change along the size dimension than
after being exposed to no change, or to change along an irrele-
vant dimension. In this experiment, color saturation was used
as the control dimension. The participants were preschool-
aged children under the assumption that the developing per-
ceptual system is more sensitive to these priming effects.
The use of preschool children was also motivated by the
desire to investigate the usefulness of a predictive mechanism
to a developing perceptual system. Based on the simple idea
that things that change together go together, the hypothesis
was formulated that if the perceptual system adapts to a co-
herent transformation along more than one dimension, these
dimensions might become perceptually fused, or more in-
tegral in the sense formalized by Garner and Felfoldy (1970).
Method
The experiment was a between-subjects design. Subjects
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. There
were also four possible orderings of the test trials (see below).
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of these four orders,
which were counter-balanced across the four conditions.
Participants Thirty-two children from the Bloomington,
IN area have participated. Children were all between 4 years
and 4 years, 8 months of age. (Mean age was 4.3 years.)
Procedure The experiment was divided into three phases,
all of which used a computer to present the stimuli.
In the rst, warm-up phase, subjects were familiarized
with the computer and trained to press the space bar when-
ever they were presented with a pair of shapes on the screen
that were the same size. This phase was the same for all sub-
jects, regardless of what condition they were in. The items
presented included pictures of various common and colorful
objects (e.g. balls, ags, hearts, etc). Across trials match-
ing and mismatching objects and matching and mismatching
sizes varied orthogonally so as to instruct the child as to the
importance of attention to size only.
Subjects were presented with 32 warm-up comparisons,
starting at a slow presentation rate and gradually increasing
to 1.25 seconds per pair. Whenever a new pair appeared, the
computer would emit a short beep. A different pitched beep
would sound whenever the space bar was pressed. If an error
was made (either the pair were the same size and the child
failed to press the space bar, or the pair were different sizes
and the child incorrectly pressed the space bar), the computer
would emit a lower beep and the warm-up sequence would
stop. The experimenter would then explain the mistake to
the child, pointing out what they should have done, and then
continue the sequence. If, after 32 trials, the child had not yet
grasped the task, the training phase was repeated. If they still
had not grasped the task after three passes, the subject’s data
was replaced.
In the second phase, the priming phase, all children
were shown a simple video animation that lasted 80 seconds
and consisted of 20 repetitions of a transformation of two
shapes. The transformation that children saw depended on
their condition assignment and will be described in the next
section, however the instructions were identical for all four
conditions. Children were told that they were playing a game
in which they were supposed to press the space bar when-
ever the shapes stop changing and begin to change back.
The game was simply a ruse to help keep the children paying
attention to the crucial animations.
The nal phase of the experiment, the test phase, was
similar to the training phase. Here subjects were again told to
press the space bar as quickly as possible whenever they saw
a pair of shapes that were the same size. In the test phase,
the shapes being compared were either a pair of circles or a
pair of squares. Half of the comparisons were the same size
and half were different. The shapes were either both blue or
both red, with their saturations varying as described in the
next section. As in the warm-up phase, the computer emitted
a beep whenever a new pair was displayed and a different
pitched beep whenever the space bar was pressed. No feed-
back was provided during the test phase.
During the test phase, each pair was displayed for exactly
1.25 seconds. After being given the instructions, and prior to
starting, subjects were warned that the speed would be fast
and that they should get ready. There were 32 test stimuli in
this phase, broken down into four sets of eight. After each
set of eight, the computer would pause and the subject would
be reminded of the instructions, and told to get ready again.
Test trials were presented to subjects in one of four random
orders. To ensure that children were still on task, any child
that pressed the space bar on at least 20% or more than 80%
of the test trials was replaced.
Materials The priming phase was designed to teach the
perceptual system a predictable trajectory of change. There
were four possible animations used corresponding with the
four conditions. All animations showed the gradual transfor-
mation of a pair of side-by-side triangles. The left and right
triangle always transformed identically and in synch with one
another. The left triangle was always red and the right triangle
was always blue. The four conditions were as follows:
1. Control: increasing and decreasing saturation;
2. Size-Only: increasing and decreasing size;
3. Correlated: both size and saturation increasing and de-
creasing: the bigger the triangles got, the more saturated, and
the smaller they got, the less saturated;
4. Anti-correlated: both size and saturation increasing and
decreasing: the bigger the triangles got, the less saturated,
and the smaller they got, the more saturated.
Since size is at least one of the transformed dimensions in
Conditions 2-4, the three conditions will collectively be re-
ferred to as the Size-change conditions. Conversely, since
saturation is at least one of the transformed dimensions in
Conditions 1, 3 and 4, these three conditions will be referred
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to together as the Saturation-change conditions.
The minimum size (area) of the triangles in the three
Size-change animations, as displayed on the monitor, was
1.83cm2 (base 1.63cm, height 2.25cm); the maximum size
was 29.25cm2 (base 6.5cm, height 9.0cm). The minimum
saturation in the Saturation-change animations was 0.1 on a
scale of 0 to 1; the maximum was 1.0. For Condition 1, the
size of the triangles remained constant at 29.25cm2. For Con-
dition 2, the saturation of both triangles remained constant
at 0.8. For the Size-change animations, the triangles always
started and ended at their smallest point.
In the Testing phase, there were four different types of
comparison possible. These were among shapes that were
either big, medium or small in size (see Table 1) and high,
medium or low in saturation (1.00, 0.45 and 0.20 respectively
in the range of 01).
Table 1: Actual On-Screen Areas (in cm2)
Term Squares Circles
Big 27.56 9.33
Medium 12.25 5.25
Small 4.86 2.33
The four types of comparison were as follows:
1. Identical: Pair being compared were identical in both
size and saturation. There were four variations of this:
big/high, big/low, small/high, small/low.
2. Saturation Different: Pair being compared were the
same size, but differed in saturation. There were two vari-
ations of this: big/high compared to big/low and small/high
compared to small/low.
3. Size Different: Pair being compared were the same sat-
uration, but differed in size. There were four variations of
this. In the rst two, the pair were both high saturation. In
the second two, the pair were both low saturation. One of
the shapes was always medium size and the other was always
either small or big.
4. Both Different: Pair being compared were different both
in size and saturation. In these pairs, the bigger shape always
had the higher saturation. (This was done for reasons related
to other experiments not reported here.) As in the Size Differ-
ent comparisons, one of the shapes was always medium size
and the other was always either small or big.
Results
Children’s errors were classied by the type of comparison
trial in which they occurred and the condition to which the
subjects were assigned. There were two broad classes of er-
rors: Misses, where the shapes were the same size yet the
subject failed to press the space bar, and False Alarms where
the shapes were different size and yet the subject incorrectly
pressed the space bar.
Figure 1 shows the average number of Misses broken down
by the four priming conditions and two types of relevant test
trial (Identical trials on the left and Saturation Different tri-
als on the right in each group). As can be seen, there were
signicantly more Misses in the Size-Change conditions as
compared to the Control Condition (p < .02 for the Identical
trials, p < .002 for the Saturation Different trials).
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Figure 1: Average Misses for Same-Size trials
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Figure 2: Average disciminibility
An analysis from the perspective of Signal Detection The-
ory (SDT) was also performed. Figure 2 shows the average
d′ (discriminability or sensitivity) for each of the four con-
ditions.3 As can be seen, the three Size-change conditions
had a signicantly lower average d ′ value (p < .03) than the
Control Condition. (In this context, lower d ′ values mean
that it is harder to distinguish Same Size shapes from Dif-
ferent Size shapes.) The three Size-change conditions also
had a marginally signicant (p < .06) higher average β value
(criterion for pressing the space bar): they were less likely to
respond Same Size in general. Also, the Correlated condi-
tion by itself also had a signicantly lower d ′ (p < .01) and
higher β (p < .03) than the Control condition.
Figure 3 shows the False Alarms, again broken down by the
four conditions and two types of relevant test trial (Size Dif-
ferent trials on the left and Both Different trials on the right).
Considering Figure 3, notice that the gap between the number
of False Alarms in the Different Size, Same Saturation trials
and the number of False Alarms in the Different Size, Dif-
ferent Saturation trials increased in the conditions where size
and saturation were covaried (Correlated and Anti-correlated)
over what it was in the conditions where they were varied in-
3 For one subject in Condition 2, d′ was infinite because the sub-
ject had a Hit Rate of 1.0. For this subject, d ′ was estimated using
an adjusted Hit Rate of 15.5/16 = .9688, yielding a d ′ of 3.01.
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Figure 3: Average False Alarms for Different-Size trials
dependently. The graph shows the group averages and the
error bars are the standard error of these means. For each
subject, the difference between their number of False Alarms
on the Different Size, Same Saturation trials and the Differ-
ent Size, Different Saturation trials was computed. This dif-
ference was found to be signicantly above zero in both the
Correlated (p < .006) and Anti-correlated (p < .028) condi-
tions. Comparing to the Control and Size-only Conditions, it
can be seen that no such difference existed where the dimen-
sions were varied independently during the priming event.
When the within-subject difference scores of the two covar-
ied conditions are compared to the difference scores of the
two independent conditions, the covaried differences are
signicantly bigger (p < .04). Thus, differences in the irrel-
evant dimension of saturation had a larger effect on subjects’
comparisons of size during test when size and saturation were
covaried together during the priming event.
To see if the effect of the priming event looses its potency
over time, the probability of error on any given test trial was
correlated with how long after the priming phase it occurred.
Table 2 shows the correlation coefcients between error fre-
quency and trial. In no case was the correlation signicant.
Thus, performance did not change throughout the test phase.
Table 2: Correlation between trial number and error prob.
Condition r
Control −.12
Size-only .12
Correlated −.17
Anti-correlated −.29
Discussion
The results appear to support the rst hypothesis of percep-
tual spreading. Priming with size transformations in the three
Size-change conditions led to a decrease in the ability to de-
tect shapes that were the same size in the Test phase. This is
consistent with spreading (bidirectional propagation) along
the size dimension due to the anticipation of change by the
perceptual system. Such spreading apparently leads to dif-
culties in comparison.
The speeded comparison task focusing on just size was
chosen specically to induce errors  it is known that chil-
dren have difculty ignoring variation on an irrelevant dimen-
sion to focus on just one dimension (Smith & Evans, 1989).
The point of interest here was how the type of errors would
be affected by the prior experience with a systematic trajec-
tory of change. It is noteworthy that in the Control and Size-
only conditions, performance was not signicantly different
for test comparisons where the saturation was different than
it was for comparisons where the saturation was the same.
Thus, size and saturation were fairly separable in these two
conditions. The fact that the gap in the number of False
Alarms widened in the two covaried conditions over the
two independent conditions is taken as support for the sec-
ond hypothesis: It appears that coherent, predictable change
along both the size and saturation dimensions caused them
to become more integral, such that saturation differences had
signicantly more of an effect on size comparisons. This nd-
ing has developmental implications, providing a possible ac-
count for how low-level features and properties that start out
as perceptually distinct can congeal into perceptual dimen-
sions when they are experienced as covarying in a predictable
and coherent way. One thing that is very interesting about the
present results is that it took only a relatively short exposure
(80 seconds) to such regularity to produce this effect! Further,
the effect appeared to decay slowly (not measurably) over the
course of the experiment. Taken together, the quick adapta-
tion and slow decay of the effect suggest that an interesting
avenue of future research will be to explore the relationship
between the amount of experience with certain types of trans-
formation and the duration of the adaptation. This type of
predictive learning of correlations may well be a potent part
of the developmental process.
Signal Detection Theory: An Alternative Explanation
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) is a type of analysis that as-
sumes that the system responsible for making decisions is in-
herently noisy, such that, for example in the case of this exper-
iment, even when the shapes are obviously very different in
size there is still a chance that the subject will respond Same
Size. What makes SDT really useful here is that it provides
a way of separating subjects’ propensity to respond Same
Size (their bias or criterion) from their ability to tell the dif-
ference between the Same Size test trials and the Different
Size trials. The predicted perceptual spreading effect should
result in a decrease in this second ability, not merely a change
in bias. And, importantly, there was a signicant difference
in discriminability (d′) triggered by experience with the Size-
change transformations. Subjects had a harder time distin-
guishing between Same Size and Different Size test trials in
these conditions, as the spreading hypothesis would predict.
The assumption of inherent noise that underlies SDT also
provides another way to explain the data. It is possible that
priming the system with changing size (dynamic priming),
increased the internal noise in the perceptual system related
to size judgements. (In SDT terms, this amounts to increasing
the variance of both the signal absent and signal present
distributions.) This would show up in the analysis as a de-
crease in d′, as seen. This provides a potentially useful de-
scription at a different level of abstraction. Indeed, the un-
certainty stemming from the proposed predictive mechanism
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might provide a mechanistic explanation (at a lower level) for
the increased noisiness.
Yet another possibility, and perhaps a simpler account of
the present data than the adaptive prediction hypothesis, is
that the dynamic priming of size increased the children’s
sensitivity to size differences, enabling them to make ner-
grained distinctions of size. In this case, the inherent nois-
iness of the system would have more of an effect. Subjects
would be more sensitive to very slight discrepancies in size
caused by noise and would be less likely to respond Same
Size in general (i.e., they would both Miss more and False
Alarm less). This would show up in the analysis as a differ-
ence in their response bias, β.
The fact that there was a marginally signicant increase
in β in the three Size-change conditions means that this hy-
pothesis cannot be ruled out here as a possibility.4 It should
be noted that this alternative only offers an explanation for
the overall decrease in performance in the three Size-change
conditions relative to the Control condition, but it does not
address the effects related to increased Integrality. Nor does
this bias-shift account explain the (more signicant) shift in
d′, which indicates that subjects in the size-change conditions
really did have more difculty distinguishing the Same Size
test trials from the Different Size trials. For this, an adaptive,
prediction mechanism still seems to be reasonable.
A motion aftereffect? The analysis of the probability of
error as a function of trial is interesting because it shows that
the induced effect does not decay rapidly. If it were a typical
motion aftereffect, 80 seconds of exposure to the animation
motion might be expected to trigger on the order of 10 sec-
onds of aftereffect, as motion aftereffects typically decay with
the square root of the time exposed to the inducing motion
(Anstis et al., 1998). Yet the error rate showed only a very
slow decay, lasting over a minute.
Furthermore, the present effects are also set apart from typ-
ical motion aftereffects in that they occur after seeing bidirec-
tional motion. Motion aftereffects typically occur in the op-
posite direction from the direction of inducing motion (Anstis
et al., 1998). The theory behind this is that the visual system
adapts to correct what it (mistakenly) takes to be drift in the
neurons detecting motion in the inducing direction and low-
ers their weight relative to neurons sensitive to motion in the
opposite direction. If this accurately reects what really hap-
pens (in a MAE), then bidirectional motion should not pro-
duce the aftereffect because there will be no incentive for the
visual system to suspect drift in the rst place, the opposing
motions will cancel each other out.
Thus, it would appear that the effect observed in this exper-
iment is a new and different type of perceptual adaptation that
is related to traditional motion aftereffects, but underwritten
by a potentially different mechanism.
Model Simulation
The basic principle of perceptual prediction was embodied in
a connectionist model consisting of a simple recurrent net-
work (Elman, 1990). Its task was to actively sample its sen-
sory input and try to predict how it changes in time. By its
nature, such a network allows for supervised learning in the
sense that it can validate its predictions by what eventually
happens. Thus, whenever the model encounters consistent,
gradual, continuous variation (for which it cannot already ac-
count), it might actively train itself to predict this variation.
The model was constructed such that its predictions could be
fed back into its input units, enabling extrapolation in time
and giving perception temporal extent.
There is not room in this paper to go into the details of
the input representation and training procedure. Basically, a
shape was represented by its values on the size and satura-
tion saturation dimensions. There were three different train-
ing sequences corresponding to the four animation conditions
in the experiment. (The Correlated and Anti-correlated con-
ditions were equivalent in the model representations, so they
were combined into a single simulation condition called Co-
varied.) For each pattern in a sequence, the network was
trained to predict the next pattern. A small amount of noise
was injected into this process.
Sixteen networks were trained and tested in each condition
on the same sequences of test pairs that the children saw in the
experiment. The model made comparisons as follows: Given
two patterns to compare, one was chosen to go rst, passed
through the network and the outputs were buffered. Then the
other pattern was passed through the network and its outputs
on the nine size units were compared to the buffered outputs
of the rst pattern using a cosine distance metric. If they fell
within 30 degrees of one another, the process was stopped.
If not, the buffered outputs from the two patterns were then
fed back in as inputs (keeping the same context layer activa-
tions).5 This process repeated until either the output vectors
eventually came within λ = 30 degrees of one another or 10
iterations had gone by. Whenever this process terminated, the
following value was calculated:
How Different = Iterations Required+ 1− cos(θ)
1− cos(λ) . (1)
This equation gives an estimate on how different the two (dy-
namic) representations were from one another. The more it-
erations that were required, the more different the patterns
were. θ is the nal angle between the two output vectors.
Finally, the model decided whether or not to say Same
Size for the patterns based upon how different they were
from one another. The likelihood of saying same was in-
versely proportional to the score computed by Equation 1.
This was operationalized with:
Say Same = (rand < exp(−How Differentβ )) (2)
where rand was a random number uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1, and β was a bias parameter that was set to
2 for this simulation.
Results and Discussion Figures 4 and 5 show the average
Misses and False Alarms (respectively) over the simulation
runs. These are comparable to Figures 1 and 3.
As can be seen, the basic trends that were present in the
child data were also present in the model simulations. In
particular, there were signicantly more misses in the Size-
change conditions as compared to the Control condition. Fur-
themore, the degree of integrality signicantly increased in
4 This has been taken up in other experiments not reported here.
5 The prediction of dynamic spreading stems from this.
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Figure 4: Misses from model simulation
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Figure 5: False Alarms from model simulation
the Covaried condition as seen in the increased False Alarm
gap of Figure 5. This was due to the fact both the size and
saturation dimensions shared the hidden layer and the net-
work learned that each of these dimensions was a good cue to
predict the next state of the other.
General Discussion
At the core of this paper is the idea that our perceptual sys-
tems are oriented around transformations. Transformations
contain rich information about the structure of the world. In-
deed, it is through this temporal structure that we perceive
atemporal structure. (For example, movement is necessary
for the detection of occluding edges.) Furthermore, percep-
tion itself is a process: it has temporal extent. There is never
a single instant when we achieve a percept.6 Moreover,
given that the objects of our perception can be changing at
the same time we are perceiving them, it behooves us to learn
to anticipate their transformations.
The experiment presented herein was designed with this
in mind. It provided evidence for a perceptual adaptation in
response to brief experience with a predictable trajectory. It
showed that there is a dynamic component involved in per-
ception, even with static shapes that are perceptually present.
It also showed that experience with coherent transformations
might have developmental consequences, given that the adap-
tation caused two dimensions that were initially fairly separa-
ble to become more integral. The model simulation then tried
to esh out one way a simple predictive mechanism could
simultaneously explain both of these effects.
Taken together, these data support the idea that perceptual
adaptations go beyond being temporary adjustments to un-
usual environments and can have important developmental
consequences. Indeed, this is the real stuff of development.
Long term effects are achieved as the accumulated result of
many small tweaks to the system occurring on a situation-
by-situation basis. Thus, understanding how the perceptual
system can and does adjust in short time windows to spe-
cic situations should be useful towards increasing our un-
derstanding of the type of lasting changes that the architecture
can achieve. These results are admittedly only a rst step in
that understanding, but they do indicate several directions for
future work in this regard.
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Abstract 
 
An important study by Münte, Schiltz, and Kutas [Nature 395 
(1998) 71-73] using ERPs (=Event-Related brain Potentials) 
suggested that sentences starting with the temporal connective 
before are more taxing for working memory than sentences 
starting with after, as evidenced by a slow negative shift for 
before sentences. According to Münte et al., before sentences 
present events out of the correct chronological order, as in 
Before the author submitted the paper [=second event], the 
journal changed its policy [=first event]. In order to come up 
with the correct discourse representation of the sentence, the 
correct chronological order has to be restored, leading to extra 
memory load. In the present experiments using a self-paced 
reading paradigm it will be shown that before sentences are 
not more difficult to process than after sentences, but that 
they are even read faster than after sentences. In addition, it is 
shown that before sentences in which events are presented in 
the correct chronological order, as in The journal changed its 
policy [=first event], before the author submitted the paper 
[=second event] are read more slowly than corresponding 
sentences with after. Implications for Münte et al.'s theory are 
discussed and objectives for future research are formulated. 
 
Introduction 
 
Readers do not wait with the interpretation of a sentence 
until they have received the final word. On the contrary, the 
process of understanding sentences occurs in a highly 
incremental fashion, approximately as each word is 
encountered (e.g., Altmann & Steedman, 1988). A striking 
illustration of this phenomenon is provided by Münte, 
Schiltz, and Kutas (1998). In a study using ERPs (=Event-
Related brain Potentials), they showed that sentences 
starting with the temporal connective before were processed 
differently from sentences starting with after. Almost 
immediately after presentation of the temporal connective, 
the ERP waveforms for the before and the after sentences 
started to diverge, with the more negative values for the 
before sentences. Münte et al. argued that this negative shift 
reflected the additional discourse-level processing that is 
necessary to deal with sentences that present events out of 
their correct chronological order. Consider, for instance, 
sentence 1a, which is an example sentence of the materials 
used by Münte et al. (1998). 
 
1a. Before the author submitted the paper, the journal 
changed its policy. 
 
Here, the event of submitting a paper precedes the event 
of policy change in this specific sentence, but in reality, the 
policy change happened first, which can be described as 
Before [Event2], [Event1]. In contrast, sentences 
starting with after, such as 1b, present the events in their 
correct chronological order, exactly as they purportedly 
happened in reality: first a submission, then change of 
policy, so: After [Event1], [Event2]. 
 
1b. After the author submitted the paper, the journal 
changed its policy. 
 
As the size of the negative shift in the ERP waveforms 
turned out to be highly correlated with the individual 
working memory spans of the participants (the higher the 
memory span, the larger the effect), Münte et al. concluded 
that the problem with before sentences is really a working 
memory problem. In other words, it is claimed that when 
reading a sentence starting with before, readers immediately 
realize that the events that they are going to read about will 
have to be re-ordered at some stage to arrive at a coherent 
and valid semantic representation of the sentence. Thus, the 
temporal connective before may act as a kind of cognitive 
operator instructing the language processor to hold in 
memory the event reported on in the first clause, in order to 
enable the reconstruction of the events in their correct 
chronological order, presumably after the sentence has been 
read. 
There are, however, a number of problems with this 
interpretation. First of all, there is no a priori reason to 
interpret a negative shift as evidence for processing 
difficulty or any other form of effortful (memory-related) 
processing. For instance, a well-known ERP component 
such as the 'P600' is a positive component (occurring about 
600 ms post-onset of a critical stimulus), which can be 
evoked by a number of syntactic problems, such as 
ungrammatical sentences (Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992), 
correct sentences with an unpreferred syntactic structure 
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(Hagoort, Brown, & Groothusen, 1993), syntactically 
complex sentences (Kaan, Harris, Gibson, & Holcomb, 
2000), and even in sentences with a correct syntactic 
structure that are semantically anomalous (Hoeks, Stowe, & 
Doedens, 2004). In other words, it cannot be excluded that 
for some reason or other the after sentences are the most 
difficult, and that this processing difficulty is reflected as a 
positive shift in the ERP signal.  
But even if the negativity does indicate processing 
problems, and the before sentences are actually the most 
difficult, there is another reason why the interpretation of 
Münte et al might be wrong. For example, if we take a look 
at the data that Münte et al. provide on the participants with 
the high and the low working memory score, visual 
inspection of the waveforms suggests that the ERPs for the 
before sentences actually do not differ between the two 
working memory groups. Shouldn't these before sentences 
be extra taxing for the group with the smallest working 
memory capacity, as compared to the high working memory 
group? What we see instead is a difference between the 
groups for the after sentences, which are more positive for 
the group with the high working memory score. This is quite 
unexpected, given that the after sentences are relatively 
'easy' and do not tax memory at all, at least much less than 
before sentences, as Münte et al. claim. In addition, there is 
only a very slight difference in the low working memory 
group between the the 'difficult' before sentences and 'easy' 
after sentences, which is also rather unexpected. It is not 
immediately clear how this pattern of results should be 
interpreted, but it is clear that it does not support Münte et 
al.'s hypotheses. 
In the light of these problematic aspects it seems 
necessary that two specific issues regarding the processing 
of sentences with temporal connectives be  resolved. First, it 
is very important to find out whether before sentences are 
more difficult than after sentences, or whether it is the other 
way around. Once this is known, we also know how to 
interpret the negative shift for before sentences reported by 
Münte et al. Indeed, we might be looking at a positive shift, 
if the after sentences turn out to be the most difficult. 
Secondly, if before sentences are more difficult than after 
sentences, we should be able to establish whether this is 
caused by the chronological order of the events described in 
the sentence or perhaps by other factors. In the present 
experiment we will focus on exactly those issues using a 
self-paced reading paradigm. 
The first issue can be tackled rather straightforwardly: by 
measuring the time people take to read the sentence in either 
the before or the after version, we can establish which 
condition is the most difficult, as it will be read more 
slowly. The second issue is more complicated, but can be 
investigated in the following way. Consider sentence 2a, 
which is an example sentence from the present experiment 
(with English translation in brackets). 
 
2a. Voordat Piet de sinas dronk, at Stefan de koekjes op. 
(Before Piet drank the soft drink, Stefan ate the biscuits) 
 
This sentence presents the events out of chronological order, 
as did sentence 1a. The 'drinking' event which is mentioned 
first, actually happened later than the 'eating' event. 
However, in a sentence such as 2b, the events are presented 
in their chronological order again. 
 
2b. Stefan at de koekjes op, voordat Piet de sinas dronk. 
(Stefan ate the biscuits, before Piet drank the soft drink) 
 
Thus, sentence 2b should not be problematic at all, and be 
processed faster than a similar sentence with after in the 
second clause (e.g., Stefan ate the biscuits [event2], after 
Piet drank the soft drink [event1]).  
 
Experiment 1 
 
This experiment is a reading time experiment in which 
participants read sentences for comprehension and made 
semantic plausibility judgments after reading each sentence.  
 
Method 
 
Participants Forty native speakers of Dutch were paid for 
participating in this experiment (28 female; mean age 21 
years, age range 18-30). All were currently receiving a 
university education.  
 
Materials & Design For this experiment, 80 sets of 
sentences were constructed, each set consisting of eight 
versions of a given item. Experimental lists were 
constructed with 10 experimental items per condition, and 
no list containing more than one version of a given item. All 
80 experimental sentences were plausible as determined by 
two expert raters. An equal number of implausible filler 
sentences (see sentence 4 below for an example) were added 
such that each list contain an equal number of plausible and 
implausible items. The purpose of the semantic plausibility 
test and the implausible fillers was to encourage deep 
semantic processing of the experimental sentences. 
The order in which experimental and filler items appeared 
was determined semi-randomly and was the same for each 
list. Each list was presented to an equal number of 
participants (i.e., five) and each participant saw one list. 
Only the first four of the eight conditions belong to the 
present Experiment 1; the other four conditions were part of 
a related experiment that will be discussed below as 
Experiment 2. The experimental sentences for the first 
experiment appeared in the following forms: 
 
3a. Before (first clause), Incorrect order (E2 - E1) 
Before Piet drank the soft drink [E2], Stefan ate the biscuits [E1]. 
 
3b. After (first clause), Correct order (E1 - E2) 
After Piet drank the soft drink [E1], Stefan ate the biscuits [E2]. 
 
3c. Before (second clause), Correct order (E1 - E2) 
Stefan ate the biscuits [E1], before Piet drank the soft drink [E2]. 
 
3d. After (second clause), Incorrect order (E2 - E1) 
Stefan ate the biscuits [E2], after Piet drank the soft drink [E1]. 
 
The filler sentences had exactly the same form as the 
experimental sentences (in exactly the same quantities) but 
were semantically implausible, as sentence 4. 
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4. Before the murder was committed, the police found the 
dead body. 
 
A practice session consisting of 30 items preceded the actual 
experiment. 
 
Procedure Participants were seated behind a computer 
screen in a sound-proof cabin. Each sentence was preceded 
by an asterisk indicating the start of a new sentence. 
Participants were instructed to use the 'b'-key on a keyboard 
before them to read the sentence clause-by-clause. That is, 
after the first key-press the asterisk disappeared and the first 
clause appeared (e.g., "Before Piet drank the soft drink,"); 
after the second press the first clause disappeared and the 
second clause appeared (e.g., "Stefan ate the biscuits."); at 
the next press the second clause disappeared and the 
question "Goed?" (="Correct?") appeared. Participants had 
to press the right SHIFT button to indicate that the sentence 
was semantically plausible, and the left SHIFT button if 
they felt it was not. Each response was followed by 
feedback on the correctness of the answer (i.e., "Correct!" / 
"Wrong!"). Participants were asked to read the sentences 
carefully and to respond as quickly as possible without 
compromising accuracy. After the feedback the asterisk 
reappeared. In all, the experiment took approximately 20 
min. 
 
Results 
 
Analysis First, reading time data were screened for outliers. 
Reading times less than 200 or greater than 4000 ms were 
excluded. After that, all observations were excluded which 
deviated more than 2.5 SDs from either the participant or the 
item mean of each clause in each condition. Two analyses 
were performed: an F1-ANOVA on the condition means for 
each participant and an F2-ANOVA on the condition means 
for each item. The factors Temporal Connective (before vs. 
after), Connective Position (in first clause vs. in second 
clause), and Clause (first clause vs. second clause) were 
treated as within-participants and within-items factors. In 
the participant-based analyses, the factor List (i.e., grouping 
together participants that were presented with the same list) 
was also included in the analyses as a between-participant 
factor, and in the item-analyses the factor Itemgroup (i.e., 
grouping together items that appeared in the same condition 
in each list) was entered as a between-items factor. Both 
factors had 8 levels as there were 8 lists and 8 itemgroups 
(see design section above). In addition, accuracy 
percentages were calculated per condition. Mean reading 
times and accuracy are presented graphically in Figure 1.  
 
Accuracy As can be seen in Figure 1, accuracy was high for 
each condition (overall accuracy 90 %). No significant 
interactions or main effects were found (all F-values < 1).  
 
Reading Times The 3-way interaction between Temporal 
Connective x Connective Position x Clause was significant 
in the analysis on items (F2(1,72)=4.12; p<.05) and 
marginally significant in the participant analysis 
(F1(1,32)=3.23; p=.08). Post Hoc analyses showed that 
there was no significant difference between before and after 
sentences as far as the first clause is concerned (though 
reading times of first clauses containing before were 
numerically smaller than those of first clauses containing 
after). Much larger differences were found in the second 
clause. The second clause of sentences with before in the 
first clause was read significantly faster than of sentences 
with after in the first clause (p<.05). The opposite pattern, 
however, was found for the sentences with the temporal 
connective in the second clause: here, the before sentences 
were read more slowly than the after sentences, though this 
difference was only marginally significant (p=.09). 
Figure 1. Accuracy (in percentages, upper panel) and 
Reading times (in ms, lower panel) for Experiment 1. 
"Before/After-1st"=temporal connective in first clause; 
"Before/After-2nd"= connective in second clause. 
 
A number of other effects were significant, which should of 
course be interpreted with caution in the presence of the 
significant 3-way interaction. For instance, the 2-way 
interaction of Connective Position and Clause was 
significant (F1(1,32)=107.16; p<.0001; F2(1,72)=87.80; 
p<.0001), reflecting longer reading times for the clause in 
which the temporal connective was present (connective in 
first clause: first clause: 1865 ms, second clause: 1525 ms; 
connective in second clause: first clause: 1959 ms, second 
clause: 2138 ms). More interestingly, there was also an 
interaction between Connective Position and Temporal 
Connective (F1(1,32)=5.06; p<.05; F2(1,72)=4.80; p<.05), 
indicating that before sentences as a whole were read faster 
when the temporal connective appeared in the first clause 
(before: 1884 ms; after: 1940 ms) than when it appeared in 
the second clause (before: 1854 ms; after: 1808 ms). No 
other effects concerning Temporal Connective were 
significant (all F-values < 1). The factors Clause (Clause 1: 
1695 ms; Clause 2: 2048 ms) and Connective Position 
(connective in first clause: 1912 ms; in second clause: 1831 
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ms) had significant main effects (F1(1,32)=34.80; p<.0001; 
F2(1,72)=84.98; p<.0001, and F1(1,32)=10.08; p<.005; 
F2(1,72)=13.69; p<.0001), respectively). 
 
Discussion  
 
This experiment yielded two important results. First, in 
the conditions where the temporal connective appeared in 
the first clause, there was no evidence at all for before 
sentences being more difficult than after sentences as 
expected on the basis of Münte et al.'s arguments (1998). 
Quite on the contrary, the first clause of before sentences 
was read numerically faster than the first clause of after 
sentences. More importantly, the second clause of before 
sentences was read significantly faster than that of after 
sentences, with an average advantage of 97 ms for the 
before sentences. This finding clearly indicates that before 
sentences are in fact easier to process than after sentences, 
contra Münte et al.'s predictions. So perhaps the slow 
negative shift for the before sentences is actually a slow 
positive shift for the more difficult after sentences. 
The second important result comes from the conditions 
where the temporal connective was placed in the second 
clause. Here, we see no difference in reading times in the 
first clause, which is as one would expect given that there is 
no difference between the conditions yet, as the temporal 
connective only appears in the second clause. We do see 
substantial differences in the second clause, but in a 
direction opposite to Münte et al.'s predictions. Recall that 
the before sentences with the temporal connective in the 
second clause present the events in the correct chronological 
order (see sentence 3c), in contrast to sentences with after in 
the second clause (see sentence 3d). This should have solved 
the problems of increased memory load and thus have led to 
a processing advantage for the before sentences as compared 
to the after sentences. However, what we find is a 110 ms 
disadvantage for before sentences with the events in the 
'correct' temporal order. This strongly suggests that 
presenting events out of chronological order does not lead to 
processing difficulty. It even seems that presenting events in 
the correct chronological order leads to an increase in 
processing difficulty. 
Summarizing, this experiment showed, contrary to 
expectation, 1) that sentences starting with before are easier 
to process than sentences starting with after, and 2) that 
presenting events out of chronological order does not cause 
processing difficulty. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 1 was intended to answer two straightforward 
questions about the processing of temporal connectives: 1) 
are before sentences more difficult than after sentences, and 
2) is that the case because before sentences present events 
out of chronological order? We have seen that neither one 
was true. Experiment 2 was more exploratory, focussing on 
the possible interaction between temporality, or the 
chronological ordering of events, with the processing of 
referential expressions which is another important aspect in 
the construction of a coherent discourse representation 
(Garnham, 1999). The main issue here is whether temporal 
and referential processing draw on the same resources, or 
whether they are processed in parallel by independent 
mechanisms.  
It is assumed that the use of referential elements such as 
pronouns (e.g., 'he' or 'she') in a sentence may increase the 
processing load during comprehension. When a pronoun is 
encountered, a search process needs to be initiated in order 
to find the intended referent for the pronoun (i.e., the person 
or thing that is referred to by the pronoun). It has been 
shown that this search process can be more costly than for 
instance having a proper name (e.g., Stefan) where no search 
process is necessary (Streb, Rösler, & Hennighausen, 1999).  
In Experiment 2, the materials from Experiment 1 were 
used, except that in each sentence a pronoun was inserted, as 
in sentence 5a. 
 
5a. Stefan at de koekjes op, voordat hij de sinas dronk. 
(Stefan ate the biscuits, before he drank the soft drink) 
 
In this sentence, the pronoun he appears in the second clause 
and is used anaphorically, that is, it refers back to an entity 
that is mentioned earlier (in this case Stefan). Although there 
is a pronoun present that might induce a search process, it 
does not seem likely that in this specific case this search 
process is in any way difficult. In fact, in a sentence such as 
5a there is only one possible referent (i.e., Stefan) and the 
use of a proper name, permitting immediate identification of 
the referent, would even be sub-optimal (see e.g., Gordon, 
Grosz, & Gilliom, 1993, regarding a phenomenon called the 
'repeated name penalty'). However, if the pronoun were to 
precede its referent, this might be taxing for working 
memory, or lead to other processing difficulty, because it 
will not be possible to fully process the clause that contains 
this pronoun before the referent is known. Consider 5b, for 
an example of such a sentence. 
 
5b. Voordat hij de sinas dronk, at Stefan de koekjes op. 
(Before he drank the soft drink, Stefan ate the biscuits) 
 
In this sentence, the pronoun is used as a cataphor, or 
backwards anaphor (Garnham, 1999), and refers to an entity 
that will be mentioned later. Because the first clause cannot 
be fully interpreted as it lacks crucial information on whom 
the pronoun refers to, and because the reader does not know 
when this referent will be presented, it seems reasonable to 
assume that these sentences are difficult to process, as 
compared to sentences such as 5a. If this kind of effortful 
processing of cataphors is handled by the same mechanism 
that is responsible for temporal processing one would expect 
an interaction between these two factors. If, on the other 
hand, these two kinds of processes proceed in parallel and 
are carried out by independent systems, then there will be no 
interaction. 
 In summary then, Experiment 2 aims to clarify two 
things:  
 1) whether cataphoric constructions are more difficult to 
process than anaphoric ones, and  
 2) whether this difference in processing load has a 
(possibly differential) effect on how before and after 
sentences are handled. In other words, do temporal and 
referential processes interact? 
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Method 
 
Participants, Design, & Procedure Participants, design 
and procedure are described in the method section of 
Experiment 1. 
 
Materials Most aspects of the materials are described above 
in the materials section of Experiment 1, except for the 
conditions of the current experiment, which were the 
following: 
 
6a. Before (first clause), Incorrect order, cataphor 
Before he drank the soft drink [E2], Stefan ate the biscuits [E1]. 
 
6b. After (first clause), Correct order, cataphor 
After he drank the soft drink [E1], Stefan ate the biscuits [E2]. 
 
6c. Before (second clause), Correct order, anaphor 
Stefan ate the biscuits [E1], before he drank the soft drink [E2]. 
 
6d. After (second clause), Incorrect order, anaphor 
Stefan ate the biscuits [E2], after he drank the soft drink [E1]. 
 
Note that a full factorial design is not possible, as sentences 
with a pronoun in the first clause and a connective in the 
second clause are ungrammatical when the pronoun is 
intended to refer to the entity mentioned in the second 
clause (as in: "He(i) drank the soft drink, before Stefan(i) ate 
the biscuits"). Instead, a reduced design was chosen that 
would enable us to answer some important questions 
regarding the interaction of temporal and referential 
processing. 
 
Results 
 
Analysis After screening for outliers (see Experiment 1), 
mean RTs and mean accuracy percentages in each condition 
were calculated for both participants and items. Figure 2 
presents the mean reading times and accuracy for 
Experiment 2.  
 
Accuracy As can be seen in Figure 2, accuracy was high for 
each condition (overall accuracy 87 %). The main effect of 
Temporal Connective was marginally significant in the 
participant-based analysis (F1(1,32)=2.80; p=.10), but not in 
the item-based analysis (F2(1,72)=1.74; p=.19), indicating a 
trend for slightly greater accuracy in the before sentences 
(89%) as compared to the after sentences (86%). There was 
no significant effect of Connective Position (F-values < 1). 
 
Reading Times The 3-way interaction between Temporal 
Connective x Connective Position x Clause was not 
significant in the present experiment (both F-values < 1). 
The interaction of Temporal Connective and Clause was 
significant in both participant-based and item-based 
analyses (F1(1,32)=5.89; p<.05; F2(1,72)=8.95; p<.005). 
This interaction is caused by before sentences taking longer 
than after sentences in the first clause (i.e., 1558 vs. 1519 
ms, respectively) with a reverse pattern for the second 
clause (i.e., before: 1917 ms vs. after: 1999 ms). None of 
these two separate contrasts were significant, however (p-
values>.20). Perhaps more importantly, there was also a 
trend towards an interaction between Temporal Connective 
and Connective Position (F1(1,32)=3.07; p=.09; 
F2(1,72)=1.67; p=.20), suggestive of shorter times for 
before sentences as a whole when the temporal connective 
appears in the first clause (i.e., before: 1704 ms vs. after: 
1762 ms), contrasting with the pattern of results when the 
temporal connective appears in the second clause (i.e., 
before: 1771 ms vs. after: 1756 ms).  
 
Figure 2. Accuracy (in percentages, upper panel) and 
Reading times (in ms, lower panel) for Experiment 2. 
"Before/After-1st"=temporal connective in first clause, 
pronoun is cataphor; "Before/After-2nd"=temporal 
connective in second clause, pronoun is anaphor. 
 
As to the main effects, there was a marginally significant 
main effect of Connective Position (F1(1,32)=1.55; p=.22; 
F2(1,72)=3.06; p=.09), suggesting that sentences take longer 
to read when the temporal connective appears in the second 
clause than when it is present in the first clause (i.e., 1764 
ms vs. 1733 ms). Finally, there was a significant main effect 
of Clause (F1(1,32)=56.37; p<.0001; F2(1,72)=195.57; 
p<.0001), reflecting the large difference in reading times 
between first clause (1539 ms) and second clause (1958 ms). 
There was no main effect of Temporal Connective (before: 
1737 ms; after: 1759 ms; p-values >.30). 
 
Discussion  
 
The aim of this experiment was to establish whether 
cataphoric constructions were more difficult to process than 
anaphoric ones, and also whether any difference between 
them would affect the processing of temporal structure. 
Some tentative evidence for such an interaction seems to 
come from the finding that before sentences are faster than 
50
60
70
80
90
100
Plausibility Judgment
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Before-1st
After-1st
Before-2nd
After-2nd
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
Clause1 Clause2
RT
Before-1st
After-1st
Before-2nd
After-2nd
581
after sentences when containing cataphors, but not when 
containing anaphors. However, this might very well be the 
result of an unfortunate 'blip' in the data, that is, the fact that 
reading times for the first clause differ between conditions 
that had identical first clauses (i.e., of sentences with the 
connective in the second clause). It is not unlikely either that 
the marginally significant main effect of Connective 
Position, another indication of a possible difference between 
cataphors and anaphors, is caused by just that spurious 
effect. So what can we say about cataphors and anaphors 
then? 
What we can say about cataphors is that they do not seem 
to be hard to process. Perhaps the most striking difference 
between the present two experiments is the large reduction 
in first clause reading times when proper names / NPs (i.e., 
in Exp. 1) are replaced by cataphoric pronouns (i.e., in Exp. 
2), indicating that inserting cataphoric pronouns makes 
sentences easier. However, because these clauses differ 
between experiments in the lexical material they contain, no 
strong conclusions can be drawn from this outcome. What is 
equally apparent, however, is that cataphors do not create a 
difference between before and after sentences: there is no 
difference at all in the first clause and only a slight 
difference in the second clause, which is numerically almost 
identical to the pattern of results in Experiment 1 (for 
sentences with the temporal connective in the first clause, 
see also Figure 1). As for anaphors, it seems clear that they 
do not cause processing difficulty either. On the contrary, 
they seem to make the processing of before sentences easier, 
if we compare the results of both experiments: In 
Experiment 1 before (with the correct order of events) was 
read more slowly than after (with the incorrect order of 
events) in the sentences with the connective in the second 
clause; in Experiment 2 this is (numerically at least) the 
other way around. In summary then, the outcome of this 
experiment strongly suggests that cataphors are not difficult 
to process, that anaphors are even easier, and that 
chronological order of events is not a factor of importance. 
 
Conclusion & Future Directions 
 
The present experiments have convincingly shown that 
before sentences are actually easier to process than after 
sentences. In addition, it has become clear that the 
chronological order of events does not strongly influence 
ease of sentence processing. Finally, as there was no strong 
evidence for an interaction between temporal and referential 
processing, it is still a bit unclear whether these two kinds of 
information are processed by the same or by different 
cognitive mechanisms. 
When we try to understand the Münte et al. results in the 
light of the present findings, we must conclude that the slow 
potential difference building up while the sentence is read 
should not necessarily be interpreted as a negativity for the 
before sentences, but rather as a positivity for the after 
sentences. In addition, this slow wave difference does not 
seem to be related, or at least not directly, to presenting 
events in or out of their correct chronological order, nor 
with memory processes per se (recall that the low working 
memory group from Münte et al. did not show a difference 
between before and after sentences). This leaves us with a 
lot of new questions: why are after sentences more difficult 
to process than before sentences? and how should we then 
conceive of the relationship between working memory 
capacity and temporal processing, if it does not work as 
Münte et al. hypothesized? It is possible that connectives 
(and also pronouns) evoke certain processing strategies that 
do not tax memory, or only minimally. Hoeks and Stowe 
(2002), for instance, have speculated that before might 
activate a relatively cost-free 'temporal ordering frame' 
(maybe only available for individuals with high working 
memory capacity?) that allows for fast sentence integration, 
whereas after does not. More research focussing on these 
processing aspects of temporal connectives is definitely 
needed. But also research using language corpora in order to 
establish both form and function of different kinds of 
temporal expressions in text and communication.  
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Abstract 
We describe the construction of statistical models that provide 
inferences about the probability that subjects will consider 
events to be memory landmarks. We review methods and 
report results of experiments probing the classification 
accuracy and receiver-operator characteristics of the models.  
Then, we discuss opportunities for integrating models of 
memory landmarks into computing applications, and present a 
prototype time-line oriented content browsing tool. 
Introduction 
Studies of memory support the assertion that people make 
use of special landmarks or anchor events for guiding recall  
(Shum, 1994; Smith, 1979; Smith, Glenberg & Bjork, 
1978)) and for remembering relationships among events 
(Davies & Thomson, 1988; Huttenlocher & Prohaska, 
1997).  Such landmarks include both public and 
autobiographical events. More generally, there has been 
significant study and modeling of episodic memory, where 
memories are considered to be organized by episodes of 
significant events, including such information as the 
location of an event, attendees, and information about 
events that occurred before, during, and after each 
memorable event (Tulving, 1983; Tulving & Thomson, 
1980).  Memory has been shown to also depend on the 
reinstatement of not only item-specific contexts, but also on 
more general context capturing the situation surrounding 
events. 
   We believe that automated inferences about important 
memory landmarks could provide the basis for new kinds of 
personalized computer applications and services.  Rather 
than focusing on specific machinery proposed as models for 
recall (e.g., Malmberg, Steyvers, Stephens, et al.,. 2002;. 
Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 2002; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997), 
we set out to investigate the feasibility of directly learning 
models of memory landmarks via supervised learning. We 
focus here on the construction, testing, and application of 
predictive models of memory landmarks, based on events 
drawn from users’ online calendars.     
   We first review experiments with the construction of 
personalized models of memory landmarks.  We describe 
how we construct models that can be used to infer the 
likelihood that events will serve as memory landmarks, 
reviewing the extraction of data from subjects’ online 
calendars, the collection of assessments about landmarks 
with tools that enable subjects to label their calendar events, 
and the learning of models via Bayesian learning 
procedures.  After reviewing the performance of the models, 
we describe, as a sample direction for the use of predictive 
models of memory landmarks in computing applications, a 
prototype, named MemoryLens Browser. MemoryLens 
Browser employs the inferences about landmarks in 
visualizations for browsing files and appointments. Finally, 
we review research directions aimed at enhancing coverage 
and discriminatory power of models of memory landmarks.  
Accessing Events and Event Properties 
We will focus on the construction of models of memory 
landmarks derived from users’ online calendar information. 
Electronic encodings of calendars provide rich sources of 
data about events in users’ lives.  People who rely on 
electronic calendars, often encode multiple types of events 
in an online format. Such items include appointments, 
holidays, and periods of time marked to indicate such 
activities as travel and vacation.  In large enterprises that 
rely on computer-based calendaring systems, appointments 
and events are typically formulated, accepted, displayed and 
managed via schemas capturing multiple properties of the 
events.   
   We developed a calendar event crawler that works with 
the Microsoft Outlook messaging and appointment 
management system. The crawler analyzes a user’s online 
calendar to create a case library of events and properties 
associated with each event. The calendar crawler extracts 
approximately 30 properties for each event. Most of these 
properties are obtained directly from the online data and 
metadata stored for events. These properties include the time 
of day and day of week of events, event duration, subject, 
location, organizer, number of invitees, relationships 
between the user and invitees, the role of the user (i.e., user 
was the organizer, a required invitee, or an optional invitee), 
response status of the user to appointment invitations (i.e., 
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user responded yes, responded tentative, no response, or no 
response request made), whether the meeting is recurrent or 
not recurrent, whether the time is marked as busy or free on 
the user’s calendar, and the nature of the inviting email 
alias—the  alias used to send the meeting invitation.  
   In addition to properties in the database schema employed 
by Outlook, a subsystem of the crawler accesses the 
Microsoft Active Directory Service to identify 
organizational relationships among the user, the organizer, 
and the invitees, noting for example, whether the organizer 
and attendees are organizational peers, direct reports, 
managers, or managers of the user’s manager.   
    Beyond the use of data from Outlook and Active 
Directory Services, we created several derived properties 
representing statistics about atypical situations, based on the 
intuition that rare contexts might be more memorable than 
common ones.  In particular, we developed procedures for 
computing atypical organizers, atypical attendees, and 
atypical locations.  We compute a measure of the rarity for 
these properties of events by considering the portion of all 
meetings over all events under consideration or for a fixed 
period of time (e.g., events over a year) in which the 
property under consideration has the same value it has in the 
event at hand.  For the studies reported here, we computed 
atypicality based on all events under consideration.  
    To compute the value of location atypia for events, we 
first compute the number of times each location has 
appeared in a user’s calendar over a fixed period.  The 
system then discretizes the location atypia variable into a 
set of states, capturing a range of percentiles, and the 
location atypia variable for each event acquires a particular 
value based on the rarity of the location associated with that 
event.  
    An analogous derivation is used for computing organizer 
atypia and attendee atypia.  For these variables, all people 
attending all of the appointments for the fixed period under 
consideration are analyzed, and the portion of a subject’s 
appointments attended or organized respectively by each 
attendee is noted.  A meeting acquires the organizer atypia 
or meeting atypia value associated with the least frequent 
attendee or organizer of the meeting.   
Building Models of Memory Landmarks 
We recruited 5 participants from our organization for data 
collection and tagging.  We asked the subjects to review a 
list of all of the appointments, holidays, and other 
annotations stored in their calendars that were extracted 
automatically by a calendar crawler, and to identify the 
subset of events that they viewed as serving as salient, 
memory landmarks.  More specifically, we directed the 
subjects to do the following: 
Please review the events on your calendar and 
identify those events that would serve as key 
memory landmarks on a timeline of events for 
such purposes as searching for files and 
appointments. 
    Each subject downloaded software components and 
executed the event-collection program to crawl their 
calendars and to create a case library of labeled data. The 
cases typically spanned several years of presentations, trips, 
meetings, tasks, and holidays, and included several thousand 
items.  We provided subjects with a memory-landmark 
assessment tool that lists events drawn from their online 
calendar within a scrollable window, ranked from most 
recent to most distant events.  The tool provides fields, 
adjacent to each event, that subjects use to label items as 
landmark or non-landmark events. 
    We pursued the construction of predictive models of 
memory landmarks from the supervised training data.  We 
elected to employ Bayesian-network learning methods so as 
to have the ability to visually inspect key probabilistic 
dependencies among variables and, in particular, to 
understand key variables and states of variables influencing 
the likelihood of events being called memory landmarks. 
   We partitioned the data into training and testing cases, 
with an 80/20 split; that is, we built the models for each 
individual using 80% of their labeled data and evaluated the 
learned model on the remaining 20% of the labeled data.  
We employed a Bayesian structure-search procedure, 
developed by Chickering, Heckerman & Meek (1997), to 
build Bayesian-network models for event landmarks for 
each subject  The procedure employs a greedy search 
through a large space of dependency structures and 
computes, for each plausible dependency structure, an 
approximation for the likelihood of the data given the 
structure. A model score is computed as a function of this 
likelihood and a model-prior parameter that penalizes for 
complexity. The model with the highest score is selected. 
    We optimized the model-prior parameter by splitting the 
training set 80/20 into subtraining and subtesting data sets, 
respectively, and identifying a soft peak in the Bayesian 
score. This value of the parameter at the soft peak was used 
to build the model from the full training set. 
    We inspected the predictive models constructed for each 
subject, noting dependencies among key variables, the 
discriminatory power of variables, and classification 
accuracy of the models at predicting the data held out from 
the training procedure.   
    Figure 1 displays a Bayesian network built from the data 
from one of the participants in the study (subject S1), 
showing all of the variables and the dependencies among 
them.  A sensitivity analysis demonstrated that key 
influencing variables in this model for discriminating 
whether an event is a memory landmark are the Subject, 
Location string, Meeting sender, Meeting organizer, 
Attendees, and whether the meeting is Recurrent.  
    We explored the strength of dependencies for variables in 
the model for each subject and found similar influences of 
key variables across subjects. For subjects in our study, 
atypically long durations, non-recurrence of events, a user 
flagging a meeting as busy or out of office, and atypical 
locations or special locations had significant influence on 
the inferred probability that events would be considered a 
landmark event.  We found that meetings marked as 
recurrent meetings rarely served as memory landmarks. 
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    Table 1 shows the classification accuracies of the learned 
models of landmarks. For each test case, the values of the 
properties of the event are identified (or computed for 
derived properties) and then input to the model which 
provides a probability that the event is a memory landmark.  
That is, we compute p(Event selected as a memory 
landmark|E), given evidence E—the multiple properties of 
associated with each event on the subject’s calendar.  The 
models range in classification accuracies for the five 
subjects from 0.78 to 0.95.   
    In addition to looking at overall classification accuracies, 
we swept out receiver-operator (ROC) curves to visualize 
the relationship between false negatives and false positives 
at different thresholds for admitting events as memory 
landmarks.  The false-positive rate is varied by changing the 
threshold of the probability score that is required for 
classifying an event as a memorable landmark, and the 
corresponding false negative rate is noted.  The curves for 
the subjects in the study are displayed in Figure 2.    We 
note that the ROC curves show a trend toward lower false 
positives and false negatives with increases in the size of the 
training sets.  
   The ROC curves are particularly important for 
understanding the value of employing such predictive 
models of memory landmarks in computing applications.   
As we shall explore in the next section, one class of 
computing applications centers on the use of a user-
controlled threshold on the probability of events used to 
identify landmark events. In such uses of predictive models 
of landmarks, users may be given the ability to define, e.g., 
via a slider control, the subset of all events that should be 
admitted, say, for displaying within a rendering of a 
timeline of events.  Such timelines could provide useful 
“memory backbones” when searching for content in a large 
personal store.  Models for inferring the likelihood that 
events will serve as memory landmarks promise to endow 
such computing applications with the ability to minimize 
clutter by limiting the revelation of events to those which 
are likely to be useful landmarks.  Moving beyond basic 
timelines for searching for desktop content, applications 
include the use of the inferential models for constructing 
hierarchical views of events for browsing large quantities of 
time-based content, such as autobiographical corpora. We 
shall now explore a sample application we have constructed 
to investigate prospects for harnessing statistical models of 
memory landmarks. 
 
Applications of Models of Memory Landmarks 
 
To motivate ongoing work on the use of supervised and 
unsupervised machine learning to construct models of 
landmark events, we developed a prototype that 
demonstrates how such predictive models might be used. 
We have integrated components for learning and reasoning 
about memory landmarks into a prototype named 
MemoryLens Browser.  The prototype is focused on 
providing users with a timeline of landmark events to assist 
them to find content across their computer store.  We 
recently distributed the prototype to a limited group of users 
within our organization and are pursuing feedback about the 
system.    
    MemoryLens comes in the spirit of recent work on 
developing tools for assisting computer users to better locate 
information from their personal stores (Adar, Karger & 
Stein, 1999; Dumais, Cutrell, Sarin, Cadiz & Jancke, 2003).  
Ringel, Cutrell, Dumais & Horvitz, (2003) recently reported 
on results of a set of user studies that showed that memory 
 
 
Figure 1: Bayesian network learned from online calendar data (subject S1) showing dependencies among event properties 
and likelihood that an event will be considered a memory landmark by a subject. 
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landmarks can be used to help computer users find relevant 
results in searches across personal corpora.  Significant 
decreases in the time required to identify search results was 
found when memory landmarks were used in comparison 
with the no-landmarks condition.  That system employed 
informal, heuristic rules for selecting memory landmarks.  
   MemoryLens Browser allows users to train models of 
memory landmarks on a portion of events from their 
calendar; the prototype offers menu options which provide 
access to the training and modeling capabilities that we 
described earlier. Users invoke a personalization component 
that executes a crawl of their calendar. The prototype 
provides assessment and machine-learning tools, allowing 
users to identify a subset of events in their calendars as 
landmark events, and to build predictive models by 
invoking machine learning from the labeled data.  
     In use, the models constructed by users serve to infer the 
likelihood that each evemt drawm from the user’s calendar 
will be considered a landmark, p(Event will be viewed as a 
memory landmark|E), given multiple evidential properties, 
E, extracted from unlabeled calendar items.  These 
likelihoods are considered in the generation of a timeline of 
inferred landmarks adjacent to files gathered from across a 
user’s file system.  The files are positioned at places along 
the timeline in accordance with the times that they were 
created or last modified.  An event-detail slider control 
provides users with a means of changing the threshold on 
the inferred likelihood of memory landmark that is required 
for displaying events.  The slider control allows users to 
specify thresholds for admitting items for display with 
successively smaller inferred likelihoods. Only calendar 
items representing events that have a probability of being a 
landmark that is greater than a user-set threshold are 
displayed; as the slider is moved from “most memorable” to 
“least memorable,” the required probability for display of 
events is lowered, thus bringing in greater numbers of 
events.  
   A screenshot of the user interface of MemoryLens 
Browser is displayed in Figure 3.  Thumbnails of file types 
are sorted in the right-hand column of the browser, in a 
traditional time-sorted view manner that computer users are 
familiar with.  Within the left-hand column, a list of relevant 
dates associated with the files are displayed, including the 
year, month, and relevant days that files were created or 
modified. The middle column contains memory landmarks 
that have been assigned through inference a landmark 
probability exceeding a user-set threshold. The titles of 
memory landmarks are displayed in the appropriate 
temporal location, adjacent to the files.  
    Figure 3 shows three different screenshots of the 
graphical interface of MemoryLens, each representating a 
different setting of the probability threshold for the same 
span of time.  Of the three snapshots, the view at the right is 
set to the highest probability threshold, thus revealing the 
fewest events. In this case, only the events representing two 
major conferences, for which the subject had to travel afar 
to attend, are displayed. As the threshold is lowered, a 
wedding, an editorial board meeting, a conference call, and 
a one-on-one meeting are included in the display.  Further 
diminishing of the threshold for admitting events brings 
larger numbers of events into view.  Beyond the use of 
thresholds for admitting versus excluding events from the 
landmarks column, the saturation of color of the text used to 
title events is faded as the probability of memory landmark 
diminishes—providing an additional cue about the likely 
value of using the event as a memory landmark. 
   We have been interested in probing the ability of models 
with the discriminatory performance represented by the 
family of ROC curves displayed in Figure 2, to construct 
useful time-line views. Such views should contain 
recognizable landmarks, while bypassing the clutter 
associated with showing a great number of events, and 
should allow users to work with such models in an 
exploratory, interactive manner (Horvitz, 1999) with tools 
embodied in  MemoryLens’ controls and display.   
    To relay a qualitative feel for the quality of timelines 
constructed with the use of the predictive models that we 
have generated, consider the ROC curve for a model of 
subject S1. The curve tells us that, at a probability threshold 
for accepting events as landmarks where ninety percent of 
the events on the timeline are correctly identified as 
Table 1: Training data and classification accuracies for 
predictive models tested on hold-out data for five subjects. 
 
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Total events 3864 3740 2770 1743 1996 
    -Train 3091 2992 2216 1394 1596 
    -Test 773 748 554 349 400 
Accuracy 0.87 0.94 0.95 0.88 0.78 
S1
S2
S4
S5
S3
Figure 2: Receiver-operator curves showing the 
relationships of false negatives and false positives for 
five subjects at a range of thresholds on probabilities for 
admitting an event as a memory landmark. 
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important landmarks, fifty percent of the important 
landmarks will not be displayed.  Such precision and recall 
may be quite tolerable for navigating to target periods of 
time, given the overall density of landmarks for users; we 
found that subjects in our study typically showed 2-4 
landmark events per week over the span of their 
assessments.  A recall of half of these events would still 
tend to identify landmark events for every week. 
   Understanding the comprehensive value of providing 
users with selective views of landmark events on timelines 
will require detailed user studies of the use of specific 
prototypes and artifacts.  We are interested in such studies 
of the value of specific designs built on predictive models of 
memory landmarks.  Such studies would serve to enhance 
our understanding of the sensitivity of particular features 
and services to the performance of the predictive models. 
Research Directions 
We have focused in this paper on the construction and 
performance of predictive models that can be used to infer 
the probability that events drawn from online calendars will 
be considered memory landmarks by users.  We provided, 
as a motivating example, a prototype application to 
highlight potential applications.  Although we did not 
dwelled on comprehensive evaluations of the value of the 
use of memory landmarks in such prototypes, we are 
nonetheless interested in pursuing a deeper understanding of 
the value to users of rendering memory landmarks of 
different types and in different settings.  We also seek to 
better understand the value of employing accurate predictive 
models of memory landmarks, based on a well-defined 
probabilistic semantics, versus using simple sets of 
heuristics to choose events for display.   
    In addition to pursuing a better understanding of the value 
of memory landmarks for users performing search and 
retrieval in computing applications, we are exploring several 
avenues of opportunity with refining and extending models 
of memory landmarks. 
Generalization of Models. In one area of work, we seek an 
understanding of the accuracy of inter-subject predictions. 
Inter-subject classification accuracy probes the potential for 
using models constructed from one subject’s training data, 
or a composite model built from multiple subjects, to predict 
hold-out data from other participants. Validating 
generalization across users would suggest that it is possible 
to field software applications that would require minimal 
personalization effort, via the use of pre-trained “seed” 
models.  Such models would have a poor ability, without 
additional training, to consider highly personalized 
information such as variables containing specific text strings 
representing labels on meeting locations and subjects. This 
information tends to vary highly among the subjects.  
Beyond Calendar Events.  Events captured on users’ 
calendars are convenient, but only a small subset of 
“events” users may wish to have captured, reasoned about, 
and harnessed in computing applications appear on a 
calendar.  We are interested in building and refining 
predictive models for other items that could serve as 
additional memory landmarks or bolster event landmarks by 
providing richer context.  As an example, we are pursuing, 
in a parallel project, the construction of predictive models 
that can identify the likelihood that images drawn from a 
large online personal photo library represent landmark 
events.  To date, image analysis tools have been used in 
conjunction with several heuristics to select pictures when a 
user wishes to only review a subset of photos from a large 
library.  Such methods include the use of a measure of the 
representativeness of each image to other images in the 
same session or event, based on such evidence as features 
derived from an analysis of color histograms ( Platt, 2000). 
    In another realm, we are interested in learning from data 
predictive models that can automatically select the most 
important national and world developments, as captured by 
news events over time.   
   Beyond calendar-centric events, images, and news, online 
interactions, communications, and patterns of interactions 
with computer-based content may serve as memory 
landmarks.  For example, particular email exchanges, or 
documents associated with clusters of items that have been 
reviewed or created in patterns of activity over time may 
provide an important source of events. 
   Taken together, multiple models of memory landmarks 
may be used in conjunction to build rich, multi-source 
timelines, providing views at different scales of time and for 
 
Figure 3: MemoryLens Browser with memory-landmark 
timeline displayed at three different settings of the 
threshold on the likelihood required for an event to be 
considered a memory landmark. 
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different quantities of events, triaged by the likelihood that 
events will serve as memory landmarks. 
New Classes of Evocative Features. We are also exploring 
the value of adding new observations features to the 
modeling of memory landmarks.  For example, we are 
interested in the value of introducing a consideration of 
observations that assist with inferences about the likelihood 
that a meeting has been attended, given desktop activity 
over time and the sensed location of systems.  Prior work 
has demonstrated the feasibility of performing relatively 
accurate inferences about the likelihood that a meeting has 
been or will be attended, based on an analysis of meeting 
properties, including activity monitored during meetings 
(Horvitz, Jacobs, & Hovel, 1999; Horvitz, Koch, Kadie & 
Jacobs, 2002; Mynatt & Tullio, 2001).  Information about 
the likelihood of meeting attendance promises to have 
influence on the probability that the meeting will be viewed 
as a memory landmark.  Other factors include capture and 
analysis of acoustical energy during meetings, and 
preparatory or follow-up activity associated with 
appointments. 
Learning Models of Forgetting. Finally, we believe that 
there are opportunities for developing analogous statistical 
models of events and tasks that will be forgotten via 
supervised training. Recent longitudinal studies of office 
workers have identified classes of important events that are 
forgotten and have demonstrated the value of heuristics for 
ways to provide reminders about such events (Czerwinski & 
Horvitz, 2002).  Beyond applications for people in good 
health, we see the feasibility of developing models for 
supporting people suffering with pathologies of memory 
associated with various forms of dementia.  
Summary 
We reviewed research highlighting prospects for developing 
and harnessing predictive models of events that will be 
viewed as landmarks.  We focused in particular on the 
construction and evaluation of models that infer subsets of 
events drawn from subjects’ calendars.  After reviewing the 
classification and ROC curves associated with training sets 
obtained from five subjects, we discussed the potential to 
employ predictive models of memory landmarks in 
computing applications. We described as an example, the 
MemoryLens Browser prototype.  Before concluding, we 
touched on several current research directions, including 
opportunities to perform additional studies to evaluate the 
value of displaying memory landmarks in search tasks, on 
seeking to define and understand the discriminatory power 
of additional evidential distinctions in building predictive 
models of landmarks, and developing models of landmark 
events for online images, news stories, and other items 
encountered or created by users in their daily lives that 
might be encoded as important landmarks in episodic 
memory. 
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Abstract
Why do people gesture when they speak? The reasons are not
entirely clear. This paper tests two hypotheses about the role
of gesture in speech production: the Lexical Access
Hypothesis, which holds that gesturing aids in lexical access,
and the Information Packaging Hypothesis, which holds that
gesturing aids in conceptualization. Participants were asked to
describe dot patterns that were either easy or difficult to
conceptualize in terms of geometric shapes. Patterns that were
more difficult to conceptualize elicited more gesture than the
patterns that were easier to conceptualize. This result supports
the Information Packaging Hypothesis.
Introduction
It is often said that a picture is worth a thousand words. In
the case of speech production, it sometimes seems that
creating pictures with our hands can help our audience
understand what we are saying. However, despite the
intuitive feeling that we gesture primarily to help our
audience, some research suggests that gestures contribute
little to an audience’s understanding of a gesturer’s speech
(Krauss, Morrel-Samuels, & Colasante, 1991; Krauss,
Dushay, Chen, & Rauscher, 1995; but see Kendon, 1994 for
an alternative perspective). Speakers often produce
representational gestures even when they know that their
audience cannot see them, making it unlikely that their
intended purpose is solely to help the audience (Alibali,
Heath, & Myers, 2001).
This evidence that gesture does not help comprehension
has led some investigators to propose that gesture has a
more direct role in the speech production process, by
facilitating the planning of speech. Specifically, gesture may
play a role in speaking about ideas that are highly spatial or
motoric in nature (Kita, 2002; Krauss & Hadar, 2001). It has
been shown, for example, that gestures are more likely to
coincide with words that are spatial and concrete (e.g., spin,
under, or cube) than with words that are non-spatial and
abstract (such as evil) (Krauss, 1998; Morsella & Krauss, in
press; Rauscher, Krauss, & Chen, 1996). By actively
engaging spatial-motoric ideas through gesture, it may
become easier to speak about them.
Although gesture may be an overt manifestation of spatio-
motoric thought, exactly how gesture may facilitate speech
production is still the subject of some debate. The majority
of research in this area has followed the speech production
model proposed by Levelt (1989), which divides the speech
production process into three broad stages:
conceptualization, formulation, and articulation. During
conceptualization, the prelinguistic thoughts of a speaker are
generated and combined into propositional form. During
formulation, these thoughts are translated into the
appropriate linguistic units by searching through the mental
lexicon and identifying the proper lemmas and lexical
entries. During articulation, the motor plan for pronouncing
the phonemes corresponding to the lexemes is created and
executed. It seems unlikely that the production of
representational gestures influences motor aspects of
articulation, and, indeed, research has typically focused on
the earlier stages of speech production (conceptualization
and formulation) as the possible beneficiaries of gesture.
Work by Krauss and colleagues (Krauss, Chen, &
Chawla, 1996) places the influence of gesture on speech as
occurring primarily during the formulation stage. According
to their view, referred to hereafter as the Lexical Access
Hypothesis, gestures serve as a cross-modal prime to help
speakers access specific items in the lexicon. In support of
this view, a number of studies have shown that speakers
produce more iconic gestures when the words of an
utterance are more elusive (e.g. Hostetter & Hopkins, 2002;
Morrel-Samuels & Krauss, 1992). For example, when
speakers have time to verbally rehearse an utterance, they
gesture less than when speaking completely
extemporaneously (Chawla & Krauss, 1994). Similarly,
speakers gesture more when describing ideas or shapes that
are not readily named than when describing ideas or shapes
that are easily named (Graham & Argyle, 1975; Morsella &
Krauss, in press). Research with aphasic patients also
suggests that gesture is involved in the formulation stage.
Aphasic patients whose problems are primarily ones of
lexical access use more gestures than age-matched controls
(Hadar, Burstein, Krauss, & Soroker, 1998). Those whose
problems are primarily not ones of lexical access produce
fewer gestures than other types of aphasic patients (Hadar,
Wenkert-Olenik, Krauss, & Soroker, 1998). Finally,
prohibiting speakers from gesturing has been shown to
negatively affect speech fluency, especially for speech that
is spatial in nature (Rauscher et al, 1996).
Studies that induce tip-of-the-tongue states have yielded
slightly less compelling and more contradictory findings
about the facilitative effects of gesture on formulation.
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Frick-Horbury and Guttentag (1998) found that preventing
participants from gesturing increased retrieval failures,
whereas Beattie and Coughlan (1998) found exactly the
opposite pattern. Participants who were restricted from
gesturing actually retrieved more words than those who
were allowed to gesture in Beattie and Coughlan’s study. In
both studies, when participants actually produced gestures,
they did not resolve their tip-of-the-tongue states more often
than when they did not gesture. Thus, although gestures do
tend to co-occur with speech that is spatial and with words
that are difficult to find, the claim that gestures actually help
the speaker to find the right words remains somewhat
unwarranted at this time.
Because Levelt’s (1989) speech production model is a
stage model, each stage of the production process partly
depends on input coming from the previous stage.
Articulation cannot begin without at least a minimal amount
of characteristic input from the formulator; a word cannot be
uttered until it has been decided what word should be
uttered. Likewise, formulation and lexical access depend on
the output from the conceptualizer. The ideas and
propositions that are to be expressed must be available
before the correct lemma and lexical affiliate can be
searched for and accessed. It would seem therefore that
facilitation in the conceptualization process would translate
into some facilitation at the lexical level as well. A concept
that is clear in the speaker’s mind is more readily lexicalized
than a concept that is unclear and vague. Thus, the fact that
gestures tend to co-occur with words that are spatial and
somewhat elusive could also be explained as facilitation at
the conceptual level. Gesture may help speakers to clarify or
organize their ideas, and this may make the output of the
conceptualizer more readily accessible to the formulator.
Such a view of gesture is referred to as the Information
Packaging Hypothesis (Kita, 2000). According to this
hypothesis, gestures help speakers organize knowledge that
is spatio-motoric in nature and put it into a verbalizable
form. Gesture is thus a mode of thinking, an aid in
translating spatio-motoric knowledge into linguistic output.
By activating the appropriate bodily representations of
spatio-motoric ideas, the ideas can be more fully realized.1
Evidence for the Information Packaging Hypothesis
comes from studies that have attempted to manipulate the
difficulty of conceptualization while holding constant the
difficulty of lexical access. Alibali, Kita, and Young (2000)
did this with children using a conservation task. They found
that children used more representational gestures when they
were asked to explain why two items (e.g. two balls of play
dough) were different amounts than when they were asked
simply to describe how the two items looked different. The
words used by the children were highly similar across the
                                                           
1 It should be noted that when gestures aid the conceptualizer, they
may or may not also aid the formulator. A speaker who is having
difficulty finding a particular word may use gesture as a way of
clarifying the idea in his or her mind; this may or may not add
enough additional information for the formulator to successfully
access the lexical affiliate.
two tasks; however, the explanation task required more
complex conceptualization than did the description task.
The authors argued that children used representational
gestures more frequently in the explanation task because of
the increased demands on the conceptualizer. Melinger and
Kita (2001) found that adults were more likely to gesture in
instances where there was a greater choice of what to say,
despite the fact that the actual words being spoken in both
situations were nearly identical. Again, the authors argued
that gesture arises as a result of taxing the conceptualizer
rather than the formulator.
Although these studies provide suggestive evidence for
the Information Packaging Hypothesis, their conclusions are
far from definitive. Although Alibali et al. (2000) found a
significant difference in gesture production based on the
difficulty of conceptualization, they did not find an
especially strong effect. Also, because the study investigated
gesture production in children, it may not be appropriate to
generalize the findings to adult gesturers. Melinger and
Kita’s (2001) results suggest an effect in adults. However,
they did not report statistical analysis of their data, so it is
not clear whether the differences they describe are reliable.
The present experiment was designed to further
distinguish between the Information Packaging Hypothesis
and the Lexical Access Hypothesis. If gestures do indeed
help speakers to conceptualize a spatial situation rather than
just helping them to find the right words to describe that
situation, then speakers should produce more gestures in a
task where there are multiple conceptual options. Similarly,
when the task provides only one conceptual option, speakers
should produce fewer gestures. However, as long as the
words that are ultimately used to describe the situation are
the same, the Lexical Access Hypothesis would predict no
difference in gesture production regardless of conceptual
difficulty.
In order to manipulate conceptual difficulty without
affecting difficulty of lexical access, it was necessary to find
a task that would result in similar verbal output regardless of
the level of conceptual difficulty. For this purpose, we
designed a dot description task in which participants were
asked to describe patterns of dots to a listener. Patterns of
dots were created that could be conceptualized in a number
of different ways; that is, a number of different geometric
patterns could be imagined to be drawn through each dot
pattern. For example, the pattern in Figure 1 could be
conceptualized as two triangles, one rectangle with a
triangle on top, a five-pointed star, three straight lines, or
two parallelograms. This scenario (the dots-only condition)
should be more conceptually difficult than a scenario in
which the same dot patterns are displayed with lines drawn
through them to guide conceptualization (the dots-plus-
shapes condition). In both conditions, however, the goal of
the participants is to describe only the dots; thus, the words
ultimately used by participants should be similar regardless
of the conceptual condition in which the dot pattern is
presented.
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Figure 1: Sample Pattern (top) in Dots-Only Condition and
4 Possible Conceptualizations (bottom)
Method
Participants
Undergraduate students were recruited from the Psychology
participant pool at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. A
total of 63 individuals (32 males, 31 females) were screened
for participation, and those who had not learned English in
infancy were excluded. Additionally, one individual was not
included because a wrist injury made it difficult for him to
gesture. These eliminations resulted in a final sample of 48
individuals (24 males, 24 females) with a mean age of 19.4
yrs (SD = 1.75). Participants did not know that gesture was
the focus of the study.
Stimuli
The stimuli were six dot patterns, each of which included 6
to 9 black dots on a white background. Each pattern was
designed so that it did not represent the outline of any single
geometric shape, but instead afforded a variety of different
geometric shapes (see Figure 1). Patterns were created in
AppleWorks 6 and loaded into PsyScope for experimental
presentation in the conceptually difficult (dots-only)
condition.
From each of these six dot patterns, the participants’
natural responses in the dots-only condition were used to
create patterns for the dots-plus-shapes condition. Each
conceptualization provided by the participants in the dots-
only condition was transposed onto the appropriate dot
pattern by making lines through the dots to indicate the
conceptualization pattern. These patterns were also made in
AppleWorks 6 and loaded into PsyScope for experimental
presentation in the conceptually easy (dots-plus-shapes)
condition. All stimulus patterns in both conditions were
presented on a Macintosh Powerbook G3 laptop with a 35-
cm color screen.
Procedure
Participants were told that the focus of the study was their
ability to remember dot patterns that are presented to them
for a very short duration and to describe these patterns
effectively to another participant. They were told that their
descriptions would be audio-taped and played later for
another participant who would try to recreate the pattern
based on their descriptions. A hidden video camera was
focused on the participant throughout the experiment
providing a head-on view of the participant from the waist
up, and their descriptions were never heard or seen by
anyone other than the experimenters. Following their
participation, each participant was debriefed regarding the
true nature of the experiment and given the opportunity to
have his or her videotape destroyed. All declined.
Each participant was brought individually into the testing
room, which was divided by a wooden screen. On one side
of the screen, a chair was placed in front of a small table
(58.5 cm H x 71 cm W x 71 cm L) where the laptop
computer was situated. The participant was told to sit in this
chair and the experimenter knelt next to the computer and
participant to give the instructions and practice trial for the
experiment. During instruction, each participant was shown
a sample dot pattern and told that patterns similar to it
would appear on the computer screen for a very short
duration. The participants were told that their task was to
describe the pattern as clearly as possible so that the
participant who would hear the description via audiotape
would be able to successfully reproduce it. Furthermore,
they were told that while the task was to get the listener to
reconstruct the dots only, they should imagine the dot
patterns in terms of geometric shapes and figures. Rather
than saying, for example, that there is a dot at the top of the
page and another dot about 2 cm below it with another dot
directly to the left of that, they should describe the pattern as
being a right triangle with dots on each corner with the right
angle of the triangle facing toward the left.
 Participants in both conditions received two sample
patterns that were appropriate to their experimental
condition (i.e., patterns shown to dots-only participants
contained only dots while patterns shown to dots-plus-
shapes participants showed dots with lines drawn to aid
conceptualization). During the instructions and example
presentations in both conditions, the experimenter produced
some small, scripted gestures that were identical across
conditions.
Following these instructions, participants in both
conditions were asked to complete a practice trial while the
experimenter was still present. The experimenter provided
feedback as needed based on this practice trial to
reemphasize the need to describe the pattern in terms of
geometric shapes and to adequately describe the location of
the dots within these shapes.
Because the purpose of this study was to manipulate
conceptual difficulty without affecting lexical difficulty,
measures were taken to assure that lexical access was as
easy as possible for participants in both conditions.
Following the examples and practice trial, all participants
were presented with an alphabetical list of 16 words that
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seemed likely to occur in descriptions of the patterns. This
list included names of geometric shapes as well as spatial
and relational prepositions. Each word was displayed in the
center of the computer screen for 1200 ms, and participants
were asked to pronounce each word out loud as it appeared
on the screen. The goal was to have these 16 words primed
and readily accessible to participants in both conditions.
After making sure that the participant understood all of
the instructions, the experimenter pressed ‘record’ on the
audio-recorder and went to the other side of the wooden
screen, where she pretended to prepare for the next part of
the experiment. On the experimenter’s side of the screen, a
table and chair were set up to face away from the participant
so that in addition to vision being blocked by the wooden
screen, the experimenter was not looking in the same
general direction as the participant as he or she described
the patterns. While it is difficult to ever definitively rule out
the possibility that some gestures produced by the
participants were intended for communicative illustration,
the presence of the wooden screen, the relative positions of
the experimenter and participant, and the participants’
naivete regarding the hidden video camera make it highly
unlikely that the participants perceived any direct visual
audience for their descriptions.  Thus the gestures produced
by the speakers were most likely for purposes other than
direct communicative illustration.
When the participant was ready to begin the first trial, he
or she pressed a key on the laptop keyboard. At the
beginning of each of the six trials in the experiment, a single
black dot was displayed in the center of the computer screen
for 2 s as a signal that the stimulus pattern was about to
appear. The single dot was then replaced by one of the six
dot patterns, which were presented to all participants in the
same fixed order. The pattern remained on the screen for 3 s
and was followed by a 1 s pause. After this brief pause, a
short beep was heard which cued the participant that it was
time to begin describing the pattern. When the participant
was ready to proceed with the next pattern, pressing any key
on the laptop keyboard prompted the beginning of the next
trial.
Because it is crucial to the design of this study that the
words used by participants in the dots-only condition
closely match those used by participants in the dots-plus-
shapes condition, each participant in the dots-plus-shapes
condition was matched to a participant in the dots-only
condition. The responses of the participant in the dots-only
condition were used to create the stimuli shown to the
matched participant in the dots-plus-shapes condition. Lines
and shapes were drawn through each dot pattern to produce
a replica of the conceptualization that was described by the
dots-only participant. This was done in order to encourage
the participants in the dots-plus-shapes condition to
conceptualize the pattern in the same way as their dots-only
counterpart, and consequently to use similar words to
describe the pattern. Because this process necessitated that
the stimuli be redesigned and the computer reprogrammed
for each dots-plus-shapes participant, 8 participants were
completed in the dots-only condition before the patterns
were recreated for the dots-plus-shapes condition.
Participants were then randomly matched to one of the dots-
only participants with gender as the only criterion for
pairing; males were always matched to males and females
were always matched to females. This pairing procedure
was then repeated for blocks of 8 individuals until the final
sample of 24 gender-matched pairs (12 male and 12 female)
was obtained.
Coding
The descriptions given by each participant were transcribed
verbatim, and all iconic gestures were identified. Individual
gestures were distinguished from one another by a change in
hand shape or motion. For example, a motion straight across
from left to right accompanying the words “the bottom line”
was coded as one iconic gesture. If a similar movement
occurred as the first motion of a sequence in which the hand
moved diagonally upward and then diagonally downward
without changing hand shape (to imply triangle), this entire
sequence was coded as one iconic gesture.
The total number of gestures produced by each participant
for each pattern was divided by the total number of words
uttered during the participant’s description of that pattern.
This quotient was then multiplied by 100 to yield the iconic
gesture rate per 100 words. Thus, each participant’s gesture
rate per 100 words was calculated for each of the six pattern
descriptions.
Table 1: Frequency of Spatial Terms Used in Each
Condition
Dots-Only Spatial Word Dots-Plus-Shapes
121 Line 148
116 Triangle 172
110 Top 122
100 Right 67
94 Bottom 124
90 Point 106
72 Middle 78
58 Parallelogram 89
58 Down 45
54 Left 40
Results
Analysis of Speech Produced
To address the question of whether conceptual difficulty
affects gesture production separately from the effects of
lexical difficulty, it is important that the lexical items being
retrieved are similar across conditions. The 10 most
commonly used spatial terms used by participants in the
dots-only condition are shown in Table 1. Although there is
some variation in the exact rank-order of the words, the
correlation between the frequency of occurrence of each
word in the two conditions is high and significant, r(8) =
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0.833, p < .001, suggesting that the spatial words used by
participants were similar in the two conditions.
Analysis of Gesture Production
The central question of interest in this experiment is whether
or not frequency of gesture production is affected by
difficulty of conceptualization. The Information Packaging
Hypothesis predicts that gestures aid in conceptualization
and should thus be used more frequently when
conceptualization is more difficult. Alternatively, the
Lexical Access Hypothesis predicts that so long as the
accessibility of the lexical items being produced remains
constant, gesture production should not be affected.
An inherent problem in analyses of gesture production
between participants, however, is the fact that there is a
large amount of individual variation in the amount of
gesture produced by different individuals. Some individuals
gesture a lot, while others gesture rarely or not at all. For
example, in the current data set, two participants produced
an average of more than 16 gestures per 100 words, while
eleven others did not gesture at all. This large variation in
gesture production between participants necessitates the
presence of a very large difference between condition means
before a significant effect can be detected. Because of this
issue, we analyzed the data using items (i.e., dot patterns)
rather than individuals as the unit of analysis. That is, rather
than collapsing across patterns and comparing individuals in
the two different conditions, data were collapsed across
participants and gesture rates were compared for each of the
six patterns.
A paired t-test revealed a significant effect of condition
on iconic gesture rate (t(5) = 2.84, p < .05).  Patterns in the
dots-only condition elicited an average of 5.69 iconic
gestures per 100 words (SD = .81) whereas the same
patterns in the dots-plus-shapes condition elicited an
average of 4.79 iconic gestures per 100 words (SD = 0.26)
(see Figure 2). Thus, gesture rate varied as a function of
difficulty of conceptualization, with more gestures produced
in the condition with more difficult conceptualization.  The
distribution of high and low gesturers in each condition
suggests that this effect was not driven solely by the
presence  of a few high gesturers in the dots-only  condition.
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Figure 2: Average Rate of Iconic Gestures/100 Words
Produced in Each of the Two Conditions
The dots-only condition included the four participants with
the highest gesture rates, but also included four participants
who did not gesture at all. The dots-plus-shapes condition
also included participants at both extremes, with six who
gestured more than 10 times per 100 words and seven who
did not gesture at all.
Discussion
The Information Packaging Hypothesis (Kita, 2000) holds
that gesture helps refine and organize spatio-motoric
concepts so that they can be readily translated into
verbalizable units. Alternatively, the Lexical Access
Hypothesis holds that gesture primarily aids speech
production by priming the appropriate items in the lexicon.
The present experiment sought to distinguish between these
two hypotheses by varying the conceptual difficulty of a
task and observing the extent to which gestures are
produced under the two levels of conceptual difficulty.
The difference in gesture rates in the two conditions
supports the Information Packaging Hypothesis. Although
the difference was small, participants gestured at a higher
rate in the dots-only condition, in which they had to produce
their own conceptualizations of the stimuli, than in the dots-
plus-shapes condition, in which they had the
conceptualizations given to them. This finding suggests that
gesture does indeed occur not only when lexical access is
more difficult, but also when the situation is more
conceptually difficult. The present findings do not disprove
the Lexical Access Hypothesis, but they do suggest that
gesture can serve an earlier stage in the speech production
process, above and beyond any benefits it may have at the
lexical access stage.
This finding is consistent with current views about the
embodied nature of cognition (e.g., Glenberg, 1997). Briefly
stated, the central claim of embodied accounts of cognition
is that the ways in which we are able to interact bodily with
the world profoundly affect the way we think. From an
embodied perspective, symbolic representations such as
language are grounded or assigned meaning via their links
to bodily experiences and actions. It has been shown, for
example, that sentence comprehension is affected by how
easy it is for the comprehender to mentally simulate him or
herself actually performing the actions implied by the
sentence (Chambers, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, Filip, &
Carlson, 2002; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002).
If we understand language in terms of how we can
interact bodily with the world, it seems likely that this same
embodied knowledge may also be integral to our ability to
produce language. Indeed, the present work regarding the
role of gesture in conceptualizing and formulating speech
seems to point to a role for embodiment in language
production. We suggest that the spontaneous gestures
produced in the act of speaking are a manifestation of
embodied knowledge. Borrowing a phrase from Schwartz
(1998), who argued that gestures reflect “physically
instantiated mental models”, we suggest that gestures reflect
bodily  instantiated mental models. According to the
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Information Packaging Hypothesis, such gestures enhance
speakers’ abilities to think and speak about those concepts.
Thus, when speakers activate their embodied knowledge
through gestures, they are better able to express that
knowledge in the linear, symbolic system of language.
In conclusion, then, it may very well be that a picture is
worth a thousand words; however, the pictures we make
with our hands are not only worthwhile for our listeners, but
also for ourselves.
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Abstract
Cognitive Constraint Modeling (CCM) is an approach to
reasoning about behavior that (1) provides a framework for
investigating the hypothesis that skilled behavior is the
optimal solution to a constraint satisfaction problem defined
by objective, environmental, knowledge, and architectural
constraints, (2) derives predictions of behavior from formal
specifications of theory, (3) supports reasoning using both
dependency-based and cascade-based ontologies for
expressing temporal relationships between processes. A
software tool that demonstrates the potential advantages of
CCM is described.  The tool, called CORE, can be used to
partially automate the generation of behavioral predictions
given a specification of the constraints. We explore the
application of CORE to dual-task data previously modeled
with EPIC and ACT-R.
Introduction
When people acquire a skill they are able to adapt their
behavior so as to incrementally improve the value of some
utility function.  With practice, the scope for improvement
attenuates and performance asymptotes.  It may asymptote
at a level that is consistent with constraints imposed by the
environment or perhaps at a level determined by the
knowledge that is brought to the task.  The bounds may
instead be imposed by the human cognitive architecture.
More plausibly, the asymptote may be determined by a
combination of constraints, including the stochastic and
temporal profiles of the task environment and the human
cognitive, perceptual, and motor systems.  The approach to
the asymptote is bounded by a multiplicity of constraints
(Simon, 1992).
There has of course been much work aimed at modeling
skilled behavior and its acquisition (e.g. Anderson and
Lebiere, 1998; Meyer and Kieras, 1997; Taatgen and
Anderson, 2003). The purpose of the current paper is to
provide an initial demonstration of how models of skilled
behavior can be generated by the formal derivation of
behavior descriptions from multiple constraints, and in
particular, how this approach supports reasoning about
asymptotic bounds on skilled behavior.  The specific
objectives of the paper are:
(1) To introduce the hypothesis that skilled behavior is the
optimal solution to a constraint satisfaction problem defined
by architecture, task environment, and knowledge
constraints.
(2) To introduce a formal modeling approach, called
CCM, that directly supports reasoning about the optimal
bounds on skilled behavior.  By using deductive inference
and constraint satisfaction algorithms, CCM computes the
necessary consequences of the constraints imposed by the
task environment, by strategic knowledge, and by the
cognitive architecture.  These constraints may determine, for
example, which cognitive and environmental processes can
execute in parallel and which have sequential dependencies.
(3) To specify two ontologies which provide alternative
information processing vocabularies for the cognitive and
task theory, and the resulting descriptions of behavior.  The
first is a straightforward formalization of temporal
dependencies, implicit in existing work based on CPM-
GOMS. The second is a richer ontology that permits
specifying sets of communicating information processes,
where both the processes, inter-process communication
channels and buffers are subject to resource constraints.
This framework has much in common with McClelland's
cascade model (McClelland, 1979).  Both ontologies are
formally defined by a set of declarative axioms that are part
of the model specification.
The paper has the following structure. We first introduce
the background to our work on CCM and then describe a
reasoning tool, called CORE (Constraint-based Optimal
Reasoning Engine).  We describe the application of CORE,
using the temporal dependency axioms, to reasoning about a
dual task experiment first reported by Schumacher, Lauber,
Glass, Zubriggen, Gmeindl, Kieras, Meyer (1999) and
subsequently modeled by Byrne and Anderson with ACT-
R/PM (Byrne and Anderson, 2001). In doing so we show
that CORE is flexible enough to support inference about the
implications of both central and peripheral bottleneck
theories of dual task performance. CORE requires 42
simple, universally quantified, declarative statements to
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specify the task, strategies, architecture, and axioms
required to reason about the dual task. We also report that
the optimal schedule for Schumacher et al.’s task suggests
that participants may have been using a strategy not
previously considered.  Lastly, we introduce, and describe
the benefits of, the cascade-based axioms.
Background
Predicting how long it will take people to perform a task is
difficult, but important.  It is difficult because human
performance depends on a multiplicity of complex
interacting constraints that derive from the environment,
from human psychology, and from knowledge that people
bring to the task. Skilled performance of a routine task
usually involves the execution of a number of parallel but
interdependent streams of activity: For example, one hand
may move to a mouse; while the other finishes typing a
word; and the eyes begin to fixate on a menu while the
required menu label is retrieved from memory.  Each of
these processes takes a few hundred milliseconds, but
together they form behaviors that take many seconds.
Importantly, the details of how processes are scheduled, of
how they are ordered, and of the implications of their inter-
dependencies, has significant consequences for the overall
time requirement.
There are a number of scientific and engineering tools that
support the prediction of skilled performance time.  Many of
these tools share a common intellectual origin in the Model
Human Processor (MHP: Card, Moran & Newell, 1983).
Card et al. introduced the MHP as an engineering model in
which human cognition was described as a set of
communicating processors each of which had parameters
(e.g. for cycle time) derived from human experimental
psychology. More recent engineering tools, particularly
CPM-GOMS (Gray, John, Atwood, 1993), have also
utilized the processor and process framework.  EPIC, a
production system architecture that synthesizes more recent
results in cognitive and perceptual psychology (Meyer and
Kieras, 1997) was also influenced by the work of Card et al.
(1983).  Most recently, ACT-R/PM (Byrne and Anderson,
1998) extended the ACT-R architecture with a set of EPIC-
like perceptual-motor modules.
The strength of these strands of work is evident in the
range of experimental findings for which explanations can
be offered; for the successful efforts at delivering
scientifically validated tools to applied practitioners (e.g.
Gray, John, Atwood, 1983); and for the rigor that is evident
in the insistence that theory be expressed computationally
(e.g. Byrne and Anderson, 2001; Meyer and Kieras, 1997).
However, there are issues.  Below we have listed three that
were significant in motivating the work reported in this
paper.
(1) It is difficult to inspect and modify architectural
assumptions (Cooper and Shallice, 1995).  Cognitive
architectures embody architectural assumptions in
underlying code, and are not easy to change. This would not
be a problem if the details of an architectural theory were
stable and comprehensive enough to be applied to a wide
range of tasks. But in the forseeable future the modeler will
find it valuable to easily manipulate and add architectural
assumptions that are still under debate in the field.
(2) Model predictions can be a function of theoretically-
irrelevant or implicit assumptions. Current approaches force
modeling at certain fixed levels of abstraction. In general,
computational cognitive architectures force computational
completeness in order to incrementally simulate behavior.
But one consequence is that modelers must specify the
details of procedural knowledge and the representations
used in long term and short-term memory, which may not
be intended as theoretical commitments.
(3) It is difficult to predict the asymptotic bound on skilled
behavior. Though learning architectures such as ACT-R/PM
could in principle automatically asymptote to the
appropriate skilled behavior, the mechanism is an open
research problem and puts a robust learning theory on the
critical path to efficiently modeling skilled behavior.
Stimuli
Audition
Vision
Cognition
Goal
Motor
Figure 1: A CCM-d prediction of performance on Schumacher et al.’s  (1999) Experiment 3 task.
Time (hundredths of a second)
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CORE: A tool to support reasoning about behavior
CORE takes as input a set of mathematically stated
constraints on behavior and outputs a prediction.  In this
respect it shares some similarities to the work of Duke and
Duce (1999). One of the formats for the output, a CPM-
GOMS-like Pert chart, is illustrated in Figure 1.  The
prediction in the Figure is for a dual task behavior studied
by Schumacher et al. (1999) and subsequently modeled in
ACT-R/PM by Byrne and Anderson (2001).  Each box
represents a process.  Task 1 (light gray processes) is to
respond to a tone (high or low) with a left-finger key press,
and task 2 (dark gray) is to respond to a pattern with a right-
finger key press.  In the Figure, time is represented on the
horizontal access and each row represents a different
resource or processor, perception at the top, through
cognition and goal, to motor actions.  The task processes
represent the temporal extent of the representation of each
task on the goal.
Following Card et al. (1983) constraints are described in
terms of the temporal and resource properties of a
distributed set of processors, each with its own processing
capabilities. Each processor is defined in terms of a set of
parameters and a defined set of processes.  Each process has
parameterized limits (min, max) on its duration.  The
duration of motor movements can be automatically
determined by a calculation of Fitts's Law.  The duration of
cognitive and perceptual processes may be directly
determined from the empirical literature (e.g. estimates of
the time required to switch attention), or by functions that,
for example, model hypotheses about the behavior of
retrieval mechanisms.
The relationships between the processes represented in
Figure 1 are an attempt to reproduce the assumptions
adopted by Byrne and Anderson (2001).  The processing
sequence for each stimulus is: attend to the stimulus,
perceive the stimulus, select a response, transmit a
command to the motor system.  The duration of the select
process is determined by ACT-R/PM’s retrieval function.
The lines between processes in Figure 1 represent
temporal dependencies .  A dependency is a type of
constraint that specifies that one process must be scheduled
after another has finished.  While the particular prediction
illustrated in Figure 1 has been constrained by
dependencies, cognitive constraint modeling is not limited
to dependency-based representation of theories.  The
constraints that specify the meaning of dependencies are the
essence of a set of CCM axioms that we call CCM-d (CCM-
dependency).  CCM-d provides a formal specification of the
CPM-GOMS modeling framework (Vera et al., 2004).  (An
alternative set of axioms, called CCM-c, for CCM-cascade,
is described later in the current article.)
Representing a theory
Constraints on behavior are specified to CORE in terms of
relationships between events in the environment, tasks, and
psychological processes.
The semantics of the language for expressing statements is
a subset of second-order predicate calculus.  An entity is
represented as a set of elements where each element is either
an ordered pair, or a triple where the first element is ‘++’.
For example, the following reads, there exists a cognitive
process called initclick that must be scheduled after process
Uj.
 ∃ Pi: { (isa,process) (name,initclick) (resource,cognition)
(++,after,Uj) } ⊆  Pi (1)
Each pair consists of an attribute and a value.  A set must
only contain a single element with a particular attribute (e.g.
there must only be, at most, one pair that matches the
pattern (name,_) ).  Each triple consists of the symbol ‘++’,
an attribute, and a value.  For triples, there are no
restrictions on the attribute or value.  Triples support the
expression of sets in which an attribute can have multiple
values.  The features in (1) are specified as a subset of Pi
(⊆).  Further features may complete the specification of this
process.
Sets that represent processes, must have a start attribute
and a duration attribute.  This can be represented with the
statement that all Pis that contain the pair (isa,process), must
also contain a start time Si and a duration Di.
∀ Pi:  { (isa,process) } ⊆  Pi
→  { (start,Si), (duration,Di) } ⊆  Pi (2)
Relationships between the start times and durations of
processes are represented with simple integer-arithmetic
constraints.  The following represents the assumption that a
motor process is a necessary consequence of an
initialization process, that a motor process cannot occur
before its initialization process, and that the maximum
temporal gap between the two processes is 300ms. This
constraint must hold irrespective of the task.
∀ Pj: { (isa,process) (name,initclick)
(start,Sj) (duration,Dj) } ⊆ Pj
→
∃ Pi: { (isa,process) (name,click) (start,Si) } ⊆ Pi
∧ Sj + Dj ≤  Si
∧ Si  - ( Sj + Dj ) ≤  300 (3)
Given a set of axioms, statements of this form can be used
to represent theoretical assumptions about the task
environment, about instruction taking, about the strategies
that people deploy, and about the human cognitive
architecture.
Crucially, universally quantified constraints specified in a
predicate calculus are not production rules.  The constraints
may appear to possess a similar surface form to production
rules but, in fact, the semantics are very different.  Most
importantly, unlike production rules, these declarative
statements of theory are statements of what must be true
irrespective of context. They are not elements of a
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procedure that generates the description.  The constraint
must hold for every circumstance where its antecedent is
met.  The generation of a model with these constraints is
entirely monotonic and the order of expansion can be (and
often is) different to the predicted order of behavior.
Generating a prediction
Given constraints on behavior, CORE can be used to
generate a prediction.  This is a two-phase process.
Phase 1. CORE derives the necessary implications of the
theory.  For example, given a Pi (as defined in statement 1)
above and rule (2), CORE would derive that the initclick
process must have a start and duration:
∃ Pj: { (isa,process) (name,initclick) (resource,cognition)
(++,source,Ui) (start,Sj) (duration,Dj) } ⊆ Pj(4)
Subsequently, with rule (3), CORE can derive that there
must be a motor click process, with a start time and duration
constrained by the given equations.
Arithmetic constraints on the start time, duration, and
costs of a process are posted to a constraint store that is
implemented in a Sicstus Prolog variant of Constraint Logic
Programming for Finite Domains ( CLP FD: Jaffar &
Lassez, 1987).  Much of the power that CORE provides is a
direct consequence of CLP FD functionality (Vera et al.,
2004).  Importantly, the scheduling algorithms provided by
CLP FD make it possible for an analyst using CORE to
focus on the declarative specification of theory without
worrying about the theory-irrelevant algorithms by which
behavioral implications will be derived.
At the end of phase 1 the values of the start, duration, and
other parameters, such as cost, are constrained by the posted
equations, but their values are not yet uniquely determined.
Phase 2. Phase 2 involves making a prediction by finding
a particular behavior that is consistent with the set of
constraints, i.e. phase 2 must identify a consistent set of
values for variables that were posted to the CLP FD
constraint store (e.g. start time, duration, cost).  This is
achieved by calling a function that uses constraint
satisfaction to achieve variable assignment.  This function
can be configured to use a range of scheduling algorithms.
Two are particularly important for the purposes of reasoning
about cognition: greedy scheduling and optimal scheduling.
Greedy scheduling.  Scheduling proceeds with the tick of
a clock.  On each tick, a process is selected that can be
scheduled immediately.  The process is assigned the
appropriate start time.  Greedy scheduling can be used to
model ACT-R/PM and EPIC.  A greedy scheduling
algorithm is not guaranteed to give an optimal schedule.
Optimal scheduling.  Using CLP FD, a branch-and-
bound algorithm can be used to generate a schedule with the
greatest utility.  We have used a utility function that is
maximal when cost is minimized.  Cost is defined as the
sum of the total duration of the schedule and the durations
of the buffers required to store information.  As we illustrate
below the ease with which CORE can be used to generate
predictions of the optimal behavior, given the theoretical
assumptions, is one of its key advantages.
Reasoning about dual task performance
In Schumacher et al.’s (1999) experiment (Experiment 3)
participants were required to respond to a tone and a visual
pattern with key presses that depended on whether the tone
was high or low and whether the pattern contained a
particular feature.  The tone and the pattern were presented
with a small gap of between 50 and 1000ms (Stimulus
Onset Asynchrony).  Participants were asked to prioritize
the tone task.  The tone task response times were, on
average, unaffected by SOA. In contrast, the mean pattern
task response time, at a short SOA (50ms), was less than the
sum of the tone task and pattern response times at long
SOAs (> 500ms). This finding has been taken as evidence
that some elements of tone and pattern task were performed
in parallel at short SOAs.  Byrne and Anderson were
interested in modeling Schumacher’s data using ACT-R/PM
in order to demonstrate that cognitive parallelism is not
required to explain these results.  They argued that the
results can be modeled with either the EPIC or ACT-R/PM
assumptions and that Schumacher’s data provides evidence
for strategic deferment of the pattern task response.
Specification and Inference
We demonstrate that the theoretical assumptions of Byrne
and Anderson (2001) and separately of Schumacher et al.
(1999) can be precisely expressed as a small set of predicate
calculus constraints, and that CORE can be used to support
reasoning about their behavioral consequences.
We used 42 universally quantified constraints to capture
the theoretical assumptions underlying the architecture and
strategies deployed in Byrne and Anderson’s model (see
www.cf.ac.uk/psych/howesa/ccm).  Together with the
CCM-d axioms, these constraints are a mathematically-
complete specification of the theory underlying Figure 1.
They capture constraints on the task environment, the
strategy, the architecture, and in addition the axioms of
CCM-d. (It would in fact be possible to use many fewer
constraints but we attempted to write them in a way that was
general enough to enable reuse.)  We selected parameters to
fit the performance time and ran the model with a greedy
scheduling algorithm to check its performance.  It produced
the same pattern of results as reported by Schumacher and
modeled by Byrne and Anderson (2001).
One of the constraints that is particularly important for the
predictions made by Anderson and Byrne’s model states
that the duration of retrieval is sensitive to whether the
retrieval request is issued when the tone task overlaps in
time with the pattern task.  This relies on an implementation
of the ACT-R retrieval time function, retrieval_time(B,S,T),
where B is the base level activation, S is the source
activation, and T is the returned retrieval duration.  The
source activation is lower per task when there are multiple
concurrent tasks.
598
Subsequently, we modified the specification in order to
remove the ACT-R/PM assumption that there is a central
bottleneck on human cognition and permit EPIC-like
concurrent cognitive processing.  Only a handful of changes
were required to make this alteration, demonstrating the
claim that CORE facilitates reasoning about the
consequence of different architectural assumptions.  First,
the tone task and pattern task cognitive processes were
assigned to separate resource streams, and second, an
unlock process was introduced and its duration adjusted to
fit the data.
The fact that ACT-R and EPIC resource assumptions can
be captured with such similar sets of constraints is
unsurprising given their shared intellectual history (though
it would be interesting to compare the Lisp code).  In
general, the space of theories that can be represented with
CCM is determined by the requirement that theories are
described in terms of processes, processors, the relationships
between them, and by the axioms (CCM-d or CCM-c).
Skill and optimal constraint satisfaction
In order to explore the hypothesis that skilled behavior is
the optimal solution to a constraint satisfaction problem, we
switched from greedy scheduling to optimal scheduling (a
parameter change in the input specification). CORE
generated a novel prediction.  In the behavior for a task with
a 50ms SOA and a simple pattern, rather than choose to
schedule the pattern selection process so that it was
concurrent with the tone task, CORE chose a schedule in
which selection (i.e. retrieval) is deferred until after the tone
task has finished.  The benefit is that by deferring selection,
the overall time requirement is slightly reduced.  This is
because even though the selection process starts later (after
the tone click in Figure 1) it has a much shorter duration
(only 30ms compared to the 250ms). The resulting
difference in the overall time cost of the schedules is
marginal but the qualitative difference in the strategies is
dramatic.  The analysis exposes a necessary consequence of
ACT-R’s retrieval function and the assumption that people
adapt strategies to reduce time cost.
The example illustrates the way in which CORE can
facilitate the exposure of a logically required implication of
a set of theoretical assumptions. Byrne and Anderson’s
ACT-R model does not make this prediction because it does
not optimize over the total cost of the behavior. Optimal
scheduling exposes the possibility that participants
strategically defer retrieval so as not to incur the costs of
concurrent processing.
Our analysis also raises a question about a fundamental
assumption embedded in the ACT-R retrieval function: That
retrieval time is not dynamically adjusted with changes in
source activation occurring during retrieval.  I.e. the
sensitivity of the retrieval time function to source activation
is limited to the value of the source activation at the time of
the retrieval request.  An alternative assumption would be
that retrieval could take advantage of increases in source
activation that occur after a retrieval request is made but
before a chunk is delivered. With this alternative
assumption, deferred retrieval in the Schumacher task would
carry no advantage.  Which assumption provides a better
model of human retrieval is an empirical question that is not
answered by Schumacher’s data.
Cognition as cascading information processing
CORE is flexible enough to accept theory specifications
expressed relative to a range of different sets of axioms.  For
the work reported above we used axioms that were based on
the notion of a dependency (CCM-d).  However, there are
intrinsic limitations of dependency-based axioms (Vera et
al., 2004) and we have therefore been working on the
specification of a set of axioms that is based in part on the
idea of a cascade as a mechanism for representing
overlapping, communicating processes. Our formalization
builds on McClelland's (1978) original cascade assumptions
to explicitly include the declaration of resource-limited
communication channels and buffers between processes.
Figure 2 illustrates a prediction derived by CORE using
CCM-c axioms.  The start times and durations of the
processes are the same as in Figure 1.  The difference
between the figures is that the relationships between
processes are expressed in terms of cascades. These capture
the resource requirements and temporal constraints on the
inter-process communication channels. The cascades are
represented in Figure 1 as the lightest gray bars that run
between the processes.  One advantage of cascades is that
they prevent cognitively implausible process orderings that
would be legal using CCM-d. For example, the process
ordering init(x), init(y), click(y), click(x) is legal in CCM-d
but cognitively implausible because it assumes no cost to
buffering information between the cognitive intention and
the motor action.
Discussion
We have introduced a framework and a tool for making
inferences about the implications of formally specified
theories of skilled behavior. The tool uses a constraint logic-
programming environment to support the inference of the
Stimuli
Audition
Vision
Cognition
Goal
Motor
Time (hundredths of a second)
Figure 2: A CCM-c prediction of performance on Schumacher et al.’s  (1999)  experiment 3 task.
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asymptotic bound on skilled behavior given a specification
of the constraints on the task environment, on perception, on
cognition, and on action.
Our investigations are at an early stage.  We have so far
explored the potential of dependency and cascade axioms on
only a handful of tasks.  In addition to the dual task
described in the current paper we have also used CORE to
generate predictions for a range of applied tasks including a
call-center accounts advise task, and a laboratory version of
an Automated Teller Machine.
Our aim in conducting this work was not to recast ACT-
R/PM and EPIC in a formal language.  The aim was to
provide a tool that could assist in the prediction of the
asymptotic bound on skilled behavior given constraints on,
not only, objective and environment but also on strategies
and architecture.  We concur with Simon (1992) that an
analysis of the optimal adaptation given all of these sources
of constraint provides a more accurate estimation of
behavior.  While the extent to which we can achieve our aim
is yet to be determined, we have presented arguments for the
scientific merit of deductive inference in exploring the
asymptotic bound on skilled behavior. We have shown that
by deriving the optimal schedule of behavior for these
constraints, logically implied but previously unexplored
predictions of behavior can be exposed.  The fact that a
novel prediction was generated for a task that has been the
subject of a number of published studes illustrates that the
benefits of cognitive constraint modeling go beyond
redescription of existing theory.
One potential concern is that if we were to write a set of
constraints to capture the range of behaviors exhibited by,
for example ACT-R, we would generate a set that was as
large and formidable as ACT-R’s Lisp code.  Our response
is twofold.  First, we note that CCM is not a simple subset
of ACT-R, it includes functionality, particularly
optimization, that is not present in simulation architectures.
Second, we point out, again, that our aim is not to recast
ACT-R or EPIC in a formal language.  More particularly,
our aim, at present, is not to build a simulation architecture,
rather it is to provide a tool for supporting reasoning about
psychological theory.  Much of the complexity of the ACT-
R and EPIC implementations may be related to the
simulation-based framework in which they are cast.
Our current work is aimed at further developing the
generality of CORE.  Most importantly, we need to take full
advantage of the constraint satisfaction engine, CLP FD,
that is used for the calculation of arithmetic parameters.  In
the present implementation of CORE, this engine is not used
to reason about the symbolic inter-process constraints.  We
also need to work on using constraint satisfaction techniques
that support reasoning about statistical distributions rather
than just integer values.
In conclusion, we have introduced a constraint-based
framework for reasoning about human behavior and argued
for the utility of a specific tool called CORE.  Our
investigation suggests that partially automatic algorithms
can be used to generate predictions of optimal human
behavior from concise, theory-relevant, and readily
modifiable, specifications of  psychological theory.
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Abstract 
We describe a connectionist model designed to reflect 
some of the anatomy of the visual pathways, notably 
the precise division of the human fovea and its 
subsequent contralateral projection to the cortex. The 
model was trained on a realistically large-scale problem, 
mapping between Chinese orthography and phonology. 
This split-fovea model replicated the interaction 
between character regularity and frequency that has 
been found in Chinese phonetic compound naming 
tasks. It also provided cross-language support for the 
hemispheric desynchronization account of dyslexia. 
Finally, the model predicted different regularity effects 
between characters with different phonetic radical 
positions. 
Introduction 
Cognitive scientists aim to understand language 
processing universals. Seidenberg and McClelland’s 
“triangle model” of the reading of monosyllabic English 
words has been substantially developed (e.g. Harm & 
Seidenberg, 1999). However, there is still little 
application to languages other than English. The 
cognitive modelling of the processing of Chinese 
orthography suffers from an input representativeness 
problem (cf. Chater & Christiansen, 1999) due to its 
complexity; there is ongoing debate as to how to 
represent Chinese characters in a psychologically 
realistic way. Most of the proposed computational 
models of Chinese character reading either have not 
been computationally implemented (e.g. Perfetti & Tan, 
1999), or have employed relatively small-scale training 
data (e.g. Chen & Peng 1994). Cognitive modelling 
research in Chinese reading thus has lagged behind 
research in the reading of English. 
Chinese has a radically different orthography from 
any alphabetic language. The basic writing units of 
Chinese are characters, which usually contain 
meaningful morphemes, instead of the letter-based 
representations of speech segments found in alphabetic 
languages. In general, there are four different ways of 
composing Chinese characters: pictographs, indicatives, 
ideographs, and semantic-phonetic compounds. A 
semantic-phonetic compound (or simply a phonetic 
compound) contains both semantic and phonological 
information. Such compounds comprise about 81% of 
the 7,000 most frequent characters in the Chinese 
dictionary (Li & Kang, 1993). Hence, understanding 
how Chinese readers recognize these phonetic 
compounds is an important goal in psycholinguistic 
cognitive modelling. 
A phonetic compound can be decomposed into two 
major components: a semantic component, which bears 
information about the meaning of the character, and a 
phonetic component, which may have partial 
information about the pronunciation of the character. 
Most phonetic compounds have their semantic radicals 
on the left and phonetic radicals on the right (SP 
characters). For example, the character “ 沐 ” means 
“taking a bath” in English and is pronounced as “mu4” 
in Pinyin1. It consists of a semantic radical on the left, 
which means “water”, and a phonetic radical on the 
right, which is pronounced the same as the character. 
We call these characters regular phonetic compounds. 
Some characters may be pronounced slightly differently 
from their phonetic radicals, such as “柚”. Its phonetic 
radical “ 由 ” is pronounced as “iou2” in Pinyin. 
However, “柚” has a different tone – it is pronounced as 
“iou4”. These characters are referred to as semi-regular 
phonetic compounds. Finally, there are some characters 
pronounced very differently from their phonetic 
radicals, such as “洒” (sa3) and “西” (xi1). We call 
them irregular phonetic compounds. The opposite 
structure to an SP character exists, in which the 
phonetic radical is on the left and the semantic radical is 
on the right (PS characters). The ratio of SP characters 
to PS characters is about 9:1 (Hsiao & Shillcock, in 
preparation). 
A regularity effect has been found in the processing 
of Chinese phonetic compounds: Chinese readers name 
regular characters faster than irregular characters. There 
is also a frequency by regularity interaction in Chinese, 
as in English (see, .e.g., Hue, 1992; Liu, Wu & Chou, 
1996; Seidenberg, 1985.)  
Researchers have also studied Chinese character 
reading in brain-damaged patients (Yin & Butterworth, 
1992) and found similar disorders as those found in 
                                                          
1 The Chinese Pinyin system is a spelling system based on the 
Latin alphabet. The number at the end indicates the tone type. 
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English word reading. Chinese deep dyslexics were 
found to be able to pronounce irregular characters well 
but had difficulties pronouncing pseudo-characters with 
real semantic and phonetic radicals. On the other hand, 
Chinese surface dyslexics tended to regularize irregular 
characters and were able to pronounce about 50% of 
pseudo-characters according to their phonetic radicals 
(Zhou, 1999).   
There is clear evidence that the human fovea is split 
precisely about the vertical midline: the left and right 
visual hemifields are projected contralaterally to the 
right and left hemispheres respectively (see, e.g. 
Fendrich & Gazzaniga, 1989). On the basis of 
anatomical and other evidence, a “split-fovea model” of 
English word reading has successfully captured several 
reading phenomena (see, e.g., Shillcock Ellison & 
Monaghan, 2000; Shillcock & Monaghan, 2001). 
Chinese phonetic compounds provide opportunities not 
available in alphabetic languages for examining the 
plausibility of this split-fovea model, since 
phonological information only comes directly from half 
of a character. In other words, the split fovea 
architecture seems to correspond fortuitously to the 
major functional division in the structure of Chinese 
phonetic compounds; the model “carves the problem at 
its joints”. Also, when an input character is irregular, 
the model faces an XOR-like problem, which makes 
interaction between the two halves necessary. Here we 
report our results of applying this split-fovea 
architecture to the modelling of Chinese character 
pronunciation. 
Simulations 
Phonological Representations 
The sound system of Chinese differs from that of 
English. One of the most salient differences is the four 
distinct tones in standard Chinese (i.e. Mandarin)2. The 
pronunciation of each character has only one syllable, 
and every syllable has a nucleus and a tone associated. 
Characters with the same nucleus but different tones are 
usually not related in their meanings or orthography. In 
addition to a nucleus and a tone, there are three optional 
components associated with a syllable: a consonant at 
the beginning, a glide in the middle, and a glide or a 
consonant from a restricted class at the end (Wang, 
1973). In total, syllables in Chinese have eight possible 
forms. 
In Chinese syllables, all consonants can appear in the 
initial consonant position, and all vowels can appear in 
the nucleus position. On the other hand, there are only 
three possible vowels in the medial glide position, and 
five possible consonants and vowels in the ending 
                                                          
2 Some dialects in China, such as Cantonese or Southern Min, 
may have more than four different tones. 
position. According to the phonetic features of the 
Chinese Pinyin system (“Mandarin Consonants and 
Vowels”), there are 14 features for consonants: bilabial, 
labiodental, dental, alveolar, palatal, velar, stop-
aspirated, stop-unaspirated, nasal, fricative, affricative-
aspirated, affricative-unaspirated, glide, and liquid. 
Hence, we encoded every consonant in terms of these 
14 features. Vowels were encoded with 8 features: front, 
central, back, high, mid, low, unround, and round.  
In our phonological representation, the two major 
parts were the initial consonant, which consisted of 14 
nodes for the 14 consonant features, and the nucleus 
vowel, which consisted of 8 nodes for the 8 vowel 
features. The glide was represented together with the 
vowel features in the nucleus vowel section. The same 
applied to the vowel features in the ending position. 
After 8 vowel feature nodes, we used 3 nodes to 
represent the features of the consonant in the ending 
position (nasal, dental, and velar). Notice that there are 
only two consonants (n and ng) possible in the final 
position. The last 2 nodes represented high and low 
tones respectively. 4 different tones in Chinese were 
represented with different combinations of the high and 
low tones (Yip, 2002). In total, the distributed 
phonological representation consisted of 27 nodes (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The phonological representation. 
 
Orthographic Representations 
Chinese characters consist of several individual strokes. 
There are some 20+ distinct strokes in Chinese 
orthography. Together, a few strokes may comprise a 
“stroke pattern”, a recurrent orthographic unit of 
Chinese characters. Some stroke patterns can be 
characters by themselves. Units can be constructed 
recursively to form another composite unit. Those units 
that are integral stroke patterns and cannot be further 
decomposed into other units have been referred to as 
single bodies (Chen et al, 1996). 
Researchers have long believed that Chinese 
character recognition starts from an analysis of features 
and the number of individual strokes (e.g., Seidenberg, 
1985), in contrast with letters in alphabetic writing 
systems. In recent years, researchers have found 
evidence that this recognition by skilled readers is 
based upon well-defined orthographic constituents, 
instead of individual strokes (Chen, Allport, and 
Initial 
consonant 
features 
14 nodes 
Nucleus 
vowel 
features 
8 nodes 
Final 
consonant 
3 nodes 
Tones 
2 nodes 
602
Marshall, 1996; Zhou & Marslen-Wilson, 1999). Hence, 
in the orthographic representation, we used the basic 
stroke patterns defined in Cangjie, a Chinese 
transcription system developed by Ban-fu Chu in 1978. 
From a database analysis, there are 179 such stroke 
patterns comprising the radicals of all left-right 
structured Chinese phonetic compounds (Hsiao & 
Shillcock, in preparation). Hence, we used these 179 
stroke patterns to encode the orthographic 
representation of the Chinese characters whose 
pronunciation we modelled. 
Training and Test Corpora 
The training corpus contained all left-right structured 
Chinese phonetic compounds and all their radicals 
which exist as characters on their own. During training, 
each character was presented according to its log token 
frequency, taken from a Chinese lexical database 
(Hsiao & Shillcock, in preparation). The database 
contains about 3,000 of the most frequent Chinese 
phonetic compound characters. Among them there are 
2,159 left-right structured phonetic compounds and 880 
radicals that are also existing characters. The test corpus 
contained the same phonetic compounds, but not the 
radicals on their own.  
Network Architecture 
Anatomical evidence has shown that the human fovea is 
precisely split about a vertical midline: when an 
alphabetic word or a Chinese character is fixated, the 
parts to the left and right of the fixation point are 
directly projected contralaterally. In modelling Chinese 
character recognition, we initially abstracted from real 
fixation behaviour and assumed that a character 
consisting of a semantic and a phonetic radical side by 
side could receive three possible fixations (see Figure 
2). Characters were presented in the three fixation 
positions equally frequently during training. The task 
for the model, as for the reader, was to coordinate the 
information across the hemifields/hemispheres 
(Shillcock et al., 2000).  
 
 
Figure 2: The complete pattern of inputs. 
 
The network consisted of three layers. Adjacent 
layers were fully connected. Input units were localist 
representations of stroke patterns, capturing the claim 
that stroke patterns are functional units of character 
recognition. The characters were all represented in each 
of the three positions necessary to accommodate the 
input schema shown in Figure 2. Each position 
represented each of the 179 possible stroke patterns. 
The input was mapped, via a hidden layer, onto a 
feature-level phonological output. For characters with 
more than one pronunciation, only the most frequent 
pronunciation was employed. 
The model is shown in Figure 3. To solve the task, 
“interhemispheric” communication is necessary, in the 
form of “callosal” connections between the two sets of 
hidden units.  
 
Figure 3: The split-fovea model for mapping Chinese 
orthography to phonology, with callosal connections. 
  
Figure 4: The model with no callosal connections. 
 
Figure 4 shows a comparison model with no callosal 
connections in the hidden layers, which was trained on 
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the same task. In order to compare the performance of 
the two different architectures, we equalized their 
computational power by putting recurrent links on the 
hidden layers of the model with no callosal connections. 
Hence, both models had identical parameters and 
numbers of weighted connections. Thus, the principal 
difference between the models was the network 
architecture. We report elsewhere the more 
comprehensive comparison with a non-split model. The 
learning algorithm was discrete back propagation 
through time (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams, 1986). 
Results 
We ran each of the two different models three times 
and analyzed their average performance. Figure 5 
shows the performance of the two models on regular 
and irregular characters, in terms of summed square 
error (SSE) at different stages during training. Neither 
of the two models had difficulty learning this task well. 
The split architecture encouraged the model to discover 
the formal similarities within the radicals in the two 
halves of the characters; that is, that most phonological 
information came from the right half of the characters.  
The divided visual system fortuitously mirrored this 
distinction in the orthography.  
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Figure 5: Performance of different models on regular 
and irregular characters. 
 
The implemented split-fovea model provides an 
approach to understanding dyslexia in terms of 
hemispheric desynchronization (Shillcock & Monaghan, 
2001). In the current simulations, the split-fovea model 
with callosal connections outperformed the model with 
no callosal connections (equivalent to extreme 
hemispheric desynchronization) on both regular and 
irregular characters; it especially exhibited more 
difficulty learning irregular characters, which constitute 
an XOR-like problem for the model with no callosal 
connections. Chinese surface dyslexics demonstrate 
reading impairments similar and analogous to those of 
dyslexics in alphabetic languages: poorer performance 
reading irregular characters (Yin & Butterworth, 1992). 
Hence, the implemented split-fovea model provides 
cross-language support for the hemispheric 
desynchronization account of dyslexia. 
The model with no callosal connections made 
regularization errors on irregular characters, as we 
might predict from the nature of the problem it faced. 
Table 1 shows some examples of such regularization 
errors. As can be seen, most characters were mistakenly 
pronounced exactly like their phonetic radicals; some 
were given the same pronunciation but with a different 
tone. Interestingly, we found some which were 
pronounced as other irregular characters with the same 
phonetic radical (e.g., 俗 in Table 1). This shows that 
the pronunciation of an irregular character was not only 
affected by its phonetic radical, but also by 
orthographic “neighbours” which share the same 
phonetic radical. 
 
Character Correct  
pronunciation
Generated 
pronunciation 
Phonetic 
radical 
pronunciation
猜 cai1 qing1 qing1 (青) 
帖 tie3 zhan4 zhan4 (占) 
橫 heng2 huang2 huang2 (黃) 
俗 Su2 yu4 (欲, 裕)  gu3 (谷) 
沙 sha1 shao2 shao3 (少) 
冶 ye3 tai2 tai2 (台) 
杯 bei1 bu4 bu4 (不) 
 
Table 1: Examples of regularization errors generated 
by the split model with no callosal connections. 
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Figure 6: Interaction between frequency and 
regularity in the model with callosal connections after 
two million character presentations. 
 
604
Figure 6 shows the interaction between frequency and 
regularity effects in the split-fovea model with callosal 
connections, after two million character presentations. 
This same interaction has been shown in experiments 
on Chinese character recognition (see, e.g., Shu et al, 
2000; Hue, 1992; Liu, Wu & Chou, 1996; Seidenberg, 
1985.). The model also produced this behaviour: the 
regularity effect was clearer among low frequency 
characters; there was a significant interaction between 
regularity and frequency (ANOVA analysis, F(1,1075) 
= 16.296, p < 0.001). The same significant interaction 
was also found in the version of the model with no 
callosal connections (F(1,175) = 6.809, p < 0.01). 
We also examined the model’s behaviour on SP and 
PS characters. It showed that there was no significant 
difference in the average SSE between the two groups 
in both split models with and without callosal 
connections (F(1,2155) = 1.730, p > 0.05; 
F(1,2155)=2.117, p > 0.05). A significant interaction 
between position of the phonetic radical (i.e. SP or PS 
characters) and regularity was also found in both 
models (F(1,2155) = 4.719, p <0.05; F(1,2155) = 5.479, 
p <0.05. See Figure 7 and 8). In the split model with 
callosal connections, there was a significant regularity 
effect among SP characters (F(1,1940) = 127.486, p < 
0.001), but not among PS characters (F(1,215) = 3.048, 
p > 0.05). This may reflect the fact that only 24% 
characters are regular in the PS group, compared with 
39% in the SP group (Hsiao & Shillcock, in 
preparation). On the other hand, the split model with no 
callosal connections did not exhibit the same behaviour: 
there were significant regularity effects among both SP 
characters (F(1,1940) = 140.654, p < 0.001) and PS 
characters (F(1,215) = 6.493, p < 0.001. See Figure 8). 
Here the modelling makes a testable prediction 
regarding human behaviour. Elsewhere we verify this 
prediction (Hsiao & Shillcock, submitted). 
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Figure 7: Interaction between position of phonetic 
radicals and regularity of characters in the split model 
with callosal connections. 
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Figure 8: Interaction between position of phonetic 
radicals and regularity of characters in the split model 
with no callosal connections. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
We have presented a connectionist model of Chinese 
character recognition, an extension of the anatomically 
based split-fovea model, and we have compared the 
processing of Chinese phonetic compounds in 
architectures with and without callosal connections. We 
have incorporated several simplifications concerning 
the nature of the orthographic input and fixation 
behaviour, but several dimensions of our modelling 
have been of a psychologically realistic scale and the 
modelling has succeeded in capturing a number of 
behaviours and also in making experimentally testable 
predictions. 
On the task of orthography to phonology mapping, 
the split-fovea architecture facilitates the network’s 
discovery of the relationship between character 
substructure and pronunciation. The split architecture 
fortuitously corresponds to the major functional 
division in the stimuli we have used. This modelling 
further demonstrates the potential value of 
incorporating the anatomical constraints of the visual 
pathways into the computational modelling of reading: 
the requirement of a staggered input (Figure 2) 
effectively parses the stimuli (a process that is more 
apparent in modelling the reading of alphabetic inputs).  
Also, we have examined the performance of the 
model with no callosal connections and found 
behaviour similar to that of Chinese surface dyslexics. 
The performance of the “callosally impaired” model is 
worse than the split-fovea model especially on irregular 
characters. A further examination showed that most 
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errors made were regularization errors, which matches 
the behaviour of surface dyslexics. The modelling 
hence provides cross-language support for the 
hemispheric desynchronization account of surface 
dyslexia. 
The model also has made some testable predictions 
from its performance. It shows that the regularity effect 
is more salient among characters with their phonetic 
radicals on the right than on the left. This interaction 
reflects a statistical fact that there is greater regularity 
among characters with phonetic radicals on the right. 
Hence, these phonetic radicals become better cues for 
pronunciation.  
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Abstract
It was investigated how spoken language is mapped onto
the mental representations of objects in the visual field.
Specifically, the visual world paradigm was used to test the
hypothesis that during ‘passive’ listening tasks attention is
directed more towards objects in the visual field that match
the physical shape of the concept of the word concurrently
heard than towards objects that do not match on physical
shape. Participants listened to sentences containing certain
critical target words of concepts with a typical shape (e.g.
‘snake’) while concurrently viewing a visual display of
four objects. We found that participants tended to fixate
conceptually unrelated objects with a similar physical
shape (e.g. cable) as soon as information from the target
word (e.g. ‘snake’) started to acoustically unfold. The
results indicate that (contrary to some priming studies, e.g.
Moss et al., 1997) shape information is accessed long
before the offset of the spoken word. We discuss the
findings with respect to the applicability of the visual world
paradigm for the investigation of the access of lexical
representations and theories of active vision.
Humans ‘translate’ between spoken language and
concurrent visual input in such a natural way that we are
hardly ever consciously aware of the processes involved.
Surprisingly, there has been little research that has
attempted to explore explicitly the interaction of these
processes. A notable exception has been the research
within the ‘visual world paradigm’ (the measuring of eye
movements around a visual scene or display of objects in
response to concurrent speech: Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus
et al. 1995) using both linguistic and visual contexts.
Cooper (1974) established that when participants were
presented simultaneously with spoken language and a
visual field containing referents of the spoken words,
participants tended to spontaneously fixate the visual
referents of the words currently being heard.  For
example, participants were more likely to fixate the
picture of a snake when hearing part or the entire word
‘snake’ than to fixate pictures of unrelated control words.
Cooper (1974) also found that participants were more
likely to fixate pictures showing a lion, a zebra, or a snake
when hearing the semantically related word ‘Africa’ than
to fixate semantically unrelated control words. Cooper’s
(1974) early study thus established two main findings:
first, during the acoustic duration of a spoken word
participants show a strong tendency to fixate objects that
the word refers to. Second, his study highlighted the
influence of semantic relationships on language-mediated
fixation behavior: participants are more likely to fixate a
visual referent that has some semantic relationship with
the word heard than a semantically unrelated visual
referent (see Huettig & Altmann, 2004; Yee & Sedivy,
2001; for follow-up studies). The primary goal of research
in the visual world paradigm following Cooper’s (1974)
pioneering study has been to use eye movements as a tool
to shed light on linguistic processing. For example,
Allopenna, et al. (1998) asked participants to ‘Pick up the
candy. Now put it …’ in the context of a visual display of
objects including (among other things) a candy and a
candle. They found evidence for a phonological
competitor effect: eye movements to both the candy and
the candle increased as the word ‘candy’ acoustically
unfolded but that soon after its acoustic offset, looks to
the candle decreased while looks to the candy continued
to rise. The Allopenna et al. (1998) study provided
evidence for a standard competitor effect as predicted by
theories of auditory word recognition such as TRACE
(e.g. McCleland & Elman, 1986). Importantly the study
demonstrated this effect in real-time as the speech stream
was unfolding acoustically (see also Dahan et al., 2001;
for more evidence that the visual world paradigm
provides fine-grained measures of lexical processing).
However, far less attention has focused on examining
the interaction of spoken language with directed attention
and the visual properties of the presented objects. In this
regard, Cooper (1974) also found that participants tended
to fixate a picture of a snake when hearing the word
‘wormed’ (in the context ‘just as I had wormed my way
on my stomach’). This finding (although not discussed by
Cooper) suggests that there may also be a strong link
between lexical processing and the visual properties of an
object such as an object’s shape (although it cannot be
ruled out that in Cooper’s experiment participants
mistook the snake for a worm and therefore directed their
attention to the picture of the snake when hearing
‘wormed’).
The visual world paradigm and the access of lexical
representations Importantly, Cooper’s study (1974) is
indicative that similar processes to semantic priming are
taking place when people map spoken words onto related
visual objects. The semantic priming paradigm (Meyer &
Schvanefeldt, 1971) has proven to be particular useful for
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the investigation of lexical representations. The currently
dominant view is that a word’s representation is
composed of smaller units (or ‘features’) of different
kinds that are accessed during spoken word recognition.
Recent distributed models of spoken word recognition
(e.g. Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson, 1997) assume that some
aspects of a word’s meaning may be activated more
rapidly than others resulting in a dynamic pattern of
changes in the semantic properties throughout the
duration of the spoken word. Evidence supporting this
notion comes, for example, from priming studies by Moss
et al. (1997) that found a significant priming effect for
functional properties of words early during the duration of
the word but priming for perceptual targets (e.g. the shape
overlap between hook and curve) only at the offset of the
prime word. In order to investigate these time-course
issues the visual world paradigm may be particularly
useful because of the closely time-locked, fine-grained
measures the method provides.
In the current study we explored how the physical
shape of objects in a visual display interacts with
language-directed attention. Participants’ eye movements
were measured, during the acoustic duration of certain
target words (concepts with a typical shape, e.g. ‘snake’),
to conceptually unrelated visual objects that have a
similar shape (e.g. the image of a cable). If participants
shift their attention to conceptually unrelated objects with
a similar shape (e.g. cable) when the word ‘snake’ unfolds
during online speech, then the inspection of the time-
course of fixation probabilities should shed light on the
issue whether (lexical) shape information is accessed only
at word offset or before. In other words, if (lexical)
‘perceptual’ information such as shape is not accessed
before the offset of the spoken word then the prediction is
that there should be no increased attention to shape
competitors (e.g. cable) before the offset of the acoustic
target words (e.g. ‘snake’).
The visual world paradigm and ‘active vision’ Our
study explored the effect of ‘shape overlap’ between
spoken words and visual objects on overt attention.
Relevant in this regard is that most vision research has
focused on what Findlay & Gilchrist (2003) term ‘passive
vision’: the assumption that image interpretation is largely
passive and that parallel processing occurs across the
visual image with algorithms charting the “progress from
a grey-scale retinal input to an internal representation in
the head”. Findlay & Gilchrist (2003) reject this view in
favor of ‘active vision’: the notion that overt gaze
orienting is an essential and crucial feature of vision. This
approach emphasizes the importance of re-directing
attention overtly (rather than covertly) by moving the
gaze in order for the attended location to obtain the instant
benefit of high-resolution foveal vision. These proposals
are similar to the notion that the perceptual system
offloads information by leaving it in the environment
rather than just passively passing information on to the
cognitive system for propositional representations to be
created. According to this view, perceptual information in
the environment is accessed when needed, with the visual
world functioning as a kind of external memory (e.g.
O’Regan, 1992). Objects in this situated memory are
represented in a spatial data structure which contains
‘pointers’ to the real-world location of the object. Thus,
the system need not store internally detailed information
about the object, but can instead locate that information,
when it has to, by directing attention back to that object in
the environment. Essentially, the focus in active vision
research is on understanding why and when gaze is re-
directed. In other words active vision places vision in a
context. And one important variable that impacts on (and
guides) active vision is spoken language.
Importantly, there was one second preview of the visual
display in our study and the target words unfolded approx.
five seconds after the onset of the visual display. This
means that all four objects were fixated (usually several
times) before the onset of the target word. Therefore the
prediction is that on ‘passive vision’ accounts, arguably,
there is no need for an immediate shift in overt attention
towards a conceptually unrelated object (e.g. cable) when
the word ‘snake’ unfolds. In other words on ‘passive
vision’ accounts all relevant information has already been
encoded and is available to the system for further
cognitive processing. On active or situated vision
accounts, however, the prediction is that on hearing the
target word, overt attention will be re-directed to the
shape competitor to retrieve more information about that
object to establish its fit with the specification provided
by the target word.
Methods
Participants 48 participants from the University of York
student community took part in this study. All were native
speakers of British English and had either uncorrected
vision or wore soft contact lenses or glasses.
Materials The experiment made use of three conditions.
21 items were created consisting of two types of spoken
sentences containing a target word (e.g. ‘snake’) for two
sets of visual stimuli. In the ‘target set’ the visual stimulus
was a picture depicting a fully matching referent (e.g. a
snake) for the acoustic target word plus three distractors
depicting objects from different conceptual categories.
The stimuli in the ‘shape competitor set’ consisted of the
same four pictures, in identical positions, except that the
target picture (e.g. the snake) was replaced by a picture
depicting an object with a similar shape as the target word
(e.g. a cable,  Figure 1).
The sentential stimuli were constructed for three
conditions: neutral sentences with the pictures of the
‘target set’ (the neutral condition), sentences biasing the
visual target referent (biasing snake) with the pictures of
the ‘target set’ (the biasing condition), and the same
sentences as in the biasing condition but where the picture
of the target object (e.g. snake) was replaced by a picture
of a shape competitor (the competitor condition, e.g. the
picture of a cable). The rationale for presenting the shape
competitor in a biasing context was simply to make it
relatively unlikely that participants would anticipate, prior
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to the target word, that the shape competitor would be the
object of attention (even though it was not going to be
referred to directly). The neutral sentences were included
in order to establish a baseline against which the efficacy
of the biasing context could be determined.
Figure 1.  Visual stimulus in the competitor condition
(depicting: physical shape competitor of the acoustic
target word ‘snake’: cable, 3 distractors)
In sum, for the neutral condition, the sentence did not
provide any contextual bias up until the target word that
would favor any of the pictures depicted in the visual
scene (‘In the beginning, the man watched closely, but
then he looked at the snake and realized that it was
harmless’). In the biasing condition, the sentence was
constructed to contextually bias towards the depicted
target object (e.g. the snake): ‘In the beginning, the
zookeeper worried greatly, but then he looked at the
snake and realized that it was harmless’. In the
competitor condition the sentence was identical to the
biasing condition. However, the picture of the shape
competitor (e.g. cable) was semantically unrelated to the
target word (e.g. ‘snake’) and thus the sentential context
did not provide any contextual bias towards the picture of
the shape competitor. The target-competitor pairs were:
anchor/arrow, apple/moon, banana/sword, bell/hat,
button/coin, candle/tube, cigar/carrot, chimney/rocket,
dice/ice cube, football/planet, globe/orange,
horseshoe/magnet, lighthouse/flask, microphone/cone,
mir ror / f rame,  penc i l / co lumn,  p la te /whee l ,
racket/saucepan, scissors/chopsticks, snake/cable,
wheelbarrow/sledge.
Norming study In order to determine the relative
similarity in physical shape of the target concept activated
by the acoustic target word with the depicted objects a
norming study was conducted. Twelve participants
provided normative data. Participants were presented with
the written target word (e.g. snake) and the actual visual
items. Participants were asked to judge how similar the
typical physical shape of the target concept (snake) was
with the physical shape of the depicted objects on a scale
from 0 to 10 (zero representing: ‘absolutely no similarity
in physical shape’, 10 representing: ‘identical in physical
shape’). The mean similarity for the shape competitors
was 7.1 (SD = 1.8) and for the distractors 1.4 (SD = 0.7).
These differences in the shape similarity judgments
between the shape competitors and the visually dissimilar
distractors were highly significant (F1 (1, 11) = 268.89,
MSE = 0.07, p < 0.01; F2 (1, 20) = 200.35, MSE = 0.17,
p < 0.001).
Procedure and Design There were 21 experimental items
(counterbalanced across the three conditions). For 14 of
the experimental items per participant the visual stimulus
included a visual referent matching the full ‘target
specification’ of the target word (e.g. the acoustic word
‘snake’ and the picture of a snake in the ‘neutral
condition’ and the ‘biasing condition’). For 7 of the
experimental items there was no picture matching the full
‘target specification’. For these items there was only a
‘physical shape match’ between the acoustic target word
and the shape competitor picture (e.g. the acoustic target
snake and the picture of a cable in the ‘shape competitor
condition’). 15 additional filler items were added, which
all included a fully matching visual referent of an acoustic
target word. There were four practice trials. Thus 82% of
the 40 trials included a fully matching target visual
referent (e.g. hearing ‘snake’ and seeing a snake). This
design made it very unlikely that the participants were
able to note the physical shape relationship and adopt a
conscious strategy accordingly. In addition, participants
consistently stated in self-report that they neither moved
their eyes according to some kind of explicit strategy nor
noticed the ‘shape manipulation’.
Participants were seated at a comfortable distance in
front of a 17’ display and wore an SMI EyeLink head-
mounted eye-tracker, sampling at 250Hz from the right
eye (viewing was binocular). They were told that they
should listen to the sentences carefully. They were also
told that they could look at whatever they wanted but
were asked not to take their eyes off the screen throughout
the experiment. The onset of the visual stimulus was one
second before the onset of the spoken stimulus. The onset
of the acoustic target word was on average 4 seconds after
the onset of the spoken sentence and thus the acoustic
target word started to unfold on average 5 seconds after
the onset of the visual stimulus. The entire experiment
lasted approximately twenty minutes. Participants’ eye
movements were recorded as they listened to the
sentences.
Results
Fixation probabilities: p(fix) The probability of fixating
a type of picture at a defined moment in time, p(fix), will
be reported. The visual display consisted of four
quadrants, each with one object. Gaze positions were
categorized by the quadrant in which an object was
depicted. The a priori probability of fixating one of the
four pictures in absence of any bias was thus 0.25.
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 Table 1: P(fix) at the acoustic onsets and offsets of the target words (e.g. ‘snake’) and difference scores per condition
condition neutral biasing competitor
type of picture target
(snake)
distractor target
(snake)
distractor competitor
(cable)
distractor
p(fix) at onset .27 .24 .39 .19 .25 .24
difference score at onset .04 0.21 .01
p(fix) at offset .50 .15 .52 .14 .33 .22
difference score at offset .35 .38 .11
Table 1 shows p(fix) for the type of picture at the time
points of critical interest: the acoustic    onset   of the target
word (e.g. the acoustic onset of ‘snake’), and the    offset   of
the target word (e.g. the acoustic offset of ‘snake’). The
probability to fixate the three distractors was averaged to
obtain one distractor value. Note that we did not add any
time to account for the time it takes to  program a
saccade. All measures and analyses were based on the
real acoustic time points. Figure 2 shows the time-course
of p(fix) in the three conditions from the acoustic onset of
the target word for 1000 ms.
Figure 2. Time-course of p(fix) to the target in the
neutral condition and the biasing condition, and to the
shape competitor in the competitor condition (and
averaged distractors of each condition).
Fixations of the different types of pictures at the
acoustic    onset   of the target word is of interest in order to
assess whether there were any biases in attention before
information from the critical target word (e.g. ‘snake’)
became available. It was predicted that at this point there
would be no such bias in the neutral condition and the
competitor condition if the context had been neutral with
respect to directed attention to any of the pictures.
However, it was predicted that at the acoustic onset of the
target word there would be a bias towards the target
picture (e.g. the snake) in the biasing condition because of
the biasing sentential context. These predictions are
apparently born out by the data. Table 1 shows that p(fix)
at the onset of the target word was around 0.25 in the
neutral and competitor conditions but that there was a
strong bias towards the target object in the biasing
condition. The acoustic    offset   of the target word reflects
the point when the entire spoken target word has been
heard by the participants. Fixations at this point are of
interest in order to assess whether the acoustic unfolding
of the target word resulted in changes in overt attention.
Table 1 and Figure 2 show that the target and competitor
fixations had increased in the neutral and the competitor
conditions, whereas in the biasing condition the
probability to fixate the target increased further.
Nonetheless, Table 1 and Figure 2 suggest that p(fix) of
the targets in the neutral and the biasing conditions was
higher than p(fix) of the shape competitors in the
competitor competition. In other words as acoustic
information from the target words became available the
probability to fixate the target picture and the shape
competitor picture increased. However, p(fix) of the
target pictures increased much more than p(fix) of the
shape competitors.
Statistical analyses In order not to violate statistical
assumptions (in particular that pertaining to the
independence of observations), difference scores obtained
in each condition are compared For instance to assess a
bias to look at a critical picture (target or competitor vs. a
distractor referent) the differences in fixation probabilities
to these stimuli are considered. Such difference scores
reveal both the magnitude and direction of the effects. In
the current study p(fix distractor) was subtracted from
p (fix target) and p(fix competitor). Any positive
difference reveals a bias of looks towards the critical
picture, a negative difference reveals a bias of looks
towards the distractors, and difference scores close to zero
reveals neither bias. The use of error bars in the form of
95% confidence intervals plotted around the sample
means provides a quantitative visual representation of the
faith that should be placed in the pattern of sample means
as an estimate of corresponding patterns of population
means. Figure 3 shows the mean of the difference scores
for participants and items at the acoustic    onset   of the
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target words (e.g. ‘snake’) in the three conditions. Error
bars represent the 95% confidence intervals of the means
computed individually for each difference score.
Figure 3. Means of the difference scores (participants
and items) at the acoustic    onset   of the target words
(Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals)
Figure 4. Means of the difference scores (participants and
items) at the acoustic    offset   of the target words (Error bars
represent the 95% confidence intervals)
Figure 3 shows that at target onset there were no
reliable differences between looks to the critical pictures
and the distractors in the neutral and the competitor
conditions. In other words there were no differences in
directed attention for type of picture at the acoustic onset
of the target. However, there was a reliable bias in
directed attention towards the target object in the biasing
condition. Thus the contextual manipulation had been
successful.
Figure 4 shows the mean of the difference scores for
participants and items at the acoustic    offset   of the critical
words. There was a reliable bias in directed attention to
the critical pictures in all three conditions. Importantly,
there was a statistically robust higher probability to fixate
the shape competitor (e.g. the cable) than the distractors at
the acoustic offset of the target word (e.g. ‘snake’).
General Discussion
Our findings directly link online conceptual processing
during lexical access in speech to attentional behavior in
the visual world. They extend Cooper’s (1974) work by
showing that during ‘passive’ listening tasks attention is
also directed significantly more towards objects that
match the shape of the word concurrently heard than
towards objects that do not match on shape.
Importantly, the competitor effect was significant at the
offset of the acoustic target words. This means that the
shape competitor effect started to occur as soon as
information from the target word acoustically unfolded
given that the average duration of the target words was
447ms and that the minimum latency to program and
initiate a saccade is 150 to 200 ms (e.g. Saslow, 1967).
This result is contrary to priming studies (Moss et al.,
1997) that found activation of perceptual (including
shape) information only at the offset of the prime word.
The current study suggests that the visual world paradigm
is particularly sensitive for capturing the access of
conceptual and perceptual information during lexical
processing. Note that Moss et al. (1997) included five
different types of ‘perceptual’ properties in their study. A
reason for the discrepancy to our results thus may be that
Moss et al. (1997) did not distinguish between different
‘perceptual’ properties such as color and shape. In other
words they may have found delayed priming for
perceptual targets because of the differential properties of
the items they selected for their perceptual condition. An
alternative explanation is that the information (from the
spoken words) provided for the attentional system to
visual objects involves such a tight ‘loop’ that other
means of observing the access of (lexical) perceptual
representations (e.g. the lexical decision task) can only do
so at some delay. Similarly the activation in our study
may have partly originated through spreading activation
from shape information portrayed within the visual
display. The shape information may have activated
concepts sharing those features resulting in an earlier
access of shape information during spoken word
recognition. Our data do not show to what extent this
activation may have originated from the visual display.
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Notably, the present results are in line with the
predictions derived from active or situated vision
accounts that on hearing the target word, overt attention
may be re-directed immediately towards only partly
matching objects in order to retrieve more information
and to establish their fit with the target specification as
provided by the target word. Arguably, our findings
coupled with the fact that there was one second preview
of the visual display and that the target words unfolded
approximatly five seconds after the onset of the visual
display, cannot be as easily incorporated in ‘passive
vision’ accounts.
Pickering, McElree, & Garrod (submitted) have
recently proposed that participants may engage in a covert
naming strategy in visual world experiments. Pickering et
al. state that “many effects in this paradigm may be partly
the result of participants’ regularly naming the objects
covertly… further research is needed to determine the
extent to which visual world results depend upon
linguistic recoding (covert naming) of the objects”. The
current data do not rule out that our participants on
occasion named an object covertly. However, the
immediate and robust shift in directed attention to a
conceptually unrelated and clearly identifiable shape
competitor with a different name (e.g. cable) on hearing
the target word (e.g. ‘snake’) does not fit comfortably
with their suggestion. The current study thus casts doubt
on the claim that participants regularly name objects in
visual world studies.
The shape competitor effects are unlikely to be limited
to the passive listening task we employed. Dahan &
Tanenhaus (2002) recently presented evidence that similar
visual form competitor effects also occur when
participants are required to engage in an explicit physical
task (moving the objects mentioned in spoken sentences
using a computer mouse). Our procedure of a ‘passive’
listening task is strong evidence that these perceptual
competitor effects are not limited to certain  specific
‘goal-directed’ task demands.
In sum, the findings are best compatible with the notion
of a rich mapping process between spoken language and
concurrent visual input. On a methodological note, the
visual world paradigm promises to be a valuable research
tool for investigations into the access of (lexical)
perceptual and conceptual representations as well as into
issues in visual perception.
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Abstract 
One of the important tasks of language acquisition is the 
ability to distinguish between an inflectional derivation from a 
target word, which is a variant of this word (e.g., tool Æ 
tools), and a completely new word (e.g., tool Æ stool).  In an 
attempt to explain the ability to solve this problem, it has been 
proposed that the beginning of the word is its most 
psychologically salient portion.  However, it is not clear 
whether this phenomenon is specific to language or whether it 
stems from a more general cognitive mechanism, with 
beginnings of sequences being more salient than endings.  
The three reported experiments were designed to answer this 
question.  In these experiments, participants judged the 
similarity of test sequences to target sequences across three 
domains: linguistic, musical and visual.  The test items were 
judged as more similar to an original target item if 
information was added to the end of that item rather than to 
the beginning of the item across all three domains.  This 
suggests that there may be a more general cognitive 
mechanism underlying the well-documented suffixation 
preference, according to which changes in the end of the word 
are more readily interpreted as inflectional derivations from 
the target word. 
Introduction 
One of the important tasks of language acquisition is the 
ability to distinguish between an inflectional derivation 
from a target word, which is a variant of this word (e.g., 
toolÆ tools), and a completely new word (e.g., tool Æ 
stool). 
There are multiple types of inflections that exist across 
languages, including prefixation (e.g., adding a morpheme 
before the stem), suffixation (e.g., adding a morpheme after 
the stem), infixation (e.g., adding a morpheme inside the 
stem), and nonconcatenative devices (e.g., interleaving a 
string of vowels with a string of consonants). 
Two types of inflections are frequently present in many 
European languages, prefixes and suffixes, and it has been 
established that suffixes are easier to acquire (e.g., interpret 
suffixation as an inflectional derivation) than prefixes.  This 
finding is not specific to the English language.  Cross-
linguistically, the suffixing preference results in stems 
generally being ordered before the added morpheme 
because language users prefer to process stems before the 
added morpheme (Hawkins & Cutler, 1988).  Overall, 
suffixing is more frequent than prefixing (Hawkins & 
Gilligan, 1988).  A number of explanations have been 
proposed, although any single explanation alone may not 
fully account for this phenomenon. 
First of all, there are positional differences with the 
addition of a morpheme at the beginning and the end of the 
word, which is important because words take place in time 
(Gasser, 1994).  For example, words are often recognized 
before they are completed (Tyler, Marslen-Wilson, Rentoul, 
& Hanney, 1992).  The information that reaches the ear first 
may be the key to the identification of that piece of 
information.  If this is the case, then the temporal aspect of 
language may be the underlying reason for suffixation 
preferences in language. 
Similarly, the psychologically most salient part of any 
word is its beginning portion (Clark 1991; Hawkins & 
Cutler, 1988).  This is to say that the effect of distorting a 
word is more severe if the distortion is at the beginning of 
the word (e.g., prefix) rather than the end (e.g., suffix).  This 
is true in both comprehension and production. In 
comprehension, adding a morpheme to the end of a word 
does not affect the recognition of the word, and in 
production, it is easier to produce a familiar sequence 
1 613
Experiment 1: Inflections in the Linguistic 
Domain 
followed by a modification in the form of a suffix than the 
reverse, a modification first and then the familiar word 
(Clark, 1991). 
These contentions seem to be supported by the literature 
on language acquisition.  In particular, Slobin (1985) 
claimed that children use procedures or strategies called 
Operating Principles (OP) in their linguistic development.  
He proposed many different principles that children use, but 
the one of importance for this area is OP (ATTENTION): 
BEGINNING OF UNIT.  This principle states that children 
pay attention to the first syllable of an extracted speech unit.  
They store it separately and in relation to the unit with 
which it occurs.  If a child were specifically attending to the 
beginning of a word, then adding a morpheme to the end of 
the word would be less detrimental to the recognition of that 
word than adding the morpheme to the beginning of the 
word. 
Method 
Participants There were 17 participants in this experiment.  
The participants were undergraduate students from The 
Ohio State University who participated to fulfill a 
psychology course requirement.  Five participants failed to 
correctly respond to at least 70 % of the catch items and 
were excluded from this experiment. 
 
Design and Materials The stimuli consisted of 42 sets, with 
each set consisting of a 2-syllable artificial Target word 
followed by two Test words.  One of the Test words was the 
Target with a morpheme added to the beginning (Test-Pre). 
The other Test word was the Target with a morpheme added 
to the end (Test-Post).   Clark has done much research on the area of children and 
inflections that add support to suffixation preference from a 
developmental perspective.  She has found that children 
acquire inflections from their earliest word use and continue 
to comprehend and produce them throughout their linguistic 
development (1995).  In general, children begin to add noun 
and verb inflections between 18 and 24 months; however, 
they consistently learn suffixes before prefixes, even when 
these inflectional forms express equivalent information 
(1995; 1998).  In addition, children aged 5 to 7 find 
nonsense suffixes are easier to imitate than nonsense 
prefixes (1998). 
The Target words were constructed by randomly 
connecting discrete syllables (e.g., Ta-Te) with .06 sec 
between syllables (see Johnson & Jusczyk, 2001; Saffran, 
Aslin, & Newport, 1996, for details of stimuli creation).  
The Test words were created by either adding a syllable to 
the beginning of the Target word (Test-Pre: BE-Ta-Te), to 
the end of the Target word (Test-Post; Ta-Te-BE), adding 
nothing to the Target word (Test-Identical: Ta-Te), or 
changing the Target word completely (Test-Different: Pu-
La-Fi). 
On each trial, participants received a Target word, 
followed by two Test words (the order of each of the Test 
words was counterbalanced), and their task was to 
determine which of the Test words was more similar to the 
Target. 
Overall, children seem to find it easier to process 
information added to the ends of words than to the 
beginnings, and it has been argued that the beginning of the 
word is its most psychologically salient portion.  This would 
explain why children are better at learning suffixes rather 
than prefixes.  These findings map quite well onto the adult 
research on inflectional morphology. 
There were six types of sets determined by pairing of the 
types of Test words: Pre-Post, Pre-Identical, Post-Identical, 
Pre-Different, Post-Different, and Identical-Different.  The 
first type was the focal interest (e.g., 25 Pre-Post sets), 
whereas the remaining 5 conditions were catch trials (3 sets 
for each condition, and 2 additional Identical-Different sets 
for the practice trials).  The set types varied within 
participants. 
However, it is not clear whether this phenomenon is 
specific to language or whether it stems from a more general 
cognitive mechanism.   
We suggest that this ability may reflect a more general 
property of processing of temporally organized information: 
changes in the beginning of a sequence are easier to detect 
than at the end of the sequence.  If this is the case, then non-
linguistic information that has temporal structure may also 
give rise to inflection-type effects, such that changes at the 
end of the sequence would more likely be considered 
variants of the original string than changes at the beginning 
of the sequence. 
 
Procedure Each participant received 2 randomly presented 
practice trials with a break to ask the experimenter any 
questions, and then the remaining 40 trials were presented 
randomly.  Presentation software was used to deliver the 
instructions, present the stimuli and record the responses.   
The participants were instructed that they would hear a 2-
syllable Target word followed by two Test words, and they 
were to decide which of the Test words was more similar to 
the initial Target word.  If the first Test word was most 
similar, they were to press “F” on the keyboard, and if the 
last Test word was most similar, they were to press “L”.  To 
start each new trial, they were instructed to press the space 
bar. 
To test this hypothesis, we conducted three experiments, 
using language (Experiment 1), music (Experiment 2), and 
visual sequences (Experiment 3). 
There was 1 sec in between each word, and the order of 
the Test words was counterbalanced across sets.   The 
Target word was heard from both of the computer speakers 
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Experiment 3a: Inflection-type Effects in the 
Visual Domain 
while the first Test word was heard only from the left 
speaker and the second Test word was heard only from the 
right speaker. 
Method Results and Discussion 
Participants There were 17 participants in the visual 
domain.  The participants were undergraduate students from 
The Ohio State University who participated to fulfill a 
psychology course requirement.  Using the same exclusion 
criterion as in Experiment 1, 2 participants were eliminated 
from this experiment. 
Overall, participants were accurate on catch trials, 
exhibiting over 90% accuracy (M = 94.90%), above chance, 
one-sample t (16) = 25.43, p < .001. 
However, the analysis of participants’ responses to Pre-
Post items was of considerable interest.  Data analyses 
focused on the percent of participants’ responses in which 
the Test-Post item was considered more similar to the 
Target than the Test-Pre item.  Overall, in more than 85% of 
responses (M = 88.00%) participants deemed the Test-Post 
item to be more similar to the Target than the Test-Pre item, 
above chance, one-sample t (16) = 9.64, p < .001.  Thus, as 
expected there was a clear tendency to choose the Test-Post 
items as more similar to the original Target word than the 
Test-Pre words. 
 
Design and Materials The design was the same as in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  The stimuli in this experiment 
consisted of object sequences.  There were a total of 25 
objects that were randomly connected to form the Target 
sequences.  The Target sequences were composed of either 
all red, blue, green or orange shapes.  Each set consisted of a 
Target sequence made of two simple objects that flashed for 
1 sec each while centered at the top of the computer screen 
(e.g., Cross, Heart). 
Having established that the procedure captures the effect 
in the domain of language, we conducted Experiments 2 and 
3, using the same procedure with music tones and visual 
patterns. 
Then, 1 sec later, the first of two Test sequences appeared 
at the bottom of the screen.  There was 1 sec in between 
each Test sequence, and the order of the Test sequences was 
counterbalanced across sets.  The first Test sequence 
appeared on the bottom left of the computer screen, and the 
second Test sequence appeared on the bottom right of the 
screen.  The Test items were created by adding an object 
(e.g., Diamond) for 1 sec either at the beginning of the 
Target sequence (Test-Pre; Diamond, Cross, Heart), at the 
end of the Target sequence (Test-Post: Cross, Heart, 
Diamond), no change at all to the Target sequence 
(Identical: Cross, Heart) or changed the sequence 
completely (Different: Star, Light Bulb, Lock).  The object 
that was added was of a different color than the Target 
sequence: a red Target sequence would have a blue object 
added (and vice-versa), and green and orange were similarly 
paired. 
Experiment 2: Inflection-type Effects in the 
Domain of Music 
Method 
Participants There were 18 participants in this experiment.  
The participants were undergraduate students from The 
Ohio State University who participated to fulfill a 
psychology course requirement. 
 
Design and Materials The design was the same as in 
Experiment 1, except the sets were made up of a 2-note 
Target melody and two Test melodies.  The Test items were 
created by adding notes to either the beginning (Pre) or the 
end (Post) of the Target melodies. 
  
Procedure The overall set up of the experiment was similar 
to Experiments 1 and 2.  In this experiment, the participants 
were instructed that they would see a Target sequence of 
objects on the top of the screen followed by two Test 
sequences on the bottom of the screen.  They were to decide 
which Test sequence was more similar to the initial Target 
sequence. 
Procedure The overall procedure was identical to 
Experiment 1.  The main exception was that instead of 
hearing words, the participants were instructed that they 
would hear a small Target musical melody followed by two 
Test melodies.  From this, they were to decide which Test 
melody was the most similar to the original Target melody. 
Results and Discussion 
Results and Discussion 
Overall, participants were accurate on catch trials for this 
experiment as well, exhibiting over 90% accuracy (M = 
91.85%), above chance, one-sample t (17) = 20.35, p < .001. 
Participants were accurate on catch trials with an overall 
accuracy over 95% (M = 98.04%), above chance, one-
sample t (16) = 63.23, p < .001. Similar to Experiment 1, data analyses of central interest 
focused on the percent of participants’ responses in which 
the Test-Post item was considered more similar to the 
Target than the Test-Pre item.  Once again, the participants 
were more likely to choose the Test-Post items as more 
similar to the Target than the Test-Pre items (M = 71.56%), 
above chance, one-sample t (17) = 4.03, p = .001. 
Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, participants were more 
likely to choose the Test-Post items as more similar to the 
Target than the Test-Pre items (M = 91.53%), above chance, 
one-sample t (16) = 13.72, p < .001. 
Having established that this effect is present in the visual 
domain, it was important to investigate the effect of 
temporal information in this domain.  Therefore, 
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Experiment 3b was conducted as a control experiment for 
the visual domain without the addition of temporal 
information. 
General Discussion 
The results of the three reported experiments clearly 
indicate that across the three domains, the beginning of the 
sequence was more salient than the end of the sequence, and 
as a result, the addition of a single element to the beginning 
of the sequence was perceived as a greater change than the 
addition of a single element to the end of the sequence.  
Presence of this tendency across the three domains indicates 
that this tendency is not limited to language.  More 
specifically, the “suffixation preference” found in the 
linguistic domain appears to be analogues for sequences of 
musical tones and visual patterns, all having a temporal 
component. 
Experiment 3b: The Visual Domain without 
Temporal Information 
Method 
Participants There were 18 participants in the visual 
control condition.  The participants were undergraduate 
students from The Ohio State University who participated to 
fulfill a psychology course requirement. 
 Results of Experiment 3b indicate that the temporal 
component is fundamental: once the temporal component is 
removed and stimuli are presented simultaneously, the 
effect is diminished. 
Design and Materials The design was the same as in the 
previous experiments.  The stimuli in this experiment 
consisted of the same object sequences that were used in 
Experiment 2 without the addition of temporal information.  
That is to say that the participants viewed a row of 
stationary shapes instead of a dynamic sequence of shapes. 
Therefore, the suffixation preference, which is often 
considered a useful linguistic bias for solving the 
inflectional problem, does not appear to be specific to 
language, but rather it stems from processing of temporally 
organized information. 
The Target appeared at the top of the screen while the 
Test items simultaneously appeared at the bottom of the 
screen.  Once again, the positioning of the Test sequences 
was counterbalanced across sets.  One Test sequence 
appeared on the bottom left of the computer screen, and one 
Test sequence appeared on the bottom right of the screen.  
Similar to Experiment 3a, the Test items were created by 
adding an object (e.g., Diamond) either to the left of the 
Target sequence (Test-Pre; Diamond, Cross, Heart,), to the 
right of the Target sequence (Test-Post: Cross, Heart, 
Diamond), no change at all to the Target sequence Identical: 
Cross, Heart) or changed the sequence completely 
(Different: Star, Light Bulb, Lock). 
To better understand this phenomenon, it is important to 
investigate this bias in native speakers of languages that do 
not have the same dominant suffixing preference (e.g., 
Thai).  This may further reveal the direction and strength of 
this tendency. 
In addition, there are several important questions that are 
to be answered in future research.  First, it is unclear 
whether this tendency to consider the beginning of a 
sequence as more salient than the end of a sequence appears 
as a domain-general attentional bias or whether it first 
manifests itself in the domain of language, and then gets 
extended to other temporally organized domains.  Although 
the former possibility seems more likely, a developmental 
study using the same set of stimuli is necessary to answer 
this question. 
 
Procedure The overall set up of the experiment was similar 
to the previous experiments.  In this experiment, the 
participants were instructed that they would see a Target 
sequence of objects on the top of the screen and two Test 
sequences on the bottom of the screen.  They were to decide 
which Test sequence was more similar to the initial Target 
sequence. 
Given the fact that the effect exists in the visual domain 
even without temporal information, it is important to 
investigate possible explanations.  Since the visual images 
without temporal information were presented in a manner 
that resembles the structure of written material, it is possible 
that this structure brought about the positional biases similar 
to those in the linguistic domain.  For example, while 
reading English, one visually scans from left to right; 
therefore, this same mechanism could account for the effect 
in Experiment 3b even without temporal information.  To 
better understand the phenomenon, it is necessary to 
structure the visual information so that a left to right 
scanning pattern does not temporally constrain the 
information (e.g., vertical presentation of the stimuli).  In 
addition, this explanation may be further expanded if the 
effects would vary not only according to the presentation of 
the stimuli, but also developmentally.  This explanation 
could be ruled out if children who do not yet read readily 
show this effect in the visual domain without temporal 
information. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants were accurate on catch trials with an overall 
accuracy over 95% (M = 95.55%), above chance, one-
sample t (17) = 42.26, p < .001. 
Similar to Experiments 1, 2 and 3a, participants were 
more likely to choose the Test-Post items as more similar to 
the Target than the Test-Pre items (M = 80.89%), above 
chance, one-sample t (17) = 7.52, p < .001. 
However, when this control condition is compared to the 
original visual domain experiment, it appears that the 
absence of temporal information attenuates this effect.  
There is a higher propensity to choose the Test-Post items as 
more similar to the Target than the Test-Pre items when 
there is the addition of temporal information, independent-
samples t (33) = 2.07, p < .05. Another important question is how flexible is this 
tendency in non-linguistic domains. The suffixation 
preference is very flexible in the domain of language 
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(otherwise people would not be able to acquire various 
kinds of inflectional morphology), and if it stems from a 
general mechanism, this tendency has to exhibit flexibility 
in other domains as well.  These issues are currently under 
investigation. 
In sum, the results suggest that when information is added 
to the end of a Target sequence, it is perceived as more 
similar to the original Target than if the same information 
was added to the beginning of this Target.  This was true 
across all three domains investigated, suggesting that there 
might be a general cognitive mechanism of processing of 
temporal information that may underlie the suffixation 
preference, which is prominently present in the linguistic 
domain. 
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Abstract 
30 undergraduates participated individually in a three-
day-drawing experiment. It was explored whether an 
experience copying others’ drawing facilitated subjects’ 
artistic creativity. Results showed that drawings by 
subjects who previously had copied others’ drawings 
were rated more creative than the drawings of subjects 
who had not copied. Two further analyses revealed how 
subjects could produce creative drawings. First, in the 
examination of constraint relaxation processes, subjects 
were initially constrained by a belief that they should 
draw things realistically. Then, they relaxed this 
constraint by means of copying abstract pictures. Second, 
according to protocols of the copying process, copying 
forced subjects to explore their original expression 
through a comparison with other artwork. It seemed that 
copying enabled them to generate new drawing ideas. 
Introduction 
It is often said that people cannot produce original 
works through the imitation of others. In the domain of 
art, many art educators believe that copying others’ 
work inhibits people’s, particularly children’s, artistic 
creativity. They claim that artistic expression should be 
as free as possible from copying (Lowenfeld, 1957). It 
is well known, however, that artists of impressionism 
created their original paintings by means of imitating 
Japanese prints, Ukiyoe. In addition, some famous 
painters, e.g., van Gogh and Picasso, created their 
original paintings through copying the work of old 
masters (Galassi, 1996; Homburg, 1996). The question 
of whether copying inhibits or facilitates creative art 
has been controversial among artists, art researchers, 
and art educators (Duncum, 1988). 
In some modern cultures, including Japanese culture, 
many art lay people (i.e., nonartists) seem to think that 
representational and realistic paintings have higher 
value than other forms of painting. That may be due to 
the content and methods of art education in school 
settings. Especially in Japanese elementary and middle 
schools, students spend the majority of their time in art 
class sketching. This may lead them to believe that 
drawing is primarily to represent objects in the real 
world on paper (Kozawa, 2001). In other cultures, it is 
also reported that people prefer realistic paintings to 
abstract or other types (Cupchik & Gebotys, 1988; 
O’Hare, 1976). Such beliefs might limit the range of 
students’ means of expression. It is predicted that 
subjects would create new drawing styles if their 
constraints become relaxed. Therefore, we focused on 
copying others’ work as a candidate for an intervention 
that could relax constraints and investigated its effect 
on creative drawing. 
Method 
Subjects. 30 undergraduates participated in this study. 
None of them had special training in drawing since at 
least middle school. 
 
Experimental Design. A three-day-experiment (pre-
treatment-post design) was conducted. All of the 
subjects were initially required to create two original 
drawings in the pretest phase. In the treatment and 
posttest phases, subjects were divided into three groups. 
In the Experimental Group (EG), subjects were asked to 
copy two pieces of an artist’s drawings, then to create 
their own original drawing. In the Reproduction Group 
(RG), subjects were also asked to copy, then to draw a 
new picture using the artist’s style. In the Control 
Group (CG), subjects were asked to draw their own 
original drawings in every session. 
 
Materials. Subjects were required to draw pictures 
using as subject matter the materials displayed in Table 
1. A4-sized Kent paper and a black ballpoint pen were 
offered to subjects for each drawing. The pictures 
copied by subjects in the two groups were abstract 
paintings by a Japanese modern artist (Figure 1). 
 
 Procedure. Each subject participated individually in a 
three-day-experiment; one session per day, each lasting 
approximately 90 minutes. Subjects were asked to draw 
two pictures in each of the pretest and treatment phases. 
The second picture in each phase was presented three 
minutes after the first one was completed.  In the 
posttest, subjects drew a picture and then were asked to 
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complete a questionnaire (described later in detail) and 
were interviewed about their drawings. Thus, each 
subject drew five pictures in total during three days. 
Subjects in CG were instructed as follows in all 
phases: “Draw your own ORIGINAL picture using this 
(these) material(s) as subject matter.” Subjects in EG 
were instructed in the same way in the pre and posttest 
phases. But, they were told in the treatment phase: “A 
painter drew this picture using this material as subject 
matter. Please copy the picture onto a blank piece of 
paper while imagining the painter’s intention.” Subjects 
in RG were instructed in the same way as EG in the 
pretest and treatment phases.  However, they were told 
in the posttest phase: “Recall the previous day’s 
experience of copying a painter’s picture and then draw 
a picture with these materials in the painter’s style. 
How would you represent the subject matter if you were 
the painter?” 
We asked subjects to talk aloud while drawing, and 
recorded their verbal protocols and behavior with three 
videocassette recorders. Except for this procedure, we 
placed upon the subjects’ activities as few restrictions 
as possible in order to promote maximum spontaneity 
(e.g., They were not told explicitly that there was a time 
limit on their drawing). 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Analysis 
In the posttest phase, drawings in RG were quite 
different from those in EG and CG in terms of content 
and number of elements in each picture (Figure 2). The 
mean number of elements in a drawing was 
significantly greater in RG (23.8) than in EG and CG 
(10.2 and 5.4, respectively) [for group by phase 
interaction, F(2,27)=5.05, p<.05]. All drawings by 
subjects in RG consisted of much repetition of simple 
geometrical elements, but those by subjects in EG had 
no such characteristics. Thus, although subjects in EG 
Table 1: Materials presented to subjects.
 
 Experimental Phases 
 Pretest Treatment Posttest 
1st drawing a cocktail glass a shell (Venus Comb Murex)* an orange and a shell (Common Spider Conch)** 
2nd drawing a paprika and a pinecone** a potted plant* - 
*   For EG and RG, the pictures to copy were drawn with each of these materials by an artist and presented alongside the materials. 
** These sets of materials were counterbalanced among subjects.
Figure 2: Examples of drawings in the posttest phase 
(EG; CG; RG, respectively from the top).
Figure 1: Example of the artist’s drawings that 
subjects in the EG and RG saw. 
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and RG copied pictures in the same manner, subjects in 
EG did not reproduce the artist’s style of pictures, but 
created their own styles. 
Analysis of Products: Rating Creativity of the 
Drawings 
In order to compare the creativity of drawings in EG 
with that in CG, a new scale was constructed that 
included three aspects of artistic creativity: six items of 
aesthetic attractiveness (e.g., “vitality of expression”); 
nine items of originality (e.g., “originality of her or his 
view or sense of value”); and two items of technical 
skills (e.g., “technical skill in picture composition”). 
Thus, in total, 17 items were included in the scale with 
all items ranging from 1 to 5. Because our critical 
question was to reveal whether or not the artistic 
creativity of subjects who copied others’ art works was 
superior to that of subjects who did not copy, the 
comparison of the two groups would be sufficient to 
answer the question. Thus, we excluded the drawings 
by subjects in RG from this analysis. 
Two professional modern artists separately rated 
subjects’ pre and posttest drawings using the scale. 
They were not informed of which drawings belonged to 
which condition. A result of factor analysis with 
Principal Component Analysis showed that the scale 
has one factor construction and was adequate for the 
evaluating creativity of drawings (eigenvalues for the 
first three factor were 10.58, 2.06, and 1.05, and the 
first factor accounted for 62.2% of the total variance). 
Since the coefficient alpha for internal coherence 
was .96 for all 17 items, we regarded the simple sum of 
the 17 items as the creativity score for each drawing. 
A three-way ANOVA (two experimental groups X 
two raters X two expositional ordering of drawing 
materials) was performed for post-pre subtracted scores. 
Drawings by subjects in EG were rated significantly 
higher than those in CG (Figure 3) [F(1,16)=5.54, 
p<.05]. The fact that scores were significantly different 
between the two raters suggested that norms of artistic 
creativity would vary among artists [F(1,16)=4.65, 
p<.05]. However, it was important to note that the two 
raters evaluated the posttest drawings by EG subjects in 
the same way. There was no interaction among the 
three factors. Findings suggest that copying other’s 
drawings provided the subjects opportunities for 
creating new styles of drawing. 
Analysis of Process 1: Relaxation of Students’ 
Constraints 
Why could subjects who had copied other’s works 
produce more creative drawings? Note that the pictures 
the subjects had to copy (abstract style) were fairly 
different from typical pictures that subjects normally 
encounter (representational style). If subjects were 
constrained by their beliefs that drawing must follow a 
representational expression style, copying drawings in 
an abstract style might relax the constraint by making 
them aware of other stylistic possibilities. 
In order to conduct further analyses of the process of 
creation, we focused on the following three aspects: (1) 
number of pictures that included realistic contents; (2) 
strength of the subjects’ realistic intention; (3) number 
of subjects who reported a failure of creative drawing. 
 
Number of Pictures that Included Realistic Contents. 
If subjects were constrained by their beliefs that 
drawing had to be realistic, such beliefs would affect 
the content of their drawings. In this study, we coded a 
drawing as constrained by such beliefs if it contained at 
least one of the following aspects: (1) drawings that 
designate a specific scene made up of either realistic 
elements or stylized ones (e.g., one similar to an 
illustration of a storybook); and (2) drawings in which 
subjects sketched only the materials presented (example 
of drawing from CG condition in Figure 2). We took 
these two types of drawings to indicate that subjects 
drew without their own figurative interpretations. 
The numbers of drawing which contained the 
contents described above were approximately equal in 
the pretest phase in both conditions (70% in EG and 
80% in CG) [p=1.00 with Fisher’s exact test]. The 
frequency of that in EG, however, significantly 
decreased compared to that in CG in the posttest phase 
(20% and 90%, respectively) [z=-2.21, p<.05 with test 
by standardized scores]. 
 
Strength of Subjects’ Realistic Intention. Did 
subjects actually intend to draw pictures so 
realistically? In order to capture their intention, we 
investigated how much they paid attention to technical 
viewpoints related to realistic sketch-like drawing. We 
assumed that the more subjects thought they had to 
draw realistic and photo-like pictures, the more strongly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of creativity rating between 
subjects in EG and in CG 
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they would attend to such technical viewpoints. If 
copying pictures in an abstract style relaxes such a 
constraint, then the degree of EG subjects’ attention to 
such technical aspects would decrease in the posttest. 
After posttest drawing, subjects were asked to answer 
a questionnaire intended to measure their realistic 
intention during both the post and pretest drawing. This 
questionnaire consisted of 11 items on five-point scale 
(ranged from 1 to 5, including two inverse items) that 
covered a variety of aspects of realistic intention (e.g., 
“I paid attention to capturing the materials’ form 
exactly”; “I tried to express the quality of the materials’ 
surface”). For the 11 items, the coefficient alpha 
was .86.  
A two-way ANOVA (three experimental groups X 
two phases) for the sum of item scores revealed a 
significant interaction [F(2,27)=9.82, p<.001]. Further 
analysis revealed that, while there was no significant 
difference on groups in pretest phase [F(1,54)=0.01, 
n.s.], in posttest phase, scores in EG and RG 
significantly decreased compared to scores in CG 
(Figure 4) [F(1,54)=7.93, p<.001; p<.05 with Steel’s 
multiple comparison for difference scores of post-pre 
test]. In addition, subjects’ scores in the pretest phase 
were on average about 70 % or more of the maximum 
score and thus seemed to show their strict intention to 
use a realistic drawing style. Hence, we can conclude 
that the subjects did, in fact, have representational 
constraints in the beginning of the study and that the 
constraints were then relaxed by means of copying 
pictures with an abstract style. 
 
Number of Subjects Who Reported a Failure of 
Creative Drawing. We asked subjects to report what 
they devised in the posttest drawings. Their answers 
were divided into categories and the contents and the 
number of responses were analyzed. 
Characteristically, half of the subjects in CG reported 
that they could not come up with any new ideas and just 
sketched what they saw (e.g., “I thought that I could not 
draw well if I pay too much attention to originality. So, 
I decided to draw the materials as they are”).  In EG, 
however, no subject reported such a comment [p<.05 
with Fisher’s exact test]. This result implies that 
subjects in CG were kept constrained by their beliefs 
and could not produce new ways of drawing. 
Analysis of Process 2: Generation of New Ideas 
The previous section revealed that copying relaxes 
subjects’ constraint. However, even if their constraints 
are relaxed, it is insufficient for production of a new 
style of drawing. Because, in order to create a new style 
of drawing, subjects need to generate concrete ideas for 
drawing. In order to reveal how subjects in EG came up 
with new ideas when their constraints were relaxed, we 
focused on subjects’ copying process in the treatment 
phase. 
We presumed that thought processes during copying 
include two aspects: (1) understanding others (in this 
case, a creator who produced the artwork) and (2) 
understanding oneself. The former aspect is an effective 
one in order to reproduce others’ artworks. The 
knowledge about the pictures would be deepened by 
means of inferring the creator’s art making process. In 
this point of view, however, copying can be risky since 
people may lose their own originality. Thus, many 
people have claimed that copying might be harmful to 
creation. As we pointed out, this is a well known 
argument. 
In contrast, the second aspect, understanding oneself, 
is not so well known. In this aspect of thought processes, 
the copiers’ own expression may become clarified by 
means of comparisons with others’ artworks. Thus, 
people’s generation of new ideas might be facilitated 
through their searching for originality. This aspect may 
be particularly important for creativity, because it might 
promote the copier’s ability to produce her/his own 
original artworks. 
It is hypothesized that subjects in EG experienced 
these two aspects of thought processes when copying 
and were able to generate new ideas to draw. In the rest 
of this section, we will focus on the protocols by EG 
and RG subjects during copying an artist’s artworks and 
describe whether or not the protocols include evidence 
of these two aspects. Of course, these aspects are 
double-faced, and one cannot work without the other. In 
this study, however, we will pragmatically separate 
them into two aspects and examine each. 
 
Copying to Understand Others. In this aspect, getting 
to know the processes by copying could deepen 
knowledge of the products. For example, F. Natsume 
(cartoon artist; 1992) copied a famous Japanese 
cartoonist’s work. He found that the lines of this 
cartoon give a very round and centripetal impression. 
This characteristic of the lines has an important role in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Subjects’ intention to draw realistically.
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creating this cartoonist’s characters’ special features 
such as bravery and cuteness. The case shows that he 
deepened his knowledge about the cartoon through 
copying its lines. 
In addition, understanding others’ works requires 
changing one’s standpoint. In order to really copy, it is 
necessary for us to understand the other’s underlying 
intention of the procedure. When copying, we are 
forced to infer the underlying intention of the other’s 
works. This process makes us switch our standpoint 
from an observer to a creator. 
Thus, copying facilitates understanding a creator. Did 
actual copying processes include this aspect? We 
focused on subjects’ protocols during the copying phase 
(treatment phase in EG and RG) and analyzed whether 
or not their protocols exemplify understanding others. 
In copying, subjects noticed concrete features of 
elements/parts in the artist’s drawings. 
 
- Why did he draw this horizontal line? (subject 
=ID3) 
-  He doesn’t draw outlines, does he? (ID3) 
- I copy it paying attention to the distance with 
other parts. (ID14) 
- I must use stronger lines. My lines were not clear 
at all. (ID19) 
 
Subjects also tried to understand the artist’s intention. 
 
- I think, the thick parts of the leaves indicate this 
plant’s vitality. (ID16) 
- Each element in the picture may not represent 
each leaf of the real plant. (ID7) 
 
In this way, copying process did have an aspect of 
understanding others. Subjects in RG could reproduce 
the new picture in the artist’s style because they would 
engage such a process and deepen their knowledge 
about the artist. 
 
Copying to Understand Oneself. It seems that 
understanding others also facilitates understanding 
oneself. Consider the following case. Even if you had 
no opinion about an issue at first, you may often form 
your own opinion while listening to others’. In the 
domain of art, there would exist such a case that the 
deeper you understand someone’s artworks, the more 
you become aware of your originality. 
There are many such examples in art history. For 
example, Picasso and van Gogh copied old masters’ 
artworks, exploring their own original style rather than 
keeping the styles of the artworks exactly (Galassi, 
1996; Homburg, 1996). Picasso talked about his 
copying (Sabartés, 1959): 
 
Suppose one were to make a copy of The Maids 
of Honor (Las Meninas); if it were I, the moment 
would come when I would say to myself: suppose 
I moved this figure a little to the right or a little 
to the left? At that point I would try it without 
giving a thought to Velázquez. Almost certainly, I 
would be tempted to modify the light or to 
arrange it differently in view of the changed 
position of the figure. Gradually I would create a 
painting of The Maids of Honor sure to horrify 
the specialist in the copying old masters. It 
would not be The Maids of Honor he saw when 
he looked at Velázquez’s picture; it would be my 
Maids of Honor. 
 
This case shows that Picasso actively explored his own 
expression through copying Velázquez’s work. It is a 
different aspect from the one that focuses on learning 
particular techniques or expressions (i.e. understanding 
other’s works). 
Why does copying facilitate self understanding? We 
propose the following two reasons. At first, when 
copying other’s works, you constantly compare other’s 
expression with your own.  This “comparison” process 
forces you to actively interpret the differences between 
the other’s works and your own. This is the first step in 
searching for your own original expressions. Secondly, 
particularly in copying artworks, you can externally 
compare a model with your copy. This encourages you 
to notice differences between the two. 
Our protocol data show subjects’ self understanding. 
First, subjects’ own visions emerged. They interpreted 
the figures in their own way as well as inferred the 
artist’s intention. 
 
- It looks like fossil fishes are swimming. (ID7) 
- It looks like insects are flying. (ID12) 
- They look like ribs or fish bones. (ID3) 
 
Some subjects felt uncomfortable with the other’s 
works. It seemed that such feelings prompted them to 
explore their comfortable expressions. 
 
- Why did he/she draw such cross marks? I cannot 
find them in this material [= a shell]. I don’t 
understand it. (ID19) 
- I don’t like patterned figures like this. Because 
it’s monotonous. (ID1) 
 
Some subjects became aware of their own expression 
by means of the comparisons with other’s work.  
 
- His lines end smoothly, but mine stopped tightly. 
(ID1) 
- In the previous copy, I failed to draw pictures 
well, because I drew the elements too big and 
lost balance. (ID14) 
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- This picture reminds me of previous day’s 
paintings [Subject’s own drawings in the last 
session]. I now understand that mine were not 
so original. (ID1) 
 
These findings enable subjects to understand what 
kinds of expressions they usually use and what kinds of 
expressions they want to create. 
General Discussion 
This study revealed that an experience copying others’ 
drawings facilitated subjects’ artistic creativity. It was 
also showed that at least two underlying processes 
affected this performance. First, constraint relaxation 
processes enabled subjects in the EG to explore 
drawing styles beyond the familiar realistic and 
representative style. Second, generating new ideas 
through comparison with other’s works prompted 
subjects to notice their own original expression. Based 
upon these findings, we propose a model about copying 
to creation (Figure 5). It is suggested that constraint 
relaxation and generation of new ideas (including two 
aspects of copying) together can facilitate a new style of 
drawing. 
Some recent studies investigated the effect of 
experimenter-presented examples on a creative 
generation task. For instance, Smith, Ward, & 
Schumacher (1993) found that people unconsciously 
tend to incorporate features of the examples in their 
creation (conformity effect). This effect varied with 
conditions; for example, the effect was enhanced with a 
delay between exemplar presentation and creation test 
(Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996). In addition, it was 
related to inadvertent plagiarism because people fail to 
monitor their source of novel knowledge appropriately. 
These studies suggest that examples may negatively 
affect creation. However, it is well known that no idea 
is completely original; all forms of creation are strongly 
affected by already existing things. Thus, the question 
that we want to answer here is how people create new 
ideas even if they have a tendency to be heavily 
influenced by old ideas, as previous studies suggest. 
Although this research is still in an early stage, we 
propose that the process of understanding oneself in 
comparison with others works is a key mechanism of 
creation. 
One reason why previous studies did not focus on 
this aspect is perhaps that the subjects in these 
investigations saw exemplars for only a few minutes 
and thus did not have enough time to involve 
themselves in the process of understanding. In contrast, 
in our experiment, the subjects spent about forty 
minutes copying pictures. This long, active exposure to 
examples may have forced them to engage in the 
process of understanding themselves. 
Despite this, copying others’ works may not be the 
only means of making people more creative. If they 
were just told verbally to consider other forms of 
drawing or presented others’ works as exemplars 
without copying, then they might also be able to draw 
more creatively. We are currently conducting another 
experiment to test these possibilities. 
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Abstract 
Cognitivism, the traditional approach to understanding 
cognition, has argued for the essential role of symbolic 
computations over internal mental representations. But this 
view has been criticized on a number of grounds, one in 
particular being the assumption of amodality: that the symbols 
involved in processing are arbitrarily related to their referents. 
An opposing view—the framework of Perceptual Symbol 
Systems—holds that the elements of thought should be treated 
not as amodal symbols, but rather as modality specific, analog 
representations that simulate particular aspects of perceptual 
experience. Though this approach has been gaining in 
popularity from intuitively appealing theoretical accounts, and 
suggestive empirical support, it has suffered from a lack of 
specificity for key constructs. To address this problem, this 
paper presents a more detailed study of the foundational 
concept of perceptual symbol. The proposal builds from 
recent work on the skill-based nature of visual perception (the 
Sensorimotor Contingency Theory), and research that 
provides tools for representing the inseparable link between 
perception and action (the Theory of Event Coding). From 
these two sources, the characterization of a perceptual symbol 
as a selective re-enactment of perceptual experience, treated 
as a unit, will be elaborated and defended.  
Introduction 
Cognitive science, for much of its short history, has been 
dominated by a view of cognition that emphasizes the 
necessary role of computation, and which holds that 
cognitive processing is rule-governed manipulation of 
internal mental representations (Fodor, 1975, 1983; Fodor & 
Pylyshyn, 1988; Johnson-Laird, 1989; Minsky, 1975; 
Newell & Simon, 1972; Pinker, 1998; Pylyshyn, 1984). The 
symbols that comprise these representations are what codify 
knowledge, and indeed are knowledge. Under this 
interpretation, symbols possess several key properties, the 
most important of which, for the purposes of this paper, is 
amodality:  that a symbol is arbitrarily related to the thing it 
represents (Barsalou, 1999; Markman & Dietrich, 2000). In 
addition, specific psychological theories that adopt this 
framework “generally assume that knowledge resides in a 
modular semantic system separate from episodic memory 
and modality-specific systems for perception, action, and 
emotion” (Barsalou, et al., 2003). This view of cognition 
has undoubtedly met with much success (for accessible 
overviews, see Johnson-Laird (1989) and Pinker (1998)).  
 There are critics, however, who have challenged this 
framework (Barsalou, 1999; Carlson, 1997; Clancey, 1997; 
Clark, 1997; Damasio, 1994; Dourish, 2001; Dreyfus, 1972; 
Gibson, 1979; Glenberg, 1997; Harnad, 1990; Hutchins, 
1995; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1986; Searle, 1980; Smith & Thelen, 2003; Suchman, 1987; 
Thelen, 1994; Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001; 
Thomas, 1999; Van Gelder, 1998; Varela, Thompson, & 
Rosch, 1992). In particular, one approach questions the 
requirement that the symbols used in cognitive processing 
should be amodal. Instead, in a Perceptual Symbol System 
(PSS), the symbols are modality-specific representations 
that do bear a principled resemblance to the things 
represented (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, et al., 2003). 
Specifically, these symbols are perceptual in the sense that 
they re-enact selective aspects of experience. But this view, 
though promising, remains underspecified in important 
ways. This paper is an attempt to clarify a fundamental 
construct of the PSS approach, the perceptual symbol. 
 The specific goals of this paper are: (1) to present an 
account of conceptual representation that is at odds with the 
traditional view in one important respect—that the symbols 
used in thought are amodal; (2) to review theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence that suggest that PSS 
should be taken seriously as a plausible alternative to 
Cognitivism; (3) to show that there are certain respects, 
however, in which the PSS framework is underspecified, 
specifically with respect to the foundational concept of a 
perceptual symbol; (4) based on the assumption that to 
clarify the concept of perceptual symbol requires some 
understanding of what perceptual experience is, to present 
one type of skill theory of perception that provides a 
comprehensive account of how perception and action 
interact to support perceptual experience; (5) to connect this 
account to perceptual symbols by adopting representational 
structures called event codes that possess key properties 
required by a PSS; (6) to review consistent empirical 
evidence that the properties of event codes that hold at the 
fine level of basic sensorimotor interaction might also hold 
during higher level cognitive processing; and (7) to suggest 
limitations and remaining questions for future study. 
Why a Perceptual Symbol System? 
 The framework of Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) is a 
perceptually-based approach to conceptual representation 
that has gained in popularity for many theoretical and 
empirical reasons. On the theoretical side, the view is more 
sophisticated than its empiricist predecessors.  First, it 
appears that the rejection of perceptually oriented 
approaches was too hasty (Barsalou, 1999). For example, 
the criticism that perceptual symbols are just holistic records 
of perceptual experience (like internal pictures that lack any 
interpretation) is based on the assumption that perceptual 
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symbols could not also be treated as discrete, componential 
units; and in this regard, be used productively in forming 
multimodal symbolic structures. But under this new 
construal, perceptually-based conceptual systems can 
acquire the power to represent a variety of concepts ranging 
in abstractness, and thereby possessing the desired 
flexibility shown by humans (Barsalou, et al., 2003).  
 Second, because of the analog relationship with their 
referents, perceptual symbols provide a great deal of 
implicit information about the things they represent (Zwaan, 
1999). This information can then be made explicit through 
perceptual processes like scanning and selective attention 
(Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998). An amodal system requires 
that knowledge be expressed in terms of syntactically well-
formed sentences, usually expressed in a first-order 
predicate calculus, or LISP-type language. This requirement 
places a heavy burden on a system if it must represent all 
knowledge explicitly (even the most mundane kind—for 
example, that cars have four wheels). 
 Third, the foundations of amodal symbol systems are not 
without problems, specifically in terms of how the symbols 
are acquired—the transduction problem (Barsalou, 1999)—
and how the symbols relate back to the world—the symbol 
grounding problem (Harnad, 1990). If perception and 
cognition are realized by fundamentally different cognitive 
processes, then how does one representational language get 
transduced—that is, translated—into the other? Conversely, 
how does the output of cognitive processing connect with 
the world to enable purposeful interaction? In other words, 
how do the symbols become grounded?  
 Fourth, though presumed to be flexible by virtue of the 
(amodal) form of the symbols (such as using the symbol 
CAT to stand for all cats), amodal symbol systems lack the 
flexibility of human cognition. To get around this problem, 
amodal representations have been supplemented with 
specific episode information (Markman & Dietrich, 2000). 
 Fifth, amodal conceptual systems are well known to be 
able to account for numerous findings after the fact 
(Anderson, 1978; Solomon, 2001), but of far greater 
importance is the power of a theory to make a priori 
predictions. The amodal view cannot easily predict 
perceptually-motivated effects, whereas a perceptually-
based view can do so with ease (Barsalou, et al., 2003). 
 In addition to the theoretical support, a growing body of 
empirical research suggests a strong influence of 
perceptually-based knowledge on conceptual processing. 
For example, in a property-listing task, people will generate 
response that depend on the nature of the perceptual 
variables involved in the simulation (e.g., listing “roots” for 
“rolled-up lawn”, rather than for “lawn”, because roots are 
less occluded in a rolled-up lawn)(Barsalou, Solomon, & 
Wu, 1999). From studies in text comprehension, in an effort 
to comprehend a text passage, people appear to construct 
online simulations of the situations described in the text. In 
other words, comprehension of language becomes 
“preparation for situated action” (Richardson & Spivey, 
2000). The situation models (Zwaan, 1999) that underlie 
this comprehension process are fundamentally experiential, 
and not surprisingly, derive much motivation from the PSS 
framework. In research motivated by these ideas, people 
have been found to recognize a picture of an object (for 
example, a nail) more quickly if the object is in the same 
orientation, vertical or horizontal, implied by a text passage 
read earlier (“The nail was hammered into the 
floor/wall”)(Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001). In related work, 
sentences such as “Open the drawer” are judged as sensible 
more quickly if at the same time people move in a manner 
consist with the implied motion (in this case, pulling rather 
than pushing)(Glenberg & Robertson, 2000). People also 
appear to re-enact the eye movements that accompanied 
earlier perceptual processing (Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; 
Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Richardson & Spivey, 2000).  These 
results are just a few of the many that have provided support 
for the PSS framework (for a more detailed review, see 
Barsalou, et al., 2003) 
The Structure of a Perceptual Symbol System 
 A PSS is a conceptual system composed of an integrated 
set of simulators (which in practice can be interpreted as the 
concepts). The simulators are composed of frames, which 
integrate perceptual symbols, and provide structure for 
event sequencing. Moreover, each simulator implies a 
simulation competence—the potential for producing an 
indefinite number, and limitless variety of perceptual 
simulations. Finally, processes of selective attention and 
memory integration provide the requisite representational 
power for the system to act as a fully functional conceptual 
system in the classical sense (Barsalou, et al., 2003; Fodor 
& Pylyshyn, 1988).  
 For a PSS to function as a conceptual system, it should 
possess certain properties. (1) The conceptual system should 
be able to interpret novel experience. This is what 
fundamentally distinguishes a conceptual system from a 
simple recording system (Barsalou, 1999). A conceptual 
system is selective and is able to bind tokens (perceived 
individuals) to knowledge of types stored in long-term 
memory. A record (e.g. a picture), on the other hand, is an 
undifferentiated—uninterpreted—mass. (2) A conceptual 
system should allow the thinker to go beyond the 
information given, to use stored knowledge to make 
inferences. (3) Conceptual systems should have the potential 
for generating an indefinite number of thoughts; that is, they 
should be productive.  
 For a conceptual system to do this, it must be composed 
of things that have special properties. What exactly these 
properties are is contested, but Markman and Dietrich 
(2000) have provided an illuminating analysis of the issue, 
and their general approach will be adopted here. 
Specifically, they have argued that internal mediating states 
can possess certain characteristics: (1) they may be 
enduring; (2) discrete; (3) abstract (amodal); (4) rule-
governed; or (5) they may possess a compositional structure 
(for more detail on these properties, see Markman & 
Dietrich, 2000). Internal mediating states in the cognitivist 
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tradition hold all five. Those in the dynamical systems 
approach hold fewer. Relaxing one or more of these 
constraints can affect the representational capacity of a 
conceptual system.  
 There are two important ingredients that support the 
interpretive capabilities of a simulator, and as a result, the 
representational power of a PSS: the frames, which integrate 
and organize perceptual symbols; and the “potentially 
infinite set of simulations that can be constructed from the 
frame” (Barsalou, 1999).  Thus, to understand what CAR 
means is to know, not only the perceptual symbols that 
comprise the representation for cars, but it is to know also 
how to interact with cars—to be able to organize the 
complex action sequences involved in effective interaction 
with cars. This means that the frames would be composed of 
perceptual symbols from several different modalities, and 
that a simulation could thus be considered a multimodal, 
selective re-enactment of perceptual experience  
 The importance of simulators and simulations for 
supporting the conceptual functions of the PSS cannot be 
overstated. However, given the role of perceptual symbols 
in supporting simulations, much work remains to be done in 
specifying their properties (such as how the symbols are 
encoded, stored, and used). There are difficulties, however, 
in getting a clear sense of what a perceptual symbol is, and 
how it fits in with the functional architecture of a PSS.  
 Most definitions of a perceptual symbol tend to 
emphasize the neural substrate, and specifically, that 
perceptual symbols are “records of the neural states that 
underlie perception” (Barsalou, 1999). But a limitation of 
this approach is that it captures just one aspect of the 
information contained within perceptual symbols. Though 
much current research tries to incorporate properties of 
classical cognitive architectures into neural networks, what 
is needed is a more explicit account of the functional 
structure to complement the neural description. What is 
needed, then, is a better sense of what information goes into 
a perceptual symbol and how that information is stored so 
that it can support the conceptual functions of a Perceptual 
Symbol System. In other words, we need a theory of 
perception, and a theory of how the products of perception 
are represented. 
  
       Perception as a skill 
The perspective in this paper holds that perception is a skill: 
that it is the ability to engage in purposeful and effective 
interaction with the world (Ballard, 1983; Clark, 2002). The 
approach outlined is just one of many types of “skill” 
theories of perception, but it is one of the most elegant and 
best developed. Specifically, this Sensorimotor Contingency 
Theory holds that to perceive is to engage in skilled 
exploration of an environment, with the exploration 
mediated by the implicit knowledge of the lawful 
dependencies that hold between actions and sensory 
consequences (O’Regan & Noë, 2001). Thus, these lawful 
dependencies are assumed to play an essential role in 
providing content for perceptual symbols.  
The SCT 
The main goal of the Sensorimotor Contingency Theory 
(SCT) is to provide an answer to the so-called “hard 
problem” of visual consciousness: to explain how physical 
or informational processes could give rise to the qualitative 
character of experience (Chalmers, 1996). The solution to 
the problem is framed in terms of an interpretation of visual 
perception as a “mode of exploratory activity that is 
mediated by knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies” 
(O'Regan & Noë, 2001). This idea is in opposition to views, 
such as Muller’s Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies, in 
which what makes one sensory modality different from 
another is due to the nerve pathways that gather 
information. Rather, what makes modalities differ is that 
each is supported by different sets of sensorimotor laws: the 
dependencies between motor outputs, and the sensory 
consequences of those actions. In other words, the laws are 
the implicit, procedural knowledge of the expectancies 
derived from an agent’s interaction with an environment. 
For more details, and supporting evidence, see O’Regan & 
Noë (2001),   
 According to this view, sensorimotor contingencies are a 
key ingredient in most, if not all aspects of cognition. As the 
authors describe it, “To see is to explore one’s environment 
in a way that is mediated by one’s mastery of sensorimotor 
contingencies and to be making use of this mastery in one’s 
planning, reasoning, and speech behavior” (O’Regan & 
Noë, 2001). How to scale up to these behaviors remains to 
be seen, however. It is this role that the PSS should fill—to 
account for the emergence of abstract thought from this 
fundamental perception-action interface. 
 But there are a number of problems to be overcome in 
attempting to extend these principles to the PSS framework. 
The main limitation is that no indication is given for how 
sensorimotor contingencies should be represented, or even 
whether they should be represented at all. For reasons given 
in Markman and Dietrich (2000), it is too early to abandon 
representation as an explanatory construct in theories of 
cognition. So, to be able to characterize a perceptual symbol 
as a selective reenactment of perceptual experience, to be 
treated as a unit, not only must there be some sense of what 
perception consists in, there must also be a way to represent 
the information that supports both perception and cognition. 
In addition, the representation should possess the right 
properties to support the functional requirements of a 
conceptual system. The Theory of Event Coding (TEC), and 
specifically, the event code, is proposed to fill this role.  
The TEC 
The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) addresses the 
relationship between perception and action planning. In 
opposition to traditional approaches, the TEC does not 
assume independence between the two processes, but 
instead emphasizes that both functions are supported by a 
common representational medium. At the heart of the TEC 
is the notion of an event code, which “consists of the codes 
that represent the distal features of an event” (Hommel, et 
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al., 2001). These codes, then, are what underlie perception-
action dependencies, but also, more generally, cognitive 
processes. In their words, “The theory holds that cognitive 
representations of events (i.e., of any to-be-perceived or to-
be-generated incident in the distal environment) subserve 
not only representational functions (e.g., for perception, 
imagery, memory, reasoning) but action related functions as 
well (e.g., for action planning and initiation)” (Hommel, et 
al., 2001). The principle of common coding is a core 
assumption of the theory. The other—the principle of effect 
cause of actions—places special emphasis on the roles of 
specific types of feature codes within the event code; that is, 
the feature codes for actions are initiated by the resultant 
changes in sensory input caused by the actions. 
 As representational constructs, the event codes are 
discrete, compositional, and the individual elements retain 
an identity, even when they participate in more complex 
structures (Hommel, personal communication, Feb. 2004). 
In all, these considerations implicate an important functional 
role that event codes may play as representational constructs 
within the PSS.  
Scaling up 
Because the TEC has focused on fine sensorimotor 
interactions, such as “arrows or circles that come and go on 
a screen, or hand and fingers that go up and down on a key 
pad” (Hommel, et al., 2001), how are these event codes 
integrated to produce more complex event structures? Why 
start with the TEC rather than, say, with CHREST (Lane, 
Cheng, & Gobet, 2000) or PLAN (Chown, Kaplan, & 
Kortenkamp, 1995)? There are several reasons. First, the 
TEC is compatible with CHREST (as a model of active 
perception) and PLAN (a model of navigation that uses 
cognitive maps), and indeed they may all share a common 
logic (Hommel, et al., 2001). Second, the TEC was adopted 
primarily for practical reasons: It seemed to bear most 
closely on the issues addressed in the SCT, and would prove 
the shortest leap to make from non-representational to a 
representational description of sensorimotor dependencies. 
Third, it appeared that the best bet was to start small, at the 
principled “bottom”, and then to work up. But associated 
with this is a riskier bet: that because of the recursive nature 
of the event codes, the integrative mechanisms operating at 
the lower-levels worked also at the higher levels. Fourth, the 
connection from the TEC to PSS had already been 
suggested by other researchers, specifically Richardson and 
Spivey (2001).  Finally, some recent evidence in word 
learning suggests that the principles operating in the TEC 
might also hold at higher levels. Specifically, Terry Regier 
and his colleagues have suggested that more attention is 
paid to the endpoint than to the beginning of a spatial event 
(Regier & Zheng, 2003). Furthermore, as evidence of this, 
Regier and Zheng found that finer semantic distinctions are 
present in spatial terms at the endpoints of spatial events 
than at their beginnings. Specifically, in a task that required 
participants to judge whether two events, presented very 
briefly, were the same or different, fewer errors were 
committed in a “joining” task (e.g., where a lid would be put 
either on or in a container) that required attention be 
devoted to the endpoint, than in a “separation” task, in 
which a lid would be taken either off or out of a container, 
and attention would be required at the starting point. These 
results are consistent with the potentially important role of 
goals, and the principle of effect cause of actions, in 
encoding event sequences at a more general level.  
Discussion  
Much talk is made in this paper about perceptual symbols 
being “selective”, suggesting that not all information from 
perception is used during cognitive processing. But what 
exactly does this mean? That the components of cognitive 
processing are less vivid, in the sense that all information 
carried over is less definite, less certain? Or does it mean 
that only specific kinds of information are carried over, such 
as spatial information, but that the information is no less 
definite, no less certain than when it was originally 
processed? 
 What are the laws of sensorimotor contingency that 
describe particular core aspects of experience, such as our 
experience of space, or time? Already much fascinating 
work has addressed the problem of doing this for space 
(Philipona, O'Regan, & Nadal, 2003), but then how might 
that knowledge map onto cognitive psychological research 
on space? And perhaps of even greater interest, how does 
our more abstract notion of time map onto that (Boroditsky 
& Ramscar, 2002; Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 2002)?  
 What implications does this view have for the problem of 
reference—determining how cognitive structures connect 
with the external world (Evans, 1982)? On the one hand, it 
seems that there might be no such problem, since in both 
cases, the thing representing, and the thing represented are 
one and the same. Truly, the “external world” is itself an 
assortment of mental entities. In other words: 
 
  Despite the importance of realism in many philosophical 
 theories of concepts and meaning, this assumption seems
 superfluous and unempirical, and it introduces a number of 
 additional problems to be dealt with that could be avoided
 without it. Rather than  making a realist assumption, it would be 
 easier to adopt a coherence-based framework. That is, the only 
 information that any person has about the outside world comes 
 from perceptual representations, which are themselves mental 
 entities. Thus, rather than being concerned with whether a 
 particular concept correctly refers to all and only proper 
 extramental entities, it would be better to generate a theory in 
 which the use of the concept attempts to remain consistent with 
 other representations in the system.  (Markman & Stillwell, in 
 press) 
 
But to someone still wary of the potential problems this 
(apparently) neo-idealistic position might suggest, the claim 
isn’t so risky: we need not take on the assorted difficulties a 
Berkelyian idealism might, since we wouldn’t be making 
claims about ontological status of the world (and whether it 
still would exist even if one were not immediately 
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perceiving it), but only claims about what is psychologically 
efficacious—that is, about the cognitive structures that 
matter to the thinker. But is this true? If it is the case that 
only a subset of information is carried over from perceptual 
processing to cognitive processing, though derived from the 
same source, might there still be a problem of reference? 
 Also related: what information is carried over from 
perceptual to conceptual processing? Isn’t this 
“selection/extraction” problem eerily similar to the 
transduction problem faced by amodal theories of 
cognition? What are the principles that determine which sets 
of sensorimotor contingencies will be exercised during, say, 
activation of the perceptual symbol for DOG, and deducing 
from a perceptual simulation that a dog, if it wags its tail, is 
happy?  
 What implications does this view have for understanding 
“meaning”? Might it be the case that “meaning” is a quale, 
much like the “redness” of red, or the “hotness” of hot? That 
is, could the meaning of, say, “apple” be the qualitative 
feeling of what-it-is-like to interact effectively with apples, 
based on the implicit, procedural knowledge of the 
sensorimotor contingencies that define the actual and 
allowable interactions with apples? Given that O’Regan and 
Noë (2001) claim that the knowledge of sensorimotor laws, 
and the current exercise of that knowledge, determine the 
qualia of experience, is it too much of a leap to claim that 
the meaning of objects arises from the whole stretch of 
competent engagement with them? Admittedly, the problem 
of meaning and reference is a difficult one—beyond the 
scope of this paper—but the hope is that this discussion will 
serve as an “intuition pump” for more detailed analyses. 
Conclusion 
The main goal of this paper has been to elaborate a link 
between three deeply related, and mutually enriching areas 
of study. However, much of the difficulty still remains in 
determining how exactly the (putative) underlying processes 
(such as how event features are integrated into event codes) 
give rise to the functional properties of a PSS. But clearly, 
the possibility that sensorimotor contingencies, event codes, 
and perceptual symbols comprise the fundamental 
components of thought further suggests a deeper result: that 
now we might be more assured that suggestive correlations 
between perception and cognition (Goldstone & Barsalou, 
1998) could now be given a principled causal basis for their 
interaction. We might now be in a better position to 
understand just in what respects perceptual processes might 
hold at the conceptual level; and accordingly, how we as 
researchers, and possessors of minds, might broaden and 
enrich our investigations. 
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Abstract 
Studies of experts with different specialties in a domain suggest 
that goals may play an important role in category learning and 
inductive reasoning.  Little experimental research, however, has 
addressed the potential influence of goal-directed activity on such 
processes. In the current study naïve participants acquire and 
utilize knowledge about a novel natural kind domain over a 
number of experimental sessions. Different groups of participants 
utilize different goals in their interactions with the experimental 
items. Participants utilizing a goal that requires the use of a certain 
subset of item features are found to develop categories around 
these features. Moreover, in a subsequent inductive reasoning task, 
these same participants perform in a manner that is highly 
consistent with the use of a goal-related category structure.   
 
Introduction 
Several researchers have encouraged a broadening of the 
methodology that has long predominated the psychological 
study of human categorization (e.g., Barsalou, 1991; 
Markman, & Ross, 2003; Medin, Ross, Atran, Burnett, & 
Blok, 2002; Murphy, 2002; Shafto, & Coley, 2003; 
Solomon, Medin, & Lynch, 1999). It is argued that 
categorization is implicated in a number of cognitive 
processes, such as, problem solving (Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981; Ross, 1996), inductive reasoning (Osherson, 
Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990; Proffitt, Medin, & 
Coley, 2000), and communication (Solomon et al., 1999; 
Markman & Ross, 2003), hence the study of categorization 
ought to reflect its multifaceted character. One area of 
research that has exemplified this broadened approach is the 
study of experts. These are individuals with extensive 
knowledge and experience in a given domain, such as, 
chess, medicine, birds, or trees.  
 Traditionally, studies of expertise have attempted to 
design tasks that elicit superior performances from experts 
in laboratory conditions so it may be systematically 
analyzed (Ericsson, & Smith, 1991). In most cases the 
performance of experts is compared with the performance of 
non-experts, typically recruited from undergraduate 
populations. However, recent research suggests that 
comparisons among experts with different specialties in a 
single domain may also provide valuable insight into the 
nature of expertise. With regard to theories of 
categorization, such comparisons could help to identify 
factors that contribute to the organization of conceptual 
knowledge that may be masked when research is restricted 
to expert-novice comparisons. 
 Inter-expert research has found that experts with different 
specializations in a domain may categorize and reason about 
domain-related information in characteristically different 
ways. For example, Medin, Lynch, Coley, and Atran (1997) 
found that different types of tree experts (taxonomists, 
landscapers, and maintenance workers) organized the same 
set of familiar tree species in distinct ways. Of particular 
interest is their finding that both landscapers and 
maintenance workers formed categories of trees based on 
their goal-related properties, such as, “weediness,” 
“landscape utility,” and “aesthetics.” Moreover, in a 
subsequent inductive reasoning task maintenance workers 
made a number of inductive inferences consistent with their 
goal-related categorizations of the tree species. Proffitt et al. 
(2000) found that tree experts would often rely on causal-
ecological relations over taxonomic relations in making 
inferences in their domain of expertise. As noted by Medin 
et al. (1997), the categories utilized by some types of tree 
experts closely resemble the goal-derived categories 
described by Barsalou (e.g., 1991): They crosscut the 
scientific/taxonomic organization of the domain and appear 
to be assembled around ideal attribute values.  
 
Exploring the Influence of Goal Use 
 The above studies suggest that the nature of a domain, 
like trees, is but one factor contributing to the category 
structures that individuals form for it. It follows that 
research focusing exclusively on the effects of category 
structure on category learning may be missing an important 
aspect of this learning process (see also Markman & Ross, 
2003). It may be that the influence of goal-directed activity 
on category learning is quite extensive, perhaps veiled by 
the characteristic ways in which members of a culture 
interact with the world. Indeed, cross-cultural studies have 
identified variations in categorization that may be related to 
such differences (e.g., Medin et al., 2002).  
 It is clear that evidence of cross-cultural and inter-expert 
variation in categorization and reasoning pose substantial 
challenges to the prevailing paradigm in categorization 
research. However, it is notoriously difficult to identify the 
causes of such variability. Numerous differences clearly 
exist between cultural groups, and even studies of different 
expert specialists from the same culture cannot control for 
differing experiences with the members of a domain. 
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Moreover, the relations between domain structure and 
domain use are likely to be highly complex. For instance, 
morphological properties can be related to both the 
taxonomic status of an object as well as its utility. Because 
domain structure and use are parameters that may vary 
freely in the real world, it is challenging to interpret cross-
cultural and inter-expert comparisons. For these reasons 
experimentation is needed to isolate the roles played by 
these different factors. 
Ross’ recent work (e.g., 1996, 2000) represents an attempt 
to utilize experimental tasks to investigate the influence of 
goals on categorization, focusing particularly on the relation 
between categories and problem solving (cf. Chi et al., 
1981). This research has demonstrated that the use of a 
category can alter its representation by enhancing the 
perceived importance of use-related features. For instance, 
in the domain of medical diagnosis, participants that learned 
that certain disease symptoms were good predictors of a 
treatment also perceived these symptoms as more diagnostic 
of the disease, even though they were no more diagnostic 
than other features that accompanied them. This research 
has primarily investigated how use affects an already-
learned category. Thus, it is an unsettled question as to how 
goal-directed interaction affects category formation, 
particularly in natural kind domains. Examining the effects 
of goal-directed activity on inductive reasoning would 
provide an interesting extension of this line of research.  
 
Overview 
To examine the effects of goal-directed activity on 
categorization and inductive reasoning, the present study 
exposes naïve participants to an artificial natural kind 
domain (the “Creatures”). Over a four-session learning 
phase, these participants acquire knowledge about the 
different types of features possessed by the Creatures and 
use this knowledge to assess the Creatures according to a 
particular goal. These goals are manipulated between 
groups: One group is given a goal that directs them to utilize 
a certain subset of the Creatures’ features, while the other 
group is given a goal that does not direct them to utilize any 
subset of features over another. Changes in categorization 
are assessed by having participants sort the Creatures both 
before and after the learning phase. An induction task is 
used to assess how goal-directed activity influences 
reasoning about the domain.  
 It is hypothesized that the performance of goal-directed 
activities will influence participants’ categorizations and 
reasoning, but only in the case where participants must 
utilize a certain subset of the Creatures’ features to perform 
the goal-related tasks. If these participants learn to re-
organize their domain knowledge around ideal (i.e., goal-
relevant) features, then a category structure that is based on 
goal-related features should provide a good account of their 
categorizations and their inductive inferences.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Eight undergraduates from the University of Illinois at 
Chicago participated in this study to fulfill a course 
requirement. Participants were run individually. Four 
participants were randomly assigned to each condition. 
 
Materials/tasks 
Experimental stimuli. A set of 16 artificial Creatures was 
designed such that it could be sorted into three structurally 
equivalent hierarchies on the basis of three different feature 
types: Features related to Avoiding Predators (AP), Features 
NOT related to Avoiding Predators1 (NAP), and Pictorially-
represented features (PR). The PR features were represented 
in an illustration of the Creature, while the AP and NAP 
features were written in point form below the illustration 
(see Figure 1).  
  
 
Figure 1: Examples of Creature cards. Note. Actual cards 
were in color. 
 
Fourteen features of each type were distributed among the 
Creatures according to the structures in Figure 2. The 
dendrograms in Figure 2 show that for each feature type 
(AP, NAP, and PR), eight of the features are possessed by 
2/16 Creatures, four of the features by 4/16, and two of the 
features by 8/16. These dendrograms can be understood as 
ideal category structures for each feature type – that is, they 
represent the three different category structures that would 
be formed by using each of the three different feature types. 
It is of interest to compare participants’ categorizations with 
these ideal structures. 
                                                          
1 These features were coherently related to another goal: assessing 
the Creatures according to how well they would serve as a source 
of nutrition. Participants in this experiment were not informed of 
this other goal. 
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Figure 2: Dendrograms representing categories based on (A) 
Written features related to Avoiding Predators, (B) Written 
features NOT related to Avoiding Predators, and (C) 
Pictorially-represented features. 
 
Goal Information. The independent variable in this study 
was whether or not participants were given a goal requiring 
them to utilize a certain subset of Creature features.  All 
participants were informed that a large corporation had 
purchased an island habitat, and they want to introduce the 
Creatures to it. Participants in Group AP (Avoid Predators) 
were told that the corporation was interested in maximizing 
the survival of the Creatures on the island, and that they 
wanted to determine which Creatures would be best suited 
for avoiding predators. Participants in Group C (Control) 
were told that the corporation was interested in cataloguing 
the Creatures, and wanted to determine which Creatures 
would be easiest to monitor. Participants in both conditions 
were told that the corporation had hired them as a 
consultant, and that their job was to assess the Creatures 
according to either: (a) how well-suited they are for 
avoiding predators (Group AP) or (b) how easy they will be 
to recall (Group C). Participants were informed that the 
Creatures’ features would be useful for making their 
assessments, and that they would learn more about the 
Creatures’ features at the next session of the experiment. 
 
Pre-training Tasks. Before engaging in goal-directed 
activities, participants had to be familiarized with the 
features that they would utilize.  This pre-training is 
important in ensuring that differences between the two goal 
groups are not due to differences in familiarity with and 
knowledge of the features.  The pre-training consisted of 
two parts, a learning phase and a test phase. 
1. Feature Learning Task. In this task participants were 
required to study several computer screens of information 
about the Creatures’ features and their relations to other 
properties. Half of these properties were coherently related 
to avoiding predators (AP) and half were not related to 
avoiding predators (NAP – see footnote 1). For example, 
participants had to learn that a “thin penactic stomach 
lining” means that the Creature cannot dig holes for hiding, 
and that a “small vestibular artery” means that the Creature 
has low vitamin C levels. Participants were permitted to 
study this information at their own pace.  
2. Feature Memory Test. This test was designed to 
determine whether participants had learned the information 
about the features from the feature learning task. This 
computerized test consisted of 14 multiple choice questions 
about Creature features. Participants were required to re-
take the test until they completed it without error. They were 
given up to 5 attempts per day. Four versions of this task 
were constructed. Each version contained the same 
questions, but with a different ordering of both questions 
and options. 
 
Goal-directed Activity. The main task for the majority of 
the experiment was a Creature Assessment task. The task 
combined memory and decision making about the creatures.  
Students performed this task on days 2-5. At the beginning 
of each trial of this task, the subject was shown a Creature 
card on a computer screen for 10 s. Following this display 
the subject completed a 2-page assessment form. On page 1 
the subject checked boxes next to the features possessed by 
the Creature that was just displayed. Participants in the AP 
condition were asked to check only the boxes next to the 
Creature’s features that are relevant to avoiding predators. 
Participants in the C condition were asked to check the 
boxes next to all of the Creature’s features. On page 2 of the 
assessment form the subject responded to 3 questions. 
Participants in the AP condition were asked: (1) Do you 
think the Creature that you were just shown will be good at 
avoiding predators in the habitat? (2) What about the 
Creature influenced your decision? (3) Rate the Creature on 
a scale of 1-10 according to how good it is likely to be at 
avoiding predators. Participants in the C condition were 
asked: (1) Do you think the Creature that you were just 
shown will be difficult to recall later on? (2) What about the 
Creature influenced your decision? (3) Rate your memory 
for the Creature on a scale of 1-10, according to how 
difficult it is likely to be to remember it. Following 
completion of the response form, the subject advanced the 
screen and the next item was displayed. Each of the 16 
Creatures was shown in a different order once per day.  
 
Dependent Measures. Two dependent measures were used 
to assess changes in categorization and reasoning about the 
Creatures. A sorting task (the Category Construction Task) 
was administered both before and after the training sessions.  
An Inference task was given on the final day of the 
experiment. 
1. Category Construction Task. In this task, participants 
were asked to construct categories using the 16 Creature 
cards. Before sorting the cards, the subject was shown each 
card one-by-one for about two seconds. Following this 
initial exposure the Creature cards were randomly arrayed 
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on a table in front of the subject. The subject was instructed 
to find the “best way” to organize the cards. First, the 
subject was asked to form 8 pairs of Creatures and to 
provide justification for each group that they made. Second, 
the subject was asked to form 4 groups of 4 Creatures using 
the pairs that they constructed, and to provide further 
justifications. Finally, the subject was asked to combine the 
4 groups of Creatures into 2 groups of 8 Creatures, and to 
provide justifications. This task was performed on both Day 
1 and Day 6 of the experiment. On Day 6 the participants 
were instructed to use their knowledge of the Creatures 
when constructing categories, and they were not shown each 
card one-by-one as on Day 1. Otherwise, the procedure was 
the same on each day. 
2. Inference Task. In this task participants were presented 
with a Creature on a computer screen and informed that the 
item has been found to possess a novel feature, “Sarca.” The 
original item was removed after 10 s and 2 different 
Creatures were then shown. The subject was then asked to 
decide which of them is most likely to also possess the 
novel feature attributed to the first item.  Following their 
response a blank screen was displayed for 2 s, followed by 
the next trial. Participants received two types of trials in 
which a more pictorially similar option (the PR option) was 
competed with either a more AP-related or NAP-related 
option. In AP vs. PR trials one option shared one more PR 
feature with the original item than did the other option. This 
other option, however, had one more AP-related feature in 
common with the original. Importantly, both options had 
exactly the same NAP-related features in common with the 
original. Thus, these trials tested whether participants would 
infer that the novel property would be more likely to 
generalize to a Creature that is more pictorially similar or 
one that is more similar with respect to AP properties.   
NAP vs. PR trials were analogously designed to compete an 
option sharing more PR features with one sharing more 
NAP-related features. The number of AP vs. PR and NAP 
vs. PR trials was matched. Trial order was randomized to 
create a single task list that was administered to all 
participants.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place on six consecutive weekdays 
(participants were not run on weekends).  On day 1, 
participants performed the category construction task and 
received information about their goal. On day 2, participants 
learned about the properties related to the Creatures’ 
features and subsequently completed the first version of the 
feature test. Participants then completed assessments of the 
Creatures, either with respect to how well suited they would 
be for avoiding predators (Group AP) or with respect to how 
easy it would be to recall them later on (Group C). Days 3-5 
were the same in format. On these days, participants 
completed different versions of both the feature test and 
Creature assessments. Finally, on day 6 they completed the 
category construction task followed by the inference task.  
 
Results 
Feature Memory Test. Figure 3 displays the mean number 
of blocks (test attempts) to criterion across the four days that 
the test was administered. A 2 (Group) x 4 (Day) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on the mean number of 
blocks to criterion. Participants that did not reach criterion 
on a given day were given a default score of 6 (five being 
the maximum number of attempts permitted). Across the 
first 3 days there were five instances in which a subject did 
not reach criterion, but by day 4 all participants reached 
criterion in 4 trials or less. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of Day, F(3, 18) = 11.61, MSE = 1.09, p < 
.01, with no  main effect of Group F(1, 6) = 1.06, MSE = 
6.62, ns, and no interaction between Day and Group, F(3, 
18) = 1.95, MSE = 1.09, ns. A follow-up comparison 
revealed a significant difference between the number of 
blocks to criterion required on Day 1 (M = 4.6) and Day 4 
(M = 1.9), F(1, 18) = 27.5, MSE = 1.10, p < .01. These 
findings indicate that participants required fewer attempts to 
reach criterion by the final day.  
 
Figure 3: Mean number of blocks to criterion by day on the 
Feature Memory Task 
 
 The pattern of change in the number of blocks to criterion 
is consistent with the decline in error rates across days (see 
Figure 4). A 2 (Group) x 4 (Day) repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted on mean error rates. This ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of Day, F(3, 18) = 9.16, MSE = 
0.002, p < .01, with no  main effect of Group F(1, 6) = 1.62, 
MSE = 0.005, ns, and no Day x Group interaction, F(3, 18) 
= 0.68, MSE = 0.002, ns. A follow-up comparison revealed 
a significant difference between the error rates on Day 1 (M 
= 0.13) and Day 4 (M = 0.04), F(1, 18) = 18.0, MSE = 
0.002, p < .01. These findings indicate that participants’ 
accuracy on the Memory Test improved across the four days 
it was administered. Examination of the decrease in both 
blocks to criterion and error rate across days provides 
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evidence that participants in both groups learned and 
retained information related to all features.  
 
 
Figure 4: Mean error rate per block by day on the Feature 
Memory Task 
 
Category Construction Task. Treatment of the category 
construction data closely follows Medin et al. (1997) and 
Shafto and Coley (2003). Participants’ categorizations of the 
Creatures were converted to dendrograms (see Figure 2). 
Each subject’s dendrogram was then used to derive a 16 x 
16 pairwise distance matrix. A number was assigned to each 
cell of the matrix corresponding to the level in the 
dendrogram at which the pair of Creatures was combined. 
Creatures paired together at the lowest level (i.e., when the 
subject was instructed to make pairs of Creatures) were 
assigned a distance of 1; Creatures paired at the next level 
(groups of 4) were assigned a distance of 2; Creatures at the 
highest level (groups of 8) were assigned a 3; Creatures 
NOT paired at any level were assigned a default distance of 
4. Only the 120 unique cells above the diagonal were used 
in subsequent analyses because of their redundancy with the 
cells below and because the cells on the diagonal (the 
distance between a Creature and itself) are irrelevant.  
Distances were averaged across participants in each group 
to create four different matrices representing initial and final 
category construction for Group C (C-1 and C-2) and AP 
(AP-1 and AP-2). Initial and final matrices for each group 
were correlated with one another and with the matrices 
derived from the ideal category structures (Figure 2). 
Table 1 displays the correlations between the ideal 
category structures (APi, NAPi, and PRi) and the initial and 
final structures for each group (C-1, C-2, AP-1, and AP-2). 
The first thing to note in Table 1 is the relatively low 
intercorrelations among the ideal structures. This implies 
that a high correlation between a group structure and an 
ideal structure cannot be attributed to covariance among the 
ideal structures. Turning to the performance of the two 
groups, it is evident that on average participants in Group C 
initially sorted the Creatures in ways that were highly 
correlated with both the APi and PRi structures. In their 
final performance of the task, these participants produced 
category structures that are still significantly correlated with 
the APi structure, but are not significantly correlated with 
the PRi structure. Group AP’s categories also have a high 
correlation with PRi at the initial stage, but unlike Group C 
they do not evidence a significant correlation with APi. 
However, at the final stage Group AP shows a high 
correlation with APi and a nonsignificant correlation with 
PRi. In summary, both groups appear to shift away from 
using PR features in their final category constructions, but 
only the participants in Group AP show an increased 
relation to APi.  
 
Table 1: Correlations between ideal and subject category 
structures 
 
Structure         NAPi       PRi        C-1        C-2        AP-1       AP-2 
 
APi            0.15       0.15       0.50**    0.45**   0.13      0.91**  
NAPi          -0.16     -0.08        0.03      -0.17      0.12  
PRi               0.55**   -0.07       0.92**  0.12 
C-1                0.41       0.49**  0.55**  
C-2              -0.02     0.48**   
AP-1       0.10 
** p < .01 (two-tailed). Note. C-1 = Group C, initial sort; C-
2 = Group C, final sort; AP-1 = Group AP, initial sort; AP-2 
= Group AP, final sort 
 
Inference Task. Participants’ choices were scored 
according to whether they were consistent with the use of 
non-pictorial information. Thus, in the AP vs. PR trials the 
participant’s choice was scored as a 1 if they chose the AP-
related option and a 0 if they chose the PR option. In NAP 
vs. PR trials, NAP choices were scored as a 1, PR choices as 
0. The mean proportion of non-PR choices was calculated 
for participants for each trial type. Figure 5 displays the 
mean proportion of non-PR choices for each trial type. A 2 
(Group) x 2 (Trial Type) repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed no main effect of Trial Type, F(1, 14) = 2.0, MSE 
= 0.05, ns, and a main effect of Group, F(1, 14) = 36.7, MSE 
= 0.031, p < .01, however, there was also a significant 
Group x Trial Type interaction, F(1, 14) = 6.58, MSE = 
0.002, p < .05. 
Of primary interest is the comparison between the mean 
proportions of non-PR choices for each trial type with the 
proportion expected by chance (.50). For Group AP, the 
mean proportion of non-PR choices was significantly higher 
that chance on the AP vs. PR trials, t(19) = 5.15, p < .01, but 
did not differ from chance on the NAP vs. PR trials, t(18) = 
0.35, ns. For Group C, the mean proportion of non-PR 
choices was marginally lower than chance on the AP vs. PR 
trials, t(19) = 2.04, p < .10, but did not differ from chance 
on the NAP vs. PR trials, t(18) = 0.98, ns. Thus, participants 
in Group AP most often generalized a novel property to a 
Creature more similar with respect to AP properties, but 
performed at chance level when AP-related similarity did 
not distinguish the two options. Participants in Group C did 
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not show this pattern, and evidenced a slight tendency 
toward the PR option in the AP vs. PR trials.  
 
 Figure 5: Mean proportion of Non-PR choices for each trial 
type in the Inference Task. Note. Asterisks indicate that the 
mean differs from chance (.50), ** p < .01 (two-tailed),  * 
.05 < p < .10 (two-tailed).   
 
Summary and Discussion 
The main hypothesis of this experiment was that the 
utilization of a certain subset of Creature features in a goal-
directed task would influence categorization and reasoning. 
It was further predicted that an ideal goal-related category 
structure would account well for the performances of these 
participants. 
  The results of the category construction task are 
consistent with these predictions. The APi structure 
correlated highly with Group AP’s final categorizations. 
Even though Group C’s categorizations also correlated 
highly with APi, this correlation showed no increase from 
this group’s initial performance. The APi structure also 
accounts well for Group AP’s performance on the inference 
task. When the APi structure distinguished between the two 
options, the participants often chose the AP-related 
Creature, when the APi structure did not distinguish the two 
options, participants performed at chance level. Altogether 
these findings suggest that participants in Group AP 
developed categories organized around a particular subset of 
goal-related Creature properties (AP-related properties). 
Participants in Group C did not evidence such change. By 
controlling the frequency of participants’ exposure to the 
domain as well as its structure, the differences between 
groups can be attributed to differences in the goal-directed 
tasks that each group performed.  
  This research is still in its early stages and would surely 
benefit from increasing the sample size and adding further 
tests of participants’ new domain knowledge. Nevertheless, 
the findings of this experiment serve to highlight the role 
that goal-directed activity could play in categorization. 
Given the extensive and varied nature of such activity 
within and across cultures, this role may deserve more 
attention than it has previously been paid.   
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Abstract
Intellectual expertise means knowledge and ability that a per-
son has that allows them to solve complex problems. It is im-
portant to understand how people become experts so that we
can improve educational strategies, and help learners achieve
their full academic potential. Unfortunately, the process of ac-
quiring intellectual expertise is not well understood. Artificial
neural networks (ANNs) have already been successful in mod-
eling other types of human learning. This paper shows that
they can also be trained as a model of expert human learning,
and address many of the difficulties found in trying to study
expertise in humans. The results confirm three hypotheses:
(1) An artificial neural network can be used as a model to in-
vestigate how people learn under different training scenarios;
(2) Different methods for delivering the training material re-
sult in different final performance; (3) The best performance
is achieved by incrementally increasing the complexity of the
material. These results provide educators with computational
evidence that structured, integrated delivery methods are bet-
ter for learners than oversimplification and isolation of learning
tasks.
Introduction
An intellectual expert has achieved a level of cognitive de-
velopment in which she or he can rapidly grasp subtleties of
complex problems, and produce very high quality solutions.
A goal of formal education is to help students achieve an ex-
pert level of understanding in their chosen field. It is im-
portant to understand the nature of expertise so that we can
improve educational strategies. As a result of many research
studies about expertise, we know a lot about the characteris-
tics of experts. However, there is a lot we do not understand
about how to become an expert. It is not easy to create ex-
perts, whether human or computational. The learning process
is complex and human studies are difficult. Understanding
how to acquire intellectual expertise has proven elusive for
educators, psychologists and students alike.
A primary goal of the study reported here is to increase un-
derstanding of the process by which humans become intellec-
tual experts. In particular, how can people develop the ability
to look at a problem statement and immediately select the best
solution strategy? The second main goal is to understand this
process in the context of formal instruction; specifically, how
does the strategy by which material is delivered to the learner
affect learning and conceptual development?
This paper presents results from a series of computational
experiments examining how different delivery methods in-
fluence learning and conceptual development. These experi-
ments use a real-world adult educational problem: the ability
to identify correct solution strategies for calculus integration
problems. The goal is to show that an artificial neural net-
work can be used as a model to investigate how people learn
under different training scenarios, and that different delivery
methods result in different overall performance. The main
results include: (1) errors are higher on final exams when dif-
ferent problem types are learned in isolation; (2) cramming
just prior to taking final exams does not significantly improve
performance. Different delivery strategies affect learning in
different ways: (1) traditional sequential delivery methods
inhibit learning and retention; (2) integrated delivery meth-
ods increase learning and retention; (3) the best performance
comes from delivery methods that incrementally increase the
complexity of material. These results can be applied to devel-
oping better training methods for people.
Prior Research on Intellectual Expertise
Studies of human expertise and understanding have revealed
key information about experts. We know that experts and
novices categorize problems differently, and that this cate-
gorization takes place before the subject attempts to solve the
problem (Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser 1981). We also know
that experts can categorize problems without solving them
(Robinson and Hayes 1978). Finally, there is strong evidence
that routine problems are solved not by intense calculating
but rather by recognizing a type of problem (categorizing)
and then using the stored knowledge about how to solve prob-
lems of that type (Reiman & Chi ’89 referenced in (Ross and
Spalding 1991).
Most studies of expertise have focused on what an expert
knows, rather than the process by which she or he attained
expertise. As a result, we know a lot less about this learn-
ing process than we do about expertise itself. Expert be-
havior does not simply follow a script: the greatest exper-
tise is the result of long-term practice (Hayes 1989) that is
consciously goal directed, self-monitoring, and self-adjusting
within the setting of each particular task (Garner 1990). In
addition, many studies have shown that meta-cognition (self-
appraisal and self-management of cognition) is critical for
successful academic learning (literature surveyed by Paris
and Winograd (1990)). Since we know that experts catego-
rize extremely well, it is possible that categorization ability
and goal-directed meta-cognition enhance one another. When
these abilities merge, intuition may be the result: there is
strong evidence that experts rely upon their accurate intuition
and a holistic recognition of appropriate actions (Dreyfus and
Dreyfus 1986).
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Cognitive scientists have often studied mathematics learn-
ing, due to the abstract nature of its concepts. Bruner has even
suggested that learning mathematics may be viewed as a mi-
crocosm of all intellectual development (Bruner and Kenney
1965). A particularly interesting early connectionist model of
mathematics learning was presented by Viscuso, Anderson,
and Spoehr (1989). Their artificial neural network (ANN)
simulated qualitative reasoning while doing multiplication.
In summarizing their model, Viscuso et al correctly pointed
out that the most important contribution of their model was
that it mimicked the manner in which experts rely not so
much on formal logic and rules but on their ”sense” of what is
correct. Another interesting ANN system learned to perform
arbitrarily long addition problems (Cottrell and Tsung 1993).
Their model learned the implicit underlying rule of addition.
This system showed that ANNs can account for conceptual
development: the network learned an important concept on
which it had not been explicitly trained. In the decade since
these studies were published, there has been quite a bit of
work in related areas, such as the development of basic nu-
merical abilities in infants and children (literature surveyed
in (Ahmad, Casey, and Bale 2002)), and in childhood strategy
development (Bray, Reilly, Villa, and Grupe 1997). However,
we still do not understand how adult human experts learn to
“sense” important concepts. It is important to understand this
ability, so that we can better educate students.
The Calculus Domain
Calculus, at its most fundamental level, is based upon abstract
cognitive concepts. As a result, understanding how people
best learn calculus requires understanding the mind. The cur-
rent educational debates over mathematics and science ed-
ucation partly result because we do not understand enough
about how the brain produces cognition and conceptual un-
derstanding. In order to become calculus experts, students
need to understand complex concepts and intuitively select
the most efficient methods to solve problems. Educators need
to understand what methods of delivering material will most
help students achieve these abilities.
In the last decade math and science have been at the center
of an increasingly wide-spread national concern with prop-
erly educating citizens for the new technological age. In col-
lege, students who want to major in science or engineering
usually have to first perform well in calculus, which turns out
to be a major obstacle for many of them.
In order to clearly identify what kinds of problems calculus
students were having at at the University of Texas at Austin
(UT), we conducted structured interviews with mathematics
faculty and teaching assistants (TAs). The results fit well
with the psychological literature on expert/novice behavior.
Faculty and TAs reported that novice learners (in this case
UT students) are often unable to select the correct solution
strategy. This problem arises before they even have a chance
to exhibit computational difficulties and prevents many from
reaching timely, correct solutions. Conversely, the experts
claimed an ability to ”just see” the correct strategy, yet were
unable to articulate how they knew. Probing revealed that al-
though there are ”rules of thumb” to assist in this domain,
they are not comprehensive and do not cover many common
scenarios. Experts instead pointed to general patterns and cat-
egorization that they have learned to recognize via extensive
practice.
Successful problem solvers categorize math problems
based upon underlying structural similarities and fundamen-
tal principles (Schoenfeld and Herrmann 1982). These cate-
gories are often grouped based upon solution strategies, that
the experts then use to calculate an answer (Owen and Sweller
1989). How such strategies are formed is poorly understood.
What regularities are most likely to be noticed, and how does
the form in which the initial procedure is learned affect what
is noticed? From the point of view of education, are there
ways of managing how learners practice, to enhance the like-
lihood that they will notice these regularities, and incorporate
this information into their problem-solving strategies?
One of the first instructional decisions is what order to
present the material in, and how to move from one concept
to the next. There are many possible orderings of material,
and a computational model can be used to explore them. The
model presented in this paper, described in the next section,
contributes to achieving this research goal.
The ANN Model
The particular calculus problem chosen for the study is
to decide whether a given integration problem should be
solved with Simple Integration (Simple), Integration by U-
Substitution (Usub), or Integration by Parts (Parts). This sec-
tion describes the architecture of the artificial neural network
as well as the training and test data, its encoding, and the ex-
perimental methods used in all the experiments described in
this paper.
Architecture and Data
The model is an artificial neural network utilizing the back-
propagation algorithm (for details of the algorithm see Bishop
1995) created using the LENS network simulator (Rohde
1999). The network is fully connected, and has 55 input
nodes and 20 hidden nodes. The 55 input nodes make up
a vector large enough to represent the features of one cal-
culus integration problem containing up to four terms. The
20 hidden units were determined to be appropriate by exper-
imentation; the results were not effected by small changes in
size.
The input data consists of 957 calculus integration prob-
lems based upon examples found in college level calculus
textbooks. Feature coding is a logical choice for represent-
ing them, given that both novices and experts use the features
of a problem to determine which approach to use (Chi et al.
1981). The 55 unit input vector contains a series of 0s and 1s
that map operators/operands to their location in the calculus
integration problem. Short problems are padded with blanks.
The vector consists of
  Four 2-unit terms representing constants and variables.
  Four 8-unit Unary Operators, representing
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is coded in postfix form as: 01 00000000 10 01000000 00
10000000 10 00000010 00010 00001 00010, where the
components are
01 : No Variable; Constant (i.e. ! )
00000000 : NONE (i.e. no unary operator for the constant)
10 : Variable (i.e. ﬂ ); No Constant
01000000 : cos (of the variable ﬂ )
10 : Variable (i.e. 0 ); No Constant
10000000 : sin (of the variable 0 )
10 : Variable (i.e. ﬂ ); No Constant
00000010 : ln (of the variable ﬂ )
00010 : +
00001 : -
00010 : +
The network has three output nodes, each of which repre-
sents one of the possible integration strategies, Simple, Usub,
Parts. Because the network is trained with one active target
at a time, it learns to represent how confident it is in each
choice (Bourlard and Wellekens 1990). For example, if the
network reports activation values at 12%, 85%, 3%, then it is
quite confident in the second category, considers the first cat-
egory possible but unlikely, and the third category extremely
unlikely (but not absolutely impossible). This percentage rep-
resents the confidence level that the network has in each an-
swer.
Experimental Design
The calculus integration problems were divided into 10-fold
cross-validation training and test sets (splits, or learning ex-
periments). In each experiment the training set was input to
the network, one problem at a time, in random order, and the
test set was used to measure performance. Validation sets
were not used because each learning experiment represented
training one subject and the training time had to be constant,
to compare how well the subjects learned. Three different
types of learning experiments were run. Each experiment was
run ten times, randomly resetting the initial network weights
each time. Thus the whole study consisted of 300 learning
experiments. This way it was possible to model the behav-
ior of many different subjects and watch for both emergent
patterns and individual variation.
During the test phase, there was always only one correct
answer to a problem. This answer, called the ”Best”, was
the answer suggested in a textbook, or by a calculus expert
(faculty, TA). For each test problem the network reported how
confident it was that the solution strategy was either Simple,
Usub or Parts. If the confidence level for all solutions was
below 80%, the problem was considered having ”stumped”
the network.
Results
Two sets of experiments (Drill and Test, Fully Integrated
Learning) validated the ANN as a model of human learning.
These experiments showed that the model accurately matches
results from past educational research. In addition, these ex-
periments provide insight into how the learning process oc-
curs. The third set of experiments provided a computational
prediction that a different type of learning (Incremental) pro-
duces the best performance.
Validating the Model: Drill and Test Learning
The first set of experiments, called “Drill and Test”, mim-
icked a classic form of delivery that results in poor long-term
retention in humans (Resnick and Ford 1981). In this method,
concepts are introduced to the learner one at a time, with no
overlap between topics. At the end of each topic, the learner
is given a midterm exam (of previously unseen examples) on
that concept.
After it has been trained with all concepts, the learner is
given an opportunity to “cram”, i.e. train on all concepts for
a short period of time. At the end of all material, there is a
comprehensive exam consisting of the entire test set.
In order to monitor the progress of learning quantitatively,
and to compare to other approaches, each network was also
tested during each epoch in two ways: (1) with the current
midterm exam, illustrating the performance that the teacher
would see in the classroom (Figure 1a), and (2) with the com-
prehensive exam, monitoring progress in learning the entire
task, but broken into separate numbers for the different con-
cepts (Figure 1b).
The main result was that the model, like humans, only re-
members the most recently introduced concept well. More
specifically, in 100 experiments run using Drill and Test, most
networks (83%) rapidly learned to identify each of the con-
cepts in turn (Simple, Usub, Parts). On midterm exams, the
network often recognized 100% of the problems belonging
to the concept that had just been studied. However, in spite
of the opportunity to cram first, when the comprehensive fi-
nal exam was given, these learners performed poorly, averag-
ing 41.65% (standard deviation 6.35). The highest score was
54.55%. The remaining 17% of network learners were un-
able to make the switch from Simple to Usub problems, and
then to Parts problems: their Usub and Parts midterms usually
scored 0%. When these learners crammed and then took their
comprehensive exams, they scored on average 17.29% (stan-
dard deviation 4.95), with a high score of 26.92% All learners
in these experiments were extremely confident in their an-
swers, even when they were wrong.
Validating the Model: Fully Integrated Learning
A second set of experiments mimicked human learning us-
ing an approach called “Fully Integrated Learning”. This
approach is inspired by the immersion experiences popular
in foreign language learning (Spolsky 1989): the learner is
placed in an environment where she or he is completely sur-
rounded by the stimuli to be learned. The cognitive mecha-
nisms that enable a foreign language student to sort out im-
portant grammatical features might not be that different from
those cognitive mechanisms that sort out features of mathe-
matical structures. In the Fully Integrated Learning experi-
ments, there was only one training period, during which the
networks were trained on all of the problem types simultane-
ously. During each epoch, the Simple, Usub and Parts train-
ing problems were input to the network in random order. Ex-
ams using the entire test set were given after every training
epoch.
Fully Integrated Learning produced significantly better re-
sults than the Drill and Test delivery experiments (Figure
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Figure 1: Drill and Test Learning. (a) The classroom perfor-
mance of 12 representative learners, i.e. their accuracy on the cur-
rent midterm (Simple, Usub, Parts, Cram periods) and comprehen-
sive exam. Exam scores are on the y-axis, and the training epoch
is shown along the x-axis. Scores on the comprehensive exam were
poor - even with the aid of a cram session the highest score was
54.55%. (b) The average performance of all learners on the com-
prehensive exams, broken down by concept. Each problem type is
forgotten when a new topic is learned.
2). The average score on the final comprehensive exam was
76.99% (standard deviation 7.94). The highest score was
80.76%. In contrast to Drill and Test, confidence in Fully
Integrated learning closely reflected exam scores. The errors
that were made on the exams followed a pattern of slow, grad-
ual learning, spread across all problem types. The Fully In-
tegrated Learning results as a whole replicated human data
showing that immersion results in better longer-term reten-
tion than does Drill and Test.
Extending the Model: Incremental Learning
The third set of experiments was designed to test the hypoth-
esis that the best learning of material is obtained by a deliv-
ery approach called “Incremental Learning”. This approach
is inspired by the result in the machine learning community
that it is often most effective to tackle large computational
tasks by starting with small problems and gradually increas-
Figure 2: Fully Integrated Learning. (a) The classroom perfor-
mance of 12 representative learners on the comprehensive test set
over the course of learning. The learners initially failed the exams,
but their scores rapidly increased, and finally plateaued. Improve-
ment was not smooth, reflecting the trial and error process of learn-
ing. The best exam score was 80.76%. (b) Average performance of
all learners broken down by concept. Usub problems were learned
fastest, Simple problems slowest. Final results for Simple, Usub and
Parts were similar.
ing their complexity (Elman 1991; Gomez and Miikkulainen
1997). When there are a large number of co-dependent vari-
ables, it is hard to discover the role that each one plays in the
problem and its solution. Therefore, an Incremental Learn-
ing delivery introduces new, increasingly complex concepts
along with reinforcement of old concepts.
As with the Drill and Test experiments, there were three
training periods. The network was first trained to identify
Simple problems. During the second training period, Usub
problems were added to the Simple problems, and for the
third training period, Parts problems were added. The class-
room performance was measured with Simple tests during
the the first period, Simple and Usub test problems during
the second, and the entire test set during the third (Figure
3a). The progress in learning the entire task was monitored
with the entire test set, broken down by concept (Figure 3b).
As in the Drill and Test experiments, Simple-only midterms
very rapidly reached scores of 100%. When Usub prob-
639
lems were introduced, test scores began to fluctuate severely.
Scores would drop to, or near, zero, rebound, and then drop
again, as the network struggled to distinguish the new con-
cept (Usub) from the old concept (Simple). Over time, al-
though fluctuation continued, overall test scores increased. In
a few cases, SU midterm scores reached 100%, however the
majority of cases peaked at 70-75%. When Parts problems
were introduced, the pattern of fluctuating scores was accen-
tuated. Midterm scores immediately plummeted, although it
is interesting to note that even the downward drop was often
not smooth, but marked by brief plateaus and recoveries. Per-
formance continued to deteriorate for longer than in the SU
training segment, with scores fluctuating lower and lower. In
contrast to the SU midterm scores, SUP midterm scores ap-
peared to tighten in closer and closer to complete failure (for
a while nearly all midterms fluctuated well under 20%). This
behavior is predictable, because it is harder to distinguish
three concepts from one another than two concepts. Even-
tually, performance began to improve, with prominent indi-
vidual differences, as each network learner identified subtle
patterns to accurately identify each concept. Eventually, vir-
tually all midterm scores surpassed 70%. The average score
on the final comprehensive exam was 81.9% (standard devia-
tion 8.23). It is important to note that the final test results for
Incremental Learning were better than either Drill and Test
or Fully Integrated Learning, in spite of interim results that
sometimes appeared poorer than either other type of exper-
iment. The maximum exam SUP score was 95.6%, higher
than any score reached in a Fully Integrated learning exper-
iment. As evaluated with a t-test, the Incremental Learning
final exam scores were higher than those of the Fully Inte-
grated learning (  
	  
  ﬀﬂﬁ ! ).
The types of errors that the network made followed a pat-
tern. As each new training period began, the network ap-
peared to “flail”, choosing first one answer then another on
successive exam questions. However, this “flailing” gradu-
ally lessened and the network learned to correctly select each
problem type simultaneously. As with the Fully Integrated
Learning experiments, the learners’ confidence levels closely
reflected exam scores. The Incremental learning experiments
showed that the best performance is achieved by introducing
increasingly complex concepts gradually, allowing learners
to build on their existing knowledge, and gradually pay more
attention to finer distinctions.
Discussion and Future Work
Calculus integration problems that are often given to novice
learners were used to study the process of learning to accu-
rately categorize them by solution strategy. These strategies -
Simple Integration, Integration by U-substitution, Integration
by Parts - represent complex concepts that students need to in-
tuitively master in order to become calculus experts. Drill and
Test experiments and Fully Integrated experiments validated
the model by showing that it can mimic known data about hu-
man learning. Drill and Test experiments supported the hy-
pothesis that delivery methods that rigidly separate concepts
during learning result in poor long-term retention of material.
Also supported was the hypothesis that when concepts are
reinforced inconsistently, only the most recently introduced
concept is remembered, and that cramming does not improve
Figure 3: Incremental Learning. (a) The classroom perfor-
mance of 12 representative learners on the current midterm (Simple,
Simple-Usub, Simple-Usub-Parts). The maximum comprehensive
exam score was 95.6%, higher than any score reached in a Fully Inte-
grated learning experiment. (b) Average performance of all learners
broken down by concept. Each problem type followed the same pat-
tern of fluctuation between learning and apparent forgetting. Over
time fluctuation lessened and performance improved for all problem
types. Simple problems fluctuated the most and the longest.
learning. The nearly perfect midterm exam scores seen in
Drill and Test experiments were misleading. They implied
a level of interim learning and understanding which was not
supported when the final exam require the learner to distin-
guish complex concepts.
Fully Integrated learning experiments supported the hy-
pothesis that if problems that belong to one concept are in-
troduced along with problems that belong to other concepts,
error rates are smaller than when the same concepts are in-
troduced separately. Over time, Fully Integrated learners per-
formed quite well on their exams and although they are not
perfect, can be claimed to have learned the task.
The results for Incremental Learning were very different
from either Drill and Test or Fully Integrated learning. By
introducing new problem types in a structured manner, the
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network learner is allowed to focus on a smaller set of charac-
teristics at the beginning of learning. Just as the first concept
(Simple integration problems) is acquired, additional prob-
lems (Usub) are mixed in. The resulting confusion is apparent
in the fluctuating midterm scores. Over time, as the learner
grapples with the two contrasting problem types, confusion
diminishes and midterm scores rise. When Parts problems
are introduced, it becomes again more difficult to discrimi-
nate between the concepts. However, it is far more difficult
to compare three related problem types than two. The confu-
sion lasts longer and is more difficult to resolve, and individ-
ual learner differences become more apparent. Fortunately,
the ”priming” effect of the previous training segments allows
most Incremental Learning learners to eventually do well, and
in most cases better than the Fully Integrated learners.
An interesting direction of future research is to analyze the
conceptual development that took place in the model during
the different types of delivery methods. Using techniques
such as Independent Component Analysis (ICA) of hidden
layer representations it may be possible to discover how the
network learners represent the problems as the learning pro-
gresses. In addition, the predictions on Incremental Learning
can be tested in a study with human subjects. If confirmed,
these results strongly suggest that a structured incremental
approach should be used in teaching for expertise.
Conclusion
The experiments reported in this paper support the following
three hypotheses: 1) An artificial neural network can be used
as a model to investigate how people learn under different
training scenarios 2) Different delivery methods result in dif-
ferent overall performance 3) Incremental Learning results in
better performance than either Drill and Test or Fully Incre-
mental learning. These results provide new insight into how
humans learn complex cognitive tasks. As a result, educa-
tors have computational evidence that structured, integrated
delivery methods lead to better performance for learners than
oversimplification and isolation of learning tasks. They also
have evidence that introducing many complex concepts at the
same time does not produce the best learning either. The
work encourages educators to focus on finding the optimal
balance between introducing complexity and providing struc-
tured guidance. Finally, educators are reminded that interim
results that reflect struggle with complex concepts will result
in longer term performance gains than near perfect results in
the short term.
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Abstract 
Transfer between isomorphic domains was 
investigated. Thirty college undergraduate students 
learned two isomorphic artificial systems. One system 
was concrete in the sense that it was perceptually rich 
and dynamic, while the other was abstract, involving 
written symbols. The results show significant positive 
transfer from the abstract domain to the concrete 
domain and no significant transfer from the concrete 
to the abstract.  
Introduction 
One of the goals of successful learning is transfer, 
or the ability to apply acquired knowledge outside the 
learned situation. Although a desired outcome of 
learning, spontaneous transfer is notoriously difficult 
to achieve. In the past few decades, numerous studies 
document poor or non-existent spontaneous transfer 
across isomorphic situations (Ben-Zeev & Star, 2001; 
Gholson et al., 1997; Holyoak, Junn, & Billman, 
1984; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Schoenfeld & 
Herrmann, 1982). Poor performance has been 
attributed to surface features distracting from 
underlying structure. 
Which aspects of the learning situation facilitate 
transfer? A widely held belief in the education 
community has been that learning and transfer of 
mathematical and scientific knowledge is facilitated 
by the use of concrete representations of more 
abstract mathematical and scientific principles.  In 
the past several decades, the use of concrete 
representations has been a growing part of the 
mathematics curriculum. Concrete representations 
include both physical manipulatives as well as 
specific instantiations of abstract concepts. They are 
often perceptually rich and meaningful. Mathematical 
concepts are traditionally represented in an abstract 
symbolic form, while applications of the mathematics 
to scientific and real-world scenarios can be thought 
of as concrete instances of the abstract concept.  
The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics 
(NCTM) reform movement launched in 1989 
promoted the role of such representations in the 
curriculum. For example, Dienes blocks (Dienes, 
1960) are used in elementary mathematics education 
to teach arithmetic and place value. Dienes blocks are 
concrete proportional representations of the base-ten 
number system. The belief of educators who use the 
blocks is that through their use, young children will 
not only be able to represent and execute arithmetic 
problems, but will also be able to gain insight into the 
structure of the base-ten number system (Fuson & 
Briars, 1990).  
Much support for the use of either concrete 
manipulatives or concretely situated applications in 
the learning of mathematics comes from 
constructivist educators. Cobb, Yackel, and Wood 
(1992) propose that students actively construct 
mathematical knowledge in social contexts. 
Furthermore, they suggest that topics which are 
applications of mathematics such as those from real-
world or scientific situations provide good initial 
instructional activities. That is, instruction of 
mathematical concepts should be initiated through 
applications of the mathematics as opposed to 
initiated in symbolic form.  
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These approaches to learning and transfer seem to 
echo the Piagetian theory, according to which 
education should parallel the process of cognitive 
development, and the ability for abstraction is not 
achieved before the formal operational stage 
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). At the same time, 
children’s reasoning during the preceding stage (i.e., 
the concrete operational stage) was said to be limited 
to objects and physically possible situations. If 
learning parallels the process of development, then 
transfer from more concrete to more abstract 
representations should be more efficient than the 
reverse. 
However, there are strong reasons to doubt this 
view. First, it has been demonstrated that concrete, 
perceptually rich objects are more likely to be 
considered objects than symbols denoting other 
entities (DeLoache, 1987; 2000). In a series of 
studies by DeLoache and colleagues, very young 
children were shown the location of a toy in either a 
photograph or a physical model of a scale room.  
They were then asked to retrieve the toy from the 
actual room. Almost all (88%) of the children shown 
the photograph were able to make an errorless 
retrieval of the toy, while only 16% of the children 
shown the physical model were able to do so. When 
the model was placed behind a screen, children’s 
retrieval rate improved. Furthermore, slightly older 
children are very successful in this task. However, 
when older children were encouraged to play with the 
model, performance dropped significantly. These 
studies demonstrate that children have difficulty 
treating perceptually rich objects as symbols. 
Decreasing the salience of the object increased the 
ease of its symbolic use. 
Second, there is a large body of literature on 
analogy (analogy is variant of transfer of knowledge 
from one domain to another) indicating that 
properties that are not a part of to-be-learned 
knowledge (i.e., surface features) may hinder rather 
than facilitate learning (e.g., Ross, 1987; 1989).  
Third, there is recent evidence that there might be a 
competition between abstract and concrete 
representations of the same situation, and salient 
concrete representations may distract learners from 
more abstract regularities (Goldstone & Sakamoto, 
2003). 
Finally, there is evidence that transfer from abstract 
instantiations of knowledge may be in fact easier than 
transfer from concrete to abstract instantiations 
(Bassok & Holyoak, 1989). Bassok and Holyoak 
examined transfer between more abstract algebraic 
knowledge and more concrete physics knowledge, 
namely between arithmetic-progression problems and 
isomorphic constant-acceleration problems. High 
school and college students (who were unfamiliar 
with both of these domains) learned one of these 
topics and then were posed word problems involving 
the other topic. The measure of transfer was whether 
the learned method had been applied to the 
structurally isomorphic problems in the unstudied 
domain. Students who had learned arithmetic-
progression first easily and spontaneously applied the 
learned method to correctly solve constant-
acceleration problems. However, the students who 
learned the physics topic showed essentially no 
transfer of method to the arithmetic-progression 
problems. The results of this study suggest that 
transfer is more likely to occur from a more abstract 
instantiation to a concrete isomorph.  
While the Bassok and Holyoak study (1989) 
certainly implies that more transfer occurs from 
abstract to concrete domains, confounds in the study 
limit such a broad conclusion. The chosen topics in 
mathematics and physics, as any mathematical and 
physical topics, do not exist in isolation. Any 
individual has many associations with each, including 
related prior learning as well as attitudes and beliefs. 
Specifically, the amount of mathematics learned 
through elementary, middle, and high school is 
significantly more than the amount of physics 
learned. This disparity of learning most likely exists 
between mathematics and any of its isomorphic 
applications. Furthermore, through the course of 
education, students develop an expectation that 
mathematical concepts can effectively and 
appropriately be applied to other domains such as 
physics, chemistry, economics, to name just a few. It 
is doubtable that student have as strong expectations 
that scientific strategies can be used to solve purely 
mathematical problems.  
The purpose of this study was to investigate 
transfer across two isomorphic domains: one that 
used a set of abstract symbols, and another that used 
concrete perceptually-rich objects. To eliminate 
potential confounds stemming from prior knowledge, 
both domains were artificially constructed to be 
algebraic Abelian groups of order three. In other 
words, each is isomorphic to the integers under 
addition modulo three. Therefore, both domains 
included three classes of entities and a set of specific 
transformation rules described in Figure 1. The first, 
more abstract, domain (hereafter “Mathematics”) was 
presented to the participants as a symbolic language 
in which three types of symbols, denoted as 6, 7, 
and , combine to yield a resulting symbol. The 
combination of symbols is expressed as written 
statements such as , 7 → 6. The second, more 
concrete, domain (hereafter “Science”) involved 
interactions between three-dimensional objects from 
three classes. The objects dynamically interact to 
form a resulting object. The appearance of the objects 
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and interactions was designed to be dissimilar to any 
particular science. 
The goal of the reported experiment was to 
investigate transfer across the two isomorphic 
artificial domains. Transfer was measured by 
comparing average test scores on a given domain as a 
function of prior learning of another domain. 
Method 
Participants  
Participants in the experiment were undergraduate 
students from Ohio State University who received 
partial credit for an introductory psychology course. 
Thirty students participated in the experiment. Fifteen 
participants were in the math-then-science condition 
and fifteen were in the science-then-math condition. 
Information was presented to individual participants 
via computer. 
Materials and Design 
Materials included two sets of entities (i.e., abstract 
meaningless symbols and concrete, perceptually-rich 
objects), and a set of transformations rules (see Table 
1). 
 
Table 1. Example of stimuli and transformation 
rules across the two domains. 
 
 
   Mathematics             Science 
Elements            
   6  7   
 
     
 
Associativity 
 
For any elements x, y, z,:    
((x , y) , z)   is equivalent to (x , (y , z)) 
Commutativity For any elements x, y:  
x , y is equivalent to y , x 
Identity  There is an element, I, such that for 
any element, x:   x , I is equivalent to x 
Inverses For any element, x, there exists 
another element, y, such that:    
 x, y is equivalent to I 
 
6 is the identity 
 
is the  
        identity 
 
 
Operands    Result 
 
 
 
   
Specific Rules: 
              
 
7 , 7  →  
 
 ,   → 7  
      
  
 
  
 
Information about each domain was given as a 
computer presentation. The training in both domains 
was essentially isomorphic. The rules of the domain, 
namely commutativity, associativity, and the rules 
governing specific elements, were explicitly stated. 
The experiment included four phases presented 
over one hour: (1) Training in domain X, (2) Test in 
domain X, (3) Training in domain Y, (4) Test in 
domain Y, with participants randomly assign to a 
particular order of learning (i.e., math-then-science or 
science-then-math). 
Training included introduction of transformation 
rules, followed by questions with feedback. Several 
detailed examples were given. Testing consisted of 
twenty multiple choice questions designed to 
measure recall of the given rules and deeper 
conceptual understanding of the system. For both 
domains, the test questions were completely 
isomorphic and were presented in the same order.  
The presentation of the two domains differed by 
storyline. The artificial mathematics was presented as 
a symbolic language discovered on an archaeological 
search. Symbols of different categories combine to 
yield a resulting symbol. The artificial science was 
explained to be a phenomenon observed on a planet 
outside of our solar system. Objects from different 
classes of shapes interact to form a resulting shape. 
The presentation of the artificial science included 
movie clips demonstrating the interactions. Two or 
more objects move toward each other. When they 
come in contact, an interaction occurs and results in a 
predictable object. 
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of two 
orders: math-then-science (MÆSc) or science-then-
math (ScÆM). Participants in the first group received 
training and testing in the artificial mathematics 
immediately followed by training and testing in the 
artificial science. Subjects in the second group 
received training and testing first in the science and 
then in the mathematics. Following training and 
testing in both domains, a brief interview was 
conducted.  
Students’ scores on the mathematics and science 
tests were recorded. They were also asked to rate the 
similarity of the two domains on a scale from one to 
five. A rating of one indicated that the domains are 
completely different and a rating of five indicated 
that the domains are structurally identical with 
different representations of the objects. 
Test scores for mathematics and science were 
compared across the two conditions, math-then-
science and science-then-math. Transfer due to 
mathematics first was taken to be the difference in 
the average science score for MÆSc and the average 
science score for ScÆM. In other words, transfer is 
the improvement in science score due to having 
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previously learned the mathematics. Similarly, 
transfer due to science was taken to be the difference 
in average mathematics score for ScÆM and the 
average mathematics score for MÆSc.  
Procedure 
All training and testing was presented on a 
computer screen. Participants were tested in a quiet 
room in a lab by a female experimenter. They 
proceeded through training and testing at their own 
pace, and their responses were recorded by the 
researcher. After training and testing in both 
domains, a brief interview was conducted. 
Results and Discussion 
Students were able to learn the artificial 
mathematics and the artificial science. With the 
exception of one student, all test scores were 
significantly above chance (i.e., 7/20) in both math-
then-science and science-then-math conditions. The 
one student who had a science score of 9/20 was 
removed from the data analysis. This score is not 
significantly different than chance and is also greater 
than two standard deviations from the mean (mean = 
16.8, standard deviation = 2.8).  
All students indicated that they noticed similarities 
between the two topics. Under both conditions the 
students rated the domains as highly similar. On a 
similarity scale from one to five, the mean rating 
given by math-then-science participants was 4.4 (SD 
= .65). The mean rating given by science-then-math 
students was 4.6 (SD = .63). 
The data on transfer across the domains are 
presented in Figure 1. These data were subjected to a 
2 (Domain: Math vs. Science) by 2 (Order: Learned 
First vs. Learned Second) mixed ANOVA with 
Domain as a repeated measure.  The analysis 
revealed a significant Domain by Order interaction, F 
(1, 27) = 24.15, p < .0001.  At the same time, none of 
the main effects was significant, both ps > .28. 
Planned comparisons indicated that there was a 
significant difference in performance as a function of 
learning order. Students in the math-then-science 
condition performed significantly better on the 
science test than students in the science-then-math 
condition, independent-samples t (24) = 3.26, p<.01. 
However, there was no significant difference in 
mathematics scores across conditions, p > .229. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean test scores for mathematics and 
science shown as first and second domain studied. 
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The higher average science score for the MÆ Sc 
group suggests that their prior knowledge of the 
mathematics improved their learning of the science. 
Therefore, significant transfer was found from the 
abstract symbolic domain to the concrete, but the 
reverse was not found. 
In order to understand why the symbolic 
representation promoted transfer, while the concrete 
representation did not, it is necessary to take a closer 
look at the process of transfer. Not only does transfer 
require recognition and mapping of analogous 
relational structure from a source domain to a target 
domain, the elements of the source domain need to 
act as symbols. In other words, the objects or aspects 
of the source domain need to act as placeholders that 
can refer to something else, namely the objects of the 
target domain. Concrete representations are 
perceptually rich and consequently engage the 
perceptual system. Perceptually rich representations 
can easily convey associated properties and overall 
similarity (Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998). However, 
the specific characteristics of objects or elements are 
often irrelevant to concepts. Maintaining dissociation 
between the relational structure and the 
characteristics of the given elements is often crucial 
to accurate analogical reasoning. The salience of 
surface attributes often misleads students in the 
course of problem solving by distracting them from 
the underlying structure (Ben-Zeev & Star, 2001; 
Gholson, Smither,  Buhrman, Duncan, & Pierce, 
1997; Holyoak, Junn, & Billman, 1984; Holyoak & 
Koh, 1987; Schoenfeld & Herrmann, 1982). 
Perceptual objects convey affordances that may be 
helpful, but may also be irrelevant to the underlying 
concepts.  
However, concrete representations may be 
beneficial under some conditions. For example 
Goldstone and colleagues (Goldstone, Son, & Patton, 
under review) have argued that maximum transfer 
occurs through “concreteness fading” where concrete 
representations progressively become idealized.      
645
The conclusions of their study were that transfer is 
promoted through multiple representations. 
Furthermore, the authors conclude that while 
idealized displays promote internal representation not 
deeply embedded in a single domain, concrete 
displays have the advantage of a strong intuitive link 
between the real world and the modeled world. In 
other words, concepts can get a partial free ride from 
familiar concrete instances. However, in the course of 
learning mathematics and science, there are many 
concepts for which obvious concrete models may not 
exist. In the absence of a familiar concrete model on 
which concepts can freeload, does an artificially 
constructed concrete representation have benefits 
over a symbolic representation?  
This notion of concepts getting a free ride from 
concrete representations as suggested by Goldstone 
and his colleagues is certainly appealing and is 
intuitively very reasonable. From a pedagogical 
perspective, there seems to be definite merit in 
concreteness fading provided that instructors do not 
allow learning to become deeply embedded in the 
concrete example. For students, the concept may 
become the concrete model and not the abstraction 
necessary for true understanding and transfer. 
Furthermore, many concepts may not have obvious 
and familiar representation in the real world. 
Mathematical concepts, by their very nature, are not 
bound to concrete contexts. Their transfer depends on 
attending to their relational structure and not salient 
surface features of a particular instance.  
The goal of this experiment was to take a closer 
look at the merits of abstraction and concreteness for 
transfer. The familiarity or intuitive link between the 
concrete model and the concept were intentionally 
removed. No significant transfer from the concrete to 
the abstract was found, while significant transfer 
from the abstract to the concrete was exhibited. 
Concrete representations may be difficult to treat 
as symbols in novel, complex concepts. Perceptually 
rich representations convey more information than 
leaner representations. As the degree of richness 
increases, it likely becomes more difficult to 
recognize the representation as an object itself as well 
as a reference to its intended referent. Successful 
transfer requires the elements of the source domain to 
be treated as symbols. Concrete representations 
engage the perceptual system. Rich percepts convey 
much information, a large portion of which is 
unrelated to a task in question. When that information 
correlates with the conceptual structure, learning may 
be facilitated. However, when the attributes are 
irrelevant to the concept, learners may not see the 
relevant analogy. Even when the analogy is 
perceived, it is difficult for rich percepts to be used as 
symbols, as demonstrated in this experiment. 
Participants in both the math-then-science and the 
science-then-math conditions recognized similarities 
between the domains. However, only the students 
who learned the symbolic mathematics prior to the 
concrete science were able to transfer information  
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Abstract 
Research on multiple cue judgment with continuous cues 
and a continuous criterion has been dominated by statis-
tical modeling of the cue utilization with linear multiple 
regression. In this study we apply two cognitive process 
models to investigate the relative contributions of explicit 
abstraction of the cue-criterion relations and memory for 
concrete exemplars in a multiple-cue judgment task. The 
task was an extension of a previous task with binary cues 
(P. Juslin, H. Olsson., A-C. Olsson, 2003) and involved 
multiple continuous cues that either combined by addi-
tion or multiplication. As predicted by the process model 
∑ (P. Juslin, L. Karlsson, & H. Olsson, manuscript) ex-
plicit abstraction of cue-criterion relations were induced 
in the additive task, while exemplar memory was induced 
in the multiplicative task.   
Introduction 
Multiple-cue judgment research has traditionally been 
concerned with statistical modeling of judgment data. 
Rather exquisite regression models have been devel-
oped that describe multiple-cue judgment as a) well 
fitted by a linear additive model; b) only taking a few 
cues into account; c) hard to report on subjectively; d) 
characterized by cue weightings that differ greatly be-
tween individuals; and e) plagued by considerable in-
consistency in the weighting of the cues (see Brehmer, 
1994; Cooksey, 1996; Hammond & Stewart, 2001).  
   In the light of the cognitive revolution it might seem 
puzzling that this field of research has not benefited 
from the growth of cognitive modeling as a means to 
track the underlying cognitive representation and proc-
ess of judgment, a growth seen in related fields like 
categorization learning (but see for example Bott & 
Heit, 2004; Busemeyer, Byun, DeLosh, & McDaniel, 
1997; or DeLosh, Busemeyer & McDaniel, 1997, sin-
gle-cue learning). Categorization – which is in many 
ways similar to multiple-cue judgment (see Juslin, 
Olsson, & Olsson, 2003) – has invited extensive inves-
tigation of the cognitive representations and processes 
that underlie behavior. A plethora of models, ranging 
from an emphasis on how abstract rules or prototypes 
guide category decisions to a domination of memory 
for category exemplars are thus available in cognitive 
science today. In this study we apply the methods of 
cognitive modeling to a typical multiple-cue judgment 
task. By connecting research on cognitive science to 
judgment and decision making research, we can gain an 
understanding of what cognitive representations and 
processes guide the judgments, and how this is mani-
fested in the results of the traditional statistical model-
ing (e.g., Cooksey, 1996).  
   Arguably, it is not mere coincidence that linear, addi-
tive models fit multiple cue judgment data well and that 
categorization is often well captured by exemplar mod-
els that entail a linear additive combination of retrieved 
exemplars (Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, manuscript). 
Imagine how you sequentially consider and weigh the 
pros and cons of different aspects of a car before you 
purchase it (its looks, reliability, etc). You may weigh 
them differently but positive qualities add to and nega-
tive qualities subtract from your overall opinion. Like-
wise, you may sequentially consider exemplars of simi-
lar cars that you are aware of: similar cars (e.g., same 
model) that have worked properly add to the appeal of 
the car and cars that that have been frustrating subtract 
from it. 
We have proposed a general process model, ∑, that 
captures the essentials of multiple-cue judgment, both 
when it is driven by consideration of cue-criterion rela-
tions and exemplar retrieval (Juslin et al., manuscript). 
The assumptions in ∑ are that our controlled and ex-
plicit thought processes have an architectural constraint 
enhancing sequential, real-time consideration of multi-
ple pieces of evidence (cues or exemplars). The process 
involves successive adjustment of an estimate, a proc-
ess structurally compatible with linear, additive cue 
integration (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979) 
and exemplar models (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000).  
The key assumption is that, in effect, all integration 
of information involves addition (or subtraction). This 
hypothesis suggests that explicit and controlled thought 
processes are apt at performing cue-integration only in 
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 tasks where the cue-criterion relations in the task indeed 
combine by addition. By contrast, a task that involves 
non-linear or multiplicative cue combination requires 
capitalization on exemplar memory (Medin & Schaffer, 
1978; Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). Exemplar memory 
involves no strong computational commitments to par-
ticular task structures. With a division of labor between 
distinct representations we are better equipped to adapt 
to different task structures. We propose that the judg-
ment process adapts to specific task environments and 
predict that in a multiple-cue judgment task with con-
tinuous cues we can induce a shift between qualita-
tively distinct processes by manipulating the structural 
properties of the environment: additive cue combina-
tion should promote cue abstraction and multiplicative 
cue combination should promote exemplar memory.   
Judgment Task and Cognitive Models 
The judgment task involves judgment of a continuous 
criterion based on continuous cues. The task concerns 
judgments of the effectiveness of different species of 
herbs as medical treatments to a lethal virus. The effec-
tiveness is measured as the maximal amount of a 
chemical substance (mg) that can be extracted from the 
species.  The species have four continuous dimensions 
(C1, C2, C3, C4), and each cue dimension can take a 
value between 0 and 10. The judgment of effectiveness 
requires inference from these dimensions, which are 
presented as verbal statements (e.g., weeks of bloom 
per year, geographic place of growth).  
The tasks involve two manipulations. First, there is 
one condition in which all cues are related to the criteria 
positively and linearly, and one condition in which two 
cues are positively and two cues are negatively linearly 
related to the criterion. This manipulation makes the 
task a matter of function learning. Second, there is a 
manipulation of whether the effects of the four cues on 
the criterion combine by addition or multiplication.  
In the additive condition the criterion is a linear, ad-
ditive function of the continuous cues: 
ε+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+= 4321 1234500 CCCCc . (1) 
C1 is the most important cue with coefficient 4 (i.e., a 
relative weight .4), C2 is the second to most important 
with coefficient 3, and so forth. The cues are uncorre-
lated. ε  is a normally and independently distributed 
random error with a standard deviation that produces a 
multiple correlation R between cues and criterion of .9 
(i.e., defining the ecological validity of the cues).  
In the multiplicative condition the criterion c is a 
multiplicative function of the four cues: 
ε+⋅= ⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅ 18/)1234( 43210.54545+509.05 CCCCec ,   (2) 
with the same coefficients as in the additive task (Eq. 
1). The effectiveness varies between 500 and 600 mg of 
chemical substance in the additive task and 509 to 650 
mg in the multiplicative task. However, the training 
ranges are hold equal for the two conditions. The range 
of cue values observed in the two tasks is therefore the 
same. Moreover, the criterion in the multiplicative 
condition is an exponential function of the criterion 
presented in the additive condition.  
We use two structural models to derive predictions, a 
cue-abstraction (CAM) and an exemplar model (EBM). 
∑ implies that in the additive task CAM should be the 
correct structural description of the process, whereas in 
the multiplicative condition EBM should be the appro-
priate description1. The CAM assumes that participants 
abstract explicit cue-criterion relations in training that 
are mentally integrated at the time of judgment. When 
presented with a probe the participants retrieve rules 
connecting cues to criterion (e.g., “More weeks in 
bloom gives more effectiveness”). The rules specify the 
sign and importance of each cue with a cue weight. For 
example, after training the rule for C1 may specify that 
high C1 goes with an increase in the criterion. 
The CAM implies that participants compute an esti-
mate of the criterion c based on sequential considera-
tion of cues. For each cue, the estimate of c is adjusted 
according to the cue weight iAω  (i=1…4). The final 
estimate CAcˆ  is a linear additive function of the cues Ci, 
∑
=
⋅+=
4
1
ˆ
i
iiACA Ckc ω , (3) 
where )10100(5.500 iAk ω∑⋅−⋅+= . If A1ω =4, A2ω =3, 
A3ω =2, and A4ω =1, Eq’s 1 and 3 are identical and the 
model produce perfect judgments. The intercept k con-
strains the function relating judgments to criteria to be 
regressive around the midpoint (550) of the interval 
[500, 600] (Juslin et al., manuscript).       
Although ruled out by the predictions of ∑, we also 
consider the possibility that participants have correctly 
abstracted the multiplicative cue-criterion relations by 
fitting a multiplicative cue-abstraction model to the 
data: 
                  
∑ ⋅
=⋅+=
4
1
18/)(
54545.005.509 i
iiM C
ec
ω
            (4) 
 
where M1ω  are the best fitting subjective cue weights in 
the multiplicative cue abstraction model. 
 EBM is commonly applied to classification, but here 
we apply it to a continuous criterion. EBM implies that 
participants make judgments by retrieving similar ex-
emplars (herb species) from memory. When the exem-
plar model is applied to judgments of a continuous 
criterion variable, the estimate Ecˆ  of the criterion c is a 
weighted average of the criteria cj stored for the J ex-
emplars, where the similarities S(p,xj) are the weights: 
∑
∑
=
=
⋅
= J
j
j
J
j
jj
E
xpS
cxpS
c
1
1
),(
),(
ˆ
. (5) 
                                                          
1 ∑ is a model of the real-time process of judgment that be-
comes structurally identical with a CAM when the represen-
tations fed to the process are abstracted cues and structurally 
identical to an EBM when the process is fed by exemplars. 
The structural description refers to the relationships between 
stimulus features and the response (Juslin et al., manuscript).   
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p is the probe to be judged, xj is exemplar j (j= 1…J), 
and S(p,xj) is the similiarity between probe p and exem-
plar xj. Eq. 5 is the generalized context model (GCM: 
Nosofsky, 1984; 1986), which generalizes the original 
version of the context model (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). 
The similarity S(p,xj) between exemplars is found by 
transforming the distance between them. The distance 
between a probe p and an exemplar j is, 


 −= ∑
=
M
M
jmpmmpj xxwhd
1
, (6) 
where xpm and xjm, respectively, are the values of the 
probe and an exemplar on cue dimension m, the pa-
rameters wm are the attention weights associated with 
cue dimension m, and h is a sensitivity parameter that 
reflects overall discriminability in the psychological 
space (the sensitivity parameter is usually denoted c, 
but we changed that to avoid confusion with the crite-
rion c). Attentional weights vary between 0 and 1 and 
are constrained to sum to 1. The similarity S(p,xj) be-
tween a probe p and an exemplar j is assumed to be a 
nonlinearly decreasing function of their distance (dpj), ( ) pjdj expS −=, . (7) 
In the experiment, herb species with a criterion above 
590 and below 510 are not included in the training 
phase. This makes it possible to distinguish between the 
models as they provide different predictions (Figure 1). 
In the training phase, all exemplars have effectiveness 
between 510 and 590. If participants have estimated the 
correct cue weight for each cue they should compute 
the most extreme judgments for the extreme exemplars 
that are left out in the training phase. More specifically, 
whenever participants have correctly identified the sign 
of each cue (i.e., whether it increases or decreases the 
criterion) they should make more extreme judgments 
for the exemplars with all cues at their maximum and 
the exemplars with all cues at their minimum, as illus-
trated on the left-side of Figure 1. By contrast, the ex-
emplar model computes a weighted average of the 
criteria between 510 and 590 stored with the exemplars 
and this can never produce a value outside of this ob-
served range (Erickson & Krusckhe, 1998; but see 
DeLosh et al., 1997). Moreover, because of the non-
linear similarity function of the GCM the most extreme 
judgments tend to be made for the second to most ex-
treme exemplars. For these exemplars the judgment is 
dominated by retrieval of the identical stored exemplars 
and these identical exemplars are the most extreme that 
were encountered in the training phase. These predic-
tions are illustrated on the right side of Figure 1. 
For new exemplars in the mid range of the criterion 
cue abstraction suggests no systematic difference be-
tween new exemplars and old exemplars matched on 
the criterion: the cognitive process is the same regard-
less of whether a specific exemplar has been encoun-
tered before or not. The exemplar model predicts more 
precise judgments for the old exemplars because for 
these exemplars the participants can benefit from previ-
ous identical exemplars with the correct criterion c. 
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Figure 1: Predictions by cue-abstraction model (CAM) 
and exemplar model (EBM) in additive and multiplica-
tive task environments. Panel A: CAM in additive task 
environment (with slightly regressive weights, 3.2, 2.4, 
1.6, & .8). Panel B: EBM in additive task environment 
(s = .25 and h = 10). Panel C: Additive [CAM(A)] and 
multiplicative [CAM(M)] cue-abstraction models in 
multiplicative task environment (with weights, 3.2, 2.4, 
1.6, & .8). Panel D: EBM in multiplicative task envi-
ronment (s = .25 and h = 10). The choice of values for 
the parameters is arbitrary and only used for illustrative 
purposes.  
The Experiment 
In the experiment we manipulated whether participants 
were confronted with a task that involved additive or 
multiplicative cue combination. For the reasons out-
lined in the introduction, we predicted that the additive 
task (Eq.1) should promote explicit cue abstraction with 
additive cue integration (Eq. 3). A multiplicative task 
(Eq. 2) should cause a shift to a qualitatively different 
process, that is, to exemplar memory (Eq. 5).  
The sign of the linear relations between cues and cri-
terion was also manipulated. For half of the participants 
all four cues were positively related to the criterion and 
for half of the participants two cues were positively and 
two cues were negatively related to the criterion. In line 
with the assumptions of ∑, we predict that in an addi-
tive task, whether cue directions are negative or posi-
tive should not affect the ability to perform cue abstrac-
tion. In a multiplicative task, both with homogeneous 
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 and heterogeneous cue directions, exemplar memory is 
predicted to prevail over cue abstraction. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty two undergraduate students volunteered, receiv-
ing a payment of 60-99 SKr, depending on their per-
formance. Twenty participants were male and 12 were 
female, all in the age between 20 and 32. 
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment consisted of a training phase and a test 
phase. In the training phase, the participant learned to 
judge the effectiveness of each species of the herb by 
means of outcome feedback. The effectiveness was 
measured as the amount (mg) of the fictitious chemical 
substance Ranulin. In the training phase, the effective-
ness varied between 510 and 590 mg. The species were 
shown as four written propositions on a computer 
screen. At each trial in the training phase, the partici-
pant was to answer the question “How many milligrams 
of Ranulin does this specie contain?”. After giving a 
response they received the correct answer: “This specie 
contain 540 milligrams of Ranulin”. The four dimen-
sions were: number of weeks in bloom, the optimal 
amount of iron in the ground, the degrees of latitude 
where it does well, and the amount of water it emits per 
leaf area. Each dimension varied “pseudo-
continuously” in 11 equidistant steps that ranged be-
tween 0 and 10, yielding a total of 114 different exem-
plars. In the training phase, a random sample of 300 
exemplars was drawn from this distribution and shown 
to the participant. A pause of two minutes was given to 
the participant after the first 150 trials.   
   In the test phase, participants were to judge the effec-
tiveness of the species of the herbs but now without 
outcome feed-back. In the test phase, new exemplars 
were included. The test phase consisted of 44 judg-
ments of a) 20 randomly chosen old exemplars shown 
in training, b) 20 randomly chosen new exemplars, 
drawn from the training distribution and c) 4 extreme 
exemplars, with criterion values outside the training 
range (eg. the exemplars with cue values [0,0,0,0] and 
[10,10,10,10])  
   In the condition with heterogeneous cue directions, 
for half of the participants, negative sign was assigned 
to the cues with objective weight 4 and 2, and for half 
of the participants to the cues with weights 3 and 1. 
Dependent Measures 
The measure of performance is Root Mean Square 
Error (RMSE) of judgment (i.e., between judgment and 
criterion). Measures of model fit are the coefficient of 
determination (r2) and Root Mean Square Deviation 
(RMSD) between predictions and data from the test 
phase. 
Results 
A two-way ANOVA with environment (additive vs. 
multiplicative) and cue directions (homogeneous vs. 
heterogeneous) as between-subject factors shows two 
main effects on RMSE (Table 1), but no interaction. In 
the additive condition performance is significantly 
better (F(1.30) = 20.36; MSE = 32.36; p = 0.000). Also, 
when the cue directions are homogeneous RMSE is 
lower compared to when the cue directions are hetero-
geneous (F(1.30) = 20.36; MSE = 6.37; p = 0.018) 
 
Table 1: Judgment performance in the experiment as 
measured by the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) 
between judgment and criterion.  
 
  Condition  
Cue directions Index Add. Mult. Mean 
Homogeneous RMSE 11.69 21.23 16.46 
Heterogeneous RMSE 17.21 25.90 21.56 
Mean RMSE   14.45  23.56  
 
Mean judgments are shown in Figure 2. In the additive 
homogeneous condition the judgments are a linear 
function of the criterion and no extra- or interpolation 
effects are visible. The best fitting regression lines for 
old and new judgments coincides. 
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Figure 2: Mean judgments for the different conditions. 
Panel A: additive, homogeneous. Panel B: multiplica-
tive, homogeneous. Panel C: additive, heterogeneous. 
Panel D: multiplicative, heterogeneous. Best-fitting 
regression lines are based on a) the old exemplars seen 
in training or b) the new exemplars introduced at test. 
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In the multiplicative homogeneous condition the 
judgments clearly deviate both from the identity line 
and the best fitting regression line based on old exem-
plars. Although the judgments are a positive function of 
the criteria in the training range there is evidence for an 
inability to extrapolate. The judgments are not extrapo-
lated beyond the range of training. 
In the additive heterogeneous condition (Figure 2C) 
the judgments are still close to the optimal judgment 
line, although there are signs of extra- and interpolation 
effects. In the multiplicative heterogeneous condition 
(Panel D) the mean judgments are a positive function of 
the criterion, but the inability to extrapolate is obvious.  
Quantitative model predictions were obtained by fit-
ting the models in the introduction (Eq. 3, 4 & 5) to the 
latter half of the training phase with Mean Square Error 
between predictions and data as the error function (Jus-
lin et al., 2003; manuscript).  
 
Table 2: Model fit: Root Mean Square Deviations 
(RMSD) and r2 for the additive cue-abstraction model 
(CAM(A)) the exemplar model (EBM) and the multi-
plicative cue-abstraction model (CAM(M)) in the four 
conditions.  
 
 CAM(A) EBM CAM(M) 
Cond. r2 RMSD r2 RMSD r2 RMSD 
Add:       
Homogen. .77 10.83 .75 13.73 - - 
Heterogen. .53 12.67 .51 13.40 - - 
Mult:       
Homogen. .21 28.26 .74 8.50 .70 12.20 
Heterogen. .18 48.62 .34 19.65 .32 18.97 
 
The models were thus fitted to data from the training 
phase and applied with these parameters to the wider 
range of herb species in the test phase. This implies 
cross-validation for exemplars presented in training and 
genuine predictions for new exemplars. To capture 
individual differences, the models were applied to indi-
vidual data. Table 2 shows the mean fit for the three 
models. In the additive condition cue abstraction is the 
overall dominant model, regardless of the cue direc-
tions. In the multiplicative condition exemplar memory 
describes the data best with regard to r2 and the multi-
plicative cue-abstraction model yields a smaller mean 
RMSD. The rather low fit of all three models in the 
heterogeneous conditions may be explained by larger 
noise in these data since this task is presumably more 
difficult than the homogeneous task. Figure 3 shows the 
proportion of participants best accounted for by each 
model in terms of RMSD. In the additive homogeneous 
condition most of the participants are accounted for by 
the cue-abstraction model. In the multiplicative homo-
geneous condition the reverse is true, namely that the 
exemplar model produces the best explanation. In the 
additive heterogeneous condition the proportion of 
participants explained by the cue abstraction model 
decreases. In the multiplicative heterogeneous condi-
tion, as hypothesized the exemplar-based model contin-
ues to provide the best explanation of data for most of 
the participants. The multiplicative cue-abstraction 
model describes some of the participants in both the 
homogeneous and the heterogeneous multiplicative 
tasks. 
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Figure 3: The proportion of participants accounted for 
by any of the three models in the additive and the multi-
plicative conditions in terms of RMSD. Panel A: addi-
tive condition. Panel B: multiplicative condition. 
Discussion 
The results reported in this paper support the assump-
tions made by ∑ that multiple-cue judgment processes 
conceal an effective division of labor between qualita-
tively distinct cognitive processes (Juslin et al., manu-
script). Cognitive modeling supports the hypothesis that 
in a multiple-cue judgment task where the cues com-
bine by addition, ∑ is fed with representations in form 
of abstracted knowledge of the relations between cues 
and criterion. On the other hand, in an environment 
where the cues relate to the criteria by a multiplicative 
function we seem to be equipped with no means to 
explicitly abstract the underlying structure. In such 
tasks, people seem to resort to the back-up process of 
exemplar-memory.  
   The fact that exemplar-memory plays part also in 
additive tasks is not a coincidence, since both processes 
allows accurate performance in training. That the multi-
plicative cue-abstraction model provide an explanation 
for some of the participants in the multiplicative task is 
more surprising. This is probably an effect both of large 
noise in data and of its high correlations to the exem-
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 plar model. Figure 2 B & C yields no evidence for 
successful extrapolation beyond the range of training. 
   The bad performance in the multiplicative heteroge-
neous condition, together with the low fit of the models 
makes it unfair to draw conclusions regarding what 
cognitive process that has dominated the judgments in 
this condition. What makes this task difficult to learn? 
A tentative hypothesis would be that in training there is 
a bias towards the abstraction of specific rules (eg. rule 
bias; see for example Ashby et al., 1998; Juslin et al., 
2003; manuscript). Presumably, a period of extensive 
hypothesis testing is therefore taking place at beginning 
of training. However, the multiplicative heterogeneous 
task may be inductive of more extensive hypothesis-
testing procedures. The back-up of exemplar memory is 
thus postponed, and thereby learning may be impaired. 
      An interesting approach to the interpretation of the 
data would be to consider how an exemplar-model 
augmented with linear extrapolation would account for 
the results (see EXAM; DeLosh et al., 1997; Busemeyer 
et al., 1997, for results on single-cue learning). EXAM 
suggests that, although learning has been in the form of 
exemplar-memory, abstraction of cue-criterion relations 
is possible at test. When encountered with a new exem-
plar at test, familiar exemplars and their stored criterion 
are retrieved from memory. An extrapolated judgment 
for the new exemplar is then made possible through 
linear regression based on the old exemplars. How this 
model explains the data reported in this paper remains 
to be tested, although a first qualitative evaluation of 
the data in Figure 2 can be made. Given the data in the 
additive condition, EXAM is likely to produce the same 
fit as the cue-abstraction model. In the multiplicative 
condition EXAM would predict no difference between 
the regression made on old exemplars and the regres-
sion made on new exemplars. This difference is how-
ever apparent in the data in Figure 2 (Panel B & C) and 
thus suggests the refutation of EXAM in favor of EBM. 
   The main interpretation to be drawn from the results 
reported in this paper is that the human judge, under the 
constraints imposed by ∑, adapt to different task struc-
tures by means of representational shifts. This high-
lights how the task is a powerful predictor of cognitive 
process in human multiple-cue judgment.  
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Abstract
Russian-English bilingual and English monolingual
participants were tested on the Picture-Word Interference task
modified for use with an eye-tracker. Distractor words were
1) non-words in English, but viable phonological words in
Russian, 2) control bigram matched non-word stimuli, and 3)
English translations of the Russian words. Russian-English
bilinguals looked at the phonological Russian words more
than monolingual participants, and took longer to name
pictures accompanied by these stimuli than did monolingual
participants. Proportion of eye-movements and reaction times
to the other two types of distractor stimuli did not differ for
the two groups. These results suggest that phonology of the
non-target language is activated automatically during visual
word recognition in the target language, even for written
stimuli that do not carry orthographic information for the non-
target language.
Introduction
The task of reading is hard enough when the reader reads in
one language alone. In the case of a bilingual reader, the
picture is even more complex: Not only does a bilingual
reader need to process the written information in one
language, but he or she may have to contend with
information from his or her other language that also
becomes activated. The activation of the non-target
language during reading in the target language is
implemented in the Bilingual Interactive Activation (BIA+)
model of visual word recognition (Dijkstra & Van Heuven,
1998; 2002). The BIA+ model is a localist connectionist
model with elements from both the dual-route models of
reading (e.g., Coltheart et al., 1993; Coltheart et al., 2001;
Ziegler et al., 2000) and the connectionist models of
reading. (e.g., Plaut et al., 1996; Seidenberg and
McClelland, 1989; Van Orden and Goldinger, 1994). The
BIA+ model proposes that lexical access of a visually
presented word in a bilingual is non-selective, i.e., when a
word is presented, information for that word, both
orthographic and phonological, is activated for both of the
bilingual’s languages.
Support for such non-selective processing of written
information in bilinguals (i.e., activation of the non-target
language orthography and/or phonology when involved in a
reading task requiring use of only the target language) has
accumulated over the past three decades (e.g., De Groot,
Delmaar, & Lupker, 2000; Nas, 1983; Van Heuven, 2000;
Van Heuven, Dijkstra, & Grainger, 1998). Activation of
non-target language phonological information has been
reported for bilingual readers of languages with shared
alphabets, such as English and French (Jared & Szucs,
2002), Dutch and English (Dijkstra, Grainger, & van
Heuven, 1999), Spanish and Catalan (Costa, Miozzo, &
Caramazza, 1999), and Dutch and French (Brysbaert, Van
Dyck, & Van de Poel, 1999). Activation of phonological
information for the non-target language has also been
reported in the case of bilinguals who speak languages with
entirely different alphabets, like Hebrew and English
(Tzelgov et al., 1996). However, it is still largely unknown
whether phonological information for the non-target
language is activated when the letter string in the target
language carries little resemblance to the non-target
language orthography (but see Feldman & Turvey, 1983;
Lukatela et al, 1978).
In this experiment, we used a modified Picture-Word
Interference (PWI) task to test whether phonological
information for Russian is automatically activated during
processing of non-words in English. The stimuli were
constructed to contain English-specific letters, but constitute
viable phonological Russian words. Using head-mounted
eye-tracking methodology, we examined Russian-English
bilinguals’ ability to control their eye-movements to
distractor words in the PWI task when these words
contained phonological, but not orthographic information
for Russian. The proportion of eye-movements to the
distractor word signified the degree to which Russian
phonological information drew the participants’ eye-
movements, while the reaction times to naming the target
picture stimulus signified the degree to which the Russian
phonological word interfered with picture naming in
English.
Eye-tracking technology has been used to explore parallel
activation of the two languages known to a bilingual during
auditory perception tasks (e.g., Marian & Spivey, 2003 a, b).
Eye-tracking has also been widely used in research of
reading (e.g., Reichle, Rayner, & Pollatsek, 1999; Starr &
Rayner, 2001). Unlike automatic eye-movements observed
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in response to spoken instructions, eye-movements in
reading are thought to be under partial cognitive control.
The E-Z Reader model of eye-movement control in reading
(Reichle, 1998; Reichle et al., 1999) posits that prior to
programming an eye-movement to a particular word, a
familiarity check takes place, which indicates whether a
word is likely to be recognized by a reader. During this
familiarity check, a reader gains information on low-level
properties of the word (Engbert, Longtin, & Kliegl, 2002),
which causes partial activation of the lexicon (e.g., Deutsch
et al., 2002; Starr & Rayner, 2001). Experimental evidence
shows that readers obtain both orthographic information
(Liu et al., 2002), and phonological information (Wong &
Chen, 1999) from the word before it is fixated. Models of
eye movement control during reading account only for
monolingual reading and it is still largely unknown whether
control of eye-movements during bilingual reading is
accomplished in the same way.
Recent research with bilinguals suggests that
phonological information for the non-target language is
automatically activated when reading in the target language.
However, phonological activation for the non-target
language when reading in the target language has not yet
been explored for bilingual speakers whose two languages
have partially overlapping alphabets. For these speakers,
letter strings with alphabet-specific symbols often contain
phonologically meaningful information for the non-target
language. Russian-English bilinguals are faced with exactly
this type of alphabetic overlap (Figure 1). Given the
properties of the Russian Cyrillic alphabet and the English
Roman alphabet, it is possible to test whether phonology of
the non-target language is activated when its orthography is
only partially present in the target language letter string.
Consider the word COBA, which is the Russian word for
“owl.” COBA can be transcribed using the Roman alphabet,
SAVA, which includes letters specific to the English
alphabet. Letter strings like SAVA constitute phonological,
but not orthographic, representations of Russian words.
When they are presented to the Russian-English bilinguals,
only phonology, but not orthography, associated with
corresponding Russian words, should be activated.
The activation of the non-target Russian language during
picture naming in English was measured using a modified
PWI task. The objective of the PWI task is to name
pictures, while ignoring the words also present on the
screen. The interference from the distractor word is thought
to arise due to the automatic reading of the word, which
then interferes with selection of the appropriate name for the
picture at the level of the lexico-semantic system. Thus,
reading during this task is largely automatic; in fact, it is
counter-productive to the successful and fast completion of
the task. Unlike a classic PWI task, where a written stimulus
is presented inside a picture, we separated the written
stimulus and picture presentation, such that a picture was in
one quadrant of the computer screen, while a written
stimulus was in another quadrant of the computer screen.
The instructions to the participants were the same as in the
regular PWI task: To ignore the word, and name the picture.
In the regular PWI task, these instructions do not prevent
reading of the words because the words are presented inside
     Russian      Orthographic Overlap       English
Figure 1: Overlapping symbols in orthographies of Russian
and English, and the associated phonemes in each language.
the picture, and therefore, the participants necessarily look
at them.  In the modified PWI task, the word and the picture
are in different locations on the screen so that the
participant sees that there is a word, but does not need to
look at it in order to recognize the picture. We tracked the
participants’ eye-movements while they were completing
the task in order to determine whether particular words drew
more eye-movements than others.
Based on the models of cognitive control of eye
movements in reading (Reichle, 1998; Reichle et al., 1999),
the proportion of eye-movements to distractor stimuli
during the modified PWI task should be indicative of the
degree to which participants were able to control their eye-
movements to the written stimuli. The stimuli presented as
distractors on the PWI task words were 1) phonological
Russian words, 2) English translations of the Russian
stimuli, and 3) control stimuli (non-words in both Russian
and English that were controlled for English bigram
frequencies to equal phonological Russian stimuli). We
hypothesized that if phonology of Russian is automatically
accessed even when the orthographic shape of the word is
not Russian (i.e., contains English-specific letter symbols),
Russian-English bilingual readers will make more eye-
movements to the phonological Russian words than the
monolingual English speakers. Consequently, we
hypothesized that if the phonological information for
Russian activates the lexico-semantic information for
Russian, Russian-English bilinguals will have longer
reaction times to the pictures accompanied by the
phonological Russian words than monolingual English
speakers.
Methods
Participants
Fifteen Russian-English bilingual speakers (Mean
Age=24.27 years, SD=4.80) and 15 English monolingual
speakers (Mean Age=21.00 years, SD=4.68) participated in
the experiment. All Russian-English bilingual participants
were born in the former Soviet Union, and immigrated to
the United States at a mean age 14.56 years (SD=5.35). All
bilingual participants filled out a Language Experience and
A, B, C, E, K,
M, H , O, P,
T, Y, X
D, F, G, I, J,
L, N, Q, R,
S, U, V, W,
Z
/a/, /v/, /s/, /e/, /k/,
/m/, /n/, /o/, /r/, /t/,
/u/, /h/
/a/, /b/, /k/, /e/, /k/,
/m/, /h/, /o/, /p/, /t/,
/j/, /ks/
, , , , ,
, , , 	, 
,
, , , ,
Ъ, , Ь,Э, Ю,
Я
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Bilingual Status Questionnaire (LEABS-Q) at the end of the
experiment. LEABS-Q is a comprehensive questionnaire
containing questions about language proficiency, modes and
ages of language acquisition, current language usage, etc.
(Marian, Blumenfeld, and Kaushanskaya, 2003). Self-
reported proficiency measures were later determined based
on the participants’ answers.
Reading fluency and reading comprehension were
assessed by administering a passage reading task in English
to the monolingual participants, and in English and Russian
to the bilingual participants. When tested in English,
bilingual participants were found to read orally with similar
speed, t(28)=0.94, p=0.36, have as many errors while
reading, t(28)=0.75, p=0.46, and comprehend as much of
the content, t(28)=0.96, p=0.35, as the monolingual
participants. For bilingual speakers, fluency of reading,
t(14)=1.89, p=0.08, and comprehension of content,
t(14)=0.38, p=0.71 were comparable for Russian and
English. However, bilingual participants were significantly
faster when reading in English (M=2.71 words/sec,
SE=0.12) than in Russian (M=2.12 words/sec, SE=0.11),
t(14)=4.44, p<0.01.
Design
Two dependent variables were considered: reaction time,
and proportion of eye-movements to the word. The
experiment followed a 4x2 Mixed Design with two
independent variables – condition (no word, phonological
Russian word, non-word control stimulus, and English
word) as a within-subjects variable, and group (bilingual vs.
monolingual) as a between subjects variable. For the
proportion of eye-movements data, condition variable
included only three levels (phonological Russian word, non-
word control stimulus, and English word).
Materials
Twenty-three target pictures of common concrete objects
were selected from the IMSI MasterClips picture database;
all pictures were transformed into black-and-white drawings
of equal size using PhotoShop.
Twenty-three words that were semantically related to
picture names, i.e. belonged to the same superordinate
category, were selected. The 23 words were then translated
into Russian to create stimuli that were phonological
representations of Russian words, spelled using the English
alphabet. For instance, for the picture of a duck, the
distractor word selected was chicken, which translates to
YTKA in Russian, and yields UTKA when spelled using the
English alphabet.
Control stimuli for the phonological Russian stimuli were
constructed by creating non-words comparable to Russian
phonological words in length and bigram frequencies.
Paired-samples t-tests confirmed that Russian phonological
stimuli (M=4355.02, SE=2244.50) and phonological
controls (M=4263.35, SE=2362.53) were similar in their
bigram frequencies (t(22)=0.36, p>0.05).
For each picture, there were 4 conditions: (1) picture – no
word, (2) picture – English semantic distractor, (3) picture –
phonological Russian semantic distractor, and (4) picture –
non-word control stimulus. The picture-no word condition
was used as a baseline, to establish that eye-movements to
words, if occurred, were due to the presence of the word in a
particular location, and not to the location itself. For each
condition, a panel divided into four quadrants was
constructed – a picture was placed into the middle of one
quadrant, and the word was placed into the middle of
another quadrant. For each condition, a picture and all the
words in the three conditions were placed in the same
quadrants; the positions of pictures and words were
counterbalanced across the four possible quadrants. To
increase the time between target picture presentations, 16
filler picture stimuli were added to the experiment.
Apparatus
All stimuli were presented on a G5 Macintosh Monitor
using SuperLab experimental software. Naming times were
measured from the presentation of the picture to the onset of
triggering the microphone response by the participant’s
voice. A headband-mounted ISCAN eyetracker was used to
record participants’ eye-movements during the PWI task. A
scene camera, joined to the view of the tracked eye,
provided an image of the participant’s field of view. A
second camera, which provided an image of the
participant’s left eye, allowed the ISCAN software to track
the center of the pupil and the corneal reflection; gaze
position was indicated by white crosshairs superimposed
over the image generated by the scene camera. The output
was recorded onto a digital mini-tape via a Cannon Digital
Camera; it was later loaded into the FinalCut Editing
software for frame-by-frame playback analysis.
Procedure
All participants were tested individually. Training for the
Picture-Word Interference task was presented first. Each
picture used in the PWI task was presented in the middle of
the screen; the participant was instructed to name it into the
microphone.
The Picture-Word Interference task was presented next.
Prior to initializing the task, the calibration of the eye-
tracking equipment was completed. To increase the
sensitivity of equipment, calibration was done on 9 fixation
points. The fixation values were then mapped onto the
corresponding monitor locations; the fixation location was
indicated by a white cross-hair that moved synchronically
with the eyes. After successful calibration, the PWI task
was initiated. Each participant was instructed to fixate on
the cross that appeared prior to each picture stimulus; he/she
was also instructed to name pictures into the microphone as
fast and as accurately as possible, and ignore the text on the
screen.
At the end of the experimental session, two proficiency
measures were administered to each participant. The first
was the reading ability measure: Each participant read a
short passage in English into the microphone, and answered
8 multiple-choice questions about it afterwards. Each
bilingual subject also read a short passage in Russian, and
answered 8 multiple-choice questions about it. Lastly, the
LEABS-Q was administered to each participant.
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Coding
Reaction times were recorded using SuperLab software by
measuring the time between the presentation of the picture
and the initiation of the vocal response into the microphone.
Accuracy was assessed by reviewing the participant’s
recorded performance. The eye-tracking data, consisting of
super-imposed cross-hairs onto the field of view, were
coded for proportion of eye-movements to the distractor
words. Eye-movements to the distractor word were
considered to have occurred when the crosshairs have
crossed into the quadrant containing the word. Ten percent
of the data were coded by a second, independent coder, who
did not speak Russian. Point-to-point reliability for coding
of proportions of eye-movements was 96%.
Results
Trials on which participants made errors accounted for
4.40% of the data. Picture naming errors were analyzed
separately, while errors like false starts were omitted from
the analyses.
Reaction times
A 4x2 Anova with condition (no word, Russian words,
Phonological controls, and English translations) as a within-
subjects variable, and group (monolingual and bilingual) as
a between-subjects variable yielded a main effect of
condition, F(1, 28)=8.39, p<0.01, and a significant two-way
interaction between condition and group, F(1, 28)=5.35,
p<0.05 (Figure 2).
Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons for condition adjusted for
multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method revealed
that both groups had shorter reaction times to pictures
without distractor words (M=809.70, SE=14.93) than to
pictures accompanied by Phonological Russian words
(M=861.77, SE=16.73), p<0.05, Phonological controls
(M=852.80, SE=16.75), p<0.05, or English translations
(M=855.36, SE=16.47).
 Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons between groups for each
Figure 2: Reaction times of bilingual and monolingual
participants when naming pictures alone, pictures,
accompanied by phonological Russian words, by bigram-
matched non-word control stimuli, and  by  English   words.
condition revealed that bilingual participants had longer
reaction times to Phonological Russian words (M=912.80,
SE=23.66) than monolingual participants (M=810.74,
SE=23.66), F(1, 28)=9.30, p<0.01. There was no significant
difference between bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ reaction
times to Phonological controls F(1, 28)=3.28, p>0.05, to
pictures alone, F(1, 28)=1.48, p>0.05, or to English
translations, F(1, 28)=0.17, p>0.05.
Proportion of Eye Movements to the Word
A 3x2 Mixed Ancova, with condition (Phonological Russian
words, Phonological controls, and English translations) as a
within-subjects variable, and group (monolingual and
bilingual) as a between-subjects variable, with speed of
reading as a covariate, was used to analyze the proportion of
eye movements to the three types of distractor words.
Results revealed a main effect of group, F(1, 27)=4.44,
p<0.05, with bilinguals looking more at the written stimuli
(M=0.46, SE=0.04) than monolinguals (M=0.34, SE=0.04)
and a marginally significant interaction between condition
and group, F(1, 27)=3.74, p<0.06 (Figure 3).
Post-hoc Univariate Analyses of Covariance revealed that
bilinguals looked more at the Phonological Russian words
(M=0.50, SE=0.05) than monolinguals (M=0.31, SE=0.05),
F(1,27)=7.66, p<0.05, but the two groups did not differ in
their proportion of looks to the Phonological controls, F(1,
27)=2.11, p>0.05, or the English translations, F(1,27)=2.09,
p>0.05.
Error Analysis
On the PWI task, monolingual participants committed 11
mis-naming errors, where a picture was named using the
distractor word (for example, naming a picture of the
chicken “duck”). Bilingual participants committed 8 mis-
naming errors. Of these, 5 were committed with the English
distractors being the word stimuli. The Mann Whitney test
for independent samples revealed that monolingual speakers
of English misnamed more pictures using the English
Figure 3: Mean proportion of looks to distractor stimuli
made by bilingual and monolingual participants when
distractors were phonological Russian words, bigram-
matched     non-word  control  stimuli,  and  English  words.
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distractor words than bilingual participants, Mann Whitney
U(15)=73.50, p<0.06.
Three mis-naming errors were committed by bilingual
participants with distractors being phonological Russian
stimuli, such as naming a picture of a collar “sleeve,” when
the distractor word on the screen was RUKAV, a
phonological word for “sleeve” in Russian. This number
was not significantly different from the number of errors
committed by monolingual participants, Mann Whitney
U(15)=90.00, p>0.05.
It is interesting to note that while interference of Russian
written stimuli did occur during naming of pictures in
English, none of the bilingual participants had switched into
Russian when naming pictures. Instead, a spontaneous
translation   of  the   Russian   distractor   into  English  had
occurred, and this, in turn, interfered with naming of the
picture. This pattern of errors is consistent with the
observation made by Costa, Miosso, and Carammazza
(1999), who suggested that items from two languages, while
activated in parallel, do not compete for selection during
production.
Discussion
Russian-English bilinguals looked at English non-words that
composed meaningful phonological Russian words more
than monolingual English speakers, while the proportions of
eye-movements made to control non-word stimuli and to
English translation equivalents were comparable for the two
groups. This finding suggests that phonological information
in the non-target language drew bilinguals’ eye-movements.
Therefore, phonological information for the non-target
language was automatically activated for these stimuli.
According to models of eye movement control in reading,
the stimuli that carried phonological information for
Russian drew the bilinguals’ eye movements because these
stimuli carried meaningful information for them, but not for
monolingual speakers of English.
Literature on eye movements during reading suggests that
before fixating a word, a reader obtains useful information
from its parafoveal preview; this information is used by the
reader to decide whether to fixate on the word or not
(Reichle et al., 1999; Starr & Rayner, 2001). While the E-Z
Reader model of eye-movement control in reading posits
cognitive control of eye-movements during reading of
sentences (Reichle, 1998), it also seems to explain the
behavior of the participants in this experiment, where they
recognized single words. The decision to look at the word
during the modified Picture Word Interference task appears
to be dictated by the amount and quality of information a
reader gleans from its parafoveal preview. Russian-English
bilinguals were better able to control eye-movements to
English non-word stimuli that did not carry any
phonological information for Russian, than to English non-
word stimuli that did carry phonological information for the
non-target language.
Testing bilinguals who speak languages with partially
overlapping alphabets allows for separating the
contributions of orthographic codes and phonological
information they carry to the parallel activation of the two
languages when processing print. Our findings are in line
with connectionist models of visual word recognition (e.g.,
Plaut et al., 1996; Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989; Van
Orden & Goldinger, 1994), which propose that phonological
information for a word is automatically activated. The only
way to obtain interference effects from phonological
Russian words is by activation of the Russian language via
its phonology because the orthographic information for
Russian is not present in these stimuli. The dual-route
models of visual word recognition, while allowing for an
indirect phonological route to the lexicon, postulate that this
route is specialized for reading non-words (e.g., Coltheart et
al, 2001; Ziegler et al., 2000).
Russian-English bilinguals had longer reaction times
when naming pictures accompanied by phonological
Russian stimuli that constituted words semantically related
to the picture names than monolingual speakers; reaction
times to non-word control stimuli and English translations
were comparable for the two groups. Because slower
naming times on the PWI task result from the interference
of the written stimulus with the picture name at the lexical-
semantic level, this finding suggests that not only was
phonology for the Russian language activated, as indicated
by greater proportion of eye movements made to these by
the bilingual than the monolingual speakers, but that this
information was meaningful enough to get processed to the
lexico-semantic level. This observation is further supported
by the analysis of the error data: Although bilingual
participants committed only 3 misnaming errors when the
distractor word was a phonological Russian word, the mere
fact that these errors exist support the idea that the
phonological information for Russian was meaningful
enough to activate the relevant lexico-semantic information.
In conclusion, we have successfully shown that
phonology of the non-target language is activated for the
target-language stimuli that bear little resemblance to the
non-target language orthography. Furthermore, we have
shown that activation of non-target language phonology is
enough to produce interference effects during picture-
naming in the target language. These findings extend the
idea of parallel activation of languages in bilinguals to those
languages in which shared orthographic symbols map onto
distinct phonological representations, and inform models of
bilingual reading on the role of phonology in the lexical
access of written words. Finally, the idea that eye-
movements during reading are under at least partial
cognitive control offers an intriguing possibility that the
bilinguals in this experiment exhibited a measure of
cognitive control over interference from the non-target
language during the modified PWI task. Future experiments
might be able to explore the idea of cognitive control over
language interference in bilinguals further by manipulating
the amount of meaningful information present for the non-
target language, and by testing different groups of bilingual
speakers.
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Abstract 
 
In political argumentation, analogies are often used to 
convince an audience of one’s views.  For example, in 
political debates leading up to the Iraq War, one such 
analogical argument was that Saddam Hussein was like Hitler 
and therefore Saddam should be forcibly ousted.  But are all 
analogical arguments really convincing?  In this paper we 
investigate whether analogical arguments are actually more 
convincing than factual arguments.  In Experiment 1 we 
asked people to rate analogical and factual arguments for 
various propositions and found that people considered factual 
arguments more convincing.  In Experiment 2, we asked 
people to think more explicitly about the analogical mappings 
but still found that people considered the analogical 
arguments less convincing than the factual ones.  These 
findings suggest that people are not more easily convinced by 
an analogical argument then a straight factual one, suggesting 
that perhaps politicians should re-consider their rhetorical 
tactics after all. 
Introduction 
Is the aftermath of the Iraq War like Germany post-WWII or 
Northern Ireland or, indeed, is it another Vietnam? In the 
furious political debate following the Iraq War, politicians 
on both sides have used different analogies to bolster their 
arguments. In science, analogies are often used to discover 
something new about natural phenomena, but in politics 
they are used to convince an audience of one’s views. In this 
paper, we consider whether such analogical arguments are 
more convincing than their equivalent, factual arguments. 
Though classical rhetoric has long advocated the use of 
analogy in argumentation (Plato, Phaedo , trans. 1871, 71c -d 
being a prime exponent of the craft) and political science 
regularly analyses the analogies used in political debate 
(Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001), we know of no studies that 
have systematically determined whether people actually find 
analogical arguments more cognitively convincing than 
their factual equivalents. This gap in the literature is all the 
more surprising when one considers the amount of research 
on the separate topics of argumentation and analogy. The 
nature of argumentation has been elaborated in a rich 
literature in philosophy, logic and psychology (e.g., Rips 
2002; Voss & Van Dyke, 2001). Similarly, the nature of 
analogy has been empirically explored in many studies, 
supported by clearly articulated theory that has been 
modeled computationally (see Gentner, 1983; Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1995; Keane, 1997; Keane, Ledgeway & Duff, 
1994; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).  Yet, the two areas have 
not been combined in a systematic study of their cognitive 
underpinnings. In the present paper, we attempt such a 
combination. 
The Present Experiments  
We propose a novel paradigm for assessing people’s 
evaluation of arguments that pits analogical arguments and 
their factual equivalents against one another. In our 
experimental setup, people are presented with a proposition 
and a two-fact argument supporting this proposition (see 
Figure 1).  They are then asked to rate how good they found 
this argument as a warrant or support for the proposition. 
For a given proposition, the argument was either two facts 
or two equivalent analogical facts. 
 
Fact-1 
Fact-2 
Proposition A 
Analogical Fact-1 
Analogical Fact-2 
Factual Argument 
Example 
Saddam committed genocide. 
Saddam was a dictator. 
War on Iraq was justified 
Saddam is like Hitler. 
Hitler  committed genocide. 
Hitler was a dictator. 
Proposition A 
Analogical Argument 
Form 
Factual Argument Analogical Argument 
War on Iraq was justified 
Figure 1: Abstract form and a gloss of a sample argument 
used in the experiments. 
For example, the Iraq War argument suggests that going to 
war with Iraq was justified because Saddam was a dictator 
and had committed genocide in his country (see gloss in 
Figure 1). The analogical equivalent suggests that war on 
Iraq was justified because Saddam is like Hitler, and Hitler 
was a dictator and had committed genocide in his country. 
In this way, the analogical argument presents the same facts 
about Saddam but through the lens of a WWII analogy. This 
is the typical way in which politicians use analogies, 
suggesting a parallel in an analogous domain that supports 
their argument in a current domain. 
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 From a cognitive perspective, there are several reasons why 
analogical arguments might be more convincing than factual 
ones.  Essentially, an argument is defined as “a course of 
reasoning aimed at demonstrating the truth or falsehood of 
something” (Kuhn, 1991, pg.12). That is, in any argument 
the aim is to convince an audience of the truth or falsehood 
of certain facts, that these facts in some way support or 
warrant your proposition and that, therefore, your 
proposition is justified as right or correct (Toulmin, 1958; 
Kuhn, 1991). Therefore if there is agreement that Saddam’s 
dictatorial powers and genocidal activities are bad and that 
these facts warrant the action of war as a response; then 
making war is, in some way, a necessary response to the 
facts given. One of the key steps in this process is getting 
the audience to accept the warrant as a necessary link 
between the facts and the proposition. Cognitive models of 
analogical thinking, show us that people use analogies to 
make high-level causal inferences about analogous domains 
(c.f., Keane, 1988). In this case, the comparison to Hitler 
provides a match to WWII where these dictator and 
genocide facts were viewed as essential reasons for military 
intervention. Thus, the analogy provides a previous case 
where the facts caused or strongly warranted military 
intervention, inviting the inference that war is therefore 
appropriate in Iraq too. 
We report two experiments on the role on analogy in 
argumentation. These experiments used a wide variety of 
topical arguments from different domains covering alcohol 
abuse, military service, university entrance exams and 
traffic congestion policy. The analogies used also varied in 
the distance of the domains from one another; some 
involved close domains (e.g., Iraq War and WWII), others 
involved distant domains (e.g., Art and Foreign Languages). 
In the experiments, no single individual saw both the factual 
and analogical versions of a given argument. We also 
gathered people’s ratings of their a priori belief in the 
proposition (i.e., their agreement/disagreement with it) to 
check for any belief bias in their assessment of the 
argument.  In Experiment 1, we made a direct comparison 
of people’s goodness ratings for the factual and analogical 
arguments to various propositions. In Experiment 2, we 
replicated this test with an intervention that encouraged 
people to reflect more on the analogy. To presage our 
findings, the evidence suggests that people are not more 
easily convinced by an analogical argument over a straight 
factual one, suggesting that politicians might indeed want to 
re-consider their rhetorical tactics. 
Experiment 1 
This experiment examined whether analogical arguments 
were deemed to be better (i.e., more convincing) than their 
factual equivalents for a variety of topical propositions. 
People were shown 10 different propositions (5 with factual 
arguments, 5 with analogical arguments) and asked to carry 
out two tasks on each: a belief task and an evaluation task. 
In the belief task, they were shown the proposition on its 
own and asked to rate their agreement/disagreement with it 
on a 7-point scale.  In the evaluation task, they were shown 
the proposition and the argument (factual or analogical) and 
asked to rate its goodness as an argument for the proposition 
on a 7-point scale. The order of these tasks was 
counterbalanced in two different conditions. If our 
politicians are right then the analogical arguments should be 
considered to be better than their factual equivalents.  
Method 
Materials. Ten propositions were created based on either 
currently debated topics (e.g., the Iraq War, the school 
examination system, societal effects of drugs, utility of GM 
foods) or long-standing debated topics (e.g., the introduction 
of the death penalty, military service, public funding of the 
arts). For each of these propositions, a two-fact argument 
was created based on the typical reasons used to support 
these propositions. Analogies were then developed that had 
clear one-to-one correspondences to the conceptual objects 
and relations used in the original facts. Eight different 
materials sets were made up from random selections of 
particular materials and arguments, such that each set 
contained 10 unique propositions, 5 of which had 
corresponding analogical arguments with the other 5 having 
corresponding factual arguments. This material-group 
variable is not reported in the results as an analysis of 
people’s ratings shows that it had no reliable effect on 
results found.  
For every material set, two booklets were collated for the 
two tasks. The belief-rating booklet had a cover sheet 
explaining that people should rate how strongly they 
agreed/disagreed with the proposition on a 7-point scale, 
followed by 10 pages with a single proposition and rating 
scale shown on each page. The evaluation booklet had a 
cover sheet explaining that people should rate how good/bad 
they thought the argument was for the proposition on a 7-
point scale regardless of their beliefs, followed by 10 pages 
with a proposition plus its corresponding (factual 
/analogical) argument and a scale shown on each page. The 
items in every booklet were randomly ordered for each 
participant.  
 
Participants & Design. Thirty-two native English-speaking 
undergraduates at University College Dublin took part in the 
experiment. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced so 
that half the participants received the belief task before the 
evaluation task (belief-then-evaluation conditions) while the 
other half received the tasks in the opposite order 
(evaluation-then-belief conditions). So, the design was a 2 
argument-type (factual or analogical) x 2 task-order (belief-
then-evaluation or evaluation-then-belief) one with 
argument-type being within-participants and task-order 
being between-participants. 
 
Procedure. In the evaluation task, participants read 
instructions that explained the 1-7 argument goodness scale 
(1 being “very bad”, 7 being “very good” and 4 being 
“neither good nor bad”), and a sample proposition was 
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 shown with a factual argument and another shown with an 
analogical argument. The participants were asked to take 
their time over each decision and to make “an objective 
assessment of the arguments.  That is, to make a judgement 
regardless of your agreement or disagreement with the 
proposition”. Each proposition-argument pair was presented 
on a separate page with a marked space for participants to 
note their 1-7 goodness rating. In the belief task, the 
instructions and materials were presented in the same way, 
except that the proposition alone was presented and the 
instructions explained that people were to rate how strongly 
they disagreed/agreed with the proposition on the 1-7 
agreement scale (1 being “strongly disagree”, 7 being 
“strongly agree” and 4 being “no opinion”). 
 
Table 1: Percentage of good arguments and mean goodness 
ratings for both experiments 
 
         Analogical       Factual 
 Measure 
Experiment 
%Good Mean 
Rating 
%Good Mean 
Rating 
Expt. 1     
belief-then-
evaluation 
21.3% 2.59 58.8% 4.3 
evaluation-
then-belief 
30% 3.11 42.5% 3.76 
Mean 25.6% 2.85 50.6% 4.03 
     
Expt. 2     
belief-then-
evaluation 
33.8% 3.43 68.4% 4.59 
evaluation-
then-belief 
43.8% 3.80 46.2% 3.90 
Mean 38.8% 3.6 57.2% 4.25 
Results  
Table 1 summarises the main results of the Experiment 
showing that the factual arguments were considered to be 
better than the analogical ones on several different 
measures. 
 
Percentages of Good and Bad Arguments. A rough feel 
for people’s responses to the arguments can be gleaned by 
re-classifying their ratings into ordinal groups of good (> 4), 
bad (< 4) or indifferent (=4) according to how they rated the 
argument on the goodness scale. Overall, 320 arguments 
were evaluated in the experiment, 160 factual and 160 
analogical. Of the factual arguments, 38.1% (61) were rated 
as bad and 50.6%  (81) as good (the remainder being 
indifferent). Of the analogical arguments, 67.5% (108) were 
rated as bad and 25.6% (41) as good (the remainder being 
indifferent). Collapsing across the order conditions, this 
result was found to be reliably different using a Chi-squared 
analysis, c2(1) = 26.032, p < 0.0001, N=291. However, an 
inspection of the percentages clearly shows that task-order 
has an impact too, in that more arguments were considered 
to be good in the belief-then-evaluation conditions (40%) 
than in the evaluation-then-belief conditions (36%).  Indeed, 
on the face of it, there appears to be an interaction between 
task-order and argument-type that is more easily revealed 
using the ratings measure. 
 
Ratings of Arguments. A 2x2 ANOVA was carried out on 
the ratings data for the between-participant variable of task-
order and within-participant variable of argument-type. All 
analyses of variance by participants and by items were 
performed by respectively treating participants (F1) and 
sentences (F2) as a random factor. These analyses revealed a 
main effect of argument-type with the factual arguments 
(M=4.03) being rated as being better than the analogical 
arguments (M=2.85), F1 (1, 286) = 40.02, p < 0.0005, MSe 
= 111.628; F2 (1, 307) = 40.30, p < 0.0005, MSe = 111.628. 
There was als o a reliable interaction between task-order and 
argument-type F1 (1, 286) = 8.10, p < 0.005, MSe = 22.578; 
F2 (1, 307) = 7.20, p < 0.008, MSe = 19.938. Planned pair-
wise comparisons revealed that the factual/belief-then-
evaluation condition was reliably different to all the other 
conditions using Bonferroni adjustments (ps<0.0005). None 
of the other comparisons were reliably different to one 
another. 
 
The Impact of Belief on Evaluation. One of the key 
questions was whether people’s prior beliefs in the 
proposition would have any impact on their rating of the 
goodness of the argument, even though we asked people to 
be as objective as possible. If people were rating the 
arguments in line with their beliefs then we should, for 
example, find that people gave high goodness ratings to 
arguments in which they strongly agreed with the 
proposition and low goodness ratings to arguments with 
which they strongly disagreed. However, there is little 
evidence of such a relationship. The correlation between 
participants’ belief ratings and their goodness ratings for the 
items is low and not reliable, using Pearsons product-
moment correlation r(319) = 0.36, p<0.0005. 
Discussion 
This experiment reveals three main findings: (i) analogical 
arguments are not considered to be better than their factual 
equivalents, (ii) people’s a priori agreement/disagreement 
with the proposition does not affect their subsequent 
evaluation of the goodness of an argument for that 
proposition, (iii) people find factual arguments much better 
if they are first asked to rate their belief in the proposition. 
The first of these findings should be a surprise for most 
politicians, as it shows that they might as well be using 
straight-forward factual arguments to present their views. In 
the next experiment, we explore whether this result may 
have occurred because people did not process the analogy 
sufficiently to draw out all its implications.  
The second finding suggests that people can separate their 
belief in the proposition from their assessment of its 
goodness, when they are instructed to do so. In other words 
662
 that people can maintain a level of objectivity in evaluating 
arguments. 
The third finding of a task-order effect was as unexpected 
as it is interesting. It shows that if someone rates their belief 
in a proposition and subsequently sees a factual argument 
for that proposition they consider it to be better than the 
same argument presented before they give their belief rating 
(this effect does not occur for analogical arguments). Why 
should this occur? One possibility is that when people are 
first asked to rate their agreement with the proposition, they 
must think of their own arguments for the proposition. Then, 
when they are subsequently shown some arguments for the 
proposition many participants may find them more 
convincing because they are similar to their own arguments. 
In contrast, when participants are first asked to evaluate the 
argument and proposition (before being asked for their 
belief) there is less opportunity to think of their own 
arguments, less opportunity to recognize similarities and, 
hence, less of a boost to the goodness rating of the 
argument. No parallel benefits are found for the analogical 
arguments because people do not readily think of their own 
analogical arguments when rating their belief in the 
proposition (see Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Keane, 1985, 1988, 
on people’s tendency not to explore analogical possibilities 
without instructions to do so). In the next experiment, we 
attempt to replicate this task-order effect to determine 
whether it is robust. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, we found that people failed to be 
convinced by analogical arguments relative to their factual 
equivalents. This result could be due to the amount of 
cognitive processing people have to carry out on analogical 
arguments as opposed to factual arguments. In the 
analogical case, they must understand the analogical 
arguments, map the corresponding objects and relations 
between the two domains, then apply the mappings to the 
proposition’s domain and, finally, evaluate it. In the factual 
case, they merely have to understand the argument, relate it 
to the proposition and evaluate it. Maybe participants in 
Experiment 1 did not bother to draw the analogy and, hence, 
marked these arguments down. We should note that this 
explanation is somewhat implausible as we know from the 
literature that people readily appreciate and understand 
analogies (see Keane, 1988; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). So, 
in this experiment, we explicitly asked people to report their 
mapping of key objects between the two domains to ensure 
that the analogy was being properly processed. We also ran 
the task-order manipulation again to see if it could be 
replicated.  
Method 
Participants, Materials & Design.. Thirty-two native 
English-speaking student volunteers at University College 
Dublin took part in the experiment. The materials were the 
same as those used in Experiment 1, as were the grouping of 
material sets and organization of task booklets. As before, 
the design was a 2 argument-type (factual or analogical) x 2 
task-order (belief-then-evaluation or evaluation-then-belief) 
one, with argument-type being within-participants and task-
order being between-participants. 
 
Procedure. The procedure was as in Experiment 1, except 
for one change to the analogical argument materials. In each 
case where an analogical argument was presented, people 
were shown two boxes listing three key objects from each 
domain of the analogical argument (as shown in Figure 2).  
The participants were asked to draw lines between the 
corresponding objects in the analogy.  For example, in the 
Saddam Hitler analogy, Hitler corresponds to Saddam, 
Germany corresponds to Iraq etc. They were asked to 
perform this mapping before they rated the analogical 
argument in the evaluation task. 
 
 
 Hitler 
 Germany  
 Dictator 
 
Analogical Objects 
Dictator 
Saddam   
Iraq 
 
Factual Objects 
 
Figure 2: Example of the object-mapping task used in 
Experiment 2 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 summarises the main results of the experiment 
showing that the factual arguments were considered to be 
better than the analogical ones on several different 
measures. The pattern of findings replicates those found in 
Experiment 1, with a strengthening of the effects being 
found. 
 
Percentages of Good and Bad Arguments. Re-classifying 
people’s responses into the ordinal groups of good (> 4), 
bad (< 4) or indifferent (=4) we found that (i) of the 159 
factual arguments evaluated 35.2% (56) were rated as bad 
and 57.2% (91) as good (the remainder being indifferent), 
(ii) of the 160 analogical argument evaluated 52.5% (84) 
were rated as bad and 38.8% (62) as good (the remainder 
being indifferent). Collapsing across the task-order 
conditions, this result was found to be reliably different 
using a Chi-squared analysis, c2(1) = 11.093, p < 0.0009, 
N=293.  
 
Ratings of Arguments. A 2x2 ANOVA was carried out on 
the ratings data for the between-participant variable of task-
order and within-participant variable of argument-type. All 
analyses of variance by participants and by items were 
performed by respectively treating participants (F1) and 
sentences (F2) as a random factor. These analyses revealed a 
main effect of argument-type with the factual arguments 
(M=4.25) being rated as being better than the analogical 
arguments (M=3.6), F1 (1, 255) = 14.17, p < 0.001, MSe = 
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 37.154; F2 (1, 279) = 7.06, p < 0.016, MSe = 38.465. There 
was also a reliable interaction between task-order and 
argument-type F1 (1, 255) = 8.63, p < 0.006, MSe = 22.623; 
F2 (1, 279) = 10.02, p < 0.005, MSe = 23.646. Planned pair-
wise comparisons revealed that the factual/belief-then-
evaluation condition was reliably different to all the other 
conditions using Bonferroni adjustments (ps<0.005). None 
of the other comparisons were reliably different to one 
another. So, again, we replicate the task-order x argument 
type interaction found in the previous experiment. The main 
effect of task order was not reliable. 
 
The Impact of Belief on Evaluation. Again, we found as in 
Experiment 1, that there is little evidence to suggest that 
people’s prior beliefs in the proposition affected their 
assessment of the argument. The correlation between 
participants’ belief ratings and their goodness ratings for the 
items is low and not reliable, using Pearsons product-
moment correlation r(318) = 0.243, p<0.0005.  
 
Conclusions from Experiments 1 and 2. So, again we find 
that the analogical arguments were considered to be less 
convincing than the factual ones, even when we ensure that 
people have mapped the analogy appropriately. However, it 
is noteworthy that, relative to Experiment 1, their analogical 
arguments seem to be rated as slightly better (e.g., 38.75% 
are considered good arguments in Experiment 2, relative to 
25.63% in Experiment 1).   
General Discussion 
The results of these experiments suggest that politicians 
should stop using analogies, as they do not seem to provide 
much more than a sugar coating on the convincingness of a 
straight, factual argument. Overall, we have shown several 
novel findings about the use of analogy in argumentation. 
First, we have seen that analogical arguments are generally 
not considered to be as good as factual arguments.  Second, 
we have seen that it is very hard for analogical arguments to 
challenge the goodness of factual arguments (in other 
experiments we have found that even when the full factual 
argument is given along with the analogical argument, the 
evaluations do not go higher than the plain factual 
arguments). Third, we have found that factual arguments’ 
ratings can be boosted if people are asked to reflect on the 
proposition in advance of rating them. Finally, we have seen 
that people can separate their beliefs in a proposition from 
their evaluation of an argument to that proposition, showing 
a noteworthy objectivity in their evaluations. To traditional 
rhetoricians this evidence may seem unwelcome and 
unconvincing.  In the remainder of this section, we consider 
three main objections that might be raised to our findings. 
 
The Arguments Were Not Very Good. One argument 
against the evidence would be to maintain that the 
arguments used were not very good; that if you had better 
arguments then different results would be found. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on how many people in 
a population find a given argument to be good or bad 
relative to some proposition, so it is hard to judge whether 
our arguments are in some way unrepresentatively poor. 
What we do know is that people only found 35-38% of our 
factual arguments to be bad (50%-60% of these arguments 
being considered good). On the face of it, using the “you 
can fool some of the people all of the time…” adage these 
figures appear to be reasonable levels of goodness. As such, 
we would argue that there is no obvious deficiency in the 
arguments used. Furthermore, we should also note that 
many of the arguments used were ones that people have 
used to support these propositions in everyday life. 
 
Maybe Our Analogies Are Not Very Good. If one admits 
that the arguments are adequate, then a further objection 
could be that the analogies were, in some way, inadequate. 
Again this is a hard objection to assess given that we have 
little idea of the space of possible analogies used in 
argumentation. What we can say is that all of the analogies 
used conform to what is deemed to constitute an analogy in 
the literature; they involve one-to-one mappings, they 
involve matching relational structure and they suggest 
inferences by analogy connecting the arguments and the 
proposition (c.f., Gentner, 1983; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; 
Keane et al., 1994). But, what if some are, in some way, 
better than others.  
To explore this possibility, we presented a separate group 
of 16 participants with a mixture of 10 analogies and non-
analogies asking them to rate the goodness of the analogies 
on a 7-point scale. Of the 10 materials used in the 
experiment only one received a bad goodness rating 
(i.e., < 4), all of the reminder being rated as being good 
(with mean ratings from 4.25 to 5.25).  Overall, people 
reliably distinguished the analogies (M= 4.6) from the non-
analogies  (M = 2.5), using a dependent t-test, t(157) = 8.10, 
p < 0.0005. So, the failure of the analogical arguments 
cannot be attributed to the poorness of the analogies. 
 
Are There Other Ways in to Improve Analogies? A final 
objection is that we have not appropriately intervened to 
boost the analogy.  We saw that asking people to plot the 
object mapping improves their goodness ratings for the 
analogy arguments. Perhaps there is some other intervention 
that might boost them further.  It is unclear to us what this 
intervention might be. However, this objection in a sense 
misses the point. If we did find some intervention that 
promotes analogical arguments is it quite likely to be quite 
artificial. In the cut and thrust of political debate the facts of 
the matter are generally known (though may not be stated 
explicitly) and the analogy is provided to be understood on 
the spot (without, for example, asking people to specify the 
object mappings). 
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Abstract 
 
So far, information visualizations, i.e., graphical representa-
tions of huge amounts of abstract data which do not have a 
natural visual representation, have mainly been used to 
support information-retrieval tasks. In this paper we investi-
gate whether information visualizations are also suitable to 
foster tasks that focus on knowledge acquisition or learning. 
In addition, we address the issue of how information 
visualizations have to be designed to be efficient learning 
tools. We conducted an experimental study which provided 
evidence that information visualizations can foster knowledge 
acquisition and that 2D-information visualizations are better 
suited for knowledge acquisition than 3D-ones. In addition, 
we found slight performance improvements due to using color 
to code information. 
 
Technological innovation allows storing fast growing 
quantities of information. Accordingly, it has become 
increasingly important to develop efficient methods to 
structure large and complex information sets. Recently, 
there have been several attempts to tackle this challenge by 
using information visualizations, i.e., graphical representa-
tions of large amounts of abstract data which do not have a 
natural visual representation (Wiss, Carr, & Jonsson, 1998). 
For instance, information visualizations have been used to 
display abstract data like document collections or text-based 
information contents in the WWW. So far, information 
visualizations have mainly been investigated with regard to 
technical issues and in the context of information-retrieval 
tasks – where they proved to be very useful to improve 
users’ ability to use information. However, it is not clear 
whether information visualizations can also foster knowl-
edge acquisition or learning. Additionally, little is known 
about the cognitive processes involved in, and maybe 
supported by the use of information visualizations as 
learning tools. Therefore, the aim of our empirical study was 
to investigate to what extent multidimensional information 
visualizations are superior compared to a non-spatial 
representation when the task is to memorize a data set and to 
acquire an understanding of the relationships embedded 
within this set. Moreover, we were interested in the design 
of information visualizations for learning. Particularly, we 
investigated experimentally whether information visualiza-
tions should be two-dimensional or whether a third spatial 
dimension may be helpful for knowledge acquisition. 
Finally, the question is addressed whether knowledge 
acquisition with spatial information visualizations can be 
further enhanced by using color coding to represent 
attributes of data. 
Figure 1 shows a simplified sketch of the type of spatial 
information visualization used in the empirical study 
presented in this paper. In this sketch, three attributes of 
four information units A, B, C, and D are represented by 
means of three spatial dimensions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
Figure 1: Simplified sketch of a 3D-information 
visualization. 
Information units pool those parts of data sets that belong 
together. The units can be described by their values on 
numerous different attributes. Typically, only a subset of 
these attributes can be represented spatially. Thus, other 
attributes of the information units may be represented 
textually or by other codes (e.g., color coding). 
What is the Pedagogical Potential of  
Information Visualizations? 
There are different cognitive theories arguing that 
information visualizations may be efficient tools to enhance 
the acquisition of knowledge on large and abstract data sets, 
attribute 2 
attribute 3 A
B
C
D attribute 1 
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 whereby knowledge acquisition refers to understanding and 
memorizing abstract data and their interrelations. 
- Firstly, theories of computational effectiveness pay 
specific attention to the inferences learners have to make in 
order to understand a task or a domain. The argument here 
is that some representational codes facilitate some 
inferential (learning) processes better than others. In their 
seminal work, Larkin and Simon (1987) found for example 
that search processes in physics are performed much easier 
with diagrammatic representations than with textual ones. 
This idea that different representations with the same 
“content” can still offer different processing opportunities is 
called “computational effectiveness” (Larkin & Simon, 
1987). Following this idea, spatial information visualiza-
tions may allow learners to draw inferences very easily on 
how different information units are related to each other 
with regard to those attributes that are represented spatially. 
In this respect, information visualizations are rather similar 
to concept maps because both of them allow arranging 
information units spatially in a specific way. Concept maps 
are 2D-diagrams that illustrate relationships between con-
cepts in a domain by representing these concepts as nodes. 
These nodes are connected by labeled lines in order to 
represent their interrelations. It could already be shown that 
concept maps foster processes of knowledge acquisition 
(Tergan, 2003), as these representations provide learners 
with a better understanding of the structures underlying a 
domain without imposing high cognitive demands on them 
to extract this information. Due to the aforementioned 
similarities between information visualizations and concept 
maps, these processing advantages should also hold for 
information visualizations. 
- Secondly, the cognitive theory of multimedia learning 
(Mayer, 2001) is based on a dual-channel assumption which 
proposes that textual information is processed and encoded 
in a verbal system, whereas pictures or graphics are 
predominantly processed in a pictorial system. The theory 
assumes that a well-designed combination of text and 
graphics leads to better memory retention than the use of 
only one representation. The reason for this is that using the 
capacity of both memory systems should lead to more 
information being processed than using only one of the 
systems. In addition, dual coding might contribute to the 
construction of a stronger mental model, if the information 
of both processing systems has to be integrated actively. In 
addition, research on spatial cognition differentiates 
between a what-system and a where-system for visual 
cognition (Landau & Jackendoff, 1993). The where-system 
is used to process the location of objects, whereas the what-
system is dedicated to identify features of an object itself. 
Memory studies revealed that the where-system operates 
more effectively with respect to speed and accuracy than the 
what-system (e.g., Amorim, Trumbore, & Chogyen, 2000). 
Representing attributes of information units by means of 
two or three spatial dimensions (instead of a purely textual 
representation or color coding) might accordingly improve 
the processing of these attributes by deploying a more 
efficient processing system. 
- Thirdly, following the cognitive load theory (Sweller, 
van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998), instructional procedures 
should be designed to prevent cognitive overload. More 
specifically, the amount of cognitive processing not directly 
relevant to learning - and thus causing extraneous cognitive 
load - should be reduced. The necessity of avoiding high 
levels of extraneous load is especially relevant when the 
contents to be learned are complex in relation to learners’ 
level of prior knowledge. In this case, the representation of 
the learning contents imposes a considerable amount of 
intrinsic cognitive load so that substantial extraneous load 
can lead to overload in that no more capacity for processes 
of understanding is left. Cognitive processes directly rele-
vant to understanding and learning are causing germane 
cognitive load. There are thus two reasons why information 
visualizations might be particularly appropriate to facilitate 
learners’ acquisition of complex data structures that consist 
of highly interrelated information units. Firstly, distributing 
different attributes of information units across different 
memory and processing systems might provide additional 
processing resources that can be used to increase germane 
cognitive load. Secondly, providing learners with a spatial 
representation of some attributes of information units might 
reduce extraneous cognitive load by reducing search proc-
esses as well as making it easier to draw inferences on how 
different information units are related to each other with 
regard to these attributes.  
According to these theoretical considerations it can be 
hypothesized that information visualizations might have a 
substantial pedagogical potential because they allow to 
deploy cognitive resources available for learning in a way 
that is more appropriate than it is with conventional 
representations of large sets of information units (e.g., 
spreadsheets). 
How to Design Information Visualizations  
for Knowledge Acquisition? 
Beyond the general claim that information visualizations are 
tools that might foster the acquisition of knowledge on large 
and abstract data sets, we are also interested in the issue of 
designing profitable visualizations. Particularly, the study 
reported in this paper addresses how dimensionality of 
information visualizations and color coding of attributes 
might affect learning. 
2D- versus 3D-information visualizations? 
Although, there are a few empirical studies investigating the 
dimensionality of information representation in general, 
nearly none of these studies is related to information 
visualization or even learning with information visualiza-
tion. Furthermore, these findings seem to be rather 
inconsistent and depending heavily on the concrete tasks 
accomplished with the information representation. For 
instance, Park and Woldstad (2000) found that 2D-displays 
are superior to 3D-displays for performing telerobotic tasks. 
Contrarily, the study of Risden, Czerwinski, Munzer, and 
Cook (2000) compared 2D- and 3D-browsers with regard to 
the ease of information retrieval and concluded that 3D-
visualizations are preferable. However, only a small number 
of studies demonstrated the superiority of 3D-represen-
tations. In sum, the existing evidence is by no means 
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 sufficient to decide whether information visualizations 
should be 2D or 3D in the context of learning tasks. 
From a more theoretical point of view, one might assume 
that representing three attributes of information units 
spatially should be superior to representing only two 
attributes in a spatial format because of the abovementioned 
advantages of spatial representations in general (i.e., 
distribution of information across processing systems, 
superiority of the where-system, computational effective-
ness). However, 3D-information representations might at 
the same time impose additional extraneous cognitive load 
onto learners due to the fact that they are usually associated 
with an increased interactivity and with additional orient-
tation demands. For instance, 3D-visualizations usually 
have to be equipped with the option to look at information 
units from different viewpoints (e.g., by rotating the 
visualization) to counteract the problem that information 
units might be concealed by other units. As a result, this 
interactivity may impose additional cognitive processing 
demands because learners must control the interaction with 
the environment and maintain orientation. 
We studied the role of the dimensionality of information 
visualizations empirically to decide whether the advantages 
or the disadvantages of introducing a third spatial dimension 
prevail in knowledge acquisition.  
Should information visualizations for knowledge 
acquisition be color-coded or not? 
The issue whether it might be helpful to enhance 
information visualizations by color coding of particular 
attributes of information units seems to be less ambiguous 
than the role of dimensionality. As color is a basic element 
of visual perception (Treisman, 1987), color coding can be 
expected to make information more salient. Therefore, color 
coding should provide learners with a better understanding 
of the structures underlying a domain. It has been shown 
that coloring objects increases learners’ ability to retrieve 
object information from memory. As the color of objects is 
stored in long term memory together with other object 
information (e.g., Hanna & Remington, 1996), color 
information provides an additional cue for memory retrie-
val. It can thus be hypothesized that color-coded infor-
mation visualizations should be superior to those without 
color coding. However, it remains an open question whether 
color coding and dimensionality will interact when they are 
combined with each other. On the one hand, combining 
spatial representation and color coding results in multiple 
memory traces which should enhance learning; on the other 
hand, encoding the same attribute of an information unit by 
means of two different representational codes might make it 
necessary to map two representational systems onto each 
other. This might involve the processing of redundant 
information which in turn can result in additional extraneous 
cognitive load and learning impairments. Therefore, it is 
unclear and subject to experimental investigation whether 
introducing a double coding of particular attributes of 
information units will support or hinder knowledge acqui-
sition.   
Experiment 
In this experiment we first investigated whether information 
visualizations are more suited to foster knowledge acqui-
sition than text-based information representations. Secondly, 
we analyzed whether dimensionality and color coding of 
information visualizations influence learning.  
Method 
Participants Subjects were 100 students (56 female, 44 
male) of the University of Tuebingen, Germany. Average 
age was 24 years.  
 
Materials and procedure This work is associated with the 
European project “Mummy” of the Computer Graphics 
Center in Darmstadt (Germany), which focuses on mobile 
knowledge management using multimedia-rich portals for 
context-aware information processing, e.g., at construction 
sites. Therefore, our experimental environment was de-
signed to provide architects with an overview on the details 
of their construction projects. Each project is described by 
values on six different project attributes, namely “rate of 
return”, “construction costs per sqm”, “number of prob-
lems”, “construction progress”, “size of construction site”, 
and “construction volume”. 
With regard to the procedure, first the participants 
received a booklet for measuring different control variables 
like retentiveness in a paper-pencil test. Afterwards, they 
received an introduction to the experimental environment 
and its usage. To ensure that all participants saw the same 
information, the exploration of the environment during the 
subsequent practice phase was standardized. In the learning 
phase subjects were given 50 minutes to accomplish five 
tasks. In the context of these tasks they had to find 14 of the 
42 information units and had to learn the data contained in 
these information units. Consecutively, subjects received 
another booklet containing 35 test tasks. In this test phase 
the learning materials were no longer available. There were 
no time limits during testing. Finally, participants had to fill 
out a questionnaire asking for difficulties regarding the use 
of the learning materials, the strategies used as well as 
assessing the cognitive load experienced during learning. 
 
Design and dependent measures As an experimental 
baseline, the information on the construction projects was 
represented by means of a spreadsheet which listed 42 
construction projects (i.e., information units) alphabetically 
(Figure 2). The first column in Figure 2 represented the 
name of the construction projects, whereas the other 
columns contained the values of these projects with regard 
to the six aforementioned attributes. The last column listed 
further project information beyond these attributes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
668
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Excel spreadsheet representation (baseline). 
 
To reduce complexity, the range of possible attribute values 
was restricted to four (i.e., very small, small, big, and very 
big). Due to the spreadsheet size it was impossible to see the 
data of all projects without scrolling. A pilot study showed 
that using this spreadsheet to memorize the abstract data set 
and to recognize relations between information units was a 
very difficult task for the subjects.  
In order to implement our experimental manipulation, we 
represented the same data set by means of information 
visualizations that were either 2D or 3D and that were either 
monochrome or used color to represent one of the attributes. 
All of the manipulations (i.e., dimensionality and color 
coding) referred to the same specific attribute (“construction 
progress”) and the way it was represented. In the 2D-
information visualizations both “size of construction site” 
and “construction volume” were visualized spatially, i.e., 
they were represented by the axis of the 2D-information 
space (Figure 3). Information units were arranged in this 
information space according to their values on these two 
attributes. In Figure 3 the information units are represented 
by squares (labeled by their project name). The value of the 
attribute “construction progress” was represented by a digit 
attached to the project label. This digit was visible in all 
four information visualizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Two-dimensional color-coded information 
visualization with opened pop-up window. 
 
The remaining project attributes (“rate of return”, 
“construction costs per sqm”, and “number of problems”) as 
well as the further project information could be accessed 
through pop-up windows by clicking on the information 
units. In Figure 3, one pop-up window is opened. The pop-
up windows could be moved with the mouse by learners in 
case the window concealed information of interest. To 
facilitate orientation, the project label of the viewed 
information unit changed its color from white to red and 
position lines from the information unit to the axes appeared 
while contacting the unit with the mouse pointer (position 
lines, see Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Three-dimensional color-coded information 
visualization with position lines. 
 
In the 3D-information visualizations a third axis was 
included to visualize the attribute “construction progress” 
spatially (Figure 4). To ensure that all information units 
would be visible in the 3D-information visualizations, the 
users were allowed to rotate the vertical axis by moving the 
visualization with the mouse button pressed. To avoid “lost 
in navigation phenomena”, users could push a home-button 
to attain the start perspective again at anytime. 
The colored conditions differ from the monochrome 
information visualizations depending whether “construction 
progress” was additionally represented by means of color 
coding. In the monochrome conditions the information units 
were always presented in blue against a black background. 
However, in the colored conditions the information units 
were displayed in colors ranging from light yellow to dark 
green – indicating the values of “construction progress”.  
To sum up, the information visualization conditions 
differed in the representation format for the attribute 
“construction progress”. In all information visualization 
conditions the values on this attribute were represented 
symbolically as a digit. In addition, in 3D-information 
visualizations the values on “construction progress” were 
visualized on the third axis. In 2D-conditions there was no 
spatial representation of this attribute. Furthermore, in 
polychrome information visualizations the values on the 
attribute “construction progress” were represented by means 
of the color of the information units. In monochrome 
conditions no color was used to visualize this attribute. 
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 Dimensionality and color coding were both varied between 
subjects resulting in a 2x2-design (plus the baseline 
spreadsheet condition). Subjects were randomly assigned to 
the spreadsheet or to one of the four information 
visualization conditions. 
With regard to the dependent measures, as a first 
dependent variable we measured performance with regard to 
the different knowledge tasks. Overall performance was 
calculated as the sum of both correct answers and partial 
correct answers. For 10 of the 35 tasks, partial credits were 
assigned to score subjects’ answers. In the remaining tasks 
one point was assigned for each correct answer. For each 
task a maximum of one point was possible resulting in a 
maximum overall score of 35 points. Relational perfor-
mance referred to tasks that asked for comparative 
judgments with regard to attribute values, whereas item-
specific performance focused on specific attribute values. 
Both measures consisted of 15 tasks each. Five further tasks 
assessed structural performance which was concerned with 
the recognition of correlational structures within the data 
set. Furthermore, in each case four tasks were used to assess 
where-performance, what-performance, and varied-perfor-
mance. Where-performance assessed knowledge on the 
attributes that were visualized spatially in all information 
visualizations, whereas tasks on what-performance regis-
tered knowledge on information always presented as text. 
Finally, varied-performance was concerned with knowledge 
on “construction progress”, i.e., on the attribute whose 
representation was varied across conditions.  
As a second dependent variable we measured learners’ 
confidence with regard to the correctness of their answers. 
Learners rated each answer to a task with regard to whether 
they felt low, middle, or high confidence that their answer 
had been correct. In the overall confidence measure these 
ratings were summed across all tasks, whereby higher rating 
indicated higher confidence. This overall measure was 
subdivided into confidence for correct answers displaying a 
participant’s belief in that a correct answer was correct. 
Confidence for wrong answers indicated a participant’s 
conviction that a false answer was correct. Because there 
were 35 items for which every subject had to rate his or her 
confidence and because ratings ranged from one to three a 
maximum of 105 points was possible for each of the 
confidence scores.  
As a third dependent variable, we assessed learners’ 
subjective cognitive load by asking them how much effort 
they had to invest into learning and how difficult it had been 
to remember the contents. The effort and the difficulty 
ratings were given on a five-point scale, ranging from very 
low to very high. 
Results and Discussion  
The analysis of the data is divided into two parts: First, we 
compared the baseline spreadsheet condition to the overall 
means of all information visualization conditions in order to 
answer the question whether information visualizations in 
general are helpful for acquiring knowledge on large data 
sets compared to a purely text-based representation. In the 
second analysis, we assessed the effects of dimensionality 
and color coding by comparing the four information 
visualization conditions in an ANCOVA (dimensionality x 
color coding with retentiveness as a covariate, see below). 
 
Do information visualizations foster learning? In a first 
step, we tested whether subjects achieved higher 
performance with information visualizations than with a 
spreadsheet, i.e., here we did not further differentiate 
between the different kinds of information visualizations. A 
two-tailed t-test for independent samples showed in fact a 
higher overall performance for information visualizations 
(M=20.80) compared to the spreadsheet (M=17.88; 
t(98)=2.18; p<.05). However, which kinds of information 
visualizations produced this effect? To answer this question, 
each of the four different kinds of information visualizations 
was compared to the spreadsheet separately (Table 1). 
Whereas the 2D-conditions were both superior to the 
baseline (without color coding: t(38)=2.20; p<.05; with 
color coding: t(38)=3.53; p<.001), there were no differences 
between the 3D-conditions and the spreadsheet condition 
(without color coding: t(38)=0.34; p=.74; with color coding: 
t(38)=1.28; p=.21). 
 
 
Table 1: Means for performance, confidence, and cognitive load ratings for the information visualization conditions. 
Information visualizations 
two-dimensional three-dimensional- 
 
monochrome with color monochrome with color 
overall performance (35 tasks) 21.80 23.38 18.43 19.60 
relational performance (15 tasks) 9.55 10.15 8.10 8.75 
item-specific performance (15 tasks) 10.35 10.98 8.88 9.10 
structural performance (5 tasks) 2.40 2.85 1.95 2.05 
where- performance (4 tasks) 3.05 3.10 2.70 2.40 
what- performance (4 tasks) 1.60 2.25 1.85 1.80 
Performance  
varied-performance (4 tasks) 2.40 2.50 1.60 1.75 
overall confidence (max. 105 points) 72.46 75.63 67.25 64.60 
confidence correct answers (max. 105 points) 47.48 51.66 35.80 35.65 
Confidence  
confidence wrong answers (max. 105 points) 23.08 21.97 29.45 27.05 
effort (max. 5 points) 3.65 3.60 4.15 3.95 Cognitive load  
difficulty (max. 5 points) 3.40 3.35 3.75 3.75 
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Which representation format of information visuali-
zations is the most suitable for knowledge acquisition? In 
all analyses of variances reported here, we used reten-
tiveness as a covariate because it was strongly associated 
with the dependent variables. In a first step we analyzed 
subjects’ overall performance by an univariate ANCOVA 
(dimensionality x color coding). 
Subjects who were presented with a 2D-information 
visualization outperformed subjects in the 3D-conditions 
(F(1,75) = 15.16; p<.001). Additionally, we obtained a 
marginally significant main effect for color coding in favor 
of “with color coding” (F(1,75) = 2.87; p<.10). There was 
no significant interaction between the two factors. The 
superiority of the 2D-information visualizations was not 
only confirmed for overall performance but also for the 
detailed performance measures - with one exception. There 
was no significant difference for the what-performance, but 
this was not astonishing because the information necessary 
to answer the respective tasks was represented the same way 
across all conditions. There were no main effects for color 
coding in the detailed performance measures.  
Concerning the overall confidence learners felt regarding 
the correctness of their answers, we found that subjects 
learning with 2D-information visualizations were more 
certain that their answers were correct than subjects in the 
3D-conditions (F(1,75)=8.71; p<.01). Further analysis 
revealed that learners in the 2D-conditions were not only 
more convinced that the correct answers they had given 
were correct (F(1,75)=18.16; p<.001). Moreover, they also 
felt more uncertain that their false answer might be correct 
(F(1,76)=5.33; p<.05). This pattern of results suggests that 
subjects in the 2D-conditions had a more accurate 
assessment of what they really knew. There were no main 
effects for color coding nor was there an interaction with 
respect to the overall confidence variable.  
With regard to the cognitive load ratings registered after 
the test phase we found that subjects using 3D-information 
visualizations indicated that they had to invest more effort 
into learning than did those in the 2D-conditions 
(F(1,76)=4.51; p<.05). In addition, they also evaluated 
learning as being more difficult than subjects in the 2D-
conditions (F(1,76)=3.30; p<.10). There were no main 
effects for color coding nor were there interaction effects.  
Summary and Conclusions 
In our experiment we provided evidence for the suitability 
of information visualizations for knowledge acquisition. 
Moreover, we demonstrated that in general 2D-information 
visualizations are more suitable to foster knowledge 
acquisition than 3D-ones. This could be due to the fact that 
learners had to invest more effort and experienced more 
difficulties during learning in the latter conditions. The 
question of whether these demands resulted from the 
necessity to rotate the 3D- information visualization will be 
addressed in further studies. With regard to the influence of 
color coding, there were only slight performance increases 
when information was displayed in color. 
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Abstract
How do people acquire and use knowledge about do-
main structures, such as the tree-structured taxonomy
of folk biology? These structures are typically seen ei-
ther as consequences of innate domain-speci+c knowl-
edge or as epiphenomena of domain-general associative
learning. We present an alternative: a framework for
statistical inference that discovers the structural princi-
ples that best account for dierent domains of objects
and their properties. Our approach infers that a tree
structure is best for a biological dataset, and a linear
structure (“left”–“right”) is best for a dataset of peo-
ple and their political views. We compare our proposal
with unstructured associative learning and argue that
our structured approach gives the better account of in-
ductive generalization in the domain of folk biology.
Psychologists have argued that cognition in differ-
ent domains draws on qualitatively different mental
representations. Tree structures appear well-suited to
representing relationships between animal species [1,
2, 10], while a one-dimensional structure (the liberal-
conservative spectrum) seems better for representing
people’s political views. The possibility of different
structures raises a fundamental question: how do peo-
ple learn what kind of structure is appropriate in each
domain?
The standard approach to this question is to reject
one of its assumptions. Nativists deny that core struc-
tures are learned, at least for evolutionarily important
domains like folkbiology. Instead, infants come equipped
with innate knowledge about which structures are appro-
priate for which domains. Atran [1], for example, argues
that folkbiology is a core domain of human knowledge,
and that the tendency to group living kinds into hier-
archies re,ects an “innately determined cognitive struc-
ture.” More generally, Keil [8] has argued that ontologi-
cal knowledge obeys an innate “M-constraint”, requiring
the extensions of predicates to conform to rigidly tree-
structured hierarchies of objects.
Alternatively, empiricists generally deny that struc-
tured representations are present at all. Domain-specific
representations are merely emergent properties of un-
structured, domain-general associative learning architec-
tures. McClelland and Rogers [12], for example, have re-
cently suggested that the acquisition of semantic knowl-
edge in domains such as intuitive biology can be ex-
plained as learning in a generic connectionist network.
Their architecture never explicitly represents any tree
structure, although with repeated training, its hidden
unit representations may implicitly come to approximate
the taxonomic relations between biological species.
This paper proposes an alternative approach – struc-
ture learning – that combines important insights from
both of these traditions. Our key contribution is to
show how structured domain representations can be ac-
quired within a domain-general framework for Bayesian
inference. Like nativists, we suggest that different do-
mains are represented with qualitatively different struc-
tures, and we show how these structured representations
serve as critical constraints on inductive generalization.
Like empiricists, though, we emphasize the importance
of learning, and attempt to show how domain structures
can be acquired through domain-general statistical in-
ference. This is not only more parsimonious than the
nativist position, but allows us to explain the origin
of structured representations in novel domains, where
the prior existence of domain-specific innate structure is
highly implausible.
After describing our structure learning framework, we
present two empirical tests of its performance. First, we
show that it chooses the appropriate domain structure
for both synthetic and real-world data sets. It correctly
chooses a tree structure for a biological domain (animal
feature judgments), and a linear structure for a politi-
cal domain (US Supreme Court decisions). Second, we
model two classic data sets of inductive judgments in bi-
ology [13] and show that our framework performs better
than an unstructured connectionist approach.
Bayesian structure learning
Our proposal takes the form of a rational analysis. We
aim to demonstrate the computational plausibility and
explanatory value of Bayesian structure learning, but
leave for future work the question of how these com-
putations might be implemented or approximated by
cognitive processes. Assume the learner’s data consist
of a binary-valued object-feature matrix D specifying
the features of each object in a given domain. In bi-
ology, for instance, the rows of D might correspond to
species, and the columns to anatomical and behavioral
attributes. The entry in row i and column j would then
specify the value of feature j for species i. Structure-
learning includes computational problems at two levels.
First, which structure class is most appropriate for the
domain? Second, given a structure class, which structure
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in that class provides the best account of the data?
For instance, suppose that a learner exposed to bi-
ological data ends up organizing animal species into a
taxonomic tree. The first problem asks how she knew to
use a tree rather than some other kind of structure. The
second problem asks why she settled on one specific tree
instead of the many other trees she might have chosen.
Our focus here is on the first problem – the problem of
inferring the right structure class for a domain. A so-
lution to the second problem, however, falls out of our
probabilistic approach.
We assume that learners come to a domain equipped
with a hypothesis space of structure classes, either
constructed from innate primitives or based on analo-
gies with previously learned domains. For simplicity,
this paper considers a hypothesis space of just three
canonical classes: taxonomic trees, one-dimensional (lin-
ear) spaces, and independent feature models. People
surely have access to other classes, including higher-
dimensional spaces, ,at (non-hierarchical) clusterings,
and causal networks. We leave it to future work to
characterize the full range of structure classes accessible
to human cognition. In particular, it is an open ques-
tion whether this space is small enough to be explicitly
enumerated as we do here, or is so large (perhaps infi-
nite or uncountable) that it can be specified only implic-
itly through some generating mechanism. Future work
should also consider the possibility that multiple struc-
tures may apply within a single domain.
Given a set of probabilistic models, Bayesian tech-
niques can be used to evaluate which of the models is
most likely to have generated some data [7]. Before these
techniques can be applied to inferring domain structures,
we need to associate each structure class in our hypoth-
esis space with a probabilistic generative model for the
features of objects. The next section defines these mod-
els, but here we show how Bayesian inference can be used
to choose between them.
Let D be an object-feature matrix generated from one
of several structure classes. The posterior probability
of each class Ci is proportional to the product of the
likelihood p(D|Ci) and the prior probability p(Ci). If we
assign equal prior probabilities to each class (as we do
throughout this paper), the best class is the class that
makes the data most likely.
Computing the likelihood p(D|Ci) requires integrating
over all structures S belonging to structure class Ci:
p(D|Ci) =
∫
p(D|S, Ci)p(S|Ci)dS, (1)
Intuitively, this means that a structure class Ci provides
a good account of object-feature data D if the data are
highly probable under a range of structures S in class
Ci, and if these structures themselves have high prior
probability within Ci. The following section explains
how the fit of each structure to the data, p(D|S, Ci), is
computed for several structure classes.
We estimate the integral in Equation 1 using stochas-
tic approximations. First we run a Markov chain Monte
Carlo simulation to draw a sample of m structures, {Sj},
from the distribution p(S|D,Ci). We then approximate
p(D|Ci) by the harmonic mean estimator [7]:
p(D|Ci) =

 1
m
m∑
j=1
1
p(D|Sj , Ci)


−1
. (2)
This estimator does not satisfy a central limit theorem,
and can be thrown off by a sample with very low like-
lihood. Despite its limitations, it is often sufficient to
identify a model that is very much better than its com-
petitors. In future work we plan to estimate these inte-
grals more accurately using path sampling [4].
From structures to probabilistic models
We will work with three probabilistic models, each ap-
propriate for a different structure class, and show how
to compute the likelihoods p(D|S, Ci) for structures in
each class. For simplicity we assume here that all fea-
tures are binary, but our framework extends naturally to
multi-valued or continuous features.
CT : Taxonomic trees
Class CT is the set of taxonomic trees — rooted trees
with the objects in D as their leaves. This is a natural
representation when the objects are the outcome of an
evolutionary process. We restrict ourselves to ultramet-
ric trees — trees where each leaf node is at the same
distance from the root.
Assume that each feature is generated by a mutation
process over the tree. We formalize the mutation process
using a simple biological model [11]. Suppose that a fea-
ture F is defined at every point along every branch, not
just at the leaf nodes where the data points lie. Imag-
ine F spreading out over the tree from root to leaves
— it starts out at the root with some value and could
switch values at any point along any branch. Whenever
a branch splits, both lower branches inherit the value of
F at the point immediately before the split. Figure 1(a)
shows one mutation history for a binary feature on a tree
with four objects.
A B C D
(a)
A B C D
(b)
Figure 1: (a) A tree with four objects (A, B, C and
D) and three internal nodes. A mutation history for a
single feature is shown. The feature is off at the root, but
switches on at two places in the tree. Shaded nodes have
value 1, clear nodes have value 0, and crosses indicate
mutations. (b) A line with four objects.
We formalize this model of mutation using a Poisson
arrival process. Under this process, the probability that
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F switches values between the beginning and end of any
branch b is
p(switch along branch b) =
1  e−2λ|b|
2
, (3)
where |b| denotes the length of b, and λ is the mutation
rate. Note that the mutation process is symmetric: mu-
tations from 0 to 1 are just as likely as mutations in the
other direction. Asymmetric mutation processes may be
more appropriate in some contexts.
Assume that the features are conditionally indepen-
dent given the tree (i.e., their mutation histories are
independent). We can then compute p(D|T , CT ), the
probability of the data given tree T by multiplying prob-
abilities for each feature vector taken individually. The
necessary calculations can be organized efficiently using
a Bayes net with the same topology as T [9].
Computing the total likelihood p(D|CT ) requires inte-
grating over the space of all trees (including variations in
branch length and topology), as in Equation 1. We used
the MrBayes [6] program for Bayesian phylogenetic infer-
ence to draw a sample of trees {Ti} from the distribution
p(T |D,CT ). We then estimated the likelihood p(D|CT )
using the harmonic mean estimator (Equation 2).
CL: One-dimensional (linear) spaces
Although trees seem appropriate for representing bio-
logical species and their properties, other domains will
have other kinds of structures. Euclidean spaces figure
prominently in mathematical models of similarity com-
parison, judgment, and choice, and probably should ap-
pear in any canonical list of structure classes. Let class
CL indicate the set of one-dimensional linear structures.
Extensions to higher dimensions are easy in principle, if
computationally more demanding.
A line L ∈ CL is a one-dimensional structure where
every node corresponds to an object in the domain. A
line is a degenerate tree, but unlike the trees of the pre-
vious section, lines have no latent nodes. A four-object
line is shown in Figure 1(b).
Features are generated over a line according to the
mutation model of the previous section. Imagine that
Feature F starts at the leftmost node with some value
and spreads to the right with the possibility of switching
value at any point. Again, the probability that adjacent
nodes separated by a branch of length |b| have different
values of F is 1−e
−2λ|b|
2
.
As with CT , we estimate the likelihood p(D|CL) with
an approximate (MCMC) sum over all linear structures.
C0: Independent Features
Class C0 is similar to a null hypothesis. Unlike the pre-
vious models, it assumes no underlying relationships be-
tween objects in the domain. Each feature is distributed
over objects independently of all other features. The
pattern of overlap in feature extensions is thus com-
pletely unconstrained. More formally, C0 assumes that
feature vectors (columns of D) are generated by ,ipping
weighted coins. Unlike the previous two cases, the like-
lihood p(D|C0) can be computed analytically. Suppose
that θi is the weight of the coin for feature i, and our
prior on θi is θi ∼ Beta(, ) (for each of our experi-
ments we use  =  = 1). If column i of matrix D
contains mi ones and ni zeros, it can be shown that
p(D|C0) =
∏
i
B(mi + , ni + )/B(, ), where B(·, ·)
is the beta function.
Model complexity and Occam’s razor
The three models CT , CL, and C0 vary significantly in
their complexity. Both the tree model CT and the linear
model CL include the independent feature model C0 as
a special case: when each object in CT or CL is a long
way from its neighbors, feature values at adjacent object
nodes are generated in effect by tosses of a fair coin. CT
is also more complex than CL: in a domain with n ob-
jects, there are roughly 2n more distinct tree structures
than distinct linear structures, and the mutation process
operating over each tree involves roughly twice as many
potential mutation events.
A key feature of Bayesian model selection is that it au-
tomatically penalizes unnecessarily complex structures.
Some form of Occam’s razor is essential when comparing
candidate domain structures of different complexities,
where the more complex structure (e.g., trees) can more
easily mimic the simpler structure (e.g., linear orders)
than vice versa. A more naive approach to structure
learning, such as choosing the structure that accounts for
the most variance in the object-feature matrix D, would
be biased against choosing the simpler model class, even
when it really generated the observed data.
Empirical tests of structure learning
Synthetic Data
We created three synthetic datasets (unconstrained,
tree-structured and linear) with 16 objects and 120 fea-
tures each. The unconstrained set was constructed using
model C0. The tree-structured set was built by running
the mutation process of CT over a balanced tree with 16
leaf nodes. The linear set was built similarly by running
the mutation process over a line with 16 nodes.
Table 1 shows log likelihoods computed for each
dataset and structure class. The first row shows that
the linear model CL is better than the tree model CT on
the unconstrained data, but that both are worse than
the independent features model C0. Similarly, the lin-
ear model is preferred for the synthetic linear data. The
results for the synthetic tree data are more interesting.
Even though the data were generated over a tree, the
structure class of choice is CL.
To see why a linear order is a good hypothesis when
a tree-structured domain is first encountered, imagine a
picture of the true tree, then remove all the branches
and internal nodes, leaving behind only the leaves in
some linear order. Now join each leaf node to its imme-
diate neighbors. This linear order is a better hypothesis
than the true tree at first. The linear model CL is sim-
pler than the tree model CT , and if the mutation rate is
small, most concepts generated over the tree will be con-
nected subsets of the linear order. Only as more features
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Data C0 CL CT
Synthetic Unconstrained 59 31 0
Synthetic Linear 0 544 300
Synthetic Tree 0 210 168
Biology 0 230 339
Political 0 1312 883
Table 1: Scaled log-likelihoods for three synthetic and
two real-world datasets. Each row has been scaled addi-
tively so that its smallest entry is zero.
accumulate should a rational learner conclude that the
extra complexity of a tree-structured model is necessary.
To confirm that the true domain structure will eventu-
ally win out, we generated a tree-structured set with 32
objects and 240 features and computed log likelihoods as
more and more features were observed. Figure 2 shows
that the linear structure is preferred while the number
of observed features is small, but that the correct tree
structure dominates in the end. This transition suggests
that our Bayesian model may offer some insight into the
dynamics of development. Piaget and others have ar-
gued that children move from simple to relatively com-
plex conceptual structures as they mature. Our model
shows an analogous shift in tree-structured domains.
30 60 120 240
−100
0
100
200
Number of Features
LL
(C
T)−
LL
(C
L)
Figure 2: Differences be-
tween the log likelihoods
of trees (CT ) and lin-
ear structures (CL) on
synthetic tree-structured
data. Linear structures
are preferred at first but
the true structure be-
comes clear as more fea-
tures are seen.
Biological and Political Data
We used our framework to infer the structure of a bio-
logical data set (expected to be tree-structured), and a
political data set (expected to be linear). The biological
set was constructed from human feature judgments col-
lected by Osherson et al. (1991). Subjects were given 48
animals and 85 features (eg ‘lives in water’, ‘has a tail’)
and asked to rate the “relative strength of association”
between each animal and feature. Subjects gave ratings
on a scale that started at zero and had no upper bound.
Ratings were linearly transformed to values between 0
and 100, then averaged. We created a binary dataset by
thresholding all values at the global mean.
The political dataset was taken from the Supreme
Court database collected by Harold Spaeth (1998). We
looked at the Burger court which served from 1981 to
1985. Spaeth records 8 possible types of voting behavior:
we considered only the cases where every judge either
joined the majority, dissented, or cast a regular concur-
rence (which we treated the same as a majority vote).
This left a binary dataset containing votes for 9 judges
on 637 cases.
Of the three classes in our hypothesis space, Table 1
confirms that trees provide the best account of the bi-
ological data and linear structures are best for the vot-
ing data. Note that a more naive approach to structure
learning fails here. An additive tree model accounts
for more of the variance of the Supreme Court data
than a one-dimensional metric scaling solution. Choos-
ing the model that accounts for the greatest proportion
of the variance incorrectly favors trees, since it ignores
the greater complexity of the tree model.
Once the structure class is known, we can identify the
member of that class that makes the data most likely.
For the animal data, we took our MCMC sample from
the posterior over tree structures, and identified the most
representative tree using the consense program in the
PHYLIP package [3]. The resulting tree is shown in
Figure 3(a). Similarly, the best linear structure for the
Supreme Court data is shown in Figure 3(b).
The ultimate reason why trees are appropriate for bi-
ological data is that evolution is a branching process.
It is harder to say a priori why the voting data should
be one-dimensional, but the political spectrum (“left”–
“right”) is an extremely common notion, and others have
analyzed Supreme Court data and found that the first
dimension of a multidimensional linear model explains
almost all of the variance [15]. Our results may explain
in part why people represent these domains as they do,
but the analysis is mute with respect to the precise mech-
anisms that give rise to these cognitive structures. Multi-
ple learning mechanisms probably operate in both these
domains. Likely mechanisms include inferences drawn
from feature observations, as modeled explicitly by our
Bayesian learning algorithm, as well as cultural trans-
mission of knowledge, which surely occurs for structures
like the “left”–“right” metaphor.
Structure learning versus empiricism
The conventional empiricist critique of structured do-
main representations has three lines of attack, well ar-
ticulated recently by McClelland and Rogers [12]: (1)
structured representations such as taxonomic trees are
too rigid to deal naturally with exceptions or gradients
of typicality; (2) it is not clear how structured repre-
sentations can be induced from raw data; (3) unstruc-
tured associative learning architectures can match all of
the supposed advantages that structured representations
claim. Our work challenges all of these critiques. Pre-
viously [10], we showed that robustness to exceptions
and sensitivity to typicality fall out naturally from defin-
ing a probabilistic generative model of object features in
terms of a mutation process over a taxonomic tree (or
other domain structure). Point (2) was addressed in the
previous section, and now we turn to point (3). We
show that learning explicitly structured domain repre-
sentations provides a powerful source of inductive bias
for reasoning about novel properties, and that this power
is not easily matched by a generic connectionist architec-
ture.
We compared our tree-structured model for the
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Figure 3: Structures (found via Bayesian structure learning) that best characterize two domains: (a) Mammal species
and their properties, and (b) Supreme Court Judges and their decisions.
animal-feature data described above1 with a connection-
ist model inspired by the work of McClelland and Rogers
[12]. The network includes one input unit for each an-
imal species and one output unit for each feature. We
explored a wide range of network parameters in an at-
tempt to achieve the best possible performance (see be-
low). Following McClelland and Rogers, we trained each
network on the full matrix D of object-feature associa-
tions, then tested how well the hidden-unit representa-
tions supported inductive projections for novel features.
In the inductive projection task, a new feature is in-
troduced, and one or more examples of species with that
feature are provided to the learner. The learner’s task
is to infer which other species have this novel property.
Like Rogers and McClelland, we modeled this task by in-
troducing a new output unit for the novel feature, freez-
ing all weights except those connected to the new unit,
and training the new unit’s weights until it reliably pro-
duced the correct feature values for the given examples.
We then tested the new unit’s output when other species
were presented as inputs.
We modeled this same induction task using our tree-
based Bayesian framework, as described in [10]. Given a
tree T inferred for the domain, the mutation process in
model CT induces a prior distribution over all possible
labellings of the species (i.e., the leaves of T ). Given one
or more examples of a novel property, this prior together
with the machinery of Bayesian concept learning allows
us to infer the most likely value of that property for all
other species in the tree [10]. We used the tree shown
in Figure 3(a), and set the mutation rate for the novel
property to the value that best fit the 85 features in the
biological data set. The resulting tree-based model has
no free parameters.
The inductive projections of each model were com-
pared with human argument ratings collected by Osh-
erson et al. [13]. Osherson used a ten-animal domain:
horse, cow, chimp, gorilla, mouse, squirrel, dolphin, seal
and rhino. The specific set contains 36 two-example ar-
1In order to model the behavioral judgments described
below, we supplemented these data with feature ratings for
two additional species, cow and dolphin, to give a total of 50
species.
guments, and the conclusion species is always “horse”.
The general set contains 45 three-example arguments,
and the conclusion category is “all mammals.” Unfa-
miliar (blank) predicates – e.g., “have biotinic acid in
their blood” – were used for all these arguments. The
tree-based Bayesian model rates the strength of general
arguments by computing the probability that all ten ani-
mals in the domain have the property. The connectionist
model rates general arguments by computing projections
to each animal separately and adding these ten scores.
Table 2 shows correlations between model predictions
and human judgments of argument strength. The first
column summarizes the performance of two separate
neural networks, re,ecting the best performance we ever
observed on each data set over a thorough two-stage ex-
ploration of the space of possible networks2. In the first
stage, we tested many different network topologies and
varied the learning rate, the number of training and test-
ing epochs, and the presence or absence of momentum
and bias. We then took the best-performing networks
from the first stage and ran every possible combination
of the two best architectures, three best learning rates,
two best numbers of testing epochs, and three best num-
bers of training epochs. The best networks were trained
for 20,000 epochs, tested after 250 epochs of training
on each testing example, and had no momentum and a
bias of -2. They had two hidden layers, typically with
10-30 units each, and a learning rate between 0.005 and
0.01. Even allowing different neural networks for the
two datasets, we were unable to match the performance
of the tree-based Bayesian model.
Our model differs from these connectionist models
along at least two important dimensions, either or both
of which could account for its superior performance.
First, it uses explicit taxonomic structure and second,
it uses Bayesian statistical inference. To isolate the ef-
2The majority of these tests were conducted with the orig-
inal 48-animal feature ratings (substituting ox for cow and
blue whale for dolphin), before we collected feature ratings
for cow and dolphin. Qualitatively similar results were ob-
served with the 50-animal dataset. The results reported in
Table 2 re,ect the best performance observed across either
dataset.
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NN NN Bayes Tree- Sim
(T) (U) Bayes Cov.
Specific 0.62 0.86 0.16 0.95 0.75
General 0.41 0.68 0.38 0.91 0.77
Table 2: Correlations between human judgments and
five models for the specific (row 1) and general (row 2)
inductive projection tasks described in the text.
fect of structure we implemented models that incorpo-
rate only one of these factors. NN(T) is a neural net-
work that uses an explicitly taxonomic representation
but not Bayesian inference. The network has 19 input
units and a single output unit for the novel property. In-
put features are derived from the ten-animal tree — the
subtree of Figure 3 that includes the ten animals used
in this task. Each input node corresponds to a node in
the tree, and a species is represented by switching on
an input unit for each of its parent nodes in the tree
(including a distinctive feature for itself). Species that
appear nearby in the tree will share a relatively large
number of ancestors and will therefore have similar rep-
resentations. Bayes(U) is a model that uses Bayesian
inference but without any explicit structural represen-
tation constraining hypotheses. The model is inspired
by Heit’s (1998) suggestion that priors for Bayesian in-
duction could be derived from familiar features stored in
memory [5]. Each of the 85 observed feature vectors is
identified with a candidate hypothesis for generalization,
e.g., the feature “nocturnal” gives rise to the hypothesis
that the new property is true of all and only the noc-
turnal species. We assigned a prior probability of 1
86
to
each of these hypotheses and reserved a further 1
86
for
the hypothesis including all mammals.
Table 2 shows that NN(T) performed better than
all of the networks explored previously. The tree-
based Bayesian model performed better than Bayes(U)
or a feature-based version of Osherson et al.’s (1990)
similarity-coverage model (which also assumes no do-
main structure). These results suggest that generic ap-
proaches to biological induction may be improved by
adding explicit representations of taxonomic structure.
The tree-based Bayesian approach also performed bet-
ter than the tree-based neural network, suggesting that
both rational statistical inference and structured domain
representations play important roles in guiding people’s
generalizations.
Conclusion
Our results are preliminary, with a focus on the domain
of biology and just the taxonomic aspect of knowledge
in that domain. No strong general claims can be made
until we push this inquiry more deeply in the domain
of biology, and more broadly into other domains. Even
so, our work suggests a viable alternative to traditional
nativist and empiricist accounts of domain knowledge.
Contrary to a strong nativist view, the organizing struc-
tural principles of a domain may be learned. Contrary
to a strong empiricist view, explicit representations of
domain structure may be valuable for guiding inductive
projections from sparse data. Structured domain repre-
sentations and domain-general statistical learning thus
need not exclude each other, and indeed are comple-
mentary. Statistical learning suggests how novel domain
structures can be acquired, and these structures provide
a powerful inductive bias for future statistical learning.
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Abstract 
Key actions are single actions or behaviors that can be singled 
out as leading to the solution of a problem.  In the nine-dot 
problem (Maier, 1930), Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) 
proposed that non-dot turns are the key action necessary for 
solution.  In two experiments, non-dot turns are further 
analyzed as the key action necessary for solving the nine-dot 
problem and its variants.  Non-dot turns are found to be 
predictive of solution, while the classic conception of drawing 
lines outside the dots does not distinguish between solvers 
and non-solvers.    
Key Actions in Problem Solving 
Problem solving in everyday life, as well as the laboratory, 
can be quite difficult.  Often a problem or activity can seem 
unduly difficult when one does not know the key action 
necessary for completing the problem.  A key action can be 
defined as a single action or behavior that can be singled out 
as the key to the solution.  Examples of key actions abound 
in everyday life.  A proper roux cannot be made without 
engaging in continual stirring.  Algebra problems become 
routine once one understands how to balance the equation 
and isolate the variables.  Finally, as I have learned one too 
many times, data will invariably disappear if I have not 
completed the key action of backing it up! 
     In laboratory problem solving, many insight problems 
can be solved through the production of a key action.  For 
example, using the pliers as the pendulum weight is the key 
action necessary for solving Maiers (1931) two-string 
problem, and moving objects in three-dimensional space is 
necessary for the six matches problem (Scheerer, 1963) and 
the eight-coin problem (Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 
2002).  As a third example, the key action necessary for 
solving the prisoner and rope problem (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 
1987) is to unravel the rope into two strands, then tie the 
ends of the two strands together to escape the tower. 
     Sometimes the key action can be realized without much 
struggle, depending on an individuals prior knowledge.  A 
friend (and fellow insight researcher) worked on a farm 
growing up, where the splitting of rope to make it longer 
was a common occurrence.  He instantly knew how to solve 
the prisoner and rope problem; the key action was easy to 
discover.  In other insight problems, however, the key action 
is not easy to discover.  The common use of pliers hinders 
their use as a pendulum weight in Maiers (1931) two-string 
problem (cf. Birch & Rabinowitz, 1951).  Additionally, 
other insight problems may have multiple factors of 
difficulty preventing the discovery of the key action, such as 
in the nine-dot problem (Maier, 1930). 
Finding the Key Action in the                      
Nine-Dot Problem 
The nine-dot problem (Maier, 1930; see Figure 1) is quite 
possibly the most difficult insight problem that has been 
studied, with a typical solution rate for unaided participants 
of 0% (MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001).  Problem 
solvers are required to connect all the dots in a 3 x 3 matrix 
by using four straight lines, without lifting their pens from 
the page or retracing any lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Nine-Dot Problem and its Solution 
     The classic conception of the key action necessary for 
solving the nine-dot problem is that participants should 
draw lines that extend beyond the dots (Maier, 1930; Maier 
& Casselman, 1970; Scheerer, 1963).  In a related 
conception, Lung and Dominowski (1985) claimed that the 
key action was drawing lines that did not begin or end on 
dots. 
     Kershaw and Ohlsson (2001) hypothesized that the key 
action necessary for solving the nine-dot problem was 
making non-dot turns, or turns that occur in the empty space 
between dots.  The conception of non-dot turns as the key 
action came about through an inspection of two of 
MacGregor et al.s (2001) nine-dot problem variants.  The 
variant with no non-dot turn had a solution rate of 88% after 
four attempts, while the variant that required one non-dot 
turn only had a solution rate of 27% after four attempts.  
Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) continued in this line of 
reasoning by explaining that the likelihood of producing a 
key action is dependent on the cognitive factors that 
underlie that action.  In the nine-dot problem, multiple 
factors of difficulty are operating that each lower the 
probability of making a non-dot turn.  Kershaw and Ohlsson 
(2004) distinguished three classes of difficulty: perceptual, 
knowledge, and process. 
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     Perceptual factors include Gestalt properties of the nine-
dot problem such as goodness of figure and figure-ground 
relationships.  Making a non-dot turn requires that one both 
breaks the good figure of the square and views the white 
space beyond the dots as part of the problem.  Knowledge 
factors refer to an individuals prior knowledge.  Making a 
non-dot turn is hindered by peoples prior experience with 
dot puzzles, such as connect-the-dot games played by 
children (cf. Weisberg & Alba, 1981).  Process factors 
include the size of the search space, the specificity of the 
goal state, and the amount of mental lookahead necessary to 
find the solution.  Making a non-dot turn is difficult because 
it is not obvious where to draw the first line or what the end 
state of the problem will be.  In addition, people vary in the 
amount of mental lookahead they possess (cf. MacGregor et 
al., 2001), which affects the process of making non-dot 
turns.  Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) showed that perceptual, 
knowledge, and process factors interact to suppress the 
probability of producing the key action of non-dot turns in 
the nine-dot problem. 
     In the following experiments, non-dot turns are again 
examined as the key action necessary to solve the nine-dot 
problem.  Experiment I follows up on Kershaw and Ohlsson 
(2004) but adds an additional possible facilitating factor: 
giving participants the first line of the solution, which 
should narrow the search space.  Experiment II uses a think 
aloud methodology to explore what behaviors precede the 
production of non-dot turns. 
Experiment I 
Prior research by Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004; Kershaw, 
Ohlsson, & Coyne, 2003) has shown that increasing the 
number of non-dot turns leads to greater problem difficulty, 
such that the more non-dot turns a given problem requires, 
the harder that problem will be to solve. 
     Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004; Kershaw et al., 2003) 
increased solution rates through a training procedure that 
targeted the multiple factors of difficulty -- perceptual, 
knowledge, and process -- that hinder the production of non-
dot turns.  This training procedure was used in Experiment 
I. 
     A new facet of the procedure was to give participants the 
first line of the solution to each target problem.  Weisberg 
and Alba (1981) raised the solution rate of the nine-dot 
problem to 62% by giving participants the first line in 
addition to instructing them to go outside of the box set up 
by the dots.  The placement of this first line was chosen 
based on an analysis by MacGregor et al. (2001).  For two 
of the target problems, the first line extended into the non-
dot space.   
     The addition of the first line influenced the predictions 
for this experiment.  One prediction was that first line would 
not affect the order nor the magnitude of the solution rates 
for the five target problems that were reported by Kershaw 
and Ohlsson (2004), with the 11-dot problem being the 
easiest and the three-turn problem being the most difficult.  
A second prediction was that the order of solution rate 
would remain the same, but that the magnitude would 
increase for all five problems.  A third prediction was that 
the first line would differentially affect the solution rates for 
the problems, such that the displaced nine-dot and three-turn 
problems would show the greatest increase in solution rate 
due to their first lines cutting into the non-dot space. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design One hundred fifty undergraduates  
from UICs participant pool participated in the experiment 
for course credit.  No demographic data were collected 
about the participants. 
     Participants all received the same training, and one of 
five target problems. 
 
Materials The first part of the training, the shape training, 
had a perceptual component in which participants learned to 
distinguish the shape of the nine-dot problem solution from 
other shapes (see Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Kershaw et al., 
2003). The second part of the training, the dot connecting 
training, featured problems made of black, filled dots 
presented on a grid of other unfilled dots as well as 
problems made of black dots that were alone on the page 
(see Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2001, 2004; Kershaw et al., 
2003).  In addition, the training contained a dialogue 
component in that participants were informed of the 
purposes of each training task.   
     The five target problems were taken from Kershaw and 
Ohlsson (2004; see Figure 2, the nine-dot problem was also 
used).  The problems were modified by adding a diagonal 
line from the bottom right to the top left of the problem.    
The placement of the first line was chosen based on an 
analysis by MacGregor et al. (2001, Experiment 4).  
Participants were told to treat this line as the first line of the 
solution that they had to produce.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 11-Dot, 10-Dot, Displaced Nine-Dot, and  
Three-Turn Problems with First Line 
 
Procedure Participants were seen in groups.  Participants 
completed the shape training, and then the dot connecting 
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training.  During the shape training, participants were told 
that the shape they learned was the shape that would be 
required to solve the target problem.  During the dot 
connecting training, participants were told that it was 
necessary to draw lines outside the dots and turn in the 
empty space between dots. Participants were also shown the 
correct answer for judging a shape or connecting dots for 
each judgment or problem that was completed.  In addition, 
they were continually reminded that what they were 
learning in the training would be applicable to the target 
problem. 
     After completing the training, participants attempted one 
of five target problems (the 11-dot, 10-dot, nine-dot, 
displaced nine-dot, or three-turn).  Participants were given 
four minutes to connect all the dots using four straight lines.  
They were instructed to view the line in the problem as the 
first line, and to draw the remaining lines such that all lines 
could be drawn without lifting their pens from the page or 
retracing the lines.      
 
Results 
 
Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) found the following solution 
rates for the five target problems (in the training condition): 
11-dot, 97%; 10-dot, 80%; displaced nine-dot, 50%; 
traditional nine-dot, 40%; three-turn, 30%.  In contrast, the 
respective solution rates for this experiment were 83%, 
60%, 38%, 40%, and 50% (see Figure 3).  However, 
individual chi-square tests between each problems solution 
rate for this experiment and Kershaw and Ohlssons (2004) 
data were all non-significant (ps > .05).   
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Figure 3: Comparison of Solution Order and Magnitude for 
the Five Problem Types 
 
Effect of the number of non-dot turns Despite differences 
in exact solution rates, the new data are similar to those 
reported by Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004).  First, there are 
overall differences in solution rate between the problems, χ2 
(4, N=150) = 17.02, p < .05, λ = .15.  The standardized 
residuals were examined.  The participants who solved the 
11-dot problem (25/30 or 83%) caused the greatest 
standardized residual, 2.2; therefore, this cell made the 
greatest contribution to the chi-square.  When the 11-dot 
problem was removed from the analysis, the differences 
between the other problems were not significant, χ2 (3, 
N=120) = 4.02, p > .05, λ = .09.  Therefore, once a non-dot 
turn was introduced, all problems became equally difficult. 
     An alternative way to examine the influence of the 
number of non-dot turns is to determine the probability of 
making a non-dot turn (cf. Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004).  The 
percentage of participants who made any non-dot turns 
versus correct non-dot turns was calculated for the nine-dot 
and three-turn problems, both of which require two 
unassisted (not affected by the first line) non-dot turns.  
Sixty-five percent (39/60) of the participants made one non-
dot turn.  Of these participants, 100% (39/39) made two 
non-dot turns.  In contrast, 52% of the participants (31/60) 
made one correct non-dot turn.  Of these participants, 94% 
(29/31) made two correct non-dot turns. 
 
Effect of drawing lines beyond the dots The nine-dot 
problem forms a good Gestalt, but the dot groups that make 
up the other problems do not.  The tendency to draw lines 
that extend beyond the boundary of the dots, the classic 
explanation of difficulty for the nine-dot problem, was 
measured across the problem types.  The 11-dot problem 
was excluded from this analysis because drawing lines 
outside the dots is unnecessary for solution. 
     Eighty-three percent (99/120) of the participants drew 
lines outside of the dots.  In the 10-dot (24/30), displaced 
nine-dot (28/30), and three-turn (29/30), participants were 
equally likely to draw lines outside of the dots, χ2 (2, N=90) 
= 5.19, p > .05, λ = .07, despite differences in solution rate.  
In contrast, participants who attempted the nine-dot problem 
were less likely to draw lines outside of the dots (18/30).  
This effect is striking when the nine-dot problem is 
compared to the three-turn problem, both of which required 
two unassisted non-dot turns, χ2 (1, N=60) = 11.88, p < .05, 
λ = .26.  Although the solution rate for these two problems 
did not differ, the three-turn problem led to a greater rate of 
drawing lines outside the dots than the nine-dot problem. 
 
Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment I are comparable to Kershaw and 
Ohlsson (2004) in solution magnitude, the probability of 
making a non-dot turn, and the prevalence of drawing lines 
outside the dots.  The order of solution rates did differ in 
that the three-turn problem had the third-highest solution 
rate in the current data, compared to the lowest solution rate 
in Kershaw and Ohlssons (2004) data.  However, as in 
Kershaw and Ohlssons results, the problems that required 
non-dot turns did not differ significantly from each other.  
In addition, individual comparisons between each problem 
across the two data sets were not significant. 
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     The current data do not support any of the predictions 
fully.  Providing the first line of the solution did not affect 
the magnitude of solution rate, as predicted, but did affect 
the order of the solution rate.  The solution percentages 
appear to support the third prediction, that solution 
magnitude would be affected differentially, but the rate 
increased for the three-turn problem yet decreased for the 
displaced nine-dot problem.  However, as mentioned above, 
individual comparisons between the problem types across 
data sets did not reveal any significant differences. 
     The current data give further support to the non-dot turn 
as the key action necessary for solving the nine-dot problem 
and its variants.  As soon as a non-dot turn was introduced, 
the solution rate dropped by at least 20%.  In addition, 
drawing lines that went outside the dots was not enough to 
solve the problem.  Eighty-three percent of the participants 
who attempted the 10-dot, displaced nine-dot, nine-dot, or 
three-turn problems drew lines outside of the dots, but only 
47% of the participants correctly solved one of these four 
problems.  
     As noted previously, giving participants the first line did 
not increase the solution rate, as compared to Kershaw and 
Ohlsson (2004).  This finding is interesting compared to 
similar manipulations used by Weisberg and Alba (1981) 
and MacGregor et al. (2001).  Weisberg and Alba (1981) 
achieved a solution rate of 62% by giving participants the 
first line and telling them to go outside the dots.  MacGregor 
et al. (2001, Experiment 4), in contrast, achieved a 6% 
solution rate after the first 10 attempts, and 47% after 10 
additional attempts by giving participants the first line of the 
nine-dot problem.  One explanation, in light of the current 
data, is that the extensive training used in Experiment I 
overshadowed any benefit of the first line for the problem 
variants.  Although the solution rate was raised for the 
three-turn problem, its solution rate was not significantly 
different than the rate found for the three-turn problem by 
Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004), nor were there any 
differences in solution rate across the two experiments for 
any of the nine-dot problem variants.  Untrained 
participants, in contrast, would most likely benefit from 
being given the first line, and would thus show differences 
in comparison to the control group in Kershaw and Ohlsson 
(2004, Experiment 3). 
 
Experiment II 
 
Experiment I further established non-dot turns as the key 
action required for solving the nine-dot problem.  
Experiment I also showed that the classic conception of 
difficulty for the nine-dot problem, the inability to draw 
lines beyond the boundary of the dots, did not hold up as a 
difficulty for the other problem types.  However, 
participants were less likely to draw lines outside the dots 
for the nine-dot problem, thus supporting the Gestalt factor. 
     The aim of Experiment II was to examine how 
participants explore the search space of the nine-dot and 10-
dot problems.  Both Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) and 
Experiment I showed that making non-dot turns is 
important, but did not show the process that participants go 
through when making a non-dot turn.  Experiment II used a 
think-aloud methodology to examine the individual thoughts 
and actions that lead to the making of non-dot turns.  Verbal 
protocols and other trace methods, such as eye movements, 
have been used effectively to understand the processes 
involved in achieving insight in problems such as the 
mutilated checkerboard (Kaplan & Simon, 1990) and in 
matchstick arithmetic (Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). 
     Half of the participants received the training used in 
Experiment I, and the other half were not trained.  The 
participants received either the nine-dot or 10-dot problem 
as their target problem.  One prediction for Experiment II is 
that participants who received training will be more likely to 
solve their target problems, and will show a greater 
incidence of behaviors that lead to non-dot turns.  Based on 
solution rates found in Experiment I and Kershaw and 
Ohlsson (2004), no difference in solution rate is expected 
between the 10-dot and nine-dot problems. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design Twenty undergraduates from 
UICs participant pool participated in the experiment for 
course credit.  No demographic data were collected about 
the participants. 
     The design of Experiment II was a 2 x 2 factorial.  The 
two independent variables were type of training (control and 
training) and target problem (nine-dot and 10-dot). 
 
Materials The training materials used in Experiment II 
were the same materials used in Experiment I.  The control 
group did not receive any training.  In addition, all 
participants were given a long division problem as a 
practice for thinking aloud while solving the target problem.  
A video camera was used to record each participants 
verbalizations and actions. 
 
Procedure Participants were seen individually.  As in 
Experiment I, the participants who received training learned 
to distinguish the shape of the nine-dot problem solution 
from other shapes, and learned how to connect dots.  They 
were shown the correct answer for each training exercise 
and were reminded that the material learned in training 
would be useful for solving the target problem.  Participants 
in the control group did not receive any training. 
     Before beginning the target problem, participants 
practiced thinking out loud by solving a long division 
problem.  Participants were then given four minutes to 
attempt the target problem.  They were told to connect all 
the dots by using four straight lines, without lifting their 
pens from the page or retracing any lines.  They were 
instructed to talk out loud while working on the problem.  If 
the participant stopped verbalizing while working on the 
problem, the experimenter reminded the participant to 
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continue talking.  Each participants verbalizations, as well 
as his or her actions, were recorded using a video camera. 
 
Protocol transcription Each participants verbalizations 
and actions were transcribed into a verbal protocol by either 
the author or a research assistant.  Protocols were 
constructed so that the participants words and actions were 
grouped together.  Actions were described in terms of 
drawing or simulating lines, and were transcribed by using a 
map that numbered the dots in each problem. 
Results  
Effects of training and problem type Solution rates for the 
problems across training types are as follows: 10-dot 
training, 60% (3/5); 10-dot control, 20% (1/5); nine-dot 
training, 40% (2/5); nine-dot control, 0% (0/5).  A chi-
square analysis was conducted to determine the effect of 
problem type.  There was no significant difference between 
the number of solvers for the 10-dot and nine-dot problems, 
χ2 (1, N=20) = .952, p > .05, λ = .13, as predicted. 
     A second chi-square analysis was conducted to 
determine the effect of the training.  Participants were more 
likely to solve their target problem when they had received 
training than when they had not, χ2 (1, N=20) = 3.81, p = 
.05, λ = .25, as predicted. 
 
Analysis of behaviors that lead to non-dot turns  
Participants verbal protocols were examined to determine 
the behaviors that led to making non-dot turns, the key 
action necessary for solving the 10-dot and nine-dot 
problems.  Based on our previous work (Kershaw & 
Ohlsson, 2001, 2004; Kershaw et al., 2003), we 
hypothesized that several actions would show that 
participants were affected by the training and understood the 
requirements of the problem: 1) making diagonal lines, 2) 
making triangle shapes, 3) making the arrow-like shape of 
the nine-dot problem solution, and 4) making lines that 
extended beyond the boundary of the dots.  For the purposes 
of this paper, the two actions that will be analyzed are 
making arrow shapes and making lines that extend beyond 
the boundary of the dots.  In addition, participants 
verbalizations may reveal attention to particular areas of the 
problem, or a rehearsal of strategies.   
     The participants verbalizations were surprisingly 
unhelpful in determining what thoughts preceded making 
non-dot turns.  The majority of participants limited their 
verbalizations to keeping track of the number of lines they 
had drawn so far.  Only four of the 20 participants 
verbalized anything about going outside of the dots.  
Examples of these verbalizations include: outside the line 
here (said while moving a pen from the bottom right dot to 
the top left dot) and lets see, I should probably think more 
about going outside, which was not accompanied by an 
action. 
     The use of arrow shapes and lines that extended beyond 
the dots illustrated the effect of the training in the solution 
attempts of the participants.  Eight participants in the 
training group made at least one arrow shape, while only 
three participants in the control group made an arrow shape; 
this difference was significant, χ2 (1) = 5.05, p < .05, λ = 
.47.  Likewise, all 10 participants in the training group made 
lines that extended beyond the dots, while only two 
participants in the control group attempted such dots.  This 
difference was also significant, χ2 (1) = 13.33, p < .05, λ = 
.78.   
     In addition, these actions were better indicators of events 
that precede non-dot turns than participants verbalizations.  
Participants who solved their target problems drew arrow 
shapes and extended lines beyond the dots in the correct 
places before making non-dot turns.  In contrast, some 
participants who did not solve their target problems also 
drew arrow shapes, but drew them exclusively inside the 
dots.  Other non-solving participants drew arrow shapes and 
extended lines, but did not make non-dot turns.  As in 
Experiment I, drawing lines that extended beyond the dots 
was not enough to solve the target problems.  Participants 
needed to extend their lines in the correct places, and make 
non-dot turns. 
  
Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment II followed up those of 
Experiment I and Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) by showing 
the importance of non-dot turns in solving the nine-dot (and 
10-dot) problem(s).  In addition, Experiment II showed, like 
Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004), the effectiveness of training 
for raising the solution rate for the nine-dot and 10-dot 
problems. 
     Experiment II contributes to this line of research by 
providing a means to analyze the process of attempting the 
nine-dot problem (or one of its variants).  This initial 
analysis of the verbal protocols revealed that participants 
who receive training are more likely to produce actions that 
are necessary for solving the problem, such as drawing an 
arrow shape, extending a line beyond the dots, and making a 
non-dot turn.  However, as shown in Experiment I and in 
Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004), making non-dot turns is a 
difficult key action to execute.  Participants must extend 
lines beyond the dots in the correct place and form the arrow 
shape of the solution correctly.  Merely extending any line 
beyond the boundary of the dots will not lead to solution.   
General Discussion 
Key actions can be identified in many different types of 
problems and in everyday life, from using pliers as a 
pendulum weight in Maiers (1930) two-string problem to 
learning to continually stir a roux.  In the nine-dot problem, 
the key action is making a non-dot turn (Kershaw & 
Ohlsson, 2001, 2004; Kershaw et al., 2003).  While some 
key actions are easily discovered and produced, making a 
non-dot turn is hindered by interacting factors of difficulty: 
perceptual, knowledge, and process. 
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     In Experiments I and II, making non-dot turns was 
compared to the classic conception of the key action 
necessary for solving the nine-dot problem, drawing lines 
that extend beyond the dots (Maier, 1930; Maier & 
Casselman, 1970; Scheerer, 1963).  In both experiments, 
drawing lines outside the dots was not sufficient to solve a 
target problem.  As a striking example, nearly all the 
participants in Experiment II readily drew lines outside of 
the dots in the 10-dot, displaced nine-dot, and three-turn 
problems.  However, less than half of the participants 
actually solved one of these problems. 
     Experiments I and II provided further support for 
Kershaw and Ohlssons (2004) analysis of the importance of 
making non-dot turns.  Other insight and everyday problems 
are best solved through different key actions.  Further study 
will allow for the identification of these key actions, and the 
determination of what cognitive factors underlie the 
production of such actions. 
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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that members of East Asian 
cultures show a greater sensitivity to context (vs. target) 
information than do members of Western Cultures.  We 
suggest this difference is rooted in a greater chronic 
fear of isolation (FOI) in East Asians than in 
Westerners.  To support this hypothesis, we first 
compare chronic levels of FOI between East Asian and 
Western participants.  Then we manipulate FOI in a 
group of Western college students and assess their 
recognition memory for object as a function whether 
the background is the same or different from when the 
picture was first seen.  Consistent with our proposal, the 
manipulation affected people's sensitivity to 
background context in picture recognition in a manner 
consistent with previous studies of cultural differences. 
 
Introduction 
Previous research has uncovered cultural 
differences in reasoning and decision making 
performance between East Asian and Western 
populations (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).  
Clearly the study of cultural differences has practical 
implications for international commerce and theoretical 
implications for claims about the universality of 
cognitive processing.   
This work is based on the observation that 
cognitive and perceptual orientations can differ in the 
degree to which they are analytic versus holistic.  For 
instance, Masuda and Nisbett (2001) showed Japanese 
and American subjects pictures of animals and fish with 
a surrounding background.  Later, subjects were shown 
pictures of animals or fish they had seen as well as new 
animals and fish appearing either with the same 
background or in a new background.  Japanese (but not 
American) subjects were more likely to correctly 
recognize an old animal when it appeared with the 
original background than when it appeared in a new 
context. 
Findings like this suggest there are significant 
differences in reasoning between cultures, but only a 
few studies in cross-cultural research have manipulated 
potential causal variables in studies.  For example, 
Briley and Wyer (2002) manipulated the degree of 
group membership and cultural identity in Asian and 
Western college students.  They found that 
experimentally induced feelings of being part of a 
group produced a greater preference for equality and 
compromise in individual choice tasks in both 
populations.  Similarly, Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee 
(1999) examined the causal role of self-construal by 
investigating whether priming independent or 
interdependent self-construals within a culture could 
result in differences in psychological worldview that 
mirror those traditionally found between cultures.  For 
instance, in one experiment of the study, they found 
that European-American participants primed with 
interdependence displayed shifts toward more 
collectivist social values and judgments that were 
mediated by corresponding shifts in self-construal.  
These studies provide insight into our understanding 
causes of observed cultural differences (Chiu, Morris, 
Hong, & Menon, 2000; Hong et al., 2003).   
In previous work, we proposed that these cultural 
differences may be caused by a higher chronic fear of 
isolation (FOI) in East Asian populations than in 
Western populations (Kim & Markman, 2003).  FOI is 
the degree to which people are anxious or afraid about 
being cut off from peers and relatives (Gilbert, Fiske, & 
Lindzey, 1998; Noelle-Neumann, 1984).  
Communication theories define FOI as a force that 
leads people to conceal their views when they believe 
they are in a minority (Noelle-Neumann, 1984).  This 
pressure is assumed to be related to their fears of being 
negatively evaluated by others.  The theory maintains 
that mass media works simultaneously with majority 
public opinion to silence minority beliefs on cultural 
issues.  On this view, FOI prompts those with minority 
views to examine the beliefs of others and to conform 
to what they perceive to be a majority view.  In this 
paper we discuss a difference in chronic FOI between 
cultures and then present a study that addresses the 
relationship between FOI and attention/memory 
respectively.    
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Different sensitivities to FOI between East 
Asian and Western culture 
Before discussing how a difference in degree of 
FOI can influence judgment and decision making, we 
must first show that members of different cultures are 
likely to differ in their chronic level of FOI.   
As a measure of FOI, we used the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation scale (Watson & Friend, 1969).1  This 30-
item instrument measures social anxiety about receiving 
negative evaluations from others.  Scores on this scale 
reflect a fear of the loss of social approval.  Items on 
the measure include signs of anxiety and ineffective 
social behaviors that would lead to disapproval by 
others.  We gave this scale to 41 Asian students 
enrolled in University of Texas Austin and their 
spouses participated for the measurement of FOI in East 
Asian population.  The participants were all born in 
East Asia (31 Korean 6 Japanese, 4 Chinese) and had a 
native language other than English.  The length of stay 
in the US was less than 5 years before their 
participation (M = 3.1 years).  Western participants 
were 49 undergraduate students at the University of 
Texas (all born in the US).  Both groups filled out Fear 
of Negative Evaluation scale along with questions for 
demographic information.  The East Asian Group 
showed significantly higher scores on the FNE (M = 
17.54) than did the Western group (M = 11.54), t (88) = 
11.56, p < .01.  This finding supports the proposal that 
members of East Asian culture have a higher chronic 
FOI than do members of Western culture. 
The social anxiety literature provides some insight 
about why different cultures have different levels of 
FOI.  Cross-cultural differences in social anxiety have 
been studied in various ways, and the consensus among 
researchers is that members of relatively society-
oriented cultures have more social anxiety than do those 
in individual-oriented cultures.  For example, Okazaki 
and colleagues (Okazaki, 1997; Okazaki, Liu, 
Longworth, & Minn, 2002) found that Asian-American 
report higher distress on various measures of social 
anxiety.  A practical merit of such studies is that they 
enable a comparison of two cultures controlling out 
other confounding variables such as language or 
culture-specific patterns in reporting /interviewing.  For 
this reason these results provide insight into chronic 
differences in social anxiety between cultures.  Other 
cross-cultural comparisons assessed the difference in 
social anxiety between Asian and Western populations.  
For example, Sato and McCann (1998) studied 
Japanese and American students and found a positive 
relation between social anxiety and interdependent self-
construals (which are typical of collectivistic cultures).  
                                                          
1
 There are other scales that have been used to measure FOI, 
but these scales also ask questions about physical rather than 
social isolation.   
Similarly, Dinnel, Kleinknecht, and Tanaka-Matsumi 
(2002) shows that TKS (Taijin Kyofusho, a Japanese 
variant of social anxiety) - like symptoms (e.g., fear of 
offending others) were more likely to be reported 
Japanese university students than by their American 
counterparts.  It is unlikely that social anxiety discussed 
in the current study is more related to other 
subcomponents then FOI.    
Given that members of East Asian and Western 
culture differ in chronic FOI, it is important to discuss 
why this difference might lead to differences in 
reasoning.  Social anxiety, especially FOI, motivates 
people to focus on social activity, to interact with other 
members in the social network and to consider others’ 
responses seriously (Gilbert, 2001; Scheufele, 
Shanahan, & Lee, 2001).  Thus, members of 
collectivistic cultures are expected to be generally more 
interested in relations among items in the environment 
than do members of individualistic cultures (Morris & 
Peng, 1994; Nisbett et al., 2001).  It is also possible to 
observe such differences within a single culture by 
manipulating a potential cause.  For example, as 
discussed earlier in the previous section, Gardner 
(1999) showed that manipulation of self-construals by 
priming interdependence induced a more collectivistic 
thinking in Western participants.  Note that such 
patterns of behavior and thinking caused by primed 
interdependence are consistent with observed patterns 
rooted in a greater level of FOI (Gilbert et al., 1998; 
Noelle-Neumann, 1984).  
In sum, social anxiety is higher in Eastern than 
Western populations.  Increased social anxiety leads to 
increased attention to relations among items and to 
context.  We connected these two and suggested that 
levels of FOI are positively related to the degree of 
dialectical thinking which has been treated as 
characteristic reasoning mode of collectivism culture 
(Kim & Markman, 2003). 
We developed this idea further in the current study 
by examining the influence of a manipulation of FOI on 
recognition memory.  As discussed above Masuda and 
Nisbett (2001) found that members of collectivist 
culture were more holistic in their analysis of scenes 
than were members of an individual culture.  If a high 
level of FOI indeed makes people to attend to 
interpersonal relationships (and more broadly to 
relations between objects and their environments), then 
inducing a high level of FOI should make Americans 
less likely to attend to target information, which in turn 
should increase their memory for context vs. target 
information.   
Manipulation and measurement of FOI 
In our studies, FOI was manipulated as an 
independent variable following the method used by 
Kim and Markman (2003).  Participants in the High 
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FOI group described experiences in which they were 
socially isolated from others (e.g., “you might have 
been anxious once when your friends were not talking 
to you at all, or when you went to a new place where 
you didn’t know anyone and had difficulty meeting new 
people”).  The Low FOI group described experiences in 
which they caused someone else to be socially isolated 
from other (e.g., “you might have been at a party and 
you didn’t talk to one of your friends who did not know 
many people at the party and you felt bad about it 
later”).  Many clinical techniques such as prolonged 
exposure treatment that is used to treat post-traumatic 
stress disorder are based on the premise that asking a 
patient to recall and describe a previous experience and 
associated emotion will activate and retrieve relevant 
feelings and memories, and put the person into that 
state again (Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997).  
Then we measured a person’s FOI with the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation (FNE) scale as a manipulation 
check.  
Experiment 
Method 
Participants  
Eighty nine American undergraduate students (all 
born in the US) of the University of Texas participated 
in the study.   Half of participants were randomly 
assigned to the High FOI condition and the other half 
were to the Low FOI condition.  
Materials 
In the first phase of the study, 24 animal pictures 
were presented.  Each picture has an animal and a 
particular background (see Figure 1).  
 
 
In the second phase, participants saw 96 pictures.  
24 of them were same with the pictures seen in the first 
phase (old animal and old background).  To create the 
rest of the 72 pictures, an additional 24 animals (new 
animal) and 24 backgrounds (new background) were 
used and the combination between the animal and the 
background information was manipulated.  Because 
each animal could have one of two different 
backgrounds – the original background or a novel 
background, there were four different conditions: (a) 
old background and old animal, (b) old background and 
new animal, (c) new background and old animal, and 
(d) new background and new animal (see Figure 1).  All 
of these pictures were used in Masuda and Nisbett’s 
(2001) study.     
Procedure 
Participants were asked to describe their previous 
experiences relating to an anxiety producing situation.  
In the High FOI condition, participants wrote about 
being socially isolated from others.  In the Low FOI 
condition, participants wrote about socially isolating 
someone else from them or other people.  After 
completing this self-descriptive priming task, 
participants in both conditions responded to the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation scale as a manipulation check.   
Then participants viewed 24 photos of animals in 
naturalistic environments.  After a 2-minute delay, 
participants viewed 96 photos in a recognition memory 
test that varied whether the animals were old or new 
and whether the background was old or new. Subjects 
responded whether they had seen the animal in the 
photo regardless of the background of the test photo.   
Results 
First, we checked the effectiveness of our FOI 
manipulation.  Average values on the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation scale were significantly higher in the High 
FOI condition (M = 15.61) than in the Low FOI 
condition (M = 10.60), t (87) = 3.92, p < .01.  Note that 
the mean score of High FOI group approaches that seen 
in the East Asian group (M = 17.54) we measured.   
For "old" and "new" responses, we subtracted 
people's accuracy for the pictures with the new 
background from their accuracy with the original 
background.  Positive scores indicate sensitivity to the 
context.   
The pattern of data in this study shows the same 
pattern observed by Masuda and Nisbett (2001) (see 
Figure 2).  There was a significantly higher index (M = 
2.39) for the High FOI condition than for the Low FOI 
condition (M = 1.22), F (1, 87) = 6.01, p<.05.  This 
effect is mediated by level of FOI.  In an ANCOVA 
including FNE score, there is a significant correlation 
between FNE and the response index (r = .33, p <.01) 
and the main effect of FOI is reduced in significance, F 
(1, 87) = 1.91, p = .171.   
Figure 1. Sample pictures used in this study.  
(A) A study picture.  (B) A new animal in the 
old background.  (C) An old animal in a new 
background.  (D) A new animal with a new 
background. 
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For "new" responses there is also a marginally 
significant difference between the High (M = -1.43) and 
Low FOI conditions (M = -2.01), F (1, 87) = 1.18, 
p<.28.  (Masuda and Nisbett (2001) found no 
significant difference between their Japanese and 
American subjects for "new" responses.)  This finding 
is consistent with the hypothesis that participants in the 
High FOI condition attend more on background 
information than do those in the Low FOI group even 
when misleading cues of original background interfered 
with recognition. 
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Interestingly, this combination of results does not 
indicate greater overall accuracy between groups.  A 
calculation of d' shows no difference for the High FOI 
condition (M = 1.74) and the low FOI condition (M = 
1.76), F (1, 87) = .01, p = .916. 
General discussion 
This experiment demonstrated the influence of fear 
of isolation on attention and memory.  Inducing a 
higher level of FOI in American college students made 
their attention more similar to that of East Asian 
students observed in previous studies.  Participants in 
the High FOI condition showed greater accuracy for the 
memory of background information than did those in 
the Low FOI condition.  When Fear of Negative 
Evaluation scale values were incorporated into the 
analyses as a covariate, they were significantly related 
to the degree of sensitivity to context, and the strength 
of the effect of FOI manipulation was decreased.   
However, an alternative interpretation of the 
current results is that the induction of low FOI 
primarily induced the feeling of guilt, and hence a more 
negative mood than in the condition designed to induce 
high FOI.  Some previous studies showed that negative 
mood leads to more analytic thinking (Bolte, Goschke, 
& Kuhl, 2003).  For example, according to the 
personality systems interaction theory (Bolte et al., 
2003; Kuhl & Kazen, 1999), an increase in negative 
affect supports a analytic processing mode whereas 
positive affect induce a relatively more holistic thinking.  
We tested this possibility in another study, in which 
participants’ relative preference for dialectical proverbs 
were measured, and found that there was no meaningful 
difference on emotion scales (e.g., hedonic tone and 
general arousal) between the two FOI groups and that 
only FNE scale values explained the variation in the 
relative preference for dialectical proverbs 
within/between group (Kim & Markman, in 
preparation).  Thus it is unlikely that emotion 
systematically influenced the current results.   
It is also important that, as discussed earlier, East 
Asian participants exhibited a significantly greater FOI 
than did Western participants.  Note that East Asian 
without FOI manipulation showed a greater average 
values on the Fear of Negative Evaluation scale than 
did those in the High FOI group in the current 
experiment.   
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that chronic differences in FOI in members of East 
Asian and Western cultures lead to the differences in 
attention observed in the previous studies (Masuda & 
Nisbett, 2001).  We are not claiming that FOI is the 
only cause of cultural differences in reasoning.  Indeed, 
differences in culturally accessible concepts such as 
collectivism and individualism may influence cognition 
either by affecting level of FOI through some other 
route (Aaker & Lee, 2001; Hsee & Weber, 1999).  This 
issue has been much discussed in communication 
theories, which have yielded no clear consensus on 
whether FOI is an antecedent or an intervening variable.  
For example, Shoemaker, Breen, and Stamper (2000) 
tested whether FOI is antecedent to opinion formation 
or an intervening variable between opinion formation 
and willingness to voice the opinion.  Their path 
analysis suggested that FOI is an antecedent variable, 
but they could not exclude possibility that it is an 
intervening variable.  However, it seems that FOI is a 
robust causal factor explaining previously observed 
difference between cultures.  Kim and Markman (2003) 
found that a manipulation of FOI induced a difference 
in degree of dialectical reasoning. 
Thus, chronic levels of Fear of Isolation may be a 
causal factor underlying observed cultural differences 
in reasoning.  The mechanisms that relate FOI to these 
reasoning differences will be the subject of future 
research, but we speculate that high levels of FOI lead 
people to think more about their relationship to others, 
and hence are more open to compromise in reasoning 
and more attentive to contextual and situational factors 
that guide behavior.  
The current study also has implications for 
Cognitive Science in general.  Most behavioral research 
assumes that the average performance of participants 
Figure 2.  Participants’ relative accuracy for “old” 
response.  
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reflects the basic functioning of the cognitive 
architecture.  However, work on cultural differences 
points out dimensions along which performance on 
cognitive tasks may reflect learned strategies rather 
than constraints of the cognitive architecture itself.  In 
line with this viewpoint, the study we present in this 
paper indicates that “some” of the observed cultural 
differences may reflect straightforward differences in 
chronic social anxiety rather than fundamental 
differences in knowledge gathered over years of 
experience within a culture.  
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that we 
induced significant differences in memory for objects 
based on a simple manipulation of a participant's level 
of fear of isolation.  As these findings demonstrate, a 
straightforward change in motivational state can lead to 
a large difference in basic cognitive functioning.  This 
work highlights the need to include more research on 
the influence of motivation on cognitive processing 
within the canon of research in Cognitive Science. 
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Abstract
Two experiments using social stimuli tested a recurrent neural
network model’s predictions for cue competition for causes
and effects. The delta-rule based model predicts the presence
of cue competition for effects as well as for causes as a result
of an asymmetry in the bidirectional associative strengths
between the relevant cue-outcome pairs. This model can
capture cue competition for effects when cues are encountered
in the cause-effect direction, unlike associative and feed-
forward models. Results support the model’s prediction of cue
competition for both effects and causes. The implications of
these results for causal model theory and for various
associative accounts of cue competition are discussed.
Introduction
Since the advent of research on causal induction many re-
searchers have focused on causal models that explain the
competitive nature of learning cues that predict or indicate
the occurrence of an event (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972;
Gluck & Bower, 1988; Shanks, 1991; Waldmann &
Holyoak, 1992). The first account of competitive learning of
cues was the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model. When
multiple cues are present preceding an event, these cues
compete with each other for predictive strength, resulting in
the competitive learning of cues.  A classic example of this
is blocking, whereupon learning that stimulus A predicts
outcome X during initial training, there is a deficit in
learning that B also perfectly predicts X when AB are
presented together preceding X in the second training phase.
Although cue competition of causes is well established in
both the animal and human causal learning literature, the
question of whether competition occurs among multiple
effects of a common cause has produced somewhat
inconsistent findings and has resulted in a heated debate
(e.g., Shanks, 1991; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; Van
Hamme & Wasserman, 1993; Price & Yates, 1995; Matute,
Arcediano & Miller, 1996; Shanks, & Lopez, 1996).  Cue
competition for effects describes a two-stage conditioning
phenomenon whereupon first learning that cause A perfectly
predicts the occurrence of effect X during Phase 1 of
training, there is a deficit in subsequently learning that cause
A also perfectly predicts the occurrence of effect Y when
the XY compound is presented together after the
presentation of cause A during the Phase 2 training.
A number of researchers have provided evidence for cue
competition for effects. Some researchers (e.g., Shanks,
1991; Shanks & Lopez, 1996; Price & Yates, 1995; Cobos,
Lopez, Cano, Almaraz & Shanks, 2002) interpret the find-
ings as consistent with associative learning theories. Others
(e.g., Matute et al., 1996; Miller & Matute, 1998) assert that
the findings are more consistent with contiguity theory,
which assumes that associations are learned noncompeti-
tively and bi-directionally through simple contiguity, and
that cue competition takes place at judgment.
In contrast, proponents of causal model theory (e.g.,
Waldmann & Holyoak 1992; Melz, Cheng, Holyoak &
Waldmann, 1993; Waldmann, 2000) deny the evidence for
cue competition for effects, suggesting that whereas causes
compete, effects do not.  They argue that multiple effects
should not compete with each other because they provide
new information about the effects of a common cause.   
The goal of this paper is to contrast the predictions of a
recurrent neural network, with associative learning theory,
causal model theory and contiguity theory’s predictions for
cue competition for causes as well as for effects. Two
experiments designed to test the different predictions for the
occurrence of cue competition between effects will be pre-
sented. These experiments use various social behaviors as
target stimuli for cues and outcomes in an attempt to extend
the research in multiple cue contingency learning beyond
the traditional settings of biological, physical or abstract
events and their consequences.
In addition, these studies assess both directions of rea-
soning between causes and effects.  Typical research in this
domain only investigates one direction of reasoning and
thus cannot say anything about the relative strength of the
forward link from causes to effects and the backward link
from effects to causes.
Cue Competition in Associative Models
The Rescorla-Wagner (R-W) model (Rescorla & Wagner,
1972) formally describes the change in associative strength
during learning by: ∆Vcs(n) = acsbus(n) (lus(n) – Vtotal(n)), where
∆Vcs(n) is the change in the associative strength (V) of CS as
a result of a pairing with US on trial n; acs is the learning
rate parameter of the CS; bus(n) is the learning rate parameter
of the US on trial n; lus(n) is the asymptote of learning or the
maximum associative strength that the US can support on
trial n; and Vtotal(n) is the sum of associative strengths of all
CSs present on trial n, or the extent to which the US is pre-
dicted on trial n. The basic principle behind the R-W model
is that associative learning is determined by the extent to
which an US is surprising,  represented by the difference
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between the US that is actually presented on  trial n and the
US that is expected on the basis of the summed predictive
value of all the cues that are present on trial n.
With respect to blocking and cue competition, the R-W
model predicts the consequences of presenting multiple
causes. Cue competition for causes is observed in blocking
experiments because by the end of Phase 1 training, the
animal has learned that CS1 perfectly predicts the US.
During Phase 2 training, when CS1 and CS2 are presented
together with the US, no learning occurs for CS1CS2
because changing the associative strength of the CS2 cannot
improve the already perfect predictability of the US.
However, the R-W model is unable to naturally handle
cue competition between multiple effects of a common
cause, because it is a predictive model that assumes a cause-
to-effect directionality in learning associations. In other
words, the difference term (l– Vtotal) only applies to the
ability of cue (CS) to predict outcome (US), but not out-
come to cue.  However, several researchers have obtained
cue competition for effects and have provided associative
accounts for them (e.g., Shanks, 1991; Shanks & Lopez,
1996; Price & Yates, 1995; Cobos et al, 2002). In order to
do so, these researchers have had to resort to the somewhat
convoluted procedure of presenting participants with the
effects preceding the cause (for instance, where symptoms
predict the disease that caused them).  In other words, the R-
W model can accommodate cue competition for effects by
using a diagnostic learning procedure, where the multiple
effects can be presented as antecedent events, which are un-
derstood to occur after their cause, even though the effects
are presented prior to the cause. Thus the effects (antece-
dents) compete with each other in predicting the cause.
However, the R-W rule cannot handle the more typical
situation in which causes occur before effects.
Gluck and Bower (1988) and Shanks (1991) demonstrated
that a simple two layer feedforward network using the delta
rule, which is closely related to the R-W rule, correctly pre-
dicted competition of cues (symptoms) for a common out-
come (a rare disease). The delta rule is an error-correcting
learning rule that says that the changes in weights, ∆wij,
from input node i to output node j is given by the following
equation: ∆wij =  ∂ (tj – oj) ai, where a is the activation on
input node i; t is the target activation on output node j; o is
the observed or actual activation on output j; and ∂ is the
learning rate (constant). As in the R-W rule, the change in
weight between the input and output nodes, ∆w, depends on
the extent to which the target activation of the output differs
from the observed activation of the output.
However, this network can only learn forward links from
cues to outcomes.  Thus, as with the R-W rule they could
capture cue competition for effects only by assuming diag-
nostic learning where the effects precede the cause.
We will show that a recurrent network model with delta-
rule learning does not have this limitation, but can handle
cue competition for effects when causes precede effects.
Cue Competition in Causal Model Theory
Causal model theory argues that people use meaningful
world knowledge about the basic characteristics of causal
relations in conjunction with contingency information to
build causal models of the relations between causes and
effect (Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). The causal model
theory uses a contingency rule to deal with a multiple cue
situation, where the contingency is the difference between
the proportion of cases in which the effect and cause co-
occur and the proportion of cases in which the effect occurs
in the absence of the cause.  When the causal model is pre-
dictive, cue competition between causes is expected in the
classic blocking paradigm because during Phase 2 training,
the new cue, Cue2, always co-occurs with first cue, Cue1.
Waldmann and Holyoak (1992) argue that because “it is
impossible to determine whether the observed unconditional
contingency between Cue2 and the effect is genuine or spu-
rious,” this should lead to uncertainty, which should further
lead to a lowered predictiveness of Cue2, or partial blocking
(p. 226). On the other hand, they assert that effects do not
compete with each other, because each effect provides fur-
ther information about the cause and there is no uncertainty
(Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; Waldmann, 2000).
Waldmann has done a number of studies that fail to find
cue competition for effects (with the exception of Study 2 in
Waldmann and Holyoak (1992)). However, he typically
uses complicated learning tasks where effects temporally
precede causes (diagnostic learning). This has apparently
been motivated by the necessity of using diagnostic learning
to compare the predictions of the R-W rule.
Cue Competition in Contiguity Models
Some researchers propose that a noncompetitive, contiguity
theory of learning may better accommodate cue competition
for effects by asserting that cue competition does not arise
during learning, but during later judgment (e.g., Matute et
al., 1996).  Further, Matute et al. (1996) found that the
wording of test questions moderates the observance of cue
competition for effects. They obtained cue competition for
causes when they used test questions that implicitly probed
the conditional probability of an effect given a cause
compared to its probability given an alternative cause
(p[E|C] with p[E|C’]), and they found cue competition for
effects when they probed the conditional probability of a
cause given an effect compared to its probability given an
alternative effect (p[C|E] with p[C|E’]).  Their work seems
to suggest that the direction of the relationship queried may
be related to whether evidence is found for cue competition.
Cue competition in Recurrent Neural Networks
Recently, Read (2003) demonstrated that a recurrent
network, based on McClelland and Rumelhart’s (1988)
auto-associator, with bidirectional links between the input
and output nodes and using a modified version of the delta
rule, can predict cue competition for both causes and effects.
Unlike a feed-forward model, the recurrent model acquires
bidirectional links or associations between the input and
output nodes, and thus is able to accommodate cue
competition for effects with predictive learning, where the
cause precedes the effects.
One of the reasons this literature has become so confusing
is that in order to use the R-W rule or a feed-forward net-
work as a model of cue competition for effects, one must
test cue competition for effects with diagnostic learning,
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where effects are encountered before causes.  However,
with the recurrent network with delta-rule learning, this is
not necessary.  The current model allows one to test an
associative model, closely related to R-W, with the more
natural situation in which causes temporally precede effects.
In a recurrent neural network, the associative strengths of
the bidirectional links between any two events may differ,
and this possible asymmetry can be illustrated in the classic
blocking paradigm. In the recurrent model, the observation
of blocking depends on the direction of the association
between the redundant cause B and the common effect X. If
the association between cause A and X is trained in phase 1,
then when A and B are subsequently paired preceding X, the
link from Bfi X should exhibit competitive learning
because, when B is activated, X is already activated due to
the simultaneous presence of the previously trained cause A,
which is a perfect predictor of X. Thus, there is little change
in the link from BfiX during Phase 2 training because B
does not provide any new information about X. However,
the link from XfiB should not exhibit cue competition dur-
ing Phase 2 training, as activating X does not predict B
because B is not initially predicted by anything. Therefore,
there is a great discrepancy between the target activation of
B and the actual activation of B, which results in a greater
weight change in the link from XfiB. The result is that the
link from XfiB will be stronger than the link from BfiX,
suggesting that cue competition should only be observed in
the link from BfiX. As seen in Figure 1, Read demonstrated
this asymmetry in weights using the recurrent model, with
delta rule learning, with a learning rate of .15, with 10
passes through 10 learning instances with the same
contingencies as in the current experimental stimuli.
Figure 1: Weights demonstrating cue competition for causes
after Phase 1 and 2 training (but not after Phase 2 only
training). A and B are causes, X is the common effect.
Similarly, the recurrent model predicts cue competition
for effects using the same rule. Again, the model predicts an
asymmetry between the associative strengths of the links
from AfiY and YfiA. The associative link from YfiA
should exhibit competitive learning because when Y is acti-
vated during Phase 2 training, A is already highly activated
from the simultaneous presence of X, which is a perfect
predictor of A. Thus, there is very little weight change in the
link from YfiA. However, the link from AfiY should not
exhibit cue competition in learning because when A is acti-
vated during Phase 2 learning, Y is not initially predicted by
anything. Therefore, the discrepancy between the target and
the actual activations of Y are large, resulting in a bigger
weight change in the link from AfiY. Thus, the associative
strength from AfiY should be stronger than the associative
strength of YfiA. Read’s simulation results in Figure 2,
with the same parameters, reflect this as well.
Figure 2: Weights demonstrating cue competition for effects
after Phase 1 and 2 training (but not after Phase 2 only
training). A is the cause and X and Y are the effects.
Purpose. Our purpose is threefold. First, we will provide
further evidence that cue competition for effects occurs.
Second, we will demonstrate that this effect can be obtained
using social stimuli. Finally, we will test the predictions of
the recurrent network model for cue competition and the
asymmetry in the associative strengths of the bidirectional
links between the cue and the target outcome. We will ask
subjects to make judgments about the associative strengths
of each of the two possible links between a cue and an out-
come. Doing this in the same study has not previously been
done. It is expected that cue competition for effects will be
observed as well as the asymmetry in the associative
strengths of the two possible links: the target outcome, Y,
will exhibit cue competition with outcome, X, for the
weight from YfiA, but not for the weight from AfiY.
We will get directional measures of strength by asking
subjects to make conditional probability judgments between
all pairs of nodes. Interpreting these judgments depends on
the relationship between weights and conditional
probabilities.  As O’Reilly and Munakata (2000) show, in
neural networks, the weight from an input i to an output o is
a function of the conditional probability of the input given
the output (p [i|o]).  The output node can be thought of as
corresponding to a hypothesis and the input node to data
concerning the hypothesis.  Thus, the weight from input to
output captures the conditional probability of the data given
the hypothesis.  The critical implication is that judgments of
the conditional probability p[Y|A] will be sensitive to the
strength of the weight from Y to A whereas judgments of
p[A|Y] should be sensitive to the weight from A to Y.
Study 1
Stimuli were four unrelated behaviors that had no known
preexisting relationship with each other: breaking a glass
(cause A); shaving one’s head (effect X); lighting a tree on
fire (effect Y); and meditating (filler effect Z). Information
was presented simultaneously in list format (as Van Hamme
et al. (1993) and Matute et al. (1996) did) with a dashed line
break in between the antecedent and subsequent events to
separate the common cause from the multiple effects.
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Participants were instructed to learn the causal relationships
between the antecedent and subsequent events. Finally,
questions designed to assess the conditional probabilities
and probe the associative strengths between all four
behaviors were used (AfiX; XfiA; AfiY; YfiA; XfiY;
YfiX; AfiZ; ZfiA).
Method
Participants. 93 undergraduates from the University of
Southern California volunteered for extra credit. The study
was a between subjects design with repeated measures on
judgments, where the experimental group received both
Phase 1 and Phase 2 of training, and the control group only
received the Phase 2 training.
Materials and Procedure. Subjects were randomly as-
signed to the experimental or control group and seated in
front of a computer, on which the entire experiment was
done. The cover story asked subjects to imagine that they
were anthropologists in the distant future traveling to a long
lost human colony on a faraway planet to study their culture
and social customs. They were instructed that their goal was
to learn the various behavioral patterns of the colonists by
observing individual instances of sets of behaviors. They
were instructed to learn the causal relationships among the
behaviors.  Before seeing the behaviors, all subjects made
initial judgments about the extent to which the four stimulus
behaviors were related to each other to establish that they
had no known relationship. They were asked to rate the ex-
tent to which the occurrence of one behavior affected the
likelihood of another behavior on a scale from -10 to 10,
where -10 indicates “strongly inhibits,” 10 indicates
“strongly promotes”, and 0 indicates “no relationship.”
These questions and rating scale were also used for the
testing after the training phase(s).
After the initial ratings, subjects in the experimental con-
dition received Phase 1 training, where they saw 10
behavior sets exhibited by 10 individuals. Each set was
presented individually on separate screens along with the
name of the individual exhibiting the behaviors. Each set
was displayed until the subject pressed the space bar. Eight
of the 10 sets involved “breaking a glass” (cause A)
followed by “shaving one’s head” (effect X); 2 of the 10
sets involved “breaking a glass” (cause A) followed by
“meditating” (filler effect Z). The order of the 10 sets was
randomized for each participant. After Phase 1, subjects
started Phase 2 training, where they saw 10 more behavior
sets exhibited by 10 new individuals. Eight of the 10 sets
involved “breaking a glass” (cause A) followed by “shaving
one’s head” (effect X) and “lighting a tree on fire” (effect
Y). As in Phase 1, two of the 10 sets involved “breaking a
glass (cause A) followed by “meditating” (filler effect Z).
Subjects in the control condition only received Phase 2
training. Immediately after training, they made judgments
about the extent to which one behavior affects the likelihood
of another behavior, for all four behaviors in both directions.
Thus, subjects made judgments about the extent to which
“breaking a glass” affects the likelihood of “shaving one’s
head” (AfiX); “shaving one’s head” affects the likelihood
of “breaking a glass” (XfiA); “breaking a glass” affects the
likelihood of “lighting a tree on fire” (AfiY); “lighting a
tree on fire” affects the likelihood of “breaking a glass”
(YfiA); “shaving one’s head” affects the likelihood of
“lighting a tree on fire” (XfiY); “lighting a tree on fire”
affects the likelihood of “shaving one’s head” (YfiX);
“breaking a glass” affects the likelihood of “meditating”
(AfiZ); and “meditating” affects the likelihood of “breaking
a glass” (ZfiA).
Results and Discussion
The mean of the eight initial ratings was -.62 for the ex-
perimental condition, and -.49 for the control, indicating that
the four behaviors had no preexisting causal relationships.
The mean of the eight final ratings was 5.77 for the
experimental condition, and 6.19 for the control, indicating
that subjects learned the causal contingencies.
A between-groups comparison for each of the eight final
ratings found all of them to be non-significant with one ex-
ception. As predicted, the difference between experimental
and control group judgments of the YfiA rating (p[Y/A])
was found to be highly significant, t(91)=3.02, p=.003
(experimental M= 5.29 vs. control M=7.21) (See Figure 3).
This provides evidence for cue competition between effects
in the direction predicted by the recurrent network.
Figure 3: Mean ratings for cue competition for effects in the
AXY (control) and AX-AXY (experimental) conditions. A
is the cause, X and Y are the two competing effects.
Although the results of Study 1 were consistent with our
predictions, we wondered whether the test questions did a
good job of measuring conditional probabilities. After
learning the behavioral contingencies, subjects were asked
to make some “final estimates about the extent to which the
occurrence of the first behavior affects the likelihood of the
occurrence of the second behavior.” However, for the
backward reasoning test questions (e.g., XfiA, YfiA, and
ZfiA) the actual test questions asked subjects to indicate the
likelihood that an individual doing X (or Y or Z) had
previously done A. In other words, the task instructions im-
plicitly asked subjects to make forward casual judgments
from the first listed behavior to the second, while the actual
test questions asked subjects to make backward causal
judgments from the first listed behavior to the second (at
least for the backward reasoning questions). Thus, it is un-
clear whether we were successful in measuring the
bidirectional associative strengths among the four behaviors.
Study 2
Study 2 involved several changes. First, the wording of the
test questions was changed to more clearly measure
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conditional probabilities. Test questions probing the
associative strength of the link from Afi X were more
clearly phrased as the probability of A given X (p[A|X]),
XfiA was more clearly phrased as the probability of X
given A (p[X|A]), and so forth (The phrasing of the new
questions is presented later).  Next, because the recurrent
network model also predicts cue competition for causes as a
result of asymmetrical associative strengths in the links
between the redundant cue and outcome, the design from
Study 1 was used to investigate cue competition for causes
as well as for effects. For the Effects condition, the design
and stimulus behaviors (Cause A, Effects X, Y and Z) were
identical to those of Study 1. For the Causes condition,
Cause A and Effect X remained the same with the addition
of a new redundant Cause B, (“ringing a bell”) in the Phase
2 training portion, and changing the previous filler effect Z
to filler cause Z. Finally, Study 2 was conducted on the web.
Method
Participants.  168 adults ranging from ages 18 to 67 par-
ticipated in this study on the Internet. Mean age was 39.28
(SD = 12.792). Participants were from previous on-line
studies, unrelated to causal reasoning, who indicated that
they were interested in future on-line studies. They were
recruited by email and were residents of the US, with three
exceptions. They were entered into a lottery for a $50 cash
prize, with the odds of winning at 1/50. The study was a
between subjects design with repeated measures on
judgments. As before, the experimental groups for causes
and effects received both Phase 1 and Phase 2 training, and
the control groups only received Phase 2 training.
Materials and Procedure. Subjects clicked a link in their
email directing them to the study. Upon clicking the button
that initiated the experiment, subjects were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions: experimental and control
conditions for Causes and experimental and control
conditions for Effects. Subjects were presented with the
same cover story as in Study 1. Because Study 1 showed
that there were no preexisting relationships between the
behaviors, the initial judgments were dropped for Study 2.
The procedures for the Effects conditions were identical
to Study 1. Procedures for the Causes conditions were
identical to those for Effects, with the exception of changes
in the behaviors. In Phase 1 for the experimental group, 8 of
the 10 sets involved “breaking a glass” (cause A) followed
by “shaving one’s head” (effect X); 2 of the 10 sets involved
“meditating” (filler cause Z) followed by “shaving one’s
head” (effect X). In Phase 2, 8 of the 10 sets involved
“breaking a glass” (cause A) and “ringing a bell” (redundant
cause B) followed by “shaving one’s head” (effect X). As in
Phase 1, 2 of the 10 sets involved “meditating” (filler cause
z) followed by “shaving one’s head” (effect X). Control
subjects only received Phase 2 training.
The order of the eight test questions was randomized for
each subject. Immediately following training, subjects were
asked to make final judgments about the extent to which the
occurrence of one behavior affects the likelihood of the oc-
currence of another behavior in terms of conditional prob-
abilities for all four stimulus behaviors both directions.
They made their judgments by clicking on a radio button on
a rating scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates “No chance”,
5 indicates “50-50”, and 10 indicates “Certain”. The test
questions were phrased: for p[A|X],  “Assuming that
someone shaves their head, how likely is it that they had
broken a glass,” and  for p[X|A], “Assuming that someone
has broken a glass, how likely is it that they will shave their
head?,” and so forth.
Results and Discussion
As presented in Figure 4, the results for the Effects condi-
tion in study 2 replicate those of Study 1.
Figure 4: Mean ratings for cue competition for effects in the
AXY  and AX-AXY  conditions in Study 2.
Between groups comparison of the final ratings for the
experimental and control conditions showed a difference in
the critical variable of YfiA rating, (p [Y|A]) t(70)=3.75,
p=.00 (M=5.30 for experimental vs. M=7.36 for control).
No other comparisons were significant. Cue competition for
effects was asymmetric in the predicted direction.
For the Causes condition, there was a significant
difference between the experimental and control groups for
the critical variable of BfiX rating (p[B|X]), t(76) = 2.57, p
=.01. However, the difference for the non-critical variable
of XfiB (p[X|B]) was also significant, t(76) = 2.88, p =.00,
as presented in Figure 5. Cue competition for causes is
obtained, but contrary to the network model’s predictions,
there is no asymmetry in the associative strengths.
Figure 5: Mean final ratings for cue competition for causes
in the ABX and AX-ABX conditions in Study 2. A and B
are the competing causes, and X is the common effect.
General Discussion
These results replicate the well-established phenomenon of
competition between causes (e.g., Van Hamme et al., 1993;
Waldman & Holyoak, 1992) as well as the more controver-
sial competition between effects (Shanks, 1991; Price &
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Yates, 1993; Matute et al., 1996). Further, these studies
show that this effect can be obtained with social behaviors
and is not limited to biological or physical events.
The present study is the first to study cue competition for
causes and effects by systematically exploring all possible
directional links between causes and effects. Studies 1 and 2
demonstrated that cue competition between effects occurs
on the weight from the redundant effect Y to the cause A,
rather than on the weight from the cause A to the redundant
effect Y. However, Study 2 seemed to indicate that cue
competition between causes occurs on both the weight from
the redundant cause B to effect X as well as on the weight
from effect X to the redundant cause B.
The results clearly contradict causal model theory, which
states that effects do not compete. As for the associative
learning and the neural network models, the results support
their prediction of competitive learning and the presence of
cue competition between effects.   
One advantage of the recurrent model is that it provides
an account of cue competition for effects without the
necessity of requiring diagnostic learning (effects precede
causes).  Further, the recurrent model predicts and the
current results confirm that the extent of cue competition
depends on the direction of the weight or relationship
between cue and effect.  Previous models would have been
unable to make such a prediction.
The results for cue competition between effects are
consistent with the idea that the weights are sensitive to the
conditional probabilities between causes and effects. These
studies show that cue competition between effects occurs on
the weights from Y to A and not from A to Y after AX-
AXY training. This makes sense in terms of conditional
probability, in that, taking both Phase 1 and 2 into account,
every time Y was presented, it was always preceded by A,
and thus p(A|Y) is 100%. (note the weight from A to Y
should encode this conditional probability). However,
whenever A was presented, Y followed A only half the time
(during Phase 2), and thus p(Y|A) is 50% (the weight from
Y to A should encode this conditional probability). Thus,
the asymmetry in cue competition between effects is
consistent with the conditional probabilities.
However, with regard to cue competition for causes the
same does not seem to apply. A conditional probability
analysis should predict a similar asymmetry. Instead, the
results indicate no asymmetry in the bi-directional associa-
tive links between the redundant cause and the common
effect; cue competition occurs when reasoning both from
BfiX and from Xfi B. It is unclear why we do not get
weight asymmetry for cue competition for causes.
However, in further research, using different social stimuli,
we did find the predicted asymmetry, suggesting that the
current results may be specific to the current stimuli.
We note one other caveat.  Research in this area has not
separated the effects of learning from the judgment process.
Future studies in cue competition should be designed to
examine the various types of processes that participants may
use to arrive at their judgments of contingency.
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Abstract 
 
Relational categories underlie many uniquely human cogni-
tive processes including analogy, problem solving, and 
scientific discovery.  Despite their ubiquity and importance, 
the field of category learning has focused almost exclusively 
on categories based on features.  Classification of feature-
based categories is typically modeled by calculating similarity 
to stored representations, an approach that successfully mod-
els the learning of both probabilistic and deterministic 
category structures.  In contrast, we hypothesize that rela-
tional category learning is analogous to schema induction, and 
relies on finding common relational structures.  This hypothe-
sis predicts that relational category acquisition should 
function well for deterministic categories but suffer catastro-
phically when faced with probabilistic categories, which 
contain no constant relations.  We report support for this pre-
diction, along with evidence that the schemas induced in the 
deterministic condition drive categorization of novel and even 
category-ambiguous exemplars. 
 
Relational and Feature-Based Categorization 
Most mathematical models of human category learning start 
with the assumption that people represent categories as lists 
of features, and assign instances to categories by comparing 
the features of an instance to the features stored with the 
mental representation of the category (either a prototype or 
stored exemplars; e.g., Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; 
Kruschke, 1992; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999; Nosofsky, 
1992; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Shiffrin & Styvers, 1997).  
Accordingly, most studies of human category learning in the 
laboratory investigate how people learn categories with ex-
emplars consisting of well-defined (to the experimenter, at 
least) features.  
In the real world, as some researchers have forcefully 
pointed out (e.g., Barsalou, 1993; Keil, 1989; Murphy & 
Medin, 1985; Rips, 1989; Ross & Spalding, 1994) catego-
ries are less often defined in terms of lists of features than in 
terms of relations between things: either relations between 
the features or parts of an exemplar (e.g., the legs need to be 
in a particular kind of relation to the seat in order for an 
object to serve as a chair), or relations between the exemplar 
and the user’s goals (e.g., any object that affords sitting can, 
in some circumstances, be considered a chair), or relations 
between the exemplar and other objects in the world (e.g., 
what makes an object a “conduit” is a relation between that 
object and whatever thing flows through it, whether it be 
water, light, electricity, information, or karma).  In spite of 
their importance in human cognition, comparatively little is 
known about how people learn relational categories. 
Relational category learning is important because rela-
tional concepts (i.e., mental representations of relational 
categories) play an essential role in virtually all aspects of 
human thinking, including our ability to make and use 
analogies, problem solving, scientific discovery, and even 
aspects of perception (see, e.g., Gentner, 1983; Gentner et 
al., 1997; Green, 2004; Hesse, 1966; Holyoak & Thagard, 
1995; Hummel, 2000).  The utility of relational representa-
tions is that they permit generalization from a small (often 
as few as one or two) number of examples to a large (poten-
tially infinite) number of new cases (as in the case of 
inferences generated through the use of analogies, schemas 
and rules; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Pirolli & Anderson, 
1985; Ross, 1987). 
Relational concepts cannot be adequately represented as 
lists of features (as assumed by most current models of 
category learning), but instead must be mentally represented 
as relational structures such as schemas or theories 
(Gentner, 1983; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 
1986; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003; Keil, 1989; Murphy & 
Medin, 1985).  This observation suggests that the operations 
governing relational schema induction may also underlie the 
acquisition of relational categories (see, e.g., Kuehne et al., 
2000). 
At least one theory of schema induction, Hummel and 
Holyoak’s, 2003, LISA model, predicts that a schema in-
duced from two or more examples retains (roughly) the 
structured intersection of what the examples have in com-
mon.  For example, consider two analogous stories about 
love triangles.  In the first, Abe loves Betty, but Betty loves 
Chad, so Abe is jealous of Chad; in the second Alice loves 
Bill, but Bill loves Cathy, so Alice is jealous of Cathy.  
Drawing an analogy between these stories maps Abe to Al-
ice, Betty to Bill, and Chad to Cathy (along with the roles of 
the loves and jealous-of relations).  The schema LISA in-
duces from this analogy retains what the examples have in 
common, and de-emphasizes the ways in which they differ.  
For example, since the analogy maps males to females and 
vice versa, the resulting schema effectively discards the 
actors’ genders, stating (roughly) “person1 loves person2 
but person2 loves person3, so person1 is jealous of per-
son3,” where persons1…3 are generic people, rather than 
being specifically males or females (see Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2003).   
Importantly, this intersection discovery process also 
takes place at the level of whole propositions.  For example, 
if the second story contained a proposition stating that, as a 
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result of her jealousy, Alice was mean to Cathy, but the first 
story had no corresponding proposition, then LISA would 
simply drop this proposition in its entirety from the resulting 
schema. 
If we assume that relational category learning is a proc-
ess of relational schema induction, then this property of 
dropping unmapped propositions (i.e., unmapped relations) 
from the induced schema (i.e., category representation) 
leads to a counterintuitive prediction: If a relational category 
has a probabilistic structure, such that every member of the 
category shares some relations with every other member of 
the category, but there is no relation that all members share, 
then category learning should fail catastrophically.  The 
reason is that the process of schema induction will drop any 
relation that is absent from any exemplar from the emerging 
schema.  If every relation is absent from some exemplar 
(i.e., no relation is present in every exemplar), then schema 
induction will eventually drop every relation from the 
schema.  By the end, the induced schema will be the empty 
set.   
To clarify, consider a simple relational category with 
four exemplars, each with three relations chosen from the 
set r1, r2, r3 and r4 (for our current purposes it does not 
matter what r1…r4 are, only that they are relations of some 
sort).  Let exemplar 1 (e1) contain the relations r1, r2 and r3.  
That is, e1 = [r1, r2, r3].  Similarly, let e2 = [r2, r3, r4]; e3 = 
[r1, r3, r4]; and e4 = [r1, r2, r4].  Note that mapping, for 
example, e1 to e2 results in a schema (s1,2) that contains 
relations r2 and r3 (which e1 and e2 share), but lacks r1 
(which e1 possesses but e2 does not) and r4 (which e2 pos-
sesses but e1 does not): s1,2 = [r2, r3].  Mapping s1,2 onto, 
say, e3, produces a schema containing only r3, and mapping 
that schema onto e4 produces a schema containing no rela-
tions.  The resulting schema is clearly not a useful basis for 
classifying exemplars as members of the category. 
The point is that relational category learning is pre-
dicted to be extremely difficult when the categories have a 
strictly probabilistic structure (i.e., with no relation shared 
by all exemplars).  By contrast, if there is even a single rela-
tion that is shared by all exemplars, then category learning 
should improve dramatically relative to the purely probabil-
istic case.  Categorization performance should also improve 
dramatically, even with purely probabilistic categories, if 
the relational structure is replaced with a feature-based 
structure.  Learning of feature-based categories is well 
known to be robust to probabilistic category structures, a 
fact that underlies prototype effects (e.g., Posner & Keele, 
1968).   
In summary, we predict a sharp dissociation between 
relational and feature-based category learning with respect 
to their robustness to probabilistic category structures: Both 
relational and feature-based categories should be learnable 
when they have a deterministic structure, even if only a sin-
gle relation or feature reliably predicts category 
membership; similarly, feature-based categories should be 
learnable whether they have a deterministic structure or a 
probabilistic one.  By contrast, relational categories should 
be extremely hard to learn from examples when those ex-
amples are presented in a probabilistic structure.   
We tested this hypothesized dissociation between rela-
tional and feature-based category learning using a 2x2 
design, in which relational vs. feature-based categories were 
crossed with probabilistic vs. deterministic category struc-
tures.  In order to control all extraneous sources of potential 
effects, the same basic stimulus set was used in all four con-
ditions; only the assignment of stimuli to categories varied. 
  
Method 
Subjects.  33 UCLA undergraduate students participated for 
course credit. 
 
Instructions.  Participants were read a cover story describ-
ing a computer manufacturer trying to determine the 
function of accidentally unlabelled computer chips.  Sub-
jects then engaged in a training phase followed by a transfer 
phase.   During both phases, subjects were instructed to in-
dicate the category to which the onscreen stimulus belonged 
by pressing one of two keys.  The categories were labeled 
“math” chips and “graphics” chips. 
 
Materials.  On each trial, the subject saw an exemplar con-
sisting of an octagon and a square, arranged on a fixed 
background designed to resemble a computer chip (see Fig-
ure 1).  Each exemplar had both relational properties (e.g., 
octagon bigger than square) and featural properties (e.g., 
octagon of size 3).   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example stimulus. 
The properties of each exemplar were determined by an 
identical family resemblance category structure (see Table 
1).  The prototypes of the two categories were defined as 
(1,1,1,1) and (0,0,0,0), and distortions were made by chang-
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ing the value of one or more dimensions to its opposite1.  
Each column in Table 1 represents an exemplar, and the 
particular value on each dimension (1 or 0) defines the value 
of a relation (in the relational condition) or a feature (in the 
featural condition) for each exemplar.  The values for both 
the relational and featural properties are listed in Table 2.  
For example, the relational prototype with structure (1,1,1,1) 
would have an octagon bigger, darker, above, and in front 
of a square, while the prototype with structure (0,0,0,0) 
would be the exact opposite.  The properties were set up so 
that using features could not result in learning to criterion in 
the relational condition, and using relations in the feature 
condition would also lead to sub-criterion responding.2  
Stimulus generation and display as well as response collec-
tion were done with a program written in Matlab. 
  
Design.  The experiment used a 2 (category structure: prob-
abilistic vs. deterministic) X 2 (relevant property: features 
vs. relations) between-subjects design. The only difference 
between the conditions in terms of the stimuli used was that, 
in the deterministic condition, a single distorted exemplar 
from each category was not presented during training, so 
that one dimension was constant for all exemplars of a cate-
gory.  The choice of which dimension was held constant 
was counterbalanced across subjects. 
 
Table 1: Family resemblance category structure.  Each col-
umn represents an exemplar, and each row a dimension. 
 
Category A Ambiguous Category B 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
 
Procedure.  During the training phase subjects classified 
only distorted exemplars of each category (depicted in the 
light gray columns of Table 2).  All distortions for each 
category were shown in random order exactly once per 
block.  Responses were followed by accuracy feedback, 
during which the exemplar remained on the screen.  Sub-
jects pressed the space bar to proceed to the next trial.  The 
training phase continued until the subject responded cor-
                                                 
1 Note that the exemplars marked “Ambiguous” are equal distance 
between the two prototypes, having exactly two values different 
from each. 
2
 In the relational condition, stimuli from different categories 
could have the same features (and stimuli from the same category 
could have different features) as long as the specified relations 
held; features were thus non-diagnostic.  For the featural condition, 
the relations in front and above had no relevance to the category 
structure, and were pseudo-randomized.  The relations bigger and 
darker were made irrelevant by choosing values such that the octa-
gon was never smaller or lighter than the square (though it could 
be the same size, since only three sizes were used).  See the Dis-
cussion section for further analysis of feature and relation values. 
rectly on at least seven out of eight trials for two consecu-
tive blocks3, or until they had finished 75 blocks (600 trials) 
without reaching this criterion.   
Following the training phase, subjects were informed 
that they would be tested on chips for which feedback could 
not be given.  During this transfer phase subjects classified 
all 16 possible exemplars, including the prototypes and am-
biguous exemplars.  Subjects completed five blocks, with 
each block showing all 16 exemplars in random order ex-
actly once.  
After the transfer phase, each subjects completed a 
questionnaire in which they were asked to write down the 
criteria they used to categorize the exemplars. 
  
Table 2: Category definitions.   
 
Relational categories 
Exemplar Relation  Exemplar Relation
1 Bigger  0 Smaller 
1 Darker  0 Lighter 
1 Above  0 Below 
1 In Front  0 Behind 
 
Feature-based categories 
Exemplar Feature  Exemplar Feature
1 O size 3  0 O size 2 
1 O shade 4  0 O shade 3 
1 S size 1  0 S size 2 
1 S shade 1  0 S shade 2 
 
Note: Prototype exemplars are shown with their defining 
properties on each dimension.  In the relational condition, 
each dimension defines how the octagon (O) in the stimulus 
relates to the square (S).  For the featural condition each 
dimension defines specific feature values. 
 
Results 
Training.  Only 5 of the 7 subjects (71%) in the relational 
probabilistic (RP) condition learned to criterion within 600 
trials.  25/25 subjects (100%) in the other conditions learned 
to criterion within the 600 trial limit.  In the analyses that 
follow, the 2 subjects in the RP condition who never learned 
to criterion are treated as though they reached criterion on 
trial 601.  Given that our hypothesis predicts that learning in 
the RP condition will be harder (and therefore take longer) 
than learning in the other conditions, this assumption is ex-
tremely conservative. 
The mean number of trials to criterion is shown in Fig-
ure 2 for each condition.  Subjects in the RP condition took 
more trials to reach criterion than those in the FD (featural 
deterministic), FP (featural probabilistic), and RD (rela-
                                                 
3 This criterion level (87.5%) was selected because strategies 
involving tracking only one or two relations in the probabilistic 
condition would not meet the criterion level (both would result in 
75% correct responding). 
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tional deterministic) conditions.  A planned contrast com-
paring the RP condition to the other three revealed that this 
difference was statistically reliable (p < 0.01).  There was 
also a significant main effect of category type (relational vs. 
featural, F(1,33)=4.64, p < 0.05).  The main effect of cate-
gory structure (deterministic vs. probabilistic) and the 
interaction were both marginally reliable (0.05 < p < 0.15). 
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Figure 2: Average number of trials required by subjects in 
each condition to reach criterion during training. 
 
Transfer.  The key prediction for the transfer phase was 
that subjects in the deterministic condition would categorize 
exemplars based on whatever dimension was held constant 
during training.  This prediction applied especially to the 
relational condition, which could not rely on holistic proc-
essing.  To test this hypothesis we analyzed classification of 
the ambiguous exemplars, which were equidistant between 
the two prototypes.  Subjects who used all category dimen-
sions equally should be unsystematic in their classification 
of these ambiguous exemplars.  By contrast, subjects who 
attend to a single dimension should classify ambiguous ex-
emplars according to that dimension only (as detailed in 
Table 3).  If a classification response for a dimension that 
was held constant during training matched the response pat-
tern in Table 3, then +1 was scored for that response; 
classifications that did not match Table 3 response patterns 
were scored as -1.  Under this scoring system, consistently 
responding to ambiguous exemplars in the direction pre-
dicted by the constant training dimension results in a 
positive score; consistently responding in the direction op-
posite the constant dimension results in a negative score; 
and unsystematic responding results in a score near zero. 
Classification of ambiguous exemplars in accordance 
with the dimension that was constant during training was 
significantly above chance (p < 0.01).  Breakdown into fea-
tural and relational conditions showed a non-significant 
trend for the relational condition to evoke classifications 
based on the constant training dimension more often than 
the featural condition (Figure 3). 
 
Discussion 
The results showed that acquisition of relational probabilis-
tic categories takes significantly longer than acquisition of 
deterministic relational categories, or featural categories of 
any kind (probabilistic or deterministic). Importantly, the 
ease of acquisition in the deterministic relational condition 
shows that this effect is not due strictly to the relational na-
ture of the task. Instead, the catastrophic failure represents 
an interaction between the relational nature of the stimuli 
and the probabilistic structure of the categories.  This inter-
action is consistent with the hypothesis that relational 
category learning is a process akin to relational schema in-
duction by intersection discovery: When the intersection is 
the empty set (as it is in the probabilistic condition but not 
the deterministic condition), relational category learning 
suffers markedly.  By contrast, feature-based category learn-
ing is much more robust to the probabilistic category 
structure, presumably because feature-based category learn-
ing is not a process of relational schema induction; instead, 
as predicted by models of feature-based category learning, it 
may be that learning feature-based categories can be ac-
complished simply by cataloging and matching features. 
 
Table 3: Classification of exemplars based on single 
                     dimensions 
 
Exemplar Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4
1 1 0 0 A A B B 
1 0 1 0 A B A B 
1 0 0 1 A B B A 
0 0 1 1 B B A A 
0 1 1 0 B A A B 
0 1 0 1 B A B A 
 
Note: Table entries indicate how each exemplar would be 
categorized by a subject who attended only to a single di-
mension (columns in the table).  For example, a subject who 
attended only to the first dimension (Dim 1) would classify 
the first, second and third exemplars as As since their values 
on that dimension are all one, and B for the fourth, fifth and 
sixth exemplars (the values of which are zero on that dimen-
sion). 
Schema use in ambiguous exemplars
(Deterministic condition)
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
A
ve
ra
g
e 
m
a
tc
h
 t
o
 
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
Feature-based Relational
 
Figure 3: Average match to predicted classification pattern. 
Positive values indicate schema-based classification; zero 
corresponds to unsystematic responding. 
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The significant match of subjects’ responses with sin-
gle-dimension classification predictions in the deterministic 
condition also shows that subjects do preferentially use di-
mensions that are constant during training to classify novel 
and even category-ambiguous exemplars. 
Is it possible to explain these results in other ways?  
One possibility is that rather than attending to the relations, 
subjects in the relational conditions may instead be tracking 
the feature values of certain dimensions.  On this hypothe-
sis, there is no schema induction going on in any condition; 
instead, responding is based on the values of particular fea-
tures.  This account obviates the need for a separate process 
to explain relational categorization. 
However, analysis reveals that subjects tracking a fea-
ture of a single dimension would only classify 5/6 correct in 
the deterministic condition, and 2/3 correct in the probabilis-
tic condition.  Both of these values are below the 7/8 
criterion, suggesting that subjects who reach criterion were 
not doing so by tracking a feature of a single dimension. 
The possibility remains that subjects were tracking the 
values of multiple features or dimensions, although these 
seem unlikely strategies for a number of reasons.  First, 
even when tracking the values of a single feature the subject 
must hold in mind three or four values and their associations 
with each category (for example, each size of the octagon 
and its corresponding category).  Each additional feature or 
dimension would double the number of values necessary to 
track.  This strategy does not seem plausible given the well-
known limits on the capacity of working memory.  Also, 
subjects’ responses to the debriefing questionnaires in the 
relational conditions did not suggest such strategies were 
being used; instead, they generally reported the use of one 
or two relations as diagnostic, often along with some excep-
tion exemplars.  Thus it seems more likely that subjects 
were indeed attending to the relations between the compo-
nents of each stimulus rather than tracking feature values of 
those components. 
Another hypothesis to explain the difference between 
the featural and relational conditions is that subjects were 
memorizing all the possible exemplars, and a difference in 
the number of distinct exemplars made the relational condi-
tion harder.  This view must also hold that the deterministic 
conditions do not rely on such memorization, in order to 
explain the results.  This view has some merit, though two 
factors reduce its likelihood.   
First, the total number of distinct exemplars in the fea-
tural condition is not very different than the relational 
condition: 128 vs. 144.  While this is a difference between 
the categories, it is difficult to ascribe the extra difficulty of 
the relational probabilistic condition to its having an extra 
16 exemplars.   
Second, although debriefing questionnaires did indicate 
subjects were memorizing some of the exemplars in the 
relational probabilistic condition, these were of very limited 
number (usually ~2 exemplars) and were memorized as ex-
ceptions to a more general classification rule.  Thus while it 
remains a theoretically possible explanation, the “number of 
exemplars” view is not very compelling. 
Preliminary analysis of the debriefing forms for sub-
jects who learned to criterion in the relational probabilistic 
task suggest that what is learned is often a classification rule 
(such as might result from a schema induction process) 
along with a few memorized exceptions.  Subjects often 
mentioned one or two relations in their classification rules; 
only one subject reported attending to all four dimensions; 
unsurprisingly, this subject was the only one who deduced 
the formal category structure (that is, that three out of four 
of the dimensions are necessary for category membership).   
Subjects in the featural probabilistic condition also 
failed to show feature-tracking strategies in their debriefing 
questionnaires.  Instead, their responses often showed a reli-
ance on emergent properties of the stimuli such as high vs. 
low contrast.  Questionnaires from the deterministic condi-
tions tended to show a focus on the dimension that was 
constant during training, and mentioned particular features 
in the featural condition and relations in the relational condi-
tion.  Thus subjects’ explicit responses often fit well with 
the predictions about processing. 
Why should relational categories rely on schema induc-
tion processes?  One possibility is that feature-based 
categories tend to give rise to emergent properties, since 
their features are fixed at some value or limited range of 
values.  However, it is much more difficult for emergent 
properties to arise in relational categories, because they can 
take on many different and overlapping values.  The lack of 
emergent properties may explain the dependence of rela-
tional categorization on deterministic dimensions.  This 
view is consistent with subjects’ self-reported strategies. 
Another interpretation of the present results is that peo-
ple are either unwilling or unable to perceive, predicate and 
categorize patterns across four relations.  This deficit may 
be due to working memory constraints, strategy choice, or 
low prior experience with similar situations. Studies of 
working memory suggest that we can hold about four 
chunks or role bindings in working memory (e.g., Halford, 
Wilson, & Phillips, 1998); holding four two-place relations 
exceeds this limit. It may be that people can learn some 
probabilistic relational categories with experience by re-
coding relations as features; others may be learned by 
dividing the probabilistic category into deterministic sub-
categories, or by perceiving a unifying causal relation for 
the entire category. 
In conclusion, the results of the present experiment 
suggest that relational category learning relies heavily on 
finding common relations across exemplars.  In contrast, 
feature-based category learning appears to function robustly 
whether common elements are present or not.  These find-
ings are consistent with the view that relational category 
learning is a kind of relational schema induction that de-
pends on intersection discovery.  Performance on the 
transfer trials also support this conclusion in that dimensions 
that were constant during training dominated classification 
of novel exemplars, even those that were category-
ambiguous.  Such findings suggest that relational category 
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learning may be fundamentally different from feature-based 
category learning, though more work is needed to distin-
guish these modes of category learning. 
 
References 
Barsalou, L. W. (1993). Flexibility, structure, and linguistic 
vagary in concepts: Manifestations of a compositional 
system of perceptual symbols. In A. F. Collins & S. E. 
Gathercole & M. A. Conway & P. E. Morris (Eds.), 
Theories of memory. Hillsdale, NJ, England: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Bruner, J. S., Goodnow, J. J., & Austin, G. A. (1956). A 
study of thinking. Oxford, England: John Wiley and 
Sons. 
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical 
framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 155-170. 
Gentner, D., Brem, S., Ferguson, R. W., Markman, A. B., 
Levidow, B. B., Wolff, P., & Forbus, K. D. (1997). 
Analogical reasoning and conceptual change: A case 
study of Johannes Kepler. Journal of the Learning Sci-
ences. Special Issue: Conceptual change, 6, 3-40. 
Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1983). Schema induction 
and analogical transfer. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 1-38. 
Green, C. B., & Hummel, J. E. (2004). Relational percep-
tion and cognition: Implications for cognitive 
architecture and the perceptual-cognitive interface. In 
B. H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and moti-
vation. San Diego: Academic Press. 
Halford, G. S., Wilson, W. H., & Phillips, S. (1998). Proc-
essing capacity defined by relational complexity: 
Implications for comparative, developmental, and cog-
nitive psychology. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 21, 
803-864. 
Hesse, M. B. (1966). Models and analogies in science. 
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Holland, J. H., Holyoak, K. J., Nisbett, R. E., & Thagard, P. 
R. (1986). Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, 
and Discovery. Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. 
Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1995). Mental leaps: Anal-
ogy in creative thought. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
Hummel, J. E. (2000). Where view-based theories break 
down: The role of structure in human shape perception. 
In E. Dietrich & A. B. Markman (Eds.), Cognitive dy-
namics: Conceptual and representational change in 
humans and machines. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erl-
baum Associates. 
Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (2003). A symbolic-
connectionist theory of relational inference and gener-
alization. Psychological Review, 110, 220-264. 
Keil, F. C. (1989). Concepts, kinds, and cognitive develop-
ment. Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. 
Kuehne, S., Forbus, K., Gentner, D. and Quinn, B. (2000). 
SEQL: Category learning as progressive abstraction using 
structure mapping. Proceedings of the Twenty-Second 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 
Kruschke, J. K. (1992). ALCOVE: An exemplar-based con-
nectionist model of category learning. Psychological 
Review, 99, 22-44. 
Kruschke, J. K., & Johansen, M. K. (1999). A model of 
probabilistic category learning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 25, 
1083-1119. 
Murphy, G. L., & Medin, D. L. (1985). The role of theories 
in conceptual coherence. Psychological Review, 92, 
289-316. 
Nosofsky, R. M. (1992). Exemplars, prototypes, and simi-
larity rules. In A. F. Healy & S. M. Kosslyn (Eds.), 
Essays in honor of William K. Estes, Vol. 1: From 
learning theory to connectionist theory; Vol. 2: From 
learning processes to cognitive processes. Hillsdale, 
NJ, England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Pirolli, P. L., & Anderson, J. R. (1985). The role of practice 
in fact retrieval. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 11, 136-153. 
Posner, M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1968). On the Genesis of 
Abstract Ideas. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 7, 
pp. 353-363. 
Rips, L. J. (1989). Similarity, typicality, and categorization. 
In S. O. Vosniadou, Andrew (Ed.), Similarity and ana-
logical reasoning. New York, NY, US: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances: 
Studies in the internal structure of categories. Cognitive 
Psychology, 7, 573-605. 
Ross, B. H. (1987). This is like that: The use of earlier prob-
lems and the separation of similarity effects. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cog-
nition, 13, 629-639. 
Ross, B. H., & Spalding, T. L. (1994). Concepts and catego-
ries. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Thinking and problem 
solving. Handbook of perception and cognition (2nd 
ed.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press, Inc. 
Shiffrin, R. M., & Styvers, M. (1997). A model for recogni-
tion memory: REM--retrieving effectively from 
memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 145-166. 
 
701
 Are natural kinds psychologically distinct from nominal kinds?  
Evidence from Learning and Development 
 
Heidi Kloos (kloos.6@osu.edu) 
The Ohio State University, Center for Cognitive Science  
208C Ohio Stadium East, 1961 Tuttle Park Place 
Columbus, OH 43210, USA 
 
Vladimir Sloutsky (sloutsky.1@osu.edu) 
The Ohio State University, Center for Cognitive Science  
208C Ohio Stadium East, 1961 Tuttle Park Place 
Columbus, OH 43210, USA 
 
Abstract  
Known theories of categorization operate under the 
assumption that most concepts are fundamentally similar. The 
current research argues that this assumption is unwarranted: 
Different types of concepts may differ in how they are 
represented and learned. We specifically focus on natural-
kind and nominal-kind concepts, concepts that differ in their 
statistical structure. Natural kinds consist of highly redundant 
and intercorrelated features, whereas nominal kinds consist of 
isolated rules that do not correlate with other features. If these 
types of concepts are fundamentally different, they should 
exhibit important dissociations in how they are learned. Two 
learning regimes were contrasted:  one in which participants 
were shown instances of the concept  without being given a 
definition of the concept (implicit learning regime), and one 
in which participant were given a definition of the concept 
without being shown individual instances (explicit learning 
regime). Preschoolers and adults participated. The results 
show a strong dissociation between the two kinds of concepts 
in terms of acquisition, indicating that existing theories of 
categorization are incomplete.  
Introduction 
The ability to form categories by overlooking differences 
for the sake of generality is a critically important component 
of cognition. While the importance of concepts and 
categories is widely accepted, a number of puzzling 
questions remain unanswered. How do categories arise?  
Which processes underlie categorization? And how are 
categories represented in the cognitive system?  
Several influential approaches have emerged in an 
attempt to answer these questions. According to the 
“classical view,” categories are represented by sets of 
features that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
to determine category membership (Bruner, Goodnow, & 
Austin, 1956; Vygotsky, 1986/1934; for a review see Smith 
& Medin, 1981). For example, the concept prime number 
includes two features: an integer, and no remainder when 
divided by one or by itself.  Each feature is necessary and 
they are jointly sufficient to determine whether or not a 
number is a prime. 
By the 1980s, the classical view came under severe attack 
for its inability to predict and account for several key 
phenomena in the study of concepts, such as, for example, 
the gradedness of category membership. (Mervis & Rosch, 
1981; see also Murphy, 2002, Smith & Medin, 1981, for 
extensive reviews).  
With the demise of the classical view, two theoretical 
approaches to conceptual development have emerged: the 
naïve-theory approach and the similarity-based approach. 
The naïve-theory approach argues that even if there are no 
truly defining features, features differ in their conceptual 
centrality, this centrality being often determined by a 
feature’s causal status (Medin, 1989; Gelman & Coley, 
1991; Keil, Smith, Simons, & Levin, 1998). For example, 
apples and basketballs are round, but the feature 
“roundness” is more central for basketballs than it is for 
apples.  
On the contrary, the similarity-based approach suggests 
that categorization decisions are made on the basis of 
similarity between a to-be-categorized entity and existing 
categories (see Murphy, 2002; Sloutsky, 2003, for reviews). 
Categories could be represented as best examples or 
prototypes (Posner & Keele, 1968, Rosch & Mervis, 1975) 
or as sets of encountered exemplars (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986, 
1992). In the former case, an entity is categorized as A if it 
is similar to A’s prototype, whereas in the latter case an 
entity is categorized as A if it is similar to individual 
exemplars of A encountered previously. 
Despite the differences among these theoretical 
approaches, there is an important commonality – they 
implicitly assume that all (or at least most the concepts) 
concepts are fundamentally the same, and therefore, that 
concepts have to be learned and represented in the same or a 
similar way. 
However, it is possible that there are different classes of 
concepts that give rise to different types of representation. 
The particular distinction considered here can be mapped 
onto the normative distinction between natural kinds and 
nominal kinds (Kripke, 1972; see also Keil, 1989, for a 
review). Natural kinds refer to classes of entities that exist 
in nature (e.g., bird), and nominal kinds refer to more 
arbitrary groupings based on a small set of necessary and 
sufficient properties (e.g., triangle, acceleration).  
Natural kinds may differ in several ways from nominal 
kinds. However, the difference highlighted in the current 
experiments pertains to the difference in their statistical 
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 structure.  Natural kinds have a rich correlational structure, 
meaning that the relevant features correlate among each 
other. For example, creatures that lay eggs also have 
feathers and fly. Nominal kinds, on the other hand, lack 
such correlations among relevant features. They are based 
instead on an isolated rule. For example, accelerated motion 
does not have any common features with other motions 
except the change in velocity or the change in vector of the 
moving body.  
It seems that the classical view of categorization 
considered nominal kinds  as most representative concepts, 
whereas the similarity-based positions considered natural 
kinds as the most representative ones. The current study 
asks whether the normative distinction between natural and 
nominal kinds is accompanied by a psychological 
distinction between these two types of concepts. If true, 
such psychological distinction should manifest itself in how 
natural kinds and nominal kinds are represented and learned.  
The goal of this research is to examine dissociations in 
learning of natural and nominal kinds. 
Statistical Structure of Concepts 
To reiterate, natural-kind concepts often have multiple 
correlations among features of category members. Nominal 
kinds, on the other hand, are typically based on a small set 
of features uncorrelated with other features. It could be said 
then that natural kinds are statistically dense, embedded in 
multiple redundancies, whereas nominal kinds are 
statistically sparse, that is based on a single rule embedded 
in irrelevant variance. 
Because natural kinds are statistically dense, it is possible 
that natural kinds are acquired spontaneously and do not 
require explicit training.  Even infants are sensitive to 
multiple correlations and can spontaneously acquire 
categories based on multiple correlations. (e.g., Younger, 
1993).  Therefore, is likely that the mere exposure to 
instances of a natural kind could suffice for the acquisition 
of the concept. For example, infants may learn to group 
dogs together after seeing a variety of dogs (Quinn, Eimas, 
& Rosenkrantz, 1993). The basis for this learning is 
extraction of statistical information from a set of exemplars 
(Mareschal & Quinn, 2001). In fact, explicit training of a 
natural-kind category may hurt the acquisition of the natural 
kind. Billman and Knuston (1996) showed that in an 
unsupervised-learning setting, adults could learn the concept 
that was based on redundant relations,  while failing to learn 
the concept when it was based on an isolated or orthogonal 
relation. 
Nominal kinds are statistically sparse, meaning that they 
lack redundancy, and that only a limited set of features or 
feature relations is relevant.  Because only a small portion 
of total information is relevant for the membership in a 
concept, it might be difficulty for the learner to 
spontaneously determine what is relevant, without having 
explicit instruction. This might be especially true for 
relational concepts, those that are based on a relation among 
features, not the features themselves (e.g., the concept of 
ratio). There are few reasons to believe that mere exposure 
to a limited set of instances would result in an acquisition of 
a relational concept.  On the contrary, even feedback-based 
learning of relational concepts proved to be a challenge 
(e.g., Bruner, et al., 1956). 
Based on these considerations, we hypothesize that there 
might be an acquisitional dissociation between natural and 
nominal kinds, with the former requiring unsupervised 
exposure (i.e., implicit learning regime), and the latter 
requiring an explicit instruction about the relevant rule (i.e., 
an explicit learning regime). 
Overview of Experiments 
In the three reported experiments, we systematically 
manipulated two factors: the type of the concept to be 
learned (“natural kind” vs. “nominal kind”) and the learning 
regime (implicit learning regime vs. explicit learning 
regime). Preschool children (Experiment 1) and adults 
(Experiment 2 and 3) participated in the four resulting 
conditions: implicit or explicit learning of a concept that 
mimics natural kinds, and implicit or explicit learning of a 
concept that mimics a nominal kind.  
For both kinds of concepts, the same animal-like artificial 
stimuli were created,  such that none of the single features 
were predictive of the category membership. Only the 
relations between features mattered. Similar to natural kinds 
in the real world, the natural kind of the current experiment 
was based on multiple correlations among features (e.g., 
creatures that had a dark body also had a long tail and lots 
of wings). Conversely, in the nominal kind of the current 
experiment only one, arbitrary selected, relation was 
predictive of category membership.  
In the implicit learning regime, the learners were 
presented with instances of the target category without 
being told the defining rule of the category. Conversely, in 
the explicit learning regime, the learners were given the 
defining rule of the category without being shown specific 
instances.  
We predicted an interaction between learning regime and 
kind of concept. The concept that is based on redundant 
relations (i.e., “natural kind”) should be best learned in the 
implicit learning regime, and the concept that is based on an 
isolated relation (i.e., “nominal kind”) should be best 
learned in the explicit learning regime.  
Experiment 1 
The goal of the first experiment was to examine the 
acquisition of natural-type and nominal-type concepts under 
different learning regimes by young children.  
Method 
Participants Participants were 61 5-year-olds (32 girls and 
29 boys), recruited from suburban middleclass preschools. 
The mean age in each condition (natural/implicit, natural/ 
explicit, nominal/implicit, nominal/ implicit) in months was 
58.1 (SD = 4.6), 61.9 (SD = 2.7), 60.4 (SD = 5.2), and 60.3 
(SD = 4.7), respectively. Additional 28 children were tested 
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 (n = 8, 5, 7, and 8 in the respective conditions) and omitted 
from the sample because their performance in the catch 
trials did not meet the criterion (see Procedure). 
 
Stimuli The stimuli were colorful drawings of unfamiliar 
animals presented on a computer screen. Each instance had 
the following six parts: a body, antennas, horizontal and 
vertical wings, a tail, and buttons on the body (Figure 1). 
These six parts could vary in at least one characteristic. 
They could vary in size (e.g., long or small tail), in shade 
(e.g., dark or light body), or in number (e.g., few or lots of 
buttons). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of the stimuli. 
 
Two types of categories were created, one that included 
multiple correlations of features (i.e., they approximated a 
natural kind), and the other that were based on a single 
arbitrary selected relation (i.e., they approximated a nominal 
kind). Each type of category consisted of a target category 
and a contrasting category.  Table 1 shows examples of 
items to illustrate how stimuli differed between natural and 
nominal kinds, and between target category and contrasting 
category.  
For the natural kind, the sizes, shades, and number of 
parts correlated systematically. In the target category, a light 
body had light antennas, short horizontal wings, a short tail, 
few vertical wings, and few buttons. And a dark body had 
dark antennas, long horizontal wings, a long tail, many 
vertical wings, and many buttons.  In the contrasting 
category the correlations were reversed. For example, a light 
body went with dark antennas, short horizontal wings, a 
long tail, few vertical wings, and many buttons. No single 
feature was predictive of the category.  
For the nominal kind, only the number of parts mattered, 
while the correlations among sizes and shades were varied 
randomly. In the target category, there were more buttons 
than tails and vertical wings together, and in the contrasting 
category, there were fewer buttons than tails and vertical 
wings together. The numbers of buttons, tails, and vertical 
wings were chosen in such a way that neither the number of 
a single part nor the correlation between two of the parts 
were predictive. This ensured that no other information 
(e.g., difference in quantity) was redundant with the rule.  
An additional set of stimuli was created that functioned as 
catch items. These items were from the contrasting category 
but with very salient changes. They had a diamond shaped 
body, no buttons, and no horizontal wings.  
 
Table 1: Structure of Exemplar Items Used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 
 
 Target Cat.  Contrasting Cat. 
 Item 1 Item 2  Item 1 Item 2 
Natural Kind      
Parts      
Body light dark  light dark 
Antennas light dark  dark light 
Horiz. wings short long  short long 
Tails short long  long short 
Vert. wings few many  few many 
Buttons few many  many few 
    
Nominal Kind      
Parts      
Tails 1 3  3 5 
Vert. wings 4 2  4 6 
Buttons 7 9  5 9 
      
Note. For the nominal kind, the numbers refer to the 
actual number of a particular part for the nominal kind (e.g., 
1 = one tail). 
 
Procedure The cover story presented to children involved 
the creature Fritz who lives on planet Elbee and who would 
like to get a pet. Pets on planet Elbee are called Ziblets and 
come from a magical store that carries both pets and 
dangerous wild animals. Children’s task was to determine 
whether or not an animal from this magical store is a Ziblet.  
The procedure had two phases: a training phase and a 
testing phase. In the training phase, children were given 
information about Ziblets (target category in Table 1). In the 
implicit learning regime, they were shown 24 pictures of 
Ziblets, presented one by one. They were told: “I will show 
you the Ziblets that other families on planet Elbee have as 
pets. Can you look at them and try to remember them?” In 
the explicit learning regime, children were presented with 
the defining rule. They were either told (for the natural kind) 
“A Ziblet with a dark body has dark antennas, long 
horizontal wings, a long tail, one or two short vertical wings 
and two or three light buttons; and a Ziblet with a light body 
has light antennas, short horizontal wings, a short tail, four 
or five long vertical wings and five or six dark buttons”, or 
they were told (for the nominal kind) “For a Ziblet, the 
number of buttons is smaller than the number of tails and 
vertical wings together”. Each separate part mentioned in 
the rule (e.g., a long tail) was depicted on the computer 
screen.  
The testing phase was identical in both learning regimes. 
Sixteen testing trials were presented in random order, half of 
them being instances of the target category (Ziblets) and 
half of them being instances of the contrasting category 
(Non-Ziblets). Children’s task was to determine whether an 
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 These results reveal an important dissociation: while the 
implicit learning regime favored acquisition of concepts 
resembling natural kinds, the explicit learning regime 
favored acquisition of concepts resembling nominal kinds, 
thus supporting the contention that there is a psychological 
distinction between natural kinds and nominal kinds. 
instance is a Ziblet or not. Six catch trials followed 
intermixed with instances of the target category. To be 
included in the study, children had to reject four of the 
catcher trials. 
Results and Discussion 
Accuracy scores were calculated for each participant by 
subtracting the number of correctly accepted Ziblets from 
the number of incorrectly accepted Non-Ziblets and 
transforming the difference into a proportion. An accuracy 
score of zero (i.e., no difference between proportion of hits 
and proportion of false alarms) would be expected by 
chance. 
Experiment 2 
The goal of this experiment  was to extend the findings of 
Experiment 1 to adult participants. Adults participated in the 
same four conditions that were used for children in 
Experiment 1: natural/implicit, natural/explicit, nominal/ 
implicit, and nominal/explicit.  
Figure 2 shows the mean accuracy scores for each 
condition. A 2 (concept: natural, nominal) by 2 (learning 
regime: implicit, explicit) between-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction (F(1,53) = 14.46, p < 
.001), with the mean accuracy scores being above chance in 
the conditions natural/implicit (t (15) = 4.07, p < .01) and 
nominal/explicit (t(15) = 3.2, p < .01) but not in the 
conditions natural/ explicit and nominal/implicit.  
Method 
Participants Participants were 54 introductory psychology 
students at a large mid-western university who participated 
for class credit. Additional nine adults (two or three in each 
condition) were tested and omitted from the sample because 
their performance in the catch trials did not meet the 
criterion (see Procedure). 
An analysis of individual pattern of responses 
corroborated this trend. Eleven children in the 
natural/implicit condition (69%) and 12 children in the 
nominal/explicit condition (75%) had an accuracy score 
above 0.20. Conversely, only 5 children in the 
natural/explicit condition (31%) and only 3 children in the 
nominal/implicit condition (23%) had an accuracy score 
above 0.20.  
 
Stimuli The stimuli were identical to the ones used in 
Experiment 1.  
 
Procedure Adults were asked to learn about creatures 
called Ziblets in order to distinguish them from creatures 
that are not Ziblets. In the implicit learning regime, they 
were presented with 24 instances and asked to remember 
them.  In the explicit learning regime, they were given the 
same defining rule that was presented to children. Again, no 
instances were presented; only pictures of the parts 
accompanied the rule.  
0
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Thirty-two testing trials followed in which instances were 
presented on the screen, and adults had to determine 
whether they see a Ziblet or not. Half of the instances were 
from the target category (Ziblets) and half of them were 
from the contrasting category (Non-Ziblets).  
Eight catch trials followed intermixed with three trials 
from the target category. To be included in the study, adults 
had to respond correctly in at least 6 catch trials. At the end 
of the procedure, adults were asked to give a verbal 
description of the difference between Ziblets and other 
animals presented on the screen.  
Figure 2: Accuracy Scores for Children.  
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Results and Discussion In short, as predicted, children could learn the natural-
type concept in the implicit learning regime, but not in the 
explicit learning regime; and they could learn the nominal-
type concept in the explicit learning regime but not in the 
implicit learning regime. These findings cannot be due to 
differences in stimuli, as the same cartoon animals were 
used for both natural and nominal kinds. Furthermore, the 
findings cannot be due to differences in procedure, given 
that the learning regime for the natural kind (either implicit 
or explicit) was closely matched with the learning regime 
for the nominal kind. 
Mean accuracy scores are presented in Figure 3 (with 
standard error as error bars). A 2 (concept: natural, nominal) 
by 2 (learning regime: implicit, explicit) between-subjects 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of learning regime 
(F(1,50) = 13.15, p < .01) with accuracy scores being higher 
in the explicit learning regime (M = 0.57, SD = .45) than in 
the implicit learning regime (M = 0.23, SD = .34), and a 
significant interaction (F(1,50) = 11.9, p < .01). When 
presented with the natural kind, participants performed 
above chance in both learning regimes (timplicit(13) = 5.3, p < 
.001; texplicit(13) = 3.68, p < .01), but when presented with 
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 the nominal kind, they performed above chance only in the 
explicit learning regime (t(10) = 6.12, p < .001).  
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Figure 3: Accuracy Scores for Adults. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Adults’ verbal responses were analyzed in terms of 
whether or not they contained the defining rule. For the 
natural kind, a response was coded as correct when the 
statement included at least one of the correlations. For the 
nominal kind, a response was coded as correct when the 
statement included the numerical relation. Table 2 shows 
the pattern of results. As expected, adults could verbalize 
the defining rule of the nominal kind in the explicit but not 
in the implicit learning regime.  For the natural kind, even 
though adults’ categorization accuracy did not differ as a 
function of learning regime, their verbal responses did. Only 
three the adults could verbalize the rule of natural kinds in 
the implicit learning regime whereas seven adults could 
verbalize the rule in the explicit learning regime1.  
 
Table 2: Number of Correct Verbal Statements  
(Percentage correct in parentheses). 
 
 Concept 
Learning Regime Natural  Nominal 
Implicit 3 
(21%) 
0 
Explicit 7 
(50%) 
8 
(73%) 
 
Overall, learning of nominal kinds in adults exhibited 
tendencies similar to those in young children: participants 
ably learned the concept when presented with the defining 
rule of the concept,  and they performed poorly when they 
were presented with instances of the category.  
At the same time, unlike young children for the natural-
kind concept, adults performed equally well under different 
learning regimes.  This was surprising, given that the rule of 
the natural concept was rather lengthy, involving statements 
about the characteristics of six parts. We content that real 
natural kinds involve more than six simple correlations, thus 
making explicit learning of real natural kinds more difficult 
than explicit learning of current categories. This contention, 
however, remains speculative, and it will be examined in 
future research. 
Experiment 3 
The goal of this experiment was to document that the 
dissociation found in Experiments 1 and 2 is not limited to 
the particular nominal kind used in those experiments. 
Recall  that the nominal kind used in Experiments 1 and 2 
was based on a mathematical relation – a relation that may 
differ considerably from the correlations relevant for the 
natural kind. This difference was minimized in Experiment 
3 by using the same target category that was used for the 
“natural kind” in the previous experiments. The contrasting 
category was new. It was constructed in such a way that 
only one correlation – rather than multiple correlations – 
was violated. To distinguish between target category and 
contrasting category, adults had to keep in mind all 
correlations. Therefore, the category to be learned was 
statistically sparse (all correlation mattered, no redundancy 
was present) without differing in content form the 
correlations of the “natural kind”.  
Method 
Participants A new group of 28 students participated in this 
experiment (14 in the implicit learning regime, and 14 in the 
explicit learning regime). Additional 3 adults were tested 
and omitted from the sample because their performance in 
the catch trials did not meet the criterion. 
 
Stimuli The stimuli of the target category were identical to 
the ones used in Experiments 1 and 2. Table 3 shows in 
abstract notation the characteristics of the contrasting 
category (Non-Ziblets) used in this experiment. These items 
differ from the Ziblets in only one of the correlations, rather 
than in all three correlations.  
 
Table 3: Exemplar Items of the Contrasting Category 
used in Experiment 3 
 Contrasting Category 
 Item Item Item Item Item Item 
Parts 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Body 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Antennas 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Horiz. wings 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Tails 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Vert. wings 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Buttons 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Note. The numbers refer to the values of the respective 
characteristics (1 = light, small, or few; 0 = dark, large, or 
many). The target category is the same as in Experiment 2 
(shown in Table 1) 
                                                          
1 The finding that some adults failed to verbalize the correct rule 
even in the explicit learning regime may be an artifact of the 
procedure. Instead of describing the difference between Ziblets and 
Non-Ziblets, a large majority of the adults described the difference 
between test items and catch items.  
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Procedure The procedure was identical to the procedure 
used for the natural-kind concept in Experiment 2. 
Participants were presented either with the implicit or the 
explicit learning regime.  
Results and Discussion 
Mean accuracy scores were calculated for each learning 
condition. A significant difference was found (t(31) = 3.76, 
p < .001), with adults in the implicit-learning condition 
performing worse than adults in the explicit-learning 
condition (implicit: M = 0.17, SE = .05; explicit: M = 0.44, 
SE = .06). These results further indicate that the dissociation 
between natural kinds and nominal kinds reflects the 
structure of the to-be-learned categories rather than the 
property of the particular relation used in Experiments 1 and 
2. 
General Discussion 
The results reported here support a psychological distinction 
between concepts that differ in their statistical structure. 
Concepts that are based on highly redundant features were 
best learned through an implicit learning regime (especially 
for children); and concepts that are based on non-redundant 
features were best learned through an explicit learning 
regime. The latter findings applied whether the concept was 
based on a mathematical relation (Experiment 2) or on a set 
of correlations between two features (Experiment 3). This 
suggests that the dissociation in acquisition reflects the 
statistical structure of the category rather than the particular 
relation. 
Though not directly investigated in these sets of 
experiments, we argue that statistically dense concepts 
resemble natural kinds, while statistically sparse concepts 
resemble nominal kinds. It is likely then that natural kinds 
(e.g., the concept of bird) require a different learning 
environment than nominal kinds (e.g., the concept of 
acceleration). Furthermore, it is possible that this learning 
dissociation reflects itself in the way the concepts are 
represented. For example, it is possible that effects of 
gradedness are more likely to be found with natural kinds 
than with nominal kinds.  
Finding dissociation in learning between different types 
of concepts indicates that a theory of categorization is 
incomplete if it pertains only to one kind of concept. A more 
complete account would address the processes of 
categorization for both natural and nominal kinds.  
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Abstract 
We report three experiments on visual mental imagery in de-
ductive reasoning. Reasoning performance of sighted partici-
pants was impeded if the materials were easy to envisage as 
visual mental images. Congenitally totally blind participants 
did not show this visual-impedance effect. Blindfolded par-
ticipants with normal vision showed the same pattern of per-
formance as the sighted. We conclude that irrelevant visual 
detail can be a nuisance in reasoning and impedes the process. 
Introduction 
Various sorts of evidence are compatible with the conjecture 
that visual mental imagery is a vital part of human cogni-
tion, including the famous studies of the mental rotation and 
the mental scanning of images (Shepard & Cooper, 1982; 
Kosslyn, 1980). The aim of the present paper, however, is to 
show that visual mental imagery is not necessary in reason-
ing. It can even be a nuisance in reasoning and impedes the 
process.  The article is motivated by the distinction between 
visual and spatial representations and processes that has 
been introduced by Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982). In ad-
dition, the article is motivated by studies showing that con-
genitally totally blind persons are as good as sighted in the 
construction and application of spatial representations (e.g. 
Kerr, 1983), but differ from sighted people in their use vis-
ual images.  
The paper begins with a brief summary of previous find-
ings on imagery and reasoning. We focus on deductive rea-
soning, in which the truth of the premises ensures the truth 
of the conclusion. We then outline our hypothesis regarding 
the connection between visual images, spatial representa-
tions, and congenital blindness. We report three experiments 
that test this hypothesis. Finally, we draw some general 
conclusions about visual imagery, spatial representations, 
and reasoning. 
An influential study of imagery and deductive reasoning 
was carried out by DeSoto, London, and Handel (1965), 
who investigated so-called three-term series problems, such 
as “Ann is taller than Beth.”, “Cath is shorter than Beth”, 
“Who is tallest?” and argued that reasoners represent the 
three individuals in a visual image, and then “read off” the 
answer by inspecting the image. There are several other 
authors who argued in the same vein (e.g. Huttenlocher, 
1968; Shaver, Pierson, & Lang, 1976; Clement & Falmagne, 
1986). Other authors did not find evidence that imagery 
plays a role in reasoning (e.g. Sternberg, 1980, Richardson, 
1987; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Tabossi; 1989; Newstead, 
Pollard, & Griggs, 1986). In Knauff and Johnson-Laird 
(2000; 2002) we argued that a possible resolution of the 
inconsistency in the previous results is that these studies 
have overlooked the distinction between visual images and 
spatial representations (e.g. Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982; 
Logie, 1995; Smith et al., 1995). We conducted a series of 
experiments to test this hypothesis. We initially accom-
plished rating studies to identify a set of verbal relations that 
varied in the ease of constructing visual images and spatial 
representations from it. Their results yielded three sorts of 
verbal relations:  
1. visuospatial relations that are easy to envisage visually  
    and spatially; e.g. above – below; 
2. visual relations that are easy to envisage visually but  
    hard to envisage spatially, e.g. cleaner – dirtier; 
3. control relations that are hard to envisage both visually  
    and spatially, e.g. smarter –  dumber   
From the three sorts of verbal relations we constructed a 
set of three-term- and four-term-series problems. In three 
experiments, visual relations such as cleaner and dirtier 
significantly impeded the process of reasoning in compari-
son with control relations such as smarter and dumber. In 
contrast, visuospatial relations, such as front and back, 
which are easy to envisage visually and spatially, speeded 
up the process of reasoning in comparison with control rela-
tions (Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002). In a subsequent 
neuroimaging study (fMRI) we showed that in the absence 
of any correlated visual input, all types of reasoning prob-
lems evoke activity in spatial areas of the brain (right supe-
rior parietal cortex, and bilaterally in the precuneus), but 
that only the problems based on visual relations also acti-
vated early visual areas corresponding to V2 (Knauff, 
Fangmeier, Ruff, & Johnson-Laird, 2003). We explained the 
findings by an interplay of visual images and spatial repre-
sentations. For example, given the premises: 
 The cat is above the ape. 
 The dog is below the ape. 
the participants construct a spatial array representing the 
relative positions of the three individuals: 
  
cat 
  ape 
dog 
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They evaluate a possible conclusion by checking whether 
it holds in the representation. Perhaps the ability to envisage 
spatial representations is a precursor to many forms of ab-
stract reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1996). Likewise, relational 
terms that lead naturally to spatial representations should 
speed up the process of reasoning. In contrast, a visual rela-
tion, such as dirtier, may elicit irrelevant visual detail. One 
imagines, say, a cat caked with mud, but such a representa-
tion is irrelevant to the transitive inference. It takes addi-
tional time to replace this vivid image with one in which 
dirtiness is represented in degrees. In other words, the visual 
relations, which are hard to envisage spatially, lead to a 
mental picture, but the vivid details in this picture impede 
the process of thinking.  
If visual relations impede reasoning in sighted people, 
what happens if congenitally totally blind people reason 
with the same materials? In the last two decades, compari-
sons between blind and sighted people have been made on a 
large variety of visuospatial tasks, involving mental scan-
ning, mental rotation, memory for paths and words, etc.  
(e.g. Kerr, 1983; Marmor & Zaback, 1976; Zimler & 
Keenan, 1983). They always reported the same results: peo-
ple who are blind from birth are able to envisage abstract 
spatial arrangements, but unable to envisage visual mental 
images. Most of the explanations rely on the distinction of 
two different neural pathways associated with the process-
ing of “what” and “where” information (Ungerleider & 
Mishkin, 1982). The distinction is well-established in nu-
merous fields of cognitive science (e.g. Kosslyn, 1994; Lan-
dau & Jackendoff, 1993), and is supported by investigations 
with brain damaged patients (e.g., Newcombe, Ratcliff, & 
Damasio, 1987), neuroimaging studies (e.g., Smith et al., 
1995), and experiments on visual and spatial working mem-
ory (c.f. Logie, 1995).  
The “what” and “where” distinction in mental imagery 
has also been studied with congenitally blind participants. 
Vecchi (1998) conducted experiments in the dual-task para-
digm with participants who were blind from birth and report 
that mental imagery can rely on purely spatial representa-
tions without a visual component. In a PET study, Büchel, 
Price, Frackoviak, and Friston (1998) demonstrated that 
congenitally blind people show task-specific activation in 
parietal association areas, whereas blind participants who 
lost their sight after puberty show additional activation in 
the primary visual cortex in the same task (Braille reading). 
Luzzatti et al. (1998) in a case study showed that visual and 
spatial imagery can be differentially impaired after brain 
injuries. All these studies clearly show that visual and spa-
tial imagery are functionally independent processes which 
must rely on different neural systems. 
What does that mean for the hypothesis that the ability to 
envisage spatial representations is a precursor to reasoning, 
but visual imagery can impede the process? The results con-
cerning visual and spatial imagery in the congenitally blind 
motivate the following hypothesis: 
Relations that elicit visual images containing details that 
are irrelevant to an inference should impede the process of 
reasoning in sighted people. They, however, should not hin-
der the reasoning of congenitally totally blind people, be-
cause they are able to construct spatial representations 
without being sidetracked by irrelevant visual images. 
The aim of the following experiments is to test this hy-
pothesis. In Experiment 1 sighted students solved three-
term-series problems with the three sorts of verbal relations, 
in Experiment 2 people who were blind from birth, and in 
Experiment 3 sighted people who were blindfolded to re-
move any visual input.  
Experiment 1: Sighted Participants 
In our previous experiments (Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 
2000; 2002) the reasoning problems were presented visually 
as sentences on the screen. The aim of the first experiment 
was to replicate the visual-impedance effect with sighted 
people but with an auditory presentation of the materials.  
 Participants. We tested 24 sighted undergraduate stu-
dents from the University of Oldenburg (mean age 22.7; 18 
female, 5 male), who received a course credit for their par-
ticipation.  
Materials. The experiment used the set of verbal relations 
that has been identified in Knauff and Johnson-Laird (2000; 
2002). The three sorts of relations were: 
1. visuospatial relations: above – below, front – back 
2. visual relations: cleaner – dirtier, fatter — thinner  
3. control relations: better — worse, smarter –  dumber   
From these verbal relations we constructed a set of three-
term series problems which all concerned the same terms 
(dog, cat, ape). Here is an example of a problem with a 
valid conclusion: 
The dog is cleaner than the cat. 
The ape is dirtier than the cat.  
Does it follow: 
   The dog is cleaner than the ape?  
All sentences of the reasoning problems were recorded as 
audio files, edited for similar length and normalized for 
loudness and peak gain. Half of the problems had valid con-
clusions and half had invalid conclusions. The participants 
were told to evaluate whether the conclusion followed from 
the premises. In the example, cleaner and dirtier are used 
once in each premise, and cleaner occurs in the conclusion. 
But, in the experiment as a whole, each relation and its con-
verse occurred equally often in each premise and in the con-
clusion.  
 Design. The participants acted as their own controls and 
evaluated 8 inferences of all three sorts (visuospatial, visual, 
and controls), making a total of 24 three-term series prob-
lems. The relations in these problems were those given 
above. The problems were presented in a randomized order 
over the set of participants.  
 Procedure. The participants were tested individually in a 
quiet room, and they sat at a PC that administered the ex-
periment. The reasoning problems were presented in audi-
tory format via headphones. The participants were told to 
evaluate whether or not the conclusion followed necessarily 
from the premises. They were instructed to respond as accu-
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rately and quickly as possible. They made their response by 
pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard, and the com-
puter recorded their response and latency. Prior to the ex-
periment, there were four practice trials.  
Results and Discussion. Table 1 presents for all three of 
our experiments the percentages of correct conclusions and 
their mean latencies for the different sorts of relational in-
ferences. The present inferences were relatively easy (92.5% 
correct overall) and there was no significant difference be-
tween accepting valid conclusions (94.5% correct) and re-
jecting invalid conclusions (95.2% correct). Thus, we 
pooled the results from these conditions.  
The M ANOVA for dependent measures on the accuracy 
data revealed a reliable difference across the three sorts of 
problems, F (2, 46) = 5.30, p < .01.  There was also a differ-
ence in the mean number of correct responses between the 
visual problems and the control problems, F (1, 23) = 6.57, 
p > .02, and the (not orthogonal) contrast between visuospa-
tial and visual problems was significant, F (1, 23) = 6.57, p 
< .02. The response latencies also showed the predicted 
trend (visual relations resulted in longer response latencies 
than control problems and reasoning with these problems in 
turn took longer than with visuospatial problems), but the  
main effect across the three sorts of problems was statisti-
cally not significant, F (2, 46) = .53, p >.6.  
The main goal of the experiment was to test a new ex-
perimental setup that can be used with the blind people later 
on. The experiment was successful in showing that the vis-
ual-impedance-effect also appears with the auditory presen-
tation of the materials. Thus, we can use the same experi-
mental setting in the later studies. A second corollary from 
the findings is that the visual-impedance effect does not 
depend on the visual presentation of the materials. It rules 
out that the impedance is simply due to interference be-
tween the visual process of reading the premises and con-
clusions and the mental activity of envisaging a visual men-
tal image to solve the problem. Instead, the findings again 
emphasize the importance of distinguishing between visual 
and spatial representations. Visual relations such as fatter 
and thinner impeded the process of reasoning in comparison 
with control relations such as smarter and dumber. In other 
words, the visual relations, which are hard to envisage spa-
tially, lead to a mental picture, but the vivid details in this 
picture impede the process of thinking.  
Experiment 2: Congenitally Totally Blind     
Participants 
This experiment directly tests the hypothesis that the visual 
relations do not impede the reasoning of congenitally totally 
blind people, because they are able to construct spatial rep-
resentations without being sidetracked by irrelevant visual 
images. 
Participants. We tested 10 congenitally totally blind par-
ticipants (mean age 24.8; 7 female, 3 male). According to 
the German Law, a person is congenially totally blind, if she 
or he has less than 5% of normal vision and got blind before 
the age of 2. Most of the participants were blind from birth 
due to retinopathy of prematurity. The participants we re-
cruited from two self-helping groups for the blind. All par-
ticipants gave their informed consent prior to the participa-
tion in the study. 
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The materials and 
the design were identical to Experiment 1. The instructions 
were read to the participants by one of the experimenters. 
The participants were tested individually in a quiet room at 
the institutions, and they sat in front of a Laptop that admin-
istered the experiment. Except of the two keys associated 
with “yes” and “no” and the spacebar, all other keys were 
removed from an external keyboard.  
Results and Discussion. The second row of Table 2 pre-
sents the mean latencies and correct responses to the three 
sorts of relational inferences. Overall, the blind responded 
correctly to 76.2 % of the inferences and again there was no 
significant difference between accepting valid conclusions 
(76.7% correct) and rejecting invalid conclusions (75.8% 
correct). Hence, we pooled the results from these conditions.  
The ANOVA showed no significant difference in reason-
ing accuracy between the three sorts of problems, F (2, 18) 
= .36, p > .70, and none of the single contrast revealed a 
significant difference (visual vs. control: F (1, 9) = 2.38, p > 
.63; visuospatial vs. control: F (1, 9) = .70, p > .79; visu-
ospatial vs. visual: F (1, 9) = .74, p > .41).  In the response 
latencies there was also no difference between the three 
sorts of problems, F (2, 18) = .928, p > .41, and not one of 
the single contrast showed a significant difference (visual 
vs. control: F (1, 9) = 1.51, p > .24; visuospatial vs. control: 
F (1, 9) = 1.32, p > .28; visuospatial vs. visual: F (1, 9) = 
.35, p > .56).  
The results shed new light on the role of visual images 
and spatial representation in reasoning. Mental representa-
tions must be derived from perception and thus the repre-
sentations of persons who are blind from birth must be dif-
ferent to that of sighted persons. In particular, haptics or 
auditory perceptions lead to spatial representations without 
a visual component. This account is supported by several 
studies that report the same pattern of performance in 
highly spatial tasks in sighted and congenitally blind per-
sons.   In a classical study by Kerr (1983) congenitally to-
tally blind and sighted showed almost the same pattern of 
response times depending on imagined distance, image size, 
etc. Kerr concluded that "picturability" does not affect the 
recall of “mental images” in the blind. The only difference 
was that sighted participants reported forming the images 
while the blind did not (or at least significantly slower). 
Marmor and Zaback (1976) explored Shepard and Metzler’s 
mental rotation tasks and found that blind people also show 
longer reaction times for larger rotation angles. Zimler and 
Keenan (1983) found similar results in congenitally blind 
children and adults. In addition, they reported that the haptic 
images of the blind maintain the same spatial information 
just as the visual images of the sighted do. Obviously, peo-
ple who are blind from birth do not tend to construct visual 
mental images. But they are able to construct and to employ 
spatial representations. In fact, most of our blind partici-
710
pants reported not using visual images. Instead, they re-
ported that they located the objects of the inference on a 
spatial scale or in degrees, representing, say “dirtiness”. 
Although such introspections certainly can be wrong, they 
agree with the experimental findings: The blind are able to 
construct spatial representations without being irritated by 
irrelevant visual images. 
Experiment 3: Blindfolded Participants 
Is there an alternative explanation for the different patterns 
of results in sighted and blind participants? One possible 
account is that the visual-impedance effect in the sighted is 
simply due to interference between the visual input from the 
surrounding and the mental activity of envisaging a visual 
mental image. To rule out this explanation in the third ex-
periment the participants had normal vision, but were blind-
folded to eliminate any visual input. If the visual-
impedance-effect is due to interference between visual im-
agery and visual perception, they should be also resistant to 
the impedance effect of visual relations—much as the con-
genitally blind people are. If, in contrast, the tendency of 
sighted people to construct visual images is responsible for 
the visual-impedance effect, then the pattern of results 
should be similar to that in Experiment 1.  
 Participants. We tested 30 sighted undergraduate stu-
dents of University of Oldenburg (mean age 23.3; 18 fe-
male, 10 male). They were completely blindfolded to re-
move any visual input. They received a course credit for 
their participation. 
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The design, the materi-
als and the procedure were identical to Experiment 1 and 2. 
As in Experiment 2, the instructions were read to the par-
ticipants by one of the experimenters and except for the two 
keys associated with “yes” and “no” and the spacebar, all 
other keys were removed from an external keyboard.  
Results and Discussion. Overall, there were 90.8% cor-
rect responses and there was no significant difference be-
tween accepting valid conclusions (90.2% correct) and re-
jecting invalid conclusions (91.6% correct). They were 
pooled again. The MANOVA showed a reliable difference 
in accuracy across the three sorts of problems, F (2, 58) = 
3.71, p < .03.  There was also a significant difference in the 
mean number of correct responses between the visual prob-
lems and the control problems, F (1, 29) = 5.80, p < .03 and 
the visual problems and the visuospatial problems, F (1, 29) 
= 4.29 p < .05 
The response latencies showed that visual problems were 
slower than control problems, which in turn were slower 
than the visuospatial problems. The main effect across the 
three types of problems is statistically significant, F (2, 58) 
= 4.22, p < .02.  The difference between visual and control 
relations did not reach statistical significance, F (1, 29) = 
2.25 p > .14, but the difference between visual and visu-
ospatial problems was reliable, F (1, 29) = 7.01, p < .02. 
The pattern of performance in the blindfolded participants is 
almost identical to that of the sighted participants in Ex-
periment 1. There was again the trend visual > control > 
visuospatial (although the single contrast between visual 
and control problems did not reach statistical significance in 
the lantencies). These data clearly show that the characteris-
tics of the reasoning problems lead to the visual-impedance 
effect. It is not simply due to interference between the visual 
input from the surrounding and the mental activity of envis-
aging a visual mental image.  
Table 1: Percentages of correct responses and their mean 
response latencies (in s) in the three experiments as a func-
tion of the different sorts of relations: visual relations, con-
trol relations, visuospatial relations.  
 Visual 
inferences 
Control 
inferences 
Visuospatial 
inferences 
sighted           
(Exp 1) 
86.9% 
1.26  
94.8% 
1.01 
94.8% 
.97 
blind               
(Exp 2) 
75.0% 
5.24 
73.6% 
5.29 
79.9% 
6.06 
blindfolded       
(Exp 3) 
86.7%  
1.42  
92.9% 
1.08 
92.9% 
.86 
 
General Discussion 
The starting point of our studies was the distinction between 
visual and spatial modes of representation in reasoning.  
Previous studies enabled us to identify visuospatial rela-
tions, such as above-below, which are easy to envisage both 
visually and spatially, visual relations, such as cleaner-
dirtier, which are easy to envisage visually but hard to en-
visage spatially, and control relations, such as better-worse, 
which are hard to envisage both visually and spatially. Our 
former studies showed that visual relations significantly 
impede the process of reasoning by slowing it down. We 
refer to that as visual-impedance-effect (Knauff & Johnson-
Laird, 2002). 
In the present studies we tested a group of sighted partici-
pants, one group of congenitally totally blind participants, 
and one group of blindfolded participants with normal vi-
sion. In the sighted participants the visual relations signifi-
cantly impeded the process of reasoning by slowing it down. 
The blindfolded did show the same impedance effect. But, 
the participants who were blind from birth were not affected 
by the ease of envisaging the verbal relations visually. They 
showed the same reasoning performance across all sorts of 
problems.  
What might cause visual imagery to impede reasoning in 
the sighed participants? A theory that relies on visual im-
agery as the medium for reasoning is implausible, because 
individuals can reason about relations that they cannot visu-
alize. Similarly, such a theory cannot readily explain why 
relations that are easy to envisage visually impeded reason-
ing. One could object that the ability to visualize the visual 
relations was impeded by the concurrent visual perception. 
In fact, several studies have shown that visual imagery and 
visual perception interfere and that visual imagery perform-
ance is impaired under this condition (c.f Logie, 1995). Our 
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third experiment with the blindfolded participants, however, 
clearly falsifies this hypothesis. An explanation based on 
formal inference rules (Rips, 1994; Braine & O’Brien, 
1998), is also questionable, because it does not account for 
the effects of content, and does not immediately suggest an 
explanation of the visual impedance effect. 
The present findings support a spatial account of reason-
ing. The initial idea has been introduced by Huttenlocher 
(1968) and was further elaborated in the mental models the-
ory of reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991). The model theory does not rely on linguistic 
processes like rule-based-approaches of reasoning (Braine 
& O’Brein, 1998; Rips, 1994). Such processes are relevant 
only to transfer the information from the premises into a 
spatial array and back again, but the reasoning process itself 
totally relies on non-linguistic processes for the construction 
and inspection of spatial mental models. The mental models 
mirror the spatial relations between the represented objects. 
In contrast to visual images, mental models can represent 
any possible situation and can abstract away from such vis-
ual details as colors, textures, and shapes (Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Mental models can 
also represent class-inclusion, temporal order, and abstract 
relations such as ownership (c.f. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991). Several studies have shown that the content can fa-
cilitate inferences in certain cases and impede them in other 
cases (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2001). Likewise, a vis-
ual relation, such as dirtier than, can elicit a vivid visual 
detail, such as an animal caked with mud that is irrelevant to 
an inference. It will then take additional time to retrieve the 
information needed to construct the appropriate spatial men-
tal model for making the inference. 
The blind participants, however, did not show this visual 
impedance effect. This provides additional support for the 
spatial account of reasoning. Clearly, people who are blind 
from birth do not tend to use visual mental images, unless 
they are forced to do so, as in the studies from the literature. 
But they are able to construct and to employ spatial repre-
sentations. Such models represent the objects of the infer-
ence in degree or on a spatial scale. For this reason, they are 
not sidetracked by irrelevant visual images and thus perform 
relatively better than sighted persons in the visual problems.  
There are, however, some ambiguities in the data from the 
blind. First, the data are in line with other studies that com-
pared blind and sighted people on a large variety of visu-
ospatial tasks. They consistently reported that blind persons 
in absolute terms perform less accurately or more slowly 
than the sighted on such tasks (e.g. Kerr, 1983). Such an 
overall deficit of the blind participants is also visible in the 
present studies. The sighted participants solved on average 
92.2% of the inferences correctly, but the blind participants 
only 76.2%. The sighted needed 1.08 seconds on average to 
respond to a problem; the participants who were blind from 
birth needed 5.3 seconds. Even the blindfolded participants 
from Experiment 3 performed much better than the blind 
persons. The dominant approach to explain such findings 
runs somewhat counter to our own account. It is usually 
seen as a visual imagery deficit of the congenitally blind. In 
particular, haptics or auditory perceptions also lead to spa-
tial representations, but it is argued that these representa-
tions might be sub-optimal compared to vision-based repre-
sentations (a recent discussion can be found in Fleming, 
Ball, Collins, & Ormerod, in press). From this view, our 
blind participants show less good performance, because they 
are less good in visual mental imagery. However, this ac-
count cannot readily explain why the impedance effect of 
visual relations disappears in the blind. If a visual imagery 
deficit is responsible for the overall performance deficit of 
the blind, the impedance effect should be even more pro-
nounced in the blind compared to the sighted.  
A second critical aspect in the data is that 9 out of 10 
blind participants showed a minor increase of response la-
tencies in the visual problems. The differences were particu-
larly small and apparent only in the visual inspection of the 
data. However, one could argue that under these conditions 
the non-effect in the MANOVA (and in the post-hoc com-
puted nonparametric tests) is just due to the small number of 
participants. If the effect would turn out to be reliable it 
could have two causes: It could either indicate that even the 
blind try to envisage the visual relations in a visual mental 
image (what is implausible due to the above reasons) or that 
the relations differ in the degree to which they imply transi-
tivity. Spatial relations are unequivocal, but visual relations 
might be more dubious. Given, say, the following premises: 
 The cat is fatter than the ape. 
 The ape is fatter than the dog. 
Reasoners might have wondered whether the fatness of 
cats, apes, and dogs, is commensurable. They claim that, 
say, an elephant is thin is relative to elephants, and so it is 
sensible to assert that a thin elephant is fatter than a fat dog. 
The criterion for fatness shifts from one animal to another. 
This factor might have confused reasoners in our experi-
ment, and impeded their inferences with the visual relations. 
A related factor is the degree to which the premises accord 
with the participants’ existing beliefs. For example, the pre-
ceding premise (The cat is fatter than the ape) might strike 
some individuals as implausible. However, these explana-
tions are unlikely, because in the experiments as a whole, 
each such plausible premise is matched with one using the 
converse relation (The cat is thinner the ape), and so this 
factor seems not likely to account for our results.  
A last point is that we did not use purely spatial relations, 
i.e., those that are hard to envisage visually but easy to en-
visage spatially. If, as our findings suggest, the visual char-
acter of the materials leads to an impairment of reasoning 
performance, whereas the possibility of spatially envisaging 
the materials speeds up reasoning, then tasks based on 
purely spatial relations should be processed most quickly. 
Indeed, we found a (not significant) trend in this direction in 
Knauff & Johnson-Laird (2002). However, we encountered 
some technical problems with these relations and some col-
leagues overall doubt the existence of such relations.  
In conclusion, our results suggest that the content of ver-
bal relations can affect the process of inference. If the con-
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tent yields information relevant to an inference, as it does 
with visuospatial relations, then reasoning proceed 
smoothly, and may even be slightly faster than with other 
sorts of content. But, if the content yields visual images that 
are irrelevant to an inference, as it does with visual rela-
tions, then reasoning of sighted persons is impeded and 
takes reliably longer. People who are blind from birth are 
immune to such impedance effects, since they do not tend to 
use disrupting visual images. A word of caution, on the 
other hand, is that the visual and spatial nature of represen-
tations in reasoning also depends on the nature of the prob-
lem. Transitive inferences might elicit spatial representa-
tions, but that does not rule out that other problems rely on 
visual images in addition. 
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Abstract
In a seminal article, Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard
& Sedivy (1995) showed that eye-movements to real-world
objects reflect a rapid interplay of utterance and visual
environments in sentence comprehension. Further, Kamide,
Scheepers & Altmann (2003) found that when linguistic and
world knowledge constrain the domain of reference in a visual
scene, people even anticipate as yet unmentioned
arguments/referents. Studies by Knoeferle, Crocker,
Scheepers & Pickering (2003) have since revealed that when
linguistic and world knowledge did not disambiguate an initial
syntactic and role ambiguity, depicted agent-action-patient
events permitted anticipation of thematic role-fillers online.
This paper opposes linguistic and world knowledge on the one
hand, and visual scenes on the other hand in order to
determine their relative importance in auditory
comprehension. We observed a preferred reliance of auditory
sentence comprehension processes on information that had to
be extracted from depicted event scenes. Determining the
nature and time-course of the interaction between
linguistic/world knowledge and visual scenes is a first step
towards developing a theory of real-time auditory sentence
comprehension in visual environments. Our finding has
implications for theories of the language faculty (e.g.,
Jackendoff, 2002).
Introduction
How do we understand utterances online in visual
environments? As a first hypothesis, we might assume that
the presence of visual environments does not affect
language comprehension processes. Crucially, however,
language refers to things in the world. It has further been
demonstrated that in on-line comprehension reference to
entities is established rapidly, and that referentially relevant
non-linguistic information influences how the linguistic
input is structured (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard
& Sedivy, 1995). In auditory comprehension in visual
environments, the unfolding utterance provides linguistic,
semantic, and world knowledge. The scene in turn affords
information about entities and events in the immediate
environment (e.g., an outstretched hand affords the prospect
of shaking hands) (Gibson, 1966; see Steedman, 2002, for a
formal description of object and event affordances). Mental
representations that issue in parallel from distinct cognitive
components such as the auditory and visual system have to
be integrated in “real-time”. Comprehension in visual scenes
hence moves from single-mode understanding to bi- or even
multi-modal understanding.
The architecture of the language faculty
Since visual scene and linguistic information interact in
online comprehension (e.g., Kamide et al., 2003; Knoeferle
et al., 2003; Tanenhaus et al., 1995), adequate description of
auditory comprehension in visual environments requires that
we embrace a theoretical account which situates language
comprehension with respect to other cognitive systems such
as the visual, auditory, or motor system. Jackendoff (2002)
proposes one such framework. The individual levels in
Jackendoff’s architecture are modular in the sense of being
domain-specific (i.e., their representational vocabulary is
specialized), but unlike Fodorian modularity (Fodor, 1983),
linguistic structures interact with one another, and with
other cognitive sub-systems. This variety of modularity
permits communication between phonological, syntactic,
and conceptual structure. Moreover, it also allows
communication between conceptual structure and perception
or action via interface processors (Jackendoff, 2002, pp.
220f.).
While Jackendoff’s theory provides for the interaction of
linguistic/world knowledge and visual information, it is
underspecified with respect to the precise nature and time-
course of this interaction. In order to develop a theory of
real-time comprehension on the basis of his architecture,
further experimental work is required. As a first step in this
direction, we need to clarify how linguistic and world
knowledge is integrated with object and event affordances
that have to be extracted from the visual environment.
Previous work emphasizes both the importance of visual
scenes in determining online comprehension when the
utterance was structurally ambiguous (Tanenhaus et al.,
1995; Knoeferle et al., 2003), and the importance of stored
linguistic/world knowledge in anticipating which object in a
scene will be referred to next (Kamide et al., 2003)1.
                                                           
1 We use the term ‘stored knowledge’ to refer to linguistic/world
knowledge which is stored in memory. The terms ‘world
knowledge’ and ‘stereotypical knowledge’ are used synonymously
to mean stereotypical relationships between scene entities (e.g., a
cat is a stereotypical agent for chasing mice).
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Stored knowledge versus depicted event scenes
Kamide et al. (2003) have shown that unambiguous case-
marking, lexical expectations and world-knowledge
influence anticipation of post-verbal arguments depicted in
the scene. In German, a case-marked article can determine
the grammatical function and thematic role of the noun
phrase it modifies. Both SVO (subject-verb-object) and
OVS (object-verb-subject) orders are grammatical.
Participants inspected images showing a hare, a cabbage, a
fox and a distractor object while hearing sentences such as
Der Hase frisst gleich den Kohl (‘The hare (subj) eats soon
the cabbage (obj)’) and Den Hasen frisst gleich der Fuchs
(‘The hare (obj) eats soon the fox (subj)’). The subject and
object case-marking on the article of the first noun phrase
together with world knowledge extracted at the verb allowed
anticipation of the correct post-verbal referent. This was
evidenced by anticipatory eye-movements to the cabbage
after participants had heard ‘The hare (subj) eats …’ and to
the fox after having encountered ‘The hare (obj) eats …’.
Hence, when the utterance is unambiguous, and
linguistic/world knowledge restricts the domain of potential
referents in a scene, the comprehension system may
anticipate mention of scene objects.
Knoeferle et al. (2003, accepted), in contrast, considered
ambiguous utterances, where neither case-marking nor
stereotypical knowledge could assist in disambiguation.
Specifically, they examined the time course with which
listeners were able to resolve an initial structural and
thematic role ambiguity in German sentences. As the
linguistic input did not determine the correct syntactic
analysis and thematic role-assignment of the sentence,
listeners had to rely on depicted events in the scene for
interpretation of the utterance. The events showed, e.g., a
princess washing a pirate, while a fencer painted her. The
princess was thus determined as either patient or agent of an
event depending on the depicted action (washing/painting
respectively). Listeners heard Die Prinzessin wäscht/malt
den Pirat/der Fechter. (‘The princess (amb.) washes/paints
the pirate (obj./patient)/the fencer (subj./agent)’). Once the
verb had identified the relevant depicted action, anticipatory
eye-movements to the appropriate other event participant
(the pirate or the fencer) were observed. The anticipation of
a patient and agent role-filler for initially ambiguous
German subject-verb-object and object-verb-subject
sentences respectively suggests rapid use of depicted events
in resolving structural and thematic role ambiguity online.
This finding was also shown for the English main clause
(MC)/reduced relative (RR) ambiguity, and hence
generalized to another language and construction.
Teasing apart the relative effects of visually perceived
events and stored linguistic/world knowledge in online
sentence comprehension is of relevance for theories of the
architecture of the language system such as the one
proposed by Jackendoff (2002). Such endeavor may
ultimately allow us to propose a more concrete theory of
processing mechanisms within such a framework and to
hence develop it into a situated theory of real-time sentence
comprehension. What the above studies have shown, is that
stored knowledge and visual-scene information are both
rapidly applied, and that each may guide comprehension
processes online. It is further clear, that utterance, world
knowledge and the immediate visual scene interact during
online comprehension. What remains unclear is the nature
and time-course of that interaction. Among other questions,
we might ask: What is the relative importance, or priority of
different information sources, such as linguistic, scene, and
world knowledge? Does scene information guide
comprehension, or is the use of scene information
determined by stored knowledge?
To further investigate this empirical question, consider an
example from German. As noted above, German has a rich
case marking system where grammatical function is usually
indicated by unambiguous case morphemes. Word order
constraints are less rigid in German than in English, and
both subject-verb-object (SVO) and object-verb-subject
(OVS) order are grammatical with SVO being the preferred
reading (e.g., Hemforth, 1993). On hearing an OVS
sentence fragment such as The pilot (object/patient2)
jinxes… while inspecting the example scene in Figure 1, a
number of processes occur. When we hear The pilot, object
case-marking permits assignment of a patient role to the
noun phrase while establishing reference to the pilot in the
scene. As there are no constraints on inspecting the scene,
perceivers might notice a wizard holding a telescope, and a
character resembling a detective who is serving some food.
Having encountered an agent and the verb, we might expect
post-verbal mention of an agent. At this point, our
knowledge that a wizard is a likely jinxing-agent can
combine with the fact that the wizard is the only entity
whose affordances match the expectations raised by the
verb. The combination of entity affordance and stereotypical
knowledge allows us to anticipate the wizard as a likely-to-
be-mentioned agent. The decisive contribution is, however,
made by the utterance, as the verb provides knowledge of
stereotypical thematic role-fillers of a jinxing-action (a
wizard). The scene affords no information about a jinxing-
relation between two event participants, as there is no
depicted jinxing-action. In contrast, when we hear The pilot
(object/patient) serves food to…, verb-based knowledge of
stereotypical agents of a serving-food action (e.g., a cook),
cannot provide any guidance, as the scene affords no such
entity. However, the scene does afford a depicted food-
serving event performed by the detective. While
stereotypical knowledge does not allow determination of
thematic role-relations in this case, the affordances of the
depicted scene events do. Based on findings by Kamide et
al. (2003) and Knoeferle et al. (2003, accepted), we would
expect unmistakable resolution of the temporal uncertainty
regarding the yet-to-be-mentioned agent in both of the
above examples once people have heard the verb.
Imagine we heard instead The pilot (object/patient) spies-
on… In this case, the scene affords both a stereotypical
                                                           
2 In our materials, a grammatical subject and object correspond to
an agent and patient respectively in the scenes.
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agent (the detective), and an immediately depicted agent of
a spying event (the wizard) as potential agents (see Fig. 1).
When we hear spies-on, lexical access makes available the
meaning of the lexical item and stereotypical knowledge
related to it  (see Ferretti, McRae & Hatherell, 2001). After
encountering the verb, word meaning, stereotypical
knowledge of spy-on, and scene affordances are available to
anticipate either a depicted spying-event and its agent (the
wizard), or a stereotypical agent (the detective).
Do listeners rely more on extracting thematic role
relations from stereotypical knowledge provided by the
utterance (spy-on + WORLD KNOWLEDGE –> detective), or do
they rely on thematic relations afforded by the scene (spy-on
+ WIZARD-SPYING-E V E N T  -> w i z a r d) in incremental
interpretation? For the ambiguous spy-on example thematic
role-relations that are provided by the visual scene, conflict
with stereotypical knowledge of who-does-what-to-whom.
The comprehension system has to choose between two
available, yet conflicting types of information in
determining online thematic role-assignment.
While Jackendoff’s framework does not make explicit
predictions, there are reasons to expect a priority of
stereotypical/world knowledge in online thematic role-
assignment in such architecture. Jackendoff (2002, pp. 282)
argues against a strict separation of linguistic meaning and
world knowledge (see also Levinson, 2000). Experimental
evidence confirms such an assumption. Ferretti et al. (2001)
found that verbs immediately activated stereotypical
knowledge of agents (arresting-cop) or patients (arresting-
criminal), but not locations (swam-ocean). They conclude
that this type of world knowledge is part of thematic-role
knowledge, and immediately activated upon encountering
the verb (see also McRae, Ferretti & Amyote, 1997). Stored
knowledge about stereotypical agents is hence readily
available for online thematic role-assignment processes.
Non-stereotypical thematic role-relations afforded by scene
events, however, must be newly acquired by a perceiver,
and via a different perceptual system (the visual system). On
the basis of experimental evidence for the tight coupling
between word meaning and world knowledge (e.g., Ferretti
et al., 1997), we expect comprehension processes to rely in
preference on stored knowledge over scene information.
Indeed, such a prediction would also appear to follow from
traditional assumptions concerning the modularity of the
language faculty with respect to other perceptual faculties
such as the visual system (e.g., Fodor, 1983).
In summary, we expect the following: when the verb
determines either a depicted or a stereotypical target agent
only (Table 1, a1 and a2), both verb-derived knowledge of
stereotypical role-fillers and affordances of the scene events
should allow anticipation of the appropriate target agent.
This would replicate - within a single study - findings by
Kamide et al. (2003) and Knoeferle et al. (2003). When the
verb is serves-food-to (a1), we expect a higher percentage of
anticipatory looks to the only depicted food-serving agent
(the detective) than to the respective other agent in the scene
(the wizard). Conversely, when the verb is jinxes (a2), more
looks should occur to the stereotypical agent (the wizard)
than to the other agent in the scene (the detective). In the
interesting case of competition, when the verb (spy-on)
allows more than one potential scene entity as target agent,
no interaction is expected. Rather, we should observe a main
effect, with the point of interest being the direction of the
main effect. The fact that stored stereotypical knowledge is
readily available from memory, argues for guidance of
online thematic role-assignment processes by stereotypical
knowledge rather than by event affordances acquired from
the scene in a Jackendoffian framework. This should be
revealed in a higher percentage of inspections to the
stereotypical spying-agent (the detective) than to the
depicted spying-agent (the wizard) for sentences b1 and b2
(see Fig. 1 and Table 1). Crucially, these looks should occur
before people hear the disambiguating second noun, and
hence reveal online expectations of thematic role
interpretation.
Experiment
Method
Participants Twenty-four German native speakers with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision were paid 5 euro for
taking part in the experiment.
Materials We created 48 images using commercially
available clipart and graphic programs. For each of these
images, a female native German speaker recorded 4
sentences, which described either a depicted event (e.g.,
wizard-spying) or a stereotypical event (e.g., detective-
spying, see Fig. 1; Table 1).
Design A set of 24 items was created. Each item consisted
of 8 spoken sentences and 2 images (Table 1 and Fig. 1
show examples for the 4 sentences for one image of an item
set). The two versions of an image only differed in the
actions performed by the respective characters. This ensured
that each of the target agents (wizard, detective) was a
stereotypical and a depicted agent in turn, and that each verb
referred once to a depicted event, and once to a stereotypical
event. Actions were typically depicted as a character
holding an instrument. The way in which actions or
characters were depicted did not differ between the two
image versions. The middle character on each image (e.g.,
the pilot) was always a patient (‘being acted upon’). The
entities to the left and the right of the patient character were
performing an action upon the patient entity, and hence
always had an agent-role. The two agents were balanced for
position (left vs. right). An example image (see Fig. 1)
showed two such agent-action-patient events, e.g., wizard-
spying-on-pilot and detective-serving-food-to-pilot.
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Table 1:  Sentences for the example image in Figure 1
Image Condition Sentence PATIENT              VERB       |------ ADV--|  AGENT
Fig. 1 No-Competitor &
depicted target
a1 Den Piloten            verköstigt         gleich      der Detektiv.
The pilot (PAT.)     serves-food-to soon        the detective   (depicted AGENT)
‘The detective will soon serve food to the pilot.’
Fig. 1 No-Competitor &
stereotypical
target
a2 Den Piloten            verzaubert        gleich     der Zauberer.
The pilot (PAT.)     jinxes               soon       the wizard     (stereotypical AGENT)
‘The wizard will soon jinx the pilot.’
Fig. 1 Competitor &
depicted target
b1 Den Piloten            bespitzelt          gleich     der Zauberer.
The pilot (PAT.)    spies-on            soon        the wizard     (depicted AGENT)
‘The wizard will soon spy on the pilot.’
Fig. 1 Competitor &
stereotypical
target
b2 Den Piloten            bespitzelt          gleich     der Detektiv.
The pilot (PAT.)    spies-on            soon       the detective  (stereotypical AGENT)
‘The detective will soon spy on the pilot.’
Figure 1:  Example of an image for Experiment 1
In addition to the affordances of the depicted events (a
telescope affording a spying action), each of the characters
also had entity affordances (a detective affording a spying
action). The event and entity affordances were always
incongruous for any one item entity in this experiment (e.g.,
a detective was never depicted as performing a spying
action). Rather, one agent on each image was a stereotypical
competitor for the depicted event performed by the other
agent (e.g., the detective was a stereotypical competitor for
the depicted wizard-spying event), while carrying out a
different action (serving-food) himself. Note, however, that
25 % of the fillers showed plausible events, e.g., a criminal
being arrested by a cop). By manipulating the verb people
heard, we created four conditions, crossing the factors
competitor (competitor, no-competitor) with information
type (depicted target, stereotypical target). For the no-
competitor conditions (see Table 1, sentences a1 and a2),
the verb permitted either a depicted or a stereotypical target
only: “verköstigen” (‘serve-food-to’) determined the
detective (Table 1, a1) as depicted agent; “verzaubern”
(‘jinxes’) identified the wizard as stereotypical agent (Table
1, a2). For the competitor condition (see Table 1, sentences
b1 and b2) the verb “bespitzeln” (‘spy-on’) allowed two
scene entities as likely targets (Fig. 1): the wizard,
being depicted as performing a spying-action, and the
detective, a stereotypical agent for a spying-action.
Sentences were unambiguous OVS sentences (see Table 1).
They always started with an object case-marked noun
phrase referring to a patient role-filler (Fig. 1, the pilot). The
middle character was not engaged in an action, and its gaze
and position did not bias towards either the left- or the
rightward entity. Conditions were matched for length and
frequency as much as possible (CELEX). For the image in
Figure 1, the sentences in Table 1 were recorded.
Procedure An SMI Eye-Link head-mounted eye-tracker
monitored participants’ eye-movements. Images were
presented on a 21′′ multi-scan color monitor at a resolution
of 1024 x 768 pixels together with the spoken sentences.
The image appeared 1500 ms prior to utterance onset. Each
participant saw only one condition of each item, and the
order of appearance of items was randomized individually
for every participant. It was further ensured that no
participant heard any utterance or part of it more than once.
There were eight experiment lists. Each consisted of 24
experiment and 48 filler items. Consecutive experiment
trials were separated by at least one filler trial. Before the
experiment, participants were instructed to listen to the
sentences and to inspect the images. There was no other
task. The entire experiment lasted approximately 30 min.
Analysis The critical time region we chose for the analysis
extended from the late verb (200 ms prior to adverb onset)
to the start of  the second noun phrase (labeled ‘ADV’, see
Table 1). For this region, participants had heard most of the
verb, but had not heard the disambiguating second noun.
The X-Y coordinates of participants’ fixations were assigned
to regions for the entities and scene background.
Consecutive fixations within one object region (i.e., before a
saccade to another region occurred) were added together,
being counted as one inspection. For the inferential analysis
hierarchical log-linear models were used, which combine
characteristics of a standard cross-tabulation chi-square test
with those of ANOVA. Log-linear models are adequate for
count variables because they neither rely upon parametric
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assumptions concerning the dependent variable (e.g.,
homogeneity of variance), nor require linear independence
of factor levels (Howell, 2001). Entities were coded
depending on their event role. For Figure 1, for instance, the
wizard was coded as ‘stereotypical agent’, and the detective
as ‘depicted agent’ for the no-competitor conditions (a1 and
a2 respectively), and vice versa for the competitor
conditions (b1 and b2, see Table 1). The inspections to a
character within the ADV time region were a dependent
variable in the statistical analysis.  Inspection counts for the
ADV analysis region were adjusted to factor combinations
of character (stereotypical agent, depicted agent),
competitor condition (competitor, no competitor),
information type (depicted target, stereotypical target) and
either participants (N = 24) or items (N = 24).
Results
Figures 2 and 3 show the proportion of inspections to the
characters (depicted agent, stereotypical agent) during the
ADV time interval. Figure 2 shows inspection percentages
to the entities in the two information type conditions
(depicted target, stereotypical target) for the No-Competitor
condition, Figure 3 for the Competitor condition.
For the No-Competitor condition (a1, a2, see Table 1),
when the verb singled out either a depicted (a1) or a
stereotypical agent (a2), a significant interaction of
information type (depicted target, stereotypical target) and
character (depicted agent, stereotypical agent) revealed clear
disambiguation using either depicted or stereotypical
information (all ps < 0.0001). This was due to a
significantly higher percentage of inspections to the
depicted agent in the depicted (a1) than in the stereotypical
target condition (a2), and a significantly higher percentage
of inspections to the stereotypical agent in the stereotypical
target condition (a2) than in the depicted (a1) (see Fig. 2).
In contrast, for the Competitor condition (b1, b2, see
Table 1), when stored stereotypical knowledge and scene
affordances competed and provided conflicting information,
we expected no interaction since the stimuli between b1 and
b2 were identical (see Table 1). Rather, we found a main
effect. We observed more anticipatory looks to the agent of
the depicted spying-event (the wizard), than to the
stereotypical agent (the detective) for sentences b1 and b2
(see Fig. 3). These looks occurred after people had heard
The pilot (object/patient) spies-on…. and before they heard
the respective second noun phrase, which then
disambiguated towards the depicted or stereotypical target
type. Log-linear analyses showed that the main effect of
depicted agent was significant (p < 0.0001 by part. and
items) in the absence of a significant interaction (ps > 0.6).
Importantly the observed main effect for the Competitor
condition (b1 and b2) is only meaningful in comparison to
the significant interaction found in the No-Competitor
condition (a1 and a2). The difference between the main
effect for the Competitor condition (b1 and b2), and the
significant interaction for the No-Competitor condition (a1
and a2, see Table 1) was significant. Analyses revealed a
three-way interaction between character (depicted agent,
stereotypical agent), competitor condition (competitor, no-
competitor) and information type (depicted target,
stereotypical target) (p < 0.001 by part. and items).
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Figure 2: Percentage of inspections to characters during
the analysis region (‘ADV’) in the No-Competitor
Condition
Competitor Condition
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
depicted agent stereotypical agent
Scene Entities
%
 o
f 
in
sp
e
ct
io
n
s
Depicted Target
Stereotypical Target
Figure 3: Percentage of inspections to characters during
the analysis region (‘ADV’) in the Competitor condition
Discussion
Within a single study the observed pattern of eye-gazes has
shown that both stereotypical knowledge and information
that has to be newly acquired from depicted event scenes,
allow rapid thematic role interpretation of an unfolding
utterance. Our results thus confirm previous findings that
thematic-role knowledge (e.g., Ferretti et al., 2001; Kamide
et al., 2003) and depicted scene events (e.g., Knoeferle et
al., accepted) each are readily available for online
comprehension. In the face of competition, however, people
have a clear preference for relying on thematic relations
acquired from depicted events. We argue that our findings
are an important step towards developing a fully specified
theory of comprehension that is able to make explicit
predictions of auditory sentence comprehension in visual
environments. For architectures of the type proposed by
Jackendoff (2002), they point to the necessity of
incorporating a processing (rather than an architectural)
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account for the preferred reliance of the comprehension
system on thematic role-relations afforded by depicted event
scenes.
Clearly, the observed preferred reliance of listeners on
information that they had to newly acquire from depicted
scenes, and via a different perceptual system (the visual
system), counters our initial expectations of a priority of
stored stereotypical knowledge. When stored knowledge
and scene compete and provide conflicting information, it is
not stereotypical knowledge, which influences our
interpretation of the scene. Rather, when verb meaning
identified relevant depicted events, the scene guided
interpretation of the utterance. Our findings hence indicate
an active contribution of thematic role-relations afforded by
scene events in online thematic role-assignment. It should
nonetheless be highlighted that scene events only influenced
thematic role-assignment once they had been identified by
the verb.
Such utterance-mediated influence of depicted events
suggests a highly efficient interaction between the visual
and comprehension systems, where lexical items single out
scene entities and events, which then may influence online
interpretation. Under this view, we would expect that
reference from verbs to the depicted actions in the scene is a
pre-requisite for the influence of scene events on online
comprehension processes.
Studies by Knoeferle, Crocker, Scheepers & Pickering
(accepted) found, however, that depicted scene events
allowed online thematic role-assignment and structural
disambiguation even before people had encountered a
sentence-final verb. The insight that emerges from their
finding, and the ones presented in this paper, is that visual
scene information has great importance in online
comprehension. Indeed, reference from verbs to depicted
actions is not an indispensable pre-requisite for the guiding
influence of depicted events in auditory comprehension. In
sum, this speaks to a strong – albeit not necessarily
unconstrained - guidance account of the influence of visual
scenes on online comprehension processes. Further research
is required to establish whether there are constraints on the
influence of depicted event scenes on online thematic role-
assignment, and under which conditions they apply.
An Adaptive Perspective
In many cases, people find themselves in relevant situations
where both spoken language and immediate scene context
are available. When watching movies, for instance, people
seem to rapidly integrate their knowledge of the world with
the movie events unfolding over time in front of their eyes.
Clearly, cognitive processes such as understanding an
unfolding utterance and an immediate event may occur
simultaneously. Yet, when both types of information are
available in our environment, the pattern of eye-gazes we
observed provides strong evidence for a preference of the
immediate environment over expectations of stereotypical
events. Further, the rapid impact of the immediate situation
identifies the comprehension system to be highly adapted
towards acquiring new information from its environment
rather than relying on linguistic and world knowledge, a
conclusion which bears important implications for both
developmental and evolutionary accounts of the language
comprehension system.
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Abstract
This paper presents an unusual prediction made by the
DUAL-based model of judgment JUDGEMAP and its
verification. The model is shortly presented as well as the
simulation data obtained with it. These data predict that
people will use the information on an irrelevant dimension
when judging another dimension. This prediction is then
tested in a psychological experiment and confirmed.
Introduction
Suppose that you are judging how tall a person is. Do you
expect that the color of his or her eyes will play a role in
that process? Or suppose you are judging the quantity of oil
in the bottle you are buying, do you expect that the font
used on its label will have an effect? Finally, suppose you
are judging the length of a given line segment. Do you
expect that the color of the line will make a difference?
Both our intuition and the theories of judgment would
answer these questions negatively. Basically they would
assume that when judging length we ignore all irrelevant
features (including color) and only physical length plays a
role. Of course, many other factors, like order of
presentation and context, may play a role, but only the
length of the lines will take part in the judgment.
This paper is challenging this assumption of standard
theories of judgment and is trying to answer the above
seemingly stupid and self-evident questions and
surprisingly to show that all features (including the
irrelevant ones) do matter or more precisely they may matter
under certain circumstances.
Approaches to Judgment
There are a number of theories of judgment and a few
running models. Most of the theories originate from
psychophysics and are mathematical in their nature; they do
not describe the process of judgment, but only characterize
the end result. Since we are interested in describing the
process of judgment we will briefly outline only the main
approaches proposed so far in that direction.
Judgment as measuring similarity/dissimilarity with a
standard. The classical ideal point approach proposed by
Coombs (1964, Wedell & Pettibone, 1999) falls into this
category. He believes individuals have their “ideal points”
and therefore judging a stimulus can be described as
comparing it to this standard and measuring the distance
toward it. The Adaptation Level Theory (Helson, 1964) falls
into the same category, however, here the standard
(adaptation level) is changed depending on context. Finally,
the Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) follows a
similar approach, however, the standard here is called
“norm” and what is more important is that this norm is
constructed on the spot rather than retrieved from long-term
memory. A comparison set is constructed in working
memory consisting of known exemplars and its norm is
computed. Thus all three theories can be described as
relying on comparison of the target stimulus with a standard
(Figure 1), but they differ in the degree to which they
subscribe to the constructivist approach toward this
standard.
Figure 1. Judgment as comparison with a standard.
Judgment as classification task. Within this approach
the comparison set is subdivided into subcategories each of
them corresponding to a judgment label (or scale element)
and the target stimulus is classified within one of these
subcategories. The Range-Frequency Theory (Parduci, 1965,
1974) postulates the constraints which should be met by
such category subdivision: the range of value variation
within all subcategories should be about the same, and the
number of examples in all subcategories should be about the
same. The Theory of Criterion Setting (Treisman &
Williams, 1984, Treisman, 1985) is a process model that
explains how dynamically we change the boundaries of the
subcategories. Finally, the ANCHOR model (Petrov &
Target
Standard
Comparison Set
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Anderson, 2000, in press) describes the process of learning
of these subcategories and solves the classification task by
comparing the target stimulus to the prototypes of each
subcategory, these prototypes are supposed to be hold in
long-term memory and are called anchors (Figure 2). The
comparison set represented by the set of anchors is
dynamically formed.
Figure 2. Judgment as classification task. Comparing the
target to the standard of each of the subcategories.
Judgment as a mapping task. The DUAL-based model
of judgment discussed in this paper follows a third
approach: The target stimulus is not compared to the
comparison set, but is rather included in it and then a
mapping is established between the elements of the
comparison set and the set of rating labels (or scale
elements). This mapping should be as close as possible to a
homomorphism, i.e. the relations among the elements of
the comparison sets should be kept among their
corresponding rating labels. Thus the process of judgment
involves construction of the comparison set, joining the
target to it, and mapping between the comparison set and
the rating labels (Figure 3).
a)
b)
Figure 3. Judgment as mapping in the DUAL-based model.
DUAL-Based Model of Judgment
The current model – JUDGEMAP (Judgment as Mapping) –
is based on a general cognitive architecture – DUAL
(Kokinov, 1994b, 1994c). This architecture is a hybrid
(symbolic/connectionist) one and is explicitly designed to
model context-sensitivity of human cognition. It is based
on decentralized representations of concepts, objects, and
episodes and parallel emergent computations.
The AMBR1 (Kokinov, 1988, 1994a) and AMBR2
(Kokinov, 1998, Kokinov & Petrov, 2001) models are built
on DUAL and integrate memory and analogy-making. Since
the process of judgment, as described above, involves
memory (construction of the comparison set in working
memory) and mapping (which is a central mechanism in
analogy-making) the JUDGEMAP model is most naturally
integrated in DUAL and borrows many of the mechanisms
developed for analogy-making in AMBR. Because of the
lack of space the model is described only in broad strokes.
Interested readers are invited to consult the literature on
DUAL and AMBR for more details.
Construction of the comparison set. The comparison set
is formed from perception (the target as well as potential
context stimuli) and from long-term memory (familiar or
recently presented exemplars as well as generalized
prototypes, if such exist in LTM). The mechanism
responsible for that construction is spreading activation. The
sources of activation are the INPUT and GOAL nodes, i.e.
the perceived target (and possibly context) stimuli and the
goal to judge the stimuli on a scale predefined in the
instruction (e.g. a scale from 1 to 7). Thus the
representations of the target and the scale elements become
sources of activation which is then spread through the
network of micro-agents. Naturally, concepts related to the
representation of the target become active, e.g. various
features of the target – these include both relevant and
irrelevant features (of course, relevant features receive more
activation than irrelevant ones). The activation spreads
further from the general concepts (like RED, GREEN, etc.)
towards specific examples of the concepts (other red or green
objects). However, there are only a few links from the
general concepts to their exemplars – only to the most
familiar (typical) exemplars or to recently experienced ones.
Thus gradually a number of exemplars (and possibly
prototypes) are activated and become part of working
memory – all these form the comparison set (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Formation of the comparison set in WM by the
spreading activation mechanism of DUAL.
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Mapping of the comparison set onto the scale elements.
We can now consider the comparison set as a retrieved base
and map it onto the scale elements which are the target. The
mapping process should preserve the relations among the
elements of the comparison set among their images on the
scale. The mapping should also follow the range-frequency
principle described in the previous section. How is the
mapping achieved in JUDGEMAP? Similarly to AMBR, a
constraint-satisfaction network is constructed by the marker-
passing and structure-correspondence mechanisms. This
network consists of temporal agent-hypotheses representing
possible correspondences between members of the
comparison set and elements of the scale. These initial
hypotheses are formed according to the range principle.
Excitatory and inhibitory links are constructed among the
hypotheses and the spreading activation mechanism selects
the winning hypotheses which form the mapping (Figure 5).
The competition among the hypotheses implements the
frequency principle. As result of this process not only the
target stimulus but also each element of the comparison set
receives a judgment. This does not mean that people would
be aware of all these judgments – most or even all of them
might remain unconscious.
Figure 5. The process of mapping accomplished by the
constraint satisfaction mechanism. The winning hypotheses
are in black.
Speculative prediction. Since the activation spreads from
the target stimulus (represented in a decentralized way by
many agents), exemplars, similar in some respect to it
(sharing some feature with the target), can be potentially
activated and thus become members of the comparison set
in working memory. This means that in addition to
currently perceived stimuli, to recently activated exemplars,
and to highly familiar (typical) exemplars, exemplars which
are simply similar to the target will also participate in the
comparison set. Moreover, these exemplars might be similar
along the relevant (judged) dimension or along an irrelevant
dimension.
Let us consider the following example. Suppose we are
judging the length of line segments but the lines are
colored. Let the target stimulus be a red line of certain
length. In this case we may expect that there will be more
red lines in the comparison set (Figure 6) – they will be
activated through the RED concept which is shared with the
target. On the other hand, if the target stimulus is a green
line of the same length, more green lines will become part
of the comparison set (Figure 7). Now, if it happens that the
known red lines are longer than the known green lines, then
the two target stimuli (differing only in color) will be
included in different comparison sets and thus judged
differently and there will be a shift in favor of the green
target. Therefore the speculative prediction of JUDGEMAP
will be that even such irrelevant feature of the line like its
color will play a role in the judgment process. This
prediction is in sharp contrast to all theories and models
described in the first section, which assume that only the
relevant features play a role.
Figure 6. The target stimulus is red and therefore we expect
more red exemplars in the comparison set. They happened
to be larger in size and thus they compete for the upper part
of the scale. In this case the target stimulus (of the same
size as in Figure 7) will compete with them and will be
mapped onto 4.
Figure 7. The target stimulus is green and therefore we
expect more green exemplars in the comparison set. They
happened to be smaller in size and thus they compete for the
lower part of the scale. In this case the target stimulus (of
the same size as in Figure 6) will compete with them and
eventually will be mapped onto 5. In this way we receive an
upward shift in the judgment.
Thus we will first describe a simulation experiment with
JUDGEMAP that tests in practice this speculation and will
also give us a rough estimation of the order of this color
effect (if any). If we are successful, we will run a
psychological experiment to text the model’s prediction and
thus verify the model.
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Simulation Experiment
In this simulation experiment we use a stimulus set of 56
lines. They are all in the long-term memory of the model.
The lines differ in length and color. There are 7 different
sizes (from 10 units of length to 34 unit with increment of
4 units) and two different colors (red and green). Thus in
each size group there are 8 lines. The frequency of the red
(respectively green) lines varies across the size groups. In
size group one (the shortest lines - length 10 units) there are
7 green and 1 red line, in the second shortest group (length
14 units) there are 6 green and 2 red lines, etc. In the largest
group size (length of 34 units) there are 7 red lines and one
green line. Thus we have positively skewed distribution of
the green lines and negatively skewed distribution for the
red lines.
Each line is represented by a coalition of 5 agents
standing for the line itself, for its color, for its length, and
for the two relations (color_of and length_of). In addition
there are agents standing for the numbers from 0 to 8, but
only the agents standing for 1 to 7 are instances of “scale
element”.
On each run of the program we connect one of these lines
to the input list thus simulating the perception of the target
stimulus, and connecting the agent standing for
“scale_from_1_to_7” to the goal node thus simulating the
instruction for rating on a 7 point scale.
We have produced 42 variations of the knowledge base of
the system thus simulating 42 different participants in the
experiment. The knowledge bases differ mainly in the
associative and instance links among the agents, thus
although all our “artificial participants” will know the same
lines and the same concepts, they will activate different
instances in the comparison set.
For each of these knowledge bases we have run two
judgment trials: one for a red line of size 22 and one for a
green line of the same size.
Simulation Results
The results from the simulations are presented in Figure 8.
As we can see the mean rating of the green lines are in most
cases slightly higher than the mean rating of the red lines
with the same length.
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Figure 8. Simulation data. The mean rating of each line
with a certain length (1-7) and color (green and red) obtained
from all subjects.
Thus the mean of the mean ratings of all red categories is
4.012, while the mean of the mean ratings of all green
categories is 4.065, which makes a difference of 0.053
which turns out to be almost significant tested with repeated
measurements analysis (F(1,41)=3.917, p=0.055). The data
show that the possible size of the color main effect is very
small, but may still be significant. This prediction makes
sense: on one hand it is small enough, so that we can ignore
it in everyday life and this explains why our intuition says
that irrelevant information does not play a role in judgment.
On the other hand, the simulation predicts that the irrelevant
information does play a role and shifts a bit the evaluation.
This means that under specific circumstances this shift
might be larger and become significant.
The experiment described below is designed to test this
prediction of the model. Basically it replicates the
simulation experiment with a larger number of lines.
Psychological Experiment
In this experiment human participants rate the length of red
and green lines of various sizes. The interesting question is
whether we will obtain a main effect of color, i.e. whether
there will be a difference between the ratings of the red and
green lines of the same size.
Method
Design
The experiment has a 14x2 within-subject factorial design.
The independent variables are length (varying at 14 levels)
and color (varying at 2 levels: green and red) of the lines.
The dependent variable is the rating of the length of the
lines on a 7-point-scale. The experimental question is
whether there will be a main effect of color, which is
supposedly an irrelevant factor in judging length.
Material
A set of 14 color lines has been presented horizontally
against a gray background on a 17-inch monitor. The
shortest line is 12 pixels, the longest one is 727 pixels and
the increment is 55 pixels. Each particular line length has
been shown eight times in red or green color. The short
lines were predominantly green while the long ones were
predominantly red. The color distribution within the set of
all 112 lines (14 lengths x 8 times) is presented in Table 1.
The frequency of the stimuli was calculated in order to
receive a positively skewed distribution for the green color
and a negatively skewed one for the red lines.
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Table 1. Frequency of the presented stimulus lines (where 1
represents stimulus length 12 pixels, 2-67 pixels and so
on).
lengths number of the
green lines
number of the red
lines
1 & 2 7 1
3 & 4 6 2
5 & 6 5 3
7 & 8 4 4
9 & 10 3 5
11 & 12 2 6
13 & 14 1 7
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in front of a
computer screen where all 112 stimuli were shown
sequentially and in random order. They were instructed to
judge the length of each line presented on the screen on a
seven point scale: 1-“it is not long at all”, …, 7-“it is very
long”. No feedback was provided to the participants and no
time restrictions have been imposed on them. The whole
experiment typically lasted about 15 minutes.
Participants
The participants were 18 undergraduate students (9 men and
9 women none of whom was color-blind) from the
introductory classes in psychology at New Bulgarian
University who participated in order to satisfy a course
requirement.
Results and Discussion
We had 14x2=28 data points for each participant. The
results averaged over subjects are shown in Figure 9. Each
bar stands for the mean rating that a line of the
corresponding size and color has received during the
experiment. The repeated measurements analysis showed
that the difference (0.046) between the mean judgment of
the green lines (4.239) and the mean judgment of the red
lines (4.193) is significant (F(1, 17)=5.966, p=0.026).
Surprisingly enough we obtained a difference (0.046) that
is almost the same as the difference we obtained in the
simulation (0.053). No tuning of the model was possible
since we did not have the experimental data in advance.
Thus the prediction of the JUDGEMAP model has been
experimentally confirmed.
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Figure 9. The mean rating of each line with a certain length
(1-14) and color (green and red) obtained from all subjects.
Conclusions
The JUDGEMAP model of human judgment has been
presented. This model is based on a general cognitive
architecture (DUAL) and is thus integrated with the memory
and analogy-making model AMBR. Moreover, this model
inherits the underlying assumptions of DUAL and AMBR:
human cognition is context-sensitive (Kokinov, 1994c),
judgment included; human memory is constructive
(Kokinov & Hirst, 2003), analogy-making is at the core of
human cognition (Gentner, Holyoak & Kokinov, 2001) and
its mapping mechanisms may be used in judgment.
The JUDGEMAP model is similar to the Norm theory
and the ANCHOR model with respect to the constructive
approach to the formation of the comparison set. However,
unlike all the models described in the first section judgment
in JUDGEMAP is not based on comparison of the target
with some aspect of the comparison set, but rather the target
stimulus is included in the comparison set and it receives a
rating along with all other members of this set. This rating
process is based on establishing a mapping between the
comparison set and the set of scale elements which mapping
preserves the order relations.
Unlike all other models JUDGEMAP does not ignore the
irrelevant features of the to be judged targets, moreover
these irrelevant features play a role in the construction of the
comparison set (retrieving similar objects according to these
irrelevant dimensions). The model makes a strange
prediction that the color of the target line may play a role in
the rating of its length and thus predicts a shift of the mean
rating (although a small one) with the change of color. This
prediction has been tested in a psychological experiment and
has been confirmed.
The size of this color effect is very small, but the stimuli
have been very simple and the features unremarkable. It is
difficult to imagine that the green color reminds us of a
particular green line. That is why we plan to repeat the
experiment with more complex stimuli (human figures and
clothes) and more memorable features (human faces). It is
possible the size of the effect in this case to become larger.
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Abstract 
With this paper, we introduce the agreement production 
error (APE) model. APE is a model of comprehension 
and production performance that applies a theory of 
memory and cognition (ACT-R 5.0) to the task of 
linguistic processing embedded in a variety of 
psycholinguistic experimental paradigms.  
With its roots in the ACT-R theory, agreement errors are 
modeled as a combination of symbolic processing and 
chunk activation dynamics. Whether a plural or a 
singular verb is produced depends on the accessibility of 
the Subject’s plural marking. The activation of plural-
marking chunks decays, so that it might not be found 
when its retrieval is attempted at the verb, resulting in a 
general singular error (Hemforth and Konieczny, 2003). 
This effect is then modulated by task and construction 
specific variations.  
Introduction 
When people speak or write they occasionally produce 
verbs not agreeing in number with the subject. This 
happens particularly often when the singular subject is 
followed by a plural modifier in constructions like (1; 
quoted form Bock & Miller, 1991). 
(1) The readiness of our conventional forces are at an 
all-time low. 
The mechanism underlying this error is attributed to the 
marked plural feature percolating up the tree too far 
(Vigliocco & Nicol, 1998). This account is 
substantiated by the fact that no comparable 
singular/plural mismatch effect for constructions with 
marked plural heads has been established so far.  
Very recently, Haskell and MacDonald (2002) proposed 
the principle of proximity as an alternative explanation. 
They showed that in disjunctions like (2), subjects have 
a strong preference to match the number marking on the 
verb with the more local noun. In addition to 
distributional evidence, this was taken to indicate that 
the classical attraction error at least partially and at least 
in English is caused by number marking on a close 
interfering noun. 
(2)  a. The hat or the gloves is/are red.  
b. Is/are the hat or the gloves red? 
In a series of five written production experiments, 
Hemforth and Konieczny (2003) tested the proposed 
mechanisms in German.  
In this paper, we follow up on this work and present a 
new model, APE, that accounts for the written 
production data in the experiments reported. The paper 
is organized as follows. We will start by summarizing 
the two most important experiments from Hemforth and 
Konieczny (2003). After that, the model will be 
outlined. Since APE is based on ACT-R 5.0, a short 
introduction to this theory is provided beforehand. The 
paper ends with a general discussion and conclusion. 
Error patterns in written production 
The first experiments replicated the classical results on 
subject-modifier-verb constructions. Two factors were 
varied in the first experiment: The factor “Match”: 
matching (1,4) or mismatching (2,3) number marking 
on head noun and local noun, and the factors “Number 
of the head noun”: singular (1,2) or plural (3,4) head 
noun.  
(1)Die Farbe auf der Leinwand __________ trocken. 
     The color on the canvas __________ dry. 
(2) Die Farbe auf den Leinwänden _________ trocken.  
   The color on the canvasses _________ dry. 
(3) Die Farben auf der Leinwand _________ trocken.  
   The colors on the canvas _________ dry. 
(4)Die Farben auf den Leinwänden _________ trocken.  
   The colors on the canvasses _________ dry.. 
 
Hemforth and Konieczny (2003) found a clear effect of 
the number of the head noun on the percentage of 
agreement errors. Neither the factor “Match” nor the 
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(12) Ich habe gehört, dass die Frauen die Männer 
besucht _________.  
number x match interaction reached significance. 
However, whereas no difference in matching versus 
mismatching local nouns could be established for 
sentences with plural marked head nouns, planned 
comparisons showed an effect with singular marked 
head nouns. This result replicates the well-known 
modifier attraction effect (e.g. Vigliocco & Nicol, 1998, 
Bock & Miller, 1991). 
I have heard that the men the women visited 
_________. 
In all three experiments, the number marking on the 
Subject had a strong effect on the number of agreement 
errors: more errors were produced following a plural 
Subject. However, less errors were produced when the 
local Object-NP was also plural marked.   
The lack of an object attraction effect for singular 
subjects is consistent with the feature percolation 
hypothesis and contradicts proximity.  
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Figure 1: Agreement errors for NP-PP-V constructions 
 
In line with earlier experiments on written production 
(e.g., Branigan et al., 1995; Hölscher & Hemforth, 
2000), we found a considerably high number of 
agreement errors for plural marked head nouns, 
reflecting a general tendency to produce singular verbs. 
Nevertheless, the result for singular heads is compatible 
with both the feature percolation hypothesis and 
proximity. Hemforth and Konieczny (2003) therefore 
ran a series of experiments on Subject-Object-Verb 
(SOV) constructions. An object attraction effect for 
singular subjects would rule out feature percolation, 
because the object is not embedded within the subject. 
Figure 2: Agreement errors in SOV-constructions 
 
The mismatch effect for plural subjects, however, is not 
predicted by feature percolation. Hemforth and 
Konieczny (2003) proposed feature reactivation as an 
explanation. According to that hypothesis, the plural 
feature of the subject (head) is subject to activation 
decay so that activation can be below the retrieval 
threshold when the verb must be produced. This 
mechanism would account for the general tendency to 
produce singular verbs. In SOV constructions, however, 
the subject plural feature can be reactivated by an object 
plural feature, because both subject and object are 
arguments of the verb. 
Object attraction? 
The experimental factors varied in three further 
experiments were “Match”: matching (9,12) or 
mismatching (10,11) number marking on Subject NP 
and local object NP, and “Number of Subject”: singular 
(9,10) or plural (11,12) Subject NP. 
APE: A hybrid model of agreement errors 
 
 The data so far suggest that both syntactic constraints 
and proximity affect agreement errors. For one, there 
are certain effects restricted to certain syntactic 
constructions (“feature percolation”), and second, there 
are effects of locality and interference best dubbed in 
terms of decay and reactivation. The Agreement 
Production Error (APE) model is built atop the ACT-R 
architecture, which provides us with mechanisms for i. 
declarative chunk activation and decay, embedded in a 
ii. symbolic processing architecture with iii. cost-
dependent rule selection, and iv. task-specific 
modelling.  
(9) Ich habe gehört, dass der Mann die Frau 
besucht _________.  
  I have heard that the man(masc,nom) the 
woman visited _________. 
(10)  Ich habe gehört, dass der Mann die Frauen 
besucht _________.  
  I have heard that the man(masc,nom) the 
women visited _________. 
(11)  Ich habe gehört, dass die Frauen den Mann 
besucht _________.  
I have heard that the women the man (masc, 
acc) visited _________. 
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An informal introduction to ACT-R 5 
ACT-R (Anderson and Lebiere, 1998; Anderson et al., 
submitted) is both a theory of cognition and a modelling 
framework, where scientists can build their specific 
models using well defined and empirically justified 
concepts that serve as the model’s building blocks.  
ACT-R distinguishes declarative from procedural 
knowledge. Both employ advanced sub-symbolic 
mechanisms. 
Chunks are the elements of declarative memory. They 
bundle information in a collection of attribute value 
pairs, by which chunks get linked to other chunks to 
form networks of declarative knowledge. When chunks 
are created, they start out with a certain base level 
activation that decays over time, following the power 
law of forgetting. If their activation falls below a certain 
threshold, their chance for being retrieved by a 
production approaches zero.  
When a chunk is retrieved from declarative memory, its 
base level activation is permanently pushed a bit 
upwards.  The more often it is used, the higher it will be 
activated (power law of learning). In addition to base 
level activation, a chunk can temporarily receive 
additional activation spreading from associated chunks 
stored in the goal of the current production rule. The 
rationale is that chunks relevant for the problem stated 
in the current goal should benefit from being within the 
current focus of attention.  
Production rules interact with declarative memory via 
retrieval of chunks. A retrieval request may succeed or 
fail, depending on whether or not a matching chunk 
exists, and on that chunk’s activation. Among several 
matching chunks, the one that is activated highest has 
the highest probability of being retrieved. A retrieved 
chunk is stored in the retrieval buffer, where the next 
production can use it. Given a certain constellation of 
chunks in the available modality specific buffers (goal, 
retrieval, visual, audio, etc.), multiple production rules 
might apply to this state, but only one will be picked for 
firing. In ACT-R, conflict resolution in the case of 
multiple potential production instantiations is 
determined by the utility value of each rule in the 
conflict set. The utility is in turn a function of the past 
history of success and the cost associated with solving 
the problem by picking this rule.  
If there are two productions in the conflict set, one of 
which has a high probability of being successful but 
which takes a while for getting there, and the other is 
quick but has only a mediocre success history, the 
choice will depend on the amount of time the user 
devotes to the problem. If the focus is on accuracy, 
plenty of time can be spent solving the problem so that 
the more successful rule will be picked. If the focus is 
on speed, the faster rule will be picked even though it’s 
not unlikely that it will fail. 
Basic modelling decisions 
While ACT-R provides only limited means of 
representing and processing declarative and procedural 
knowledge, there are still many alternative ways in 
which knowledge can be modelled. We settled on the 
following modelling decisions before we actually 
started: 
• Restricted use of direct storage. We do not store 
linguistic elements in slots of goals unless it is 
required for declarative reasons. Newly created 
chunks are released into declarative memory and 
retrieved when needed. Binding a chunk to a slot in 
the goal for procedural reasons is too strong a 
computational assumption, since stored chunks are 
excluded from activation decay. 
• As a consequence of this, syntactic nodes have to 
be retrieved from memory in order to become 
integrated with other nodes. For instance, when the 
verb is processed, all its complements and adjuncts 
must be retrieved from memory to form an 
integrated interpretation.  
• The cost of integrating a word is hence a function 
of the accessibility of its dependents in memory. 
Integration will be the easier, the more locally its 
dependents have been processed beforehand (cf. 
Gibson, 1998) 
• The restricted use of direct storage has also 
consequences for the agreement mechanism, 
because NPs have to be retrieved all the time to get 
attached to modifiers or for incremental 
interpretation. The continuous retrieval of NPs 
influences their activation, so that some will be 
more accessible than others when the plural feature 
is to be assigned. 
The sentence processing mechanism 
The current model version performs the completion task 
as used in Hemforth and Konieczny (2003). First, a 
series of noun phrases are processed before the model 
produces a verb.  
Processing starts with a goal that represents the current 
processing state during the assembly of the sentence 
elements. Each word read from the screen triggers the 
retrieval of a lexical element and is integrated into the 
currently processed phrase marker. The first NP is 
marked as the subject of the clause. When a modifier is 
processed, its host will be retrieved for attachment.  
At each top level element of the sentence, a 
propositional interpretation is sought that matches the 
concepts associated with the processed phrases to a 
long term proposition (cf. Budiu & Anderson, 2000). If 
such an interpretation can be found, the concepts are 
hooked to that proposition.  
In verb-final constructions, multiple arguments might 
precede the verb. In the absence of thematic 
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information of the verb, APE anticipates the verb by 
retrieving a proposition in the background knowledge 
that integrates the arguments processed so far. The 
more arguments have been read, the more likely will 
the interpretation match the right one when the verb is 
read, so that actually integrating the verb will become 
easier (Konieczny and Döring, 2003). In this view, 
anticipation is at the conceptual rather than the syntactic 
level. 
Modelling agreement 
Representation of number. Singular is the default 
number of nouns, whereas plural has to be assigned 
explicitly. A noun phrase is hence considered singular 
unless it is marked plural.  
The plural feature is modelled as a chunk that links the 
plural attribute to a noun phrase, rather than as a slot in 
an NP chunk. As a chunk, a plural feature is subject to 
ACT-R’s activation dynamics. 
Producing number. Verb production is modelled by 
distinct production rules for singular and plural forms. 
The plural rule attempts to retrieve the plural feature of 
a noun phrase marked as subject of the sentence. If it 
succeeds, the plural form is generated from the base 
form. If it fails, the singular rule produces the singular 
base form.  
The plural rule has higher utility, due to its better 
accuracy in actually producing the right verb when the 
subject is plural. The singular rule is less specific and 
therefore error prone, but less cost intensive. 
Where syntax matters. The German production data 
suggest that plural attraction is construction specific: 
While there is a robust modifier attraction effect for 
singular subjects in SMV constructions, there is none in 
SOV. This result has been predicted by the feature 
percolation hypothesis. 
Feature percolation is an encoding error by nature, in 
which the plural feature is erroneously assigned to the 
head noun instead of the embedded noun.  
ACT-R, however, lacks a direct mechanism for 
encoding errors (i.e. the creation and release of false 
chunks). The only place where errors can occur in 
ACT-R is during retrieval of chunks.  
Modelling “Feature percolation”. In APE, the 
construction specific encoding error is modelled as a 
retrieval error during the search for an NP that the 
plural feature is to be assigned to. That is, during plural 
assignment, the newly created plural feature requires a 
root NP that has to be retrieved from memory. At the 
modifier in a complex-NP construction, the head NP at 
that point is highly activated due to the fact that is had 
been retrieved for modifier attachment shortly before 
plural assignment. Since both the head NP and the 
modifier NP are about equally strongly activated, there 
is a certain chance that the head NP, not the modifier 
NP is retrieved for plural marking. If that happens, the 
subject has inherited the plural marking from the 
embedded NP. 
In SOV constructions, no attachment takes place 
between the Subject and the Object-NP. Therefore the 
Subject NP is not going to be retrieved before the plural 
assignment of the Object. Retrieving the root NP for the 
object plural feature is hence less error prone.  
On the other hand, the subject NP will be retrieved after 
the object has been assigned to the new plural feature, 
because subject and object are both needed for 
incremental interpretation, i.e. the anticipation of a 
matching relationship between both. The interpretation 
depends upon the number of the entities to be 
integrated, as the examples () and () illustrate. 
(8) Gestern haben die Professoren den Studenten … 
Yesterday have the professorsnom the studentacc 
“Yesterday, the professors have … the student.” 
(9) Gestern hat der Professor die Studenten … 
Yesterday has the professornom the studentsacc … 
“Yesterday, the professor has … the students.” 
Things that multiple professors are likely to do to a 
single student (examined, rejected, etc.) can be different 
from things that a single professor is likely to do to 
multiple students (taught, etc.). Number is hence an 
important feature at the conceptual level and useful for 
interpretation anticipation. 
Differential plural re-activation in SOV constructions. 
During the process of incremental interpretation of each 
new verb-complement, each previous concept partici-
pating in the proposition, and, importantly, its plural 
feature - if it exists - will be retrieved and hence its 
activation will be pushed a bit. That is, when the object 
in SOV constructions is processed, the plural marking 
of the subject will be re-activated. This will only 
happen, however, if it can be successfully retrieved 
when the object is interpreted. There is a slight chance 
that the plural feature cannot be found here because its 
activation has already decayed too strongly. This 
chance, however, will be lower, if the plural feature 
receives additional activation from the goal, which is 
the case if the object is marked for plural. The 
additional amount of source level activation results in a 
higher retrieval probability for the subject plural 
marking if the object is plural. Therefore, the subject 
plural will be reactivated more often, so that it can be 
retrieved better and more often when the verb is 
produced. 
Implications 
Whether a plural or a singular verb is produced depends 
on the accessibility of the Subject’s plural marking. The 
activation of plural-marking chunks decays, so that it 
might not be found when its retrieval is attempted at the 
verb, resulting in a general singular error (Hemforth and 
Konieczny, 2003). This effect is then modulated by task 
and construction specific variations. The model will 
729
come in variants for different experimental paradigms, 
which are nevertheless based on the same core for verb-
production. The first model variant presented here 
performs the completion task for written production and 
is hence a combined sentence processing and 
production model. It first reads two NPs, embedded in a 
variety of constructions, and then produces a verb. 
Modifier attraction errors (cf. Bock & Miller, 1991; 
Vigliocco & Nicol, 1998 ) are due to encoding errors 
during plural marking (feature percolation). The plural 
feature of the modifier-NP sometimes gets wrongly 
assigned to the Subject-NP. This effect is due to the 
necessity of reactivating the Subject-NP in processing 
the modifier-NP and is therefore restricted to modifier-
NPs (Hemforth & Konieczny, 2003). In SOV 
constructions on the other hand, at each new NP, all 
verb arguments get reactivated to allow incremental 
interpretation and verb-anticipation (Konieczny and 
Döring, 2003). During this process the plural feature of 
an Object-NP can reactivate a plural feature of the 
Subject, reducing the singular error in S-O-V 
constructions (Hemforth & Konieczny, 2003). 
The model is currently extended to other types of tasks 
to be able to account for task-specific-differences.  
Aural repetition and completion. In this task, the 
participants are first presented with a preamble and then 
have to repeat and complete it with a verb in order to 
form a full sentence. This type of task has been used in 
the majority of experiments on agreement errors (e.g. 
Bock and Miller, 1991, Franck, Lassi, Frauenfelder and 
Rizzi, 2003, Bock and Cutting, 1992, Hartsuiker, 
Antón-Méndez and van Zee, 2001, Vigliocco and 
Nicol, 1998) and is generally claimed to test “pure” 
production, because subjects actually utter the whole 
sentence and not just the verb as in a completion task. 
Nevertheless, there is an inevitable comprehension 
component in this task as well, as the preamble has to 
be presented to the participants in some form. Instead of 
accounting for only the production part, we model the 
entire task, including reading and memorizing the 
preamble, repeating and completing it. Processing the 
preamble entails forming declarative representations for 
phonological and syntactic/conceptual information as in 
the completion task. To repeat the preamble, the model 
will have to retrieve either its phonological or syntactic 
representation. After repetition of the preamble, the 
verb should than be produced in the same way as in the 
present model. The difference between this task and the 
written completion task is in the higher activation of all 
elements of the preamble, as it is not only read once, 
but than (partly) retrieved and repeated. This should 
have no influence on the encoding error, but should 
make the general singular error much less frequent, 
which is in fact what has been observed in the 
experiments above. Moreover, the model predicts a 
floor effect for length variations of the intervening 
material in this paradigm, which is in fact was has been 
found (e.g. Bock and Miller, 1991, Bock and Cutting, 
1992).  
Time pressure. In the experiments reported by 
Hartsuiker, Antón-Méndez and van Zee, 2001, 
participants had to perform the production task under 
time pressure. The model predicts the observed effects: 
Under time pressure, productions that consume too 
much time are more likely to be ignored in favor of 
faster but less accurate productions. In particular, the 
plural-feature will sometimes be left underspecified for 
its root. Under-specified plural-features will then 
erroneously be retrieved at the moment of the 
production of the verb. This would happen even with 
plural-features of intervening object noun phrases, 
hence accounting for the object-attraction-effect 
obtained by Hartsuiker et al. Moreover, time pressure 
should increase the general singular error due to a 
change in the utilities of the productions which 
determine the number of the verb: the more accurate, 
but also more time consuming plural rule will have a 
lower utility than in other paradigms. This will lead to 
the singular rule firing more often, which produces the 
singular base form without checking for the plural 
feature. 
Dual task paradigms. Finally, the model can also be 
extended to dual-task-paradigms, as applied by Fayol, 
Largy and Lemaire, 1994, and Hemforth, Konieczny 
and Schimke 2003, in which participants have to 
perform a second working-memory consuming task in 
addition to the sentence completion or production task. 
The cognitive load created by this second task will lead 
to less attention, i.e. source activation, being devoted to 
relevant chunks during the processing of the preamble. 
This will make both the encoding error and the singular 
error more likely, because they are both due to retrieval 
errors that become more likely if decay is stronger or 
starts from a lower level. As predicted, a higher overall 
number of errors was found in the experiments cited 
above. 
The influence of a specific experimental paradigm may 
further interact with properties of the language which is 
investigated. Such an interaction may eventually 
explain a cross-linguistic difference which has been 
observed in SOV-constructions: In contrast to the 
German results reported above, several studies 
conducted on French SOV-construction found a 
mismatch effect in the SP-condition (“object 
attraction”, see for example Fayol , Largy, Lemaire, 
1994; Franck, Lassi, Frauenfelder, und Rizzi, 2003). In 
French, if there is an object in preverbal position, it 
always has to be a clitic pronoun. As these pronouns are 
very short, they have to be processed in less time than a 
full NP. Under such conditions, the model would 
predict the same effect as under time pressure: the 
plural-feature may be left underspecified for its root and 
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might then be retrieved when the verb has to be 
produced, leading to a plural-error.   
Conclusion 
We have introduced APE, an activation-based model of 
agreement errors in production. The model emphasizes 
the activation dynamics of the plural feature as the 
major source of variability in the data. Syntax effects 
are accounted for via operations that some constructions 
require that others do not. For instance, while modifiers 
have to be attached to their hosts, objects are not 
attached to subjects. On the other hand, objects, like 
other arguments, participate in anticipating the verb, 
while modifiers to NPs do not (to same extent, at least). 
These construction-specific operations interact with the 
activation dynamics of the plural feature in systematic 
ways that have been demonstrated to cover a wide 
variety of agreement phenomena discussed in the 
literature. The model predicts that time and feature re-
use are crucial variables in production. Unlike purely 
linguistic production models of agreement errors, it can 
account for differences in task demands and non-
linguistic factors of agreement performance.  
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Abst rac t
1-h is  inves t iga t io r r  ex tends  S in ton tor r ' s  (1977)  senr ina l  s tudy
of  l i f ' espan c rca t iv i t y  to  e igh teen c r r inent  c lass ica l  co lnposers '
total output. Major and n.t inor lvot 'k pl 'odttct ion rvas posit ively
c o | r e l a t e d  o v e I  t h c  l i t t s p a n .  c o n s i s t c n t  w i t h  S i r n o n t o n ' s
clrance-contiguration theorl '  of cleatir" i t1". I  Iolr cvcr, col l trar) '
to  S i rnonton 's  (1977)  nLr l l  ind ing .  here  s t long.  ; . ros i t i vc .  l i r tear '
and *eakcr, negativc, quai l lat ic age trcncls * 'elc cclt tsistentl l
f i runc l  in  p red ic t ing  h i t  ra t io  (p ropor t io r r  o1 'n ras tc rp iece- levc l
n rus ic  to  to ta l  n . tus ic  co tnposcc l  per  age per iod) .  ' t ' h is
Lrni t i rrnr l) '  repl icated in sevet 'al anzrly scs exat 'n in i  n g alternati  vc
cxp lanat ions  lo r  th is  pa t te rn .  Most  i r ld iv idLra l  con lposers 'h i t
ra t ros  inc leased r i i th  age;  none dec l i r tec l .  The t ' cs t l l t s  ind ica te
tha t  eonrposcrs '  persp icac i ty  in  eva l r . ra t ing  ideas  most l l
inc leascs  *  i th  aqe.  s t rgges t ing  gre i l te f  impor tance lb r
er  a lLn t ion  and e labora t ive  p lob le rn  so lv i r l , s  p roccsses  l l l
c lea tnc  p lo t iL rc t i r i t l  than  i rnp l i cd  b1  a  chancc-con l ig t t ra t ion
i lcc o u lr1.
In t roduct ion
Hor. i  does creat iv i ty  ch i rnge over  thc l i l 'espan' /  Do
eminent  creators learn to be ntorc creat ivc and to re l iab ly
intu i t  r ih ich ic ieas are u,or t l t  e laborat ing? Ol  is  creat ivc
plodLrct iv i t i '  pr imar i ly  dr iven by chancc and by inc l iv idual
d i l ' fercnces that  are largely i rnperv ior- ls  tc l  leat 'n t t . tg  or  t t ' t
external  in t l r - rcnces ' l  [ )ean Kci th Si t ronton 's  (1911) sern inal
s t r - rc ly  o l ' ten eminent  c lass ical  co lnposcrs wAS one of  thc f l rs t
t o  a d d r e s s  t h e s e  q t t c s t i o r l s  i r l  r t  c o t n p r c h e n s i v e ,
methcldological ly  sopl r is t icated wa1' .  His resul ts  s t rongly
argue for  the second a l ternat ive:  i l l l rs t r ious col l lposers
apparcnt ly  do not  learn to rvr i te  a larger  proport ion of  great
mus i c  as  t he i r  ca ree rs  p rog ress .  a l rd  p roc luc t i v i t y  i s
renrarkably i t 'n tnune to cxternal  per turbat io t - ts  l ikc r i 'ars  or
c i r .  i l  t rnrest .  S i r .nonton 's  (1911) antr lys is  has bccc ' r t .ne a
conrefstonc of  h is  "chance-con1lgurat ion"  t l rcory of  I i f -espan
c f  c l t i \  e  p roduc t i i  t y  (S imon to r . r ,  1984a ,  I 988 ,  1997 .  1999 ) ,
t hc  n ros t  comp t ' ehe t t s i ve .  e l abo ra t cd ,  and  p l r s i r non ious
psvchological  theory of  th is  complex phenomenon.
Howevcr .  is  i t  real ly  the case that  creat iv i ty ,  or  at  least
pe rsp i cac i t y ,  does  no t  i t . np rove ,  cven  i n  c l i s t i ngL r i shed
cornposcrs ' l  Classical  rnusic  af lc iorrados r . t lay th i r rk  of
Beethoven,  Haydn,  or  Verc l i .  and be l iard pressed to th ink o1 '
any la te,  nta. ior  works by t l resc colnposers that  are not
c r i t i ca l l y  acc la imed ,  evcn  when  compared  to  t hc i r  ea r l i e r
cf - for ts .  ln  contrast .  th ink ing of  coniparably lauded ear ly
works by thesc conrposers i probably r r r r - rch harder  ( l  Iayes,
l 98c ) l  We isbc rg .  1999 ) .  Neve r the less ,  S i l . non ton ' s  ( l r 911 )
c1 r - ran t i t : r t i v c  ana l ys i s  imp l i cs  t ha t  t hesc  i ns tances  a re
i l lLrsory.
Understanding l i f -espi rn learn ing and creat iv i ty  c lear ly  has
impor lan t  t heo re t i ca l  and  p rac t i ca l  imp l i ca t i ons .  and
mu l t i p l e  app loaches  may  p rovc  t i L r i t f u l .  Fo r  i ns ta l l ce ,
a l tcrnat ive dcf ln i t ior . rs  o1-  "great"  music might  be used to
cx t r rn ine  l i ow  u ' c l l  S imc ln ton ' s  (1971 )  resu l t s  gene ra l i zc .
Also,  h is  nonrothet ic  analys is  d ic l  not  invcst igate indiv idual
d i f - fcrcnces in  career  t ra iectory.  Var ied l rends c i ln  cancel
each other ,  account ing lbr  thc nr- r l l  t ind ing.  O1'par t icu lar
in tercst  are two types o1 ' t ra. lector ies:  l )  a  cornplcte ly t la t
agcrvise fr-rnctiorr, consistent ri ' i th the "eclLral-odds rule" and
a chance-conl igr- r rat ion accol ln l ,  and 2;  an agcl is t '  i l lc rease
in  l i i t  r a t i o ,  cons i s ten t  l v i t h  an  cxpc r t i se  ac r l u i s i t i t ) n  o r
problem solv ing t iarner , r 'ork.  (Of-  coLrrsc.  t ra. icctor ies cr tn
also c lec l inc or  exhib i t  curv i l ine ar  f i rnct ions.  )
Simonton's  own Dar\ \ ' in ian chance-conl igura l ion n lodcl
i s  t hc  mos t  t ho rough l y  resca rched  thco ry  o f  l i f c spa r l
c rea t i v i t y  ( see  S imon ton ,  1988 ,  l 9c )7 ) .  I t s  bas i s  i s  t he  b l i nd
gencrat io t . t  ancl  se lect ive rc tc t . t t ic ' r l . l  o f  ideas (Crnrpbcl l .
1960).  Crcat ive idcat ion tb l lor . is  a constant  probabi l i ty  o l '
succcss.  or  the "eqr . ra l -odds" rLr le .  Sin lonton (  lc)9c) ,  pp.  I  88-
197) has lLrrther argr-red that this ratio cannot be increased by
any means; a creator's hit ratio stays constant ri ' i th age.
Th i s  t hco ry  has  p ro fbu r . rd  psycho log i ca l  i n rp l l ca t i ons .
F i r : t .  i t  suggcs t5  t l r c r c  i s  l i t t l c  l c r r r r r r l r g  r t r i t t t I r ove tnc t t t  
pcrspicaci ty .  Crcators lack the abi l i ty  to . judge thc i r  ic leas or
works reliably, eithcr as fltral prodr-rcts or r'rorks-itr-pr(rSless.
At  a socia l  level ,  i t  sL lggcsts hat  creators have l i t t le  contro l
ovcr  the u l t in tatc  la te of  thei r  products.  T l . tus,  Inass-
product ion is  the best  s t rategy fbr  those lvho scek etn inet lce.
Thc c l rance-conl rgr- r rat ion theor l '  counter intu i t ive ly  predicts
that  the h ig l i  po int  o l 'a  creator 's  career  v i l l  s inrLr l lancoLrs ly
rcsul t  in  the tnost  n lasterp icces and the most  cphemera:
writ ing one mastcru'ork does tlot gltarantee l itfthe r success.
Numerous t r - rd ics support  h is  theory.  l l igh corrc lat ions
( t yp i ca l l y  r =  . 50  1o  .75 )  a rc  o l t en  l ound  be t r ' i ' ce t t  t hc
prodLrct ion of na. ior  and mi t lor  works over  the l i l 'espan (see
Simonton,  1997).  Comprehensive studies of  the oLr tput  o l '
t en  g rea t  compose rs  (S imon ton .  1977 )  and  ten  cm lncn t
psychologists  (Simonton,  1985) a lso fbund no agelv ise h i t
rat io  changcs.  I lor , 'n 'ever ,  Kozbcl t  ( in  press)  found a very
strong agerv isc increase ( r  (age.  annual  h i t  rat io)  -  .91 '  p  <-
.000 I )  i r r  Mozart ,  a  composcr  in  Si t ronton 's  (  1977) sanrple.
Thus,  at  least  sorne composers '  h i t  rat i t ls  tn i tv  i tnprore
r . l ' i th  age.  This is  co l ls is tc l l t  "v i th  an expert ise acquis i t ior r  or
p rob len r  so l v i ng  pe rspec t i ve  (Ne r ' ve l l ,  S I ra r i .  &  S in ron .
1962;  Weisbcrg,  l99c)) .  From th is  v is11 ' ,  grcat i t l r :  r t  tnLts ic l t l
cornposi t ion is an open-ended problern,  c ' rn which conlposers
b r i ng  the i r  I n r - r s i ca l  sk i l l  t o  bea r .  [ : xpe r t i se  r c t l u i s i t i t ' r l
s tudies (Er icsson,  Krampe,  & Tesch-Romer '  19c)3)  sLrggest
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i nc l i v i dL ra l  d i f l ' e rences  i n  t r us i ca l  ab i l i t y  a re  l a rge l y
at t r ibutablc to del iberate pract ice rathcr  than innate ta lent .
L i ke rv i sc .  I I ayes  (1989 )  cxamincd  76  compose rs  and  fbund
that  in  a lnrost  a l l  cases.  at  least  ten vears o1-  in tensivc studv
ri 'crc requircd belbre a colttposcr urotc his l irst r-nastcni'ork.
det lncd by recording col ln ts .  This  resul t  scc l t ls  i l lconsls tent
u i t l r  S in ron ton ' s  (1977 )  f r nc l i ng  o f  no  change  i n  h i t  r a t i c l
o l ' e r  cc lmpose rs '  en t i r e  ca rce rs .  s i nce  c lea r l y  g rea l
conlposers arc r i ' r i t i r lg  so i l re grcat  lvorks in  thei r  nrr t tLrr i tv .
Thus,  despi te potent ia l ly  in tpor tant  s t r t lc tura l  d i l '1 'erences
betrveen expert  per f t l r lnance atrd creat ive I lL ' r lbr l l l i l l lcL '
(S in ion ton ,  2000 ) ,  age* i se  impro r . ' e t . ne r r t  m i l y  bc  a
poss ib i l i t y ,  pa r t i cu la r l y  i l - sk i l l ed  pe r tb rn rancc  i s a  cen t ra l
conlponcnt of' creati vity.
As notcd ear l ier .  ind iv idunl  var iat i t l t i  mav overn 'hel l ' t l  a
seemirrg ly  l la t  aggregate agelv ise t ra. iectory.  ( ia lenson
(200 l )  has lbuncl  a systemal ic  d ichotorry Ar l1or lc  pdi l l tc ' rs ,
l ink ing carcer  t ra. jector ies (based c ln the a\ /erage value of
u 'ork produced at  var iot rs  t imes)  u ' i th  creat ive proccsses.
"Findcrs"  pcak ear ly  and largely ; r lan thc i r  rvork in  ac lvance.
proceecl ing u i th l i t t le  rcv is ion.  "Seekers"  peak at  re l iab ly
laler agcs ancl cngage in nruch rel ' isiclt ' t as they vvork A
conrparable d ichotomy amons cornposers uas sr- rggested by
S in ron ton  (1986 ) .  t l e  l bund  t l i a t  t he  n ros t  aes the t i ca l l y
sLrccesstu l  'orks appeared ear ly  or ,  bct ter .  very la te i r . r
cot.r.t1-losers' carcefs.
' [ 'he prcsent  s tL ld] '  tests the robr . ts tness ot ' thc eqLral -odds
rulc  and a lso examines i r td i r , idutr l  co l l lposers.  l t  adopts
S in ron ton ' s  (1911 )  bas i c  mc thodo logy  o f  c ross -sec t i ona l
t inre-ser ics.  Ho' ' r 'ever ,  t l ic  prescnt  invest igat ion a lso seeks
to vary or  in tprove the t . t reasr t remcnt  of  somc col ls t r t lc ts
(e.g. .  hon "masterp ieces"  are det l r red or  hou'  wcl rks can be
n.rc l rc  sensi t ive ly  ueighted in  the analys is) .  F-ur ther ,  i t  seenrs
i r . r . rpol tant  to  cont l r t t . t  hat  the nr . r l l  l - ind i l lg  on h i t  rat io
repl icates on a largct '  santp lc  o1-  cotrposers.  s ince.  r is  notec l
aboi 'e ,  f -ew studies d i rcct ly  and corrprchenslvc ly  exatn i l te
th is  important  c luest i t t t t .  Moreovcr ,  a carcer- long l la t  h i t
fa t io  seems inconsistent  u ' i th  the f ind ing that  conlposers
tencra l ly  rvr i te  no great  rvorks in  the f l rs t  decade or  so of
thei r  careers ( f layes,  1989,  Weisbcrg,  1999).  Unfbr tunate ly ,
Sin. rcrnton 's  \1911) or ig inal  data are no longcr  er tant ,  due to
co l r l pL l t e r  t cchno logy  cha r rges  (S i r -non ton ,  pc rsona l
cor-nmunicat ion) .  Whi le cata logs o l -  cot l lposers '  u 'orks arc
la i r ly  s tandarc l ized,  many vr  orks of  c luest ionable ar- r thentrcr ty
o r  da t i ng  l r ove r  a t  t hc -  pe r i phc l ' y  o f  such  ca ta logs ,  so
rev i s i t i ng  and  cx tend ing  th i s  t ype  o f  t r r l a l ys i s  eems
u'orthwhile.
T h e  1 ' o u r  I r o d e l s  d c s c r i b c d  a b o v e  p e r n r i t  a
character izat ion 1-  aggregate and indiv idr- ra l  career  h i t  rat io
t ra. jector ies.  The charrce-cor . t f igurat ion heory predicts  no
chanqe in h i t  rat io  u ' i th  age,  a posi t ive corrc lat ion betrvecn
nra. jor-nr inor  u 'ork prodr-rc t ion lcr  the l i l 'espan.  and is  la i r ly
agnostrc on r . r 'ork qLra l i ty .  TI rc  problcm solv ing pL ' rsnect i \ t '
predic ls  a l ikc ly  i r rcrease in hi t  rat i t l  and I rastcrp iece qLral i ty
ove r  t i n i c  and  i s  f a i r l y ' agnos t i c  on  ma . i o r - rn ino r  r ' vo rk
procluction cclrrclations
Method
Composers Composcrs were sc lected l iom three sources:
one  l i s t  based  on  em inence  (Fa rnsu 'o r th ,  1969 ,p .  228 ) .  one
based or . r  per lbrnrarrce f i 'ec lucncy (Molcs,  1958/66,  p.  28) ,
and onc l is l  o f  acsthet ic  s igni l - icrncc rat ings o1 'conrposers '
nrasterp ieces ( l la lscy,  lc)76)  l -he top tc l . t  corrposcrs i r t  the
l l rs t  tu ,o l is ts  lvcre autontat ica l ly  sanrpled.  Othcr  composcrs
r i ' ho  had  numerous  mas te r \ \ ' o r ks  l i s t cd  by  I l a l scy  (1976 )
were a lso inc luded.  The l8 contposers examinccl  rvere .1.S.
Bach .  Ba r tok ,  Bee thc l vcn .  B ra l rn t s ,  Chop in ,  Debussy ,
DvoYak,  l {andel ,  I Iayc ln,  N4er. rdc lssohn.  Mozart .  SchLrber t ,
Schumann ,  R i cha rd  S t ra t t ss .  S t rav  i nsky ,  Tcha i kovsky .
Ve rd i ,  and  Wagner .  Co l l cc t i ve l y ,  t he i r  l i v cs  spa r l  t h r ce
ccntur ies and t l ' re i r  torks accor- tnt  lbr  -54%r ot 'a l l  c lass ical
mr-rs ic  per f i r r rned (Mole s.  I  958i  1966,  p.  28) .
Works  Ch r i ' i a l kousk i ' s  ( l t ) 96 )  compre  hens i vc  ca ta log
p rov ided  l i s l s  and  da tes  o l '  a l l  kno rvn  l vo rks  o f  t hc  l 8
corxposcrs (6,560 cc ' r t . t . rposi t io t . ts  to ta l ) .  Arrangcmel l ts ,
rcvisions, and lost rvorks u'e re excludcd liom lnost analyses
Age at  Composi t ion Age at  composi t ion tbr  cach r ' r 'ork
u 'as a lso determined (us in-e Chrv ia lkowski ,  1996).  Whcn
composi t ion spanned mLr l t ip le years,  the n ledian ( ror- rnc led
r- rp i l  necessary)  r . i ,as used.  For  aggregate analyses.  wor l (s
\ \ 'ere grouped into consecr-r t rvc l ive-1,car  agc per iods lbr
each  co rnpose r  ( c t - .  S i rnon ton ,  I  977  ) :  5  9 .  l 0  14 ,  e t c .
Thus,  each composer contr ibrr tcd data only dLrr ing h is  act ive
conrposing career .  Ages rvere pr- r t  in to mean-deviat io t l  lbr t l l
based on the cnt i re sample of  composcrs,  y ic ld ing an dgc
l ineur  varrable.  Age l inear  scorcs werc a lso sqLrared.
y ie ld ing an oge quat l rut i t '  var iable to test  fbr  cr - r rv i l inear
efl'ccts.
Works 'uvere also pooled into onc-year agc ri ' indorvs fbr
l i ne r -g ra ined  ana l yscs .  A  to ta l  o f '  714  agc  pe r i oc l s  ne re
t i r l l ied across the I  8  cot t . tpose rs Age l inat t r  and u g c
c luut l ra l ic '  measLlres n 'e re calcula led rn the sanre r 'vay lor
one-year vit.tdou's as fclr f ive-ycar n'inclorvs.
Weight ing Pcr for tnance t in les rvere used lo rvc ight  each
rvork. Timcs werc taken liom rccordings (14oh of ri 'orks).
es t ima tes  based  on  sco res  o r  l i s t i ngs  i n  c t l r npose rs ' r vo rk
catalcrgs (14%), averages bascd on corrparable ri 'orks by thc
sa lnc  co l rpose r  (8%) ,  and  cs t i r na te  s  t r s i ng  S imon tc ' r t - t ' s
( \ t )71)  genre-based system r i . 'hen r ro other  i t t f i r l rnr t t i t t t t  r r rs
ava i l ab le  (4%) .
Masterp iece del in i t ions For-r r  cr i ter ia  werc used to det lnc
masterp ieces.  Trvo r - rsed l la lscy 's  (  1976) l is t  o f  n i r - rs ica l
masterp ieces:  l )  a l l  works l is tcd by Halsey,  2)  only  u 'or l<s
given one of  the two h ighest  rat ings (scores of  I  or  2)  by
I l a l sey  ( ' s t r i ngcn t  I l a l sey ' ) .  T rvo  t t sec l  r cco rd ins  cou l r t s
fiom 1) the RED Clo,s.vic'ul Ottttt lrtg (l 'ord' 2001). or 2) Thc
Pengtr in  guida to ( 'o t ' t lPdcl  r . / i . r r ' .s  (March,  ( i reenf ie ld,  &
Layton.  200l ) .  Each conlposer 's  works rvcre rank-orc lcred
t iom most  to least  recorded,  and cumulat ive per l t r rmance
durat ions were computcd f l -orr  the top dor ' in  unt i l  thc tota l
approacl.red 50%. Top *orks rverc designated nrasterpieces
tbr cach nleasure.
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Concu r ren t  p roduc t i v i t y  Tn 'o  va r i ab les  we fe  re la ted  to
overall oLrtpllt. One, r,eor'.s in interval. logged how marry
ycars per  per iod i r rvo lved actr . ra l  composi t ion.  This rangcd
f iorn I  to  5 (per iods rvhen no music was ur i t ten were not
i r r ra lyzed) .  The other ,  output .  ta l l ied the tota l  anrount  of '
rnr- rs ic  ( in  minr : tcs)  cach cornposcr  $ ' rotc  in  cach f lvc-  or
onc -yca r  pe r i od .  To  n . r i n im ize  ove ra l l  p roduc t i v i t y
dif-ferences, individual z-scorcs firr outpr,rt u,crc conrputed
for  cacl r  c0mposer separate ly .
Results
Because  e  ach  composc r ' s  r . i ,  o r ks  \ \ ' e re  exhaus t i ve l y
tabulated,  not  sarrp led l iom a larger  popr-r la t ic ln .  i l -erent ia l
s tat is t ica l  tcsts  arc argLrably inappropr iatc  (c f - .  S imonton,
2000).  Therefbre,  ef - tect  s izes and pararneter  est imates
acconrpal ry  in ferent ia l  rcsul ts ,  u,hosc hypothet ica l  7r-values
can be usecl  as a heur is t ic  tbr  d iscr- rss ion.
Lif 'espan productivity
L. i lcspan product iv i ty  general ly  increases c lLr ick ly  ear ly  in  a
crealor 's  career .  peaks,  and thcn decl ines lnore gradual ly
(Sinrorr ton,  1911.  1991).  When age is  expressed in mean-
deviat ion fbm, oulput  usual ly  corre lates posi t ive ly  r .v i th  uge
l ineor  and ncgat ive ly  wi th oge qLrctdr t t t ic ' .  When these
cl ' f 'ccts  arc combined,  they fbrm the backwards,  inver ted . l -
cr-rrve charactelistic of creative output ovcr thc l iftspan.
To cont lnr  th is  t rend f i r r  the present  set  of 'composers,  i ls
in  Sinronton (1911),  data l iom al l  composers were put  in to
t l rc  sanrc t ime-ser ies fbr  a mr-r l t ip le regression analys is .  To
mini rn ize in ter-composer p ocluct iv i ty  var iancc,  z-scorcs fbr
oLl tput  across 5-year  agc per iods \ \ 'ere compLl ted lbr  eacl r
conrposcr  scparate ly .  These def lned the depenclent  Var iable.
Age lineor ancl rrge quodrutic, as ri 'el l as 
_l,crlrl in intertu/,
vn,ere then used to prcdic t  prodLrct iV i ty .  A tota l  o l '  179 age
per iods rvere rnc luc lcd in  the analys is .
The regressi t tn  'n l t rs  s is t t i f lcant ,  1 : '  ( i ,  175)  :  38.7:1,  p <
.0001 ,  ad . l us t cc l  R : .39 .  Age  r l t t c td ru l i c  and  1 ,eo r . s  i n
interv 'u l  rvere h ighly  s igni f icant ,  rcspcct ivc ly .  B = - .35 and
.45,  both 7. ,  < 000 I  .  The anloLl l r t  o f  r . 'ar iancc unic lLre ly
accor-rnted l i lr by cach variable is grven by tlre scluared semr-
par t ia l  corre lat iorrs ,  here sr l '  -  .09 and .1 8,  rcspect ive ly .
T l re regressiorr  cocf f lc icnt  lbr  agc l inear  . ' 'as rnarg inalJy
s ign i f i can t ,  f 3 :  . 11 ,  p  :  . 08  ( . s r ' ' -  :  . g l ) .  Thus .  t hc  ovc ra l l
l  i  t 'espan tfa.i cctory o 1' lotal productivity echocs thc 1 r'ecluenlly
observcd s ingle-peaked f i rnct ion,  a l though i ts  present  shape
is closer to an inverled U than tcl a backli 'arcls, inverted.l.
' fhe peak agc lbr  prodLrct iv i ty  cnn bc conrpLr ted by l rnding
thc rcs idual  outpt r t  a t \er  rcgressing 
. t 'aurs in  in tervul ,  sct t rng
rrp a polynomial  rc-ercss ion r - rs i r rg r rgc l incur  t t t td  uge
t l t r ad ru l i c  t o  p red i c t  r es idua l  ou tpL t l ,  and  tak ing  the
der ivat ivc of  the regression cc luat ion.  When th is  r .vas done.
peak product iv i ty  was fc l r - rnd to occur  at  39.7 years.  When
untranslbrr r red product iv i ty  lvas arra lyzed,  the resul ts
essent ia l ly  repl icatcd (peak = 37.  I  years) .
Whcn  age  \ \ ' as  s ta t i s t i ca l l y  con t ro l l ed ,  t he  r csu l t s
i r rd icat i r . rg an inver ted U-curvc rcpl rcated.  In  l i rc t ,  peak age
l i r r  p r o d u c t i v i t ) ' l i e s  a l r n o s t  e x a c l l y  i n  t h e  m i d c l l c  o t
stanclardized carcer lcngths (z - +0.0'1).
Major-minor  work corre lat ions
Recal l  that  the chance-corr f igurat ion theory predicts  a
pos i t i ve  co r re la t i on  be tween  rna . j o r  and  m ino r  wu rk
product ion over  the l i t 'espan.  I  Iere,  r ra. jor  rvorks were
def lned by i r . rc lus ion i  Halsey (1976).  Ma. jor  arrc l  minor
rvorks r , r ,ere posi t ive ly  corre lated,  r  ( l r11)  = .36,2 < .000 1
( r '  =  
. 13 ) ,  s r - rppo r t i ng  t he  chance -con f  i g r - r ra t i on  t l r eo ry .
I Ior , i 'ever .  only  tvn 'o inc i i i  duals s l rorved stat is t ica l ly  rc l iab lc
corrc la l ions:  Strauss,  r  = - .50.7r  - -  . t )5 .  arrd Bach.  r^= .93, l t  <
.000 L Among inc l i r " ic lLra l  oonlposcrs.  thc rncc l ian r - :  . l ( r .
Hit ratio over the l ifespan
This is  thc nra in analys is  of  in terest .  Recal l  that  Sinronton
(1911) lbLrnd that  h i t  rat io  rvas essent ia l ly  1)at  over  the ent i re
durat ions of  ten great  composers '  careers.  sholv ing ncr
systcrnat ic  change r , i ' i th  age.  l lou,ever ,  th is  f ind i r rg seenrs
incons i s ten t  r v i t h  l l ayes ' s  (1989 )  t i nd ing  tha t  con rposc rs
u ' r i te  no masterr , ' 'orks in the l i rs t  c lecade or  so of ' therr
carccrs.  To i r r r "cst igatc th is  issLre r . r ' i th  the presenl  sample o l '
l8  composers,  a h i t  rat io  was cornputed tbr  cach composcr
in each age pcr ioc l  r - rs ing each o l - the lbur  r reasr- r res (basic
I Ialsey, stringent Halscy, RED, and Penguin).
Conrposers vary considerably in t l ie i r  overa l l  i f 'e t ime hr t
rat ios.  When dcf incd by a l l  lvorks inc l r - rded in l la lsey
(1976 ) ,  t hcsc  ran -ee  l i o rn  . 18  ( l l ande l )  t o .70  (Wagnc r ) .  Thc
M (SD) h i t  rat io  among the con.rposers r 'vas .4.1 ( .17) .  ThLrs,
t o  n r i n im ize  va r i ance  duc  to  i n t c r - compose r  h i t  r a t i o
di l - l 'erences,  z-scores f i r r  h i t  rat ios were computed separate ly
firr each conrposcr on each measLrre.
Intercorre lat ions bctween h i t  rat ios determir . red by thc lbur
mas te rp iece  c r i t e r i a  we re  a l l  h i gh l y  co r r c l a t cd .  w i t l l
corre lat ion coefJ lc ients ranging l ionr  .45 to .74.  To s inrp l i ty
mat tefs.  an urr rotated,  pr inc ipal  components analys is  rvas
conclucted and revealed tu,o f 'actors. Factor I accounted lbr
l l . 6 ' h  o l  t he  va r i ancc .  r v i t h  an  c igenva l r , r e  o1 '2 .87  and
loadings rangi r . rg f }om .75 to .91.  Factc l r  2  accountcc i  lor
16 .1% o f  t hc  va r i ance ,  r v i t h  an  e igenva lue  o l '  . 65  and
load ings  rang ing  f l ' o r r r . 63  t o  - . 36 .  The  s t r i ngen t  I l a l sey
cr i ter ion,  dc l rn ing colxposers '  vcry grcatest  masteru"orks.
had the lou"cst  loading on Factor  I  and thc h ighest  loading
on Factor 2, ancl t l i is pattern \\ 'as cxagge rated in varimax
rotated and obl ique analyses.  This measr" t re rvas t l rus
analyzed scparate ly .  ( ln  pract ice.  thc rcsul ls  repor ted bc lou '
dc l  not  substant ive ly  d i f fer  depending orr  whether  threc or
fbur  rneasures are conlb incd,  or  i l 'each of  the lbLrr  nreasures
i s  examincd  i nd i v i dua l  l y . )
Hi t  rat io  mul t ip le regression To test  h i t  rat io  t rc t rc ls  o l 'er
thc l i lcsparr ,  : r l l  composcrs were inr t ia l ly  pLl t  o t t to  the sanre
t ime-ser ies.  l ,ach composer contr ibr- r ted data only dur ing h is
act ive composing career .  In  each agc pcr iod.  ind iv idr- ra l  ; -
scores o1 '  h i t  rat ios f ion i  the basic  l la lsey,  R E 1f  ,  and
Penguin measures werc averaged,  y ie ld ing the dependent
r reasure (basic  h i t  rat io) .  lnd iv idutr l  z-scores for  oulpt t t  i r t
each age pcr iod.  used as thc dcpcndent  rncasl t re lbr
prodLrct iv i ty ,  u ,crc used here as a stat is t ica l  cotr t ro l .  t tgc
lineor. ugc tluudt'ttt i t ' .  and ott/ ltttt preclictccl hit ratio.
Con t ra ry  t o  S in ro r t l on ' s  (1917 )  1 - i  nd ings  anc l  t he
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prcd i c t i ons  o f  t he  cha rncc -con f i g r - r ra t i on  t heo r l ' .  t he
rcs rcss ion  r . i ' as  h igh l y  s i gn i f i can t ,  / r  ( 3 .  175 )  -  40 .0 .  p  <
.000 l, acljLrsted Rr - .40. l loth nga linettr and oge tlLruclrtt l ic'
(brr t  not  out l t t r t )  s igni l icant ly  predicted h i t  rat io .  uge / ineur  13
- .65 .  anc l  u ,qe  t l uod ru l i c  l . l  -  - . 43 .  bo thT r  < .000  I  ( s r i r  - . 36
and . l i ,  rcspect iv t :  ly) .  S ince oLl tput  \ \ ,as not  s igni t icant ,
t ak ing  the  de r i va t i ve  o1 ' t l . r e  second -o rde r  po l y r rom ia l
regression ec luatron y ie lds the peak age fbr  h i t  rat io :  52.6
years. alrnost l5 years afier the peak fbr overall output. The
basic lrit ratio tra.jectory is shovvn in Figure I .
Hit Ratio oYer the Lifespan
! i
F c !
2 >
0.5
F igr-rre I : Average basic hit ratio over tl ie l i t-espan (z-scores
computed lbr  each composer indiv idr- ra l ly) .
Subsample and indiv idual  analyses Why c lo these resul ts
d iU -c r  so  s t r i k i ng l y  l i om S imon ton ' s  (  1977 ) ' ?  I ) e rhaps  thc
acld i t ional  c ight  cor lposers a l ' l 'ected the resul ls .  Holvever ,
t l i i s  i s  no t  t he  case :  u ' hen  h i s  t en  con rpose rs  and  the
acld i t ional  e ight  are analyzed separar te ly  ( recalcr- r la t ing age:-
scores lbr  each subsarrrp le) ,  the resul ts  essent ia l ly  repl icate:
l b r  S i m o n t o n ' s  ( 1 9 7 7 )  t e n  c o m p o s e r s ,  t h e  l e g r e s s i o r r
equaticlr.r accounts fbr 379lo of thc variancc in hit ratlo, .r,qc,
l inettr [3 - .(t4, p < .000 I , (v '] - .38.) ancl Ltg,L' lttLtdruti( '  13 =
- .26.  p < .05.  ( . i r ' ; -  :  .0 ;1) ;  lbr  the rernain ing e ight .  the
regression cquat ion accounts fbr  4 l7o of  the var iance in h i t
ratio, .7.qd l ineur B - .63, agc c1r-radratic IJ = -.-52, both p <
.000 I ( .v ' , -  = .31 and .19,  respectrvely)  .
Each composcr  \ \as a lso inc l iv idr- ra l ly  analyzed.  In  these
analyscs,  one-year age u ' indorvs rvere used and age z-scores
\ \ 'ere reconlputed.  Thc h i t  rat io  o l 'a l r r rost  every indiv ic lLra l
composer rvas impactcd by agc (median adjusted-R'  -  .34) .
In par t icu lar .  th i r teen composers horvcd rc l iab lc  lp  < .05)
posi t ive uge l inenr  ef ' t 'ects  (median indiv idual  . i r i -  -  .22) .
Five shori,ed relinble negative oge quadrulic cfl-ccts (nredian
inc l iv idLra l  .v ' ; l  -  .Q]1.  Only Bach and Strauss l ro*ed ncr
agc-rc latcc l  t rcr rds.  The I inear  increase seerns qui te rot rust :
the nr id-career  q -radrat ic  boost  is  consistcnt lv  r eaker .
S t r i c t c r  h i t  r a t i o  c r i t e r i on  The  s t r i c te r  I l a l se , r  c r i t c l i o r r
( reversed rat ings of ' .1  or  -5)  * 'as a lso tcsted.  I l i t  ra t ios and
indiv idual  h i t  rat i i l  z-scorcs u 'crc recalculatcc l .  ancl  t l rc  sanre
three-predictor  regression uas pcr f i r rmecl .  This  c lcnranding
cr i ler ion reduces powcr,  as happens u ' l tenever h i1 rat ios
app roach  0  o r  L  Dcsp i t e  t h i s ,  t he  reg ress ion  ren ra ined
h igh l y  s i gn i l i can t .  . t r  ( 3 ,  175 )  =  15 .05 .  p <  .0001 .  ad jL rs t cc l  R l
= 
.19.  c tge l inectr  B = .19.  p < .000 l .  ( . r r i :  -  .10)  and ogc
t l t r t t t l r t t l ic  f l  -  - .19,p <.05,1. r r , r  -  .021.  Tolo l  oulpul  \ \ 'Lrs
no t  s i gn i f i can t .  I r r d i v i dua l  ana l yses .  us ing  one -1 'ea r  aqe
windor. i ,s ,  revealed ten conlposers lv i th  re l iab le (7;  < .05 )
posi t ive oge l incar  t rer . rds (mecl ian indiv idual  sr1- '  -  .12) .
Age c luudrnt ic  was a rveaker predictor  ( rncdian indiv idr , ra l
, r / ' i -  =  0 i ) .  Three composers horved rc l iab le c luadrat ic
t rends,  one (Wagner) ,  neeat ive,  and tu 'o (13ar t6k and
Schube r t ) .  pos i t i ve .  i nd i ca t i ng  a  l a te  su rue  i r r  g re r t
n las t c rwo rk  p rod r - r c t i on .  Tak ing  thc  dc r i va t i r .  c  o f  t hc
polynonr ia l  rcgrcss ion cc l r . rat ion (at icr  accounlrng l i r r  ( )Lt  tprr  |  \
y ic lds a peak age u,as 65.  I  ye i l rs  fbr  s t r ingerr t  h i t  rat io .
notably la ter  than that  t i r r  product iv i ty  ( la te th i r t ics)  or  the
basic h i t  rat io  rneasure (ear ly  to mic l - l r l i ics) .
Ma tu re  wo rks  Pe rhaps  t l r ese  res r r l t s .  p r r t i cL r l a r l y  t he
rcpeatedly observed t tge l inear  e l l 'ect .  are an ar t i lact  o1 '
composers '  unacclarnrecl  car ly '  wor l<s ( recal l  Haycs 's  ( l t )8c)1
1en-year rLr le) .  uhich c lampcn h i t  rat io  i l t  carccr  oLl tsct .  To
test  th is ,  the l l rs l  t \ !o  ase per iods c l f 'each composer (p lus the
th i rd pcr iods of  Bar t6k rnt l  DvtrYr ik ,  uhcn hoth h i t  rat ios
were 0) r.vere dropped fiorn the analysis. Age z-scores rvere
recalcr- r la ted.  The average of  the basic  I Ia lsey.  RfD,  and
Penguin h i t  rat ios del lned h i t  rat io .  The three-predictor
regression remaincd s igni f icant ,  f (3,  140)  = 7. r<r ,  t ,  ' -
.000 l ,  ad. justed Rr -  .13.  Age l i r rca l  posi t ive ly  prcc l ic ted h i t
rat io ,  R = .2() ,  l t  -  .00 I  ( . r r , :  -  .07) .  Age t l r tu t l ro t i t '  ' tnc)
out l t t r t  each ncgat ivc ly  predicted h i t  rat io ,  respecl ive ly .  B -
- . 3 0 ,  p  -  . 0 0 1  ( s r , r  -  . 0 S ) . a n c l  f J-  - . 1 5 ,  p  - . 0 9  ( . ! / ' i r  = . 0 2 ) .
The agewise et fbcts arc at tcnLla lcd Lrr ing conrposi t ional
matur i ty ,  bLr t  thc ef fcc ls  rcmain re l iab lc .
Arrangements and rev is ions No1 incorporatcc l  in to any
prer ,  ior - rs  analyscs wcrc arrangements arrd rev is ions that
r ve re  i nc luded  (a ibe i t  m i r . r ima l l y  r i ' c i gh t cc l )  i r r  S in ron ton ' s
(  1977 )  a r . ra l ys i s .  As  a  f  i na l  t es t  o t '  t he  u ' o r k  mc i t sL l r c ,
a r rangcn l cn t s ,  r e l  i s i ons ,  a r rd  da tab le  l os l  u ' o r ks  ue re
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  S i m o n t o n ' s  ( i 9 7 7 )  r v e i g h t i n g
s.vstem u 'as cnrp loycd.  f l i t  ra t ios n 'ere recalculatcd us ing
inc l r - rs ion i  Halsey (1976) as nrastcrp iccc cr i ter ion.  n tota l
o l  8 ,0-57 data pornts r " 'cre inc ludecl .  The nr- r tnbcr  o1 '  agc
per ioc ls  a lso increased,  to 186.  Untransf i r rmcd h i t  rat ios in
each age per iod rverc used as the dependcnt  tncasure,  ancl
veors in  in tervul  was used as a contro i ,  echoing Simonton
(1911 ) .  The  r csL r l t s  rep l i ca ted  a r rd  a rc  co r r . r pa rab le  i n
st rcrrgth to most  prev ious analvses.  The threc-prcdic tor
regressiorr  remaincd s igni { icant ,  F (3,  I  82)  -  i  L85,  p <. -
.000 l ,  ad justed R- - -  .31.  Age l inetr r  posi t rvc ly  predicted h i t
rat io ,  lJ  = .51 ,  p  < .0001 ( .sr ' , '  :  .27) .  Ago qut tdrut i t
negatrvc ly  prcdic ted h i t  rat io .  /  -  - .30.  p < 000i  ( . r r , -  -  .06) .
Outptr t  was a r rarg inal ly  s igni f icant  prcc l ic tor .  / t  -  .13,  p -
. 05  ( s r , r  =  . 01 ) .  F . i gh t  compose rs  ho l l ' ed  s i gn i f i can t
posifivc uge linettr trends. and thrcc sho"ved si-unil icant agc
qtrudrolit '  trcncls (1rvo negative, onc positivc).
Themat ic  measure  A l lna l  ana lys is  uscc l  a  t r reasure  bascc l
on  mus ica l  thc rncs  or  n ' re lod ies  ra thcr  t l ran  cn t i re  *  t t rks  (c1 ' .
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Sinronton,  1977).  Hi t  rat io  in  each age per iod rvas del lned
by  t l i e  nun lbe r  o f  n r c l od ies  i nc luded  by  I l a r l o r v  and
Morgcns te rn  (  1948 ,  1950 )  i n  a l l  r vo rks  l i s t ed  by  Ha l sey
(  1976 )  d i v i ded  by  t he  to ta l  n r - rmber  o1 -  an tho log i zec i
nre lodies t iorn that  age per iod.  Fewer age pcr iods (  l4 l )
\ \cre repfcscnted by th is  measr" t rc  thal r  the lvork t r reast t re.
s ince not  a l l  per ioc ls  cot t ta ined ant l io logizecl  thcnles.  Age z-
sccrres tor the samplc \\ 'ere recalcLtlated. Hcle. lotol themes
pcr  per iod rvas uscd as a cot t t ro l .  The three-predic lor
rcgrcssion predict ing h i t  r i r t io  renta ined s i  gr . r i  t icant .  contrar) '
1 o  S i n r o n t o n ' s  ( 1 9 7 7 )  r e p o r t :  F  ( 3 ,  1 3 7 )  =  9 . 6 4 ,  p  <  . 0 0 0 1 ,
acljLrsred Rr : . l 6. Age linear posittvely predictcd hit ratio,
U  - . i 7 ,  p  < .0001 ,  ( . s r1 r : . 12 )  and  oge  q t t t t d ra t i c  nega l i ve l y
prcc l ic ted h i t  rat io .  B -  - .26.  p -  .002,  ( ,sr ,2 -  .06) .  Totu l
theme.s r l 'as nrarq inal ly  s igni f icant ,  f l  = .15,  p = .06,  ( " r ' r ' , :  -
. 02  ) .
Al ternat ive analyses In adcl i t ion to the analyscs repor tcd
hc re .  add i t i ona l  ana l yses  ru lec l  ou t  l i r r t hc l  cand ida tc
al ternat ive xplanal ions fbr  the incotrs is tet tcv of '  the present
rcsr- r l ts  wi th those of  Si t r ronton ( l r971]) .  Arnong the analyses
perfornred u'crc tlrclse using the ra\\ average hit ratio ti lr thc
basic Hnl . rc . r ' .  RED. t t t ld  Pcngt in cr i tcr ia .  rathcr  than
ind rv idua l l y  z - t r ans lb r tned  h i t  r a t i os ;  us ins  an  agg rega te
onc-year  age r . i indolv rat l re l  than a f ivc-ycar  age u indolv:
compLrt ing agc based o l t  ) 'ears of  nt r - rs ica l  s tuc ly  (carecr  agc)
rathcr  than chronological  ge;  analvz ing onl l '  malure u 'orks
r :s ing a one-year u indou c lat ing f ion l  t l re  onsct  o l -  musical
s tudy or  o1 'nrLrs ica l  omposi t ion;  arrd per lbrmi l lg  a l l  o f ' thesc
analyses on cacl r  t r ' r 'o  subsantp lcs o1 'cornposcrs:  Si rnonlon 's
(1911) tcn and thc addi t ional  e ight .  The sarnc pat tern ofa
s igni f icant ,  posi t ivc uge l ine(1r  t rend cor , rp lcd rv i th  a
significant (bLrt weaker). negative ttge cltrtrdrotic' trcltd u'as
found in each analys is .
Discussion
Withor - r t  except ion .  the  prcsent  rcsu l ts  cor r t rad ic t  Srmon lon 's
( 1 9 7 7 )  n u l l  t - i n c l i n g  o n  a g c r , r ' i s e  c h a n g e s  i n  c l a s s i c e r l
composcrs' hit  rat ios. Age l incur increases r.vere ur.r i lbrnl l l '
lbund in analyscs t-tsi trg tu'o sets ol 'nlastcrpiece cri tcrta, tu'o
m e r r s u r e s  o f  o v e r a l l  o u l p L l t  ( r v o r k s  a n d  t h c m c s ) ,  t u o
u 'e igh t ing  sys ter t l s ,  s ta t i s t i ca l l y  con t ro l l ing  fb r  ind iv id r - ra l
d i f te renccs  in  l i t c t ime hr t  ra t i t t ,  ana lyz ine  on ly  co lnposers '
mat l r re  rvorks .  inc l r - rd ing  ar ra l lge l l l c l l t s  a r rd  rev is ions  and
los t  r io rks ,  and separa ie ly  cxarn in ing  tu  o  s l tbsar . t . lp lcs  o f  the
conrposers .  Ind iv idua l  ana lvses  genera l l y '  shorvcd  re l iab lc
Ur  1  .05)  oge l ineur  i t i c rcases  in  a t  leas t  ha l l ' o f  thc  san lp lc '
anc l  no  changc in  h i t  ra t io  i l i  the  rcs t .  A  vveaker ,  ncgat ive
ctgc t l t tadrutic tretrd r,r 'as also f iccltrently cvidettt ,  sLrggesting
a mic l -carecr  boos t  in  h i t  ra t io .  These l lnd ings  sL lppor t  hc
prob lem so lv ing  and peak  age perspec t ives  and scer r r  la rge ly
incons is ten t  w i t l i  the  chance-con l lgL l ra t io l l  thcory  A t l
i r rc rease in  the  qua l i t y '  o1 'masterp ieces .  a lso  s ign i f i can t  in
about  ha l f  o l ' i nc l i v idua l  co t . l . tposc l ' s .  f i r r ther  sL lppor ts  the
prob lem so lv ing  and pcak  agc  perspcc t ives .  The chance-
c o n f i g r - t r a t i o n  t h e o r y  u a s  s r - r p p o r t e c l .  h o r v e v e r .  b y  a
somevn,ha t  lower  ( thoLrgh s t i l l  re l iab le )  pos i t i vc  cor re la t ion
between the prodLrct ion of ma.jor and minor rvclrks.
I t  remains  unc lear  why these rcsu l ts  d i f fe r  so  dramat ica l l - " -
f i o m  t l i o s e  r e p o r t e d  b y  S i m c l n t o n  (  1 9 7 7 ) .  N u m e r o t t s
a l te rna t rve  exp lanat io r rs  (e .g . ,  inc lud ing  ar ra t tge l ren ts  a t rd
rev is ions ,  us ing  var ious  t -nas te  rp iece  c r i le  r ia )  \ \  e rc  tcs tcc l
and ru lcd  c lu t .  More  de ta i l cd  cor t tpar iso t ' t s  a re  c l i f f i c r - r l t  to
n r a k c ,  s i r r c e  S i m o n t o n  ( 1 9 1 1 )  f e p o r t e c j  l ' e r r  d c s c r i p t t l ' e
s ta t rs t i cs  about  the  ana lyzed cornposr t ions ,  and son le t imcs
t l re  repor ted  s ta t i s t i cs  cont rad ic t  the  prescnt  da ta  (c .g . .  in  thc
numbel  o f  age per iods  ana lyzed) .  Unf  o r tunatc ly ,  becausc  t l f '
computc r  techno logy  advanccs .  h is  o r ig ina l  da ta  a re  no
I onger rctr ievab le ( S i  monton, pelsc'tnal comnr r-rnicatiot. t  ) .
Aspec ts  o f  thc  observcd  ageu ' i se  c l ianges  arc  con lpa t ib lc
r , i ' i th  bo th  the  prob lenr  so lv ing  and chancc-conf ig r ' r ra t ion
perspec t ivcs .  For  ins tance,  n lL lch  o f  thc  impror "c rncn t  in  h i t
r a t i o  o c c u r s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  o f '  c o l x p o s c r s '  c a r e e r s ,
c o n s i s t e n t  u i t h  e x p c c t a t i o n s  a b o L t t  s k i l l  a n d  e x p e r t l s c
a c q u i s i t i o n  a s  a  p r e c o l t c l i t i o n  f i t r  o L l t s t a l l d i l l s  c r e r t t r \  c
ac l r ievemcr r t  ( l  Iaye  s ,  I  989;  Wc isberg .  1999) .  I  Iou 'cve  r .  lge
t rcnds  dur ing  compos i t iona l  r ra t r - r r i t y  acco t tn ted  t i r r  on ly
one- th i rd  to  o r re -ha l f  as  r -n t tch  var iancc  as  th ( )sc  sprn t l  i t lu
co lnposcrs '  en t i rc  careers .  u 'h ich  is  a t  leas t  Jo iT i  c l l ' h t l1  t l lo l '€
cons i  stcnt lvi t l r  thc chancc-confl  sural i  ol l  theorl ' .
T h e  s l i g h t  h i t  r a t i c t  d c c l i n e  l a t e  i n  l i 1 ' e  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  u i t h
both  theo l i cs .  
' fhe  prob lem so lv rng  pcrspec t ive  does  no t
pos i t  a  n rec l ran is rn  to  cxp la in  a  d rop  in  pcrsp icac i ty  la te  in
l i l ' e .  T h e  h i t  r a t i o  d e c l i n e  a m o n g  c l d e r l y  c o r n p t l s c r s  a l s t r
v i o l a t e s  t h c  e q u a l - o d d s  r u l e  a p p l v i r r g  u n t i l  t h e  e n d  o l '
c r c a t o r s ' l i v e s .  H o u ' e v e r ,  t h i s  d e c r c n l e n t  s h o L r l d  b e
i r l te rp re tcd  caut ious ly ,  c lue  to  a  low 'N and h igh  var iab i l i t y  in
h i t  ra t ios  o f  composcrs  in  the i r  sevent ics  and bcyond.
The pa t te rn  o1-  peak  ages  is  more  d i f l l cL r l t  to  reconc i le
rv i th  the  chancc-conf igura t ion  theory .  Overa l l  p roduc t iv i t y
peaks  f i rs t ,  in  contposcrs '  la tc  th i r t ies ,  cons is te  n t  ' " r  i th
prcv io r - rs  work  (see S imor . r ton ,  1997) .  F l i l  ra t io  de t rncc l  by
t l ie  th rcc  less  s t r ingent  masterp iccc  c r i te r ia  peaks  around agc
53.  The nrore  s t r ingcnt ly  dc l ined h i t  ra t i c l  pcaks  evcn la te r .
a1  65  1 ,ears .  Note  a lso  tha t  thcse  da ta  a re  l lo l  l l l l nor
s ta t i s t i ca l  aber la t io r rs ,  as  they  rcpresent  para lnc l t - rs  t - t r r  the
career landmarks o1'these I 8 corttposers.
These resu l ts  d issoc ia te  t rvo  pred ic t ions  o1 ' t l rc  chance-
conf igura t ion  theory .  Many s tuc l ies ,  rnc l t rd ing  th is  o t . t c ,
5 l6q '  pos i t i ve  n ra . jo r -minor  rvork  cor rc la l ions .  I lo rvc le r '
such  cor re la t ions  do  no t  p rcc lL lde  an  agerv ise  t t t tp ro r  c t . t . t t ' t t l
i n  h i t  ra t io  and cannot  by  t l ienrse lvcs  ru lc  o t t t  a l tc rna t lvc
theorc t i ca l  tnode ls  Comprchens ivc  ana l ) tscs  o t 'agcr ' r  i se  h i t
rat io trends, as pcrlormed here, are also necessary.
The cor rs is ten l  uge l ineu t '  i r rc rease and la tc  peaks  lo r  h i t
ra t io  and masterp icce  qLra l i t y  sL lgges t  tha t  a t  leas t  son te
crea tors  boos t  c rea t iv i t y  as  ther r  careers  p rogress .  Whi lc
ccr ta in ly  c luant i t y  o f  idea t ion  prc lv idcs  the  ra rv  rna ter ia l  lb r
c rea t ive  produc t iv i t y ,  the  present  resu l ts  suggest  tha t  so l l l c
c rea tors  a re  persp icac ious  and ab le  to  cons< l l ida te  ga ins  as
they  e labora te  ideas .  T l iL rs .  goa l -c l i rec ted  prob lcnr  so lv ing
anc l  cva lua t ic ln  p rocesscs .  as  rve l l  as  accumula tcd  e ' rpcr t i se
( H a y e s ,  1 9 8 9 ;  S i r n o n t o n .  2 0 0 0 ;  W e i s b c r g ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  p l a y
s r - r b s t a n t i a l  r o l c s  i n  c r e a t i v e  p r o d u c t i v i t l ' .  N a t u r a l l y .
c rea tors ' ins t i t - t c ts  a re  no t  pcr l -ec t ,  b t r t  r rany  co l l lposcrs '
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in t r . r i t ions about  the valL le of  thc i r  ideas appear to have been
souncl ,  and they seent  to harve inrproved these intur t ions
sLrbstantial ly u'ith age.
The  eva lua t i vc  and  e labo ra t i ve  p rocesses  tha t  rn igh t
permi t  an increase in h i t  rat io  ancl  nrasterp icce qual i ty
rernai r . r  i l l  def ined,  bLr t  thesc resul ts  sLlggest  that  both
cogn i t i v c  and  n ro t i va l i ona l  va r i ab les  p lay  key  ro l cs .
Averagc h i t  rat io  does not  incrcase l inear ly  br- t t  is  l t  tnore
cu rv i l i r r ea r .  s i ng le -peaked  l i r nc t i on .  La te r  i n  t he i r  l i v cs .
composc rs  u r i t c  l ess  r rus i c  t h : rn  i n  n l i c l ca ree r .  bu t  a
progressivc ly  h igher  proport ion is  uastct 'prece- lcvel .  and thc
rnasterp ieccs ther .nsc lves are o l 'h ig l . rcr  c1r- ra l i t l ' .  What  o ldcr
conposers lack in  encrgy,  thcy appear to n lakc r . rp lbr  in
u'isdorl.
1 ' hc  unde r l y i ng  psycho log i ca l  p rocesses  n lay  a l so  be
infbnncd by lur ther  ic ieograpl i ic  analyscs.  I lerc,  or"er  hal l '
of the I 8 conrposers shorved systematic agewisc i l lct 'cr.tscs in
hi t  rat ios and mastcrp iece qLral i ty .  a l ld  thc rcst  shou'cd 1 'erv
agen' ise changes.  Fr- r r ther  rcsearch l ink ing care t  t ta . icctory
vr i th  charactcr is t ic  reat ivc processcs c l1 '  cot lpc lsers (c l - .
Galcr . rsor t ,  200 l )  may in lbnn the condi t ions urrder  rvh ic l ' t
imprc lvemenl  in  h i t  rat io  or  n lasterp iecc qr- ra l i ty  may bc
real  ized.
The present  data tnust  be in tcrpreted u i th caul ion.  They
represeut  a s ingle (bt r t  robust)  r . ' io la t ior l  o f  t l rc  eqLral -odds
rule.  FIou 'cver .  they c lear ly  shcl rv  that  thc cqr- ra l -oc lds ru le
does not  univcrsal ly  chr t r r lc tc ' r izc cre3t iv t  pr t rdLrct iv i ty .  ln
addi t ion to ideographic analyses.  conlprehensive st r - rd ics l ike
th is  one arc necessary tc l  deter tn ine the extcnt  of  cqr- ra l -odds
rL r l e  app l i ca t i on  (o r  v i o l a t i o r l s )  i n  o the r  doma ins .  A t  a
niinirnr.rr.r.r. the resr.rlts uggest that therc can be importanl
ro les  f c l r  e l abo ra t i vc  and  cva lua t i ve  p rob le rn  so l v i ng
processes.  aslvel l  as lbr  learn ing,  in  creat i r . 'c  product iv i ty
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Abstract 
External visualizations such as diagrams and animations are 
frequently used to teach people about the workings of 
mechanical systems. The present study considers the types of 
mental models that can be constructed from visual-spatial 
(non-verbal) materials alone, and the extent to which people 
revise their incorrect mental models. Comparing 10 high 
physics knowledge participants to nine low physics 
knowledge participants, we assessed how these two groups 
constructed and revised mental models of a flushing cistern. 
High domain knowledge participants extracted more 
meaningful information from the materials, although their 
initial models of the system were not as accurate as expected. 
However, after answering comprehension questions and 
viewing the learning materials again, high domain knowledge 
participants were more likely to revise their mental models 
into correct representations of the system, whereas the 
participants with low domain knowledge continued to rely on 
incorrect models. The discussion of these findings focuses on 
how prior knowledge may contribute to understanding visual 
instructional materials. 
 
External visualizations (e.g., diagrams and computer 
animations) are often used to inform people about how a 
complex system behaves. Physical systems such as 
machines are causally and temporally complex, and 
understanding these systems depends on an appreciation of 
the spatial relations between their components and how 
these change over time. The spatial and temporal aspects of  
mechanical movements can be illustrated directly via visual-
spatial representations, while the same information 
presented in a verbal format might be more difficult to 
understand.  
It seems plausible that the design of external 
visualizations could greatly affect one’s success at 
extracting relevant information from the display.  For 
example, adding accompanying text that describes aspects 
of phenomena presented in the visualizations may help in 
providing additional information that a diagram alone could 
not provide. Previous studies researching the integration of 
text and diagrams have shown that people with low domain 
knowledge or low spatial ability rely heavily on 
accompanying textual descriptions (Hegarty & Just, 1993; 
Kalyuga, Chandler, & Sweller, 1998). These studies also 
suggest that as a person becomes more familiar with a 
domain, the reliance on textual explanations decreases. 
However they have not specifically addressed which types 
of information are best understood from diagrams and 
animations by people with different amounts of background 
knowledge.  
The purpose of the present study is to examine how 
understanding a mechanical system is achieved when visual 
materials such as diagrams and animations are presented 
without accompanying textual or verbal explanations. As 
part of a larger research objective, we analyze how purely 
visual materials are understood by both high and low 
physics knowledge participants. By examining how people 
with varying degrees of domain knowledge interpret visual 
materials, we can design future materials containing verbal 
descriptions that supplement informational gaps in the 
visual displays. We assume that these informational gaps 
will differ for low and high domain knowledge individuals, 
therefore, this study focuses on how domain knowledge 
contributes to the comprehension of visual materials 
conveying a complex mechanical system. 
Constructing Mental Models 
Creating a mental model of a complex system requires that a 
person identify the parts involved, understand their causal 
relationships, and relate the causal steps to the larger 
functions of the system. Our cognitive model of how people 
come to construct mental models from multimedia materials 
follows that outlined by Narayanan & Hegarty (2002). To 
summarize, there are five steps that a person must take to 
understand a machine from multimedia presentations. First, 
the system must be decomposed into individual 
components. Second, the learner must make representational 
connections to prior knowledge. Third, if verbal information 
is present, a person is required to make further referential 
connections between the visual media and the verbal 
explanations. Then, she must determine the causal chain of 
events. Finally, a dynamic mental model is constructed. In 
the present experiment, we are particularly interested in the 
second step-- how prior domain-related knowledge affects 
the construction and revision of mental models. 
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We predict that, in accordance with previous studies 
(Spilich et al., 1979; Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979; Lowe, 
1994; 1999), high domain knowledge individuals will be 
more likely to construct initial mental models that 
incorporate high-level functional understanding, whereas 
people lacking domain-related knowledge will focus on the 
movements of the parts on a local level. Additionally, we 
expect the level of domain knowledge to influence the 
extent to which models are revised. Assuming that learning 
is an iterative process of understanding (Miyake, 1986), 
how people move from a state of understanding to a state of 
non-understanding may depend on their level of domain-
related knowledge. As previous studies have shown (Chi, 
2000; Chi et al., 1994), it is when conflicts between internal 
models and external information occur that people are more 
likely to revise their internal mental models.  We propose 
that conflicts are more likely to be perceived by people with 
high domain knowledge because they are at an 
informational advantage for meaningfully evaluating their 
models. 
Three Types of Mental Models 
The stimulus used in this experiment was a British model of 
a toilet tank. While the purpose of the system is the same as 
an American model (i.e., to flush water into the toilet bowl), 
the mechanism used to accomplish this function differs 
vastly from its American counterpart. Thus, we assume that 
the participants in our experiment (American college 
students) did not have prior knowledge of the mechanism 
that they studied in this experiment.  
Specifically, the main difference is the manner in which 
water exits the tank into the bowl. In the British model, 
water exits the tank through a siphon process. The siphon 
process begins when two disks (located at the bottom of the 
bell in the middle of the diagram) are pushed together (by 
pulling the handle) and push water up through the main 
siphon pipe. As water flows up the siphon pipe and down 
into the toilet bowl, the siphon process begins. This enables 
water to flow through the siphon pipe without the aid of the 
disks. The process ends when the water level in the tank 
falls below the siphon bell, and air enters the siphon pipe. 
This is reflected in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Air enters and stops the siphon process. 
 
Data from this and previous experiments (e.g., Hegarty, 
Kriz, & Cate, 2003), indicate that people construct one of 
two types of mental models of the flushing cistern. The first 
(physically correct) model works according to the physical 
process of siphoning. As explained above, a siphon occurs 
when liquid in an enclosed system moves, via a pressure 
differential, from a point of high pressure to a point of lower 
pressure. In the case of the British toilet tank shown in 
Figure 1, a siphon enables water to continuously flow up 
and back down the large pipe in the middle in order to exit 
the tank. The siphon is broken when air, which is lighter 
than water, enters the enclosed system. This breaks the 
pressure differential, and the water flow out of the pipe 
stops.  
The incorrect model of this system involves the disks as 
the main stopping agents. Participants with incorrect models 
may or may not understand the initialization of the siphon 
process. Their model is characterized, however, by the 
function of the disks. The incorrect model assumes that the 
water stops flowing out of the tank because the upper disk 
falls on the lower disk and creates a water-tight barrier, or 
seal. As Figure 1 illustrates, the two disks do not touch 
when the lower disk falls. If they did, air would not be able 
to enter. Therefore, the visual materials that participants 
view are in direct conflict with this model. 
Many participants do not offer an explanation for how 
water starts and stops flowing from the tank to the bowl. A 
possible reason for this omission is that they have an 
informational “gap” (Chi, 2000) in their mental model. In 
other words, they are missing the knowledge necessary to 
explain the causal relationship between activity in the tank 
and the stopping of exiting water. However, it is quite 
possible that this process is, in fact, represented in their 
mental models but was simply not explained during the 
protocol. Because there was no method for empirically 
differentiating between these two possibilities, these cases 
were not considered in analyses. 
Method 
Participants 
Nineteen adults (10 high domain knowledge, 9 low domain 
knowledge) volunteered for the study as paid participants. 
The high domain knowledge (HDK) participants were 
UCSB graduate students from Mechanical Engineering or 
Material Science, with the exception of one participant, who 
was the staff lab manager of the undergraduate Mechanical 
Engineering lab. All experts held Bachelors degrees in 
engineering or physics and had been studying physics and 
engineering for a mean of 6.4 years (range 5-8 years). It was 
assumed that the HDK group had knowledge of pressure 
differentials and siphoning, as these topics are covered in 
undergraduate physics and engineering courses. 
The low domain knowledge (LDK) participants were 
UCSB graduate students from Social Sciences, Art, 
Humanities, or Biology, and all considered themselves 
physics novices.  Four had taken introductory physics in 
high school and one had taken freshman physics in college. 
None had taken engineering courses.  
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Materials and Apparatus 
Participants viewed a variety of visual displays depicting a 
toilet tank either in a resting state or in motion. The labeled 
static diagram showed a color picture of the toilet tank in its 
resting state and included labels naming the mechanical 
parts. The unlabeled static diagram was identical to the 
labeled version, but without the labels. The four phases 
static diagram was a series of four diagrams displayed 
together. Each diagram showed a different phase of the 
flushing process. The labeled, unlabeled, and four phases 
diagrams were all viewed as PowerPoint slides. 
Three animations were also available to the participants. 
All of the animations consisted of a series of 134 bitmap 
images. The computer-controlled animation was displayed 
in Macromedia Flash MX and played at a rate of 6 frames 
per second. The participant pressed a button with the mouse 
in order to begin playing, but otherwise had no control over 
the speed or the direction of the animation. The participant-
controlled animation with arrows was run in a Quicktime 
player, which allows one to control the speed and direction 
in which a video file plays. In both animations, arrows 
appeared at various points to indicate a part’s direction of 
movement or to signal an important event. The participant-
controlled animation without arrows was identical to the 
other participant-controlled animation except it did not 
contain arrows.  
All materials were displayed on a 17” desktop monitor at 
1024x768 resolution. 
Procedure 
Participants sat in front of the computer and were told, “You 
are going to view diagrams and animations that illustrate a 
toilet tank, but note that this is not an American model. 
Please view the materials and learn how the system works. 
You have as much time as you need to study the materials.” 
They were then shown the six visual learning aids. The 
researcher briefly explained each learning aid, without 
mentioning the presence or absence of arrows in the 
animations, and demonstrated how to manipulate the 
controls of the Quicktime Player.  
After viewing the material, the monitor was turned off 
and participants were given a booklet of comprehension 
questions. The first question asked to explain step-by-step 
what happens in the toilet tank after the handle is pushed. 
The next four questions were troubleshooting questions, in 
which novel breakdown scenarios were described. The 
participants were required to generate as many responses as 
possible that would account for the breakdown of the 
system. The final four questions were function questions 
that asked about the function of specific parts of the 
mechanical system. Participants were asked to provide 
written answers at their own pace. 
Upon finishing the written portion of the experiment, the 
participants were then asked to view the visual materials 
again. The participant-controlled animation without arrows 
was displayed and participants were asked to orally report to 
the researcher where events began and ended. An “event” 
was not predefined by the researcher, and participants were 
allowed as much time as they needed to formulate their 
answers before reporting. When they were ready, 
participants reported what they saw as “events.” This 
portion of the session was video taped for later analysis. 
Results 
Constructing Initial Mental Models 
In order to assess participants’ initial mental models of the 
system, we evaluated the first written question, in which 
participants described the step-by-step process of a flush. 
The two groups’ responses showed both quantitative and 
qualitative differences. As Figure 2 shows, the HDK 
participants reported on average four more steps than the 
LDK participants, and this difference reached significance: 
M = 16.8 v. M = 12.8; t(17) = 3.176, p < .05. This difference 
indicates that the HDK individuals were able to extract 
more information from the visual materials.  
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Figure 2:  Mean number of steps in written responses. 
 
Furthermore, the types of events that were mentioned by 
each group differed. The majority of participants (i.e., seven 
participants or more) in both groups reported eight common 
steps. However, the HDK participants tended to mention 
steps that the LDK students did not mention. (See Table 1.) 
Of note, the HDK participants tended to focus on the rising 
and falling of the water level, and that focus was not evident 
in the majority of the LDK participants’ written reports. 
To evaluate the accuracy of participants’ initial mental 
models, the step-by-step written reports were evaluated for 
steps that reflected correct, incorrect, or unstated models of 
the siphon process. If participants mentioned the siphon 
process beginning when the disks pushed the water up the 
siphon pipe and ending when air entered the system, their 
models were considered correct. Incorrect models were 
those in which the disks were reported as stopping the water 
from leaving the tank. Finally, a mental model was coded as 
“not stated” if participants made no mention of the how the 
water stopped flowing out of the tank. As Table 2 shows, 
the distribution of initial model types did not differ at all 
between the two groups.  
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Table 1: Steps mentioned by at least 7 participants in their 
step-by-step written responses. 
 
Steps HDK LDK 
Push down on the handle x x 
The upper disk moves up x x 
The lower disk moves up x  
Water enters siphon pipe x x 
The upper disk moves down x x 
The lower disk moves down x  
Water level falls below siphon bell x  
Water level lowers in tank x  
Float lowers x x 
Inlet valve opens x x 
Water flows from inlet pipe to tank  x 
Water level rises x  
Float rises x x 
Inlet valve closes x x 
In their oral reports, the majority of participants in each 
group (at least 7) mentioned three steps that were not in 
their written reports. For the LDK participants, these 
included: (1) the lower disk moves up, (2) the lower disk 
falls down, and (3) water stops flowing into the siphon pipe. 
The three events that the majority of HDK participants 
mentioned in their oral reports but not in their written 
response were: (1) water flows into the toilet bowl, (2) the 
siphoning process begins, and (3) the siphoning process is 
broken. The striking difference between the two groups is in 
the perceptibility of the added steps. The three steps 
commonly added by the LDK participants are directly 
perceptible from the animation, which they were allowed to 
view while giving their reports. On the other hand, the HDK 
group added steps that were not directly perceptible from 
the animation, but instead involved higher-level processes 
and functions. 
The number of participants in each group who changed 
from one model to another is shown in Table 2. As is 
evidenced in this table, the majority of the HDK participants 
moved from an incorrect or unstated model to a correct 
model. Whereas two HDK participants began the study with 
a physically correct model, eight of the ten finished the 
study with this model. That is, they orally reported that the 
siphon phenomenon, not the disks, ends the outflow 
process. Contrary to this, the LDK participants show no 
clear pattern of model revision. Many of their final models 
remain incorrect. In sum, the steps reported in the written 
response compared to the oral response clearly showed 
signs of model revision in the HDK sample, whereas no 
pattern was evident in the LDK data. 
 
Data from the troubleshooting and function question 
responses reveal, however, that high and low knowledge 
participants did differ on how strongly they relied on 
incorrect models in later comprehension questions. Figure 3 
reflects the mean number of troubleshooting and function 
question answers that contained the incorrect model. The 
data indicate that the LDK participants used incorrect 
mental models significantly more often than the HDK 
participants to account for system breakdowns and overall 
functions of the tank: M= 3.4 v. M=1.6; t(17)=2.535, p<.05. 
 
Discussion 
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Initial Models 
The results of this study indicate that HDK participants 
were able to extract more information about the flushing 
cistern system from the visual materials provided. They not 
only reported more initial steps than the LDK individuals, 
but were also better at integrating higher-level causal 
changes, such the rising and falling of the water level, into 
their initial reports. As predicted, and following previous 
findings on reasoning with external visualizations (Lowe, 
1994; 1999), the LDK participants’ step-by-step reports 
revolved around small mechanistic movements and did not 
indicate a functional understanding of the system. 
Figure 3:  Mean number of troubleshooting and function 
responses conveying incorrect model. 
A comparison of HDK and LDK participants’ written 
protocols revealed that the types of models constructed 
initially were similarly distributed across the two groups. 
This result was rather surprising, given that we expected the 
engineers to fully comprehend the siphon process upon 
viewing the materials. Additionally, we expected reading 
the label “siphon pipe” to prime this siphon schema. Our 
findings conflict with previous accounts of experts solving 
physics problems (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981), as well 
as lay beliefs that people trained in a certain domain are able  
Revising Mental Models 
Although the written step-by-step responses and the orally 
presented event structure responses resulted from slightly 
different tasks, a paired samples t-test yielded no significant 
differences for either group in the number of steps 
mentioned between the two tasks. Thus, we were able to 
compare the written and oral reports in order to assess 
model revisions. 
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                      Table 2: Summary of Initial and Final Models. 
 
 
 
 
           
HDK Initial Model Final Model LDK Initial Model Final Model 
E01 Correct Correct N02 Incorrect Not Stated 
E02 Incorrect Incorrect N03 Incorrect Incorrect 
E03 Not Stated Correct N04 Not Stated Incorrect 
E04 Not Stated Correct N05 Correct Not Stated 
E05 Correct Correct N06 Incorrect Incorrect 
E06 Incorrect Incorrect N07 Incorrect Incorrect 
E07 Incorrect Integrated1 N08 Incorrect Incorrect 
E08 Not Stated Correct N09 Not Stated Not Stated 
E09 Incorrect Correct N10 Not Stated Incorrect 
E10 Incorrect Correct    
 
                                                          
1 The participant incorporated both the correct and incorrect models  
into his final model.  
to understand domain-related phenomena quickly and 
easily. As evidenced by their later oral reports, the engineers 
were able to spontaneously report the siphon process, 
indicating that they had the relevant domain-knowledge, yet 
they did not grasp the process in their initial viewing of the 
materials.  
Here we offer a possible explanation for why many of the 
HDK participants did not incorporate the siphon process 
into their initial mental models. In the initial viewing phase 
of the experiment, participants were trying to integrate their 
prior domain-related knowledge with the external 
visualizations in order to create a cohesive causal model of 
the system. Because the HDK individuals have a larger 
body of prior knowledge than the LDK participants, they 
have more explanations in competition. Two sources of 
knowledge that may contribute to the understanding or 
misunderstanding of how water stops exiting the tank are: 
(1) domain-specific knowledge about a siphon process and 
pressure differential, as described previously, and (2) 
domain-general knowledge of “damming.” From experience 
with the real world, we know that flowing liquid can be 
stopped by solid objects. Integrating the damming principle 
with the external visualizations leads to the incorrect model 
of the disks blocking the outgoing water. This integration of 
domain-general information seems to be how LDK 
individuals reason about the flushing cistern. Although both 
explanations were available to the HDK participants, the 
domain-specific explanation may not have been adequately 
cued by the visual materials. Thus, the HDK relied on their 
domain-general knowledge until they had reason to switch 
to using domain-specific understanding. This explanation is 
purely speculative, and further studies exploring these issues 
need to be conducted. 
Model Revision 
While the distribution of both groups’ initial model types 
were found to be relatively similar, analyses of their final 
oral reports revealed that the model revision process 
differed across the groups. Although both groups did, on 
average, add three steps that were not present in the majority 
of the initial models, the steps differed qualitatively across 
the groups. The LDK participants seemed to perform 
“model addition” after answering the comprehension 
questions and reviewing the visual materials. They added 
visually salient information that was left out of their initial 
models. However, the LDK participants did not change their 
model to the correct model. Moreover, the sealing of the 
disks continued to be the dominant view of how the water 
stopped exiting the tank, even though this explanation was 
in direct conflict with what was shown in the visual 
materials. These findings are consistent with previous 
findings that LDK individuals do not integrate functional 
information into their mental models (Spilich et al., 1979; 
Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979; Lowe, 1994; 1999) and that 
they tend to stay at a kinematic/behavioral level of 
explanation, even after spending additional time with the 
learning materials (Hale & Barsalou, 1995).  
The HDK participants in this study can be described as 
truly revising their mental models. Rather than simply 
adding perceptually salient steps to their final models, the 
majority of HDK participants changed their models to 
include the beginning siphon process and the correct 
explanation for the ending of the siphon process. The HDK 
participants did not tend to rely as heavily on their initial 
incorrect model while answering the troubleshooting and 
function questions. This indicates that the HDK group was 
more flexible in generating other responses to the questions, 
possibly because they had more prior knowledge available 
to them. 
There are many possible explanations of how the revision 
process occurred. Because a variety of activities took place 
between the initial written step-by-step explanations and the 
final oral reports, we can only speculate on the possible 
causes of revision. One possibility is that the 
troubleshooting and function questions lead the HDK group 
to internal conflicts within their models. Troubleshooting 
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questions can be used to induce causal knowledge of a 
system (Hale & Barsalou, 1995), and can also be used to 
judge deep comprehension (Graesser & Olde, 2003). While 
providing responses to these questions, HDK participants 
might have become aware of conflicts between their initial 
mental model and the possible explanations for the 
breakdown scenarios presented in the troubleshooting 
questions. Alternatively, viewing the visual materials a 
second time may have contributed to model revision. As the 
HDK participants were able to compare their mental models 
to the information presented in the visual tools, they may 
have realized inconsistencies in their models.  
The LDK group, on the other hand, did not seem to 
experience conflicts between their models and their 
troubleshooting and function responses, nor between their 
models and the external representations. Although their 
models conflicted with what was shown in the learning 
materials, none of the participants explicitly identified a 
conflict. These participants may have refrained from 
revising their mental models even after re-viewing the 
materials because they began to rely on their mental models 
as perceptual evidence (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). The HDK 
group, on the other hand, seemed to be more sensitive to 
conflicts between their mental models and information that 
did not match. 
Conclusion 
This study demonstrates the limitations of visual materials 
such as diagrams and animations for communicating about 
how machines work. Although the animations showed how 
the parts of the mechanism move when it is in operation, 
LDK individuals were unable to construct an accurate 
mental model from the visual materials, and tended to 
construct erroneous mental models that were in fact 
inconsistent with what they viewed. Most HDK individuals 
were able to construct the correct mental model eventually, 
but this took some time and occurred only after engaging in 
other activities such as answering troubleshooting and 
function questions.  
The results of this study suggest that materials designed 
for low domain knowledge participants must explicitly 
describe the siphon process (e.g., through language), while 
materials targeting learners with adequate domain 
knowledge may need to merely induce these learners to 
access the relevant domain information they already 
possess. Thus, examining the mental models constructed 
from visual materials alone can provide insights into the 
design of instructional materials for individuals with 
different amounts of background knowledge, and suggest 
when and how visual-spatial instruction materials should be 
supplemented by verbal instruction.  
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Abstract 
Causal reasoning has been shown to underlie many aspects of 
everyday judgment and decision-making. We explore the role 
of causal structure in conditional reasoning, hypothesizing 
that people often interpret conditional statements as assertions 
about causal structure. We argue that responses on the Wason 
selection task reflect the selection of evidence expected to 
maximally reduce uncertainty over candidate causal 
structures. We present a model in which people’s selections 
depend on their interpretation of which causal relationship is 
asserted by a given conditional statement. 
Introduction 
Consider the following statement: “If a pot falls in the 
kitchen, then you will hear a clang”. Is this statement true? 
Not if something breaks its fall, like a pillow. Now consider 
the statement: “If a clang is heard then a pot has fallen in the 
kitchen.” Is this statement true? Not if something else can 
cause a clang, such as falling silverware. The first statement 
is not always true because there are conditions that can 
disable the mechanism by which falling pots cause clangs to 
be heard. The second statement is not always true because 
there are alternate causes of clangs other than falling pots. 
As this example illustrates, causal knowledge often 
underlies how people reason about conditional statements. 
Recent research has shown that causal reasoning 
permeates many aspects of cognition, including associative 
learning (Waldmann, 2000; Glymour & Cheng, 1998), 
category learning (Rehder, 2003; Ahn, 1999), and judgment 
under uncertainty (Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2003). In this 
paper we analyze the role of causal structure in conditional 
reasoning (Over & Jessop, 1998), and argue that people’s 
responses on the Wason selection task reflect sophisticated 
abilities to induce causal structure. 
An important open question in causal reasoning is how 
people’s background knowledge interacts with observations 
when inferring causal structure. Causal domain knowledge 
places important constraints on which cause-effect 
relationships exist and how the effects depend functionally 
on the causes (Pearl, 2000; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2003; 
Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995). This effectively 
specifies a hypothesis space of candidate causal structures, 
which we model using causal Bayes nets (Pearl, 2000). 
Observational evidence can then be used to determine which 
causal structure is most likely. We propose that this 
interplay of causal domain knowledge and observational 
evidence underlies people’s judgments on the Wason 
selection task. 
The Wason selection task presents subjects with a 
conditional statement of the form “if p then q”, and asks 
subjects to choose evidence to determine whether the 
statement is true. Prior accounts of people’s responses on 
the selection task have emphasized logical reasoning 
(Wason, 1966; Ahn & Graham, 1999), probabilistic 
reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 1994), or social reasoning 
(Cosmides, 1989), as well as others. In contrast, we argue 
that the selection task often engages causal reasoning: for 
conditional statements in which p and q are causally related, 
people choose cards that will be most useful to determine 
which of several candidate causal structures is correct for a 
given situation. 
We have developed a model that extends Oaksford & 
Chater’s (1994) probabilistic information gain framework to 
handle causal hypotheses. The information gain framework 
of O&C proposes that in the Wason selection task, people 
seek to reduce their uncertainty among hypotheses about the 
relationship between the antecedent (p) and the consequent 
(q) in a conditional statement of the form “if p then q”. The 
model of O&C (1994) proposes that these hypotheses are 
assertions about conditional dependencies (e.g., q depends 
on p, q is independent of p, etc.), whereas we propose that 
these hypotheses are assertions about causal structure (e.g., 
p causes q, p does not cause q, etc.). 
Our causal framework enables us to explain some 
previously puzzling results from the literature, as well as 
compelling intuitions that are not predicted by other 
approaches. We also address an important open question 
with both logical and probabilistic accounts: they leave 
unspecified how people interpret conditionals to determine 
which hypothesis is being asserted. We propose that the 
interpretation of conditionals often depends on causal 
domain knowledge, which imposes constraints on candidate 
causal structures, as well as pragmatic considerations. 
Why interpret conditionals causally? 
In contrast to O&C’s proposal that conditional statements 
assert a conditional dependency, we propose that people 
interpret conditional statements in which p and q are 
causally related as assertions about causal structure. The 
underlying reason for this is that conditional dependencies 
are often a symptom of some underlying causal relationship. 
“If p then q” states that there is some dependency between p 
and q, which in turn implies there is some mechanism by 
which p and q are related; i.e., p causally influences q, q 
causally influences p, or they have some common cause. 
The term “causally influences” does not necessarily mean 
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“directly causes”; causal influence can be generative, 
inhibitive, enabling, permissive, or otherwise. 
Examples of the prevalence of causal interpretations come 
from statements in which the logical interpretation and the 
causal interpretation are at odds; in these cases, the causal 
interpretation tends to take precedence. Some conditionals 
are logically false but seem true because they are causally 
true. For example, “If you spin around then you will get 
dizzy” seems true enough, although it’s possible to spin 
around without getting dizzy, therefore it’s logically false. 
Other conditionals are logically true but seem false because 
they are causally false. For example, “If you drink coffee 
during the day then you will fall asleep at night” sounds 
false because it seems to be saying that coffee causes you to 
fall asleep, but it is logically true (assuming you eventually 
fall asleep every night). These examples suggest that it is 
often, but not always, more natural to interpret conditionals 
as causal assertions, rather than logical implications. 
Causal Structure Induction 
We adopt the following Bayesian framework: given 
conditional statement “if p then q”, reasoners consider a 
total hypothesis space T of candidate causal structures 
relating p and q. The conditional statement is interpreted to 
be asserting that a specific causal relationship holds between 
p and q. T then partitions into a subspace of structures S 
consistent with the statement, and its complement, T-S, 
inconsistent with the statement. Testing the conditional 
amounts to testing whether the true structure, s*, is in S or 
T-S. The probability that the conditional is true is the 
probability that s* is in S: . ( * ) ( ) ( )
s S
P s S P S P s∈∈ = = Σ
Initial degrees of belief in these hypotheses are 
represented as prior probabilities, and those structures that 
do not satisfy the constraints of causal domain knowledge 
are not considered. For example, people know that falling 
pots can cause noise, but noise cannot cause pots to fall, 
hence no structures with noise causing falling pots will be 
included in T. In this case of the conditional “if a pot falls, 
then it makes a noise”, T could be the set of all causal 
structures consistent with domain knowledge in which 
falling pots exist, and S could be the subset of structures in 
T in which falling pots are a cause of noise. 
Data can help determine how likely the conditional 
statement is to be true. Using Bayesian belief updating, 
 ( ) ( | )( | ) ( | )
( )s S s S
P s P d sP S d P s d
P d∈ ∈
= =∑ ∑  
According to the information gain (IG) approach (O&C, 
1994), when determining whether a particular conditional 
statement is true, the most informative data are those that 
are expected to maximize information gain, Ig: 
1( | ) ( ) log ( | ) log
( ) ( | )g H H
I S D P H P H d
P H P H d
= −∑ ∑ 1  
However, O&C (1996) propose that when P(S) is not 0.5, a 
better measure is the distance between the probability 
distributions of the new and old beliefs, as measured by 
Kullback-Leibler distance, (we will use this, and call it IKL): 
( | ) ( | )( | ) ( | ) log ( | ) log
( ) ( )KL
P S d P T S dI S d P S d P T S d
P S P T S
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ −= + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ −⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞⎟⎠
  
In the case of the Wason selection task, IKL(S|d) is the 
amount of information gained from turning over cards. The 
selection task can be used to test two claims: (1) people 
often interpret conditional statements in which p and q are 
causally related as assertions that a particular causal 
relationship holds, and (2) people select information with 
the goal of maximally reducing uncertainty in that assertion. 
Applying the IG approach to the selection task 
The Wason selection task and its variants present people 
with a conditional statement of the form “if p then q”, where 
p and q can be any propositions. Cards are then presented 
which represent trials; one side specifies whether p was true 
on the trial, while the other side specifies whether q was 
true. Subjects are presented with four cards, having each of 
the four possible sides (p, q, ¬p, ¬q) facing up. The specific 
task instructions vary depending on the experimenter’s 
intent, but they generally instruct participants to select only 
those cards necessary to turn over in order to determine 
whether or not the given conditional statement is true. 
Consider the information gained from turning over a 
single card with v on the visible side and finding u on 
unseen side: (v,u take on values in {p, q, ¬p, ¬q}, subject to 
the constraints of the selection task): 
( | , )( | ) ( | , ) ( | , ) log
( )KL KL
P S v uI S d I S v u P S v u
P S
⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
( | , )( | , ) log
( )
P T S v uP T S v u
P T S
⎛ ⎞−+ − ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 
( | ) ( | , )( | , ) ( | , )
( | )s S s S
P s v P u v sP S v u P s v u
P u v∈ ∈
= =∑ ∑  
Since it is generally obvious that the cards in the Wason 
selection task were not randomly sampled, but rather one 
card of each possible side (p, q, ¬p, or ¬q) was presented, 
no information can be gained from learning that the visible 
side of the card is v, thus . ( | ) ( )P s v P s=
One more step is necessary for predicting card selection: 
summing over all possible values of the unseen side of the 
card to obtain the expected information gain from turning 
the card with v on the visible side, EIg(S,v): 
( , ) ( | , ) ( | )g KL
u
EI S v I S v u P u v=∑  
The IG approach proposes that subjects select cards in the 
Wason selection task as a function of expected information 
gain, with selection favoring cards with higher expected 
information gain. 
Applying the IG approach to causal hypotheses 
The Bayesian framework presented thus far is similar to 
O&C (1996), except that it treats conditional statements as 
asserting the validity of a set of hypotheses rather than a 
single hypothesis. We now turn to the major differences 
between our account and that of O&C: 
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(1) The hypotheses in our framework are assertions 
about causal structure rather than conditional 
dependency; hence, a causal framework predicts 
different values for information gain than do O&C. 
(2) We propose that mapping conditional statements onto 
hypotheses about causal structure is inherently 
ambiguous and depends on pragmatic considerations. 
Here we will discuss the implications of (1), leaving the 
implications of (2) for the next section. 
The information gained from turning over card v and 
finding u on the other side depends on the hypotheses under 
consideration; in particular,  depends on 
 for every h ∈ T, which in turn depends on the 
content of each hypothesis h. In the O&C (1994) approach, 
H is the hypothesis that q depends deterministically on p, 
while ¬H is the hypothesis that p and q are independent, 
and these are the only two hypotheses considered. Thus, 
( | , )KLD S v u
( | , )P v u h
( | , ) 1; ( | , ) ; ( | , ) ; ( | , ) 0P q p H P q p H b P p q H a b P p q H= ¬ = = ¬ =   
( | , ) ( | , ) ; ( | , ) ( | , )P q p H P q p H b P p q H P p q H a¬ = ¬ ¬ = ¬ = ¬ ¬ =  
where the parameters  and  are the 
same for H and ¬H. Other possible hypotheses are proposed 
by O&C but not developed, specifically those in which q 
depends probabilistically on p, such that 
( )a P p= ( | )b P q p= ¬
( | , ) 1P q p H < . 
In our approach, the hypothesis space T consists of causal 
structures. The conditional statement asserts that a particular 
causal relationship holds between p and q, thus the true 
causal structure is in the set S of structures for which this 
relationship holds (S ⊂ T). For a given causal structure, h, 
 can be derived using the formalism of causal 
Bayes nets (Pearl, 2000). For the subsequent presentation 
we will work with a simple causal structure that provides a 
reasonable approximation to many of the causal structures 
asserted by common conditional statements. In this 
structure, a cause (C) generates an effect (E), but there are 
conditions (D) that can disable the mechanism, and there are 
alternative causes (A) of the effect (see Figure 1). D 
represents all disabling conditions aggregated together, and 
A represents all alternative causes aggregated together. The 
arrow coming from D in Figure 1 indicates that the presence 
of D blocks the causal path from C to E. This structure is the 
causal model behind Cheng’s power-pc theory (Cheng, 
1997) (where P(¬D) is equal to the causal power of C to 
generate E); the model can also be expressed as a noisy-or 
Bayes net (Glymour & Cheng, 1998). For this simplified 
structure, the total hypothesis space T contains all structures 
with one or more of the links shown in Figure 1 (subject to 
the constraint that the link from D cannot exist without the 
link from C to E). 
( | , )P u v h
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As an example of the model of Figure 1, consider a 
dropped pot (C) causing a clang (E). This can be disabled by 
various things (D), such as someone catching the pot or a 
pillow breaking the pot’s fall. There are also alternate 
causes (A) of clangs, such as falling silverware. 
Next we will use the semantics of the noisy-or Bayes net 
to derive , for the case where h is the hypothesis 
that the model of Figure 1 holds. This derivation works for 
all cases in which the cards in the selection task contain C 
on one side and E on the other, as is the case in our example 
“if a pot is dropped then a sound is heard” (here p is C (“a 
pot is dropped”) and q is E (“a sound is heard”), hence v, u 
take on values in {C, E, ¬C, ¬E}): 
( | , )P u v h
( )
( )
( | , ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( | , ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( | , )( | , )
( | ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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¬ =
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where the prior probabilities of C and A, P(C) and P(A), 
correspond to a and b in the O&C model, and the prior 
probability of D, P(D), is 1-P(E|C). (P(D) is taken to be 
zero in O&C’s model for the case where p is C and q is E.) 
We do not require that the parameter values be the same 
across hypotheses, eliminating some objections to O&C’s 
model. One could, for example, interpret a statement to be 
asserting that alternate causes are rare, hence S is all 
structures with P(A)<0.1. For simplicity, however, we will 
discuss only those interpretations in which a structural claim 
is being made (such as, a link exists from A to E); for these 
cases, the parameters will be the same across hypotheses. 
Interpreting conditionals as causal assertions 
Conditional statements are inherently ambiguous. Those for 
which p could be a cause of q we will call “forward” 
conditionals. They generally assert that p causes q, but the 
exact causal structure being asserted depends on pragmatics. 
For example, the statement “if a pot is dropped then it 
makes a clang” could have several different meanings, as 
demonstrated by the following hypothetical exchanges: 
(1)   A: “What sound will be made if I drop this pot?” 
B: “If a pot is dropped then it makes a clang.” 
Meaning: dropped pots cause clangs 
Causal Assertion: dropped pots can cause clangs 
Hypothesis Space: all structures in which dropped 
pot is the cause and a sound is the effect 
(2)   A: “I think a pot just fell.” 
B: “That’s impossible; I didn’t hear a clang. If a pot 
falls then it makes a clang.” 
Meaning: dropped pots always cause clangs 
Causal Assertion: no D exists to block the path from 
dropped pots to clangs 
Hypothesis Space: all structures in which dropped 
pot is a cause of clangs 
In contrast, conditionals for which q could causally 
influence p we call “reverse” conditionals. They generally 
assert that q is the only cause of p, but again the exact causal 
structure being asserted depends on pragmatics. For 
example, the statement “if you hear a clang then a pot was 
dropped” could have several different meanings, as 
Figure 1: Noisy-or causal model 
C 
E 
A 
D 
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demonstrated by the following hypothetical exchanges: qualitative predictions for S, T, and IKL for common types of 
conditionals, which will motivate future experiments. (1) A: “What are those sounds coming from the kitchen?” 
B: “Those are items being dropped. For instance, if 
you hear a clang then a pot was dropped.” 
Meaning: falling pots are the primary cause of 
clangs, but not necessarily the only possible cause. 
Causal Assertion: dropped pots can cause clangs 
Hypothesis Space: all structures in which dropped 
pot is the cause and a sound is the effect. 
(2)  A: “I heard a clang. What do you think happened?” 
B: “It must have been a dropped pot. If you hear a 
clang then a pot was dropped.” 
Meaning: the only cause of a clang is a dropped pot. 
Causal Assertion: no alternative cause A exists that 
can cause clangs. 
Hypothesis Space: all structures in which dropped 
pot is the cause and clang is the effect. 
Predicting card selection  
The key point of distinction between our model and that of 
O&C is in predicting information gain, because EIg is a 
simple function of information gain. IKL(S|v,u) depends on 
the particular set of causal structures in the hypothesis space 
T, as well as the set of asserted hypotheses S, and the 
parameters P(C), P(A), and P(D). S in turn depends on 
pragmatic considerations. In Figures 2 and 3 we give 
Some generalizations are worth noting: (1) EIg(p) is often 
h  
l
often high; (3) if the conditional assumes the C to E link 
ex , t have low 
priors and g(S,q) will be low. In general, with pragm c 
co iderations, e model predicts selection of p and q cards 
if the conditional asserts that C causes E, and selection of p, 
¬q if the conditional assumes that C causes E. 
 
Relation to previous analyses and phenomena 
In this section we discuss how our approach accounts for 
previous phenomena on the selection task. We group these 
phenomena within a discussion of previous approaches, 
while highlighting the distinctive aspects of our approach. 
igh. (2) for rare p and q, when structures with no C to E
ink have sufficient priors (e.g., a uniform prior), EIg(S,q) is 
ists hen structures with no C to E link will 
 EI ati
ns  th
Interpretation of reverse conditionals with cause known 
We know from domain knowledge that q could be a cause of p. 
Example:“if there is smoke then there is fire”, p=E=smoke,q=C=fire
C 
E 
A 
D C 
E 
A D 
C
E
A 
D
Interpretation: fire is the only cause of smoke 
Interpretation of reverse conditionals with single cause  
We know p has a single cause but we are not sure whether it is q 
Example: “if a person is in the XYZ club then that person is a 
good computer hacker”, p= E=in the club q=C=good hacker 
Interpretation: good hackers get into the XYZ club 
C 
E 
A D 
C 
E 
A 
D
Uniform Prior, EIg: p:0.391, ¬p:0.015, q:0.205, ¬q:0.033 
If P(3rd Model)=0.01, p:0.305, ¬p:0.000, q:0.001, ¬q:0.051 
Uniform Prior, EIg: p:0.758, ¬p:0.052, q:0.758, ¬q:0.052 
Figure 2: Predictions for reverse conditionals 
Dotted arrows indicate a mixture of two hypotheses, one in which the 
arrow is present, and one in which the arrow is absent 
All EIg values assume P(C)=P(A)=P(D)=0.1
S 
S 
T 
T 
Inte
W
Example:“if there is fire then there is smoke”,p=C=fire,q=E=smoke
rpre forward conditionals with cause known tation of 
e know from domain knowledge that p could be a cause of q. 
Interpretation 1: fire causes smoke 
C
E
A D
C
E
A 
D
C 
E 
A
D C
E
A
D
C
E
A
D
Interpreta on 2: fire always causes smoketi  
Interpretation of forward conditionals with single cause  
We know q has a single cause but we are not sure whether it is p 
Example: “if a person is in the XYZ club then that person is a 
good computer hacker”, p=C=good hacker, q=E=in the club 
Interpretation: good hackers get into the XYZ club  
C
E
A D
C
E
Uniform Prior, EIg: p:0.758, ¬p:0.052, q:0.758, 
A 
D
¬q:0.052 
Uniform g Prior, EI : p:0.189, ¬p:0.001, q:0.040, ¬q:0.018 
If P(3rd model)=0.01, p:0.058, ¬p:0.000, q:0.001, ¬q:0.006 
Uniform Prior, EIg: , ¬p:0.00 :0.220, p:0.442 5, q ¬q:0.032 
S
S
S
T
T 
T 
Figure 3: Predictions for forward conditionals. 
Dotted arrows indicate a mixture of two hypotheses, one in which the 
arrow is present, and one in which the arrow is absent. 
All EIg values assume P(C)=P(A)=P(D)=0.1
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Information-gain (Oaksford & Chater, 1994) 
In many of their publications, O&C analyze a simple 
c d 
¬
our m
co spo p=C, q=E, and D 
does no e subset of those 
structures i  which a link exists from C E. 
With the richer hypothesis space of causal models, the 
inform n gain framework predicts some previous results 
on the ection task that are not predicted by O&C (see 
next section). O&C predict that the p and q c hould be 
chos ¬q 
cards should be chosen when p or q is common. This is 
pr at  1, Ig(p,q) is 
high  g g ¬q) are zero. 
Our a hese assumptions are ly v d 
if structures in  with links from C to ave sufficient 
priors. If these structures have very low priors, the ¬q card 
should be more informative than the q card because 
IKL(S|p,q)  IKL(S|¬p,q) will be low, hence EIg(S be 
low.  is 
hea e 
that dr
placed on any structure with no link from dropped pots to 
c will 
n
f
v
or & Sloman (1996) provide evidence that appears to 
co ad e, yet 
people choose th p and ¬q cards. Some exa ples of their 
condition  are a duct gets a prestigious prize then it 
must h a distinctive quality”, and “if a product breaks 
then it must have been used under abnormal conditions”. 
O&C (1996) cla these results can be acco d for using 
their utility-theoretic 
thes les 
that pe his is 
th s 
reve e 
statement a  causes (A) 
while taking for granted the link from C to E, thus assigning 
l  
l 
certain 
le will 
in
tility). If, 
however, the participant is being asked simply to determine 
omparison in which H asserts complete dependency an
H asserts a complete independency between p and q. In 
odel, this is identical to the assertion that T 
rre nds to all structures in which 
t exist, while S corresponds to th
n  to 
atio
 sel
ards s
en when both p and q are rare and that the p and 
edic ed on the assumptions that Ig(p,¬q) is
rare p and q, and I (¬p,q) and I (¬p,  for
nalysis suggests that t on ali
 T E h
 and ,q) will 
 For example, suppose one asserts that “if a clang
rd then a pot was dropped”. It is reasonable to assum
opped pots cause clangs, hence a low prior should be 
langs. Thus, finding a dropped pot that clanged (p,q) 
ot be very informative, despite p and q being rare, but 
inding a dropped fork that produced a clang (p,¬q) will be 
ery informative, hence p and ¬q should be chosen. 
Alm
ntr ict O&C (1994), in which p and q are rar
e 
“if 
m
als
 
pro
ave
im unte
analysis of deontic tasks. However, 
e statements would only be deontic if they were ru
ople have to follow, but it is not apparent that t
e case. According to our analysis, the conditional i
rsed (q causes p), leading subjects to interpret th
s asserting the absence of alternate
ow probability to structures without this link. For example,
since there are other possible causes of a product breaking, 
subjects choose the ¬q card (no abnormal usage) to see if p 
occurred (the product broke for some other reason), but 
there is no need to see if abnormal usage causes breakage. 
A further point of differentiation is that our causa
framework predicts the ¬p card should be chosen in 
cases (when IKL(¬p,q) and P(q|¬p) are both high). 
Social Contracts and Precautions (Cosmides, 1989) 
People have been found to provide high levels of logically 
correct responses to Wason selection tasks about social 
contracts (Cosmides, 1989; Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
2000). A debate has emerged over whether this is evidence 
for a specialized social reasoning engine. Social contracts do 
indeed seem to be special, but do people reason about them 
differently than other tasks? In our framework, what makes 
them special is that they all have a consistent causal 
structure, in which people follow rules to ensure that C 
produces E reliably. For example, in the social contract “if 
you pay $10 then you get a watch”, the rules compel the 
seller to give the buyer a watch (E) once $10 is paid (C). 
When the link from C to E is assumed to exist, as is the case 
in most social contract tasks, one should assign a prior of 
zero to any hypothesis in T with this link missing. Since all 
the hypotheses with non-zero prior then contain links from 
C to E, our causal analysis predicts that only IKL(p,¬q) is 
high, and hence only the p and ¬q cards should be selected.  
Precaution tasks (Fiddick et. al, 2000) have essentially the 
same structure as social contracts: they assume that the 
precaution is in force (i.e., the link from C to E exists), and 
ask subjects to determine whether the rule is being followed 
by everyone. Our analysis suggests that if instead the rule 
itself is questioned (i.e., is the rule in force?), peop
terpret S as asserting that there is a link from C to E; since 
this link questioned, one should assign a non-zero prior to 
the structures in T in which this link is missing, making the 
q card useful (if p and q are rare) because IKL(p,q) is high. 
The results of Fiddick et. al (2000) show that this is 
exactly what people do. Fiddick et. al (2000) published 
precaution experiments that show people choose q more 
than ¬q in “standard” versions of precaution studies such as 
“if you go hunting then you wear [orange] jackets to avoid 
being shot”. In the “standard” version, subjects are 
instructed to see if it is true that the jackets are for hunting, 
whereas in the “precaution” version they are instructed to 
see if any people are endangering themselves. This result 
confirms that when testing whether a social contract or 
precaution is in force, people will test the assertion that a 
link exists from C to E, and hence will choose the p and q 
cards (provided p and q are rare). 
O&C (1994) propose a utility-theoretic account for how 
people make choices in social reasoning tasks. This is 
appropriate for tasks in which the participant is told that 
catching rule violators is important (i.e., has high u
whether or not the rule is being violated, the assignment of 
utility to this information is not warranted. We avoid the 
difficulty of assigning utilities to information by using 
expected information gain as the sole basis on which to 
select cards. A causal analysis predicts the selection of p and 
¬q responses for any task in which structures without C to E 
links are given low priors, which should be the case in all 
social reasoning tasks that assume the rule is in force and 
ask subjects to detect violators. 
Perspective Shifting 
Perspective shifts (interpreting “if p then q” as “if q then p”) 
have been explained as the result of adopting different 
perspectives on a rule – the enforcer vs. actor. We propose 
that perspective shifts occur when three conditions are met: 
(1) C is a known cause of E, (2) it is not obvious whether D 
exists, and (3) it is not obvious whether A exists. This sets 
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up the hypotheses in Figure 4. For example, “if you pay $10 
then you get a watch” can be shifted to “if you got a watch 
necessary for q if A does not exist, and p is sufficient for q if 
D doe
th
E exists, hence as before, p 
rmative cards (or q and ¬p when a 
angs). Because 
s causal asymmetry, some amount of causal reasoning 
m precede determination of necessity and sufficiency 
relationships. Furthermore, determining necessity or 
sufficiency can be done using just causal knowledge, as p is 
oncl io
Causal reasoning underlies many of our intuitive judgments 
in everyday life, and the results we present here demonstrate 
that causal structure plays an important role in a domain of 
reasoning previously thought to be governed by logic and 
probability. effects on
th
n be 
the 
e and diagnostic learning. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
26, 53-76. 
en you paid $10” because our domain knowledge tells us 
that no disabling conditions exist (the buyer must get the 
watch once $10 are paid), and no alternate causes exist (the 
buyer cannot get the watch without paying). 
 
 
On this view, perspective shifting occurs not just on 
deontic tasks, but in any situation in which the above three 
conditions are met. For example, “if water boils then it is 
over 100°C” could easily be interpreted to imply that “if 
water is over 100°C then it will boil”. Perspective shifting 
can therefore occur, even in non-deontic situations, when 
the asserted structure does not contain D or A links. 
Necessity and Sufficiency (Ahn & Graham, 1999) 
Ahn & Graham (1999) show that most people choose the 
normative response if it is clear that the statement asserts 
either that p is a sufficient condition for q or that q is a 
necessary condition for p, or both. Asserting that p is a 
sufficient condition for q corresponds to asserting that D 
does not exist. For example, asserting that flipping the 
switch is sufficient for the lights turning on corresponds to 
asserting that nothing (D) can disable the switch. In 
contrast, asserting that q is a necessary condition for p 
corresponds to asserting that A does not exist in the causal 
model. For example, asserting that flipping the switch is 
necessary for lights turning on corresponds to asserting that 
nothing else (A) could turn on the lights. Both of these cases 
assume that the link from C to 
and ¬q are the most info
conditional with “must” is reversed to say “may”), which 
follows Ahn & Graham’s predictions. Ahn & Graham 
(1999) also discuss cases in which p is asserted to be both 
necessary and sufficient for q, in which cases subjects 
choose all 4 cards. This corresponds to asserting that neither 
A nor D exist, and IKL(S|¬p,q), IKL(S|p,¬q) are both high. 
An open question in Ahn & Graham’s (1999) theory is 
how people know whether p is necessary or sufficient for q 
in cases when it is not explicitly stated. A cause can be 
necessary or sufficient for an effect, but it does not make 
sense to say that an effect is necessary or sufficient for a 
cause (e.g., a clang could not be necessary or sufficient for a 
ot to drop, because dropped pots precede clp
o
s not exist. 
C us n 
 Our approach predicts a number of  
e selection task that do not follow naturally from previous 
approaches. If used appropriately, the selection task is an 
excellent tool for testing people’s abilities to gather 
evidence and become more informed about their world. 
Since knowing the causal structure of the world is of great 
value for making predictions in every life, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the cards people naturally select tend to be 
those that maximize the amount of knowledge that ca
f thi
ust 
obtained about causal structure from a single observation. 
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Abstract 
 
In this paper we investigate the forms in which quantity 
information can appear in written natural language. Our 
focus is on physical quantities found in descriptions of 
physical processes, such as expansion, movement, or 
transfer. Using Qualitative Process Theory as our 
underlying formalism, we show how information extracted 
from natural language text corresponds to the five 
constituents of physical quantities. The results of this 
analysis can be used for the creation of interpretation rules 
and extraction patterns in NL systems. 
Introduction 
Ordinary people know a lot about the physical world 
around them. They know that water will eventually boil if 
you heat it on a stove, that a ball placed at the top of a 
steep ramp will roll down, and that a cup will overflow if 
you continue to pour coffee in it. When people talk and 
write about such phenomena in everyday language, 
references to continuous properties are usually part of 
these descriptions. From simple utterances like “The 
coffee is hot” to a more complicated comparison like 
“The velocity of gas molecules is higher than the velocity 
of molecules in a liquid.” being able to identify and 
extract the information about physical quantities is 
essential to understand these sentences. Using Qualitative 
Process Theory (Forbus, 1984) as the underlying 
formalism, we investigate the forms in which continuous 
properties can appear in written natural language. Our 
focus is on physical quantities found in descriptions of 
physical processes, such as expansion, movement, or 
transfer.1  
The way in which continuous parameters and processes 
are described in natural language is not accidental. Since 
Qualitative Process Theory is a formalism of how people 
reason about the physical world, the basic ideas of the 
                                                          
                                                          
1 The findings of this analysis are applicable to other types of quantities 
as well. The framework of QP theory determines just determines kind of 
information we are interested in, i.e. constituents of a physical quantity. 
Abstract and conceptual quantities are often referred to metaphorically 
by words with a physical basis and require a different semantic 
interpretation. ‘The price is hot.’ is does not have anything to do with 
temperature, unlike ‘The water is hot.’ However, the techniques for the 
extraction of information about such quantities are essentially the same.  
theory should be reflected in the language that people use 
to communicate their understanding of physical 
phenomena. This paper shows that the natural language 
descriptions of physical processes contain abundant 
information about the constituents of physical quantities. 
Moreover, the results of this study can be used in a variety 
of applications, such as grammatical rules of a parser or in 
the design of information extraction algorithms.2 
Physical quantities 
In Qualitative Process Theory, all physical changes in 
continuous properties are caused by physical processes. 
The identification of continuous parameters is therefore 
an essential step in the extraction of information about 
physical processes from natural language text. In an 
earlier analysis (Kuehne & Forbus, 2002) we presented a 
scheme for the extraction process that uses FrameNet-
compatible representations (Baker, Fillmore, & Lowe, 
1998; Fillmore, Wooters, & Baker, 2001) to capture 
information about physical processes. The examples 
presented draw from the same corpus material (Buckley, 
1979; Maton et al., 1994; Moran & Morgan, 1994) used 
in our previous analysis. Our goal here is to show how 
information about continuous parameters can appear in 
natural language, and the ways in which this information 
corresponds to the following five constituents of physical 
quantities: 
 
• The Entity is a uniquely named object or an instance of 
a process associated with the quantity. For example, the 
word ‘brick’ in the noun phrase ‘the temperature of the 
brick’ denotes an entity.3 
• The Quantity Type specifies the kind of parameter. The 
word ‘temperature’ in the noun phrase ‘the temperature 
of the brick’ is a reference to a quantity type. 
• The Value specifies the numerical or symbolic value of 
the property.  The number ‘3’ in ‘3 liters of water’ or 
2 Although we use the results of the analysis for exactly these purposes, 
the findings are presented in a general way and not limited to any 
particular type of grammar or pattern language. 
3 The noun ‘brick’ actually refers a particular individual, maybe 
‘brick32’, not the collection of all bricks. 
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the adjective ‘hot’ in ‘the hot ground’ are values 
associated with a quantity. 
• The Unit specifies the physical units of the property. 
Example: The word ‘kilograms’ in ‘3 kilograms of 
lead.’ Units usually appear in combination with a 
numerical value or with a quantifier. 
• The Sign of the Derivative specifies how the parameter 
is changing. In the sentence “The temperature is 
increasing.” the sign of the derivative is expressed by 
the word ‘increasing’, which indicates that the 
parameter is changing in a positive direction. 
  
Only the first two of these five constituents are required to 
identify a physical quantity. The quantity type together 
with the entity are sufficient to talk about quantities like 
‘the temperature of a brick’ or the ‘the flow rate of heat’. 
Values, units, and information about changes are optional 
and often not explicitly stated. 
Entities and quantities types 
We begin with a look at the forms commonly used in 
natural language descriptions to express information 
about the two required constituents of physical quantities, 
the entity and the associated quantity type. The remaining 
three constituents, i.e. values, units, and changes, will be 
discussed in the subsequent sections. 
Explicitly referenced quantities 
Natural language text can refer to physical quantities 
either directly or indirectly, depending on whether the 
type of the quantity is explicitly mentioned in the 
sentence. Explicit references can be found in nouns, 
verbs, and adjectives that are morphologically related to 
quantity types. 
Nouns 
The quantity type can be explicitly mentioned as a noun, 
together with one or more entities that it is associated 
with. 
 
(1)  VOLUME flows from the can to the ground. 
(2)  The TEMPERATURE of the brick is rising. 
 
Sentence 1 contains information about two physical 
quantities, the volume of some substance in the can and 
on the ground. The quantity type ‘volume’ is associated 
with both locations, i.e. the ‘can’ and the ‘ground’. In (2) 
the quantity type ‘temperature’ is associated with a single 
entity. 
The quantity type can also appear as the head of a 
compound noun. The remaining constituents of the 
compound noun can be treated as information about a 
specialization of the quantity type. For example, in (3) the 
quantity type ‘radiation heat’ is a specialization of ‘heat’; 
in (4) ‘heat energy’ is a type of ‘energy’. 
(3)  RADIATION HEAT flows from the heater. 
(4)  The HEAT ENERGY of the water increases. 
Verbs 
Verbs can refer to physical events as well as to quantity 
types associated with these events.4 The verb in sentence 
5 appears as a direct reference to the quantity type 
‘length’. Sentence 6 is slightly more complicated, because 
it allows two different interpretations. The obvious 
interpretation is to treat the verb as an explicit reference to 
a quantity, as it is in (5). In this case, the quantity type 
‘heat’ is tied to both entities, the stove as the source of the 
heat flow and the kettle as the destination of the heat flow. 
 
(5)  The press LENGTHENS the iron beam. 
(6)  The stove HEATS the kettle. 
 
Alternatively, (6) can be interpreted as an increase in 
temperature of the kettle caused by the stove. Even 
though the quantity type ‘temperature’ is not mentioned in 
the sentence, we might infer that heating the kettle also 
increases the temperature of the kettle. This is an 
inference that most readers of such a descriptions will 
readily draw, and it coincides with the kind of conclusions 
that are supported by QP Theory.  
Adjectives 
Certain adjectives can refer to quantity types directly, if 
the adjective is morphologically related to a quantity type. 
For example, in (7) the adjective ‘denser’ refers to the 
quantity type ‘density’. The quantity type in this sentence 
is associated with both entities, i.e. ‘iron’ and ‘wood’.  
 
(7)  Iron is DENSER than wood. 
Implicitly referenced quantities 
While the quantity types in explicitly referenced 
quantities are usually easy to identify and extract, implicit 
references to quantities are more difficult to figure out. 
Implicitly referenced quantities do not mention a quantity 
type. Instead, the reader has to use the contextual 
information provided by the sentence as well as available 
background knowledge. The following examples show 
how nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs can determine 
a quantity that is not explicitly mentioned in a sentence.  
Verbs 
A quantity type can be implicitly referenced by a verb that 
describes a physical process, e.g. movement, expansion, 
or transfer. The sentence in which the verb occurs usually 
                                                          
4 Events such as the increase or decrease of a parameter, e.g. the 
temperature of a brick, can be involved in an instance of a physical 
process. For one linguistic perspective on actions, processes, and events, 
see (Parsons, 1990).  
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provides additional contextual information for the 
interpretation of the implicitly referenced quantity. 
 
(8)    As the temperature rises, the liquid EXPANDS. 
 
The verb 'expand' in (8) indicates that something is 
changing in different physical dimensions, i.e. in length, 
area, or volume. For the three-dimensional entity ‘liquid’ 
the appropriate quantity type is therefore ‘volume’. The 
verb also includes implicit information about a positive 
change in the quantity, i.e. an increase in volume of the 
liquid, which we will address later.  
Adjectives 
The quantity type can be implicitly referenced by certain 
adjectives. For example, the quantity type described by 
the adjective ‘hot’ in (9) is ‘temperature’. The 
comparative also encodes the ordinal relationship between 
the quantities associated with the two entities, i.e. the fact 
that the temperature of the stone is greater than the 
temperature of the water. Similarly, the quantity type 
expressed by ‘lighter’ in (10) is ‘weight’. 
  
(9) The stone is HOTTER than the water. 
(10)  The upper air masses are LIGHTER than the lower 
air masses. 
 
For a correct interpretation the relationship between the 
adjective and the associated quantity type has to be 
known. The fact that the adjective ‘hot’ is associated with 
‘temperature’ is a fact learned by a human reader and is 
typically provided as background knowledge in NL 
systems. 
Verb/Adverb combination 
Quantity types can also be determined by combining 
verbs and adverbs. The quantity type referenced in (11) is 
the rate of movement, or ‘velocity’. The adverb alone is 
not sufficient to determine the quantity type. Although 
‘faster’ is generally associated with velocity, it just 
qualifies the rate of change, i.e. that something is 
happening in less time. There are cases in which the 
quantity type referenced by ‘faster’ is not velocity. For 
example, ‘expanding faster’ in (12) refers to the rate of 
expansion. 
  
(11) The gas molecules are MOVING FASTER than 
molecules in a solid. 
(12)  Liquid A is EXPANDING FASTER than liquid B. 
 
All these cases have one thing in common: the referenced 
quantity is a rate, most likely associated with a process 
referenced by the verb (‘movement’, ‘expansion’, 
‘decay’).  
Noun/Verb combination 
This type of implicitly referenced quantity uses a 
noun/verb combination to refer to the rate of change of a 
quantity.  
 
 (13) The less heat is supplied, the slower the temperature 
RISES. 
 
The quantity type in (13) is not ‘temperature’ but the rate 
of change in temperature, resulting from a change in the 
amount of heat. The combination of ‘rises’ and 
‘temperature’ determines the quantity type, while the 
combination of the verb ‘rises’ and the adverb ‘slower’ 
gives the direction of change. 
Noun/Adjective combination 
The quantity type is only implicitly referenced by a 
combination of a noun and an adjective. 
 
(14)   The BIGGER the surface [is], the more heat is 
absorbed. 
 
The quantity type in (14) is the size of the surface (not the 
surface itself) associated with an unnamed participant or 
the size of a participant ‘surface’. The adjective ‘bigger’ 
refers to the quantity type ‘size’ (or ‘area’). Since ‘big’ 
can also refer to the quantity type ‘volume’, the 
dimensionality of the entity determines the appropriate 
quantity type in this case.  
Representation of values in  
physical quantities 
Knowing the type of a quantity and the entity it is 
associated with enables us to talk and reason about it. A 
simple noun phrase such as ‘the depth of the water’ 
contains enough information recognize it as a physical 
quantity, even without having any information about a 
particular value the quantity might have, the unit of that 
value, or the direction in which the quantity is changing. 
The following two sections examine how values and units 
of quantities appear in natural language text, and how 
changes in quantities can be identified. 
There are three common types of references to values 
and units that can be found in natural language text: in the 
context of comparisons, as symbolic labels, and as 
quantitative information. We will discuss values and units 
together because units usually appear in combination with 
values.5 
                                                          
5 Units can appear separately from values in definitional statements, like 
“Length is measured in Meters.” or, even more explicit, “The unit of 
power is the Watt.” 
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Comparison 
Values in the context of a comparison appear in sentences 
like “The brick is warmer than the plate.” The comparison 
orders the quantities, i.e. the temperature of the brick is 
greater than the temperature of the plate. However, it does 
not contain exact information about the possible values of 
the quantities. Even though the comparative ‘warmer’ 
might refer to a specific range of temperature, the exact 
values cannot be known or even guessed from the 
information provided by the sentence. The brick might be 
red hot, while the plate is frosted with ice. 
It is impossible to determine how far the values 
associated with the two compared quantities are apart 
from each other. The only information that can be 
extracted from this sentence is the fact that the value of 
one quantity is greater than the other. With several of 
these comparisons along the same dimension, it is 
possible to identify the potential ranges of the values for 
particular quantities. For example, the temperature of a 
coffee is greater than the temperature of an ice cube, and 
it is lower than the temperature at the tip of a lit cigarette.  
Symbolic labels 
Values can also take the form of a symbolic label 
associated with an entity, e.g. “The brick is hot.” Even 
though the exact temperature of the brick is unknown, the 
adjective ‘hot’ suggests a certain temperature range. The 
range might be different depending on the context of the 
sentence. In refrigeration 'hot' might be in a very different 
range of temperatures than in the context of metallurgy. 
Nouns that are associated with the adjective can impose 
restrictions on the range of the value in certain cases. For 
example, (Bierwisch, 1967) compares two simple 
sentences, “The room is tall.” and “The space is tall”. In 
the first sentence the noun ‘room’ might restrict the 
average range of values for the height to those for a 
typical room, e.g. between 8 and 10 feet. Without further 
information, this kind of assumption is more difficult to 
make for the second sentence. Is the space a small 
compartment or a crawl space? Or is it the inside of a 
cathedral? The range of typical values would be quite 
different for these two cases. 
Adjectives that represent a value are generally quantity-
specific, i.e. they refer to a particular type of quantity as 
in the sentence “The brick is hot.” Alternatively, a 
quantity-neutral form could be used to express the same 
fact, e.g. “The temperature of the brick is high.”6  
While adjectives and adverbs such as ‘hot’ or ‘slow’ 
generally refer to a range of values along a dimension, 
natural language also uses symbolic labels to refer to 
concrete values, i.e. particular points along a dimension. 
The noun phrase ‘boiling point of water’ usually refers to 
                                                          
                                                          
6 The Cyc knowledge base (Lenat & Guha, 1989) handles values in a 
similar way. For example, the value #$Hot is the result of  
#$HighAmountFn of #$Temperature. 
the point where liquid water turns into steam and the 
value of approximately 212 degrees Fahrenheit. The noun 
phrase provides a label for this particular point.7 
The structure for labels that describe limit points is not 
arbitrary. Usually the head of the noun phrase refers to a 
point on a scale (e.g. ‘point’, ‘barrier’), while the noun 
modifier is associated with a process, a dimension, or a 
quantity type (i.e. ‘boiling’, ‘sound’). These two parts are 
mandatory components of the label. Determining the 
quantity type and the dimension is difficult in many cases, 
e.g. we have to know that ‘boiling point’ is associated 
with ‘temperature’ and that ‘sound barrier’ actually refers 
to the speed of sound or velocity. Additionally, the label 
can take an optional complement phrase that restricts the 
compound noun. For example, the complement phrase ‘of 
water’ restricts the interpretation of boiling point to a 
particular substance. The key idea here is that the 
underlying mechanisms for handling limit points are 
essentially the same as those for symbolic references to 
intervals on a particular dimension. 
Concrete numeric values and units 
The most explicit form in which values can appear is 
quantitative information, i.e. by using concrete numeric 
information and units. For example, in (15) the quantity 
type (‘temperature’) is explicitly stated, together with 
detailed information about the numeric value (‘120’) and 
the unit (‘degrees Fahrenheit’).  
 
(15) The temperature of the brick is 120 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
 
Sentences that contain concrete numeric values and units 
typically do not use quantity-specific adjectives or 
adverbs instead of explicit references to the quantity type. 
 
(16) *The water is 80 degrees Celsius hot. 
(17)   The water has 80 degrees Celsius. 
 
Sentence 16 should be considered anomalous, because the 
adjective ‘hot’ provides at best redundant information in 
the form of a symbolic value. Units can refer indirectly to 
the quantity that they are associated with, as shown in 
(17). The association between units and quantity types 
(degrees Celsius as a unit for temperature) is a learned 
fact and has to be encoded as background knowledge.  
Representations of changes in  
physical quantities 
The values of physical quantities cannot always be treated 
as static information, because they can change while 
7 Note that the compound noun ‘boiling point’ would be an 
underspecified symbolic label because different substances have 
different boiling points. Other labels such as ‘sound barrier’ may not 
need the additional complement. 
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physical processes are active. The sign of the derivative 
indicates whether a quantity is changing and in which 
direction.8 
 The most obvious choice to express changes in the 
physical world is the use of verbs. For example, if water 
is flowing from one container into another, there are 
several ways of expressing the change of the amount of 
water in each container.  
 
(18)   The amount of water in container A is decreasing, 
while the amount of water in container B is 
increasing. 
(19)    Water flows from container A to container B. 
 
Although (18) and (19) might be describe the same 
scenario, they are not equivalent. For example, (19) only 
implies a decrease of the amount of water in location A. It 
does not state this information explicitly. On the other 
hand, (18) implies a flow, without actually mentioning it. 
These distinctions are important for a semantic 
interpretation process, because the information that is 
directly available from the sentences is different. 
Verbs with direct references to a quantity change 
Verbs can directly refer to a change in a quantity and its 
direction, i.e. whether the quantity is increasing or 
decreasing, when the verb alone contains all the 
information about the change and the direction and we 
can therefore distinguish between verbs for positive and 
negative changes in quantities. For example, gain, 
increase, and add are verbs for positive changes, while 
lose, decrease, and leak are associated with negative 
changes.9 Some verbs belonging to this class also allow 
prepositional phrase as a complement, which is restricted 
to the particular direction of change indicated by the verb 
itself  (e.g. ‘add to’ vs. *’add from’).  
 
(20)  The brick LOSES heat to the room. 
(21)  The temperature of the water is INCREASING. 
(22)  The brick GIVES OFF heat. 
 
Some otherwise ‘neutral’ verbs can also fall into this class 
if they use specific particles to indicate a change in a 
quantity, as in (22).10 
Verbs with directional prepositional phrases 
Verbs associated with Transfer and Motion event do not 
contain a direct reference to changes in quantity. For 
                                                          
8 Information about changes in quantities can support other aspects of 
QP theory, e.g. in determining relationships between continuous 
parameters such as direct and indirect influences.  
9 Another distinction could be made between verbs that can only used 
with extensive quantities. For example, heat can be added, while 
temperature cannot. 
10 The particle has to agree with the complement structure of verb. For 
example, the verb phrase *’gives in’ cannot take ‘heat’ as its argument.    
example, verbs like flow or move indicate a transfer of 
something between two physical or conceptual locations, 
but they do not contain information about the actual 
direction of the change. Instead, this information is 
provided by directional prepositional phrases attached to 
the verb. The description of the transfer can be complete 
when both the source and the destination are identified by 
prepositional phrases, as in (23), or partial when only one 
of the directional prepositional phrases is attached, as in 
(24) and (25).  
 
(23)  Heat is transferred FROM inside the house TO the 
outdoors. 
(24)  Energy is moved TO a new location. 
(25) The fan moves heat away FROM the processor. 
Verbs in combination with quantity-specific 
adverbs 
Quantity-specific adverbs can determine the change in a 
quantity in conjunction with a verb. Analogous to verbs 
with direct reference to a quantity change, the 
combination of verbs and quantity-specific adverbs can be 
associated with a decrease in a quantity, as in (26) or with 
an increase, as in (27).  
Similar to the interpretation of the quantity type from 
verb/adverb combinations, there are cases in which the 
same adverb can refer to an increase (or a decrease) of a 
particular quantity type, depending on the verb with 
which it is used. For example, in the context of (27), the 
adverb ‘faster’ would indicate a positive change in the 
velocity of the molecules, while in (28) it will indicate an 
increase in the rate at which a substance dissolves.   
 
(26)    The glass is COOLING FASTER. 
(27)    The molecules are MOVING FASTER. 
(28)    The substance DISSOLVES FASTER. 
Nouns with direct references to change 
Nouns provide another way of describing changes in 
physical quantities. They can be divided into similar 
classes as verbs, i.e. nouns with direct references to a 
change in a quantity, and nouns that use directional 
prepositional phrases. 
 Nouns can directly refer to a change in a quantity, and 
analogous to verbs they can be divided into nouns that 
refer to positive, as in (29), and negative changes, as in 
(30).    
 
(29)  The INCREASE in temperature is significant. 
(30)  The DECREASE in pressure caused a failure. 
Nouns with directional prepositional phrases 
Similar to verbs of the Transfer and Motion domain, the 
corresponding nouns will also need directional 
prepositional phrases to describe changes in a quantity. 
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Again, the information about the transfer can be complete, 
as in (31) or partial as in (32).  
 
(31)   The flow of oxygen FROM the tank TO the capsule 
is blocked. 
(32)   The transfer of heat TO the kettle has been 
completed. 
Discussion 
Parts of our current research are concerned with the 
design of a controlled language for describing physical 
phenomena. One important aspect in the development of 
such a language is the goal to reduce possible syntactic 
and semantic ambiguity. The identification of patterns 
used for references to continuous parameters in natural 
language is an essential part of the semantic interpretation 
process, which must include the detection of directly 
referenced quantities as well as indirect references.  
Research on the lexical semantics of adjectives has tried 
to establish taxonomies for the different semantic 
categories of adjectives (see Raskin & Nirenburg (1995) 
for an overview). Several of these taxonomies focus on 
the class of adjectives that we are most interested in for 
extracting information about physical quantities, i.e. 
qualitative (scalar, gradable) adjectives (Dixon, 1991; 
Frawley, 1992). From our perspective, using the 
semantics of Qualitative Process Theory, the taxonomies 
suggested by Dixon and Frawley are inconsistent. The 
breakup of types and subtypes appears to be arbitrary, 
because several of the types of quantities can be collapsed 
into a single type. In Dixon’s taxonomy the adjectives of 
the ‘speed’ and ‘physical property’ types are separated 
from those classified as ‘dimension’. Similarly, ‘age’ and 
‘value’ are listed as separate types.  
Many quantity-specific adjectives and adverbs form 
opposing pairs for the same quantity type along a single 
dimension. For example, ‘tall’ is the opposite of ‘short’ 
for the quantity type ‘height’, and ‘wide’ the opposite of 
‘narrow’ for the quantity type ‘width’ (see Bierwisch 
(1967, 1989) and Kennedy (2001) for a detailed analysis 
of polar adjectives). For certain quantity types we can 
identify not just a single opposing pair but a set of 
quantity-specific adjectives. For the quantity type 
‘temperature’ we can find adjectives such as ‘warm’, 
‘cool’, ‘tepid’, and variations such as ‘lukewarm’ as 
references besides just ‘hot’ and ‘cold’. It is an interesting 
question to speculate why this variety of quantity-specific 
adjectives exists for some quantity types but not for 
others. Frequent use or familiarity with the concept 
‘temperature’ cannot explain this fact alone. 
 Understanding the connections between Qualitative 
Process Theory and natural language is important for 
understanding the general cognitive plausibility of 
qualitative models. It will also give us greater insight into 
how results from qualitative reasoning can be 
communicated back to human users in an intuitive  
way – by using natural language.   
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Abstract
Our central question is whether comparison of co-presented
instances promotes category learning. We report results of four
experiments testing acquisition of relational categories under
conditions of Comparison learning versus traditional Single
item learning. In order to control for frequency of exposure,
the Single group received twice as many learning trials.
Experiment 1 showed more accurate single-item classification
at test for both old and new items by the Comparison group
relative to the Single group. Experiment 2 used only within-
category pairs in the Comparison condition (rather than both
types of pairs), but no accuracy advantage was found.
Experiment 3 repeated this design using a reduced training set
and showed a learning effect of comparison and a marginal
advantage in transfer to new items. In Experiment 4, a novel
paradigm revealed further evidence of a facilitative effect for
within-category comparison. The power of comparison to
promote learning and transfer is discussed in terms of
mechanisms of encoding and knowledge change.
Introduction
The present research addresses the effect of comparing co-
presented instances during classification learning. Nearly all
theorists propose that categorizing an instance involves
some type of comparison between an instance and stored
category representations. A further role for comparison in
category learning is between presented instances and
remembered instances. Sequential effects may occur if items
presented in immediate or near succession are brought into
temporal juxtaposition (e.g., Elio & Anderson, 1981).
Learners may also experience remindings of previously
encountered instances which can guide further processing
(Spalding & Ross, 1994; Ross, Perkins & Tenpenny, 1990).
Of considerable interest to our project, Ross and Spalding
(2000) report that reminding-driven comparisons during
category learning mediate attribution of abstract features to
individual instances. We investigate the effect of
comparison of instances presented together within a
classification learning trial with the core prediction of better
learning and transfer of relational categories.
This prediction is motivated by several sources including
the rich literature supporting the structural alignment
account of analogy and similarity (Gentner & Markman,
1997). Perhaps the most directly related evidence is the
finding that 4-year-old children extend a label according to
category match more frequently than by perceptual match
when the label had been applied to two examples (Gentner
& Namy, 1999). After only a single labeled example,
children did not favor the category-based extension. Gentner
and Namy conclude that a structural alignment process
(invited by the common linguistic label) yielded a deeper,
more conceptual encoding.
In light of recent findings that classification learning
influences similarity, Boroditsky (in press) collected
similarity ratings of pairs of object drawings from
participants who had first listed either similarities or
differences between the items. For both familiar and novel
stimuli, items were rated more similar by participants who
made comparisons than by those who did not. The effect
depended critically on the items being similar – suggesting
that comparison drew out a richer realization of the
commonalities between alignable objects.
How might comparison work to mediate learning and
representation? In the structural alignment framework,
comparison influence encoding by: 1) highlighting common
relations or alignable differences between examples; 2)
projecting candidate inferences from one example to
another; 3) promoting abstraction of shared structure as the
basis for a generic knowledge structure; and 4) fostering re-
representation that  alters or re-organizes representational
elements in one or both cases (Gentner & Wolff, 2000).
To illustrate, imagine a pair of cases for which a
particular relation is encoded in the learner’s mental
representation of each instance. The process of comparing
the representations would render this relation salient and
promote abstraction and transfer (e.g., Loewenstein,
Thompson & Gentner, 1999). Now, consider a common
relation that is differently encoded in each case. Re-
representation is posited as a means of aligning non-
identical relational structures when there is semantic overlap
(Gentner & Kurtz, in preparation) or a computational
opportunity (Yan, Forbus, & Gentner, 2003). Next, consider
a relation that has only been encoded in the representation
of one of two instances. If there is sufficient surrounding
structure in common, then a candidate inference would be
projected from the more fully elaborated case to the sparser
one (Gentner, 1983; Markman, 1997).
Finally, consider a common relation that is not encoded in
the mental representations of either case. The mechanisms
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listed above depend on the presence of relational
information encoded in item representations. In the current
project, we study learning in a novel domain and the
underlying relation defining each category is far from self-
evident to the uninitiated. In fact, short of resorting to
exemplar memorization, the learning task is best
characterized as trying to discover each relation. We posit a
role for comparison in the discovery of relational content.
The notion of manifest versus latent representational
content is of use here (Clement, Mawby, & Giles, 1994).
While an individual may have somewhere in their idea of
‘dog’ the knowledge that dogs often feast on foodstuffs
fallen to the floor during a family meal, this relational
content is probably not routinely activated in a context-
independent manner (Barsalou, 1982). Therefore, an
analogy between a dog and vacuum cleaner might initially
fall flat for someone who does not have the ‘cleaning-up-of-
table-scraps’ aspect of their ‘dog’ concept activated.
However, a thorough comparison of dog and vacuum
cleaner could well activate latent matching content. Such
resurfacing occupies a place between novel inference and
highlighting, but, like the others, it relies on available
relational content.
What is needed is a mechanism for articulating relational
content over presumably unstructured initial inputs. Such
processing is likely be of critical importance in any type of
routine formation of structured mental representations since
constraints are needed on which of the vast range of
possible relations among objects, scenes, and situations in
everyday experience should be explicitly encoded. As a
number of theorists have put forth, language may be of
particular use with regard to this problem.
We propose that comparison provides potential for a kind
of side-to-side (as contrasted with top-down or bottom-up)
interpretation process that promotes relational construal.
The best evidence we can draw upon is the phenomenon of
analogical bootstrapping in which intensive comparison of
two partially understood depictions of a simple physics
principle (heat flow) led participants to a deeper, more
relationally-rich construal (Kurtz, Miao, & Gentner,  2001).
It is not clear how such analogical insight occurs, but here
are two speculations. The first is consistent with the notion
of progressive alignment (Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996) and
states that observed commonalities at the level of lower-
order representational elements (i.e., attributes, objects,
first-order relations) may serve as entry points from which a
familiar higher-order relation can be invoked. An example
of instantiating a richer representation would be going from:
is-high(square) and is-low(circle) to: is-above (square,
circle). The second speculation is that relations do not need
to be built up so much as they need to be picked out of a
crowd. The idea here is that many relations hold for any
given case; too many to routinely articulate and encode.
When given an opportunity to compare cases, the potential
arises to find a manageable intersection of the relations.
In order to explore the power of comparison in knowledge
change, our experimental question is as follows: can
comparison promote the acquisition of novel categories
defined by non-obvious relations? Relational categories
have been treated theoretically (Gentner & Kurtz, in press;
Markman & Stilwell, 2001) and have begun to receive
empirical attention (Kurtz & Gentner, 2001; Rehder & Ross,
2001).
In a study using an early version of the present paradigm,
Kurtz & Gentner (1998) found that participants reached a
learning criteria for classification accuracy more quickly
with trials consisting of within-category pairs than with
single-instance trials. However, this can be attributed either
to comparison or to more frequent exposure to training
items, i.e., two instances per trial versus one. This creates a
difficult circumstance for the researcher since fully
convincing evidence for a comparison effect in learning
(with frequency of exposure controlled) requires obtaining
reliably higher classification accuracy on the basis of half
the number of trials. This is the challenge we pursue.
An additional purpose of this project is the advancement
of greater naturalism in the study of categorization. The
dominant paradigm is a two-way classification task with
instances that are clearly dimensionalized sets of perceptual
or verbal features. Our stimuli are line drawings depicting a
set of realistically varying “rock arrangements” having no
clear reduction into a compositional set of underlying
dimension values. Learners are asked to acquire three
different categories to avoid two limitations inherent in
binary classification: 1) a perfect success rate can be
achieved based on an ability to identify examples of only
one category and; 2) task demands encourage hypothesis-
testing for a boundary over positively-defined concepts.
Experiment 1
One major concern in designing the first study was
ensuring that the Comparison condition actually elicited
comparison. An act of comparison can be shallow or
intensive, and this  difference can be a causal factor (Kurtz,
et al., 2001). A failure to observe a comparison effect might
be due to a failure by participants to compare. Classifying a
within-category pair can easily be done with consideration
of only one of the instances. Therefore, instead of all same-
category pairs, we designed the Comparison condition to
use an equal mix of within- and between-category pairs. In
this mixed-pairs version, the status of any given pair is not
known to the learner. Since the two instances may or may
not belong to the same category, we collect two separate
classification judgments on each learning trial. Accordingly,
the participant must give direct consideration to each
member of the pair. It is implicit in the task that the
participant must consider whether or not to guess the same
category for the two instances in each trial. However,
classifying each instance could still be done largely
independently despite taking place in a common task space.
For this reason, we used an orienting task at the beginning
of each learning trial to encourage comparison. Participants
were asked to consider the role played by one of the rocks
relative to the rest of the arrangement and then to look for a
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corresponding rock in the other instance. The orienting task
for Single learners was to consider the role of one of the
rocks in the arrangement. In both conditions this unenforced
orienting task (no response was collected) was followed by
a question that did require a response: whether or not the
participant found the orienting task helpful. This was to
discourage participants from ignoring the orienting task.
Method
Participants A total of 100 undergraduate students at
Binghamton University received a course credit.
Materials A set of 36 images of rock arrangements was
created on the computer. Rocks in each arrangement varied
in color, shape, and size. A subset of 24 images were
designated as the training instances and the remaining 12
images constituted the transfer set. The rock arrangements
were evenly distributed across three categories given the
names: “Tolar,” “Besod,” and “Makif.” The category Tolar
was defined by the presence of two stacked rocks similar in
color and shape. Besod was defined by the presence of one
rock supported by two others. Makif was defined by
monotonically decreasing height from left to right. Care was
taken that each instance conformed to exactly one of the
relational categories. For the Comparison condition, a fixed
set of pairings was established with an equal number of
within-category and between-category pairs.
  TOLAR
  BESOD
  MAKIF
Figure 1:  Sample Rock Arrangement Stimuli used in
Experiments 1-3 Shown in Same-Category Pairs
Procedure Each participant was randomly assigned to one
of the two conditions. Before the learning phase,
participants read a set of instructions including a cover story
about different rock arrangements created by the “Ladua”
culture. Ss were instructed to try to learn to tell which rock
arrangements belonged to which of the three types.
In the Single condition (n=50) an attempt was made to
minimize the potential for temporal comparison by using a
pseudo-random order in which each trial showed an instance
from a different category than that of the previous trial. On
each of the 48 learning trials participants were shown a
single instance from the training set on the computer screen
along with the orienting task: “Study the example, then
focus on a single rock and consider the role it plays in the
arrangement.” Participants gave a forced-choice response
regarding the helpfulness of the orienting task and were then
asked to classify the rock arrangement into one of the three
categories. After their choice was entered, corrective
feedback was provided for a fixed interval of 3s. The
stimulus image remained on screen for the entire trial.
In the learning phase of the Comparison condition (n=50),
instances were presented two-at-a-time for 24 trials. On
each trial, the presentation of the two instances on either the
left or right side of the screen was randomized. The
orienting task instructions for each trial were: “Study the
examples, then focus on a single rock in one of the
examples and consider the role it plays in that arrangement.
Try to decide which rock plays a corresponding role in the
other example.” Participants made helpfulness judgments as
in the Single condition. Ss were then asked to classify one
of the instances followed by the other. Whether the left or
right instance was queried first was alternated by trial. After
the second response, corrective feedback for each of the
responses was presented simultaneously for a total of 6s.
The learning phase in both conditions was followed by a
common testing phase. Participants were presented with 24
old and 12 new items in random order and asked to classify
each in a single-instance trial without feedback. Additional
dependent measures were subsequently collected, but space
limitations prevent their inclusion in this report.
Results and Discussion
The learning data reveal that it was not easy for most
participants to acquire the relational categories in the
allotted number of trials. We note that a set of pilot data
showed that performance did not increase notably with
twice the training. It is, however, important to remember
that chance is 33.3% percent on a three-way classification,
so the accuracy data reflects considerably more learning
than it would appear at first glance. First we describe the
learning data though we did not conduct statistical tests
since the critical comparison between conditions is
performance in the test phase when all participants respond
to the same type of trial (single instance). Early (first
quarter) classification accuracy shows that Comparison
learners (M = .44, SD = .18) got off to a slow start compared
to the Single group (M = .52, SD = .19), but they caught up
by the final quarter: Single (M = .70, SD = .22) and
Comparison (M = .69, SD = .25).
In the test phase, Comparison (M = .75, SD = .22) was
significantly better than Single (M = .65, SD = .23) on old
instances, F(1, 98)= 4.73, MSe = .234, p < .05. In addition, a
transfer effect was found with Comparison (M = .72, SD =
.22) significantly more accurate than Single (M = .59, SD =
.27) in classification of novel instances, F(1,98)= 7.29, MSe
= .444, p  < .05. In sum, while Comparison learning
presented a similar level of challenge during acquisition, a
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reliable comparison advantage was found at test compared
to Single learners receiving equal exposure.
Experiment 2
The goal of the second study was to determine whether a
comparison effect would be found using only within-
category pairs and a single categorization response per trial.
The structural alignment view predicts a greater likelihood
of comparison-driven effects on learning and encoding
given the opportunity to compare alignable  examples.
However, as discussed, it is difficult to pin down the extent
to which participants invoke a comparison process when
making a joint classification response.
Method
Participants A total of 95 undergraduate students at
Binghamton University received a course credit.
Materials The materials were the same as in Experiment 1.
The assignment of pairs for the Comparison condition was
accomplished by random generation of within-category
pairings for each participant.
Procedure Each participant was randomly assigned to one
of the two conditions. The Single condition (n=46) was
conducted as in Experiment 1. The Comparison condition
(n=49) followed the procedure of Experiment 1 except that
participants were trained only on within-category pairs.
Unlike Experiment 1, participants made a joint classification
choice in response to both of the instances on each trial.
Corrective feedback for the one response was shown for 3s.
Results and Discussion
A much different result was obtained relative to the findings
of Experiment 1. Comparison learners with only within-
category pairs showed good performance in the learning
phase (M = .63, SD = .16) as compared to Single learners
after an equal number of trials (M = .53, SD = .14), but not
after an equal number of exposures (M = .60, SD = .14). No
significant differences were found in test performance on
old items (Comparison: M = .66, SD = .23 and  Single: M =
.67, SD = .21; p > .8) or transfer to new items (Comparison:
M = .61, SD = .23 and  Single: M = .63, SD = .24; p > .6).
The evidence suggests that mixed pairs offer a more
productive learning context than exclusively within-
category pairs. This could be a benefit derived from
evaluating whether or not co-presented pairs are from the
same category. It could be due to useful contrastive
evaluation of different-category items. However, it is worth
noting on this point that no reliable difference was observed
between learning accuracy on within-category and different-
category trials in the Comparison condition of Exp. 1 (p >
.3). Therefore, we are inclined to consider additional
explanations. One possibility is that the joint classification
task failed to fully encourage comparative evaluation of
both instances in the trials. A final and somewhat
compelling possible culprit is the 3s window for evaluating
feedback as opposed to the 6s window for the dual-feedback
in the Comparison condition of Exp. 1. In the current study,
Comparison learners actually had half the overall amount of
time to study images with their correct labels then was
provided to Single learners.
Experiment 3
Given the lack of comparison advantage in Experiment 2,
we considered the question of which is better: many
different within-category comparisons over a large training
set or repeated within-category comparisons over a small
training set? It has been shown that larger category size
promotes better transfer to novel examples when the
instances in the training set are sufficiently variable (Homa
& Vosburgh, 1976). Our hypothesis was that in the case of
relational categories, repeated comparisons of within-
category pairs in a smaller set would actually be more likely
to promote an advantage of comparison in transfer accuracy.
If Comparison learners in Exp. 2 underachieved due to a
failure to fully compare and/or insufficient feedback time,
repeated training on fewer examples might prove more
conducive to comparison-driven learning.
Method
Participants A total of 87 undergraduate students at
Binghamton University received a course credit.
Materials The materials were the same as in Experiment 1
except that the total number of examples in the training set
was reduced to 12. Each category was represented by four,
rather than eight, instances. All possible within-category
pairings appeared once (determining 18 of the 24 trials in
the Comparison condition). The remaining 6 trials were
randomly determined for each participant including exactly
one exposure of each training item.
Procedure The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2,
though the same number of learning trials with fewer items
in the training set yielded more exposures to each instance
in the Single (n=42) and Comparison (n=45) conditions.
Results and Discussion
Comparison learners (M = .79, SD = .16) showed excellent
overall accuracy on learning trials with the small category
size relative to Single learners (M = .68, SD = .16).
Although we have emphasized test performance rather than
learning accuracy, Comparison learners  were reliably more
accurate across learning trials, F(1, 85)= 10.39, MSe = .25, p
< .005) with equal frequency of exposures. The Comparison
group (M = .68, SD = .16) also performed better on transfer
items, F(1, 85)= 3.91, MSe = .18, p = .051, though the
significance here was marginal. In performance on old items
at test, a trend was found (F(1, 85)= 2.54, MSe = .09, p =
.11) favoring the Comparison condition (M = .83, SD = .16)
over Single (M = .76, SD = .21). These results provide yet
another turnaround—the previous failure to find an
advantage of comparison using within-category pairs is
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overturned in the case of repeated comparisons with a small
set of training items. The advantage is not limited to
overlearning of the items in the small set since the results at
test including transfer to new items favor Comparison. Our
interpretation is that repeated comparison opportunities
among increasingly familiar instances better allows the
fruits of comparison to be borne out.
Experiment 4
We developed an additional paradigm to evaluate
comparison of instances in category learning. The key
difference is that in all conditions the orienting task is
dropped and each learning trial begins with a single-instance
classification judgment. In the Single condition, feedback is
provided and the trial is done. In the Comparison condition,
a within-category context item appears next to the target
item, and the participant is asked for a second time to
classify the initially presented target. Once the learner has
made their second response, feedback is then provided
based on the final response. Therefore, the only difference
between conditions is that learners in the Comparison group
are asked to repeat their classification choice in light of the
availability of a context item from the same category for
their consideration. We believe this is a naturally motivating
and “unforced” version of comparison. A further advantage
of this design is that since only the single target item is
classified in each condition, we are better able to evaluate
the impact of comparison during the learning phase.
Method
Participants A total of 50 undergraduate students at
Binghamton University received a course credit.
Materials  A full-sized stimulus set was used as in
Experiments 1-2, but some alterations were made to the set.
It was decided that the Tolar category was of a somewhat
different character than the other categories since only two
rocks in the entire arrangement participated in the relation of
“same shape and color of two stacked rocks.” In the other
categories, the relation was more globally realized in the
overall arrangement. A new relational definition and item
set for the Tolar category was developed in terms of a
symmetrical outline for each arrangement across the vertical
axis. In addition, instances of the Makif and Besod
categories were fine-tuned to ensure that the relation was
globally realized in each rock arrangement. For example,
the relation “one rock supported by two” would not be
localized in a set of small rocks off to the side. These
modifications were expected to make the learning task
somewhat easier and the results more interpretable. Pairings
for the Comparison condition were assigned such that all 28
possible same-category pairs in each category occurred once
during learning and the remaining 12 learning trials were
repetitions equated for instance exposure.
Procedure Each participant was randomly assigned to one
of three conditions. Prior to the start of the learning phase
participants read the instruction set. However, in order to
help limit cases in which a learner embarked on a
counterproductive approach, the instruction set was given
the following addition: “Each of the three types is based on
a distinct way of arranging rocks.  Please note:  It is not a
small detail or a feature of one single rock.  It is something
about the way in which the group of rocks are arranged.”
In the Single condition (n=20), participants completed 96
classification learning trials of single instances of the new
set of rock arrangements in  pseudo-random order. Feedback
was given after each trial with study time self-paced rather
than a fixed window. In the Comparison condition (n=17),
each trial began exactly like a Single condition trial.
However, participants did not receive feedback on their
response. Instead they were shown another within-category
instance from the training set as a context item. Participants
were asked for a second time to classify the initial target
item (this was reinforced by presenting the question under
the target, not the context item). An accompanying
instruction encouraged Ss to compare the target to the
additional example from the same category. Participants
were instructed to feel free to change their initial answers or
not. Ss received feedback on their second response with
self-paced study time.
A third condition called Identical (n=13) was conducted
just as the Comparison condition except that the additional
context item was a repeat of the target item—resulting in
two identical images shown side-by-side. This task
(responding twice to the same stimulus) was justified in the
instructions as something Ss might find helpful.
In all conditions, participants went on to a test phase like
that used in Experiments 1-3.
Results and Discussion
Means and standard deviations for the learning phase
accuracy are shown in Table 1. One-way ANOVA showed a
main effect of learning condition on classification accuracy
in the first quarter, (F(2, 47)= 5.22, MSe = .16, p < .05), in
the last quarter, (F(2, 47)=3.19, MSe = .12, p < .05), and in
the overall performance, (F(2, 47)= 3.77, MSe = .11, p <
.05).  The first quarter difference was driven by the Identical
group and most likely reflects participants adjusting to the
somewhat odd repeated query. Planned comparisons showed
that last-quarter accuracy (the final 24 trials) was
significantly higher in Comparison versus Single, t(35)=
2.22, p < .05), as well as Comparison versus Identical,
t(28)= 2.27, p < .05.
In the test phase there was a marginal main effect of
learning condition on accuracy, F(2, 47)= 3.167, MSe =
.142, p  = .051. Planned comparisons showed that
Comparison learners performed significantly better on old
items (M= .93, SD= .15) than Single learners (M = .82, SD =
.18), t(35)= 2.06, p < .05. Performance on new items was
also better for the Comparison condition (M = .87, SD = .18)
than the Single condition (M = .70, SD = .20), t(35)= 2.71, p
< .05. Trends (presumably due to small sample size) were
found in favor of Comparison over Identical for old items (p
= .08) and new items (p = .12). No difference was found in
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accuracy between the Single condition and Identical
condition. We see in these results good evidence for better
learning with the opportunity to compare to a within-
category context item versus conditions with no additional
comparison or a kind of item self-comparison that serves as
a full control for exposure (equal number of classification
responses; equal number and duration of item exposures).
Table 1.  Classification Accuracy in Learning.
Mean SD
First quarter
Single .69 .18
Comparison .71 .17
Identical .52 .16
Last quarter
Single .81 .18
Comparison .94 .15
Identical .77 .24
Overall
Single .77 .16
Comparison .84 .16
Identical .67 .18
General Discussion
We conclude that comparison of instances during category
learning is not necessarily of great impact, but when task
constraints emerge that engage the learner to apply the
machinery of comparison, superior performance in learning
relational categories is achieved. These findings are most
naturally understood in terms of learning to construct richer,
more sophisticated encodings of category instances. While
this is a difficult process, it is made easier by comparison.
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Abstract
A novel approach to generating retrieval and transfer of
structured knowledge is presented. We investigate the effect
of comparing  two analogous unsolved problems at test as
opposed to comparing two solved analogous stories during
initial study. We found that both procedures facilitate transfer
relative to a standard baseline group studying one solved story
and then attempting to solve a new analogous problem. In two
studies we demonstrate that: 1) comparing two unsolved
problems at test promotes analogical problem solving at least
as effectively as comparing two fully solved problems during
study; and 2) comparing two unsolved problems is helpful
even when no source story is made available for retrieval.
Introduction
There is a wealth of cognitive science research about how
people learn from examples and use them to solve new
problems (Reeves & Weisberg, 1994). We also know that
people are unlikely to spontaneously compare examples that
seem different on the surface even though such comparison
can provide learning and transfer advantages (Gick &
Holyoak, 1983; Kurtz, Miao & Gentner, 2001). Retrieving
analogous matches is therefore both important and
demonstrably difficult. Research on retrieval shows that
people have an easier time accessing examples on the basis
of surface features than structural match (Catrambone,
2002; Gentner, Rattermann & Forbus, 1993; Ross, 1987). It
is not that structural matches, particularly partial matches,
are impossible or even rare, just that surface matches tend to
predominate among novices, whereas experts seem able to
exhibit structure matches more reliably (Dunbar, 2003;
Novick, 1988).
We know that comparing examples can lead people to
focus on common systems of relations which can in turn
facilitate knowledge transfer (e.g., Loewenstein, Thompson
& Gentner, 1999). The conventional wisdom in the field is
that upon encountering a test problem, people are able to
retrieve the earlier analogous cases, or a schema abstracted
from those cases, to generate potential solutions to the
problem (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). The implication is that
the similarity function used in memory retrieval can link a
current case to a prior case if the prior case is represented
well in long term memory. The specific nature of such a
superior representation is a challenging question for the
field, but we take as a starting point the idea that a good
representation is one that accurately encodes pertinent
systems of relational structure and does so with sufficient
generality to support transfer. This generality can be
considered in terms of domain generality of encoded
relational content (Clement, Mawby & Giles, 1994),
uniformity of  representational elements (Forbus, Gentner,
& Law, 1995), or filtering out of mismatching irrelevant
case details (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).
We are currently intrigued by a new role for analogy in
memory retrieval (see also, Loewenstein, Gentner, &
Thompson, 2004). Our question is whether the benefits of
this kind of representational “improvement” to the
analogical source might also be observed with respect to the
target (probe). Is a structural reminding more likely with a
target that is better encoded? Theories of memory retrieval
rely on a similarity function between the probe and stored
items. Such similarity functions are symmetric. Since the
empirical data suggest that only one side (i.e., the source)
needs to be well-encoded to encourage a match, then it is
plausible that a relevant, but regularly encoded source might
become more retrievable on the basis of applying a probe
with a superior encoding. In addition to being a theoretical
possibility, there is a phenomenon, admittedly rare, of
recalling an example with the sense of having a new
understanding about it as a result of something we have just
learned. The current line of thinking could explain such
occurrences. Furthermore, it suggests a mechanism by
which reflection upon a newly learned principle or
abstraction could be a prod to retrieve prior examples,
reinterpret them, and integrate the new knowledge with the
old. Drawing analogies might then not only be a source of
changes in knowledge from this point forward, but could
also be a means for reorganizing the knowledge we already
have and retrieving further analogous matches.
To reiterate, one of the seminal findings in the analogy
literature is that problem solvers are more successful in
retrieving an available solution strategy when they have
previously made use of comparison to improve the encoding
of the source analogs (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). We adapt
this highly influential paradigm to ask the following
question: Can comparison of target problems be used to
facilitate analogical retrieval? There is considerable reason
for skepticism. First, the advantage of source comparison is
thought to rely on storing a generalized version of the
solution principle, but in the case of target comparison the
solution is not part of the compared cases—only the two
problem statements are available. Secondly, the traditional
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account suggests that structural reminding depends on
having a well-represented source in memory—it may well
follow that structural reminding is largely a dead end
without a well-encoded source. Third, it is easy to imagine
that having two problems to solve rather than just one could
divide attention and processing resources in a detrimental
manner. Finally, there is an extensive tradition of failed
attempts to improve analogical problem-solving
performance. Even so, if comparison at test can improve the
encoding of targets such that retrieving structural matches is
facilitated, this would have significant theoretical and
applied ramifications. In the following two studies, we
explore comparison-improved representation at the point of
actual problem solving in hopes of gaining new insights into
learning, retrieval, and transfer.
Experiment 1
In the current studies we use classic materials to study a
novel set of questions about analogical problem solving:
Duncker’s (1945) tumor problem and its associated
materials generated by Holyoak and colleagues (Gick &
Holyoak, 1980, inter alia). In Experiment 1, we use these
materials to examine whether retrieval is a two-way street.
That is, if comparing two examples at study facilitates
transfer at test (as shown by Gick & Holyoak, 1983), then
can comparing two examples at test facilitate retrieval from
study? In addition to the comparison being on-line rather
than during initial study, the other key difference is that
compared target problems do not include the solution.
We include two conditions to replicate prior data: a
baseline group receiving one solved story at study and one
problem at test (which will presumably yield little transfer)
and a group comparing two solved stories at study and then
receiving one problem at test (which will presumably show
transfer). The key question is what will result in a new
condition with one solved story at study and a comparison
of two unsolved problems at test. Will participants who
compare two test problems show greater success than
participants in the baseline condition? Furthermore, to
address the question of whether success hinges on transfer
via retrieval of the source story, we include a group asked to
compare and solve two problems without having first seen a
solved story at study. Participants in this group are the only
ones to receive no exposure at all to the relevant solution
strategy.
Method
Participants A total of 293 undergraduate students at
Binghamton University participated in partial fulfillment of
a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of four conditions: Baseline, Source Comparison,
Target Comparison, or Just Targets.
Materials The target case in all conditions was the well-
known Radiation problem developed by Duncker (1945)
and further studied by Gick & Holyoak (1980, 1983). The
source and comparison cases were analogs based on the
convergence principle used by Gick & Holyoak (1983). The
source case was “The General” set in a military context and
the comparison case was “Red Adair” set in a firefighting
context. The comparison case was given with solution
included during the study phase in the Source Comparison
condition. We used the same Red Adair problem for
comparison at test without the last lines that give the
convergence solution in the Target Comparison and Just
Targets conditions.
Procedure All phases of the experiment were conducted
using paper packets for the presentation of instructions and
materials as well as for the collection of responses. Separate
packets were created for study and test phases. Participants
did not receive the test packet until they completed and
handed in their study packet (if a study packet was required
by their condition).
In the Baseline condition (1:1, meaning participants were
given 1 source story and 1 target problem), participants
were instructed at the beginning of Part I to read the story
(General) carefully and to gain sufficient familiarity that
they could retell the story in their own words. Toward the
bottom of the page, participants were asked: “What critical
insight allowed the problem in the story to be solved?” In
Part II, participants were asked to read the problem
(Radiation) and to “use the space at the bottom of the page
to explain how the problem can be solved.”
In the Source Comparison condition (2:1), participants
were instructed in Part I to carefully read two stories
(General and Red Adair). The two stories were shown on
the same page with General appearing first. At the top of the
second page were two tasks to encourage better encoding.
As in the control condition, participants were asked to gain
sufficient familiarity that they could retell the stories in their
own words. In addition, participants were asked to
“Consider the parallels between the two stories” and
complete a task in which five elements of Column A
(General) had to be matched with elements of Column B
(Red Adair). Each element had exactly one appropriate
match. The columns were prepared in a jumbled order so
that no correctly corresponding elements were directly
across from one another. In Part II, participants were asked
to solve the Radiation problem. The exact same procedure
was used as in the Baseline condition.
In the Target Comparison condition (1:2), participants
were presented with the General story using the exact same
procedure as in the Baseline condition. In Part II, these
participants were given two problems to solve (Radiation
and Red Adair) The first page of the packet gave the
following instructions: “What approach would you take to
solve both of the following problems? After reading the
problems carefully, please complete the matching task and
then explain your proposed solutions in the space provided.
Here’s an important hint: The same strategy can be used to
solve both problems.”
Below the instructions were the two problems: Radiation
followed by Red Adair. On the second page was a matching
task between the Radiation and Red Adair problems
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constructed in the same manner as above. On the last page,
participants were again given the hint that “The same type
of solution can be used” and asked to: “Please write down
how these two problems can be solved.”
In the Just Targets condition (0:2), participants were
given Part II of the Target Comparison condition only. That
is, they were asked to solve the Radiation and Red Adair
problems without any prior exposure to the General story
and its convergence solution. There was one additional
procedural difference. The same-solution hint was provided,
but in this case it was given only at the point when
participants were actually asked to produce their solutions
(rather than mentioning the hint twice).
An important point to clarify here is that this hint is
distinct in type from the well-known use of a hint in the
Gick & Holyoak studies. In that prior work the hint was to
use the initial story as a basis for solving the target problem.
That hint removed the fundamental obstacle in analogical
problem solving: achieving a spontaneous structural
reminding. The manipulation was of critical theoretical
importance since it revealed that the Radiation problem was
widely solved once participants accessed the source analog.
In our current work, the hint has nothing to do with
retrieval; instead it enforces mutual consideration of the two
target problems.
Scoring A rater blind to condition scored each response for
success in solving the Radiation problem in terms of the
convergence solution. Responses were scored as correct if
they captured the key principle of a multiplicity of low-
intensity rays acting in concert on the tumor. The rater
marked any responses they considered questionable for
discussion with another rater. The agreed-upon scoring was
then recorded. In occasional cases in which more than one
solution was proposed, participants were given credit for the
correct answer if it was produced.
Results
As expected, we replicated prior data showing that people
who compared two source stories showed a transfer
advantage relative to a baseline group who only read one
source story (as shown in Table 1, 38% vs. 13% generated
convergence solutions), χ2(1, N=146) = 12.12, p < .01. The
important new result is that the group comparing at test,
rather than study, performed as well or better than all other
groups. The Target Comparison group performed better than
the Baseline group (51% vs. 13%), χ2(1, N=142) = 24.06, p
< .001. There was also a trend toward better performance by
the Target Comparison group than the Source Comparison
group (51% vs. 38%), χ2(1, N=142) = 2.62, p  = .11.
Critically, the Target Comparison group also performed
better than the Just Targets (25%) group, χ2(1, N=147) =
10.58, p  < .005. This suggests that participants who
compared target problems were drawing upon the story
from study since this was the major difference between the
Target Comparison and Just Targets conditions. Finally, the
Just Targets participants were marginally more likely to
derive the convergence solution than were Baseline
participants, χ2(1, N=145) = 3.62, p = .06. This suggests that
comparing two unsolved target problems facilitated
reaching the correct solution as compared to the Baseline
condition of single cases at study and test.
Table 1: Proportion of convergence solutions by condition
Condition N Proportion generating
convergence solution
Baseline (1:1) 70 .13
Source Comparison (2:1) 76 .38
Target Comparison (1:2) 72 .51
Just Targets (0:2) 75 .25
Discussion
We were able to replicate the well-known finding that
comparing two examples at study yielded transfer benefits
at test relative to a control group reading just one story at
study. The intriguing result is that comparing two problems
at test resulted in higher performance than the control group.
Perhaps even more surprising, the Target Comparison group
performed slightly, but not significantly, better than the
comparison at study group. Confronted by one hard
problem, these results suggest that a reasonable course of
action would be to seek another problem with the same
underlying structure!
Prior research suggests that abstracting the convergence
schema was critical for success on the Radiation problem.
Yet it is highly unlikely that the Target Comparison group
abstracted the convergence schema from one example
(otherwise the control group should have done well too).
Our interpretation is that comparing analogous problems can
lead to better representations of one or both problems. Such
an encoding is likely to serve as a more effective retrieval
cue for analogical problem solving. Due to having better
representations of the problems via comparison, participants
recalled the initial source story and borrowed its
convergence solution. That is, retrieving prior examples on
the basis of structure might be feasible if the probe is
sufficiently well encoded, just as the comparison at study
condition suggests that retrieval is feasible if the stored item
is sufficiently well encoded.
The lower level of performance by the group who
compared test problems, but did not receive a story at study,
provides support for the claim that retrieval was a factor.
Further tests are needed however to determine whether the
single versus repeated hint played any role in this finding.
The marginal advantage obtained in the Just Targets (0:2)
condition over the Baseline condition indicates potential,
not only for problem comparison as a means to achieve
analogical retrieval, but also as a means to generate problem
insight right then and there via analogical encoding.
In sum, we found that performance on a difficult problem
can be greatly facilitated by an on-line technique. It is not
necessary to construct improved representations at the time
of encoding because one can do the necessary work through
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comparison at test. Furthermore, such comparison is
between problems, not between solved stories. The power of
this comparison is not based on highlighting the
convergence principle, but arises from comparison of two
problem scenarios both amenable to a convergence solution.
Experiment 2
A second study was designed to replicate our basic finding
and to further test whether drawing comparisons was an
important component of the Target Comparison group’s
strong performance in Experiment 1. In this study we
contrast the Target Comparison condition with a condition
also receiving one study story and two test problems, but
not guided with a hint to seek one solution for both
problems. This Separate Targets condition still includes a
matching task and the task to write down how “these
problems can be solved,” but the specific suggestion to
work toward a single solution strategy is removed. If the
Target Comparison group outperforms the Separate Targets
group, this would serve as an indication that the depth of
comparison of the problems is critical, just as comparing
study problems is critical (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989;
Loewenstein, et al., 1999; Kurtz, et al., 2001). Additionally,
in Experiment 1, the Source Comparison group tended to
perform less well than the Target Comparison group, so a
Source Comparison condition was included to test for a
reliable difference.
Method
Participants A total of 224 undergraduate students at
Binghamton University participated in partial fulfillment of
a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of three conditions: Source Comparison, Target
Comparison, or Separate Targets.
Materials, Procedure and Scoring The same source and
target cases, the same use of paper packets, and the same
scoring procedures were used as in Experiment 1. The
Source Comparison (2:1) and Target Comparison (1:2)
conditions were conducted using the same experimental and
scoring procedure as in Experiment 1. The Separate Targets
(1:2 without hint) condition followed the Target
Comparison condition exactly with the exception that the
initial hint and hint repetition were excluded from the text of
the instructions.
Results
The main focus of this study was the contrast between the
Target Comparison and Separate Targets conditions. People
who received two problems, but no hint to compare them
generated the convergence solution infrequently (16%, see
Table 2). As in Experiment 1, the Target Comparison group
frequently generated convergence solutions (40%), and did
so reliably more often than did participants in the Separate
Targets condition, χ2(1, N=147) = 10.77, p < .005. Thus an
explicit instruction to compare and generate a common
solution was critical to the effectiveness of the Target
Comparison manipulation.
There was little difference between the Source
Comparison (35%) and Target Comparison (40%) groups in
this study, χ2 < 1. The previous study suggested there might
be a difference between the two conditions, and the ordering
of the means was consistent, but the difference in this study
was minimal.
Table 2: Proportion of convergence solutions by condition
Condition N Proportion generating
convergence solution
Source Comparison (2:1) 77 .35
Target Comparison (1:2) 72 .40
Separate Targets (1:2)
  without hint
75 .16
Discussion
This study replicated the effectiveness of comparing two
target problems. It also confirmed an important boundary
condition, namely that comparing the target problems
toward drawing out a common solution was important.
Merely receiving two target problems with minimal
encouragement to assess their parallels was not effective.
Indeed, solving two target problems separately led to
comparable performance as solving one target problem (i.e.,
the baseline condition) in Experiment 1.
General Discussion
With these two studies, we provide grounds for a new
emphasis, if not a new interpretation, of analogical retrieval
and transfer. The usual assumption is that comparing
examples facilitates generation of a representation of the
common schema that clarifies the key structure and is less
cluttered by unrelated contextual details than the original
examples. It is clear that without drawing a comparison,
people are unlikely to represent the structure in such a way
that it can be retrieved and used to solve a new problem—an
effect we replicated in Experiment 1. The current results
open up the possibility that the benefit of comparison at
study may be due to: 1) improving the encoding of the
examples rather than creating a new general knowledge
structure; or 2) allowing people to form better encodings of
subsequent cases using a more sophisticated or general
representational vocabulary.
The current studies were aimed at addressing this issue by
turning it around: what if people study just one example (so
they are unlikely to form any particularly clear or
uncluttered representation), but they compare examples at
test and then profit from having read the earlier single case.
The results of our two experiments are consistent with
people being able to retrieve single stored cases in just this
fashion. We showed a distinct transfer advantage for a
group that was: (1) specifically encouraged to compare two
unsolved test problems and (2) had previously studied a
single case. One may not need to store cases in a
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particularly good fashion if one can later construct a
superior retrieval probe.
There are multiple implications if a comparison today can
facilitate retrieving a case learned yesterday. First, with
respect to models of the retrieval process, it suggests a
constraint on the similarity process that matches stored
items to probes: it may well have to be symmetric. Second,
it suggests a mechanism by which people can reorganize
their knowledge. One may not have to “learn it right the first
time” if, after appreciating a new abstraction, one is able to
retrieve and perhaps re-represent a prior matching example.
This supplies a concrete mechanism for gradual conceptual
change in both development and the acquisition of expertise.
Third, this implies that educators, particularly those who
teach adults, can look to integrate people’s prior experiences
in their formal acquisition of domain expertise.
A second point arising from these studies is that drawing
comparisons can facilitate learning in a new way. Typically,
people draw comparisons to understand a principle or
solution in a more general way.  In our studies, people used
comparison to generate better formulations of the problem
at hand, not a better understanding of provided solutions.
There are at least three reasons as to why this should
facilitate problem solving. First, comparing two problems
with the knowledge that that they have a common solution
type means that idiosyncratic information can be ignored.
Second, potentially misleading example-specific solution
types can be ruled out. Third, it may allow people to
formulate a more abstract or general version of the problem
at hand. As Polya (1945) suggested, despite it seeming
counterintuitive, sometimes a more general problem is
easier to solve than a more specific problem. There may be
interesting and important applications of this use of
comparison both in education and in discovery.
We find these studies an intriguing first step. We are
pursuing several related issues that might influence our
interpretation of these studies. The Just Targets condition
was given a weaker hint to compare than the Target
Comparison condition, and as the Separate Targets
condition showed: hints are important. We are running a
new study that examines equal encouragement to draw
comparisons. We are also interested in whether the Target
Comparison condition benefits from one problem being
easier to solve than the other (in which case its solution
would be tested on the second problem) or whether it is the
development of a more general version of the problem that
is driving participants’ success.
In conclusion, drawing comparisons may facilitate
learning and transfer in multiple ways. It may enhance
recalling prior experiences as much as generating
knowledge that is likely to be later transferred. It may
enhance clarifying a problem formulation as much as
deriving generalizations from solved problems.
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Abstract
Do statistical regularities between pronouns and verbs help
children learn verb meanings? This question is addressed by
an analysis of child directed speech. The results show that
there are statistical regularities in the co-occurrences of
pronouns and verbs that could be used to cue verbs that
describe physical motion, psychological states, and features
such as transitivity. The learnability of these regularities is
demonstrated in a simulation study.
Introduction
It is well known that learning the meanings of verbs is a
difficult task for young children. It is also well known that
pronouns make up a substantial proportion of the nouns that
children hear. The distributional relations between pronouns
and verbs thus could play a role in early verb learning.
There are several reasons why verb meanings are difficult
for children to learn. Whereas parents label objects
(relatively) often, they rarely label events or relations. There
are no observable referents for many verbs, such as
psychological state verbs like look, think, want, believe, and
know. Even verbs that refer to observable actions present
ambiguities—for example, when does the opening of a door
begin? Further, the aspect of an action that is relevant is
ambiguous, and could be, for example, the manner or the
path. Finally, verb meaning often depends on taking a
particular perspective on a scene; consider the difference
between “giving” and “receiving.” In brief, meaning maps
between verbs and the world are not transparent.
Accordingly, many have suggested that word-word relations
are particularly important to learning verbs (see, for
example Gleitman, 1990; Gleitman & Gillette, 1995). Here
we examine how statistical relations between pronouns and
verbs in parental speech might help children learn the
meanings of the verbs.
Pronouns are, by far, the most common syntactic subjects
and objects in adult speech to children. Most syntactic
subjects in spontaneous spoken adult discourse in general
are pronouns (Chafe, 1994), and English-speaking mothers
often begin with a high-frequency pronoun when speaking
to their children, with you and I occurring most frequently
(Valian, 1991). The sheer frequency of pronouns suggests
that pronouns—and their statistical co-occurrences with
verbs—may be developmentally very powerful.
Consistent with this idea, Childers & Tomasello (2001)
suggested that children acquire lexically specific frames
such as “I do it” as a way into learning syntactic frames.
Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven, & Tomasello (2003) also
observed that parents use the inanimate pronoun it far more
frequently as the subject of an intransitive sentence than of a
transitive one. As Cameron-Faulkner et al. note, this
suggests that intransitive sentences are used more often than
transitives for talking about inanimate objects. It also
suggests that the use of the inanimate pronoun might serve
as a cue to some semantic aspects of the verb.
Pronouns may also help learners partition verbs that
express psychological attitudes toward events and states of
affairs into two rough categories. Verbs that express deontic
status, such as goals, purposes or intentions (try to),
volitions or desires (want to), and compulsions (have to)
tend to take infinitival complements, whereas verbs that
express epistemic status, such as perceptions (see that),
beliefs (think that), and knowledge (know that) tend to take
sentential (propositional) complements (Tomasello, 2003).
In the ecology of early childhood, parents tend to be the
ones who know whereas children tend to be the ones who
need. All this suggests the potential value of examining the
distributional relations among pronouns and verbs in
language to young children.
Experiment 1
The first experiment consisted of a corpus analysis to
demonstrate patterns of co-occurrence between pronouns
and verbs in the child’s input.
Method
Parental utterances from the CHILDES database
(MacWhinney, 2000) were coded for syntactic categories,
then subjected to clustering and statistical analysis. The
target children represented in the transcripts were aged
approximately 1;4 – 6;1.
Materials The following corpora were used: Bates, Bliss,
Bloom 1970, Brown, Clark, Cornell, Demetras, Gleason,
Hall, Higginson, Kuczaj, MacWhinney, Morisset, New
England, Post, Sachs, Suppes, Tardiff, Valian, Van Houten,
Van Kleeck and Warren-Leubecker.1
Coding was performed using a custom web application
that randomly selected transcripts, assigned them to coders,
collected coding input, and stored it in a MySQL database.
The application occasionally assigned the same transcript to
all coders, in order to measure reliability. Five
undergraduate coders were trained on the coding task and
1 The full references for each corpus may be found in
(MacWhinney, 2000).
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the use of the system. Cluster analysis and other statistical
analyses were performed using MATLAB and R.
Procedure Each coder was presented, in sequence, with
each main tier line of each transcript she was assigned,
together with several lines of context; the entire transcript
was also available for viewing by clicking a link on the
coding page. For each line, she indicated (a) whether the
speaker was a parent, target child, or other; (b) whether the
addressee was a parent, target child, or other; (c) the
syntactic frames of up to 3 clauses in the utterance; (d) for
each syntactic frame, up to 3 subjects, auxiliaries, verbs,
direct objects, indirect objects and obliques. Nouns
appearing in prepositional phrases were coded as obliques
(with the exception of recipients indicated with “to”, which
were coded as indirect objects). Object complements were
indicated by coding the direct object of the matrix verb as
“<clause>” and coding the constituents of the complement
clause as the next clause associated with the utterance. This
was intended both to simplify the coding scheme and to
avoid attributing too much grammatical knowledge to the
child—we do not assume that the child can convert an
utterance into an accurate parse tree, only that she can
identify verbs and the nouns that surround them.
The syntactic frames were: no verb, question, passive,
copula, intransitive, transitive and ditransitive. The no verb
frame included clauses—such as “Yes” or “OK”—with no
main verb. The question frame included any clause using a
question word—such as “Where did you go?”—or having
inverted word order—such as “Did you go to the bank?”—
but not merely a question mark—such as “You went to the
bank?” The passive frame included clauses in the passive
voice, such as “John was hit by the ball.” The copula frame
included clauses with a copula (including be, seem and
become) as the main verb, such as “John is angry.” The
intransitive frame included clauses with no direct object,
such as “John ran.” The transitive frame included clauses
with a direct object (or an object complement) but no
indirect object, such as “John hit the ball.” The ditransitive
frame included clauses with an indirect object, such as
“John gave Mary a kiss.”
In total, 59,977 utterances were coded from 123
transcripts. All of the coders coded 7 of those transcripts for
the purpose of measuring reliability. Average inter-coder
reliability (measured for each coder as the percentage of
items coded exactly the same way they were coded by
another coder) was 86.1%.2
We only considered parental child-directed speech
(PCDS), defined as utterances where the speaker was a
2 Cohen’s kappa coefficient (Cohen, 1960), which adjusts for
chance agreement, is only applicable for two raters. We know of
no chance-corrected multiple rater agreement measures that are
widely used in the language acquisition literature. However, given
the number of variables, the number of levels of each variable (3
speakers, 3 addressees, 7 frames, and 6 syntactic relations), and the
number of coders (5) in the present study, the probability of chance
agreement is low.
parent and the addressee was a target child. A total of
24,286 PCDS utterances were coded, for a total of 28,733
clauses. More than a quarter (28.36%) of the PCDS clauses
contained no verb at all; these were excluded from further
analysis. Clauses that were questions (16.86%), passives
(0.02%), and copulas (11.86%) were also excluded from
further analysis. The analysis was conducted using only
clauses that were intransitives (17.24% of total PCDS
clauses), transitives (24.36%) or ditransitives (1.48%), a
total of 12,377 clauses.
We formed 2 matrices from these clauses: a verbs-by-
subjects matrix and a verbs-by-objects matrix. The verbs-
by-subjects matrix contained only verbs used with an overt
subject; its size was 621 verbs by 317 nouns (subjects). The
verbs-by-objects matrix contained only verbs used with a
direct object; its size was 524 verbs by 907 nouns (objects).
Each cell of each matrix contained the proportion of times
that verb was used with that noun (as subject or object) in a
coded clause.
For the purposes of exploratory data analysis, we then
performed 4 cluster analyses. First, we took the 50 nouns
most commonly used as objects and clustered them
according to their proximity in verb space, i.e., the space
formed by considering each verb as a dimension. Each noun
was placed along each dimension according to the
proportion of times it was used with the corresponding verb.
Hence, a noun never used as the object of a particular verb
would be at 0, and a noun always used as the object of a
particular verb would be at 1. Second, we clustered the 50
most common subject-nouns in verb space. Third, we took
the 50 verbs most commonly used with objects and
clustered them according to their proximity in noun space
(defined analogously to verb space). Finally, we clustered
the 50 most common verbs-with-subjects in noun space.
Results
We cannot show the cluster diagrams here due to space
limits. We summarize the main regularities observed.
The observed distribution of nouns in the corpus is
consistent with Zipf’s law — the numerical frequency of
words decays roughly as an inverse power of their rank
frequency. Moreover, the most frequent subjects and objects
in the corpus are pronouns, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Our quantitative analysis of co-occurrence relationships is
based on the log likelihood ratio as described by Dunning
(1993) and recommended by Manning & Schutze (1999).
Suppose we have observed N clauses with m subject-(or
object-) types and n verb-types. Let
msssS ,,, 21 L= and nvvvV L,, 21=
represent the subjects and the verbs respectively.
Furthermore, let
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Figure 1: The 10 most frequent subjects in PCDS by their
number of occurrences.
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Figure 2: The 10 most frequent objects in PCDS by their
number of occurrences.
represent the observed frequencies of subject-verb co-
occurrences. Then the test statistic is the quantity:
−2log λ = 2[logL(p1,ksi v j ,kv j ) +
logL( p2,ksi − ksi v j ,N − kv j ) −
logL( p0,ksi v j ,kv j ) −
logL( p0,ksi − ksi v j ,N − kv j )]
Where the components are defined as follows:
L(p,k,n) = pk (1− p)n−k = k log p + (n − k)log(1− p)
p0 = p(si) =
ksi
N
p1 = p(si | v j ) =
ksi v j
kv j
p2 = p(si |¬v j ) =
ksi − ksi v j
N − kv j
The test statistic -2logλ is χ2 distributed with 1 degree of
freedom. Intuitively, it represents how much more likely it
is that si and v j go together than should be expected purely
by chance. It has also been demonstrated that this statistic
identifies natural collocations in text corpora.
As expected, the inanimate pronoun “it” was more likely
as the object of verbs of physical motion than as the object
of psychological attitude verbs, whereas complement
clauses were more likely to occur with psychological
attitude verbs than with verbs of physical motion. As shown
in Table 1, “it” tended to occur with physical motion verbs
far more often than would be predicted by chance, and
clauses occurred with most physical motion verbs, if at all,
only about as much as would be predicted by chance. The
verb “put” is an exception to this general rule, occurring
with a clause more often than would be predicted by chance.
As shown in Table 2, complement clauses tended to occur
with psychological attitude verbs more often than would be
predicted by chance, whereas “it” only occurred more often
than would be predicted by chance with two of five
psychological attitude verbs. The exceptions were want
(uses such as “Oh, I want it now”) and know (“No, that’s
wrong and you know it”). In any case, as shown in Figure 3,
it is somewhat more likely that a physical motion verb will
occur with “it” than with a complement clause, and
substantially more likely that a psychological attitude verb
will occur with a complement clause than with “it”.
Table 1: The log likelihood ratio for uses of object “it” or
a clause with physical motion verbs. * indicates p<0.01;
— indicates no co-occurrences.
“it” (clause)
put 102.79* 70.70*
turn 72.58* —
throw 39.55* 6.14
hold 32.17* —
push 24.87* 3.02
Table 2: The log likelihood ratio for uses of object “it” or a
clause with psychological attitude verbs. * indicates p<0.01;
— indicates no co-occurrences.
“it” (clause)
think — 399.13*
want 12.00* 283.28*
know 69.53* 134.44*
remember — 37.22*
mean 0.91 15.81*
Table 3: The log likelihood ratio for uses of subject “I” or
“you” with epistemic verbs. * indicates p<0.01;
— indicates no co-occurrences.
“I” “You”
think 605.01* 24.7*
know 200.05* 108.17*
guess 60.00* —
769
Phys − It Phys − Clause Psych − It Psych − Clause
Lo
g−
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
Ra
tio
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Figure 3: Mean log-likelihood ratio of the object pronoun
“it” (white bars) versus a clause (gray bars) given a physical
motion verb (left) or a psychological attitude verb (right).
We also found that “I” is more likely to be the subject of
epistemic verbs, whereas “you” is more likely to be the
subject of deontic verbs. As shown in Table 3, “I” occurred
with epistemic verbs far more often than would be predicted
by chance. The subject “you” also occurred more often with
“think” and “know” than would be predicted by chance, but
with a much lower likelihood.
As shown in Table 4, “you” tended to occur with deontic
verbs far more often than chance would predict. The subject
“I” was no more likely than chance would predict to appear
with the verbs “like” and “need” and was only slightly more
likely than chance to occur with the verb “want”. In any
case, as demonstrated in Figure 4, it is substantially more
likely that the subject “I” will appear with an epistemic verb
than it is that the subject “you” will appear with an
epistemic verb. It is also somewhat more likely that “you”
will appear with a deontic verb than “I” will appear with a
deontic verb.
Table 4: The log likelihood ratio for uses of subject “I” or
“you” with deontic verbs. * indicates p<0.01.
“I” “You”
want 6.72* 116.97*
like 0.03 74.24*
need 2.69 15.26*
We conclude by noting that there are many other
significant co-occurrences in the corpus, some of which
involve triadic correlations between specific verbs, specific
nouns, and pronouns. For example the objects “book” and
“story” are more likely to appear with the verb “read” than
would be predicted by chance (LLR=131.51, 128.39). Both
the object “book” and the object “this” are likely to appear
with the phrasal verb “look at” (LLR=67.28, 88.01).
Similarly, not only is “it” likely to appear as the object of
“turn” (as discussed above), but so is “page” (LLR=81.89).
Likewise for “play,” which makes not only the objects
“ball”, “blocks”, “game”, and “house” more likely, but also
the objects “this” and “it”. These are potentially important
on several fronts. The child may learn an association
between pronouns such as “this” and “it” and inanimate
objects, like books and pages. The pronouns “this” and “it”
may then be used to help the child understand the meanings
of other verbs that take inanimate objects as their objects.
Conversely, the verb “tell” selects strongly for the pronouns
“us” and “me” as well as for “Mommy” and “Daddy”.
Hence, the child may learn that verbs taking “us” and “we”
as objects have to do with communicating with or directing
attention toward other people.
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Figure 4: Mean log-likelihood ratio of the subject
pronoun “I” (white bars) versus “you” (gray bars) given an
epistemic verb (left) or a deontic verb (right).
Discussion
Although pronouns are “light” in their meaning, their
referents determinable only from context, they may
nonetheless be potent forces on early lexical learning by
identifying some kinds of verb meanings as more likely than
others. The results of Experiment 1 show that there are
statistical regularities in the co-occurrences of pronouns and
verbs that the child could use to discriminate verb meanings.
Verbs that describe physical motion or transfer are likely to
be followed by “it,” whereas verbs attributing psychological
state are likely to be followed by a relatively complex
complement clause. Verbs having to do with thinking or
knowing are likely to occur with subject “I,” whereas verbs
having to do with wanting or needing are likely to occur
with subject “you.” This regularity most likely reflects the
ecology of parents and children—parents “know” and
children “want”—but it could nonetheless be useful in
distinguishing these two classes of meanings. The results
thus far show that there are potentially usable regularities in
the statistical relations between pronouns and verbs.
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Experiment 2
To demonstrate that the regularities in pronoun-verb co-
occurrences in parental speech to children can actually be
exploited by a statistical learner, we trained a connectionist
network to auto-associate subject-verb-object “sentences”
from the input, then tested it on individual verbs and
pronouns. We predict that the network should be able to
learn the statistical regularities demonstrated in
Experiment 1, specifically: (1) physical transfer verbs are
likely to have “it” as an object, whereas psychological verbs
are likely to take a complement clause, and (2) epistemic
verbs are likely to have “I” as a subject, whereas deontic
verbs are likely to have “you” as a subject.
Method
Data The network training data consisted of the subject,
verb, and object of all coded utterances that contained the 50
most common subjects, verbs and objects. There were 5,835
such utterances. The inputs used a localist coding wherein
there was exactly one input unit out of 50 activated for each
subject, and likewise for each verb and each object. Absent
and omitted arguments were counted among the 50, so, for
example, the utterance “John runs” would have 3 units
activated even though it only has 2 words—the third unit
being the “no object” unit. With 50 units each for subject,
verb and object, there were a total of 150 input units to the
network. Active input units had a value of 1, and inactive
input units had a value of 0.
Network Architecture The network consisted of a two-
layer 150-8-150 unit autoassociator with a logistic
activation function at the hidden layer and three separate
softmax activation functions (one each for the subject, verb
and object) at the output layer—see Figure 5. Using the
softmax activation function, which ensures that all the
outputs in the bank sum to 1, together with the cross-
entropy error measure allows us to interpret the network
outputs as probabilities (Bishop, 1995). The network was
trained by the resilient backpropagation algorithm
(Riedmiller & Braun, 1993) to map its inputs back onto its
outputs. It is well known that this sort of network performs
nonlinear dimensionality reduction at its hidden layers,
extracting statistical regularities from the input data.
Figure 5: Network architecture
Training The data was randomly assigned to two groups:
90% was used for training the network, while 10% was
reserved for validation. Starting from different random
initial weights, 10 networks were trained until the cross-
entropy on the validation set reached a minimum for each of
them. Training stopped after approximately 150 epochs of
training, on average. At that point, the networks were
achieving about 81% accuracy on correctly identifying
subjects, verbs and objects from the training set.
Testing After training, the networks were tested with
incomplete inputs corresponding to isolated verbs and
pronouns. For example, to see what a network had learned
about it as a subject, it was tested with a single input unit
activated—the one corresponding to it as subject. The other
inputs were set to 0. Output unit activations were recorded
and averaged over all 10 networks.
Results
To test the hypothesis that the network learns that
psychological attitude verbs are more likely than physical
motion verbs to take a clause as an object, we tested the
networks with the frames “I ___ (clause)” and “You ___
(clause)” using psychological and physical verbs. The
psychological verbs were “think,” “want,” “know,” and
“remember.” The verb “mean” was not among the top 50
verbs used in the corpus and therefore was not used in the
network training experiments. The physical verbs were
“put,” “turn,” “throw” and “hold.” The verb “push” was not
among the top 50 verbs used in the corpus and therefore was
not used in the network training experiments. As shown in
Figure 6, the networks activated the psychological verbs
more strongly at the output (M = 0.047, SD = 0.152) than
the physical verbs (M = 0.002, SD = 0.014). This difference
was significant, t(80) = -2.62, p = 0.01. Results are similar
for the converse (physical verbs are significantly more
activated when the object is “it”) and for the epistemic /
deontic distinction (epistemic verbs are significantly more
activated when the subject is “I,” whereas deontic verbs are
significantly more activated when the subject is “you”).
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Figure 6: Network output activations for physical verbs
versus psychological attitude verbs for the frames
“I___(clause)” and “You____(clause)”.
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Conclusions
We have shown that there are statistical regularities in co-
occurrences between pronouns and verbs in the speech that
children hear from their parents, including regularities that
distinguish between psychological and non-psychological
verbs, as well as between deontic and epistemic
psychological verbs. We have also shown that a simple
statistical learner can exploit these regularities, not to learn
the meanings of verbs per se (the network obviously does
not know the meanings of the verbs), but to learn the formal
associations between tokens of verbs and pronouns. How
might this help the child learn the meanings of verbs? In the
first place, hearing the verb framed by pronouns may help
the child isolate the relevant event or action from the
blooming, buzzing confusion around it; the pronouns can
indicate animacy, gender, number and direction of causality.
This would allow the child to focus on the relevant things.
Second, if we suppose that the child has already learned one
verb and its pattern of correlations with pronouns, and then
hears another verb being used with the same or a similar
pattern of correlations, the child may hypothesize that the
meaning of the unknown verb is similar to the meaning of
the known verb. For example, a child who understood
“want” but not “need” might observe that “you” is usually
the subject of both and conclude that “want,” like “need,”
has to do with his desires and not, for example, a physical
motion or someone else’s state of mind.
Now that we have shown that the regularities exist and are
learnable in principle, the next step is to show that children
actually pick up on these regularities. We are planning a
series of experiments with children from 24-36 months that
will involve priming the children with movies showing
actions corresponding to nonsense verbs in the context of
various pronoun frames (“He zorps it,” “It zorps,” “They
zorp this to her” and so on) and testing whether this
influences their interpretations of these verbs, for example
by having them select which of a pair of novel movies
shows “zorping.” This will provide a strong test of the
hypothesis that children actually use pronoun distributional
statistics to pick up on the meanings of novel verbs.
Future modeling experiments will attempt to capture not
only the statistical relationships among verb-pronoun token
co-occurrences but also their relationships with shared
meanings, by associating words with featural
representations of their meanings. We are also working on a
mechanism for manipulating the statistical properties of the
relevant conditional distributions to be used for generating
network inputs in future simulations—the distribution of
syntactic frames, the distribution of verbs given a syntactic
frame, and the distribution of nouns (including pronouns) in
each argument position given a verb. We expect that such a
model could be used to test the utility of statistical
associations between pronouns with verbs for a theoretical
learner—simulations run with varying degrees of
correlations could demonstrate not only whether but also
just how much correlation is useful in principle.
Finally, work is underway to collect crosslinguistic data
from Japanese and Tamil, verb-heavy languages with
frequent argument dropping and case-marked pronouns
referring to various levels of social status. We are especially
keen to find out what sorts of cues children might be using
in languages where pronouns are both rarer and “heavier”
than they are in English.
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Abstract
A new recognition memory model is proposed which differs
from the existing memory models in that it operates on natural
input. Therefore it is called the natural input memory (NIM)
model. A biologically-informed perceptual pre-processing
method takes local samples from a natural image and translates
these into a feature-vector representation. The feature-vector
representations reside in a similarity space in which perceptual
similarity corresponds to proximity. By using the similarity
structure of natural input, the model by-passes assumptions
about distributional statistics of real-world input. Our sim-
ulations on the list-strength effect, the list-length effect, and
the false memory effect support the validity of the proposed
model. In particular, we conducted a face recognition simula-
tion with the NIM model and found that it is able to replicate
well-established recognition memory effects that relate to the
similarity of the input.
Memory Representation
Many computational memory models represent an item by a
vector of abstract features (e.g., the SAM model, Raaijmakers
& Shiffrin, 1981; the REM model, Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997,
the model of differentiation, McClelland & Chappell, 1998).
The feature values are usually drawn from a mathematical
distribution (e.g., a geometric distribution). Since the com-
putational models artificially generate vector representations,
they do not address the contribution of the similarity struc-
ture intrinsic to natural data. However, we believe that the
similarity structure contains important information. There-
fore, we propose a memory model that operates on natural
data and represents the similarity structure of these data.
The similarity structure of natural data can be represented
in any type of space that fulfills the compactness criterion
(Arkadev & Braverman, 1966). This criterion is fulfilled
when similar objects in the real world are close in their rep-
resentations. Several researchers developed so called ‘simi-
larity spaces’, in which representations of similar items are in
close proximity of each other (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986; Steyvers,
Shiffrin, & Nelson, in press). An analysis of human similarity
judgments or of free association data often forms the basis of
a similarity space. However, we propose to derive the similar-
ity space from the natural data by employing a biologically-
informed transformation.
In the next section, a new recognition memory model that
operates on natural images is introduced and described. We
call this model the natural input memory (NIM) model. We
will conduct a face recognition simulation with the NIM
model and will evaluate its ability to replicate findings from
recognition-memory studies. Finally our main conclusion
will be given.
The NIM Model
The NIM model encompasses the following two stages.
1. A perceptual pre-processing stage that translates a natural
image into a number of feature vectors.
2. A memory stage comprising two processes:
(a) a storage process that simply stores feature vectors;
(b) a recognition process that compares feature vectors of
the image to be recognized with previously stored fea-
ture vectors.
Figure 1: The natural input memory (NIM) model.
Figure 1 presents a schematic diagram of the NIM model.
The face image is an example of a natural image. The two
boxes correspond to the perceptual pre-processing stage and
the memory stage.
The Perceptual Pre-Processing Stage
In this section, we first provide some background on the
sources of biological inspiration and on the computational
considerations. Then, we discuss some relevant implemen-
tation details.
Biological Inspiration and Computational Considerations
The human visual system is our main source of biological
inspiration. The eye sequentially fixates on those parts of a
visual scene that are most informative for recognition (e.g.,
Yarbus, 1967). Early visual processing in the brain leads to
the activation of millions of optic nerve cells (Palmer, 1999).
The nerve-cell activations may be conceived as a high di-
mensional vector. The high dimensionality enables the rep-
resentation of a large amount of information without suffer-
ing from interference (Rao & Ballard, 1995), but it also ham-
pers the memory performance, as the number of examples
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that is necessary for a reliable generalization performance
grows exponentially with the number of dimensions. This
phenomenon is known as the ‘curse of dimensionality’ (Bell-
man, 1961; Edelman & Intrator, 1997). In coping with the
curse of dimensionality, subsequent stages in the visual sys-
tem are assumed to reduce the dimensionality of the high-
dimensional input (e.g., Hubel, 1988; Tenenbaum, Silva, &
Langford, 2000). The assumption is supported by findings
of Edelman and Intrator (1997), who showed that the human
visual system is able to retrieve the intrinsic low-dimensional
structure of the high-dimensional visual input.
In the NIM model, dimension reduction of high-
dimensional natural input is achieved in two sequential steps:
(1) a biologically-informed feature-vector extraction (Free-
man & Adelson, 1991) followed by (2) a principal compo-
nent analysis (Pearson, 1901). The feature-vector extraction
method employed by the NIM model operates directly on a
high-dimensional natural image. The image has a high di-
mensionality because it is treated as a vector, the elements of
which are the constituent pixel values. Motivated by eye fixa-
tions in human vision, the feature-vector extraction method
takes samples from randomly-selected locations along the
contours in the image. To emphasize the parallel with hu-
man vision, we refer to the samples as ‘fixations’. For each
fixation, the NIM model extracts features (i.e, a feature vec-
tor) from the image area centered at the fixation location.
Since the feature vector contains a limited number of fea-
tures, it is of a much lower dimensionality than the image.
The feature-vector extraction method is based on the visual
processing generally believed to occur in the visual area V1.
The responses of neurons in V1 are modeled by a multi-
scale wavelet decomposition (described later). Several stud-
ies showed that the biologically-informed multi-scale wavelet
decomposition results in a representation space that accu-
rately represents similarities as perceived by humans (e.g.,
Kalocsai, Zhao, & Biederman, 1998; Lyons & Akamatsu,
1998; Bartlett, Littleworth, Braathen, Sejnowski, & Movel-
lan, 2003). After extraction of feature vectors, principal com-
ponent analysis represents the feature vectors by their projec-
tion onto a number of orthogonal basis vectors which are or-
dered according to the amount of variance they explain. The
dimensionality of the feature vectors is reduced by taking the
projection onto the first p basis vectors. The low-dimensional
feature vectors reside in a similarity space where visual sim-
ilarity translates to proximity of feature vectors. Translating
a two-dimensional image using a multi-scale wavelet decom-
position followed by a principal component analysis, is an
often applied method in the domain of visual object recogni-
tion to model the first three stages of processing of informa-
tion in the human visual system (i.e., retina/LGN, V1/V2,
V4/LOC; Palmeri & Gauthier, 2004). In contrast, existing
memory models lack such a pre-processing method and often
make simplifying assumptions about object representations.
Implementation The input image is translated into a multi-
scale representation at four spatial scales. At every scale,
the image is processed by four oriented filters in the orien-
tations 0◦, 45◦, 90◦, and 105◦ using the steerable-pyramid
transform (Freeman & Adelson, 1991). This processing re-
sults in sixteen (four scales times four orientations) filtered
images. From each of the sixteen images a 7× 7 window is
selected at a fixation point and the 16× 49 pixel values are
placed in a vector. In addition, the pixel values of a 7× 7
low-resolution subimage centered at the fixation point are ap-
pended to the vector. Fixation points are randomly drawn
from the contours of the face. The result is a feature vector
for each fixation. As mentioned before, a principal compo-
nent analysis was used to reduce the dimensionality of the
feature vectors by taking the projection onto the first p basis
vectors.
The Memory Stage
The Storage Process In the NIM model, the storage pro-
cess straightforwardly stores an item (i.e., a pre-processed
natural image). A pre-processed natural image is represented
by a number of low-dimensional feature vectors in the simi-
larity space, each corresponding to an eye fixation. The stor-
age strength, S, is defined as the number of feature vectors
stored for an image.
The Recognition Process In the NIM model, the recog-
nition process determines the familiarity of an image to
be recognized by comparing feature vectors of the image
to be recognized with previously stored feature vectors.
Models with a recognition process based on comparing
items to previously stored exemplars can provide an accurate
quantitative account of recognition performance (Medin &
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986; Nosofsky, Clark, & Shin,
1989). In the NIM model, the recognition process uses a
nearest neighbor classifier method, which takes each feature
vector of the image to be recognized and then determines
the number of previously stored feature vectors, f , that fall
within a hypersphere with radius r, centered around the
feature vector of the image. The familiarity, F , of the image
is defined as ∑ fi/T , with fi the value of f for the ith feature
vector of the image, and T the total number of feature vectors
of the image.
We expect that the similarity-space representations em-
ployed by the NIM model will deepen our understanding of
human recognition memory. Moreover, they may effectively
support a number of memory effects often obtained in recog-
nition memory studies. The latter studies are described in the
next section.
Human Recognition Memory Studies
Three recognition memory effects often found in recognition
memory studies are: the list-strength effect, the list-length
effect, and the false memory effect. In general, recognition
memory studies provide subjects with a study list of items
and test their recognition memory for (some of) the studied
items (i.e., targets) and a number of non-studied items (i.e.,
lures). We will emphasize the relation between the similarity
structure of the targets and the lures used in the experiments
on the one hand and the memory effects on the other hand.
The List-Strength Effect
A list-strength effect is defined as: a decrease in memory per-
formance for a given set of study list items when other items
of the study list are ”strengthened” (i.e., the amount of time or
the number of times the items are studied is increased) (Rat-
cliff, Clark, & Shiffrin, 1990). While some researchers failed
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to find a list-strength effect for recognition memory (e.g., Rat-
cliff et al., 1990), recent findings showed that a list-strength
effect can be obtained when there is a high degree of similar-
ity between targets and lures. Norman (2002) tested whether
strengthening some words of the study list affected a sub-
ject’s recognition performance for other (non-strengthened)
studied words. In the experiments, a significant list-strength
effect was obtained only when targets and lures were sim-
ilar. For dissimilar targets and lures, no list-strength effect
was found. Moreover, recognition scores were significantly
higher for dissimilar targets and lures than for similar targets
and lures.
The List-Length Effect
A list-length effect is defined as: a decrease in memory per-
formance for the items of the study list when additional items
are added to the study list (Ratcliff et al., 1990). List-length
studies yielded contradictory results. While some researchers
failed to find a list-length effect (e.g., Dennis & Humphreys,
2001), others did obtain it (e.g., Cary & Reder, 2003). Re-
cent experimental results indicate that the similarity between
targets and lures can affect the degree to which a list-length
effect occurs (MacAndrew, Klatzky, Fiez, McClelland, &
Becker, 2002). In a study examining the effect of phono-
logical similarity on recognition memory, MacAndrew et al.
(2002) tested subjects’ recognition memory for letters on a
study list of four or six letters. The results showed that a
larger list-length effect occurred for similar targets and lures
than for dissimilar targets and lures. Also, overall recogni-
tion scores were higher for dissimilar targets and lures than
for similar targets and lures.
The False Memory Effect
A number of experimental studies showed a false memory
effect, which holds that the recognition of a lure (i.e., a
false memory or a false alarm) is more likely to happen
when the lure is similar to (one of the) studied items (e.g.,
Postman, 1951; Dewhurst & Farrand, 2004). For instance,
the results by Dewhurst and Farrand (2004) show that
the number of false memories increases together with the
number of targets on the study list that are similar to the lures.
In a similarity space, representations of similar targets and
lures show more overlap than representations of dissimilar
targets and lures. Similar targets and lures are thus more dif-
ficult to discriminate than dissimilar targets and lures. There-
fore, we expect that list-strength effects and list-length effects
will be more pronounced and there will be more false alarms
when targets and lures are similar than when targets and lures
are dissimilar.
We hypothesize that the similarity structure of the per-
ceived targets and lures can give rise to the recognition-
memory effects discussed above. To test this hypothesis, we
conducted a face recognition simulation with the NIM model,
which employs similarity-space representations of perceived
natural images.
Simulation
In our simulation, we investigated the ability of the NIM
model to produce the following effects: (1) the effect of the
similarity between targets and lures on the list-strength ef-
fect, (2) the effect of the similarity between targets and lures
on the list-length effect, and (3) the false memory effect. The
NIM model was repeatedly provided with a study list of face
images and tested for recognition of the studied images (i.e.,
targets) and a number of non-studied images (i.e., lures). The
images were gray-scale images of human faces taken from the
FERET database (Phillips, Wechsler, Huang, & Rauss, 1998)
of facial images. Male and female Caucasian faces without
beards or glasses were selected. An example of such an image
is shown on the left hand side of Figure 1. In this simulation,
recognition memory was tested in two different conditions:
(1) the dissimilar condition that employed lures dissimilar
from the targets, and (2) the similar condition, that employed
lures similar to one of the targets. In the NIM model, simi-
lar images are separated by a small distance in the similarity
space. List-strength effects and list-length effects were as-
sessed in both conditions and compared to determine whether
the similarity between targets and lures had affected the de-
gree to which the list effects occurred. Moreover, a compari-
son of the recognition results in the dissimilar condition and
the similar condition revealed whether a false memory effect
had occurred. Below we describe the calculation of recogni-
tion scores, the paradigms, the conditions, the procedure, and
the results.
Calculation of Recognition Scores
The familiarity values, F , were used in a signal detection
analysis to determine the recognition scores. The appropri-
ate measure for the recognition score (da) was based on the
normalized difference between the average F values of the
targets (F(IT )) and the average F values of the lures (F(IL)):
da =
F(IT )−F(IL)√
σ2[F(IT )]
+σ2[F(IL)]
2
(Simpson & Fitter, 1973). Each da value was calculated on
the basis of the familiarity values for targets (F(IT )) and the
familiarity values for lures (F(IL)) of ten recognition tests.
Paradigms
The List-Strength Effect We used the mixed-pure
paradigm first proposed by Ratcliff et al. (1990). It is used
in many list-strength studies. The mixed-pure paradigm em-
ploys three types of study lists: pure weak lists (N weak im-
ages), pure strong lists (N strong images), and mixed lists
(N/2 strong and N/2 weak images). A list-strength effect is
said to occur (1) when the recognition score for weak images
on a pure list is higher than the recognition score for weak
images on a mixed list or, (2) when the recognition score for
strong images on a mixed list is higher than the recognition
score for strong images on a pure list. The pure/mixed ratio
for weak images (i.e., the recognition score for weak images
on a pure list divided by the recognition score for weak im-
ages on a mixed list) thus is an indication for the degree to
which a list-strength effect occurs for weak images. Like-
wise, the mixed/pure ratio for strong images is an indication
for the degree to which a list-strength effect occurs for strong
images.
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The List-Length Effect A list-length effect is said to oc-
cur when the recognition score for images on a shorter list
is higher than the recognition score for images on a longer
list. To assess the occurrence of a list-length effect we com-
pared recognition scores for images on study lists of different
lengths.
The False Memory Effect A higher false alarm rate (to-
gether with no difference in the hit rate) for the similar condi-
tion than for the dissimilar condition is said to indicate the
occurrence of a false memory effect. However, using the
general performance measure da (as described in the pre-
vious subsection) to determine recognition scores, the NIM
model produces no false memories (and thus no false memory
effect), simply because no recognition decisions are made.
Most computational memory models, however, make recog-
nition decisions based on the comparison of an obtained fa-
miliarity value to a given criterion (e.g., Busey, 2001). When
the familiarity value exceeds the criterion, the item is rec-
ognized, if not, the item is not recognized. To assess the
false memory effect, we also applied a decision criterion to
the familiarity values, F , obtained for the dissimilar condi-
tion and for the similar condition. As a criterion we used:
C = S× (0.02+N/500), with S the storage strength of the
images, and N the number of images on the study list.
Conditions
We distinguished two conditions: the dissimilar and the sim-
ilar condition. For the dissimilar condition, recognition per-
formance for targets versus dissimilar lures was tested. Tar-
gets and lures were selected from a subset of dissimilar im-
ages. The images in the subset of dissimilar images were
selected in such a way that the clusters of their feature vec-
tors in the similarity space showed relatively little overlap.
Hence, dissimilarity for a subset of images, D, is defined as:
∑ fB,Ai/TA ≤ d1,∀A,B ∈ D, with fB,Ai the number of feature
vectors of image B that fall within a hypersphere with radius r
centered around the ith feature vector of image A, TA the total
number of feature vectors of image A, and d1 a dissimilarity
constant. For the similar condition, recognition performance
for targets versus similar lures was tested. Pairs of similar
targets and lures were selected in such a way that the clusters
of their feature-vector representations in the similarity space
showed relatively much overlap. Hence, similarity for two
images, A and B, is defined as: ∑ fB,Ai/TA ≥ d2, with fB,Ai the
number of feature vectors of image B that fall within a hyper-
sphere with radius r centered around the ith feature vector of
image A, TA the total number of feature vectors of image A,
and d2 a similarity constant, with d2 > d1.
Procedure
We provided the NIM model with (1) pure weak study lists,
(2) pure strong study lists, and (3) mixed study lists of lengths
N = 4, 8, and 12, in both the dissimilar and the similar con-
dition. Weak images were stored with storage strength S = 5
(i.e., five feature vectors were stored, corresponding to five
fixations) and strong images were stored with storage strength
S = 10. For each feature vector, the first p = 50 dimensions
were stored. After the last image of a study list had been pre-
sented to the model, the N images of the study list (i.e., tar-
gets) along with N new images (i.e., lures) were presented for
(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a) Norman’s (2002) results, and (b) Recognition
scores (da) for weak images on pure lists (black bars) and on
mixed lists (white bars) of length N = 12 for the dissimilar
condition and for the similar condition.
recognition. Lures in the dissimilar condition were selected
with dissimilarity constant d1 = 0.26 and lures in the simi-
lar condition were selected with similarity constant d2 = 0.8.
Recognition tests and the selection of targets and lures were
performed using the radius parameter r = 5.0.
Results
Table 1 presents the results for the dissimilar and similar con-
ditions, respectively. The rows show the recognition results
for lists of lengths N = 4, 8, and 12. The columns labeled
w show the recognition scores for the weak images and the
columns labeled s show the recognition scores for the strong
images. The columns labeled pw/mw show the pure/mixed
ratio for weak images and the columns labeled ms/ps show
the mixed/pure ratio for strong images (both of which are
indications of the degree to which a list-strength effect oc-
curred). Figure 2(a) presents a bar graph of the results re-
Table 1: The average recognition scores produced by the NIM
model for the dissimilar and the similar condition.
Dissimilar condition
Pure lists Mixed Lists ratios
N w s w s pw/mw ms/ps
4 1.81 2.39 1.78 2.41 1.01 1.01
8 1.65 2.18 1.54 2.28 1.07 1.05
12 1.59 2.11 1.48 2.15 1.07 1.02
Similar condition
Pure lists Mixed Lists ratios
N w s w s pw/mw ms/ps
4 1.38 1.83 1.14 1.97 1.21 1.08
8 1.12 1.52 0.87 1.78 1.29 1.17
12 0.98 1.35 0.73 1.61 1.36 1.20
ported by Norman (2002) (described previously). Figure 2(b)
presents a bar graph of the recognition scores produced by the
NIM model in conditions analogous to the conditions in Nor-
man’s experiment. Since results were similar for lists of dif-
ferent lengths N, only the results for lists of length N = 12 are
shown. A comparison of the graphs in Figures 2(a) and 2(b)
reveals a close correspondence between Norman’s results and
the results produced by the NIM model.
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Similarity and the List-Strength Effect List-strength ef-
fects for the dissimilar condition were significantly smaller
than list-strength effects for the similar condition as indicated
by the higher pw/mw and ms/mw values for the similar con-
dition compared to those for the dissimilar condition. This
was supported in a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) by
the interaction between list type (pure or mixed) and condi-
tion. Calculated F values for lists of lengths N = 4, 8, and 12
ranged from F(1,159) = 4.97 to F(1,159) = 9.62, p < 0.05
for weak images and F(1,159) = 4.52 to F(1,159) = 12.02,
p < 0.05, for strong images.
Similarity and the List-Length Effect The list-length ef-
fects for the dissimilar condition were significantly smaller
than those for the similar condition. This was indicated in a
two-way ANOVA by the interaction between list length and
condition for pure weak lists, F(2,239) = 4.61, p < 0.05, and
for pure strong lists, F(2,239) = 3.68, p < 0.05.
The False Memory Effect Table 2 presents the hit rates and
false alarm rates for pure strong lists of lengths N = 4, 8, and
12 for both the dissimilar and the similar condition. Since
the results were similar for pure weak lists and pure strong
lists, we only present the results for pure strong lists. The
Table 2: The average hit rates and false alarm rates produced
by the NIM model for the dissimilar and the similar condition.
Dissimilar condition Similar condition
N Hit rate F/A rate Hit rate F/A rate
4 0.84 0.01 0.86 0.14
8 0.76 0.02 0.78 0.17
12 0.69 0.02 0.70 0.15
results show that a false memory occurred: false alarm rates
were higher for lists in the similar condition than for lists in
the dissimilar condition (while hit rates were not significantly
different). In an ANOVA, calculated F values for the false
alarm rates ranged from 163.38 to 384.74, p < 0.05, while F
values for the hit rates ranged from 2.08 to 2.24, p > 0.05.
Discussion
Based on recent experimental findings (Norman, 2002), we
assumed that the degree to which a list-strength effect and a
list-length effect occur varies with the degree of similarity be-
tween targets and lures. The NIM model produces this effect,
as well as a false memory effect. Below we discuss the single-
process NIM model in relation to other memory models and
the ability of the NIM model to simulate mirror effects.
Comparison to Other Models
The NIM model differs from existing memory models in that
it operates on natural input and employs a single process for
recognition.
A Perceptual Process Operating on Natural Input The
NIM model encompasses a transformation that yields the sim-
ilarity structure of natural images. So far, existing memory
models have been tested with artificial data (e.g., the REM
model, Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997), with predefined similar-
ity spaces (e.g., the SimSample model, Busey, 2001), or with
synthesized natural images (Kahana & Sekuler, 2002). The
predictions these models make for recognition memory per-
formance can be similar to the predictions the NIM model
makes, provided that a representation space is employed that
accurately reflects the similarity structure of the input. How-
ever, these models fall short in constructing a representation
in an a priori manner. In contrast, the NIM model remedies
this. Therefore, we expect that the NIM model provides us
with a useful tool for making predictions about the effects of
varying similarity of natural input on memory.
Single versus dual-process models Several memory mod-
els assume two processes for recognition to explain recog-
nition results. These dual-processing models assume that
recognition involves (1) a familiarity process, i.e., a context
insensitive automatic process, and (2) a recollection process,
i.e., a context sensitive strategic process (see Yonelinas, 2002,
for a review of dual-processing models). Norman (2002) ex-
plains his experimental findings on the similarity effect by
a dual-processing approach. He argues that the degree to
which a list-strength effect occurs depends on the extent to
which recollection drives recognition. While there might be
good biological evidence that more than one process is in-
volved in recognition, our results show that a single straight-
forward process for recognition suffices to produce Norman’s
and other findings on recognition memory.
Mirror Effects
In addition to the list-strength effect and the list-length ef-
fect, memory models are often tested for two related effects
consistently obtained in experimental studies: the strength-
mirror effect and the length-mirror effect (e.g., Murnane
& Shiffrin, 1991). Simulation results, reported elsewhere
(Lacroix, Murre, Postma, & Herik, submitted), showed that
the NIM model exhibits these effects.
Conclusion
We have seen that the NIM model is able to build a similar-
ity space from perceived natural data. Moreover, it success-
fully replicated recognition findings on list-strength effects,
list-length effects, false memory effects, and mirror effects.
Though it is at present not clear to what extent these results
emerge from the use of natural images, it does increase the
validity of the model by by-passing assumptions about dis-
tributional statistics of real-world perceptual features. Future
studies aim at extending the NIM model to simulate a wider
variety of findings on recognition memory.
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Abstract
In this paper, we examine approaches to representing
and utilizing hierarchical skills within the context of
a cognitive architecture. We review responses to this
issue by three established frameworks – ACT-R, Soar,
and Prodigy – then present an alternative we have de-
veloped within Icarus, another candidate architecture.
Unlike most earlier systems, Icarus lets skills refer di-
rectly to their subskills and communicate within a single
recognize-act cycle. This assumption has implications
for the number of cycles required to complete complex
tasks. We illustrate our approach with the domain of
multi-column subtraction, then discuss related methods
and directions for future work in this area.
Introduction and Overview
Human skills are organized in a hierarchical fashion.
There seems to be general agreement with this claim,
as it is consistent not only with experimental findings
about the execution and acquisition of skills, but also
with introspection about our everyday behavior. Upon
request, most people can describe their complex skills
at successive levels of aggregation, whether these involve
how they drive to work each day, how they cook a meal,
or how they write a technical article.
What remains an open question is how we should
model such skill hierarchies in computational terms. Al-
ternative approaches to modeling cognition encode the
notion of hierarchy in distinct ways that have different
implications for performance and learning. The most
interesting positions are those which are embedded in
theories of the human cognitive architecture, such as
Soar (Laird et al., 1987), ACT-R (Anderson, 1993), and
EPIC (Kieras & Meyer, 1997). These frameworks make
strong commitments to both the mental representations
of knowledge and to the processes that operate on them.
In the pages that follow, we consider the challenge of
modeling hierarchical skills within a unified theory of
cognition. We begin with a brief review of three such ar-
chitectures and their responses to this issue, then turn to
Icarus, an alternative framework that approaches hier-
archical skills from a different perspective. The key issue
involves whether one can traverse levels of a hierarchy
within a single cognitive cycle. Our illustrative example
comes from a familiar cognitive skill that has a hierar-
chical organization – multi-column subtraction – but we
also consider other models that incorporate multi-level
skills. We conclude by discussing related work and our
plans to extend the architecture’s capabilities.
Previous Research on Hierarchical Skills
A cognitive architecture (Newell, 1990) specifies the in-
frastructure for an intelligent system, indicating those
aspects of a cognitive agent that remain unchanged over
time and across different application domains. Many
proposals for the human cognitive architecture take the
form of a production system, which stores long-term
knowledge as a set of condition-action rules, encodes
short-term elements as declarative list structures, and
relies on a recognize-act cycle that matches against,
and executes rules that alter, the contents of short-term
memory. Soar, ACT-R, and EPIC are all examples of
the production-system paradigm, although other archi-
tectural frameworks are also possible.
Despite the general agreement that cognitive skills are
organized hierarchically, there exist different ways to im-
plement this basic idea. Within a production-system ar-
chitecture, the most natural scheme involves communi-
cation between skills and their subskills through the ad-
dition of elements to short-term memory. For instance,
ACT-R achieves this effect using production rules that
match against a generalized goal structure in their condi-
tion sides, such as the desire to prove that two triangles
are congruent, and, upon firing, create new subgoals,
such as the desire to prove that two lines have the same
length. This approach requires the explicit addition of
goal elements to short-term memory, since this is the
only mechanism through which other production rules
can be accessed.
Soar takes a somewhat different approach to encoding
hierarchical skills that relies on multiple problem spaces.
For instance, Jones and Laird (1997) report a detailed
model of ,ying an aircraft in combat training scenarios.
This system organizes its capabilities in a hierarchical
manner, with each node implemented as a Soar problem
space with associated states, operators, and goals. To
invoke a lower-level problem space, the system adds a
new element to short-term memory that refers to that
space, and it must take similar action in order to exit.
The details differ from those in ACT, but the passing of
messages through short-term memory is similar.
The Prodigy architecture (Minton et al., 1989) pro-
duces cognitive behavior in yet another manner. The
system represents knowledge about actions as Strips-
like operators, and the central module utilizes means-
ends analysis to decompose problems into subproblems.
This gives Prodigy the ability to generate hierarchical
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structures dynamically for each problem it encounters,
and it can use control rules to select among candidate
operators, states, and goals that determine the decom-
positions. However, these hierarchical structures do not
remain in memory after a problem has been solved; in-
stead, the system stores its experience in generalized con-
trol rules that let it reconstruct them for new problems.
Again, this requires adding explicit elements to short-
term memory that serve as mediators.
Thus, despite their diversity, these three frameworks
share a basic assumption about how communication oc-
curs among skills and subskills. This tenet has implica-
tions for the cognitive behavior of systems cast within
them, including whether intermediate results are avail-
able, the time required to execute complex skills, and the
effects of learning on hierarchical structure. We will see
shortly that another response to this issue is possible.
Hierarchical Skills in Icarus
Icarus (Choi et al., in press) is a cognitive architecture
that shares some central features with its predecessors.
For instance, it relies on symbolic list structures to en-
code information, and it makes a clear distinction be-
tween long-term and short-term memories, with the for-
mer storing generic knowledge and the latter containing
specific beliefs. Moreover, Icarus assumes a recognize-
act cycle, which relies on matching patterns in long-term
memory against elements in the short-term store, to de-
termine behavior over time. The framework also comes
with a programming formalism for building knowledge-
based systems.
However, Icarus has other characteristics that distin-
guish it from earlier frameworks in significant ways. One
such feature is its commitment to embodied cognition,
which requires that all symbols in Icarus programs be
grounded in sensori-motor primitives.1 A second key as-
sumption is that each long-term memory structure may
have not only a symbolic description but also an as-
sociated numeric function that computes its value as a
function of sensory attributes. A third novel feature is
that Icarus contains distinct long-term memories for
skills, which store its knowledge about action, and for
concepts, which specify its knowledge about states and
relations. Yet another contribution lies in the strong cor-
respondence between long-term and short-term memory,
specifically that every element in the latter must be an
instance of some structure in the former.
A fifth important assumption, which is our focus here,
is that hierarchical structures play a central role in cog-
nition. Although production systems and related archi-
tectures allow hierarchies, many do not encourage them,
and we maintain that Icarus supports them in a sense
that is stronger and more plausible psychologically than
do frameworks like ACT and Soar. To understand this
claim, we must first examine the architecture’s represen-
tation for skills and the relations among them.
1Some recent architectural variants, like ACT-R/PM and
EPIC-Soar, incorporate sensori-motor modules, but these
were grafted onto systems based on theories of human prob-
lem solving, whereas Icarus included them from the outset.
Icarus skills bear a strong resemblance to production
rules, but they have an even closer kinship to the oper-
ators in Prodigy and Strips. Each skill has a name,
arguments, and some optional fields. These include:
 a :start field, which encodes the situation that must
hold to initiate the skill;
 a :requires field, which must be satisfied throughout
the skill’s execution across multiple cycles; and
 an :effects field, which specifies the desired situa-
tion the skill is intended to achieve.
For example, Table 1 shows a complete set of Icarus
skills for the domain of multi-column subtraction, includ-
ing borrow, which has the objective of getting ?digit1
to be greater than ?digit2. This skill can start only if
?digit2 is greater than ?digit1 and if a third element,
?digit3, is nonzero. Moreover, its execution requires that
?digit1 be above ?digit2, that ?digit3 be in the top row,
and that ?digit3 be left of ?digit1.
In addition, each Icarus skill includes another field
that specifies how to decompose it into subskills or ac-
tions. This may be either:
 an :ordered field, which indicates the agent should
consider the components in a specific order;
 an :unordered field, which identifies a choice among
skill components; or
 an :actions field, in which a primitive skill specifies
one or more actions that are directly executable.
For example, borrow states that one should invoke decre-
ment on one digit and call add-ten on another, in that
order. These are both primitive skills that play the same
role as Strips operators in a traditional planning sys-
tem, with their :start fields serving as preconditions
and their :effects fields specifying the desired results
of execution.
The table also clarifies that Icarus can specify mul-
tiple ways to decompose each skill in this manner, much
as a Prolog program can include more than one Horn
clause with the same head. Different decompositions of
a given skill must have the same name, number of ar-
guments, and effects. However, they can differ in their
start conditions, requirements, and subskills. The skill
borrow has two such expansions, one for borrowing from
nonzero elements and another for borrowing across zero,
which involves a recursive call to itself.
Each skill decomposition may also include a numeric
function that encodes the utility expected if it exe-
cutes this decomposition. This function is specified by a
:percepts field that matches against the values of ob-
jects’ attributes and a :value field that states an arith-
metic combination of these quantities. The expected
utility for a skill decomposition is a linear function of the
numeric descriptors matched by that skill. Such func-
tions are not required when the available skills specify
deterministic behavior, as do those in the table, but we
have used them in other domains and we mention them
here for completeness.
We should note that Icarus also organizes its long-
term conceptual memory in a hierarchy, with higher-level
concepts being defined in terms of lower-level ones, which
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Table 1: Icarus skills for multi-column subtraction.
(subtract ()
:percepts ((digit ?digit))
:requires ((top-row ?digit) (right-col ?digit))
:unordered ((process ?digit))
(subtract ()
:requires ((processed ?digit1) (top-row ?digit2)
(left-of ?digit2 ?digit1))
:unordered ((process ?digit2))
(process (?digit)
:ordered ((borrow ?digit)
(find-difference ?digit))
:effects ((processed ?digit)))
(borrow (?digit1)
:percepts ((digit ?digit2) (digit ?digit3))
:start ((greater ?digit2 ?digit1)
(nonzero ?digit3))
:requires ((above ?digit1 ?digit2)
(top-row ?digit3)
(left-of ?digit3 ?digit1))
:ordered ((decrement ?digit3)
(add-ten ?digit1))
:effects ((greater ?digit1 ?digit2)))
(borrow (?digit1)
:percepts ((digit ?digit2) (digit ?digit3))
:start ((greater ?digit2 ?digit1)
(zero ?digit3))
:requires ((above ?digit1 ?digit2)
(top-row ?digit3)
(left-of ?digit3 ?digit1))
:ordered ((borrow ?digit3))
:effects ((greater ?digit1 ?digit2)))
(decrement (?digit)
:percepts ((digit ?digit val ?val))
:start ((nonzero ?digit))
:actions ((*cross-out ?digit)
(*decrement ?digit ?val))
:effects ((crossed-out ?digit)))
(add-ten (?digit1)
:percepts ((digit ?digit1 val ?val1)
(digit ?digit2) (digit ?digit3))
:start ((above ?digit1 ?digit2)
(top-row ?digit3)
(left-of ?digit3 ?digit1)
(crossed-out ?digit3))
:actions ((*add-ten ?digit1 ?val1))
:effects ((greater ?digit1 ?digit2)))
(find-difference (?digit1)
:percepts ((digit ?digit1 col ?col val ?val1)
(digit ?digit2 col ?col val ?val2))
:start ((above ?digit1 ?digit2)
(greater-or-equal ?digit1 ?digit2))
:actions ((*add-difference ?col ?val1 ?val2))
:effects ((processed ?digit1)))
ultimately connect to perceptual elements. The literals
that appear in the :start, :requires, and :effects
fields must be defined concepts, thus linking the skill and
conceptual memories in an interleaved manner. The ar-
chitecture also incorporates three short-term memories.
These include a perceptual buffer, updated on each cycle,
that contains descriptions of perceived objects, a concep-
tual short-term memory that contains inferences derived
from the perceptual buffer, and an intention memory
that contains instances of skills the system intends to ex-
ecute. The elements in these memories are simple literals
but, because their predicates correspond to hierarchical
structures in long-term memory, they encode substantial
information about the agent’s beliefs and intentions.
Distinctive Aspects of Icarus Hierarchies
From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that
Icarus utilizes a more structured representation of
knowledge than traditional cognitive architectures, but
the implications of this structure depend directly on the
processes that operate over them. Together, they enable
cognitive processing that exhibits important differences
from that in older frameworks.
One such characteristic involves the ability of Icarus’
skills to reference subskills by their names, rather than
through the indirect references used in Soar, ACT, and
Prodigy. For example, the borrow skill in Table 1 calls
directly on decrement and add-ten. Icarus’ approach
has some aspects of subroutine calls in procedural pro-
gramming languages but, when combined with multiple
expansions for each skill (such as two variants for bor-
row), effectively embeds these calls within an AND/OR
search. This makes our formalism a close relative of
logic programming languages like Prolog, which uses a
very similar syntax to support logical reasoning. But like
other cognitive architectures, Icarus is concerned with
agents that exist over time, so it situates these compu-
tations within a recognize-act cycle.
As a result, Icarus retains the overall ,avor of a pro-
duction system but gains the ability to invoke subskills
directly, rather than through the creation of short-term
memory elements. This lets it execute complex skills in
a top-down manner without having to descend through
the hierarchy one step at a time. Icarus can take advan-
tage of this hierarchical organization without requiring
the generation of explicit intermediate goal structures
that are needed by production systems.
Recall that Icarus includes a short-term memory that
contains skill instances the agent considers worth execut-
ing. On each cycle, for each skill instance, the architec-
ture retrieves all decompositions of the general skill and
checks whether they are applicable. A skill is applica-
ble if, for its current variable bindings, its :effects field
does not match, the :requires field matches, and, if the
system has not yet started executing it, the :start field
matches the current situation. Moreover, at least one of
its subskills must also be applicable. Since this test is
recursive, a skill is only applicable if there exists at least
one acceptable path downward to executable actions.
For each such path, the architecture computes the ex-
pected value and selects the candidate with the highest
utility for execution. For a given path, it uses the value
function stored with each skill and the numeric values
matched in that skill’s :percepts field to calculate the
expected value at each level, summing the results along
the path to compute the overall score. For instance, for
the path ((subtract), (process digit11), (borrow digit11),
(decrement digit21)), the system would sum the ex-
pected value for all four levels to determine the utility
of decrementing. This means that the same action can
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have different values on a given cycle depending on which
higher-level skill invokes it, providing a natural way for
the hierarchy to incorporate the effect of context.
The architecture treats a skill expansion differently
depending on whether its components appear in an
:unordered set or an :ordered list. If they are un-
ordered, the module considers each of the subskills and
selects the one that yields the highest scoring subpath.
If they are ordered, it instead treats the list as a reactive
program that considers each subskill in reverse order. If
the final subskill is applicable, then it expands further
only down paths that include that subskill. Otherwise,
it considers the penultimate skill, the one before that,
and so forth. The intuition is that the subskills are or-
dered because later ones are closer to the parent skill’s
objective, and thus should be preferred when applicable.
We should clarify that Icarus’ consideration of alter-
native paths through its skill hierarchy does not involve
generative planning. On each cycle, the architecture
finds the best pathway through a set of ,exible but con-
strained structures. The process is much closer to the ex-
ecution of a hierarchical task network (e.g., Myers, 1999)
than to the construction of a plan from primitive oper-
ators. Such computation can be done efficiently within
a single recognize-act cycle, at least for well-structured
skill hierarchies. One can craft Icarus programs that
are expensive to evaluate, but the same holds for pro-
duction systems with complex conditions on their rules.
An Illustrative Example
We can best clarify Icarus’ operation with an exam-
ple that uses the skills from Table 1 on the subtraction
problem 305   147. The system interacts with a simu-
lated environment that, on each cycle, deposits percep-
tual elements such as (digit digit11 col 1 row 1 val 5)
and (digit digit12 col 1 row 2 val 7) into the percep-
tual buffer. A conceptual recognition process draws in-
ferences from these elements, such as (greater digit12
digit11) and (above digit11 digit12), which it adds to
conceptual short-term memory.
The model also begins with the single top-level in-
tention (subtract), which focuses cognitive behavior on
the skills in the table even if others are present in long-
term memory. On the first cycle, the system would
consider both expansions of subtract, selecting the first
one and binding ?digit to digit11, the object in the top
row and right column. This skill instance would in turn
invoke (process digit11), which would consider its sub-
skills find-difference and borrow. Only the latter skill has
its :start and :requires fields met, specifically by its
second expansion, which handles situations that require
borrowing from zero.
This skill instance, (borrow digit11), then invokes
itself recursively, producing the call (borrow digit21),
where the argument denotes the digit 0 in the top row
and second column. Because the digit to its left is
nonzero, this instantiation can only utilize the first ex-
pansion of borrow, which in turn calls on (decrement
digit31) in its :ordered field, since its preconditions are
satisfied, but those for add-ten, which occurs later in
this ordering, are not. Because decrement is a primitive
skill, it becomes the terminal node for an acceptable path
through the skill hierarchy. Also, because this is the only
such path Icarus finds, it executes the instantiated ac-
tions (*cross-out digit31) and (*decrement digit31 3).
These actions alters the environment and lead to an-
other execution cycle. This time Icarus again finds a
single acceptable path that shares all but the last skill
instance with that from the first round. The difference
is that digit31 has been crossed out, making (decrement
digit31) inapplicable but enabling the skill instance (add-
ten digit21). Again this is the only acceptable path
through the hierarchy, so Icarus executes the action
associated with this primitive skill, thus altering the sim-
ulated display so that digit21’s value is increased by ten.
On the third cycle, the architecture again finds only
one path, in this case ((subtract), (process digit11), (bor-
row digit11), (decrement digit21)), since the top number
in the second column is no longer zero and can be safely
decremented. This action enables execution of the path
((subtract), (process digit11), (borrow digit11), (add-ten
digit11)) on the fourth cycle, after which (on the fifth
cycle) the model selects the path ((subtract), (process
digit11), (find-difference digit11)), which writes the two
digits’ difference in the rightmost column.
This altered situation leads Icarus to add the infer-
ence (processed digit11), which on the sixth cycle causes
it to select the second expansion of subtract; this in-
vokes the skill instance (process digit21) on the revised
top digit in the second row. Because this digit has al-
ready been incremented by ten, it is greater than the one
below it, so the skill instance (find-difference digit21) is
now applicable. Execution of this path produces an an-
swer in the second column, which leads on the next cycle
to processing of the third column and to an answer there
as well. No paths are satisfied on additional cycles, so the
system idles thereafter, waiting for new developments.
General Implications
The sample trace above does not illustrate all of Icarus’
capabilities, since it ignores details about the conceptual
inference process and it does not utilize value functions.
However, it should make clear that Icarus operates over
its skill hierarchy in a different manner than frameworks
like Soar and ACT-R. They can model behavior on com-
plex tasks in two distinct ways. One scheme assumes
hierarchical rules or problem spaces, which require addi-
tional cycles for stepping downward through each level of
the hierarchy. Another assumes that learning has pro-
duced compiled rules that eliminate the hierarchy and
thus the need for intermediate goal structures. Such
compilation methods have been used to explain both the
power law of learning and reduced access to subgoals
(e.g., Neves & Anderson, 1981).
However, it seems unlikely that the hierarchical struc-
ture of skills disappears entirely with practice, and
Icarus offers an account that avoids the above di-
chotomy. An architecture that traverses levels in a skill
hierarchy within a single recognize-act cycle also predicts
that intermediate structures will be inacessible, and the
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power law follows from the construction of the hierarchy
itself, which we discuss later. This account also makes
different predictions than traditional schemes about the
number of cycles, and thus the time, required to accom-
plish tasks with hierarchical and recursive structures.
Again, we can use multi-column subtraction to illus-
trate this point. A standard production-system model
for this domain, like that described by Langley and Ohls-
son (1984), finds the difference between two numbers in
a column when the top one is larger but otherwise adds
a goal to process or borrow from the adjacent column.
Analysis reveals that such a model will take 5 · b + 2 · n
cycles to complete a problem with b columns that require
borrowing and n columns that do not. In contrast, the
Icarus model in Table 1 requires 3 ·b+2 ·n cycles on the
same problems. The two frameworks both indicate that
solution time will increase with the number of borrow
columns, but they predict quite different slopes.
Experiments with human subjects should reveal which
alternative offers a better explanation of skilled behavior
in this arena. We have not yet carried out such stud-
ies, but to test our framework’s generality, we have de-
veloped Icarus models for behavior in other domains
that appear to have hierarchical organizations. One in-
volves the well-known Tower of Hanoi puzzle, which can
be solved using a hierarchical strategy. Our model for
behavior on this task includes three primitive skills for
lifting, lowering, and moving a disk sideways, along with
one high-level skill for moving a disk to a target peg that,
in two expansions, calls itself recursively. However, the
Tower of Hanoi is like subtraction in that the environ-
ment changes only when the agent takes some action.
To ensure that Icarus can also support behavior in
more dynamic domains, we have developed two addi-
tional models. One involves hierarchical skills for bal-
ancing an upright pole by moving its lower end back
and forth. This system includes two high-level skills with
knowledge about the order in which the four primitive
skills should be invoked. As described elsewhere (Choi
et al., in press), we have also constructed a system that
drives a vehicle and delivers packages in a simulated in-
city environment. This model includes 46 skills that are
organized in a hierarchy five levels deep. The high-level
skills let the agent drive straight in lanes, get into right-
most lanes, slow for intersections, drive through inter-
sections, turn at intersections, and make U turns. These
terminate in actions for changing speed and altering the
wheel angle. Another 13 skills support the delivery of
packages to target addresses.
We have not attempted to compare the details of these
systems’ operations to human behaviors on the same
tasks. Nor have we attempted to show that Icarus pro-
duces more robust behavior than programs cast in earlier
frameworks like Soar and ACT-R. Rather, our goal has
been to demonstrate the same broad functionality as we
observe in humans, including their apparent organization
of complex skills into hierarchies. We have also aimed to
show that Icarus constitutes a viable point in the space
of cognitive architectures, which we believe has been too
thinly explored to date.
Related Efforts and Future Research
Although Icarus incorporates a number of features that
distinguish it from typical cognitive architectures, some
related ideas have appeared elsewhere under different
guises. For instance, our framework has much in com-
mon with the ‘reactive planning’ movement, which often
utilizes hierarchical procedures that combine cognition,
perception, and action in physical domains.2 Examples
include PRS (Georgeoff et al., 1985), teleoreactive pro-
grams (Nilsson, 1994), and the 3T robotic architecture
(Bonasso et al., 1997), and some case-based planners
(e.g., Hammond, 1993) embody similar notions.
However, within this paradigm, only Freed’s (1998)
APEX has been proposed as a candidate architecture for
human cognition. This framework shares Icarus’ com-
mitment to hierarchical skills, but it has a more procedu-
ral ,avor and it does not incorporate a separate concep-
tual memory or enforce a correspondence between long-
term and short-term structures. Another kindred spirit
is Albus and Meystel’s (2001) RCS architecture, which
organizes knowledge hierarchically and makes a clear dis-
tinction between logical structures and value judgments.
Icarus and RCS share many common features, but they
also retain many differences due to their origins in cog-
nitive modeling and control theory, respectively.
We should clarify that, as a cognitive architecture,
Icarus still requires some development. The framework
lacks many processing assumptions that would make it
more plausible as a general theory of human behavior.
For instance, it lacks any limits on perceptual bandwidth
that require attention, which arises even on routine tasks
like subtraction. We intend to model such behavior by
introducing an action that focuses the agent’s attention
on an object and deposits its description in the percep-
tual buffer, with Icarus being able to apply this action
to only one visible object per cycle. This should produce
longer subtraction runs that require additional steps for
attentional events, much as in Anderson, Matessa, and
Lebiere’s (1997) ACT-R model of visual attention.
We should also extend our models for subtraction
and other domains to handle lower levels of behavior
more faithfully. The skills in Table 1 terminate with ac-
tions for decrementing, adding ten, and finding a differ-
ence, but these can be further decomposed into subskills
for writing specific digits and even drawing individual
lines. Our claim to model embodied cognition would be
stronger if we extended the skill hierarchy downward in
this fashion. We should also extend the hierarchy up-
ward to model choices about which problem to tackle
when many are present on the page. Such an expanded
system would model subtraction behavior in a more com-
plete way than do most accounts.
However, a more important omission concerns the ori-
gin of Icarus’ hierarchical skills. To handle this, we
hypothesize a mechanism that is related to chunking in
Soar and production composition in earlier versions of
ACT. Although humans prefer to use routine behav-
iors when possible, they can, within limits, combine
2Our model of subtraction skills also has similarities to
VanLehn’s (1990) hierarchical treatment of this domain.
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knowledge elements when needed to solve novel prob-
lems. Means-ends analysis has been implicated in such
situations, so we plan to incorporate this method into
future versions of the architecture. The generalized re-
sults of means-ends problem solving would be cached
as a new skill. However, unlike chunking and composi-
tion, which produce ,at rules that eliminate structure,
Icarus would store a new hierarchical skill that refers
to the original ones as components. This method should
lead to the construction of skill hierarchies in a gradual,
bottom-up manner as an agent learns about a domain.
Concluding Remarks
In closing, we should review the main claims we have
made about hierarchical skills and their treatment within
various cognitive architectures. There seems to be gen-
eral agreement that skills are organized in some hierar-
chical fashion, but most existing models implement the
invocation of subskills through goal structures that are
deposited in short-term memory. In contrast, Icarus
produces hierarchical behavior by letting skills commu-
nicate directly with their subskills, as in procedural lan-
guages and logic programming formalisms.
We illustrated this idea by presenting an Icarus
model for multi-column subtraction and tracing its be-
havior on a specific problem. We saw that this system
takes the same basic steps as a production-system model,
but that steps involved in traversing the skill hierar-
chy occur within a single recognize-act cycle rather than
across successive cycles. This theoretical difference leads
to different predictions about the time required to exe-
cute complex skills. Future research should test these
predictions and extend Icarus to incorporate mecha-
nisms for attention and construction of skill hierarchies.
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Abstract 
Because unbiased learners are unlikely to arrive at the 
appropriate generalizations of their language (Gold, 
1967), accounts of acquisition must examine the 
nature of learning biases.  One form of bias is 
learners’ prior learning experience.  Adult participants 
familiarized with a category-induction language 
learned a language with the same underlying structure 
but novel vocabulary much more rapidly than naïve 
learners (Lany, Gómez, & Gerken, 2004).  In the 
present experiments, we extend our investigations of 
prior learning experience by manipulating whether 
learners were initially exposed to fully- or partially-
cued structure.  Generalization is hindered by prior 
exposure to fully-cued structure, but enhanced by prior 
exposure to structure that is partially-cued.  The 
results are important for understanding of the role of 
prior experience in constraining language acquisition. 
 
Introduction 
The syntax of natural languages is highly 
complex. Without corrective feedback, 
unconstrained learners are unlikely to converge 
on the grammar of their linguistic community 
(Gold, 1967).  However, language learners 
regularly manage to discover the underlying 
patterns of their language while ignoring 
irrelevant structure, suggesting that they are 
constrained.  Recent work in artificial language 
learning has begun to investigate forms of 
learning constraints, or ways in which learning 
processes might be guided. 
Saffran (2002) demonstrated modality 
constraints on learning an artificial language by 
exposing adult learners to a phrase-structure 
language in which the presence of one item in a 
phrase predicted the presence of another item 
(Language P), or to a phrase-structure language 
in which predictive relationships were absent 
(Language N).  Participants were presented with 
either an auditory or visual version of Language 
P or N.  Learning of Language P was better when 
presentation was auditory.  Visual language 
learners acquired the predictive and non-
predictive languages equally well, suggesting 
that learners’ sensitivity to patterns and 
relationships varies as a function of modality. 
Recent work by Gómez (2002; Gómez, 
Welch, & Lany, 2003) speaks to another way 
learning may be guided. Gómez’ studies suggest 
that learners selectively tune in to regularities by 
seeking out the most reliable structure in their 
input.  While learners are highly sensitive to 
conditional probabilities of adjacent elements 
(e.g., Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996), Gómez 
demonstrated that when conditional probabilities 
between adjacent elements are low or unreliable, 
learners attend to relationships between non-
adjacent elements.  These findings indicate that 
learners are biased to take the statistical 
reliability of a structure into account.  
Importantly, languages make use of various cues 
highlighting relevant structure, not just statistical 
ones1.   
Saffran’s (2002) work suggests that learners 
are biased before they even begin to learn 
language.  Gómez’s work (2002; Gómez et al., 
2003) suggests that statistical characteristics of 
the input itself can bias learning.  Research also 
suggests learners can be biased by prior 
experience.   
Saffran and Thiessen (2003) provided 
evidence that once infants form phonological 
generalizations based on regularities in their 
input, those generalizations influence how they 
parse new speech materials.  Lany, Gómez, and 
Gerken (2004) demonstrated that generalization 
occurs at the abstract level of syntax-like 
structure.  In these experiments, adults were 
exposed to a language consisting of categories of 
words, with restrictions on how categories could 
combine (see Braine, 1987; Frigo & MacDonald, 
1998; Gerken, Wilson, & Lewis, in press; 
Gómez & Lakusta, in press).  The language is 
composed of words belonging to the categories 
a, b, X, and Y.  As in natural languages, the rules 
                                                 
1 For example, languages are rich with prosodic cues 
to syntactic structure, and learners are sensitive to 
such cues beginning in early infancy (see Jusczyk, 
1997 for an overview). 
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involve relationships between word categories.  
Specifically, the language has restrictions on 
how categories of different types can be 
combined within a string, such that a elements 
are paired with X elements and b elements with 
Ys, but not vice versa. (See Figure 1.) 
 
 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
a1 a1X1 a1X2 a1X3 a1X4 a1X5 
a2 a2X1 a2X2 a2X3 ?? a2X5 
 
 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
b1 b1Y1 b1Y2 b1Y3 b1Y4 b1Y5 
b2 b2Y1 b2Y2 b2Y3 ?? b2Y5 
 
Figure 1.  A typical aX bY paradigm.  Learners are 
exposed to a subset of the grammatical pairings of 
markers and content-words then are tested for 
generalization to the withheld (??) pairings. 
Learners exposed to 18 or 6 minutes of the 
aX bY language successfully acquired the 
language in the former but not the latter 
condition.  However, learners exposed to 18 
minutes of one language, and then transferred to 
a second language with the same underlying 
pattern, but none of the same words, learned the 
pattern with just 6 minutes of exposure.    
The findings of Lany et al. (2004) 
demonstrate that learners do not remain the same 
over the course of acquisition.  Rather, the 
learning process changes them, constraining the 
ways they perceive and learn about subsequent 
input.  Thus, prior experience represents an 
additional constraint enabling learners to 
successfully acquire language.   
Using this procedure, we can begin to 
investigate other ways learning might be 
facilitated by prior experience.  In doing so, it is 
important to explore the extent to which this 
process might be useful in natural language 
acquisition.   
 In English, consistency in head direction 
results in a co-occurrence relationship between 
determiners and nouns, and also between 
auxiliaries and verbs.  These relationships both 
involve a functional element preceding a lexical 
one, and restrictions on co-occurrences of 
categories of functional and lexical elements 
(similar to the aX bY structure used by Lany et 
al., 2004).  Importantly, learners only truly 
acquire categories, and their co-occurrence 
restrictions, when there are cues indicating 
category membership (Frigo & McDonald, 1998; 
see also Gerken et al., in press).  However, cues 
in natural language are variable, differing with 
strength according to category.  For example, a 
corpus analysis (Lany et al., 2004) showed that 
in infant-directed speech, a greater proportion of 
nouns are marked with morpho-syntactic cues 
than verbs – e.g. nouns were fully cued by a 
determiner and a plural or diminutive ending 
20% of the time and partially cued by either a 
determiner or an ending 60% of the time.  Verbs 
were fully cued both by an auxiliary and 
inflectional ending 1% of the time and by one or 
the other 20% of the time.  Thus languages 
contain different degrees of fully- and partially-
cued structure.   
In this study, we asked whether learners 
with prior exposure to a well-cued pattern have 
an advantage over naïve learners in acquiring a 
version of that pattern in which the cues 
highlighting relevant structure are diminished.  
In Experiment 1, we exposed a control group to 
18 minutes of a partially-cued aX bY language, 
in which only 60% of the X and Y words had 
cues to category membership.  We exposed an 
experimental group to 18 minutes of a fully-cued 
aX bY language, in which 100% of the X and Y 
words had cues to category membership, and 
then transferred them to 18 minutes of the 
partially-cued aX bY language.  Interestingly, 
learners with prior exposure to a fully-cued 
language did not subsequently learn a partially 
cued language better than the control group. 
However, in Experiment 2, learners with prior 
exposure to a partially-cued language learned a 
second partially-cued language better than naïve 
learners.  Why might this be the case?  Learners 
initially exposed to the fully-cued language may 
have learned the perfectly predictive surface 
regularities resulting from the underlying 
structure, as opposed to the category 
relationships.  These surface regularities were 
probabilistic in the partially-cued language, and 
thus a focus on this aspect of structure would not 
result in successful learning at transfer.  In other 
words, perhaps learners of the fully-cued 
language were hindered by their focus on the 
surface regularities of the strings.  Learners of 
the partially-cued language were not led to rely 
exclusively on a cue that would later be less 
reliable.  We speculate on factors facilitating this 
group’s transfer in the discussion.      
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants  Ninety-five University of Arizona 
undergraduate students participated for course 
credit, forty-eight in the experimental condition.  
Materials  Learners in these experiments were 
exposed to category-induction languages of the 
form aX bY.  We constructed both a fully-cued 
and a partially-cued aX bY language.  The fully-
cued language had two versions which shared the 
same underlying structure, but had none of the 
same words (two versions were necessary to test 
transfer).  The vocabulary of each version of the 
language consisted of two a elements (ong and 
rud in Version A, and ush and dak in Version B) 
and two b elements (alt and pel in Version A, 
and erd and vot in Version B).  The vocabulary 
of each version also consisted of six bisyllabic X 
words and six bisyllabic Y words.  The X words 
all ended with the same syllable (“-ul” in 
Version A and “-it” in Version B).  Similarly, all 
Y words shared the same final syllable (“-ee” in 
Version A and “-oo” in Version B.   
Additionally, each version had two variants, or 
grammars.  The two grammars of a version were 
composed of the same set of words, but differed 
in how they were combined – strings from 
Grammar 1 (G1) took the form aX bY and strings 
from Grammar 2 (G2) took the form aY bX.  For 
example, strings from Version A, G1were ong 
bivul and erd suffee, and strings from G2 were 
ong suffee and erd bivul.  In Version B, G1 
strings were ush zamit and alt wifoo, and G2 
strings were ush wifoo and alt zamit.   The fully-
cued versions of the language consisted of 24 
possible strings (12 aX strings and 12 bY 
strings), however, 4 strings (2 aX and 2 bY 
strings) were withheld from familiarization to be 
presented at test, so the familiarization set 
consisted of 20 strings. 
The test materials for the fully-cued 
languages consisted of 16 strings, half 
grammatical and half ungrammatical.  Four 
grammatical strings had been withheld during 
familiarization, four strings had been presented 
during training, and eight strings were 
ungrammatical strings (these were from the 
unheard language).  Strings that were 
grammatical for one group of participants were 
ungrammatical for the other. 
The materials for the partially-cued 
languages were the same as those of the fully-
cued languages, with the exception that only 
60% (four of six) of the X and Y words had 
endings cueing their category membership. 
Uncued words were bisyllabic, and each had a 
distinct ending (i.e. an ending that was not 
present on any of the other words, cued or 
uncued).  Examples are jeeloff, skyjer, bowda, 
and pefto.  These uncued words replaced four of 
the cued words from the fully-cued version of 
the language. The partially-cued versions of the 
language consisted of 24 possible strings (12 aX 
strings and 12 bY strings), however, 8 strings (4 
aX and 4 bY strings) were withheld from 
familiarization to be presented at test, so the 
familiarization set consisted of 16 strings. 
The test materials for the partially-cued 
languages consisted of 32 strings, half 
grammatical and half ungrammatical.  Eight 
grammatical strings had been withheld from 
familiarization (four were cued and four were 
uncued).  Eight strings had been presented 
during familiarization (four were cued, four were 
uncued).  There were also 16 strings from the 
grammar of the unheard language. 
The process underlying successful learning 
of this language is twofold (Braine, 1987; Frigo 
& MacDonald, 1998).  Learners must first 
discover that there are different categories of 
words, which requires that words from different 
categories be differentiable based on their 
semantic or phonological characteristics.  Once 
learners are sensitive to the categories, they can 
then learn that there are restrictions on how 
categories co-occur.  Learners with knowledge of 
co-occurrence restrictions can generalize to 
novel combinations that respect these 
restrictions.  When cues to category membership 
are present, generalizations can be accomplished 
through attention to the pairing of as and bs with 
the endings of the X and Y words.  Additionally, 
learners exposed to the partially cued language, 
can generalize to novel combinations involving 
uncued words by noting that if an X-word is 
paired with a particular a word, it can co-occur 
with other a words, but not with b words.   
Procedure  There were eight conditions in this 
experiment, resulting from the between-subjects 
manipulations of familiarization type (Transfer 
vs. Control), version (Version A vs. Version B), 
grammar (Grammar 1 vs. Grammar 2),  
Aside from instructions at the start of the 
familiarization phase, which were delivered by 
the experimenter, the entire experiment was 
conducted on a Hewlett Packard Brio PC 
running SuperLab 2.01 software.   
In the Transfer condition, participants 
listened over headphones to 18 blocks 
(approximately 18 minutes) of randomly ordered 
strings from their fully-cued training language, 
and then answered two iterations of 16 test 
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questions, each in a different random order and 
separated from each other by a brief pause.  
Using the “Y” and “N” keys on their keyboard, 
participants made yes/no judgments on the 
grammaticality of each string.  They then 
repeated this familiarization and test procedure 
for a partially-cued version of the language with 
novel vocabulary.  In the Control condition, 
participants were familiarized with 18 blocks of 
the partially-cued language before test. 
For the fully-cued language, participants 
sensitive to the aX bY structure should endorse 
grammatical test strings, including those 
withheld during training, more often than they 
endorse ungrammatical ones. Similarly, for 
participants familiarized with a partially-cued 
language, sensitivity to the aX bY structure 
would be indicated by higher endorsement rates 
to withheld grammatical strings (both cued and 
uncued) than to ungrammatical ones. 
Results and discussion  Preliminary analyses 
indicated that there were no differences in 
learning as a function of language version or 
grammar, so we collapsed across these variables. 
Mean endorsement rates to test strings are found 
in Table 1. 
We tested whether participants in the 
Transfer group learned the partially-cued 
language better than Control participants.  We 
did a three-way mixed ANOVA, with a between-
participant factor of familiarization type 
(Transfer vs. Control), and the within-participant 
factors of test string familiarity (heard vs. 
unheard), and test string cues (cued vs. uncued).  
The dependant measure was the difference in 
endorsement rates to grammatical test strings and 
their ungrammatical counterparts. 
There was a main effect of test string 
familiarity, F (1, 92) = 88.89, p < .001, with the 
difference in endorsement rates to heard 
grammatical strings and ungrammatical ones (M 
= .27, SE = .026) more than to unheard ones (M 
= .05, SE = .022). There were no other main 
effects or interactions. Thus, both Transfer and 
Control participants endorsed heard grammatical 
test strings more often than unheard grammatical 
strings, but the Transfer group did not perform 
better than the control group. Neither group 
showed differences in endorsement rates to 
unheard grammatical and ungrammatical strings, 
ts ≤ 1.82, ps ≥ .076.  Thus there was no 
generalization to unheard items.  
These findings suggest that Transfer learners 
did not benefit from their prior exposure to a 
fully-cued aX bY language.  One explanation is 
that learners cannot acquire an aX bY pattern 
with only partial cues, regardless of their prior 
experience.  However, given that other studies 
provide evidence of learning partially cued aX 
bY structure (e.g. Frigo & McDonald, 1998), this 
explanation seems unlikely.  An alternative 
explanation is that learners exposed to a fully-
cued language focused only on the surface 
relationship between the a and b elements and 
endings on the X and Y words, essentially 
learning a co-occurrence relationship between 
the first word in the string and the ending on the 
second.   If this were the case, they would learn 
only the surface regularities resulting from the 
underlying structure as opposed to the category 
relationships.  Experiencing a perfectly 
predictive relationship between the first word 
and the ending of the second may have led 
Transfer learners to tune-in to this aspect of the 
partially-cued language as opposed to the 
abstract structure.   
We next tested whether learners would 
transfer from a partially-cued aX bY language, by 
exposing them to a partially-cued aX bY 
language before transferring them to another 
version of this partially-cued language.   Because 
the initial language does not have a perfect 
correspondence between the initial word and 
ending of the final word of a string, learners 
would not likely focus solely on it, and thus 
might perform differently than the Experiment 1 
learners at transfer.   
 
Table 1:  Endorsement Rates to Test Items with Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 
 Grammatical 
Heard  
Grammatical 
Unheard  Ungrammatical 
Expt 1 Cued Uncued  Cued Uncued  Cued Uncued 
      Transfer .76  (.028) .77  (.031)  .54  (.029) .60  (.028)  .50  (.031) .55  (.032) 
      Control .80  (.020) .75  (.026)  .62  (.025) .56  (.031)  .56  (.029) .59  (.026) 
Expt 2         
  Transfer-2 .83  (.028) .80  (.026)  .59  (.036) .54  (.031)  .48  (.033) .48  (.032) 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants  Forty-eight University of Arizona 
undergraduates participated for course credit. 
Materials  The language materials were the two 
partially-cued versions of the language used in 
Experiment 1.  
Procedure  The procedure for Experiment 2 
participants was the same as for the Transfer 
group in Experiment 1, such that participants 
were familiarized and tested on one version of 
the language in Phase 1, and then transferred to 
the other version  in Phase 2.  Half of the 
participants were exposed to Version A of the 
partially-cued language and then Version B, and 
half to Version B and then A.  This group is 
referred to as the Transfer-2 group. 
Results and discussion  We wanted to 
determine whether participants in the Transfer-2 
group learned the partially-cued language they 
heard in Phase 2 better than the control 
participants from Experiment 1.  Thus, we did a 
three-way mixed ANOVA, with the between-
participant factor of familiarization type 
(Transfer-2 vs. Control), and the within-
participant factors of test string familiarity (heard 
vs. unheard), and test string cues (cued vs. 
uncued).  The dependant measure was the 
difference in endorsement rates to grammatical 
and ungrammatical test strings.   Mean 
endorsement rates to test items can be found in 
Table 1. 
We found that the difference in the Transfer-
2 learners’ endorsement rates to grammatical vs. 
ungrammatical test items (M = .21, SE = .030) 
was higher than that of the control group from 
Experiment 1(M = .11, SE = .031), F (1, 93) = 
5.69, p = .019.  There was an effect of test string 
familiarity, with the difference in endorsement 
rates to heard grammatical test strings and 
ungrammatical ones (M = .27, SE = .026) greater 
than the difference between unheard grammatical 
test items and ungrammatical ones (M = .05, SE 
= .022), F (1, 93) = 102.45, p < .001.  There was 
also an effect of test string cues.  The difference 
in endorsement rates to grammatical test strings 
with cues and ungrammatical strings (M = .20, 
SE = .026) was significantly greater than the 
difference to grammatical test strings without 
cues and ungrammatical strings (M = .13, SE = 
.023), F (1, 93) = 6.50, p = .012.  There were no 
interactions between any of the three variables, 
suggesting that learning in the Transfer-2 group 
was generally better than the Control group.   
Paired-sample t tests comparing 
endorsement rates for each of the four types of 
grammatical strings and ungrammatical ones 
indicate that the Transfer-2 group learned the 
underlying structure of the language (see Table 1 
for means and standard errors).  Endorsement 
rates to grammatical heard test strings, cued and 
uncued, were higher than those to ungrammatical 
ones, ts (47) ≥ 6.36, ps ≤ .001.  Critically, 
endorsement rates to unheard grammatical 
strings with cues were higher than those to 
ungrammatical strings, t (47) = 2.10, p = .04.  
(Recall that control subjects in Experiment 1 did 
not show such learning).  Endorsement rates to 
grammatical unheard strings without cues did not 
differ from those to ungrammatical ones, t (47) = 
1.68, p = .1.   
In sum, learners with prior exposure to a 
partially-cued language subsequently learn a new 
version of such a language better than naïve 
learners.  Thus, these findings shed light on how 
learners might acquire patterns in the absence of 
robust cues typically necessary for successful 
learning.     
 
General discussion 
In this set of experiments, we demonstrated that 
what learners can acquire from their input 
changes as they gain experience with a particular 
type of structure.  Our results suggest that 
learners exposed to a fully-cued category-
induction language become sensitive to a 
phonological pattern in the form of a perfect 
correspondence between a and b words and the 
endings on the X and Y words.  Because they 
have not become sensitive to the underlying 
category relationships, only to the surface 
correlates of this pattern, their learning of a 
partially-cued language in which this relationship 
is probabilistic is not enhanced relative to 
controls.  However, exposure to a partially-cued 
language facilitates subsequent acquisition of 
another partially-cued language.  What is the 
basis for generalization in these learners?  Recall 
from Experiment 1 that control participants 
exposed to a partially-cued language do not 
generalize to new strings.  Tranfer-2 learners, 
whose initial learning phase was identical to 
controls’, are also unlikely to have learned the 
aX bY structure.  While neither the Transfer nor 
the Transfer-2 group appeared to successfully 
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acquire the structure of their initial training 
language, unlike learners transferred from a 
fully-cued language, Transfer-2 learners were 
not led to rely on a cue that would later be 
disrupted.  While we cannot precisely determine 
what aspect of their exposure to the partially-
cued language facilitated generalization, it is 
clear that strong sensitivity to the underlying 
category relationships does not drive the effect.  
Generalization may be driven by sensitivity to 
the underlying pattern learners acquire in their 
initial exposure.   Generalization may also be 
influenced by other similarities between 
languages.  In these experiments, strings from 
both versions of the language were composed of 
two words, the first monosyllabic and the second 
bisyllabic, and most Xs and Ys in both versions 
of the language had distinctive features in the 
form of endings on the words.  If some or all of 
these similarities were absent, transfer of 
structure might be less likely to occur, thus 
raising important questions about constraints on 
transfer.  We might test this by transferring 
learners to languages in which some of these 
similarities are removed. 
These results add to our previous work 
(Lany et al., 2004) by providing information 
about how prior learning experience can interfere 
with generalization (Exp. 1) or enhance it (Exp. 
2). We plan to extend this work by asking 
whether prior exposure to one of the partial-
structure languages facilitates acquisition of a 
language in which the cues are even further 
diminished.  This would be analogous to asking 
whether the higher incidence of partially cued 
noun phrases found in English child-directed 
speech could help learners acquire verb phrases 
(in which category structure is less reliably 
marked).  This manipulation should also provide 
information about how prior learning affects the 
flexibility of later learning. 
In conclusion, learners’ prior experience can 
be instrumental in shaping what they acquire 
from their input.  Learning biases of other sorts 
have also been proposed, such as constraints on 
the kinds of computations likely to be performed 
based on the modality of the input (Saffran, 
2002), and the tendency to acquire the most 
reliable or statistically predominant structure 
from indeterminate input (Gómez, 2002; Gómez 
et al., 2003).  Prior experience is yet another 
source of bias constraining language learners. 
Understanding the scope of these biases will 
contribute importantly to our theories of 
language acquisition. 
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Abstract
This article presents the results of a two stage investigation
about how linguistic quantifiers are used to summarize
expressions of quantity. In the first step subjects were asked
to give verbal descriptions of arrays of percentages. Then a
second group of subjects was asked to reproduce the original
array from the verbal description. The second group produced
quantities extremely similar to the original percentages even
though the verbal descriptions they used did not describe all
categories within the arrays. We shall show that quantifiers
have implied meaning (e.g., between a large number and
most) and that similar linguistic constructions may refer to
amounts that are noticeably different (e.g., the principal vs.
principally). Finally we highlight the importance of the
implicit, topic-related meaning in the choice of spoken
complements by showing how the concept of fuzzy
quantifiers can be applied not only to their modeling, but also
to their use in multi-dimensional data searches.
Cognitive semantic approaches of Quantifiers
For Cognitive semantic approaches of Quantifyers have also
been quite rare. Just, (1974) defined cognitive traits within
three dimensions (Universal-Specific, Large-Small,
Negative, Positive) which serve to categorize and give
meaning to quantifiers. Quantifiers also project a
representation of quantity which influences how information
is perceived. The statement " few dots are blue (or red)"
with a visual image of two dots of one color and 12 dots of
another, will result in attention being focussed on the two
dots. If the statement were "a lot of dots are blue (or red)",
attention would be focussed on the group of 12 dots (Just &
Carpenter, 1971). Quantifiers also carry implied meaning
and lead to making inferences about other quantities. This is
the case for distinctions based on the positive ("a few of") or
negative ("few of") polarity of quantifiers (Paterson,
Sanford, Moxey & Dawydiak, 1998). The statement, "there
are a few people in the train" designates the amount of
people in relation to an empty train, whereas "there are few
people in the train" refers to the number of people missing
in relation to how many the train should carry.
How much meaning can be inferred from quantifiers?
How many bottles of soda should you buy when a friend
asks you to pick up "a few"? The analogous approach of
Holyoak & Glass, (1978) is based on the idea that there is a
direct correspondence between terms and a numerical scale.
They showed that confusion arises when the quantifiers are
very close in scale, as did Anderson (1981). Furthermore,
with their approach it is not possible to evaluate the question
when maximum values are unknown (the maximum amount
of bottles of soda, for example). The adverbs "generally"
and "usually" can be accepted as covering almost all the
people or things in consideration. The adverb "often" refers
to either the majority of the individuals ("children are often
bright") or the majority of occurrences and can thus convey
repetition ("demonstrations are often violent"). Continuing
in this vein, Hörmann,  Cascio & Bass O' Connor, (1974)
sought to define how quantifiers would be spread on a scale
with class intervals. Unfortunately quantifiers denoted
values that varied in relation to what was being quantified.
For example "frequently" corresponded to 70% (on
average), when referring to how often Miss Sweden was
judged attractive, but only to 30% when used to refer to the
frequency of airplane crashes (Newstead, 1988). In natural
language semantics, where quantifiers denote relations
between groups (Geurst, 2003), "a lot" corresponds to the
majority. Thus "a lot of A's are B's" can mean that there a
more A's that are B's than there are A's that are not B's. This
interpretation nevertheless is not valid for the statement  "in
the last elections a lot of (A: electors) were (B: electors that
didn't vote)" which actually refers to the number of non-
voters (Barwise & Cooper, 1981). The adverbs "sometimes"'
and "rarely" appear to designate respectively a small, but
non-negligible frequency, and a quite negligible frequency.
Still, it is difficult to say what is "small" or "negligible", as
in (1) and (2) where "sometimes" probably is not the same.
What a quantifier denotes is therefore dependant on the
various elements of the situation being described.
(1) Sometimes I watch the evening news.
(2) Sometimes I go to the movies.
The vast majority of studies have confined themselves to
the quantifiers "all", "none" and "some", but even with these
most simple cases the process which generates inferences
from their meanings remains unclear. In function of given
statements 49 to 75% of respondents infer from "all A's are
B's" that "all B's are A's" (Newstead, 1988; Chater &
Oaksford, 1999). Applying pragmatic linguistics theory,
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Grice (1975) similarly found that while "all" should
logically encompass "some", it is possible for "some" to be
restrictive and exclude "all". Interestingly enough, it has
been observed that children do not have the same
understanding of quantifiers as adults. Although at 3 years
of age children do not differentiate between "all" and
"some" (Hollander, Gelman & Star, 2002), by the time they
are seven and even though they have not learned all rules of
conversation, their answers are logically more valid than
adults' are (Smith, 1980).
A question remains as to the information the adult is using
to make an inference. Are they saying "some" because they
know they cannot include "all" the objects (3), in which case
the restrictive interpretation is pragmatically valid, or, are
they saying "some" because they have no more information
about the other objects (4), in which case a non-restrictive
interpretation is more accurate.
 (3) There are some broken eggs in this carton
 (4) I took some eggs from this carton and they weren't fresh
In contrast to studies which have used ad hoc statements,
in this article we have sought to potentially include all the
values and expressions that "some - not all" can have in
relation to a real situation (results of the 1998 French high
school graduation standardized examination, the
"baccalauréat"). There were 1,277,282 students in the class
of '98. The data from this group are multidimensional; they
can be arranged according to many factors: pass rate,
gender, age, nationality, region, type of school, presence
during the exam, which specialized baccalauréat was taken,
which foreign languages were studied, etc.
From the 18 independent dimensions used (each
containing 2 to 13 terms), more than 300 million relations
are possible when only considering the intersection of the
dimensions' terms, because relations may also derive from
the fusion of exclusive terms. Our objective was to
investigate quantifiers both in terms of their production and
their interpretation.
The first step was to observe an initial group of students
producing quantifiers (experiment 1). In step two a second
group of students was given the opposite task of assigning
numerical percentages to the verbal descriptions which were
summarized by group 1.
Experiments
In order to assess the wide range of quantifiers used, in
experiment 1 we allowed the free production of verbal
descriptions for the percentage distributions. In order to
assess how often certain quantifiers were used for each
distribution, participants then selected terms from a list
Experiment 1: production and choice of quantifiers
Method
Participants. 83 university students in psychology and
computer sciences responded to the questionnaires either in
writing or via the Internet. In the later case students had to
access the research lab's site. All the participants had passed
their baccalauréat  examination one or two years
previouslySecond-level headings should be 11 point, initial
caps, bold, and flush left.  Leave one line space above and
1/4 line space below the heading.
Questionnaires. 18 percentage distributions generated
from a database concerning the 1998 baccalauréat,
constituted the basic information in the questionnaires. The
distributions were selected to include the largest range
possible of cases in terms of dimensions, number of
variables (from 2 to 13) and values. They were as follows:
D-1: very close values all around a half,
D-2: very different values; one very large, one very small,
D-3: many values; one very large, one small and all others very
close and very small,
D-4: many values, but none large (i.e. near a half) and all others
very small but not as close as in D-3,
D-5: five not very high values; two quite close, one not very
distant and two others quite close and very low,
D-6: three values close to a third and two other very weak ones
(almost null),
D-7: data in absolute values (to compare with the first
distribution),
D-8: one very strong value, one very weak,
D-9: two strong proportions (above 50%), neither very, nor too
distant,
D-10: on two lines, a strong imbalance between columns with a
rather large difference between lines with intersections as well,
D-11: two rather close proportions near 50%, but one was 10
points over and the other 10 points below,
D-12 : many very small and close values with two other values
close to 20% and a third near 40%,
D-13: two close values, both quite average,
D-14: two high and close values,
D-15: two very weak, close values,
D-16: five values; one near a half, two others near 20%, and two
very weak others
D-17: three very weak and close values (two almost equal and the
third a little higher)
D-18: two strong, very close values (in comparison to D-14).
Procedure.The instructions on page one of booklet one were
as follows: "Without using any of the figures in the tables,
in a few lines, write what you can say about the table. You
have 20 minutes for this task." The second booklet had the
same instructions with the constraint to use words from the
quantifiers list given: "Without using any of the figures in
the tables, in a few lines, use words from the list below to
say what you can about the table. If a non-included term
seems absolutely necessary you may add it to the list. You
have 20 minutes for this task”.
Results and Discussion
 Quantifier production. The participants' responses fell into
two contrasting types of verbal statements summarizing the
given distributions. The first type consisted mostly of
describing the dominant term(s) and its(their) impact by
using quantifiers, like "half". Modifiers like "very" were
used extensively. These kinds of responses were particularly
common when the distribution table had only two variables
and/or when the table had one very high level, very different
from the other levels.
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The other type of verbal summary was used when there
were many variables and when no one term was prominent.
The statements first purpose was to organize and structure
the data, that is, to make comparisons (especially of near
equality) between the different terms, for example by
contrasting the girls' results to the boys'. This process can be
seen as a relative analysis of the results. Sequencing terms
like "first" and "then" were prevalent and no indication in
either quantitative or qualitative terms was given for
evaluating proportions. When statements of this type set
hierarchical relations between variables, they did not on the
other hand, establish orders of magnitude. For D-13 and D-
14 for example, all the respondents ordered the success
rates, but only one gave an indication of the actual values of
the scores.
The principal terms found fall into four categories:
Ordering numerical values
More ___ than ___ and less ___ than ____
first ... next/then ... the rest ...
best/better than ...
many ... few
Quantifiers
principally, in general, the majority, frequently, often,
almost/almost all, a good part
(very) few of, a minority of
a third, (nearly) half, more than a million
 about x%
Relations (fuzzy
about the same, (a little) more often, almost as much, no major
difference, lower, raise, constantly, bigger, below, above, …
Modifiers (fuzzy)
just about, almost, lightly, clearly, noticeably, approximately,
(very) (low) minority, large majority, …
It quickly appeared that certain quantifiers were not used
as often as would have been assumed. This was the case for
the expressions of proportion other than "about half" (i.e.
"about a quarter", "about a third") and it was also true for
"most of" which wasn't often produced spontaneously, but
was chosen when included on the list (see next section). In
general the respondents preferred the expression "a lot of".
Comparisons and ordering seemed of primary interest and
thus, the term "more" was used extensively.
Finally, we observed in most cases that the verbal
summary descriptions were incomplete: the respondents
only focussed on certain variables in each distribution. It is
true that for inter-dimensional variables, orders of
magnitude cannot be deduced. However, our distributions
were for the most part intra-dimensional. For this reason it
was often possible to infer and reconstruct the numerical
values of the proportions in the tables (all proportions
summed to 100%), from the verbal summaries.
The choice of quantifiers. The quantifiers the respondents
chose for summarizing the data are as follows. When more
than 75% of the participants chose a certain quantifier, it
was then associated with the distribution
If we consider only the data compiled from the Internet
questionnaires, only distributions 4 and 10 generated a
disparate choice of quantifiers. For the majority of the other
cases, three groups of quantifiers stand out; the first being
simply "almost all", the second being proportional ("about
half", "about a quarter", "about a third", etc.), and the third
being composed of quantifiers that describe either the
general case ("most of"") or particular cases ("few").
The option "If a non-included term seems absolutely
necessary you may add it to the list" was chosen most often
to differentiate (and provide a substitute for) descriptions
that used the terms "as many/much as", "equals", "similar",
"almost equal", "more than", etc., found with test booklet
version 1
Items (D-1) and (D-7) presented the same information in
numerical values and as a proportion, respectively. For D-7
the participants massively chose the same quantifiers as in
the distribution, whereas for the absolute values there was a
much greater diversity in the quantifiers selected.
Items (D-14) and (D-18) represent approximately the same
numerical data (strong proportions near 75%), but with
different dimensions. The temporal dimension is more
salient with quantifiers like "constant over time" or "rose
by" for D-18, (which described baccaulareat rates by years),
than for D-14 (pass rates vs. gender), even though for
version 2 the results were quite similar.
Finally, it was noted that although version 2 had different
quantifiers added to its list which did not necessarily appear
on version 1, the answers concerning the same subject were
often very close, for both versions of the questionnaire.
Experiment 2: understanding quantifiers
The objective of this second investigation was to determine
whether respondents would be able to reconstruct tables of
numerical data from the series of verbal summaries
containing quantifiers which the subjects in experiment 1
defined.
Method
Participants. As with the first test, the participants were
university students in psychology or computer sciences
(N=116), who all had passed their baccalauréat one or two
years previously. All students used printed questionnaires
(none responded via the Internet).
Questionnaires. The questionnaire used in experiment 2
contained nine (D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-11, D-13, D-15, D-
16 and D-17) of the original 18 distribution tables, without
their numeric values. Hereafter they will be designated as
D-1 through D-9. Each distribution is associated with a
verbal description containing the quantifiers that the
majority of the subjects in test one chose. The descriptions
are as follows:
D-1: "There are a few more girls than boys",
D-2: "There are very few foreigners enrolled",
D-3: "The test candidates mainly  came from public schools, if not,
they came principally from state accredited private schools",
D-4: "About half the candidates have no possible area of
specialization. Most of the others chose mathematics or a modern
foreign language",
D-5: "The majority of test passers were girls",
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D-6: "The pass rate was higher (quantifier=more) for the French
than for the foreigners and represents the majority",
D-7: "The pass rate was higher (quantifier=more) for the girls than
the boys",
D-8: "A quarter of the test takers fail. Half receive no honors. 1/5
receive the honorable mention - good. Very few receive the highest
distinction - excellent".
D-9: "The excellent honors rate was very weak for the
baccalauréats specialized in economics and social sciences. It is 3
times higher (quantifier=more) for the literary baccalauréats (a
little less than double) and it is 4 times higher (quantifier=more)
for the scientific baccalauréats".
The tables and their descriptions were on one sheet of
paper. On the top of the paper the following instructions
appeared: "Use the corresponding summaries to reconstruct
tables of numerical data (percentages)".
Procedure. Each participant received the questionnaire sheet
with the nine distributions to fill in according to its
corresponding verbal summary. They were allotted a
maximum of 30 minutes to complete the task.
Some of the tables submitted did not present a total of
100, so they were proportionally corrected to reach 100. In
this manner the quantitative values obtained in experiment 2
could be compared to the initial numeric information the
subjects used in experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Item D-7 introduced a comparison with a conditional
frequency. The number of boys receiving highest honors
was 7.6%; for girls it was 7.8%. This relationship was
interpreted by the respondents as being complementary and
thus, they furnished values that summed to 100%. Setting
aside this distribution, the results demonstrate that the
subjects were able to reconstruct numeric tables from the
textual summaries. Variation around the average response
was quite low in the majority of answers (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Comparison of the initial values and the
reconstructed values.
It is clear that although the verbal descriptions were
often incomplete, the participants were capable of filling in
the distribution tables with values quite similar to the
original ones. Aside from D-7, the averages of the quantities
generated by the respondents correlate to the initial values at
0.89 (p<0.0001) and the medians correlate at 0.875
(p<0.0001). The greatest differences occurred with items D-
6 and D-9. In D-6 as in D-7, the participants produced
complementary percentages that totaled to 100%. In D-9,
they greatly overestimated the percentage of excellent
honors.
General Discussion
Despite the variances in D-6, D-7 and D-9, the students
were able to produce a very good approximation of the
initial quantitative data and the question remains as to how
they managed this using just the quantifiers in the verbal
descriptions.
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Abstract
Concept mapping is widely used in educational and other set-
tings to aid knowledge construction, sharing, and comparison;
concept maps are also used as a vehicle for assessing under-
standing. To aid the concept mapping process, projects at Indi-
ana University and the Institute for Human and Machine Cog-
nition (IHMC) are developing “intelligent suggesters” to sup-
port users as they build concept maps, by presenting them with
relevant information from existing knowledge models and the
Internet. This depends on identifying important concepts in
the concept map under construction. This paper presents and
evaluates models of the influence of concept map layout and
structure on the selection of concepts expected to be relevant
to the topic of concept maps. It presents and assesses a set of
potentially-relevant structural factors and evaluates how these
factors combine to affect human judgments of concept impor-
tance. Twenty subjects were asked to judge the relative impor-
tance of concepts in concept maps selected to highlight partic-
ular characteristics, and three models were compared to their
judgments. Analysis of the results shows that subjects were
significantly influenced by concept map topology, but little in-
fluenced by other aspects of concept map layout. The results
suggest that layout-independent models of concept maps can
provide a suitable representation for guiding retrieval of topic-
relevant information to support concept map construction, pro-
vided that the representation reflects topologically-based influ-
ences. The results are applied in the design of the suggesters’
similarity assessment procedures for retrieving relevant con-
cept maps.
Introduction
Concept mapping [Novak and Gowin, 1984] has been widely
used to elucidate humans’ knowledge and to facilitate knowl-
edge elicitation, construction, and comparison and shar-
ing. In concept mapping, users construct a two-dimensional,
visually-based representation of concepts and their relation-
ships. The concept map representation encodes proposi-
tions describing two or more concepts and their relation-
ships, in simplied natural language sentences. In educa-
tional settings, concept mapping exercises have been used
to encourage students to actively construct an understand-
ing of concepts and relationships within domains of inter-
est. To facilitate concept map construction and sharing,
the Institute for Human and Machine Cognition (IHMC)
has developed CmapTools, publicly-available tools to sup-
port generation and modication of concept maps in an elec-
tronic form (http://cmap.ihmc.us/). CmapTools enable in-
terconnecting and annotating maps with material such as
other concept maps, images, diagrams, and video clips,
providing rich, browsable knowledge models available for
navigation and collaboration across geographically-distant
sites. The CmapTools software has been downloaded by
users in approximately 150 countries, and has been used in
major educational initiatives, such as the Quorum project
[Canas et al., 1995], which involved more than one thousand
schools in Latin America. It has also been used for modeling
and sharing the knowledge of human experts, for example, for
modeling NASA experts’ knowledge of Mars (http://cmex-
www.arc.nasa.gov/).
CmapTools provides a convenient framework for knowl-
edge construction, but users may have difculty nding rele-
vant resources, remembering specic aspects of a domain to
include, or locating relevant concept maps to compare. To
alleviate this problem, projects are under way at Indiana Uni-
versity and the IHMC to develop intelligent suggesters to
support users by retrieving resources such as prior concept
maps and multi-media materials [Leake et al., 2003]. Fig-
ure 1 shows a screenshot of a Mars knowledge model under
construction, with suggestions of propositions, resources, and
topics to consider. The suggesters’ effectiveness depends on
their ability to retrieve topic-relevant information, which in
turn depends on modeling users’ own judgments as they ex-
amine concept maps. Thus modeling users’ judgments of the
importance of concepts to a map’s topic has practical value
for suggester software to support concept mappingand sci-
entic value, for better understanding what inuences human
understanding of the knowledge that concept maps convey.
The assessment of concept importance may depend on the
concepts they include (based on their labels in the concept
map), on the concept map topology, or on layout differences
between isomorphic maps. Especially for users unfamiliar
with a domain, we would expect topology and layout to play
an important role in their assessment of the topic of a con-
cept map. However, to our knowledge, no previous stud-
ies have investigated whether/how the topology and layout
of a concept map actually inuence judgments of its topic.
To hypothesize candidate topological and layout factors that
might inuence decisions of which concepts are most topic-
relevant, we considered general structure and layout guide-
lines for building good concept maps in the concept map-
ping literature, as well as methods for identifying important
nodes from the structure of hyperlinked environments. These
were used to develop candidate models for the inuence of
structural features on identifying the concepts most impor-
tant to the topic of a concept map. We then performed exper-
iments in which twenty paid subjects judged the relative im-
portance of concepts in concept maps selected to investigate
particular structural inuences. We used this data to set pa-
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Figure 1: Portion of a Knowledge Model developed by the NASA Center for Mars Exploration, with Sample Suggestions.
rameters in the models and to assess the ability of the models
to predict the subjects’ performance. Our results suggest that
topology is important; the structure of concept maps plays an
important role in assessments of concept importance. How-
ever, they also suggest that layout plays a less important role.
Methods suggested by the models have been implemented in
the suggesters to provide support for students and experts’
concept map construction.
Modeling Concepts and their Relationships
Concept mapping was developed in an educational set-
ting by Joseph Novak, in an effort to design better teach-
ing and learning activities [Novak and Gowin, 1984]. No-
vak based the approach on Ausubel’s cognitive learn-
ing theory[Ausubel, 1963], which proposes that meaningful
learning requires deliberate effort by the learner to connect
new concepts to relevant preexisting concepts and proposi-
tions in the learner’s own cognitive structure. Concept map-
ping was designed to support the learner’s effort by external-
izing concepts and propositions known to the student, mak-
ing them visually apparent to facilitate their connection with
newly acquired concepts. Concept maps have been used by
teachers to assess students’ understanding, by students to
compare their knowledge and collaboratively rene their un-
derstanding, and by experts as a vehicle for modeling and
sharing their knowledge.
Concept maps relate to several other frameworks devel-
oped in cognitive psychology and articial intelligence to
model concepts and their relationships. Schemes based
on graphs or networks are commonly used as models
of human memory organization, to account for phenom-
ena such as similarity judgments or hierarchical category
structure. Early examples include the hierarchical net-
work model [Collins and Quillian, 1969], semantic memory
[Tulving, 1972] and conceptual structures [Ausubel, 1963].
More formal approaches to graph-based representations, such
as conceptual graphs [Sowa, 1984] or semantic networks
[Quillian, 1968], attempt to provide a representation suit-
able for machine processing. Proposals for non graph-based
representations to model concepts and their relationships
include formal concept analysis [Ganter and Wille, 1999],
which models the organization of concepts in terms of lat-
tice theory, and the geometric structure of conceptual spaces
[G¤ardenfors, 2000].
Despite the many differences among theories of knowl-
edge organization, they share a fundamental assumption
that knowledge can be modeled in terms of a set of com-
ponents and their relationships. Concept mapping is a
method for externalizing such a structure in an individ-
ual, making concepts and relationships explicit. Thus ex-
amination of concept maps can be used to assess sub-
jects’ knowledge [West et al., 2002], and support for the use-
fulness of this approach has been provided by empirical
studies[Aidman and Egan, 1998, Michael, 1994]. However,
there has been little study of what affects subjects’ judgments
of the topic of a concept map, how to determine topic similar-
ity from concepts maps, and the types of representations that
may support computer models of concept map retrieval. In
previous studies using similar types of representations, topo-
logical information about graphs has been used to dene mea-
sures of graph similarity [Goldsmith and Davenport, 1990]
and for concept clustering [Esposito, 1990]. These frame-
works are based on the premise that the closer the rela-
tionship of two conceptsthe closer they are in cognitive
structurethe closer they will be in the graph representation.
This has been used to induce concept proximity or related-
ness. Our study investigates a complementary question, the
inuence of other structural factors, such as the numbers of
incoming and outgoing links. How graph topology and layout
affect assessments of concept importance is central to under-
standing the information conveyed by concept map structure,
as well as for developing models of topic similarity for con-
cept maps.
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Models for Analyzing Concept Maps
We developed four candidate models of the inuence of struc-
tural and layout characteristics on expectations for the im-
portance of particular concepts to the topic of concept maps.
In the models, concepts are represented as nodes in the con-
cept map graph. The baseline model treats map topology and
layout as unimportant. The three remaining models use the
topology of the concept map to compute a weight predicting
each concept’s importance in describing the topic of the map.
To determine which factors to include in the models, we
rst considered factors from the concept mapping litera-
ture. Novak proposed that meaningful learning is facilitated
when new concepts or concept meanings are subsumed un-
der broader, more inclusive concepts, which suggests that
concept maps should have a hierarchical structure. All of
the non-baseline models can reect such a structure, with
weighings reecting that important concepts are at the top
of the map, and less important at the bottom. However,
the models are parameterized so that the actual contribution
of hierarchical structureif anycan be determined empir-
ically. We also considered the applicability of topological
analysis methods from other domains, in particular, Klein-
berg’s algorithm[Kleinberg, 1999] for topological analysis of
graphs, used to identify important nodes in a hyperlinked
environment. Kleinberg’s work characterized nodes on the
World Wide Web as hubs and authorities based on their
interconnections. When applied to concept maps, we ex-
pected hub and authority concepts to be especially important
to determining the topic of concept maps.
Connectivity Root-Distance Model (CRD)
The connectivity root-distance model is based on two obser-
vations. First, concepts that participate in more than one
proposition, as indicated by their connectivitythe number
of incoming and outgoing connectionsmay be more im-
portant in dening a map’s content than concepts with lower
connectivity. Second, Novak argues that concept maps are
best constructed if a focus question or a single root concept
guides the selection of concepts and their hierarchical orga-
nization in the map. The root concept, typically located at
the top of a map, tends to be the most general and inclusive
concept and to specify the map’s topic. This suggests that
concept importance may increase with proximity to the root
concept.
The CRD model determines proximity by counting the
number of direct links between the map’s root concept and a
given concept. For example, in gure 2, the concept masses
of ice has a connectivity of four (one outgoing and three
incoming links) and a distance of one to the root concept
glaciers. If concept  in a map has  outgoing and  in-
coming connections to other concepts and is  steps distant
from the root concept of the map, then the weight assigned to
 by the CRD model is


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The model parameters  ,  , and  determine inuence of the
incoming connections, outgoing connections, and distance to
the root concept. The formula implies that the higher a con-
cept’s connectivity and the shorter its distance to the root con-
Figure 2: A simple concept map about glaciers.
cept, the larger its weight and therefore relevance in the topic
of the map.
Hub Authority and Root-Distance Model (HARD)
The Hub Authority and Root-Distance Model also explores
the importance of the root node and the hierarchical organi-
zation of concepts in maps. However, while CRD performs a
local analysis, only taking immediate neighbors into account,
HARD performs a global analysis on the inuences of the
concepts on each other. Its analysis centers on three different
types of concepts that may be found in a concept map:
! Authorities are concepts that have multiple incoming con-
nections from hub nodes.
! Hubs are concepts that have multiple outgoing connections
to authority nodes.
! Upper nodes include the root concept and concepts closest
to the root concept.
To determine a node’s role as a hub or authority, we
adapted Kleinberg’s algorithm for analyzing hyperlinked
graphs to concept maps. Our algorithm, described in de-
tail in [Canas et al., 2001], associates each concept with three
weights between 0 and 1, each reecting the concept’s role
as a hub, authority, or upper node. A given concept may
simultaneously have properties of all three, but in Figure 2,
glaciers is primarily a hub concept, due to the number of
outgoing connections, and masses of ice is primarily an au-
thority, due to its mostly incoming connections. Among the
three concepts with outgoing links to the concept masses of
ice, glaciers is the one with the greatest inuence in mak-
ing masses of ice an authority node, because of the com-
parative strength of glaciers as a hub.
In the HARD model, the three weights of a selected con-
cept  are combined into a single weight as follows:
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In the above formula % , # , and * are the corresponding au-
thority, hub, and upper node weights of a concept in a map
and

,  , and ( are the model parameters. As above, the
parameters reect the inuences of the different roles that a
concept may play.
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Path Counter Model (PC)
The Path Counter Model, like the CRD model, reects the
expectation that concepts participating in more propositions
will tend to be more important to the topic of a map. How-
ever, instead of considering only a concept node’s immediate
connectivity, like the CRD model, the PC model considers in-
direct relationships as well. It counts all possible paths that
start from the root and either (1) end on a concept with no out-
going connections, or (2) end on a concept that has already
been visited in a path. We note that if a concept has high
connectivity (which allows for many paths through the map
to include that concept), then the number of paths crossing
concepts indirectly linked to the high-connectivity concept
increases as well. For example, the PC value for the concept
gravity in gure 2 is three, because there are three paths ex-
tending from the root concept to gravity, due to masses of
ice which is well connected in the map. Formally, to deter-
mine the weight

	 of a concept  in a map, assume that
, is the number of paths crossing  . Then the weight is com-
puted as  
	- , . Unlike the previous two models, this
model considers only a single inuence on concept weight,
and consequently requires no parameters.
Experiments and Results
We conducted a human-subjects experiment to study the in-
uences of the hypothesized factors on human judgments of
concept importance, and the overall t of the four models’
predictions to human judgments, with the parameter settings
that best t the CRD and HARD models to the subject data.
Method
Twenty paid subjects, all students admitted to Indiana Univer-
sity, were recruited by postings on electronic message boards
and bulletin boards for a one-hour experiment conducted on
the Web. In a training phase, participants were given a brief
description of concept maps and their applications and asked
to write a short summary of two concept maps from different
domains. In the test phase, subjects answered 56 questions
about a total of 12 small concept maps (fewer than 15 con-
cepts each). The maps were designed with controlled differ-
ences in their topological structure and layout, to investigate
the presence or absence of inuences from particular types
of changes (e.g., changing position of a node without affect-
ing topology). Each question presented a concept map and
two concepts selected from that map. Participants were asked
to examine a map and to answer which of the two concepts
best described the map’s topic, or whether both described it
equally well.
To allow participants to rst practice decision making on
regular concept maps, the rst 2 of the 12 concept maps used
regular words in the concepts. To prevent domain knowl-
edge from inuencing participants’ decisions, concept labels
were replaced with articial terms in the remaining 10 maps,
and only responses concerning the latter 10 test maps were
used in evaluating the models. To minimize the inuence of
previously-seen concept maps on new responses, different ar-
ticial labels were used for each map, and both the ordering
of options for questions and ordering of topological and lay-
out changes between successive concept maps was random-
ized. The concept maps in the experiment were designed to
test specic hypotheses about the topological and layout fac-
tors that may inuence subjects’ evaluation of relevance of
concepts to a concept map’s topic; the absence of domain
information forced subjects to rely entirely on topology and
layout.
Results
To test whether subjects’ judgments of the importance of two
concepts changed signicantly from one map to another, we
used a .+/ test of independence when comparing the subjects’
selections from two different maps. Table 1 summarizes the
statistical results.
Distance to root concept: To test the inuence of distance
to the root concept, subjects evaluated two concept maps in
which the distance from a test concept to the root concept
was changed from 2 to 1, by inserting an intermediate node.
In a series of questions, subjects were asked to compare im-
portances of the test concept, which was moved in the map’s
hierarchy, to the root concept and neighboring concepts of
the moved concept. The results show that the root concept
was considered most important compared to the other con-
cepts, and that the importance of the test concept increased as
it moved up the hierarchy. The differences in the selection of
the moved concept over its neighboring concepts between the
two concept maps were statistically signicant.
Connectivity of a concept: To test the inuence of connec-
tivity, we used two concept maps which differed by increas-
ing a test concept’s connectivitythe number of incoming
and outgoing connections to neighboring conceptsfrom 1
in the rst map to 6 in the second. Subjects were asked to
compare importances of the test concept to the root concept
and the neighboring concepts of the modied concept. When
the test concept’s connectivity was increased, participants fa-
vored it over neighboring concepts and sometimes even over
the root concept. All differences were statistically signicant
except for the preference over the root concept.
Layout of a map: To test whether a difference in layout af-
fects subject’s selections, two concept maps were constructed
with identical topology but substantially different layout. The
layout changes primarily involved horizontal organization,
but in one instance a single concept was moved from the
center right to the bottom left position. The questions asked
for both layouts compared the concept that changed its po-
sition to its neighboring concepts. The statistical evaluation
revealed that the layout changes had no signicant affect on
the concept ratings.
Direct and indirect influences of hub and authority nodes
in a map: To test the effects of direct and indirect inuences,
a total of four concept maps were constructed with strong
hub and authority concepts connected to other concepts in
the map. The results showed that hub and authority concepts
have an inuence on the selection of concepts, and that au-
thorities play a stronger role than hubs. However, the indirect
inuence of either a hub or authority concept on other con-
cepts (when a hub or authority is indirectly connected to a
test concept) did not signicantly affect concept importance.
Fitting the Models to the Data
A hill-climbing algorithm was used to determine the param-
eter settings for the CRD and the HARD models which gave
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Table 1: Statistical evaluation of inuences on concept importance.
Model Parameters for Best Fit RMSE Cumul.

 ( /  Error
CRD 0.930 4.959 3.603 0.072 27.5%
HARD 0 2.235 1.764 0.1487 32.8%
PC N/A N/A N/A 0.170 27.8%
Baseline N/A N/A N/A 0.564 66.8%
Table 2: Summary of model parameters and RMSE.
the best t between the models and user data. Table 2 summa-
rizes the chosen parameter values, the root-mean-square error
(RMSE) of user and model data, and the cumulative error.
The cumulative error is the percentage of the total questions
(44 questions per subject, involving the 10 test concept maps)
for which the models determine different responses from the
subjects. To determine a model’s preference between two
concepts in a concept map, we compared the model’s im-
portance values for the two nodes. The model was consid-
ered to treat the concepts as equally relevant when their rele-
vance values were within a xed threshold of each other, for a
threshold distance determined by hill-climbing. The last row
of the table shows the RMSE and the cumulative error for a
baseline model. In this model each concept in a map is rated
equally important by assigning it a weight of 1.
The results show that the CRD model provides the best t
to the user data, followed by HARD and PC. All models ex-
cept the baseline agree with more than 67% percent of the de-
cisions reached by the participants, who were in a few cases
strongly divided in their vote for the best topic-describing
concepts. For the remaining 33%, in most cases the mod-
els’ predictions match the decisions of some subjects. Only
once for the CRD model, twice for the HARD model, and
four times for the PC model were model and user predictions
entirely disjoint. Overall, CRD, HARD, and PC perform bet-
ter than the baseline model.
Further analysis of the best-t parameters for the CRD and
HARD models supports the importance of authority nodes
(nodes with incoming connections). For the CRD model,
nodes with incoming connections (nodes that play the role
of an authority) are more relevant than nodes with outgoing
connections (nodes that play the role of a hub) because their 
is greater than

. With the best-t parameters for the HARD
model, hub nodes are not considered relevant when comput-
ing the weight of a node. However, we note that hub nodes
still play an important role when computing the level of au-
thority of other nodes in the map.
Discussion
The experiments studied how topology and layout affect
assessments of the importance of concepts within concept
maps. They compared four candidate models which, using
only analysis of a map’s topology, compute a weight for each
concept in a map. The computed weights provide an estimate
of the importance of each concept as a descriptor of the topic
of the map, according to subjects’ judgments of topic impor-
tance.
The studies highlighted the importance of topological in-
formation; to our knowledge, this is the rst study to show
this effect. They also suggested that specic layout does not
have a signicant effect. This is important for being able to
recognize similarity across concept maps developed by dif-
ferent individuals, despite supercial differences that might
affect user judgments. It is also interesting to note that despite
the importance of topology, local information alone was suf-
cient to account for the observed results. The CRD model,
which considers distance from the root node and local con-
nectivity, outperformed the HARD model, which takes indi-
rect inuences into account as well.
The current study did not examine interobserver variation;
this is an interesting area for future work. Also, the experi-
ment used small concept maps, and considered only the topo-
logical and layout factors of the maps, rather than their con-
tent. We are conducting additional studies to explore the role
of content in assessments of concept importance. However,
preliminary results suggest that structure plays a surprisingly
strong role, with structural information alone often sufcient
to make high-quality predictions.
Application in the Suggesters
The experimental results are reected in the design of the
CmapTools suggesters, two of which are shown in use in the
lower center of Figure 1. The rst suggester uses the cal-
culated importance values to weight keywords from concept
labels in a concept map, in order to retrieve similar prior con-
cept maps for comparison and to suggest propositions from
those maps. This approach to supporting concept map gen-
eration is inspired by case-based reasoning [Kolodner, 1993];
concept maps constructed by different users are considered as
case-bases of their concept-mapping activity, with each con-
cept map considered to be a separate case. When a user wants
to extend a conceptto add a new connected concept
the system draws upon prior concept maps that include the
original concept, as examples of how that concept was ex-
tended in similar past contexts. The second suggester uses
the similarity weighting to weight keywords for Web search,
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to derive topics for the user to consider when starting a
new concept map to broaden the knowledge model. These
and other implemented suggesters are described in detail in
[Leake et al., 2003].
Conclusion
This paper explores factors affecting human judgments of
concept importance in determining the topic of concept maps.
Modeling such judgments helps elucidate the knowledge cap-
tured in concept maps, provides information to guide the de-
sign of concept maps in educational settings, and aids the de-
velopment of intelligent support systems to provide relevant
material during concept mapping. Our experiments assessed
the inuence of specic factors and examined the ability of
four different models to reect human assessments of con-
cept importance.
Among the three models, the CRD model, which consid-
ers connectivity and distance to the root concept, provided
the best match to human data: Its predictions were consis-
tent with the average predictions made by the participants
for forty-three out of forty-four questions. The results high-
light the importance of local topology and suggest that human
topic decisions are robust to layout differences, which is en-
couraging for the generality of concept mapping for knowl-
edge sharing and the development of support tools to retrieve
similar concept maps and topic-relevant information. We are
performing followup studies to examine the role of domain
content and the t between the predictions of these models
and the concept maps developed by domain experts for sam-
ple domains.
Principles suggested by the results have been applied to
intelligent suggesters to aid the human knowledge mod-
eling process, and the implemented systems appear to give
good results in practice. We consider the type of evaluation
presented here as important step for guiding the design of
such tools, and are now designing experiments to more for-
mally test the relevance of the suggester systems’ recommen-
dations during the concept map construction process.
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Abstract 
What are the problems faced by artists in real-life contexts? 
By what processes do they solve these problems? In this 
paper, work on scientific discovery (e.g, Klahr, 2000; 
Kulkarni & Simon, 1988; Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, & 
Zytkow, 1987) and a situated perspective on creative 
cognition (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1999; Nersessian, 
2004) are brought together into a unifying framework for 
studying the processes of artistic creativity in real-life. Within 
this framework, artistic creativity is viewed as situated 
problem solving. We illustrated our approach by applying it to 
Isabelle Hayeur, a successful Canadian visual artist.  
Introduction 
In this paper, work on scientific discovery and a situated 
perspective on creative cognition are brought together into a 
framework for studying the processes of artistic creativity. 
Everybody is interested in art, but up until now few have 
examined the problem-solving processes that provide 
support for the artistic process and the production of works 
of art; almost no one has looked at real-life artistic practices. 
We begin by reviewing work on scientific discovery 
processes. We then present a current definition of creativity 
that parallels work on situated and distributed cognition. We 
then go on to describe part of an ongoing field study we are 
conducting, a study of creative artistic processes in a 
contemporary visual arts practice, within our framework. 
Finally, we discuss the potential of this approach for future 
studies of artistic creativity. 
Artistic Practice and Creativity as Situated 
Problem Solving 
Artistic Creativity as Problem Solving 
There is now a tradition of studying creativity from a 
problem-solving viewpoint (e.g., Klahr, 2000; Kulkarni & 
Simon, 1988; Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, & Zytkow, 1987; 
Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1962). The processes of scientific 
discovery, especially, have been studied from this 
perspective. 
In an excellent review, Klahr and Simon (1999) present 
the four major approaches of these studies: historical, 
laboratory, direct observation, and computational. What 
Klahr and Simon note is that all these approaches to the 
study of scientific creativity have led to convergent findings 
about discovery processes. 
Klahr and Simon propose that by using the concepts and 
vocabulary of human problem-solving theory "we may be 
able … to converge toward a common account of discovery 
in many areas of human endeavor: practical, scientific and 
artistic, occurring both in everyday life and in specialized 
technical and professional domains" (p.524). Here, these 
concepts and vocabulary are those of problem spaces – 
states, operators and goals –, heuristic rules, weak and 
strong search methods – hill-climbing, means-end analysis, 
planning (Newell & Simon, 1972). Discovery is thus viewed 
as a search process in a problem-solving space, composed of 
goals, rules and other aspects of the task and situation. 
Up until now, artistic creativity had almost never been 
studied from a problem-solving perspective. There are a few 
exceptions (e.g., Weisberg, 1993), but a lot of groundwork 
still needs to be done. So far, the studies of artistic creativity 
based on this approach have mainly addressed creative 
processes in relatively general terms; they have not 
produced specific descriptions of problem spaces and 
heuristics in specific artistic practices. 
 
Search Spaces in Scientific Discovery Search spaces or 
problem spaces are abstract – representational, conceptual – 
spaces explored by a ‘problem solver’ during the problem-
solving process. In the case of scientific discovery, scientists 
have been found to work in two, three, four, and even in 
search spaces of greater dimensionality (e.g., Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988; Kulkarni & Simon, 1988; Schunn & Klahr, 
1995; Thagard, 1998; Wolf & Beskin, 1996; see also Klahr 
& Simon 1999; Klahr, 2000). The traditional two-space 
view of scientific discovery has its origins in Simon and 
Lea's (1974) work on problem solving and rule induction; it 
was first proposed by Klahr and Dunbar (1988). According 
to this model, in the process of scientific discovery, search 
happens in two coordinated spaces: (1) the hypothesis space, 
and (2) the experiment space. Thus, scientific discovery 
involves generating new hypothesis and experiments; then 
these experiments serve to evaluate the hypothesis and 
further generate new ones. This can be considered a 
problem-solving process. 
Similarly, we may ask: what problem space is explored by 
an artist in the course of the artistic work and practice? In 
what problem space, and by what processes, is this search 
conducted? And, of course, there is the possibility that the 
artist is working through multiple search spaces, 
corresponding to diverse subproblems involved in artistic 
creativity. 
Artistic Creativity as Situated Activity 
According to Csikszentmihalyi (1999), “For creativity to 
occur, a set of rules and practices must be transmitted from 
the domain to the individual. The individual must then 
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produce a novel variation in the content of the domain. The 
variation then must be selected by the field [the social 
organization of the domain] for inclusion in the domain” (p. 
315; see also Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, & Gardner, 1994). 
From this point of view, creative cognition is not just “in 
the head” (Norman, 1993a), it is a computational process 
involving domain and field, as well as the individual. The 
parallels with situated or distributed approaches to cognition 
are obvious (e.g., Hutchins, 1995; Nersessian, Kurz-Milcke, 
Newstetter, & Davies, 2003; Thagard, 1999). Nersessian et 
al. (2003), for example, studied innovation – creativity – in 
biomedical engineering research laboratories as a situated 
and distributed process. The view of creativity as situated, 
contextual, points toward individual, field, and domain-
specific studies of creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1999; 
Li, 1997; Mace & Ward, 2002). 
A lot of recent work in cognitive science explores the 
situated nature of cognition and action (e.g., Clancey, 1997; 
Hutchins, 1995; see Nersessian, 2004; Norman, 1993b). 
Nersessian summarizes the challenges posed to traditional 
cognitive science by this environmental perspective with 
three interrelated questions: “1) What are the bounds of the 
cognitive system? 2) What is the nature of the processing 
employed in cognition? and 3) What kinds of 
representations – internal and external – are used in 
cognitive processing?” This perspective effectively poses 
challenges to cognitive science; the same challenges are also 
implicit in current models of creativity.  
Thus, as with the problem-solving approach, situated and 
distributed cognition approaches have been used to study 
processes of scientific discovery (e.g., Nersessian et al., 
2003). 
Within our framework for studying processes of artistic 
creativity, in accord with problem-solving theory, recent 
approaches to situated and distributed cognition, and with 
current definitions of creativity, we view artistic creativity 
as situated problem solving. We are interested in finding out 
what problem-solving processes are involved in artistic 
creativity and in situating these – computations, rules – 
within the larger system involved in an artistic practice. 
Contemporary Visual Arts Practice: The Case 
of Isabelle Hayeur 
To illustrate this approach, we will briefly present 
preliminary results obtained from the study of a 
contemporary Canadian visual artist’s work and practice. 
The main focus of this first phase of analysis is on 
determining the search spaces involved in a real-life artistic 
work and practice. 
Isabelle Hayeur1 is a professional Canadian artist. She is a 
professional artist in the sense of Quebec’s law on the 
Professional status of artists in the visual arts, arts and 
crafts and literature, and their contracts with promoters 
(R.S.Q., c. S-32.01); she has received multiple grants from 
both the Canada Council for the Arts and the Conseil des 
                                                          
1 Her work, artist’s statement, and resume can be found on her 
Web site: isabelle-hayeur.com. 
Arts et des Lettres du Québec, and her work has been shown 
nationally and internationally. 
Isabelle Hayeur works mainly with digital photography 
and video. Her digital photomontages and videos have been 
shown in solo and group exhibitions, and festivals, in 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, 
England, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Portugal, Poland, Serbia, Spain, and the 
United States. She also produces Internet art projects and 
site-specific works. Her artistic work deals mainly with the 
impact of the Western model of development on the 
environment. Her images often display landscapes, part 
idyllic, part disenchanted, amid man’s interventions. Based 
on a major sociological survey2 of Québec’s visual artists’ 
conditions of practice (Bellavance, Bernier, & Laplante, 
2001), she can be considered representative of other 
successful visual artists in that context. 
At the time of writing we had been conducting a field 
study of this artist’s creative processes and practice for a 
ten-month period; the study is ongoing. Kulkarni and Simon 
(1988) discussed the use of different kinds of data for 
building models of processes that span many months or 
years (e.g., discovery processes in science), where gathering 
continuous protocols is not practical; in such contexts, 
recourse to other kinds of data is required. Data about this 
artist’s creative processes were collected on-site, at the 
artist’s studio, through interviews, recording of her artistic 
activity at the computer, and photographs taken of her work 
space and tools. Extensive field notes were also taken. The 
combined data collection allows for the recording of 
cognitive processes involving a distributed set of activities 
and tools (see Clancey, 2001). All data was digitally 
recorded (except for the field notes); the total archived data 
volume amounts to close to 30 gigabytes. 
Our study is at the crossroads of the observational and 
computational approaches to discovery and creativity 
processes (Klahr & Simon, 1999); we are using 
observational and interview data to build a computational 
description and model of processes of artistic creativity. 
Here we will focus on the interview data. Eight semi-
structured interviews were conducted over a six-month 
period, at the artist’s studio (Leclerc & Gosselin, 2003). We 
took inspiration from the traditional protocol analysis 
methodology (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) for eliciting verbal 
reports; interviews were thus conducted with the goal of 
producing information resembling what Ericsson and Simon 
call “Level 2 verbalizations”. This type of verbalization 
involves descriptive information; Isabelle Hayeur was 
therefore asked for descriptions of her activities as an artist, 
not for explanations. Interviews were digitally recorded and 
were 30 to 60 minutes long each. These were transcribed 
verbatim and represent a total of 74,507 words. Interviews 
were organized, stored, and analyzed using Atlas.ti, a 
computer package designed for qualitative data analysis. 
                                                          
2 This study was commissioned by Québec's main group of 
professional visual artists, the Regroupement des Artistes en Arts 
Visuels du Québec. 
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Problem Spaces in Isabelle Hayeur’s Creative 
Process 
Viewing artistic creativity as a special case of human 
problem solving, we have to ask what are the problems 
solved by an artist? More precisely, what are the problems 
solved by Isabelle Hayeur? Finding what problems she 
solves means finding out what problem spaces she explores 
in the course of her artistic practice. Problem spaces are 
defined in terms of states, operators, goals, and constraints 
(Klahr & Simon, 1999, citing Newell & Simon, 1972); we 
have coded and analyzed our interviews in these terms. 
Recently, some researchers have also started to redefine 
the concept of problem space, putting the emphasis not just 
on internal representations, search, and operations on these 
representations, but also on the physical space, and the 
context, involved in real-life problem-solving activity. For 
example, Nersessian et al. (2003), in their study of 
innovative practices in biomedical research laboratories, 
considered the “lab-as-problem-space”; the laboratory, with 
its resources, people, technology, equipment, etc., is thus 
considered as a ‘problem space’. Similarly, in contemporary 
visual arts practice, the artist, work space, tools, 
technologies, technical knowledge and skills, environment, 
partnerships with other artists, relations with galleries, art 
centers, funding agencies… constitute the problem space of 
an arts practice (e.g., see Figure 1). Our analysis is thus 
based on identifying states, goals, operators, and constraints, 
in this sense – in a situated artistic practice. 
 
Figure 1: The artist’s “studio-as-problem-space” 
 
Criteria for Proposing New Search Spaces Schunn and 
Klahr (1996; see also Klahr, 2000) have suggested three 
criteria for proposing new problem spaces: (1) logical, (2) 
empirical, and (3) implementational. The logical criterion 
refers to logical coherence of the categories – spaces – 
proposed; spaces must be mutually exclusive. The empirical 
refers to the fact that there must be some activity going on 
in the proposed spaces. And, the implementational criterion 
allows precise characterization of the proposed problem 
spaces. 
Given the preliminary nature of our research, we have 
relied mainly on the empirical and on the logical criteria. 
We have analyzed transcripts from the interviews and coded 
those in terms of rules (i.e., production rules), condition-
action rules. And based on these rules, we have identified 
goals and heuristic operators3; these define the spaces 
searched by Isabelle Hayeur in the course of her creative 
process. 
 
Artistic Practice and Career Search Spaces Following 
coding and analysis of the interviews, two main spaces 
emerged as the ones most actively searched in the course of 
Isabelle Hayeur’s account of her creative activity: the 
artistic practice space and the career space. Throughout the 
interviews she describes both areas of activity. For example: 
 
Interview 2 
(28:30) I always plan, I plan moments where I 
concentrate on my [artistic] production. And there are 
moments where I put together my artist’s dossiers; it is 
rather dull, but it has to be done. I put together those 
dossiers [for submission calls]. You see, there really is 
the creative work, you know what this is, and there is 
also everything surrounding that, which takes about 
half my time [italics added]4. 
Interview 3 
(29:49) I find myself putting more time on my artistic 
work… the artistic work, and the career. 
Interview 5 
(01:08) Already, I am very busy, with things related to 
the dissemination [of the artistic work], but which I 
must do, everything surrounding the artistic practice. 
 
In the following sections, we will look at the organization 
and role of the artistic practice and the career search spaces. 
 
Artistic Practice Search Space: Goals and Heuristics 
Table 1 shows the main set of goals found to operate in the 
artistic practice space. These high-level goals shape Isabelle 
Hayeur’s artistic practice. Heuristic operators searching 
through the artistic practice space apply these goals; these 
play a role in many heuristic rules used by Isabelle Hayeur 
to accomplish the tasks associated with this space. 
 
Table 1: Artistic practice space main goals 
 
 
[gR2-12; gR2-13] Doing my work as an artist seriously, full 
time. 
[gR2-14; gR2-15] Living with less money, in order to put 
more time into my artistic practice (and less time into 
‘bread-and-butter’ jobs). 
[gR2-17; gR2-28] Having more time for my artistic practice.
                                                          
3 Goals are labeled gR and rules R. A rule is given the number of 
the interview in which it first appeared; goals are constitutive parts 
of rules. 
4 For this paper, interview excerpts, goals, and rules were 
translated from the French language. 
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[gR2-30; gR2-32] Working on my images, especially after a 
few weeks of not working on them. 
[gR2-31] After a long time working on my images, taking 
some time away from the work, doing something else. 
[gR2-33; gR-35] Putting time into my practice, taking up 
and continuing work on projects, planning time when I 
concentrate on my production. 
[gR2-38] Art must remain a calling, it must remain research; 
the career side must not take too much time. 
[gR2-38; gR3-06] I want my images, series, artistic work 
and career to succeed. 
[gR2-39] Doing art for the knowledge it brings in my own 
life, and for what it may teach or give to others. 
[gR3-04] Not stopping my artistic work. 
[gR3-07] Being an artist; doing this my entire life. 
[gR5-01; gR5-02] Creating strong works, strong images; 
saying things in a strong way, a stronger way. 
 
 
Among the goals defining the artistic practice space, some 
appear to play a major role because they call upon many 
other goals to search the problem space. For example, gR3-
07 calls on a host of activities to reach its aim (see Tables 1 
& 2, [gR2-33; gR2-35; gR2-36; gR2-37; gR2-38; gR3-01, 
gR3-02; gR3-05; gR3-06], for an example of subgoals – 
heuristics – called by gR3-07 ).  
The artistic practice space is divided further in a number 
of important subspaces. Among these figures the image-
generation space. Of great importance, it is the very basis of 
Isabelle Hayeur’s artistic practice; this subspace includes all 
the knowledge and skills actually involved in the image 
production activity. Another subspace would be a ‘project-
management’ subspace. We will not expand on these here. 
The task achieved through the artistic practice problem 
space is the task of being an artist, of focusing on one’s 
artistic practice and of producing art works.  
 
Career Search Space: Goals and Heuristics This is the 
main set of goals found to operate in the career space. Goals 
gR2-36, gR3-01, gR3-06, gR3-07, and their associated 
heuristic rules, are the most significant; these actually call 
upon every other goal and heuristic in the career space. 
 
Table 2: Career space main goals 
 
 
[gR2-01; gR2-03] Sitting on panels, juries, etc., with other 
artists. 
[gR2-01; gR2-02] Learning. Learning how other artists talk 
about their work, getting ideas about how to present your 
work, how art councils work, etc. 
[gR2-26; gR2-27] Being represented by a private art gallery, 
in order to sell my work. 
[gR2-34; gR6-01] Sending my work to art centers, galleries, 
and obtaining exhibitions. 
[gR2-35; gR3-05] Putting together “artist’s dossiers” – 
artistic projects and related documents about my practice (to 
be sent to art centers when there are calls for submissions). 
[gR2-36] Doing the things that make a difference in an 
artist’s career, in order to have a successful career. 
[gR2-37; gR3-02; gR3-05] Taking care of the career side – 
everything that surrounds the creative work: searching for 
submission-call deadlines, new places and centers to show 
my work, residencies, putting together my “artist’s dossiers” 
according to grants and submission-call deadlines, also 
answering specific requests for exhibitions and, at some 
point, sending a set of dossiers – around ten at a time – to 
art centers I want to reach in a given year, etc. I put half of 
my total work time as an artist on these activities (when I do 
not have other contracts, ‘bread-and-butter’ jobs to do). 
[gR2-38] Not putting too much time on the career side; 
leaving aside some activities if necessary, even if I miss out 
on some opportunities. 
[gR3-01; gR3-06] Being entrepreneurial; sending out a lot 
of artist’s dossiers in order to have exhibitions. 
[gR3-01; gR3-07] Having success as an artist; being an 
artist my entire life. 
 
 
The career space is further subdivided in two main 
subspaces: the dissemination and the promotion spaces. 
These serve to solve the ‘problem’ of making the artistic 
work known and seen. 
Some of the career goals are related to the same rules as 
some of the artistic practice goals. This is because certain 
heuristics operators mediate activity between these two 
search spaces. The task achieved through the career problem 
space is the task of making one’s work known and seen, 
thereby building up a successful career. 
 
Heuristics Coordinating Search We have found some 
heuristic operators, some rules, to be of special importance 
in Isabelle Hayeur’s creative process because they 
coordinate the search between the artistic practice and 
career spaces. Here is such a heuristic operator associated 
with the recurrent goal gR3-07: 
 
[R3-07] If I want to be an artist and I want to be an 
artist my entire life, and I know what I have to do, then 
I do it immediately (i.e., gR2-33, gR2-35, gR2-36, 
gR2-37, gR2-38, gR3-01, gR3-02, gR3-05, gR3-06). 
 
R3-07 coordinates a lot of activity related to the artistic 
practice and the career spaces. In fact, it links vocational 
goals, wanting to live the life of an artist, with very practical 
career goals and activities. 
Here is another example of a heuristic operator linking 
artistic practice and career: 
 
[R2-38] If I want art to remain a calling as it must, and 
if at a certain point I realize that the ‘career’ side takes 
too much of my time, then I just don’t do it, that 
activity (even if it means missing opportunities). 
 
Identifying coordination between search spaces is an 
important part of modeling problem-solving processes; as 
Klahr (2000) notes, “One must … distinguish search in a 
particular space from coordination among multiple spaces” 
(p. 215). 
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An Additional Search Space This additional space, the 
economic space is not directly part of Isabelle Hayeur’s 
process of artistic creativity, although, as we will see, it is 
essential for it. This space could also be called the ‘working 
for a living’ or the ‘bread-and-butter job’ space. Table 3 
shows a sample of goals from this space. 
 
Table 3: Some economic space goals 
 
 
[gR2-07] Taking small jobs, contracts, especially in my 
domain or related to my practice, the arts, and the art milieu.
[gR2-07] Trying to find more gratifying, better paid, and a 
little bit more interesting jobs. 
[gR2-13] ‘Bread-and-butter’ jobs must not take away from 
my hours of artistic work. 
[gR2-14; gR2-16] To live with less money, in order to need 
to work less (in order to have more time for my practice). 
[gR2-23; gR2-24] Not putting time into searching for bread-
and-butter jobs; taking what comes. 
[gR2-27; gR2-28] To sell my art work, in order to spend 
more time on my production and less on contracts outside 
my practice. 
 
 
Some rules related to these goals show an interaction 
between the artistic practice, career, and economic spaces. 
Here are some examples: 
 
[R2-07] If you are an artist, and you (necessarily) need 
to pay for your own production (e.g., the high cost of 
printing large format photographs), and you have the 
chance to work in your own domain, then generally 
you accept these small jobs. 
[R2-14] If I cannot live solely from my art, and I have 
to take ‘bread-and-butter’ jobs, and I do not want this 
to replace my hours of artistic practice, then I decide to 
live with less money, in order to need to work less. 
[R2-28] If I sell my art work, even if just one image a 
month, then for each picture sold, I have one less 
contract to do, and I have more time for my practice. 
 
These rules show that artistic creativity – artistic practice 
and career – is supported by the economic space. Search, 
minimal search in Isabelle Hayeur’s case, in this space aims 
at finding the necessary resources to allow most of the 
artist’s activity to be focused on her professional life and 
artistic production. The main task achieved through the 
economic problem space is finding (minimal) financial 
resources to support artistic and career related activities. 
In Isabelle Hayeur’s life and developmental trajectory as 
an artist, less and less time is spent on the economic space 
and more is spent on the actual artistic practice and career 
(see goals gR2-12, gR2-13, gR2-14, gR2-15, gR2-16, gR2-
17, gR2-23, gR2-24, gR2-27, gR2-28, gR2-33, gR2-35, 
gR2-38, gR3-04, in Tables 1, 2, & 3). The rules that 
coordinate the artistic practice, career, and economic spaces 
aim at: (1) diminishing economic space activity, (2) 
maintaining career activity at a balanced level, and (3) 
maintaining or augmenting artistic practice activity level. 
According to Bellavance, Bernier, and Laplante’s (2001) 
survey, few professional artists manage to achieve these 
goals in Québec’s and Canada’s socio-cultural and 
economic context. One measure of an artist’s success, at 
least in regard to the interplay between practice, career, and 
economic spaces, seems to be his or her ability to do just 
that, focus on the artistic life rather than just on sheer 
survival. 
Our situated problem-solving perspective on artistic 
creativity has shown that two main spaces are directly 
involved in a contemporary visual artist’s creative process: 
the artistic-practice-as-problem-space and the career-as-
problem-space. When Nersessian (2004) describes the 
challenges posed by the environmental perspective to the 
traditional view of cognition, she mentions considerations of 
the boundaries of cognitive systems; according to this 
perspective, cognition is situated and distributed in a 
complex cognitive system, a system that includes 
environment and individual. In this first part of Isabelle 
Hayeur’s case study, we found a number of environmental 
elements playing a role in the artistic practice space (e.g., 
the artist’s studio, equipment, time and financial resources, 
knowledge and skills needed to produce art works, etc.) and 
the career space (e.g., relationships with other artists, art 
centers and galleries, funding agencies, etc.), and defining 
the complex cognitive space of her artistic creativity. 
Conclusions 
The project of modeling Isabelle Hayeur’s processes of 
artistic creativity is ongoing. What was outlined here is 
meant as an illustration of our framework for studying real-
life artistic creativity; our preliminary results suggest a well-
integrated set of search spaces and processes involved in 
real-life, situated, artistic practice and cognition. Further 
work will involve collecting verbal protocols related to the 
image-generation search space – the actual picture 
producing process; we have already recorded more than 100 
hours of her image-generation activity. 
Within the artistic creativity as situated problem solving 
framework, it is possible to study real-life artistic practices. 
The product is a descriptive model of search spaces, goals, 
and heuristic operators involved in artistic creativity. 
Dasgupta (1994, see also 2003) has done something of the 
kind in the context of science and technological innovation. 
The type of studies provided by our framework may lead to 
computational models of historical instances of artistic 
creativity, as studies in science have led to computational 
models of historical scientific discoveries (Langley, 
Magnani, Cheng, Gordon, Kocabas, & Sleeman, 2001). 
Such studies may also serve an educational purpose by 
providing information about real-life processes of artistic 
creativity. 
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Abstract 
The ability to evaluate competing models against
noisy data is central to progress in cognitive science. 
In general, this requires advanced model selection 
criteria, such as the Minimum Description Length 
(MDL) criterion, that balance goodness­of­ﬁt with 
model complexity. One limiting property of many 
of these criteria, however, is that they cannot read­
ily be applied to deterministic models. A solution to 
this problem, developed by Gru¨nwald (1999), involves 
a process called ‘entropiﬁcation’ that associates de­
terministic models with probability distributions, and 
allows MDL criteria to be calculated. However, a po­
tential practical diﬃculty with this approach is that it 
requires a multidimensional summation over the data 
space that can be prohibitively computationally ex­
pensive in realistic situations. This paper derives a 
simpler version of the MDL criterion for deterministic 
models in the important special case of 0­1 loss func­
tions that is computationally feasible. Two concrete 
applications of the simpler MDL criterion are pre­
sented, demonstrating its ability to consider model ﬁt 
and complexity in selecting between competing mod­
els of cognitive processes. The ﬁrst application in­
volves three diﬀerent heuristics for a problem solving 
task, while the second involves three diﬀerent models 
of forced­choice decision making. 
Introduction 
To a large extent, progress in cognitive science relies 
on the development of better models of cognitive phe­
nomena. Models provide a formalized representation 
of theoretical explanations, and make predictions that 
can be tested empirically. For this reason, the ability 
to evaluate competing cognitive models against noisy 
data in a complete and meaningful way has been a cen­
tral concern recently in mathematical psychology (e.g., 
Myung & Pitt 1997; Myung, Balasubramanian & Pitt 
2000; Myung, Forster, & Browne 2000; Pitt, Myung, 
& Zhang 2002). 
In particular, there has been a strong (and overdue) 
focus on balancing the goodness­of­ﬁt of models with 
their complexity. These ideas have been applied to 
core topics in cognitive science such as models of psy­
chophysical discrimination (e.g., Myung et al. 2000),
stimulus representation (e.g., Lee 2001; Navarro & 
Lee 2003; in press), inference and generalization (e.g., 
Tenenbaum & Griﬃths 2001), and decision­making 
(e.g., Myung & Pitt 1997). 
Probabilistic Models 
For the most part, however, these recent development 
have been restricted to considering probabilistic cogni­
tive models. This class of models has the property 
that any parameterization (or, more generally, any 
probability distribution over the parameter space) cor­
responds to a probability distribution over the data. 
That is, the model corresponds to a parametric family 
of probability distributions over the data. This means 
that considering a probabilistic model at a particular 
set of parameter values makes some data quantiﬁably 
more likely than others. In turn, for probabilistic mod­
els the likelihood of any observed data having arisen 
under the model at any parameterization of interest 
can be evaluated. 
Many cognitive models are probabilistic in this way. 
For example, models of memory retention (e.g., Ru­
bin & Wenzel 1996) usually consist of parameterized 
functions that specify the probability an item will be 
recalled correctly after a period of time. As another ex­
ample, the ALCOVE model of category learning (Kr­
uschke 1992) also produces a probability, that depends 
upon the values of a number of parameters, for each 
possible category response on any trial. For these mod­
els, their probabilistic nature allows likelihood to be 
measured against any pattern of observed data. 
Many advanced model selection criteria, such as 
Bayes Factors (e.g., Kass & Raftery 1995), Minimum 
Description Length (MDL: e.g., Gru¨nwald 2000), Sto­
chastic or Geometric Complexity (Myung, Balasubra­
manian & Pitt 2000; Rissanen 1996), and Normalized 
Maximum Likelihood (Rissanen 2001), rely on this 
property. This is because they integrate the proba­
bilities of the data across the parameter space of the 
models, or the maximum likelihoods across all possible 
data sets, and so require non­zero probabilities over a 
subset of the parameter space that has measure greater 
than zero to be meaningful. 
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Deterministic Models 
As Myung, Pitt and Kim (in press) note, however, 
there are many important cognitive models that belong 
to the alternative class of deterministic models. These 
models specify diﬀerently how to assess the relation­
ship between data on the one hand, and model predic­
tions at diﬀerent parameterizations on the other. For 
example, a sum­squared loss or error function might 
be proposed, so that increasingly large diﬀerences be­
tween model predictions and observed data are penal­
ized more heavily in evaluating the model. Alterna­
tively, a 0­1 loss function might be proposed, so that 
models are evaluated as being correct only if they pre­
dict data exactly, and are wrong otherwise. What de­
terministic models do not specify, however, is an error 
theory that describes the likelihood of data that dif­
fer from model predictions. This means that, when a 
deterministic model makes incorrect predictions, it is 
not possible to assign the probabilities needed by many 
modern model selection criteria. 
A good example of a deterministic cognitive model is 
the ‘Take the Best’ model of decision making (Gigeren­
zer & Goldstein 1996). This model takes the form of 
a simple algorithm, searching a ﬁxed stimulus envi­
ronment in a deterministic way, so that it will always 
make the same decisions. One way of interpreting the 
model in relation to empirical data is that it has prob­
ability one when it makes the same decision as that 
observed, but probability zero when it makes a diﬀer­
ent decision. Adopting this approach, however, any 
evaluation of the model against human data involv­
ing multiple decisions is very likely to ﬁnd an overall 
probability of zero, because at least one of the model’s 
decisions will disagree with the data. 
Other deterministic models that face similar prob­
lems include the memory models surveyed by Pietsch 
and Vickers (1997), axiomatic theories of judgment 
and choice (e.g., Luce 2000), and various lexicographic 
decision models (e.g., Payne, Bettman & Johnson 
1990). For these sorts of models, the natural assess­
ment is in terms of the proportion of correct decisions 
it makes, or some such error function, but this mea­
sure is not the same as the probabilities from likelihood 
functions used in probabilistic model selection. In par­
ticular, it is not clear how the error function measuring 
goodness­of­ﬁt should be combined with measures of 
model complexity to undertake model selection. 
Recently, however, Gru¨nwald (1999; see also Myung, 
Pitt, & Kim in press), has developed a model selection 
methodology that overcomes these diﬃculties. He pro­
vides a principled technique for associating determin­
istic models with probability distributions, through a 
process called ‘entropiﬁcation’, that allows MDL cri­
teria for competing models to be calculated. There is 
a potential practical diﬃculty, however, in using this 
approach to evaluate cognitive models. The MDL cri­
terion involves multidimensional summations over the 
data space that could be prohibitively computation­
ally expensive in some realistic situations. This pa­
per derives and demonstrates a reformulation of the 
MDL criterion for deterministic models in the impor­
tant special case of 0­1 loss functions that is much less 
computationally expensive. 
The MDL Criterion 
In this section, Gru¨nwald’s (1999) formulation of the 
MDL criterion based on entropiﬁcation is described, 
and a computationally simpler form is then presented. 
In one sense, the reformulation is just a straightforward 
algebraic manipulation, and has probably been noted 
(but not published, as far as we are aware) by others. 
In another sense, making the reformulation explicit, 
and demonstrating its advantages, is a useful contri­
bution. There are many cognitive models that are de­
terministic and naturally assessed under 0­1 loss1, for 
which the MDL method described here ought to ﬁnd 
wide application. 
Original Formulation 
Suppose a deterministic model M is being evaluated 
using a dataset D that has n observations, D = 
[d1, . . . , dn]. Each of the observed data are discrete, 
and can assume only k diﬀerent values. The model 
uses P parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θP ) to make predic­
tions Y = [y1, . . . , yn]. To evaluate any prediction 
made by the model, a 0­1 loss function is deﬁned as�nf (D,Y ) =  i=1 γi, where γi = 0  if  di = yi and 
γi = 1 otherwise. By considering all possible para­
meterizations, the model makes a total of N diﬀer­
ent predictions. In other words, there are N diﬀer­
ent predictions, Y1, . . . , YN , the model is able to make 
about the data by choosing diﬀerent parameter values. 
In general, the relationship between parameterizations 
and predictions will be many­to­one. This means that 
every unique model prediction is naturally associated 
with one or more parameterizations of the model. 
Under these assumptions, Gru¨nwald (1999) shows 
that using entropiﬁcation the model making prediction 
Y can be associated with a probability distribution, 
parameterized by the scalar w, as follows: 
e−wf(D,Y ) p (D |M,Y,w) =  �k �k . 
x1=1 . . .  xn=1 e
−wf(D,[x1,...,xn]) 
Determining the MDL criterion for the model requires 
ﬁnding the model predictions Y ∗ and scalar w ∗ that 
jointly maximize p (D |M, θ, w) to give the value p ∗ . 
1All of the deterministic decision making, memory and 
judgment models already mentioned eﬀectively have 0­1 
loss when they are restricted to two choices. There are 
other models, such as the optimal stopping models consid­
ered later, that are also naturally associated with 0­1 loss 
despite having a larger number of choices. 
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Once this is achieved the MDL criterion for the model 
is given simply by MDL = − ln p ∗ + lnN . 
Besides automatically balancing the competing de­
mands of model ﬁt and complexity, this MDL criterion 
has at least two attractive properties for model selec­
tion in cognitive science. First, diﬀerences in MDL 
values, through their natural probabilistic interpreta­
tion, can be assessed as odds, in much the same way 
as Bayes Factors. This allows the assessment the ‘sig­
niﬁcance’ of diﬀerent MDL values for diﬀerent models 
to be done meaningfully as a question of the standards 
of scientiﬁc evidence required for the problem at hand, 
using a scale that is calibrated by betting. Secondly, as 
Gru¨nwald (1999, pp. 24­28) discusses, the information 
theoretic or coding approach used by MDL means that 
results are available for cases where the data generat­
ing process that is being modeled has statistical prop­
erties that are not perfectly represented by the models 
being considered. We would argue this is inevitably 
the case for cognitive models, and so the ability of the 
MDL approach to address this problem is an important 
one. 
Despite these attractions, however, there is an ob­
vious diﬃculty in maximizing p (D |M, θ, w). The 
problem is that the denominator given by Z = 
x1=0 . . .  xn=0 e
−wf(D,[�k �k x1,...,xn]) involves consider­
ing every possible data set that could be observed, 
which involves a total of kn terms. In cognitive sci­
ence, where it is possible for a deterministic model to 
be evaluated using many data points, each of which 
can assume many values, the repeated calculation of 
Z may be too computationally demanding to be prac­
tical. 
A Simpler MDL Computation 
A simpler form for Z can be derived by noting that 
f (D,Y ) can only take the values 0, . . . , n, in accor­
dance with how many of the model predictions agree 
with the data. Since Z considers all possible data sets, 
the number of times n−x matches (i.e., x mismatches) 
nwill occur is (k − 1)x. For a prediction Y that has x 
n − m matches with the data (i.e., there are m mis­
matches and f (D,Y ) =  m), this leads to the simpliﬁ­
cation 
e−wm p (D |M,Y,w) =  �n � � (k − 1)x e−wx ,n x=0 x 
which has a denominator that sums n+ 1 rather than 
kn terms. 
The computational eﬃciency oﬀered by this refor­
mulation means it will generally be possible to ﬁnd 
∗the wi ∗ that maximizes p (D |M,Yi, wi), giving pi , for 
all N model predictions. The p ∗ required for MDL 
∗ ∗calculation is then just the maximum of p1, . . . , p  N . 
Finding each wi ∗ can also be done eﬃciently by ob­
serving that 
n n −wx∂p/∂w =
1 −wm �
� � 
(k − 1)x (x−m) e .Z2 e x 
x=0 
This derivative is clearly always positive if m = 0 and 
always negative if m = n. This means, if a model 
predicts all of the data correctly, wi ∗ → ∞, and if a 
model fails to predict any of the data correctly wi ∗ → 
−∞. Otherwise, if 0 < m  < n, the substitution u = 
∗ e−w allows wi to be found from the positive real roots 
of the degree n polynomial 
n n 
(k − 1)x (x−m)ux . x 
x=0 
by standard numerical methods (e.g., Forsythe, Mal­
colm, & Moler 1976). 
Gru¨nwald (1999, pp. 98­99) notes, with particular 
reference to the 0­1 loss function, that the case w < 0 
corresponds to ‘inverting’ models. For example, if a 
model only makes two choices, and so considers bi­
nary data (i.e., k = 2), the inverted model changes 
all of the model predictions to the alternative possi­
bility. We would argue it will generally be the case in 
cognitive modeling that it is not appropriate to con­
sider inversion, because this manipulation will require 
the model to be interpreted in a substantively diﬀerent 
and unintended way. If this is the case, it is necessary 
to restrict consideration to w ≥ 0 in ﬁnding the MDL 
value. 
∗With this restriction in place, the Y ∗ and w learned 
from data for qualitative model selection convey use­
ful information in their own right. In particular, as 
Gru¨nwald (1999, pp. 94­95) explains carefully, the 
value of w ∗ measures the ‘randomness’ of the data with 
∗respect to the model Y ∗ , so that smaller values of w 
indicate that the the model provides relatively less in­
formation about the data. 
Demonstrations of the MDL Criterion 
In the remainder of this paper, we present two con­
crete examples of the MDL criterion evaluating cogni­
tive models, in situations where there is a clear need 
to assess whether the better goodness­of­ﬁt of some 
models warrants their additional complexity. The ﬁrst 
involves diﬀerent heuristics for a problem solving task, 
while the second involves diﬀerent models of forced­
choice decision making. 
Optimal Stopping Problem 
As a ﬁrst demonstration of the MDL criterion for de­
terministic models, consider three diﬀerent account 
of human decision­making on an optimal stopping 
task sometimes known as the full­information secretary 
problem (see Ferguson 1989 for a historical overview). 
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Figure 1: An optimal stopping problem of length 10, 
with the sequence of values shown by circles, demon­
strating the operation of the biased optimal (curved 
line), threshold (horizontal line) and cutoﬀ (vertical 
line) models. 
Background In these problems, a person presented 
with a sequence of numerical values, and told to select 
the maximum. They must decide whether to accept 
or reject each possibility in turn and, if a possibility is 
rejected, they cannot select it at some later point. The 
number of choices in the complete sequence is ﬁxed and 
known, and the distribution from which the values are 
drawn (usually a uniform distribution on the interval 
[0, 1]) is also known. Performance is assessed using a 
0­1 loss function, so that if choosing the maximum is 
regarded as correct, but any other choice is regarded 
as incorrect. 
From the mathematical (e.g., Gilbert & Mosteller 
1966) and psychological (e.g., Seale & Rappoport 
1997) literature, there are at least three plausible ac­
counts of how people might make decisions on these 
problems. The ﬁrst ‘threshold’ model assumes peo­
ple simply chooses the ﬁrst value that exceeds a ﬁxed 
threshold. The second ‘biased optimal’ model assumes 
people choose the ﬁrst value that exceeds a threshold 
level, where the threshold level changes for each posi­
tion in the sequence. The threshold levels correspond 
to the mathematically optimal values (see Gilbert & 
Mosteller 1966, Tables 7 and 8), for the given prob­
lem length, all potentially biased by shifting by the 
same constant. The third ‘cutoﬀ ’ model assumes peo­
ple view a ﬁxed proportion of the sequence, remember 
the maximum value up until this cutoﬀ point, and then 
choose the ﬁrst value that exceeds the maximum in the 
remainder of the sequence. Each of these models has 
one parameter, giving the threshold, the bias, or the 
cutoﬀ proportion respectively. For all three models, 
if no value meets the decision criterion, the last value 
presented becomes the forced choice. 
Figure 1 summarizes the three models on a secre­
tary problem of length 10. The sequence of values 
presented is shown by the ﬁlled circles. The horizontal 
line shows the constant level used by the threshold 
model. The threshold levels for the optimal model 
with no bias follow the solid curve. The vertical 
line shows the proportion used by the cutoﬀ model. 
Under these parameterizations, the biased optimal,
threshold, and cutoﬀ models choose, respectively, the 
eighth, ninth, and ﬁfth values presented. 
Application of MDL Lee, O’Connor and Welsh 
(this volume) administered n = 20 problems of length 
k = 10 to a number of subjects. For this set of prob­
lems, the threshold, biased optimal, and cutoﬀ models 
are able to predict, respectively, 60, 78, and 9 data 
sets by varying their parameters. As a concrete ex­
ample of how the MDL criterion can balance these 
diﬀerent model complexities against the ﬁt they are 
able to achieve, consider the decisions made by one 
subject from the experiment. For this subject, the 
best­ﬁtting parameterizations of the threshold, biased 
optimal, and cutoﬀ models correctly predict, respec­
tively 14, 17, and 10 of the 20 decisions. This is an in­
teresting case to consider, because increases in model 
complexity lead to increases in model ﬁt. 
The MDL criteria values for each model, in relation 
to this subject’s data, are 29.5, 19.4 and 38.0 respec­
tively, showing that, despite its increased complexity, 
the biased optimal model provides a better account 
than the threshold and cutoﬀ models. This superi­
ority can be quantiﬁed in terms of naturally inter­
pretable odds, because diﬀerences between MDL val­
ues lie on the log­odds scale. For example, the bi­
ased optimal model provides an account that is about 
e29.5−19.4 ≈ 24, 000 times more likely than that pro­
vided by the threshold model. 
Sequential Sampling Processes 
As a second example, we consider the sequential sam­
pling model of decision making developed by Lee and 
Cummins (in press). 
Background Lee and Cummins (in press) proposed 
that an evidence accumulation approach can unify the 
‘Take the Best’ (TTB: Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1996) 
model with the ‘rational’ (RAT) alternative to which 
it is usually contrasted. The cognitive process being 
modeled involves choosing between two stimuli on the 
basis of the cues or features that each does or does 
not have. In essence, TTB searches the cues until it 
ﬁnds one that only one stimulus has, and then simply 
chooses that stimulus. The RAT model, in contrast, 
forms weighted sums across the cues for both stimuli, 
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Figure 2: A sequential sampling process using evidence 
accumulation to decide between choices A and B. Suc­
cessive evidence values are shown as cues are examined 
from highest validity to lowest. A decision is made 
once the evidence exceeds a threshold value. 
and chooses the one with the maximum sum. 
Figure 2 shows a sequential sampling process accru­
ing information in making this sort of decision. Each 
of the cues is examined and the evidence provided by 
that cue is used to update the state of the random 
walk in favor of choosing stimulus A or stimulus B. If 
stimulus A has the cue and stimulus B does not, the 
random walk moves towards choosing A. If stimulus B 
has the cue and stimulus A does not, the random walk 
moves towards choosing B. If both stimuli either have 
or do not have the cue, the state of the random walk 
is unchanged. 
The important observation about Figure 2 is that 
the TTB and RAT models correspond simply to 
diﬀerent required levels of evidence being accrued 
before a decision is made. If a very small evidence 
threshold were set, the sequential sampling process 
would choose stimulus A, in agreement with the 
TTB choice. Alternatively, if a very large evidence 
threshold were set, the sequential sampling process 
would eventually choose stimulus B (because the ﬁnal 
evidence is in its favor), in agreement with the RAT 
model. In general, if a threshold is small enough
that the ﬁrst discriminating cue is guaranteed to 
have evidence that exceeds the threshold, sequential 
sampling corresponds to the TTB decision model. If 
a threshold is large enough that it is guaranteed never 
to be reached, the ﬁnal evidence is used to make a 
forced decision, and sequential sampling corresponds 
to the RAT decision model. 
Application of MDL For the 200 decisions col­
lected from 40 subjects by Lee and Cummins (in press), 
the TTB model made 36% correctly, while the RAT 
model made 64% correctly. The sequential sampling 
model, at the best­ﬁtting value of its evidence thresh­
old parameter, made 84.5% of the decisions correctly. 
Of course, the sequential sampling model, through 
its use of the parameter, is more complicated than 
both the TTB and RAT decision models, which are 
parameter­free. This raises the issue of whether the 
extra complexity is warranted by the improved ac­
curacy. Using the model selection method developed 
here, Lee and Cummins (in press) found MDL values 
of 87.6, 138.6 and 130.7 for the sequential sampling, 
TTB and RAT models respectively. The much smaller 
MDL value for the uniﬁed model indicates that it pro­
vides a better account of the data, even allowing for 
its additional complexity. 
Conclusion 
These demonstration of the MDL criterion provides 
clear practical examples of how it can be used to eval­
uate competing deterministic models of human cogni­
tive processes. It also highlights the contribution of 
this paper, which is a simpler form of the MDL cri­
terion for the special case of 0­1 loss functions. For 
the optimal stopping problem example, the original 
MDL formulation involves summing 1020 terms in the 
denominator to ﬁnd p (D |M,Y,w) for each combina­
tion of m and Y that needs to be evaluated in opti­
mization. The simpler form given here requires sum­
ming only n + 1 = 21 terms each time. For the se­
quential sampling problem, the original formulation 
involves 2200 ≈ 1060, while the simpliﬁcation involves 
201 terms. As these comparisons make clear, the dras­
tic reduction in computation oﬀered by the simpliﬁ­
cation developed here makes the MDL evaluation of 
deterministic cognitive models under 0­1 loss feasible 
for most (if not) all empirical data collected in cogni­
tive science. 
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Abstract 
Three experiments investigated how individuals solve “shape” 
problems.  These problems are not susceptible to a means-
ends strategy.  They consist of a configuration of squares, 
whose sides consist of separate pieces; and the task is to 
remove a given number of pieces to leave behind a given 
number of squares.  The paper presents a theory of how 
individuals develop strategies for these problems.  Experiment 
1 explored the constraints of symmetry and visual saliency in 
shape problems.  Experiment 2 corroborated the theory’s 
prediction of a major shift in which knowledge acquired 
during the evaluation of tactical steps comes to govern the 
generation of these steps. Experiment 3 showed that 
participants could be biased to adopt strategies making use of 
specific tactical steps. 
Introduction 
How do individuals develop strategies to solve problems?  
The question arises crucially for those problems that come 
in a series of different instances (e.g. Luchins’s, 1942, water 
jug problems).  Our aim was to answer this question for 
problems that do not have a unique solution and for which 
individuals cannot develop a simple deterministic strategy 
guaranteeing an error-free solution.  We therefore studied 
what we refer to as  “shape” problems (see Katona, 1940).  
Figure 1 presents an example of such a problem.  There is 
an initial shape made out of separate pieces (matchsticks) 
and the goal is to remove a given number of pieces to leave 
a given number of squares.  There are two constraints: the 
resulting squares should be of the same size as the initial 
squares, and the solution should not have any loose ends 
(pieces with an end not connected to any other piece). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: On the left is a shape problem in which the task is 
to remove five matches so that only ten squares remain.  A 
solution is shown on the right. 
 
 An important feature of shape problems is that naïve 
individuals cannot use a means-ends strategy in which they 
work backwards from the desired goal (Newell & Simon, 
1972).  The goal merely specifies how many squares should 
remain, but not how they are arranged.  Likewise, 
individuals cannot always tell if a tactical step in a shape 
problem makes progress towards the goal.  The discovery of 
the tactical steps in shape problems is accordingly a 
discovery of the problem space.  There are, in fact, seven 
distinct tactical steps for removing pieces, which are 
summarized in  Figure 2. 
 
 
________________________________________________ 
1. To remove 1 piece & 0 squares, remove loose end 
2. To remove 1 piece & 0 squares, remove join 
3. To remove 1 piece & 1 square, remove outer 
4. To remove 1 piece & 2 squares, remove middle 
5. To remove 2 pieces & 1 square, remove corner 
6. To remove 3 pieces & 1 square, remove U-shape 
7.  To remove 4 pieces & 1 square, remove isolated-square 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 2: The seven tactical steps for shape problems. 
 
  In what follows, we outline a theory of how individuals 
explore these tactical steps, and how they use these 
explorations to develop strategies.  We then report three 
experiments that test the predictions of this theory.  
 
The theory 
Problem solving is a creative process, and we distinguish 
three main sorts of algorithm for creativity (e.g., Johnson-
Laird, 1993).  First, a neo-Darwinian algorithm consists of a 
stage in which ideas are generated followed by a stage in 
which they are evaluated.  Generation depends on arbitrary 
combinations and modifications of existing elements; 
evaluation depends on the use of knowledge as constraints 
to filter out useless results.   Any ideas that survive can be 
recycled recursively through the generative stage again, and 
so on.  Second, in a neo-Lamarckian algorithm, all the 
knowledge acquired from experience constrains the 
generation of ideas.  If alternatives are created, then choice 
amongst them can only be arbitrary, because all the 
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constraints have already been used in their creation.  When 
individuals have the requisite knowledge, the algorithm is 
highly efficient, because there is no need for recursion.  
Third, in a multi-stage algorithm, some knowledge is used 
to constrain the creation of ideas and some knowledge is 
used to evaluate the results – with the option of recursion. In 
sum, according to this account, constraints govern the 
evaluation of ideas, or their generation, or both. 
 The algorithm that individuals use to solve shape 
problems should depend on their experience.  Naïve 
individuals are likely to tackle their initial problems using a 
strategy that is close to neo-Darwinian.  They should be 
constrained solely by the statement of the problem, the 
problem shape itself, and their existing perceptual and 
cognitive processes.  As they try out the various possible 
tactical steps, they learn their consequences, which are 
summarized in Figure 2.  Learning occurs whether or not a 
tactical step turns out to be useful in solving a problem.  
Any problem allows only a limited set of tactical options, 
and so individuals should gradually narrow down the steps 
that are left to explore.  Likewise, granted that the problem 
is within their competence, they should at length hit upon a 
sequence of steps that leads to a solution.  In addition, some 
pieces in the problem shape are visually salient, and they 
may bias participants to attempt certain tactical steps first.  
Saliency is likely to depend on the perimeter of the shape.  
Any piece in the perimeter should be visually salient if it 
has at least one adjacent piece that is also in the perimeter 
and is at right angles to it.  In addition, a piece should be 
more salient if both adjacent pieces are at right angles.  A 
visually salient component comprises a group of such 
visually salient pieces that are adjacent to each other.  These 
principles are probably special cases of broader factors 
governing visual salience.  The acquisition of tactical 
knowledge depends on perceptual abilities, e.g., subitizing a 
small number of squares, and conceptual and inferential 
abilities, e.g., a grasp of the concepts of squares and pieces, 
and relevant arithmetical operations. 
 According to the theory, as tactical knowledge is 
acquired, it shifts from the evaluative stage of the creative 
process to the generative stage.  Individuals accordingly 
shift from using a neo-Darwinian algorithm to a multi-stage 
algorithm, and may even converge on a neo-Lamarckian 
algorithm.  This strategic shift enables them to avoid useless 
tactical steps and thereby to make more efficient progress 
towards solutions.  They may proceed at once to correct 
tactical steps.  A central component of an efficient strategy 
for shape problems is the ratio of the number of pieces to 
remove to the number of squares to remove (henceforth, the 
“p/s” ratio).  It constrains the appropriate tactical steps from 
those afforded by the current configuration of the problem 
(see Figure 2).  But, its optimal use depends on knowledge 
of the full variety of tactical steps.  Conversely, a limited 
knowledge of these steps yields limited strategies for coping 
with the problems.  Yet, the shift of tactical knowledge to 
the generative stage of problem solving should still occur, 
albeit with a restricted repertoire of tactical steps.  Hence, it 
should be possible to bias the development of strategies by 
giving individuals only a limited experience of tactical steps 
in an initial set of problems. 
Experiment 1 
This experiment explored two factors that should affect 
shape problem solving: whether the initial shape is 
symmetrical or asymmetrical, and whether the solution is 
salient or not in the shape.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: The eight problems used in Experiment 1.  We 
manipulated symmetry and the presence of a salient 
solution. 
 
Method and procedure 
Twenty Princeton University students carried out eight 
problems, which manipulated symmetry and the presence or 
absence of salient solutions.  Figure 3 presents the eight 
problems used in the experiment.  In order to 
counterbalance the manipulation, one set of four problems 
(see Figure 3a) called for the same number of pieces and 
squares to be removed.  This condition is feasible only by 
changing the shapes from the cases in which the solution is 
salient to the cases in which it is not.  Hence, a second set of 
four problems (see Figure 3b) used the same shapes in these 
two cases but changed the number of pieces and squares that 
had to be removed.  The experiment employed a block 
design: half of the participants carried out the four problems 
in Figure 3a first, and the other half carried out the four 
problems in Figure 3b first.  The assignment of block 
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presentation, as well as the order of problems within each 
block, was random. 
On each trial, the participants constructed the shape in a 
given diagram using matchsticks.  They then tried to solve 
the problem.  They were told that they should not leave any 
loose ends, and that each square must consist of four pieces. 
They had to say “done” at the end of each trial to the 
experimenter, who recorded the latencies. 
Results and discussion 
Figure 4 presents the mean latencies to solve the eight 
problems.  The two blocks did not differ reliably (z = 1.61, 
n.s.), and therefore we collapsed their latencies for analysis.  
Participants solved problems with a salient solution reliably 
faster than those without a salient solution (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, z = 3.85, p<.001).  In addition, they also 
solved problems with a symmetric initial shape reliably 
faster than those with an asymmetrical initial shape 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 2.09, p<.05).  The two 
variables did not interact.  These results demonstrate that 
existing factors in the problems can constrain problem 
solving strategies.  To investigate how people develop 
strategies to cope with shape problems, however, 
participants would need to solve a series of problems calling 
for the removal of different numbers of pieces, and to think 
aloud as they solve the problems.  Experiment 2 employed 
this procedure. 
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Figure 4: Experiment 1: Mean latencies as a function of 
symmetry and the presence of salient solution. 
 
Experiment 2 
This experiment tested the key prediction of a shift in 
strategy from a neo-Darwinian exploration of steps to their 
use in constraining the generation of steps. As a corollary, 
there should be a reduction in the number of steps that 
individuals take to solve problems.   
Method and procedure 
Fourteen Princeton University students carried out 12 
problems presented in a random order.  The problems (see 
Figure 5) varied in terms of symmetry, number of matches 
to be removed, and tactical steps, but they all called for 
removing two squares.  The experimental procedure was the 
same as that in Experiment 1.  However, there was an 
additional requirement: participants had to think aloud as 
they solved the problems.  We video-recorded what they did 
and what they said.   
 
 
 
Figure 5: The 12 problem shapes used in Experiment 2. 
 
Results and discussion 
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Figure 6: Experiment 2: Mean latencies and numbers of 
false steps across trials. 
 
Figure 6 presents the mean latencies to solve the problems, 
and the mean numbers of false steps, over the 12 trials.  A 
false step was one that the participants subsequently undid. 
As predicted, the participants were able, with experience, to 
solve the problems faster (Page’s L = 7882.5, z = 4.86, p << 
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.001), and to make fewer false steps (Page’s L = 6750.0, z = 
2.16, p <.05).  These two variables correlated reliably for all 
but two of the problems (Pearson’s r ranged from .65 to .95, 
with p <.05 to p <.001). In addition, in a post-experimental 
questionnaire, the participants were most likely to identify 
those tactical steps that they had used during the 
experiment: they all mentioned the outer and the U-shape, 
but none identified all seven tactical steps (see Figure 2). 
The transcriptions of the video-recordings showed that the 
participants relied mainly on a single strategy, but there 
were other two strikingly different strategies.  The main 
strategy has two stages.  The first stage is exploratory: the 
participants try out various tactical steps, which they usually 
subsequently undo.  They are acquiring knowledge of these 
steps, including steps irrelevant to the present problem.  
They are also acquiring knowledge of the p/s ratio, i.e., the 
ratio of pieces and squares to be removed (see the previous 
section).  They grasped its relevance, but rarely in a 
complete way.  The duration of this stage depends on the 
participants’ experience with the problems.  It accordingly 
shrinks in proportion over the problems as the participants 
acquire knowledge.  The second stage of the strategy is the 
application of tactical knowledge.  The participants consider 
the p/s ratio, often mentioning it explicitly, and use their 
tactical knowledge to select an appropriate tactical step.  
The shift has occurred from a neo-Darwinian strategy to a 
multi-stage strategy. Hence, the participants are able to 
make rapid progress to the solution.  For some problems, 
they make no false steps.  Likewise, they can combine 
tactical steps into a single step that solves the problem at a 
stroke.  In other cases, they apply their knowledge 
recursively, removing a correct piece, re-assessing the 
number of pieces and the number of squares to be removed, 
and, as result, selecting a further tactical step, and so on, 
until they solve the problem.  They are converging on a neo-
Lamarckian strategy for solving shape problems. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: An example of the main strategy in a non-
deterministic finite-state automaton.  On the right, is the 
shape problem in which the goal is to remove 2 pieces and 2 
squares (Problem 7). 
 
 Figure 7 shows an example of the main strategy.  The 
participant started in an exploratory state (state 0) and tried 
various steps, which she immediately undid.  She then 
correctly removed an outer (shifting to state 1), and then 
removed another outer to solve the problem.  On some 
subsequent trials, e.g., with problem 5, she proceeded at 
once to the correct solution with no false steps.  The 
protocol is typical in that it appears to reflect the use, not of 
a simple deterministic strategy, but one in which various 
steps are tried out in a way that appears to be non-
deterministic. 
  One participant used a quite different sort of strategy.  
During the first stage of tackling a problem, the participant 
removed some pieces – often the required number – in an 
apparently arbitrary way, sometimes leaving several loose 
ends.   The participant then carried out one of three actions: 
removing a new piece, replacing a piece removed earlier, or 
moving a piece from one position in the shape to fill the 
position of a piece that had been removed.   The participant 
persisted in these steps until the solution emerged.  The 
strategy was inefficient, yielding many more false steps than 
other participants. Yet, the participant gradually acquired 
some tactical knowledge, which became evident in both a 
more judicious initial removal of pieces and in more 
efficient steps in the second stage.  
 Another participant used a strategy that depended on the 
initial shape.  The participant used the statement of the 
problem to divide the initial shape into two or three 
conceptual parts.  For example, for Problem 2 (remove five 
pieces to remove two squares), the participant identified the 
number of squares to remain in the solution (eight), and then 
partitioned this number into two parts (three squares plus 
five squares).  The participant then searched for ways to 
eliminate all but these configurations. Unfortunately, the 
attempt ignored the number of pieces to be removed. The 
strategy was inefficient, and yielded little tactical 
knowledge. 
 All three strategies stabilized as instances of the multi-
stage algorithm outlined earlier.  No-one developed a neo-
Lamarckian strategy that guaranteed that they could proceed 
directly to the solution of a problem without any false steps.  
Experiment 3 
When individuals acquire a deterministic strategy, it 
transfers to new problems (see, e.g., Luchins, 1942).  With 
shape problems, however, individuals do not acquire a 
deterministic strategy guaranteed to lead to solution, but 
instead acquire a tactical knowledge that constrains the 
generation of steps. Their resulting strategy does not appear 
to be deterministic (see Figure 7).  Nevertheless, it should 
be possible to bias the development of strategies by giving 
participants an experience of only certain tactical steps in 
the initial problems.  Experiment 3 tested this prediction. 
 The participants first encountered a series of four 
problems that could be solved only by using certain tactical 
steps.  These tactics differed between two groups of 
participants. Both groups then tackled two “ambiguous” 
problems that could be solved using either set of tactics. A 
final unambiguous problem could be solved only with novel 
tactics, i.e., a problem used to train the participants in the 
other group.  Such a problem should force the participants 
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back to a greater use of the exploratory stage of their 
strategy. 
Method 
Twenty Princeton undergraduates were assigned at random 
to one of two groups: both carried out seven problems 
calling for the removal of four pieces to eliminate two 
squares.  In Group 1, participants tackled four problems that 
could be solved only by removing two corners; in Group 2, 
they tackled four problems that could be solved only by 
removing a U-shape and an outer.  Each participant carried 
out these trials in a different random order.  Both groups 
then attempted two ambiguous problems, and finally a 
problem chosen randomly from the first four problems 
given to the other group.  Figure 8 shows the complete set 
of problems. The experimental procedure was the same as 
that in Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The problems used in Experiment 3.  Each 
problem called for the removal of four pieces and two 
squares. 
 
Results 
Figure 9 presents the mean latencies of the two groups to 
solve the problems.  The participants took progressively less 
time to solve the problems over the seven trials (Page’s L = 
1618.0, z = 4.23, p <<.001).  The ambiguous problems took 
slightly longer than the last training problem, though the 
difference was only marginally significant (Wilcoxon test, z 
= 1.64, p >.05).  However, the choice of pieces to be 
removed showed that both groups persevered with the same 
tactics that they had used in training: overall, 92% of 
solutions were based on the same tactics; 14 out of the 20 
participants used these tactics on both ambiguous problems, 
and the remaining participants were ties (Binomial test, p << 
.001).  The final control problem took significantly longer to 
solve than the last training problem (Wilcoxon test, z = 
2.61, p < .01). 
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Figure 9: Mean latencies of the two groups in Experiment 
3. 
 
  The results show that even when individuals have not 
acquired a deterministic strategy, their knowledge of tactics 
transfers to new problems.  The training trials sufficed for 
the participants to develop tactical knowledge, and this 
knowledge constrained their search for solutions to the 
subsequent problems.  With ambiguous problems, they 
readily succeeded though there was a marginal tendency for 
them to be slightly slower.   In the case of the final problem, 
the tactics were inappropriate, and so they had to revert to a 
longer exploratory stage, which slowed them down. 
General Discussion 
Problem solving calls for creativity, because it calls for the 
generation of ideas that are novel (at least for the 
individual).   In the case of, say,  Duncker’s X-ray problem 
(Duncker, 1945), psychologists can study only how 
individuals solve the problem for the first time.   Hence, in 
order to investigate the development of strategies for 
solving problems, it is necessary to use problems that can be 
presented in a series that call for distinct solutions.   In the 
past, such problems have been open to solution by a  simple 
deterministic strategy of one sort or another (see, e.g., 
Luchins, 1942).  In contrast, our goal was to examine the 
development of strategies for coping with problems that lie 
outside the bounds of a deterministic strategy – at least for 
our participants.   We therefore studied problems that come 
in a series, just as many problems in daily life do  – from the 
writing of computer programs to the search for a job. 
  Experiment 1 explored two constraints in shape problems, 
and found that symmetry of the initial problem shape, and 
the presence of salient solutions in the shape, facilitated 
problem solving.  Experiment 2 showed that individuals do 
indeed normally begin to tackle such problems by exploring 
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the consequences of various tactical steps in a way akin to a 
neo-Darwinian procedure.  They choose a step arbitrarily, 
and then evaluate its consequences in relation to the solution 
of the problem.   More importantly, however, they acquire 
knowledge of the number of squares that the step removes.  
They pick up this knowledge whether or not the step is 
useful in the solution of the problem.  And, as the think-
aloud protocols also showed, they acquire some 
understanding of the importance of the p/s ratio in 
determining appropriate steps for a given problem.  This 
ratio, between the number of pieces to be removed and the 
number of squares to be removed, constrains the set of 
useful steps at any point in solving a shape problem.  As the 
theory postulates, a strategic shift then occurs.  Individuals 
start to use their knowledge of tactical steps and the ratio to 
govern the generation of tactical steps.  In this way, they are 
able to avoid useless false steps in the solution of problems.  
No participant, however, was able to converge completely 
on a neo-Lamarckian strategy that guaranteed a solution to 
any problem without false steps.  Indeed, it is an open 
question whether such a strategy is possible for shape 
problems of any degree of complexity.  
 Experiment 3 corroborated the prediction that constraints 
in the form of tactical knowledge do transfer to new 
problems. Participants acquired tactical knowledge during 
training trials, and they continued to use these tactics for 
problems that could be solved in other ways.  When the 
tactics were inappropriate, they were slowed down because 
they had to revert to a longer exploratory stage to find the 
right tactics.  Luchins (1942) discovered that deterministic 
strategies transfer in this way.  Our results generalize his 
findings to show that even when experience leads at best to 
a strategy that is not deterministic, the strategy nevertheless 
transfers. 
 Is the strategic shift an instance of insight?  The answer 
depends on what one takes insight to be (cf. Weisberg, 
1986; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Isaak & Just, 1995; Ormerod, 
MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002).  When the current 
constraints fail to yield a solution, the shift yields new 
constraints on the generation of tactical steps. This change, 
in turn, can yield the solution of a problem. The 
development of strategies for shape problems accordingly 
reflects a series of small insights in which constraints are 
changed as a result of strategic shifts. 
Ackowledgments 
This research was supported by a grant from the National 
Science Foundation to the second author to study strategies 
in reasoning (BCS-0076287).  We thank Sam Glucksberg, 
Geoffrey Goodwin, Uri Hasson, Cathy Haught, Sanna 
Reynolds, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful 
comments. 
References 
Duncker, K. (1945).  On problem solving.  Psychological 
Monographs, 58(5), Whole number 270. 
Isaak, M.I., & Just, M.A. (1995).  Constraints on thinking in 
insight and invention.  In Sternberg, R.J., & Davidson, 
J.E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight. (p.281-325).  
Cambridge MA: Bradford books, MIT Press.  
Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1993).  Human and Machine Thinking.  
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Katona, G. (1940).  Organizing and Memorizing.  New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Kaplan, C.A., & Simon, H.A. (1990) In search of insight.  
Cognitive Psychology, 22, 374-419. 
Luchins, A.S. (1942).  Mechanization in problem-solving: 
the effect of Einstellung.  Psychological Monographs, 
54(6): 95. 
Newell, A., & Simon, H.A. (1972).  Human Problem 
Solving.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Ormerod, T.C., MacGregor, J.N., & Chronicle, E.P. (2002).  
Dynamics and constraints in insight problem solving.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 28(4), 791-799. 
Weisberg, R.W. (1986) Creativity: Genius and Other 
Myths.  New York: Freeman. 
 
 
818
Decision-Making on the Full Information Secretary Problem
Michael D. Lee, Tess A. O’Connor and Matthew B. Welsh
{michael.lee,tess.oconnor,matthew.welsh}@psychology.adelaide.edu.au
Department of Psychology, University of Adelaide
South Australia, 5005, AUSTRALIA
Abstract
The secretary problem is a recreational mathematics
problem, suited to laboratory experimentation, that
nevertheless is representative of a class of real world
sequential decision-making tasks. In the ‘full infor-
mation’ version, an observer is presented with a se-
quence of values from a known distribution, and is
required to choose the maximum value. The difficul-
ties are that a value can only be chosen at the time
it is presented, that the last value in the sequence is
a forced choice if none is chosen earlier, and that any
value that is not the maximum is scored as completely
wrong. We report a study of human performance on
full information secretary problems with 10, 20 and
50 values in the sequence, and considers three differ-
ent heuristics as models of human decision-making. It
is found that some people achieve near-optimal lev-
els of accuracy, but that there are individual differ-
ences in human performance. A quantitative evalua-
tion of the three heuristics, using the Minimum De-
scription Length criterion, shows inter-individual dif-
ferences, but intra-individual consistency, in the use
of the heuristics. In particular, people seem to use
the heuristics that involve choosing a value when it
exceeds an internal threshold, but differ in how they
set thresholds. On the basis of these findings, a more
general threshold-based family of heuristic models is
developed.
Introduction
Many real world decision-making problems are sequen-
tial in nature. A series of choices is made available
over time, and it is often efficient (and sometimes even
necessary) to make a selection without waiting to be
presented with all of the alternatives. On long cross-
country drives, for example, people refill their cars at
one of a sequence of towns on the route, without know-
ing the price of fuel at subsequent towns. This type of
sequential decision has a continuous utility function.
People aim to choose the cheapest price, and measure
their success by how much their purchase exceeded this
minimum.
Other sequential decision-making tasks have bi-
nary utility functions, where any incorrect decision is
equally (and completely) incorrect. For example, con-
sider being a witness for a police line-up, where, be-
cause of the circumstances of the case, the offender
is known to be in the line-up. Police line-up policy
demands that suspects are presented one at a time,
may only be viewed once, and that a suspect must
be identified at the time they are presented (e.g., Ste-
blay, Deisert, Fulero, & Lindsay 2001). Suppose also
(unrealistically, we hope) that the police insist that a
suspect be identified, and indicate that they will force
the identification of the last person in the line-up if
none of the previous people are chosen. The aim is to
choose the offender, and any misidentification has the
equally bad outcome of selecting an innocent suspect.
This decision-making scenario has the same essential
features as a recreational mathematics problem known
as the ‘secretary problem’ (see Ferguson 1989 for a his-
torical overview). In secretary problems, an observer
is presented with a sequence of possible choices, and
must decide whether to accept or reject each possi-
bility in turn. The number of choices in the complete
sequence is fixed and known, and only the rank of each
possibility, relative to those already seen, is presented
to the observer. If the observer chooses the best pos-
sibility in the sequence, their decision is correct, and
any other choice is regarded as incorrect.
Variants of the secretary problem have been consid-
ered that change or relax different parts of the problem.
In particular, the full information version of the secre-
tary problem, sometimes known as the ‘Cayley’ prob-
lem, presents observers with a score from a known dis-
tribution for each possibility, and the goal is to choose
the maximum score in the sequence. Rank information
corresponds to the assumption that witnesses keep a
relative ordering of people in line-ups, whereas value
information corresponds to the assumption that wit-
nesses evaluate some continuous measure of the prob-
ability that a person is the offender. In either case, the
secretary problem has the important feature of using
the same binary utility function as the line-up deci-
sion. The goal is to choose the actual offender, and
any incorrect decision is equally wrong.
Problem Solving and Secretary Problems
Human performance on secretary problems is an in-
teresting topic for cognitive science, for a number of
reasons. It offers a well defined task, suited to labora-
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tory experimentation, that nevertheless is ecologically
representative of a class of real world situations. Be-
cause of their inherent complexity, secretary problems
also provide an opportunity to study the relationship
between rational analysis and heuristic strategies in
human problem solving.
Most laboratory research on human problem solv-
ing has relied on artificial problems that are charac-
terized by well-defined initial and terminating states
that must be linked by a systematic, finite series of
steps. Typically, these problems, like the ‘Towers of
Hanoi’ or ‘Cannibals and Missionaries’, are determin-
istic, and have state spaces with combinatorially lim-
ited possibilities. A major focus of studying people’s
abilities to solve these tasks involves examining under
what circumstances, if any, people make rational de-
cisions. Violations of rationality are easy to measure,
because the tasks permit a complete formal analysis.
This approach to studying human problem solving as-
sesses what Simon (1976) terms ‘substantive’ rational-
ity: the ability of people to produce optimal final de-
cisions. Typically, they do not address what Simon
(1976) terms ‘procedural’ rationality—the efficiency of
the processes required to make the decision—because
of the limited combinatorial complexity of the prob-
lem.
More recently, however, some research has studied
human performance on difficult combinatorial opti-
mization problems, such as visually presented Trav-
eling Salesperson Problems (TSPs), that have very
large state spaces, and resist complete formal solution
(e.g., MacGregor & Ormerod 1996; Vickers, Butavi-
cius, Lee, & Medvedev 2001). In attempting to solve
these problems, subjects are constrained both by the
nature of the task (e.g., limited time), and by their
cognitive capabilities (e.g., limited memory). In other
words, their performance is constrained not only by the
need to achieve a substantively rational outcome, but
also by the need to use procedurally rational heuristic
processes that are sufficiently fast and accurate, and
are implementable with available cognitive resources.
Procedural rationality offers an important additional
constraint for understanding human problems solving
processes, and for the development and evaluation of
cognitive models of decision-making.
Secretary problems provide an opportunity to con-
tinue and extend this line of study. Because they are
not inherently perceptual, secretary problems allow
consideration of whether results obtained with prob-
lems like TSPs generalize to cognitively-based prob-
lem solving. Secretary problems also introduce uncer-
tainty, and place demands on memory. While visual
problems like TSPs are combinatorially large, the basic
information about distances between points is always
perceptually available in a complete and certain form
to subjects. In contrast, the sequences of information
in secretary problems are stochastic and presented only
temporarily, requiring people to deal with uncertainty
and rely on their memory.
Previous Research
Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) provide a thorough and
useful overview of early mathematical analysis of sev-
eral versions of the secretary problem. When only rank
information is provided, the optimal decision rule takes
the form of observing some fixed proportion of values
in the sequence, remembering the maximum presented,
and then choosing the first subsequent value that is
greater, if one exists. Gilbert and Mosteller (1966, Ta-
ble 2) detail the optimal ‘cutoff’ proportion for the
initial sequence of observations, which depends upon
the length of the sequence, but converges to the value
1/e ≈ 0.368. They also give the associated probability
of making a correct decision using the optimal decision
rule.
For the full information version, where values rather
than ranks are presented, the optimal decision rule re-
quires choosing the first value that exceeds a thresh-
old level for its position in the sequence. Gilbert and
Mosteller (1966, Tables 7 and 8) detail these optimal
thresholds and the associated probabilities of mak-
ing a correct decision. Since Gilbert and Mosteller’s
(1966) seminal work, a large literature has developed
on mathematical analyses of a large number of vari-
ants on the secretary problem, often with a focus on
the performance of heuristic decision rules (e.g., Free-
man 1983).
Relatively less attention has been given to study-
ing human performance solving secretary problems.
Seale and Rapoport (1997) consider the rank infor-
mation version of the problem with lengths of 40 and
80, and focus on the evaluation of plausible heuristic
models of human decision-making. In an individual
subject analysis, they found a parameterized version
of the optimal cutoff rule provided the best fit. Ka-
han, Rapoport and Jones (1967) studied human perfor-
mance on full-information versions of the problem with
length 200, where the values were drawn from either
a positively skewed, negatively skewed, or a uniform
distribution. They found no evidence for the different
distributions affecting the decisions made. They also
compared individual and group decision-making, and
found that decisions were made earlier in the sequence
by individuals. Other empirical studies (e.g., Kogut
1990), make a large methodological departure by re-
quiring subjects to sacrifice explicitly held resources
to view additional presentations, usually because they
are interested in applications of the problem to eco-
nomic decision-making.
In this paper, we study human performance on
the full information version of the secretary problem,
where values are chosen from a uniform distribution.
We consider problems of length 10, 20 and 50, under
the binary utility function, but without any explicit
820
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
20
40
60
80
100
Presentation
Va
lu
e
Cutoff Biased Optimal
Threshold
Figure 1: A sample secretary problem of length 10,
with the sequence of values shown by filled circles,
demonstrating the operation of the biased optimal
(curved line), threshold (horizontal line) and cutoff
(vertical line) heuristics.
search cost. Our primary interest, like that of Seale
and Rapoport (1997), is to develop and evaluate com-
peting cognitive models of human decision-making.
Three Heuristics
We consider three possible heuristics as models of hu-
man decision-making. The first is a biased version of
the optimal decision rule. This heuristic chooses the
first value that exceeds a threshold level for its posi-
tion in the sequence. The threshold levels correspond
to the optimal values, for the given problem length,
all shifted by the same constant. The second heuris-
tic is inspired by Simon’s (1956) notion of satisficing.
It simply chooses the first value that exceeds a single
fixed threshold. The third heuristic is inspired by the
optimal decision rule for the rank information version
of the secretary problem. It observes a fixed propor-
tion of the values in the sequence, and remembers the
maximum value up until this cutoff point. The first
value that exceeds the maximum in the remainder of
the sequence is chosen. For all three heuristics, if no
value meets the decision criterion, the last value be-
comes the forced choice.
Figure 1 summarizes the functioning of the three
heuristics on a problem of length 10. The sequence
of values presented is shown by the filled circles. The
threshold levels for the optimal heuristic (with no bias)
follow the solid curve. The horizontal line shows the
constant level used by the threshold heuristic. The
vertical line shows the proportion used by the cutoff
heuristic. Under these parameterizations, the biased
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Figure 2: The accuracy of the heuristics, across their
parameter spaces, for 10, 20 and 50 sequence length
problems.
optimal, threshold, and cutoff heuristics choose, re-
spectively, the eighth, ninth, and fifth values presented.
The left panel of Figure 2 shows the accuracy of
the biased optimal heuristic for bias values between
-100 and 100 for problems of length 10, 20, and 50,
calculated using the analytic method of Gilbert and
Mosteller (1966, p. 55). At zero bias, the heuristic
corresponds to the optimal decision rule, and so the
maximum possible accuracy is obtained. The middle
panel of Figure 2 shows the accuracy of the threshold
heuristic for threshold values between 0 and 100 for
problems of length 10, 20 and 50, calculated using the
same analytic method. The maximum possible accu-
racy, corresponding to the use of the optimal decision
rule, is shown for each problem length by the horizon-
tal lines. Finally, the right panel of Figure 2 shows
the accuracy of the cutoff heuristic for proportions be-
tween 0 and 1 for problems of length 10, 20 and 50,
generated by simulation on a large sample of indepen-
dently generated problems. Once again, the maximum
possible accuracies are shown by the horizontal lines.
There are two observations worth making about the
accuracy of the heuristics shown by Figure 2. It is clear
that the threshold heuristic is capable of making bet-
ter decisions than the cutoff heuristic. This is interest-
ing, given that the cutoff heuristic is optimal for rank
information secretary problems. It is also clear that
the accuracy of both the biased optimal and threshold
heuristics are very sensitive to their parameterizations,
particularly for larger problem lengths.
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Experiment
Participants Ten participants completed the exper-
iment. There were 4 males and 6 females, with a mean
age of 26.1 years.
Method Each participant completed the same three
sets of problems. The first set contained 20 problems
of length 10. The second contained 20 problems of
length 20. The third set contained 20 problems of
length 50. Participants always did the three sets in
the same order—length 10, then 20, then 50—but the
order of the 20 problems within each set was random-
ized across participants.
For each problem, the participants were told the
length of sequence, and were instructed to choose the
maximum value It was emphasized that (a) the values
were uniformly and randomly distributed between 0.00
and 100.00, (b) a value could only be chosen at the time
it was presented, (c) the goal was to select the max-
imum value, with any selection below the maximum
being completely incorrect, and (d) if no choice had
been made when the last value was presented, they
would be forced to choose this value. As each value
was presented, its position in the sequence was shown,
together with ‘yes’ and ‘no’ response buttons. When
a value was chosen, subjects rated their confidence in
the decision on a nine point scale ranging from “com-
pletely incorrect” to “completely correct”.
Results Table 1 summarizes the accuracy of the de-
cisions made by all of the subjects for all of the prob-
lems. The average accuracy for the 20 problems in each
set is given, together with averages across all problems
for each subject, and across all subjects for each prob-
lem length. There are three observations worth making
about these results. First, some subjects achieve lev-
els of accuracy competitive with the optimal decision
rule. Secondly, there appear to be individual differ-
ences between the subjects, with a range in average
accuracy from 33% to more than 60%. Thirdly, there
is some suggestion that human performance worsens as
the problem length increases, even after accounting for
the slightly decreased accuracy of the optimal decision
rule.
Model Evaluation One compelling aspect of the
model evaluation undertaken by Seale and Rapoport
(1997) is that it was done at the level of individual sub-
jects, rather than by averaging decisions across sub-
jects. As noted by Estes (1956), averaging non-linear
decision processes in the presence of noise, and with
significant individual differences, acts to corrupt the
form of the empirical data being modeled. Because
these criteria are likely met in the current problem,
we also undertook individual subject evaluation of the
biased optimal, threshold and cutoff heuristics.
A potential criticism of Seale and Rapoport (1997)
is that the quantitative component of their model eval-
Table 1: Accuracy of human decisions, showing the
percentage of correct answers for each participant on
each set of problems. Average accuracy for each par-
ticipant, and for each problem length are also shown.
Participant n = 10 n = 20 n = 50 Mean
1 65 65 55 61.37
2 45 45 20 36.67
3 55 45 50 50.00
4 40 35 25 33.33
5 55 35 55 48.33
6 65 45 20 43.33
7 45 60 50 51.67
8 55 50 45 50.00
9 70 55 55 60.00
10 50 35 55 46.67
Mean 54.50 47.00 43.00
uation relied solely on the ability of a heuristic, at
one or more parameterizations, to match the decisions
made by a subject. As argued by Roberts and Pashler
(2000), measures of goodness-of-fit fail to account for
important quantifiable components in model selection.
In particular, it is important also to assess the com-
plexity of parameterized models, to ensure that good
fit to empirical data does not merely arise because a
model is so complicated that it can fit any data, in-
cluding data that are never observed.
In model theoretic terms, there are clear differences
in the complexity of the three heuristics being con-
sidered. For the set of 20 length 10 problems given
to subjects, there are 1020 possible combinations of
decisions. The biased optimal, threshold, and cutoff
heuristics can predict, respectively, 78, 60, and 9 of
these possibilities by varying their parameters. Similar
differences in complexity hold for the longer problem
lengths, with 88, 70 and 17 data distributions being
indexed by the parameters for the length 20 problems,
and 121, 90 and 30 for the length 50 problems. Ac-
cordingly, any superiority in the ability of the biased
optimal heuristic over its competitors, or in the thresh-
old over the cutoff heuristic, could possibly be due to
greater complexity, rather than fundamentally captur-
ing regularities in the empirical data.
These concerns are best addressed using advanced
model selection methods (e.g., Pitt, Myung, & Zhang
2002), which provide criteria for choosing between
models in ways that consider both goodness-of-fit and
complexity. One interesting challenge in doing this
is for the current models is that they are determin-
istic, and do not specify an error theory. This means
that various probabilistic model selection criteria, such
as Bayes Factors (e.g., Kass & Raftery 1995), Mini-
mum Description Length (MDL: e.g., Gru¨nwald 2000)
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Table 2: Minimum Description Length (MDL) criteria
values for the Biased Optimal (BO), Threshold (Th)
and Cutoff (Cu) models, measured against the decision
made by the ten participants on each problem length.
Bold entries highlight strong evidence in favor of the
preferred model.
n = 10 n = 20 n = 50
BO Th Cu BO Th Cu BO Th Cu
1 32.7 26.3 40.1 34.4 25.6 52.6 34.6 23.2 60.6
2 19.4 32.4 33.2 38.0 40.4 45.0 34.6 32.8 60.6
3 35.4 26.3 35.7 38.0 29.7 35.2 29.7 32.8 47.5
4 15.3 35.1 42.0 26.3 25.6 47.8 18.7 32.8 44.1
5 32.7 32.4 40.1 30.4 29.7 50.3 52.0 48.9 60.6
6 19.4 29.5 38.0 21.8 29.7 42.1 29.7 28.1 43.8
7 26.6 22.9 40.1 26.3 21.2 41.5 18.7 17.8 35.8
8 32.7 26.3 40.1 41.5 33.5 50.3 12.5 23.2 47.8
9 26.6 32.4 38.0 26.3 25.6 52.6 24.4 23.2 36.0
10 29.8 37.6 40.1 21.8 37.0 52.6 34.6 28.1 43.8
or Normalized Maximum Likelihood (Rissanen 2001),
are not immediately applicable. Gru¨nwald (1999),
however, develops a model selection methodology that
overcomes these difficulties. He provides a principled
technique for associating deterministic models with
probability distributions, through a process called ‘en-
tropification’, that allows MDL criteria for competing
models to be calculated.
Table 2 shows the MDL values found by applying
Gru¨nwald’s (1999) method to all three heuristics, tak-
ing each subject individually, and considering each
problem length separately. Lower MDL values indi-
cate better models, and differences between values can
be interpreted on the log-odds scale. This means,
for example, that the threshold heuristic (MDL value
26.3) provides an account that is about 600 times
more likely than that provided by the biased opti-
mal heuristic (MDL value 32.7) for the decisions made
by the first subject for the length 10 problems, since
e32.7−26.3 ≈ 600. Kass and Raftery (1995) suggest,
without being prescriptive, that a difference of six or
more in the log-odds given by MDL values corresponds
to ‘strong’ evidence in favor of the preferred model.
Adopting the same standard, Table 2 highlights in bold
those instances where the MDL for one of the heuris-
tics provides strong evidence in its favor compared to
both of the others.
There are several conclusions that can be drawn
from this analysis. First, despite its simplicity, the
cutoff heuristic does not provide a good model of
the human decisions. For almost every subject and
every problem length, it has the greatest MDL value,
and often is so much larger as to provide strong evi-
dence against its suitability. Secondly, there is clear
evidence of inter-individual differences in the use of
the biased optimal or threshold heuristics. There are
approximately as many instances, for each problem
length, where the biased optimal or threshold heuris-
tic is strongly favored as an account for an individual
subject. Thirdly, there is also some evidence of intra-
individual consistency in using the biased optimal or
threshold heuristic. This is because, in most instances,
strong preferences favor the same heuristic for the same
subject on different problem lengths.
Once the MDL criteria have been used to control
for effects of model complexity, it is sensible to ex-
amine the goodness-of-fit of the heuristics. This was
done by considering the average percentage of correct
predictors made by each heuristic, for just those par-
ticipants with MDL values favoring the heuristic. The
biased optimal heuristic correctly predicted an aver-
age of 81%, 78% and 88% of participant decisions for,
respectively, the 10, 20 and 50 length problems. The
threshold heuristic correctly predicted an average of
74%, 78% and 79% of decisions. These results suggest
that, while the heuristics may not provide a complete
account of human performance, they do capture im-
portant regularities in the decision-making data.
Where there is strong evidence for a participant us-
ing either the biased optimal or threshold heuristic,
it is also worthwhile to examine the parameter values
used. For participants using the biased optimal heuris-
tic, the bias parameter was always negative, indicating
they underestimated the optimal threshold value for
each position in the sequence. As the problem length
increased from 10 to 20 then 50, however, the average
bias changed from -5.1 to -1.8 then -1.9. This suggests
that, for the longer sequences, participants were bet-
ter calibrated to the optimal curve. For participants
using the threshold heuristic, the average best-fitting
threshold increased from 88.1 to 93.2 then 94.6. These
values compare to theoretically optimal thresholds of
86.4, 92.6 and 97.2, as shown in the middle panel of
Figure 2. It is clear that participants are sensitive
to the need to increase the threshold as the length
of the sequence increases, and do not seem either to
under- or over-estimate the optimal value. It should
be acknowledged, however, that these parameter val-
ues analyses are based on limited data, and additional
data are required to confirm the suggested trends in
this experiment, as well as to ascertain whether there
are significant individual differences that also need to
be considered.
Discussion
This study constitutes a first attempt to understand
human decision-making on the full information version
of the secretary problem. A first contribution of the
study is to reject the usefulness of the cutoff heuris-
tic, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, as an
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account of human decision-making. This is a worth-
while finding, given that Seale and Rapoport (1997)
found good evidence for people using this strategy on
the rank information version of the secretary problem.
More importantly, it seems clear that both the bi-
ased optimal and threshold heuristics do capture some-
thing fundamental about human decision-making on
the full information version. Both heuristics take the
form of choosing the first value that exceeds a thresh-
old, with the key difference being that the biased opti-
mal heuristic uses thresholds that are sensitive to the
position in the sequence, rather than being fixed.
Indeed, the biased optimal and threshold heuris-
tics represent the two extremes of a continuum of
threshold-based decision-making heuristics. Instead of
using a constantly changing or a fixed threshold, it is
possible for a decision process to use a small number
of thresholds, and apply each to a sub-sequence of the
presented values. For example, for a problem of length
10, a heuristic might apply one threshold for the first
five values, decrease it for the next three values, and
finally decrease it again for the penultimate value1.
These sorts of heuristics seem likely to have complexity
that lies somewhere between that of the biased optimal
and threshold heuristics. It may well be the case that
human performance is best explained by an account
that is more sophisticated than the threshold heuris-
tic, but does not have the full complexity of the biased
optimal approach.
A final interesting problem for future research is
whether the observed individual differences in accuracy
are related to more traditional measures of problem
solving ability and psychometric intelligence. In the
everyday world, the ability to solve practical problems
is generally regarded as an expression of intelligence.
There is some evidence (e.g., Vickers et al. 2001) of
a relationship between solution quality on TSPs and
measures of IQ. Given that secretary problems are rep-
resentative of a class of real world sequential decision-
making tasks, they allow the possibility that there is
a similar relationship for non-perceptual tasks to be
examined.
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Abstract
This paper presents a computational model of the incremental
construction of an associative network  from a corpus.   It   is
aimed at modeling the development of the human semantic
memory.   It   is  not  based  on  a  vector   representation,  which
does not well  reproduce the asymmetrical property of word
similarity, but rather on a network representation. Compared
to   Latent   Semantic   Analysis,   it   is   incremental   which   is
cognitively more plausible. It is also an attempt to take into
account   higher­order   co­occurrences   in   the   construction  of
word   similarities.   This   model   was   compared   to   children
association  norms.  A good  correlation  as  well  as  a   similar
gradient of similarity were found. 
Introduction
A computational  model   of   the   human   semantic  memory
may be valuable for its ability to mimic the human semantic
representations,   but   also   for   its   ability   to   mimic   the
construction of these representations over a long period of
time.  Not  all  models  possess  both   features.  For   instance,
symbolic formalisms like semantic networks had proven to
be interesting for representing human knowledge but they
do not tell us how human beings build such representations
over   their   life.  Several  computational  models of  both   the
representation   and   construction   of   the   human   semantic
memory have been proposed in the recent years. Some of
them are based on a general common mechanism that rely
on   a   huge   input,   composed   of   examples   of   associations
between words. The statistical analysis of the occurrences of
each word within well­defined units of context   leads to a
computational   representation  of   association   links  between
words. The representation of word meanings per se is not of
significant interest, it is rather their association links which
combined  will   form   a  model   of   the   long­term   semantic
memory.
These models can be distinguished along six features:
1. the kind of input they are based on (either a corpus or
word association norms);
2. the knowledge representation formalism (either vector­
based  or network­based);
3. the   way   a   new   context   is   added   to   the   long­term
semantic memory (incrementally or not);
4. the unit of context in which co­occurrence information
is considered (either a paragraph or a sliding window);
5. the use or not of higher­order co­occurrences;
6. compositionality: the way the meaning of a text can be
inferred from the meaning of its words. 
After a description of existing models, we will discuss these
features, present our model and describe an experiment that
aims at comparing our model to human data.
Existing computational models of the
construction of semantic representations
Latent Semantic Analysis
LSA (Landauer, 2002) takes as input a corpus of free texts.
The unit  of  context  is   the paragraph.  The analysis  of  the
occurrences of each word within all paragraphs leads to a
representation of the meaning of words as vectors, which is
well   suited   for   drawing   semantic   comparisons   between
words.   The   underlying   mechanism   (singular   value
decomposition   of   the  word­paragraph   occurrence  matrix)
implicitly   takes   into   account   higher­order   co­occurrences
(Kontostathis & Pottenger, 2002). Compositionality in this
model is straightforward: the meaning of a text is a linear
combination of the meaning of its words. There is however
no way of updating the semantic space with a new unit of
context without redoing the whole process. LSA's semantic
representations   have   been   largely   tested   in   the   literature
(Foltz, 1996 ; Wolfe et al., 1998). This model can account
for   some  mechanisms   of   the   construction   of   knowledge
(Landauer & Dumais, 1997).
Hyperspace Analogue to Language
HAL   (Burgess,   1998)   is   also   a   model   of   the   semantic
memory. It is similar to LSA except that (1) it does not take
into account higher­order  co­occurrences since vectors are
just direct co­occurrence vectors; (2) the unit of context is a
sliding window of a few words which takes into account the
lexical   distance   between   words   and   (3)   updating   the
semantic space with a new paragraph can be done easily. 
Sparse Random Context Representation
SRCR (Sahlgren, 2001, 2002) is also based on the use of a
sliding window applied to a  large corpus. Words have an
initial   random   vector   representation   (1,800   dimensions),
which   is   updated   with   the   vectors   of   the   co­occurring
words: they are all added to the current word, but with a
multiplying factor  which depends on their distance to the
current   word   within   the   window.   The   way   the   initial
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representation is computed is important: all 1,800 values are
set to 0 except eight which are randomly selected and set to
1.   This  method   is   intrinsically   incremental.   It   has   better
results than LSA on the famous  TOEFL  test. However, it
does not take into account higher­order co­occurrences.
Word Association Space
WAS (Steyvers, Shiffrin & Nelson, in press) is not based on
a corpus but on association norms providing associates for
5,000 words. The authors applied scaling methods to these
data in order to assign a high­dimensional representation to
each   word.   In   particular,   they   relied   on   singular   value
decomposition,   the  mathematical   procedure   also   used   by
LSA. The idea is similar to LSA: words that appear within
similar   contexts   (i.e.   words   with   similar   associative
relationships)   are  placed   in   similar   regions   in   the   space.
WAS   appeared   to   be   a   better   predictor   of   memory
performance than LSA.
Features
We will now discuss the six previous features in order to
sketch out a model of construction and representation of the
long­term   semantic   memory   that   would   attempt   to
overcome existing limits.
Input
A corpus of free texts as input is cognitively more plausible
than   association   norms  or   even   a   sublanguage   of   a   few
propositions   (Frank  et   al.   2003).  As  humans,  we  do  not
obviously   construct   our   semantic   representations   solely
from written data (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000), but there
is currently no formalism able to model all perceptual data
such that they can be processed by a computational model.
In addition, written data, although it is not perfect, seems to
cover   a   large   part   of   our   semantic   representations
(Landauer, 2002).
Representation
Most models are based on a vector representation of word
meaning.  Dimensions   of   the   semantic   space   can   be   the
result   of   a   statistical   analysis   which   keeps   hundreds   of
dimensions   like   in   LSA   or   SCRC   (they   are   therefore
unlabelled),   the most  variant  words as  in  HAL,  the most
frequent   ones   (Levy   &   Bullinaria,   2001)   or     even   a
predefined subset of words,  either taken from a thesaurus
(Prince & Lafourcade, 2002) or selected as being the most
reliable   across   various   sub­corpora   (Lowe  &  McDonald,
2000).
One major interest of the vector representation is that it
offers   a   simple   way   to  measure   the   similarity   between
words. The angle between the corresponding vectors or its
cosine are generally used.
One drawback of the vector representation however is the
difficulty to determine the words that are similar to a given
word   or,   say   differently,   the  words   that   are   activated   in
memory. It requires the scanning of all vectors in order to
find   the   closest  ones,  which   is  both   computationally  and
cognitively not satisfactory. A direct link between a word
and its associates should exist in a plausible model of the
semantic memory. 
Another  problem with   the  vector   representation   is   that
similarity   is   symmetrical:   similarity(A,B)=similarity(B,A).
This is not coherent with psycholinguistic findings showing
that   semantic   similarity   is   not   a   symmetrical   relation
(Tversky, 1977).  For instance, bird is a very close neighbor
of swallow, but the opposite is not so obvious.
A network of words with simple numerical oriented links
between nodes (what is called an oriented graph in graph
theory)  would be better for   that purpose. Numerical  links
would represent semantic similarities. Such a basic network
would  offer   a   direct   connection  between  a  word   and   its
neighbors   and   represent   differently   similarity(A,B)   and
similarity(B,A).
Memory updating
A model of the construction of the semantic memory should
describe   the  way processing  a  new piece  of  written  data
affects the representation of the long­term memory. Some
models like Latent Semantic Analysis are not incremental,
which means that the whole process needs to be restarted in
order to take into account a new context. Actually, a new
paragraph   can   easily   be   represented   by   a   vector   in   this
model, by a simple linear combination of its words, but this
operation   does   not   affect   at   all   the   semantic   space.
Incremental  models are  much more  cognitively plausible:
processing   new   texts   should   modify,   even   slightly,   the
semantic memory.
Unit of context
The semantic relations between words are constructed from
the occurrences of words within contexts. The size of such
contexts plays an important role. Psychological experiments
as  well   as   computer   simulations   (Burgess,   1998)   tend   to
consider that a context composed of a few words before and
after   the   current   word   is   reasonable.   However,
computational constraints have led some models to consider
a whole paragraph as a unit of context, which is probably a
too large unit.  Latent Semantic Analysis is  such a model.
The use of  a sliding window allows models  like HAL or
SRCR  to   take   into   account   the   distance   between  words
within   the   window,   whereas   approaches   based   on
paragraphs deal with bags of words. 
Higher­order co­occurrences
It has been shown that higher­order co­occurrences play an
important   role   (Kontostathis   &   Pottenger,   2002)   in   the
latent   structure   of   word   usage.   Two   words   should   be
considered   associated   although   they   never   co­occur   in
context   units,   provided   that   they   occur   within   similar
contexts. A is said to be a second­order co­occurrence of B
if  it  co­occurs with C which also co­occurs with B.  If  C
were   a   second­order   co­occurrence   of   B,   A   would   be
considered as a third­order co­occurrence of B, etc.
By means of the singular value decomposition procedure,
LSA semantic  similarity  indeed  involves  higher­order  co­
occurrences   (Lemaire   &   Denhière,   submitted).   Other
approaches such as SCRC or HAL do not.
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Compositionality
Compositionality   is   the   ability   of   a   representation   to   go
from   words   to   texts.   The   vector   representation   is   very
convenient for that purpose because the linear combination
of   vectors   still   produces   a   vector,  which  means   that   the
same representation is used for both words and texts. This
might   be   a   reason   why   vector   representations   are   so
popular. On the contrary, symbolic representations of word
meaning like semantic networks do not offer such a feature:
it   is   not   straightforward   to   build   the   representation   of   a
group   of   words   from   the   individual   representations   of
words, especially if the representation is rich, for instance
with labelled links.
Summary
Table  1  describes  some of   the  existing  models  along   the
previous six   features.  We present ICAN, our proposal,  at
then end of the next section.
ICAN
Basic mechanisms
Like others, this model takes as input a corpus of free texts
and   produces   a   computational   representation   of   word
meanings. This model is based on a network representation,
which we believe is more accurate in modeling the process
of semantic activation in memory. The idea is to associate to
each word a set of  neighbors  as  well  as  their  association
weights in [0..1], exactly as in rough semantic network. The
model is incremental which means that the set of connected
words for each word evolves while processing new texts. In
particular,  new words can  be  added  according   to   the  co­
occurrence information and other words can be ruled out if
their association strengths with the current word become too
low. 
Links between words are updated by taking into account
the results of a previous simulation on 13,637 paragraphs of
a corpus (Lemaire & Denhière, submitted), which showed
that:
– co­occurrence of W1  and W2  tends to strongly increase
the W1­W2 similarity;
– occurrence of W1 without W2 or W2 without W1 tends to
decrease the W1­W2 similarity;
– second   and   third­order   co­occurrence   of  W1  and  W2
tends to slightly increase the W1­W2 similarity.
In our model, a sliding window is used as a unit of context.
Therefore,   each   word   of   the   corpus   is   considered   with
respect to its preceding and following contexts. The size of
the window can be modified. For the sake of simplicity, we
will   not   use   the   third­order   co­occurrence   effect.   The
algorithm is the following:
For   each   word  W,   its   preceding   context   C1..Ck  and   its
following   context  Ck+1..C2k  (the   sliding  window   therefore
being [C1 C2 ... Ck W Ck+1 Ck+2... C2k]):
Direct co­occurrence effect:  reinforce the link W­Ci  (if
this  link does not  exist,  create it  with a weight of  0.5,
otherwise increase the weight p by setting it to p+(1­p)/2;
Second­order co­occurrence effect: let  p  be the weight
of the W­Ci link. For each M linked to Ci  with weight m,
reinforce  the   link W­M (if  such a   link  does  not  exist,
create it with a weigth of  p.m,  otherwise, increases the
weight  q  by   setting   it   to  q+A(1­q)(p.m),   A   being   a
parameter;
Occurrence   without   co­occurrence   effect:   reduce   the
links between W and its other neighbors (if the weights
were p, set them to a fraction of p, e.g., 0.9p). If some of
them fall under a threshold (e.g., .1), then remove these
links.
Example
As an example, consider the following association network,
which is the result of processing several texts:
The new text being analyzed is:
... if you have such a device, connect the cable to the
network connector then switch...
We now describe how this text will modify the association
network, according to the previous rules. Suppose a window
of size 5 (2 preceding words, 1 current word, 2 following
words). Since functional words are not taken into account,
the current window is then [device, connect, cable, network,
connector],  cable  being   the   current  word.  The  direct   co­
occurrence effect leads to reinforce the links between cable
and   the   four   co­occurring  words.  Two  of   them  are   new
links,  while   others   are   existing   links  whose  weights   are
simply increased. The network becomes:
cable
electric
connector
network
rope
wire
.7
.2
.4
.6
.5.7
.5.4 .3
plug
.4
Table 1: Features of different models
Input Representation Memory updating Unit of context higher­order co­
occurrences
Compositionality
LSA corpus vectors not incremental paragraph yes easy
HAL corpus vectors incremental sliding window no easy
SCRC corpus vectors incremental sliding window no easy
WAIS association norms vectors not incremental N/A no easy
ICAN corpus network incremental sliding window yes hard
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The second­order  co­occurrence effect reinforces the links
between cable and all words connected to one of its four co­
occurring word. In this small example, this is only the case
for   the   word  plug.   Finally,   the   occurrence   without   co­
occurrence effect leads to a decrease of the links between
cable and its other neighbors. The network is then:
The next current word is  network, the window is [connect,
cable,  network, connector, switch] and the process repeats
again.
Measure of similarity
Similarity  between  words  W1  and  W2  is   the  combination
(i.e. the product) of the links of the shortest path between
W1 and W2. If W2 is connected to W1, it is just the weight of
the link; if W1 is connected to Z which is connected to W2, it
is   the   combination   of   the   two  weights.   If  W2  does   not
belong   to   the  neighbors  of  W1's neighbors   it   is   probably
sufficient to set the semantic similarity to 0. Since the graph
is   oriented   (the   link  weight  between  A   and  B  might   be
different from the link weight between B and A), this way
of   measuring   the   similarity   mimics   the   asymmetrical
property of the human judgment of similarity better than the
cosine between vectors.
Tests
Comparison to association norms
In  order   to   test   this  model,  we  compared   the  association
links it  provides to  human association norms.  The corpus
we   relied   on   is   a  3.2  million  word  French   child   corpus
composed of texts that are supposed to reproduce the kind
of   texts   children   are   exposed   to:  stories   and   tales   for
children   (~1,6   million   words),   children   productions
(~800,000 words), reading textbooks (~400,000 words) and
children   encyclopedia   (~400,000   words).  All   functional
words were ruled out. Words whose frequency was less than
3 were not taken into account. The program is written in C,
it is available on demand. Processing the whole corpus takes
a   few   hours   on   a   standard   computer,   depending   on   the
window size.
Once the association network was built, we measured the
similarity between 200 words and 6 of their associates (the
first three and the last three), as provided by the de la Haye
(2003) norms for 9 year­old children. The association value
in these norms is the percentage of subjects who provided
the associate. For instance, the six associates to abeille(bee)
are:
– miel(honey): 19%
– insecte(insect): 14%
– ruche(hive): 9%
– animal(animal): 1%
– oiseau(bird): 1%
– vole(fly): 1%
Actually, 16 words were not part of the corpus. Only 1184
pairs of words were therefore used.
We   then   compared   these   values   to   the   similarity   values
provided by the model. We had two hypotheses. First, the
model  should distinguish betwen the three first  associates
and the last ones and there should be a gradient of similarity
from the first one to the last ones. Second, there should be a
good correlation between human data and model data.
Several parameters have to be set in the model. The best
correlation   with   the   human   data   was   obtained   with   the
following parameters (see the algorithm presented earlier):
– window size = 11 (5 preceding and 5 following words);
– co­occurrence effect: p ­­> p+(1­p)/2;
– 2nd­order co­occurrence effect : p ­­> q+.02(1­q)(p.m);
– occurrence without co­occurrence effect : p ­­> .9p.
Using   these   parameters,   the   average   similarity   values
between stem words and associates, as well as the children
data, are the following: 
1st
associates
2nd
associates
3rd
associates
Last
associates
ICAN .415 .269 .236 .098
Norms 30.5 13.5 8.2 1
All model values are highly significantly different,  except
for the 2nd  and 3rd  associates which differ only at the 10%
level. Our model reproduces quite well the human gradient
of association.
We also calculated the coefficient of correlation between
human   data   and   model   data.   We   found   an   interesting
significant correlation: r(1184)=.50. 
The   exact   same   test   from   the   same   corpus   was   also
applied   to   Latent   Semantic   Analysis.   Results   are   the
following:
1st
associates
2nd
associates
3rd
associates
Last
associates
LSA .26 .23 .19 .11
Similarities between the stem word and the first associates
appear stronger in the ICAN model. LSA's correlation with
human   data   is  r(1184)=.39,   which   is   worse   than   our
correlation.
cable
electric
connector
networkrope
wire
.7
.2
.7
.8
.5.7
.5.4 .3
device .5
connect
.5
plug
.4
cable
electric
connector
networkrope
wire .6
.2
.7
.8
.4.7
.5.4 .2
device
.5
connect
.5
plug
.4.3
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Similarity as direct co­occurrence
One can wonder whether the similarity could be mainly due
to the direct co­occurrence effect. Similarity between words
is   indeed   often   operationalized   in   psycholinguistic
researches   by   their   frequency   of   co­occurrence   in   huge
corpus.   Experiments have indeed revealed the correlation
between both factors (Spence & Owens, 1990). However,
this shortcut is questionable. In particular, there are words
that are strongly associated although they never  co­occur.
Burgess & Lund (1998) mentioned the two words road and
street  that   almost   never   cooccur   in   their   huge   corpus
although they are almost synonyms. In a 24­million words
French corpus from the daily newspaper Le Monde in 1999,
we found 131 occurrences  of  internet,  94  occurrences  of
web, but no co­occurrences at all. However, both words are
strongly associated. Edmonds (1997) showed that selecting
the best typical synonym requires that at least second­order
co­occurrence   is   taken   into   account.   There   is   clearly   a
debate: is the frequency of co­occurrence a good model of
word similarity? 
In order to test that hypothesis, we modified our model so
that only direct co­occurrences are taken into account: the
2nd  order   co­occurrence   effect   as  well   as   the   occurrence
without co­occurrence effect were inhibited.  Results are the
following:
1st
assoc.
2nd
assoc.
3rd
assoc.
Last
assoc.
ICAN
(only direct co­occurrences)
.903 .781 .731 .439
The gradient of similarity is  still   there but  the correlation
with   human   data   is   worse   (r(1184)=.39).   This   is   in
accordance   with   our   previous   findings   (Lemaire   &
Denhière, submitted) which show that the frequency of co­
occurrence tends to overestimate semantic similarity.
Effect of second­order co­occurrence
Another   test  consisted in measuring the effect  of  second­
order   co­occurrences.   This   time,   we   only   inhibited   this
effect in order to see whether the loss would be significant.
Results are presented in the next table:
1st
assoc.
2nd
assoc.
3rd
assoc.
Last
assoc.
ICAN (no 2nd­order
 co­occurrences)
.371 .225 .191 .056
Correlation with human data was not significantly different
from the full model. It only decreased from .50 to .48. This
means   that   second­order   co­occurrences   do   not   seem   to
have much effect in this simulation.  One reason might be
due to the mathematical formula we used to model higher­
order co­occurrences. It might not be the right one. Another
reason could be that we only implemented second­order  co­
occurrence   effects.  Third   and   higher­order   co­occurrence
effects might play a much more significant role than could
be expected. A final reason could be that higher­order co­
occurrence does not play any role. But, how then could we
explain the high similarity between words that almost never
co­occur?  More   experiments   and   simulations   need   to   be
carried out to investigate this issue.
Window size
We also modified the model in order to shed light on the
role of the window size. Results are as follows:
Window size Correlation with human data
3 (1+1+1) .34
5 (2+1+2) .38
7 (3+1+3) .44
9 (4+1+4) .48
11 (5+1+5) .50
13 (6+1+6) .49
15 (7+1+7) .47
We  found   that   the   best  window  size   is   11   (5   preceding
words and 5 following words). This is in agreement with the
literature: Burgess (1998) as well as Lowe and McDonald
(2000) use a window of size 10, Levy and Bullinaria (1998)
found best  performance for  a  window size from 8  to 14,
according to the similarity measure they relied on.
Conclusion
This  model  could  be   improved   in  many  ways.  However,
preliminary   results   are   encouraging:   the  model   produces
better results than the outstanding Latent Semantic Analysis
model  on  a word  association  test.   In addition,   it  adresses
two major LSA drawbacks. The first one has to do with the
representation   itself:   the   fact   that   LSA's   associations   are
symmetrical   is   not   satisfactory.  A  network   representation
seems better for that purpose than a vector representation.
The   second   limitation   of   LSA   concerns   the   way   the
semantic space is  built.  LSA is not  incremental: adding a
new piece  of   text   requires   that   the  whole  process   is   run
again.  Like  HAL or  SCRC,   ICAN has   the   advantage   of
being incremental.
ICAN's main limitation is related to compositionality. The
construction of a text's representation is not straightforward,
given  the  representation  of   its  words.  Representing  every
text   as   a   simple   function   of   its  words,   and   in   the   same
formalism,   as   in   the   vector   representation,   is   very
convenient since text comparisons are then easy to perform.
Compared   to  other  approaches,  LSA  is  for   instance  very
good at simulating the human judgment of text comparisons
(Foltz, 1996). However, the cognitive plausibility of such a
representation   can  be  questioned.  Do  we   really   need   the
exact   same   representation   for   words   and   texts?   Is   it
cognitively   reasonable   to   go   directly   without   any   effort
from words to texts? Why having two ways of processing
texts: one which would be computationally costly (singular
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value decomposition in LSA) and another one very quick
(adding its words)?
A   solution   could   be   to   process   each   new   text   by   the
mechanism described  in   this paper:  a   text  would   then  be
represented by a subgraph, that is by a small subset of the
huge semantic network, composed of the text words, their
neighbors   and   their   links.   An   information   reduction
mechanism   like   the   integration   step   of   the   construction­
integration  model   (Kintsch,  1998)   could   then  be  used   to
condense   this   subgraph   in   order   to   retain   the   main
information. This smaller subgraph would constitute the text
representation.   This   way,   there   would   be   a   single
mechanism   used   to   process   a   text,   construct   its
representation and update the long­term semantic memory.
However, much work remains to be done in that direction.
Once a corpus was processed, it would be interesting to
study   the   resulting   network   structure.   In   particular,   this
structure could be compared to existing semantic networks,
in   terms of  connectivity  or  average  path­lengths  between
words,  much like Steyvers & Tenenbaum (submitted)  did
recently.
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Abstract 
The domain of spatial language is an ideal testing ground for 
proposals addressing the representational gap between 
perceptual-motor and language systems precisely because it is 
an unambiguous case of these systems coming together. To 
date, however, efforts addressing this representational gap 
within the domain of spatial language have generated 
conflicting results. Focusing on an “above” ratings task, we 
provide here a dynamical systems approach to spatial 
language performance and supporting empirical results that 
address this impasse. The development of a dynamical 
systems model linking spatial language and spatial memory is 
also discussed.  
Representation and Spatial Language 
A current focus in cognitive science is understanding 
how the sensory-motor and linguistic systems interact. 
Because spatial language brings words and physical space 
together so directly, it is the ideal vehicle for exploring this 
interaction. To date, two general approaches to 
representation speak to this issue of interaction in spatial 
language (Barsalou, 1999): amodal symbolic systems and 
perceptual symbol systems.  
Amodal symbolic systems presume representational 
independence between symbolic processes like language 
and sensory-motor systems (Harnad, 1990; Anderson, 
2000). The amodal view thus requires a transduction 
process that permits “communication” between linguistic 
and non-linguistic systems. This transduction process is best 
described by Jackendoff’s representational interface (1992; 
1996; 2002) in which communication between different 
types of representations (e.g. auditory and visual) is 
achieved through a process of schematization─ the 
simplifying and filtering out of information within one 
representational format for use in another representational 
system (Talmy, 1983). The representational interface 
approach ultimately permits abstract conceptual structures 
that can encode spatial representations but still capture the 
core characteristics of the symbolic view (e.g. pointers to 
sensory modalities, type-token distinctions, taxonomies).  
There is significant empirical support for this 
perspective. Talmy (1983), for example, showed that 
language uses closed-class prepositions (such as “above”, 
“below”, or “near”) to provide an abstracted, skeletal 
structure of a scene that narrows the listener’s attention to a 
particular relationship between two objects by disregarding 
other available information (Talmy, 1983; Hayward & Tarr, 
1995). Thus, in the sentence “The bike stood near the 
house”, all of the specific information about the bike (e.g. 
size, shape, orientation) is disregarded and the bike is 
instead treated as a dimensionless point (Hayward & Tarr, 
1995). As a result of this schematization, linguistic 
representations of relational states can be extended to a 
variety of visual scenes and objects with little regard to the 
individual object characteristics.  
In contrast to transduction and the amodal approach, 
Barsalou’s Perceptual Symbol Systems (1999) posits 
perceptual symbols: “records of neural states that underlie 
perception” (p.583) that are both inherently grounded in the 
given sensory modality and capable of replicating the 
flexible, productive, and hierarchical capacities of amodal 
symbolic systems. These perceptual symbols are 
implemented when top-down processes partially reactivate 
sensory-motor areas and organize the perceptual 
components around a common frame. Ultimately, 
perceptual components implement a simulator that captures 
both perceptual memories and core symbolic behaviors (e.g. 
type-token distinctions, hierarchies). Because these symbols 
are grounded in sensory-motor processes, they do not 
require pointers or transduction to become “meaningful”. 
A growing empirical literature supports Barsalou’s 
(1999) PSS as well. For example, Stanfield and Zwaan 
(2001) argued that if symbolic, linguistic representations are 
integrated with perceptual symbol systems, people should 
be faster to recognize visual objects described in a sentence 
as the similarity between the perceived object and the 
description increase. Consistent with this prediction, they 
found that people were faster to recognize an object (e.g. a 
vertically oriented pencil) as part of a previous sentence 
when that sentence matched the orientation (e.g. He placed 
the pencil in the cup) than when it conflicted (e.g. He placed 
the pencil in the drawer). Visual information has also been 
shown to facilitate real-time resolution of temporarily 
syntactically ambiguous sentences (Tanenhaus, Spivey-
Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995), further evidence 
against a hard separation between linguistic and sensory 
systems. Finally, recent work by Richardson et al. (2003) 
shows that verbal stimuli interact with visual discrimination 
performance, additional evidence that linguistic processing 
can directly impact the processing of visual space. 
In summary, the contrasting amodal and modal 
perspectives both appear to be substantially supported. 
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iven the clear contrast between the two theories, however, 
both cannot be correct. Thus, despite a vigorous debate and 
valuable empirical data on both sides, the fundamental 
question of how linguistic and non-linguistic systems relate 
remains unanswered.  
Limits of the Current Approaches 
Further consideration suggests two critical limits of the 
proposals and empirical support discussed above. First, they 
rely on descriptive, conceptual accounts of representational 
structure. Though critical at initial stages of theory 
development, the flexibility of conceptual accounts makes 
them ultimately difficult to critically test and falsify. 
Consequently, data collected in support of one view can be 
reinterpreted by the other view. Jackendoff (2002), for 
example, incorporated the resolution of syntactic ambiguity 
through visual processing (Tanenhaus, et al., 1995) using 
characteristics of a syntax-semantics interface.  
 The second, related limit of the current literature is 
treatment of representational structure in the abstract. In 
particular, with the exception of recent tests of the PSS 
theory (e.g. Richardson et al., 2003), spatial language 
studies have tended to focus on the nature of 
representational structure without considering the second-
to-second processes that give rise to those structures. This 
can lead to an impasse because representations are not 
strongly grounded in task-specific performance. 
Consideration of an ongoing debate within spatial language 
illustrates this point. Because this debate is central to our 
empirical work, it is considered in some detail. 
Evidence for Shared Representations 
 In order to explore the possible correspondence 
between the linguistic and sensory-motor representations of 
space, Hayward and Tarr (1995) conducted a series of 
experiments designed to compare how object relations are 
linguistically and visually encoded. In the first experiment, 
participants were presented with a visual scene depicting a 
referent object and a target object and asked to generate a 
preposition describing the relationship. Results suggested 
that the prototypical spatial positions for “above” and 
“below” lie along a vertical reference axis and prototypical 
spatial positions for “left” and “right” lie along a horizontal 
axis. In addition, use of these terms declines as target 
positions deviate from the horizontal and vertical reference 
axes. 
Next, Hayward and Tarr built on these findings by 
using a preposition ratings task. In the ratings task, 
participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1 (least 
applicable) to 7 (most applicable) the applicability of a 
given spatial term (e.g. above) to a relationship between two 
objects. This ratings task is particularly valuable because it 
permits quantification and metric manipulation of an 
otherwise gross measure of linguistic output (e.g. above/not 
above). As such, this task provides a means of empirically 
bridging the continuity of sensory-motor representations 
with the discreteness of linguistic representations. Results 
from this ratings task showed strong metric effects of spatial 
language use around the vertical and horizontal axes. For 
instance, “above” ratings were highest along the vertical 
axis and systematically decreased as the target object’s 
position deviated from the vertical axis. Hayward and Tarr 
concluded that this ratings gradient across spatial positions 
reflected the use of prototypical vertical and horizontal 
reference axes.  
To compare the representational prototypes of spatial 
language with visual representations of space, Hayward and 
Tarr compared these findings with performance on location 
memory and same-different discrimination tasks. 
Importantly, the areas of highest spatial recall accuracy were 
vertically aligned with the reference axes used as prototypes 
in the ratings task. Performance in the same-different 
location task yielded similar findings, showing that 
discrimination was best along the vertical and horizontal 
axes. Collectively, data from these four experiments point to 
a shared representational spatial structure between linguistic 
and sensory-motor systems, a result consistent with 
Barsalou’s PSS approach.  
Evidence Against Shared Representations 
Follow-up results from Crawford, Regier, & 
Huttenlocher (2000) present a different picture. To probe 
both linguistic and visual representations of space, they 
analyzed “above” ratings as well as spatial memory 
performance. Although results showed an “above” ratings 
gradient aligned with the vertical axis similar to that of 
Hayward and Tarr (1995), Crawford et. al. also found 
location memory bias away from the vertical axis when 
participants had to recall the locations of targets to the left 
and right of this axis. These researchers proposed that the 
cardinal axes that appear to function as prototypes in the 
linguistic task instead serve as category boundaries in the 
spatial memory task. Thus, while both linguistic and 
sensory-motor spatial representations use the same cardinal 
axes, these axes serve functionally distinct representational 
roles in the two tasks. It therefore appears that the linguistic 
and sensory-motor representations of space differ in critical 
ways, a conclusion consistent with an amodal 
representational interface perspective. 
Considered together, these results illustrate the limits of 
dealing with representation in the abstract: both sets of 
researchers used similar experimental tasks and reported 
largely similar findings, yet they draw starkly different 
conclusions, conclusions that depend critically on abstract 
definitions of representational structure. Because we do not 
yet know the process that selects, creates, and encodes 
spatial prototypes nor the process used to create a spatial 
rating, we cannot go beyond abstract representational 
descriptions to make predictions about the similarities and 
differences across tasks. Notably, the failure to resolve this 
particular debate within spatial language mirrors the larger 
failure to resolve the modal-amodal conflict. In most 
general terms, the empirical support offered in both cases 
fails to delineate between the proposed accounts. 
A Process Approach to Spatial Language 
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Figure 1 Dynamic Field Theory of spatial working 
memory  
 The theory and data discussed so far appear to be at 
an impasse, due in part to an emphasis on descriptive 
accounts of representational systems and a focus on 
representation in the abstract. To move beyond these 
fundamental limitations, the current proposal seeks to 
establish and test a process model that relates spatial 
memory and verbal performance. Such a process model can 
move beyond description and representation in the abstract 
and provide strong, testable predictions.  
 To lay the foundation of this proposed model, 
consider again the results of Crawford et al. (2000). The 
distinguishing result was the finding of spatial memory 
biases away from the vertical axis. They interpreted this 
movement away from midline to be a function of bias 
towards spatial categories. This interpretation is derived 
from Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991) Category Adjustment 
(CA) model. According to the CA model, people encode 
spatial location at two levels. The first level encodes fine-
grained information about target location (e.g. angular 
deviation), while the second level encodes the region or 
category of target location. Specifically, the CA model 
proposes that people represent a central or prototypical 
value within a category that is most representative of that 
category. To remember a location, these two levels of detail 
are then combined to produce a remembered target location. 
Importantly, fine-grained and categorical information can be 
weighed differently. If, for example, the fine-grained detail 
is less certain, the prototype can be given more weight, 
resulting in a bias away from midline. Moreover, evidence 
from Huttenlocher et al. (1991) indicates that these spatial 
prototypes lie along the diagonal axes. According to 
Crawford et al. (2000), these spatial prototypes along the 
diagonals are the source of the observed spatial memory 
biases away from midline. Recall, however, that spatial 
prepositions maintained their highest applicability ratings 
along the vertical and horizontal axes. Thus, spatial 
prepositions appear to maintain prototypes along vertical 
and horizontal axes while spatial categories appear to 
maintain prototypes along the diagonal axes. 
But must the drift away from midline observed in 
spatial memory performance result from spatial prototypes 
along the diagonal? A recent model suggests no. 
Specifically, the Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) (Spencer & 
Schöner, 2003; Schutte, Spencer, & Schöner, 2003) 
provides a formalized process account of spatial memory 
bias away from reference axes without positing prototypes. 
This model specifies how location-related activation is 
maintained in spatial working memory (SWM) during short-
term delays and how perception and memory are integrated 
within this single representational system. 
The DFT can be best understood within the context of a 
location memory task used to test predictions of the model. 
In this task, participants are seated at a large empty table 
and a spaceship-shaped object is flashed for 2 seconds on 
the table. After a variable delay, participants are asked to 
indicate the location of the ship using a computer mouse. 
Participants in this task show the same biases away from 
midline reported by Huttenlocher and colleagues. The focus 
of the DFT is to explain this performance through activation 
in the SWM 
field.  
Figure 
1 shows the 
structure of 
the DFT 
model. The 
large box 
shows the 
excitatory 
and 
inhibitory 
layers of 
neurons that 
together 
form the SWM field. Each layer has a collection of spatially 
tuned neurons that respond selectively to a specific location. 
Spatial location is indicated by position along the x-axis, 
where 0˚ is the center of the space; positive locations are 
rightward, and negative locations are leftward. The y-axis 
represents time which is moving away as a particular 
experimental trial proceeds from start to finish. The z-axis 
captures the activation of each neuron in the field. 
In addition to the excitatory and inhibitory layers of the 
SWM field, there are input fields: target input,  reference 
input, and memory input. The upper left portion of Figure 1 
shows the target input which feeds into the excitatory layer 
of the SWM field. This target input turns on when the target 
is visible and turns off when the target is hidden. Figure 1 
also shows the reference input. This reference input captures 
perception of the midline or vertical symmetry axis, the 
same axis central to the linguistic and non-linguistic 
representations of space discussed above. The third input is 
the long-term memory field which reflects the activation 
history of the SWM. This field also reciprocally feeds into 
the SWM field to impact real-time spatial memory 
processes. 
The integration of these inputs in working memory is 
governed by an interaction function that determines how 
activation at one site in the SWM field influences activation 
at other sites. The DFT uses a local excitation and lateral 
inhibition function. Thus, activation at one site increases the 
activation of its neighbors and decreases the activation of 
sites further away. There are two main consequences of the 
interaction function. First, strong target input can lead to a 
self-sustaining peak of activation. These self-sustaining 
peaks of activation maintain themselves even after the target 
input is removed. In this way the field can maintain a 
memory of the target location during short-term delays.  
The second consequence of the interaction function is 
that self-sustaining peaks can drift away from reference axes 
such as midline during memory delays. The process that 
gives rise to such delay-dependent spatial drift is illustrated 
in Figure 2. The short activation profile in this figure was 
generated by running a simulation of the model shown in 
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Figure 3. Spatial memory performance 
Figure 1 with only a single input—the reference input—and 
taking a time slice through the excitatory layer (top layer in 
the large panel of Figure 1) of the resultant SWM field (at 
time 8.00 s). Thus, this short activation profile reflects the 
influence the reference input has on each neuron in SWM at 
a particular moment in time (note that, because the reference 
input in Figure 1 is constant throughout the memory delay, 
the short activation profile actually captures the resultant 
influence of the reference input throughout the trial).  
As can be seen in Figure 2, the resultant reference 
profile has stronger activation around midline; however, 
there are also two troughs in activation to the left and right 
of midline. These troughs cause systematic delay-dependent 
drift away from midline when targets are positioned to the 
left and right of this axis. This is captured schematically by 
the tall activation profile in Figure 2. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, this tall activation profile receives slightly more 
reference-related input on its left side than its right side. As 
a consequence, neurons on the left side of the activation 
peak will tend to join into the locally-excitatory interaction, 
while neurons on the right side of the peak will tend to be 
laterally inhibited.  
The excitatory (top) layer of the SWM field in Figure 1 
shows that as this interactive process propagates through 
time, activation peaks can spatially drift. In particular, 
Figure 1 shows a simulation of the model during a single 
trial to a -40º location. At the start of the trial, activation in 
the excitatory layer of SWM is relatively uniform because 
no strong inputs are present. At 2 s, the target appears at      
-40º and the strong target input associated with this event 
builds a peak of activation in SWM. Importantly, this 
activation peak sustains itself even after the target 
disappears at 4 s. And, during the ensuing memory delay, 
the peak drifts systematically away from midline (i.e., away 
from 0º). Note that this effect is partially counteracted by 
the long-term memory input at -40º. 
In summary, the DFT provides a process-based 
alternative to Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991) category 
adjustment model. Critically, this model links spatial 
memory biases to a process that integrates remembered 
information in working memory with perceived reference 
frames, the same reference frames implicated in research by 
Hayward and Tarr (1995). As a result, the central argument 
against Hayward and Tarr’s claim of shared structure 
between linguistic and non-linguistic representations of 
space—that memory is biased away from a category 
boundary—no longer follows obligatorily from the data. 
This provides the impetus to once again consider the 
potentially rich and direct connections between spatial 
memory and spatial language. 
Connecting the DFT with Spatial Language 
 Inspired by our model of spatial working memory, 
we recently conducted a set of experiments designed to 
investigate Hayward and Tarr’s (1995) claim that linguistic 
and non-linguistic representations overlap, not by 
examining representational structures in the abstract, but by 
considering the 
specific 
representational 
structures that 
emerge in our 
formalized 
process model. 
In particular, we 
asked whether 
the processes 
that create 
delay-dependent spatial drift in spatial working memory 
might also leave some empirical signature in a spatial 
language task. Toward this end, we used the ratings task 
from Hayward and Tarr given its capacity to reveal 
quantifiable metric effects and its centrality in the spatial 
language literature (e.g., Hayward & Tarr, 1995; Crawford 
et al., 2000; Logan & Sadler, 1996; Regier & Carlson, 
2001).  
To relate the DFT to performance in the ratings task, 
we borrowed an idea from Regier and Carlson’s (2001) 
Attentional Vector Sum model and scaled verbal ratings for 
“above” by the angle between the representation of the 
target location and the representation of the reference axis, 
that is, by the spatial distance between the center of the 
activation peak in SWM and the midline axis (0º). Ratings 
should be highest when activation is centered at 0º and 
should fall off systematically as the activation peak is 
shifted to the left or right. Based on this proposal and the 
dynamic properties of the DFT, we predicted that if spatial 
language and 
spatial memory 
use the same 
representational 
system—spatial 
working 
memory—then 
ratings 
performance 
should show 
delay-dependent 
“drift”, giving 
systematically 
lower “above” 
ratings as memory 
delays increase 
(i.e. as the 
distance between 
the activation peak 
in SWM and the 
midline axis 
increases).  
Experimental 
Support 
Subjects. 15 University of Iowa undergraduates 
participated in this study in exchange for class credit or 
payment.  
Figure 2 Local excitation/ lateral inhibition 
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Figure 5 Ratings and drift 
Method. Experimental sessions were conducted in dim 
lighting in a room with black curtains covering all external 
landmarks. A curved border occluded the corners of the 
table (and therefore the diagonal symmetry axes).  
A single referent disc appeared at midline 30cm in front 
of the participant and remained visible throughout each 
presentation trial. At the start of each trial the participant 
moved a computer mouse to this disk. A number (100-500) 
then appeared and participants begin counting backwards by 
1s aloud until they made a response. This counting task 
prevented the verbal encoding and maintenance of the 
spaceship position or rating. A small, spaceship-shaped 
target then appeared on the screen for two seconds.  
Trial Types For spatial memory trials, participants were 
instructed to move the mouse to the location corresponding 
the ship’s location when the computer says “Ready-Set-
Go”. For spatial language rating trials, on the other hand, 
participants are instructed to rate on a scale of 1 (“definitely 
not above”) to 9 (“definitely above”) the extent to which the 
word “above” describes the spaceship’s location relative to 
the reference disk and say their rating when the computer 
says “Please give your ‘Above’ rating.” The spoken stimuli 
that indicated which response to provide were each 1500ms 
in duration. In No Delay conditions, completion of the 
spoken stimulus was timed to coincide with the offset of the 
spaceship target. In the 10s Delay conditions, completion of 
the spoken stimulus occurred exactly 10 seconds after the 
disappearance of the spaceship target. Spaceship targets 
appeared at a constant radius of 15cm at 19 different 
locations relative to the midline axis (0º): every 10º from -
70º to +70º as well as ±90º and ±110º to map onto previous 
research. 
Results 
Participants in our modified spaceship task either gave 
a spatial memory response or a verbal ratings response (1 = 
“definitely not above”, 9 = “definitely above”) after a 0 s or 
10 s delay. The top portion of Figure 3 shows directional 
errors on the memory trials across target locations and 
delays. Positive errors were clockwise, while negative errors 
were counterclockwise. Consistent with previous work 
(Spencer & Hund, 2002), directional error was larger in the 
10 s delay condition and responses were systematically 
biased away from midline (responses to negative or leftward 
targets showed counterclockwise bias; responses to positive 
or rightward targets showed clockwise bias). Similar effects 
were found for variable error (see lower portion of Figure 
3). Specifically, variability was higher in the 10s delay 
condition, and responses to targets to the left and right of 
midline were more variable than responses to the target 
aligned with 0º.  
Critically, we also found the predicted delay-dependent 
drift effect in participants’ ratings performance. The top 
portion of Figure 4 shows that “above” ratings in the 
spaceship task followed a gradient similar to that obtained 
by Hayward and Tarr (1995) and Crawford et al. (2000). 
However, there was a systematic and significant decrease in 
ratings in the 10 s delay condition. Examination of ratings 
variability revealed 
effects of delay 
comparable to those 
found on the spatial 
memory trials (see 
Figure 4). 
Specifically, ratings 
variability was higher 
at the long delay and 
lower for targets near 
the midline axis.  
In a final 
analysis, we 
compared spatial 
memory and ratings 
responses directly by 
converting the ratings 
“drift” apparent in 
Figure 4 into a spatial 
deviation measure 
(e.g., deviation at 10º 
target = (change in 10 
s delay rating between 
10º and 20º) * 10º / 
(change in 0 s delay 
rating between 10º and 
20º)). This analysis 
revealed a high degree of 
overlap in delay-
dependent spatial drift 
across the two tasks (see 
Figure 5). These results 
support the prediction we 
generated from the DFT 
and suggest that a shared 
working memory 
representation underlies 
performance in both 
tasks.  
 
Towards a Dynamic Field Model of Spatial 
Language Performance 
Given that we have a formal theory of SWM and 
encouraging preliminary data, we are in a unique position to 
develop a process model of both spatial memory and verbal 
behavior in spatial tasks. The starting point of such a model 
will be a modified dynamic field model that links two 
dynamic fields—the SWM field discussed previously and a 
new spatial prepositions field. Although this new spatial 
prepositions field has yet to be formalized, the current data 
suggest two important features. First, this field must be 
alignable with particular locations in SWM, in particular 
with perceived reference frames. We are currently 
developing a process within the field theory that handles the 
alignment of multiple fields, including the anchoring and 
scaling necessary in such situations. Critically, these 
processes must be developed in a way that allows for 
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generalizability to spatial prepositions beyond “above” such 
as “left”, “right”, and “below”. 
Second, consistent with the dynamic nature of the tasks 
employed here,  and cognition more generally, the two 
fields should be dynamically coupled. This means that 
activation in SWM can serve as input to the spatial 
preposition field and vice versa. This dynamic coupling is 
critical given the presented evidence that verbal ratings 
reflect the same dynamic processes underlying spatial 
working memory performance. If these layers are indeed 
dynamically coupled as we suggest, then establishment of 
stable activation peaks within one layer should give rise to 
stable peaks in the other. Similarly, instability and drift 
within one layer should give rise to a instability and drift 
within the other layer. Experiments are currently underway 
to test these specific predictions. 
Although this provides only a limited window onto the 
dynamic processes that underlie a very flexible spatial 
cognitive system, we contend that this is an appropriate 
starting point given the novelty of our general theoretical 
approach. Indeed, the results of our current experiments will 
provide the empirical foundation for a more extensive 
formal model that links spatial working memory with spatial 
language processes.  
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Abstract 
In this paper we explore the role of simplicity in choosing 
between competing explanations, and in particular how a 
preference for simplicity is integrated with information about 
the probability of particular explanations. In Experiment 1 we 
establish that all else being equal, people prefer explanations 
that are simpler in the sense of invoking fewer causes. 
Experiment 2 finds that people require disproportionate 
evidence in favor of a complex explanation before they will 
choose it over a simpler alternative. Experiment 3 suggests 
that this bias is not driven by assumptions about the 
probabilistic dependence of causes. Finally, Experiment 4 
replicates the basic findings with a more ecologically valid 
computer task. We also find that participants who prefer a 
simpler but less probable explanation overestimate the 
frequency of events that would make the simpler explanation 
more probable. We conclude by suggesting that people 
believe simpler explanations are more likely to be true in 
virtue of being simple. 
Introduction 
Explaining the world around us is a fundamental part of 
everyday life. We wonder why objects have the properties 
they do, why people act in particular ways, and why things 
do or don’t happen. But more often than not, explanations 
are vastly underconstrained by our knowledge and the 
available data. When more than one explanation is possible, 
how do we choose between them? A plausible constraint on 
competing explanations, often attributed to William of 
Occam, is simplicity. Here we explore whether people in 
fact prefer simpler explanations, and if so how they balance 
a preference for simplicity with the desire to maximize other 
virtues of explanation, like their probability of being true. 
We show that people do prefer simpler explanations, even 
when they are less probable than more complex alternatives. 
We also show that this preference can lead to systematic 
distortions in the perceived frequency of events. 
A Metric for Simplicity 
While simplicity is commonly invoked, it is notoriously 
difficult to formalize and justify. Several recently proposed 
approaches, like the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
(e.g. Sober, forthcoming), Bayesian Occam’s razor (e.g. 
Jeffreys & Berger, 1992), Minimum Description Length 
(MDL) and Kolmogorov Complexity (e.g. Chater & 
Vitanyi, 2003), nonetheless succeed in precisely specifying 
a metric for simplicity in the language of statistics and 
computer science. What’s more, these metrics can be 
motivated on principled grounds. The AIC warrants a 
preference for simplicity by showing that simpler 
explanations are more likely to generalize. Similarly, 
Bayesian Occam’s Razor shows that a simpler explanation 
will have a higher posterior probability. From a bottom-up 
perspective, considerations of processing constraints make 
measures like MDL and Kolmogorov complexity attractive. 
While compelling, formal measures of simplicity are 
generally formulated over well-defined problems like line 
fitting, which bear little resemblance to the complex 
inductive leaps that characterize everyday explanatory 
judgments. For this reason we looked to the history of 
science for a more psychologically plausible metric. In the 
Principia, Newton wrote that “we are to admit no more 
causes of natural things than such as are both true and 
sufficient to explain their appearances” (1686). This maxim, 
similar to Occam’s statement that entities should not be 
multiplied beyond necessity, suggests that explanations 
invoking fewer causes are to be preferred. We thus chose to 
quantify simplicity in terms of number of causes, where 
explanations involving fewer causes are simpler. 
Simplicity and Probability 
Newton’s endorsement of explanations with fewer causes 
was likely grounded in metaphysical assumptions. After the 
quote above, he went on to suggest that “nature is pleased 
with simplicity and affects not the pomp of superfluous 
causes.” If nature is in fact simple, then simple explanations 
are more likely to be true. 
In the first experiments reported below we explore 
whether people prefer explanations involving fewer causes, 
but also if this preference is motivated by the belief that 
simpler explanations are more likely to be true. We examine 
the relationship between simplicity and probability both 
directly and indirectly. As a direct test, we look at people’s 
justifications for choosing a simpler explanation. More 
indirectly, we look at whether people switch their preference 
from a simpler to a more complex explanation when 
provided with evidence that the more complex explanation 
is more likely.  
Seeing how people balance the competing explanatory 
virtues of simplicity and probability can help distinguish 
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two possible hypotheses about the nature of a preference for 
simplicity. According to what we call the probabilistic 
metric hypothesis, people prefer simpler explanations, but 
represent this preference in terms of probability. That is, 
simpler explanations are believed to be more likely to be 
true in virtue of being simple. While choosing between 
competing explanations involves deciding which is most 
likely to be true, simpler explanations gain a probabilistic 
boost just for being simple. A second hypothesis is the 
trade-off hypothesis, according to which simplicity and 
probability are independent virtues of explanation that must 
be integrated according to some weighting function. The 
probabilistic metric hypothesis differs from the trade-off 
hypothesis in that the former claims the preference for 
simpler explanation is expressed in terms of probability, 
whereas the latter assumes that simplicity and probability 
trade-off in a way that is not commensurate. 
In the final experiment we go on to explore the 
consequences of a tendency to favor simpler explanations. 
Specifically, does the preference for simpler explanations 
distort our perception of probability? If so, we would ex-
pect people’s preferred explanations to influence their 
frequency judgments. 
Experiments 
All experiments we report involve a simple task adapted 
from Lagnado (1994) in which participants are asked to 
choose between one and two diseases to account for some 
symptoms. By varying the prevalence of the diseases we 
were able to manipulate the relative probability of the 
simpler, one-disease explanation to the more complex, two-
disease explanation. 
Experiment 1: Explanatory Virtues 
Before examining how people integrate information about 
simplicity and probability in explanation, we wanted to 
confirm that simplicity and probability are indeed virtues of 
explanation.  
 
Methods Twenty-four Boston-area undergraduate and 
summer school students completed a questionnaire in one of 
two conditions: the simplicity condition and the probability 
condition.  
In the simplicity condition, participants read the 
following: 
 
There is a population of 750 aliens that lives on planet Zorg.  You 
are a doctor trying to understand an alien’s medical problem. The 
alien, Treda, has two symptoms: Treda’s minttels are sore and 
Treda has developed purple spots.  
 
Tritchet’s syndrome always causes both sore minttels and 
purple spots.  
 
Morad’s disease always causes sore minttels, but the disease 
never causes purple spots.  
 
When an alien has a Humel infection, that alien will always 
develop purple spots, but the infection will never cause sore 
minttels.   
 
Nothing else is known to cause an alien’s minttels to be sore or 
the development of purple spots. 
 
They were then asked to choose the most satisfying 
explanation for Treda’s symptoms among a list of 
possibilities that included every disease individually and 
every pairwise combination of diseases. Choosing Tritchet’s 
syndrome would be the simplest option; choosing Morad’s 
and a Humel infection is a more complex alternative.  
In the probability condition, the cover story was similar, 
but participants were asked to choose between two diseases 
that each accounted for both symptoms. However, one 
disease was said to be present in about 50 of the aliens on 
Zorg, while the other was present in about 73 aliens on 
Zorg, making the latter choice the more probable option. 
After choosing an explanation, participants were also 
asked to explain their reasoning. The names of the diseases 
were counterbalanced and we used three different sets of 
symptoms.  
 
Results and Conclusions In the simplicity condition, 100% 
of participants chose the simpler explanation. They justified 
this choice about equally often by appeal to simplicity and 
probability: 50% explicitly said they chose it because it was 
simpler, while 42% said they thought it was more likely for 
the alien to have one disease than two. In the probability 
condition, 92% of participants chose the more probable 
explanation. All participants justified this choice by appeal 
to probability. 
Experiment 2: Simplicity Versus Probability 
Having established that people do prefer both simpler and 
more probable explanations, we went on to see how these 
virtues of explanations are traded off. To do so we had 
participants choose explanations in cases where the simplest 
was not the most likely to be true. 
 
Methods One-hundred-thirty-seven Boston-area summer 
school and undergraduate students participated by 
completing a questionnaire. The questionnaire was like the 
simplicity condition from Experiment 1, but participants 
were additionally given information about the prevalence of 
each disease in the population. For example, one 
questionnaire read: 
 
There is a population of 750 aliens that lives on planet Zorg.  You 
are a doctor trying to understand an alien’s medical problem. The 
alien, Treda, has two symptoms: Treda’s minttels are sore and 
Treda has developed purple spots.  
 
Tritchet’s syndrome always causes both sore minttels and 
purple spots. Tritchet’s syndrome is present in about 50 aliens 
on Zorg. 
 
Morad’s disease always causes sore minttels, but the disease 
never causes purple spots. Morad’s disease is present in about 
225 of the aliens on Zorg. 
 
When an alien has a Humel infection, that alien will always 
develop purple spots, but the infection will never cause sore 
minttels. You know that Humel Infections are present in about 
210 of the aliens on Zorg. 
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Nothing else is known to cause an alien’s minttels to be sore or 
the development of purple spots. 
 
As in Experiment 1, they were then asked to choose the 
most satisfying explanation and selected among six options, 
which included each disease individually and every pairwise 
combination. On a second page of the questionnaire they 
were asked to justify their choice, and also to complete a 
math problem. The math problem required participants to 
compute the joint probability of winning at two slot 
machines and compare this to the probability of winning at a 
different machine. We included this problem to see whether 
participants knew how to compute joint probabilities. 
We varied the prevalence of the diseases to manipulate 
the relative probability of having the single disease causing 
both symptoms (D1) to having both of the other diseases 
(D2&D3). Table 1 indicates the 8 sets of values we used, 
along with the corresponding probability ratios, which were 
computed on the assumption that the diseases are 
probabilistically independent. There were 14 to 18 
participants per condition. 
 
Table 1: Disease prevalence for each frequency condition. 
 
D1 D2 D3 P(D1):P(D2&D3) 
50 50 50 15:1 
50 197 190 1:1 
50 195 214 9:10 
50 225 210 4:5 
50 250 220 2:3 
50 268 280 1:2 
50 330 340 1:3 
50 610 620 1:10 
 
Explanation justifications were coded into one of three 
categories: simplicity, probability, and other. Justifications 
were coded as ‘simplicity’ if (1) the participant explicitly 
mentioned simplicity, or (2) the justification emphasized 
that the single disease accounted for both symptoms, thus 
suggesting that it was unnecessary to invoke two diseases 
when one would do the trick. Justifications were categorized 
as ‘probability’ if the participant claimed their choice was 
more probable or seemed more likely to be true. Both 
participants who computed the joint probability of D2&D3 
and those who went on a subjective feeling of probability 
were included in this category. Finally, participants whose 
justifications could not be classified as simplicity or 
probability were included in the ‘other’ category. Often 
these justifications included a restatement of the question 
(“it seemed best” or “it seemed most satisfying”) or an 
appeal to general intuition (“I went with my gut feeling”). 
As before, the disease names were counterbalanced, and 
the explanation choices were presented in random order. In 
addition, we counterbalanced the order of the presentation 
of the diseases such that half the participants read about D1 
first and half read about D1 last. We used three different sets 
of symptoms. 
 
Results and Conclusions Figure 1 indicates the percentage 
of participants choosing the simpler explanation in each 
frequency condition. Nearly all participants chose the 
simpler explanation when the probability ratio of D1 to 
D2&D3 was close, but this number steadily declined as it 
became increasingly probable that an alien had D2&D3. 
Even when it was ten times more likely for the alien to have 
D2&D3, however, over a third of participants were still 
choosing the simpler explanation. Nor was this preference 
for the simpler explanation due to participants’ inability to 
compute joint probabilities. The correlation between 
explanation choice and answering the math problem 
correctly was small and not significantly different from zero 
(r = .12, p > .15). 
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Figure 1: Percent of participants choosing simpler 
explanation as a function of the probability condition. 
 
To better understand the data we conducted a logistic 
regression analysis. We used the natural log of the 
probability ratio as the predictor for the percentage of 
participants choosing the simpler explanation, as this choice 
results in a straightforward interpretation of the regression 
parameters. To understand why, it helps to consider how 
these parameters relate to the computations that would be 
performed by an idealized Bayesian agent. In our task, the 
ideal agent’s data would result in a slope parameter of 1 and 
a constant of 0. A non-ideal agent could have a bias in favor 
of simplicity at either of two stages in the inference process, 
each corresponding to a parameter of the logistic function. 
A slope significantly less than 1 would suggest that the 
agent underweights the importance of probability: as 
evidence in favor of D2&D3 accumulates, the agent fails to 
reduce the probability of choosing D1 accordingly. In 
contrast, a constant significantly different from zero reflects 
a bias at the level of the prior probability. The non-ideal 
agent could overweight, underweight, or appropriately 
weight probability information, but starts out with 
disproportionate confidence that D1 is true.  
The probabilistic metric and trade-off hypotheses make 
different predictions about the parameters of the logistic 
function resulting from this analysis. Specifically, the 
probabilistic metric hypothesis requires that the slope 
parameter be 1. If the preference for simplicity is 
represented in terms of probability, then probability 
information should be weighted appropriately. The constant, 
however, could be significantly different from 0. In contrast, 
the trade-off hypothesis makes no predictions about these 
parameters. Because simplicity and probability are 
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evaluated on different metrics, the bias could be reflected in 
either or both parameters. 
The regression analysis resulted in a constant significantly 
different from zero, but a slope not significantly different 
from one. This provides some support for the probabilistic 
metric hypothesis. Specifically, the data suggest that as a 
group, participants think the simpler explanation is more 
likely than the complex alternative by a factor of about 4 
(1.4 to 9, .95 confidence interval), and this belief influences 
what would be the prior probability in a Bayesian 
computation. When the probability ratio is 1:2, the 
percentage of subjects choosing the simpler explanation 
corresponds to the ideal Bayesian’s posterior probability for 
D1 at a frequency of 1:(2/4), and so on for the other values. 
As a result, participants require disproportionate evidence in 
favor of the complex explanation before it can rival the 
simpler alternative. Nonetheless, the slope of the regression 
suggests that participants incorporate probability in-
formation appropriately in making a decision. 
We can also examine participants’ beliefs about 
simplicity by looking at how they justified their explanation 
choices. When the simpler explanation was also more 
probable, a majority of participants justified choosing the 
simpler explanation by appeal to probability. However, 
‘simplicity’ and ‘other’ explanations became increasingly 
common as the simpler explanation became less probable. 
These trends are illustrated in Figure 2, which indicates the 
percent of each justification type for the simpler 
explanation. Because there were few participants in some 
categories, the figure combines data from pairs of 
probability ratios. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of justifications for choosing the 
simpler explanation. 
 
Overall, the data suggest that many participants thought 
simpler explanations were more likely to be true. This is 
most apparent from the logistic regression analysis, but is 
also supported by the patterns of explanation justifications. 
In particular, many participants justified the choice of a 
simpler explanation by appeal to probability in conditions 
where the more complex explanation was as much as two 
times more likely. The data from the math problem suggest 
that this preference does not result from an inability to 
compute joint probabilities, but Experiment 3 considers and 
eliminates another alternative explanation. 
Experiment 3: Independence Assumptions 
In Experiment 2 we found that participants chose the 
simpler explanation well beyond the point at which a more 
complex alternative was more probable. However, the 
probability values against which we compared participants’ 
choices were calculated on the assumption that diseases D2 
and D3 are probabilistically independent—that is, that 
P(D2|D3) = P(D2) and P(D3|D2) = P(D3). As participants 
were told nothing about the dependence of the diseases, it’s 
possible that they made a different assumption. In particular, 
if P(D2|D3) is much smaller than P(D2), participants would 
be warranted in choosing D1 on probabilistic grounds.  
In Experiment 3 we were interested in determining 
participants’ beliefs about the dependence of diseases. We 
also wanted to assess whether such beliefs influence 
explanatory preferences. To do so we found a domain 
involving dependence assumptions distinct from those for 
diseases, and examined whether more participants chose the 
complex explanation for this domain. 
 
Methods Sixty-eight Boston-area undergraduate and 
summer school students participated. Twenty were in the 
assumptions condition, where we explicitly asked 
participants to provide a judgment of probabilistic 
dependence as follows: 
 
Suppose there are two diseases with similar symptoms, D1 and 
D2. Do you think someone who has D1 is more or less likely to 
have D2 than someone who does not have D1? 
Circle one: More  Less 
 
In addition to asking about the dependence of diseases, we 
also wanted to find items with a different dependence 
assumption. We thus queried participants about books: 
 
Suppose there are two books on similar topics, B1 and B2. Do you 
think someone who has read B1 is more or less likely to have read 
B2 than someone who has not read B1?  
Circle one: More  Less 
 
Participants in the assumptions condition saw both the 
disease and book questions, with the order counterbalanced. 
The remaining 48 participants performed a task like 
Experiment 2 at the 2:3 probability ratio. However, half 
were asked about diseases, while the remaining half saw a 
formally identical question about books. Instead of 
reasoning about diseases causing symptoms, they were 
asked about books ‘causing’ knowledge of facts. For 
example, a passage read: “The Zorgian Guide to 
Interplanetary Living contains the fact that Planet Earth 
has an atmosphere and the fact that humans have two 
legs. You know that about 50 aliens on Zorg have read The 
Zorgian Guide to Interplanetary Living.” 
 
Results and Conclusions We first analyzed the data from 
the assumptions condition. Most participants (80%) claimed 
that having a disease makes someone less likely to have a 
similar disease, but 80% thought that having read a book 
makes someone more likely to have read a similar book. 
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These values were significantly different from chance, as 
well as being significantly different from each other (χ2(1) = 
14.4, p < .01). Having thus established that people have 
different dependence assumptions about diseases and books, 
we went on to look at whether these assumptions affect 
explanatory preferences. 
Replicating Experiment 2, we found that about half (46%) 
of participants chose the simpler explanation at the 2:3 
probability ratio in the disease condition. In the book 
condition the results were identical, with 11 of 24 
participants (46%) choosing the simpler explanation. There 
were also no differences between conditions in how 
participants justified their choice. The absence of a 
difference between the disease and book conditions suggests 
that beliefs about probabilistic dependence do not account 
for participants’ preference for simpler explanations. 
Experiment 4: Computer Replication 
In the previous experiments participants were informed of 
the prevalence of each disease by being presented with a 
frequency. This method has two limitations. First, in the real 
world most frequency information is acquired through 
experience rather than a summary value, making the 
ecological validity of the task questionable. Second, having 
actual numbers allowed some participants to compute the 
joint probability of the diseases rather than relying on 
subjective judgments. For these reasons we decided to 
replicate the basic task in a computer format. Doing so also 
allowed us to examine whether explanatory preferences 
have consequences for perceived frequencies.  
 
Methods One-hundred-and-eight Boston-area summer 
school and undergraduate students participated. The task 
was like Experiment 2, but on the computer. Instead of 
being told the prevalence of the diseases, for each disease 
participants saw ten screens containing a total of 75 aliens, 
some of which were marked as having a particular disease. 
In this way equivalent frequency information was 
communicated. 
Participants were in one of four frequency conditions 
corresponding to probability ratios of 15:1, 9:10, 1:2 and 
1:10, with 27 participants per condition. After being 
presented with the cover story and frequency information, 
participants were asked to choose the most satisfying 
explanation for the alien’s symptoms and, as before, 
selected an answer among six options, which included every 
disease alone and each pairwise combination. They were 
then asked to explain their choice and to estimate the 
frequency of each disease in the Zorg population. 
Counterbalancing and randomization was as in 
Experiment 2, with the additional control that the order of 
presentation of the disease frequencies was varied according 
to a Latin square. 
 
Results and Conclusions The overall explanatory 
preferences in the computer task replicated those of 
Experiment 2, suggesting that the questionnaire format was 
methodologically sound (see Figure 3). Virtually all 
participants chose the simpler explanation when it was more 
likely, but nearly half continued to prefer the simpler 
explanation when it was as much as ten times more likely 
that the alien had two diseases. 
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Figure 3: Percent of subjects choosing simpler explanation 
in computer task. 
 
We also analyzed justifications for choosing the simpler 
explanation, using the coding scheme from Experiment 2. 
Not surprisingly, as the simpler explanation became less 
probable, a larger proportion of participants invoked 
simplicity rather than probability in their justifications (see 
Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Distribution of justifications for choosing the 
simpler explanation in the computer task. 
 
Using a computer task allowed us to examine an aspect of 
simplicity we couldn’t address in the questionnaire format, 
namely how explanatory choices affect perceived 
frequencies. Figure 5 presents participants’ estimates of the 
percentage of the Zorg population with each of D1, D2, and 
D3. The average estimates are shown as a function of both 
frequency condition and explanation choice, with 
participants who chose the simpler, one-cause explanation 
distinguished from those who chose the more complex, two-
cause explanation. Solid lines indicate the actual percentage 
of aliens with each disease. 
While subjects were remarkably accurate overall, the data 
for D1 suggest that those participants who chose the simple, 
one-cause explanation when it was less probable 
systematically overestimated the frequency of D1. In both 
the 1:2 and 1:10 frequency conditions, the average estimate 
of participants who chose the simpler explanation were 
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significantly higher than that of participants who chose the 
more complex alternative (p < .05). One possibility, 
however, is that some subjects confused the frequency of D1 
with either D2 or D3, which would result in inflated D1 
estimates. If this were true we would expect to see 
systematic underestimation of D2 and D3. Moreover, only 
one subject provided a higher estimate for D1 than either D2 
or D3. This suggests that the overestimation of D1 is not due 
to mismatching the frequencies and their corresponding 
diseases. 
Another explanation for the D1 overestimation is that 
participants who chose the simpler explanation were bad at 
estimating frequencies, and for this reason based their 
explanation choice on simplicity. This possibility is ruled 
out by the frequency estimation data for D2 and D3, where 
there were no differences between the estimates of par-
ticipants who chose one or two cause explanations. 
These data suggest that participants who chose the 
simpler explanation systematically overestimated the 
frequency of D1 as a result of their explanation choice. 
However, it could be that some participants overestimated 
D1, which in turn lead them both to choose the simpler 
explanation and to indicate a high prevalence of D1. 
Evidence that the former interpretation is the correct one 
comes from the fact that participants never systematically 
overestimate D1 in the 1:15 condition, when simplicity and 
probability converged on the same explanation.  
Conclusions 
We began by considering whether people prefer simpler 
explanations, and whether this preference is supported by a 
belief that simpler explanations are more likely to be true. 
We found overwhelming evidence for the claim that people 
do prefer simpler explanations, at least where simplicity is 
understood in terms of number of causes. Participants 
consistently chose a simpler explanation when provided no 
information about probability, and required a dispro-
portionate amount of probability information in order to 
override this preference.  
These findings are consistent with the idea that people 
believe simpler explanations are more likely to be true, 
albeit implicitly. Many subjects explicitly justified their 
choice of a simpler explanation by appeal to probability, but 
more telling is the fact that participants evaluated simplicity 
and probability as if they were commensurable quantities. 
The results from Experiment 2 tentatively support the 
probabilistic metric hypothesis over the trade-off 
hypothesis: people do prefer simpler explanations, but this 
bias manifests as a reweighing of priors rather than a failure 
to appropriately incorporate probability information.  
The intimate relationship between simplicity and 
probability is most dramatically illustrated by the finding 
that committing to an improbable, simple explanation 
results in the systematic distortion of perceived frequencies. 
This result indicates that explanatory choices can have 
consequences for probabilistic judgments, and suggests that 
the study of explanation can provide a unique window into 
the mechanisms by which beliefs about the world influence 
decisions. 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the variation in cohesion across 
written and spoken registers. The same method and corpora 
were used as in Biber’s (1988) study on linguistic variation 
across speech and writing; however instead of focusing on 67 
linguistic features that primarily operate at the word level, we 
compared 236 language and cohesion features at the text-
level. Variations in frequencies across these features provided 
evidence for six dimensions: (1) speech versus writing, (2) 
informational versus declarative, (3) factual versus situational, 
(4) topic consistency versus topic variation, (5) elaborative 
versus constrained, (6) narrative versus non-narrative. Our 
cohesion and linguistic analysis showed most variation in 
speech and writing, whereas the linguistic feature analysis 
operating at the word level did not yield any difference. 
Introduction 
One way to investigate similarities and differences between 
speech and writing is by using corpus linguistic methods. 
The most common and largest investigation of this kind is 
Biber (1988). Biber used 23 spoken and written registers. 
These registers are language varieties mediated by social 
situations and are similar to genres. Biber took these 
registers from the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen (LOB) corpus and 
the London-Lund corpus, and computed the frequency of 67 
linguistic features in these registers (see Table 1 for an 
overview of registers). 
The linguistic features used for Biber’s analysis primarily 
operate at the word level (e.g., parts-of-speech) and can be 
categorized as (1) tense and aspect markers, (2) place and 
time adverbials, (3) pronouns and pro-verbs, (4) questions, 
(5) nominal forms, (6) passives, (7) stative forms, (8) 
subordination features, (9) prepositional phrases, adjectives 
and adverbs, (10) lexical specificity, (11) lexical classes, 
(12) modals, (13) specialized verb classes, (14) reduced 
forms and dispreferred structures, and (15) coordinations 
and negations.  
 
 
Table 1. The 23 registers used in Biber (1988) 
Corpus Register 
Lancaster-
Oslo-Bergen  
corpus 
Press reportage, editorials, press reviews,  
religion, skills and hobbies, popular lore, 
biographies, official documents, academic 
prose, general fiction, mystery fiction, 
science fiction, adventure fiction, romantic 
fiction, humor 
London-
Lund corpus 
Face-to-face conversation, telephone 
conversation, public conversations, debates, 
and interviews, broadcast, spontaneous 
speeches, planned speeches 
(Additional) Personal letters, professional letters 
 
In Biber’s study the normalized frequencies of these 
features in each of the registers were then entered in a factor 
analysis, from which six factors emerged. These factors can 
be seen as dimensions on which registers can be placed. 
Biber’s analysis showed that no single dimension comprised 
a difference between speech and writing; As such, Biber 
defined the sets of relations among texts as follows: 
1. Involved versus informational production 
2. Narrative versus non-narrative concerns 
3. Explicit versus situation dependent reference 
4. Overt expression of persuasion 
5. Abstract versus non-abstract information 
6. On-line informational elaboration. 
For example, registers such as romantic fiction, mystery 
fiction and science fiction were positioned high on the 
second dimension (narrative); whereas registers such as 
academic prose, official documents, hobbies, and broadcasts 
scored low (non-narrative). 
 Biber’s (1988) study and the multi-feature, 
multidimensional approach have become a standard in 
corpus linguistics (McEnery, 2003), leading to various 
extensions (Biber, Conrad & Reppen, 1998; Conrad & 
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Biber, 2001), as well as to assessments of the validity, 
stability, and meaningfulness of the approach and its 
findings (Lee, 2004). 
Measuring cohesion 
Texts obviously consist of a large variety of linguistic 
features, many of which can be identified at a word level 
(e.g. morpho-semantics, syntactic category, frequency). 
Biber’s study has shown that these linguistic features are 
powerful determiners of similarities and differences 
between registers. But despite these impressive results, the 
theoretical question that remains lurking is to what extent 
these linguistic features fully capture the nature of a text and 
thereby the nature of a register. 
 Although linguistic features operating at the word level 
may identify several register characteristics, we also know 
that one of the key features of a text is that it is not just a 
concatenation of words and sentences. Instead, there is a 
structure in the text that glues the various text components 
together. In comprehending the text, the reader or listener 
constructs a coherent, mental representation of the situations 
which have been cohesively described by the text. We have 
used the term “coherence” for the representational 
relationships and “cohesion” for the textual indications 
through which coherent representations should be built 
(Louwerse & Graesser, 2004). Cohesion, it should be noted, 
cannot be captured only by linguistic features at the word 
level. Instead, cohesion stretches to the inter-clause, inter-
sentence and inter-paragraph level. 
 But if a key component in the nature of text consists of 
cohesion, a practical issue related to the theoretical question 
needs to be addressed. Linguistic features that operate at a 
word level can currently be reliably identified by regular 
expressions, part-of-speech taggers, and syntactic parsers. 
However, there is the practical question of whether 
automated techniques can also capture the cohesion of text. 
Recent landmark progress in computational linguistics has 
indeed allowed us to go far beyond surface level 
components into automating deeper and global levels of text 
and language analysis (Jurafsky & Martin, 2001). This 
progress has resulted in the cohesion and coherence 
measurement tool Coh-Metrix. 
Coh-Metrix 
Coh-Metrix was initially developed in order to replace 
readability formulas that exclusively focus on simple and 
shallow metrics. Instead, Coh-Metrix is sensitive to a 
broader profile of language and cohesion characteristics. It 
analyzes texts on 236 types of cohesion relations and 
measures of language, text, and readability (McNaramara, 
Louwerse, & Graesser, 2002; Graesser, McNamara, & 
Louwerse, in press). For this paper, we will only focus on 
the textual features (cohesion) of the tool. 
The modules of Coh-Metrix use lexicons, part-of-speech 
classifiers, syntactic parsers, templates, corpora, latent 
semantic analysis, and other components that are widely 
used in computational linguistics. For example, the MRC 
database (Coltheart, 1981) is used for psycholinguistic 
information; WordNet (Miller, Beckwith, Fellbaum, Gross 
& Miller) for underlying lexical concepts; Latent Semantic 
Analysis (Landauer & Dumais) for the semantic similarities 
between words, sentences and paragraphs; the ApplePie 
parser (Sekine & Grishman, 1995) and the Brill (1995) part-
of-speech tagger for a variety of syntactic categories.  
Spatial restrictions do not make it possible to discuss all 
of the measures Coh-Metrix makes available. As such, a 
brief summary of key measures will have to suffice, 
whereas Graesser et al. (in press) has a more complete 
overview. 
1. Word information includes word familiarity, word 
concreteness, word imageability, meaningfulness, and age 
of acquisition. 
2. Word frequency includes four corpora-based standards: 
CELEX from the Dutch Centre for Lexical Information 
(Baayen, Piepenbrock & Van Rijn, 1993); the Kucera-
Francis norms (Francis & Kucera, 1982); Thorndike-Lorge 
norms (Thorndike & Lorge, 1942) and the Brown norms 
(Brown, 1984). 
3. Part of speech categories are adopted from the Penn 
Treebank (Marcus et al., 1993) and the Brill (1995) POS 
tagger. 
4. Pronoun density is computed by taking the ratio of 
pronouns and nouns. 
5. Logical operators are the incidence score of logical 
operators or, and, not, and if-then phrases 
6. Interclausal relationships are the additive, temporal 
and causal cohesion based on connectives between clauses. 
These can be positive (extending) and negative 
(adversative), as outlined in Louwerse (2001).  
7. Type-token ratio refers to the number of unique words 
divided by the number of tokens of the words. 
8. Polysemy and hypernym: Polysemy is measured as the 
number of senses of a word in WordNet; whereas the 
hypernym count is defined as the number of levels in a 
conceptual taxonomic hierarchy that is superordinate to a 
word.  
9. Concept clarity is a composite of multiple factors that 
measure ambiguity, vagueness, and abstractness.  
10. Syntactic complexity refers to the noun-phrase density, 
the mean number of modifiers per noun phrase, the number 
of high-level constituents per word and the incidence of 
word classes that signal logical or analytical difficulty. 
11. Readability scores are computed according to the 
Flesch Reading Ease formula and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade 
Level formula, the standard readability formulas. 
12. Coreference: Three forms of coreference between 
sentences are computed, namely noun overlap between 
sentences, stem overlap, and stem-noun overlap. 
13. Causal cohesion is interpreted as the ratio of causal 
particles to causal verbs. 
14. Latent semantic analysis: LSA is a statistical, corpus 
based, technique used to represent world knowledge that 
computes similarity comparisons for terms and documents 
by taking advantage of word co-occurrences. LSA scores 
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can be computed for sentence to paragraph, sentence to text, 
paragraph to paragraph and paragraph to text. These 
measures can be used for measuring the local and global 
cohesion of the text (see Kintsch, 2002; Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997). 
The advantage of the use of this wide range of 
computational linguistic tools is that Coh-Metrix is sensitive 
to variations in language, discourse, and cohesion. Such an 
analysis may not only help us to determine text difficulty, 
but may also help us with determining variations across 
registers. 
Multi-dimensional study on cohesion 
In our multi-feature, multi-dimensional approach we 
carefully followed Biber’s study to allow comparison of his 
findings. We used the same fifteen written registers from the 
LOB corpus and the same six spoken registers from the 
London-Lund corpus. Two further non-published registers 
(professional and personal letters), which Biber had 
generated himself, were substituted with the Compilation of 
Messages and Letters of the Presidents Richardson  
(2003/1801) and The Upton Letters from Christopher 
Benson (1905), both downloaded from the Gutenberg text 
archives. 
 All textual coding other than alphanumeric characters and 
punctuation was removed. The 23 spoken and written 
registers were then processed through Coh-Metrix and the 
normalized frequencies for each of the 236 cohesion, 
language, and discourse features were saved. We followed 
Biber’s approach in standardizing all frequencies to a mean 
of 0.0 and a SD of 1.0 and entered them in a factor analysis 
using the Promax rotation. Whereas Biber used a principal 
factor analysis to account for the shared variance, we opted 
for a principal component analysis to account for all the 
variances. Loadings with an absolute value of less than .35 
were excluded from the analysis (Biber, 1988; Comrey & 
Lee, 1992). The scree plot of eigenvalues, illustrating the 
amount of variance accounted for by each factor, showed a 
clear break after six factors, explaining 88.3% of the total 
variance. 
In order to translate the factor scores to the registers, we 
followed Biber by adding together the standardized scores 
of all linguistic features responsible for a factor in a 
particular text. This provides a measure of register’s 
salience on a particular dimension given the presence of the 
linguistic features in that register. We deviated from Biber’s 
approach in one important way: Whereas Biber removed the 
linguistic features from subsequent factors once it was used 
by a previous factor, we preferred to include these linguistic 
features in additional factors to account for the interactions 
between language, discourse, and cohesion features. 
Dimensions 
Space limitations dictate us to summarize the findings by 
presenting tables in which we have translated the ratio scale 
to an ordinal scale, thereby not serving full justice to the 
actual differences between the 23 registers.  
Dimension 1: Speech versus writing. This dimension 
significantly accounts for 53.5% of the variance, (F (1, 22) 
= 35.61, p < .001, MSE = .721). When looking at the 
grouping of the registers, it immediately becomes apparent 
that spoken registers are distinct from written registers. In 
addition, the registers clearly show the degree to which the 
registers are speech-dependent. For example, fiction 
includes, or more closely reflects, spoken discourse, 
whereas this is far less likely to be the case with press 
reviews or professional letters.  
The linguistic features with positive loadings are 
presented in the first data row of the table, signifying the 
higher presence in the register. They consist of 
concreteness, imageability, meaningfulness, polysemy, and 
frequency in the spoken discourse. Negative loadings relate 
to ambiguous quantification, pronoun density, argument 
overlap, and semantic similarity between sentences and 
paragraphs. Registers with a higher score on this dimension 
(like public conversations and face-to-face conversations) 
are characterized by frequent occurrences of concrete, 
imaginable, and meaningful language, together with higher 
pronoun density and ambiguous quantification. At the same 
time, occurrences of argument overlap and semantic 
similarities between text units are less prevalent. Registers 
with negative scores, presented in the second data row, have 
the opposite characteristics. 
In Table 2 results are given for the Dimension 1. The first 
column presents the registers ranked by total scores and the 
second column presents the linguistic features ranked by 
factor loadings. Row separators mark the difference 
between positive and negative factor loadings. The same 
format is used for the remaining five tables representing the 
remaining five dimensions. 
 
Table 2:  Distribution registers and summary Coh-Metrix 
Dimension 1 (speech versus writing) 
public conversations, face to 
face conversation, 
spontaneous speeches, 
telephone conversations, 
planned speeches, broadcast, 
mystery fiction 
frequency, concreteness, 
imageability, meaningfulness, 
polysemy, Flesch Reading 
Ease, ambiguous 
quantification, pronoun 
density, higher level 
constituents per word, abstract 
nouns, hypernym, polysemy 
Personal letters, general 
fiction, romantic fiction, 
religion, adventure fiction, 
skills and hobbies, official 
documents,  humor, academic 
prose, editorials, popular lore, 
biographies, science fiction, 
press reportage, press reviews, 
professional letters 
LSA sentence to sentence, 
ratio of causal particles to 
causal verbs, LSA paragraph 
to paragraph, paragraph to 
text, vague adverbs, type-
token ratio for nouns, 
concreteness, argument 
overlap, average paragraph 
length, age of acquisition, 
average syllables per word, 
mean number of modifiers per 
noun-phrase, stem overlap, 
Flesch Kincaid Grade Level 
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Dimension 2: Informational versus declarative. The 
second dimension accounts for 16.3 % of the variance, but 
without significant differences between the registers (F (1, 
22) = .93, p = .56, MSE = .968). This dimension shows 
many similarities with Biber’s Dimension 6, with the 
majority of the registers positioned similarly along the axis 
in both studies. Biber tentatively labeled this “on-line 
informational elaboration marking stance” with registers 
such as planned speeches and public conversations being 
informational in focus and conveying the speaker’s attitudes 
and beliefs. We come to a similar conclusion, interpreting 
the difference as informational and subjective versus 
declarative and objective. Informational registers are 
characterized by a higher occurrence of temporal cohesion, 
imageability, and concreteness, but a low occurrence of 
causality, whereas the opposite characterizes declarative 
registers. 
 
Table 3:  Distribution registers and summary Coh-Metrix 
Dimension 2 (informational versus declarative) 
mystery fiction, religion, 
skills and hobbies, romantic 
fiction, spontaneous 
speeches, official documents, 
general fiction, popular lore, 
telephone conversations, 
adventure fiction, 
biographies, face to face 
conversation, broadcast, 
humor 
Positive temporal 
connectives, polysemy 
(adjectives), meaningfulness, 
LSA paragraph to paragraph, 
familiarity, LSA sentence to 
sentence, negative temporal 
connectives, paragraph 
length, argument overlap, 
LSA sentence to paragraph, 
LSA paragraph to text, ratio 
of causal particles to causal 
verbs, LSA paragraph to 
paragraph, type-token ratio 
for nouns, LSA paragraph to 
text, imageability, 
concreteness, LSA sentence 
to sentence, LSA sentence to 
sentence, concreteness 
planned speeches, public 
conversations, academic 
prose, personal letters, 
editorials, science fiction, 
professional letters, press 
reportage, press reviews 
 
Negative causal connectives, 
frequency, (verbs), causal 
particles, average syllables 
per word, positive causal 
connectives, age of 
acquisition 
 
 
Dimension 3: Factual versus situational. This dimension, 
explaining 7.7 % of the variance, shows similarities with 
Biber’s Dimension 3: “explicit versus situation-dependent 
reference.” Biber argues that the situation-dependent site of 
the dimension refers to places and times outside of the text 
(imaginary and real world), whereas the opposite side of the 
dimension has registers with elaborated explicit reference. 
Although we do not find evidence for the time or place 
reference, we do find a higher frequency of imageability and 
a lower frequency of clarification and causal connectives, 
with the opposite trend evident for the registers on the 
factual side of the dimension (F(1, 22) = 5.88, p < .001, 
MSE = .871). The labels “factual” and “situational” refer to 
the presentation, rather than the content. For instance, 
religion is located high on the factual dimension because 
this register is generally presented as factual. On the other 
hand, press reviews, reportages and fiction are presented in 
a less transparent way, often requiring the reader to imagine 
a situation. 
 
Table 4:  Distribution registers and summary Coh-Metrix 
Dimension 3 (factual versus situational) 
academic prose, official 
documents, religion, skills 
and hobbies, popular lore, 
biographies, spontaneous 
speeches, personal letters, 
face to face conversation  
Clarification connectives, 
causal particles, negative 
causal connectives, noun 
overlap, ratio of causal 
particles to causal verbs, 
vague adjectives, negative 
additive connectives, positive 
causal connectives, 
ambiguous quantification, 
argument overlap, vague 
verbs, vague nouns,  
telephone conversations, 
humor, editorials, public 
conversations, press reviews, 
press reportage, professional 
letters, planned speeches, 
general fiction, broadcast, 
mystery fiction, romantic 
fiction, adventure fiction, 
science fiction 
polysemy, imageability, 
causal verbs, mean hypernym 
of verbs 
 
Dimension 4: Topic consistency versus topic variation. 
This dimension explains 4.6% of the variance with 
significant differences between the registers (F(1, 22) = 
3.76, p < .001, MSE = .870). It marks the consistency of 
topics across and within instances of a particular register. 
For instance, personal and professional letters often have a 
similar set of topics that are used, as do biographies and 
spontaneous speeches. Face-to-face conversations, 
interviews, public debates, press reportages and editorials 
on the other hand, have more topics and are less predictable, 
often switching between different instances. In the registers 
located high in the topic consistency (e.g. personal letters 
and professional letters), semantic similarities marking 
global cohesion and local cohesion are higher, but noun 
density and type-token ratio are lower than the topic 
variation registers (e.g., reportages and editorials).  
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Table 5:  Distribution registers and summary Coh-Metrix 
Dimension 4 (topic consistency versus topic variation) 
personal letters, spontaneous 
speeches, professional letters, 
biographies, broadcast, 
academic prose, religion, 
official documents, skills and 
hobbies, romantic fiction, 
mystery fiction 
frequency conditionals, 
frequency negations, causal 
verbs, positive additive 
connectives, polysemy, LSA 
paragraph to paragraph, 
positive causal connectives, 
LSA sentence to text, LSA 
paragraph to paragraph, LSA 
paragraph to text 
telephone conversations, 
general fiction, press reviews, 
popular lore, planned 
speeches, humor, adventure 
fiction, science fiction, face 
to face conversation, public 
conversations, press 
reportage, editorials 
type-token ratio, noun density 
 
 
Dimension 5: Elaborative versus constrained. This 
dimension is harder to interpret and explains only 3.7 % of 
the variance. Differences between registers (F(1, 22) = 3.55, 
p < .001, MSE = .866) suggest that personal letters and press 
reviews for instance are more opinion-based and have a 
closer distance between writer and reader, whereas 
professional letters and press reportages, are more fact and 
evidence driven. It is almost as if there is more space in 
personal letters and press reviews to compare ideas. This 
conclusion is supported by the factor loadings of the 
linguistic features, which show a prominent role for additive 
cohesion, vague adjectives and adverbs, along with a high 
type-token ratio and an accompanying low semantic 
similarity in the case of the personal letters and the press 
reviews. It is as if many ideas are juxtaposed within these 
registers.  
 
Table 6:  Distribution registers and summary Coh-Metrix 
Dimension 5 (elaborative versus constrained) 
personal letters, press 
reviews, biographies, skills 
and hobbies, religion, humor, 
popular lore, academic prose,  
official documents, editorials, 
general fiction 
type-token ratio, negative 
additive connectives, vague 
adjectives, vague verbs, 
positive additive connectives 
 
mystery fiction, science 
fiction, romantic fiction, 
telephone conversations, 
broadcast, adventure fiction, 
face to face conversation, 
press reportage, planned 
speeches, public 
conversations, spontaneous 
speeches, professional letters 
LSA paragraph to text, LSA 
paragraph to paragraph, LSA 
sentence to text 
 
 
Dimension 6: Narrative versus non-narrative Although 
significant differences were found between registers (F (1, 
22) = 1.64, p = .037, MSE = .991) only 2.5 % of the 
variance was accounted for by this dimension. Dimension 6 
is virtually identical to Biber’s Dimension 2. In registers 
such as fiction and biographies, a narration of events is 
prominent, whereas narration is less obvious in press 
reviews and professional letters. Linguistic features like 
temporal connectives are primarily responsible for this 
dimension. Despite the similarities with Biber’s dimension, 
there are also some important differences. For instance, in 
our findings, science fiction scores low on narrative but 
face-to-face conversations score high, whereas in Biber’s 
analysis the opposite is the case. The clear similarities 
between the two studies (e.g., the clustering of the fiction 
texts) support this interpretation of the dimension. 
 
Table 7:  Distribution registers and summary Coh-Metrix 
Dimension 6 (narrative versus non-narrative) 
Romantic fiction, mystery 
fiction, face to face 
conversation, general 
fiction, adventure fiction, 
biographies, religion, public 
conversations, telephone 
conversations, official 
documents 
ambiguous temporal 
relation, vague nouns, 
positive connectives, 
temporal connectives 
Editorials, academic prose, 
press reportage, skills and 
hobbies, humor, 
spontaneous speeches, 
popular lore, personal 
letters, broadcast, planned 
speeches, science fiction, 
professional letters, press 
reviews 
LSA sentence to text, LSA 
paragraph to text, LSA 
sentence to sentence 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The present study has investigated the multi-feature, multi-
dimensional corpus linguistic approach initially outlined by 
Biber (1988). We have used the same corpora and the same 
methods as Biber, but instead of including linguistic 
features that primarily operate at the word level, we have 
included a large variety of language, discourse and cohesion 
features. These features ranged from the word level, to 
sentence, paragraph and discourse level. Six dimensions 
emerged from a factor analysis: (1) speech versus writing, 
(2) informational versus declarative, (3) factual versus 
situational, (4) topic consistency versus topic variation, (5) 
elaborative versus constrained, (6) narrative versus non-
narrative. Three of these dimensions (Dimension 2, 3 and 6) 
show strong similarities with the distributions of registers as 
well as the interpretations of dimensions in Biber’s study. 
 Results showed one crucial difference with Biber’s 
finding. Whereas Biber was not able to find one single 
dimension that determined the difference between speech 
and writing, we found a very prominent difference in 
linguistic features between spoken and written discourse 
(Dimension 1). The most plausible explanation for this 
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result is the contrast between Biber’s focus on the linguistic 
features operating at the word level and our study which 
included a much wider range of language and discourse 
characteristics that we have called cohesion. 
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Abstract 
What temporal relations do humans use to form dynamic 
mental representations of events? In the fields of artificial 
intelligence and computational linguistics, some have 
proposed an interval based representation, in which two 
events could be related in time by seven primitives. The seven 
primitives are BEFORE, MEET, OVERLAP, START, 
DURING, FINISH, and EQUAL. In the present study, 
perception, memory, and language about event temporal 
relations were investigated. The results showed that 
BEFORE, MEET, and DURING seem to be prevalent in the 
temporal experiences across a range of cognitive tasks, 
despite that there is variability with respect to different 
cognitive tasks.  
Event Temporal Representation 
Time is an inherent dimension of event representations 
(Freyd, 1987; Lu, 2003; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Zacks & 
Tversky, 2001; Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). In 
everyday life, there are many goal oriented activities that 
require an understanding of fine-tuned and subtle timings of 
events, as in the case of making chicken soup, operating 
certain mechanical devices, and making a camp fire. There 
are also many events that are loosely related, as in the case 
of recalling some quarreling couple while dinning at a 
restaurant, hearing a loud sound from a house while taking 
a walk, and seeing a squirrel running on the electrical wire 
while walking past a fence. How do people construct the 
temporal relations of events that may or may not be related 
in an overarching conceptual structure? For the purpose of 
this paper, the term event will be used as a covering term for 
both intentional  actions (as in the case of an agent making 
chicken soup) and events that are not governed by the goals 
of an agent (as the in the case of oil turning smoky).  
     Previous research suggests that the plan and goal 
structures of everyday activities play an extremely 
important role in the encoding and retrieval of event 
temporal relations (Lichtenstein & Brewer, 1980). When 
people are asked to recall the sequence of events, they often 
place events in an order that maps onto the logical 
inferences derived from the goal and causal constraints 
instead of the actual order in time (Bauer & Mandler, 1989; 
Lichtenstein & Brewer, 1980). It is notable that the type of 
the events investigated in these studies tends to be the case 
where one agent manipulates one object and enacts one 
action at a time (Lu, 2003), whereas the examples in the 
previous paragraph seem to suggest that humans often 
experience events that have overlap in time. Additional 
research is needed to specify the details of how the plan and 
goal based theories could account for events overlapping in 
time.   
How are events represented in temporal dimension? There 
are two types of primitives for temporally representing 
events (Allen, 1984; 1991). A point based representation 
captures events as being indexed as points in time. One 
event can be a single point in time, as in the case of a 
sunrise at 4:30 or a hiccup. There are many singular point 
expressions in natural language (Moens & Steedman, 1988; 
TerMeulen, 1995); the events described in these point 
expressions appear to be conceptually instantaneous. A 
point based representation can also represent non-
instantaneous events with a set of points in time. For 
example, a person’s cleaning the fish tank can have a 
beginning at 2:15 and an end at 2:35 p.m. Its sub-event 
getting the supplies begins at 2:16 and ends at 2:19 p.m. 
Each of these events has points in time marking the 
beginning and the end.  
    In contrast, an interval based representation captures 
events as durations that may gloss over exact time points. 
Thus, the interval of getting the supplies occurred during the 
interval of cleaning the fish tank, without any specification 
of the exact points in time that mark the beginning and end 
points of events. Psychological studies have reported that 
people have a grasp of the range of time during which an 
event occurs (Golding, Magliano, & Hempill, 1992; Loftus, 
Schooler, Boone, & Kline, 1987). For example, John may 
not know exactly at which points of time he opens his car 
door, yet he knows it takes two or three seconds to open it. 
The chief theoretical challenge lies in specifying how to 
relate the intervals of events and how to draw inferences 
about the relative timing of events on the basis of interval 
constraints.  
In the fields of artificial intelligence and computational 
linguistics, Allen (1984; 1991) developed a formalism that 
captures the various temporal relations between two events 
that are represented in intervals. Figure 1 provides an 
illustration of these seven relational structures: BEFORE, 
MEET, OVERLAP, START, DURING, FINISH, and 
EQUAL. In Figure 1, each double-headed arrow represents 
an event that occurs over some time interval, and each 
arrow-head represents either the beginning or the end of an 
event. The relation between each pair of events is described 
by one of the seven predicates. The  BEFORE relation 
means that one event is prior to another event and that two 
events do not overlap in any way, whereas the MEET 
relation means that one event starts at the time another event 
ends. START means that two events share the same 
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In this paper, four experiments are reported to investigate 
the temporal relations people tend to construct. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, animated events of fish swimming 
were presented, and judgments of temporal relations were 
made. In Experiment 3, events were presented linguistically, 
and a production task was used. In Experiment 4, three 
separate sentence sorting tasks were conducted to see what 
semantic distinctions humans make when they describe 
events and their temporal relations.   
beginning, but one ends before another, whereas EQUAL 
means that two events share the same interval and the same 
beginning and end. These primitives are essential for 
constructing a computational system of event 
representations (Allen, 1984). To what extent are Allen’s 
seven relations used as conceptual primitives in event 
temporal representation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEFORE 
Experiment 1: Perception of animated events  
Experiment 1 investigated which temporal relations humans 
tend to construct out of the 7 primitives in the context of 
event perception. Participants were presented with 
animations of fish swimming events made in an animation 
program, called 3D Studio Max. Participants were asked to 
make judgments about which temporal relation out of the 7 
choices best captures the animated events they saw. 
MEET 
OVERLAP 
START 
Participants There were 51 college students at the 
University of Memphis who participated for course credit. 
DURING 
Materials Forty-two 3D animations were made using an 
animation program called 3D Studio Max release 5. Each 
animation depicted two fish of different colors and sizes 
swimming in the water. The spatial trajectory of the fish 
swimming was a straight line. For each relational structure 
in Allen’s scheme, there were two sets of animations. One 
set of animations holds the distances of fish swimming 
constant but varies the speed of fish swimming, whereas the 
other set of animations holds the speed of fish swimming 
constant but varies the distances. For each set, there were 
three different perspective combinations: horizontal –
horizontal, vertical - vertical, and horizontal - vertical.  
FINISH 
EQUAL 
Figure 1: Temporal Representations by Allen (1991). 
 
The formalism laid out in Figure 1 may capture some 
intuitive aspects of human temporal reasoning. For example, 
there is some evidence that endorses the distinction between 
BEFORE and MEET. Kate, a language found in Papua New 
Guinea, makes grammatical distinctions between the 
following two types of events: (a) events that are separated 
by a period of time with nothing significant, and (b) events 
that have successive temporal relations (Grime, 1975; but 
see Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998, pp. 176). In the Newtson 
task, participants are asked to segment a videotape of an 
activity into events and their parts (Newtson & Engquist, 
1976). Participants are told to press the spacebar when they 
think one event ends and another begins. This methodology 
implicitly endorses MEET as the typical temporal 
experience encountered in the world. 
    The animation quality is near photorealistic. Each 
animation was 25 seconds in length and was run at 
approximately 30 frames / second.  
Procedure Each participant was seated in front of a 
Pentium computer, which used MediaLab 2000 (Jarvis, 
2000) to display the materials. Participants were asked to 
make judgments concerning how fish swimming events 
were related in time, as discussed below. 
   Participants were shown Figure 1 (without linguistic 
labels), and steps were taken to make sure they understood 
Figure 1. Participants were instructed to choose one relation 
out of the seven which best captured how two animated 
events were related in time. Before the animations were 
launched, participants were told that they could only have 
one viewing of each animation and that the screen with 7 
choices would automatically pop up after each animation. 
Participants made choices by clicking a number that was 
next to the temporal relation.  
 Gestalt laws of perception postulate that forms are easier 
to process psychologically if they have more redundancy in 
pattern and permit fewer alternative forms. Conversely, 
forms are harder to process psychologically if they have less 
redundancy in pattern and render more alternative forms 
(Garner, 1974; Rock & Palmer, 1990). Examining Figure 1 
based on Gestalt laws of perception, the complexity of the 
seven temporal relations seems to vary. For example, 
EQUAL may not have alternative forms, whereas START 
may have several alternative forms pending on the intervals 
of events. It is reasonable to infer that humans may capture 
some relations easily, but have some other relations 
confused (Lu, Graesser & Wolff, 2003).  
   Each participant received the same order of the temporal 
relations depicted in a diagram throughout the experiment. 
There were 20 sets of orders in which the temporal relations 
were presented. For each participant, the animations were 
presented in a random order.  
Confusability Analysis Entropy was used to calculate the 
conceptual distance between each pair out of the 7 temporal 
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relations. The construct of entropy originated in information 
theory, which is a mathematical formulation of the 
uncertainty in a data set (Shannon, 1948). In the current 
study, each item may have 7 types of responses. For a given 
item, the following formula computes how likely one 
relation is confused with another one. 
Ei= N
pp
N
i
ii
ln
ln
1
∑
=−  
The pi refers to the proportion of times a given choice is 
selected out of the N possible choice items. 
   The entropy gives an index of how similar any two given 
structures (e.g. BEFORE and MEET) appeared to 
participants. A similarity matrix can thus be constructed, 
and then entered into the multidimensional scaling program 
implemented in SYSTAT version 9 with Young’s S-
STRESS scaling method (Wolff & Song, in press).  
Results and Discussions The probability of people making 
the correct judgment of temporal relations was .80 on 
average. The error rates of the seven relations were the 
following: BEFORE (.20), MEET (.29), OVERLAP (.33), 
START (.15), DURING (.29), FINISH (.26), and EQUAL 
(.07). The EQUAL relation has the lowest error rates.  
 
Figure 2: MDS Solution of Perception Task. 
 
    The confusability index was computed in entropy Ei. The 
similarity matrix was constructed using the entropy formula. 
This similarity matrix was submitted to the 
multidimensional scaling program. The MDS solutions in 
Figure 2 showed the following pattern of structure 
clustering yielded from the perception task. The similarity 
matrix was fit by a 2-dimensional MDS solution, with a 
very low stress value (.01), and a high proportion of 
variance accounted for (R2 = 0.99). The seven temporal 
relations in Figure 1 were clustered into three main groups:  
BEFORE, MEET, versus (OVERLAP, FINISH, START, 
EQUAL, DURING). 
    The results showed that people tend to make distinctions 
whether events have overlap in time, as BEFORE and 
MEET stand out from the rest of the five temporal relations. 
People seem to make mistakes often among the five 
temporal relations that have overlap in time.  
Experiment 2: Perception of animated events 
in the speeded condition 
In Experiment 1, participants were given the luxury of 
focusing on two events. Experiment 2 investigated whether 
the effects observed in Experiment 1 are the result of people 
having enough attentional and cognitive resources during 
event perception. The animations used in Experiment 1 were 
presented at a faster rate (see Graesser & Nakamura, 1982; 
Reiger & Zheng, 2003, for the same method). Participants 
made judgments of the animated events in the same way as 
Experiments 1. 
Participants There were 40 college students at the 
University of Memphis who participated for course credit. 
Materials The same set of 42 3D animations used in 
Experiment 1 was used in Experiment 2. The animations 
were speeded up using an animation program called 
VirtualDub. The animations were displayed 30 frames / 
second in Experiment 1, whereas the animations was 
speeded to 75 frames / second in Experiment 2.  
Results and Discussions   The probability of people 
making the correct judgment of temporal relations was .66 
on average. The error rates of the seven relations were the 
following: BEFORE (.34), MEET (.40), OVERLAP (.40), 
START (.23), DURING (.41), FINISH (.43), and EQUAL 
(.10). Compared with Experiment 1, the error frequency 
increased in Experiment 2.  
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    The similarity matrix was constructed in the same way as 
Experiment 1, and then was submitted to the 
multidimensional scaling program. The MDS solutions 
showed the same pattern of structure clustering yielded as in 
Experiment 1. The seven temporal relations were clustered 
into three main groups: BEFORE, MEET, versus 
(OVERLAP, FINISH, START, EQUAL, DURING). The 
relational clustering in Experiment 2 did not differ from 
Experiment 1. Whether two events had overlap in time was 
again used to distinguish BEFORE and MEET from the rest 
of the temporal relations. Experiment 2 ruled out the 
possibility that the pattern observed in Experiment 1 was 
merely the effect of attentional allocation.  
Experiment 3: Memory of everyday event time 
using a drawing task 
Experiments 1 and 2 investigated the perception of events 
and their temporal relations. The question at this point is 
whether the relational clustering in the perception of 
everyday events will also be observed in the memory of 
everyday activities. In the perception judgment experiments, 
participants were provided Allen’s seven relations. We were 
curious to find out whether the same pattern will be 
observed if Allen’s seven relations are not provided. 
Participants were presented pairs of everyday events that 
were coded to have the temporal relations in Allen’s 
representation. Participants read pairs of events, and then 
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drew which temporal relation in Allen’s representation best 
captures the events they read.   
   The similarity matrix, which was used to fit a 2-
dimensional MDS solution, does not include START. The 
resulting MDS solution had a very low stress value (.01), 
and a high proportion of variance accounted for (R2 = 0.99). 
The six temporal relations were clustered into three main 
groups with varying distances: BEFORE, MEET, versus 
(OVERLAP, FINISH, DURING, EQUAL). Compared with 
the MDS solution in the perception experiments, the 
distances among the four relations that have overlap in time 
are farther apart in the drawing task.  Nonetheless, the 
clustering formed by the rest of the 6 temporal relations, are 
not incompatible with the previous perception tasks. 
Whether two events have overlap in time continued to be an 
important dimension in the memory of everyday events. 
Participants There were 34 college students at the 
University of Memphis who participated for course credit. 
Materials A sample of events from everyday activities were 
collected. To ensure generality, the events were chosen from 
a wide range of everyday activities. Some examples include: 
driving a car, grocery shopping, cashing a check, and so on. 
Three raters were trained to understand Allen’s 
representation, and made judgments on how each two events 
were related in time separately. The materials used in the 
experiment were the items agreed upon by all three judges.  
    For every pair of events, a supporting context was 
provided. An example is below: 
Context:  Imagine a passenger at an airport. 
Events:  She went through the security screening. Experiment 4: Semantic organization of 
temporal lexemes 
             Her carry-on bags were x-rayed. 
For each of the 7 temporal relations in Allen’s proposal, 
there were 10 test items. There were 70 test items in total. Children tend to describe an event when they answer 
questions about time (Nelson, 1996). Consider such an 
example. When do you go to bed? When mommy comes to 
get me. The child did not say something like at night. This 
example suggests that how we talk about time is correlated 
with how we think of time (Gentner & Boroditsky, 2001). 
Does the pattern of event temporal relations observed in the 
perception and memory of events reflect in the language 
about event temporal relations? 
Procedure Participants were introduced how to represent an 
event occurring over some time with beginning and end 
points. Then they were given two examples: one indicating 
one event occurring before another, the other indicating one 
event occurring in the middle of another. The events were 
presented on A4 size papers, and space was provided for 
drawing. Allen’s 7 temporal relations were used to code the 
drawings. The inter-rater agreement was 96%. 
     Experiment 4 investigated the semantic clustering of 
temporal event language when college students performed 
linguistic sorting tasks. Participants were presented 
sentences with temporal words embedded in them. They 
sorted the sentences into groups which shared similar 
meanings of the embedded words. The central question is 
whether the words would cluster according to theoretically 
interesting dimensions. Three experiments were conducted 
separately for verbs, adverbs, and prepositions plus 
conjunctions. 
Results and Discussions The probability of people making 
the correct judgment of temporal relations was .29 on 
average. The error rates of the seven relations were the 
following: BEFORE (.31), MEET (.83), OVERLAP (.82), 
START (.95), DURING (.73), FINISH (.83), and EQUAL 
(.51). The probability of drawing START was significantly 
lower than chance, whereas the probability of drawing other 
six relations was higher than chance. For example, 
compared with the probability of drawing FINISH, the 
probability of drawing START are significantly lower, t 
(33) = 3.021, p < .005, using Bonferroni correction. 
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Experiment 4 (a): Verb sorting 
Participants There were 27 college students at the 
University of Memphis who participated for course credit. 
Materials A list of verbs and their synonyms encoding how 
two events are related in time was assembled from several 
thesauruses. Each of the 17 verbs in (4a) was printed at the 
top of a 4” x 6” index card. Below each verb were printed 
two sentences that illustrated the use of the verb. The 
example sentences were selected from the British National 
Corpus.  
Procedure Participants were asked to read the sentences on 
the verb index card, and then sort the verb index cards into 
as many or as few groups as they felt appropriate. They 
were told that the cards in each group should have 
“essentially the same meaning”.  
Results The frequency of each pair of words co-occurring in 
the same group was scored and assembled in a word-pair 
co-occurrence matrix. The MDS solutions showed a pattern 
of verb clustering. The sorts were fit by a 2-dimensional 
MDS solution, with a very low stress value (.18), and a high 
proportion of variance accounted for (R2 = 0.87). The verbs Figure 3: Drawing MDS Solution. 
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Discussions of Experiment 4 in (4a) were sorted into three main groups as shown in 
Figure 4:  Across grammatical categories, Experiment 4 showed that 
people are predisposed to three types of temporal relations 
when they talk about time. The results are compatible with 
the proposals by Wierzbicka (1973) in linguistics and 
Graesser et al. in psychology (Graesser, Wiemer-Hastings, 
& Wiemer-Hastings, 2001). The mapping between linguistic 
primitives and Allen’s primitives may be more complex 
than the MDS solutions suggested. Nonetheless, the 
evidence in linguistics may indicate some alignment 
between the linguistic clustering and the conceptual 
clustering that emerged from the previous experiments.  
BEFORE – type verbs (anticipate, be before, foresee, go 
before, and precede);  
AFTER – type verbs (come after, go after, follow after, 
succeed, and result); 
DURING – type verbs (coincide, concur, co-occur, ensue, 
fall together, go with and overlap). 
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    The linguistic primitive AFTER may correspond to some 
aspects of MEET. Wierzbicka and others have noted that 
BEFORE and AFTER encode somewhat different temporal 
conceptions of events (Thompson & Longacre, 1985, but 
see Wierzbicka 2002; Wierzbicka, 2002). One difference is 
that the event in the BEFORE clause usually does not begin 
until the event in the main clause ends, whereas AFTER 
does not have this constraint. Consider the following two 
examples: (a) John took out the water pipe before he 
drained the fish tank and (b) John washed the dishes after 
he cooked the dinner. The two events in example (a) have to 
occur one before another, whereas washing the dishes in 
example (b) could occur before finishing the cooking. There 
is some empirical evidence in support of this conjecture. In 
a separate sentence rating task we conducted, two types of 
after sentences were selected from a corpus. One type refers 
to the situation where one occurs after another with a time 
interval in between, whereas a second type refers to the 
situation where the beginning of one event is after another 
event but both events have overlap in time. There were 
significant differences between the likelihood ratings of 
whether the two events described in each sentence have 
overlap in time.   
 
        Figure 4: Verb Sorting MDS Solution. 
 
Experiment 4 (b): Adverb sorting 
There were 58 undergraduates at the University of Memphis 
who participated for course credit. Materials and procedure 
were the same as Experiment 4 (a).  
Results The MDS solutions showed a pattern of adverb 
clustering. The sorts were fit by a 2-dimensional solution, 
with a very low stress value (.13), and a high proportion of 
variance accounted for (R2 = 0.94). The adverbs in (4b) 
were sorted into three main groups:  
BEFORE – type adverbs (before, beforehand, earlier, 
formerly, in advance, previously and sooner; 
 
Summary and Discussions AFTER – type adverbs (after, afterwards, later, later on, 
next, sooner or later, and subsequently); Four experiments investigated how people piece together 
events that may or may not have an overarching conceptual 
structure in a range of cognitive tasks. The results suggested 
that the distinctions made among BEFORE, MEET, and 
DURING seem to be prevalent when people perceive, 
remember, and describe how events are related in time.  
DURING – type adverbs (at the moment, at the same time, 
concomitantly, concurrently, contemporaneously, for now, 
in chorus, in concert, in the meantime, in the same breath, in 
time, in unison, instantaneously, meanwhile, on the beat, 
simultaneously, synchronously).  
       However, there is apparently some variability in the 
MDS solution yielded from different cognitive tasks. When 
people had to linguistically encode and retrieve events, the 
event temporal representations may be harder to construct. 
The MDS solution in Figure 3 indicated the trend that 
BEFORE, MEET, and EQUAL are more likely to be 
constructed than other temporal relations. BEFORE, MEET, 
and EQUAL may be easier for humans to process because 
they have inherent simplicity, symmetry, and good forms, 
which are hallmarks of the Gestalt Law of Prägnanz (Rock 
& Palmer, 1990).  
 
Experiment 4 (c): Preposition sorting 
There were 76 undergraduates at the University of Memphis 
who participated for course credit.  
Results The MDS solutions showed a pattern of preposition 
clustering. The sorts were fit by a 2-dimensional solution, 
with a very low stress value (.14), and a high proportion of 
variance accounted for (R2 = 0.91). The prepositions in (4c) 
were sorted into three main groups:  
BEFORE – type prepositions (before, prior to); 
AFTER – type prepositions (after, soon after, as soon as, 
until, pending, by);      It is not clear at this point how the linguistic primitives map onto the primitives in perception and memory tasks. 
According to the relational relativity hypothesis, language DURING – type prepositions (just as, when, as, along with, while, amid, during, in the course of, throughout, over). 
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affects thought in more abstract domain (Gentner & 
Boroditsky, 2001; Gentner, 2003). Temporal constructs are 
abstract, this points to the possibility that the way we talk 
about time affects how we encode the temporal aspects of 
events. The MDS solutions in the current study indicate 
some alignment among the primitives across different 
cognitive tasks. However, the alignment may be more 
complicated and needs further investigations.  
    It appears that BEFORE, MEET, and DURING are used 
in the perception, memory, and linguistic experiences of 
temporal representations. When the representations are 
harder to construct, for example, in the case of linguistic 
retrieval of event representations, people are more likely to 
mistake one temporal relation with another. In further 
studies, it is necessary to investigate the cognitive principles 
that constrain the constructions of temporal event relations. 
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Abstract 
A corpus consisting of eighty-one one-on-one tutoring 
sessions with first-year medical students carried on by two 
professors of physiology at Rush Medical College was 
analyzed for the use of analogies to facilitate understanding of 
the topics covered. Analogies were infrequently used, but had 
a positive effect on improving student comprehension of the 
topics tutored. The human tutor’s goals, topics, discourse 
strategies, follow-up, and clarification in the presence of 
misunderstanding were analyzed with the long term goal of 
implementing analogies in an intelligent tutoring system. 
Introduction 
Analogies play a major role in learning. Eighty-one one-
on-one tutoring sessions carried out by two professors of 
physiology at Rush Medical College were extensively 
marked for analogies using SGML. Instances of analogies 
were then classified in terms of the goals, targets, bases, and 
whether they were proposed by the student or the tutor. 
 Current advances in education, cognitive science, 
linguistics, and expert systems make it feasible to generate 
analogies in an intelligent tutoring system using a 
computational model. To date, as far as we know, no one 
has used full-scale natural language generation to implement 
analogies in an electronic tutoring system. The goal is to use 
computational models of memory retrieval and analog 
mapping to simulate the human tutor’s behavior in our 
intelligent tutoring system, CIRCSIM-Tutor. 
Analogies in Cognitive Science 
Gentner defines analogies as: 
 
        partial similarities between different situations 
that support further inferences. Specifically, 
analogy is a kind of similarity in which the same 
system of relations holds across different objects. 
Analogies thus capture parallels across different 
situations (Gentner, 1998, p.107). 
 
Analogical reasoning is essential to cognitive ability 
(Gentner, 1998; Kurtz, Miao, & Gentner, 2001), and 
scientific inquiry and study (Dunbar, 1993; Goldblum, 
2001; Michael & Modell, 2003; Modell, 2000; Thagard, 
1997). Research studies exist that:   
 
• analyze the way humans store and retrieve 
analogues from memory (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 
1995; Hofstadter, 2001; Holyoak, Gentner, & 
Kokinov, 2001; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; 
Kokinov & Petrov, 2001; Kolodner, 1993) 
• use computational models to simulate the results of 
human studies (Forbus, 2001; Forbus, Gentner, & 
Law, 1995; Holyoak, & Thagard, 1995) 
• analyze the use of analogy in problem 
solving/reasoning (Holyoak & Thagard, 1985; 
Holyoak, Gentner, & Kokinov 2001; Kolodner, 
1993; Thagard, 1997) 
• analyze the use of analogies in education, 
medicine, and scientific inquiry (Dunbar, 1993, 
1995; Goldblum, 2001; Thagard, 1997) 
 
   Gentner’s (1983, 1998) structure mapping theory (Gentner 
& Markman, 1997; Holyoak, Gentner, & Kokinov, 2001; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Kurtz, Miao, & Gentner, 2001) 
seems to closely match the way our expert tutors work. New 
knowledge (the target) is learned by mapping its structure to 
existing knowledge (the base). Inferences are made from 
these mappings. The representation of mappings is 
discussed in length in Yan, Forbus, & Gentner (2003). 
When retrieving possible analogs from memory, the goal is 
to find mappings that have predictive value (Gentner, 1983). 
   Further studies have demonstrated that analogical 
encoding—the “process of comparing two examples and 
deriving an abstraction on the basis of their commonalities” 
(Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999, p. 586)—can 
be effective in facilitating the learning of similar problems. 
Abstractions of schemas gained through the intensive  
comparisons of two analogous concepts that are not fully 
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understood not only facilitate the understanding of the new 
pieces of information, but the general schemas derived can 
be applied to similar problems encountered later (Gentner, 
Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Kurtz, Miao, & Gentner, 
2001; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999). Studies 
involving the learning of negotiation skills in 
undergraduates and graduate management students 
(Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999) and 
presentation of heat flow scenarios to teach the concept of 
heat flow (Kurtz, Miao, & Gentner, 2001) demonstrated that 
the intentional and intensive comparisons of two concepts 
that are not fully understood are as effective in knowledge 
transfer as structural alignment. Gentner (1983) 
demonstrated that this approach to teaching by analogy 
bypasses the common problem that humans have when 
trying to retrieve relevant information from memory to 
connect to new knowledge that one is attempting to learn. 
Mutual alignment is especially relevant to electronic 
tutoring systems that cannot always rely on the presence of 
existing knowledge when presenting new concepts. 
   Possible problems resulting from misunderstandings when 
reasoning analogically in a scientific domain are well-
recognized (Feltovich, Spiro, & Coulson, 1989). Holyoak 
and Thagard (1995) have studied misconceptions and 
devised the multiconstraint theory that addresses the 
problems resulting from the use of inappropriate analogies. 
They recommend placing certain restrictions—of similarity, 
structure, and purpose—on the analogy. If all three 
constraints are met, only one interpretation of the analogy 
can be gleaned from the mapping. In cases where the three 
constraints are not met, misunderstandings can be identified 
and corrected. We have observed this behavior in our expert 
tutors’ human sessions, as discussed below. 
 
Analysis of Analogies Found in the Corpus 
In order to understand our human tutoring session, one must 
first have background information on what is being tutored. 
The human body requires a blood pressure within a certain 
range to sustain life. The baroreceptor reflex is a negative 
feedback system that controls blood pressure in the 
cardiovascular system to ensure that the pressure remains 
within this range. When a perturbation in the system occurs, 
the response has three phases: direct response (DR) of the 
system to the perturbation, the reflex response (RR) to the 
new values of affected variables, and the steady state (SS), 
or state of the system after it has re-stabilized. CIRCSIM-
Tutor asks the student to predict the qualitative changes in 
several important variables at all three stages. The variables 
are: Heart rate (HR), Cardiac Contractility (CC), Stroke 
volume (SV), Cardiac output (CO), Mean arterial pressure 
(MAP), Total peripheral resistance (TPR), Central venous 
pressure (CVP). Eighty-one hour-long tutoring sessions 
with first year medical students solving problems about the 
baroreceptor reflex were conducted by our experts, two 
professors of physiology at Rush Medical College, Joel 
Michael and Allen Rovick. Face-to-face sessions were 
recorded and transcribed. Keyboard-to-keyboard sessions 
were recorded using Computer Dialogue System (CDS) 
discussed in Li, Seu, Evens, Michael, & Rovick (1992). 
CDS forces each person to take turns typing. An annotation 
language based on SGML (Kim, Freedman, Glass, & Evens, 
2002) was used to mark up the human sessions by hand. The 
following examples (discussed in Lulis & Evens, 2003; 
Lulis, Evens & Michael, 2003) were selected from the 
analogies found in these expert human tutoring sessions. 
They are representative of sessions where the tutor uses 
analogies: new material is explained, misconceptions are 
corrected, and prompts—successful and unsuccessful—are 
made to the student to make analogies and inferences. In 
each of the examples listed, the tutors used analogies after 
the student made an incorrect inference. The identifiers at 
the beginning of each sentence make it possible to find the 
original context at any time: initial F or K indicates whether 
the session was face-to-face or keyboard-to-keyboard; the 
session number comes next; st (student) or tu (tutor) 
indicates who is speaking/typing; this is followed by the 
turn number and the number of the sentence within the turn. 
A complete set of marked-up transcripts will be provided on 
request. 
 
Example 1.   Face-to-face session number one (F1) contains 
examples of the use of analogy to explain domain material 
and a correction by the tutor. The analogy of comparing the 
heart to a sink is proposed by the student (st). However, the 
sink is not a compliant object and the heart is. As a result, 
the tutor (tu) offers a better analogy—the heart is like a 
balloon.  
 
F1-st-62-1: If I make an analogy of you try to fill a sink   
                   with water and you... 
F1-tu-63-1: Try to fill a balloon with water, since that's what  
                    we're dealing with, a distensible object. 
F1-st-64-1: OK. 
 
After making a one-to-one mapping of the base (balloon) to 
the target (heart), a correct inference is made. In accordance 
with Holyoak and Thagard (1995) and Gentner’s (1983) 
theory of structure mapping, the following structures 
underlie what the tutor does (as discussed in Lulis & Evens, 
2003; Lulis, Evens, & Michael, 2003): 
 
Structure for the balloon 
• fill a balloon with water  
• it will distend 
• the pressure in the balloon increases as it distends 
 
Structure for the heart 
• fill the right atrium  
• the right atrium will distend 
• the pressure will increase as it distends 
 
The above example demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
accepted structure mapping approach of connecting new 
knowledge to knowledge already understood by the student. 
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As a result, the student develops a better understanding of 
the new concept (Gentner, 1983, 1998; Goldblum, 2001; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). 
 
Example 2.  We see the tutor correcting a misconception in 
face-to-face session #7.  
 
F7-tu-267-1: Well, let's give it another thought, OK? 
F7-tu-267-2: We can look at that central blood chamber that        
                      means the big veins and the atria together as 
 though they were an elastic chamber. 
F7-tu-267-3: Is that not correct? 
F7-st-268-1: Yeah, and the heart is the pump. 
F7-tu-269-1: Well, let's stick to this elastic chamber and   
                      look at it first more or less in isolation. 
F7-tu-269-2: If you have an elastic chamber what are the   
                      things that determine the pressure inside that 
 chamber. 
F7-st-270-1: Size. 
F7-st-270-2: No. 
F7-st-270-3: I mean if you.. 
F7-st-270-4: I mean... 
F7-st-270-5: Area is one but I gather for the heart.. 
F7-tu-271-1: Area of what? 
F7-st-272-1: Area that.. 
F7-st-272-2: I mean if you want to know what the pressure   
                     is of a gas or well liquids aren't that... 
F7-st-272-3: We're not talking about gas, we're talking  
                     about liquids. 
F7-st-272-4: And liquids are not affected by size because  
                     you can't compress the molecules that much. 
F7-tu-273-1: Oh, you mean the volume occupied by the  
                     liquid, expansion and condensation of the  
                     liquid. 
F7-tu-273-2: No. 
F7-tu-273-3: That's not an issue. 
F7-st-274-1: No, because we're talking about liquids and  
                     liquids aren't  affected. 
F7-st-274-2: Like with gas, besides the container matters a  
                     lot.... 
F7-tu-275-1: Let's throw away this atria central venous  
                      system and take instead something inanimate 
 elastic stretcher,  say like a balloon. 
F7-tu-275-2: Right? 
F7-tu-275-3: What determines what the pressure is inside  
                      the  balloon? 
    
In the above example, an analogy of the atria as an elastic 
chamber is proposed by the tutor, but the structure of the 
intended base analog—the atria or central venous system as 
a reservoir—is not understood by the student resulting in a 
failure to make the connection between existing knowledge 
and the new knowledge. The tutor suggests a base that the 
student is familiar with—a balloon to compare the atria to. 
A correct structure mapping is made allowing the student to 
understand the new concept. 
 
Example 3. In keyboard-to-keyboard session number one 
(K1), the tutor prompts the student to make an analogy 
between neurally controlled variables in the DR (direct 
response) period. The behavior of the variable TPR during 
the DR period has already been tutored. The inference is 
that all neurally controlled variables will behave similarly 
during this period. The student makes the connection 
between the analogs resulting in a correct inference. 
 
K1-st-29-1:During the DR period it would remain  
                   unchanged. 
K1-tu-30-1: Correct. 
K1-tu-30-2: What other variables are neurally controlled? 
K1-st-31-1: CC, HR 
K1-tu-32-1: Again correct. 
 
Example 4. An example of the student not getting the point 
of the analogy is seen in keyboard-to-keyboard session #5 
(K5). After tutoring the neurally controlled variable CC, the 
tutor attempts to get the student to make an analogy between 
it and other neurally controlled variables. The student fails 
to make the analogy and the tutor finally tells the student the 
analogy that he is seeking.  
 
K5-tu-31-1: No, it is under neural (sympathetic) control,rily. 
K5-tu-31-2: We are now discussing what happens in the DR 
                    period, before any neural (reflex ) effects. 
K5-tu-31-3: Sowhat will happ en to CC in this pe;riod? 
K5-st-32-1: Cc 0. 
K5-tu-33-1: Correct. 
K5-tu-33-2: While we're on the subject, what other variable  
                    is underneural contro l and how will it be 
 affected in the DR? 
K5-st-34-1: SV 0. 
K5-st-34-2: It will not be affected in the DR. 
K5-tu-35-1: Not true. 
K5-tu-35-2: SV is only partially under neural control via  
                    CC, one of its importan t determinants. 
K5-tu-35-3: We'll come back to this in a moment. 
K5-tu-35-4: What othervariable is un der neural control? 
K5-tu-39-3: LIKE CC!. 
K5-st-40-1: TPR 0. 
 
Example 5.  More interesting analogies can be found in 
several sessions. Keyboard-to-keyboard session number 
sixty-four (K64) contains an analogy proposed by the 
student (st) between the heart and a traffic cop. The 
mapping between these analogs is not correct; the tutor (tu) 
proposes a more suitable analogy between the heart and a 
traffic jam. The structure mapping theory discussed in 
Gentner (1983, 1998), Goldblum (2001), Holyoak and 
Thagard (1995), and formalizes what the tutor is doing. 
 
K64-st-54-1: Would it be a reasonable analogy to look at the 
 heart like a traffic cop? 
K64-st-54-2: If it slows down the rate of blood flow (lets  
                      fewer cars through) then there will be a  
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                      backup behind it (a backflow of blood  
                      prior to the heart, and therefore an increase in  
                 CVP) and fewer cars coming through (less  
 blood coming out of the heart and therefore a  
 decrease in   MAP) 
K64-tu-55-1: The analogy is OK. 
K64-tu-55-2: But just as traffic jam does not occur    
                      because cars back up, the increase in CVP 
 caused by a fall in CO is not the result of  
                      blood BACKING UP. 
K64-tu-55-3: Everything soes in one direction. 
K64-st-56-1: well, slowing down would be a better way to  
                       put it  then 
K64-tu-57-1: Yes. 
K64-tu-57-2: A traffic jam caused by everybody piling into   
                      the same area at once. 
Analogies in Human Tutoring Sessions 
In the tutoring sessions that we have studied, we observe 
expert tutors taking steps to avoid misconceptions. They 
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1995): 
 
• Make certain that students understand the system 
mapping. 
• Use a variety of analogies. 
• Inform students when an analogy is relevant  and 
when it is not—point out the differences, as well as 
the similarities, between the known knowledge and 
 the target. 
• Correct misconceptions when they occur. 
 
   The outcomes of the analogies proposed by the tutor are 
shown in Table 1 (as discussed in Lulis & Evens, 2003; 
Lulis, Evens, & Michael, 2003). We summarize the 
analogies that we found in human tutoring sessions 
described here. 
 
 Table 1: Use of observed analogies proposed by tutors 
 
Type No. observed in corpus 
no inference requested     5 
    successful mapping  
    failed mapping 
4 
1 
inference requested    
successful inference 
    failed inference  
        success after repair 
        failure after repair 
37 
15 
 
15 
7 
enhancement only 9 
Total: 51 
 
   Out of the fifty-one analogies proposed by the tutors, nine 
were used after correct inferences and apparently intended 
to enhance the student’s understanding of the material 
discussed and not to lead to further development. In forty-
two cases, the tutor used analogies after the students made 
incorrect inferences. In five of the forty-two cases, the tutors 
did not request inferences from the students. However, 
students did make correct inferences four out of the five 
times without prompting. In the remaining thirty-seven 
cases, an inference was requested after the analogy was 
proposed resulting in correct inferences being made by 
students fifteen times without repair to the analogy (to 
correct misunderstandings) and fifteen times with repair—
81% success rate. In only seven of the thirty-seven cases—
19% of the time—did the tutor abandon the use of analogy 
and opt for a different teaching strategy. In total, the use of 
analogy after an incorrect prediction was followed by a 
correct prediction in 34 out of the 42 times—81% success 
rate. The empirical evidence suggests that the use of 
analogy had positive affects on the students’ ability to 
understand the material. 
   If we examine the different bases employed while tutoring 
using analogies—proposed by students and tutors—we find 
a wide range, as shown in Table 2. The analogy that was 
most often proposed by the tutors was another neural 
variable—twenty-nine times. In five of these cases, the 
tutors eventually gave up on the analogy and utilized a 
different approach to the material, but the other twenty-four 
were ultimately successful. There was one successful 
mapping without an attempt at an inference, twelve 
successful mappings with correct inferences, and four 
successful mappings with correct inferences after repairs. 
Other successful mappings occurred using in a wide variety 
of bases such as the heart as a balloon or pump, Ohm’s law, 
airplane wings, bootstraps, a dimmer switch, traffic jams, 
and a black box. These bases were not observed as often, 
 
Table 2:  Bases present in the corpus 
 
Base 
No. observed in 
corpus 
Airplane wing 1 
Another algorithm 2 
Another neural variable 29 
Another procedure 3 
Balloon 1 
Balloon as a compliant structure 2 
Black box 1 
Bootstrap 1 
Brake & accelerator 1 
Compliant structure 3 
Dimmer switch 1 
Elastic reservoir 1 
Flight or fight 1 
Gravity 1 
Last problem 1 
Ohm’s Law 2 
Physician 1 
Pump 1 
Reflex 2 
Sugar or glucose 1 
Summation 1 
Traffic jam 2 
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but made for extremely productive and interesting structural 
mappings resulting in correct inferences.  
   Gentner’s (1983; Lowenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 
1999) work suggests that information from abstract and 
concrete bases may be processed differently.  She has 
observed that children find it easier to understand analogies 
with concrete bases than with abstract ones. We hope to 
investigate this phenomenon using CIRCSIM-Tutor. In our 
data in Table 2, we see twenty-two different bases, twelve 
are concrete and ten are abstract (Table 3). The use of 
abstract bases are observed forty-four times in the corpus, 
while the concrete bases are used only fifteen times. 
Examination of the language used suggests another 
potentially useful classification—into analogies that remind 
students of earlier experience with another neural variable 
or another procedure and those that depend on a base from 
outside the immediate domain.  
 
Table 3: Analogies with abstract and concrete bases 
 
No.   Type of base No. of times seen in the 
corpus 
12 different concrete 15 
10 different abstract  44 
   
Implementation 
Holyoak & Thagard (1995) identified the steps of analogical 
reasoning: the retrieval of possible analogs from memory, 
the mapping of these analogs to the new knowledge being 
learned, inferring something from the mapping, adjusting 
the new knowledge if necessary, and storing the new 
knowledge for future use. Computational models dealing 
with analogy address the first two steps—retrieval based on 
similarity and structural mapping. There are two dominating 
models for the retrieval step—case based reasoning 
(Birnbaum & Collins, 1989; Kass, 1990, 1994; Kolodner, 
1984, 1993, 1994; Schank, 1982) and a model that emulates 
a document retrieval system, retrieving both relevant 
analogs and irrelevant ones. There are also two approaches 
to the mapping step. One makes inferences before the 
mappings—projection first—the other makes the mappings 
before the predictions—alignment first.  
   It is our goal to implement an analogy generating function 
in CIRCSIM-Tutor (Michael, Rovick, Glass, Zhou, & 
Evens, 2003). It has been decided that a document retrieval 
model coupled with an alignment-first mapping—
MAC/FAC—(Gentner, 1998; Gentner & Markman, 1997; 
Forbus, Gentner, Everett, & Wu, 1997) was best suited for 
use when simulating human tutoring in CIRCSIM-Tutor 
System. MAC/FAC was chosen because we believe that it 
simulates how people process analogies and it the 
implementation is very successful.  
MAC/FAC  
MAC/FAC (Many Are Called/Few Are Chosen) models 
Gentner’s (1983) theory of structure mapping and simulates 
the human propensity to favor relationships between bases 
and targets when comparisons are made and to favor 
superficial similarities and not retrieve the more profound 
analogical similarities while still, on occasion, retrieving 
relevant structural comparisons (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 
1995). Working memory consists of content vectors 
constructed from the structural representations of the bases. 
The MAC stage functions like a document retrieval system, 
searching working memory in a parallel manner seeking 
content vectors that are similar to the target. The dot product 
between each of the bases and the target is computed to 
determine the best and those within 10% of the best 
matches. Stage two, the FAC stage, utilizes the output from 
the MAC phase to do Gentner’s (1983) structure mappings. 
The structure mapping engine (SME) selects the best 
mapping and all those within 10% of it. 
Conclusion 
Analogies are used by our human tutors infrequently; on the 
average, less than once a session. However, the human 
sessions have demonstrated that the use of analogies is 
extremely effective. We have observed tutors using analogy 
to tutor the topic at hand and to enhance existing 
knowledge. Misunderstandings were corrected and 
inappropriate analogies replaced with more suitable ones. 
The structure mappings between the analogs underlie what 
the tutor was doing. 
   Future research includes simulating the schemas observed 
in the corpus in our expert system CIRCSIM-Tutor 
(Michael et al., 2003). Many of the analogies observed can 
be implemented using structure mapping (Gentner, 1983, 
1998; Goldblum, 2001; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) to 
connect new knowledge to existing knowledge. We will 
attempt to simulate mutual alignment (Gentner, 
Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Loewenstein, Thompson, 
& Gentner, 1999) for the most commonly found analogy in 
the corpus—another neurally controlled variable. The 
recommendations of Goldblum (2001), and Holyoak & 
Thagard (1995)—use more than one analog, detect and fix 
incorrect mappings, identify the analogical scope, and refine 
analogies—will also be attempted. 
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Abstract 
Causal models of illness vary extensively across socio-cultural 
groups. The current paper describes two studies that were designed 
to explore the role of universal domain-specific causal knowledge 
in causal models of illness. The first study compares illness causal 
models in three American groups: registered nurses, energy 
healers, and college undergraduates. The second study examines 
illness causal models in a group of Maya in Guatemala. In all 
groups illness models are composed of systematic combinations of 
domain-specific causes. It is argued that analysis of causal models 
in terms of domain-specific causal types reveals similarities in 
illness models that would be obscured by comparison of specific, 
detailed causes. The analysis of illness models as patterns of 
domain-specific causes suggests that American energy healers 
have models of illness that are more similar to those of the Maya 
than to illness models of American undergraduates and RNs. 
Introduction 
An issue of interest to both anthropologists and 
psychologists is the extent to which conceptual 
representations are affected by socio-cultural factors and the 
mechanisms by which this influence occurs. The extent to 
which thinking varies across cultures depends in large part 
on the content of the domain. For example, the domain of 
folkbiology is characterized by striking similarities across 
cultures, while less consistency has been observed in social 
attribution (Choi, Nisbett & Norenzayan, 1999) moral 
reasoning (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990, Haidt, Koller, 
& Dias, 1993), and reasoning about illness (Murdock, 1980; 
Kleinman, 1978). In general, theories of cultural knowledge 
transmission that explain diversity of knowledge are distinct 
from ones that explain uniformity.  
Explanations for cultural diversity often assume that the 
mind is a “blank slate,” open to any form of knowledge 
(Atran, 2001; Pinker, 2000; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). In 
contrast, explanations of uniformity in knowledge across 
cultures appeal to a view of the mind as a highly structured, 
modular information-processing device.  As Pinker (2000), 
Atran (2001), and Sperber & Hirschfeld (2004) argue, the 
view of the mind as a blank slate is almost certainly wrong. 
There is plenty of evidence that the mind is not a blank 
slate, but is structured in a modular way such that 
qualitatively distinct reasoning processes are utilized for 
different kinds of phenomena (Carey & Gelman, 1991; 
Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994, Pinker, 2004).  
The mind, like other parts of the natural world, evolved in 
an environment with a particular structure. The modular 
nature of the mind is the result of evolutionary adaptations 
to the objective structure of the world. The mind evolved 
different cognitive processes in order to effectively predict 
the behavior of ontologically distinct objects. This view 
predicts and explains cross-cultural universals in human 
thinking. Sperber and Hirschfeld (2004) argue that stability 
of cultural knowledge results from the universal structure of 
the human mind, in particular the fact that all minds process 
information in similar, highly constrained ways. For 
example, there is striking cross-cultural uniformity in 
folkbiological knowledge. Medin and Atran (in press) argue 
that cross-cultural uniformity in thinking and behavior with 
regard to plants and animals is due to the existence of a 
universal cognitive module, the folkbiology module, that 
evolved specifically to process information about plants and 
animals. Despite differences in experience or environmental 
input, minds are universally constrained to construct a 
particular kind of representation of plants and animals – 
hence, cultural uniformity and stability. 
The current paper presents two descriptive studies that 
demonstrate how universal domain-specific knowledge is 
expressed in causal models of illness, which are 
characterized by cross-cultural diversity rather than 
uniformity. Domain-specificity theory implies that, just as 
there are different ontological kinds of objects in the world 
(e.g. mental and physical objects), there are also different 
kinds of causal mechanisms. For example, there are 
psychological causal mechanisms, like intentionality, which 
explain behavior of animate objects, and there are physical 
causal mechanisms which explain the behavior of inanimate 
objects. One role of cognitive modules is to constrain the 
search for causal explanations by delimiting the range of 
possible causes for a particular phenomenon. Thus, causes 
can be divided into types based on the module with which 
they are associated. For example, blocked arteries and 
chemical imbalance are physical causes of illness. Low self-
esteem and problems in love relationships are psychological 
causes. These causes differ in specific detail but are of the 
same type. Causal models of illness can be analyzed in 
terms of the kinds of causes of which they are composed.  
One important dimension of variation among cultural 
belief systems about illness is whether illness is attributed to 
psychological causes – human or spiritual agents – or to 
natural causes (Murdock, 1980, Foster, 1976). In a world 
survey of illness theories, Murdock (1980) found that every 
cultural group in his sample (which did not include 
industrialized societies) explained (at least some) illness in 
terms of spirit aggression.  Spirit aggression is a 
psychological cause. In contrast, biomedical theories of 
illness (used by medical doctors) explain illness using 
physical causes. One explanation for this difference is that 
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different cultural groups use different cognitive modules to 
process information about illness. That is, some cultural 
groups think about illness as a psychological phenomenon, 
and generate psycho-social attributions, while others 
construe illness as a physical phenomenon, and generate 
physical explanations. On this account, cultural environment 
influences the domain in which individuals search for 
causes of illness. Perhaps, some cultural groups use the 
domain of folk psychology to explain illness where other 
groups use the domain of folk physics (or folk biology). An 
alternative possibility is that multiple domains are used to 
process information about illness. Sperber & Hirschfeld 
(2004) suggest that some belief systems, like religion, 
maintain stability by being “anchored” in several cognitive 
domains at once. Thus, different cultural groups may 
combine different kinds of causes in different ways in their 
causal models of illness (Ahn, 1998). 
The current paper will look at use of psycho-social causes 
and physical causes in the causal models of illness of three 
groups of participants. The groups were chosen precisely 
because they have different beliefs systems of illness. The 
first group consisted of registered nurses (RNs) who work 
as medical practitioners in professional medical settings and 
practice standard scientific biomedicine. The second group 
of participants consisted of energy healers. These 
individuals believe that illness is caused by a disruption or 
imbalance of “energy” in the body and that illness can be 
treated by balancing that energy. Energy healers often 
explain illness as the result of psychological problems 
(Eden, 1999). RNs and energy healers were chosen because 
they practice healing within belief systems that vary in the 
kinds of causes to which illness is attributed. Variation 
along the dimension of psychological versus physical 
attribution is cross-culturally salient, as mentioned above. 
While findings from these groups cannot be automatically 
generalized to other cultural groups, current findings can 
generate hypotheses about the causal models of other 
cultural groups which can then be tested. Study Two in the 
current paper demonstrates that this framework can be 
usefully extended to very different cultural settings. 
Experiment One 
The question of interest is how domain-specific causes are 
invoked in illness causal models of different groups. To 
measure causal models, causal chains leading to depression 
and heart attack were elicited from each participant in an 
open-ended format. The key feature of this study is the 
elicitation of causal chains rather than lists of causes. 
Elicitation of causal chains will provide evidence for 
distinguishing between three possible patterns of use of 
domain-specific causal information. The three possible 
patterns are:  
 
1. Different groups use different domains of knowledge 
to construct causal models of illness. This hypothesis 
predicts that the causal chains of energy healers will 
consist of psychological causes while the causal chains 
of RNs will consist of physical causes. 
 
2. Illness models are anchored in several domains. 
Causal models of illness are composed of both 
psychological and physical causes which are patterned 
systematically within groups.  
 
3. A third possibility is that there is no systematicity in 
use of domain knowledge in illness models. That is, 
mental and physical causes may be distributed in 
different ways across different individuals and/or across 
different illnesses. 
 
It is expected that energy healers will cite psycho-social 
causes of both illnesses more often than RNs. The question 
that will distinguish between the first and second 
alternatives above is whether illness models consist of a 
single kind of cause or multiple kinds of cause. The 
question that will distinguish between the second and third 
alternatives is whether different kinds of causes pattern 
systematically within groups.  
In addition to the two practitioner groups, a group of 
undergraduates was also interviewed. Because the nurses 
may have had more experience with illness than the energy 
healers, undergraduates were included as an independent 
measure of the effect of experience on concepts of illness.  
Method 
Participants This study included three groups of 
participants. The first group consisted of 13 registered 
nurses (RNs) with an average age of 41 and an average of 
13 years of nursing experience. The second group consisted 
of 14 energy healers with an average age of 48 and an 
average of 8 years of energy healing experience. 
Practitioners had an average of four years of college 
education and there was no difference in level of education 
across groups. The final group consisted of 23 
undergraduates (UGs) with an average age of 18 and no 
energy or medical experience. Some undergraduates did 
only a single illness and others did both (5 did both 
illnesses, 10 only heart attack, 8 only depression). No 
differences were observed among those who did one versus 
both illnesses. 
 
Procedure All participants were asked about heart attack, a 
physiological illness, and clinical depression, a 
psychological illness. The order of the illnesses was 
counterbalanced across participants. For each illness, 
participants were first asked to list all the causes of the 
illness and then, for each cause, were asked for causal 
chains linking each elicited cause to the target illness. To 
elicit the causal chain linking cause X to the illness, the 
experimenter asked, for example, “How does X cause 
illness A” (e.g. How does high blood pressure cause a heart 
attack?). The participant responded with an intermediary 
cause, Y. The experimenter then repeated the probe with 
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cause Y: “How does Y cause a heart attack?” This process 
was continued until the participant said the causal chain was 
complete. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
Results 
Across illnesses causes were collapsed into four types: 
physiological, psycho-social (henceforth called mental), 
behavioral, and energy. Depression models included an 
additional cause type, external environmental. 
 
Depression Table 1 lists the average proportion of each 
type of cause in the models of participants from each group. 
Anovas were used to compare the proportion of each type of 
cause across groups. Because these measures are not 
independent a Bonferroni adjustment set the p-value for 
significance to 0.01. With this adjustment, only the 
difference in proportion of energy causes was reliably 
different across groups [F(2,40)=17.77, p<.001]. Proportion 
of physical causes [F(2,40)=.925, p=.41], mental causes 
[[F(2,40)=4.12, p=.024], and environmental causes 
[F(2,40)=2.15, p<.13] did not differ across groups. 
Proportion of behavioral causes [F(2,40)=5.24, p=.01] was 
marginally different across groups. Tukey post hoc tests 
showed that the Energy group cited slightly more behavioral 
causes than the UG group. 
 
Table 1. Proportion of depression cause types by group. 
 
CAUSE UG RN EN 
Physical 0.33 0.43 0.32 
Mental 0.66 0.53 0.43 
Behavioral 0.00 0.02 0.11 
Environmental 0.01 0.02 0.10 
Energy 0.00 0.00 0.19 
 
The next set  of analyses measured the types of causal 
relations in the conceptual models of each group. Systematic 
differences in the types of causal relations across groups 
indicates the extent to which groups represent different 
patterns of causal types within their models of illness. The 
majority of causal relations within the depression models of 
all groups consist of physical and mental factors (UG=99%, 
RN=96%, EN=75%) so analysis of causal relations focused 
on physical and mental causes only. Table 2 shows the 
proportion of each type of causal interaction among physical 
and mental causes across groups. 
 
Table 2. Proportion of relations in depression models. 
 
Causal Relation UG RN EN 
Physical-Physical 0.10 0.28 0.16 
Mental-Mental 0.80 0.47 0.43 
Physical-Mental 0.03 0.12 0.02 
Mental-Physical 0.07 0.14 0.40 
 
These measures are not independent so with a Bonferroni 
adjustment the p-value for significance was adjusted to 
0.013. There were no differences between groups in the 
proportion of causal interactions among physical causes 
[F(2,40)=1.4, p=.257], nor in the proportion of physical-
mental causal interactions [F(2,40)=2.1, p=.13], which were 
quite low across groups. The key difference between groups 
was that energy participants were more likely than other 
groups to cite mental-physical interactions [F(2,40)=5.26, 
p=.01]. Tukey post hoc tests showed that Energy healers 
cited more mental-physical interactions than RNs and UGs, 
who did not differ from one another. Undergraduates were 
more likely than RNs and Energy healers to cite interactions 
among mental causes [F(2,40)=5.28, p=.01]. Interactions 
among mental causes made up the bulk of undergraduate 
depression concepts. 
The most important finding in depression models is that 
all groups included equal proportions of mental and physical 
causes in their conceptual models of depression but showed 
systematic differences in the patterns of causal interaction 
among them. Specifically, the RNs and UGs placed mental 
and physical causes on separate causal chains but Energy 
healers included both types of causes on a single causal 
chain.  
 
Heart attack Table 3 shows proportions of causes in heart 
attack models across groups. Energy participants cited 
proportionately fewer physical causes of heart attack than 
RNs or Undergraduates [F(2, 42 = 14.9, p<.0001]. Post hoc 
tests indicated that the RNs and UGs cited equal proportions 
of physiological causes and EN participants cited fewer than 
both groups. Energy participants cited a greater number of 
psychological causes of heart attack than did either of the 
other groups, who were equivalent [F(2, 42 = 34.9, 
p<.0001]. These differences were reliable with a Bonferroni 
adjustment. Not surprisingly Energy participants cited a 
greater proportion of energy causes. 
 
Table 3. Proportion of causes in heart attack models. 
 
Relation UG RN EN 
PHYSICAL 0.70 0.77 0.45 
PSYCHOLOGICAL 0.08 0.08 0.27 
BEHAVIORAL 0.16 0.15 0.17 
ENERGY 0.00 0.00 0.10 
 
The next set of analyses explores patterns of causal 
relations in models of each group. A majority of the causes 
in heart attack models of all groups were ones with physical 
effects (RN=0.98, UG=0.99, DUAL=0.88, ENERGY=0.77), 
so the following set of analyses compares the proportion of 
physical effects that have either physical, mental, 
behavioral, or energy causes. Table 4 shows the distribution 
of these types of relations in individual models of 
participants in each group. 
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Table 4. Proportion of causal relations across groups. 
 
Causal Interaction UG RN EN 
Physical-Physical 0.54 0.61 0.21 
Physical-Mental 0.11 0.11 0.42 
Behavioral-Physical 0.35 0.27 0.27 
Energy-Physical 0.00 0.00 0.09 
 
These measures are not independent but all effects are 
reliable with a Bonferroni adjustment. An ANOVA showed 
that Energy participants cited proportionately fewer physical 
– physical causal interactions (PP relations) than RNs and 
UGs [F(2,42)=20.31, p<.0001]. ENERGY participants 
mentioned the greatest number of mental-physical causal 
interactions in their heart attack models [F(2,42)=23.73, 
p<.0001].  There were no differences across groups in the 
frequency of behavioral-physical relations [F(2,42)=.68, 
p=.51].  Finally, Energy participants mentioned a greater 
number of energy-physical relations [F(2,42)=9.79, 
p<.0001].  In all causal relation analyses, Tukey post hoc 
tests showed that RNs and UGs were equivalent and both 
were different from Energy participants. 
As in models of depression, energy healers and RNs and 
UGs showed different patterns of causal relations among the 
causes in their conceptual models of heart attack.  Like in 
depression models, Energy healers cite causal interactions 
among mental and physical causes whereas RNs and UGs 
do not. 
Summary Experiment 1 provides compelling evidence for 
Alternative two cited above – that illness models are 
anchored in several domains. Alternative One predicted that 
illness models would consist of a single kind of cause. This 
was not supported by current findings. All groups used both 
psycho-social and physical causes in illness models. 
Alternative Three was also ruled out, because mental and 
physical causes patterned systematically, rather than 
randomly, across participants within a group. Causes also 
patterned similarly across illnesses for each group. Across 
both illnesses energy healers frequently cited causal 
relations in which mental (psycho-social) causes led to 
physical effects. RNs and UGs rarely mentioned causal 
interactions between mental and physical features. For 
depression, mental and physical causes were conceived as 
distinct causal chains. For heart attack, these participants 
rarely mentioned mental causes at all. While energy healers 
combined mental and physical causes within a single causal 
chain, RNs and UGs kept mental and physical causes on 
separate causal chains. Further, they did not conceive of 
heart attack as psychologically caused.  
 
Experiment Two 
Whereas Experiment One included groups from a single 
cultural environment, the current experiment uses the same 
method to measure concepts of illness in individuals from a 
very different cultural environment, Peten, Guatemala. The 
question of interest is whether Maya have systematic 
patterns in their conceptual models of illness, and if so, 
whether their concepts correspond to either of the American 
groups. 
Method 
Participants Participants were 13 illiterate Itza’ Maya 
adults living in Peten, Guatemala. All participants spoke 
Spanish as their primary language. Peten is a very different 
cultural environment from Chicago, IL where participants 
from Experiment 1 reside. None of the Itza’ participants was 
trained in medicine. 
 
Procedure Causal models were elicited in Spanish for the 
Itza’ illnesses which most closely resemble depression and 
heart attack. The illnesses were tukul (meaning “thought” 
and glossed “pensiveness” in Itza', a wasting illness) and 
derrame (glossed as the verb “to spill” in Spanish; derrame 
cerebral is the Spanish gloss for “stroke”).  
Results 
Itza' explain tukul as the result of separation from a family 
member which leads to dilution of the blood and rashes on 
the skin. 100% of Itza' participants attributed tukul to social 
causes (85% to separation from a family member), and 77% 
stated that social causes led to a change in the state of the 
blood (62% said the blood thinned, or was diluted, by too 
much thinking). 85% specified physical effects that result 
from the thinning of the blood, usually skin rashes (69%). 
Every Itza’ participant explained tukul as the result of 
psycho-social factors leading to physical changes in the 
body. 
Derrame is also seen as the result of an interaction of 
mental and physical causes. Itza' explain derrame as 
resulting from anger, which slows the blood, causing it to 
“spill” into the brain or nerves. 100% of Itza’ participants 
attributed derrame to strong emotions (85% to anger), and 
70% claimed that strong emotions cause the blood to change 
state in some way (e.g. blood stops circulating or gets cold), 
which causes it to mix inappropriately with some other 
substance of the body (85%), usually the brain or nerves 
(70%). Every Itza’ participant explained derrame as the 
result of the deleterious effect of strong emotions on the 
state of the blood in the body. 
Summary Itza concepts of tukul and derrame were 
structurally similar to energy healer concepts of depression 
and heart attack. Specifically, their conceptual 
representations of both illnesses included causal interactions 
in which psycho-social factors led to physical ones. 
General Discussion 
The current experiments show that, rather than being 
processed from within a single domain, illness knowledge is 
anchored in multiple domains. Illness models can be 
explained as specific combinations of domain knowledge. In 
Experiment 1 illness concepts of energy healers, RNs and 
Undergraduates showed systematically different causal 
patterns among mental and physical features. Specifically, 
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RNs and undergraduates rarely mentioned causal interaction 
between mental and physical causes. Energy healers, on the 
other hand, saw both illnesses as resulting from psycho-
social causes which result in physical changes. Experiment 
2 showed that the Itza’ also view these illnesses as resulting 
from the physical effects of psycho-social factors. 
Results from both studies clearly distinguish between the 
three alternatives presented above. Alternative Three, which 
was that mental and physical causes would be distributed in 
unsystematic ways in illness models, was ruled out. 
Evidence from RNs and undergraduates was also 
inconsistent with the first alternative, which proposed that 
illness models would be composed of causes from a single 
domain. RNs and undergraduates used psycho-social causes 
in explanations of depression, and physical causes in 
explanations of heart attack and depression. Thus, these 
participants utilized causes from distinct domains. However, 
for these participants a single causal chain consisted of only 
one type of cause. Data suggest that depression is construed 
both psychologically and physically for RNs and 
undergraduates, and heart attack is construed physically.  
Stress was the only psychological cause utilized in heart 
attack models of RNs and undergraduates. Stress may be a 
cause that is flexible, and can function as either 
psychological or physical. When RNs and undergraduates 
mentioned stress in the context of heart attack, they usually 
discussed physiological aspects of stress, such as increased 
adrenalin. However, because the nature of stress was 
ambiguous in the current study, it was coded as a 
psychological cause. For RNs and undergraduates, some 
illness models are constructed from within the cognitive 
domain of folk psychology, and others are constructed from 
within the domain of folk physics. For these participants, 
cultural factors influence whether an illness should be 
construed in psychological or physical terms. In this sense, 
Alternative Two is correct. Knowledge about illness is 
anchored in both domains. 
Energy healer models are also consistent with Alternative 
Two. But in the case of energy healer models, single causal 
chains were composed of knowledge from different 
domains. For these participants causal chains are composed 
of psycho-social and physical causes. Further, when causal 
chains contain both kinds of causes, psycho-social causes 
are the distal causes and physical causes are proximate. The 
fact that domain boundaries are not preserved in causal 
chains of energy healers might be taken to suggest that 
domain knowledge does not constrain models of illness for 
energy healers. However, the systematicity in the models of 
energy healers is reflected in the uniformity with which 
individual participants combined psycho-social and physical 
causes. That is, the coherence of illness models across 
participants and across illnesses is precisely in their 
systematic use of causes from different domains. 
Participants cited different specific causal factors for heart 
attack and depression, but all participants were committed 
to the belief that some kind of psycho-social factor was the 
initial, distal cause of both illnesses and that physical, 
mechanical factors were the proximate cause. Analysis at 
the level of causal types reveals more agreement across 
individuals and illnesses than analysis at the level of 
specific, detailed causes.  
Similarity in the causal models of energy healers and 
Maya is also revealed by analysis of patterns of causal types 
rather than analysis of overlap in specific causes. There was 
virtually no overlap in the specific causes cited by energy 
healers and Maya. In fact, it is not even clear that the 
illnesses being explained were conceptualized as precisely 
the same (biomedically defined) conditions across groups. 
But when analyzed as patterns of domain-specific causal 
types, it is clear that Maya and energy healers have similar 
causal models of illness. For both groups illnesses are 
caused by psycho-social factors which lead to proximate 
causes which are physical in nature. It would be 
unreasonable to expect that Maya, who have little or no 
formal education, would independently derive the same 
specific causes of illness as energy healers or 
undergraduates who live in a completely different cultural 
context. Analysis of illness models as patterns of domain-
specific causal types reveals uniformities in thinking across 
cultures that are obscured by exclusive focus on specific, 
detailed causes. 
In sum, cultural knowledge about illness may take the 
form of learning the culturally appropriate heuristics for 
combining domain specific knowledge to construct causal 
models of illness. Diversity among illness models reflects 
differences in the ways that different cultural groups 
combine information from different domains. For RNs and 
undergraduates, illness explanations are constructed from 
single causal types and culture specifies which type of cause 
is relevant to which illness. For energy healers and Maya, 
all illnesses are presumed to be caused by psycho-social 
factors which lead to physical changes.  Thus, diversity in 
models of illness across cultures may be analogous to 
diversity in language across cultures where an overlapping 
set of categories, for example nouns and verbs, are 
combined in different ways.  
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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issue of how to compute the intensity 
of surprise in an artificial agent. Resolution of this issue is 
important for the further specification of the computational 
model of surprise proposed by Macedo and Cardoso (2001) 
that was implemented in artificial agents “living” in a multi-
agent environment. This model of surprise is mainly rooted in 
the cognitive-psychoevolutionary model of surprise proposed 
by the research group of the University of Bielefeld (Meyer, 
Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997) and in proposals by Ortony 
and Partridge. We propose several possible functions to 
compute the intensity of surprise. To assess their accuracy, 
they were evaluated in an experimental test that focused on 
the comparison of surprise intensity values generated by 
artificial agents with ratings by humans under similar 
circumstances. 
Introduction 
Considered by many authors a biologically fundamental 
emotion (e.g.: Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1991), surprise may play 
an important role in the cognitive activities of intelligent 
agents, especially in attention focusing (Izard, 1991; Meyer 
et al., 1997; Ortony & Partridge, 1987; Reisenzein, 2000b), 
learning (Schank, 1986) and creativity (Boden, 1995; 
Williams, 1996). Psychological experiments conducted by 
Meyer, Reisenzein and Schützwohl provide evidence that 
surprising-eliciting events initiate a series of mental 
processes that (a) begin with the appraisal of a cognized 
event as exceeding some threshold value of unexpectedness 
or schema discrepancy, (b) continue with the interruption of 
ongoing information processing and the reallocation of 
processing resources to the surprise-eliciting event, and (c) 
culminate in the analysis and evaluation of that event plus 
immediate reactions to it and/or schema (belief) 
updating/revision. According to these authors, surprise has 
two main functions, the one informational and the other 
motivational: it informs the individual about the occurrence 
of a schema-discrepancy, and it provides an initial impetus 
for the exploration of the unexpected event. Thereby, 
surprise promotes both immediate adaptive actions to the 
unexpected event and the prediction, control and effective 
dealings with future occurrences of the event. 
Ortony and Partridge's (1987) model of surprise shares 
several aspects with the one proposed by Meyer, Reisenzein 
and Schützwohl (1997), especially in that both models 
assume that surprise is elicited by unexpected events. The 
same is also true for Peters’ (1998) computational model of 
surprise, implemented in a computer vision system, that 
focuses on the detection of unexpected movements. Finally, 
models of surprise have also been proposed in the fields of 
knowledge discovery and data mining (e.g. Suzuki & 
Kodratoff, 1998). 
Macedo and Cardoso (e.g., Macedo & Cardoso, 2001)) 
developed a computational model of surprise that is an 
adaptation (although with several simplifications) of the 
models proposed by Meyer, Reisenzein and Schützwohl 
(1997) and by Ortony and Partridge (1987). In the present 
article, we elaborate and evaluate this model further by 
discussing different possible functions for the computation 
of surprise and by evaluating these functions in an empirical 
study. 
The following section describes Macedo and Cardoso’s 
surprise model in more detail, including an overview of its 
theoretical background models. Subsequently, we discuss 
several possible functions for computing the intensity of 
surprise. Finally, we describe an experimental test that was 
carried out to evaluate the accuracy of these surprise 
functions. 
Surprise Model 
As mentioned, the surprise model developed by Macedo and 
Cardoso (2001) is mainly based on Ortony and Partridge’s 
(1987) proposals and on those of Meyer, Reisenzein and 
Schützwohl (1997). Therefore, we first give an overview of 
these background theories and then explain the 
computational model proposed by Macedo and Cardoso, by 
comparing it with these two models. 
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Background Models 
Although Ortony and Partridge agree with Meyer, 
Reisenzein and Schützwohl and other authors that surprise 
is caused by events that are commonsensically called 
unexpected, they proposed that unexpectedness covers two 
cases. First, surprise results when prior expectations 
regarding an event are disconfirmed. Second, however, 
surprise can also be caused by events for which expectations 
were never computed. That is, according to Ortony and 
Partridge, there are situations in which one is surprised 
although one had no explicit expectations (either conscious 
or unconscious) regarding the surprising event. Ortony and 
Partridge also proposed that surprisingness is an important 
variable in artificial intelligence systems, particularly in 
attention and learning. 
In more detail, Ortony and Partridge's model of surprise 
assumes a system (or agent) with an episodic and semantic 
propositional memory whose elements may be immutable 
(propositions that are believed to be always true) or typical 
(propositions that are believed to be usually but not always 
true). Furthermore, they distinguish between practically 
deducible propositions and practically non-deducible 
propositions. Practically deducible propositions comprise 
all propositions that are explicitly represented in memory, as 
well as those that can be inferred from these by few and 
simple deductions. Hence, practically deducible 
propositions are that subset of formally deducible 
propositions that don’t require many and complex 
inferences. Furthermore, practically deducible propositions 
may be either actively or passively deduced. In the former 
case, their content corresponds to actively expected or 
predicted events; in the latter case, to passively expected 
(assumed) events. 
Based on these assumptions, Ortony and Partridge 
proposed that surprise results when the system encounters a 
conflict or inconsistency between an input proposition and 
preexisting representations or representations computed 
“after the fact”. More precisely, surprise results in three 
situations (Table 1 presents the corresponding range of 
values): (i) active expectation failure: here, surprise results 
from a conflict or inconsistency between the input 
proposition and an active prediction or expectation; (ii) 
passive expectation failure (or assumption failure): here, 
surprise results from a conflict or inconsistency between the 
input proposition and what the agent implicitly knows or 
believes (passive expectations or assumptions); and (iii) 
unanticipated incongruities or deviations from norms: here, 
surprise results from a conflict or inconsistency between the 
input proposition (which in this case is a practically non-
deducible proposition) and what, after the fact, is judged as 
normal or usual (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), that is, 
between the input proposition and practically deducible 
propositions (immutable or typical) that are suggested by 
the unexpected fact. Note that, in this case, prior to the 
unexpected event there are no explicit expectations (passive 
or active) with which the input proposition could conflict. 
In their cognitive-psychoevolutionary model, Meyer, 
Reisenzein and Schützwohl also assume that surprise 
(considered by them as an emotion) is elicited by the 
appraisal of unexpectedness. 
 
Table 1:  Three different sources of surprise and 
corresponding value ranges (adapted from (Ortony & 
Partridge, 1987)). 
 
Related Cognition Confronted 
proposition Active Passive 
Immutable [1]; SA=1; Prediction [2]; SP=1; Assumption 
Typical [3]; 0< SA<1; Prediction [4]; SP<SA; Assumption 
Immutable [5]; ∅ [6]; SP=1; none 
Typical [7]; ∅ [8]; 0< SP<1; none 
 
More precisely, it is proposed that surprise-eliciting 
events give rise to the following series of mental processes: 
(i) the appraisal of a cognized event as exceeding some 
threshold value of unexpectedness (schema-discrepancy) - 
according to Reisenzein (2001), this is achieved by a 
specialized comparator mechanism, the unexpectedness 
function, that computes the degree of discrepancy between 
“new” and “old” beliefs or schemas; (ii) interruption of 
ongoing information processing and reallocation of 
processing resources to the investigation of the unexpected 
event; (iii) analysis/evaluation of that event; and (iv) 
possibly, immediate reactions to that event and/or updating 
or revision of the “old” schemas or beliefs. 
Overview of the Computational Model of Surprise 
Macedo and Cardoso (e.g., Macedo & Cardoso, 2001) 
developed a multi-agent environment in which, in addition 
to inanimate agents (objects such as buildings), there are 
two main kinds of animate, interacting agents: the “author-
agents” or creators, whose main function is to create things 
(objects, events), and the “jury-agents” or explorers whose 
goal is to explore the environment by analyzing, studying 
and evaluating it. An agent can also show both of these 
activities (creation and exploration). 
The computational model of surprise is integrated into the 
motivations module of the architecture of the artificial 
agents (see Figure 1). The other modules of this architecture 
are: sensors/ perception; memory; goals/desires; and 
reasoning/decision-making. This last module and the 
module motivations are provided with information from the 
world obtained through sensors/perception, as well as with 
information recorded in memory. The reasoning/decision-
making module then computes the current state of the world. 
Afterwards, probability theory is applied to predict possible 
future states of the world for the available actions, and a 
utility function (which makes use of the intensity of the 
generated emotions) is applied to each of these world states. 
Finally, the action that maximizes the utility function is 
selected. 
The computational model of surprise incorporated in this 
agent system is an adaptation (although with some 
simplifications) of the surprise model proposed by Meyer, 
Reisenzein and Schützwohl in which the above-mentioned 
four mental processes elicited by surprising events are 
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present. The suggestions by Ortony and Partridge are 
mainly concerned with the first of these steps, and are 
compatible with the Meyer, Reisenzein and Schützwohl 
model. Accordingly, in our model, we drew on the 
assumptions of Ortony and Partridge for the implementation 
of the appraisal of unexpectedness and the computation of 
the intensity of surprise, as well as for the selection of 
knowledge structures. 
In Macedo and Cardoso’s model, knowledge is 
exclusively of an episodic kind (for an example, see Figure 
2), rather than being both semantic and episodic in nature 
(although this will be considered in future work), as in 
Ortony and Partridge’s model. In this respect, the 
knowledge structure of our model also differs from the 
schema-theoretic framework of the Meyer, Reisenzein and 
Schützwohl model that also assumes both episodic and 
semantic knowledge. In our model, an input proposition (or 
new belief) is therefore always compared with episodic 
representations of objects or events (or their properties) (for 
instance an object with squared windows, rectangular door, 
etc.). Besides, the agent has in its episodic memory explicit 
representations of similar objects. Following Ortony and 
Partridge, we also distinguish between deducible and non-
deducible, active and passive, immutable and typical 
propositions as well as between different possible sources of 
surprise (see Table 1). The immutability of a proposition 
can be extracted from the absolute frequency values 
associated with the cases stored in episodic memory (see 
Figure 2). For instance, in the example shown in Figure 2, 
the proposition “houses have square facades” is immutable 
(since all the houses in memory have squared facades), 
whereas “houses have square windows” is a typical 
proposition with a probability (immutability) value of 0.50 
(as implied by Ortony and Partridge’s model, in our model 
immutability is a continuous variable). 
 
World
Agent
Deliberative Reasoning /
Desicion-making
Motivations
Memory Sensors
Efectors
Goals, Desires
 
Figure 1:  Architecture of an agent. 
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Figure 2:  Example of an episodic memory in the domain of 
buildings. 
 
The usual activity of the agents consists of moving 
through the environment hoping to find interesting things 
(objects or events) that deserve to be investigated. We 
assume that this exploratory behavior is ultimately in the 
service of other (e.g., hedonic) motives, although this issue 
is not explicitly addressed in the present model. When one 
or more objects/events are perceived, the agent computes 
expectations for the missing information (e.g., “it is a house 
with 67% of probability”, “it is a hotel with 45% of 
probability”, etc.; note that the function of a building 
becomes available to the agent only when its position and 
that of the building are the same). On the basis of the 
available information (e.g., the visible structure of an 
object) and the computed expectations (e.g., predictions for 
the function of an object), the agent then determines the 
intensity of surprise that may be caused by the object/event 
(these computations, which correspond to the “appraisal of 
unexpectedness” in the Meyer, Reisenzein and Schützwohl 
model, are described in more detail below). Subsequently, 
the object/event with the maximum estimated surprise is 
selected to be visited and investigated. This corresponds to 
the “interruption of ongoing activity” and the "reallocation 
of processing resources" assumed in the Meyer, Reisenzein 
and Schützwohl model. The previously estimated value of 
surprise may subsequently be updated on the basis of the 
additional information acquired about the object/event. The 
object/event is then stored in memory and the absolute 
frequencies of the affected objects/events in memory are 
updated. This is a simplification of the fourth step of the 
Meyer, Reisenzein and Schützwohl model (for alternative 
approaches to belief revision, see, for instance, (Gärdenfors, 
1988)). 
The different surprise-eliciting situations distinguished by 
Ortony and Partridge are dealt with in our model in the 
following way. As said above, when an agent perceives an 
object, it first computes expectations (deducible, active 
expectations) for missing information (e.g., “it is a hotel 
with 45% of probability”). If, after having visited that 
object, the agent detects that the object is different from 
what was expected (e.g., if it is a post office), the agent is 
surprised because its active expectations conflict with the 
input proposition (note that, in our model, belief conflicts 
may be partial as well as total). This is thus an example of 
the first source of surprise distinguished by Ortony and 
Partridge. In contrast, when an agent perceives an aspect or 
part of an object with particular properties (e.g., a building 
with a window of a circular shape) that were not actively 
predicted, it may still be able to infer that it expected 
something (e.g., a rectangular-shaped window with, 45% 
probability, a square-shaped window with 67%, etc.). This 
is an example of a deducible, passive expectation: although 
the expectation was not present before the agent perceived 
the object, it was inferred after the object had been 
perceived. This case is therefore an example of the second 
source of surprise distinguished by Ortony and Partridge, 
where an input proposition conflicts with an agent’s passive 
expectations. Finally, when an agent perceives an object 
with a completely new part (e.g., a building with no facade), 
it has neither an active nor a passive expectation available. 
875
The reason is that, because there are no objects of this kind 
(e.g., buildings with no facade) stored in the agent’s 
memory, the agent cannot predict that such objects might be 
encountered. The perception of an object with a completely 
new part is thus an example of a non-deducible proposition. 
This is an example of the third source of surprise 
distinguished by Ortony and Partridge: there is a conflict 
between the input proposition (e.g., “the house has no 
facade”) and what after the fact is judged to be normal or 
usual (e.g., “buildings have a facade”). 
The Computation of Surprise Intensity 
We now address the question of how the intensity of 
surprise should be computed in the model. In humans, this 
problem has already been successfully solved by evolution; 
therefore, a reasonable approach is to model the agent's 
surprise function according to that of humans. Experimental 
evidence from human participants summarized in 
(Reisenzein, 2000b) suggests that the intensity of felt 
surprise increases monotonically, and is closely correlated 
with, the degree of unexpectedness. On the basis of this 
evidence, we propose that the surprise “felt” by an agent 
elicited by an object/event X is proportional to the degree of 
unexpectedness of X (which in the model is based on the 
frequencies of objects/events present in the memory of the 
agent). According to probability theory, the degree of 
expecting an event X to occur is its subjective probability 
P(X). Accordingly, the improbability of X, denoted by 1-
P(X), defines the degree of not expecting X, or for short its 
unexpectedness. The intensity of surprise elicited by X 
should therefore be an (at least weakly) monotonically 
increasing function of 1-P(X). As a first approach, this 
function (S1) could simply be taken to be the identity 
function, that is, the intensity of surprise could simply be 
equated with the degree of unexpectedness: 
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However, on second thought, S1 does not seem to 
faithfully capture the relation between unexpectedness and 
surprise. For example, consider a political election with 
three candidates A, B and C, where the probability of being 
elected is P(A) = P(B) = P(C) = 0.333. In this case, one 
would not be surprised if either A, B or C is elected. 
Therefore, in this situation at least, S1 fails. 
To arrive at a more adequate surprise function, consider 
the case where there are only two mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive alternative events, X and Y (i.e., not X). Here, 
intuition suggests that X is not surprising as long as P(X) ≥ 
0.5, whereas X is surprising for P(X) < 0.5, and increasingly 
more so the more P(X) approaches 0. This intuition is 
captured by the following surprise function (S2): 
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To deal with sets of more than two mutually exclusive 
events, S2 could be generalized as follows (S3, where n  
denotes the number of events in the set): 
 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
≥⇐
<⇐−
=
n
XP
n
XPXP
XAgtS
1
)(0
1
)()(1
),(3  
 
However, it may be more adequate to set the upper limit 
of surprise not to 1, but to 
n
1
 (see S4): 
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Yet another possible surprise function, suggested by 
further reflection on the above election example, is the 
following (S5): 
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In this formula, Y is the event with the highest probability 
of a set of mutually exclusive events. S5 implies that, within 
each set of mutually exclusive events, there is always one 
(Y) whose occurrence is entirely unsurprising, namely the 
event with the maximum probability in the set (P(Y)). For 
the other events X in the set, the surprise intensity caused by 
their occurrence is the difference between P(Y) and their 
probability P(X). This difference can be interpreted as the 
amount by which P(X) has to be increased for X to become 
unsurprising. For instance, in the election example 
considered earlier, where P(A) = P(B )= P(C) = 0.333, S5 
correctly predicts that one would not be surprised if either 
A, B or C is elected. By contrast, if P(A) = 0.55, P(B) = 0.40 
and P(C) = 0.05, S5 predicts that the surprise caused by B is 
0.15 and for C is 0.50, whereas for A it is 0. S5 also implies 
that maximum surprise, that is, S(X) = 1, occurs only if 
P(Y) = 1 and hence, by implication, P(X) = 0. (In the 
Ortony and Partridge model, this corresponds to situations 
[1], [2], [5] and [6], where the disconfirmed event Y is 
immutable, i.e., its probability is 1). Therefore, S5 seems to 
correctly describe surprise in the election example. 
Confirming this impression, S5 also acknowledges the 
intuition behind S2: if there are only two alternative events 
X and Y (= not X), S5 predicts, like S2, that X should be 
unsurprising for P(X) ≥ 0.5, for in this case X is also the 
event with the highest probability in the set. By contrast, for 
P(X) < 0.5, S5 predicts that X should be surprising and 
increasingly so the more P(X) approaches 0, with maximum 
possible surprise (S(X) = 1) being experienced for P(X) = 0. 
Yet another possible surprise function (S6) is suggested 
by Information Theory (Shannon, 1948): 
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According to S6, surprise about X is 0 when P(X) = 1 and 
increases monotonically with decreasing P(X). In these 
respects, then, S6 is similar to S1. However, in contrast to 
S1, S6 is a nonlinear function of P(X), and it is not 
normalized. For instance, for P(X) = 0.3, S6(X) = 1.7 (bits), 
for P(X) = 0.01, S6(X) = 6.6, and for P(X) = 0.001, S6(X) = 
9.9. In fact, there is no upper limit of S(X): for P(X)=0, 
S6(X) = +∝. To overcome this problem, we propose the 
following normalized function S7 (stipulating the upper 
limit to be 10): 
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Finally, yet another surprise function (S8), a nonlinear 
modification of S5, is suggested by the results of the 
experiment, reported below, performed with humans in the 
domain of elections and sport games: 
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This function retains the essential features of S5: when X 
is the most expected event (X = Y), then S8(X) = 0; when X 
is different from Y, S8(X) > 0 and increases monotonically 
with the difference between P(Y) and P(X); and S8(X) is 
maximal (= 1) if P(Y) = 1 and P(X) = 0. In addition, 
however, S8 also captures the nonlinearity of the surprise 
function suggested by the experiments with humans 
reported below. 
Experiment 
To test the validity of the proposed surprise functions, we 
conducted an experiment that involved two steps. In step 1, 
we collected ratings of probability and surprise intensity 
from humans in two domains, political elections and sports 
games. In step 2, artificial agents that implemented the 
different surprise functions were provided with the 
probability judgments obtained from the humans and, on 
this basis, computed surprise intensity values. These 
predicted surprise values were then compared with the 
actual surprise ratings provided by the human participants. 
Step 1 was conducted with ten participants (mean age, 29 
years). They were presented with 20 brief scenarios, 10 of 
which described political elections with 2-4 candidates (see 
Figure 3), whereas the other 10 scenarios described sports 
games with 2-4 teams or players (see (Reisenzein, 2000a) 
for a conceptually similar experiment using knowledge 
questions). Political elections and sports games were chosen 
because we thought that these domains are familiar to most 
people and that the participants would have no problems to 
state their probabilities and their surprise about outcomes. In 
addition, in contrast to the domain of buildings used in a 
previous study reported in (Macedo & Cardoso, 2001), 
elections and sport games allow for an easier matching of 
the knowledge of artificial agents with that of humans. Part 
of the scenarios did not include information about the actual 
outcome of the election or game, whereas the remaining 
scenarios included this information. For scenarios without 
outcome information, the participants were asked to first 
state their expectations for all possible outcomes and to rate 
their probability on a 1-100 scale. Subsequently, they were 
informed about the outcome of the election or game and 
rated their surprise about the outcome first on a qualitative 
intensity scale and then again on a quantitative intensity 
scale within the chosen qualitative level. By contrast, for the 
scenarios that included outcome information, participants 
first rated the intensity of surprise about the outcome and 
subsequently their (passive) expectations regarding the 
outcome. An example of a scenario is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3:  Example of a test item. 
Given the following prognosis for the election of candidate A,
B and C for a political position: 
 
Victory of A=45%; Victory of B=45%; Victory of C=10% 
 
a) What are your personal expectations regarding the victory
of candidates A, B and C? 
b) Assume that candidate A won the election and rate the
intensity of surprise that you would feel. 
 
In step 2 of the study, the probability ratings obtained 
from each participant in step 1 were delivered to eight 
artificial agents, each of which implemented one of the eight 
surprise functions S1-S8 described earlier. Using these 
functions, the agents computed surprise intensity values 
from the probabilities. These predicted surprise values were 
then compared with the surprise ratings of the humans 
obtained in step 1. 
The data obtained in the first step of the experiment 
suggested two qualitative conclusions. First, the occurrence 
of the most expected event of the set of mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive events did not elicit surprise in humans. For 
example, when the expectations for the election of three 
political candidates A, B and C were P(A) = 0.55, P(B) = 
0.40, and P(C) = 0.05, the participants felt no surprise about 
the election of candidate A. This was also true when two or 
more candidates had equal maximal probabilities. For 
example, when P(A) = 0.40, P(B) = 0.40 and P(C) = 0.20, 
participants were not surprised when either A or B was 
elected. Second, beyond the point of zero surprise, the 
surprise function appeared to be nonlinear. For example, 
relatively high surprise was indicated when candidate C 
won the elections in both of the above situations, although it 
was still higher for P(C) = 0.05 than for P(C) = 0.20. 
To compare the surprise values generated by the artificial 
agents and the surprise ratings provided by the human 
judges, the following fit indices were used: the root mean 
squared difference, the mean absolute difference, and the 
Pearson correlation. The results of these comparisons are 
shown in Table 2, separately for the 10 participants (H1, …, 
H10) and for six of the eight artificial agents (A1,…,A8) 
(the surprise functions S6 and S7 were not included because 
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they have a different range than the human ratings and 
therefore computation of the absolute and squared 
differences is not meaningful). It can be seen from Table 2 
that, regardless of which fit index is used, agent A8 (which 
implemented surprise function S8) was the one with the best 
fit to the human ratings: it had on average, the lowest root 
mean squared differences (Ms= 0.10), the lowest absolute 
differences (Md= 0.06), and the highest correlation to these 
ratings (Mr= 0.98). A8 was closely followed by A5 (Ms = 
0.21; Md = 0.08; Mr = 0.97), whereas agents A1 and A2 had 
the comparatively worst fit values (for instance, A1 had Ms 
= 0.35; Md = 0.26; Mr = 0.81). A main reason for the bad 
performance of A1 was apparently that it failed in the case 
of the occurrence of the most expected event of the set: A1 
still predicts a positive surprise value (1-P(X)) for this case, 
whereas humans do not feel surprised by the occurrence of 
this event. However, in other situations, A1 performed well. 
 
Table 2:  Statistical comparison of the surprise values 
computed by the artificial agents and those provided by the 
humans (s = root mean squared difference, d = mean 
absolute difference, and r = Pearson correlation). 
 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 M 
s .35 .36 .34 .35 .35 .34 .35 .36 .35 .36 .35 
d .25 .26 .25 .25 .26 .24 .27 .27 .26 .27 .26 
A1 
r .82 .80 .82 .82 .80 .82 .81 .80 .82 .82 .81 
s .30 .33 .29 .32 .32 .30 .33 .32 .31 .31 .31 
d .18 .21 .16 .20 .21 .18 .22 .19 .19 .19 .19 
A2 
r .82 .79 .82 .81 .79 .83 .80 .80 .81 .81 .81 
s .22 .30 .24 .21 .30 .22 .18 .19 .19 .16 .22 
d .07 .15 .09 .07 .17 .09 .09 .09 .08 .08 .10 
A3 
r .95 .85 .89 .94 .81 .92 .93 .92 .92 .94 .91 
s .43 .41 .45 .43 .43 .43 .44 .46 .46 .45 .44 
d .29 .28 .30 .29 .29 .28 .28 .28 .29 .27 .28 
A4 
r .93 .92 .88 .96 .90 .95 .91 .91 .93 .94 .92 
s .22 .16 .19 .16 .23 .20 .21 .24 .24 .24 .21 
d .07 .06 .11 .06 .09 .05 .08 .10 .09 .09 .08 
A5 
r .97 .98 .96 .98 .95 .99 .97 .96 .96 .96 .97 
s .09 .07 .13 .08 .12 .06 .11 .13 .12 .12 .10 
d .05 .05 .09 .05 .08 .04 .06 .08 .07 .07 .06 
A8 
r .98 .99 .98 .99 .97 .99 .98 .07 .07 .97 .98 
Conclusions 
The empirical study of the surprise functions suggests S8(X) 
=  as the most appropriate surprise 
function for the domains of political elections and sport 
games, although S5 (the linear counterpart of S8) is a very 
close contender. However, before more definitive 
conclusions can be drawn, additional tests need to be 
performed in other domains, as well as with yet other 
possible surprise functions (e.g., Shackle, 1969). 
))()(1(log2 XPYP −+
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Abstract
The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to captur-
ing the role of action in many interesting situations: action
provides otherwise unavailable information that enables the
agent to solve problems by starting and performing a suitable
abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses.
Many external representations, even if in some cases inert
from an epistemological point of view, can be transformed
into what is called epistemic mediators, active in creative ab-
ductive reasoning. An often neglected side of human creativ-
ity is related to emotional, artistic, and ethical aspects, and
concerns the active shaping of values in an esthetical and
ethical world. I will present some aspects of this kind of rea-
soning in the case of scientific and ethical thinking; moreover,
I will illustrate some aspects of what I call “ethical mediators”
in their activity of shaping and reshaping ethical worth of hu-
man beings and collectives.
The Inexplicability of Creativity
Creativity is certainly an important aspect of our definition
of “intelligence” but the literature associates many different
notions to creativity. This ambiguity has brought to a lack of
consensus in the research community. The common views
associate to creativity unusual and mysterious qualities that
drive the concept of creativity to a confused verbosity.
Statements like “to break the rules”, “to think different”, “to
destroy one Gestalt in favor of a better one”, and “to arrange
old elements into a new form”, present in the field of psy-
chological research on creativity since 1950s, certainly do
not clarify the topic, and seem to lead to the Freudian con-
clusion that creativity cannot be understood. This conclu-
sion has also been supported by many philosophers who
studied conceptual change in science during the second half
of the last century. They distinguished between a logic of
discovery and a logic of justification (i.e. between the psy-
chological side of creation and the logic argument of prov-
ing new discovered ideas by facts). The consequent conclu-
sion was that a logic of discovery (and a rational model of
discovery) could not exist: scientific conceptual change is
cataclysmic and irrational, dramatic, incomprehensible and
discontinuous. Many other studies already argued that crea-
tivity can be understood (Boden, 1991, Sternberg, Kaufman,
and Pretz, 2002), but paid attention mainly to the psycho-
logical and experimental aspects, disregarding the philo-
sophical, logical, and computation ones.
In AI research, however, since Simon, two characteris-
tics seem to be associated to creativity: the novelty of the
product and the unconventionality of the process that leads
to the new product. Hence, in a strictly pragmatic sense,
when we can clarify what behavior we are looking for, we
could implement it in a machine: a methodological criterion
enables us to define and consider just those practical effects
we conceive to be associated with novelty and unconven-
tionality (cf. Buchanan, 2001).
I maintain we can overcome many of the difficulties of
creativity studies developing a theory of abduction, in the
light of Charles Sanders Peirce’s first insights.
Abduction and Epistemic Mediators
If we decide to adopt this kind of methodology it is neces-
sary to develop a cognitive model of creativity able to repre-
sent not only “novelty” and “unconventionality”, but also
some features commonly referred to as the entire creative
process, such as the expert use of background knowledge
and ontology (defining new concepts and searching heuristi-
cally among the old ones) and the modeling activity devel-
oped in the so called “incubation time” (generating and
testing, transformations in the space of the hypotheses). The
philosophical concept of abduction may be a candidate to
solve this problem, and offers an approach to model creative
processes of hypotheses generation in a completely explicit
and formal way, which can fruitfully integrate the narrow-
ness proper of a merely psychological approach, too ex-
perimentally human-oriented.
Theoretical and Manipulative Abduction
A hundred years ago, C. S. Peirce (CP, 1931-1958) coined
the concept of abduction in order to illustrate that the proc-
ess of scientific discovery is not irrational and that a meth-
odology of discovery is possible. Peirce interpreted abduc-
tion essentially as an “inferential” creative process of gener-
ating a new hypothesis. Abduction has a logical form (falla-
cious, if we model abduction by using classical logic) dis-
tinct from deduction and induction. Reasoning which starts
from reasons and looks for consequences is called deduc-
tion; that which starts from consequences and looks for rea-
sons is called abduction.
Abduction is the process of inferring certain facts and/or
laws and hypotheses that render some sentences plausible,
that explain or discover some (eventually new) phenomenon
or observation; it is the process of reasoning in which ex-
planatory hypotheses are formed and evaluated. There are
two main epistemological meanings of the word abduction
(Magnani, 2001): 1) abduction that only generates “plausi-
ble” hypotheses (“selective” or “creative”) and 2) abduction
considered as inference “to the best explanation”, which
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also evaluates hypotheses. To illustrate from the field of
medical knowledge, the discovery of a new disease and the
manifestations it causes can be considered as the result of a
creative abductive inference. Therefore, “creative” abduc-
tion deals with the whole field of the growth of scientific
knowledge. This is irrelevant in medical diagnosis where
instead the task is to “select” from an encyclopedia of pre-
stored diagnostic entities. We can call both inferences am-
pliative, selective and creative, because in both cases the
reasoning involved amplifies, or goes beyond, the informa-
tion incorporated in the premises.
Theoretical abduction1 certainly illustrates much of what
is important in creative abductive reasoning, in humans and
in computational programs, but fails to account for many
cases of explanations occurring in science when the exploi-
tation of environment is crucial. It fails to account for those
cases in which there is a kind of “discovering through do-
ing”, cases in which new and still unexpressed information
is codified by means of manipulations of some external ob-
jects (epistemic mediators). The concept of manipulative
abduction2 captures a large part of scientists’ and physi-
cians’ thinking where the role of action is central, and where
the features of this action are implicit and hard to be elicited
Peirce uses the terms “inference” and “inferential proc-
ess” to refer to abduction. It is useful to try to clarify the
meaning of the term “inference” as considered by Peirce’s
thought. Peirce stated that all thinking is in signs, and signs
can be icons, indices or symbols. Moreover, all inference is
a form of sign activity, where the word sign includes “feel-
ing, image, conception and other representation” (CP
5.283), and, in Kantian words, all synthetic forms of cogni-
tion. Feelings, images, simulations, etc., are currently char-
acterized as forms of model-based reasoning (Magnani &
Nersessian, 2002). Consequently, following Peirce, we can
say that a considerable part of thinking activity is model-
based (cf. footnote 1), that most of the forms of constitution
of phenomena are characterized in a model-based way. I use
the term “model-based reasoning” following Nersessian
(1995), that is, to indicate the construction and manipulation
of various kinds of representations, not necessarily senten-
tial and/or formal. Scientific concept formation, scientific
discovery, and – as we will see – diagnostic reasoning are
often related to heuristic procedures that resort to men-
tal/internal but also to external “models” and representa-
tions.
Peirce gives an interesting example of model-based ab-
duction related to sense activity: “A man can distinguish dif-
ferent textures of cloth by feeling: but not immediately, for
he requires to move fingers over the cloth, which shows that
he is obliged to compare sensations of one instant with those
of another” (CP 5.221); this idea surely suggests that ab-
ductive movements also have interesting extra-theoretical
                                                
1 Magnani (2001) introduces the concept of theoretical abduction.
He maintains that there are two kinds of theoretical abduction,
“sentential”, related to logic and to verbal/symbolic inferences, and
“model-based”, related to the exploitation of internalized models of
diagrams, pictures, etc., cf. below in this paper.
2 Manipulative abduction and epistemic mediators are introduced
and illustrated in Magnani (2001).
characteristics and that there is a role in abductive reasoning
for various kinds of manipulations of external objects (cf.
below, the problem of “action-based, manipulative abduc-
tion”). One more example is given by the fact that the per-
ception of tone arises from the activity of the mind only af-
ter having noted the rapidity of the vibrations of the sound
waves, but the possibility of individuating a tone happens
only after having heard several of the sound impulses and
after having judged their frequency. Consequently the sen-
sation of pitch is made possible by previous experiences and
cognitions stored in memory, so that one oscillation of the
air would not produce a tone.
Model-based thinking activity also exploits external
models. We have seen that the concept of manipulative ab-
duction is devoted to capturing the role of action on external
models in hypothetical and creative reasoning. This kind of
manipulation provides otherwise unavailable information
that enables the agent to solve a problem by performing ab-
ductive processes of generation or selection of hypotheses.
An expert manipulation of objects directed by abductive
movements that implicates the strategic application of old
and new templates of behavior mainly connected with extra-
theoretical components also esthetical, ethical, and emo-
tional.
Manipulative abduction happens when we are thinking
through doing and not only, in a pragmatic sense, about do-
ing. It refers to an extra-theoretical behavior that aims at
creating communicable accounts of new experiences to in-
tegrate them into previously existing systems of experi-
mental and linguistic (theoretical) practices. Gooding (1990)
refers to this kind of concrete manipulative reasoning when
he illustrates the role in science of the so-called “construals”
that embody tacit inferences in procedures that are often ap-
paratus and machine based. The embodiment is of course an
expert manipulation of objects in a highly constrained ex-
perimental environment, and is directed by abductive
movements that imply the strategic application of old and
new templates of behavior mainly connected with extra-
theoretical components, for instance emotional, esthetical,
ethical, and economic.
Epistemic Mediators
Recent research, taking an ecological approach to the analy-
sis and design of human-machine systems, has shown how
expert performers use action in everyday life to create an
“external” model of task dynamics that can be used in lieu
of an internal model (Kirlik, 1998). Not only a way for
moving the world to desirable states, action performs an
epistemic and not merely performatory role that is very rele-
vant to abductive reasoning.
The whole activity of manipulation is devoted to build
various external epistemic mediators that function as an
enormous new source of information and knowledge. I de-
rive this expression from the cognitive anthropologist
Hutchins (1995), that coins the expression “mediating
structure” to refer to various external tools that can be built
to cognitively help the activity of navigating in modern but
also in “primitive” settings. Any written procedure is a sim-
ple example of a cognitive “mediating structure” with possi-
ble cognitive aims: “Language, cultural knowledge, mental
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models, arithmetic procedures, and rules of logic are all me-
diating structures too. So are traffic lights, supermarkets
layouts, and the contexts we arrange for one another’s be-
havior. Mediating structures can be embodied in artifacts, in
ideas, in systems of social interactions […]” (pp. 290-291).
In this light manipulative abduction in science represents
a kind of redistribution of the epistemic and cognitive effort
to manage objects and information that cannot be immedi-
ately represented or found internally (for example exploiting
the resources of visual imagery).3
The hypothetical character of manipulations in creativity
is clear: they are a sort of test, they can be developed to ex-
amine further chances, they are a provisional creative or-
ganization of experience and some of them become in their
turn hypothetical “interpretations” of experience, suggesting
new worldviews. Step by step the new interpretation – that
at the beginning is completely “practice-laden” – relates to
more “theoretical” modes of understanding (narrative, vis-
ual, diagrammatic, symbolic, conceptual, simulative).
A Cognitive Theory of the Abductive Modeling
Activity
We can say abduction is a complex process that works
through imagination: it suggests a new direction in reason-
ing by shaping new possible ways for explaining object and
hypotheses (cf. the templates mentioned above). In this
sense imagination should not be confused with an act of in-
tuition. Peirce describes abduction as a dynamic modeling
process that fluctuates between states of doubt and states of
belief. To solve the doubt, and some eventually linked
anomalies, the agent implements a process of information
gathering which at the same time relates to the “problem”,
to the agent’s evolving understanding of the situation and to
its changing requirements. By imagination here I mean this
process of knowledge gathering and shaping. A process, that
Kant considered “blind”, that leads to see things as we
would not otherwise have seen them: “a blind but indispen-
sable function of the soul, without which we should not
have no knowledge whatsoever” (Kant, 1929, A78-B103, p.
112). Scientific creativity, it is pretty obvious, involves
seeing the world in a particular new way: scientific under-
standing permits us to see some aspects of reality in a par-
ticular way and creativity relates to this capacity to shed
new light. Suggestions which make us able to further ana-
lyze this process come from a theory developed in the area
of computer vision: the active perception approach (see
Thomas, 1999).
This approach aims at understanding cognitive systems in
terms of their environmental situatedness: instead of being
used to build a comprehensive inner model of its surround-
ings, the agent’s perceptual capacities are seen as simply
used to obtain “whatever” specific pieces of information are
necessary for its behavior in the world. The agent constantly
“adjusts” its vantage point, updating and refining its proce-
dures, in order to uncover a piece of information. This re-
                                                
3 For example it is difficult to preserve precise spatial relationships
using mental imagery, especially when one set of them has to be
moved relative to another.
sorts to the need of specifying how to efficiently examine
and explore and to the need of “interpreting” an object of a
certain type. It is a process of attentive and controlled per-
ceptual exploration through which the agent is able to col-
lect the necessary information: a purposefully moving
through what is being examined, actively picking up infor-
mation rather than passively transducing (cf. Gibson, 1979).
As suggested for instance by Lederman and Klatzky
(1990), this view of perception may be applied to all sense
modes: for example, it can be easily extended to the haptic
mode. Mere passive touch, in fact, tells us little, but by ac-
tively exploring an object with our hands we can find out a
great deal. Our hands incorporate not only sensory transduc-
ers, but musculature which, under central control, moves
them in appropriate ways: lifting something tells about its
weight, running fingers around the contours provides shape
information, rubbing it reveals texture. As already stressed
by Peirce in the quotation I already reported above, when
dealing with the hypothesizing activity of what I call ma-
nipulative abduction, “A man can distinguish different tex-
tures of cloth by feeling: but not immediately, for he re-
quires to move fingers over the cloth, which shows that he is
obliged to compare sensations of one instant with those of
another” (CP 5.221).
Thomas (1999) suggests we can think of the fingers to-
gether with the neural structures that control, for example,
running them so that we can consider the afferent signals
that they generate as a sort of (perceptual) instrument to
gather knowledge: a complex of physiological structures
capable of active testing for some environmental property.
The study of manipulative abduction that I outlined above,
can gain from this approach. To give an example, the role of
particular epistemic mediators (optical diagrams) in non-
standard analysis has been studied, and so their function in
grasping and teaching abstract and difficult mathematical
concepts (see Magnani and Dossena, 2002). In this case the
external models (mathematical diagrams) do not give full
available knowledge, but, on the contrary, compel the agent
to engage a continuous epistemic dialogue between the dia-
grams and its internal knowledge to the aim of understand-
ing an already existing information or at “creating” a new
one (cf. also the geometrical example in the following sec-
tion).
It is clear that humans and other animals make a great
use of perceptual reasoning and kinesthetic abilities. We can
catch a thrown ball, cross a busy street, read a musical score,
go through a passage by imaging if we can contort out bod-
ies to the way required, evaluate shape by touch, recognize
that an obscurely seen face belongs to a friend of ours, etc.
Usually the “computations” required to achieve these tasks
are not accessible to a conscious description. Mathematical
reasoning uses language explanations, but also non-
linguistic notational devices and models. Geometrical con-
structions represent a relatively simple example of this kind
of extra-linguistic machinery we know as characterized in a
model-based and manipulative - abductive - way.
Creativity and Ethical Mediators
The active process of information gathering through me-
diators, to shape knowledge, should not be restricted to the
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scientific activity and so to the “epistemic” side of them. An
often neglected side of human creativity is, in fact, related to
emotional, artistic, and ethical aspects, and concerns the ac-
tive shaping of values in an esthetic or in an ethical world.
In the case of morality the role of hypotheses and manipula-
tion of the world is clear in Kant’s moral doctrine. When
Kant considers pure moral rules, in fact, he says that they
could be applied to the concrete experience through a kind
of “typification”, a figurative envisioning of a non existing
world, based on a metaphoric mapping, as a means for
judging a given moral situation (Johnson, 1993).
As already outlined above, for Peirce all knowing is infer-
ring and inferring is not instantaneous, it happens in a proc-
ess that needs an activity of comparisons involving many
kinds of models (signs) in a more or less considerable lapse
of time. All sensations or perceptions participate in the na-
ture of a unifying hypothesis, in the case of “emotions” too.
In Peircian sense emotions too express a kind of model-
based reasoning and have and “inferential” character. In de-
cision making emotions play a distinguished role: they make
the velocity of the decision process, surely related to what
we care about, and lead directly to actions. But they are also
usually considered irrational because of the serious disad-
vantages they present: failure to consider other options, lack
of consideration of accurate and relevant information, not
sharability in group situation, when the decisions have be
adopted collectively. It is important to understand that emo-
tions are not inherently irrational, for example they can be
usefully intertwined with cultural aspects.
In general we can say that moral deliberations relate to a
sort of selection or creation of principles (rules, prototypes)
and to their application to concrete cases. We can both just
select (or create, if we do not have any) moral principles
(rules, prototypes) and apply them to concrete cases or
looking for the best ones among them according to some
ethical meta-criteria. When we create new ethics, we pro-
vide new knowledge and new rules about problems and
situations not yet clearly covered from the moral point of
view. In this last case we certainly are in front of a particular
case, but the problem is not only the one of ethically solving
the case at hand by applying already available ethical con-
cerns – indeed we lack a satisfactory moral knowledge to
handle the puzzling situation. Instead we need to create
something new, for example new good reasons first which
can provide an acceptable intelligibility of the problem.
Once created, it will be possible to see the new principle and
the new moral knowledge as a crystallization of the various
insights emerging from peoples’ and/or experts’ experience
and thinking.
The role of cognitive delegations to external objects and
structures has to be extended to the case of human actions
and organizations, so viewed as cognitive “mediating”
mechanisms endowed with moral aspects. In this light it is
possible to introduce the concept of ethical (or moral) me-
diator. Moral mediators play an important role in reshaping
ethical worth of human beings and collectives. They espe-
cially involve a continuous reconfiguration of social orders
aimed at rebuilding new moral perspectives and chances.
These mediators represent a kind of redistribution of the
moral effort through managing objects and information in
such a way that we can overcome the poverty and the un-
satisfactory character of the moral options immediately rep-
resented or found internally. Moral mediators are also used
to exploit latent constraints in the human-environment sys-
tem. These new constraints grant additional and precious
ethical information. When we spontaneously act in a way so
that we spend more quality time with our partner to save our
marriage, for example, then our actions automatically can
cause variables relating to “unexpected” and “positive”
contents of the relationship to covary with perceptible new
released informative, sentimental, sexual, and in general
bodily variables. Prior to the adoption of the new reconfig-
ured “social” order of the couple, there is no active con-
straint between these hidden and overt variables causing
them to carry information about each other. It is also well-
known that also “trained” emotions4 play an important crea-
tive role in moral deliberations .
Figure 1. Conjectural moral templates I.
Templates of Moral Doing
It is difficult to establish a list of invariant behaviors that are
able to illustrate manipulative reasoning in ethics. As illus-
trated above, certainly the expert manipulation of non-
human objects in real or artificial environments implies the
application of old and new templates of behavior that ex-
hibit some regularities. As I have said it is important to re-
member they are embodied and implicit, as tacit forms of
acting: I are not referring here to the moral actions and ma-
nipulations that simply follow previous explicit and devised
plans. Anyway, this moral activity is still conjectural: these
templates are embedded hypotheses of moral behavior
(creative or already cognitively present in the people’s
mind-body system, and ordinarily applied) that enable a
kind of moral “doing”. Hence, some templates of action and
manipulation can be selected in the set of those available
and pre-stored, others have to be created for the first time to
                                                
4 That is not just shaped by biological evolution but also by cul-
tural aspects.
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perform the most interesting accomplishments of manipu-
lative moral inference.
Some common features of these “tacit” templates that
enable us to manipulate external human and non-human
things and structures to achieve moral effects are related to
(Figure 1): 1. sensibility to the aspects of the moral situation
which can be regarded as curious or anomalous; manipula-
tions can also be performed to be able to introduce potential
inconsistencies in the received knowledge (we suddenly
adopt a different attitude with respect to our wife/husband to
get some reactions we can regard as interesting – or “unex-
pected” – to confirm or discard hypotheses about
her/feelings or to develop further hypotheses about them; in
an investigation about a crime we spontaneously engage
further manipulations of the evidence to get more interesting
data to morally shape the suspect); 2. preliminary sensibility
to the dynamical character of the situation at hands, and not
only to entities and their properties, common aim of ma-
nipulations is to practically reorder the dynamic sequence of
the events correlated to the main problem to promote the
subsequent possibility of new possibilities and options for
action (a women in front of decision in favor of abortion
spontaneously tries to modify the dynamical aspects of her
behavior and the structure of her human relationships to try
to establish new perspectives able to make her able to envis-
age a possible decision different from the first one first en-
visaged); 3. referral to manipulations that exploit artificial
created feelings and environments to free new possibly sta-
ble and repeatable sources of information about hidden
moral knowledge and constraints (when dealing with the
moral problem of capital punishment we can spontaneously
handle people, for example with statistics, interviews, sci-
entific research, associations, to artificially reconfigure so-
cial orders in a way suitable to get real and not hypocritical
information, for example about the real relief generated in
the victim’s relatives by killing the criminal); 4. various
contingent ways of spontaneous moral acting: looking from
different perspectives, checking the different information
available, comparing subsequent events, choosing, dis-
carding, imaging further manipulations, re-ordering and
changing relationships in the world by implicitly evaluating
the usefulness of a new order (for instance, to help memory)
(in the ethical case they certainly are all useful ways for
getting suitable evidence and for stimulating the derivation
of further consequences to test our previously established
moral judgments; analogous of all these manipulative tem-
plates are active in epistemic settings, as illustrated in Mag-
nani, 2001).
More features of our tacit templates and ethical media-
tors are related to the following additional issues (Figure 2):
5) moral spontaneous action that can be useful in presence
of incomplete or inconsistent information – not only from
the “perceptual” point of view – or of a diminished capacity
to morally act upon the world: it is used to get more data to
restore coherence and/or to improve deficient knowledge; 6)
action as a control of sense data illustrates how we can
change the position of our body (and/or of the external ob-
jects) to reconfigure social orders, collective relationships,
and how to exploit various kinds of artificially created
events to get various new kinds of stimulation: action pro-
vides some tactile, visual, kinesthetic, sentimental, emo-
tional, and bodily information (e.g, in taking care of people,
cf. below in the following subsection), otherwise unavail-
able; 7) action enables us to build new external artifactual
models of ethical mechanisms and structures (for example
through “institutions”) instead of the corresponding “real”
and “natural” ones.5 For instance, we can substitute to the
“natural” structure “family” an environment more adequate
to agent’s moral needs. In this case we aim at reconfiguring
relationships for instance when we exploit the social re-
shaping role of the “houses” were children molested inside
family are recovered, to rebuild in a whole artificial frame-
work their moral perception for example of the sexual mo-
lestation received and of the related bad feelings. Something
similar occurs in the case of the addicted people. We also
establish structures to implicitly favor good manners, for
example fences, barriers in the lines, etc.
Figure 2. Conjectural moral templates II.
Moral Mediators
The whole activity of manipulation is also devoted to build
various external moral mediators6 that function as an enor-
mous new source of information and knowledge. Therefore,
these mediators represent a kind of redistribution of the
moral effort through managing objects and information in
such a way that we can overcome the poverty and the un-
satisfactory character of the moral options immediately rep-
resented or found internally (for example exploiting the re-
sources in terms of merely internal/mental moral principles,
utilitarian envisaging, and model-based moral reasoning).
                                                
5 Of course these “real” and “natural” structures are also artificial,
because we can think of a “family” as a kind of not merely natural
institution.
6 I derive this expression from the one “epistemic mediators” I in-
troduced in Magnani (2001, chapter 3): these consist of external
representations, objects, and artifacts that are relevant in scientific
discovery and reasoning processes.
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Not only a way for moving the world to desirable states,
action performs a moral and not just merely performatory
role: people structure their worlds to simplify and solve
moral tasks when they are in presence of incomplete infor-
mation or possess a diminished capacity to morally act upon
the world when they have insufficient opportunities to
know. Moral mediators are also used to exploit latent con-
straints in the human-environment system. These elicited
new constraints grant us additional and precious ethical in-
formation: when we spontaneously act in a way in which we
spend more quality time with our partner to save our mar-
riage, then our actions automatically cause variables relating
to “unexpected” and “positive” contents of the relationship
to covary with perceptible new released informative, senti-
mental, sexual, and, in general, bodily variables. Prior to the
adoption of the new reconfigured “social” order of the cou-
ple, there is no active constraint between these hidden and
overt variables causing them of carry information about
each other
Conclusion
What I call theoretical abduction (sentential and manipu-
lative) certainly illustrates much of what is important in
creative abductive reasoning both in humans and computa-
tional programs, especially the objective of selecting and
creating a set of hypotheses that are able to dispense good
(preferred) explanations of data, but fails to account for
many cases of explanations occurring in science or in eve-
ryday reasoning when the exploitation of the environment is
crucial. The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to
capture the role of action in many interesting situations: ac-
tion provides otherwise unavailable information that enables
the agent to solve problems by starting and performing a
suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hy-
potheses. Many external things, even if usually inert from
the epistemological point of view, can be transformed into
what is called epistemic mediators, which are illustrated in
the second part of this paper, together with an analysis of
the related notion of “external representation steps in a way
that discharges the “internal” mind of a computational load.
To define a cognitive system it seems we can no longer
identify it only with internal processing devices.
By exploiting the concept of “thinking through doing”
and of manipulative abduction I have tried to shed new light
on some of the most interesting cognitive aspects of creative
ethical reasoning of what I call “ethical mediators”. Indeed,
I contend that the whole activity of manipulation can be
seen as an activity for building various external “ethical me-
diators” that function as an enormous new source of infor-
mation and knowledge. Furthermore, while describing mo-
rality “through doing” a list of “moral templates” as forms
of invariant behaviors that are able to illustrate manipulative
ethical reasoning is furnished. These templates are forms of
behavior which are inclined towards providing ethical out-
comes. The application of old and new (creative) moral
templates of behavior exhibits some regularities and ex-
presses expert manipulation of human and non-human ob-
jects in real or artificial environments. These templates are
embodied and implicit as tacit forms of acting. They are
embedded hypotheses of moral behavior (creative or already
cognitively present in the people’s mind-body system, and
ordinarily applied) that enable a kind of moral “doing”.
Hence, some templates of action and manipulation can be
selected in the set of those available and pre-stored, while
others have to be created for the first time in order to per-
form the most interesting accomplishments of manipulative
moral inferences. These “tacit” templates enable us to ma-
nipulate external human and non-human things and struc-
tures to achieve moral effects.
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Abstract 
Many studies in cognitive science address how people 
categorize objects, but there has been comparatively little 
research on event categorization. This study investigated 
the categorization of events involving material destruction, 
such as “cutting” and “breaking”. Speakers of 28 
typologically, genetically, and areally diverse languages 
described events shown in a set of video-clips. There was 
considerable cross-linguistic agreement in the dimensions 
along which the events were distinguished, but there was 
variation in the number of categories and the placement of 
their boundaries. 
 
Introduction 
Categorization research in cognitive science has focused 
overwhelmingly on the mental representation of objects. 
Behavioral studies with adults, neuropsychological studies 
with patient populations, cross-cultural comparisons, and 
acquisition evidence provide converging evidence about 
how objects are represented. For example, objects are 
stored according to semantic domains, with natural kinds 
represented distinctly from artifacts. Within these 
categories there are subdivisions: animals are stored 
separately from fruits, while musical instruments are 
stored separately from furniture (Shallice, 1988). Objects 
are organized not only by semantic domain but also 
hierarchically, with categories at the superordinate, basic, 
and subordinate levels (Rosch, 1978). Basic level 
categories are cognitively privileged, in the sense that they 
are labeled with shorter words, they constitute the 
preferred level of naming, they can be verified faster than 
superordinate and subordinate categories in judgment 
tasks, and they are acquired earlier by children (Brown, 
1958; Rosch et al., 1976). There also appears to be 
considerable cross-cultural consensus in the organization 
of object representations (Berlin, 1992; Malt, 1995). 
In contrast to all the work on objects, relatively little has 
been done on the mental representation of events. One 
line of research, with roots in social psychology, has 
investigated how people segment events (Newtson & 
Engquist, 1976; Newtson, Engquist, & Bois, 1977; Zacks 
et al., 2001). Another important line of work on event 
representation, originating in cognitive psychology and  
 
 
 
 
artificial intelligence, has examined the organization of 
event knowledge in scripts, frames, and schemas (Minsky, 
1975; Schank & Abelson, 1977).  
Neither of these approaches to event representation has 
examined how everyday activity types are categorized. 
Studies of event segmentation do not ask which event 
segments are regarded as being “of the same kind”. Script 
and frame research concentrates on scenarios like “going 
to the movies”, “going to a restaurant”, “sports”, or 
“housework” (Morris & Murphy, 1990; Rifkin, 1985). 
These scenarios are often culture-specific, and so do not 
lend themselves to cross-cultural research. They are also 
complex, consisting of sequences of finer-grained events 
such as “walking into the restaurant”, “sitting down”, 
“ordering”, “eating”, and “paying the bill”. Little is 
known about how uniformly people categorize such finer-
grained units, but it has been widely assumed – certainly 
by developmentalists – that there is a universal core set of 
everyday event types and that children learn basic verbs 
such as have, hit, move, put, and give by linking them 
directly to these concepts (Gleitman, 1990; Pinker, 1989). 
In the present study, we focus on the linguistic 
categorization of a set of everyday events of “cutting and 
breaking” – more  formally known as events involving a 
“separation in the material integrity” of objects (Hale & 
Keyser, 1987).1 This domain was chosen because such 
events are universal and do not rely on specialized 
knowledge; they are accessible to everyone. The 
manufacture and use of tools for purposes of cutting and 
breaking has been dated back to at least 2.5 million years 
ago in the East African Rift area. Modern humans (homo 
sapiens sapiens) appear to be distinctive for making and 
using particular tools for “cutting”, such as pressure-
flaked knives (Toth & Schick, 1993). “Cutting” and 
“breaking” can, then, be taken as human activities that are 
central to human language and cognition.   
We examine the categorization of “cutting and 
breaking” events by looking at how speakers of 
                                                 
1 The terms “cutting” and “breaking”, with quotes, designate 
actions of the type that speakers of English typically label with 
verbs like cut and break; other languages may or may not have 
words with closely similar meanings. Throughout this paper, 
words in quotation marks point to actions of a certain general 
type, and words in italics designate linguistic forms. 
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genetically, typologically, and areally diverse languages 
describe a set of actions shown in video-clips.  Do 
speakers of all languages make the same distinctions 
when they are talking about such events?   
The verbs cut and break have been widely discussed in 
the linguistics literature. One influential approach has 
suggested that “cutting”-type verbs and “breaking”-type 
verbs can be universally distinguished on the basis of their 
semantic and syntactic behavior (Guerssel et al., 1985). 
This suggests that speakers of different languages should 
recognize similar distinctions.  
Other work, however, suggests that there may be 
significant differences in the way languages categorize 
“cutting” and “breaking” events; for example, English 
speakers use break for actions on a wide range of objects 
(e.g., a plate, a stick, a rope), while speakers of K’iche’ 
Maya must choose from among a set of “breaking” verbs 
on the basis of properties of the object; e.g., -paxi:j ‘break 
a rock, glass, or clay thing’ (e.g., a plate); -q’upi:j ‘break 
(other kinds of) hard thing’ (e.g., a stick); -tóqopi’j ‘break 
a long flexible thing’ (e.g., a rope) (Pye, 1996; Pye, Loeb, 
& Pao, 1995). Differences in the categorization of 
“cutting and breaking” events might also be expected due 
to variation in cultural tools and techniques; for example, 
Americans and Europeans chop vegetables by holding 
them still and bringing a knife down on them from above, 
whereas Punjabi speakers in rural Pakistan and India often 
move the vegetables against a stationary curved knife.  
In studying the categorization of “cutting and breaking” 
events, it is not obvious a priori what the domain of 
investigation should be taken to encompass. Whereas 
speakers of English do not use cut and break for actions 
like peeling a banana or pulling paper cups apart, and they 
do not use open for events like breaking the stem off an 
apple, perhaps such categorizations occur in other 
languages. Children learning English in fact make such 
overextensions (Bowerman, in press; Schaefer, 1979), 
which suggests that the boundaries of the “cutting and 
breaking” domain may not be cognitively obvious, and 
therefore not universally shared. One important goal for 
the present study, then, is not only to examine the 
categorization of “cutting and breaking” events by 
speakers of different languages, but also to discover the 
extent to which “cutting and breaking” events hang 
together in the first place as a relatively coherent semantic 
domain, as distinct from events involving other kinds of 
separations. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Event descriptions were collected from speakers of 28 
typologically, genetically and areally diverse languages. 
For each language there were between one and seven 
consultants. Twenty researchers collaborated in this effort, 
all of them experts on the language they worked on – a 
critical point for the validity of the coding of the data (see 
Results section). Data collection was carried out in the 
language being studied, not a contact language.  Details of 
the languages, language affiliations, and researchers 
responsible for the collection and coding of the data are 
given in Table 1.  
 
Materials 
The data were collected using a set of 61 video-clips that 
depicted a wide range of events (Bohnemeyer, Bowerman, 
& Brown 2001). The majority of these clips showed an 
event in which an actor brought about a change of state in 
an object – specifically, some kind of destruction of the 
object’s material integrity. Some clips depicted state- 
change events that involved separation but not material 
destruction, such as opening a pot or pulling paper cups 
apart. Still others depicted “peeling” events, which share 
properties with events of both material destruction and 
simple separation. Stimuli were constructed by varying 
the agent, the instrument used, the object acted upon, the 
manner of the destruction, and the prototypicality of the 
event (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example stills from video clips 
 
 
Procedure 
Consultants saw one video-clip at a time on a laptop. The 
clips were presented in a fixed order. The consultants’ 
task was to describe what the agent did. After free 
description they were asked what other descriptions could 
be applied felicitously to each clip. They were also asked 
whether other descriptions would be infelicitous. 
 
 
Results 
Coding 
We defined the target event we were interested in as the 
change in an object from a state of integrity to a state of 
separation or material destruction. For each of the 
languages, the researcher who collected the data identified 
those constituent(s) of a speaker’s description which   
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Table 1: Language details and associated researchers 
 
 
 
 
encoded the event. For example, the event of “a boy 
cutting a carrot”, at the top left of Figure 1, can be 
expressed in English as The boy cut the carrot. Here the 
caused state-change event is expressed solely by the 
transitive verb cut.   
Languages differ in whether information about the state 
change is typically located in a single verb or is spread out 
across a number of constituents, such as additional verbs 
or particles. For example, speakers of Mandarin use verb 
compounds to describe many of the events; e.g., qie1-
duan4 ‘cut-break.long.thin.object’ for the scene of 
someone karate-chopping a carrot shown in the lower left 
corner of Figure 1. For purposes of the present study, we 
concentrated on how the stimuli were categorized by the 
verbs of a language. Every verb in the data that described 
the target event was input to the analysis. 
 
 
Analysis 
Speakers’ event descriptions can be treated as analogous 
to the data obtained in sorting tasks designed to study 
categorization. In a typical sorting task, a subject might 
receive a set of cards, each depicting a different stimulus, 
and be asked to sort them into piles of objects that are 
similar. Speakers in the present study received no 
metalinguistic instructions; they were simply asked to 
describe what they saw in the video-clips. But each 
 
 
Language Language affiliation Country Researcher 
Biak Austronesian Indonesia W. van de Heuvel 
Chontal Isolate Mexico L. O’Connor 
Dutch Indo-European Netherlands M. van Staden 
English Indo-European UK, USA M. Bowerman, A. Majid, C. Wortmann 
Ewe Niger-Congo Ghana F. Ameka 
German Indo-European Germany M. van Staden 
Hindi Indo-European India B. Narasimhan 
Jalonke Niger-Congo Guinea F. Lüpke 
Japanese Isolate Japan S. Kita 
Kilivila Austronesian Papua New Guinea G. Senft 
Lao Tai Laos N. Enfield 
Likpe Niger-Congo Ghana F. Ameka 
Mandarin Sino-Tibetan China J. Chen 
Miraña Witotoan Colombia F. Seifart 
Otomi Otomanguean Mexico E. Palancar 
Punjabi Indo-European Pakistan A. Majid 
Spanish Indo-European Spain, Mexico M. Bowerman, E. Palancar 
Sranan Creole Surinam J. Essegbey 
Swedish Indo-European Sweden M. Gullberg 
Tamil Dravidian India B. Narasimhan 
Kuuk Thaayorre Pama-Nyungan Australia A. Gaby 
Tidore West Papuan Phylum Indonesia M. van Staden 
Tiriyó Cariban Brazil S. Meira 
Touo Papuan Isolate Solomon Islands M. Dunn, A. Terrill 
Turkish Altaic Turkey A. Özyürek 
Tzeltal Mayan Mexico P. Brown 
Yélî Dyne Papuan Isolate Rossel Island S. Levinson 
Yukatek Mayan Mexico J. Bohnemeyer 
 
different verb they applied to the target events was taken 
to define a category (“pile”). Across languages (and of 
course also within individuals or across individuals within 
the same language), stimuli that are often described with 
the same verb (“are sorted into the same pile”) can be 
taken to be more similar to each other than stimuli that 
typically fall under different verbs (Bowerman, 1996).  
Multivariate statistics can then be used to explore the 
similarity structure of the data set as a whole.  
To extract the most important dimensions organizing 
the similarity space of our stimuli, we used 
correspondence analysis (Greenacre, 1984). Correspon-
dence analysis provides a dual factoring of a rectangular 
matrix in which the column scores and row scores are 
projected into the same low dimensional space. To 
perform the correspondence analysis, we first transformed 
the linguistic data for each language into a similarity 
matrix. This was done by determining, for all scenes taken 
pairwise, whether each member of the pair was ever 
described by the same verb. If so, the pair was assigned a 
similarity score of one; if not, zero.2  
                                                 
2 This technique was adopted rather than a more graded 
approach to similarity based on the number of speakers within 
each language who used the same description, so as not to bias 
the results toward the categorizations favored by languages for 
which we happened to have more speakers. 
 
887
The similarity matrices from all the languages were 
then stacked one on top of another to build a matrix with 
61 columns (the stimuli) and 28*61 (language*stimuli) 
rows. This matrix was submitted to correspondence 
analysis to find the dimensions that are cross-linguistically 
the most important in structuring the similarity space of 
the stimulus set.  The analysis extracts first the dimension 
that accounts for the most variance, then the dimension 
that accounts for the next most variance, and so on. Each 
stimulus scene is positioned in this multidimensional 
space in such a way that the distance between any two 
scenes reflects the degree to which, across languages, 
people described them with the same verbs. Scenes often 
described with the same verb are positioned close 
together, while scenes that are rarely or never described 
with the same verb are positioned far apart.   
 
 
The major dimensions 
The first and most important dimensions extracted in our 
analysis distinguished between events of material 
destruction and other events involving separation. There 
was widespread consensus across languages that events of 
“taking apart” (e.g., separating paper cups), “opening” 
(e.g., opening a box) and “peeling” (fruit) should be  
described with different verbs than events of “cutting and 
breaking”. “Cutting and breaking” events are 
distinguished as a group from other kinds of separation, 
and so form a coherent semantic domain. 
Leaving aside the events of “taking apart”, “opening”, 
and “peeling”, we next focused specifically on the 
similarity structure of the remaining 46 events. These 
stimuli were analyzed with the same procedure outlined in 
the previous section.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Plot of scenes, based on all languages, along 
Dimensions 1 and 3. Dimension 1 distinguishes events 
with precise control over the locus of separation (cutting a 
carrot with a knife) from scenes with intermediate control 
(karate-chopping a carrot) and imprecise control (breaking 
a stick with the hands). 
 
The first and most important dimension of this analysis 
distinguishes among events on the basis of how precisely 
the agent controls the locus of the separation in the object. 
The events are distributed continuously on this dimension. 
(See Figure 1 for the placement of the scenes along 
Dimension 1. Each scene is represented by a number.) 
Events involving relatively precise control (e.g., cutting a 
carrot with a knife, scene 10) is positioned to the left, 
events with imprecise control (e.g., breaking a stick with 
the hands, scene 19) to the right, and events with 
intermediate degrees of control (e.g., karate-chopping a 
carrot, scene 32) in between. Events intermediate on this 
dimension are treated variably across languages, with 
some languages grouping them with the “precise control” 
events positioned to the left, others with the “imprecise 
control” events positioned to the right, and still others 
assigning them to categories of their own. 
Dimension 2 distinguishes just two scenes from the rest 
– those showing an agent tearing a piece of cloth (a two-
dimensional flexible object) partially (scene 36) or 
completely (scene 1) with the hands. These events were 
labeled tear in English, as distinct from cut and break. 
Nineteen out of the 28 languages have a verb that was 
used to categorise these and only these scenes. The 
remaining 9 languages did not distinguish these scenes, 
but grouped them in various ways with other scenes. 
Within the group of scenes pulled out on Dimension 1 
as lacking precise control over the locus of separation, 
Dimension 3 makes a further distinction between 
“snapping” and “smashing” events (see Figure 2a). The 
“snapping” cluster comprises events in which a one-
dimensional rigid object is separated into two pieces by 
applying pressure to both ends (scenes 25, 19, 57, 5), 
while the “smashing” cluster is made up of events in 
which a rigid object is fragmented into many pieces by 
applying a blow, e.g., with a hammer (40, 39, 21, 31). The 
Dimension 3 distinction between “snapping” and 
“smashing”, like the Dimension 2 distinction between 
“tearing” and separations of other kinds, is respected by 
speakers of many languages – cf. the distinction in Likpe 
between events described with f3s3 (the snapping scenes) 
and those described with ba (the smashing scenes) (see 
Figure 2b). But this distinction is not made in all 
languages; colloquial Tamil, for example, collapses these 
two categories (along with a few additional scenes) into a 
single event type, denoted by the verb oDai (see Figure 
2c). 
 
 
Discussion 
Speakers of a variety of typologically, genetically and 
areally diverse languages agree to a surprising  extent in 
their linguistic categorization of events of material 
destruction of objects (“cutting and breaking” events). 
First, they agree on treating such events as a relatively 
coherent semantic domain. A priori, it is not obvious that 
languages will distinguish “cutting and breaking” events 
as a group from events involving other kinds of 
separations of objects or object parts, such as “taking 
apart”, “opening”, and “peeling”; after all, learners of 
English make a number of errors suggesting that the   
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Figure 2a: Plot of scenes, based on all languages, along 
Dimensions 1 and 3, showing the distinction between 
“snapping” and “smashing” events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Likpe is a good example of a language which 
distinguishes “snapping” from “smashing” events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2c: Tamil collapses the “snap-smash” distinction.  
 
boundaries of these event types are not obvious. For this 
reason our set of events to be described included not only 
scenes of “cutting and breaking”, but also of various other 
kinds of separations. But these other separations were 
rarely described with the same verbs that were applied to 
the core set of “cutting and breaking” events. The “cutting 
and breaking” events were treated as far more similar to 
each other than they were to the other kinds of 
separations, in the sense that they were much more often 
described by the same verbs.  
Second, speakers of different languages also showed 
considerable agreement in the kinds of distinctions they 
drew within the domain of  “cutting and breaking” events. 
Although their societies ranged from industrial urban-
dwelling to rainforest-dwelling swidden agriculturist, and 
they varied in their tools and techniques for cutting and 
breaking things in their daily lives, they converged on a 
shared similarity space for events of “cutting and 
breaking”. The most important dimension for the set of 28 
languages taken as a group distinguishes events featuring 
precise control over the locus of separation from those 
with imprecise control (roughly, “cutting” events vs. 
“breaking” events). Further, “tearing” events are very 
often distinguished from among other events with an 
intermediate degree of control (Dimension 2), while 
“snapping” and “smashing” events are often distinguished 
among the events involving imprecise control (Dimension 
3).   
Despite this cross-linguistic agreement there were also 
many differences – language-learners clearly have 
something to learn. Speakers of different languages varied 
in the number of categories of “cutting and breaking” they 
recognized and in where they placed the category 
boundaries. For example, speakers of most of the 
languages respected the distinction between “tearing” and 
other actions of material destruction, but some did not; 
speakers of many languages rigorously distinguished 
between actions of “snapping” and “smashing”, but some 
did not (see Figures 2a-c); and languages differed in 
where they placed the boundary between “precisely” and 
“imprecisely” controlled acts of separation. These 
differences respected the overall structure of the semantic 
space; for example, no speakers described events at the far 
left of Dimension 1 with the same verb(s) as events at the 
far right, while describing the events falling between them 
with different verbs.   
One topic we have not yet mentioned is how a 
language’s semantic categories of “cutting and breaking” 
are related to one another. For instance, English clearly 
organizes its “cutting and breaking” terms hierarchically, 
with the high-frequency verbs break and cut each 
encompassing a number of more specific subtypes, such 
as snapping and smashing for break, and slicing and 
chopping for cut. This kind of organization is less 
apparent in many of the other languages in our sample. 
For example, Dutch has no verbs for “cutting and 
breaking” with as wide an application as English cut and 
break. “Cutting” events are obligatorily subdivided 
according to whether they involve a single-bladed tool 
like a knife or a double-bladed tool like scissors (snijden 
vs. knippen), and there is also no cover term for a wide 
range of “breaking” events; e.g., breken – cognate with 
English break – is used only for “snapping” events. It is 
unclear, then, whether the hierarchical organization found 
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across languages in words for objects will also be 
characteristic of words for events.  
A final topic that we also leave to future work is the 
intriguing question of how the categorization of events 
imposed by language is related to categorization as 
studied with nonlinguistic techniques such as similarity 
ratings. For the object domain of “containers”, speakers of 
different languages classified nonlinguistically more 
similarly than they classified linguistically (Malt et al., 
1999). Whether the same will be true for event categories 
remains to be seen. 
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Abstract
Mapping of written input onto orthographic representations
was examined in bilingual speakers whose two languages
have partially overlapping orthographies. Russian-English
bilinguals and English monolinguals were tested with a
modified version of the picture-word interference paradigm,
adapted for use with eye-tracking. Compared to English
monolinguals, Russian-English bilinguals (tested in English)
made more eye movements to written stimuli that, if mapped
onto two orthographic systems simultaneously, constituted
Russian words. Results suggest parallel activation of both
languages during visual processing of written input, even
when the orthography is associated with different
phonological representations in the two languages. We
suggest that decoding of written input in languages with
partial orthographic overlap is not limited to one language
only, but that the mapping of visual stimuli takes place onto
the orthographic systems of both languages and that lexical
representations in the non-target language become activated.
Introduction
Recent studies of bilingual language processing challenge
earlier accounts of the language switch hypothesis (e.g.,
MacNamara & Kushnir, 1971), according to which
bilinguals are able to selectively activate and deactivate
their two languages. Instead, data support interactive
parallel processing accounts, according to which linguistic
input activates both languages simultaneously. For spoken
word recognition, evidence supporting activation of both
lexicons comes from research investigating spoken language
processing in bilinguals using eye-tracking (Marian &
Spivey, 2003a,b; Spivey & Marian, 1999). In the eye-
tracking paradigm, participants are given spoken
instructions to move objects on a table while their eye
movements are recorded. Although participants rarely pick
up incorrect objects, it is often observed that they fixate
objects that have similar phonology to the spoken word
(e.g., Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998;
Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995).
The eye-tracking technique, merging input from both the
visual and auditory modalities, was adapted for use with
bilinguals to index activation of a second language non-
linguistically. For example, when Russian-English
bilinguals were presented with a visual display containing
four objects (actual objects or toy replicas, as applicable),
such as a shark, a balloon (sharik in Russian), a horse, and a
napkin, and were instructed in English to “pick up the
shark,” they frequently made eye movements to the cross-
linguistic phonological competitor sharik. In this case, the
Russian word sharik was a cross-linguistic cohort (cf.
Marslen-Wilson, 1987; see also Cutler, 1995; Marslen-
Wilson & Welsch, 1978) of the English target word shark,
i.e., the beginning portion of the name of the target object
carried phonetic similarity to the name of one of the other
objects in the other language. Eye movements to the cross-
linguistic cohort, even when the other language is not being
used overtly, supports the hypothesis that phonemic input
initially activates both languages during bilingual spoken
language processing.
For written word recognition, studies examining whether
or not both languages are activated in parallel used code
switching (e.g., Doctor & Klein, 1992; Grainger, 1993;
Grainger & Dijkstra, 1992; Li, 1996; Nas, 1983; Soares &
Grosjean, 1984), phoneme monitoring (e.g., Colome, 2001),
lexical decision (e.g., Brysbaert, Van Dyck, & Van de Poel,
1999; DeGroot, Delmaar, & Lupker, 2000; Dijkstra,
Grainger, & van Heuven, 1999), and priming tasks (e.g.,
Beauvillain & Grainger, 1987). Results indicate that
orthographic input simultaneously activates lexical items
across the two lexicons in the very early stages of
processing, that bilingual visual word recognition is based
on a stimulus-driven analysis indifferent to language, and
that lexical representation in bilingual visual word
recognition is governed by orthography rather than by
language. For example, Bijeljac-Babic, Biardeau, and
Grainger (1997) investigated activation of orthographic
representations in bilingual visual word recognition by
using a masked priming paradigm. Orthographic priming
was observed in both monolingual and bilingual conditions,
suggesting that printed strings of letters can simultaneously
activate lexical representations in both languages, insofar as
these share the same alphabet.
In another study on visual word recognition, Van Heuven,
Dijkstra, and Grainger (1998) used the interlingual
neighbors paradigm (an orthographic neighbor is any word
differing by a single letter from the target word). Cross-
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language interference on target word recognition was
examined with a comprehensive corpus of Dutch and
English words by varying the number of orthographic
neighbors of the target word in the non-target language. The
results showed that words in the non-target language with a
greater number of orthographic neighbors in the target
language had slower response times than words that had
fewer orthographic neighbors in the target language. An
increase in orthographic neighbors within the same language
consistently produced inhibitory effects for the non-target
language and facilitatory effects for the target language.
Because this work is based on bilinguals whose languages
share orthography and where orthography-to-phonology
mappings largely overlap across the two languages, the
extent of parallel activation for languages that do not share
orthography, or share it only partially, remains unclear.
Studies with bilinguals that speak languages that do not
overlap orthographically are limited (e.g., Tzelgov, Henik,
Sneg, & Baruch, 1996). Languages that do not share visual
representation make it possible to examine phonological and
semantic activation of the non-target language during
bilingual reading (Besner & Hildebrandt, 1987; Bowers,
Mimouni, & Arguin, 2000; Brown, Sharma, & Kirsner,
1984; Chen & Tsoi, 1990; Smith & Kirsner, 1982), but not
activation of the written form of both languages. Testing
Russian-English bilinguals whose two languages share
some, but not all, orthographic and phonological forms,
provides precisely this advantage--it becomes possible to
dissociate the activation of phonology and orthography
during language processing by manipulating stimulus make-
up.
The two languages of a Russian-English bilingual include
some graphemes that share both visual and auditory form
(e.g., K), other graphemes that share visual, but not auditory
form (e.g., P, which in Russian reads R), yet others that
share auditory, but not visual form (letters specific to the
Latin vs. Cyrillic alphabets). Of particular interest in
designing the present study are the 12 letters that overlap
orthographically across English and Russian. Of these, 6
share both orthography and phonology—A, E, K, M, O, T.
The remaining six, although identical orthographically,
carry no phonological overlap—B, C, H, P, Y, X (the
corresponding phonological representations in Russian are,
following the Library of Congress Transliteration Schemes
for Non-Roman Scripts (1991): B-v, C-s, H-n, P-r, Y-u, X-
h). Testing Russian-English bilinguals makes it possible to
examine the mapping of the visual stimulus onto
orthographic and phonological representations in the two
languages during bilingual lexical access in circumstances
where phonemic overlap across two languages is possible
without orthographic overlap and where orthographic
overlap between the two languages is possible without
phonemic overlap. By manipulating orthographic form and
the associated phonological representations, the present
experiment tests activation of the other language when the
written input shares orthographic, but does not share
phonological, representation across languages. The stated
relationship between Russian and English in terms of
phonological and orthographic structure of the two
languages can provide valuable insights into orthographic
and phonological processing and contribute to
understanding the extent to which constraints imposed by
language structure modulate cross-language interactions.
The only other similar work exploring processing of Latin
and Cyrillic alphabets comes from studies of monolingual
speakers of Serbo-Croatian (e.g., Feldman & Turvey, 1983;
Lukatela, Savic, Gligorijevic, Ognjenovic, & Turvey, 1978).
Serbo-Croatian as a language is unique in that it uses two
alphabets, Latin and Cyrillic. Serbo-Croatian speakers are
slower in lexical decision tasks when two phonological
interpretations could be assigned to the same letter string, an
effect sensitive to the number and distribution of ambiguous
characters. The major difference between studying Russian-
English bilinguals and studying Serbo-Croatian speakers is
that Serbo-Croatian speakers are monolingual and therefore,
by definition, have an integrated lexicon.
In the present experiment, a modified version of the
Picture-Word Interference (PWI) paradigm, adapted for use
with an eye-tracker, was used. The PWI paradigm consists
of presenting participants with a picture that also contains a
written word. Participants have to name the picture while
ignoring the word; reaction times are recorded. Multiple
studies suggest that picture naming latencies vary as a
function of the relation between a picture and a distracter
word (e.g., Caramazza & Costa, 2000, 2001; Deschneiak &
Schriefers, 2001; LaHeij & van den Hof, 1995; Rayner &
Springer, 1986; Schriefers & Meyer, 1990). For example,
semantically related words interfere more than semantically
unrelated words (e.g., Levelt, Schriefers, Vorberg, Meyer,
Pechmann, & Havinga, 1991; Starreveld & LaHeij, 1996,
1995). The surface form of the distractor word also
influences picture naming (e.g., Meyer & Schriefers, 1991),
with phonological similarities facilitating picture naming
(e.g., Descheniak & Schriefers, 2001). Performance on the
bilingual PWI task has been examined both for semantically
and phonologically related items (e.g., Costa & Caramazza,
1999; Costa, Miozzo, & Caramazza, 1999) and was found to
be vulnerable to semantic interference from a non-target
language (e.g., Ehri & Buchard-Ryan, 1980; Hermans,
Bongaerts, de Bot, & Schreuder, 1998), but the effect was
mediated by degree of proficiency (e.g., Goodman, Haith,
Guttentag, & Rao, 1985), by similarity of the two
languages, and by response language (for a review, see
Smith, 1997).  The modification of the PWI task for use
with eye-tracking consists of presenting the written word in
a different quadrant of the visual display (as opposed to
within the picture). The technique was piloted with
monolingual English and bilingual Russian-English
speakers and confirmed that interference effects persisted.
In sum, the present experiment examined parallel
activation of both languages during bilingual written word
recognition in monolingual settings and extended the study
of parallel activation during bilingual written word
recognition to languages with partial overlap in orthography
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and orthography-to-phonology mappings. We predicted that,
compared to English monolinguals, Russian-English
bilinguals naming pictures in English would make more eye
movements to written stimuli that are semantically unrelated
to the picture in English, but are related to it in Russian, thus
suggesting that processing of written input is not limited to
the target language, but that the visual stimulus is also
mapped onto non-target language orthography, even when
orthographic representations are associated with different
phonological forms in the two languages.
Methods
Design
The study followed a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design, with
group (bilingual vs. monolingual) as the between-subject
factor and condition (control vs. Russian words) as the
within-subject factor. All participants were tested in English
only. In the first condition, the picture and the distracter
word were semantically unrelated if the written stimulus
was mapped onto either language (e.g., picture of a
palmtree , written stimulus HOCTA). In the second
condition, the picture and the distracter were unrelated if the
written word was mapped onto English orthography only,
but semantically related if it was also mapped onto Russian
orthography (e.g., picture of a palmtree, word stimulus is
COCHA. In English COCHA is a non-word, while in
Russian it is the orthographic representation of the word
pinetree and is pronounced sasna.) In the second condition,
semantic interference is present if the written stimulus is
mapped in parallel not only onto English orthography, but
also onto Russian orthography, therefore activating the other
language in a bottom-up manner. Proportion of eye
movements to distracter words and reaction times for
picture naming were measured.
Participants
Fifteen Russian-English bilinguals (mean age=25 years) and
15 English monolinguals (mean age=21 years) were tested.
Russian-English bilinguals and monolingual English
speakers were recruited among undergraduate and graduate
students at Northwestern University and via personal
contacts. All participants were paid for their participation.
In addition to picture naming, all participants were
administered the Language Experience and Bilingual Status
(LEABS) Questionnaire (Marian, Blumenfeld, &
Kaushanskaya, 2003) for self–reported measures of
language preference, proficiency, acquisition history, and
current exposure. All bilinguals were fluent in both
languages and were not enrolled in ESL classes. Measures
of language experience collected via self-reports were
included in analyses of covariance.
Stimuli
Twenty-four stimulus sets were generated for the two
conditions. Across conditions, stimuli were controlled for
length and bigram frequency. For English frequencies, the
CELEX database was used (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Van
Rijn, 1993). For Russian frequencies, the new Frequency
Dictionary at the Russian Research Institute of Artificial
Intelligence (www.artint.ru/projects/frqlist/frqlist-en.asp;
Sharoff, 2002) was used. Stimuli consisted of black line
drawings and were generated using the IMSI Masterclips
database and original artwork, and were altered in Adobe
Photoshop. In order to meaningfully monitor eye
movements, the locations of the target picture and the
written word on the display were varied across four possible
quadrants (top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right).
Procedure
All participants were tested in English. The bilingual
speakers were tested in one language only so as to prevent
overt activation of the other language during the experiment.
Participants were asked to label pictures presented on a Mac
computer display (G4 dual-processor computer) using
Superlab software. Their verbal responses were recorded
using a microphone. Eye movements during the experiment
were recorded using an ISCAN head-mounted eye-tracker.
The head-mounted eye-tracker consisted of a baseball-like
cap, with two small cameras attached to the visor. One
camera recorded the participant’s field of view, and the
other camera recorded the participant’s eye movements; the
outputs from the two cameras were superimposed and
recorded using a digital recorder and were later analyzed
using FinalCutPro software with frame-by-frame
audio/video playback.
Results
The proportions of eye movements to distracter words
during picture naming were analyzed with a 2 x 2 Analysis
of Covariance, with group (monolingual or bilingual) and
condition (control or Russian word) as the two independent
variables and language preference when reading as
covariate. Results revealed a main effect of group, F (1,
27)=5.06, p<0.05 and a significant interaction between
condition and group, F (1, 27)=4.78, p<0.05. Overall,
bilinguals made more eye movements to distracter words
than monolinguals, 56% vs 34%. However, post-hoc
analyses suggest that this difference was larger in the
Russian words condition (61% for bilinguals vs 32% for
monolinguals), where the two groups were significantly
different from each other (F (1,27)=7.77, p<0.01), than in
the control condition (50% for bilinguals vs 37% for
monolinguals), where the two groups did not differ
significantly (F (1,27)=1.92, p>0.1). A similar 2x2 Ancova
on reaction time data did not reveal any significant effect of
condition (F=1.16, p>0.1), group (F=1.33, p>0.1), or
interaction between the two (F=0.21, p>0.1).
Based on self-reports collected with the LEABS
Questionnaire, Russian-English bilinguals were grouped
into 2 types, one consisting of bilinguals who preferred to
read in English and one consisting of bilinguals who
preferred to read in Russian. The proportion of looks made
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by the two types of bilinguals to Russian competitor words
and to control stimuli were compared in two ways.  First,
we examined whether or not the two types of bilinguals
looked at the written stimuli at all (individual trials were
coded with a 0 if participants did not look at the written
stimulus and with a 1 if they did). Next, we examined the
number of times the participants looked at a written
stimulus (individual trials were coded with a 0 if
participants did not look at the written stimulus, with a 1 if
they looked at it once, with a 2 if they looked at it twice,
with a 3 if they looked at it three times, and so on).  Results
of the first comparison did not reveal any significant
differences, suggesting that the two types of bilinguals were
just as likely to fixate distracter Russian words. Results of
the second comparison revealed a marginally significant
interaction between condition and type of bilinguals, F(1,
13)=4.43, p<0.06. Bilinguals who preferred to read in
English (N=9) looked at Russian words more often (60%)
than at control stimuli (48%); this pattern was not observed
for bilinguals (N=6) who preferred to read in Russian (47%
to Russian words and 52% to control stimuli).
Discussion
The present experiment examined mapping of visual input
onto orthographic representations and lexical forms in
bilinguals whose two languages share partial orthographic
overlap. Results suggest that Russian-English bilinguals,
when presented with written language input in a
monolingual English setting, map the visual stimulus onto
orthographic representations in both languages. As a result,
lexical representations in the non-target language become
activated, as evidenced by more eye movements to Russian
distracter words relative to bigram-matched control stimuli
in bilinguals, but not in monolinguals. These findings
contribute to the existing body of literature suggesting
simultaneous activation of a bilingual’s two languages
during written language processing and extend them to
speakers whose two languages overlap orthographically
only partially.
Absence of differences in picture-naming reaction times
suggests that the simultaneous activation of non-target
language orthography and lexicon (as demonstrated by eye
movement data) did not minimize the efficiency with which
bilinguals accomplished a language production task in the
target language. This finding is consistent with recent
accounts of optimal speed/accuracy outcomes achieved by
parallel interactive models of language processing.
The finding that preferred reading language influenced
the degree of activation of a bilingual’s other language (as
indicated by number of times bilinguals looked at Russian
words) points to the importance of carefully assessing
bilinguals’ experience and proficiency in the two languages.
Proficiency understanding, speaking, reading, and writing in
the two languages, as well as factors pertaining to
acquisition and current use of the two languages are just
some of the variables to be taken into account when testing
language processing in bilinguals (Marian, to appear). In our
study, bilinguals who preferred reading in their second
language (English) were just as likely to fixate Russian
words as their peers who preferred reading in Russian, but
once a written stimulus drew their eye movements,
bilinguals who preferred to read in English were more likely
to look at the Russian word again, fixating it repeatedly.
These results suggest that, while the non-target language
was activated in both types of bilinguals, processing the
written input and possibly accessing its lexical
representation was more effortful for those bilinguals whose
preferred reading language was English.
It is notable that activation of the non-target language
occurred in spite of the differential orthography-to-
phonology mappings associated with the two languages.
Although these results suggest simultaneous mapping onto
the orthography and lexicon of the non-target language, they
do not provide information about activation of the non-
target language phonology, since lexical activation of the
non-target language during orthographic processing may or
may not have included phonological activation (i.e.,
mapping to the lexicon may have been directly from
orthographic representations, bypassing phonology). To
examine activation of non-target language phonology during
written language processing, a mirror image of the present
experiment is required. Namely, while the present
experiment tested activation of non-target language
orthography  by examining processing of input that
overlapped orthographically, but not phonologically, a
separate experiment tested activation of non-target language
phono logy  by examining processing of input that
overlapped phonologically, but not orthographically
(Kaushanskaya & Marian, 2004).
Moreover, for a more comprehensive understanding of
parallel activation of both languages in Russian-English
bilinguals during written language processing, a closer look
at semantic processing is necessary. In the present study,
stimuli consisted of English non-words, so as to avoid word
frequency confounds across languages. Future work needs
to expand this paradigm to processing written stimuli that
constitute words in both languages. Whether the written
stimuli are English words or nonsense strings is likely to
influence the strength of competition from Russian
semantically-related words. Furthermore, when the written
stimulus is a word in each language, word frequencies in the
two languages are likely to influence the effect, with higher-
frequency mappings resulting in faster activation. Finally,
future efforts will also focus on examining input properties
that are likely to influence the relative activation of the non-
target language during written word recognition, such as
amount of orthographic and phonemic overlap across the
two languages.
The proposed project has implications for understanding
language development and processing in bilinguals, and
reading and acquisition of literacy in bilinguals, with
potential implications for bilingual education and for
assessment of bilinguals. For instance, understanding
written word recognition in bilinguals who are in
894
monolingual contexts may have implications for bilingual
children entering mainstream (not ESOL) classrooms. The
results of the 2000 Census indicate that 18% of American
households speak a language other than English at home and
that this proportion is increasing. Understanding how
bilingual status influences cognitive and linguistic
functioning may have direct implications for this
linguistically diverse and severely under-served segment of
the population. Beyond bilingual language processing, this
research will contribute to advancing the understanding of
language processing in general, including written word
recognition and spoken word production.
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Abstract
Performance modeling has been made easier by architectures
which package psychological theory for reuse at different
levels. Both CPM-GOMS, which packages theory at the task
level, and ACT-R, which packages theory at the lower level
of rules for perceptual-motor interaction, have been shown to
be useful. This paper describes ACT-Stitch, a framework for
translating CPM-GOMS templates and interleaving theory
into ACT-R. The research involved in producing ACT-Stitch
will benefit reusable template research by showing how to
implement templates and interleaving in a new architecture
that processes resource information. ACT-R research will
benefit from re-usable productions packaged at a higher task
level and from the multi-tasking control structure used that
allows ACT-R to interleave productions from different
templates. The zero-parameter predictions of ACT-Stitch are
empirically validated.
Introduction
Predicting well-practiced human performance in human-
computer interaction (HCI) domains by means of computer
modeling is a valuable but difficult process. For example,
modeling has been used to predict the outcome of a test of
new computer workstations, saving a telephone company
millions of dollars per year (Gray, John & Atwood, 1993),
but much of the modeling was done by hand. 
For accurate predictions, a large amount of psychological
theory needs to be applied. Several modeling architectures
have been developed to make modeling easier by packaging
this theory for reuse. CPM-GOMS (John, 1988; 1990) uses
templates of behavior to package at a task level (e.g., mouse
move-click, typing) predictions of lower-level cognitive,
perceptual, and motor resource use. These templates are
interleaved to reflect the ability of skilled people to perform
parts of one task in parallel with another. For example, an
eye-movement study has demonstrated interleaving in a
hand-washing task -- while people perform the subtask of
first getting their hands wet they interleave a look to the
soap dispenser before performing the motor actions in the
subtask of soaping their hands (Pelz & Canosa, 2001). The
CPM-GOMS theory has been automated (John, et al., 2002)
in a computational architecture that schedules blocks of
abstract resource use (Freed et al., 2003). ACT-R (Anderson
& Lebiere, 1998; Anderson et al., submitted) uses a
computational production system architecture for packaging
knowledge at the lower level of rules for working with
cognitive and perceptual information and motor actions. In
contrast with CPM-GOMS, the ACT-R system can interact
with an environment to perceive objects and manipulate
them. However, ACT-R does not have a built-in theory of
multi-tasking which would interleave tasks, although some
work has been done in modeling multi-tasking in the ACT-R
architecture (Byrne & Anderson, 2001; Lee & Taatgen,
2002; Salvucci, 2002).
This paper presents a new framework, ACT-Stitch, which
combines the usefulness of modeling at the task level with
the process theory of a lower-level cognitive architecture. It
uses a process of macro-compilation similar to that used by
Salvucci and Lee (2003) to translate CPM-GOMS templates
into ACT-R productions. Their system will be compared to
the current system in the discussion section, but one
difference is that their system models at the level of KLM-
GOMS, which does not interleave cognitive operators (John
& Kieras, 1996). The control structure used by ACT-Stitch
to achieve the interleaving of cognitive operators from
different templates is one of the major contributions of this
paper. The research involved in producing ACT-Stitch will
benefit reusable template research by showing what aspects
of template and interleaving theory are important in a new
architecture that processes resource information. ACT-R
research will benefit from re-usable productions packaged at
a higher task level and from the multi-tasking control
structure used that allows ACT-R to interleave productions
from  different templates.
Templates
Templates are building blocks of human behavior containing
a detailed theory of cognitive, perceptual, and motor
behaviors. They are beneficial for modelers because they
package this theory at the task level and can be reused in
different applications (Matessa et al., 2002). Even behavior
as simple as a mouse move and click requires coordination
of the use of cognitive, perceptual, and motor resources, as
Figure 1 shows in PERT chart form with boxes representing
resource use and lines indicating dependencies. The
template was developed for the simple task of clicking on lit
circles by Gray and Boehm-Davis (2000), but has been
successfully reused for clicking to operate a simulated
automated teller machine (John, et al., 2002).
Templates require a theory of interleaving to reflect the
ability of skilled people to perform operations from different
tasks in parallel. When CPM-GOMS was first developed,
this interleaving was done by hand, with modelers applying
their knowledge of the psychology involved. John et al.
(2002) codified this knowledge and implemented automated
interleaving in a system that scheduled blocks of abstract
resource use. Results from this work were used in the
construction of ACT-Stitch templates that produce
productions which ACT-R can interleave. 
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Figure 1:  A template of carefully moving the cursor to a target and clicking the mouse 
(adapted from Gray and Boehm-Davis, 2000).
Macro-Compilation
ACT-Stitch uses a process of macro-compilation to translate
CPM-GOMS templates of human behavior into ACT-R
productions. More specifically, cognitive operators are
translated into productions with ACT-R perceptual-motor
commands that represent CPM-GOMS perceptual-motor
operators. Productions also contain a control structure that
allows ACT-R to implement CPM-GOMS interleaving and
have productions from one template execute during the
execution of productions from another template. This
differs from the ACT-Simple system (Salvucci & Lee, 2003)
that compiled a sequence of KLM-GOMS tasks into a series
of productions which were controlled by an incrementing
state counter.
Macro-compilation should not to be confused with ACT-
R production compilation in which two productions are
translated into another more efficient production. Salvucci
and Lee (2003) argue that macro-compilation facilitates
theoretical consistency, inheritance of architectural features,
model integration, and model refinement. Theoretical
consistency is maintained by having the higher task-level
template share a consistent representation with the lower-
level ACT-R architecture. The macro-compiled template
inherits parameters and limitations that increase
psychological plausibility as well as a framework for
learning, showing individual differences, and making errors.
Model integration is helped by providing a common
language where models from different domains can interact.
ACT-Stitch Framework
To understand how ACT-Stitch works, this section will first
explain the process of how a modeler uses ACT-Stitch, then
describe the ACT-R architecture, then go into more detail
about macro-compilation and production execution, and
finally give an example of macro-compiled productions.
ACT-Stitch modeling
ACT-Stitch currently has two templates implemented, Slow-
Move-Click and Fast-Move-Click, based on templates from
Gray and Boehm-Davis (2000). For Gray and Boehm-
Davis, Slow-Move-Click represented the selection of a
target when there is uncertainty about where the target
appears in each trial. Fast-Move-Click represented the
selection of a target at a known location. and skipped the
verification of the cursor being at the target. These
templates were reused by John et al. (2002) in modeling
interactions with a simulated automated teller machine.
There, Slow-Move-Click represented the selection of
difficult targets at far distances, requiring more careful
verification of target and cursor location before clicking than
the selection of easier targets, which are represented with
Fast-Move-Click.
To use ACT-Stitch, the modeler creates two lists, one for
target objects and one for a task sequence. The target object
list contains target names, positions, and sizes. The task
sequence list contains template/target pairs. The system
then creates an environment including target objects and
macro-compiles templates into productions. The ACT-R
system is then run, and information about resource use and
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dependencies is automatically stored. This information can
be exported to a PERT chart viewing program.
ACT-R
ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Anderson et al.,
submitted) is a computational theory of human cognition
incorporating both declarative knowledge (e.g., addition
facts) and procedural knowledge (e.g., the process of solving
a multi-column addition problem) into a production system
where procedural rules act on declarative chunks. Chunks
are made up of slots containing information, and production
rules which match the information in chunk slots are able to
execute. The goal chunk represents the current intentions.
The ACT-R system includes the capability for modelers to
create simulated environments, such as screen interfaces.
Production rules have the ability to interact with this
environment by perceiving objects and making motor
movements through perceptual and motor buffers. With this
interaction, ACT-R can make use of Fitts' Law to make
predictions of movement time based on distance to target
and target size.
ACT-Stitch production creation
CPM-GOMS templates contain predictions of cognitive,
perceptual, and motor behavior. When translating a
template into ACT-R productions, each cognitive operator in
a template corresponds to a production in ACT-R.
Cognitive operators and productions are both predicted to
take 50 ms to perform by each theory. Both theories predict
parallel execution of cognitive, perceptual, and motor
processes. In CPM-GOMS, each perceptual and motor
operator requires an initiation by a cognitive operator. This
corresponds to the ACT-R requirement of productions to
initiate vision and motor processes. To move visual
attention to a new location and perceive an object, CPM-
GOMS predicts that it takes 30 ms to move attention plus
some time for perception, while ACT-R predicts that is takes
85 ms to move attention with no additional time for
perception. For mouse movement, CPM-GOMS predicts an
execution time calculated by Fitts' Law, while ACT-R
predicts a 200 ms preparation time plus a time calculated by
Fitts' Law plus a 50 ms finish time. For mouse clicks, CPM-
GOMS predicts a 100 ms mouse down time plus a 100 ms
mouse up time, while ACT-R predicts a 150 ms preparation
time plus a 60 ms execution time plus a 90 ms finish time.
ACT-R can perform motor preparations in parallel with the
motor executions and finishes of previous motor commands,
and ACT-Stitch creates productions that take advantage of
this capability.
ACT-Stitch creates a set of productions for each
template/target pair in the task list, and the productions
created from macro-compilation must insure proper
sequencing of motor actions, insure the ability to allow the
correct productions in future templates to interleave during
the execution of productions in the current template, and
insure the ability to block the incorrect productions in future
templates from interleaving with productions in the current
template.
These three requirements are accomplished in productions
by using information in the current goal as well as
perceptual-motor buffers. Slots in the goal are created for
the vision and hand resources for both the intended action
and target making use of the resource. This makes four slots
in the goal: vision action, vision target, hand action, and
hand target. To insure proper sequencing, the action slots in
productions of the current template are filled with an
intended action appended with the unique number of the
current template. Also, the target slots are filled with an
intended target. The intended action cannot be used alone
since without the template number no sequence information
would be stored. The template number cannot be used alone
since there may be multiple actions in the same template
using the same resource (e.g., mouse move and click). The
intended target cannot be used alone since sequence
information would be lost if a target appears twice in a
sequence (e.g., clicking the same number twice). The
intended target cannot be ignored since the same action
could be used in a template for two targets (e.g., verify
target and verify cursor).
To insure the ability to interleave productions, separate
action slots are used for each resource (vision and hand).
This allows, for example, a procedure to initiate a vision
action from a future template before a procedure initiates a
hand action from the current template. To insure the ability
to block productions from future templates, the action slots
are filled with intended actions appended with the current
template number. This prevents, for example, moving to the
next target while the hand resource is free between moving
to the current target and clicking on the current target. The
template number cannot be contained in a separate goal slot
because that would not allow productions from the next
template to execute before the productions of the current
template have finished.
Perceptual-motor buffers are also used in sequencing.
Productions that interact with the perceptual-motor buffers
check to make sure the buffers are free before using them.
Also, the task logic of perception and action makes use of
buffers to order productions. For example, the process of
verifying a target position before clicking requires filling the
visual location buffer with the location of the intended
target, then filling the visual object buffer with the object
found at that location, and then making a mouse click
through the motor buffer.
These goal slots and buffers could be extended to include
resources such as a left hand and buffers such as memory
retrieval in future template development.
ACT-Stitch production execution
The ACT-R system is initialized with the goal containing
the actions and targets of the first template. ACT-R selects
productions to execute based on the state of the goal and
perceptual-motor buffers. Productions make calls to the
perceptual-motor system which has assumptions for how
long the resources are used. Slack time corresponds to the
time a resource is available during procedure execution. A
production that is created from the next template can
execute (even if all the productions made from the current
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template are not finished executing) when it matches values
in the action and target goal slots. Action slots contain
intended actions appended with unique template numbers,
and target slots contain intended targets. When a resource is
no longer needed by a template, a production in the template
will fill the action slot with the next intended action
appended with the next template number, and the target slot
will be filled with the next intended target.
Within-template dependencies are implemented by
productions waiting for action and target slots to be filled in
the goal and for resources to be available. Template
productions are created so that a production will change the
contents of action and target slots appropriately. A
production (A) from a future template that is waiting for
another production (B) in that template to change the
contents of action and target slots cannot execute during the
execution of productions in the current template until
production B is executed.
Relationships across templates are established the same
way as within templates, using action and target slots in the
goal. Values in these slots allow the blocking of
productions that would use resources even if the resource is
free.
Example ACT-Stitch productions
To get an idea of what a template looks like after being
macro-compiled into ACT-R productions, the following
shows pseudo-code for the Fast-Move-Click template. Each
instance of a template in the task sequence list would have
its own set of productions labeled by the position of the
template in the list (x).
Tx-Init-Move-Cursor
IF
right hand action goal is to move in this template
right hand target goal is this template's object
motor preparations have completed
THEN
move cursor
empty right hand target goal
set right hand action goal to click in this template 
Tx-Attend-Targ
IF
vision action goal is to attend target in this template
vision target goal is this template's object
visual location and object buffers are empty
vision is available
THEN
 fill visual location buffer with location where 
    this template's object should be
Tx-Init-Eye-Move
IF
vision action goal is to attend target in this template
vision target goal is this template's object
visual object buffer is empty
visual location buffer holds object location
 THEN
fill visual object buffer with object at location
empty visual location buffer
Tx-Verify-Targ-Pos
IF
vision action goal is to attend target in this template 
vision target goal is this template's object
right hand target goal is empty
visual object buffer holds object at location y
location y is the expected location of this template's object
THEN
empty visual object buffer 
set visual action goal to attend in the next template 
set visual target goal to next template's object
set right hand target goal to this template's object
Tx-Init-Click
IF
right hand action goal is to click in this template 
right hand target goal is this template's object
motor preparations have completed
THEN
click mouse
set right hand action goal to move in next template
set right hand target goal to next template's object
Productions that initiate motor movements (Init-Move-
Cursor and Init-Click) first check that the motor preparations
from previous motor movements have completed Since
motor preparations can happen in parallel with motor
executions and finishes in ACT-R, this means that
preparations can start during previous executions and
finishes. Productions could be written to wait for the
previous executions and finishes to complete before starting
preparations, but they would not be as efficient.
Empirical Validation
ACT-Stitch was applied to the ATM task used by John et al.
(2002) to test their automation of CPM-GOMS. The task
was to make an $80 withdraw from a checking account on a
simulation of an automated teller machine. Users interacted
with the ATM by using a mouse to click on simulated keys
or slots. The users were instructed to follow the following
steps:
Insert card (click on the card slot)
Enter PIN (click on the 4, 9, 0, and 1 keys in turn)
Press OK (click on the OK button)
Select transaction type (click on the withdraw button)
Select account (click on the checking button)
Enter amount (click on the 8 and 0 keys)
Select correct/not correct (click on the correct button)
Take cash (click on the cash slot)
Select another transaction (click on the No button)
Take card (click on the card slot)
Take receipt (click on the cash slot)
This task was repeated 200 times by the users, and results
were analyzed using the means of trials 51-100. This level
of practice is comparable to that used by both Card, Moran,
and Newell (1983) in a text editing task and Baskin and
John (1998) in a CAD drawing task when they explored the
effects of extensive practice on match to various GOMS
models. As in John et al. (2002), Slow-Move-Click
templates were used for targets that were difficult to select
because of size and distance (e.g. the thin card slot) and
Fast-Move-Click templates were used for easier targets (e.g.
keypad keys).  
Figure 2 compares ACT-Stitch predictions of mouse click
times to average subject mouse click times of trials 51-100.
The results are highly correlated (r=.96) with a low average
absolute difference of 62 ms. 
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Figure 2:  Average subject performance compared to ACT-Stitch predictions, 
ACT-Stitch predictions with no interleaving, and Fitts' Law predictions.
Figure 2 also shows the value of cognitive modeling over a
Fitts' Law only prediction and the value of ACT-Stitch
interleaving. A Fitts' Law prediction has a high correlation
with subject performance (r=.97) but predicts faster
performance, with an average absolute difference of 416 ms.
A version of ACT-Stitch was created that did not interleave
template productions, and while the correlation with subject
performance was still high (r=.95), the predictions are too
slow (average absolute distance = 257 ms).
The effect of interleaving on resource use is shown in
PERT chart form in Figure 3. This output is from the
Sherpa visualization tool developed by John et al. (2002) in
their work to automate CPM-GOMS. The top row shows
vision resource use, the second shows cognition, the third
shows motor preparation, and the bottom shows motor
execution and finishing. Resource use is indicated with
shaded boxes, and instances of resource use in the same
template are shown with the same shade of gray. The figure
shows how cognitive, perceptual, and motor resources are
interleaved between templates.
General Discussion
ACT-Stitch appears to be a useful framework for modeling
the cognitive, perceptual, and motor processes involved in
HCI tasks. With a simple description of an environment and
task sequence, it is able to produce detailed, zero-parameter
predictions that match well to human data.
ACT-Stitch has some similarities and differences with the
ACT-Simple framework created by Salvucci and Lee
(2003). They both use a process of macro-compilation to
translate task-level descriptions of behavior into ACT-R
productions, which give a detailed account of the cognitive,
perceptual, and motor processes involved in the task. ACT-
Stitch adds the ability to easily simulate simple
environments, the ability for templates to interleave
cognitive operators, and the ability to view resource use of
the model with PERT chart tools. With the environment,
models can take advantage of Fitts' Law to make detailed
predictions of movement times. With a theory of
interleaving that is based on fixed resources instead of
spontaneous task demands, ACT-R modelers have the
ability to start moving away from control theory based on
simple chained productions. With PERT chart output,
complex interactions of resource use in models can be
understood easier.
CPM-GOMS is assumed to model skilled performance,
and a CPM-GOMS model translated into ACT-R can be
thought of as a state of performance after learning. With the
ACT-R compilation process of learning more efficient
productions, the whole learning curve from slow reading
and remembering instructions to quick interleaving of
resources can be studied. There has already been some start
on this by Lee and Taatgen (2002), where they describe a
model of performance on an air traffic controller task that at
first has slow performance to due interpreting instructions,
then speeds up due to production compilation creating more
efficient productions, and eventually interleaves an optional
step to look at wind conditions during multiple keystrokes.
In the ATM task, ACT-Stitch accounts for the data as well
as CPM-GOMS automated in another system (see John et
al., 2002), but it differs from that system in that it predicts a
200 ms motor preparation that occurs between the
movement of attention and motor execution (see Figure 3).
ACT-Stitch predicts that during this motor preparation time
previous motor operations are taking place. This prediction
could be tested with eye-tracking experiments.
This paper offers only a first step of a template and
interleaving theory in ACT-R. Many more templates are
needed to test the robustness of the representations used for
the interleaving theory.  
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Figure 3:  PERT chart of ACT-Stitch interleaving perceptual, cognitive, motor preparation, 
and motor execution and finishing resources
There are some interleaving abilities that the current
framework cannot accomplish, for example, hovering a hand
over a key for a key press that occurs in a template that is
more than one template away in the future, or blocking an
arbitrary combination of resources (such as both hands
during typing) from interleaving. But this work is a first
step to easier modeling and multi-tasking in ACT-R.
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Abstract
Cognitive scientists interested in the link between language and
visual experience have shown that linguistic input influences eye
movements. Research in this area, however, tends to focus on
literal language alone.  In the current study, we investigate
whether figurative language influences eye movements.  In our
experiment, participants viewed two-dimensional depictions of
static spatial scenes while they heard either fictive motion
sentences, such as The palm trees run along the highway, or
non-fictive motion sentences, such as The palm trees are next to
the highway. Overall, sentence type influenced participants’ eye
movements. Specifically, gaze duration on the figure (e.g., palm
trees) was longer with fictive motion sentences than with non-
fictive motion sentences.  Our results demonstrate that figurative
language influences visual experience. They provide further
evidence that fictive motion processing includes mentally
simulated motion.
Introduction
Imagine that you and a friend are sitting in a courtyard
chatting. During the course of the conversation, you
occasionally glance over at a long, thin stationary object on
the ground. You assume the object is a tree branch or a
walking stick until your friend says, “Oh! Look what
slithered onto the courtyard.” At that point, your perceptions
and conceptions of the object dramatically change.  The
object goes from a piece of wood to a snake.
Situations like these––in which language influences the
interpretation of objects and actions––are ubiquitous.  The
question addressed here is whether this influence is limited
to literal language, or whether it also includes figurative
language. We are especially interested in whether sentences
such as The road goes through the desert or The fence
follows the coastline (figurative because they include a
motion verb but express no motion) affect eye movements.
Our results suggest they do.
What We Know about Fictive Motion
Everyday language is replete with sentences such as (1a)
and (1b).  These are literal descriptions of static scenes.
(1a)  The road is in the desert
(1b) The fence is on the coastline
Language is also full of sentences such as (2a) and (2b).
(2a)  The road goes through the desert
(2b) The fence follows the coastline
These sentences are figurative because they contain a
motion verb (e.g., goes, follows) but express no actual
motion (Matlock, 2001).1 They contrast with literal
sentences with motion verbs, such as The bus goes through
the desert, or The herd of sheep follows the coastline, which
feature mobile agents that move from one point in space and
time to another (Talmy, 1975; Miller & Johnson-Laird,
1976).
Despite the absence of actual movement with sentences
such as (2a) and (2b), they have been claimed to involve
fictive motion, an implicit mental simulation of “movement”
through a construed scene (Talmy, 1983, 1996, 2000). On
this view, the conceptualizer subjectively “scans” from one
part of the scene to another, most notably, along the figure
(i.e., prominent entity, subject noun phrase referent).  For
(2a), this means “moving” along the road, and for (2b), it
means “moving” along the fence.  According to the
argument, fictive motion is a way to impose motion on what
is otherwise a static scene.  It enables the language user to
compute information about the layout of a scene, for
instance, a road in a desert in (2a), or a fence aligned with a
coastline in (2b). Importantly, Talmy (1996) and other
cognitive linguists do not maintain that fictive motion
involves vivid imagery whereby the conceptualizer “sees”
himself or herself (or any other animate entity) moving
point by point along the figure in the scene being described.
Instead, they take the motion to be relatively fleeting and
tacit. (See also Langacker’s abstract motion, 1986, 2000,
and Matsumoto’s subjective motion, 1996).2
At first, the claim that people simulate motion while
processing descriptions of static scenes seems bizarre. Why
would motion be processed, for instance, with sentences
such as (2a) and (2b) when neither the road nor the fence is
                                                          
1 Like Rumelhart (1979) and Gibbs (1994), we do not maintain a
hard and fast distinction between “literal” and “figurative”.  We
simply use these terms here to operationalize two types of motion
verb constructions: those that express motion and those that do not.
2 Our study looks at just one type of fictive motion, Talmy’s
(2000) co-extension path fictive motion.  There are many others.
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capable of movement? Perhaps it is more reasonable to
assume that such sentences are yoked to a purely static
representation, as proposed by Jackendoff (2002). On this
view, the representation underlying sentences such as (2a)
and (2b) is static and atemporal.  It is not unlike the
representation underlying the literal sentences shown in (1a)
and (1b), in which all points along the figure are activated
simultaneously rather than incrementally.
Recent experimental work suggests that mental
simulation, a fundamental part of cognition (e.g., Schwartz
& Black, 1999; Freyd, 1983; Barsalou, 1999) generalizes to
fictive motion.  In several reading studies, Matlock (in
press) investigated whether thinking about motion would
affect fictive motion processing. In one study, participants
read vignettes about fast or slow travel through a large-scale
spatial region (e.g., driving in a desert), and then a fictive
motion critical sentence, such as The road goes through the
desert. Participants were quicker to read the critical
sentences after reading about fast motion than they were
after reading about slow motion. The same effects were also
observed with easy versus difficult terrains, and with short
versus long distances.  Critically, the effect was not obtained
with non-fictive motion test sentences at the end of the same
stories, such as The road is in the desert.  In sum, the results
show that thinking about motion influences the processing
of fictive motion sentences, but not the processing of
comparable non-fictive motion sentences. They provide
evidence that simulating motion is part of fictive motion
understanding.
Matlock, Ramscar, and Boroditsky (2003a, 2003b)
investigated whether engaging in thought about fictive
motion would influence  metaphoric construal of time in the
way that engaging in thought about real motion has been
shown to do (see Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar,
2002). In one experiment, participants were primed with
fictive motion sentences or non-fictive motion sentences
(e.g., The tattoo runs along his spine versus The tattoo is
next to his spine) before reading this ambiguous question:
“Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two
days. When is the meeting now that it has been
rescheduled?”3 When primed with fictive motion (congruent
with an ego-moving construal), people were more likely to
say, “Friday”, suggesting they viewed themselves “moving”
forward in time. When primed with non-fictive motion
(congruent with a time-moving construal), people were more
likely to say, “Monday”, suggesting they viewed time as
“moving” toward them.  Another experiment issued this
same question with one of two primes: The road goes all the
way to New York (fictive motion away from conceptualizer),
The road comes all the way to New York (fictive motion
toward conceptualizer). The results indicated that people
were more likely to respond “Friday” after the away prime
and more likely to respond “Monday” with the toward
                                                          
3 The question is ambiguous because people are just as apt to
answer Friday as they are Monday when the question is posed
without any prime. (See Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar,
2002 for discussion.)
prime.  They suggest that people take a perspective and
simulate motion when thinking about fictive motion, and
that that in turn affects the way they perform abstract
reasoning, such as reasoning about temporal movement.
Hence, people simulate motion when processing
figurative sentences such as The road runs along the coast,
and this naturally affects conceptual representation.  Given
this, we would like to know whether fictive motion also
influences perceptual processing.
What Eye Movements Can Tell Us
Eye movements have been measured during a range of
cognitive and perceptual activities (for review, see
Richardson & Spivey, 2004). Scene perception has been
studied in terms of the "bottom up" statistical properties of
the image that attracts eye fixations, and in terms of the "top
down" knowledge, beliefs or expertise that might affect how
one person inspects a scene differently from another (for
review, see Henderson, 2003). In a separate research
tradition, eye tracking has been used to investigate reading,
which engages both linguistic and perceptual processing
(Rayner, 1998; Tinker, 1946).
Until recently the intersection between language and
visual perception––looking at a scene and listening to a
voice––had not been studied. The advent of head-mounted
and remote eye tracking devices has allowed researchers to
place participants in relatively rich, natural visual contexts
and record how the eyes respond to spoken instructions and
descriptions. Such experiments have yielded a surprisingly
close integration between incremental linguistic processing
and visual perception, demonstrating that eye movements to
possible referents in the world are used to resolve temporary
ambiguities in word recognition and syntactic structure
(Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995),
and to predict upcoming agents based on thematic role
information (Altmann & Kamide, 2004).
Language has also been shown to modulate eye
movements even when there is nothing to look at.  In studies
by Spivey and colleagues (Spivey & Geng, 2001; Spivey,
Tyler, Richardson, & Young, 2000), people stared at a blank
screen or closed their eyes and listened to a story that was
spatially extended along an axis, for example, a story about
a train going past, or a sequence of activities occurring on
successive floors of a tall apartment block. While listening,
participants’ saccades tended to be extended along the
horizontal or vertical axes that were consistent with those
communicated in the story.
Whether it is in the presence of temporary ambiguity, or
in the absence of visual input, linguistic input has been
shown to influence eye movements. However, with the
current surge of interest in language and vision (e.g.,
Henderson & Ferreira, 2004) one question has been left
behind.  What about figurative language?  Does it influence
eye movements?  If so, how?  This is an important question,
for figurative language is not restricted to poetic or literary
works.  It is at least as pervasive in every day talk as literal
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language, if not more pervasive (see Gibbs, 1994; Katz,
Cacciari, Gibbs, & Turner, 1998; Lakoff, 1987).
Experiment
In the current study, participants viewed static depictions of
scenes while they heard fictive motion and non-fictive
motion sentences.  Of interest was whether there would be
differences between the eye movements that accompanied
fictive motion sentences, such as The palm trees run along
the highway, and those that accompanied non-fictive motion
sentences, such as The palm trees are next to the highway.
On the surface, the sentences convey similar information:
Both include a linearly extended subject noun phrase
reference (e.g., palm trees) and both describe a static spatial
scene. However, the former has been argued to involve
mentally simulated motion or scanning along the figure, but
the latter has not.  Would participants spend more time
inspecting figures with fictive motion sentences than figures
with non-fictive motion sentences?  Longer gaze durations
on regions of interest with fictive motion sentences would
suggest mentally simulated motion or scanning.
Method
Participants
A total of 24 Stanford University psychology students
participated for course credit.  All had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision.
Design
Gaze durations were recorded along the axis referred to by
the subject of the sentence (the compatible region) and
along the axis not referred to by the subject of the sentence
(the incompatible region). Half the sentences included
fictive motion language and half did not. Therefore, the
experiment was a 2 x 2 design, with compatibility as one
factor and sentence type as the other.
Stimuli
Sixteen pictures served as the primary visual stimuli. Each
depicted a simple spatial scene and featured both a
horizontally extended figure and a vertically extended
figure, for example, a river extending from top to bottom,
and a fence extending left to right. A further 16 pictures
were used as filler items. All pictures were matched on level
of color luminance.
Sixteen blocks of recorded English sentences served as
primary stimuli. Each block contained two sentence pairs.
Each pair included a FM-sentence (fictive motion sentence)
and a comparable NFM-sentence (non-fictive motion
sentence), for example, The cord runs along the wall, and
The cord is on the wall.  One sentence pair referred to the
vertical object in a picture and the other referred to the
horizontal object in that same picture. Figure 1 displays an
example picture and its block of sentences. Sixteen
sentences that described the filler pictures were also
recorded.
We conducted three norming studies on our sentences
and pictures. In the first, 57 Stanford undergraduates judged
all FM- and NFM-sentences on a scale of 1 to 7, in which 1
indicated “makes no sense at all” and 7 indicated “makes
good sense”.  The mean for all FM-sentences was 5.85 and
the mean for all NFM-sentences was 6.02. A t-test showed
no reliable difference between the two, t(31) = 1.16, p > .1.
In the second norming study, 28 undergraduates rated pairs
of FM- and NFM-sentences on how similar they were in
meaning. They used a scale of 1 to 7, in which 1 indicated
“not at all similar” and 7 indicated “very similar”.  The
mean for all sentence pairs across all subjects was 6.04, with
the highest average at 7 and the lowest average at 5.25. In a
third norming study, 12 undergraduates judged our pictures
and sentences on how well they went together. Overall, the
sentence-picture combinations were judged as well-
matched.  The means were 6.63 FM-horizontal, 6.58 FM-
horizontal, 6.53 NFM-horizontal, and 6.34 NFM-vertical.  A
one-way ANOVA yielded no difference, F(3, 63) = .04, p >
.1, showing that they were equally good descriptions.
 Together, the norming studies indicate that (a) all FM-
and NFM-sentences were equally sensible in meaning, (b)
all FM- and NFM-sentences described comparable
information, and (c) all FM- and NFM-sentences were
equally good descriptions of the pictures.
Horizontal landmark
FM       The books run along the wall
NFM    The books are on the wall
Vertical landmark
FM     The cord  runs along the wall
NFM   The cord is on the wall
Figure 1. Example of picture with vertical and
horizontal fictive motion and non-fictive motion
sentences.
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Apparatus
An ASL 504 remote eye tracking camera was positioned at
the base of a 17” LCD stimulus display. Participants were
unrestrained, and sat approximately 30” from the screen.
The camera detected pupil and corneal reflection position
from the right eye, and the eye tracking PC calculated point-
of-gaze in terms of coordinates on the stimulus display. This
information was passed every 33ms to a PowerMac G4
which controlled the stimulus presentation and collected
gaze duration data. Prior to the experimental session,
participants went through a 9 point calibration routine,
which typically took between 2 and 5 minutes.
Procedure
Once a successful eye track was established, participants
were told to “Look at the pictures and listen to the
sentences.” On each trial, a picture appeared 1000ms before
the sentence began, and then remained in view for 2000ms
after the sentence finished. There was a 2000ms inter-
stimulus interval, during which participants saw a gray
screen, roughly isoluminant with the pictures.
Following 4 practice trials, each participant was
presented with a random sequence of 16 experimental and
16 filler trials. Each experimental picture was accompanied
by one of four sentences that described the picture (e.g.,
vertical FM-sentence). Sentence presentation varied such
that each participant heard 4 vertical FM-sentences, 4
horizontal FM-sentences, 4 vertical NFM-sentences, and 4
horizontal NFM-sentences.
Coding
The screen was partitioned into 17 non-overlapping regions
of interest, corresponding to a central square, six squares
spanning the horizontal axis, six squares spanning the
vertical axis, and four squares in each corner (see Figure 2).
During the period that the experimental picture was
onscreen, total gaze durations in each region were recorded.
Figure 2. Grid defining relevant regions
superimposed on grayed example picture.
Results and Discussion
For a quantitative analysis, we compared total gaze
durations to the vertical region of the picture (regions 2 to 7)
and the horizontal region of the picture (regions 8 to 13).
Each accompanying sentence described either the horizontal
or vertical element in the picture. Thus our data could be
expressed in terms of gaze durations to the compatible and
the incompatible regions. 4
We conducted a 2 (compatibility) x 2 (sentence)
ANOVA. There was a main effect of compatibility,
indicating that our participants spent more time inspecting
the compatible portion of the grid containing the figure
described in the sentences, F(1,23) = 5.51 , p < .03. There
was also a main effect of sentence, revealing a reliable
difference between inspection time for FM-sentences (M=
995) and inspection time for NFM-sentences (M=827),
F(1,23) = 10.18, p < .001. Most importantly, there was a
reliable interaction between these factors, F(1,23) = 6.00, p
< .03, shown in Figure 3. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the
only cell that differed from all others was gaze duration to
the compatible region with fictive motion sentences  (p <
.01).
600
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800
900
1000
1100
1200
Fictive Non-Fictive
m
se
c
Compatible
Incompatible
Figure 3. Gaze durations to compatible and
incompatible picture regions only differed when the
sentence employed fictive motion.
As predicted, people spent more time gazing at the region of
a picture associated with the figure in fictive motion input
than with the figure in non-fictive motion input, especially
when the figure in the picture was compatible with the
                                                          
4 Example recordings of eye tracks can be seen at
http://psychology.stanford.edu/~richardson/ficmot.
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figure in the sentence.  Taken together, our results show that
fictive motion sentences had a consistent and dramatic
effect on eye movements, most notably on the compatible
region of interest.
General Discussion
Participants in our preliminary study spent more time
inspecting the compatible region of interest in spatial scenes
when they heard fictive motion sentences than when they
heard non-fictive sentences.  The results demonstrate that
figurative language influences eye movements in consistent
and predictable ways.  The results are in line with other
work on fictive motion (Matlock, in press; Matlock,
Ramscar, & Boroditsky, 2003a, 2003b), and they suggest a
dynamic mental representation that mirrors perception or
enactment of motion (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, Glenberg, 1999).
One explanation for the results obtained here is that
when our participants were presented with fictive motion
input, they mentally simulated motion along the figure, and
then their eye movements mirrored that internal simulation.
For example, on hearing the sentence The road runs through
the desert, participants conceptually “moved” along a road
and then their eye movements enacted a congruent
simulation. Another not incompatible explanation assigns a
more active role to eye movements. It might be that
participants’ eye movements were central to simulation and
building an appropriate representation of the figure.  For
example, on hearing the sentence The road runs through the
desert and seeing a depiction of that scene, participants’ eye
movements allowed them to incrementally construct an
appropriate model of the road. If this is the case, then
perhaps eye movements allowed participants to simulate and
compute some information about the scene externally (for
related views, see Spivey, Richardson, & Fitneva, in press;
Spivey, et al 2000).
Are there other explanations for longer gaze durations
with fictive motion sentences? For instance, could it be that
people activated the literal meaning of the motion verb in
fictive motion sentences, and that that literal interpretation
led to longer inspection times?  Based on the results
reported here, we cannot rule out this possibility entirely.
But we would argue that our compatibility results suggest
that this is not likely.  Namely, if the verb alone –
independent of the figurative meaning of the fictive motion
sentence – brought on longer gaze durations, we would not
have seen selective differences in the axis of orientation
(vertical versus horizontal).  After all, the motion verb alone
provided no information about direction.
Our data show that figurative language, like literal
language, influences eye movements.  We argue that this is
because fictive language evokes a dynamic mental
simulation, and that this simulation determines how the
visual system interprets and inspects the world.  Further
research will reveal how these simulations occur and the
extent to which they mirror perception or enactment of
physical motion in the world.
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Abstract 
Matsuka and Corter (2003b) presented evidence that people 
tend to utilize only the minimally necessary information for 
classification tasks.  This approach for categorization was 
efficient and valid for the stimulus set used in the experiment, 
but might be considered a statistically or mathematically non-
normative approach.  In the present paper, I hypothesized 
human category learning processes are biased toward simpler 
representation and/or conception rather than complex but 
normative ones.  In particular, a few variants of “biased” 
learning algorithms are introduced and applied to Matsuka 
and Corter’s stochastic learning algorithm (2003a, 2004).  The 
result of a simulation study showed that the biased learning 
models account for empirical results successfully. 
Introduction 
In their recent work, Matsuka and Corter (2003b & 2004) 
investigated the possibility of using stochastic learning 
rather than gradient-based methods in neural network 
models of human category learning.  They introduced 
stochastic learning models to more accurately account for 
human category learning. The gradient based learning 
algorithm used in many neural network models may be 
considered to have a normative justification (i.e., it models 
how people “should” learn or process information), but may 
not be descriptively valid at the individual level.  Models 
utilizing a gradient method for learning seem to require a 
high degree of mental effort and assume that optimal 
adjustments are made to the vector of parameters on each 
trial.  In contrast, Matsuka & Corter’s stochastic learning 
model (2003a, 2004) does not assume that learning is 
associated with monotonic increases in accuracy (and 
attention) or continuous search for better categorization 
processes by humans.   Rather, it models random 
fluctuations or “errors” in people’s memory and learning 
processes, and how people utilize and “misutilize” such 
errors.   
In their simulation studies (Matsuka & Corter 2004a), the 
effectiveness of stochastic learning methods applied to an 
ALCOVE-like model (Kruschke, 1992) was evaluated in 
several settings.  The modified models were shown to be 
satisfactory in replicating two phenomena observed in 
empirical studies on categorization; namely, rapid change in 
attention processes (Macho 1997; Rehder and Hoffman 
2003), and individual differences in distribution of attention 
(Matsuka & Corter 2003b). 
Although the stochastic learning model reproduced more 
realistic individual differences than models with a gradient 
type learning algorithm, it did not replicate one tendency 
observed in the empirical study of Matsuka and Corter 
(2003b).  They found that for four dimensional stimulus sets 
with two diagnostic but perfectly correlated dimensions, the 
proportion of human participants who paid attention 
primarily to only one of the two correlated dimensions was 
higher than that of those who paid attention to both of the 
two correlated dimensions approximately equally (see 
Figure 2, top row, third column). In other words, many 
participants utilized only the minimal necessary information 
for this task.  In contrast, the stochastic learning model 
inadequately predicted that a higher proportion of 
participants would pay attention to the two correlated 
dimensions approximately equally. 
 The strategy of using minimal information may be a very 
natural and efficient usage of limited mental resources for 
humans.  This would be particularly true for real world 
categorization tasks, where the number of feature 
dimensions could easily exceed a manageable number, in 
which many are not necessary or crucial (e.g., irrelevant and 
or highly correlated) for successful categorization.  There 
are several ways that could lead people to use a lesser 
amount of information, resulting in simple conception of 
categories.  One possible explanation is that there may be an 
implicit or explicit penalizing mechanism in human 
cognition that encourages less complete but simpler 
concepts than more complete but more complex concepts.  
Another possible explanation is that there may be a 
mechanism in human cognition that leads to a more 
thorough search for simple concepts.   
In the present research, based on these remarks, I 
hypothesize and model human category learning as being 
biased toward simpler and heuristic concepts 1  (or 
representation) than complex and complete ones.   
Biased Stochastic Learning 
The proposed algorithm is based on a simulated annealing 
algorithm (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, & Vecchi, 1983; Metropolis, 
Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, & Teller, 1958) and 
somewhat resembles Boltzmann Machine (Hinton & 
Sejnowski, 1986).  In the present algorithm, initial 
association weights are randomly selected from a uniform 
distribution centered at 0, and initial dimension attention 
weights are equally distributed across all dimensions.  This 
equal attention allocation in the early stages of learning is 
motivated by the results of empirical studies (Matsuka, 
2002; Rehder & Hoffman, 2003) that showed many 
participants initially tended to evenly allocate attention to 
the feature dimensions. In the present algorithm, at the 
beginning of each training epoch, a hypothetical “move” in 
                                                          
1
 In the present paper, the concepts of categories correspond to the 
configurations of the association weights and dimensional attention 
attractiveness. 
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the parameter space is computed by adjusting each 
parameter by an independently sampled term.  These 
adjustment terms are drawn from a prespecified distribution.  
The move (i.e., the set of new parameter values) is then 
accepted or rejected, based on the computed relative fit or 
utility (defined below) of the new values.  Specifically, if 
the new parameter values result in a better fit/utility, they 
are accepted.  If they result in a poorer fit/utility, they are 
accepted with some probability P.  This probability is a 
function of a parameter called the “temperature”, which 
decreases across blocks according to the annealing schedule.   
Because of the human’s biased cognitive processes, 
possibly as a consequence of our implicit or explicit biased 
processes and/or preference toward simpler but less 
complete concept (these processes are discussed in detail in 
the model section), the learned concepts of categories, thus 
the configuration of the association weights and attention 
strengths, are inclined toward simpler ones.  Note that in the 
present algorithm the notion of simplicity (or complexity) is 
directly related to the number of effective (non-zero, or non-
subzero) association weights and attention strengths.   
The proposed models would not require computation 
intensive (back) propagations of classification errors.  
Rather, in the present biased stochastic learning model 
framework, a very simple operation (e.g., comparison of 
two values) along with the operation of stochastic processes 
are assumed to be the key mechanisms in category learning. 
These learning algorithms can be applied to virtually any 
feed-forward NN model of human category learning 
General Algorithm for Stochastic Learning 
A general framework for the stochastic learning algorithm is 
discussed in this section. Here, the stochastic learning 
algorithm is embedded into ALCOVE, which is one of the 
most studied and applied computational models of category 
learning incorporating a selective attention mechanism 
(Kruschke, 1992).  Again, it should be noted that this 
learning algorithm is very general and can be applied to 
virtually any NN model of category learning. 
 
STEP 0: Initialization: 
Problem specific parameters: (T0,υ) 
T0 : initial temperature. 
υ :   temperature decreasing rate 
Association weights wkj,, Attention strengths αi,, 
Exemplar ψji  
STEP 1: Calculate ALCOVE output activations: 
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where K = # categories, N = # input in one block, dk is a 
desired output for category node k.  Here, the superscript t 
indicates time. 
STEP 3: Accept or reject of parameter set, α & w: 
Accept all weight and attention parameters at the 
probability of: 
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if F(wt, αt) > F(ws, α s), or 1 otherwise, where F(ws, α s) is 
the fit index for the previously accepted parameter set, 
and Tt is temperature at time t. 
STEP 4: Reduce temperature: 
( )tTT ot ,υδ=      (SL-4) 
where δ is the temperature decreasing function that take 
temperature decreasing rate, υ, and time t as inputs. 
STEP 5: Generate new wkj and i. 
ws
kj
t
kj rww += , ( )⋅Φ wwr ~    (SL-5) 
ααα rsi
t
i += , ( )⋅Φαα ~r    (SL-6) 
where rw and rα are random numbers generated from 
prespecified distributions Φw and Φα.  
REPEAT STEPS 1~5 until stopping criterion is met. 
Biased Stochastic Learning Models 
There are several approaches to model biased learning 
processes using stochastic learning model.  Here, two 
simple approaches are introduced.  The first biased learning 
model is based on the parameter regularization in which 
complex parameter configurations are penalized.  The 
second model based on asymmetric random distributions, 
searches simpler parameter configurations more thoroughly. 
Model 1: Bias via penalizing fitness function 
In the present algorithm the utility index rather than the fit 
index is used for the decision on acceptance and rejection of 
the current parameter set.  The utility of a particular 
parameter configuration is defined as a weighted sum of the 
accuracy in classification and the mental effort required by 
the parameter configuration. Thus, the utility index consists 
of two independent indices, namely “classification 
accuracy”, L and “mental effort”, Q, both dependent on 
learnable parameters w and α at time t.   ( ) ( ) ( )tttttt wQwLwU ααα ,,, +=              (M1-1) 
The L function can be the same function for the fitness 
index (i.e., Eq. SL-2).  Here, the Q function may be 
considered as a penalty function, penalizing “complex” 
parameter configurations that are believed to require more 
mental effort. The general form of Q function is given as 
follows: ( ) ( ) ( )tmtmwwtt awwQ ααφγφγα +=,                        (M1-2) 
where φw and φα are functions calculating mental effort 
required for specific parameter configurations at time t (i.e., 
wt and αt), and γw and γα are coefficients weighting these 
mental efforts. Note that γw and γα also control relative 
importance of L and Q functions (i.e., accuracy vs. 
simplicity). That is the hypothetical coefficient, γQ, 
weighting importance of Q function relative to L function is 
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included in γw and γα.  I.e., *wQw γγγ =  and *αα γγγ Q= .  Thus 
Equations M1-1 and M1-2 may be rewritten as: ( ) ( ) ( )ttQtttt wQwLwU αγαα ,,, *+=            (M1-1R) 
( ) ( ) ( )tmQtmwwQttQ awwQ ααφγγφγγαγ *** , +=        (M1-2R) 
There are several functions applicable for φ: 
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where ζw and ζα are threshold values, and I(expression) is 
the indicator function that returns 1 if the expression is 
satisfied. Equations M1-3a and M1-3b, often referred to as 
ridge penalty function or weight decay, encourage 
parameter settings that have small parameter values, 
whereas Equations M1-4a and M1-4b encourage parameter 
settings that have large number of parameters with less than 
the threshold values ζs.  More general φ function is given as 
follows:  
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where q, which can be either time dependent or 
independent, controls types of penalization or 
encouragement. That is, Equations M1-5 approach 
Equations M1-3s as q → ∞, and approach Equations M1-4s 
as q → 0 (Cherkassky & Mulier, 1997).   
In many simulation studies, relative, but not absolute 
predicted attention allocation strengths are analyzed and 
compared (e.g. Matsuka, 2002).  In such cases, the relative 
attention strengths ai = αi/Σ(αm) should be used as inputs 
for the penalty function. In addition, the penalization 
functions do not have to be in the same form for association 
weights and attention strengths.  For example, in order to 
pay attention to a smaller number of feature dimensions it 
seems more sensible to use M1-4b or M1-5 with small q 
values for the attention parameters, because the relative but 
not absolute attention strength values are usually 
considered.  In contrast, either choice seems appropriate for 
the association weight parameters where raw values are 
usually used. 
Model 2: Bias via asymmetric distribution. 
In the present model, random numbers are drawn from an 
asymmetric distribution with its mode equal to zero. Thus, 
as in the previous model, the probability of drawing a 
random number r from the vicinity of current values (i.e., 
vicinity of zero) is still the highest 
( ) ( )εεεε +<<−>+<<− MrMPrP 00        (M2-1)  
for all M ≠ 0.                           
However, unlike the previous model, for a particular 
parameter value, the probability of drawing a random 
number which will lead its updated value toward zero is 
higher than that of a random number that leads to the 
opposite direction. In other words, when the association 
weight value, wkj is negative, then the probability of drawing 
a positive number is greater than a negative number; when 
the weight is positive, then the opposite is true, or ( ) ( )0|00|0 ><<>> kjwkjw wrPwrP               
( ) ( )0|00|0 <<><> kjwkjw wrPwrP               (M2-2) 
For the attention strength parameter αi the probability of 
drawing a negative random move is larger than for a 
positive move, assuming that αi is constrained to be 
positive, thus, ( ) ( )00 <<> αα rPrP .                (M2-3) 
Parameter updates are accomplished by the following 
functions:  
w
kj
t
kj
t
kj rww +=
+1
                             (M2-4) 
ααα i
t
i
t
i r+=
+1
                (M2-5) 
where ( ) ( )⋅Φ⋅ wtkjwkj wr sgn~  and ( )⋅Φαα ~ir  
The random movement rm is drawn from the negatively 
skewed distributions for αi and wkj if wkj is positive, and 
from the positively skewed distributions for negative wkj. 
Thus, the expected value of the distance of the random 
movement leading the learnable parameters to zero is 
greater than that of the opposite direction. This makes the 
model to decrease values of “irrelevant” parameters quickly. 
There are several asymmetric distributions, and the χ2 
(Eq. M2-6, Figure 1, left panel) and Rayleigh (M2-7 & 
Figure 1, right panel) distributions are examples of 
asymmetrical distributions.   
( ) 



 −





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1)|( 122 xx
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vxf
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              (M2-6) 
where Γ(·) is a gamma function, v is the degree of freedom. 
( ) 





−
= 2
2
2 2
exp|
b
x
b
xbxf                           (M2-7) 
where b is the Rayleigh distribution parameter. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example asymmetric distributions. Left panel: 
χ2 distributions with several different distribution 
parameters.  Right panel: Rayleigh distributions with 
several different distribution parameters. 
 
Since the modes of these asymmetric non-negative 
distributions are not zero, and the distribution parameters 
affect both central tendencies and spreads of the 
distributions, the random numbers should be transformed as: 
 ( )( ))()( xfMODExfsr t −−=                (M2-8) 
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where st is a time-dependent scalar controlling the width of 
the search areas.  This ensures that the mode of the 
transformed random variable is zero and thus satisfies M2-
1.  Note that the distribution parameter v or b may be 
selected a priori and held constant throughout the training, 
or they can be time dependent so that the model starts with a 
highly skewed distribution and terminates with a near 
normal distribution, or vice versa.  
While the present biased learning model (bias via 
thorough searches around zero) may be interpreted as active 
bias, actively trying to reduce the effective number of 
parameters or simplifying concepts, the bias via 
regularization (Model 1) may be interpreted as passive bias, 
involuntary resulting in simpler concept because of the 
limitation of mental capacity. 
Simulations 
Here, I examined how the two new biased stochastic 
learning models account for individual differences in 
attention learning. To do this, I simulated the results of an 
empirical study on classification learning, Study 2 of 
Matsuka (2002).  In this study, there were two perfectly 
redundant feature dimensions, Dimension 1 & Dimension 2 
(see Table 1), and those two dimensions are also perfectly 
correlated with category membership. Thus, information 
from only one of the two correlated dimensions was 
necessary and sufficient for perfect categorization 
performance. Besides classification accuracy, data on the 
amount of attention allocated to each feature dimension 
were collected in the empirical study.  The measures of 
attention used were based on feature viewing time, as 
measured in a MouseLab-type interface (Bettman, Johnson, 
Luce, & Payne, 1993). 
The empirical results that I am trying to simulate 
indicated that 13 out of 14 subjects were able to categorize 
the stimuli almost perfectly (Figure 2, top left panel). The 
aggregated results suggest that on average subjects paid 
attention to both of the correlated dimensions approximately 
equally (Figure 3, top middle panel).  However, more 
interestingly when the attention data were analyzed per 
individual, it was found that many subjects tended to pay 
attention primarily to only one of the two correlated 
dimensions, particularly in the late learning blocks as shown 
in Figure 2, top row third column (Matsuka & Corter, 
2003).  This suggests that subjects used only the minimal 
necessary information for this task. 
 
Simulation method: There were three ALCOVE-type 
models in the present simulation study, namely ALCOVE 
with stochastic learning (ASL; Matsuka & Corter, 2003a, 
2004); ALCOVE with a regularized stochastic learning 
(ARSL); and ALCOVE with the Rayleigh distribution-
based stochastic learning (ARAY).  The standard ALCOVE 
will not be evaluated in the present simulation study, 
because its standard gradient learning method was shown to 
be unsuccessful in replicating individual difference when 
attention allocation is initialized equally (Matsuka & Corter, 
2003a, 2004). 
All three models were run in a simulated training 
procedure to learn the correct classification responses for 
the stimuli of the experiment.  ARAY was run for 300 
blocks of training, where each block consisted of a complete 
set of the training instances, while ASL and ARSL were run 
for 500 training blocks.  For each model, the final results are 
based on 50 replications. 
The model configurations (e.g., type of distribution, 
temperature decreasing rate & function, search ranges) for 
ASL and ARSL were the same except for the additional 
parameter-penalization functions incorporated in RSL to 
model biased processes in category learning.  The random 
numbers for these two models were drawn from the Cauchy 
distribution, and its random number generation algorithm 
was based on Ingber (1989).   For ARSL, the ridge penalty 
(Equation M1-3a) was imposed on the association weights, 
and a subset selection method (M1-4b with ζ = 0.1) was 
used for the relative attention strengths.   
For ARAY, a (pseudo) random number generator function 
from MATLAB Statistical Toolbox (MathWorks, 2001) was 
used to generate random numbers, and its transforming 
scalar s (see Eq. M2-8) was exponentially decreased during 
the learning.  For all models, an exponential function was 
used as the temperature decreasing function.  Models’ user-
definable parameters (e.g., initial temperature, temperature 
decreasing rate, ζ, and etc…) were selected arbitrarily.  
 
Table 1: Stimulus structure used in Study 2 of Matsuka 
 
Category Dim1 Dim2 Dim3 Dim4 
A 1* 1* 3 4 
A 1* 1* 4 1 
A 1* 1* 1 2 
B 2* 2* 2 1 
B 2* 2* 3 2 
B 2* 2* 4 3 
C 3* 3* 1 3 
C 3* 3* 2 4 
C 3* 3* 3 1 
D 4* 4* 4 2 
D 4* 4* 2 3 
D 4* 4* 1 4 
*Diagnostic feature 
 
Results: All three models correctly replicated aggregated or 
averaged relative attention allocations to the four feature 
dimensions (Figure 2, second column).  However, there are 
some minor differences in their predictions; ARAY paid 
less attention to non-diagnostic dimensions than ASL, 
which in turn paid less attention to those dimensions as 
compared with ARSL.  Qualitatively, ARSL appears to be 
the most successful in replicating not paying attention to 
both Dimension 1 and 2 equally, while ASL appears to be 
least successful in this regard. ARAY was similarly 
unsuccessful, overestimating the proportion of people who 
would attend to both of the correlated dimensions equally.  
A noticeable difference between ARAY and other two 
918
models is that ARAY virtually ignored non-diagnostic 
feature dimensions and paid attention exclusively to either 
or both Dimensions 1 and 2.   
Among all three models, the proportion of sub-zero 
association weights for ARAY was the largest (Figure 2, 
fourth column), indicating it yielded simpler category 
conceptions than the other two models. Here, the notion of 
simplicity (or complexity) is directly related to numbers of 
effective (i.e., non-zero, or non-subzero) association weights 
and attention parameters. When compared with the 
distribution of the association weights of ASL, the 
proportion of sub-zero weights for ARSL was larger, 
indicating penalizing processes incorporated in ARSL 
resulted in simpler configuration.  Note that the model 
configurations and settings for ASL and ARSL were the 
same expect for the regularization process incorporated in 
ARSL.  Thus, the straightforward comparison of ASL and 
ARSL seems reasonable.  However, because ARAY and 
ARSL had different parameter settings, interpreting the 
comparisons of distributions of the weights for ARAY and 
ARSL or ASL should be done with care.   
In sum, the stochastic learning model with the 
regularizing processes penalizing mentally-expensive 
complex category conceptions (i.e. ARSL) appears to be the 
most successful model capturing human category learning 
trends that appeared biased, heuristic, and/or less optimal. 
 
 
  
 
   
Figure 2. Results of the simulation study.  Top row: Observed empirical results of Matsuka & Corter (2003b). The graphs on 
the first column show observed and predicted classification accuracy, second column shows relative attention allocation for 
the four feature dimensions; third column compares relative attention allocated to Dimensions 1 and 2 for the last four 
blocks, where each dot represents an observation. Fourth column shows histograms for the final association weights.  Second 
row shows results of ALCOVE-SL; Third row, ALCOVE-RSL; Fourth Row, ALCOVE-RAY.  
 
Discussion: Although there are 12 unique exemplars in the 
stimulus set, there are only four exemplars (one from each 
category) needed for a perfect categorization. Then, one 
might wonder if people would utilize all the exemplars or 
not.  The distribution of ARAY’s association weights may 
suggest that there are several “dead” or inactive exemplars 
whose association weights are all zero or near-zero, not 
being utilized for categorization.  This characteristic along 
with not paying attention to irrelevant feature dimensions 
may suggest that ARAY replicates learning of an efficient 
learner, who utilizes a lesser amount of information.  In 
contrast, ARSL predicts that people would utilize more than 
necessary information.  In terms of attention allocation, the 
empirical results indicate that some people do try utilizing 
irrelevant information, suggesting that ARSL is more 
descriptive than other models.  This suggests that people 
may not actively being biased, searching for simpler 
concepts (i.e., Model 2).  Rather it suggests that biases may 
be caused by the limited mental capacity, involuntarily 
resulting in simpler concepts. 
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Discussion  
RULEX vs. Stochastic Learning: The stochastic learning’s 
take-all-or–none parameter updating strategy may be 
considered as a type of hypothesis testing learning model, 
which makes it similar to the RULEX model (Nosofsky, 
Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994).  However, its random search 
method, interpreted as unstructured hypothesis generation 
and search, is very distinct from RULEX whose hypothesis 
generation algorithm is very strategic and well-structured.  
Thus, for Matsuka’s (2002) stimuli set, RULEX would 
predict that everyone would allocate his/her attention 
exclusively to the one of the two diagnostic dimensions.  
Whereas the stochastic learning would predict some paying 
attention to either one of the two dimensions, another 
paying attention to both, and others distributing attention in 
some other combinations, since, as an exemplar-based 
model, it can minimize classification error with several 
different attention allocation patterns (i.e., it can learn to 
classify stimuli without “optimal” or “rational” attention 
distribution).   In other words, when there are several 
minima, which is probably true for real world category 
learning task, stochastic learning can result in several 
different learning trajectories and parameter (i.e., 
association weight & attention allocation) configurations, 
corresponding to possible individual differences.   In 
contrast, RULEX would always predict that people pay 
attention to the least number of dimensions, which may be a 
too normative prediction. 
 
Gradient-type vs. Stochastic Learning:  For two perfectly 
redundant feature dimensions, a gradient-type learning 
algorithm in general would allocate the same amounts of 
attention to the two dimensions, or its attention learning 
curves for the two dimensions would be parallel.  In 
contrast,  (biased) stochastic learning could result in 
asymmetric attention allocation to the two dimensions, and 
its attention learning curves are not necessarily parallel.  In 
these regards, stochastic learning’s predictions appear more 
realistic than those of gradient-type learning.  However, this 
point alone does not necessarily indicate stochastic learning 
is what people would do.  Perhaps, a gradient-type learning 
with some stochastic elements or errors might, as well, 
result in more “realistic” predictions. 
Conclusion 
Biased stochastic learning is a descriptive model of heuristic 
learning that prefers a simpler conception of categories in 
which less mental effort seems to be needed.  Although the 
present two stochastic learning algorithms are intended to 
model such bias, the algorithms appear to be modeling two 
different types of learners, namely “ordinary people” and 
“proficients”.  The simulation study indicates that modeling 
biased learning via parameter-configuration regularization 
was the most successful in replicating the empirical results 
(i.e., ordinary people).  In contrast, biased learning via 
asymmetric distributions appears to be more optimal or 
rational model, paying attention to only diagnostic feature 
dimensions and having smaller numbers of effective 
association weights (proficient-like concepts).   
Although the present study supports biased stochastic 
learning’s descriptive validity, more comprehensive 
simulation studies would be useful in evaluating the present 
learning models. 
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Abstract 
In the present study, GECLE (Matsuka, 2003) was used as a 
general modeling framework to systematically compare the 
plausibility of two prominent assumptions about internal 
representations of neural network (NN) models of human 
category learning.  In particular, exemplar-model friendly 
Medin and Schaffer’s 5/4 stimulus set (1978) was used for 
comparing prototype- and exemplar-based NN models.  The 
results indicate that some prototype-based models performed 
as good as or better than an exemplar-based model in 
replicating the empirical classification profile.  In addition, a 
phenomenon called A2 advantage  (i.e., people tend to 
categorize the less “prototypical” stimulus A2 more 
accurately than more “prototypical” stimulus A1) reported in 
empirical studies (e.g., Medin & Schaffer 1978) was also 
successfully reproduced by these prototype-based NN models.   
Introduction 
There have been an increasing number of studies debating 
how stimuli are internally represented in human cognition 
during the last few decades (e.g., Minda & Smith 2002; 
Nosofsky & Zaki 2002).  Most of these debates have been 
based on quantitative models of categorization, and only a 
few have considered representational aspects of adaptive, 
network, or learning models of categorization.  Several 
studies (Matsuka, 2002; Matsuka, Corter, & Markman, 
2003) have compared exemplar-based (EB) and prototype-
based (PB) adaptive network models of categorization, but 
there has been no systematic comparison of specific 
assumptions in EB and PB modeling. Although these 
comparative studies provided information on the models’ 
capabilities for reproducing human-like categorization 
learning, they did not necessarily provide information that 
can lead to specific understanding of the nature of human 
category learning.  That is because model-to-model 
comparisons are not informative for testing the plausibility 
of each specific assumption, rather such model comparisons 
are essentially omnibus tests collectively comparing all 
variations in assumptions at once.  In other words, it has 
been difficult to use the results of these previous 
comparative studies to understand which specific 
assumptions are supported by the empirical data.  Therefore, 
it seems desirable to make systematic comparisons between 
competing model assumptions using a general modeling 
framework that allows us to manipulate and test one or a 
limited number of model assumptions at a time. 
In the present study, a generalized exploratory modeling 
approach for human category learning is introduced.  Then, 
using this general framework two assumptions about how 
categories are internally represented, namely prototypes and 
exemplars, are compared in a systematic fashion. 
GECLE 
GECLE (for Generalized Exploratory models of Category 
LEarning) is a general and flexible exploratory approach for 
modeling human category learning, that is capable of 
modeling human category learning with many variants using 
different model assumptions (Matsuka, 2003). This general 
modeling framework allows model assumptions to be 
manipulated separately and independently.  For example, 
one can manipulate assumptions about how stimuli are 
internally represented (e.g. exemplars vs. prototypes), or 
about how people selectively pay attention to input feature 
dimensions (e.g., paying attention to dimensions 
independently or not).   
The GECLE model uses the Mahalanobis distances (in the 
quadratic form) between the internally represented reference 
points (RP: corresponding to either exemplars or 
prototypes) and the input stimuli as the measure of 
similarity between them.  Thus, unlike other neural network 
models of category learning, GECLE does not necessarily 
assume that attention is allocated independently dimension-
by-dimension.  Rather, it assumes that humans in some 
cases might pay attention to correlations among feature 
dimensions.  This allows GECLE to model processes 
interpretable as dimensionality reduction or mental rotation 
in the perception and learning of stimuli.  Such processes 
may increase the interpretability of stimuli in categorization 
tasks. Another motivation for using the Mahalanobis 
distance is that the capability for paying attention to 
correlations among feature dimensions may be necessary for 
classification tasks defined on integral stimuli.   
In the GECLE framework, the attention parameters 
(which are the diagonal and off-diagonal elements of the 
covariance matrices) can be considered as shape and 
orientation parameters for receptive fields or attention 
coverage areas of the reference points.  It should be noted, 
however, that one can constrain GECLE to incorporate the  
“dimensional attention processes” assumption (i.e., attention 
is allocated independently on a dimension-by-dimension 
basis) by forcing the off-diagonal entries in the covariance 
matrices to be equal to zero. 
Another unique feature of GECLE’s attention mechanism 
is that it allows each reference point to have uniquely 
shaped and oriented attention coverage area, which is 
referred to as “local attention coverage structure” (Matsuka 
2003).  Again, one can impose a restriction on the model’s 
attention mechanism by fixing all covariance matrices to be 
the same, which may be called “global attention coverage 
structure”. Many NN models of category learning, 
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) for example, incorporate the 
global attention coverage structure.   
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The local attention coverage structure model is complex, 
but may plausibly model attention processes in human 
category learning. For example, it allows models to be 
sensitive to one particular feature dimension when the input 
stimulus is compared with a particular reference point that is 
highly associated with category X, while the same feature 
dimension receives little or no attention when compared 
with another reference point associated with category Y.  
Thus the local attention coverage structure causes models to 
learn and be sensitive to within-cluster or within-category 
feature configurations, while the global attention coverage 
structure essentially stretches or shrinks input feature 
dimensions in a consistent manner for all RP receptive fields 
and all categories. 
Another way of interpreting GECLE’s capabilities for 
paying attention to correlations among feature dimensions 
and having local attention coverage structures is that the 
model learns to define what the feature dimensions are for 
each RP and to allocate attention to those dimensions 
independently.  In contrast, for almost all previous adaptive 
models of category learning, the definition of the feature 
dimensions is static and supplied by individuals who use the 
models. 
Some studies showed that humans learn much better in 
“filtration” tasks, in which information from only one 
dimension is required for (perfect) categorization, than in 
“condensation” tasks, in which information from two 
dimensions is required (e.g., Gottwald & Garner, 1975). 
This finding has been used as evidence that people pay 
attention to each dimension independently, rather than 
dependently (i.e., paying attention to correlations). Thus, a 
model paying attention to correlations or having diagonal 
attention coverage, as GECLE does, may not replicate 
filtration advantage.  However, Matsuka (2003, 2004) 
successfully replicated the filtration advantage using a 
prototype based correlation-attentive GECLE with local 
attention coverage structure.  He suggested that for a 
prototype based GECLE, the condensation stimuli require a 
stricter correspondence or synchronization between 
prototype search (i.e., shifting centroids of prototypes) and 
psychological scaling of the two feature dimensions (i.e., 
attention processes) as compared with the filtration stimuli.  
This is because the “correct” prototypes and “correct” 
scaling are defined by two dimensions in the condensation 
stimuli as compared to one dimension in the filtration 
stimuli. 
In its natural form, the GECLE may be considered as a 
model using prototype internal representation, because it 
tries to learn to locate its reference points at the centers of 
each category cluster.  However, with proper user-defined 
parameter settings, it can behave like a model with an 
exemplar-based internal representation. 
Quantitative Descriptions (Algorithm) 
The feedforward and learning algorithms of the GECLE are 
typical for implementation of the Generalized Radial Basis 
Function (Haykin, 1999; Poggio & Girosi, 1989, 1990).  
GECLE uses the following function to calculate the 
distances or similarity between internally represented 
reference points and input stimuli: 
( ) ( ) ( )jnjTjnjnnj rxrxrxD −Σ−= −1,         (1) 
where xn is an I-ruple vector representing an input stimulus 
consisted of I feature dimensions presented at time n, rj, also 
an I-ruple vector, that corresponds to the centroids of 
reference point j, expressing its characteristics, and Σj-1 is 
the inverse of the covariance matrix, which defines the 
shape and orientation of the attention coverage area of 
reference point j.  For a model with global attention 
coverage structure, there is only one global Σ -1 for all 
reference points.   
The psychological similarity measures Dj(x,r) cause some 
activations in internal “hidden” units or reference points 
(i.e., exemplars or prototypes).  The activation of “hidden” 
basis unit j, or hj, is obtained by any differentiable nonlinear 
activation transfer function (ATF), or  ( )),( rxDGh jj =            (2) 
given that its first derivative G’(⋅) exists.  An exponential 
function, exp(-cDj(x,r)), is an example of an ATF.  The ATF 
must be a differentiable function, because GECLE uses a 
gradient method for learning, where the partial derivatives 
are used for updating the learnable parameters.  However, it 
is possible to eliminate this restriction by incorporating a 
form of derivative-free learning algorithm such as stochastic 
learning (Matsuka & Corter 2004).  
The activations of hidden units are then fed forward to 
output nodes.  The activation of the kth output node, Ok, is 
calculated by summing the weighted activations of all 
hidden units connected to the output node, or  
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where wkj is the association weight between output node k 
and reference point j. The probability that a particular 
stimulus is classified as category Ck, denoted as P(C), is 
assumed equal to the activity of category k relative to the 
summed activations of all categories, where the activations 
are first transformed by the exponential function (Kruschke, 
1992)  
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φ is a real-value mapping constant that controls the 
“decisiveness” of classification responses. 
GECLE uses the gradient method to update parameters.  
The error function is defined as the sum of squared 
differences between targeted and predicted output values 
(i.e., L2 norm), or 
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Then the following functions are used to update parameters. 
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where ηw is the learning rate for the association weights. 
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where G’(⋅) is a derivative of G(⋅).  Equation 7 can be 
considered as a function that locates or defines prototypes of 
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stimuli.  For the exemplar-based modeling η r must be set to 
zero to maintain the static nature of reference points. 
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For models with global attention coverage structure, 
Equation 8 should be summed over both k and j.  
Hierarchy of Constraints on Attention Parameters  
There is a hierarchy of constraints that one can impose on 
the attention parameters Σ-1 to manipulate GECLE’s 
attention mechanisms.  There are two levels of uniqueness 
of Σ-1 (global and local attention coverage structure), in each 
of which there are three levels of constraints on entries in Σ. 
The following is a list of six possible levels of restriction.  
Note that regardless of the types of restriction, the entries 
(sim) in Σj are assumed and constrained to satisfy the 
following conditions: sii ≥ 0 & |sim| ≤  MIN(sii, smm).      
 
Global Attention Coverage Structures   
A. Global Pure Radial (GPR): Constraints on Σj: sii = s, for 
all i: sim = 0, for all i ≠ m; Σj = Σ, for all reference points j.   
B. Global Uncorrelated Non-radial (GUN):  Constraints on 
Σj: sim = 0, for all i ≠ m; Σj = Σ, for all reference points j. 
C. Global Correlated Non-radial (GCN): Constraints on Σj: 
Σj = Σ, for all reference points j. 
 
Local Attention Coverage Structures   
D. Local Pure Radial (LPR): Constraints on Σj: sii = s, for 
all i; sim = 0, for all i ≠ m.   
E. Local Uncorrelated Non-radial (LUN):  Constraints on 
Σj: sim = 0, for all i ≠ m. 
F. Local Correlated Non-radial (LCN): Constraints on Σj: 
none. 
 
 
Figure 1. Six types of attention structures in the GECLE 
framework. Clockwise from top left. GRP, GUN, GCN, 
LCN, LUN, and LRP. 
Simulations 
In this section, three simulation studies were conducted to 
compare adaptive network models of category learning 
utilizing prototypes or exemplar internal representations 
using the GECLE framework. Here, a classical category 
learning study (Medin & Schaffer 1978) was replicated with 
several variants of GECLE.  Simulation 1 reports the 
predictions by several GECLE models based on “optimal” 
parameter values.  In Simulation 2, the general tendencies in 
some key aspects associated with the stimulus set were 
investigated with the same GECLE models used in 
Simulation 1.  The plausibility of prototype models was 
further investigated using two variants of prototype-based 
GECLE in Simulation 3. 
Simulation 1 
In Simulation 1, I simulated category learning using the 
well-known Medin and Schaffer’s 5/4 stimulus set (1978).  
Table 1 shows the schematic representation of the stimulus 
set.  Eight different GECLE-based models were involved in 
the present simulation study. Among them there were seven 
prototype-based models (PB) with 2,3,4,5,6,7, or 8 
prototypes and one exemplar-based model (EB) with all 9 
unique exemplars. The global attention structure with 
dimensional attentional processes (i.e., GUN) was used for 
all eight models.  They were run in a simulated training 
procedure to learn the correct classification responses for 
the training set. The models were run for 100 blocks of 
training, where each block consisted of a complete set of the 
training instances.  The final parameter values used for each 
model were chosen by a simulated annealing method to 
minimize the objective function (i.e., sum of squared error: 
SSE) in reproducing the classification profile reported in the 
original Medin & Schaffer’s work (1978). There are a total 
of 50 simulated subjects in each condition.   
The following one-parameter exponential activation 
transfer function was used for the models: ( )),(exp rxDch jj ⋅−=   
One of the main interests of the present simulation study 
was how well the eight models could reproduce observed 
classification profile reported in Medin & Schaffer (1978).  
The other related interest was how well each model 
performs on stimuli A1 and A2 (see Table 1).  These two 
stimuli have been considered to be very important and 
diagnostic, because PB and EB tend to give different 
predictions for these particular stimuli (e.g., Nosofsky & 
Zaki, 2002). Specifically, EB models are used to explain 
empirical results that show that humans are better able to 
categorize less “prototypical” A2 than more “prototypical” 
A1 (e.g., Medin & Schaffer 1978).  Moreover, simulation 
studies (e.g., Nosofsky & Zaki 2002) indicate that EB gives 
a better fit for differential performance on these particular 
stimuli. 
 
Table 1. Stimulus set used in Simulation 1 
 
Training Set  Transfer Set 
 Cat D1 D2 D3 D4  D1 D2 D3 D4 
A1 A 1 1 1 0  1 0 0 1 
A2 A 1 0 1 0  1 1 1 1 
A3 A 1 0 1 1  0 1 0 1 
A4 A 1 1 0 1  0 0 1 1 
A5 A 0 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 
B1 B 1 1 0 0  0 0 1 0 
B2 B 0 1 1 0  0 1 0 0 
B3 B 0 0 0 1      
B4 B 0 0 0 0      
 
Results: Table 2 shows two fit indices for the eight models, 
namely SSE as an absolute fit index, and SSE multiplied by 
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the number of learnable parameters (NLP) as a (crude) 
relative fit index that may account for the model 
complexity.  A pure prototype model (here a pure prototype 
is defined as a model that has as many RPs as the number of 
categories) performed worst before and after controlling for 
the model complexities.  In addition, it failed to show the 
A2 advantage. Rather as in many previous studies, it 
predicted that A1 was easier than A2.  However, other PB 
models performed well; PB8 resulted in the best absolute fit, 
and PB5 resulted in the best relative fit.   
When the PB models are compared with the EB model, 
some PBs fit the observed profile better than EB, 
particularly after controlling for the model complexities.  
More interestingly, as the EB model, almost all PBs were 
able to predict the A2 advantage (Table 2, last column).  
Although, this Medin and Schaffer 5/4 stimulus set has 
been used as evidence supporting exemplar-based models 
and undermining prototype-based models, the results of the 
present simulation study appear to show no competitive 
advantage of the exemplar-based model.  Instead, some PB 
models were able to reproduce the observed classification 
profile and the A2 advantage equally successfully with 
smaller numbers of learnable parameters. 
  
Table 2. Results of simulation 1 
 
Model NLP NRP SSE SSE x NLP A2-A1 
PB2 16 2 0.1438 2.301 -5.633 
PB3 22 3 0.0694 1.527 3.643 
PB4 28 4 0.0361 1.011 5.444 
PB5 34 5 0.0250 0.850 9.046 
PB6 40 6 0.0215 0.860 2.663 
PB7 46 7 0.0193 0.888 4.314 
PB8 52 8 0.0182 0.946 3.273 
EB9 58* 9 0.0201 1.166 8.011 
NLP: Number of Learnable Parameters 
NRP: Number of Reference Points (e.g. prototype or exemplar) 
* Location parameters for exemplar were static & not subject for 
learning, but assumed that optimized locations were learned when 
the exemplars were created. 
 
Discussion of Simulation 1: All GECLE models that were 
capable of learning to locate the reference points were 
interpreted as prototype-based models in the present 
simulation study.  However, it might not have been a 
sensible interpretation for some of those models, 
particularly for models with larger numbers of prototypes 
(e.g., PB5 ~ PB8). That is, it does not seem logical to create 
eight prototypes from only nine unique stimuli.  Rather, 
there may be better interpretations for these models. Two 
possible alternative interpretations are discussed below. 
First, it might be more sensible to interpret PB GECLE 
with larger numbers of prototype as models utilizing 
“fuzzy” or modular prototypes (or simply modules) as the 
reference points (RP) in a combinatorial fashion: it tries to 
create and memorize modules (defined by or being 
prototypes of subsets of stimuli belonging to a particular 
category) that summarize characteristics of particular 
feature dimensions more correctly than the other feature 
dimensions for a particular category, and uses combinations 
of the module activations triggered by similarities between 
the modules and input stimuli for categorizing.  This 
combinatorial coding seems to be a very efficient use of 
limited mental resources for categorizing virtually unlimited 
number of unique instances.  
Alternatively, those models that were interpreted as 
prototype-based GECLE with many prototypes might have 
been utilizing RPs that were more sensible to be interpreted 
as probabilistic, partial, or erroneous exemplars, instead.  
That is, although the models might have tried to store 
correct exemplars in their memory, the process was not fully 
completed because of the limited mental resources, resulting 
in imprecise exemplars memorization, in which a particular 
feature of a particular exemplar was more correctly 
memorized than other features. Then, these imprecise 
exemplars were utilized for categorizing the stimuli.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Predicted classification profiles by two best 
prototype based GECLE models (i.e., PB8-GUN: lowest 
absolute fit; PB5-GUN: lowest relative fit). 
 
 
Figure 3.  Predicted classification profiles by exemplar 
based GECLE model (i.e., EB9-GUN). 
Simulation 2 
Simulation 2 is a replication of Simulation 1 with 10,000 
randomly chosen parameter configurations to investigate 
general tendencies in the A2 advantage by the same eight 
models used in Simulation 1.  Here, the 10,000 simulated 
subjects with randomly assigned parameter values were 
trained to classify the 5/4 stimulus set. The ranges of 
parameters were [0.1 10] for c and φ, [0.001 1] for the three 
learning rates.  
 
Results & discussion: Table 4 summarizes the results of 
Stimulation 2.  In short, the A2 advantage was observed in 
almost all PB and EB models, indicating that the results of 
Simulation 1 are reasonably generalizable in this regard.  
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More interestingly, the EB model showed lesser 
magnitude of the A2 advantage than several PBs. This was 
mainly because EB9 learned to produce network output 
activations correctly with many parameter configurations 
(i.e., minimizing the error defined as Equation 5 perfectly) 
since the model was supplied the correct locations of all 
unique stimulus exemplars from the beginning of the 
training. This in turn, resulted in very small differences in 
classification responses for Stimuli A1 and A2, because the 
activations triggered by Stimulus A1 and A2 for the output 
nodes were almost identical (i.e., L2 was minimized).  This 
implies that any EB-based GECLE or any EB-based model 
such as ALCOVE would find this learning task (here, 
learning task does not correspond to categorization, but L2 
minimization, i.e., Eq. 5) easy because it can satisfactorily 
complete the task with virtually any parameter settings 
inasmuch as the locations of exemplars were well defined. 
Although this may be true if the condition of correctly 
memorizing exemplars is met, there is no guarantee for 
satisfying the condition in real human cognition. But, more 
likely, the condition would not be tenable for some people 
(i.e., some memorize exemplars more correctly and/or faster 
than other individuals).  This difference in memorization 
ability may be one of the factors creating individual 
differences in category learning.  This aspect of exemplar 
type modeling alone does not invalidate the assumption of 
exemplar-type internal representation, but it does suggest 
that exemplar-based (computational) models of 
categorization could be benefited from integrating an 
algorithm or quantitative explanation of how people learn 
and memorize exemplars. 
On the contrary, exemplar theorists may argue that the 
upper limits of the randomly selected learning rate 
parameters (or the number of training epochs) were set 
unrealistically high.  Although this argument is likely valid 
and thus the interpretation of the results may require some 
caution, it is still true that exemplar model may need to have 
learning algorithm for exemplar initialization, maintenance, 
and memorization. 
 
Table 4. Results of Simulation study 2: Differences in 
classification accuracies for A2 and A1.  (numbers of 
observed cases shown in parentheses). 
 
Model Overall Classification Accuracy (CA) in training 
  100 CA >90% 90 CA >80% 
PB2 1.011 -8.725(117) -8.178(162) 
PB3 2.184 0.056(250) 0.539(295) 
PB4 2.521 0.331(556) 1.261(369) 
PB5 3.071 0.885(905) 3.007(342) 
PB6 2.711 0.661(1212) 3.816(365) 
PB7 2.962 0.342(1690) 4.029(367) 
PB8 2.446 0.330(2037) 2.885(393) 
EB9 0.050 0.014(7660) 0.087(837) 
Note: Observed classification accuracy for the training set is 0.85 
Simulation 3 
Simulations 1 and 2 showed that the pure prototype model, 
PB-2, accounted poorly for phenomena associated with the 
Medin and Schaffer’s stimuli. However, these results might 
have resulted from incorrect assumptions about the 
prototype modeling.  For example, I assumed that the 
locations of prototypes were continuously updated 
throughout the training, but in reality, people may quickly 
identify prototypes which may be less likely to be updated 
unless absolutely necessary.  Another possible explanation 
is that people may have a uniquely shaped activation area 
for each prototype and/or pay attention to correlation among 
feature dimensions.  For example, Matsuka (2003 & 2004) 
showed that there may be an interaction between types of 
internal mental representation and types of attention 
mechanism: the prototype-based model performed better 
when it incorporated unique attention structure with the 
capability of paying attention to dimensional correlations; 
whereas the exemplar-based model performed better with 
global attention structure with independent dimensional 
attention processes (i.e., no attention to correlations).  
In the present simulation study, pure prototype modeling 
was reinvestigated using two variants of the original PB2 
GECLE.  The first one, SPB-2 is a static version of PB-2.  
That is SPB-2 is identical to PB2 appeared in Simulations 1 
and 2, but the locations of prototypes were supplied from 
the beginning of the training and the learning rate for RPs 
was set to zero.  Thus, this model resembles EB-based 
GECLE (except that RPs were prototypes) in that the 
locations of RPs were static.  The second one, CPB2, is 
PB2-GECLE with the most complex attention mechanism, 
namely LCN (see Figure 1, lower right panel), having a 
unique receptive field for each prototype and the capability 
of paying attention to correlation. 
For SPB2, the prototype for each category was created by 
averaging the feature values of each dimension of every 
object in a particular category, thus [0.8 0.6 0.8 0.6] for 
Category A and [0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25] for Category B.  The 
rest of the procedures of the present simulation study follow 
those of Simulations 1 and 2. 
 
Table 5a. Simulation 3: Results based on optimal 
parameters 
 
Model NLP NRP SSE SSE x NLP A2-A1 
SPB2 16 2 0.1972 3.155 -9.208 
CPB2 32 2 0.0377 1.206 11.130 
 
Table 5b. Simulation 3: A2 advantage based on randomly 
drawn parameters. 
 
Model Overall Classification Accuracy (CA) in training 
  100 CA >90% 90 CA >80% 
SPB2 -2.346 -3.740 (2263) -4.535(1920) 
CPB2 2.931 -0.814(2215) 5.964(1505) 
 
Results & discussion:  A great decrease in SSE was 
obtained for CPB2 as compared with the original PB2, and 
after controlling for the model complexity by the simple 
linear adjustment (i.e., SSE x NLP) it performed nearly as 
good as EB9 (1.206 vs.1.166).  In addition, unlike PB2, 
CPB2 was able to replicate the A2 advantage, and it was 
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shown to be generalizable to some extent in the second part 
of the present simulation study using the randomly drawn 
parameters (Table 5b).  In contrast SPB2 performed worse 
than PB2 for replicating the observed classification profile.  
Moreover, SPB2 consistently failed to replicate the A2 
advantage in the randomized simulation study.  
Discussion on Simulations  
Medin and Schaffer’s 5/4 stimulus (1978) has been used as 
a benchmarking stimulus set for computational models of 
categorization and category learning, usually favoring 
exemplar models (e.g. Matsuka et al. 2003; Minda & Smith 
2002; Nosofsky & Zaki, 2003).  However, the results of the 
present simulation studies showed that several GECLE 
models with prototype internal representation performed as 
good as or better than the exemplar-based GELCLE.  One 
type of those successful prototype-based GECLE was the 
model that created and utilized multiple modular prototypes 
for categorization. The modular prototype is a prototype 
defined by subsets of stimuli belonging to a particular 
category that summarize characteristics of particular feature 
dimensions more correctly than the other feature dimensions 
for the particular category (however, the modular prototypes 
may be interpreted as imprecise exemplars).  The other type 
of the successful prototype-based GECLE was the one with 
uniquely shaped and oriented attention coverage areas and 
with the capability of paying attention to correlations among 
feature dimensions. 
There are at least few concerns associated with the 
present simulation studies.  First one, as discussed in 
Simulation 1, is that as the number of GECLE’s reference 
points (RP) increases, it become philosophically difficult 
within the cognitive science paradigm to interpret what 
these RP are representing (e.g., modular prototypes vs. 
imprecise exemplars).  The other concern is the way the 
numbers of learnable parameters were counted for the 
exemplar-based GECLE (see notes on Table 2).  That is, in 
the present simulation studies, the location parameters of the 
exemplars were counted as learnable parameters.  On one 
hand, the locations of exemplars may be learnable, because 
they are initialized at the “optimal” location without error.  
On the other hand, they may not be learnable, because they 
reside in static locations.     
Conclusions 
Generalized Exploratory model of human Category 
LEarning (GECLE) is a flexible and general framework for 
modeling human category learning that is capable of 
manipulating a limited number of assumptions 
independently and systematically.  In the present study, the 
plausibility of two different assumptions about internal 
representation was investigated with GECLE using 
exemplar-model-friendly Medin & Schaffer 5/4 stimulus set 
(1978).  The results of simulations showed no competitive 
advantage of previously favored exemplar-based modeling.  
Rather, they appeared to suggest some prototype models 
performed better than an exemplar model.  In addition, the 
exploratory nature of GECLE yielded new plausible 
prototype-based adaptive models of category learning with 
different structures and model assumptions. 
Although, several models were examined in some depth 
in the present research, the results were based only on a 
simulation of one empirical study.  More simulation studies 
with several other stimulus sets should help identify models 
or assumptions with descriptive validities more accurately.  
In addition, measurements of several different cognitive 
processes associated with category learning, such as, 
attention allocation should be collected in empirical studies, 
in order to restrict model parameters and to better 
differentiate among models. 
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Abstract 
In eye-movement experiments using gaze-contingent 
windows, the stimulus display is continuously updated in 
response to the participant’s current gaze position. Usually, a 
window is centered at the participant’s gaze position and 
follows it wherever the participant looks. Within the window, 
all stimulus information is visible, while outside of the 
window at least part of the information is masked. In the 
present paper, we apply this technique to a face recognition 
task. By varying the size of the window, we gain insight into 
face recognition processes in humans and characterize the 
visual information on which face recognition relies. The 
results also motivate the use of gaze-contingent windows to 
study visual perception. 
Introduction 
Face recognition is a very important function of the human 
visual system and is fundamental to our complex social 
behavior. Therefore, it is not surprising that face recognition 
in humans has been extensively studied. Many studies 
concluded that face recognition relies more strongly on 
holistic information than does object recognition in general 
(see Maurer, Le Grand & Mondloch, 2002, for a review). In 
other words, ideally, the recognition process uses the entire 
visual information available from a face.  
What makes faces so special in this regard?  An important 
reason seems to be our everyday-life expertise in identifying 
people by their faces. It was found that people can be 
trained to recognize individual non-face objects, and thereby 
develop analysis patterns that are similar to those used in 
face recognition (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier, 
Williams, Tarr & Tanaka, 1998).  
Other researchers presented participants with face images 
filtered by different spatial frequencies and found that only a 
rather narrow band of spatial frequencies (about 6 to 12 
cycles per face width) contributes significantly to the 
recognition of a face (e.g., Näsänen, 1999). Again, this 
finding does not apply to non-face objects, even if 
individual objects of the same class are to be distinguished 
(Biederman & Kolacsai, 1997). 
Moreover, face recognition has received considerable 
attention in machine vision research (e.g., Phillips, Moon, 
Rizvi & Rauss, 2000; Senior, Hsu, Mottaleb & Jain, 2002; 
Zhou., Krueger & Chellappa, 2003). Despite these immense 
efforts, however, even the currently best vision algorithms 
achieve face recognition rates that are far below the ones of 
a human observer.  
We believe that a better understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying human face recognition will be beneficial to both 
the fields of medicine and machine vision. In the present 
study, we applied the sophisticated method of gaze-
contingent windows to a psychophysical eye-movement 
study of a face recognition task in order to broaden our 
understanding of the underlying perceptual and attentional 
processes. The gaze-contingent window technique provides 
powerful experimental control and has been used 
extensively in reading, scene perception, and more recently 
in visual search studies (e.g. Bertera & Rayner, 2000; 
McConkie & Rayner, 1975; Pomplun, Reingold & Shen, 
2001; Saida & Ikeda, 1979; see Rayner, 1998, for a review).  
In most of its applications, this technique obscures all 
objects from view except those within a certain window that 
is continually centered on the participant’s current gaze 
position. The window position changes across fixations to 
follow the gaze position. For example, in a study by 
McConkie and Rayner (1975), participants read text that 
was masked outside a visual window that included the 
fixated character and a number of characters to the left and 
to the right. Only the text within the window was legible. 
The visual span in reading was assessed by varying the 
window size across trials and determining the smallest 
window size that allowed participants to read with normal 
speed. 
In the present study, participants were presented with 
images of famous and non-famous faces and had to indicate 
whether they recognized the displayed person or not. While 
viewing the images, a gaze-contingent window was 
administered with its size varying across trials. This allowed 
us to address the following questions: First, to what extent 
does face recognition rely on the simultaneous availability 
of the entire face features? Second, from which positions in 
the image and in what manner do participants acquire 
information about a face when their peripheral vision is 
restricted? It is well known that saccades during unrestricted 
face viewing tend to be aimed at the region formed by the 
eyes, nose, and mouth (e.g., Yarbus, 1967). However, where 
and how do participants gather information if they have to 
do it sequentially and be as efficient as possible? Third, how 
can the moment of recognition be characterized? Is it 
possible to determine this moment based on psychophysical 
data?
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Figure 1:  Sample stimuli used in the present study – each column represents one of the viewing conditions. From left to right 
column: unrestricted, large window, medium window, and small window. (a) Illustration of the different window sizes.  
(b) - (e) Sample gaze trajectories for each of the four stimulus categories (from top to bottom row): famous females, famous 
males, non-famous females, and non-famous males. Fixations are shown as circles with their size indicating fixation 
duration; the initial fixation is displayed in red color.
(a) 
    
(b) 
    
(c) 
    
(d) 
    
(e) 
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Method 
Participants. Twenty students of the University of 
Massachusetts at Boston (ten females and ten males) 
participated in the present study. All of them had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. They were naïve with respect to 
the purpose of the study and were paid $10 for their 
participation. 
Materials. We prepared 80 face images to serve as stimuli – 
20 in each of the following four categories: famous females, 
famous males, non-famous females, and non-famous males. 
We chose the most popular American actresses and actors 
for the “famous” categories, while foreign actresses and 
actors, who had never appeared in international movies, 
were chosen for the “non-famous” categories. These 
grayscale images subtended an area of about 18° 
horizontally and 24° vertically on the screen of a 21-inch 
monitor. In the gaze-contingent window trials, the display 
area outside a circular, gaze-centered window was replaced 
with plain gray color. Four different viewing conditions 
were included in the experiment: unrestricted, large window 
(diameter of 8.2°), medium window (diameter of 5.5°), and 
small window (4.1°). These window sizes are illustrated in 
Figure 1a. 
Apparatus. Eye movements were measured with an SR 
Research Ltd. EyeLink-II system. After a calibration 
procedure that was typically completed in less than a 
minute, gaze-position error was below or equal to 0.5 
degrees of visual angle. The temporal resolution of the 
system was 2 ms. The gaze-contingent window followed the 
participant's gaze position with an average delay of 12 ms. 
Procedure. Prior to each trial, participants were asked to 
fixate a marker in the center of the display. Following a 
button press, a face display was presented. As soon as 
participants had decided whether the depicted person was 
famous or non-famous, they terminated the trial by pressing 
one out of two buttons indicating their decision. Each 
participant was presented with each of the 80 stimuli exactly 
once, resulting in 80 trials per participant. The trials were 
administered in eight blocks of ten successive trials. Each of 
the four viewing conditions was applied in two of these 
blocks. The order of blocks and stimuli as well as the 
combination of stimuli with viewing conditions was 
systematically varied across participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Figures 1b to 1e show sample gaze trajectories for different 
stimuli across the four viewing conditions. Notice that the 
four trajectories for the same stimulus were generated by 
different participants, because each participant saw each 
stimulus only once. Two things can clearly be observed: 
First, in the unrestricted viewing condition, only a few 
central fixations were performed; the parafoveal and 
peripheral information of most of the face seems to be 
sufficient for successful face recognition. Second, when the 
gaze-contingent window was implemented, participants 
produced more fixations and directed them also at features 
that would normally not require foveal inspection, such as 
the hair or the ears, but obviously hold important 
information for the face recognition process. This effect of 
the gaze-contingent window on the eye-movement patterns 
generally increased with decreasing window size. 
The quantitative analysis of the empirical data included 
the “standard” variables response time, proportion of correct 
responses, fixation duration, and saccade amplitude, but also 
the variables area coverage per trial and relative pupil size 
(see below). Interestingly, four-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) for each of these variables (factors: viewing 
condition, stimulus recognizability, stimulus gender, and 
participant gender) revealed no significant effect by the 
factors stimulus gender or participant gender or their 
interaction. In other words, the gender of the participants or 
the people shown in the stimuli had no significant influence 
on any of the obtained variables. Therefore, in the following 
analyses, data were collapsed over these factors and only 
two-way ANOVAs (factors: viewing condition and stimulus 
recognizability) were conducted. 
Response time was found to significantly depend on the 
viewing condition, F(3; 57) =  80.93, p < 0.001 as well as on 
recognizability (famous faces vs. non-famous faces), F(1; 
19) = 8.80, p < 0.01. The interaction between the two 
factors also reached significance, F(3; 57) = 2.77, p = 0.05. 
As can be seen in Figure 2a, response time increased with 
smaller window size for both famous faces (no window: 
1.90 s; large window: 4.57 s; medium window: 6.57 s; small 
window: 9.34 s) and non-famous faces (1.82 s, 5.69 s, 7.60 
s, and 11.33 s). With more severe viewing restriction, 
response time became increasingly longer for non-famous 
faces as compared to famous ones. The pattern of these 
findings was expected, because restricting the participants’ 
parafoveal and peripheral vision obviously makes their task 
more difficult. Detecting a familiar face should on average 
be faster than deciding that a face is unfamiliar, because 
before a negative decision can be made, all reasonable 
possibilities for a match have to be considered. With a 
smaller field of view, this effect increases, because more 
information needs to be obtained for a negative decision. 
The only unexpected finding is the pure magnitude of the 
response time difference imposed by the window 
manipulation.  
The proportion of correct responses was also 
significantly influenced by the viewing condition, F(3; 57) = 
21.92, p < 0.001, while there was neither an effect by 
recognizability, F < 1, or an interaction between the factors, 
F < 1. As shown in Figure 2b, there was no tradeoff between 
participants’ response time and accuracy, but actually the 
opposite effect was found: The proportion of correct 
responses strongly decreased with more severe viewing 
restriction (91.3%, 78.0%, 67.8%, and 68.7%). Given that a 
participant who just gives random responses would reach an 
average of 50% correct responses, this result indicates a 
dramatic decrease in performance accuracy. The fact that 
there was no significant difference between famous and 
non-famous faces demonstrates that participants were not 
biased towards giving positive responses or towards giving 
negative responses. The latter would have been found if 
participants had just clicked the “non-famous” button  
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Figure 2: Psychophysical measurements obtained in the present study: (a) response time, (b) proportion of correct answers, 
(c) fixation duration, (d) saccade amplitude, (e) area coverage per trial, and (f) relative pupil size. Notice that the depicted 
interval of the variable values does not always start at 0. 
(a) (b)
(c) 
(f)
(d)
(e) 
930
whenever they did not recognize a face immediately, instead 
of making an effort to verify their first impression. 
Therefore, the analysis of the proportion of correct 
responses provides evidence for the participants of the 
present study to perform their task according to the 
instructions. 
A variable that is analyzed in almost all eye-movement 
experiments is fixation duration. The duration of a fixation 
indicates how long the local information in a display was 
processed, which includes the duration necessary to 
program the subsequent saccade. In the present experiment, 
we found a significant effect by the viewing condition on 
fixation duration, F(3; 57) = 23.15, p < 0.001. The factor 
recognizability also exerted a significant effect, F(1; 19) = 
7.84, p < 0.05, while there was no interaction between the 
two factors, F(3; 57) = 1.33, p > 0.2. In Figure 2c, fixation 
duration can be seen to increase with smaller windows for 
both famous faces (266 ms, 315 ms, 312 ms, and 336 ms) 
and non-famous faces (263 ms, 293 ms, 304 ms, 316 ms). 
Since smaller gaze-contingent windows reduce the amount 
of information that is available near the fixation point, there 
are two likely factors that determine this pattern of results: 
First, the smaller the window, the more effort is required to 
merge the available visual information with the current 
representation of the face in visual working memory. 
Second, for efficient task performance, a smaller window 
increases the necessity to aim saccades at locations where 
the most useful information is assumed to be located; 
consequently, the programming of these saccades requires 
more time. The finding of longer fixations for famous than 
for non-famous faces (see Figure 2c) is more puzzling; one 
possible explanation is that the recognition process itself 
causes one or more prolonged fixations – such fixations do 
not occur in non-famous faces. We conducted another 
analysis, reported later in this section, to test this hypothesis. 
Another variable is routinely analyzed in eye-movement 
studies, namely saccade amplitude, measuring the length of 
saccades in degrees of visual angle. Short saccades can 
indicate fine-grained processing of local information, 
whereas long saccades often signify low information content 
or superficial scanning of local visual input. In the present 
context, we might expect saccades to become shorter with 
decreasing window size in order to uncover contiguous 
patches of an image. However, no influence by the viewing 
condition on saccade amplitude was found, F < 1, and 
recognizability showed no effect either, F(1; 19) = 2.83, p > 
0.1. There was no interaction between the factors, F(3; 57) = 
1.74, p > 0.1. As shown in Figure 2d, saccade amplitude 
(famous faces: 6.17°, 5.87°, 6.00°, and 6.45°; non-famous 
faces: 5.33°, 6.10°, 5.73°, and 6.00°) is unaffected by the 
recognizability of faces or the viewing condition. This result 
suggests that saccadic endpoints are not chosen to 
completely inspect local areas of the image by patching 
together adjacent pieces of visual information. Instead, 
saccades are aimed at positions that are assumed to contain 
the most significant information for the famous versus non-
famous decision. This interpretation is in line with the view 
that fixations become longer with decreasing window size 
because of increased effort in the programming of saccades. 
If it is true that the additional saccades induced by smaller 
gaze-contingent windows are aimed at “foraging” for useful 
information wherever in the image it is suspected, rather 
than inspect focused areas more thoroughly, then this 
behavior should be quantitatively reflected in the eye-
movement data. In order to investigate this, we analyzed the 
eye-movement variable area coverage per trial. To compute 
this variable, we divided the stimulus area into 9 
(horizontally) by 12 (vertically) squares. For each trial, we 
calculated the area coverage as the number of different 
squares that contained at least one fixation. This number 
should increase with the amount of “information foraging” 
(as opposed to focused examination) performed by 
participants. We found the area coverage per trial to be 
significantly influenced by the viewing condition, F(3; 57) = 
96.42, p < 0.001, and by recognizability,  F(1; 19) = 13.50, 
p < 0.01. The interaction between these factors was also 
significant, F(3; 57) = 5.78, p < 0.01. As shown in Figure 
2e, the pattern of results for area coverage per trial is very 
similar to the one for response times (Figure 2a): Area 
coverage per trial increases strongly with decreasing 
window size, both for famous faces (4.37, 9.49, 12.30, and 
14.54 squares) and for non-famous ones (4.38, 11.73, 14.45, 
and 18.77 squares). Area coverage is also smaller for 
famous faces than for non-famous ones, with this difference 
being more pronounced for smaller windows. This finding 
supports our assumption that peripheral restriction of 
information induces an exploration strategy that guides 
saccades towards the most promising new locations in the 
stimulus. 
Finally, a variable that usually receives less attention, 
although it is a “by-product” of video-based eye tracking, is 
pupil size. Pupil size is known to depend on factors such as 
the luminance in the visual field or the cognitive activation 
of a person (e.g. Kahneman, 1973; Pomplun & Sunkara, 
2003). Since we were only interested in relative changes in 
pupil size, we divided all measurements by the participants’ 
initial pupil size after the eye tracker setup. Consequently, 
values above 1 indicate a dilated pupil, while values below 1 
signify a contracted pupil. We found a significant influence 
of the viewing condition on pupil size, F(3; 57) = 42.58, p < 
0.001, and also a significant influence by recognizability, 
F(1; 19) = 8.37, p < 0.01. There was no interaction, F(3; 57) 
= 1.81, p > 0.1. Figure 2f illustrates that pupil size clearly 
decreases with smaller window size for both famous faces 
(1.094, 1.002, 0.975, and 0.974) and non-famous faces 
(1.086, 0.992, 0.952, 0.925). This could be explained by the 
smaller amount of information that is available for 
processing at any given time during the trial. However, why 
was the pupil larger for famous than for non-famous faces? 
A possible explanation is that the moment of recognizing a 
famous face has an impact on the eye-movement data. In an 
earlier, unpublished study on a face search experiment, we 
observed that the moment of recognizing the presence of a 
face tended to coincide with a prolonged fixation and 
temporarily dilated pupils. If such a reaction also occurs at 
the moment of recognizing a known face, then in the present 
study this would not only explain the greater in pupil size, 
but also the longer fixations measured for famous as 
compared to non-famous faces. To test this hypothesis, we 
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Figure 3: (a) Fixation duration and (b) pupil size analyzed separately during the first 75% and the last 25% of each trial. 
 
separated the data for the first 75% of the duration of each 
trial from the final 25%. The moment of recognition is 
most likely to occur during the last 25% of a trial, so if we 
found the recognizability effects on fixation duration and 
pupil size to only occur during the last phase, as indicated 
by an interaction of the factors recognizability and time 
interval, it would support the moment of recognition 
interpretation.  
For each of the two variables, we therefore conducted a 
two-way (recognizability and time interval) ANOVA. 
While there was no significant interaction for fixation 
duration (Figure 3a), F < 1, it was found for pupil size, 
F(1; 19) = 6.92, p < 0.05. Figure 3b shows that the 
difference in pupil size between famous and non-famous 
faces clearly increases during the final 25% of the trials. 
This finding suggests that the moment of recognizing a 
face may be associated with pupil dilation. 
All in all, the present study has shown that the 
simultaneous availability of the entire face information is 
crucial for efficient face recognition, which supports the 
view that face recognition is a holistic process that 
heavily relies on parafoveal and peripheral input. 
Restricting this input has provided us with insight into 
which essential information was eliminated and needed to 
be foveally processed instead. Finally, we have found that 
the moment of recognizing a face may be indicated by a 
dilated pupil. This line of research is only at its beginning, 
and we hope to inspire other researchers to consider the 
technique of gaze-contingent windows for their face 
recognition and other perceptual studies. 
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Abstract 
Two experiments examine the use of the recognition heuristic 
which states that, in the absence of other information, 
individuals make judgments on the basis on recognition alone. 
This has been shown to be adaptive (Borges, Goldstein, 
Ortmann & Gigerenzer, 1999) and in Experiment 1 we 
demonstrate that the heuristic is reliably employed when 
participants are placed under time pressure. Experiment 2 
considers a possible confound of the adaptive recognition 
heuristic with a less-adaptive recognition-preference strategy 
and shows that both may be employed but that the 
recognition-preference strategy is not sufficient to account for 
the recognition heuristic. We discuss the implications of our 
results for the recognition heuristic and the rest of the 
adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).  
Introduction 
A recent approach to human judgment and rationality put 
forward by Gigerenzer and colleagues (Gigerenzer, 2000; 
Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) emphasizes the real-time 
constraints of many decision-making and reasoning tasks. In 
doing so they have suggested that many so-called “biases” 
in human judgment are actually adaptive within real-world 
situations. The approach uses “fast and frugal” heuristics 
that have been shown to be highly effective in a number of 
situations (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999; Borges et al., 
1999) even when compared to more sophisticated methods 
that take into account multiple sources of information.  
The recognition heuristic is one such strategy and is, 
furthermore, the first step in a number of fast and frugal 
strategies within what has been termed the adaptive toolbox 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Simply stated, the 
recognition heuristic provides the following rule of thumb: 
“If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, 
then infer that the recognized object has the higher value” 
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, p. 41). So, for example, if 
an experimental participant is asked to judge which of two 
cities has the larger population, the participant will be 
following the recognition heuristic if they choose the city 
which they recognize. This leads to the less-is-more effect 
whereby participants using the recognition heuristic 
outperform other participants who recognize both cities and 
should, therefore, have more information available upon 
which to base their decision. The reason for this is that 
recognition of city correlates with the size of the city and 
hence may be a more effective cue than those used by more 
knowledgeable participants.  
Having demonstrated the usefulness of the heuristic, 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer (2002) examined whether the 
heuristic was actually employed in practice. Data from 22 
participants showed that all of them produced choice 
behavior consistent with use of the recognition heuristic. 
These data were, however, disputed by Oppenheimer (2003) 
who noted that the American participants tested by 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer may have accessed information 
other than mere recognition in making their choices. 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer required their participants to select 
the larger of the two in pairs of German cities. Oppenheimer 
suggested that the stimuli employed conflated recognition 
with knowledge that the recognized city was one of the 
largest cities in Germany. 
In his study, Oppenheimer presented participants with 
towns or cities that were local to them and that were known 
to be small. In doing so, Oppenheimer demonstrated that the 
recognition heuristic is not an inevitable strategy when 
faced with forced-choice tasks where only one of the 
choices is recognized. Oppenheimer’s participants proved 
smarter than the recognition heuristic by choosing the 
recognized city significantly less often than would be 
expected by chance. However, the differences between the 
studies by Goldstein & Gigerenzer (2002) and by 
Oppenheimer (2003) go beyond the choice of stimuli. One 
aim of the current paper is to consider how differences in 
procedure may have contributed to the reported 
contradictions in choice behavior between the two studies. 
In doing so we will provide a more balanced view of the 
place of the recognition heuristic in decision-making 
generally and in the adaptive toolbox in particular.  
The key methodological difference between the two 
studies was the time pressure that participants experienced. 
In the Oppenheimer study (Experiment 1), participants 
made 10 choices over a five-minute period, an average of 30 
seconds for each choice. In Oppenheimer’s Experiment 2, 
participants were given a week to return the booklet 
containing their answers. In contrast, in the Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer study (Experiment 1), participants made 
between 300 and 435 choices during a single experimental 
session. Although Goldstein and Gigerenzer did not specify 
how long their participants had to complete the task, it is 
likely that their participants had substantially less time per 
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choice than the 30 seconds for each choice taken by 
participants in the first Oppenheimer study (as, if this were 
the case, participants who had 435 choices to make would 
have taken over 3 ½ hours). We suggest that participants 
will be much more likely to use so-called “fast and frugal” 
strategies when tasks put them under time pressure. This 
situation basically reinstates the constraints under which 
boundedly rational approaches such as the use of fast and 
frugal heuristics are presumed to operate (Simon, 1956). It 
alos provides an alternative explanation, besides the 
difference in stimuli, of why participants were much more 
likely to use the recognition heuristic in the Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer study than in Oppenheimer’s experiment.  
In the two experiments that we report we therefore 
replicated the general procedure of Oppenheimer (2003) but 
gave participants a strict time limit for the experimental 
session. In order to address the issue of the confound in the 
stimuli identified by Oppenheimer we chose English towns 
or cities whose soccer teams played in the UK First 
Division, not in the Premier League, as the recognizable 
stimuli. The town or city names would thus have been 
familiar to the participants without being considered a large 
or major city as large cities in the UK (e.g., London, 
Liverpool, Manchester) tend to have soccer teams in the 
Premier League. The city names used as the (hopefully) 
unrecognizable stimuli were the fictional cities invented by 
Oppenheimer, all of which had made-up but (to UK 
participants) foreign-sounding names. 
The general situation experienced by the participants 
therefore is one where the recognition heuristic is applicable 
(only one of the names is recognized) and there is no other 
information upon which to base a choice. The recognized 
name is not known to be a particularly large city (unlike the 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer study). Equally, the participant has 
little time with which to consider what they know of the 
recognized town or city or attempt to infer anything 
regarding the unrecognized city (unlike the Oppenheimer 
study). Under these circumstances the recognition heuristic 
is the only tool available in the adaptive toolbox. In 
Experiment 1 we consider whether, with these potential 
confounds identified and controlled for, participants will 
make use of the recognition heuristic. Failure to observe the 
use of the single simplest heuristic in the toolbox under such 
circumstances would be a severe setback to the fast and 
frugal heuristics research agenda. 
Experiment 1 
Participants and Procedure 
The participants were 50 adult volunteers. The 30 men and 
20 women who took part had an average age of 28 years 
(range 17-62; standard deviation 11.2). Each participant was 
presented with a four-page experimental booklet. The 
instructions told them that they would be presented with 
pairs of names of towns, and that their task was to circle the 
town with the largest population in each pair. Participants 
were given one minute to complete the task, timed with the 
stopwatch. In order to encourage them to work quickly, 
participants were given updates on the time at 15-second 
intervals. On completion of the first part of the task 
participants were then given a list of all of the towns used in 
the experiment (both real and fictional) and were asked to 
circle those out of the list that they recognized.  
Materials and Design 
The materials used in this experiment were based on those 
used by Oppenheimer (2003). We created a group of stimuli 
where participants could show the recognition heuristic by 
pairing the names of 10 real English towns with the names 
of 10 fictional towns (taken from Oppenheimer; see 
Appendix). The English towns were selected from the list of 
towns with First Division soccer teams, and each was paired 
with three different fictional towns, giving 30 recognition 
heuristic items in all. In addition, we created two groups of 
filler items. The first group consisted of pairs of real towns 
and cities taken from a list of 8, which contained four 
international towns/cities (e.g., Limerick) and four English 
towns (e.g., Bradford). Each participant received 10 pairs of 
this type. The second type of filler item consisted of pairs of 
the fictional towns. Participants each received 9 pairs of this 
type1. Therefore, each participant received 49 choice pairs in 
total, of which 30 were of the critical recognition heuristic 
type. The order of presentation of these pairs was 
randomized across participants. 
Results 
Coding Some participants did not complete all 49 choices in 
the allotted time. In addition, some participants either failed 
to recognize a real place name, or erroneously recognized a 
fictional place name. Therefore, on the basis of the number 
of items that they had completed, and their responses to the 
recognition task, we calculated for each participant: (a) the 
number of times that they could have used the recognition 
heuristic, (b) the number of times that they did use the 
recognition heuristic. The second figure divided by the first 
gave us a figure for the proportion of responses that 
conformed to the recognition heuristic. 
Analysis One sample t-test showed that, by participant, the 
proportion of responses attributed to the recognition 
heuristic was significantly greater than would be expected 
by chance, t = 3.55, df = 49, p = .001 (2-tailed). These data 
are shown in Figure 1 (overleaf). 
 
                                                          
1 There should have been 10 pairs of this type, but, due to a 
printing error with the materials, participants only received 9 pairs. 
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Figure 1:  Proportion of Recognized Items Chosen by 
Participant (Experiment 1). 
 
Further analysis of the choices made by individual 
participants shows that 23 out of the 50 participants showed 
evidence of use of the recognition heuristic at levels greater 
than chance, binomial z > 1.28, p < .05. Interestingly, a 
further 6 participants showed the reverse pattern, using the 
recognition heuristic significantly less often than chance, 
binomial z  > 1.66, p < .05.  
Discussion 
These data confirm Goldstein & Gigerenzer’s contention 
that participants use recognition in choice behavior when no 
other information is available. Use of this recognition 
heuristic may, however, be limited to situations when the 
participant is under time or other pressure. We should note 
that our participants did not use the recognition heuristic as 
frequently as those of Goldstein and Gigerenzer. This may 
have been due to the materials we used, and hence may 
provide some support for Oppenheimer’s position. 
Additionally, not all the participants used the recognition 
heuristic consistently in their responses in our experiment 
and a significant subgroup of participants appeared to be 
using quite the opposite strategy. This was confirmed by the 
spontaneous self-reports of some participants. There are 
drawbacks to analyzing individual participants’ data in this 
manner, for example, if participants were responding at 
random we might expect some individual participants to 
appear to use the recognition heuristic purely by chance. 
However, we are following a precedent in the literature 
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 
1999) in attempting to identify individual strategies rather 
than averaging over potentially very different strategies. To 
answer some of these questions, we therefore ran a further 
experiment to examine whether altering the form of the 
question for the same choice stimuli would influence use of 
the recognition heuristic.  
One possible explanation of our data is that participants, 
rather than using the recognition heuristic in the manner 
suggested by Goldstein & Gigerenzer (1999), were using 
recognition in a different way. For example, one participant 
reported deliberately choosing city names he did not 
recognize on the assumption that these foreign-sounding 
cities must be larger than the local towns that he knew. This 
use of recognition could explain the pattern of choice 
displayed by those participants who showed significantly 
less choice of recognized towns than would be expected by 
chance. This explanation is consistent with the data reported 
by Oppenheimer (Experiment 1). 
If participants are capable of using recognition in a 
strategic and less rigid way than suggested in the 
formulation of the recognition heuristic, we would expect to 
see recognition effects not only in judgments of which of 
two cities is the larger but also in judgments of which of two 
cities is the smaller. According to the formal account of the 
recognition heuristic asking which of two cities is the 
smaller is equivalent to asking which is the larger. So 
participants would, paradoxically, be expected to use the 
recognition heuristic to choose the unrecognized city (since 
it is inferred that the unrecognized city is smaller of the 
two). However, if participants merely choose the recognized 
city because of some learned preference (e.g., Zajonc, 1968) 
or strategy we might expect them to continue to choose the 
recognized city. This hypothesis is tested in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
The participants were 42 adult volunteers. The 24 men and 
18 women who took part had an average age of 21 years 
(range 18-48; standard deviation 4.5). The procedure and 
materials for this experiment were the same as that of 
Experiment 1. The only difference being that instead of 
making judgments of which of two towns was the larger, 
participants made judgments of which of two towns was the 
smaller. 
Results 
Coding We once again assessed participants’ usage of the 
recognition heuristic taking into account the number of 
items completed and the participants responses to the 
recognition task in calculating a proportion of choices of the 
recognized item. 
Analysis In this experiment, one sample t-test by participant 
failed to show that choice of recognized item varied 
significantly from chance, t = 1.0, df = 41, p > .05. These 
data are shown in Figure 2. Examination of Figure 2 also 
suggests, however, that some individual participants did use 
the recognition heuristic reliably in their responses.  
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Figure 2:  Proportion of Recognized Items Chosen by 
Participant (Experiment 2). 
 
 
Further analysis of the choices made by individual 
participants shows that 10 out of the 42 participants showed 
evidence of use of the recognition heuristic at levels greater 
than chance, binomial z > 1.28, p < .05. A further 7 
participants showed the reverse pattern, using the 
recognition heuristic significantly less often than chance, 
binomial z  > 1.28, p < .05. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment are intriguing because exactly 
the same stimuli and presentation conditions were used as in 
Experiment 1 yet we find a different pattern of results.  The 
choice that participants needed to make was also identical to 
the previous experiment - judging the relative sizes of two 
towns or cities. The only thing that changed was the framing 
of the question, from asking which of the two was larger, to 
asking which was smaller. Some participants (n = 10) used a 
recognition heuristic to judge the smaller of the two towns, 
however, others (n = 7) used a diametrically opposed 
strategy.  Consequently, the sample as a whole did not 
significantly differ from chance in their choice behavior.  In 
this experiment, therefore, although all the preconditions for 
using a recognition heuristic were met, only a minority of 
participants did so. 
Analysis of individuals’ data showed that some 
participants did reliably use the recognition heuristic in their 
choices. It also showed that, as in the previous experiment, 
some participants used the even simpler strategy of always 
picking a town they recognized, regardless of the framing of 
the question. However, only a small group of participants 
appear to use this strategy, which, in the previous 
experiment, would have been indistinguishable from the 
recognition heuristic. 
 
General Discussion 
The recognition heuristic is an adaptive strategy in decision-
making because of the correlation between recognition and 
magnitude. When a choice is made between the larger, or 
the more numerous, of two items it is frequently the case 
that the recognized item is, in fact, the larger or more 
numerous of the two. This is formalized within the 
recognition heuristic by stating that “when an individual 
only recognizes one of two items, the individual will judge 
the recognized item to be greater in whatever dimensions 
are positively correlated with recognition” (Oppenheimer, 
2003, p. B2; see also Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999; 2002). 
Oppenheimer questioned the unthinking use of the 
recognition heuristic in his study. However, both 
Oppenheimer’s study and the earlier reports by Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer confound choosing the recognized object 
because of the inferred correlation between recognition and 
magnitude and choosing the recognized object on some 
other basis, for example preference due to mere exposure 
(Zajonc, 1968). 
In our studies, the two possible strategies of use of the 
recognition heuristic as a means of inferring relative 
magnitude and simple choice of the recognized item 
regardless of the question were examined in Experiment 2. 
We found that some participants do indeed choose the 
recognized item regardless of the framing of the question, a 
strategy indistinguishable from the recognition heuristic in 
standard formulations of the problem. However, the number 
of participants who use this strategy is small and although it 
might exaggerate the effect ascribed to recognition heuristic 
elsewhere, it cannot account for it. 
The recognition heuristic was demonstrated in our 
Experiment 1 using similar materials to Oppenheimer 
(2003) and a similar procedure to that of Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer (2002). The majority of our participants did use 
the recognition heuristic as a “fast and frugal” means of 
decision-making when placed under time pressure, a 
constraint that was absent in the Oppenheimer (2003) study. 
However, the   heuristic is not automatically applied as the 
number of participants showing it was reduced in our 
Experiment 2. This was despite the fact that the choice to be 
made was identical and the heuristic would therefore have 
equivalent adaptive value in both situations. The recognition 
heuristic is the single simplest heuristic in the adaptive 
toolbox and makes up the first principle in more complex 
decision-making algorithms such a take-the-best 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Establishing the situations 
when the recognition heuristic is employed is a necessary 
prerequisite for evaluating the applicability of the fast and 
frugal tools within the adaptive toolbox. There have been 
very few experiments on this. The current study goes some 
way towards addressing this issue. We suggest that our 
results also throw up some interesting avenues for future 
research. For example, a future study could vary the degree 
of time, or other, pressure on participants and examine the 
effects of this on the frequency with which a recognition 
strategy is used. 
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Appendix 
Towns and Cities used in Experiments 1 & 2 
 
Fictional 
Papayito 
Al Ahbahib 
Las Besas 
Weingshe 
Rio del Sol 
Heingjing 
Rhavadran 
Gohaiza 
Schretzberg 
Svatlanov 
 
Real 
Norwich 
Ipswich 
Preston 
Wigan 
Sunderland 
Crewe 
Coventry 
Gillingham 
Sheffield 
Burnley 
 
Filler 
Limerick 
Toledo 
Berkley 
Haifa 
Stoke 
Rotherham 
Bradford 
Derby 
937
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Abstract
This study investigated whether children’s knowledge of
arithmetic operations hinders their ability to solve novel
equations after instruction. Second- and third-grade
children completed a timed arithmetic pretest as a means
for assessing their proficiency with arithmetic
operations. Next, they received lessons on the principle
of mathematical equivalence either in a context designed
to activate their knowledge of arithmetic operations (e.g.,
15 + 13 = 28), or in a context designed to not activate
their knowledge of arithmetic operations (e.g., 28 = 28).
Then, children completed an equation-solving posttest
(e.g., 3 + 9 + 5 = 6 + __). After the posttest, children
switched lesson contexts and completed the posttest
again. Children solved more equations incorrectly after
receiving lessons in the operational context.
Additionally, the operational context led children who
were most proficient with arithmetic operations to solve
more equations using the typical addition strategy of
adding up all the numbers. Results highlight that the
activation of existing knowledge can interfere with the
acquisition of new information.
Some domains of knowledge are particularly difficult
for people to learn, even after significant amounts of
training or instruction. There are many examples of this
in our formal education system, including reading,
mathematics, science, and foreign language. Over the
past several years, a number of scientists (e.g., Flege,
Yeni Komshian, & Liu, 1999; Kuhl, 2000; McNeil &
Alibali, 2002; Schauble, 1990; Zevin & Seidenberg,
2002) have begun to consider how existing knowledge
may contribute to these difficulties. The general
theoretical view is that later learning is strongly
constrained by early learning (cf. Tolman, 1948). If this
is true, it obviously has implications in domains, like
second language learning, where people learn one thing
for many years (native language) before switching
gears and learning something new, but closely related
(second language).
The domain of mathematics is another domain in
which people learn one topic for many years before
switching gears and learning a new, but closely related,
topic. Specifically, in most American mathematics
classrooms, children learn arithmetic operations for
many years (i.e., grades K-6) before eventually
reaching algebra and being introduced formally to
equations and the principle of mathematical
equivalence. Mathematical equivalence is the principle
that the two sides of an equation represent the same
quantity.
Elementary school children (ages 7-11) have
significant difficulties with equations and the principle
of mathematical equivalence (Carpenter & Levi, 2000;
Kieran, 1981; Baroody & Ginsburg, 1983). Their
difficulties are most apparent when they are presented
with equations that have operations on both sides of the
equal sign (e.g., 3 + 4 + 5 = 3 + __). In the absence of
instruction, approximately 80% of second- through
fifth-grade children solve these types of equations
incorrectly (Alibali & Goldin-Meadow, 1993; Alibali,
1999; McNeil & Alibali, 2000; NCISLA, 2000; Perry,
Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988; Rittle-Johnson &
Alibali, 1999).
Although there are many possible accounts of
children’s difficulties, including immature working
memory function (Adams & Hitch, 1997; Gathercole &
Pickering, 2000) or insufficient knowledge of necessary
prerequisite skills (Haverty, 1999), the change-
resistance account suggests that children’s equation-
learning difficulties are due, at least in part, to
children’s existing knowledge (McNeil, 2004). More
specifically, the account posits that children construct
knowledge on the basis of their early experiences with
arithmetic operations and that this knowledge
contributes to children’s difficulties with more complex
equations.
There are at least three knowledge structures that
children learn from their early experiences with
arithmetic operations that may ultimately hinder the
ability to learn complex equations (see McNeil &
Alibali, 2002). First, children may learn an operational
strategy for solving math problems—perform all the
given operations on all the given numbers. For
example, in a typical addition problem like 3 + 4 + 5 +
3 = __, a problem solver simply needs to add up all the
numbers and put the total in the blank. Second, children
may learn an operational perceptual pattern related to
the structure of math problems—the traditional
“operations = answer” problem structure. For example,
in the typical addition problem above, all of the
numbers and operations are on the left hand side of the
equation, and the answer blank is on the right side of
the equation (directly following the equal sign). Third,
children may learn an operational concept of the equal
sign—the equal sign means “the total.” Although these
three operational patterns facilitate fast and accurate
938
performance on typical addition problems, they do not
map onto more complex equations. For example, when
presented with the equation “3 + 4 + 5 = 3 + _”, a
problem solver cannot just add up all the numbers. He
or she cannot assume that the equation will conform to
the traditional “operations = answer” problem structure.
And, he or she needs to understand that the equal sign
denotes an equivalence relationship between the two
sides of the equation in order to generate a correct
solution.
According to the change-resistance account, children
learn these operational patterns from their experience
with arithmetic operations. They store these operational
patterns in memory. Then, when they are presented
with a novel equation, their representations of the
operational patterns are activated. Once activated, the
representations guide attention and can hinder the
ability to encode and interpret novel equations that do
not directly map onto the patterns (cf. Bruner, 1957;
Luchins, 1942; Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001).
In accordance with the change-resistance account,
studies have shown that children do, indeed, rely on
their knowledge of arithmetic operations when
presented with complex equations. For example, when
asked to solve the equation “3 + 4 + 5 = 3 + __”, most
students use their knowledge of the “perform all given
operations on all given numbers” strategy and just add
up all the numbers and put 15 in the blank (McNeil &
Alibali, 2000, 2002, in press b). When asked to
reconstruct the equation “3 + 4 + 5 = 3 + __” after
viewing it briefly, many students use their knowledge
of the traditional “operations = answer” problem
structure and write “3 + 4 + 5 + 3 = __” (McNeil &
Alibali, 2002, in press b). When asked to define the
equal sign, many students use their knowledge of
operational symbols (e.g., +) and say that it means, “the
total” (McNeil & Alibali, in press a). Thus, children
rely on their knowledge of the operational patterns
when presented with complex equations.
McNeil and Alibali (2002) provided additional
evidence for the change-resistance account by showing
that children’s reliance on the operational patterns can
hinder the ability to learn about equations. In the study,
they documented a significant negative linear
relationship between children’s reliance on the
operational patterns on a pretest and the generation of
correct equation-solving strategies after a brief lesson
on equations. Children who were most reliant on the
operational patterns at pretest were the least likely to
generate correct equation-solving strategies following a
lesson, and children who did not rely on the operational
patterns at pretest were the most likely to generate
correct equation-solving strategies following a lesson.
Although the results of McNeil and Alibali (2002)
support the change-resistance account, they provide
only correlational evidence about the relationship
between children’s knowledge of arithmetic operations
and equation-learning difficulties. The change-
resistance account argues that the activation of
children’s knowledge of arithmetic operations causes
equation-learning difficulties. Thus, in the present
study, the activation of children’s knowledge of
arithmetic operations is manipulated. Children are
given lessons about the principle of math equivalence
either in a context designed to activate their knowledge
of arithmetic operations (operational context), or in a
context designed to not activate their knowledge of
arithmetic operations (non-operational context). If the
activation of knowledge of arithmetic operations
contributes to difficulties with equations, then the
operational lesson context should be inferior to the non-
operational lesson context. That is, after receiving
lessons in the operational context, children should solve
more equations incorrectly, and they should solve more
equations with the strategy that is the most often used in
the absence of instruction (i.e., they should rely on their
knowledge of the operational strategy and just add up
all the numbers in the equations).
Additionally, if knowledge of arithmetic operations
contributes to difficulties with equation learning, then
children who are most proficient with arithmetic
operations should be least likely to benefit from the
lessons. This, of course, is assuming that children who
are most proficient with arithmetic operations have the
strongest representations of the operational patterns.
Children who are proficient with arithmetic operations
should solve more equations incorrectly, and they
should solve more equations by just adding up all the
numbers in the equations.
Continuing this rationale, the combination of the
operational lesson context and proficiency with
arithmetic operations should be a “double whammy.”
That is, proficient children who have just received
lessons in the operational context should solve more
equations incorrectly, and they should solve more
equations by just adding up all the numbers in the
equations.
Method
Participants
Ninety-three second- and third-grade children from a
public elementary school in Youngsville, North
Carolina participated. Eleven children were excluded
from the analysis because they were absent on one or
more days of the study. Two additional children were
excluded because their performance on the equations
was three standard deviations away from the mean. The
final sample contained eighty children (38 boys and 42
girls).
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Measures
Timed Arithmetic Pretest The timed arithmetic
pretest was used to assess children’s proficiency with
arithmetic operations. Participants were given 30
seconds to solve as many arithmetic problems (out of
20) as possible. The problems involved only addition
and subtraction (no multiplication or division).
Equation-solving Posttest Participants were given
unlimited time to solve twelve equations with
operations on both sides of the equal sign (e.g., 5 + 4 +
7 = 5 + __, 6 + 4 + 8 = __ + 3).
Procedure
The study was conducted over a two-week period in
children’s regular mathematics classrooms. Children’s
mathematics teachers collected the measures and
administered the lessons in the classroom setting.
Children first completed the timed arithmetic pretest.
Then, teachers taught a set of lessons about the
principle of mathematical equivalence. The following is
an excerpt from the spoken lesson script: “The correct
answer is 28! That’s because whatever is on one side of
the equal sign has to be the same amount as [teachers
were told to stress words in bold] whatever is on the
other side of the equal sign.”
Because the lessons were scripted, all children
received the same spoken lessons. Children were
randomly assigned to lesson contexts through the use of
individual booklets. The booklets enabled children to
follow along with the spoken lessons. Children received
lessons in one of two contexts. In the operational
context, booklets contained problems designed to
activate children’s knowledge of arithmetic operations
(e.g., 15 + 13 = 28). In the non-operational context,
booklets contained problems designed to not activate
children’s knowledge of arithmetic operations (e.g., 28
= 28). Children received two days of lessons
(approximately 15 minutes per day) before they
completed the first equation-solving posttest. After the
first posttest, children received lessons in the other
context (e.g., children who had already received lessons
in the operational context now received lessons in the
non-operational context). Finally, children once again
completed the equation-solving posttest.
Coding
Proficiency with Arithmetic Operations Children
were categorized as proficient on the timed arithmetic
test if they both solved three (median) or more
arithmetic problems correctly, and solved one (median)
or fewer arithmetic problems incorrectly. This coding
system led to approximately equal numbers in the
proficient (N = 37) and not proficient (N = 43) groups.
Equation-solving Performance Children’s strategies
were coded using a system developed by Perry, Church
and Goldin-Meadow (1988). Strategies were assigned
based on the solutions that children wrote in the answer
blank. Examples are presented in Table 1. Solutions
were coded as reflecting a particular strategy as long as
they were within ±1 of the solution that would be
achieved with that particular strategy. Again, we were
especially interested in children’s use of the add-all
strategy (see Table 1) because it is the most commonly
used strategy in the absence of instruction.
Table 1: Example solutions and corresponding
strategy codes for the given equation.
5 + 4 + 7 = 5 + __
Solution Strategy
11 Correct
21 Add all
16 Add to equal sign
4 Carry
1 Idiosyncratic
Results
Number of Incorrect Solutions
Overall, performance on the equation-solving posttest
was abysmal. Children solved 11.27 (SD = 0.98)
equations incorrectly (out of 12). We performed a 2
(proficiency with arithmetic operations: proficient or
not proficient) x 2 (lesson context: operational context
or non-operational context) ANOVA with repeated
measures on lesson context and number incorrect on the
equation-solving posttest (out of 12) as the dependent
measure. As expected, the analysis revealed a
significant main effect of lesson context, F(1, 78) =
5.24, p = .025. Children solved more equations
incorrectly after receiving lessons in the operational
context (M = 11.44, SD = 0.90) than after receiving
lessons in the non-operational context (M = 11.11, SD
= 1.03). Neither the main effect of proficiency nor the
interaction of proficiency and lesson context was
significant. Although, as mentioned, children’s
performance was very poor overall, so there was not a
great deal of variability on the dependent measure to
predict.
Number of Add-all Solutions
Consistent with prior work, the add-all strategy was the
most popular strategy. On average, children solved 5.29
(SD = 3.67) equations (out of 12) by just adding up all
the numbers in the equations. We performed a 2
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(proficiency with arithmetic operations: proficient or
not proficient) x 2 (lesson context: operational context
or non-operational context) ANOVA with repeated
measures on lesson context and number of equations
solved with the add-all strategy (out of 12) as the
dependent measure. As expected, the analysis revealed
a significant interaction of proficiency and lesson
context, F(1, 78) = 4.90, p = .03. As shown in Figure 1,
the children who solved the most equations using the
add-all strategy were the ones who were proficient with
arithmetic operations and had just received lessons in
the operational context (M = 6.11, SD = 3.60).
Figure 1: Mean number of equations solved with the
add-all strategy (out of 12) as a function of arithmetic
proficiency and lesson context. Error bars represent the
pooled standard error.
Discussion
Consistent with the change-resistance account of
children’s equation-learning difficulties, results of the
present study suggest that children’s knowledge of
arithmetic operations hinders their ability to learn about
more complex equations. Children solved the fewest
equations correctly after receiving lessons in contexts
designed to activate their knowledge of arithmetic
operations. Moreover, children who were most
proficient with arithmetic operations and had just
received lessons in the operational context solved the
most problems by just adding up all the numbers, which
is the most common strategy used by children who have
not received any instruction at all.
Results suggest that it is vital to consider the state of
children’s existing knowledge when theorizing about
children’s learning difficulties. Thus, prevailing
theories that focus on children’s immature working
memory system or their lack of prerequisite knowledge
are missing a layer of complexity. More generally,
results contribute to a growing body of work that
suggests that knowledge can be detrimental to learning
in some cases (Adelson, 1984; Flege et al., 1999; Kuhl,
2000; Schauble, 1990). Because knowledge typically
facilitates learning, cases like these in which knowledge
hinders learning can provide a unique window onto
how the mind works (cf. Luchins, 1942).
Although the present study suggests that knowledge
of arithmetic operations hinders equation learning. The
results are not definitive. Performance on the equations
with operations on both sides of the equal sign was
abysmal, even after four, fifteen-minute classroom-
based lessons. Thus, most children in the study had
difficulties learning from the lessons on the principle of
math equivalence. However, this is not surprising when
viewed from the perspective of the change-resistance
account. Children in the study are learning math on a
day-to-day basis from a traditional, skills-based
mathematics curricula. Thus, they are deeply
entrenched in the operational patterns that are predicted
to hinder learning. It is not that surprising that the brief
lessons in the present study were not able to override
this deeply entrenched way of thinking.
In terms of educational implications, results conflict
with both intuition, and traditional mathematics
practices. Intuition suggests that the children who are
best at one topic in math should be best at another topic
in math. And indeed, most schools assign, or track,
children to algebra based on their performance in
elementary school with arithmetic operations. This
policy certainly makes sense if children need to be
highly proficient with arithmetic operations before they
are able to learn algebraic equations. However, it makes
less sense if arithmetic proficiency hinders equation
learning. Thus, our schools may be holding back
children who would thrive in an early algebra course.
Equally important, American schools often
implement spiral curricula in which old information is
reintroduced year after year. The idea is that old
information provides a framework within which new
material can be introduced. In relation to mathematics
instruction, this means that basic arithmetic operations
are reintroduced year after year. Indeed, data from the
Third International Mathematics and Science Study
(Beaton et al., 1996) show that, unlike students from
higher-achieving countries, students in American
mathematics classrooms spend substantial amounts of
class time practicing and reviewing basic arithmetic
skills throughout the elementary and middle school
years, when they should be concentrating on more
advanced topics.
This type of spiral, review-based instruction has
received some support from the scientific community.
For example, Nathan et al. (2004) argue that the most
effective instructions are the ones that “bridge” from
children’s existing knowledge to the new material.
However, results of the present study suggest that
teachers need to be careful about what they are trying to
build bridges between. In some case, to-be-learned
information does not map well onto existing
knowledge, and in these cases, bridging might not be
the most effective instructional strategy.
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Instead of reintroducing basic arithmetic facts year
after year, mathematics educators may wish to develop
creative ways to integrate more algebraic ways of
thinking into the math curricula as early as possible.
One recommended strategy for integrating algebraic
thinking into the earlier grades is to focus on equality
and the equal sign (e.g., Carpenter, Franke, & Levi,
2003). For example, instead of simply reviewing and
practicing basic arithmetic “facts” such as “3 + 4 = 7”
year after year, young students can learn “3 + 4 = 7,” “7
= 3 + 4,” “3 + 4 = 5 + 2,” and “7 = 7.” Instructional
strategies such as this may prevent the entrenchment of
operational patterns and facilitate the notoriously
difficult transition from arithmetic to algebra.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a Research Award from
the University of Wisconsin Department of Psychology
to N. M. McNeil. I thank members of the Cognitive
Development Research Group at the University of
Wisconsin for helpful discussions about the study and
Jerry Haeffel for comments on a previous version of
this paper. I also thank the students, teachers, and
administrators at Youngsville Elementary School in
North Carolina. Special thanks go to third-grade teacher
Heather Shipley for her organization and enthusiasm.
References
Adams, J. W., & Hitch, G. J. (1997). Working memory
and children's mental addition. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 67, 21-38.
Adelson, B. (1984). When novices surpass experts: The
difficulty of a task may increase with
expertise. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 10, 483-495.
Alibali, M. W. (1999). How children change their
minds: Strategy change can be gradual or
abrupt. Developmental Psychology, 35, 127-
145.
Alibali, M. W., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (1993). Gesture-
speech mismatch and mechanisms of learning:
What the hands reveal about a child's state of
mind. Cognitive Psychology, 25, 468-523.
Baroody, A. J., & Ginsburg, H. P. (1983). The effects
of instruction on children's understanding of
the "equals" sign. Elementary School Journal,
84, 199-212.
Bruner, J. S. (1957). On perceptual readiness.
Psychological Review, 2, 123-152.
Carpenter, T. P., & Levi, L. (2000). Developing
conceptions of algebraic reasoning in the
primary grades. Madison, WI: National Center
for Improving Student Learning and
Achievement in Mathematics and Science.
Carpenter, T. P., Franke, M. L., & Levi, L. (2003).
Thinking mathematically: Integrating
arithmetic and algebra in elementary school.
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
Flege, J. E., Yeni Komshian, G. H., & Liu, F. (1999).
Age constraints on second-language
acquisition. Journal of Memory and Language,
41, 78-104.
Gathercole, S. E., & Pickering, S. J. (2000). Working
memory deficits in children with low
achievements in the national curriculum at 7
years. British Journal of Educational
Psychology, 70, 177-194.
Haverty, L. A. (1999). The importance of basic number
knowledge to advanced mathematical problem
solving. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation,
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA.
Kieran, C. (1981). Concepts associated with the
equality symbol. Educational Studies in
Mathematics, 12, 317-326.
Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., & Raney, G. E. (2001). An
eye movement study of insight problem
solving. Memory and Cognition, 29, 1000-
1009.
Kuhl, P. K. (2000). A new view of language
acquisition. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Science, 97, 11850-11857.
Luchins, A. S. (1942). Mechanization in problem
solving. Psychological Monographs, 54 (6,
Whole No. 248).
McNeil, N. M., & Alibali, M. W. (2000). Learning
mathematics from procedural instruction:
Externally imposed goals influence what is
learned. Journal of Educational Psychology,
92, 734-744.
McNeil, N. M., & Alibali, M. W. (2002). A strong
schema can interfere with learning: The case
of children's typical addition schema. In C. D.
Schunn & W. Gray (Eds.), Proceedings of the
Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference of the
Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
McNeil, N. M., & Alibali, M. W. (in press a).
Knowledge change as a function of
mathematics experience: All contexts are not
created equal. Journal of Cognition and
Development.
McNeil, N. M., & Alibali, M. W. (in press b). You'll
see what you mean: Students encode equations
based on their knowledge of arithmetic.
Cognitive Science.
Nathan, M. J., Masarik, D. K., Stephens, A. C., Alibali,
M. W., & Koedinger, K. R. (2004). Enhancing
middle-school students' representational
fluency: A classroom study. Manuscript under
review.
942
National Center for Improving Student Learning and
Achievement in Mathematics Education
(2000). Building a foundation for learning
algebra in the elementary grades. Madison,
WI: Author.
Perry, M., Church, R. B., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (1988).
Transitional knowledge in the acquisition of
concepts. Cognitive Development, 3, 359-400.
Rittle-Johnson, B., & Alibali, M. W. (1999).
Conceptual and procedural knowledge of
mathematics: Does one lead to the other?
Journal of Educational Psychology, 91, 175-
189.
Schauble, L. (1990). Belief revision in children: The
role of prior knowledge and strategies for
generating evidence. Journal of Experimental
Child Psychology, 49, 31-57.
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men.
Psychological Review, 55, 189-208.
Zevin, J. D., & Seidenberg, M. S. (2002). Age of
acquisition effects in reading and other tasks.
Journal of Memory and Language, 47, 1-29.
943
Processing Ambiguous Words: Are Blends Necessary for Lexical Decision?
David A. Medler (dmedler@mcw.edu)
Language Imaging Laboratory
Department of Neurology, Medical College of Wisconsin
Milwaukee, WI
C. Darren Piercey (piercey@unb.ca)
Department of Psychology, University of New Brunswick
Fredericton, NB
Abstract
A  previous  computational  model  (Joordens  &  Besner,
1994)  has  suggested  that  during  lexical  access,  ambiguous
words tend toward a blend state; that is, network activations
settle into an incorrect state that is a mixture of the multiple
representations of the ambiguous item. It has been suggested
that  this blend state  actually aids  lexical  decision  (LD) for
ambiguous items as the blend state creates a larger “feeling of
familiarity” which lexical decision may exploit. This theory,
however, is based on the results of a computational model (a
simple Hopfield network) in which multiple representations
cannot  be  learned.  Here  we  use  a  Symmetric  Diffusion
Network  (SDN)  to  effectively  learn  and  retrieve  multiple
mappings  for  a  single  input  (i.e.,  ambiguous  items).   The
model  consists  of  three  main  processing  regions–
orthographics, phonology, and semantics–and is trained on a
corpus of unambiguous items and ambiguous items that range
in their degree of balance (probability distribution) between
the multiple meanings. Following training, the SDN is able to
reproduce  the  correct  probability  distributions  for  the
ambiguous  items;  that  is,  it  does  not  produce blend  states.
Furthermore, the model qualitatively captures the processing
advantage for ambiguous items. Consequently, the notion of a
blend  state  being  used  for  LD is  re-evaluated,  and  further
assumptions about semantic processing are explored.
Introduction
From  a  computational  perspective,  we  can  break  basic
language  processing  into  three  main  components:  the
semantic  representation  (what  a  word  means),  a
phonological representation (the sound of a word), and an
orthographic  representation  (the  written  form of  a  word)
(e.g., Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989; Plaut,  McClelland,
Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996; Harm & Seidenberg, 1999).
The  relationship  between  the  phonological  and  semantic
representations  is  initially  established  in  early  childhood,
and  then  the  mapping  between  the  orthographic
representation and the phonological representation (spelling-
to-sound conversion) along with the mapping between the
orthographic representation and the semantic representation
(spelling-to-meaning  conversion)  is  learned  later  in  life
(e.g.,Harm & Seidenberg, in press).
Ideally, there would be a one-to-one mapping between
any of  the  representations,  such  that  one  spelling  would
correspond to one pronunciation, which would correspond
to one meaning. Unfortunately, one-to-one mappings are far
from the norm in English.   That  is,  words that  sound the
same  (homophones)  can  have  different  semantic
representations  (/flaI/: fly  [insect];  fly  [zipper]),  different
orthographic  representations  (/laIt/;  light  [fewer  calories];
lite [fewer calories]), or different semantic and orthographic
representations  (/be/:  bear[furry  animal];  bare[naked]).
Similarly, words that are spelled the same (have the same
orthographic representation) can have different phonological
representations (either: /aI.D/ [one or the other], /ID/
[one  or  the  other]),  or  phonological  and  semantic
representations (wind: /waInd/ [twist]; /wInd/ [moving air]).
In  fact,  many  words  in  English  have  polysemous  or
ambiguous semantics. For example, WordNet® (Fellbaum,
1998) lists a total of 146,350 noun, verbs, adjectives, and
adverbs.  Table  1 shows  the  percentage  of  unique  and
ambiguous words, as well as sense data. Whereas ambiguity
is often defined as a word having multiple meanings across
semantic  categories  or  word  classes,  a  word’s  sense  is
defined as it’s meaning within a semantic category and can
vary dramatically from the prior definition of ambiguity. For
example,  although  Borowsky &  Masson  (1996)  consider
“deep” to be an unambiguous word, WordNet lists “deep”
with  3  noun  senses,  15  adjective  senses,  and  3  adverb
senses.  It is clear that ambiguity is prevalent in English, and
there is  evidence that it has an effect on how we process
words.
Table 1. Percentage of words having unique, ambiguous,
and multisense meanings.
Word Class Unique Ambiguous Senses
Noun 86.7 13.3 29.7
Verb 53.4 46.6 75.4
Adjective 74.5 25.5 48.7
Adverb 82.9 17.1 33.1
For example, the behavioral data from word ambiguity
studies  produces  a  paradox.   In  a  lexical  decision  (LD)
paradigm,  ambiguity  aids  in  word  identification;  that  is,
ambiguous words are identified as words more quickly and
more  accurately  than  unambiguous  words  (Gernsbacher,
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1984;  Borowsky  &  Masson,  1996).   In  contrast,  in
connected text  studies  (Rayner & Duffy, 1986;  Rayner &
Duffy, 1987; Duffy, Morris,  & Rayner,  1988),  ambiguous
words are processed more slowly than unambiguous words.
In other words, when semantic decisions (SD) (decisions on
word meaning) are required, words with multiple meanings
pose more difficulty than words with single meanings.  This
ambiguity paradox was illustrated in a single experiment in
which participants first  made a lexical  decision,  and  then
had  to  make  a  relatedness  judgement  on  a  subsequently
presented word (Piercey & Joordens, 2000).   In this study,
participants  showed  an  ambiguity  advantage  for  lexical
decision, and an ambiguity disadvantage on the subsequent
relatedness  decision.   The  importance  of  the  ambiguity
paradox lies in the fact that it leads directly to the question
of how words are represented in the brain, and how we get
access to these words.  Any model of language will have to
account for the ambiguity paradox if it is to be successful. 
Previous  models  of  the  ambiguity  advantage  in  LD,
however, have shown mixed results.  For example, Joordens
&  Besner  (1994)  trained  a  two  layer  Hopfield  network
consisting of 125 binary nodes (75 perceptual nodes and 50
conceptual  nodes;  activations  of  either  +1  or  -1).   The
perceptual nodes represented perceptual features and were
never updated during retrieval (that is, they were clamped to
a  specific  pattern).   The  conceptual  nodes  represented
semantics, and the network was effectively fully connected.
Learning was via a Hebbian learning algorithm.
They had two criteria for deciding if a PDP model could
successfully  account  for  the  ambiguity  effect;  (a)  the
network  had  to  retrieve  one  of  the  semantic  patterns
associated with the ambiguous words, and (b) the network
had to retrieve ambiguous words faster than unambiguous
words.  Joordens and Besner (1994) were able to produce an
ambiguity advantage within the  conceptual nodes  of  their
network when it into a stable pattern.  This only occurred,
however, when the network was relatively small and when
the ambiguous meanings had equal probability. Most of the
time (over 50% of the trials), their networks failed to settle
into  a  correct  pattern  and  formed  a  “blend”  of  the  two
learned meanings of  the words over  the conceptual units.
Their  initial  conclusion  from  these  simulations  was  that
distributed models trained with Hebbian learning rule may
not be suitable for capturing ambiguity effect.
In a different computational model, Kawamoto, Farrar &
Kello  (1994)  trained  a  recurrent  neural  network with the
Least  Mean  Square  learning  algorithm.   Their  model
contained both “spelling” nodes and “meaning” nodes using
a distributed representational coding scheme. During recall,
the “spelling” nodes  were given environmental  activation,
and the network was allowed to  settle  into a  stable state.
They found that they could produce an ambiguity advantage
within  the  units  representing  “spelling”,  but  showed  the
opposite  effect  in  units  representing  “meaning”  (an
ambiguity  disadvantage  in  semantics?).  It  has  been
suggested, however, that Kawamoto et al.’s (1994) network
also settled into  blend states  in the meaning units  (Kello,
2003, Personal Communication).
Although both of these models produced an ambiguity
advantage  (albeit  in  different  processing  regions),  the
networks failed to differentiate between the ambiguous items
and  produced  blended  representations.  However,  in  later
commentaries (Masson & Borowsky, 1995;  Rueckl,  1995;
Besner & Joordens, 1995), it was concluded that it may be
possible  for  lexical  decisions  to  be  made  prior  to  the
network settling into  these  blend  states.   In  other  words,
correct  lexical  decisions  could  be  based  on  the  “blend”
states for ambiguous words resulting in a greater feeling of
familiarity which could then be used to produce LD.
Using the  model  of  Joordens  and  Besner  (1994)  as  a
basis  for  their  theory,  Piercey  and  Joordens  (2000)
developed the “efficient then inefficient” hypothesis for the
processing  of  ambiguous  words.   They concluded  that  a
lexical decision is made based on early processing and that a
blend  state  (i.e.,  when  all  meanings  of  a  word  are
simultaneously activated) produces an advantage for lexical
decision  but  a  disadvantage  for  the  relatedness  decision.
That  is,  lexical  decisions  are made  based  on a feeling of
familiarity that occurs during the early stages of processing,
before a complete representation of the current item forms
(i.e., efficient processing). Therefore, these decisions could
be  made  regardless  of  an  eventual  blend  state.  However,
when the participants need to determine which meaning of
the word is appropriate to a particular context,  processing
slows  down.  The  participant  continues  to  process  the
ambiguous word and each of the word’s meanings compete
with each other. That is, the participant needs to leave the
blend state and choose a meaning for the item so that further
semantic processing can occur.  This disambiguation of the
blend state is an inefficient process that unambiguous words
do not share.  It should be noted that this theory is based
specifically  on  the  fact  that  the  model  of  Joordens  and
Besner  (1994)  produced  blended  states  for  ambiguous
words.
In this paper, we readdress the ambiguity advantage for
lexical decision using a computational model that is able to
learn multiple mappings for a single input.  These models do
not  produce  blend  states;  therefore,  if  the  ambiguity
advantage can be reproduced, then the notion of blend states
existing should be questioned.
Symmetric Diffusion Networks 
Symmetric  Diffusion  Networks (SDNs)  are  a  class  of
computational  models  based  upon  the  principles  of
continuous, stochastic, adaptive, and interactive processing
(Movellan  & McClelland,  1993).   From a  computational
perspective, SDNs can be viewed as a continuous version of
the  Boltzmann  machine;  that  is,  time  is  intrinsic  to  the
dynamics  of  the  network.   Furthermore,  SDNs  embody
Bayesian  principles  in  that  they  develop  internal
representations based upon the statistics of the environment.
One of the main advantages of SDNs is that they are able to
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learn  multiple  mappings  for  a  single  concept,  something
previous  models  often  have  difficulties  with.   In  other
words, SDNs are able to learn ambiguous mappings.
Recent work (Medler & McClelland, 2001) has shown
that when biologically inspired constraints (i.e,  activations
within the range [0,1],  positive between layer  projections,
lateral  inhibition)  are  applied  to  SDN’s,  their  effective
performance  is  increased  substantially  in  terms  of  the
number of patterns they can be trained on, the rate at which
patterns  are  learned,  and  their  ability  to  separate  out
independent sources in an unsupervised manner.
Network Dynamics and Learning
Network  dynamics  are  based  upon continuous activations
that develop over time, and are governed by the following
equation: 
Eq. 1
where, 
is the summed activation of all the activities coming into the
unitincluding its biaspassed through a squashing function
such as the logistic, h(u) = 1-exp(-u), and
represents the net input required to maintain an activation
value of ai. Here we use the inverse logistic, where min and
max  are  the  minimum  and  maximum  activation  bounds
respectively.  gi is a gain function, and  Zi(t) is the standard
Gaussian variable with zero mean and unit variance.   The
last term in the equation adds stochasticity to the network,
which allows it to learn multiple meanings for a single input.
SDNs  are  trained  with  the  Contrastive  Hebbian
Learning (CHL) algorithm, which performs both supervised
and unsupervised learning depending on the environmental
inputs  to  the  network.   Basically,  learning  occurs  by
presenting a pattern to the network and letting it settle for a
set  number  of  cycles.   During  this  positive  phase,  co-
occurrence  statistics  are  computed  for  all  the  units.   A
negative phase then follows where the pattern is removed,
the  network  is  allowed  to  re-settle,  and  co-occurrence
statistics  are  collected  once  again.   Weights  are  then
adjusted  using the  difference  between the  negative  phase
statistics and the positive phase statistics.  
Eq. 2
In  essence,  the  CHL  algorithm  makes  weight
adjustments based upon subtracting out the statistics of the
base  activity  of  the  network  (negative  phase)  from  the
statistics  of  the  environment  plus  base  activity  (positive
phase).  Weight adjustments in this model were computed
after each pattern presentation, as opposed to batch learning
which  adjusts  weights  only  after  all  patterns  have  been
presented (Movellan & McClelland, 1993).
Network Architecture, Stimuli, & Training
In keeping with previous models of language (e.g., Harm &
Seidenberg,  1999),  the  network  consisted  of  three  main
processing layers: an “orthographic”, a “phonological”, and
a  “semantic  processing”  layer.  To  capture  the  gross
relationship  between  semantics  and  the  orthographic  and
phonology  representation  of  words,  there  were  twice  as
many units (10) in the semantic layer as in the orthographic
and  the  phonology layers  (5  units  each).  Each  layer  was
connected to the other via a set of hidden layers (5 units).
Between  layer  connections  were  excitatory,  while  within
layer  connections were inhibitory (Medler  & McClelland,
2001).
Stimuli were arbitrary, distributed binary patterns [0,1]
that encoded the orthography, phonology, and semantics of a
given “word”.  It is recognized that the abstract, distributed
codes used in this simulation are not true representations of
semantics,  phonology,  and  orthography;  however,  future
simulations  using  the  same  architecture  will  use  more
systematic encodings for these representations.  Half of the
training  patterns  (20)  were  unambiguous  words,  and  half
(20) were ambiguous words. In this model, only semantics
had  ambiguous  patterns  (as  opposed  to  ambiguous
orthography or  phonology).  Hence,  ambiguous words had
two  possible  meanings,  and  were  selected  with  either  a
70/30  distribution  or  a  50/50  distribution.   Two
representational training patterns are shown in Table 2; the
presentation  probability  is  the  likelihood  of  that  specific
pattern being selected during the positive phase. Nonwords
were simply random patterns  across  the  orthographic  and
phonology units that had not been previously trained1.
During  training,  the  orthography and  phonology units
were clamped on, and the semantic and hidden units were
modified during the positive and negative phases. Following
training,  the  network  was  able  to  correctly  produce  the
probability  structure  of  the  training stimuli.   That  is,  the
network was able to successfully recall the semantic patterns
with  the  same  probabilities  that  it  was  trained  on.   The
1 As previous results have suggested that non-word foils need
to  be  word-like  for  the  ambiguity  advantage  to  be  stable
(Borowsky & Masson,  1996),  and we are assessing LD over the
semantic units, we clamped both the orthographic and phonology
units for the non-words.
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Figure 1. Network architecture showing the three main
processing layers and connecting hidden layers.
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network  did  not  produce  blend  states  for  the  ambiguous
items.
Table 2. Sample Patterns Showing Positive and
Negative Training Phases for Unambiguous and Ambiguous
Words
Present. Unambiguous
Prob. Orthography Phonology Semantics
+1.0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
-1.0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1          
Ambiguous
Orthography Phonology Semantics
+0.7 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
+0.3 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
-1.0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0          
During  testing,  the  orthography  and  phonology  units
were clamped on, and the semantic units were allowed to
settle. Previous models waited for the networks to settle into
a stable state, and took this measure as a reaction time. In
our  model,  we  assume  a  speeded  decision  based  on  a
differentiation  measure  (McClelland  &  Chappell,  1998)
computed over the known words, k:
where  Gi is the generated pattern,  and  Ti is a  target.  If a
generated pattern does not match a target pattern, then the
differentiated  score  should  approach  zero.   A  matched
pattern,  on  the  other  hand,  should  produce  a  score  that
approaches one.  If multiple patterns are partially activated
(i.e.,  a  blend),  then  several  words  should  show  a
differentiation score that approaches a middle value.
When diffk exceeds a threshold (in this case, an arbitrary
value of 0.25), a decision of “word” is made.  If a word (or
non-word) fails to reach the threshold within a certain time
limit (an arbitrary point such as 20 time steps plus or minus
some random time to introduce stochasticity in the response
times),  then  a nonword decision  is  made.   This  nonword
time limit can be adjusted to reflect task instructions (e.g.,
“respond as quickly as possible” vs. “respond as quickly and
accurately as possible”). Consequently, we can produce both
accuracy and reaction time measurements from our model.
Results
Figure  2 shows some  representative  differentiation  scores
for a sub-sample of the testing stimuli.  As can be seen, no
blends  were  formed  (a  single  score  tended  towards  one,
whereas all other scores tended towards zero).  Furthermore,
the figure shows how using a threshold criterion of 0.25 for
a  speeded  decision  leads  to  the  first  non-word  being
misclassified as a word.  Finally, it should also be noted that
although the second ambiguous word looks like it is initially
activating  two  word  meanings  (heading  towards  a  blend
Figure 2. Sample differentiation scores for a subset of unambiguous, ambiguous, and non-words. Note that the first non-
word  is mistaken for a word at a criterion of 0.25.
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perhaps?), the second word meaning (i.e., the dashed line) is
actually associated with the second unambiguous word.
In  terms  of  reaction  times,  the  network  showed  an
ambiguity advantage.  The network made a lexical decision
for  unambiguous items in  an  average  of  13.0  time steps,
whereas ambiguous items took 11.5 time steps. In contrast to
previous  empirical  work  (Piercey  &  Joordens,  2000),
however,  there  was  not  a  clear  advantage  of  ambiguous
items  in  terms  of  accuracy.   Lexical  decision  for
unambiguous items was approximately 97% correct,  while
ambiguous items were only 95% correct within the speeded
decision.
One last  note to  make is  that  the  final  differentiation
score  for  ambiguous  items  was  often  lower  and  more
variable than for unambiguous words.  The differentiation
score  averaged  over  the  last  ten  time  steps  for  the
unambiguous  items  was  0.92  (var  =  3.7x10-4)  whereas
ambiguous  items  had  an  average  differentiation  score  of
0.87  (var  =  5.1x10-4).   This  suggests  that,  for  ambiguous
items,  the  final  settled  state  for  the  networks  was  more
unstable  than  unambiguous  items,  and  that  if  speeded
decisions were not made, then the ambiguity advantage in
reaction times may disappear.
Discussion
We  have  shown  how  a  network  trained  with  the  CHL
produces the ambiguity advantage over the semantic nodes
based on speeded decision. Furthermore, the model was able
to produce the approximate correct probability distributions
of  the  training  corpus,  thereby  avoiding  “blend”  states.
Consequently, the theory of blend states having to exist to
aid in LD for ambiguous items may have to be re-evaluated.
Furthermore,  the  efficient-then-inefficient  hypothesis  of
Piercy and Joordens (2000) may have to be recast.
The  results  from this  network  stimulation  suggest  an
alternative  theory  as  to  why  ambiguous  items  show  an
advantage for lexical decision.  Given that there are multiple
distinct  attractor  states  in  semantics  for  ambiguous items,
and  given  a  random  start  state,  then  the  probability  of
starting near an attractor is greater for ambiguous items than
unambiguous items.  Consequently, if a decision is based on
traveling toward an attractor  basin,  then ambiguous items
shouldon averagereach a basin sooner than unambiguous
items.  This is similar to the attractor basin theory proposed
by Plaut and Booth (2000). Consequently, lexical decisions
are efficient for ambiguous items because they have a higher
probability of starting near an attractor basin.
Note that this theory would require lexical decisions to
be  made at  the  semantic  level.   That  is,  if  LD could  be
completed at the orthographic level or at the phonological
level  (say  by  having  non-words  that  either  violated  the
orthographic  rules  or  the  phonological  rules  of  English),
then  the  ambiguity  advantage  would  disappear  (cf.,
Borowsky & Masson, 1996).
Interestingly,  this  theory  would  also  explain  the
disadvantage  seen  for  ambiguous  items  during  semantic
decisions.  If we assume that the network has settled into a
stable  state  following  the  lexical  decision  (processing  is
automatic  and  continues  even  after  the  decision  process),
then both the unambiguous and ambiguous items will have
activated a meaning in semantics.  For unambiguous items,
the semantic comparison would be relatively easy as there
would only be  one meaning to  compare.   For  ambiguous
items,  however,  the  comparison becomes more  unsettling.
On some trials,  the semantic  decision would be relatively
quick2 as  the  network  would  be  in  the  correct  semantic
attractor.  On other trials, however, the network would be in
an  incorrect  attractor,  and would have to  switch attractor
states.   Therefore,  when  trials  are  averaged,  ambiguous
items should show a  disadvantage for  semantic  decisions.
Consequently,  semantic  decisions  are  inefficient  for
ambiguous  items  because  of  the  need  to  visit  multiple
attractor basins. Hence, this theory predicts that if we prime
an ambiguous item towards one meaning or another, then the
disadvantage  should  be  lessened.  Indeed,  preliminary
behavioral results show this to be the case (Piercey, Medler,
& Hebert, 2003).
One area of potential criticism for the current model is
that although it showed an ambiguity advantage for reaction
times, it did not show an ambiguity advantage for accuracy.
This  discrepancy  may  be  due  to  the  choice  of  the
differentiation score to evaluate network performance.  This
scoring  mechanism  assumes  that  the  currently  presented
pattern  is  simultaneously  compared  to  all  learned  words
(thus,  assuming  that  the  learned  patterns  are  stored
somewhere exterior to the current model).  Consequently, as
unambiguous and ambiguous words are learned to criteria in
the model, a decision based on the learned representations
should show equal performance (where failure to recognize
a word is based on a combination of the threshold criterion
and the nonword decision time limit).  One possible solution
to this would be to use a different type of LD process, such
as  the  harmony/referent  model  (Piercey,  2002;  Joordens,
Piercey, & Azarbehi, 2003) of lexical decision.
Future models will focus on training all processing levels
(orthographic,  phonological,  and  semantic)  to  address  the
theory  of  non-word  background  driving  the  ambiguity
advantage  in  LD. As well,  we will  explicitly  address  the
semantic  relatedness decision issue  to  evaluate  the  theory
predicted by the current simulations.
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Abstract
The goal of the current paper is to investigate the behavior of
gesture when the information conveyed by speech and the
information conveyed by the image being described conflict
as a result of perspective taking. To construct a corpus of
speech-image mismatches, we designed a picture description
elicitation procedure using path-like networks of colored
circles. The results of our analysis demonstrate that gestures
can be mismatched to both speech, as has been previously
observed, and to the image, which has not been previously
reported. The results provide insights into the nature of the
representations that give rise to gestures.
The Origin of Gesture
This paper investigates the underlying cognitive processes
involved in relating spatial information from a visual input
to two separate output modalities, namely speech and
gesture. Three theoretical possibilities have been proposed
for how these three modalities of representation, visual-
spatial, verbal and gestural, are related: The Lexical
Semantic Hypothesis (Butterworth & Hadar, 1989;
Schegloff, 1984), the Free Imagery Hypothesis (Krauss,
Chen, & Chawla, 1996; Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000;
but see de Ruiter, 1998, 2000 for another version of this
hypothesis), and the Interface Hypothesis (Kita & Özyürek,
2003).
The Lexical Semantic Hypothesis (Butterworth & Hadar,
1989; Schegloff, 1984) proposes that gestures are generated
from the semantics of the lexical items chosen to express the
desired message. It predicts that gestures should always
correspond to the meaning expressed by specific lexical
items. In contrast, the Free Imagery Hypothesis (Krauss et
al., 1996, 2000) claims that gestures are generated on the
basis of pre-linguistic non-propositional representations; the
strong reading of this proposal implies that the information
conveyed by gesture should be unaffected by the specific
lexical items selected during formulation and by the
‘thinking for speaking’ (Slobin, 1987, 1996) processes that
convert the imagistic representation into propositional
content (however, see below for alternative readings of this
proposal). The Interface Hypothesis (Kita & Özyürek, 2003)
claims that gestures originate from a mediating
representation connecting spatio-motoric representations in
memory and linguistic representations. According to this
view, gestures are generated from the imagistic
representation, but they can also be influenced by ‘thinking
for speaking’ operations on this representation.
Discriminating between these theoretical alternatives is
difficult because there is usually a close isomorphism
between the semantic content of speech and the imagistic
content of the representation speech is describing.
Bearing on this discussion are recent studies
demonstrating that gestures can convey complementary
information to what is expressed in speech. For example,
when describing their solutions to the Tower of Hanoi
problem, speakers’ gestures sometimes corresponded to
possible strategies that were not mentioned in the concurrent
speech rather than to the strategy that was mentioned in
speech. (Garber & Goldin-Meadow, 2002). The non-
isomorphism between the content of speech and gesture has
been referred to as speech-gesture mismatches. High rates
of speech-gesture mismatches have also been reported for
children who are in the transitional stage of acquiring the
ability to correctly respond to the Piagetian conservation
task (Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986).
Speech-gesture mismatches appear to contradict the
claims of the Lexical Semantic Hypothesis in that they
express information not included in speech. However, the
information expressed by gesture in the speech-gesture
mismatches does not actually conflict with either the
linguistic or the imagistic representation; instead they
provide complementary information. Thus, they do not
provide a strong test of the competing theories. In this paper
we employed perspective taking to create situations in
which what was said conflicted with what was seen.
Examining the behavior of gesture in these cases should
discriminate between the competing hypotheses regarding
gesture generation. The Lexical Semantics Hypothesis
predicts that gestures will always align with the speech. The
Free Imagery Hypothesis predicts that the gestures will
always align with the image. The Interface Hypothesis
predicts that gesture alignment will be influenced by
‘thinking for speaking’ processes and therefore the
alignment of gesture could be to either or both
representations, depending on the specific situation.
Perspective Taking
Perspective taking is a critical step required to express
spatial relations in speech (cf. Miller & Johnson-Laird,
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1976). Spatial representations, which are inherently relative,
must be grounded to some referent in a scene. The choice of
the grounding referent impacts the linguistic terms that can
be selected to express the relationship. Thus, perspective
taking necessarily precedes linguistic formulation. It forms
part of the ‘thinking for speaking’ conceptualizing process
(cf. Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999) that abstracts away
from the visual imagery and maps the relations onto
propositional representations. Choice of perspective can be
influenced by, among other things, language/culture specific
resources (Levinson, 2003), the specific task at hand
(Tversky, 1991) and/or pragmatic concerns (Levelt, 1996).
Consider the image in Figure 1. In describing the
relationship between the ball and the car, the speaker can
select himself as the grounding referent, describing the
relationship from his own personal orientation, as in (1).
This perspective will be referred to as the de ic t i c
perspective. Alternatively, he can select one of the objects
in the scene as the grounding referent, such as the car, and
describe the relation with respect to the car’s inherent
orientation, producing the intrinsic description in (2).
Figure 1
(1) The ball is to the left of the car.
(2) The ball is in front of the car.
When speakers choose to describe the relationship between
the ball and car as in (2), a special situation arises; namely,
the characteristics of the visual input, pre-abstraction, do not
match the linguistic terms used to describe them. On the two
dimensional representation of the image, nothing is in front
of the car; the notion of front used in (2) is only relevant
with respect to the orientation of the car — only within the
perspectivized mental representation of the image. This
contrast between the pre-abstraction visual input and the
perspectivized mental representation provides the gesture
researcher with the opportunity to contrast the content of the
image with the content of speech in a unique way.
Specifically, the content of the input imagistic
representation and the output linguistic representation can
be pitted against each other. How gesture behaves when the
input and output representations conflict will reveal the
underlying representation from which gesture was
generated, thus discriminating between the three
hypotheses.
Mismatch Corpus
To compile a corpus of speech-image-gesture mismatches,
we presented speakers with networks of colored circles
arrayed along a path. The images were very similar to
networks used previously by Levelt (1996) to investigate
perspective taking in speech production. As with other
spatial relations, adopting different linguistic perspectives to
describe an image, such as in Figure 2, results in the use of
different linguistic terms to express the same spatial
relations, as seen in examples (3a) and (3b).
Deictic Sample descriptions:
(3a) You begin with a yellow circle. Above that you see
a blue circle. To the right you see a red circle and above the
red circle you see another red circle. Right of the second red
circle is the yellow circle and right of that is a blue circle.
Intrinsic Sample descriptions:
(3b) You begin with a yellow circle. You go straight
ahead to a blue circle. Then you go to the right to a red
circle and then left to another red circle. From the second
red circle, go to the right again to a yellow circle and then
straight ahead to a blue circle.
Figure 2
Notice that the term straight ahead in description (3b) is
used to refer to two different directions of transition. First, it
is used for the vertical transition from the first (yellow)
circle to the second (blue) circle. Later, it is used again to
refer to the lateral transition from the second from the last
(yellow) circle to the last (blue) circle. In contrast, the terms
used in description (3a) hold a constant relationship to a
particular axis on the paper. For the deictic description,
there is perfect isomorphism between the input image and
the output description. In contrast, for the intrinsic
descriptions, there is non-isomorphism, which allows for a
further investigation of how gesture is related to the two
representations.
If gesture is generated on a faithful memory
representation of the image, as proposed by the strong
version of the Free Imagery Hypothesis, then, in cases of
speech-image mismatch, gesture should align to the image
and conflict with speech. If gesture is generated from the
lexical semantics of the words used to encode the message,
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as suggested by the Lexical Semantics Hypothesis, then
gesture should always match the speech and conflict with
the image. If gesture is generated from an interface
representation that results from ‘thinking for speaking’
processes, as suggested by the Interface Hypothesis, then
gestures may match preferentially either the image or the
speech, depending on the needs of the speaker at any given
moment. In this case, characteristics of the image, the
lexical item, or the situation could affect to which
representation the gesture is aligned.
Constructing the Corpus
Speakers. Sixteen native speakers of Dutch from the Max
Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics’ subject pool were
paid for their participation.
Pictures. Sixteen path-like images depicting networks of
colored circles were constructed. Each image consisted of
an explicit start point as well as red, yellow, and blue circles
arrayed along a path. Half of the pictures had branching
paths while the other half did not. All speakers saw all
pictures in the same presentation order. In sum, 256 picture
descriptions were collected.
Procedure. Speakers were seated across from their
interlocutor separated by a visual block. Their task was to
describe the pictures to the interlocutor, who was, in fact, a
confederate.
Speakers were given approximately 15 seconds to study
the image, which was placed on the table by the
experimenter. After this memorization period, the picture
was removed and the speaker began to describe the image.
Speakers were free to describe the routes in any way that
was natural to them; they were not given any linguistic
examples to bias their description strategy. The listener was
instructed not to ask any specific questions that might bias
the content of the descriptions. She was free, however, to
ask the speaker to repeat portions or even the entire
description of an image. All sessions were video recorded.
Coding system. A native Dutch speaker familiar with
gesture transcription systems but blind to the hypotheses
under investigation used the videotapes to create a
transcription of the speech as well as a record of all
gestures. Several types of linguistic information were
identified, including directional information (e.g., right, left,
straight ahead), destination information (e.g., a red circle, a
blue circle), landmark information (e.g., you arrive at an
intersection), and shape information (e.g., you will travel in
a big circle). In this paper, we will focus exclusively on
directional information and accompanying directional
gestures.
Gestures were either produced with the head or hands.
Both were coded for several features, most crucially for the
direction of the stroke but also for handedness. Once speech
and gesture were fully transcribed, they were coded for
three binary features: Speech matches image, gesture
matches speech, and gesture matches image. These codes,
together with codes for which directional term was
produced and unperspectivized direction of transition, form
the bases of the mismatch analysis.
Speech-image mismatches were identified as any
transition in the network for which the verbal description
provided in the intrinsic perspective did not match the actual
direction of the transition in the network. For example, any
transition labeled right that did not progress rightward on
the page was a mismatch. Likewise, any use of straight
ahead that did not correspond to an upward transition was
coded as a mismatch. (Note that as the image was placed on
the table in front of the speaker, the upward transition in the
image was in the forward direction for the speaker, for
which straight ahead is felicitous.)
Every picture provided multiple mismatch opportunities.
For example, 11 networks included an upwards transition,
similar to the transition from circle 3 to 4 in Figure 2, which
intrinsic speakers described as right or left. Eight networks
included lateral transitions, similar to the final movement in
Figure 2, linguistically described as straight ahead. Four
networks included downward transitions, linguistically
described as right and three networks including lateral
transitions that followed downward transitions. These
transitions leftwards or rightwards were described with the
opposite directional term, namely, rightward turns were
described as left and vise versa.
Corpus Analysis
In this section we first give some descriptive details of the
corpus before we turn to the crucial questions under
investigation.
Characteristics of speech and gesture varied greatly
between speakers. Six speakers produced almost no gestures
at all. Of the ten gesturers, three produced predominantly
deictic descriptions and seven produced predominantly
intrinsic descriptions. While the deictic speakers are
generally orthogonal to the issue of speech-image mismatch,
two produced some mixed perspective descriptions,
producing mismatch opportunities. Only speakers who
adopted the intrinsic frame of reference AND who gestured
are of relevance to our investigation.
In total, the corpus of directional terms consisted of 1440
directional tokens, 389 of which were produced with a co-
expressive gesture. Table 1 presents lexical, gesture, and
mismatch frequencies for each of the directional terms
found in our corpus.
1
1
We will present English translations for the Dutch directional
terms found in our corpus. With respect to the description of our
images, there are no critical differences in how directions and
spatial relations are lexicalized.
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Table 1. For each directional term, the total number of
tokens, the percentage of tokens produced with a gesture,
and the number of speech-image mismatches.
Lexemes Total
Tokens
% With
Gesture
Speech- Image
Mismatches
Right 494 27% 100
Left 317 26% 79
Straight ahead 321 15% 62
Up 120 8% --
Down 19 10% --
Back 106 37% --
Further 63 13% --
The three directional terms that are relevant for mismatches
are right, left, and straight ahead. In 241 instances, these
words did not match the direction in the image. 58 of these
speech-image mismatches were produced with a gesture that
could either align with the linguistic term or the direction in
the image. The terms up and down were only used by deictic
speakers and therefore always matched the input image. The
terms back and further can only be interpreted in the context
of prior movements, and therefore the question of whether
they match the picture is not applicable
The term back received the highest proportion of co-
expressive gestures. The terms left and right were each
produced with co-expressive gestures over 25% of the time,
further and straight were produced with intermediate
gesture rates and up and down had the lowest gesture rates.
We now turn to the central question of the paper. The
crucial data from the corpus are gestures produced when
speech and image are mismatched. The critical question is
whether these gestures reflect the direction represented in
the image, in speech, or both. The number of gestures that
matched the image or the speech for each directional term is
presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Number of speech-image mismatches for which the
gesture matches either the speech or the image, for the three
relevant directional terms.
Lexeme Gesture = Image Gesture = Speech
Right 8 15
Left 9 10
Straight ahead 13 3
The distribution of cases where the gesture matches the
image compared to when it matches speech is different for
the three directional terms, right, left, and straight ahead, c
2
(2) = 7.13, p < .05. Two by-speakers comparisons were also
carried out to assess this relationship. First, for the cases in
which gesture aligned with speech, the proportion of
speech-image mismatches for each of the three lexemes was
calculated for each speaker by dividing the number of
speech-image mismatches for the lexeme divided by the
total speech-image mismatches for all three lexemes. The
proportions differed significantly between the lexemes,
Friedman’s c
2
(2) = 7.3, N=8, p < .05. Second, for the cases
in which gesture aligned with image, the proportion of
speech-image mismatches for each of the three lexemes was
calculated for each speaker in the analogous way to the
previous analysis. There is no evidence that proportions
differed between the lexemes, Friedman’s c
2
(2) = 0.9, N=8,
p > .1.
Table 2 shows that gesture alignment patterned differently
for different lexemes. Table 3 further breaks down the
information for different directions of transition within the
network.
Table 3. Number of speech-image mismatches in
descriptions of either upwards, downwards or lateral
transition in which gesture aligned to either the image or to
speech.
Transition
Direction
Lexeme Gesture =
Image
Gesture =
Speech
Up Right or left 5 12
Down Right or left 5 11
Laterally Right or left 7 2
Laterally Straight ahead 13 3
The alignment pattern for vertical (up and down)
transitions was significantly different compared to lateral
transitions, c
2
(1) = 12.15, p < .001. Speakers preferred to
align with the image when the transition was lateral but
preferred to align with speech when the transition was
vertical. One possible interpretation of this pattern is that
speakers generally prefer to gesture laterally.
In speech-image mismatch cases, gestures sometimes
aligned with the image and sometimes with the speech.
This split was quite even for gestures produced for the
lexemes left and right but not for straight ahead. In the
latter case, speakers preferred to align their gestures with the
image. The different alignment patterns to different lexical
items may also be interpreted in terms of a general
preference to gesture laterally rather than vertically.
What the data from the corpus clearly indicate, however,
is that there is no strong tendency to align gestures to the
image at the expense of speech or vise versa. When the
information conveyed in speech conflicts with the
information presented in the visual input, gesture can align
with either. The decision as to whether a gesture aligns with
the con-current speech is mediated by a spatial factor
(lateral vs. vertical transitions). This result was not predicted
by the Free Imagery Hypothesis or the Lexical Semantic
Hypothesis, as we will discuss in more details in the next
section. The result is, however, compatible with the
Interface Hypothesis.
Discussion
By using images consisting of path-like networks of circles,
we succeeded in constructing a corpus of picture
descriptions in which the content of speech and the content
of the to-be-described image often conflicted. Our aim was
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to see whether gestures produced in these instances would
be co-expressive with the lexical affiliate, as predicted by
the Lexical Semantics Hypothesis (Butterworth & Hadar,
1989; Schegloff, 1984), with the characteristics of the
image, as predicted by the strong reading of the Free
Imagery Hypothesis (Krauss et al., 1996, 2000), or whether
the alignment to one representation or another would be
influenced by ‘thinking for speaking’ processes, as proposed
by the Interface Hypothesis (Kita & Özyürek, 2003).
What our corpus analysis reveals is that gesture
alignment behavior in speech-image mismatches was not
driven solely by either the characteristics of the input image
or the characteristics of speech. Rather, the gestural content
seemed to be co-determined by the lexeme choice and the
type of spatial representation. Specifically, when the
lexemes left and right were used to express the spatial
representations upwards and downward, gesture tended to
align with speech rather than with the spatial representation.
When the lexeme straight ahead was used to express the
spatial concepts leftwards and rightwards, gestures tended
to align with the spatial representation of the image. When
the lexemes left and right were used to express the spatial
representations rightwards and leftwards, respectively,
gesture again tended to align with the spatial representation.
The fact that the gestural content was determined by the
interplay between both lexical and spatial representations
makes it difficult to maintain either the Lexical Semantics
Hypothesis, which holds that gestures are generated from
the semantic representations of lexical items that have been
selected for speaking, or the strong version of the Free
Imagery Hypothesis, which holds that gestures are
generated from pre-linguistically generated imagery.
However, we need to recognize that there are different
versions of the Free Imagery Hypothesis, which make
different assumptions. In de Ruiter's (2000) version of the
Free Imagery Hypothesis, gestures are generated in the
Conceptualizer in Levelt's (1989) sense, which generates the
(pre-linguistic) proposition to be linguistically formulated in
the next utterance. According to de Ruiter, both gestural and
linguistic perspectives are determined in the Conceptualizer.
Similarly to the strong version of the Free Imagery
Hypothesis, "the shape of the gesture [iconic gesture] will
be largely determined by the content of the imagery" (de
Ruiter, 2000: 293). As such, the results from the present
study are problematic not only to the strong version of the
Free Imagery Hypothesis, but also to de Ruiter's version.
However, because in de Ruiter's model the shape of a
gesture is determined in the Conceptualizer, which in
principle has access to (pre-linguistic) propositions to be
linguistically formulated, it might be possible to modify the
model to account for the present results.
The gestural content is determined by the interplay
between lexical choice and directions of the transition in the
image. This result could be accounted for by the Interface
Hypothesis (Kita & Özyürek, 2003), which proposes that
gestures are generated from an interface representation,
namely, a spatio-motoric representation that is in the process
of being prepared for speech. According to this hypothesis,
there is a general tendency for an interface representation to
converge with the linguistic representation in the utterance
being planned. The degree of convergence is determined by
various contextual factors (Kita, 2000). In the case of this
study, when the spatial representation of the transition is
confusable, that is, when the transition is lateral (i.e.,
leftwards or rightwards), the convergence to the linguistic
representation is weak, and thus gesture tends to match the
spatial representation of the transition, rather than the
linguistic representation. When the spatial representation of
the transition is not confusable, that is, when the transition is
vertical (i.e., u p w a r d s or downwards), the interface
representation converges strongly to the linguistic
representation. Note further that the idea that gestures help
distinguish confusable spatial representations is compatible
with theories of self-oriented functions, in particular, the
theory that gestures help organize spatio-motoric
information for speaking (Kita, 2000; Alibali, Kita, Yong,
2000; Kita, 2003).
The data also rule out the possibility that gestures can be
randomly generated from either the input imagistic
representation or the output lexical representations,
alternating randomly between these two sources. This
possibility, previously discussed in Kita and Özyürek (2003)
predicts that speech-gesture mismatches should randomly
align to the input or to speech, without a discernable pattern.
This is not the observed pattern, as seen in Table 3.
One could object to our definition of speech-image
mismatch. Consider for example the possibility that
speakers mentally rotate the image in memory in order to
calculate the correct directional term for the intrinsic
perspective. In this case, apparent speech-image mismatches
would in fact be matches. However, if this were true we
would not have expected gesture alignment to ever conflict
with speech, since speech would always match the
perspectivized internal memory representation of the image
for the speaker at that moment. This is not consistent with
the observe data pattern, as seen in Table 1.
The gesture-speech mismatches reported in this study are
of a different type from what have been attested in previous
research. Gesture-speech mismatch has been observed in
children's explanations for Piagetian conservation tasks
(Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986) and children's
explanations for equivalence of an equation (Perry, Church,
& Goldin-Meadow, 1988), and adult and children's
description of the solution to the Tower of Hanoi puzzle
(Garber & Goldin-Meadow, 2002). In these studies, gesture
and speech refer to two distinct referents that are both
relevant to the current goal of discourse, or two alternative
strategies or solutions that might apply to the problem at
hand. For example, in the explanation for a Piagetian
conservation task, speech may indicate the height of a glass,
this one is tall, and gesture may indicate the width of the
same glass. By contrast, mismatches that result from
perspective taking can be called same-referent mismatches.
Speech and gesture have the same referent, namely a motion
954
vector, but they map the vector to a gestural body movement
under different perspectives. Using these same-referent
mismatches allows the predictions of the competing theories
to be properly tested.
To conclude, we have introduced a new source of
evidence into the field of gesture research, namely speech-
image mismatches with concomitant gestures. These
speech-image mismatches allow the content of the linguistic
and the imagistic representations to be separated and
contrasted. An analysis of the behavior of these gestures
revealed that gestures cannot be generated from a purely
linguistic or purely imagistic representation. Rather, gestural
content was determined by the interplay between the lexical
items used in the description and the type of directional
information in spatial representation of the transitions.
Many issues in gesture research have had difficulty in
finding clear evidence for or against specific proposals
exactly because it is generally difficult to disentangle the
independent contributions of linguistic and imagistic
representations. The present paper uses perspective taking to
avoid this problem. The present study is also significant in
that the methodology affords reliable elicitation of same-
referent mismatches from normal adult speakers.
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Abstract
This research investigates thinking processes of duos of jazz
improvisers in performance. Of particular interest are
cognitive processes related to creativity and to reasoning
about time, since both activities are fundamental to
improvisation. Data sources are the group members’
retrospective verbal protocols, collected after the performance
of each tune. One result of this work is that cognition related
to reasoning about time and creativity varied little either
within or across groups, regardless of the type of tune being
played. This result is further investigated by examining some
of the statements from the protocols themselves.
Introduction
This research examines the thinking processes of duos of
jazz improvisers in performance. Of particular interest are
cognitive processes related to creativity and to reasoning
about time, since both activities are fundamental to
improvisation. To produce the data used in this study, each
member of the duo watched and listened to a tape of the
duo’s performance and recalled out loud what he had been
thinking during it. The study addresses a gap in prior
research by presenting an analysis of cognition during
improvisation as reflected in verbal protocol data. Since this
study is thought to be the first of its kind, an exploratory
approach is taken.
A brief review of related work is followed by a
presentation of exploratory questions concerning how
performers reason about time and how they produce ideas
for performance. The results of the study are then presented,
followed by an analysis of the contents of selected
statements in the protocols. The paper concludes with a
discussion of implications for current theory and directions
for future work.
Related Prior Research
Improvisation in jazz is said to involve “reworking
precomposed material and design in relation to
unanticipated ideas conceived, shaped, and transformed
under the special conditions of performance, thereby adding
unique features to every creation” (Berliner, 1994). While
improvising has been compared to “real-time composing”
(Kernfeld, 1988), the two differ in salient ways (Nettl,
1974). Composition refers to “the discontinuous process of
creation and iteration (usually through notation) of musical
ideas” (Sarath, 1996). Improvisation, by contrast, is a
continuous and serial process. Composing involves
distributing musical elements (such as notes) over a score
that is to be played serially: the composer may add to, delete
or edit any part of the composition at any time before its
performance. Performance of a composition involves
interpreting and articulating a written or memorized score.
Performance of an improvisation involves conceiving,
articulating and remembering an unwritten, evolving score
(Berliner, 1994). While a misplaced note in a composition
can be erased and rewritten; a misplayed note in
improvisation cannot. Errors in improvisation therefore
“must be accepted as part of the irrevocable chain of
acoustical events, and contextually justified after the fact by
reinforcement or development” (Pressing, 1984). As stated
by Pressing (1984), “If erasing, painting over, or non-real-
time editing exist, improvisation does not.”
Temporal Cognitive Processes
Following Berliner’s (1994) comments, improvisers must
reason about time in order to conceptualize what is to be
articulated in light of what they remember has been played
(see Sarath, 1996 for further discussion). In comparison
with a tune that is being composed as it is being played (i.e.,
a free tune), the performance of a well-learned tune (such as
a jazz standard) may place fewer demands on remembering,
since much of what needs to be recalled (e.g., chord
changes) is easily accessible from long-term memory
(Johnson-Laird, 2002). Similarly, conceptualization may
also be easier for a jazz standard, since the path in front of
the improviser is better known. A tentative hypothesis, then,
is that players will spend more cognitive effort on
remembering and planning ahead for a free tune than on a
standard.
Creative Cognitive Processes
Creativity—the production of new ideas—is fundamental to
improvisation, since it is not enough for improvisers to
produce music that has already been composed: they must
produce something that, to them at least, is new. There have
been numerous proposed models of the cognitive processes
involved in creative thinking (Sternberg, 1999) and on the
factors that influence creative thinking (Welsh, 1973). These
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theories typically include convergent and divergent
processes, along with some mechanism that governs
switching between them (Newell, 1962). The Geneplore
model (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992) describes creative
thinking as entailing divergent processes of generation and
subsequent exploration of ideas (see Ward, Smith, & Finke,
1999 for a discussion). Evaluation (a convergent process) is
discussed in Geneplore in terms of constraint satisfaction.
A jazz standard may afford more opportunities for
divergent thinking than a free improvisation. Jazz standards
are tunes with familiar structures and a long history of
performance which players routinely draw upon. Their
performance may enable the improviser to spend less time
trying to recall the tune or, in the case of free improvisation,
trying to determine the structure and content of the tune.
Similarly, evaluation may be easier to accomplish for a jazz
standard, since the player can easily recall what has been
played and speculate reliably what is to be played.
Analytic Framework
The analytic framework for this study is used to define a set
of temporal and creative processes. A scheme for classifying
the contents of the protocols based on these definitions was
developed so that independent coders could identify these
processes in the protocols. This section provides the
definitions of the processes; the method of their application
is discussed in the subsequent section on “Study Design.”
An improviser in performance must reason about past,
present and likely or possible future events, resulting in
three different processes related to temporal cognition.
Orientat ion  is the process of considering a current
performance event. An example of orientation is the
statement "The time is in 4," since the speaker is referring to
the present moment.  Retrospection is the process of
recalling a previous performance event. The statement "He
had just played in three so I did too" is an example of
retrospection. Prospection (a term coined for this research)
is the process of looking ahead; that is, of predicting or
speculating about a future event in the performance. An
example of prospection is the statement "I knew I was
coming to the end of my solo so I looked up."
Three different types of creative cognition are considered
here. Idea generation is said to occur when a musical idea
(i.e., one that pertains to the performance) is recalled or
created. An example is the statement "I was thinking about
playing an open figure there." Idea development is said to
occur when a player further develops a musical idea which
has already been generated, either by the speaker or the
other member of the group. An example is the statement "I
was thinking of inverting the figure I played previously."
Both idea generation and development are regarded as
divergent processes. Finally, idea evaluation is said to occur
when the speaker makes a statement about the value or
worth of a musical idea. An example is the statement, “I
remember liking what I played there.” Idea evaluation is a
process that leads to decisions about whether or not to
pursue ideas, and is therefore convergent.
Research Questions The research questions concern the
frequencies of occurrence of temporal and creative
cognition within and among groups during the performances
of various jazz tunes. Although some tentative hypotheses
have been discussed, a broad range of questions are
addressed. This decision is due to the exploratory nature of
the study, one goal of which is to provide suggestions for
further lines of research. The research questions explore (i)
the defensibility of the assumption of between-group
homogeneity; they also examine possible differences in
creative and temporal cognition (ii) within a group for a
particular tune and (iii) across tunes by the same group.
Data from performances of a jazz standard and a free
improvisation are used. An example of question (i) is, do the
proportions of occurrence of the various types of temporal
processes differ across the groups for the performance of a
jazz standard? An example of question (ii) is, do the
proportions of occurrence of the various types of temporal
processes differ between the trumpet and bass player in the
performance of a jazz standard? An example of question
(iii) is, do the proportions of occurrence of the various types
of temporal processes differ between the performance of a
jazz standard and of a free improvisation for a particular
group?
Study Design
The study employs the preceding three research questions to
investigate the impact of different types of tunes on how
members of professional jazz duos reason about time and
think creatively.
Tune Choice The tunes which the duos were asked to
perform were intended to vary in difficulty and familiarity.
The first tune played, “I Got Rhythm,” has been extensively
recorded and is the origin of the so-called “Rhythm
Changes,” a set of widely-used chord changes in jazz
(Berliner, 1994; Kernfeld, 1988).  All participants were
expected to be very familiar with this tune and comfortable
in improvising on it. The second tune, “Willow Weep for
Me,” was chosen since it is not as familiar as “I Got
Rhythm” and because it is typically played as a blues ballad.
In case a duo did not know this tune well enough to play it
without sheet music, a backup tune— “Blue Train”—was
used. The third tune, “Giant Steps,” is known for being a
difficult tune, since the chord progressions are highly
idiosyncratic and the tempo is fast. The backup tune for
“Giant Steps” was “Cherokee,” which is in part challenging
because it is also typically played at a quick tempo. The
fourth tune was a free improvisation. A free improvisation
has no pre-determined structure other than the one which
performers create.
Solicitation of Participants Groups of two players each
were solicited through word-of-mouth contact with
professional musicians working in the Albany, New York
area. (Though the duo is a common configuration in jazz,
the use of duos was also due to practical concerns of cost
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and the availability of appropriate recording space.) The
player of the lead instrument—a trumpet player in all
cases—was first secured. The lead player then suggested the
second member of the duo, someone with whom he played
often. The groups were intended to be reasonably
homogeneous in terms of musical experience and
experience improvising. Accordingly, all participants were
asked to describe their backgrounds. Because they would be
asked to verbalize their thoughts, only players who had
experience in teaching—and therefore talking
about—improvisation were asked to take part in the study.
Finally, they were then told that, during the study, they
would be given three or four tunes to play, videotaped
during the performance of each tune and then asked to recall
their thinking while watching the videotape.
Procedure
The study was conducted at a local professional recording
studio. Once a duo arrived, study personnel reviewed the
study protocol with them. The duo’s members next signed
consent and contract forms, tuned their instruments and
performed a sound check.
Each member of the duo then entered a vocal (i.e.,
isolation) booth to practice giving concurrent and
retrospective verbal protocols, using two tasks from the
literature (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). In the third task they
whistled or sang a short tune then recalled their thinking
during the performance of the tune. Once these practice
tasks had been completed to the player’s and the
experimenter’s satisfaction, the players practiced operating
the VCR that would assist them in giving the retrospective
verbal protocol. The main part of the study then began.
The group first played “I Got Rhythm.” They were asked
to keep the performance to less than ten minutes and to take
one solo each. A maximum length of ten minutes was
chosen since that is the maximum length recommended in
guidelines for conducting a retrospective verbal protocol
(Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Once any questions had been
answered, all personnel except two video camera operators
left the main studio and the duo performed the tune. The
videotape recorded the images and sound of the two
performers, along with a display of the duration of the
performance.
After the performance, each participant went to a vocal
booth in order to watch and listen to a videotape of the
performance and to deliver the protocol. (About two to three
minutes usually elapsed between the end of the performance
and the beginning of the protocol.) As is commonly done in
verbal protocol-based studies, one experimenter remained
with the participant in order to reiterate the instructions and
to ask the participant to “keep talking” whenever there was
silence for more than about ten seconds (Ericsson & Simon,
1993). While giving a protocol, each participant could
control the videotape as necessary. All protocols were
audio- and video-taped, so that it would be possible to hear
and see what was on the videotape while the participant was
speaking.
Once the protocol had been delivered, the participants
returned to the performance area and prepared for the next
performance. The above procedure was repeated for the
tunes “Willow Weep for Me” and “Giant Steps.” If the
participants decided not to play a tune, the backup tune was
played. For the fourth and final tune, participants were
asked “to work out the composition of the tune as you play
it.” Again they were asked to keep the total length of the
performance to less than 10 minutes. They were not asked to
take solos, since doing so would have helped determine the
structure of the performance.
Once the think-aloud protocol for the final tune had been
given, participants were asked a series of questions about
their background and their participation in the study.  They
were then paid and invited to discuss the study further in a
relaxed atmosphere without being recorded. The total
duration of each session was approximately two hours.
Results
Data are taken from the verbal protocols associated with the
performances of "I Got Rhythm" (IGR) and a free
improvisation (Free). Performances of these two tunes were
chosen for initial analysis since they represent opposite ends
of the spectrum of jazz performance. All the groups played
IGR first and Free fourth.
Participants' protocols were first transcribed and
segmented (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). All references to
study participants in the protocols were masked so that it
would not be possible for a reader to determine which
protocol corresponded to which session or player. Segments
pertaining to cognition during the actual performance of the
tune were coded using the definitions for the types of
temporal and creative cognition that are given above in the
“Analytic Framework” section. Coders were provided with
(i) the segmented and masked protocols and (ii) instructions
on how to use the above definitions to code the protocols.
Coding was done by two independent coders unfamiliar
with the objectives of the research. The coders were trained
first to identify creative processes, then applied the
instructions to the protocols. The same procedure was then
followed for temporal processes. A second coder coded
approximately 10% of the data, and reliability as measured
by Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) was approximately 87%.
Counts of the various types of temporal and creative
processes were then entered into contingency tables. For
creative cognition, it was immediately obvious that there
were too few instances of idea development to justify the
use of the appropriate statistical test, the Chi-squared test for
differences in proportions (Conover, 1999). All instances of
idea development were therefore recoded as instances of
idea generation, since, as discussed previously, both are
processes of divergent thinking. All statistical tests were
then performed on the tables at a 0.05 significance level.
The observed significance level of a test is denoted p. Some
of the contingency tables are shown below, with the
following symbols used: for temporal cognition,
O=orientation, P=prospection and R=retrospection; for
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creative cognition, G =idea generation and E=idea
evaluation.
Between-group Differences
A reasonable degree of homogeneity was desired among the
groups in order to minimize the possibility of between-
group confounding effects. Information on participants’
backgrounds was collected, as discussed previously. Also,
differences in groups’ temporal and creative thinking
processes for each tune were investigated using question (i),
with the following results. For temporal thinking, no
significant between-group differences were found among
the groups for either IGR or Free.
For creative cognition, no significant differences
were found among the groups for IGR, but a significant
difference (p=0.0045) was found for Free. This result may
be stated by saying that at least two of the proportions in
some column were not equal to each other. Table 1 shows
the data associated with Free.
Table 1:  Creative Cognition, by Group for Free.
Group G E
One 33 37
Two 13 9
Three 68 26
The assumption of homogeneity may therefore be seen as
reasonable for IGR but not for Free. Accordingly, the
analysis will consider individual groups rather than pooling
data across groups.
Description of Performances
I Got Rhythm All groups structured their performances of
IGR in approximately the same way, with the head (i.e., the
introduction and first AABA chorus) and ending (i.e., the
last AABA chorus) played more or less as discussed by
Kernfeld (1995).  In Groups One and Two, solos were two
choruses long; in Group Three they were four choruses
long. All performances were less than ten minutes long.
Free Improvisation For the free improvisation, participants
were asked to "work out the composition of the tune as you
play it."  Groups in sessions one and two asked for some
additional guidance but were given nothing more than a key
and/or time signature. All performances were less than ten
minutes long and had a stable time signature. It should be
noted that, although all free tunes were spontaneously
composed, all were clearly in the idiom of bebop jazz.
Temporal Processes
For question (ii), no significant differences in temporal
cognition were evident between the participants in each
group for IGR or Free. Table 2 shows the question (ii) data
associated with Group One for IGR.
Table 2: Temporal Cognition for IGR, by Player in Group
One.
Player O P R
Trumpet 25 13 11
Bass 17 10 4
Similarly, for question (iii), no significant differences were
evident across the two tunes as performed by each group.
Table 3 shows the question (iii) data associated with Group
One.
Table 3:  Temporal Cognition for Group One, by Tune.
Tune O P R
IGR 42 23 15
Free 30 21 21
Creative Processes
No significant differences were evident in creative cognition
between the participants in each group for IGR or Free. So,
in Group One, the proportion of segments from the trumpet
player reflecting idea generation is not significantly
different from the corresponding figure for the bass player.
Table 4 shows the question (ii) data associated with Group
One for IGR.
Table 4:  Creative Cognition for IGR, by Player in Group
One.
Player G E
Trumpet 18 16
Bass 8 6
No significant differences were evident across the two tunes
as performed by each group. Table 5 shows the question (iii)
data associated with Group One.
Table 5: Creative Cognition for Group One, by Tune.
Tune G E
IGR 26 22
Free 37 33
For both temporal and creative processes, the
results suggest that—contrary to expectation—the same
proportion of segments reflected each type of temporal or
creative process. The same was true for differences within
the same group across the two tunes. This result is
particularly surprising, since groups were expected to
approach IGR and Free quite differently; indeed, the
recorded performances of the tunes by any given group,
while sharing certain elements (e.g., stable key signature
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and meter within each performance) nonetheless sound quite
different, particularly in Group Three and to a lesser extent
in Group One.
Content Analysis
The contents of the protocols from the performance of IGR
by Group One are now analyzed in order to provide further
insight into individual- and group-level creative and
temporal cognition. These protocols were chosen because
they are richer in content than those of the other groups and
because it is appropriate to begin with an analysis of a
simpler tune before moving to more complex ones. The
statements examined here were those thought to provide the
most insight into processes of collaboration, temporal
reasoning and creativity. To aid the discussion, statements
are labeled with their segment number from the protocols.
Collaboration Statements by one player about himself, the
other player in the group and the group itself suggest how
the duo collaborated. In IGR, the trumpet player (JH)
explicitly mentioned trying to fit the melody and rhythm of
his playing with that of the bass player (PT), as follows:
19. I'm just ah, I'm hearing melodies, I'm trying to play
them, that I know will fit with what PT is playing.
24. I'm trying to keep, trying to keep a steady rhythm with
PT, trying to make  my eighth notes very steady.
JH also engaged in active listening following the completion
of his own solo and the onset of PT’s solo:
32. I'm kind of ah thinking after the thought and reacting
to what he's playing.
Segments 19, 24 and 32 reflect JH trying to solve two types
of problems related to collaboration. The first type, as in
S24, is reasonably well-posed and technical. In this case, it
involves keeping the rhythm of the tune. In contrast, the
second requires the generation of new melodies: here, ones
that “fit with” PT’s playing. Segment 19 (S19) suggests that
generation of the melodies occurred closely in time to their
evaluation and performance. The use of the phrase “hearing
melodies” would seem to indicate that the process is more
one of retrieval rather than on-the-spot composition.
Computational approaches to this type of thinking in jazz
improvisation have sometimes involved retrieval and use of
fragments or motifs (e.g., Ramalho, Rolland, & Ganascia,
1999) S32 is similar in spirit to S19, the distinction being
that JH was not actually playing anything at that moment.
The statements show that JH was actively listening to PT,
analyzing PT’s playing and attempting to use the results of
this analysis to guide his own playing.
Temporal Processes A number of statements by both
players reflect reasoning about time, particularly about the
group’s movement through the structure of the tune. Once
they were asked to play IGR, one of the things they
discussed was whether or not to play the tag (an optional
ending to the melody). JH decided that they would play the
tag at the very end of the tune. As they neared the end of the
tune (i.e., the last A section), JH recalled thinking
47. I'm, I'm thinking about how we're going to resolve the
tune, how we're going to end it here.
48. I know we're going to put the tag on, which is what
we're doing right now.
Similarly, at about the same point PT recalled thinking
41. Ah, we're coming up on the last eight, eight bars.
42. And we had talked about putting the the tag at the
end, so I'm actually thinking, yeah we're going to put
that tag on the end.
Successful completion of the tune was therefore in part
dependent on both players recalling the need to play the tag
at the end of the tune. Additionally, JH was thinking about
how to resolve the tune, given the need to include the tag.
At numerous points in the performance, JH and PT each
speculated about what might be played by the other person.
For example, after the first chorus of JH’s solo, PT thought
22. Now I'm, right now I tell you I'm thinking, is he
taking another chorus?
23. There, so, he's taking two choruses.
These segments suggest that the de facto structure of the
tune was in part determined during performance, thus
requiring the performers to think explicitly about past,
present and future events. For example, because JH had
taken two choruses in his solo, PT did the same.
Creative Processes An interesting exchange occurred at the
very end of the group’s performance of IGR. As shown in
S47-48 and S41-S42 (above), JH and PT recalled the
agreement to play the tag and planned for it. JH made the
following statements immediately after S48:
49. Now, I didn't, I also extended the tag.
50. I could have made that, I could have made that tag a
few bars, uh one or two bars shorter.  By not
extending it, I I kind of doubled the time.
52. Ok, as I said I I I doubled the length here, just to see
what PT would do, how he'd react.
53. And I held that note out because that gave PT an
opportunity to decide for both of us how exactly that
was going to end.
54. Um and then I just threw that little tag of those couple
notes on the end uh expecting he might react off of
that,...
JH therefore elaborated upon the tag by doubling the time,
holding out a note and adding a couple of notes to the tag.
Each generated idea was intended to result in PT generating
an idea in reaction to it, which would of course require
evaluation. PT’s reaction was as follows:
43. And right there I'm thinking, should I put a tag after
his little ending there, but I decided to just let him
have the final word.
S54 (above) concludes with JH saying “and he chose not to.
And that was his choice.” This example therefore shows
cycle of idea generation (by JH), evaluation of those ideas
by (PT), and finally JH’s evaluation of PT’s evaluation.
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Discussion and Conclusions
The statistical analysis suggests a great degree of stability
in creative and temporal cognition across the various
conditions. Groups may therefore have applied similar
cognitive strategies, regardless of the conditions of
performance. The analysis of the “I Got Rhythm” protocols
for Group One provides additional insight into how
improvisers collaborate while simultaneously abiding by
constraints of an evolving musical structure and generating,
evaluating and executing new ideas.
Temporal cognition is necessary when a tune’s structure
evolves in real time. A theory of improvisation, even for the
performance of standard tunes, should therefore include
explicit modeling of temporal reasoning (see Johnson-Laird,
2002 and Ramalho et al., 1999 for discussions on both sides
of this issue). A key consideration is range of planning
(Palmer, 1997), since the current study and others (Sarath,
1996) have suggested that improvisers engage in
contingency-based reasoning during performance. This
study used prompted retrospective verbal protocols as
primary data sources. Data on physical movements (Palmer,
1997) and cues and communications (Brinner, 1995) of
performers may be useful in triangulating the results.
Further work is needed in understanding the role of
knowledge and experience in the production of new musical
ideas. A large body of work (see Pressing, 1984) shows that
skilled improvisers draw upon and adapt highly resilient
motifs during performance. Some evidence (Berliner, 1994)
suggests that the use of these motifs can be conscious,
though this claim has not been rigorously tested.
The results show that some creative and temporal
processes may themselves be highly collaborative. Indeed,
as suggested by Pressing (1984), the nature of improvised
performance demands that the all “acoustical events” must
be folded into the performance. The protocols contained
evidence of both routine and non-routine problems arising
out of collaboration between duos.
Finally, as discussed by Johnson-Laird (1991, 2002),
additional work is needed in expressing theories of
improvisation as computer programs. The current study has
provided some evidence that such programs should include
mechanisms for reasoning about (i) evolving conceptions of
musical structure (and therefore time),  (ii) processes of
creativity and (iii) how dependencies among group members
are negotiated (e.g., Bongers, 1999; Walker, 1997) in order
to deal with temporal constraints while thinking creatively
(Ramalho et al., 1999). Such an approach ought to result in
a theory of improvisation that seeks to explain how it occurs
in a wide variety of domains.
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The Problem and its Context
Research on tutoring has shown that the student’s
interaction with the tutor heavily determines the learning
outcomes. In human tutoring, the responsibility of the
interaction is shared between the tutor and the student (Chi,
2001). In the case of a computer coach such as the McGill
Statistics Tutor,  the control of the interaction is put entirely
in the hands of the learners. Learners’ ability to interact with
the system productively therefore represents a critical aspect
affecting the learning outcomes. This ability of help seeking
(Nelson-LeGall, 1981) has not been well researched from a
cognitive science point of view in the context of computer-
supported learning (Aleven et al., 2003).
The aims of the present work are to elaborate a cognitive
model of help seeking and to examine its interaction with
critical aspects of the learning situation. Two studies using
discourse analysis methodology are conducted using a
formal model of the learning domain.
Methodology
First-level Participants are 20 graduate students from a
faculty of Education of a Canadian university. The seven-
hour experiment involves working in pairs to solve a very
challenging statistics problem (a two-way analysis of
variance) for which students don’t have sufficient
background. A computer coach based on human tutoring,
the McGill Statistics Tutor, is available to provide help with
every aspect of the task.
Data consist of three complementary sources. The
dialogue between the pair of participants as they work on
the statistics problem using the computer coach. The
interaction with the computer coach is also recorded, in two
forms. First, the display of the computer is recorded using a
special device. Second, the computer coach keeps a log of
some characteristics of every help request made by the
students. The students solutions to the problem are also
integrated in the database.
Data analysis consists of complementary strategies.
Trace analyses of the task performance and the help seeking
process were elaborated. Statistical analyses were also
performed..
Results and Discussion
Results show that a help seeking model based on
information processing  theory is reflected in the data. The
components of the model are (1) recognize an impasse, (2)
diagnose the impasse, (3) establish a specific need for help,
(4) find appropriate help, (5) comprehend help, and (6)
evaluate help.
Help seeking interacts with the performance of the task and
with the structure of the domain knowledge. Help seeking is
intertwined with problem solving ; help is sought to fill gaps
in students’ knowledge in order to solve the problem.
However, student’s use of the computer coach is not optimal
since they tend to select help at higher levels in the
hierarchical knowledge structure while they tend to problem
solve at lower levels.
Conclusion
These results have implications for the design of computer
coaches and instructional situations. These results help
characterize the contribution of the learners to the
emergence of more or less contingent tutorial interactions.
In addition, identifying key skills that students use in
problem-based learning situations is a first step in training
and assessing those skills.
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Abstract 
Numerous theories of language acquisition have indicated that 
distributional information is extremely valuable for assisting 
the child to learn syntactic categories, yet these theories differ 
over the type of information that is proposed as useful in 
acquisition. Mintz (2003) has proposed that children utilize 
the previous word and the following word (AxB frames) for 
acquiring categories, whereas Monaghan, Chater, and 
Christiansen (submitted) have suggested that information 
about the previous word alone provides a rich source of data 
for categorization. In three modeling experiments we found 
that bigrams were better than fixed AxB frames for learning 
syntactic categories in a corpus of child-directed speech. 
However, presentation of the preceding and succeeding words 
when these can be processed separately resulted in better 
learning than presenting the preceding word alone, and also 
improved performance over presenting the previous two 
words. 
Introduction 
What sort of information does the child use to develop an 
understanding of their language? The rational analysis 
approach answers this question by assessing what sort of 
information is useful for learning the language. If a 
particular source of information proves to be rich and 
reliable then a computational system (of which the child is a 
very special case) will exploit it. The child learns a sense of 
syntactic categories early in language development. In order 
to understand speech and relate it to the world, the child 
must know which part of speech refers to an action, and 
which to objects, and which words modify relations between 
objects. “Look at the cow mooing” elicits many possibilities 
for relations between words and the world, for example, 
whether the animal in question is referred to by the word 
“cow”, “look”, or “mooing”. Constraints within the 
language, restricting which words in the sentence can refer 
to objects, for example, greatly limit the number of 
possibilities for relating words to the world. 
But what sort of information is useful for constructing 
syntactic categories? A variety of different types of 
information have been proposed as useful for categorization, 
including gestural, semantic, phonological, and 
distributional information. Combining more than one type 
of information has indicated improvements in categorization 
(Reali, Christiansen, & Monaghan, 2003), and it may indeed 
be the case that combining multiple sources is necessary for 
categorization to take place (Braine, 1987). 
This paper focuses on distributional information as a cue 
for syntactic categorization, and questions what type of 
information is most useful and thus usable by the child. 
Theories of the use of distributional information in language 
acquisition have suggested different analyses of the context 
in which a word (category) occurs, but no empirical 
comparisons of these competing accounts have been made. 
We present a series of computational models that compare 
the extent to which accurate syntactic categorization of 
language directed to the child can be made on the basis of 
different sources of distributional information. 
Sources of distributional information 
Theories of distributional information in language 
acquisition have tended to focus on demonstrating that such 
information can contribute significantly toward 
categorization, rather than proposing that the particular 
implementation is psychologically realistic. Redington, 
Chater, and Finch (1998) produced context vectors based on 
the two preceding words and the two words following the 
target word from the CHILDES (MacWhinney, 2000) 
database of child-directed speech. The resulting vectors for 
the most frequent 1000 words in the database clustered 
together with a high correspondence to syntactic categories. 
Redington et al. (1998) also assessed vectors resulting from 
using different context words. They found that good results 
were also obtained for the one preceding and one following 
word, and also for the two preceding words, and for the two 
succeeding words (with better performance for preceding 
words than succeeding words). Yet, using only the 
immediately preceding word also resulted in good 
performance, though addition of richer contextual 
information improved performance. 
An alternative approach is the proposal that particular 
sequences of words are useful for determining syntactic 
category. Fries (1952) produced a set of “frames” in which 
only words of a certain category could appear. For example, 
only a noun could appear in “The __ is/was/are good”. 
Similarly, Maratsos and Chalkley (1980) proposed that there 
were local constraints on the occurrence of particular word 
categories, such as that only a verb can occur before the 
inflection –ed.  
Mintz (2003) provided an empirical test of this local 
source of information, by analyzing corpora of child-
directed speech for the occurrence of frames of the 
preceding and the succeeding words. We refer to these as 
AxB frames, where A and B are fixed, and x indicates the 
intervening word. For example, for the frame “you __ to”, 
“go” and “have” both occur as “x” words in the frame. 
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Mintz selected the 45 most frequent frames involving the 
preceding and succeeding word, and then grouped the words 
that occurred within each of these frames. In the above 
example, “go” and “have” would be grouped together in the 
analysis. Accuracy was assessed by counting the number of 
times that words of the same category were grouped 
together, and dividing this by the number of pairings of all 
words within the groups. Completeness was determined by 
counting the number of pairings of words of the same 
category within the group, and dividing this by the number 
of pairings of words of the same category occurring in any 
of the groupings.  
The 45 most frequent frames resulted in high accuracy but 
low completeness, indicating that these frequent AxB 
frames grouped together words of the same category, but 
that many words of the same category tended to occur in 
different groups. Relatedly, Mintz (2002) found that people 
categorized words together when they occurred in AxB 
frames in an artificial language learning task, and 
consequently claimed that such AxB frames were a source 
of distributional information that children used to acquire 
syntactic categories. 
An alternative proposal is that a frame involving only the 
preceding word – an Ax frame – is required in order to 
produce effective categorization (e.g., Valian & Coulson, 
1988). Monaghan, Chater, and Christiansen (submitted) 
found that categorizations of child-directed speech based on 
the association between the 20 most frequent preceding 
words and the target word resulted in accurate classification 
of words of different categories, but critically, also resulted 
in a large proportion of words being classified. Additionally, 
Monaghan et al. showed that, in an artificial language 
learning task, participants could group words on the basis of 
Ax frame information alone. 
Both AxB and Ax frames can therefore be exploited in 
learning artificial languages, but which source of 
information is most useful to the child learning their 
language? AxB frames result in high accuracy, but low 
completeness, whereas Ax frames produce high 
completeness at the expense of some accuracy. Should a 
learning system select accuracy over completeness, or vice 
versa? 
A comparison of different sources of distributional 
information requires that alternative methods are subjected 
to the same analyses. In addition, an empirical test of 
whether accuracy or completeness is a priority in acquisition 
is necessary. We now present a series of modeling 
experiments that test the extent to which different types of 
distributional information lead to successful categorization 
of words in child-directed language. Experiment 1 
replicated Mintz’s (2003) analysis of AxB frames in child-
directed speech, and directly compared the resulting 
classification to an Ax analysis. Experiment 2 assessed 
whether a neural network model learned to categorise words 
more accurately on the basis of AxB information or Ax 
information alone. Finally, Experiment 3 tested a neural 
network model learning from AxB information when the 
relationship between A and x and B and x can also 
contribute separately towards categorization, and compared 
performance to a model with information about the two 
preceding words. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Corpus preparation From the CHILDES database, we 
selected a corpus of speech directed towards a child of age 
0-2;6 years (anne01a-anne23b, Theakston, Lieven, Pine, & 
Rowland, 2001). This was one of the corpora used by Mintz 
(2003). We replaced all pauses and turn-taking with 
utterance boundary markers, and the resulting corpus 
contained 93,269 word tokens in 30,365 utterances (mean 
utterance length = 3.072 words). There were 2,760 word 
types, and the syntactic category for these words was taken 
from the CELEX database (Baayen, Pipenbrock, & 
Gulikers, 1995), according to the most frequent category 
usage for each word. Some interjections, alternative 
spellings, and proper nouns were hand-coded. There were 
12 syntactic categories: noun, adjective, numeral, verb, 
article, pronoun, adverb, conjunction, preposition, 
interjection, wh-words (e.g., why, who), and proper noun. 
Analysis In accordance with Mintz (2003), we selected the 
45 most frequent AxB frames from the corpus, and 
determined the words that occurred in the x position within 
each frame. Each AxB frame thus resulted in a cluster of 
words. Accuracy and completeness were assessed in the 
same way as for Mintz (2003), described above. An 
additional method for assessing completeness was taken as 
the total number of word types that were classified in (at 
least) one frame. 
For the Ax analysis, the 45 most frequent words were 
selected from the corpus, and co-occurrence with these 
frequent words formed the clusters in the bigram analysis. 
Accuracy and completeness were assessed in the same way 
as for the AxB co-occurrence analysis. 
Results 
As an example of the resulting classification, Table 1 shows 
a summary of the words that were classified into the 5 most 
frequent AxB and Ax frames. For these most frequent AxB 
frames, two frames clustered verbs together, and two 
clustered only pronouns. For the Ax classifications, the 
results are noisier, but have far higher numbers of words 
classified. The most frequent Ax frame – “the x” – classifies 
623 nouns, and very few verbs, whereas the next most 
frequent Ax frame – “you x” – classifies 210 verbs, and 
only 26 nouns. The accuracy and completeness results are 
shown in Table 2, together with those from Mintz (2003)1. 
In parentheses are the random baseline values. We closely 
replicated Mintz’s (2003) results indicating the high 
accuracy of the AxB frames, though, as noted in the  
                                                          
1
 Data are shown from Mintz’s analysis of the anne corpus, with 
standard labeling and word-type analyses. 
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Table 1. Classifications based on the 5 most frequent Ax 
and AxB frames. 
AX 
AX noun verb pronoun adjective preposition other 
a 
it 
to 
you 
the
 
335 
37 
76 
26 
623 
33 
69 
107 
210 
23 
2 
12 
16 
15 
9 
56 
29 
6 
27 
38 
0 
13 
1 
8 
5 
11 
43 
9 
39 
14 
AXB 
AXB noun verb pronoun adjective preposition other 
do_think 
do_want 
are_going 
what_you 
you_to
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
19 
1 
6 
5 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
 
Table 2. Completeness and accuracy of classifications for 
the Ax and the AxB co-occurrence models. 
 CO-OCCURRENCE MODEL 
 MINTZ  AX AXB 
Accuracy 
Completeness 
Words classified 
0.94 (0.41) 
0.09 (0.04) 
405, 14.7% 
0.57 (0.22) 
0.07 (0.04) 
1930, 69.9%
 
0.88 (0.26) 
0.06 (0.03) 
394, 14.3% 
 
Introduction, there was very low completeness for this 
classification.   The Ax   analysis   also   resulted   in    high 
accuracy, and slightly higher completeness according to 
Mintz’s definition. However, a striking difference between 
the AxB and the Ax analyses is the overall number of words 
from the corpus that were categorized. Clustering based on 
bigrams resulted in a classification of almost 5 times as 
many words as the trigram analysis. The small differences 
in completeness between the two analyses is therefore 
misleading, as this only considered words that were 
clustered – in the AxB case, completeness was assessed 
over only a fraction of the corpus considered in the Ax 
analysis. 
Discussion 
We successfully replicated Mintz’s (2003) demonstration 
that classifications of syntactic category based on 
occurrence within the most frequent AxB frames resulted in 
impressively high accuracy. However, our prediction that 
high accuracy could also be achieved by the smaller, less 
specific Ax frame was supported. The Ax analysis had the 
additional advantage of enabling a classification of far more 
words from the child’s environment than was possible using 
AxB frames. There is a pay-off between accuracy and 
completeness: a specific context will result in high accuracy, 
but low completeness, whereas a general context will result 
in lower accuracy but high completeness. 
This raises the question as to whether categorization is 
best based on information that renders highly reliable 
classifications of only a few words, or whether learning 
would benefit from using information that classifies a larger 
proportion of the words in the environment, but with the 
possibility that such classifications may contain more errors. 
One way to test this issue is to train a neural network to 
base predictions of the syntactic category of words based on 
either AxB frames, or Ax frames. After training, the neural 
network model’s error on the predicted classifications 
reflects the extent to which the given source of information 
is beneficial for learning the syntactic categories of the 
language. If the model trained on AxB frames has lower 
error then learning is more effective when based on high 
accuracy but low completeness, whereas if the model 
trained on the Ax frames has lower error then high 
completeness at the expense of high accuracy is a better 
source of information for learning.  
We were concerned with how effective the frame is in 
predicting the category of the x word, so we trained the 
models to predict the category of x without entering the 
identity of the x word at the input. In addition, we did not 
preselect the frames that were input into the model: the 
entire corpus was used for training and not just the 45 most 
frequent frames, as we were interested in whether the model 
would be able to pick up which frames were useful for 
categorisation. From Mintz’s (2003) analysis, it is not clear 
whether the AxB frames are to be interpreted as non-
compositional, or whether the relationship between A and x 
and between x and B may also contribute to categorization. 
Experiment 2 tests the non-compositional interpretation, 
whereas Experiment 3 assesses the compositional version of 
the AxB frames. 
Experiment 2 
We trained two neural network models to learn to predict 
the category of the target (x) word using the same corpus of 
child-directed speech as in Experiment 1. We compared the 
learning of models that were given either Ax or AxB 
information. The AxB model was designed to test whether 
the AxB frame was useful for learning when the frame is 
interpreted as a whole, i.e., the “A” and the “B” do not 
contribute separately toward classification. 
Architecture 
Ax model The model was a feed-forward network with a set 
of input units fully-connected to a hidden layer, which was 
fully-connected to an output layer. The model is shown in 
Figure 1. Each unit in the input layer represented one word 
type in the child-directed speech corpus (so there were 
2,760 input units), and there was also a unit representing the 
utterance boundary, in accordance with other connectionist 
models of syntax learning (e.g., Elman, 1990) that provide 
this additional information to the simulated child learner. 
There were 10 units in the hidden layer. The output layer 
contained units representing the syntactic category of the 
next word in the corpus. The model was trained on all Ax 
bigrams in the corpus, with the first word in the bigram 
occurring in the input layer, and the category of the second 
word in the bigram as the target at the output layer. 
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 Figure 1. The feedforward neural network model of 
syntactic categorization. The active input unit represents 
either the A-word in the Ax model, or the AxB frame in the 
AxB model. The active output unit is the category of the x 
word, or the utterance boundary if x represents the end of 
the utterance. In the Figure, the output verb unit is active. 
 
AxB model The AxB model was identical to that of the Ax 
model, except that  in  the input layer  each unit  represented 
one of the possible AxB frames. There were 36,607 such 
AxB frames, and so there were 36,607 input units in the 
model. The model was trained on all AxB frames in the 
corpus, with the A_B frame activating the appropriate unit 
in the input layer, and the syntactic category of the x word 
as the output layer target. 
Training and testing 
The models were trained using backpropagation with 
gradient descent with learning rate 0.01, and momentum 
0.95. Before training, the weights between connections were 
randomized with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.1. We 
imposed a 0.1 error tolerance on the output units to prevent 
the development of very large weights on the connections. 
The models were trained on all Ax or AxB frames in the 
corpus, with each epoch being one pass through the corpus, 
and training was halted after 5 epochs, which was over 
600,000 training events. As a baseline, we trained and tested 
the Ax model and the AxB model on a corpus where the 
frequency of words was maintained, but word-order was 
randomized. In the AxB randomized control model, there 
were 44,786 AxB frames and thus 44,786 input units in the 
model. 
The models were tested after each epoch on the whole 
corpus, with the mean square error (MSE) across the output 
units taken as a measure of the ability of the model to learn 
to categorize words in the corpus on the basis of either the 
Ax or the AxB information. As an additional measure, we 
assessed whether the target unit – that is, the appropriate 
category of the x word – was the most highly activated for 
each pattern presentation. 
Table 3. Percent correctly classified and MSE for the Ax 
and AxB models for each syntactic category in the corpus, 
with number of tokens (n) and t-test on MSE (all p < 0.001). 
 % CORRECT MSE 
CATEGORY N AX AXB AX AxB t 
Nouns 
Adjectives 
Numerals 
Verbs 
Articles 
Pronouns 
Adverbs 
Prepositions 
Conjunctions 
Interjections 
Proper nouns 
Wh-words 
Boundary 
TOTAL 
12458 
4125 
1087 
23182 
7996 
18932 
5456 
9491 
1955 
3762 
2104 
3500 
30365 
123634 
66.3 
1.9 
0 
83.9 
31.0 
47.6 
0 
31.3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
79.6 
52.4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
22.9 
0.533 
1.116 
1.128 
0.511 
0.848 
0.675 
1.150 
0.865 
1.147 
0.984 
1.149 
1.041 
0.446 
0.680 
1.000 
1.035 
1.040 
0.851 
1.025 
0.869 
1.040 
1.016 
1.032 
1.026 
1.032 
1.024 
0.793 
0.911 
-116.316 
21.373 
20.304 
-145.602 
-52.371 
-71.369 
46.221 
-34.894 
29.448 
-24.608 
28.642 
7.510 
-147.391 
-205.957 
Results 
The Ax model performed better than the random baseline, 
MSE was 0.680 compared to 0.920, t(247266) = -189.808, p 
< 0.001. The model also classified more words correctly 
than the random baseline: 52.4% compared to 22.9%, 2 = 
75,014.859, p < 0.001.  
The AxB model performed at a level similar to the 
random baseline. MSE was 0.911 which was slightly higher 
than the randomized version of 0.910, t(247264) = 4.418, p 
< 0.001. Classification was poor, with the model classifying 
all words as the utterance boundary, which was the single 
most frequent token in the input, This behavior was 
identical to the performance of the AxB model on the 
randomized corpus. 
Table 3 shows the comparison between the Ax and the 
AxB models, for all words, and for each syntactic category. 
In terms of MSE, performance was better for the Ax model 
than the AxB model on all categories apart from adjectives, 
numerals, adverbs, conjunctions, proper nouns, and wh-
words. However, performance was better for the large 
closed-class categories – pronouns and articles – and for 
nouns and verbs. Overall, the Ax model classified more 
words correctly than the AxB model, 2 = 75,014.011, p < 
0.001. 
Discussion 
The Ax model performed significantly better than chance in 
predicting the category of the x word from the preceding 
word. The AxB model performed at a chance level, and did 
not discriminate any word category. The better performance 
of the AxB model in terms of MSE on adjectives, numerals, 
adverbs, conjunctions, proper nouns and wh-words may 
have been due to a broader context serving these categories 
better: adverbs often occur after nouns in positions normally 
taken by verbs, and adjectives intervene between 
determiners and nouns. An enriched context would 
undoubtedly assist the categorization of these types. 
However, the better performance may merely have been due 
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to a lack of discrimination between any of the word types in 
the AxB model. 
These simulations demonstrated that categorization of a 
large, entire corpus of child-directed speech was best 
achieved using information about the preceding word, rather 
than information about set frames comprised of the 
preceding and the following word. Greater coverage of the 
set of words, rather than greater accuracy in categorization, 
resulted in better performance. 
The next experiment assessed whether a compositional 
treatment of the AxB frame may provide better information 
about the syntactic category of the target x word than the Ax 
frame alone, and compared it to a model with information 
about the two preceding words. 
Experiment 3 
We trained neural network models to learn to predict the 
category of the next word from the same corpus of child-
directed speech as used in Experiments 1 and 2. We 
compared the learning of a model that was given 
information about the preceding and the following word in 
order to predict the category of the intervening word, but 
could operate on this information separately and combined. 
We call this the AxB-compositional (AxB-c) model. We 
also tested a model where information was given about the 
two preceding words: the ABx model.  Note that these 
models embed the bigram information from the Ax model in 
the input. We predicted that both models would perform 
better than both the Ax model and the non-compositional 
AxB model from Experiment 2. We also predicted that the 
AxB-c model would outperform the ABx model, as 
proximity to the target word is most informative. 
Architecture and training 
The AxB-c model had the same architecture as the Ax 
model in Experiment 2, except that it had two banks of input 
units. In the first bank of units the unit corresponding to the 
A-word was activated, and in the second bank of units the 
B-word unit was activated. At the output layer, the model 
had to learn to predict the category of the x word. The same 
architecture was used for the ABx model, but it had as input 
the two words preceding the target word. 
Training and testing was identical to that for the models 
in Experiment 2. Baselines for learning were determined by 
training and testing the models on the randomized corpus. 
Results 
For both models, performance was better than the random 
baseline in terms of accurate classifications and MSE. For 
the AxB-c model, accuracy was 69.4% (baseline 22.9%), 2 
= 82422.148, p < 0.001, and MSE was 0.480 (baseline 
0.920), t(247266) = -329.487, p < 0.001. For the ABx 
model, accuracy was 56.3% (22.9%), 2 = 60841.166, p < 
0.001,    and    MSE    was     0.628   (0.920),     t(247266)  =  
-221.728, p < 0.001. 
As   predicted,   both   the  AxB-c  and  the  ABx   model 
Table 4. Percent correctly classified and MSE for the AxB-c 
and ABx models. T-tests are computed on MSE (all p < 
0.001, except † p < 0.1). 
 % CORRECT MSE 
CATEGORY AXB-C ABX AXB-C ABX t 
Nouns 
Adjectives 
Numerals 
Verbs 
Articles 
Pronouns 
Adverbs 
Prepositions 
Conjunctions 
Interjections 
Proper nouns 
Wh-words 
Boundary 
TOTAL 
73.7 
25.8 
0 
85.4 
67.6 
80.5 
20.8 
59.0 
0.5 
80.8 
0.1 
38.6 
84.7 
69.4 
68.0 
0 
0 
86.6 
38.7 
53.5 
0 
37.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
85.8 
56.3 
0.408 
0.878 
1.185 
0.289 
0.490 
0.361 
0.976 
0.592 
1.140 
0.671 
1.214 
0.817 
0.283 
0.480 
0.509 
1.167 
1.149 
0.466 
0.827 
0.585 
1.151 
0.807 
1.148 
0.957 
1.155 
1.006 
0.350 
0.628 
-43.808 
-44.306 
5.969 
-77.029 
-72.861 
-81.153 
-33.207 
-50.213 
-1.409† 
-71.643 
11.694 
-23.613 
-26.769 
-147.470 
 
performed with greater accuracy than the non-compositional 
AxB model from Experiment 2 for all syntactic categories: 
overall, t(123633) < -300, p < 0.001, for each individual 
syntactic category, all t < -50, all p < 0.001.  
Compared to the Ax model in Experiment 2, the 
additional word information in the AxB-c and ABx models 
resulted in an increase in accurate classifications. For both 
models, classification was more accurate (p < 0.001), and 
resulted in lower error, both t < -300, p < 0.001. For the 
individual syntactic categories, the AxB-c and the ABx 
model performed better for all syntactic categories apart 
from numerals, all t < -50, all p < 0.001, though the 
difference for conjunctions was non-significant. 
Table 4 compares the AxB-c model to the ABx model, 
indicating that accuracy was lower and MSE higher in the 
ABx model. The AxB-c model performed better on all 
syntactic categories apart from numerals and proper nouns. 
Discussion 
Providing decomposable  information  about  the preceding  
and following   word   resulted    in   increased accuracy   of 
performance in the model. The AxB-c model classified 
words of all syntactic categories better than the non-
compositional AxB and the Ax models of Experiment 2. 
Accuracy across all the categories was high, though 
classifications of adjectives and adverbs was still inaccurate 
– these tended to be classified as nouns/pronouns and verbs, 
respectively. Adding information about the two preceding 
words also assisted in increasingly accurate classifications, 
though not to the same degree as providing the preceding 
and succeeding word. 
General Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated, as predicted, that AxB 
information provides high accuracy at the expense of 
completeness, whereas Ax information results in slightly 
lower accuracy but much higher coverage of the language.  
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Experiment 2 tested the extent to which a computational 
model could utilize AxB frame information in categorizing 
the intervening word. The model trained on AxB frames 
performed at slightly below chance level, and well below 
the accuracy that could be achieved from categorizing on 
the basis of Ax information alone. The high completeness of 
Ax frames resulted in significantly better learning than the 
high accuracy but low-coverage of AxB information. 
However, when the model is able to learn on the basis of 
AxB information when this information is compositional, 
i.e., the relationship between the preceding word and the 
target word and between the succeeding word and the target 
word can be computed separately, then a different picture 
emerges. The AxB-c model of Experiment 3 was more 
accurate than the Ax model of Experiment 2. Furthermore, 
this provided better classification results than the two 
preceding words (the ABx model), though this latter model 
also improved performance over a non-compositional AxB 
frame or just the single preceding word. 
The simulations presented here suggest that learning is 
most effective when information about the preceding word 
and the succeeding word is available. However, this is only 
the case when the AxB frame is not computed as a whole. 
Learning must also be based in part on the relationship 
between A and x and between x and B. In the experiments 
presented in Mintz (2002), such a distinction is not made – 
the learning situation resembles that of the AxB-c model, 
where the participant has access not only to the AxB frame, 
but also to the Ax and the xB bigrams. Therefore, it is not 
yet possible to distinguish the contribution of bigram and 
trigram information in adult learning situations (though see 
Onnis et al., 2003). 
The possibility remains that the requirement for category 
learning depends on establishing distinctions and 
similarities between only a few words in the language: it is 
not realistic or feasible to attempt to learn the whole 
language simultaneously. However, performance for the 
most frequent 100 words was poorer in the non-
compositional AxB model than the Ax model, and even 
taking only those words that occurred in the most frequent 
45 AxB frames resulted in poorer performance than for the 
45 most frequent Ax frames. 
The experiments presented in this paper require the 
models to learn pre-ordained syntactic categories. The task 
facing the child is more difficult: the child must also 
construct the categories. Yet, both tasks concern learning 
about which words co-occur. When the relationship between 
the occurrence of certain categories in particular 
distributional contexts is easy to learn then this 
demonstrates that the category itself is more clearly defined. 
We have shown that AxB frames provide poor 
information about categorization unless this information is 
componential, such that Ax information is also available. 
We suggest that the distributional information that a neural 
network model finds most useful is more likely to be used 
by the child in acquiring syntactic categories. 
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Abstract
In order to investigate how analogs are retrieved from
everyday experience, we conducted an experiment in
which subjects were not presented with analogies by an
experimenter, but presented with only one story as a
retrieval cue. In our experiment, subjects were divided
into four groups varying the cue stories, which were ma-
nipulated by their surface and structural features. In all
the groups, the subjects were asked to report the cases
that came to mind when they read the cue story. Af-
ter retrieving, the subjects rated the inferential sound-
ness (goodness as analogy) of each retrieved case. We
computed similarities between each retrieved case and
the cue stories, using a computational model MAC/FAC
(“many are called but few are chosen”), which was de-
veloped for simulating two stages of analogy making
(Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995). The results showed
that (1) the retrieved cases were similar to the presented
story in the surface features rather than in the struc-
tural features and (2) the structural similarity between
the retrieved cases and the presented story increased
with the rated scores of inferential soundness. These re-
sults confirmed that, as the results of prior controlled
experiments suggested, the surface similarity guides the
retrieval of cases and the structural similarity guides the
evaluation of the cases.
Introduction
Analogy making is a core component of higher-order
cognition, such as problem solving (Gick and Holyoak,
1980), decision-making (Markman and Moreau, 2001),
and creative generation (Smith, Word, and Schumacher,
1993). In the past two decades, many researchers have
conducted controlled experiments and gained reliable
ﬁndings on analogy making. However, there have been
only a few studies to verify the ﬁndings in less controlled
environments. Our goal here is to replicate previous ﬁnd-
ings on analogy making in extended laboratory settings.
Prior to presenting our experiment, we brieﬂy review
a framework developed in the area of analogy research.
First, in analogy research, a representation of a novel sit-
uation is called a target, and a past case that is similar
to the target is called a base. The process of analogy
making is comprised of two main components: the re-
trieval of the base and the mapping from the base to the
target.
It has been pointed out that the analogy process is
guided by similarities between the base and the target.
Using propositional representations (predicate-argument
formalism), Gentner (1983) distinguished three types of
correspondence between the base and the target.
• Correspondence of attributes: e.g., The sun is round
and yellow → The orange is round and yellow [sun
(round) sun (yellow) → orange (round) orange (yel-
low)]
• Correspondence of first-order relations: e.g., The plan-
ets revolve around the sun. → The electrons revolve
around the atom [revolve-around (planet, solar) →
revolve-around (electron, atom)]
• Correspondence of higher-order relations: e.g., Be-
cause the sun attracts the planets, the planets re-
volve around the sun. → Because the atom attracts
the electrons, the electrons revolve around the atom
[cause (attract (solar, planet), revolve-around (planet,
solar)) → cause (attract (atom, electron), revolve-
around (electron, atom))]
The above discrimination was based on the types of
predicates. The attribute is a predicate type that takes
only a single argument. On the other hand, the ﬁrst-
order and higher-order relations are predicate types that
take multiple arguments. There is no depth in the for-
mer, but there is in the later. Based on this discrim-
ination, in analogy research, further discrimination of
similarity has been proposed: i.e., surface similarity and
structural similarity. The degree of surface similarity is
roughly deﬁned as the number of attributes shared be-
tween the base and the target. Contrary to the surface
similarity, the degree of structural similarity is deﬁned as
the depth of structural mapping from the base to the tar-
get; so correspondence of higher-order relations is deeper
than that of ﬁrst-order relations (Gentner, 1983).
It has been demonstrated that two types of similari-
ties take diﬀerent roles in the analogy process (Holyoak,
& Koh, 1987; Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993;
Wharton, Holyoak, Downing, Lange, Wickens, & Melz,
1994). For example, Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus
(1993) conducted experiments in which subjects learned
several stories and then retrieved the learned stories
when they read new cue stories. The cue stories were
manipulated by two factors: surface and structural sim-
ilarities to the learned stories. As a result, the subjects
retrieved more often the surface similar stories than the
structurally similar stories. However, once the subjects
were presented with the learned stories with the cue sto-
ries, they rated the inferential soundness (goodness as
analogy) of the structurally similar stories higher than
that of the surface similar stories.
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To explain these results, Forbus, Gentner, &
Law (1995) proposed a computational model, called
MAC/FAC (“many are called but few are chosen”),
which simulates two stages of the analogy process. In
the ﬁrst stage of MAC/FAC, several potential bases are
retrieved from a memory pool, computing the dot prod-
uct of the target’s content vector (CVector), which is
a simple list of the predicates contained in the propo-
sitional representation, with the CVector of each case
in the memory pool. In the next stage, the cases re-
trieved at the initial stage are further evaluated by using
the Structure-mapping Engine (SME), which computes
structural alignment and evaluation of the match be-
tween each set of cases and the target (Falkenhainer, For-
bus, & Gentner, 1989). Finally, MAC/FAC selects the
cases that have high structural evaluation scores (SES),
which indicate the degree of depth and breadth of the
common structure. In brief, MAC/FAC can discrimi-
nate the initial stage of retrieval that is guided by sur-
face similarity from the evaluation stage that is guided
by structural similarity. In the past, similar discrimina-
tion has been employed in many other models of analogy
(Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson, & Gochfeld, 1990; Hummel
& Holyoak, 1997).
Recently, however, limitations on the above ﬁnding
have been pointed out. The limitations are derived from
the fact that many analogy researchers have only dealt
with cases created by the researchers themselves. In
other words, the experiments have been conducted in
closed laboratories, where the subjects retrieved cases
created by researchers in advance. In real-world situa-
tions, it is impossible to predict the cases that will be
retrieved or used. In real-world situations, the analogy is
made from individuals’ everyday experience. Therefore
to extend the ﬁndings to realistic problems, it is neces-
sary to investigate analogy making using cases that the
subjects learn in their own everyday life.
From this viewpoint, Blanchette & Dunbar (2000) con-
ducted experiments that examined analogy making in
situations where the subjects were not provided analo-
gies guided by an experimenter. In their experiments,
the subjects were asked to generate analogies to the zero-
deﬁcit problem - the deﬁcit that Canadian governments
had to cut. The results showed that the subjects gener-
ated few analogies that have surface features in common
with the target (the zero-deﬁcit problem), but generated
many analogies that shared deep structures with the tar-
get. Further, being asked to select the best analogy from
the generated analogies, the subjects selected analogies
that had deeper structural correspondence than the oth-
ers.
These results indicate the strong eﬀect of structural
similarity on both the retrieval and the evaluation stages,
contradicting the previous studies that showed diﬀerent
similarities involved in the two stages. Based on the
results, Blanchette & Dunbar claimed that surface sim-
ilarity has little eﬀect on analogy making in situations
where subjects use their own analogies.
Although we agree on the importance of their ap-
proach, which aims to combine naturalistic settings and
controlled experiments (Dunbar & Blanchette, 2001), we
think that further investigation is needed for their claim.
Thus, we reexamined the similarity eﬀects on the anal-
ogy process in a situation where the subjects retrieved
cases that were learned in their own everyday life. The
method of our experiment is similar to that of Blanchette
& Dunbar, but there are three important diﬀerences, as
follows.
First, we modiﬁed the instruction in which the sub-
jects were asked to “generate analogies”. Because many
researchers argued that the term “analogy” commonly
implies “the cases that have low surface similarity and
high structural similarity” (e.g., Gentner, 1983), there
exists a possible other account for Blanchette & Dun-
bar’s results: The subjects might actually be reminded
of surface similar cases, but would not report those cases.
In order to test this possibility, we did not include the
term “analogy” in our instruction.
Second, we constructed several controlled experimen-
tal conditions. Blanchette & Dunbar conducted the ex-
periments without clear manipulations using surface or
structural similarities. In such an experiment, it is dif-
ﬁcult to exclude possible conjectured factors, such as
the types of cases that subjects hold, or the frequency
of using these cases in their everyday life. To control
these factors, we divided subjects into several experi-
mental groups and presented the targets whose surface
and structural features were systematically changed.
Third, we analyzed the data quantitatively. In
Blanchette & Dunbar’s study, the generated analogies
were analyzed by categorizing their surface/structural
features and comparing frequencies of categories. How-
ever, they did not show how much the generated analo-
gies shared surface/structural features with the target.
For quantitative analysis, we computed similarity scores
for each retrieved case based on the algorithm assumed
in the MAC/FAC (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995).
Method
Materials
The experiment was conducted to investigate the eﬀects
of similarities on the analogy process in a situation where
subjects retrieved cases that were learned in their own
everyday life. In our experiment, the subjects were pre-
sented with a cue story and then were asked to report
the cases that came to mind while they read the cue
story. The cue story consisted of about 600 Japanese
characters. In this paper, we call these stories the target
stories.
The texts of the target stories were manipulated with
their surface and structural features. The subjects were
divided into four experimental groups varying target sto-
ries (the between-subjects factor). As the surface fea-
tures, a set of attributes related to animals (A) and a
set of attributes related to countries (C) were chosen.
As the structural features, a story whose plot is a transi-
tion from peace to war (PW) and a story whose plot is a
transition from war to peace (WP) were created. Com-
bining the surface and structural features, four types of
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peace (obj1, obj2)
war (obj1, obj2)
attack (obj2, obj1)
damage (obj1)
tire (obj2, war)
offer (obj1, obj2, not(war))
reject (obj2, offer)
desire (enitiy2, obj3)
useful (obj2, obj4)
blame (obj1, obj2)
useful (obj2, obj3)
attack (obj1, obj2)
accept (obj2, offer)
desire (obj1, obj4)
animal (obj1)
wolf (obj1)
bear (obj2)
claw (obj1)
muscle(obj2)
nature (obj3)
clean (obj4)
hill(obj4)
richness (obj3)
punch (attack)
injured (damage)
many-years (war/peace)
one-day (attack)
country (obj1)
democracy  (obj1)monarchy (obj1)
population (obj2)
long-history (obj2)
climate (obj4)
warm (obj2)
grain (obj3)
missile (attack)
broken-city (damage)
one-year (attack)
many-decades (war/peace)
animal (obj2)
country (obj2)
climate (obj3)
nature (obj4)
short-history (obj1)
rare-rain (obj1)
richness (obj3)
forest(obj3)
good-view (obj4)
industry (obj2)
arm (obj2)
think (obj2, useful)
big (ob j2)
have (obj2, obj3)
have (obj1, obj2)
fruit (obj4)
cool (obj1)
diligence (obj2)
free (obj1)
high-tech (obj1)
economic (obj2)
sea (obj3)
fang (obj1)
feet (obj1)
A
CWP
PW
CVector between targets
29C
029A
CA
SES between targets
27.9WP
12.228.8PW
WPPW
Figure 1: Propositions contained in the target stories.
target stories were prepared (A/PW, A/WP, C/PW, and
C/WP).
Figure 1 shows the propositions converted from the
texts in the target stories. Each of them was included
in either set A or set C. Two complements [(A∩ C¯) and
(A¯∩C)] contain attributes of objects and an intersection
(A∩C) includes ﬁrst-order relations between two objects.
Each of the ﬁrst-order relations was connected by two
types of higher-order relations (PW/WP) represented by
two types of arrows (solid/dotted).
Figure 1 also shows similarity scores calculated based
on the algorithms of the MAC/FAC. The CVector, indi-
cating surface similarity, was computed as a dot product
of each pair of surface features (A vs. A, A vs. C, and C
vs. C). In our study, the CVector was represented as a
list of attributes, not containing ﬁrst-order and higher-
order relations. The SES, indicating structural similar-
ity, was computed by inputting each pair of relational
structures (PW vs. PW, PW vs. WP, and WP vs. WP)
into the SME model. From the several matching rules
of the SME package, we chose analogy rules that do not
compute the match of attributes.1
In order to verify the above manipulation, we con-
ducted a preliminary experiment. The subjects (n = 8)
were presented with four target stories and then rated
the inferential soundness of each pair of the target stories
on a 1 (“low”) – 5 (“high”) scale. Similar to Gentner,
Rattermann, & Forbus (1993), soundness was explained
as “the degree to which inferences from one story would
hold for the other”.
1Our way of computing similarity was slightly modified
from Forbus’s method. Forbus treated the CVector as a list of
all types of predicates including relations, and computed the
SES using the literal-similarity rules that mapped all types
of predicates including attributes (Forbus, Gentner, & Law,
1995). In our study, for clear discrimination between surface
(attributes) and structural similarity (relations), we chose the
above method.
The results showed that the manipulation is consistent
with human feelings of soundness. Seven of eight sub-
jects judged the structurally similar pairs (A/PW vs.
C/PW and A/WP vs. C/WP) as having higher inferen-
tial soundness than the other pairs (A/PW vs. A/WP,
CPW vs. C/WP, A/PW vs. C/WP, and A/WP vs.
CPW).
Participants
Thirty-three undergraduate and graduate students par-
ticipated in the experiment. They were divided into four
groups: a group presented with A/PW (n = 8), a group
with A/WP (n = 9), a group with C/PW (n = 8), and
a group with C/WP (n = 8).
Procedure
The subjects participated in the experiment individually
or in groups of two to four. The experiment was divided
into the following three phases.
Retrieval phase In the ﬁrst phase, the subjects re-
ported the cases of which the target story reminded
them. In explaining the task, we avoided using terms
like “analogy” or “analogous”. The subjects were sim-
ply told that “while reading the presented story, you
should write out any cases that come to mind”. After
the instruction, the subjects were presented with one of
the four targets and then they wrote down any reminded
cases. This phase continued for twenty minutes.
Evaluation phase Following completion of the re-
trieval phase, the subjects were given a soundness rating
task. The subjects rated the soundness of the match be-
tween each retrieved case and the presented target on a
1 – 5 scale.
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Subjects’ descriptions Converted propositions 
The story about two tigers. 
In a forest, two tigers lived. 
Each of them has a turf. And 
they battled each other for 
the turf. One day, an animal 
that lived in the forest 
persuaded one of the tigers to 
stop fighting. After this 
persuasion, the relationship 
between the two tigers 
became peaceful. 
 
CVector (A) = 8 
CVector (C) = 0 
SES (PW) = 7.59 
SES (WP) = 11.75 
 
((animal tiger1) :name prop3) 
((animal tiger1) :name animal2) 
((animal animal1) :name animal3) 
((have tiger1 turf1) :name have1) 
((have tiger2 turf2) :name have2) 
((desire tiger1 turf2) :name desire1) 
((desire tiger2 turf1) :name desire2) 
((war tiger1 tiger2) :name war1) 
((and desire1 desire2) :name and1) 
((cause and1 war1) :name cause1) 
((not war1) :name not1) 
((offer animal1 tiger1 not1) :name off) 
((accept tiger1 off) :name accept1) 
((cause offer1 accept1) :name cause2) 
((cause war1 off) :name cause3) 
((peace tiger1 tiger2) :name peace1) 
((cause accept1 peace1) :name cause4) 
((many-tree turf1) :name prop1) 
((many-tree turf2) :name prop2) 
The gallic war. 
In order to expand the 
national land, the Roman 
Empire kept attacking other 
countries. 
 
CVector (A) = 0 
CVector (C) = 5 
SES (PW) = 6.18 
SES (WP) = 6.10 
 
((country garia) :name country1) 
((country other) :name country2) 
((monarchy garia) :name prop1) 
((have other land) :name have1) 
((attack gallia other) :name attack1) 
((desire gallia land) :name desire2) 
((war gallia other) :name war1) 
((cause desire2 attack1) :name cause1) 
((cause attack1 war1) :name cause2) 
Figure 2: Examples of subjects’ descriptions and propo-
sitions.
Explanation phase Finally, the subjects were asked
to explain the retrieved cases in as much detail as possi-
ble.
Coding
The retrieved cases were coded using propositional rep-
resentations. The subjects’ descriptions were segmented
by the appearance of a predicate. Then a coder judged
whether each segmented sentence could be represented
as a proposition by using predicates contained in the tar-
gets (the predicates in Figure 1). If possible, a proposi-
tion would be constructed by complementing for proper
arguments. Examples of the coding are shown in Figure
2.
Results and Discussion
The total number of cases retrieved by the subjects was
266. There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence on the number
of cases among the four experimental groups [χ2(3) =
6.15, ns.]. Thus, we treated each retrieved case as an
individual datum for statistical tests.
In order to examine the relationship between the sur-
face/structural similarities and the retrieval/evaluation
stages of analogy making, we tested (1) whether the
retrieved cases were similar to the presented target in
the surface/structural features, and (2) whether the sur-
face/structural similarity between the retrieved cases
and the presented target increased with the degree of
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Figure 3: (a) Mean CVector for four groups. (b) Mean
SES for four groups. Note. Error bars represent one
standard error of mean.
soundness rating.
1. Eﬀects of Similarities on Retrieval
For investigation of the eﬀects of similarities on retrieval,
four types of similarity scores were computed based on
the algorithm assumed in the MAC/FAC.
• CVector (A) was computed as the dot product be-
tween each retrieved case and the surface feature A
(A ∩ C¯ in Figure 1).
• CVector (C) was computed as the dot product be-
tween each retrieved case and the surface feature C
(A¯ ∩C) in Figure 1).
• SES (PW) was computed by inputting each retrieved
case and the structural feature PW (the solid lines in
Figure 1) into the SME model.
• SES (WP) was computed by inputting each retrieved
case and the structural feature WP (the dotted lines
in Figure 1) into the SME model.
We conducted two ANOVAs to investigate interaction
between the above similarity scores and the experimen-
tal groups. If the surface/structure features aﬀected the
case retrieval, the retrieved cases would be similar to the
presented target rather than the targets that were not
presented for each group.
Eﬀects of Surface Similarity on Retrieval Fig-
ure 3a shows the mean CVector for each group. A 2
× 2 × 2 surface features of targets (between) × struc-
tural features of targets (between) × types of CVec-
tor (within) ANOVA revealed signiﬁcant interaction be-
tween the surface features of targets and the types of
CVectors [F (1, 262) = 118.21, p < .05], indicating CVec-
tor (A) was higher than CVector (C) in the group A
[F (1, 262) = 14.22, p < .05], and CVector (C) was
higher than CVector (A) in the group C [F (1, 262) =
134.67, p < .05].
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Both in group A and group C, the retrieved cases were
more similar to the target that was presented for each
group than the targets that were not presented. A strong
eﬀect of surface similarity on retrieval contradicts the re-
sults of Blanchette & Dunbar (2000), but is consistent
with the ﬁndings of the previous controlled experiments
(Holyoak, & Koh, 1987; Gentner, Rattermann, & For-
bus, 1993; Wharton et. al, 1994).
Eﬀects of Structure Similarity on Retrieval Fig-
ure 3b shows the mean SES for each group. A 2 × 2
× 2 surface features of targets (between) × structural
features of targets (between) × types of SES (within)
ANOVA revealed signiﬁcant interaction between the
structural features of the target and the types of SES
[F (1, 262) = 8.01, p < .05]. However, simple main eﬀects
were signiﬁcant only in group WP [F (1, 262) = 7.50, p <
.05]. There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence of types of SES
in group PW [F (1, 262) = 1.60, ns.].
These results suggest that structural similarity has
more restricted eﬀects on retrieval than surface sim-
ilarity. Again, this result contradicts the study by
Blanchette & Dunbar, but is consistent with the ﬁndings
of the previous controlled experiments (Holyoak, & Koh,
1987; Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993; Wharton
et. al, 1994).
2. Eﬀects of Similarities on Evaluation
In order to investigate the eﬀects of structural similarity
on the evaluation stage, we treated the subject groups
as counterbalance conditions, and reduced the number of
factors for the ANOVA. Therefore, we investigated four
types of similarity scores as follows:
• CVector (presented) was computed by combining
CVector (A) in group A and CVector (C) in group
C. This score indicates the degree of surface similar-
ity, meaning howmany attributes were shared between
each retrieved case and the target that was presented
for the subjects.
• CVector (not presented) was computed by combining
CVector (A) in group C and CVector (C) in group A.
This score indicates how many attributes were shared
between each retrieved case and the target that was
not presented for the subjects. Because two types of
surface features (A and C) share no attributes, this
score indicates surface dissimilarity.
• SES (presented) was computed by combining SES
(PW) in group PW and SES (WP) in group WP.
This score indicates the depth of structural mapping
from each retrieved case to the presented target. Thus,
this score indicates structural similarity that reﬂects
higher-order relations.
• SES (not presented) was computed by combining SES
(PW) in group WP and SES (WP) in group PW. This
score indicates the depth of structural mapping from
each retrieved case to the target that was not pre-
sented for the subjects. Since two structural features
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Figure 4: (a) Mean CVector for rating scores of sound-
ness. (b) Mean SES for rating scores of soundness. Note.
Error bars represent one standard error of mean.
(PW andWP) share no higher-order relations but only
ﬁrst-order relations, this score indicates the degree of
overlap of the ﬁrst-order relations.
We computed two ANOVAs for the retrieved cases by
using the above similarity scores. Each ANOVA tested
whether the similarity scores increased with the rated
scores of soundness (1 – 5). If the structural similar-
ity had a strong eﬀect and the surface similarity had
only a little eﬀect in the evaluation stage, as suggested
by the previous studies (Gentner, Rattermann, & For-
bus, 1993; Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000), the CVector
(presented/not presented) would not increase with the
soundness rating, but the SES (presented/not presented)
would increase with the soundness rating. Further, the
SES (presented), which reﬂects the higher-order rela-
tions, would be related to the soundness ratings more
than the SES (not presented), which reﬂects only the
ﬁrst-order relations.
Eﬀects of Surface Similarities on Evaluation Fig-
ure 4a shows the mean CVector for each score of sound-
ness (1 – 5). A 5 × 2 soundness scores (between) ×
CVector types (within) ANOVA detected a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of CVector types [F (1, 261) = 121.17, p <
.05.]. However, a main eﬀect of soundness [F (4, 261) =
1.91, ns.] and an interaction between CVector types and
soundness scores [F (4, 261) = 0.40, ns.]) were not sig-
niﬁcant. These results indicate an advantage of surface
similarity over surface dissimilarity regardless of sound-
ness ratings. Thus, as the previous studies indicated, the
results suggest that there is no eﬀect of surface similarity
or dissimilarity on the evaluation stage.
Eﬀects of Structural Similarity on Evaluation
Figure 4b shows the mean SES for each score of sound-
ness (1 – 5). A 5 × 2 soundness scores (between)
× SES types (within) ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant
interaction between soundness scores and SES types
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[F (4, 261) = 7.52, p < .05]. Simple main eﬀects of sound-
ness scores were signiﬁcant for both SES (presented)
[F (4, 261) = 15.46, p < .05] and SES (not presented)
[F (4, 261) = 11.09, p < .05]. Further it was conﬁrmed
that SES (presented) was higher than SES (not pre-
sented) at the soundness scores 4 [F (1, 261) = 8.76, p <
.05], and 5 [F (1, 261) = 35.73, p < .05].
Signiﬁcant main eﬀects of soundness on both the SES
(presented) and the SES (not presented) indicate that
the subjects’ evaluation was positively correlated to the
degree of commonalities in the ﬁrst-order relations. The
fact that the SES (presented) was higher than the SES
(not presented) in the cases in which the subjects rated
high soundness (rate scores 4 and 5) implies that com-
monalities in the higher-order relations are more strongly
related to soundness than mere ﬁrst-order relations. In
summary, these results are consistent with prior studies
(Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993; Blanchette &
Dunbar, 2000) showing the strong eﬀects of structural
similarity on evaluation.
General Discussion
Inﬂuence of Similarities on Analogy Process
In this study, we investigated types of similarities inﬂu-
encing the analogy process, conducting an experiment in
which the subjects retrieved cases that they had learned
in their own everyday life. As with the results of previ-
ous controlled experiments, our results also suggest that
diﬀerent types of similarities are responsible for the re-
trieval and evaluation stages of the analogy process. The
results were diﬀerent from those of Blanchette & Dun-
bar (2000), which showed little eﬀect of surface simi-
larity on the retrieval phase. The diﬀerence between
our results and Blanchette & Dunbar’s results could be
explained by diﬀerences in the instructions. The sub-
jects who participated in the experiments of Blanchette
& Dunbar may have ﬁltered out the surface similar cases
because they were instructed to “generate analogies”.
Since there exist other diﬀerences between our experi-
ment and Blanchette & Dunbar’s experiments, such as
the reality of the tasks used and the method of analy-
sis, we must conduct further experiments controlling for
these factors.
In addtion, our study obtained results indicating a
strong eﬀects of structural similarity on the evaluation
stage. The results were clearer than Blanchette & Dun-
bar’s results. Blanchette & Dunbar’s analysis was based
on counting elements shared with the base and the tar-
get, without any consideration of relational structures.
In contrast, our analysis was based on a computational
model that computes structural alignment and struc-
tural evaluation. Our analysis showed that the degree
of shared attributes did not increase with the sound-
ness rating, whereas the degree of shared relations in-
creased with the soundness rating. Further, sharing
higher-order relations made the relation to the sound-
ness rating stronger. These results are important for
the extension of the systematicity principle, proposed by
Gentner (1983), which predicted that deeper structural
mapping would be preferred in an analogical inference.
Investigation based on a Computational
Model
The above results imply the beneﬁt of using a compu-
tational model for analysis of psychological data. In the
past, few studies have used a computational model to
analyze data obtained from psychological experiments.
However, without a suﬃcient computational model, it
would be impossible to investigate complex cognitive
conceptual products such as structural similarity.
Recently, in the community of cognitive science, the
connection between theory and experimental data has
been stressed. Usage of a computational model for anal-
ysis, demonstrated in this paper, could open a new way
of directly licensing these two entities that play the most
important role in cognitive scientiﬁc studies.
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Abstract
Students learning facts such as foreign language vocabu-
lary often rely on a self-testing procedure in which they
cue themselves with the English word and try to recall the
foreign language target, instead of simply memorizing
cue-target pairs. The value of this strategy has been
empirically verified by a long history of research, yet
existing computational models of human learning do not
address the enhancing-learning-through-testing phenom-
enon. Using a simple, well studied model—a feedforward
neural net with no hidden units—we propose two differ-
ent hypotheses for characterizing the phenomenon.
Hypothesis 1 is that self-testing generates a target which
is used for additional training. Hypothesis 2 is that self-
testing produces a more reliable error signal for training
than rote memorization. Through simulation studies, we
find that hypothesis 2 readily explains the phenomenon
whereas hypothesis 1 does not. Further, hypothesis 2
makes predictions worthy of further empirical study, and
can be viewed as a natural consequence of temporal dif-
ference learning.
When learning foreign language vocabulary and other
facts, students often study using index cards that have an
English vocabulary word (or cue) on one side and a for-
eign language vocabulary word (or target) on the other.
The intuition is that by testing oneself, the associations
are better learned and retained.
This intuition has been supported by a long history
of empirical demonstrations (e.g., Izawa, 1966; Young,
1971). For example, Bartlett and Tulving (1974) asked
participants to learn a list of paired associates (the study
phase), and later tested retention of the pairs using free
recall or recognition (the final test). Before the final test,
subjects were given a cued-recall test (a self test) of
some of the paired associates. Retention was better on
the final test for those items that received the self test.
In this paradigm, it is unclear whether the benefit of
the self test is attributable to attempting retrieval per se,
or to the fact that successful retrieval of an associate
also results in a re-presentation of the pair—an addi-
tional training trial.
An obvious strategy for examining the effect of
retrieval is to conduct and experiment with, in addition
to the initial study phase and the final test, an interven-
ing phase in which participants are given either a self
test or an experiment-provided re-presentation of the
paired associate (which we’ll refer to as study only). In
this paradigm, the outcome is ambiguous (Carrier &
Pashler, 1992): self testing outperforms study in some
experiments (e.g. Hogan & Kintsch, 1971), but not oth-
ers (e.g., McDaniel & Masson, 1985). One explanation
for the inconsistency is that the rate of retrieval success
on self test trials varies among experiments, and the
mechanisms of learning are likely to be dependent on
retrieval success. The experiments have other problems,
including different amounts of time for study-only and
self-test conditions, and failure to control the time spent
on individual items (Carrier & Pashler, 1992).
To overcome these metholological difficulties, Car-
rier and Pashler (1992) compared a study-only or SO
condition in which each cue-target pair was presented
for ten seconds to a test/study or TS condition in which
the cue was presented alone for five seconds and then
the target appeared for the final five seconds. In TS tri-
als, participants were supposed to use the cue to retrieve
the target, but even if retrieval failed, the trial still had
value due to the presentation of cue and target together
for five seconds. Consequently, the dependence on
retrieval success rate is minimized. Also, the paradigm
matches the total time per item in SO and TS conditions.
If anything, self testing is at a disadvantage because the
total viewing time for cue plus target was lower.
In Experiments 1 and 2 of Carrier and Pashler, 40
cue-target pairs were used, half each assigned to the SO
and TS conditions. The experiment began with a study
only phase in which participants viewed each of the 40
pairs once for ten seconds. Then two more passes were
made through the pairs, presented in the manner desig-
nated for that pair—SO or TS. For both conditions, par-
ticipants were instructed to say aloud the target. In the
TS condition, this instruction required that participants
recall the target, or if they failed to recall, to wait until
the target appeared. Following the three presentations of
each pair, a final test phase evaluated performance in the
two conditions via cued recall.
In Experiment 1, the cues were consonant-vowel-
consonant trigrams and the targets were two digit num-
bers. For the sake of ecological validity, Experiment 2
used a language learning task with English language
word cues and the corresponding Siberian Eskimo
Yupik language translation targets. Table 1 shows the
percentage of error responses. In both Experiments 1
and 2, performance was better in the TS condition than
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the SO condition. These results indicate roughly 10%
fewer errors with testing, therefore, having to retrieve
the target is more effective than simply studying the tar-
get, when all else is controlled for.
Carrier and Pashler conducted a further experiment
to rule out an alternative explanation of their results. In
Experiments 1 and 2, participants may have used the
first retrieval attempt in the TS condition to determine
which items were difficult, and then increased their
encoding effort for the difficult items on the second
retrieval attempt, thereby learning the items better.
Experiment 3 ruled out this explanation by giving par-
ticipants only a single pass through the items in either
the TS or SO conditions, following two passes through
the items as study-only trials. The total number of items
was reduced to 30. The results were similar to Experi-
ments 1 and 2 (see Table 1), suggesting that the effect of
attempting retrieval on later retention does not depend
on strategic allocation of encoding effort.
Mechanism Underlying
Enhanced Learning Through Testing
Why does testing oneself—i.e., attempting to retrieve a
target from memory—have beneficial effects for later
retention, above and beyond the effects due to mere
study? A variety of explanations have been proposed for
the self-testing benefit. 
•Landauer and Bjork (1978) considered that retrieval
attempts provide a general sort of practice or context
that boosts performance at a future time. However,
this account predicts that the benefits would not be
item specific, i.e., SO and TS items would benefit
equally in an experiment where the item types were
mixed within subject. 
•Mandler (1979) suggested that cued recall might
strengthen the structural, integrative information
about a cue-target pair. Cooper and Monk (1976) pro-
posed that retrieval requires neural activity that con-
solidates the representation of the target in memory.
However, both of these accounts do not provide a
strong explanation for why TS should be better than
SO, because both conditions involve simultaneous
activation of cue and target.
•Bjork (1975) hypothesized that the act of retrieval
may strengthen existing retrieval routes to the target
representation, or may create new routes. Although
interesting and consistent with the data, it is unclear
what this hypothesis corresponds to in computational
terms, and seems as if it might require novel, custom
learning mechanisms.
This paper explores two alternative hypotheses concern-
ing the enhancement of learning through testing, and we
evaluate their plausibility via simulation studies. In pro-
posing hypotheses, our aim was to determine whether an
existing, well-accepted model could explain the basic
phenomenon without requiring additional assumptions.
A model is not convincing if two novel assumptions are
needed to explain two data points. Further, an existing
model is already constrained and therefore has the
power to make strong predictions, which can guide the
design of behavioral experiments.
Our hypotheses lie within the framework of neural
network models. We explore the simplest architecture
that might be capable of explaining the phenomenon: an
associative network consisting of a pool of nI input units
fully connected to a pool of nO output units. The activity
of output unit j, yj, is simply a weighted sum of the
inputs, xi, passed through a sigmoid squashing function
that limits the output in the range [–1, +1]:
.
A training set consists of nL paired associates to be
learned, { , ..., }, where the super-
script is the index over pairs in the training set, and x
and d are the activity vectors of the cue and target of the
pair, respectively. To reflect the fact that items to be
learned in the behavioral studies are arbitrary, make lit-
tle contact with existing knowledge, and have no sys-
tematic similarity to one another, we assume that the cue
and target activity vectors are random. (Further details
in the methodology section that follows.)
In neural net models of cognition, the training of
the model is often viewed as an abstract procedure for
loading knowledge into a network, and as having no
direct correspondence to the sequence of episodes a
human learner experiences. In contrast, we commit to a
one-to-one correspondence: An SO trial in a behavioral
experiment is modeled as one weight update in the neu-
ral network. For many neural net architectures and
learning procedures, this correspondence is implausible;
training the network requires dozens if not hundreds of
passes through the training examples, and training on
one example can result in catastrophic interference with
other examples. We avoid these problems in two ways.
First, our architecture has direct connections from input
TABLE 1. Performance in Enhancing-Learning-Through-Testing Experiments
Human Data (% Error) Simulation (Mean Squared Error)
Study Only Test Then Study Study Only Test Then Study
Carrier & Pashler, Expt. 1 42.0% 36.0%
.389 .321
Carrier & Pashler, Expt. 2 43.0% 36.0%
Carrier & Pashler, Expt. 3 40.0% 32.7% .356 .258
yj tanh wjixi
i 1=
nI∑
  
  =
x1 d1,( ) xnL dnL,( )
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units to output units, in contrast to strictly layered archi-
tectures with hidden units. Second, we endow our archi-
tecture with as many inputs as training examples, i.e.,
; consequently, cues are approximately orthog-
onal to one another, and interference among examples is
minimal. Due to the architecture, the model can learn
associations with roughly the same number of exposures
as a human participant in a paired-associate experiment.
We use the standard supervised learning procedure
for associative networks, a generalization of the Wid-
row-Hoff or LMS learning algorithm (Widrow & Hoff,
1960) to nonlinear outputs. Following presentation of a
cue x to be paired with target d, a weight update is per-
formed:
where ε is a step size (learning rate).
Having described the general class of models we
consider, we turn to two specific hypotheses concerning
the nature of learning via self testing.
Hypothesis 1: Self-generated training
One hypothesis is based on the notion of Guthrie (1952)
that one learns what one does. That is, when individuals
test themselves, they generate a candidate response, and
then learn the association between the cue and the can-
didate response, whether it is correct or incorrect. If the
candidate is correct, existing connections are strength-
ened and are therefore more resilient to decay or inter-
ference; if the candidate is incorrect, the wrong
association is reinforced, making it more difficult to
unlearn. 
This interpretation of self testing suggests that test-
ing should benefit an individual only if the material is
already somewhat familiar. Some evidence indeed sug-
gests that testing on novel paired associates—when
individuals cannot possibly know the correct
response—is detrimental to learning (Cunningham &
Anderson, 1965).
By this hypothesis, a TS trial involves the following
steps: (1) The cue is presented and a candidate response
is generated. (2) The LMS weight update is computed
for the candidate response. (3) When the target is even-
tually presented, the LMS weight update is computed
for the experiment-provided target. In contrast, an SO
trial involves only the third step. In a TS trial, two
weight updates are generated; the weight updates are
added together and performed at the end of the trial.
How does the model generate a candidate response?
It might produce an output and then deterministically
select the nearest well formed state, defined as a state
which has a meaning in the domain (e.g., the set of all
targets used for training, plus some distractor alterna-
tives, plus a null or “no response” state). However, indi-
viduals are essentially guessing at early stages of
learning, and the deterministic rule implies an ability to
find the best response among a set of barely-known
alternatives. Instead, one might wish to introduce a sto-
chastic selection rule. A standard stochastic procedure
for reading out from a neural network is to use a Luce
choice or Boltzmann rule (Luce, 1959). By this rule, the
distance between each possible response, ri, and the net-
work output, y, is computed, , and the
probability of choosing response i is
,
where large β achieves a more deterministic selection. 
Rather than treating β as a free parameter, we chose
β such that the mean correct-response probability is 0.95
if the network produces the correct response on each
trial. The model has other free parameters, though,
including learning rates for supervised and self-gener-
ated targets, the number of distractor vectors considered
as candidates for response selection, and the possibility
of memory (weight) decay that introduces forgetting.
Hypothesis 2: Complete processing of cue
Carrier and Pashler (1992) speculated on an intriguing
basis for the self-testing benefit. They reasoned that in
neural net models that learn by error correction, which
includes the LMS algorithm, learning requires a com-
parison between the desired output and the actual out-
put—the output that the network produces given its
current state of knowledge. If presentation of the target
simultaneously with the cue “contaminates” (to use their
term) production of the actual output, learning would be
less efficient. Essentially, presentation of the target ter-
minates ongoing processing and interferes with the esti-
mation of error needed for learning.
An elegant instantiation of this hypothesis in the
context of neural net models is via the incorporation of
time into the neural net, specifically, the notion that
units in a neural net are slow integrators of information
and therefore require many time steps for information to
propagate from the input layer to the output layer
(McClelland, 1979). We can do this in the network by
indexing its output by the (discrete) time step t, i.e.,
, and adding a time constant to the activation
dynamics:
,
where  Asymptotically, the output is inde-
pendent of the time constant , for , but 
determines the rate at which convergence is achieved,
i.e., how rapidly information is transmitted from the
input to the output.
If we assume that activation dynamics freeze—
equivalent to setting —when the target is pre-
sented, the model will produce a more accurate estimate
of its output in the TS condition than in the SO condi-
tion, and the learning procedure will have a better esti-
mate of the error. From another perspective, note that if
activation dynamics freeze at , the actual output y
will be zero, and the training procedure reduces to a
form of Hebbian learning; at the other extreme, if the
activation dynamics do not freeze and the asymptotic
nL nI=
wji∆ ε dj yj–( )xi 1 yj+( ) 1 yj–( )=
vi ri y–
2=
pi exp βvi–( ) exp βvj–( )j∑⁄=
yi t( )
yj t( ) 1 τ–( )yj t 1–( ) τtanh wjixi∑( )+=
yi 0( ) 0= τ 0 τ 1≤< τ
τ 0=
t 1=
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value  is used for training, the learning procedure
is exactly the LMS gradient descent step. Because LMS
is a more powerful procedure than Hebb, it should yield
better performance.
For our simulations, we established a relatively
coarse-grained correspondence between time steps in
the neural net and real-world time by designating the
duration of each time step to be 250 msec. Rather than
leaving the time constant  as a free parameter, we
chose  in advance such activation would reach half-
way to asymptote by 2000 msec. To match the TS con-
dition in the behavioral studies, 20 time steps (= 5
seconds) of processing was allowed before the onset of
the target. For the SO condition, we had some freedom
to determine the time step at which activation dynamics
freeze. Although the cue and target appeared simulta-
neously in the behavioral experiments, participants may
nonetheless have done some amount of processing of
the cue before the target is processed. We experimented
with 0, 1, and 2 time steps of processing in the SO con-
dition, and all yielded similar results; we chose 1 time
step in modeling Carrier and Pashler, because that was a
sufficient amount of processing to ensure that with
enough practice, the model could learn the items in the
SO condition. For evaluation of the model during the
final test, the activity at time step 80 was used.
Simulation Studies
General Methodology
In all simulations, we used networks with  = 
= . Cue and targets were random binary vectors in
. To model Experiments 1-3 of Carrier and
Pashler, we used the same number of items as in their
experiment,  for Experiments 1 and 2, and
 for Experiment 3. Because Experiment 2 is
essentially a replication of Experiment 1 with different
stimulus materials, and the materials in both experi-
ments were intended to be unfamiliar to participants, we
capture both experiments with one simulation. Half of
the items were assigned to the SO condition and half to
the TS condition.
Weights in the neural network were initialized to
zero. We also conducted stimulations in which the initial
weights were chosen from a normal distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation 0.001. However,
because the variability of the weights had no systematic
effect on the results, we simplified by eliminating this
source of noise from the simulation.
The experiments of Carrier and Pashler each
involved three epochs of training, followed by a final
test. An epoch is a presentation of all items in the train-
ing set. Within an epoch, order of presentation was ran-
domized, with the constraints that Carrier and Pashler
imposed to ensure an intermixing of SO and TS items. 
Epochs were of two sorts: in a pure study epoch, all
items were studied without testing, regardless of
whether they were SO or TS items; in an experimental
epoch, presentation of an item depended on whether it
was assigned to the SO or TS condition. In Experiments
1 and 2, the first epoch was pure study (denoted S), and
epochs 2 and 3 were experimental (denoted E); we use
the shorthand notation SEE for this design. In Experi-
ment 3, the first two epochs were pure study and the
third was experimental, i.e., an SSE design.
All results reported are a mean computed from
1,000 independent simulations, where the simulations
differ from one another in the choice of random training
vectors and the randomization of items within an epoch.
We use mean squared-error (MSE) as a measure of
performance of the model. With additional assumptions,
we could classify a response as correct or incorrect (e.g.,
using the stochastic read out procedure that is built into
Hypothesis 1), but there is little value in transforming a
qualitative fit to a quantitative fit if several new assump-
tions are required. Consequently, we focus on obtaining
qualitative measures of recall, and determining how
manipulations of the model affect relative recall.
Hypothesis 1: Self-generated training
After a systematic exploration of the model parameter
space, we failed to find any parameter settings that
yielded an enhancement of learning by testing. Error
was consistently higher in the TS condition than in the
SO condition. The two conditions converge as the learn-
ing rate for the self-generated target approaches zero,
where at the limit SO and TS become identical. Figure 1
illustrates one exploration of the parameter space.
In retrospect, the negative result should not have
been surprising. After one or two epochs, the model—
like people—is about as likely to make an error as to
guess correctly. Consequently, the model will receive as
much training from self-generated targets that steers it
away from veridical recall as training that steers it
toward veridical recall.
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FIGURE 1. Testing error for TS minus SO as a function of the
learning rates for self-generated and experiment-provided
targets. The difference is nonnegative everywhere, indicating
no enhancement through testing. For this simulation, no
additional distractor states or weight decay are included.
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Hypothesis 2: Complete processing of cue
Fortunately, our second hypothesis yields more encour-
aging results. Consistent with Carrier and Pashler, the
model produces an enhancement of learning by test-
ing—a lower error for TS than SO—in simulations of
Experiment 1/2 (one simulation for both experiments,
since they are identical except for the stimulus materi-
als) and Experiment 3 (right side of Table 1). In these
simulations, we chose a learning rate that yielded the
best possible performance, averaged over TS and SO
items. However, the testing benefit was robust over the
choice of learning rate. 
Figure 2 facilitates a better understanding of the
phenomenon in terms of the model. The Figure shows
mean-squared error for TS and SO items for four differ-
ent experimental designs. All designs involve three
epochs of training, but they differ in how many epochs
of pure study (S) precede the experimental (E) epochs.
The designs range from all study (SSS) to all experimen-
tal (EEE). SEE and SSE correspond to Experiment 1/2
and Experiment 3, respectively.
The Figure shows that two testing trials helps more
than one (SEE versus SSE). Interestingly, three testing
trials shows little benefit over two (EEE versus SEE).
This latter result was at first surprising to us, because it
would seem that the more accurate error estimate that is
obtained via testing would benefit epoch 1 as well as
epochs 2 and 3. However, with an untrained net whose
weights are all zero or close to zero, the initial output of
the net is close to zero regardless of the number of time
steps of activation dynamics.
Comparing SO items in SSS versus EEE designs, it
appears that the SO items benefit from being in a con-
text where testing is occurring; this is a bit surprising
considering that the training of these items is identical
and learning rates are identical across designs.The result
also cannot be explained by virtue of generalization
from the better-learned TS items to the SO items,
because the items were generated with no systematic
similarity structure. Instead, we suggest that the transfer
from TS to SO is due to the TS items generating a more
meaningful error signal—an error signal that reflects the
sort of outputs the network is likely to produce if it is
allowed to run to asymptote. Although the precise out-
puts will differ from one cue to another, the TS items
provide information about the distribution of activity
values for each output unit across items. This informa-
tion can certainly be used to determine characteristics of
the weight vector (e.g., its overall magnitude, and the
sign of biases). 
We discuss the implication of these results next.
Discussion
In simulations of two models, we found that one hypoth-
esis for the enhancement-of-learning-through testing
effect—the hypothesis that self-generated responses are
used as targets for further training—is not supported.
Another hypothesis—that presentation of the target ter-
minates processing of the cue—is consistent with the
experimental data. In the remainder of the paper, we dis-
cuss predictions, extensions, and implications of the
second hypothesis.
Predictions
•Our model predicts little difference between an EEE
design and the SEE design used in Experiment 1/2.
That there is no cost to testing on the first epoch runs
against at least one experimental study (Cunningham
& Anderson, 1965), but that study used a quite differ-
ent methodology, and the finding of an initial-epoch-
testing cost has not been widely reported in the litera-
ture.
•Our model predicts that an SO item should benefit
from being embedded among TS items. If it is
observed experimentally, a natural interpretation of
this effect is that the greater effort on TS items spills
over to the SO items. However, the model achieves
this spillover without any notion of generalized
“effort.”
•Our model predicts the relative magnitude of the test-
ing enhancement as a function of the cue-target asym-
metry (CTA), i.e., the difference in time between the
onset of the cue and the onset of the target. The Car-
rier and Pashler experiment used a CTA of 5 seconds
(20 time steps in the model). One could conduct an
experiment in which the CTA was longer or shorter.
(Because the time scale of retrieval in the model was
set arbitrarily, there is a degree of indeterminacy in
the model’s predictions. Nonetheless, with one free
parameter tied down, the model can characterize the
effect of shorter or longer CTAs) Figure 3 shows the
model’s performance as the CTA is varied. For small
CTAs, there is little difference between SO and TS
conditions; for large CTAs, the conditions are similar
to those studied in the present simulations. Clearly,
increasing the CTA has diminishing returns.
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Extensions to the Model
In both SO and TS conditions, each simulation trial
began by presenting the cue for T time steps—T being
different for SO and TS conditions—at which point a
weight update was performed to reduce the difference
between the actual response, , and the target. An
alternative procedure involves updating the weights to
reduce the difference between each of , , ...,
 and the target. This alternative procedure encour-
ages the net to produce the target as rapidly as possible,
and is equivalent to a form of temporal difference (TD)
learning known as TD(1) (Sutton, 1988). Temporal dif-
ference learning is concerned with learning to predict
the future given successively better information over
time—exactly the situation experienced by the network
with time constants, because the propagation of infor-
mation occurs gradually. However, TD(1) is often not
useful in practice because the earliest predictions, e.g.,
, are treated as important as later, better predic-
tions, e.g., . To remedy this problem, Sutton pro-
posed a family of algorithms, denoted TD(λ), for
, where λ is roughly the emphasis on achiev-
ing correct early predictions. The λ that yields optimal
performance depends on the domain. Although it would
be interesting to discover how the self-testing benefit
depends on λ, the deeper contribution of casting the
learning procedure in the TD framework is that it offers
a rationale for the termination of processing when the
target is presented. 
The TD framework is based on the notion that
learning mechanisms are fundamentally concerned with
predicting eventual outcomes at the earliest possible
moment. The adaptive value of prediction is clear; accu-
rate prediction can avoid danger and missteps. Consid-
ering the associative learning task in this manner, the
cue is a predictor of the target, and TD learning aims to
get from the cue to the target as rapidly as possible.
However, once a target has been presented, nothing
remains to be predicted. The TD framework has been
valuable for explaining a broad range of data, from the
animal conditioning literature (Sutton & Barto, 1981) to
the neural basis of reward (Schultz, Dayan, & Mon-
tague, 1997). It seems a natural extension to the mecha-
nisms of associative learning, although one must
confront the finding that associative learning appears
symmetric (Kahana, 2002).
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Abstract
In most cognitive and motor tasks, speed-accuracy trade
offs are observed: Individuals can respond slowly and
accurately, or quickly yet be prone to errors. Control
mechanisms governing the initiation of behavioral
responses are sensitive not only to task instructions and
the stimulus being processed, but also to the recent stimu-
lus history: when stimuli can be characterized on an easy-
hard dimension (e.g., word frequency in a naming task),
an easy item is responded to more slowly when inter-
mixed with hard items than when presented among other
easy items; likewise, hard items are responded to more
quickly when intermixed with easy items. We propose a
mathematical theory with three components: a model of
temporal dynamics of information processing, a decision
criterion specifying when a response should be initiated,
and a mechanism of adaptation to the stimulus history.
Performance during the course of an experimental trial is
cast in terms of a utility function that increases with accu-
racy and decreases with response time. We assume a deci-
sion criterion that initiates a response at the point in time
that maximizes expected utility. We posit that the effect
of the stimulus history arises because information con-
cerning recent trial difficulty is incorporated into the util-
ity estimate. We present further behavioral studies to
validate predictions of the theory.
Consider a simple task in which you are asked to name
the sum of two numbers, such as 14+8. Given sufficient
time, you presumably produce the correct result; how-
ever, under speed pressure, mistakes can occur. In most
all cognitive and motor tasks, such empirical speed-
accuracy trade offs are observed: Individuals can
respond slowly yet accurately, or quickly and be prone
to errors. Speed-accuracy trade offs are due to the fact
that evidence accumulates gradually in response sys-
tems over time (Rabbitt & Vyas, 1970). Responses initi-
ated earlier in time will be based on lower quality
information, and hence more likely to be incorrect. This
paper addresses a simple yet fundamental form of cog-
nitive control—the mechanism that governs the initia-
tion of a behavioral response, and therefore, where an
individual operates on the speed-versus-accuracy con-
tinuum. In the following section, we describe data that
place constraints on the nature of control mechanisms.
We describe shortcomings of existing theoretical frame-
works that have tried to account for these data. We then
present a framework that successfully explains key phe-
nomena and makes further predictions which we have
verified through additional behavioral studies.
The Blocking Effect
To understand the control mechanism that initiates
responses, consider the variables that affect its opera-
tion. The mechanism is influenced by task instructions:
individuals can choose to emphasize speed or accuracy.
The mechanism is also influenced by recent perfor-
mance: participants often slow down after producing an
error (Rabbit & Vyas, 1970). Finally, even in the
absence of errors, the mechanism is sensitive to the
recent stimulus environment (Kiger & Glass, 1981):
when items are presented in a sequence or block, reac-
tion time (RT) and error rate to an item depends on the
immediately preceding items.
This blocking effect is generally studied by manipu-
lating item difficulty. Some items are intrinsically easier
than others, e.g., 10+3 is easier than 5+8, whether due to
practice or the number of cognitive operations required
to determine the sum. By definition, individuals have
faster RTs and lower error rates to easy problems. How-
ever, the RTs and error rates are modulated by the com-
position of a block. Consider an experimental paradigm
consisting of three trial blocks: just easy items (pure
easy), just hard items (pure hard), and a mixture of both
in random order (mixed). When presented in a mixed
block, easy items slow down relative to a pure block and
hard items speed up. Thus, the control mechanism that
initiates responses uses information not only from the
current stimulus, but also adapts to the stimulus environ-
ment in which it is operating. Table  shows a typical
blocking result for a word reading task, where word fre-
quency is used to manipulate difficulty. Based on our
review of the blocking-effect literature (e.g., Lupker,
Brown & Columbo, 1997; Lupker, Kinoshita, Coltheart,
& Taylor, 2000; Taylor & Lupker, 2001), we summarize
the central, robust phenomena as follows.
Pure Block Mixed Block Difference
Easy Item 488 ms (3.6%) 513 ms (1.8%) +25 ms (–1.8%)
Hard Item 583 ms (12.0%) 559 ms (12.2%) –24 ms (+0.2%)
TABLE 1. RTs and Error Rates for 
Blocking study of Lupker, Brown, 
& Columbo (1997, Experiment 3)
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(1) Easy items are faster and less error prone than hard.
(2) When intermixed, easy items slow down and hard
items speed up. However, the convergence of RTs
for easy and hard items in a mixed block is not
complete. Thus, RT depends both on the stimulus
type and the composition of the block.
(3) Speed-accuracy trade offs are observed: a drop in
error rate accompanies easy-item slow down; a rise
in error rate accompanies hard-item speed up.
(4) Blocking effects occur across diverse paradigms,
including naming, arithmetic verification and calcu-
lation, target search, and lexical decision. They are
obtained when stimulus or response characteristics
alternate from trial to trial (Lupker et al., 2000).
Thus, the blocking effect is not associated with a
specific stimulus or response pathway, but rather is
a general phenomenon of response initiation.
(5) Overt responses are necessary for obtaining block-
ing effects, but overt errors are not.
(6) A signature of the effect concerns the relative mag-
nitudes of easy-item slow down and hard-item
speed up. Significantly more speed up than slow
down is never observed. The trend is that speed up
is less than slow down—indeed, some studies show
no reliable speed up—although equal magnitude
effects are observed.
(7) The effects of stimulus history are local, i.e., the
variance in RT on trial n due to trial n–k decreases
rapidly with k. Dependencies for k>2 are not reli-
able (Taylor & Lupker, 2001).
Explanations for the Blocking Effect
The blocking effect demonstrates that the response time
depends not only on information accruing from the cur-
rent stimulus, but also on recent stimuli in the trial his-
tory. Therefore, any explanation of the blocking effect
must specify how control processes, which determine
the point in time at which a response is initiated, are sen-
sitive to the composition of a block. Various mecha-
nisms of control adaptation have been proposed.
Domain specific mechanisms. Most of the pro-
posed mechanisms are domain specific. For example,
Rastle and Coltheart (1999) describe a model with two
routes to naming, one lexical and one nonlexical, and
claim that the composition of a block affects the empha-
sis that is placed on the output of one route or the other.
Meyer, Roelofs, and Levelt (2003) manipulate word
length and explain blocking effects in terms of a control
process, sensitive to block composition, that decides
when to initiate a naming response—either after the
motor program for the first syllable has been generated,
or after the motor program for the entire word has been
generated. Because of the ubiquity of blocking effects
across tasks, domain-specific accounts are not compel-
ling. Parsimony is achieved only if the adaptation mech-
anism is localized to a stage of response initiation
common across stimulus-response tasks.
Rate of processing. Kello and Plaut (2003) have
proposed a rate-of-processing explanation, according to
which control processes adjust a gain parameter on units
in a dynamical connectionist model. The parameter
determines the steepness of the sigmoid curve. Techni-
cally, the gain does not affect rate of processing, i.e., it
does not simply rescale time. Increasing the gain does
result in more rapid convergence, but it also yields a
higher error rate; thus the account should more appro-
priately be framed in terms of adapting the rate of con-
vergence. Simulations of this model have explained the
basic blocking effect, but not the complete set of phe-
nomena we listed previously. Of greater concern is the
fact that the model predicts that naming duration
decreases with increased speed pressure, which doesn’t
appear to be true (Damian, 2003; Kinoshita, unpub-
lished). 
Evidence criterion. A candidate mechanism with
intuitive appeal is the trial-to-trial adjustment of an evi-
dence criterion, which specifies the level of evidence
that must accumulate in support of a decision before the
response is initiated. Random walk and diffusion mod-
els have such a parameter, often called the response cri-
terion (Ratcliff, 1978). According to this account, the
evidence criterion is determined by recent trial history:
if previous trials were easy, the criterion is set low, if
previous trials were hard, the criterion is set high. Thus,
the criterion would be lowest in a pure-easy block, inter-
mediate in a mixed block, and highest in a pure-hard
block. When the criterion is high, RTs are slower but
error rates are lower, resulting in slow down of easy
items and speed up of hard items in a mixed block.
Taylor and Lupker (2001) illustrate that adaptation
of an evidence criterion can—at least in some models—
yield incorrect predictions concerning the blocking
effect. Strayer and Kramer (1994) attempted to model
the blocking effect with an adaptive response criterion
in the diffusion model. They managed to fit their block-
ing data but the account had two fatal shortcomings.
First, they allowed different criteria for easy and hard
items in a mixed block, which makes no sense because
the trial type was not known in advance, and setting dif-
ferential criteria depends on knowing the trial type. Sec-
ond, they used a nonstandard blocking paradigm in
which the trial difficulty depended on whether an item
was presented in a pure or mixed block, easy items
being more difficult and hard items being less difficult
in a mixed block. 
In spite of these problems, we were also convinced
an evidence-criterion-adjustment explanation should be
feasible. We used a somewhat different model of tempo-
ral dynamics and response initiation than Strayer and
Kramer (to be described shortly), but like Strayer and
Kramer, the model had an adaptive parameter that deter-
mined the trade off between speed and accuracy. After
six frustrating months of exploration, we admitted
defeat: The model was unable to obtain the right qualita-
tive pattern of results; either the blocking effect was an
order of magnitude smaller than that observed in experi-
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ments, or went in the wrong direction. Several variants
of the model came close, but were not robust; tiny
changes to parameter values yielded qualitative effects
on the pattern of results.
The failure of an evidence-criterion-adjustment
account is not surprising from another perspective. On
logical grounds, the relative importance of speed versus
accuracy should be determined by task instructions and
pay offs. Item difficulty is independent and unrelated
factor. Consistent with this logical argument is the find-
ing that manipulating instructions to emphasize speed
versus accuracy does not produce the same pattern of
effects as altering the composition of a block (Dorfman
& Glanzer, 1988). 
Adaptation to the statistics of the environment.
Having ruled out three possible explanations, we sketch
a fourth alternative, which is based on the premise that
the goal of cognition is optimal and flexible perfor-
mance across a variety of tasks and environments. In
service of this goal, control mechanisms must be sensi-
tive to the statistical structure of the environment, e.g.,
stimulus characteristics and configurations, response
contingencies, etc. Previous models of control have
exploited this assumption. For example, Treisman and
Williams (1984) and Mozer, Colagrosso, and Huber
(2002) considered a sequential choice task involving
two response alternatives, and proposed that control
mechanisms estimate prior probabilities of the two
responses. If one response is more frequent, the larger
prior induces a bias toward that response, which typi-
cally boosts performance.
Blocking effects can be explained via a related
hypothesis. Because RTs depend on whether a trial is
easy or hard, the control mechanisms responsible for
response initiation must utilize an estimate of the item
difficulty, or the quality of information available to
response processes. If this estimate is unreliable (noisy),
and if control mechanisms make the ecological assump-
tion that the current trial is similar to recent trials, the
estimate can be made more reliable by incorporating
estimates from recent past trials. We elaborate this idea
in a mathematical model of response initiation, and
show that it can explain the key blocking phenomena
listed earlier as well as other puzzling phenomena.
The ASE Model
We refer to our model as ASE, which stands for Adapta-
tion to the Statistics of the Environment. Although the
key claim of the model concerns the mechanism of con-
trol adaptation based on recent experience, we must
make two additional sets of assumptions, one set con-
cerning the temporal dynamics of information process-
ing, and another set concerning the decision criterion
for response initiation Although the specific assump-
tions we make are not critical, they must be made
explicitly to fully flesh out the model.
Temporal dynamics. We need a way to character-
ize the temporal dynamics of information processing in
tasks such as naming. The particular model of temporal
dynamics is not critical, as long as it has the property
that the quality of information available for responding
increases gradually and monotonically over time. 
We chose the probabilistic information transmission
(PIT) model of Mozer, Colagrosso, and Huber (2002,
2003). To summarize the key properties relevant for the
current work, the model consists of a cascaded series of
processing pathways whose details are determined by
the task being modeled. For example, to model a word
naming task, we use a perceptual pathway that maps
visual word forms to an internal semantic/lexical repre-
sentation, and a response pathway that maps the internal
representation to a distinct verbal naming response.
Each pathway is a dynamic Bayesian network, and the
conditional probability distributions in the model are
specified by the nature of the mapping, the state of
expertise being modeled, and the similarity structure
among elements of representation. Given a stimulus pre-
sentation, the output of the model is a probability distri-
bution over response alternatives as a function of time
(Figure 1a). The response chosen at a particular time is a
sample from the distribution (the model cannot choose
the most probable response). The time course of pro-
cessing depends on information transmission probabili-
ties in the model. Easy, high frequency, and well
practiced items have higher transmission probabilities,
and hence are conveyed more rapidly.
This model is a generalization of random walk
models and has several advantages. It provides a mathe-
matically principled means of handling multiple alterna-
tive responses (necessary for naming) and similarity
structure among elements of representation, and charac-
terizes perceptual processing, not just decision making.
The counter model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1997) or con-
nectionist integrator models (e.g., Usher & McClelland,
2001) could also serve us, although the PIT framework
has an advantage in that it operates using a currency of
probabilities—versus more arbitrary units of count or
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activation—which leads to explicit, interpretable deci-
sion criteria and adaptation mechanisms, and requires
fewer additional assumptions to translate model output
to predictions of experimental outcomes. 
Decision criterion. To model blocking effects, we
must make an explicit assumption concerning the deci-
sion criterion used for response initiation. A simple
speed criterion (i.e., respond at α milliseconds following
stimulus onset) or accuracy criterion (i.e., respond when
the error rate is below α) is inadequate, because easy
items are both faster and more accurate than hard items
in pure blocks. Ratcliff’s (1978) diffusion model uses an
evidence threshold, which effectively yields an accuracy
criterion that declines over time. We adopt this notion,
as illustrated by the gray line in Figure 1b. The line is
characterized by one free parameter, the slope κ. This
criterion can be recast in an optimization framework: A
response is initiated at the point in time that maximizes
utility, where utility increases with expected accuracy
and decreases with time (Figure 1c). Previous psycho-
logical theory has suggested that individuals can choose
the optimal point at which to respond (Mozer et al.,
2002; Rabbitt & Vyas, 1970; Triesman & Williams,
1984).
To summarize, we propose a theory premised on
five key assumptions. (1) Transmission of stimulus
information to response systems is gradual and accumu-
lates over time. (2) Control mechanisms respond at the
point in time that maximizes a utility measure that
depends on both expected accuracy and time. (3) During
ongoing processing, the system is able to compute an
estimate of its response accuracy for the current stimu-
lus. (4) This estimate is unreliable. (5) If control systems
make the ecological assumption that the current trial is
similar in difficulty to recent trials, the accuracy esti-
mate can be made more reliable by incorporating esti-
mates from recent trials.
An accuracy estimate can be obtained from the PIT
dynamics by assuming that the most probable output at
a point in time is correct (Figure 1b); we refer to this as
curve as the current accuracy trace (CAT). Given the
response criterion (grey line, Figure 1b), a response ini-
tiation time can be determined (dashed line). 
If the model’s transmission probabilities are noisy,
the CAT is a high-variance estimate of accuracy,
because the assumption that the most probable response
state is correct may be wrong. The suggestion of noise is
not arbitrary, but rather is a central claim of the diffusion
model, and has been key to explaining a variety of RT
data. To overcome this noise source, it is sensible for
control mechanisms to rely not solely on the CAT, but
on accuracy traces from recent trials. We claim that the
model maintains a historical accuracy trace (HAT), and
the trace used for estimating utility—the mean accuracy
trace (MAT)—is a weighted average of CAT and HAT,
i.e., ,
where n is an index over trials, and
; λ and θ are
averaging weights. Figure 2a depicts the CAT, HAT, and
MAT. The two solid curves represent CATs for easy and
hard trials, as well as the MATs for pure blocks. The dot-
ted curve represents the expected HAT in a mixed
block—an average of easy and hard CATs. The dashed
curves represent the MATs for easy and hard trials in a
mixed block, formed by averaging the HAT and corre-
sponding CAT. Because the CAT and HAT are time-
varying functions, the notion of averaging is ambiguous;
possibilities include averaging the accuracy of points
with the same time value and times of points with the
same accuracy value. It turns out that the choice has no
qualitative impact on the simulation results we present.
The essential requirement is that the computation to
determine response-initiation time can be performed in
real time, including identification of the utility maxi-
mum.
Modeling Blocking Effects
Figure 2b provides an intuition concerning the model’s
ability to replicate the basic blocking effect. The mean
RT for easy and hard items in a pure block is indicated
by the point of intersection of the CAT with the time
threshold. The mean RT for easy and hard items in a
mixed block is indicated by the point of intersection of
the MAT with the time threshold. The easy item slows
down, the hard item speeds up. Because the rate of pro-
cessing is not affected by the blocking manipulation, the
error rate will necessarily drop for easy items and rise
for hard items. Although the RTs for easy and hard items
come together, the convergence is not complete as long
as . The theory thus explains the first three phe-
nomena of Section 1. The fourth phenomenon, that the
effects occur across diverse paradigms, is consistent
with the theory: the theory concerns the response
curves, but not the stimulus or response modalities or
domains that underlie the curves. Consequently, cross-
task blocking effects are implied by the theory. The the-
ory is consistent with the observation that blocking
effects occur even in the absence of overt errors,
because the theory is neutral with regard to error pro-
duction, and only if response mechanisms are engaged
(phenomenon 5). If responses are not produced, the
HAT n( ) λCAT n 1–( ) 1 λ–( )HAT n 1–( )+=
MAT n( ) θCAT n( ) 1 θ–( )HAT n( )+=
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response-accuracy curves need not be generated, and the
averaging process that underlies the effect cannot occur.
The fact that hard-item speed up is never greater
than easy-item slow down (phenomenon 6) turns out to
be a key diagnostic. Our initial candidate models tended
to yield more speed up than slow down because the
magnitude of RT change was proportional to the RT, and
hard RTs are larger than easy RTs. Empirically, the
error-averaging model we propose never yields more
speed up than slow down. As shown in Figure 2b, the
mixed-block MAT (dashed) hugs the pure-block MAT
(solid) more tightly for hard than easy items. The asym-
metry is due to the fact that the easy CAT reaches
asymptote before the hard CAT. The model produces
more symmetric blocking effects when responses are
initiated at a point where both easy and hard CATs are
ascending at the same rate (leading to high error rates,
unlike the behavioral data). However, we were unable to
find model parameters that produced the invalid pattern
of more speed up than slow down.
Beyond providing qualitative explanations for key
phenomena, the model fits specific experimental data.
Taylor and Lupker (2001, Expt. 1) instructed partici-
pants to name high frequency words (easy items) and
nonwords (hard items). Table 2 compares mean RTs and
error rates for human participants and the simulation.
One should not be concerned with the error-rate fit,
because measuring errors in a naming task is difficult
and subjective. (Over many experiments, error rates
show a speed-accuracy trade off.) Taylor and Lupker
further analyzed RTs in the mixed block conditional on
the context—the 0, 1, and 2 preceding items. Figure 3
shows the RTs conditional on context. The model’s fit is
excellent. Trial n is most influenced by trial n–1, but
trial n–2 modulates behavior as well; this is well mod-
eled by the exponentially decaying HAT.
Simulation details. Parameters of the PIT model
were chosen to obtain pure-block mean RTs comparable
to those obtained in the experiment and asymptotic
accuracy of 100% for both easy and hard items. We
added noise to the transmission rates to model item-to-
item and trial-to-trial variability, but found that this did
not affect the expected RTs and error rates. We fixed the
HAT and MAT averaging terms, λ and θ, at 0.5, and
picked κ to obtain error rates in the pure block of the
right order. Thus, the degrees of freedom at our disposal
were used for fitting pure block performance; the mixed
block performance (Figure 3) emerged from the model.
Asymptotic Effect of Context
In the standard blocking paradigm, the target item is
preceded by a context in which roughly half the items
are of a different difficulty level. We conducted a behav-
ioral study in which the context was maximally different
from the target. Each target was preceded by a context
of ten items of homogeneous difficulty, either the same
or different difficulty as the target. This study allows us
to examine the asymptotic effect of context switching.
We performed this study for two reasons. First, Taylor
and Lupker (2001) obtained results suggesting that a
trial was influenced by only the previous two trials; our
model predicts a cumulative effect of all context, but
diminishing exponentially with lag. Second, several
candidate models we explored predict that with a strong
context, speed up of hard is significantly larger than
slow down of easy; the model we’ve described does not.
The results are presented in Table 3. The model
provides an excellent fit to the data. Significantly larger
context effects are obtained than in the previous simula-
tion (~50 ms in contrast to ~25 ms), and—given the
strong context—the easy items become slower than the
TABLE 2. Expt. 1 of Taylor & Lupker (2001): Human data and simulation
Human Data Simulation
Pure Mixed Difference Pure Mixed Difference
Easy 519 ms (0.6%) 548 ms (0.7%) 29 ms (0.1%) 524 ms (2.4%) 555 ms (1.7%) 31 ms (–0.7%)
Hard 631 ms (2.9%) 610 ms (2.9%) –21 ms (0.0%) 634 ms (3.0%) 613 ms (3.7%) –21 ms (0.7%)
E H EE HE EH HH EEE HEE EHE HHE EEH HEH EHH HHH
540
560
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FIGURE 3. RTs from human subjects (black) and
simulation (white) for easy and hard items in
mixed block, conditional on 0, 1, and 2 previous
item types. Last letter in a string indicates the
current trial and first letters indicate context.
Thus, “EHH” means a hard item preceded by
another hard item preceded by an easy item.
simulation
human data
TABLE 3. Context experiment: Human data and simulation
Human Data Simulation
Same Context Diff. Context Switch Effect Same Context Diff. Context Switch Effect
Easy 432 ms 488 ms 56 ms 437 ms 493 ms 56 ms
Hard 514 ms 467 ms –47 ms 514 ms 470 ms –44 ms
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hard (although this effect is not statistically reliable in
the experimental data). Further, both data and model
show more slow down that speed up, a result that
allowed us to eliminate several competing models. For
this simulation, we fit parameters of the PIT model to
the same-context results. We also treated the MAT aver-
aging constant, θ, as a free parameter on the rational
argument that this parameter can be tuned to optimize
performance: if there is not much variability among
items in a block, there should be more benefit to sup-
pressing noise in the CAT using the HAT, and hence θ
should be smaller. We used 0.35 for this simulation, in
contrast to 0.5 for the first simulation.
Reinterpreting Other Experimental Findings
In many studies, contrasts are made between experimen-
tal blocks whose composition varies in terms of the pro-
portion of easy and hard items. In such cases, our model
may provide an alternative interpretation of experimen-
tal results. Consider a subliminal priming study in which
participants are asked to perform lexical decision on a
target string preceded by a masked prime (Bodner &
Masson, 2001). The prime and target could be identical
or unrelated. Although the prime was subliminal—not
accessible for report—a repetition priming effect is
observed: lexical decision RT to a target is faster if the
prime is identical to the target. Subliminal repetition
priming effects are common in the literature, but what is
surprising in this study is that prime validity influences
priming: The priming effect is larger when the prime
and target are identical on 80% of trials (high validity)
than when they are identical on 20% of trials (low valid-
ity). Bodner and Masson suggest that “recruitment of
the prime resource to assist target processing should be
more likely when the...prime validity...is higher.” (p.
618). This counterintuitive explanation implies that the
prime is analyzed deeply: its match to the target is deter-
mined, prime validity is estimated, and the estimate is
available for strategic control. 
Our model offers an alternative account. The repeti-
tion prime makes a trial easy because the prime activa-
tion supports the target, and the unrelated prime makes a
trial relatively hard. Low and high validity conditions
are thus mixed blocks containing 20% and 80% easy tri-
als, respectively. We ran a simulation to show that these
mixtures yield a blocking effect consistent with the
reduction of priming in the low validity condition
(Table 4). In the model, the prime influences the time
course of information transmission, which modulates
the model’s response-initiation criterion on future tri-
als—a simpler, more elegant account than Bodner and
Masson’s.
Conclusions
Theories in cognitive science occasionally hand the
problem of control to a homunculus. More commonly,
control processes are left unspecified. And when imple-
mented, control generally involves explicit, active, and
sophisticated mechanisms. We have described a model
that achieves an interesting sort of control—sequential
adaptation of the speed-accuracy trade off. However, the
mechanism that gives rise to this adaptation is passive
and in a sense dumb; it essentially reestimates the statis-
tical structure of the environment by updating an expec-
tation of task difficulty. Our hope and belief is that many
aspects of cognitive control can be explained away by
such simple, passive mechanisms, eventually eliminat-
ing the homunculus from cognitive science.
REFERENCES
Bodner, GE, & Masson, ME (2001). Prime validity affects masked rep-
etition priming: Evidence for an episodic resource account of prim-
ing. Journal of Memory & Language, 45, 616–647.
Damian, MF (2003). Articulatory duration in single word speech pro-
duction. JEP: LMC, 29, 416-431.
Dorfman, D., & Glanzer, M. (1988). List composition effects in lexical
decision and recognition memory. J. Mem. & Lang., 27, 633–648.
Kello, CT & Plaut, DC (2003). Strategic control over rate of process-
ing in word reading: A computational investigation. Journal of
Memory and Language, 48, 207-232.
Kiger, JI, & Glass, AL (1981). Context effects in sentence verification.
JEP:HPP, 7, 688-700.
Lupker, SJ, Brown, P, & Colombo, L (1997). Strategic control in a
naming task: Changing routes or changing deadlines? JEP:LMC,
23, 570–590.
Lupker, S, Kinoshita, S, Taylor, T, & Coltheart, M. (Nov. 2000) Is a
time criterion used when naming pictures and computing sums?
Annual meeting of the Psychonomic Society, New Orleans.
Meyer, AS, Roelofs, A, & Levelt WJM (2003). Word length effects in
object naming: The role of a response criterion. Journal of Mem-
ory and Language, 48, 131–147.
Mozer, MC, Colagrosso, MD, & Huber, DE (2002). A rational analy-
sis of cognitive control in a speeded discrimination task. In NIPS
XIV (pp. 51-57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Mozer, MC, Colagrosso, MD, & Huber, DE (2003). Mechanisms of
long-term repetition priming and skill refinement: A probabilistic
pathway model.  In Proceedings of the Twenty Fifth Annual Con-
ference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
Assoc. 
Rabbitt, PMA, & Vyas, SM (1970). An elementary preliminary taxon-
omy for some errors in laboratory choice RT tasks. Acta Psych.,
33, 56–76.
Ratcliff, R. A theory of memory retrieval. Psych. Rev., 1978, 85, 59-
108.
Ratcliff, R., & McKoon, G. (1997). A counter model for implicit prim-
ing in perceptual word identification. Psych. Review, 104, 319–
343.
Taylor, TE, & Lupker, SJ (2001). Sequential effects in naming: A
time-criterion account. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27, 117–138.
Treisman, M & Williams, TC (1984). A theory of criterion setting
with an application to sequential dependencies. Psych. Review,
91, 68–111.
Usher, M, & McClelland, JL (2001). On the time course of perceptual
choice: The leaky competing accumulator model. Psychological
Review, 108, 550-592.
TABLE 4. Simulation of validity-modulating masked priming effect
Repetition-Prime Trial Unrelated-Prime Trial Priming Effect
20% valid 560 ms 585 ms 25 ms
80% valid 515 ms 580 ms 65 ms
986
Numerically-Driven Inferencing in Instruction:  
The Relatively Broad Transfer of Estimation Skills 
 
Edward L. Munnich (munnich@berkeley.edu) 
Michael A. Ranney (ranney@cogsci.berkeley.edu) 
Daniel M. Appel (dappel@berkeley.edu) 
University of California, Graduate School of Education, 4533 Tolman Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 
 
 
Abstract 
What is the current U.S. immigration rate?  Policy-makers, 
voters, and consumers should have a sense of quantities of 
this kind in order to help shape effective policies, and schools 
must prepare students for such roles. We examine the 
Numerically-Driven Inferencing paradigm (NDI), using a 
method in which participants: Estimate policy-relevant 
quantities, state Preferences for these, receive actual 
quantities as feedback to Incorporate, and offer preferences 
again to exhibit any policy Changes (EPIC). Past work has 
generally suggested rather poor estimation of such base rates, 
but there is potential for improvement as one carries out many 
estimates over various issues, and perhaps a benefit for taking 
a more analytic approach to estimation. Here we consider 
whether one can improve estimation skills broadly by using 
multiple perspectives in estimation problems, and by working 
out of conflicts that arise among multiple, locally coherent, 
numerical understandings. Using an NDI curriculum that 
emphasized disconfirmation, we found that estimation 
improved across a wide variety of questions. 
 
What is the current annual U.S. immigration rate (including 
both legal and illegal immigration)? Please take a moment 
to estimate this quantity, and reflect on the kinds of skills 
you used to generate your estimate. One might assume that 
those who know about immigration issues are good at 
estimating immigration rates, while those who know about 
environmental issues are good at estimating per capita 
garbage production, but that there is no general skill for 
estimating across content domains. Research on estimation 
suggests that people can improve the accuracy of estimates 
in a variety of ways, including using category information 
(e.g., Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Prohaska, 1988), or learning 
relevant “seed” numbers (e.g., Brown & Siegler, 2001), but 
there is no indication that such benefits transfer broadly to 
estimation over a wide variety of quantities, to say nothing 
of problem solving skills more generally. However, we 
suggest that in domains ranging from estimation to physics 
problem-solving, it is important to learn to seek alternatives 
to initial conceptions of problems, which brings the 
possibility of disconfirming hypotheses. The potential value 
of such a strategy is illustrated Johnson-Laird and Hasson 
(2003), who have found that when some premises are 
consistent with an invalid conclusion, counterexamples are 
useful in rejecting the conclusion. The focus of the present 
paper is on the extent to which analytic estimation skills can 
transfer broadly, so that people might improve their 
estimates for quantities across a broad range of issues 
without specific instruction on those issues. 
Theoretical Framework 
This project builds on the Numerically-Driven Inferencing 
paradigm (NDI; Ranney, Cheng, Nelson, & Garcia de 
Osuna, 2001), which examines how understandings of 
relevant base rate information (e.g., the present U.S. 
immigration rate) affects people’s attitudes on public policy 
issues (e.g., given the immigration rate, what would you 
prefer that rate to be?). With NDI’s methods, people need 
not be asked whether they are for or against a particular 
issue, but rather what they would prefer the numbers to be. 
Indeed, it is not uncommon that those who consider 
themselves to be in favor of reducing immigration (e.g., 
believing the current base rate of a policy-relevant quantity 
to be 10%, one might prefer 5%) have more in common 
than they realize with those who claim to favor an increase 
(e.g., believing the rate to be 1%, but sharing a preference 
for 5%). However, if such people were only asked the extent 
to which they favor or oppose an issue, they would appear 
to be at odds. In contrast, NDI asserts that qualitative 
attitudes have some—albeit not necessarily direct—
relationships with relevant quantities, and aims to explore 
the nature of the relationships. By focusing on numerical 
concepts, NDI can shed light on how these concepts interact 
with people’s initial attitudes, and the extent to which 
learning actual values shapes subsequent attitudes: Do we 
maintain preferences for the same absolute rates, or for the 
same proportions relative to actual rates? To what extent do 
we shift our policy stances after surprising feedback 
(Munnich, Ranney, Nelson, Garcia de Osuna, & Brazil, 
2003)? 
NDI builds on research in many fields, such as attitude, 
conceptual change, mental models, and judgment and 
decision-making (although NDI deals directly with base 
rates—not through Bayesian analyses). In particular, NDI 
has drawn on work in scientific conceptual change including 
the Theory of Explanatory Coherence (TEC; Ranney & 
Thagard, 1988; Thagard, 1989), which describes change as 
spawned by incoherence and conflicts among ideas, such 
that people try to revise their beliefs to increase global 
coherence. In an illustration of this, Ranney, Schank, 
Mosmann, and Montoya (1993; based on a misconception 
noted by Keysar, 1990) found that most participants initially 
believed that Berlin lay on the East/West German border, 
but revised their beliefs as they incrementally received 
987
information that could be used to disconfirm “on-border” 
hypotheses (e.g., they were told/reminded of the Berlin 
airlift, the Western Allies’ agreement to halt their troops far 
west of Berlin, Berlin’s location within united Germany, 
and northern and southern ends of the border). With each 
successive piece of evidence, participants moved toward a 
more accurate view of Berlin’s location relative to the 
border, suggesting that they modified their belief networks 
to maintain coherence in the face of the new information. 
 According to TEC, evidence that is critical, germane, and 
credible carries considerable weight in our belief systems. 
Within NDI, we seek to understand when and how a 
particular kind of evidence that meets these criteria—
numerical propositions—can catalyze knowledge-
transforming effects. NDI asserts that estimates and 
numerical preferences are outputs of our belief systems—
the tips of a “reasoning iceberg.” One’s understanding of an 
issue may be thought of as a network of ideas connected by 
personal experiences, media, religion, etc. When asked to 
estimate an immigration rate, few can simply recall it. 
Instead one activates various understandings about 
immigration that shape the estimate. Likewise, numerical 
preference is an output from an extensive belief network 
that lies below the surface of overt response. For example, 
one might believe the assumed immigration rate to be 
acceptable and simply reiterate one’s estimate as one’s 
preference (a status quo policy). However, if later surprised 
by the actual immigration rate, one’s sense of reality is 
challenged, and one might come to the conclusion that prior 
reasoning was incorrect or incomplete.  
In this conception, the iceberg’s “bulk”––the belief 
network from which estimates and numerical preferences 
emerge––may be transformed by the impact of feedback. As 
such, NDI can offer rich, quantitative findings to cognitive 
scientists concerned with the dynamics of belief networks. 
In this paper, we consider curricula based on NDI, designed 
to facilitate the recruitment of multiple, locally coherent 
understandings that can mutually constrain one another. Just 
as feedback that conflicts with one’s numerical 
understanding might lead to a transformation, when one 
spontaneously seeks to disconfirm one’s own numerical 
hypotheses by bringing alternative numerical notions to 
bear, it may lead to revisions that bring one’s belief network 
into closer alignment with facts of the world. Such a 
transition would be evidenced by improved estimation 
across a wide range of issues. 
NDI Findings That Frame the Issues 
To address NDI, Ranney and colleagues developed a variety 
of methods, including EPIC (Estimate-Prefer-Incorporate-
Change), which is used in this paper: (1) Participants 
estimate a quantity that is relevant to an issue, as you did for 
the U.S. immigration rate at the beginning of this paper. (2) 
Participants indicate what they prefer the quantity to be; to 
familiarize yourself, please write down what you would 
prefer the U.S. immigration rate to be (including both legal 
and illegal immigration). (3) Participants receive correct 
base rate feedback to incorporate; now, please look at the 
actual immigration rate in the footnote below.1 Finally, (4) 
participants indicate again what they prefer the quantity to 
be; has your preference changed now that you know the 
actual number? We have found that, to the extent feedback 
is surprising, it generally leads to nontrivial belief revision. 
So far, research on estimates within NDI has focused on a 
rather short period of time, but an obvious extension of this 
work is to consider (a) whether estimation skills can 
improve with targeted interventions, and (b) the extent to 
which there may be broad transfer. 
Illustrations of the kinds of alternative conceptions that 
people can have comes from Munnich et al. (2003), who 
reported differential patterns of estimation for the same 
underlying question: One group was asked to estimate the 
number of abortions in the U.S. per million live births, 
while a second group drawn from the same undergraduate 
class estimated the number of abortions in the U.S. per 
million fertile women each year. The results showed a 
striking contrast in numerical understanding, depending on 
how the question was framed: For the per-women question 
the median response (10,000) was half the correct answer at 
that time, but for the per births question, the median 
estimate (10,000 as well, coincidentally) was 33.5 times too 
low at the time the study was conducted.2 Could people 
perhaps improve their estimates of abortions per live births 
by considering how many abortions there are per fertile 
women? More broadly, what might happen when people 
bring together alternative conceptions and resolve conflicts 
on their own, without external feedback? To address this 
issue, McGlothlen (2003) interviewed high school students 
as they produced estimates and numerical preferences for a 
variety of issues, and reported on their online reasoning 
processes. She coded responses as analytic—containing 
relevant numerical information and constraints—or 
holistic—based on a feeling or general sense of the issue. 
McGlothlen found that estimates reached through an 
analytic process were significantly more accurate than those 
reached through a holistic process. This leads us to the 
following hypothesis:  
 
An analytic approach invokes multiple locally coherent 
numerical representations that provide mutual constraints 
among themselves, leading to more refined, more globally 
coherent, and hence more accurate estimates than would 
be observed if only one representation were invoked. 
 
To discover whether there is a causal relationship between 
invoking multiple representations and accuracy, we might 
manipulate the degree to which people take an analytic 
approach. Below, we discuss an experiment in which the 
analytic process is explicitly emphasized in the instruction 
given to one group of students, and the accuracy of this 
group’s estimates, pre- and post-instruction, is compared to 
                                                          
1 The U.S. Census Bureau reports that the annual U.S. immigration 
rate, including legal and illegal immigrants, is 0.4%. 
2 Garcia de Osuna, Ranney, and Nelson (2004) observed a median 
of 5,000, sixty-seven times too low. 
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a parallel group who received no such instruction. If those 
taught analytic strategies show greater estimation accuracy, 
it would provide causal evidence for the benefit of an 
analytic approach. 
Previous Curricular Interventions 
In several recent studies, our group has observed estimation 
accuracy benefits, arising from practice with forming 
estimates and generating preferences. These activities are 
unusual for math or science classes, for which problems are 
generally solvable in straightforward ways by applying 
formulas and principles. Our curricula illustrate the utility of 
mathematical and scientific reasoning through our use of 
problems about issues that students find interesting. We ask 
students for societally-relevant opinions, which is virtually 
unheard of in math classes. These factors motivate students 
in ways that standard curricula may not, and shows benefits 
for estimation ability with relatively little practice. 
In one such intervention, Curley (2003) and Howard 
(2003) gave fifth-grade science camp students standard 
physics labs about the stopping distances of vehicles. An 
Experimental class received NDI problems to frame the 
labs, while a Control class did not. Both classes took a 
pretest with estimation and preference problems, then a 
posttest with a different set of items three days later.3 In this 
between-subjects design, Curley and Howard observed 
improvement in estimation accuracy for both classes on 
items about U.S. household income and the number of 
alcohol-related automobile crashes. Notably, the only NDI 
experience that the Control class received was during the 
pretest, suggesting that exposure to such items alone might 
be sufficient to improve estimation abilities.  
In a later study, Juan (2003) found similar effects among 
eighth-grade Algebra students. Her Experimental class 
received one NDI problem per day for three days, followed 
by graphing activities and class discussions on estimates and 
preferences. In contrast, the Control class received standard 
algebra instruction. All students took a pretest and a 
posttest, in which they estimated twelve quantities (six per 
test). Questions dealt with issues such as California’s 
population and teachers’ salaries. On each test, students 
estimated and offered preferences before and after feedback 
for two items, and simply estimated for the remaining four 
items. Experimental students showed a significant overall 
gain between pre- and posttest estimates, while the Control 
class showed only a marginally significant improvement. 
However, an additional sign test between groups showed no 
advantage for the Experimental class.  
The studies discussed up to this point showed minimal 
benefit for the curricula themselves—while both 
Experimental classes improved, the Control classes may 
have also benefited just from their pretest experience with 
NDI. This raised the possibility that one may improve 
estimation merely by working on NDI problems. Before 
                                                          
3 When we ask for preferences, the objective is to assess how 
students’ numerical understandings affect their preferences, not to 
make a normative assessment. 
drawing this conclusion, we carried out the following 
experiment, which lasted much longer than past 
interventions, and focused not on content areas like physics 
or college costs, but on analytic techniques aimed at 
improving students’ general estimation abilities.  
A Focal Experiment 
Method 
Two high school geometry classes participated, each with 
27 students. Both classes received a normal geometry 
curriculum, but the Experimental class spent 12% of their 
time over a ten-week period on activities centered on six 
NDI questions. Activities included discussions and written 
reflection aimed at promoting the analytic responses that 
McGlothlen (2003) found to correlate with successful 
estimation. In addition, explicit connections were made 
between logical argumentation about issue-relevant 
quantities and the argumentation required in geometric 
proof. Due to limited space, we omit discussions of possible 
benefits regarding student motivation and the transfer of 
argumentation skills from NDI to geometric problems. 
 
Table 1: Pretest, Intervention, and Posttest Questions 
(Group B received the pre- and posttest in reversed order) 
 
Pretest (Group A) Intervention Posttest (Group A) 
Average US age 
Athlete salary 
College cost 
Miles driven/Year 
Commute time 
Incarceration rate 
Soda calories 
Homes-with-TVs 
US population 
CA population 
College vs.  
   H.S. grad  
   earnings 
H.S. dropout 
   rate 
Athlete salaries  
   by gender 
Poverty line 
US oil imports 
Cars per driver 
College degrees (%) 
Homes-with-computers 
% Female teachers 
Garbage per person 
Hours of sleep 
Inflation 
Voting percentage 
Teacher salary 
Car price 
 
On Thursday of each week, students generated estimates 
and preferences for a given quantity as homework (see 
Munnich et al., 2003, for examples of how such items are 
worded). In class on Friday, they discussed their estimates 
in groups and generated a group estimate, in which they: (a) 
provided a consensus estimate, (b) explained their rationale 
for that number, (c) provided rationales for a number 
considerably higher than their estimate, and for a number 
considerably lower than their estimate. This was followed 
by a short class discussion to acquaint students with 
alternative approaches that their classmates had taken. 
Between hearing classmates’ arguments and generating 
rationales for estimates and preferences other than their 
own, students were encouraged to engage in problems 
analytically, considering the strengths and weaknesses of 
various constraints that might be placed on the estimate. 
The following Monday, students’ original estimates and 
preferences were returned, along with the actual number as 
feedback. From Monday to Tuesday, they generated final 
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preferences, based on the feedback and any insights they 
gleaned from group discussions. Finally, on Tuesday, 
students discussed their preferences in groups and generated 
arguments that might be used by one who preferred (a) 
decreasing the quantity, (b) maintaining the status quo, and 
(c) increasing the quantity. As with estimation discussions, 
this was followed by a whole class discussion on 
preferences. 
To measure the intervention’s effects, both Experimental 
and Control classes were given ten NDI items as a pretest, 
and then, ten weeks later, ten different NDI questions as a 
posttest (an immigration rate item was excluded when it 
became clear that responses were bizarrely high in many 
cases; students also reported numerous misinterpretations). 
Questions were counterbalanced so that the items that half 
of each class saw on the pretest (Group A in Table 1) 
appeared on the posttest for the other half of each class, and 
vice versa. Students were asked to generate estimates and 
preferences, and were then handed a separate sheet of paper 
with the actual quantity, which also elicited a Likert surprise 
rating and their final preferences. Students received two 
items per day for five days (as past studies indicated that 
fatigue sets in when students receive many items on a single 
day). Each of the ten problems was presented in the same 
order to all students, minimizing any benefit for discussing 
items with classmates in unintended ways. 
Results and Discussion 
All estimates (for both classes, pre- and posttest) were 
ranked by proximity to the actual value for each item, in 
order to put data from questions with different scales onto 
one common scale (i.e., accuracy rankings). Between-group 
analyses on the rankings assessed whether there were 
differences between the classes, and whether each class 
improved from pre- to posttest. Mann-Whitney tests showed 
no reliable pretest difference between Experimental and 
Control classes (z=1.04, n.s.). On the posttest, however, the 
Experimental class estimated reliably more accurately than 
Controls (z=3.29, p<.001). Further, while there was no 
difference among Controls on pre- and posttests (z=0.41, 
n.s.), Experimentals showed a significant improvement 
(z=2.74, p=.003). These effects indicate that the intervention 
led to improved estimation of novel quantities (i.e., 
transfer). 
To explore the effect’s loci for the Experimental class, 
planned Mann-Whitney comparisons were performed 
separately on each item. Participants improved significantly 
on three items (U.S. population, z=2.49; cars per driver, 
z=1.97; hours of sleep, z=1.96; ps<.05), and marginally on 
three other items (college cost, z=1.48; teacher salary, 
z=1.36; miles driven/year, z=1.19; ps<.10). Among these 
items, we see patterns of both near and relatively far transfer 
from the intervention. The only one of these items that was 
directly related to one of the intervention questions was that 
on U.S. population (i.e., related to an question on 
California’s population in the intervention). The other items 
range from those that seem to have only an indirect 
relationship with intervention items (e.g., “teacher’s salary” 
may be related to “H.S. vs. college grad earnings,” although 
teachers’ incomes are closer to the incomes of high school 
graduates than to those of other college graduates), to items 
that have no obvious relationship with the intervention 
problems (e.g., hours of sleep the average person gets). 
The results point to benefits from an intervention focused 
on analytic approaches to estimation. Looking more closely, 
we found both transfer among highly similar questions, as 
well as the relatively far transfer of general estimation skills 
to seemingly unrelated quantities. These findings are in line 
with the hypothesis that multiple numerical representations 
provide constraints on one another and can lead to more 
globally coherent estimates. The difference between the 
classes was that, although both had experience with 
estimation and giving preferences on the pretest, the 
Experimental class received a curriculum that engaged them 
in discussions of multiple perspectives in estimation and 
numerical preference. These results are rather surprising if 
one believes that estimation ability is not a broadly 
transferable skill. Given the variety of topics covered by 
items on the pre- and posttests, it is unlikely that the 
Experimental class could have learned the vast array of new 
facts about the world necessary to drive observed 
improvements. Rather, they appeared to use their extant 
numerical knowledge about the world more constructively 
than before.  
Why did students improve broadly in estimation? 
McGlothlen (2003) found that those who invoked a richer 
repertoire of analytic tools estimated better than those who 
used a more holistic/feeling approach. With this in mind, 
one explanation for the Experimental students’ 
improvement is that the intervention moved them towards a 
more comprehensive approach to estimation. Our lab is 
conducting ongoing research to examine other possible 
causes for students’ improved performance. One such 
possibility is that Experimental students enjoyed the 
curriculum and were simply more motivated than Controls 
to complete the posttest exercises. If this were the source of 
improvement, we would expect Experimental students to 
spend more time on solutions, and report more interest in 
the task, but we would not expect to see greater richness in 
the strategies they employ. Another possibility is that 
Experimental students benefited from the recency of their 
practice with estimation during the intervention. If this 
caused the difference between the groups, then, again, 
although Experimentals gave more accurate estimates, we 
would not expect subsequent analyses to show that they 
used richer strategies than Controls. We cannot reject this 
possibility at present, but we find it highly unlikely, as 
estimation curricula are generally quite taxing for students: 
Our prior results indicate that without a particularly 
engaging curriculum, more recent practice leads to a 
performance decrement, presumably due to fatigue.  
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General Discussion 
Many propositions inform our social preferences (e.g., 
Ranney & Schank, 1998), but to illustrate the role played by 
numbers, consider whether your immigration preference 
would change if you made an estimate that was highly 
inaccurate. What sort of numerical feedback might call your 
assumptions into question, leading you to a different 
preference?  Preferences are central to human cognition, and 
numerical preferences provide useful sources of evidence 
regarding conceptual change. Numerical preference 
represents a concrete way in which mathematics is relevant 
to our lives, and contributes to discussions of quantitative 
literacy in math education. By ignoring base rates, voters or 
political candidates may take stands that conflict with what 
they would otherwise prefer. Of course, some people take 
absolute stances on particular issues, such as completely 
eliminating abortion; as such, they imply that the numbers 
are irrelevant to their beliefs on the issue, and we would not 
expect them to change their preferences after feedback very 
often (Ranney et al., 2001). For those who indicated 
nonzero preferences, Munnich et al. (2003) found two main 
patterns: First, those who were less surprised by base rates 
generally proportionately rescaled their preferences—those 
who preferred halving the abortion rate initially, still 
preferred halving the actual rate when it was revealed. This 
suggests the base rate was belief-relevant, but that it did not 
inspire dramatic revisions of belief networks. Second, those 
who were more surprised by feedback showed policy 
shifs—accommodative belief revisions—for instance, those 
who preferred halving the abortion rate initially, but were 
surprised by the actual rate, indicated final preferences 
notably more or less than half of that rate (see Garcia de 
Osuna, Ranney, & Nelson, 2004, for more discussion of the 
qualitative nature of such shifts). 
Even when considering the same issue, people can arrive 
at markedly different estimates and policies, depending on 
how the issue is framed (cf. Schwarz, 1999). As noted 
earlier, when Munnich et al. (2003) asked for the number of 
abortions per live births, the median response was 33.5 
times too high. With their estimates so far off, what 
happened with these people’s preferences? After feedback, 
they showed a policy shift—a 64% more reductive policy 
than they had initially indicated. By contrast, when 
participants estimated the number of abortions per fertile 
women, the median estimate was much closer—half the 
actual number. Rather than shift policies, for the fertile-
women variant, participants merely rescaled their 
preferences to adjust to their new understanding of the 
number. In other words, when a quantity (e.g., the number 
of abortions performed each year) is framed in different 
ways, people show vastly different abilities in estimating the 
quantity, and this strongly affects their preferences after 
they learn the actual numbers. 
Our hypothesis in this paper focused on the estimation 
side of NDI, but there are also implications for preference. 
When an intervention successfully fosters estimation ability, 
what might we predict, regarding people’s preferences? One 
possibility is that as estimates improve, feedback-driven 
surprise will abate, and policies will stabilize, producing 
less subsequent policy shift. However, it is also possible that 
when estimates improve, people might become more 
sensitive to numbers, and attach more importance to small 
errors, yielding more policy shift. Note that while some of 
our past studies showed framing effects, they did not focus 
on people who recruited relevant facts to frame issues in 
different ways for themselves. When an individual integrates 
multiple constraints without prompting, the effects may be 
quite different than what we see with more passive 
participants. In analyses of the preference data gathered 
along with the estimation data reported above, we find 
support for both possibilities—while some participants 
appear to shift policies less after intervention, others seem to 
be more sensitive to small changes in numbers, and thus 
shift less. In aggregate these effects largely cancel each 
other out. A more in-depth analysis of individuals’ changes 
in estimation ability, surprise levels, and preferences is 
being conducted to determine how each phenomenon 
contributes to the overall pattern of results. One possible 
benefit of this research may be in teaching people to 
construct policies that are less susceptible to rhetoric. That 
is, as people adopt more analytic strategies (assuming this is 
why estimates improve in our curricula), when they hear a 
quantity in advertisements or on the news, they might think 
of the issue several different ways and generate a preference 
that is constrained by other numbers they have considered.  
Beyond transfer to tasks involving numerical 
understanding, what other forms of transfer might exist? 
NDI problems can be considered examples of “Fermi 
Problems,” after the physicist who famously posed queries 
such as “How many piano tuners are there in Chicago?” 
Few, if any, can simply recall answers to Fermi questions, 
but through successive approximations and drawing on 
other known quantities, one can approach the correct 
answer. When Fermi questions are posed—often by 
potential employers or as classroom exercises—the implicit 
assumption is that one’s answers are indicative of general 
analytic ability and creativity in problem solving. It is not 
difficult to imagine that NDI-type interventions might 
benefit reasoning about the location of Berlin relative to the 
former East-West border: With analytic techniques, one 
could do for oneself what Ranney et al. (1993) did for their 
participants—foster the integration of multiple, mutually 
constraining, perspectives into a solution.  
More broadly, was Fermi’s physics problem-solving 
ability related to his ability to estimate the number of piano 
tuners in Chicago? Much of the problem solving literature 
indicates little general transfer of problem solving skill 
across divergent domains (Singley & Anderson, 1989), so 
this may initially seem unlikely. However, we note that one 
of Ranney and Thagard’s (1988) participants (“Pat”) 
reached a more sophisticated understanding of projectile 
motion through the same kinds of processes that we have 
argued to underlie strong numerical reasoning. Pat initially 
believed that a ball dropped by a walking person would fall 
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straight to the ground. Later on in her verbal protocol, she 
contemplated the motion of a ball thrown obliquely 
upwards, and decided that it would follow an arc-shaped 
trajectory. Upon realizing this, it occurred to her that, from 
the zenith of its trajectory to the ground, the ball would 
descend analogously to a ball dropped while walking. 
Accordingly, she concluded that the two trajectories must 
have a similar arc-shape. Pat thus revised her view of the 
path of the dropped ball to a (more accurate) curved 
trajectory. This example illustrates the potential generality 
of the analytic skills that are useful in numerical reasoning: 
In both physics and estimation, we seem to benefit from 
using alternative representations, and then resolving 
conflicts among them. The degree to which one skill 
transfers to another is a worthy topic for future research. 
Summary 
It is critical that citizens and consumers be able to make 
decisions on numerically laden issues. We found that people 
can improve their numerical understandings through 
activities emphasizing the consideration of multiple 
perspectives and the integration of mutual constraints, and 
we discussed possible implications of such findings for 
individuals’ policy stances. We propose that improvements 
in estimation abilities arose from an analytic approach that 
this intervention cultivated, leading students to seek 
evidence that might disconfirm their initial hunches. Such 
an approach might have value beyond the numerical and 
policy realms, with respect to more general reasoning and 
problem solving skills. In these ways, classroom 
interventions that test aspects of the emerging theory around 
the Numerically-Driven Inferencing paradigm have the 
potential to answer questions of fundamental interest to both 
cognitive science and society. 
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Abstract
Increased cognitive workload is typically considered to hinder
task performance. The current study presents an example
where increased workload aided  a visual search task.
Increased workload, via a secondary task, provided
participants extra time to avoid distracting stimulus
configurations. Furthermore, initial fixations on distracting
densities occurred at higher frequencies when initial saccades
lasted less–than 400 milliseconds. We conclude that the
combination of the primary visual search task and the
secondary task create an environment where the secondary
task was beneficial to the visual search task.
Introduction
There is a rich literature demonstrating how visual stimuli
affect visual search patterns (Findlay, 1982, 1997; He &
Kowler, 1991; McCarley, Kramer, & Peterson, 2002;
Pomplun, Reingold, & Shen, 2003; Rayner, Liversedge,
White, & Vergilino-Perez, 2003; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel,
1989; Zelinsky, 1996). However, few studies have focused
on how stimulus configurations influence eye movements.
An example of a stimulus configuration is differences in
inter-stimulus distance, or density. Stimulus density can be
easily manipulated. Increasing the inter-stimulus distance
decreases density, and vice-versa. There is also little
research describing the effects of increased workload on
visual search. Do visual search strategies change as a
function of workload? In this paper, we address workload
and stimulus configuration effects on visual search.
Previous research suggests that saccades are programmed
and targeted in an automatic, data-driven fashion. Data-
driven processes shape overt behavior via environmental
factors, and are typically considered unconscious processes.
There are two striking examples that suggest data-driven
processes determine saccadic endpoints. The first example
is the global effect (Findlay, 1982, 1997). The global effect
occurs when saccadic endpoints land at intermediate target
positions during abrupt onset tasks containing at least two
stimuli. That is, when two stimuli appear to the right or left
of an initial fixation point, saccadic endpoints tend to be
located between the stimuli. The global effect provides
evidence that global target configurations influence saccadic
amplitude. It appears that saccadic processes use stimulus
attributes such as spatial properties in determining
endpoints.
The second example is the center–of–gravity effect (He &
Kowler, 1991). The center–of–gravity effect indicates that
saccades directed toward a shape land at consistent locations
near the center of the shape, and that the shape’s contour
information is all that is necessary for consistent saccades.
The two effects taken together suggest that the saccadic
mechanism relies on spatial properties of stimuli when
determining saccadic endpoints.
The amount of influence deliberate, top-down strategies
have on saccadic endpoint location is still unclear. However,
it is unlikely that humans solely rely on purposeful, top-
down strategies when determining saccadic endpoints. He
and Kowler (1991) propose a serial, two-stage process for
determining saccadic endpoints that incorporates both
automatic processes and intentional strategies. The two-
stage process involves an initial intentional target selection,
followed by an automatic weighted averaging of the shape
or stimuli to determine the saccadic endpoint.
Shen, Reingold, and Pomplun (2000) demonstrated that in
a conjunctive search task visual search is also affected by
the cost structure of the search environment.  When few
same-color distractors were present, saccadic selectivity was
biased towards color. However, as the number of same-
color distractors increased, saccadic selectivity shifted from
same-color to same-shape stimuli. This suggests that visual
search may be sensitive to the soft constraints of the search
space. Hard constraints arise from the types of stimuli built
into the search environment, and the types of interactive
behavior permitted (such as searching by color or shape).
Hence, hard constraints determine which microstrategies are
possible (Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000). In contrast, soft
constraints determine which of the possible microstrategies
are most likely to be selected (Gray & Fu, 2004). When
selection is non-deliberate or automatic the least effort
microstrategy is chosen. Searching same-color targets when
they are the majority distractor leads to higher movement
latencies, higher manual response times, and more fixations
than searching the minority, same-shape distractors (Shen et
al., 2000).
Our research has focused on where a participant is likely
to initially fixate. Initial fixations are the dwells located at
the endpoint of the initial saccade. This work has uncovered
an effect of stimuli density on initial fixation locations, or
the pro-density effect (Myers, Gray, & Schoelles, 2003,
2004). As the density of stimuli increases (inter-stimulus
distances become smaller), the probability of initially
fixating the dense group also increases. Our work in
conjunction with Shen et al. (2000) makes it apparent that
stimulus features are not the only aspects of the search space
considered. Rather, we have found that stimulus
configurations are also important. It is likely that the results
of Shen et al. (2000) and Myers et al. (2003; 2004), are
solely attributable to neither data–driven nor purposeful,
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top–down search strategies, but are attributable to a
combination of both processes.
If the determination of saccadic endpoints and initial
fixation locations are not the exclusive result of top-down,
purposeful processes, then taxing top-down processes in
order to eliminate any purposeful search strategy will allow
automatic, data-driven processes greater influence in overt
behavior. Our research has demonstrated that the pro-
density effect is heightened with increased workload. The
pro–density effect doubled with an added auditory task
(Myers et al., 2004). This result suggests a data–driven
component when determining where to initially fixate or
saccade.
In the studies conducted by Myers et al. (2003; 2004),
target and density locations were completely orthogonal; as
a result, dense clusters of stimuli provided no useful
information of the target’s whereabouts. Therefore, there
was no incentive to avoid dense clusters of stimuli.
Having found a pro-density effect in previous work, the
current study attempted to determine the robustness of this
effect by establishing a negative correlation between dense
clusters and the probability of a target being located in a
dense cluster. If initial fixations still land on the dense
cluster, this would suggest that the effect is determined by
low–level, bottom–up process that are drawn to certain
configural properties. On the other hand, if initial saccades
resist the dense cluster or show an aversion to the dense
cluster, this “anti-density” effect would suggest target
location information provided by dense clusters might be
incorporated into a conscious, top–down strategy such as
deliberately avoiding the dense cluster. However, Myers et
al. (2003; 2004) demonstrate that dense clusters are initially
fixated more than chance and the number of initial fixations
increases with the degree of density and added workload.
Therefore, a dense cluster of stimuli is an attractive
distractor in the current study. Workload was manipulated
between participants as a dual task condition and a single
task condition. Participants in the dual task condition
performed two tasks simultaneously, thereby increasing
cognitive workload. The single task group performed one
task.
If participants were able to resist initially fixating a dense
cluster, the pro-density effect would drop to at most chance
levels in the single task group. This would suggest that
deliberate processes are overriding the influence of
unintentional, data-driven processes on overt behavior in the
task environment. We also predicted no effect of degree of
density (moderate vs. strong) in the single task group. For
the dual task group, we predicted an increase in the pro-
density effect as demonstrated in Myers et al. (2004). This
would suggest that data–driven processes begin to peer
through deliberate strategies in dual task, high load
situations. We did not predict the pro-density effect to
increase two–fold, rather that it would increase to levels
significantly greater than chance. Finally, we predicted that
there would be a significant effect of degree of density in
the dual task condition, specifically that strong densities
would be initially fixated more often than moderate
densities.
Method
Participants
A total of thirty-three undergraduate students volunteered to
participate. All participants had normal, or
corrected–to–normal vision. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two groups. The single task group
performed a visual search task, and the dual task group
simultaneously performed the same visual search task and
an auditory letter classification task. There were 16
participants in the single task condition and 17 participants
in the dual task condition. The study lasted approximately 1
hour, and participants were run individually.
  1.  Fixation
  2.  Stimulus
  3.  Test
Figure 1. One visual search task trial, presented in order
of from top to bottom.
Apparatus
The data collection apparatus consisted of a PowerMac G4
Apple computer running MacOS Jaguar, a 17-inch flat panel
display with the resolution set to 1024 x 768, a chinrest, and
an Eyegaze eye-tracking system developed by LC
Technologies that measured gazepoint at a 60Hz rate.
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Visual Search Task
The visual search task was composed of three different
displays, each presented sequentially and in a fixed order.
Each display was composed of a window and a Found
button. An example of the task is depicted in Figure 1. The
initial display was composed of a single cross hair located in
the middle of the window. The cross hair was used as an
initial fixation point for each trial (top, Figure 1). Once the
eye tracking system determined cross hair fixation, the
stimulus display appeared. The stimulus display (middle,
Figure 1) contained a target (e.g., L) and distractors (e.g., T)
that were randomly rotated about their axes on each trial.
The stimulus display consisted of a 10x10 stimuli matrix,
enabling the display to be divided into four equal quadrants
of stimuli. The L was placed at the center of a randomly
chosen quadrant that did not contain a dense cluster of
stimuli.
The within-subject independent variable, stimuli density,
varied on 3 levels: strong, moderate, and weak with an inter-
stimulus distance of 0.54°, 0.97°, & 1.94° of visual angle,
respectively. Each density level occurred on 33% of all
trials, with quadrant location randomized for each trial.
Quadrants not containing a dense cluster had an inter-
stimulus distance equal to weak. (Hence, on weak density
trials, all four quadrants were of equivalent density.) The L
was never located in a dense cluster of stimuli.
Participants were instructed to find the target as quickly
as possible and were aware there were only four possible
target locations. On target discovery, participants clicked the
‘found’ button. After clicking ‘found’, the test display
appeared (bottom, Figure 1). The test display was divided
into four visible quadrants with the mouse pointer located at
the quadrants’ intersection. Participants were instructed to
click on the quadrant where the target was discovered. Once
the participant clicked on a quadrant, the pointer was
automatically relocated to the ‘found’ button and the
fixation display reappeared, beginning a new trial. Each
participant performed 4 blocks of 48 trials.
Auditory Letter Classification Task
Participants in the dual task condition were acoustically
presented random letters of the alphabet in four-second
intervals via the speaking software Victoria, developed by
Apple™. For each letter presented, the participant pressed X
if the current letter came before the previous letter or C if it
came after. For example, if the subject heard ‘A’ followed
by ‘G’ she would press C signifying ‘G’ occurs after ‘A’ in
the alphabet. If after four more seconds ‘B’ was presented,
she would press X signifying ‘B’ occurs before ‘G’. Letter
presentation occurred every four seconds throughout each
block of 48 trials. Participants were instructed to
simultaneously perform both the visual search task and the
letter classification task to the best of their ability. Each dual
task participant received accuracy feedback on the letter
classification task at the end of each block. No subject
scored below 85% accuracy in the last three blocks. Single
task participants did not participate in the letter
classification task.
Dependent Measures
Our dependent measure was the initial fixation location for
each trial, where the initial fixation is the second dwell on
the stimuli display. The first dwell was a residual fixation
resulting from fixating the cross hair on the fixation display.
Fixations were determined using the eye tracking software’s
default fixation analysis. Initial saccades were defined as the
eye movement from the residual fixation to the initial
fixation.
Results
Comparisons are between the actual number of initial
fixations on a dense cluster and the number expected by
chance. Since there were four possible quadrants to fixate
within, there is a 25% chance that an initial fixation would
occur on the dense cluster. All t-tests reported are two-tailed
and measured at a 0.05 significance level. The first block
was removed to reduce any variance attributable to task
familiarization. Trials in which all four quadrants were of
equivalent density (weak density trials) were excluded from
the analyses.
Single Task Condition
The dense cluster was initially fixated on 23.63% of the
trials when a dense cluster was present. This rate of initial
fixation does not differ from chance [t(15)= –0.71; p  =
0.485]. The planned comparison of degree of density
(moderate vs. strong) was not significant (p = 0.95). This
supports our hypothesis that for the single task there would
be no pro-density effect.
Dual Task Condition
The dense cluster was initially fixated on 17.44% of all
trials. The rate of initial fixation significantly differs from
chance [t(16) = –2.88; p = 0.01]. There was a marginally
significant effect between degrees of density [t(16) = 1.962;
p = 0.067] when comparing moderately dense clusters (M =
15.14, SE = 2.51) to strongly dense clusters (M = 19.86, SE
= 2.72).
In the dual task condition, we predicted a positive effect
of density on initial fixation locations. Instead, we found a
negative effect. Initial fixations on dense clusters of stimuli,
under dual task conditions, were less than would be
expected by chance. We term this the anti-density effect and
explore it in the following sections. We also found the
strong density was initially fixated more often than the
moderate density.
Initial Saccade Latencies (ISLs)
Initial Saccade Latencies were defined as the amount of
time the participant continued to fixate the cross hair
location after the stimuli display appeared. The eye tracker
used in the study sampled the eye position every 16.67
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milliseconds. Each sample in the residual fixation was
counted and multiplied by 16.67 in order to determine each
subject’s ISL for each trial.
ISL Analyses
Before analyzing the ISL data we removed outliers from the
data set. Outliers were identified for each group by
calculating the mean and standard deviation for each group
and removing any data point that exceeded the mean by +/–
3 standard deviations. This procedure resulted in removing
27 data points from the single task group and 41 data points
from the dual task group.  All blocks were included.
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Figure 2. Comparison between dual and single task ISLs.
The error bars represent standard error.
An independent groups t-test was performed between the
dual and single task conditions on mean ISL. The dual task
group had longer ISLs on average (M = 327.79, SE = 11.5)
when compared to the single task group (M = 289.53, SE =
11.3), and this difference was significant, t(31) = 2.37; p =
0.024 (see Figure 2). This result signifies that there was a
difference between the groups average ISL.
Discussion of Results
The single-task manipulation worked as predicted: the
density effect occurred at chance levels. However, our dual-
task manipulation exhibited an anti-density effect. This
result is quite startling in the face of previous research that
consistently demonstrated dense clusters attracting initial
fixations (Myers et al., 2003, 2004). We also found a
marginally significant effect of degree of density in the dual
task condition.
When unintentional processes associated with dense
clusters are not producing an effect, dense clusters should
only be initially fixated at chance levels. However, if
participants were using implicit information provided by the
dense cluster (that the target was not located there), then
participants should avoid dense clusters.  However, 23.63%
of initial fixations are located on a dense cluster of stimuli.
The results do not support dense cluster avoidance for the
single task. In the single task condition it is apparent that the
unintentional attraction of dense clusters has been
overridden by a different, possibly deliberate, strategy.
Perhaps participants learned to avoid the dense cluster in
the single task condition, but were unable to reduce the
effect below chance levels. However, in the dual task
condition, the pro-density effect is reduced to below chance
levels (17.44%, depicted in Figure 3). This was a significant
reduction from chance, and suggested the dense cluster was
avoided. It is apparent that something was aiding
participants to avoid dense clusters in the dual task group.
Initial saccade latencies provided a clue. Due to longer ISLs,
participants might have more time to implement a
conscious, deliberate strategy. We explore this possibility in
the upcoming sections.
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Figure 3. Effects of density by task compared to chance,
error bars indicate 95% confidence interval.
Post-Hoc Analyses
Our initial analyses suggested the letter classification task
aided dual task participants. Extra time might allow
participants to avoid dense clusters. Added time could result
from performing some aspect of the letter classification task
at stimuli display onset, such as making a comparison,
pressing a keyboard key, or even retrieving a memory of the
previous letter presented. Extra time was apparent in
participants’ initial saccade latencies (ISLs). Specifically,
dual task participants had significantly longer ISLs
compared to single task participants. Further analyses were
performed to determine if short ISLs led to a stronger pro-
density effect and longer ISLs led to a weaker pro-density
effect (anti-density effect). All four blocks were included in
the analyses.
 To determine if the pro-density and anti-density effects
occurred at different rates for different ISLs, we divided our
data into 5 bins. Each bin spanned 150 ms, and ranged from
100 ms to 550+ ms. The number of pro-density initial
fixations was derived for each bin and divided by the total
number of initial fixations for the same bin, creating a
percent of pro-density fixations (see Figure 4).
Figure 4 shows a reduction in the pro-density effect as
ISLs increase in duration. Figure 4 also shows that single
task participants followed the same general trend. The
separation between the single task curve and the dual task
curve is a result of the single task having a greater number
of pro-density fixations.
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Figure 4. Pro-density effect as a function of initial
saccade latency, by task.
It is important to note that the 550+ bin does not contain
much data, especially for the single task condition. In fact
these data points may be considered aberrant for the single
task condition, however they fell within the outlier cutoff.
Very few single task participants had ISLs that were 550 ms
or greater, as demonstrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Frequency of initial saccade latencies for each
bin, by task
Figures 2 and 4 provide evidence that there was a
difference in mean ISLs between the dual and single task
conditions. Figure 4 demonstrates that as ISLs increased, the
likelihood of initially fixating a dense cluster reduced
dramatically. In order to test for significance, a 2 (single
task, dual task) x 3 (bins 100–249, 250–399, & 400–549)
repeated measures ANOVA was performed. The 550+ bin
was removed from the analysis due to insufficient data in
the single task group, as demonstrated in Figure 5. Results
indicate that there is a significant interaction [F(1,2) =
3.292; p  = 0.045)] between the presence of the letter
classification task and ISLs (see Figure 6). There was also a
main effect of ISL on the percent of initial fixations on a
dense cluster [F(1,2) = 31.275; p < 0.0001)].
Summary and Discussion
The results of our post-hoc analyses revealed a surprising
effect. Participants were aided in the dual task condition via
the auditory task. Generally, aid came in the form of not
initially fixating distracting dense clusters. As a result of
increased ISLs, the visio-cognitive system gained the
opportunity to acquire and use information relevant to the
task at hand. This analysis suggests that low-level strategies
are chosen based on the soft constraints inherent in the task
environment (Gray & Fu, 2004).
In previous research (Myers et al., 2003, 2004) dense
clusters were uninformative and we found that dual task
situations increased the pro-density effect. In the current
study, dense clusters were made informative and the
information was somehow used in a beneficial manner.
When dense clusters are uninformative, they should always
be considered as a possible target location. However, when
a dense cluster provides target location information, then it
becomes possible to reduce your search costs, and is akin to
differences in saccadic selectivity as a function of distractor
ratios discussed by Shen et al. (2000). Costs attributable to
the current experiment’s search space begin at very low
levels. However, when the opportunity arose to reduce cost,
providing benefit by reducing the search space, both dual
and single task participants seized the opportunity. This
occurred at greater rates as ISLs increased. It appears that
the visio-cognitive system is extremely sensitive to cost-
benefit tradeoffs, even when the cost is an average of one
extra fixation. Our data suggests a limit: enough time must
be provided in order to achieve a reduction.
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Figure 6. Interaction of initial saccade latency and task
condition. Error bars represent standard error.
The reasons for and ways in which purposeful, top-down
strategies interact with automatic, data-driven processes are
unclear; however our analyses do shed some light. The data
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suggest that the pro-density effect is an automatic,
data–driven process. This is attributable to short ISLs
leading to high percentages of initial fixations on dense
clusters. This was observed in both task conditions when
ISLs were relatively short (see Figure 6). Dense clusters
were avoided on roughly 90% of all trials in both task
conditions when ISLs were ≥ 400 ms. This suggests more
time is necessary to impose deliberate, top–down strategies.
In addition, dense clusters were initially fixated more than
chance levels for short ISLs. This indicates that automatic,
data–driven processes have more influence in overt behavior
when ISLs were relatively short, and as ISLs increased the
ability to impose top–down strategies on the search task
increased. Soft constraints theory suggests that after initially
adopting a least-cost strategy, such as avoiding the dense
cluster, the number of initial fixations on dense clusters
should be reduced as the new microstrategy gains in success
over time. It is likely that participants do reduce initial
fixations from block 1 to block 4 for all ISL bins, and this
reduction would be an example of a learned, unconscious,
data-driven strategy.
Further support comes from the planned comparisons
between moderate and strong densities in the dual task
condition. When top-down processes are sapped by added
workload, there are differences between strong and
moderate densities. However, there was no difference in the
single task condition. When deliberate top–down strategies
are taxed, it is likely that bottom-up processes have an
opportunity to exert more control on overt behavior.
Pomplun, Reingold, & Shen (2003) have developed a
computational model (Area Activation Model) that predicts
where saccadic endpoints will be located. These locations
are based on information in the search space such as color
and shape. The current study points to areas in the model
where more work is needed; namely, that stimuli
configuration and cognitive workload are important aspects
of visual search that must be considered when developing
models of saccadic selectivity.
Although the experiment revealed surprising effects, we
did not design the experiment with these effects in mind.
We see this as a possible limitation in our study and feel that
more studies such as the one presented here need to be
completed to understand the true nature of the effects that
stimuli configurations and high levels of cognitive workload
have on visual search.
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Abstract 
 
Two experiments are reported which examine how 
manipulations of visual attention affect adult speakers’ 
linguistic choices regarding word order and verb use when 
describing simple visual scenes.  Participants in Experiment 1 
were presented with scenes designed to elicit the use of one of 
two perspective verbs (e.g., “A dog is chasing a man”/“A man 
is running from a dog”).  Speakers’ visual attention was 
manipulated by preceding the display with a crosshair 
positioned on one or the other character.  Cross-hair position 
affected word order and verb choice in the expected direction.  
Experiment 2 replicated this effect with a subliminal 
attention-capture cue, and results were further extended to the 
order within conjoined noun phrases in sentential subjects (“A 
cat and dog are growling…”).  The findings have important 
implications for incremental theories of sentence planning and 
suggest some specifics for how joint-attention might serve as 
a useful cue to children learning verbs. 
 
Introduction 
 
What makes people say what they say?  This is a complex 
question, which has been the source of much investigation 
and dispute over the past several decades.  Early on in the 
generative linguistic tradition, the emphasis on the 
productive and creative power of structural expression led 
many researchers to assume that properties of a visual 
stimulus can be related to a speaker’s linguistic choices in 
only vague and theoretically uninteresting ways (e.g., 
Chomsky, 1957).  Currently, though not disputing that one 
can say – or not say – many different things under the same 
environmental conditions, investigators doing experimental 
research on word order and structural choices in sentence 
production have concluded that some combination of 
perceptual, conceptual and linguistic accessibility contribute 
in a dynamic way to utterance planning.  In particular, 
questions of word order have received much attention, and 
prompted much debate, as this issue must be richly 
intertwined with the planning of both an utterance’s 
overarching message and the syntactic structure carrying 
that message.  In advance of speaking, one must somehow 
decide where the upcoming utterance is to start, and much 
of how it is to proceed.  A number of factors seem to 
contribute to this process.   
First, studies have found a crucial role for preferred (i.e. 
primed or otherwise accessible) syntactic structures in the 
form a message ultimately takes (e.g. Bock & Loebell, 
1990).  Additionally, lexical/conceptual factors (e.g. 
accessibility, animacy) have been shown to affect word 
order materially, even at the expense of a preferred syntactic 
structure (Tversky, 1977; Bock, 1986; MacDonald, Bock & 
Kelly, 1993).  
The role perceptual prominence plays in word and/or 
constituent order, however, seems a bit more nebulous.  
Within the literature on visual attention, it is quite clear that 
perceptual cues are involved in the interpretation of visual 
stimuli; research on perception of ambiguous figures (e.g. 
duck/rabbit, wife/mother-in-law) has shown that the 
perception of such stimuli can be driven by localizing eye 
gaze on critical features of a given interpretation 
(Georgiades & Harris, 1997).  And perceptual factors (e.g. 
size, color) are clearly involved in ordering within simple 
conjoined noun phrases (e.g. A bear and a dog) (Osgood & 
Bock, 1977; Gleitman, Gleitman, Miller & Ostrin, 1996), 
but the role of perceptual prominence in constituent order 
remains unclear.  Some find no relationship between 
initially fixated stimuli and subject role assignment (Griffin 
& Bock, 2000), while others find evidence supporting a role 
for attention (perceptual prominence) in constituent order 
(Tomlin, 1997; Forrest, 1996).   
Some have interpreted these latter results as evidence for 
an incremental account of language production, in which a 
speaker builds an utterance as it is produced, and is apt to 
begin with whichever sentential elements are most salient at 
the time of speech onset.  This account contrasts with more 
structuralist version of sentence planning, in which the 
underlying message of an utterance must be wholly planned 
prior to the onset of speech, and which accounts for the 
robust and reliable effects of syntactic priming (see Bock, in 
press, for discussion).   
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A troubling issue with all prior investigations into 
perceptual prominence and word ordering arises, however, 
if one examines the methodology.  Manipulations have all 
been overt attention-getting devices (raising demand 
characteristic concerns), and have often had rigid task 
demands allowing for minimal generalization. 
The current research investigates the question of 
perceptual contributions to word and constituent order, 
drawing on the attention and perception literature for more 
suitable methods.  In two experiments, subjects’ attention 
was directed subtly (Experiment 1) and then subliminally 
(Experiment 2) to scene participants, to determine whether 
perceptual cues under these covert conditions have any 
effect on the linguistic choices speakers must make.  If such 
perceptual factors lead subjects to differing descriptions of 
identical scenes, a clear role can be established for 
attentional factors in sentence planning and constituent 
order.  Such results may also provide evidence for an 
incremental approach to production, or perhaps, rather, to 
message planning.  Finally, as we describe later, these 
effects may rebound on aspects of word learning. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
In the spirit of the afore-mentioned perceptual attention 
research on ambiguous figure resolution, our first 
investigation of attentional effects on event interpretation 
used a simple crosshair fixation point – prior to stimulus 
presentation – to direct a subject’s eye gaze to a scene 
participant (analogous to directing gaze to a set of critical 
features in the ambiguous figure literature).  Stimuli were 
designed to elicit one of two word order and verb choices on 
the part of the speaker, thereby making one or the other 
character in a scene the subject of the sentence.   If initial 
visual attention subtly alters a speaker’s perspective on the 
scene, we should expect that the speaker’s choice of 
sentential subject and verb would be influenced by our 
attentional manipulation.  
 
Methods 
 
Norming and Stimuli Prior to initiating data collection on 
an attention-manipulating task, the specific stimuli to be 
used were normed, to identify baseline rates of verb 
selection for these particular items.  Twenty-one 
monolingual English-speaking University of Pennsylvania 
Intro Psychology students participated for course credit.  
Subjects were presented with the 52 pictures to be used in 
experiment one, and asked to describe the event that was 
taking place in the scene using a simple sentence.  No other 
manipulations or cues were introduced.  Of these 52 
pictures, twelve depicted pairs of so-called Perspective 
Verbs (e.g. chase/flee, see Figure 1), and these were the 
critical items (PVs).  
Rates of verb use for these twelve items varied (see Table 
1), but for each verb pair, subjects showed some degree of 
bias towards one interpretation and/or verb choice; there 
was a preferred verb and a dispreferred verb, and hence a 
corresponding preferred subject and dispreferred subject 
(passives were rare, occurring only 6 times across all 252 
items).  Overall, preferred subjects and verbs were used 
69% of the time, dipsreferred subjects and verbs were used 
27% of the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Sample Perspective Verb item from Experiment 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Norming study baseline rates of verb usage in PV 
stimuli in Experiment 1.  Percentage of total usage across all 
utterances in parentheses. 
 
Item Preferred 
Verb 
Dispreferred 
Verb 
   
Buy/sell Sell (62) Buy (38) 
Chase/flee 
(dog/man) 
Flee (57) Chase (43) 
Chase/flee 
(rabbit/elephant) 
Chase (71) Flee (29) 
Eat/feed 
(puppies/dog) 
Feed (76) Eat (24) 
Eat/feed 
(child/mother) 
Feed (95) Eat (5) 
Give/receive Give (71) Receive (29) 
Listen/talk (office) Talk (76) Listen (24) 
Listen/talk 
(phone) 
Talk (19) Listen (29) 
Perform/watch 
(singer) 
Perform (67) Watch (33) 
Perform/watch 
(speaker) 
Perform (86) Watch (14) 
Win/lose (boxing 
match) 
Win (95) Lose (5) 
Win/lose (race) Win (48) Lose (24) 
 
Participants and Design Eighteen monolingual English-
speaking Introductory Psychology students at the University 
of Pennsylvania participated in this study for course credit.  
There were three conditions, defined by the location of the 
crosshair fixation point prior to scene presentation:  
Dispreferred (where the dispreferred subject would appear), 
Preferred (where the preferred subject would appear), and 
Middle (a neutral middle region, as a control).  
Manipulations were within-subjects, with each subject’s 
gaze directed to the dispreferred subject on four of the 
twelve critical items, to the preferred subject on four of the 
1000
twelve critical items, and to a neutral middle region on the 
remaining four items.   
 
Procedure Subjects in this experiment were presented with 
52 scenes depicting participants engaged in a given activity 
(e.g. a picture of a boy swimming), including the twelve 
critical items, depicting perspective verb pairs.  Subjects 
were instructed to describe each picture using one simple 
sentence, and subjects’ utterances throughout the task were 
recorded.   
A crosshair fixation point preceded presentation of each 
of the 52 scenes.  This fixation point was presented on-
screen for approximately 500 msec, then immediately 
followed by presentation of the scene (either filler or trial).  
(Earlier pilot work with an eyetracker confirmed that 
subjects followed directions and routinely fixated the cross 
prior to stimulus presentation.)  Subjects in the current study 
were misled to believe that position of the crosshair was 
random and irrelevant to their task, so as to prevent their 
eyes from inspecting scenes in the same fashion on each 
trial.  Position of the crosshair in fact corresponded directly 
to position of an upcoming scene participant.  Although 
some subjects noted that the fixation marker frequently had 
been where an object appeared, no subject reported noticing 
the correlation between the location of scene participants 
and the crosshair.  And in post-experimental interviews, 
most subjects who bothered to posit a guess as to the 
experiment’s purpose speculated that it pertained to color 
brightness and/or interpersonal relationships of scene 
elements. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Rate of preferred verb usage was highly influenced by cue 
location in the expected direction (see Figure 2).  In 
particular, when the preferred subject (e.g., the dog) was 
visually cued, speakers uttered on 77% of the trials 
sentences like “A dog is chasing a man.”  When the 
dispreferred subject was cued, however, speakers produced 
such utterances only 61% of the time (and showed a 
corresponding increase in utterances like “The man is 
running from the dog”).  Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) 
on participant and item means revealed that the effect of cue 
location was significant (both p’s<.05).    
 
Experiment 2 
 
Following the results of Experiment 1, a couple of questions 
arose.  First were concerns regarding demand characteristics 
of the crosshair fixation point manipulation.  Although 
subjects did not seem to sense the specific purpose of the 
experiment (namely, subject and verb selection), many 
noticed that the crosshair’s position frequently corresponded 
to an object in the upcoming scene.  We worried that this 
knowledge alone might have subtly influenced their 
linguistic choices.  To this end, we developed an attention-
capture cue (see Jonides & Yantis, 1988), as discussed 
below, which successfully directed subjects’ attention to a 
particular region of the scenes, without being consciously 
perceptible.   
 Secondly, as discussed previously, much prior research on 
sentence production and linguistic choice has compared the 
role of many different factors, from animacy to size of 
entities, on differing constructions.  Specifically, different 
variables seem to contribute differently to linguistic choice 
in simple conjoined noun phrases (e.g. the dog and the man 
vs. the man and the dog) than to linguistic choices involving 
thematic role assignment (e.g. the dog chased the man vs. 
the man fled the dog).  In Experiment 2, we wanted not just 
to replicate our prior result, but also to compare the 
influence of our covert attention-capture manipulation on 
these sorts of different constructions.  To this end, twelve 
additional items were added in Experiment 2, depicting 
events in which two scene participants were engaging in an 
activity together (see Figure 3, designed to elicit “The 
cat/dog and the dog/cat are growling at each other”).  These 
Conjoined Noun Phrase (CNP) items were aimed at eliciting 
descriptions containing a conjoined noun phrase in the 
sentential subject position (e.g. A dog and a cat are 
growling), so as to investigate the effect of our covert 
manipulation on word order in a simple conjoined noun 
phrase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Sample Conjoined Noun Phrase item from 
Experiment 2. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of utterances beginning with the
preferred subject and verb, by condition, in Experiment 1. 
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Methods 
 
Norming and Stimuli CNP pictures were first normed for 
baseline preferences.  Twenty-one monolingual English-
speaking University of Pennsylvania Intro Psychology 
students described 64 scenes (52 fillers, and the 12 CNP 
items), absent any manipulations or cues.  In an effort to 
avoid utterances beginning with uninformative sentential 
subjects (e.g. “Two people are…”), CNP stimuli consisted 
of scenes with animal, rather than human, participants (e.g. 
a dog and a cat growling, see Figure 3).   
Baseline rates of first-mentioned scene participants varied 
less than with the PV stimuli in Experiment 1 (See Table 2).  
Most items were relatively unbiased, but scene participants 
with even a slight advantage were dubbed Preferred First-
Mentioned, and referred to as such from this point onward, 
for the sake of simplification.  Overall, preferred first-
mentioned participants were mentioned first 56% of the 
time, dispreferred first-mentioned only 44%. 
 
Table 2: Norming study baseline rates of first-mentioned 
participants in CNP stimuli in Experiment 2.  Percentage of 
total usage across all utterances in parentheses. 
 
 
An additional consideration that arises when adding the 
CNP stimuli is orientation.  As previously mentioned, one 
factor driving word order in conjoined noun phrases is the 
left-to-right bias, with leftmost participants more likely to be 
first mentioned.  This prediction bore out in the current 
norming study as well, with leftmost participants mentioned 
first 78.2% of the time for CNP items (as compared to only 
52.8% of the time for PV items in prior norming study). 
 
Participants and Design Forty monolingual English-
speaking Introductory Psychology students at the University 
of Pennsylvania participated in this study for course credit.   
Both the location of the attention-capture cue and the left-to-
right orientation of the scene were systematically varied, 
creating a 2 X 2 design (cued participant X leftmost 
participant) and four stimulus lists.  Manipulations were 
within-subjects, with each subject assigned randomly to one 
of these four lists.   
 
Procedure Subjects in this experiment were presented with 
64 scenes: the same 40 fillers and 12 PV scenes used in 
Experiment 1 and the 12 normed CNP scenes.  Subjects 
were instructed to describe each picture using one simple 
sentence, and subjects’ utterances and eye movements were 
recorded throughout the task.   
Prior to stimulus presentation, subjects fixated a crosshair 
fixation point (equidistant from the two scene participants) 
for 500 msec.  Subjects were misled to believe that position 
of the crosshair was randomized, to assist the experimenters 
in maintaining eyetracker calibration accuracy (no subject 
reported suspecting anything otherwise).  The fixation point 
was then followed by a brief, covert attention-capture 
manipulation.  This manipulation consisted of a small black 
target area (subtending an area of approximately 0.5X0.5 
degrees of visual angle) against a white background, with a 
duration of 60-80 msec, followed immediately by the 
stimulus.  Although no subject reported noticing the 
subliminal cue, it was highly effective in capturing 
attention.  Subjects looked first to the cued location a 
median of 76% of the time.  
 
Results 
 
Table 3 shows rates of mentioning the Preferred First-
Mentioned participant first for the CNP stimuli, and Table 4 
shows rates of using the Preferred Subject for the PV stimuli 
for all four conditions in the 2X2 design.  Collapsing across 
sentence types, significant effects of Left-Right Position and 
Attention-Capture were observed; leftmost and cued entities 
were more likely to be first-mentioned (p’s<0.01).  Further   
analyses showed that Left-Right orientation was significant 
only for word order in CNP stimuli (p<0.01), not for subject 
selection in PV items. Both sentence types, however, 
showed significant, stable effects of Priming, with primed 
characters more likely to appear first in CNPs (p<0.05) and 
to be the subject of a perspective verb (p<0.01).   
Item Preferred First-
mentioned 
Dispreferred 
First-mentioned 
Biking Turtle (61.9) Dog (38.1) 
Dancing Fish (57.1) Bear (42.9) 
Eating Koala (52.4) Panda (47.6) 
Growling Cat (52.4) Dog (47.6) 
Juggling Elephant (52.4) Seal (47.6) 
Jumping Frog (57.1) Cat (42.9) 
Playing 
cards 
Pig (57.1) Dog (42.9) 
Playing 
horns 
Rhino (52.4) Snail (47.6) 
Rowing Bear (52.4) Snowman (47.6) 
Skating Monkey (57.1) Rabbit (42.9) 
Swinging Elephant (61.9) Monkey (38.1) 
Waiting Penguin (52.4) Deer (47.6) 
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Table 3: For all four conditions of Conjoined Noun Phrase stimuli, proportion of utterances in which subjects mentioned 
Preferred First-Mentioned participant first 
 
 Preferred First-Mentioned 
Primed 
Dispreferred First-
Mentioned Primed 
Average 
Preferred First-Mentioned 
on Left 
79.3% 63.8% 71.6% 
Dispreferred First-
Mentioned on Left 
58.1% 41.4% 49.7% 
Average 68.7% 52.6%  
 
 
Table 4: For all four conditions of Perspective Verb stimuli, proportion of utterances in which subjects mentioned used 
Preferred Subject 
 
 Preferred Subject 
Primed 
Dispreferred Subject 
Primed 
Average 
Preferred Subject on 
Left 
87.4% 66.4% 76.9% 
Dispreferred Subject on 
Left 
77.3% 60.1% 68.7% 
Average 82.3% 63.2%  
General Discussion 
 
Language Production Overall, our results show a role for 
perceptual prominence in constituent ordering, and may be 
taken as support for a more incremental approach to 
sentence production.   
It is important, however, to keep these results in the 
context of the current literature on the subject of speech 
production.  Although Griffin and Bock (2000) found no 
correlation between first-fixated scene participants and first-
mentioned participants, in an extensive investigation into 
the time course of message extraction from a visual scene, 
they did show tightly linked eye movement and speech 
patterns once an utterance was to begin; subjects looked 
reliably to an object less than a second before producing the 
corresponding word.  This, and other research in this vein 
(Bock, Irwin, Davidson & Levelt, 2003), implies a system 
that begins with an initial, message-planning stage, followed 
by a more incremental process of retrieving the necessary 
lexical elements to construct an utterance (see Bock, in 
press, for discussion).   
Our result is in no way inconsistent with this model of 
speech production.  It is quite possible that subjects in our 
studies, rather than beginning to incrementally code their 
final utterance at the onset of the stimulus, begin with an 
information-extracting, message-planning stage, and that the 
perceptual priming effects we see take effect in this early 
stage.  In the analogous ambiguous-figure literature, such 
attentional manipulations seem to affect the way subjects 
perceive, or interpret a stimulus.  This may well be what’s 
resulting from our similar attention-driving tools: a different 
perception, or interpretation of the stimulus.  Ongoing 
research will investigate the effects of the same perceptual 
prime on both transitive verbs – where subjects must shift to 
an infrequent, passive structure to alter subject role 
assignment – and symmetrical predicates – where prominent 
information tends to appear in the object role/position (e.g. 
“I met Meryl Streep” vs. “Meryl Streep met me”) (Gleitman 
et al., 1996).  These explorations into the underlying nature 
of the perceptual prime should begin to determine where 
and how it is having its effect. 
 
Language Acquisition These results have interesting 
implications for word learning studies as well.  It has been 
noted that perspective verb pairs should be specifically very 
difficult for children acquiring a language to learn, as in 
many cases both members of these pairs necessarily co-
occur under the same situational circumstances (Gleitman, 
1990; Fisher, Hall, Rakowitz & Gleitman, 1994); for 
instance, a child is not apt to be presented with a situation 
that involves chasing but, at the same time, does not involve 
fleeing, and vice versa.  How can the young learner figure 
out, then, whether the mother was saying “chase” or “run 
away?”  These studies showed that syntactic information 
can inform the listener/learner as to the speaker’s intended 
meaning.  By varying the syntactic frame in which a novel 
verb appeared while referring to a perspective verb stimulus 
(e.g. “The man is glorping the dog” vs. “The dog is glorping 
the man,” with regard to Figure 1) Fisher et al. showed that 
young listeners are quite adept at using this syntactic input, 
or “zoom lens,” to arrive at the same interpretation intended 
by the speaker. 
Another “zoom lens” that is more closely related to the 
present studies, is joint visual attention of speaker and 
listener.  Infants as young as 2-months-old engage in such 
gaze-following activities (Bruner, 1998), looking where an 
adult is looking, during conversation.  Moreover, by 12 to 
18 months of age, the infant can successfully use this gaze-
1003
direction information as a cues for how to label new objects 
(Baldwin, 1993).  Contributions of attentional cues to word 
learning have not been as broadly or rigorously investigated 
for the case of verb learning.  Given our current result on the 
relationship between attention-direction and variation 
between subject and verb choice, we suggest that similar 
attentional cues are available to the young language learner 
in successfully parsing and interpreting speech as well, even 
in the especially difficult case of perspective verbs. 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the results of these two experiments as they 
interface with relevant prior investigations clearly 
demonstrate a relationship between attention and language 
production.  Further investigation will be necessary to delve 
into the detailed nature of this relationship, and explore the 
way it fits into a model of language production.  These 
results, though, and the implications they have for 
attentionally-aware young language learners trying to 
interpret the speech stream, open exciting new investigative 
doors in both language production and acquisition. 
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Abstract
Building new information tools to support cognitive work
requires research at a level that, within the constraints of time
and resources, will reveal higher-order cognition among
practitioners. Practitioners develop cognitive artifacts in order
to perform technical work. As densely encoded representations
of work domains, their artifacts embody the most meaningful
information in the task setting. The study of cognitive artifact
development and use makes it possible to study individual and
team cognition. This approach reveals what information is
important, and how practitioners capture and use it. As replicas
of physical artifacts, digital cognitive artifacts often amount to
only meager representations of what matters in the work
environment. This clumsy automation imposes a burden on
practitioners by forcing them to cope with its shortcomings. In
this setting, user-centered automation must support reasoning
through time. The study of physical artifacts indicates ways that
digital artifacts might better support temporal reasoning.
 Use of Cognitive Artifacts
to Understand Technical Work
The coordination of anesthesia assignments at a major urban
teaching hospital spans 50 to 80 cases a day and requires the
orchestration of multiple departments including anesthesia,
surgery, nuclear medicine, obstetrics and gynecology,
gastrointestinal endoscopy, diagnostic and interventional
radiology, and psychiatry.  This activity involves a distributed
cognition (Hutchins, 1995), that is comprised of the shared
awareness of goals, plans, and details that no single individual
grasps. Through socially distributed cognition (Perry, 1999),
individuals cultivate the mutual awareness and understanding
that is needed to collectively accomplish shared goals.
Surgeons, anesthesiologists and the others at the hospital
work to a Standard of Medical Expertise (SME).  Resources
among care settings, patient populations and system are
constrained and must be allocated prudently in order to meet a
Standard of Resource Use (SRU). (Sharpe and Faden, 1998). A
few of the senior anesthesiologists serve in the role of daily
coordinator, assigning staff to perform a full schedule of
anesthesia, sedation or pain management procedures each
weekday. To do this, the coordinator must evaluate the number
and types of procedures, determine the number and types of
staff available, assign staff to perform procedures, and
evaluate the balance between the two. The coordinator
typically manages the execution of that schedule on the
following day.  Management of this process involves the
synchronization of complex, changing activities through
time. This requires an accurate grasp of the number and
nature of available staff as well as an accurate, up-to-the-
minute account of procedures that have been performed so
far, are underway, and have yet to be performed within work
setting constraints.
   Research into cognitive activity in this setting is
challenging for a number of reasons. Healthcare practitioners
may have little insight into how their work is organized.
Information and interaction at the sharp (operator) end is
dense, complex, varies widely, and changes rapidly. (Cook
and Woods, 1994)
     In order to understand cognition in this environment, the
researcher needs to employ a number of  methods. Woods
and Roth’s (1988) cognitive engineering approach studies
behavior in actual environments in order to change behavior
and to improve performance. Klein’s (2000) naturalistic
decision making (NDM) approach accounts for the
performance of decision makers in actual settings. Hutchins’
(1995) ethnomethodology describes how  distributed
cognition  includes artifacts that make it possible for a group
to accomplish shared goals.
The development and use of cognitive artifacts makes it
possible to perform the otherwise impossible process of
assignment coordination. Cognitive artifacts are an efficient
representation of what matters here because they represent
only the information that is critical in this work domain.
Previous work (Nemeth 2002, 2003a) describes the use of
observational studies to discover how the acute care team
uses cognitive artifacts to make the plan for the day’s work.
It also explains how controlled study of artifact creation
reveals the strategies that coordinators employ in order to
create a feasible future for the next day of procedures. Two
artifacts are essential to the coordinator while developing a
plan. The Daily Availabilities sheet is used to account for
the status of each of the members in the department who are
available for assignment. The preliminary copy of the Master
Schedule lists all procedures that are scheduled to be
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Figure 1:Anesthesia Coordinator Schemata Analysis (selected portion)
Copyright (c) 2004 Christopher Nemeth.  All rights reserved.
and Preliminary Copy that he refers to are shown at center,
along with indications of where he is paying attention. A
diagram and comments at right show the analysis of his
cognitive activity as he assigns available attending and
resident anesthesiologists to cover procedures in eight
outpatient clinic rooms. After scoping the supply of staff
resources and evaluating the type and  number of procedures,
the coordinator assigns staff to particular procedures and then
assesses the assignments.  In eleven minutes, he has assigned
attending and resident anesthesia staff to perform a day’s
performed the following day that will require anesthesia,
sedation or pain management. These two artifacts are the tools
that are used to create the Master Schedule.
An example shows how one coordinator uses the Daily
Availabilities sheet and the preliminary copy of the Master
Schedule to build a final version of the Master Schedule. Figure
1, from Nemeth (2003b), represents the schedule development
process in three ways. The left column shows the verbatim
transcript of how the coordinator describes his deliberations
using Verbal Protocol Analysis (VPA). The Daily Availabilities
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Figure 2: Master Schedule Physical Artifact (upper) and OpAssign format (lower)
All names are fictitious
IOR      OR Time    End Time    Cls/Rr Patient Name           Age     Primary Surgeon  Anesthes   Anes  Procedures Progress St    Event
IOR1    07:30         11:30        SDA Smith, Christine       17yrs   Barnes         Connor     GEN   Resection of Subaortic Membr In OR
        Watts
IOR1    12:15         16:15        SDA Delano, Ashley         4mos   Barnes         Connor     GEN   Left Upper Lobectomy R-404
        Watts
IOR2
IOR3     07:30         09:30       SDA       Malone, Anna            77yrs   Potter        Ellenson    GEN  Left Total Knee Replacement   In OR
        Morey
IOR3     10:15         11:45          SDA Perry, Helen             62yrs   Potter                 Ellenson   GEN   Hip Total Arthroplasty, Cement  R-325
        Morey
Copyright (c) 2004 Christopher Nemeth  All rights reserved
.
 shown on a flat screen monitor. As a mimic of the physical
Master Schedule,  OpAssign shows surgical procedures that
are organized by room and by time of day within the room.
All procedures are represented by alphanumeric characters
and each procedure occupies the same amount of space in
the layout. Colored bars are intended to indicate case status
such as called for, arrived on unit, in OR, in-progress,
delayed, and concluded. Procedures appear identical on the
display even though they differ as markedly in criticality and
duration as a circumcision and a coronary artery bypass graft
(CABG).
A number of changes have occurred as a result of the
transition from physical to digital cognitive artifact.
 The physical artifact had previously made it possible for
the coordinator to control the accuracy of information that
was used to make decisions. Only the coordinator would
make marks on the one original hard copy that was posted at
the coordinator station. The physical artifact also allowed
for the coordinator to make margin notes to keep track of
unofficial, yet important information such as the name and
extension of a staff member who had called with information
outpatient procedures. This planning process requires deep
domain knowledge and deft diplomacy. It also requires the
ability to exploit opportunities, to create trial solutions and to
assess their possible consequences. No two coordinators
approach the process in the same way. Until recently, the
coordinator would use only hard copies of the artifacts to
develop the Master Schedule. During the day the coordinator
would track and update case status by making marks on the
Master Schedule hard copy that was posted at the Inpatient
Operating Rooms (IOR) coordinator station. Team members
also used the OR Board, a white marker board with magnetic
plaques, as a platform to discuss assignments, negotiate trade-
off decisions, plan and re-plan assignments, speculate about
how to re-balance changes in demand and staff.
Digital Artifact Concerns
Hard copies of the Master Schedule have recently been replaced
by a computer-based system, OpAssign. The Daily Availabilities
remains a hard copy report that the coordinator refers to while
composing the Master Schedule.
     The OpAssign display is an alphanumeric table that is
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that pertained to a case. Now that the Master Schedule is no
longer a physical artifact, neither the coordinator nor the acute
care team can annotate it.
 Data field limitations force certain compromises in the
information that can be shown. Many elements of information
are truncated on the OpAssign display. Details can only be found
by drilling down through multiple levels of the interface.
 Information on case status was traditionally written onto the
Master Schedule hard copy by the coordinator as a patient was
wheeled past the coordinator station toward an IOR room.  Now,
case status must be entered via laptop from a very busy IOR
room. This means that information on the Master Schedule
display can lag actual events by 30 minutes or more. The lag
causes the coordinator to second guess the display and to do
additional cognitive work to check on case status. It also erodes
the coordinator’s ability to manage decisively.
 Case location on the original hard copy remained the same.
Team members could use the fixed location for each case to
find and refer to it. As case status changes through the day on
OpAssign, their location on the screens also changes and team
members have to search to find them.
These and other shortcomings have caused team members
to do additional cognitive work to cope with limitations of the
digital display, impeding team performance. Figure 3 shows
OpAssign in use at the coordinator station.
  Opportunities to Improve Displays
Interestingly, both the hard copy of the Master Schedule and
the OpAssign display list scheduled start and end times.
However, neither of these two reflect the time-related
demandsand complexity that are the primary drivers in this
environment. Figure 4 illustrates a conceptual prototype for
a digital version of the Master Schedule information that
draws on the findings from research into coordinator schedule
development and team schedule use. Six of the IOR rooms
are shown in the figure. Information on each case is shown
in a horizontal bar that is aligned next to the label of the
operating room to which it is assigned. A shaded segment
follows each procedure to indicate the 45 minute period that
is required to clean-up and restock the room. The arrow at
top of the display indicates that the time is 0800 on the day
of procedures that are being conducted in the Inpatient
Operating Room (IOR) unit.
     IOR1 shows that a half hour is open after the first
procedure and clean-up have been completed. The procedure
that is scheduled for 0730 to 1330 in IOR2 has just been
cancelled and the display indicates that the room is scheduled
and prepared for use. IOR3 shows that cases are scheduled
efficiently. IOR4 is available for any general surgery to be
added on after 1215. Somehow, the second procedure
scheduled for IOR6 has been slated to start before the
technicians would be able to finish clean-up. The solid bar
can be used to display more information on the cases by
choosing it with an input device such as a mouse or touching
the screen.
   Certain information is crucial in order to optimize
assignments. This includes knowing when procedures are
likely to finish, which procedures can be moved into another
room, and which opportunities (such as Medicare payment)
might be exploited.  Such information can be made available
by polling the database of scheduled cases to see what
opportunities may exist.
     The example in Figure 4 is based on research into the
work domain in which it would be used. Because of this, it
avoids many of the shortcomings that the OpAssign display
encountered. It may also improve on the OpAssign design in
a number of respects.
 The visual organization of the display remains the same as
it evolves. By using a graphic representation of time, the
team can understand and evaluate relationships among events
through time.
 Relevant variables such as age are shown within each case
window, which saves the need to locate and assemble
information that is related but is displayed separately.
 Cases that were performed remain on the display in
sequence, making it possible to review the entire day’s
activities while they are still underway.
 Aspects of schedule management that were previously
hidden are made evident. These include requirements that
are the objects of coordinator cognitive work such as showing
conflicts and gaps in timing, and constraints on schedule
management such as room clean-up and restocking.
Figure 3: OpAssign Display at Coordinator Workstation
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       Speculation—Digital artifacts can enable coordinators
to speculate about and choose among possible courses of
action. For example, speculation about plans for the afternoon
staff is currently limited to the OR Board. Developing
potential courses of action would make it possible to evaluate
how desirable they might be.
     Consequences—Applying evaluation criteria to potential
courses of action could make it possible to display the
consequences of choices. One example is to show how billing
might be increased, or costs might be minimized, by opening
one operating room or closing another.
       Value-based decisions—Digital artifacts can be used to
develop templates of schedule planning strategies.
Coordinators could review and use the template that best
matches their values and preferences. Such templates can
capture scheduling expertise and make it available beyond a
single individual. Study of template use through time might
open the way to insights about coordinator training and the
development of further schedule models that might ease
coordinator workloads.
Figure 4: Prototype Digital Display of the Master Schedule
All names are fictitious
Copyright (c) 2004 Christopher Nemeth. All rights reserved.
IOR1
IOR2
IOR3
IOR4
IOR5
IOR6
0730 0800 0900 1000 1100 1200 1300
1330
Smith, Christine 17yr
Resection of Subaortic Membrane (pump)
Loc: SDA, Sur: Barnes, An:Connor, AnRes: Watts
Malone, Anna 77yr
Left Total Knee Replacement
Loc: SDA, Sur: Potter, An:Ellen, AnRes: Mo...
Delano,Ashley
Left Upper Lobectomy
Loc: SDA, Sur:.. 1615
Perry, Helen 62yr
Hip Total Arthroplasty, Cemented
Loc: SDA, Sur: Potter, An:Ellen...
X
X
S
CARDIAC
CARDIAC
GENERAL
ORTHO
GENERAL
GENERAL
Morrow, Billy 53yr
Kidney Transplant Live Donor
Loc: SDA, Sur: Harney, An:Rupert, AnRes:
Norcross, Anette 59yr
Laparascopic Cholesystectomy Poss Open
Loc: 23, Sur: Alberta, An:Calumet, AnRes: Palevsky
Miller, Edwin 82yr
Bronchoscopy, Mediastinoscopy
Loc: SDA, Sur: Formosa, An:Colem..
Timmerman, Bruce 7yr
Right Thorachotomy, Sleeve Lobectomy (double lumen tube)
Loc: SDA, Sur: Potter, An:Ellen, AnRes: More
1430X
Spinner, Ruth 70yr
Left Knee Total...
Loc: SDA ...
1345 X
Pullman, Katherine 53yr
Laparoscopic Roux-en-y Gastric Bypass
Loc: SDA, Sur: Alberta, An:Calumet, AnRes: Pal...
Adding Value to Cognitive Tools
Any tools that are created to assist these complex and highly
sensitive interactions need to reflect the underlying complexity
of the work that is to be performed. A digital version of the
Master Schedule might improve team performance by
supporting work in ways that the research that was described
earlier in this paper demonstrated.
The flexibility that digital representation offers is powerful
and can be used to support cognitive work. However, this does
not happen automatically. The digital artifact’s design must
represent constraints and opportunities that are relevant in this
domain. Because time is the key aspect here, organizing display
design according to time allows users to easily track changes,
to anticipate future events, and to respond to emerging
situations.
Further features such displays might provide include:
     Prompting—Digital artifacts might survey information in
the distributed cognition for gaps and inconsistencies that go
unnoticed and unaccounted for. Nominating the item(s) for
consideration would enrich and improve the cognition.
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Conclusion
This paper has described a detailed study of the operational
aspects in a complex, high hazard work setting, assessed the
role and effect of physical and digital cognitive artifacts on
cognitive work, and presented a display concept that embodies
the task demands that workers confront. Support for the cognitive
work of those who labor in this setting is the hallmark of user-
centered automation. (Billings, 1997)
As a readily available source of information, cognitive
artifacts make it possible to study cognition in complex
environments. Because those who work in the environment have
created them, artifacts are highly encoded representations of
what matters most in complex settings. The creation and use of
cognitive artifacts also provide the researcher with a means to
understand deeper structure of behavior in the work domain.
Findings from such research can be used to identify the
functions of computer-supported displays that are needed to not
only support but to improve performance. Validation of those
findings and related display designs will come from operator
acceptance in actual use.  Improving work efficiency and
reliability can make it possible for  work teams to be more
effective, thereby improving medical safety.
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Abstract 
The paper reports empirical and computational research on 
semantic facilitation and inhibition in the picture-word 
interference paradigm for different values of stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA). The main claim it makes is that purely 
semantic facilitation effects are conditioned by the degree of 
picture-word semantic similarity in contrast to inhibition 
effects for which categorical relatedness is typically 
sufficient. The experimental results support this claim and a 
simulation with an attractor neural network attempts to 
provide a unified account of semantic facilitation and 
inhibition in this paradigm as a function of SOA. 
Introduction 
Semantic facilitation from context words in a picture 
naming task, just like semantic priming in visual word 
recognition, has been a somewhat controversial issue. 
However, in picture naming, unlike word recognition, the 
issue does not seem to have been settled in favor of 
facilitation. It is naturally to ask then why purely semantic 
facilitation should show up when making a lexical decision 
or reading words but not when naming pictures. Both 
methodological and theoretical grounds are examined as 
potentially responsible for the failure to establish such a 
result with a picture naming task. The claim we attempt to 
support is that the categorical view on semantic similarity, 
as opposed to a graded featural one, is mainly responsible 
here. However, if facilitation is shown to be possible, one 
has to face the challenge of accommodating it with other 
experimental results, notably picture-word interference, in 
the framework of a general theory of speech production. 
Originating with the study of Rosinski, Golinkoff & 
Kukish (1975), the picture-word interference paradigm 
established a classical result in the psycholinguistic 
literature. To put it succinctly, it takes more time to name 
the picture of an object in the presence of a semantically 
related word than in the presence of an unrelated one. For 
instance, naming the picture of a DOG in the presence of the 
word ‘cat’ takes longer than in the presence of  ‘tree’. 
The classical study of Glaser and Düngelhoff (1984) 
opened the way to time-course analyses of the interference 
effect in the picture-word paradigm by systematic 
manipulation of the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
values, i.e. the temporal difference between the onsets of the 
two stimuli on a trial, the target picture and the context 
word. Examining different SOA values ranging from –400 
to 400 ms, where negative SOA values correspond to word 
onset preceding picture onset, the two researchers found 
semantic inhibition in a small time window around 
synchrony (SOA=0) with a maximum inhibitory effect at 
100 SOA. A facilitation effect at – 400 ms SOA, on the 
other hand, was not found to be significant. 
Semantic interference around synchrony has been 
replicated many times and extended to cover various 
modifications of stimulus properties such as modality of the 
prime, category of named objects, stimulus duration, SOA 
etc. (Alario, Segui & Ferrand, 2000; Damian & Martin, 
1999; La Heij, 1988; Roelofs, 1992; Schriefers, Meyer & 
Levelt, 1990; Starreveld & La Heij, 1996). 
Facilitation at early SOAs, on the other hand, was more of 
a debated possibility. While the early studies of Sperber, 
McCauley, Ragain and Weil (1979) and Carr, McCauley, 
Sperber and Parmelee (1982) reported facilitation, later 
research failed to obtain it (Alario, Segui & Ferrand, 2000; 
Glaser & Glaser, 1989; La Heij, Dirx & Kramer, 1990). The 
reason invoked for this difference was twofold. First, early 
studies used long or very long SOAs – Sperber et al. (1979), 
for instance, reported facilitation for an interstimulus 
interval of as much as one second – which opened the gate 
to strategies on the part of subjects. Second, they failed to 
separate semantic from associative relatedness. ‘Dog’ and 
‘cat’, for example, are good candidates not only for 
cohyponims, i.e. members of the same semantic category, 
but also for close associates as recorded by free association 
norms. The nature of the facilitation could have been then 
associative rather than semantic as suggested by robust 
purely associative facilitation results at negative SOA 
values (Alario, Segui & Ferrand, 2000; La Heij, Dirx & 
Kramer, 1990; Lupker, 1988). As a result, currently the 
issue seems to be settled pretty much against the possibility 
of purely semantic facilitation at negative SOAs. 
The debate on facilitation in the picture-word paradigm 
can be paralleled quite interestingly with the debate on 
automatic semantic priming in lexical decision and word 
reading. Does a word prime speed up, for instance, the 
lexical decision for a semantically related word compared to 
a semantically unrelated one? The examination of many 
studies investigating this issue cannot give us a straight 
answer (see Neely, 1991 for a review). Similarly to the line 
taken in the picture-word paradigm, it was suggested that 
automatic priming in such a task reflects only an associative 
relationship (Shelton & Martin, 1992). 
McRae and Boisvert (1998) suggested that the divergence 
of results and the failure to elicit purely semantic priming in 
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a number of studies could be due to an inadequate 
conception of semantic relatedness. In many of the previous 
studies two concepts have been taken as semantically 
related if they belonged to the same intuitive semantic 
category as judged by the researcher. However, if 
categorical relationships do not reflect accurately the 
organization of our semantic memory and only approximate 
quite roughly the graded nature of semantic similarity, e.g. 
featural similarity (McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg, 1997), then 
our choice of semantically related prime-target pairs in the 
experiment should be performed accordingly. McRae and 
Boisvert tested their hypothesis in a series of experiments 
with a lexical decision task controlling the semantic 
similarity of stimuli. The results supported their hypothesis. 
Highly similar pairs, e.g. turkey – goose, did elicit semantic 
priming at –250 ms while less similar pairs, e.g. turkey – 
robin, did not. Purely semantic priming was also obtained 
with synonyms and near-synonyms by Perea and Gotor 
(1996) both in lexical decision and word reading tasks, a 
result which adds further support to the hypothesis 
mentioned above. 
In picture-word experiments researchers also tend to 
adhere to a categorical understanding of semantic 
relationship. Two concepts are judged as semantically 
related if they relate as cohyponyms or as category – 
exemplar pairs. This is enough to guarantee a reliable 
interference effect, so facilitation is searched for by the 
same standards. What if facilitation is a smaller effect 
sensitive to the degree of similarity between picture target 
and context word? An average or even low degree of 
similarity might be enough for a large and robust 
interference effect around synchrony but facilitation at 
earlier SOAs might remain undetected. 
If one could show, as we attempt below, that there is 
semantic facilitation and, additionally, that it is conditioned 
by the degree of semantic similarity, that would be a 
successful extension of the results from one experimental 
paradigm to another and additional support for a graded 
view of semantic relatedness. However, it would amount to 
more than simply importing an experimental result from one 
paradigm to another. In picture-word experiments, in 
contrast to primed lexical decision or word reading, 
semantic interference is the rule. Putting together semantic 
facilitation and inhibition as a function of SOA is the 
challenge one would have to face next. A simulation with an 
attractor neural network is our candidate for accommodating 
these opposite effects. 
The proper way of understanding and deploying semantic 
relatedness, on the other hand, might not be the only 
problem in detecting a small facilitation effect in picture-
word experiments. One particular aspect of the procedure 
made use of in such experiments can also be a source of 
worry. In most of the studies in the paradigm, subjects are 
allowed to familiarize themselves with the target pictures 
and their proposed names in a pre-experimental session. 
Presenting the pictures and their desired names in advance 
certainly offers a number of benefits like keeping low the 
rate of misnaming errors. Familiarization with the target 
pictures is also supposed, as argued by Glaser and 
Düngelhoff (1984), to homogenize subjects with respect to 
visual processing of the pictorial stimuli. All of this, 
however, comes at a price. Subjects are primed before the 
experiment with the visual stimuli. Asking them to name the 
pictures in a pre-experimental session extends the scope of 
priming to all levels of processing in speech production. 
Moreover, having subjects learn the names of the pictures in 
advance could be a way of turning a lexical task into more 
of a memory task. Instead of accessing semantic memory 
for the concept corresponding to the picture, subjects may 
try to recall the name used for it before the experiment. The 
impact of these factors on the detection of a semantic effect, 
especially a small one, is hard to predict. The alternative we 
offer is a careful control of the pictorial stimuli, in particular 
their name and image agreement. Optimizing the stimulus 
material rather than preparing subjects for the test could be a 
reasonable alternative. 
Experiment 
The experiment addresses mainly the possibility of a 
semantic facilitation effect at an early SOA in the picture-
word interference paradigm. The hypotheses we explore 
ascribe the failure to find such an effect in previous studies 
to an inadequate view on semantic similarity and to 
procedural specificity.  
First, the experiment aims at exploring the role of 
semantic similarity in this paradigm. The question we ask is 
whether a high degree of semantic similarity, as opposed to 
simple categorical relatedness, could induce such an effect 
at an early SOA. 
Second, we attempt to improve on the experimental 
procedure by eliminating subjects’ familiarization with the 
stimulus material before the experiment and replace it with 
careful control of the stimuli. If this familiarization is the 
main culprit for hiding facilitation, we would expect to 
detect such an effect independent of the degree of picture-
context word semantic similarity as long as they qualify for 
categorical relatedness. 
Finally, as we deploy a somewhat nonstandard procedure 
and as it is the first time an experiment in this paradigm is 
run with Bulgarian stimuli, it is desirable to seek the 
replication of the classical result in the paradigm, i.e. 
semantic inhibitory effects around synchrony. 
Participants 
We tested 45 undergraduate students at the New Bulgarian 
University in Sofia, Bulgaria. All were native Bulgarian 
speakers and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
None of them participated in the norming studies performed 
in advance on the stimulus material used in the experiment. 
Materials and Design 
Thirty-six black-and-white drawings of common objects 
were selected from the pool of items for which norms are 
available in Bulgarian as part of the crosslinguistic study of 
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Bates et al. (2003). The choice of items was guided mainly 
by the attempt to maximize their nameability or consensus, 
i.e. percent of subjects naming the picture with the same 
name (dominant name), and image agreement as rated by 
subjects on a 1-to-7 scale. The main properties of the 
materials are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Properties of the target picture stimuli. 
 
 Mean Range 
Consensus (%) 92 78-100 
Image agreement 
(1-7) 
5.7 4.6-6.6 
Subjective 
frequency (1-7) 
4.7 3.5-6.2 
Concreteness (1-7) 5.9 4.5-6.7 
 
Next, 36 picture-word pairs were constructed such that 
each picture and its corresponding word denote concepts 
from the same intuitive semantic category, e.g. spider and 
ant as insects. Care was taken that the pairs would not be 
close semantic associates by the examination of free 
association norms for Bulgarian (Gerganov, Ivancheva, 
Kurlova, Nikolov & Nikolova, 1984). 
The total set of pairs was split in two halves as they 
scored higher (M=5.03, SE=0.15) or lower (M=3.33, 
SE=0.1) on a semantic similarity test in which 20 subjects 
were asked to rate the degree of similarity of the objects 
denoted by the pair items on a 1-to-7 scale (1 – very 
dissimilar, 7 – very similar). 
Each picture was additionally assigned a nonword and an 
unrelated word by random choice of a word from a different 
semantic category. Thus, our first factor was type of 
context: semantically related, unrelated and nonword. 
Context type was crossed with the SOA. Three values were 
chosen to cover the time-course of semantic effects in 
picture naming: -350, 0 and 100 ms. Negative SOA values 
indicate that the context item was presented before the target 
picture. Both factors were within-subject. 
Nine different lists were constructed containing all 
picture-word pairs, an equal number of pairs per condition. 
Half of the semantically related pairs in each list fell in the 
higher semantic similarity group while the other half in the 
lower semantic similarity one. 
Procedure 
Subjects were randomly assigned to lists and tested 
individually using the PsyScope Experimental Control Shell 
on a Macintosh computer with a 14-in. monitor. 
The pictures were scaled and centered in an imaginary 
square with dimensions 4.5° X 4.5° visual angle. The 
(non)words, displayed below the pictures, were selected for 
each target so as to maximize the length match with their 
corresponding pictures. Both stimuli on a trial, the picture 
and the distractor, were thus displayed within an imaginary 
rectangle with dimensions 4.5° X 6° centered in the middle 
of the screen. 
The subjects were instructed to name the pictures that 
would appear on the screen as quickly and accurately as 
possible with the best name they could think of and to avoid 
false starts, hesitations or extraneous material. 
Each experimental trial had the following structure. A 
fixation crosshatch appeared in the center of the imaginary 
rectangle containing the picture and the (non)word for 200 
ms followed by a 50 ms blank interval. Depending on the 
SOA, next appeared the picture, the (non)word or both. The 
(non)word stimulus duration was set to 200 ms. The target 
picture remained on the screen for a maximum of 2 seconds. 
The picture disappeared from the screen as soon as a vocal 
response was registered by a voice key.  
The experimental session was preceded by a 6 trial warm-
up set to let subjects familiarize with the task. There was no 
previous presentation of the stimulus material in the 
experiment and once presented stimuli were not repeated 
later with the same subject. 
Results 
Responses such as productions of names different from the 
dominant name, verbal disfluencies or no responses were 
scored as errors and excluded from the analysis. Three 
subjects and two items were excluded from the analysis 
because of the large percentage of errors they produced 
(more than 25 %). The error percentage for the remaining 
trials reached a level of 6.4%. Latencies greater than 3 SDs 
above the mean per condition were also removed. The 
resulting mean naming latencies per condition averaged by 
subjects are presented in Table 2. Positive values for 
semantic effects indicate facilitation while negative values 
indicate inhibition. 
 
Table 2:  Mean naming latency and semantic effect per 
condition1. 
 
SOA Context type 
- 350 0 100 
Semantically related 892 973 958 
Semantically unrelated 911 941 934 
Nonword 898 910 910 
Semantic effect 19 -32* -24* 
 
An overall analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted 
on the RT data, with context type and SOA as within-
subject factors. Both analyses, by subjects and by items, 
revealed significant main effects for distractor type2 
(F1(2,82)=12.99; F2(2,66)=8.51), for SOA (F1(2,82)=23.96; 
F2(2,66)=13.48) and for their interaction (F1(4,164)=6.52; 
F2(4,132)=2.97). The lexical effect between the unrelated 
word condition and the nonword one was also found 
significant in a separate analysis (F1(1,41)=9.11; 
F2(1,33)=66). Naming latencies were significantly smaller 
at the negative SOA compared to either of the other two 
conditions. More importantly, we obtained semantic 
facilitation at –350 ms SOA and inhibition at 0 and 100 ms. 
Planned comparisons run for each of the SOA values 
established significant inhibitory effects both at synchrony 
                                                          
1 Effects significant at  p<.05 are marked with an asterisk *.  
2 In all analyses reported, p<.05 unless otherwise stated. 
1013
(F1(1,41)=6; F2(1,33)=11.27) and at 100 ms (F1(1,41)=4.8; 
F2(1,33)=4.3). However, at the negative SOA there was 
only a trend to semantic facilitation both by subjects and by 
items (F1(1,41)=3.48, p<.07; F2(1,33)=3.42, p<.08). 
Next, planned comparisons by items between the related 
and unrelated conditions were run at each SOA separately 
for the high and low similarity sets. They both replicated the 
inhibition pattern found at 0 and 100 ms with all items. The 
only difference showed up for the negative SOA where 
semantic facilitation reached significance for the high 
similarity set (F(1,16)=4.57) but not for the low similarity 
set (F(1,16)=0.5, p<.56). An additional power analysis 
showed the power to detect with all items an effect of the 
same size as the one obtained with the high similarity set 
was as high as 0.84. 
The error analysis did not lead to any significant results. 
Discussion 
The experiment tested the possibility of detecting semantic 
facilitation at a negative SOA along with inhibition around 
synchrony in the picture-word interference paradigm. 
One hypothesis ascribing the failure to detect facilitation 
in previous experiments to potential procedural drawbacks, 
namely pre-experimental familiarization of subjects with the 
stimulus material, was not supported by the results. Without 
familiarization we only noticed a trend to facilitation at –
350 ms SOA (Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984). However, we 
were able to replicate the inhibition results they and many 
others reported for small positive SOAs. 
A second hypothesis linked this failure to too rough a 
conception of semantic similarity, namely categorical 
relationship. A move from a categorical view to a featural 
similarity view on semantic similarity proved successful in 
obtaining semantic facilitation in the word recognition 
paradigm (McRae & Boisvert, 1998). Making the same 
move in the picture-word interference paradigm proved to 
be a successful strategy, too. Categorical relatedness alone 
was not enough to deliver a significant facilitation effect. 
But high semantic similarity did provide us with such an 
effect. Additionally, the power analysis indicated that 
categorical relatedness, that is, the analysis including all 
semantically related pairs, was very likely to detect a 
significant effect of the size of the one we observed with the 
high semantic similarity set, if such an effect existed. The 
absence of a graded inhibitory effect at positive SOAs, on 
the other hand, was not a surprising result. As categorical 
relatedness is able to ensure large inhibitory results, a 
ceiling effect seems a likely explanation for this absence. 
However, one worry we still need to address is the 
possibility of strategy use. Facilitation alone is not at stake. 
One has to ensure it is automatic. We could argue against 
expectancy effects at least on two grounds. First, 350 ms is 
still a small interval. It does not depart so much from the 
250 ms limit proposed by Neely and Keefe (1989) for 
ensuring automaticity of effects and is still far from the 
large SOA values used in the early studies. Second, a lower 
relatedness proportion is believed to diminish or eliminate 
expectancy effects for long SOAs, e.g. de Groot (1984). 
Related pairs made up only a third of the stimuli subjects 
were presented and they could have deployed expectancy 
strategies meaningfully only at –350 ms SOA, that is, on 
one ninth of the total number of trials. Taken together, the 
size of the interval and the proportion of the occasions for 
potential strategy use could offer reasonable support for the 
claim that the semantic effect we observed was automatic. 
Finally, our results and interpretation need to be qualified 
by the remark that they were obtained in Bulgarian, a Slavic 
language. To what degree effects like the one we investigate 
are sensitive to language characteristics is an experimental 
question. The study of Bates et al. (2003) raised such an 
issue with respect to timed picture naming. One peculiarity 
noticed about Bulgarian in this study was that naming 
latencies were longer than in other languages. In our 
experiment we also obtained naming latencies a little longer 
than the ones reported in similar experiments carried out in 
other languages. However, we were successful in replicating 
semantic interference effects for this language as they have 
been observed in many others. That only gives further 
ground for the expectation that semantic effects are robust 
enough across language dissimilarities. 
Simulation 
Once experimental evidence is available, the next step 
would be to offer an explanation for the effect in the general 
framework of a speech production theory. A unified account 
of semantic inhibition and facilitation in a picture naming 
task as a function of SOA would be the main challenge here. 
If we conceive of the speech production system as a series 
of layers (stages) one on top of the other, we might get a 
very general idea of the way most theories in the field go. 
The sequence semantic representations (semantic 
processing) – lemmas (syntactic processing) – lexemes 
(morpho-phonological processing) – phonetics is a good 
candidate here (Dell, 1986; Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999). 
The interference effect is typically explained in this 
framework by competition / inhibition of the lexical items at 
the level built on top of semantics, e.g. lemmas (Roelofs, 
1992) or lexemes (Starreveld & La Heij, 1996). A 
semantically related word compared to an unrelated one 
activates more its corresponding lexical unit at the next level 
as it receives additional support from the semantic 
representation of the target to be named. Thus it makes a 
more powerful competitor than the lexical representation of 
an unrelated word and interference shows up as a result. 
In order to explain the pair of facilitation - inhibition 
effects in single word production we set up a small 3 layer 
neural network simulating lexical item activation based on 
semantic input. The input layer hosts semantic 
representations distributed over a set of feature units. The 
output layer stands for localist representations of lexical 
items at some level in the speech production system, 
possibly lexemes. The hidden layer thus compresses the 
intermediate levels of processing, notably lemma (syntactic) 
processing. Therefore, we may view the network as a 
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simplified model of speech processing in three stages: 
concept activation, lemma retrieval and lexeme selection.   
 A 20 X 30 X 20 feedforward architecture was enriched 
with a full set of interconnections at the hidden layer 
(without self-connections). Continuous spread of activation 
and a continuous version of backpropagation through time 
(Pearlmutter, 1989) as a training algorithm were made use 
of in order to be able to simulate temporal properties and 
relations of the stimuli like SOA and stimulus duration as 
well as naming latencies (see Plaut, 1995). 
The network was trained for a fixed amount of time on 20 
input-output pairs. The inputs were random distributed 
patterns on the semantic layer while the outputs were 
localist lexeme representations. That is, each input pattern 
was supposed to activate only its corresponding lexeme 
node on the output layer. Semantic relatedness was 
simulated by featural overlap. We had 15 related input pairs 
sharing on average around 5 features and 3 for a minimum. 
Another 15 unrelated pairs had at most 2 features in 
common. The first item in each pair stands for the concept 
denoted by the context word while the second stands for the 
meaning evoked by the picture.  
In the simulation context meanings were presented to the 
network by clamping the state of the semantic layer to their 
assigned representations for a limited amount of time. 
Target meanings, in contrast, were presented to the network 
until the network settled, that is, until no lexeme unit 
changed its state by more than an output tolerance value. 
The time needed for the network to settle provided us with 
an estimation of naming latencies. 
The three SOAs in the experiments were simulated by 
presenting the context meaning before the meaning of the 
target, at the same time or after it. Figure 1 presents the 
results. Both the mean latency differences and the size of the 
three SOAs are given in network time units. (The absolute 
time scale of the network is arbitrary.) 
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Figure 1: Mean latency differences between the related and 
unrelated conditions for three SOA values  
 
The simulation replicated the experimental pattern of 
results: facilitation at an early SOA and inhibition for 
positive SOA values. Tracing the patterns of activation at 
both the hidden and the output layer suggested to us the 
following explanation of the effects. Related input patterns 
tend to have similar hidden layer representations or, at least, 
more similar than unrelated input patterns. Thus, it takes 
less time for a negative SOA to change the overall hidden 
layer configuration moving from a related context to the 
target than from an unrelated one. Therefore, the locus of 
the facilitation effect seems to be the hidden layer, that is, in 
our interpretation, the lemma level. Next, inhibition shows 
up at synchrony and at a short positive SOA as the lexeme 
node for a related context tends to be more active than the 
lexeme of an unrelated context making it a stronger 
competitor for the target node. On the other hand, 
processing of related and unrelated contexts did not seem to 
make much difference at the hidden layer. So, we could 
conclude that the locus of the inhibition effect is the lexeme 
level rather than the lemma level (see also Starreveld & La 
Heij, 1996). To conclude, the simulation offers a tentative 
explanation of both effects suggesting, however, that they 
reside at different levels and stages of processing. 
The theoretical relevance of the simulation and the 
architecture we proposed intends to reach, however, farther 
than the simulation of the two opposite semantic effects we 
discussed. The key feature, we could say, is a distributed 
conception of lemma representation and the view that 
lemma retrieval corresponds to slipping into an attractor 
rather than activating above threshold a distinct lemma 
node. While the theoretical advantages of such a proposal 
are certainly in need of evaluation, we believe it could 
answer a major challenge put forward by Caramazza (1997): 
why should the speech production system be in need of 
lemma entities? The answer we propose is that lemmas play 
the role of a hidden layer in a connectionist network, namely 
they re-represent the semantic input (see also Dell, 
Schwartz, Martin, Saffran & Gagnon, 1997 for a similar 
suggestion). However, if lemmas continue to be conceived 
of as separate individual nodes as current models describe 
them (Dell, 1986; Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999), it is hard 
to see how such a re-representation could take place. 
Distributing lemmas across a set of features, on the other 
hand, can make them serve that purpose. 
 
Conclusions 
A graded featural view of semantic relatedness, as opposed 
to simple categorical relatedness, proves to be essential for 
ensuring purely semantic facilitation effects not only in 
word recognition but also in picture naming. Besides giving 
support to a featural account of semantic similarity and 
semantic memory organization, this also serves as a warning 
that categorical relations might be too rough a conception of 
semantic relatedness for the detection of potential semantic 
effects in various tasks. 
Different loci for semantic facilitation and inhibition in 
picture-word experiments as a function of SOA are 
identified based on a simulation with an attractor neural 
network – the lemma level and the lexeme level in our 
interpretation. A hypothesis concerning the distributed 
nature of lemma representation is advanced with the more 
general goal of motivating the presence of lemmas in the 
speech production system. 
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Abstract
To investigate people’s ability to update memory in a dy-
namic task environment we use the experimental card game
TRACS™ (Burns, 2001). In many card games card count-
ing is a component of optimal performance. However, for
TRACS, Burns (2002a) reported that players exhibited a base-
line bias: rather than basing their choices on the actual num-
ber of cards remaining in the deck, they chose cards based on
the initial composition of the deck. Both a task analysis and
computer simulation show that a perfectly executed memory
update strategy has minimal value in the original game, sug-
gesting that a baseline strategy is a rational adaptation to the
demands of the original game. We then redesign the game
to maximize the difference in performance between baseline
and update strategies. An empirical study with the new game
shows that players perform much better than could be achieved
by a baseline strategy. Hence, we conclude that people will
adopt a memory update strategy when the benefits outweigh
the costs.
Introduction
Optimal performance in dynamic environments requires that
we base our decisions on the current state of the world, not on
past states. Radar operators must act on the basis of continu-
ously changing variables such as plane altitude and heading.
Drivers constantly need to monitor the current speed limit,
posted road signs and the traffic behind and in front of them.
Failure to mentally update these types of information can lead
to dangerous decisions and catastrophic behavior. Even our
chances to win at card games like Blackjack or Bridge are
closely tied to our ability to count cards and update memory.
Previous research suggests that human ability to monitor
and adjust to change is limited and dependent on various fac-
tors. Yntema (1963) found that people are better at tracking a
small number of variables with a large range of values each,
than a large number of variables with a small set of possi-
ble values each. In addition, reducing the frequency of up-
date can improve performance. Other manipulations, such
as increased predictability of a sequence, provide little or no
advantage in remembering the current state of the environ-
ment. Venturino (1997) distinguished the memory capacity
for static information from that for dynamically changing in-
formation and showed that the latter is highly limited, par-
ticularly when the to-be-remembered attributes are similar.
Hess, Detweiler and Ellis (1999) added that update perfor-
mance is improved when spatial invariants constrain where
different data values are presented on a visual display.
In general, human rational behavior is constrained by the
structure of task environments and the computational capa-
Table 1: Baseline distribution of cards in the deck. The back
of every card shows only its shape, whereas the front shows
both its shape and color.
Shape: N   N  
Color: red red red blue blue blue
Initial deck: 6 4 2 2 4 6
bilities of the actor (Simon, 1990). To capture functional
relationships of complex tasks while abstracting away from
domain specific details we advocate the use of synthetic task
environments, or microworlds (Gray, 2002). If the properties
of the synthetic task environments are known and manipula-
ble, the scope and limits of human rationality can be assessed.
Moreover, the effects of environmental changes are tractable.
Straight TRACS
TRACS™ is a ‘Tool for Research on Adaptive Cognitive
Strategies,’ designed and developed by Kevin Burns (2001,
2004). Being both entertaining card game and experimental
research tool, TRACS provides a microworld which promises
to bridge the gap between mathematical rigor and real-world
relevance. We will limit our discussion to Straight TRACS,
which is the simplest version of an entire family of games.1
TRACS is played with a deck of 24 cards. The back of each
card shows one of three shapes—circle, triangle, or square—
filled in with black. The front of each card shows both its
shape, and one of two colors (red or blue). Table 1 shows
the initial deck distribution for each of the six possible card
types. This baseline information is always available to the
player. As hands are played the number of cards remaining
in the deck decreases, and the odds for each shape change
accordingly.
At the start of a game, three cards are dealt in a row. The
middle card is dealt face up (showing both its shape and
color), while the left and right cards are dealt face down,
showing their shape not their color. The task for the player
is to choose the card, either left or right, most likely to match
the color of the middle card. The chosen card is then turned
over, revealing its color. If the chosen card matches the color
of the middle card, a hit is credited to the player’s score. A
mismatch is scored as a miss. The two face up cards (the mid-
dle and the chosen card) are then removed from the game. On
1Online versions are available at www.tracsgame.com.
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the next turn, the unchosen card is flipped over and becomes
the new middle card, and two new cards are dealt face down
to the left and right. A game lasts 11 turns, at which point
there are not enough cards in the deck to deal another hand.
A player’s objective in TRACS is to maximize the number of
hits.
As a probe of the player’s assessment of odds at each turn,
Burns (2002a, 2002b) added a confidence meter to the task.
On each turn, players were presented with a red to blue color
gradient for each of the two face-down cards. Prior to choos-
ing a card, the participants used the gradient to indicate the
likelihood of each candidate card to be red or blue. In an-
other condition, Burns used a scale of nine buttons rather than
a continuous spectrum. For consistency reasons all gradient
estimates were rounded to the nearest button, corresponding
to the nearest 12.5%.
Burns (2002a) characterized players’ likelihood estimates
as exhibiting a baseline bias; i.e., their judgments of odds
deviate systematically from the actual odds in the direction
of the initial card distribution. There are six types of color–
shape combinations. Burns (2002b) reports that players could
only monitor 2–4 types of cards with reasonable reliability.
He concludes that the dual tasks of concurrently counting and
normalizing numbers ‘are naturally hard’ and that continu-
ously updating odds exceeded the cognitive capacity of the
‘unaided mind’ (Burns, 2002a, p. 159).
In the following sections, we will challenge this claim both
theoretically and empirically. To preview our conclusions,
we find that subtle constraints in the task environment can
have profound effects on the strategy adopted by participants.
The reported baseline bias is revealed as both rational and
adaptive when considered in light of a cost-benefit analysis of
the environment. We then demonstrate that players will adopt
a more effortful memory strategy if the cost-benefit structure
of the environment rewards this.
Tracking TRACS
Given the original finding that players find it challenging to
succeed at TRACS, a natural starting point for our investiga-
tion is a task analysis. What specifically makes this game so
difficult to play?
Task Analysis
In describing TRACS as a game of ‘confidence and conse-
quence’ Burns (2001, 2002b) distinguishes two subtasks of
diagnosis and decision. On each turn, a player first provides
an odds judgment for each face-down card and then chooses
one on the basis of these estimates.
Extending Burns’ analysis, we suggest that each turn in-
volves a minimum of three distinct cognitive tasks: a mem-
ory retrieval task, an odds conversion task, and a decision
task (see Figure 1). The first subtask on each turn consists
in remembering how many cards of each candidate shape and
color remain in the deck. As the initial card distribution is
provided in terms of frequencies and players encounter card
instances through a process of natural sampling, we assume
that this retrieval is framed in terms of natural frequencies.
Secondly, the retrieved frequencies need to be converted into
odds, which is a non-trivial process involving Bayes’ rule for
natural frequencies (Gigerenzer, 2000). For example, to de-
Initial deck 
of cards
1. Memory retrieval task:
Recall frequencies
2. Conversion task:
Compute probabilities
3. Decision task:
Choice of card
Memory: 
Initial deck 
− cards played
New turn:
Outcome:
Cognition Update 2
Update 1
Figure 1: Subtasks and memory updates required on each turn
of Straight TRACS.
termine the likelihood of a red triangle, a player has to divide
the number of red triangles currently left in the deck by the
sum of red and blue triangles left in the deck. As people
are notoriously bad at dealing with probability information
(see Gigerenzer, 2000, and Koehler, 1996, for reviews) it is
conceivable that this translation process incurs a loss of accu-
racy. If so, merely asking for likelihood estimates confounds
memory updates with probability judgments and may under-
estimate players’ true memory capacity. As a third subtask, a
player needs to integrate all estimates and decide which can-
didate card is more likely to score a hit on the current trial.
In addition to these three subtasks, each turn requires two
distinct updates of memory. The first update is necessary as
soon as the middle card is revealed. If the middle card hap-
pens to be a red triangle, the player needs to realize that there
now is one less red triangle left in the deck. The second up-
date ought to occur at the end of a turn when the chosen card
is revealed. This second update is critical, as at this point in
the game, players may be distracted by focusing exclusively
on the correctness of their choice and ignoring the additional
information revealed.
This task analysis reveals both the complexity and sim-
plicity of TRACS. On one hand, multiple subtasks and mem-
ory update requirements make the game quite challenging.
Even if frequency information on card types was readily
available, the conversions into probabilities, comparisons be-
tween odds, and selection of cards introduce potential sources
of error. On the other hand, remembering and updating a list
of six numbers (representing the current frequency of each
card type) does not in itself seem beyond the capacity of hu-
man memory.
The Impact of Memory
At first glance, it seems that TRACS is a ‘memory game’
(Burns, 2001, 2002a) in which players can succeed only by
remembering which cards have left the deck. However, our
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experience playing TRACS casts some doubts on the impor-
tance of memory. Due to the random card selection process a
typical game contains many knowledge-indeterminate turns.
For example, whenever both face-down cards show the same
shape, a player has no choice but to guess. Likewise, both
face-down cards frequently have the same color, so that the
player scores a hit or miss regardless of knowledge or choice.
Even when the cards differ in shape, color, and odds, it is pos-
sible that selecting the card with higher actual odds results in
a miss, whereas choosing the ‘wrong’ card scores a hit.
These concerns raise questions about whether memory
really matters. To what extent can poor performance be
blamed on failures of memory? Would better memory im-
prove performance? The non-deterministic nature of the
game makes it hard to answer these questions analytically;
thus, we implemented the game as a computer simulation.
Simulation As Allen Newell and Herbert Simon famously
stated, “Just as a scissors cannot cut paper without two blades,
a theory of thinking and problem solving cannot predict be-
havior unless it encompasses both an analysis of the structure
of task environments and an analysis of the limits of rational
adaptation to task requirements.” (1972, p. 55). In this spirit,
we created a simulation in MATLAB™ in which ‘pure’ cog-
nitive strategies could be formalized and implemented. By
running these artificial agents for thousands of trials, we were
able to determine precise performance levels, despite the dy-
namic and nondeterministic aspects of the game.
We compared four cognitive agents that differed in their
memory resources and strategies, but did not make any errors
in odds translation or judgment. A baseline agent has perfect
knowledge of the initial deck distribution, but is amnesic with
regards to the cards played during a game. In contrast, the
update agent enjoys perfect memory of every hand played,
and bases all choices on the actual odds at any given moment.
Two additional agents bracket the performance of baseline
and update agents: random agent has neither memory nor
knowledge of the initial distribution, and hence is forced to
blindly guess at every turn. On the other end of the scale, om-
niscient agent effectively enjoys X-ray vision and can observe
the colors of both candidate cards, allowing for optimal card
selections without the need for memory or odds estimates.
The mean score for the random agent across 10,000 simu-
lated games was 5.24 (out of 11 possible) hits per game. To
our surprise, baseline and update agents performed about the
same, scoring 6.57 and 6.79, respectively. Thus, the aver-
age performance difference between the baseline and update
agents was roughly two tenths of one point per game. Fur-
ther, both strategies achieved only marginally better scores
than the random strategy.
Figure 2 shows the mean percentage of hits per turn for
each agent. It is obvious that the performance of baseline
and update agents are very similar, except for an increasing
benefit of update strategy late in a game. The entire range
between random and omniscient performance scores is only
25%, which is essentially due to 25% of all turns not allowing
for a hit.
While an optimal update agent acts to maximize perfor-
mance regardless of the effort involved, humans have limited
cognitive resources and are required to negotiate cost–benefit
tradeoffs (Anderson, 1990; Simon, 1990, 1992). Given these
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Figure 2: Simulation results for four artificial agents playing
10,000 games of original TRACS.
constraints and the minimal benefits of an update strategy,
participants might well have adopted a baseline strategy for
good reasons. Thus, our analysis suggests a re-interpretation
of Burns’ original findings: In Straight TRACS, memory up-
date yields no performance benefit over adopting a much eas-
ier baseline strategy. Hence, adopting the baseline strategy is
both adaptive and rational.
TRACS*
The simulation results suggest that—by not offering an incen-
tive to a memory update strategy—Straight TRACS is inad-
equate for investigating people’s willingness and capacity to
monitor and update changing environmental circumstances.
In this section we introduce TRACS*, which provides a clear
benefit for adopting an update strategy, as well as introduces
additional probes of memory performance.
In designing TRACS*, we sought to create a variant of the
game for which a memory update strategy clearly benefits
performance. We achieved this by carefully controlling the
cards dealt to the players. While cards were selected ran-
domly, they were selected from a card space constrained by
two rules. First, only pairs of face-down cards that would not
have equal odds of matching the target color would be dealt.
By eliminating ties, this rule eliminates the need to guess.
Second, pairs were not selected if the card with the lower
odds resulted in a hit, or if the card with the higher odds did
not. This rule aimed to reduce the influence of luck by elimi-
nating win-win and lose-lose situations, thus driving a wedge
between the baseline and update strategies.
Figure 3 illustrates the effects of these changes. The mean
score for the random agent in TRACS* remained stable, at
5.49 (out of 11) hits per game across 10,000 games. How-
ever, baseline and update scores rose to 8.22 and 10.83, re-
spectively. Hence, our game modifications were successful
in introducing a substantial benefit of the update strategy over
the random and baseline strategies. Given that baseline and
update strategies now yield unique performance signatures, it
should be possible to determine which strategy our partici-
pants actually adopt in the game.
Our second alteration in TRACS* was procedural. In addi-
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Figure 3: Simulation results for four artificial agents playing
10,000 games of modified TRACS*.
tion to using continuous color gradients to assess our partici-
pants’ odds calculations, we introduced memory recall boxes
to judge the accuracy of their memory. In this way we hoped
to elucidate whether Burns’ findings indicated an actual base-
line bias, or merely just difficulty in converting accurately re-
called frequencies into points along a likelihood gradient.
Experiment
Method
Twenty-five undergraduates from Rensselaer Polytechnic In-
stitute participated in partial fulfillment of a course require-
ment. They ranged in age from 18 to 22 years, with an aver-
age of 19.6 years. Participants were tested individually.
The experimenter spent about ten minutes instructing each
participant on the rules of original TRACS. Each participant
played a total of 10 games of 11 turns each. On every turn,
players had to complete the recall task, provide odds esti-
mates, and choose a card.
On the newly added recall task participants were asked,
for each face-down card, to report the number of red and
blue cards of that shape which remained in the deck. An-
swers were typed into text boxes immediately below each
face-down card. Players then estimated the odds of each face-
down card being red or blue by placing a marker on a continu-
ous color gradient. Gradients were red on the left and blue on
the right, and 300 pixels wide (≈10 cm), allowing for a pre-
cision below one percent (see Figure 4 for a screenshot). Fi-
nally, participants chose a card by clicking on it. Feedback on
correctness was then provided by a thumbs-up/thumbs-down
image and the next turn was initiated by clicking on the feed-
back image.
The game was implemented in Macintosh Common Lisp
5.0 running on OS 10.2 with a 17” flat panel display set to a
1024×768 screen resolution. The initial card distribution and
a hit/miss counter were shown to the left of the game window.
Results
We will assess participants’ performance before turning to
more detailed analyses of various error types.
Figure 4: Screenshot of the TRACS* interface requesting
odds estimates (after the completion of the recall task).
Performance TRACS* allows for a straightforward corre-
spondence between a player’s awareness of the current game
state and his or her outcome score. Thus, scores reliably
exceeding the expected values of a simulated baseline agent
would signal a memory update strategy.
On average, participants scored 9.3 hits per game with 22
out of 25 players (88%) exceeding the theoretic baseline score
of 8.2 hits. This strongly suggests that memory updates con-
tributed to task performance.
To allow for a statistical assessment of these differences,
we let our simulated baseline and update agents both play the
same number of games as human participants. A compari-
son of mean scores over the sequence of ten games per player
showed that human players scored significantly more points
than baseline agents [9.3>8.2, t(26)=2.1, p<.001], and sig-
nificantly fewer hits than update agents [9.3<10.8, t(25)=2.1,
p<.001]. Figure 5 contrasts the performance of human par-
ticipants with that of simulated agents on a within-game res-
olution. It is obvious that human players did not perform on
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Figure 5: Participants’ mean percentage of hits by turn com-
pared to those of simulated baseline and update agents. (Error
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.)
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Figure 6: Average errors of odds by turn. (Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals.)
the level of an ideal update agent, but did reliably better than
a baseline agent.
To assess possible effects of learning we conducted an
ANOVA with game number as a within-subjects factor. A
significant main effect [F(9,216)=3.0, p<.01] indicated that
players improved their scores reliably from an average of 8.8
hits in earlier to about 9.7 hits in later games. Subsequent
comparisons showed that human participants outperformed a
pure baseline agent in all but the initial two games.
Errors Even though human participants performed better
than a baseline agent, their performance was worse than that
of an ideal update agent. In this section, we examine this dis-
crepancy by first considering erroneous frequency and likeli-
hood estimates before assessing errors of internal consistency.
As participants estimated card frequencies as well as likeli-
hoods we were provided with two distinct indices of memory.
To allow for direct comparisons of both indices on a single
scale, we converted reported frequencies into ‘recall odds’.
For both recall odds and likelihood estimates (as indicated on
the gradient scales) we then calculated and summed up the
absolute difference from the actual odds.
Figure 6 illustrates that both recall-odds and gradient-odds
errors increase over the course of a game, but errors in fre-
quency recall (with a mean of 8.0%) are significantly lower
than the errors in likelihood estimates provided on gradient
scales (12.6%). The third line in Figure 6 shows the mean
size of the ‘baseline-odds’ error (16.5%) which would result
if participants had adopted a baseline strategy on the given
trial. Even though the mean gradient-odds error exceeded the
baseline-odds error on the first three trials, the general trend
indicates that participants’ actual errors on both scales were
lower than suggested by a baseline bias.
Taking into account the direction of deviations rather than
just error magnitudes, we can also ask whether empirical re-
call and gradient odds are closer to the baseline or to the ac-
tual odds. Whenever the actual odds value deviates from the
baseline value there are two possible attractors: Participants
might specify odds closer to the baseline odds, or they might
select odds closer to the actual odds. A bias is defined by a
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Figure 7: Percentage of odds selections closer to the baseline
vs. closer to the actual value (based on n=4404 estimates).
systematic preference. If participants—due to update failure
or memory decay—were more likely to choose odds closer to
the baseline than to the update value this would constitute a
baseline bias. Likewise, an “update bias” could be diagnosed
if participants were more likely to select odds in the vicinity
of the actual value. Figure 7 shows that, in TRACS*, the evi-
dence for an update bias clearly outweighs the evidence for a
baseline bias. Participants’ preference for actual values seems
particularly pronounced when odds are based on recall fre-
quencies (77.1% vs. 22.9%). In contrast, the same preference
is weaker when odds estimates are measured by probability
gradients (57.6% vs. 42.4%). As the baseline attractor seems
to exert less gravitational pull when providing frequency es-
timates than when responding on a gradient scale, examining
only the latter (e.g., Burns, 2002a, 2002b) might overestimate
the size of a baseline bias.
All errors reported so far were deviations of empirical es-
timates from either true or baseline values. Our finding that
participants’ frequency estimates are closer to the actual val-
ues than to the initial baselines makes it implausible that
participants’ frequency estimates are governed by a baseline
bias. At the same time, it raises questions about alternative
breakdowns in performance. On the basis of our initial task
analysis, the complexity of TRACS allows for a variety of
non-memory related errors. In the following and final sec-
tions we consider conversion errors and errors of choice as
examples of errors of internal consistency.
Due to our sequential procedure of first requiring frequency
information and then asking for probability estimates, partic-
ipants’ responses on the likelihood gradients ought to be a
direct function of recall performance. Nonetheless, people’s
notorious problems with probabilities can cause conversion
errors when transforming recalled frequencies into odds on
continuous scales. To assess the occurrence of such errors, we
compared subjective recall odds (based on the card frequency
entries of each participant and turn) with the likelihood es-
timates provided on the same turn. An average deviation of
6.6% indicates that this translation process was indeed non-
trivial and error-prone. The magnitude of this error is striking
not only as it is almost as large as the average error in fre-
1021
quency recall (8.0%, see Figure 6), but also when considering
that players reported their subjective frequencies immediately
before indicating their judgment of odds and had all relevant
frequencies displayed directly above the gradient scales (see
Figure 4). Thus, we conclude that a large proportion of par-
ticipants’ error-prone responses on likelihood scales were due
to errors in odds conversion.
Two curious errors of internal consistency address the re-
lation between odds estimates and card selections. Recall-
choice errors can be defined as instances in which the card
with lower recall odds (based on the subjective card fre-
quency estimates) is selected by the participant. Similarly,
gradient-choice errors occur whenever the card with lower
likelihood odds (based on probability estimates) is chosen.
There were 4.3% (119 out of 2750 choices) recall-choice
errors, but 8.3% (229) gradient-choice errors. Given that any
conflict between judgment and choice is relatively bizarre,
both errors are more frequent than we would have expected.
As the gradients are evaluated immediately before a choice
is made, we interpret the relative size of both errors as evi-
dence that players were more likely to base their choices on
perceived frequencies than on perceived odds.
Discussion
Our first result is of a methodological nature: When creating
artificial task environments to assess the scope of human ra-
tionality, the cost–benefit structure of the task must provide
an incentive to display the behavior in question. Our simula-
tion of Straight TRACS revealed that the original game pro-
vides only minimal benefits for adopting an effortful memory
update strategy. This led us to re-interpret Burns’ (2002a,
2002b) original finding of a ‘baseline bias’ as an adaptive and
rational response to the properties of the task environment.
Our critique, however, does not imply that TRACS is not
an interesting game and valuable research paradigm—quite to
the contrary! We now believe that TRACS is both more com-
plex and more interesting than it at first appeared. Our task
analysis has suggested the need to distinguish three cognitive
components: retrieving numbers of cards from memory, con-
verting frequencies into probabilities, and mapping frequency
or probability estimates to choices.
We are particularly intrigued by the errors our players
made when converting natural frequency information to like-
lihood estimates. Players who had to provide the same in-
formation in two different formats within seconds and saw
the frequencies displayed in front of them while computing
probabilities still made substantial errors when coming up
with simple likelihood estimates. Interestingly, our analysis
of choice errors revealed that players seemed less likely to
act on their inaccurate probability estimates than on their per-
ceived frequencies even though the former just preceded their
choice.
A potential caveat of our study is that by altering the cost-
benefit structure of the task and assessing players’ memory
for card frequencies we introduced two changes to the origi-
nal game. It is conceivable that the mere query for frequen-
cies made the necessity to count cards more explicit, whereas
it remains rather implicit in the original game. The extent
to which each of our modifications contributed to the im-
proved performance and to which a procedural task demand
may have inadvertently prompted different memory strategies
is an empirical question to be addressed in future studies.
Finally, the performance results of our modified version
TRACS* provide a more optimistic view of the human ca-
pacity for concurrent memory updates than do previous stud-
ies. As our players were able to reliably exceed baseline per-
formance, we conclude that the previously reported ‘baseline
bias’ may be an artifact of the original game.
Despite our criticisms, our results agree with those of
Burns (2002a, 2002b) that people are able to take baserate
information into account. However, we additionally demon-
strate that—when memory matters—people are also able to
dynamically update their memory while being engaged in a
highly demanding task.
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Abstract 
The present study introduces a method of identifying 
potentially new words in a large corpus of texts, and assesses 
the morphological productivity of 12 English suffixes, based 
on some 78 million words of the written component (books 
and periodicals) of the British National Corpus (BNC). The 
method compares two corpus segments (created by randomly 
sampling at the level of documents within the BNC), and 
defines new words as those that are not shared across 
segments (segments being interpreted as randomly sampled 
speaker groups). The approach taken differs from others in the 
literature in that new words are identified irrespective of how 
many times a given word is used by the same speaker 
(author). A productivity ranking of the 12 English suffixes is 
obtained, and the results are shown to be intuitively satisfying 
and stable over different sample sizes. With a 
psycholinguistic interpretation of the data, implications for the 
nature of intuitions about productivity are considered. 
Introduction 
Morphological productivity is central to the study of word 
formation, but it continues to defy a solid, uniform 
description (see e.g., Aronoff, 1976; Bauer, 2001; Plag, 
1999). The coinage of a “new” word is abundant in our 
daily use of language; for example, a person who is being 
gossiped about may be referred to as a gossipee, or a used 
book may be cleanish. Affixation in English (as in gossip + 
-ee  gossipee; clean + -ish  cleanish) is a productive 
word formation process, and there is plenty of evidence that 
affixes differ in their degree of productivity (e.g., Aronoff, 
1976; Bauer, 2001); for example, words can in general be 
formed more easily with -ness than with -ity (and thus we 
may accept cleanness but not cleanity). The majority of 
researchers investigating the issue of productivity are 
interested in accounting for varying degrees of productivity, 
and several productivity measures have been proposed in 
the literature (e.g., Aronoff, 1976; Baayen, 1992, 2001; 
Bauer, 2001; Plag, 1999). Assessing the degree of 
productivity, however, has proven to be a complex task 
(Bauer, 2001): while the consensus seems to be that 
capturing the coinage of new words is essential in assessing 
productivity, there is an inherent difficulty in defining what 
a “new” word is. 
Most notable among previous studies is a corpus-based 
approach proposed by Baayen (1992, 2001). Based on word 
frequency in a large corpus of texts, his productivity 
measure is formulated as P = n1/N, where given a particular 
affix, n1 is the number of word types with that affix that 
occur only once (the so-called hapax legomena, hereafter 
hapaxes), N is the sum of word tokens with that affix, and P 
is the productivity index.1 P is interpreted as expressing the 
probability of encountering a word type with a given affix 
that has not been seen in the sampled corpus. Thus, new 
words are defined under this measure as “unseen” words in 
a corpus. An important characteristic of P is that it is based 
on token frequency—N directly refers to a count over 
tokens, and a word is included in the n1 count only if it 
occurs just once. The measure P, with its focus on hapaxes 
as estimators of unseen words, is motivated by the 
probability estimation method of Good (1953)—or the 
Good-Turing estimation method (Church & Gale, 1991).2 
While a dictionary provides another source of data for 
quantifying morphological productivity, a corpus-based 
approach has many advantages. A large corpus of texts 
contains productively formed words that are typically not 
listed in a dictionary (e.g., gossipee), and corpus data reflect 
how words are actually used (Baayen & Lieber, 1991; 
Baayen & Renouf, 1996). 
The present study pursues and extends the corpus-based 
approach by introducing a new method of identifying new 
words and assessing productivity. 
Type Frequency and Deleted Estimation 
It has been suggested that the type frequency for an affix 
(the number of word types with an affix) in a corpus, 
represented by V, is inadequate in expressing its degree of 
productivity. Baayen and Lieber (1991: 804) point out that 
in their reference corpus of 18 million words, the type 
frequencies for -ness (497) and -ity (405) do not adequately 
express the fact that -ness is intuitively felt to be much more 
productive than -ity. They find that the P indices for -ness 
(0.0044) and -ity (0.0007) are more in line with linguists’ 
intuitive estimates for these suffixes. There are, however, 
some aspects of the measure P that can be quite counter-
intuitive. In Baayen and Lieber (1991), for example, the P 
index for verbal suffix -ize (0.00007) is substantially lower 
                                                          
1
 As is usually the case in a corpus study, the term token refers to 
each occurrence of a word, and the term type refers to each distinct 
word. For instance, if we have {awareness, fairness, fairness, 
sharpness, sharpness}, the token frequency for -ness is 5 (the sum 
of all occurrences of -ness), whereas the type frequency for -ness is 
3 (the number of distinct words with -ness). 
2
 For more detail, see Baayen (2001). 
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than that for -ity (0.0007). To correctly interpret these data, 
we need to take into account the fact that P is dependent on 
token frequency, and that verbs and nouns generally differ 
in their overall frequency in a corpus (Baayen & Lieber, 
1991). Consequently, an across-the-board comparison of 
affixes across lexical categories is ruled out. 
The view that type frequency in a corpus is problematic 
for assessments of degree of productivity holds only if type 
frequency alone is examined, for an entire corpus. A use of 
type frequency is suggested by Nishimoto (2003) in a 
productivity measure that adopts the mechanism of deleted 
estimation (Jelinek & Mercer, 1985; see also Manning & 
Schütze, 1999: 210–211), a probability estimation method 
used in Language Technology. The basic concept 
underlying the proposed productivity measure is the cross-
comparison of corpus segments to identify word types that 
are not shared. The PDE measure, a productivity measure 
based on the deleted estimation method, is formulated as: 
(1) 
V
V
VV
VV
VV
VV
P NBA
BA
0
AB
0
BA
BA
0
AB
0
DE
2/)(
2/)(
=
+
+
=
+
+
=  
Given a particular affix and two corpus segments A and B 
(both of some size m), VA is the number of word types with 
that affix that are present in segment A, and V0AB is the 
number of word types with that affix that are present in 
segment A but are absent (unseen) in segment B. VB and 
V0BA are defined similarly. Averaging the elements of the 
denominator and of the numerator separately, we obtain V, 
the total number of word types with that affix in a corpus 
segment of size m, and VN (V-New), the number of 
otherwise-unseen word types with that affix (unseen being 
dependent on the relationship between segments). PDE 
expresses the degree of productivity of an affix as the 
likelihood that a given word type with an affix will be 
unseen, hence potentially new. In addition to V and VN, we 
also define VNN (V-Non-New) as the number of word types 
with the relevant affix that are seen in both segments, hence 
non-new. What is essentially achieved by the PDE measure 
is the division of sampled word types (V) into new word 
types (VN) and non-new word types (VNN). The relationship 
V = VN + VNN holds in each application of the measure. 
What are the grounds for associating new words with 
words that are not shared by two corpus segments? In the 
British National Corpus (BNC), data from unique sources 
are sampled in single documents, and thus each document 
could be considered to represent a set of words used either 
by one speaker (author) or by a few speakers (co-authors). 
Randomly distributing these documents into two corpus 
segments therefore gives us two groups of randomly 
sampled speakers (and the words that they used). Words that 
are not used in common by the two speaker groups are more 
likely to be new than words used by both groups. Cross-
comparing two corpus segments offers a crude yet 
computationally simple method of separating words into 
potentially new words and potentially non-new words.3 
Simulation Environment 
We will examine the performance of the PDE measure, based 
on the written component (books and periodicals) of the 
BNC, which offers some 78 million words sampled in 2,688 
documents. Each sampled document is randomly assigned 
to one of two corpus segments, until each segment has a 
specified number of words in total (say, 30 million words). 
Documents are sampled without replacement, so no 
document is shared by two corpus segments. One simulation 
run (i.e., one application of the PDE measure) consists of 
creating two corpus segments (as above) and obtaining 
values for V, VN, and PDE, based on formula (1). 
Table 1 lists 12 English suffixes and 1 non-suffix control 
selected for the current study.4 At least one suffix is 
included for each major lexical category. 
 
Table 1: 12 English suffixes and 1 non-suffix control. 
 
Suffix Category Prediction 
-ness, -ity Nominal -ness > -ity 
-er, -ee Nominal -er > -ee 
-ion, -ment Nominal -ion > -ment 
-th Nominal Unproductive 
-ish, -ous Adjectival -ish > -ous 
-ize, -ify Verbal -ize > -ify 
-ly Adverbial Productive 
ch# Noun ending Unproductive 
 
The predicted differences in productivity in the last column 
of Table 1 are largely based on views expressed in the 
literature. We also examine ch#, the word ending of a noun 
(as in church), as a presumably unproductive non-suffix 
control that provides a baseline for determining whether 
suffixes are productive (or unproductive). Different 
semantic patterns among words formed with a suffix are 
ignored: for example, amputee, absentee, and employee 
exhibit different semantic patterns, but they are collectively 
treated as -ee words. We do not distinguish words with a 
suffix by the class of bases that the suffix attaches to: for 
example, -er includes employer (verb base) and islander 
(noun base). Ordinal numbers are excluded from -th. 
A database of 17,347 word types representing the 12 
suffixes and the non-suffix control was compiled, based on 
100 million words occurring in the entire BNC. The 
database crucially relies on decisions about what constitutes 
a word type with a suffix. Most problematic are prefixation 
and compounding, which could dramatically increase the 
number of word types with a suffix. Removing all prefixes 
                                                          
3
 Nishimoto (2004) offers more detailed exploration of the 
mechanism of the PDE measure, by increasing the number of cross-
compared corpus segments (speaker groups) to 6. 
4
 These are suffixes whose productivity is often discussed in the 
morphology literature. We focus on suffixes only, as they play a 
more prominent role than do prefixes in English word formation. 
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has some negative consequences, such as encouragement  
*couragement or disagreement  agreement.5 On the other 
hand, allowing all prefixes does not seem plausible, since 
words such as anti-institution that appear to be cases of 
prefixation would count as distinct word types with a suffix. 
Compounding poses a similar problem, and the issue is 
further complicated by the variable hyphenation of words. 
In solving this familiar problem, we make use of entries in 
the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) and Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary (WD). All prefixed forms and 
compounds are checked against the OED/WD, and any 
preceding part of a word that cannot be spelled without a 
hyphen in both the OED and WD is removed. As a result, 
for example, anti-institution will be treated as institution, 
but disagreement will remain as disagreement. With the 
assumption that the OED and WD are conservative in 
accepting novel word forms, the current treatment 
effectively prevents novel cases of prefixation and 
compounding from inflating the count of word types with a 
suffix. Each word type in the database was inspected to 
exclude errors (e.g., misspelled words, words with a pseudo-
suffix).6 See Nishimoto (2004) for further detail. 
Evaluation of Data 
Productivity Indices 
Table 2 presents mean values for V, VN, and PDE, averaged 
over 100 simulation runs, with 30 million words in each of 
the two corpus segments required by the PDE measure (i.e., 
the total of 60 million words were sampled in each run). The 
suffixes in Table 2 are sorted by their PDE value, to achieve 
a productivity ranking. 
Suffixes -ish and -ness meet our expectations by being 
found at the more productive end of the ranking (although 
we might have expected -ness to be more productive than 
-ish), and -th and ch# fall at the less productive end. We 
consider the PDE index for ch# to arise from processes other 
than affixation, such as the coinage of simplex words, 
compounding, or some sources of noise including the 
occurrence of rare or obsolete words. 
Taking ch# as a baseline for determining productivity in 
affixation, we find that -th is unproductive. The finding that 
-ment is effectively non-productive matches Bauer’s (2001: 
8–9) observation that the productivity of -ment has been in 
decline so that new -ment words are synchronically rare. 
 
                                                          
5
 Removing dis- from disagreement appears to be undesirable if we 
view disagreement as a nominalization of disagree. 
6
 There are 6,797 rules defined for these corrections (mostly 
generated automatically, but some inevitably defined manually for 
cases such as “dona-a-a-ation”  donation). The number of rules 
is large, but it must be noted that some are needed to obtain correct 
forms for irrelevant words (so that they can be deemed irrelevant), 
and that a given word can be misspelled in a number of ways. 
Errors in a corpus cannot be overlooked. Evert and Lüdeling 
(2001) point out, for example, that each error in a corpus typically 
occurs only once and could greatly distort the number of hapaxes. 
Table 2: Mean values of the PDE measure. 
 
 V VN PDE 
-ish 261.3 90.6 0.347 
-ness 1354.9 431.2 0.318 
-ee 88.6 26.1 0.295 
-ize 437.6 114.5 0.262 
-ity 1008.5 234.4 0.232 
-er 2517.8 558.6 0.222 
-ly 3585.0 754.3 0.210 
-ify 105.8 21.1 0.199 
-ous 639.1 107.1 0.168 
-ion 2152.9 348.7 0.162 
-ment 424.2 61.6 0.145 
 ch# 213.6 29.7 0.139 
-th 40.9 3.5 0.085 
 
The high productivity of -ee is somewhat unexpected, on 
its face. Based on the measure P, Baayen and Lieber (1991) 
also find -ee (0.0016) to be more productive than -er 
(0.0007), and they attribute the high productivity of -ee to 
the “vogue” nature of this suffix, as suggested by Marchand 
(1969). 
In contrast to -ee, the productivity of -er is lower than we 
might have expected. Also lower than expected is the PDE 
index for -ly. The result for -ly seems unsatisfactory 
considering the high regularity in -ly word formation—the 
suffix attaches to almost any adjective to form an adverb, 
with few restrictions (Aronoff, 1976: 37 fn 4; Baayen & 
Renouf, 1996: 82–83). The low PDE indices for -er and -ly 
might be thought to arise from large values of V for these 
suffixes; however, Spearman’s test shows no significant 
correlation between V and PDE, rs = .203, p > .10. We will 
return later to the data for -er and -ly. 
Overall, we find that the PDE measure yields results that 
largely accord with the productivity expected for the 
suffixes examined. 
Sample Size Dependency 
A question that naturally arises in evaluating the PDE 
measure is to what extent the measure is dependent on 
sample size. Could it be the case, for example, that the 
productivity ranking of suffixes would differ markedly if the 
two corpus segments were smaller? Table 3 presents PDE as 
a function of corpus segment size.7 Again, each PDE value is 
a mean over 100 simulation runs. 
We find that PDE values are remarkably similar across 
three series with different corpus-segment sizes. Friedman’s 
test finds no significant difference in PDE among the three, 
χ2(2,13) = 2.627, p > .10. Spearman’s test shows that the 
PDE indices are highly positively correlated: for 10 vs. 20 
million words, rs = .990, p < .01; for 10 vs. 30 million 
words, rs = .971, p < .01; and for 20 vs. 30 million words, rs 
= .984, p < .01. Thus, the PDE measure offers a consistent 
                                                          
7
 As is clear from the formulation of the measure, a change in 
corpus segment size applies simultaneously to both corpus 
segments. 
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characterization of the productivity of these suffixes over 
different sample sizes. 
 
Table 3: PDE as a function of corpus segment size. 
 
PDE 
 10 million 20 million 30 million 
-ish 0.322 0.332 0.347 
-ness 0.371 0.336 0.318 
-ee 0.313 0.301 0.295 
-ize 0.262 0.260 0.262 
-ity 0.238 0.235 0.232 
-er 0.260 0.236 0.222 
-ly 0.226 0.215 0.210 
-ify 0.179 0.191 0.199 
-ous 0.164 0.165 0.168 
-ion 0.169 0.163 0.162 
-ment 0.153 0.148 0.145 
 ch# 0.164 0.153 0.139 
-th 0.078 0.081 0.085 
 
Token Frequency of New Words 
One advantage of the PDE measure is that new words in a 
corpus are identified in a way that is not solely dependent on 
token frequency. To ensure that advantage, it is crucial to 
implement the measure by creating corpus segments via 
random sampling at the level of documents (hereafter RD), 
rather than random sampling at the level of words (hereafter 
RW). The data presented in the preceding sections arise in 
implementations using RD. 
If we were to follow RW, which words become identified 
as new would be dependent on their token frequency in the 
whole corpus.8 Under the PDE measure, a word is identified 
as new if all its tokens are distributed into only one corpus 
segment. If we were to randomly distribute words into two 
corpus segments (i.e., RW), the probability P that word w 
with token frequency r (in the whole corpus) will be 
identified as new is given by: P(w: new) = 2(0.5r). Figure 1 
shows how P(w: new) changes as a function of r. We find 
that words that occur more than a few times in the whole 
corpus are highly unlikely to be identified as new. Hapaxes 
are exceptional in that they are guaranteed to be new, 
regardless of whether RD or RW is adopted. What is of 
interest regarding the difference between RD and RW is 
how many non-hapaxes are found to be new. 
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 The whole corpus here refers to the set of data used to create two 
corpus segments. 
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Figure 1: Probability of word w being identified as new. 
 
We compare the outcome of RD and RW as follows. VN 
values obtained under RD are listed in Table 2. For each of 
the 100 simulation runs generating these values, we sum the 
two corpus segments to obtain the whole corpus, and then, 
based on token frequencies in this whole, calculate a VN 
value expected under RW, E(VN), based on the following 
formula: 
(2) ( ) 
=
=
1
N )5.0(
r
r
rNVE  
Here, r is the token frequency of a word, and Nr is the 
number of word types that occur r times. Table 4 contrasts 
VN under RD and E(VN) under RW. 
 
Table 4: Mean values for VN (RD) and E(VN) (RW). 
 
 VN E(VN) 
-ish 90.6 85.9 
-ness 431.2 401.4 
-ee 26.1 18.3 
-ize 114.5 101.4 
-ity 234.4 186.5 
-er 558.6 463.9 
-ly 754.3 707.0 
-ify 21.1 18.5 
-ous 107.1 89.1 
-ion 348.7 270.6 
-ment 61.6 49.4 
 ch# 29.7 23.0 
-th 3.5 2.8 
 
We find that each value of E(VN) is consistently an 
underestimation of the VN. That is, more new words are 
captured by RD than by RW. 
What kind of words are responsible for the discrepancy 
between RD and RW that is exhibited in Table 4? Consider 
causee (undoubtedly new to the majority of English 
speakers, except perhaps those who are syntacticians), 
which occurs 9 times in 1 document of the written 
component of the BNC. Under RW, the probability that all 9 
tokens of causee will be distributed into only a single corpus 
segment is as low as about 0.002—in effect, causee is 
virtually guaranteed to be identified as non-new under RW. 
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Under RD, on the other hand, all 9 tokens of causee 
(occurring in just 1 document) will inevitably be distributed 
into only one corpus segment, and causee will thus be 
identified as new. The advantage of the PDE measure (when 
implemented with RD) is that it captures as new words 
those words such as causee that are repeatedly used by the 
same speaker. 
Implications for Linguistic Intuitions 
Intuition-Based Interpretation 
Although intuitions about productivity may not be reliable, 
they play an informal yet important role in evaluating results 
for a productivity measure—such results are often said to be 
intuitive or counter-intuitive. However, to the extent that 
little is known about the nature of such intuitions, 
determining the validity of a productivity measure on this 
basis may not be viable. Nevertheless, we may still ask what 
kind of information could be available to speakers 
(linguists) when they offer intuitive judgments about 
productivity. 
We found in Table 2 that PDE indices for -er and -ly are 
unexpectedly low, but one possibility is that the data on 
which PDE is built are simply not in the form to be 
accessible to intuition. Speakers presumably cannot tell with 
any precision, for example, how many -er and -ee word 
types exist in the BNC, and thus, exact values of V, VN, and 
PDE may have little relevance to speakers’ intuitions. On the 
other hand, speakers may be able to predict that “more” -er 
words than -ee words will occur. 
What will be attempted here is a transformation of the 
data underlying the PDE measure into a form that could be 
relevant to speakers’ intuitions. There are two points to 
consider. The first is the possibility that whatever type 
frequency information speakers may have access to may be 
better represented on a logarithmic scale. Word frequency 
effects have been well studied in psycholinguistics (since 
Howes & Solomon, 1951; see Monsell, 1991, for an 
overview), where it has been noted that reaction time for a 
word in a lexical decision task is inversely proportional to 
the log frequency of that word. Although word frequency 
effects are normally discussed with respect to token 
frequency, the possibility that we entertain is that a similar 
logarithmic scaling may be also applicable to type 
frequency information. 
The second point to consider is Baayen’s (1993: 204) 
view that speakers’ intuitive judgments on productivity are 
ordinal rather than interval in nature. Speakers presumably 
cannot tell to what extent -ness is more productive than -ity, 
but they may reject a productivity ranking in which -ness is 
ranked lower than -ity. Baayen also suggests that intuitions 
about productivity may simply be unavailable for some 
affixes. 
Transforming V and VN into log10V and log10VN and taking 
their ratio (by analogy to VN/V) is too simplistic a solution, 
and suffers a problem in that the complementary 
relationship between VN and VNN will be broken: the order 
of suffixes defined by VN/V should be the reverse of the 
order defined by VNN/V, but that relationship will no longer 
hold when values are log-transformed values. A solution to 
this dilemma is to shift our point of view, and to think of 
log10VN as the extent to which words are new and of 
log10VNN as the extent to which words are non-new. These 
are two conflicting factors that may simultaneously affect 
speakers’ “impression” about a given word formation 
process. When log10VN (the extent to which words with a 
suffix are new) approaches log10VNN (the extent to which 
words with that suffix are non-new), the word formation 
process for that suffix may be felt to be productive, with a 
degree that can be calculated by the ratio of log10VN to 
log10VNN.9 Table 5 presents a productivity ranking of 
suffixes calculated in just this way. 
 
Table 5: Intuition-oriented productivity ranking of suffixes. 
 
 
log10VN log10VNN Ratio 
-ness 2.63 2.97 0.886 
-ish 1.96 2.23 0.879 
-er 2.75 3.29 0.836 
-ly 2.88 3.45 0.835 
-ize 2.06 2.51 0.821 
-ity 2.37 2.89 0.820 
-ee 1.42 1.80 0.789 
-ion 2.54 3.26 0.779 
-ous 2.03 2.73 0.744 
-ment 1.79 2.56 0.699 
-ify 1.32 1.93 0.684 
 ch# 1.47 2.26 0.650 
-th 0.54 1.57 0.344 
 
Following the view that intuitive judgments on 
productivity have an ordinal character, we concentrate only 
on the ranking of suffixes shown in Table 5. Interestingly, 
we seem to have gained many improvements as compared 
to Table 2. We particularly note the following: (a) -ness 
now counts as the most productive suffix; (b) -er and -ly 
move up in the ranking to be close to -ness and -ish; (c) -ee 
moves down in the ranking but is still close to -ize; and (d) 
-ify is now much lower in the ranking. Perhaps one 
unsatisfactory result is that -ly still does not emerge as the 
most productive suffix. 
Although the exploration offered in this final section is 
based on speculation about what information could be 
available to speakers, the fact that the productivity ranking 
of suffixes in Table 5 is intuitively satisfying, by and large, 
suggests that the approach merits further investigation in 
future research. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the data for the PDE measure demonstrates 
that the deleted estimation method offers an effective means 
of capturing new words in corpus data and of assessing the 
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 The complementary relationship between VN and VNN is of course 
maintained by the ratio of log10VNN to log10VN. 
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productivity of affixes. An interesting characteristic of the 
PDE measure is that its identification of new words is not 
dependent on token frequency, and this may be construed as 
an advantage, given potential burstiness in the use of new 
coinages. The current measure identifies a word as new 
regardless of whether it is used repeatedly by the same 
speaker. The measure is also shown to be stable over 
different sample sizes. 
Some findings appeared to deviate slightly from our 
intuitive expectations, but we proposed, (appealing to a 
psycholinguistic interpretation of the data), that it may be 
necessary to draw a distinction between raw corpus statistics 
and information that could be accessible to intuitions about 
productivity. Corpus statistics, scaled in psychologically 
plausible ways, may offer insights into the kind of 
information available to speakers when they make intuitive 
judgments on productivity. 
A description of productivity obtained with a corpus-
based productivity measure will be useful in many forms of 
linguistic research, not necessarily limited to the study of 
word formation. The success of the present study provides 
another indication that the corpus-based approach to the 
study of productivity advocated by Baayen (1992, 2001) is 
worthy of many future extensions. 
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Abstract 
Three theories of knowledge transfer -- analogy, knowledge 
compilation, and constraint violation -- were tested across 
three transfer scenarios. Each theory was shown to predict 
human performance in distinct and identifiable ways on a 
variety of transfer tasks. Results support the hypothesis that 
there are multiple mechanisms of transfer and that a general 
theory of transfer must incorporate each mechanism in 
principled ways. 
Introduction 
In order to understand human thinking and problem solving 
in complex and novel situations we need to have a general 
theory for how people use and adapt their prior knowledge to 
solve new problems. Aspirations towards such a goal have 
traditionally been discussed in terms of transfer, or how 
knowledge acquired from one task or situation can be 
applied to a different situation (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999; 
Detterman & Sternberg, 1993; Salomon & Perkins, 1989).  
Work in cognitive science over the past thirty years has 
progressed towards this goal by investigating separate 
strands of transfer phenomena that occur in particular 
learning and problem solving situations. Although this 
research strategy has proven successful in developing local, 
independent explanations of knowledge transfer for 
particular experimental scenarios (e.g., analogical transfer 
and transfer appropriate processing), it has done little to 
bring us closer to a general theory of transfer. It is time to 
begin to weave these separate strands of investigation into a 
more complete theory that incorporates each strand in 
principled ways. 
It is this charge of theoretical synthesis that motivates 
the two hypotheses under investigation in the current study. 
First, it is proposed that there is no single knowledge transfer 
mechanism, but multiple ones. These mechanisms include 
(but are not limited to) analogy, knowledge compilation, and 
error correction. Second, the particular transfer mechanism 
used depends on both (a) the knowledge actually present and 
how it is represented, and (b) the processing demands of the 
transfer task.  
Below I summarize some of the prior work on transfer 
that is relevant to the investigation of these two hypotheses. 
Mechanisms of Knowledge Transfer 
The first mechanism of interest is analogical transfer 
(Gentner, Holyoak, & Kokinov, 2001). Analogical transfer is 
composed of three subprocesses: retrieving a prior 
knowledge structure, creating a mapping between it and the 
current problem or situation, and then using that mapping to 
generate new knowledge structures relevant to the 
application context. The transferred knowledge is typically 
assumed to be a declarative representation, but it can also 
include procedural attachments (Chen, 2002). 
The empirical evidence for analogical mapping is 
extensive (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gentner & 
Toupin, 1986). However, the evidence also shows that 
although people are capable of mapping deep relational 
structures, the retrieval of an analogue is heavily dependent 
upon matches between the surface features of the current 
problem and prior problem solving experiences 
(Catrambone, 2002; Ross & Kilbane, 1997). Therefore, 
analogy is perhaps a better explanation for near transfer than 
for far transfer.  
The second transfer mechanism of interest is knowledge 
compilation proposed by John R. Anderson and co-workers 
(Anderson, 1983; Neves & Anderson, 1981). Knowledge 
compilation was specifically proposed to explain how 
declarative knowledge is brought to bear on problem solving 
in the context of the ACT-R theory. This computational 
mechanism operates through the deliberate and explicit, step-
by-step interpretation of a declarative statement that 
generates new production rules as a side effect. Those rules 
are then optimized via rule composition and the result is a 
procedural representation of the content of the declarative 
knowledge given a specific goal.  
The knowledge compilation mechanism can be viewed 
as a translation device that translates or interprets declarative 
knowledge (e.g., advice, instructions, and strategies) into a 
set of procedures and actions that can be used to solve 
problems. Since knowledge compilation operates on 
declarative knowledge it can be used in a wide variety of 
application contexts because the knowledge has yet to be 
proceduralized, or tied to the goals of a particular problem 
solving context. This mechanism embodies a tradeoff 
between applicability and efficiency in that it has wide 
applicability across many contexts but requires a 
complicated and lengthy application process to translate the 
declarative knowledge into a set of actions. There is some 
empirical support for knowledge compilation but the 
evidence is not extensive (Anderson, Greeno, Kline, & 
Neves, 1981; Neves & Anderson, 1981).  
The third transfer mechanism of interest is Ohlsson’s 
(1996) error correction mechanism. Ohlsson and co-workers 
(Ohlsson, 1996; Ohlsson & Rees, 1991) have proposed that 
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the role of declarative knowledge is primarily to help a 
learner identify and correct his or her own errors. The 
constraint violation theory has both declarative and 
procedural components that operate in parallel, and the 
function of declarative knowledge is to constrain possible 
problem solutions. When incomplete or faulty procedural 
knowledge generates undesirable outcomes, these are 
recognized as violations of those constraints and the 
responsible rules are revised accordingly.  
The power of declarative knowledge is that it can help 
the learner pinpoint the cause of an error, and transfer is the 
process by which errors are identified and remedied. This 
mechanism has wide applicability in that the constraints can 
be applied to a variety of problems that may require different 
strategies or sequences of actions to produce the correct 
solution. The constraint violation theory has been shown to 
generate power law learning curves (Ohlsson, 1996) and to 
support the design of successful tutoring systems (Mitrovic 
& Ohlsson, 1999). 
In addition to each transfer mechanism using different 
cognitive processes, each mechanism has also been 
hypothesized to operate on specific types of prior knowledge 
structures. Analogy uses exemplar knowledge that consists 
of a declarative representation that may also have procedural 
attachments (Gentner, 1983). Knowledge compilation uses 
declarative knowledge such as instructions, advice, or 
tactical knowledge (Anderson, 1983). Error correction uses 
declarative knowledge of the constraints for a particular 
problem domain (Ohlsson, 1996).  
In summary, researchers have proposed multiple 
alternative transfer processes including analogy, knowledge 
compilation, and error correction. Each mechanism has been 
associated with a particular kind of transfer scenario that 
specifies the conditions necessary for transfer (i.e., type of 
prior knowledge and application context). The purpose of the 
current study is to test the predictions of each transfer theory, 
and ask whether we can predict what transfer mechanism 
will be triggered for a given set of transfer scenarios. 
The Present Study 
In order to test these theories I implemented a between-
groups training study in which subjects were given one of 
three training scenarios (exemplar, tactics, or constraints) 
and then were tested on a common set of problem solving 
tasks.  
Each training scenario was designed to facilitate the 
construction of one of the three of the aforementioned 
knowledge structures associated with each transfer 
mechanism (i.e., exemplars for analogy, tactics for 
knowledge compilation, and constraints for error correction). 
In the exemplar training condition participants solve 
problems similar to those used in the transfer phase. In the 
tactical training condition participants learn instructional 
tactics for solving the transfer problems. In the constraints 
training condition participants learn the constraints 
associated with the problem solving task domain. 
The transfer task is Thurstone’s letter extrapolation task 
(Thurstone & Thurstone, 1941). In this task subjects are 
given a sequence of letters containing a pattern and their task 
is to find the pattern and continue it. Here is a simple 
example, A B M C D M  . . . the correct continuation is E F 
M G H M. An important aspect of these problems for the 
current purposes is that prior declarative and procedural 
knowledge can make them easier to solve.  
Although letter extrapolation is an invented task, it has 
several elements in common with many real world tasks 
including: a prior knowledge base (e.g., the alphabet), 
conceptual content (e.g., the pattern), materials to study (e.g., 
tactics), and generativity (e.g., one has to generate a 
sequence of coordinated actions). 
Three different extrapolation problems were used in the 
transfer phase.  Each problem was constructed with different 
properties or affordances, to elicit quantitative (accuracy, 
solution time, self-corrected errors) and qualitative (solution 
type) differences in performance from each training group.  
The first transfer problem was designed to have a 
similar surface and deep pattern structure as that used in the 
exemplar training problems. This problem can also be solved 
by applying either tactical or constraint knowledge. The 
second transfer problem is open-ended and depending on 
how the given sequence is interpreted, different solution 
types are expected. This problem shares the same deep 
structure as the exemplar problems. However, the surface 
similar characteristics are misaligned and suggest a different 
interpretation. If the given sequence is interpreted as similar 
to the surface sequence one solution is expected. If it is 
interpreted as a deep analogy a second solution is expected. 
Tactical knowledge can also be used to solve this problem 
and biases one towards the second solution. Constraint 
knowledge can be applied as well and does not provide an a-
priori bias towards any one of the correct solutions. The third 
transfer problem has neither surface nor deep structure 
similarity to the exemplar problems. The tactics are also not 
directly applicable. However, the constraints can be applied 
to find a unique solution. 
In addition to comparing task performance across 
training groups, each training group was compared to a no-
training control group for a measure of transfer relative to 
baseline performance. 
Predictions 
Exemplar Training. If participants in this training condition 
use exemplar knowledge and analogy to solve the first 
transfer problem they are expected to show high accuracy 
and fast solution times with few error-correcting behaviors 
as compared to the no-training group. They should show fast 
solution times for this problem because there is both surface 
and deep similarity to the training exemplars (i.e., fast 
memory access). They should show few error-correcting 
behaviors because they can transfer both declarative and 
procedural knowledge from the exemplars. For transfer 
problem 2 participants are expected to show high accuracy 
with slower solution times and few self-corrected errors. In 
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addition, they should show a bias for the surface similar 
problem solution. For transfer problem 3 they should show 
similar performance to no-training participants. 
Tactical Training. If participants in this training 
condition use tactical knowledge and knowledge compilation 
to solve the first two transfer problems they should show 
high accuracy but similar solution times and error-correcting 
behaviors to that of the no-training group. In addition, for 
transfer problem 2 they should show a bias for the tactics 
relevant solution. For transfer problem 3 they should show 
similar performance to that of the no-training participants. 
Constraints Training. If participants use constraint 
knowledge and error correction to solve all three transfer 
problems they should show high accuracy, similar solution 
times, and many error-correcting behaviors compared to the 
no-training group. In addition, they should show more 
variability in solution types for transfer problem 2. 
Methods 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-five undergraduate students from 
the University of Illinois at Chicago’s subject pool 
participated in return for partial course credit. 
Materials 
Training Materials. The training materials for the exemplar 
group consisted of four sequence extrapolation problem 
isomorphs. Each problem was presented on a separate sheet 
of paper. All four training problems had the same deep 
pattern structure as each other and the first two transfer 
problems, but each was instantiated with different surface 
features. Below are two examples: 
  Exemplar 1: L M Z M L Y M N X . . .  
  Exemplar 2: E F S F E R F G Q . . .  
The training materials for the tactics group consisted of 
a general tutorial, a tactic summary sheet, and several blank 
recall sheets. The tutorial (10 pages) provided instruction on 
specific kinds of pattern relations including: forward, 
mirror-flip, backward, repeat, and identity. Each pattern 
relation was defined and multiple examples were given. The 
tactics summary sheet consisted of one pattern continuing 
tactic and four pattern finding tactics including: (1) look for 
mirror flips or periods to break apart the pattern, (2) repeated 
letters may signal a mirror-flip order of symbols, group 
repeat, or period marker, (3) letters that are far apart in the 
alphabet may signal a mirror-flip alphabet, (4) letters close 
together may signal backward or forward relations. The 
tactics could be used to solve the first two transfer problems. 
The training materials for the constraints group 
consisted of a constraints tutorial, constraint summary sheet, 
blank recall sheets, and letter string violation worksheet. The 
tutorial (5 pages) provided instruction on four letter pattern 
constraints: (1) all completed letter strings must be divisible 
into six groups of letters, (2) the number of letters in each 
similar group must be the same, (3) each letter group must be 
derived from either the immediately preceding letter group 
or the letter group two back, (4) letter operations must be 
repeated. The string violation worksheet provided a series of 
completed letter strings in which the participants’ task was to 
identify constraint violations.  
Test Materials. The test tasks were three letter 
extrapolation problems. See Table 1 for each transfer 
problem and its solution(s). The first extrapolation problem 
had a periodicity of three letters. It was superficially similar 
to the exemplar training problems and shared the same deep 
pattern structure. This problem could also be solved by 
applying either tactics or constraint knowledge. Subjects 
were asked to continue the solution to six positions. 
The second extrapolation problem also had a periodicity 
of three letters. However, the correct continuation was 
ambiguous and was dependent on how the subject 
interpreted or “parsed” the given sequence. There are two 
primary solutions depending on the interpretation of the 
given sequence. If the letters are parsed into cross period 
relations of forward-1 and backward-1 comparable to 
surface similar relations used in the exemplar problems, one 
solution type will be derived (see Table 1, solution 1). 
However, if the given string is instead parsed as cross period 
relations of mirror-flip-alphabet and backward-1 relations as 
suggested by a deep analogy or pattern finding tactic 3, a 
different solution will be derived. Subjects were asked to 
continue the solution to nine positions. In addition, there 
were four other possible correct solutions. 
The third problem had a periodicity of two letters and 
had neither surface nor deep structure similarity to the 
exemplar problems. In addition, there was no pattern finding 
tactic that directly applied to this problem. However, a 
unique solution could be derived by constraint application. 
The pattern consists of pairs of letters incrementally 
increasing through the alphabet, each pair skipping an 
additional letter as the pattern progresses. 
 
Table 1. Transfer problems and their solutions. 
  
 Problem       Given letter sequence  
  Type            & the correct extrapolation  
 Transfer 1 
   Given: R S F S R E S T D T S C . . .          
   Solution Æ T U B U T A 
 Transfer 2     
   Given: B C P X Y O C D N . . .  
   Solution 1 Æ Y Z M D E L Z A K 
   Solution 2 Æ W X M D E L V W K  
 Transfer 3 
     Given: B A C B E D H G . . . 
    Solution Æ L K Q P  
       
 
Transfer problems were presented on a Macintosh 
computer with a 17’’ color monitor, standard keyboard and 
mouse. Problems were presented in black 30 pt font in the 
center of the screen. The transfer portion of the experiment 
was designed and presented using PsyScope software. 
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Design 
A between-subjects design was used with subjects randomly 
assigned to one of four training conditions: exemplar 
training (n = 31), tactic training (n = 31), constraint training 
(n = 33), and no-training (n = 30). Participants were tested 
individually. The procedure consisted of a training phase and 
a transfer phase.  
Procedure 
Training procedure for the exemplar group. Participants 
were first given general instructions for solving extrapolation 
problems. Next they were given three minutes to solve the 
first training problem. After three minutes participants 
received feedback on each position of their solution. If they 
extrapolated any position of the solution incorrectly they 
were given another instance of the same problem and three 
minutes to solve it. This cycle continued until the problem 
was solved correctly or the participant made four attempts to 
solve that problem. After the first problem this same 
procedure was continued for the remaining three training 
problems. 
Training procedure for the tactics group. Participants 
first read the general tutorial. Next they memorized a 
summary sheet of the tactics for three minutes. Then they 
were given a simple unrelated distractor task to solve (e.g., 
three arithmetic problems). Participants were then asked to 
recall and write down all of the tactics. The experimenter 
assessed memory performance for recall of each tactic. If the 
subject omitted or incorrectly recalled any of the tactics they 
were given the tactic summary sheet to study again for 
another two minutes. After the second memorization phase 
they were given another distractor task followed by recall. 
This cycle was continued until the subject recalled all five 
tactics. After correct recall the subjects were asked to explain 
each tactic to the experimenter. If the subject gave an 
incorrect explanation the experimenter provided the correct 
explanation. 
Training procedure for the constraints group. 
Participants first read the constraints tutorial. Next they 
memorized a summary sheet of the four constraints for three 
minutes. They were then given an unrelated distractor task to 
solve. Participants were then asked to recall the constraints 
and were given feedback on their recall performance. If they 
omitted or incorrectly recalled any of the constraints they 
were given the constraint summary sheet to memorize for 
another two minutes. After the second memorization phase 
they were given another distractor task followed by a blank 
recall sheet. This cycle continued until participants recalled 
all four constraints. After correct recall of the constraints 
subjects were asked to explain each constraint to the 
experimenter. If the subject gave an incorrect explanation the 
experimenter provided the correct explanation. Participants 
were then given the string violation worksheet. 
Training procedure for the no-training group. 
Participants in this condition did not receive any training and 
served as a comparison condition of baseline performance on 
the transfer tasks. 
Test procedure for all training groups. Subjects were 
seated at the computer and were told that they were to solve 
three extrapolation test problems. They were instructed that 
the given string of each transfer problem would be presented 
on the left side of the computer screen and that there would 
be an empty box for each letter position they were to 
extrapolate and fill in. Subjects were informed that they 
could re-enter new letters in any given position as many 
times as they would like. Subjects were told to click the 
mouse on the “Finished” field after all solution positions 
were filled and they were finished solving the problem. After 
the initial instructions participants were presented with each 
problem one at a time and given six minutes to solve each 
one.  
Results and Discussion 
Training Performance 
Subjects in all three training groups were trained to criterion. 
The criterion measure for the exemplar group was solving at 
least two of the training problems completely correct. The 
criterion measure for the tactical and constraints groups was 
complete recall and correct explanation of the tactics and 
constraints respectively. Three subjects in the constraints 
training condition and one subject in both the exemplar and 
tactical training conditions did not pass the criterion. These 
subjects were excluded from further analysis leaving thirty 
subjects (n = 30) in each training group.  
The training criterion provides evidence that each 
subject learned the target knowledge during the training 
phase (i.e., subjects in the exemplar group could solve 
training problems and subjects in the tactical and constraints 
group could recall declarative knowledge from memory). 
Next, I examine whether these subjects could transfer this 
knowledge to the problem solving tasks. 
Transfer Performance 
The three measures of central interest for the transfer phase 
were participants’ accuracy scores and behavioral profiles 
across the three transfer problems, as well as the type of 
solution used to solve problem 2. 
Accuracy Performance. To assess overall transfer 
performance participants’ accuracy scores were examined 
for each training group. The accuracy score was the 
proportion of solution positions correctly extrapolated for a 
given transfer problem. The mean accuracy scores and 
standard deviations for each training group on the transfer 
problems are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Mean proportion of solution positions correctly 
extrapolated for each transfer problem. 
 
Training Transfer1 Transfer2 Transfer3 
Exemplar .93* (.19) .80 (.26) .21 (.43) 
Tactics .78* (.32) .71 (.32) .22 (.37) 
Constraints .70* (.34) .74 (.33) .23 (.41) 
No-training .40  (.36) .69 (.38) .29 (.43) 
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A 4 (training) X 3 (problem type) mixed-analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant interaction of 
training by problem type, F (6, 232) = 6.46, p < .05. Follow-
up comparisons showed that the interaction was best 
explained by the large advantage of the training groups over 
the no-training group on transfer problem 1, F (6, 232) = 
43.14, p < .05, but not on problems 2 and 3, F (6, 232) = .76, 
ns and F (6, 232) = 1.41, ns respectively. 
As predicted, all three training groups showed high 
accuracy in solving the first two transfer problems. Problem 
1 in particular shows that the knowledge generated from 
each training condition facilitated transfer resulting in 
significantly higher accuracy performance than the no-
training group. Although the constraints training group 
showed high accuracy on the first two transfer problems they 
did not show high accuracy scores on the final problem. One 
potential explanation for this lack of predicted transfer is that 
solving the first two transfer problems provided participants 
with partial exemplar knowledge that interfered with 
constraint application (this issue is further discussed in the 
conclusion).  
Behavioral Profile. In order to assess whether a given 
participant used a particular transfer mechanism an ideal 
behavioral performance profile was created for each transfer 
mechanism. The use of a particular transfer mechanism can 
be evidenced by a constellation of scores across a set of 
dependent variables, what I term the behavioral signature.  
The dependent variables used in this assessment 
included the accuracy score, the solution time, the number of 
self-corrected errors, and the checking time. The solution 
time was the total time in seconds to solve the problem. The 
self-corrected error score was the total number of times a 
subject re-entered a new letter into a given solution position 
that changed a previous response. The checking time was the 
amount of time in seconds between a subject’s last 
extrapolation response and clicking on the finished button. 
This was presumably an indirect measure of error-checking 
behavior.  
Using this set of dependent measures an ideal behavioral 
signature was created for each transfer mechanism (see 
Table 3). The qualitative indices (e.g., fast vs. slow) for a 
given variable are in comparison to the average no-training 
baseline performance.   
 
Table 3. Ideal behavioral signatures for each transfer 
mechanism. 
 
Transfer Mechanism 
Behavior 
Analogy Knowledge Compilation 
Error-
Correction 
High Accuracy √ √ √ 
Fast Solution √   
Error Checking   √ 
 
The ideal behavioral signature for analogical transfer 
was a high overall accuracy, a fast solution time on problem 
1, and few error correcting behaviors. The ideal behavioral 
signature for knowledge compilation was a high overall 
accuracy, similar solution times and error correcting 
behaviors. The behavioral signature for error-correction was 
high accuracy, similar solution times, and a high number of 
error correcting behaviors. 
Each subject’s performance was examined as to whether 
it fit with a particular behavioral signature. For a subject’s 
accuracy performance to be classified as high he or she had 
to have an overall accuracy score higher than the average 
(collapsed across problem) of the no-training group. For a 
subject’s solution time to be classified as fast it had to be at 
least 1 standard deviation faster than the average solution 
time of the no-training group. Subjects were classified as 
having high error checking behavior if their performance met 
one of two criteria. The participant must have either scored 1 
standard deviation above the average no-training group on 
both of the error measures (i.e., many self-corrected errors 
and long checking time), or have scored 2 standard 
deviations above on a single error measure. The number of 
subjects classified under each behavioral signature is shown 
in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Number of subjects classified under each behavioral 
signature. 
 
Behavioral Signature Training 
Condition Analogy Knowledge Compilation 
Error-
Correction Other 
Exemplar 19* 9 0 2 
Tactics 2 16* 6 6 
Constraints 3 7 13* 7 
 
Chi-square tests showed that the training groups differed 
in the number of subjects classified for a given behavioral 
signature, χ2 (6, N = 90) = 43.10, p < .05. Follow-up tests 
showed that more subjects trained on exemplars used 
analogy than those trained on tactics or constraints, χ2 (2, N 
= 30) = 31.02, p < .05, more subjects trained on tactics used 
knowledge compilation than those trained on exemplars or 
constraints, χ2 (2, N = 30) = 6.49, p < .05, and more subjects 
trained constraints used error-correction than those trained 
on exemplars or tactics, χ2 (2, N = 30) = 16.94, p < .05. 
In summary, the majority of subjects in a particular 
transfer condition showed the expected pattern of behavioral 
results as predicted by the three theories of transfer. This 
provides evidence that these three mechanisms are triggered 
under particular learning and transfer task conditions.   
Solution Type. In addition to accuracy performance and 
behavioral profiles, further support for transfer can be 
assessed via the types of solutions participants used on 
problem 2. The number of subjects to use a given solution 
type is provided in Table 5.  
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Table 5. The number of subjects from each training group to 
use a given solution type.  
 
Correct Solution Type Training 
Condition Solution 1 Solution 2 Others 
Exemplar 19* 1 1 
Tactics 5 12* 4 
Constraints 12 0 4 
No-training 9 0 9 
 
Chi-square tests showed that the training groups 
significantly differed in the number of subjects to use a 
particular solution type, χ2 (6, N = 77) = 41.68, p < .05. Of 
particular interest is that more exemplar training subjects 
used solution 1 than those given other forms of training, χ2 
(3, N = 77) = 20.80, p < .05, and that more tactics training 
subjects used solution 2 than subjects from the other groups, 
χ2 (3, N = 77) = 29.70, p < .05. 
In sum, these results provide further evidence that 
participants used training knowledge to solve the transfer 
problems. Subjects given exemplar training showed a 
preference for the surface similar solution and the tactics 
group showed a preference for the tactics relevant solution. 
Conclusion 
The results from this study provide support for the 
hypothesis that there are multiple mechanisms of transfer 
that are distinct and identifiable. Subjects in three separate 
transfer scenarios exhibited behavioral patterns of 
performance consistent with those predicted by three theories 
of knowledge transfer. 
Several review articles have pointed out that the transfer 
literature exhibits a mixture of both positive and negative 
results (Bransford & Shwartz, 1999; Salomon & Perkins, 
1989). While some studies have failed to find large transfer 
effects where we intuitively expect them, others have found 
transfer effects under particular types of study and test 
conditions. The complexity of the empirical results suggests 
that transfer is a heterogeneous phenomenon. Greater clarity 
might result if we assume that different transfer processes 
are triggered in different types of transfer scenarios. Results 
from the current study suggest that to understand transfer one 
must take a multifaceted approach and examine several 
interrelated aspects of the transfer scenario, not just one or 
two variables from a single theoretical perspective. Progress 
towards a general theory of transfer requires the synthesis 
and integration across current lines of research.  
Future work should examine the interaction of these 
transfer mechanisms and investigate whether people are 
capable of adaptively shifting between mechanisms 
depending on their prior knowledge and the processing 
demands of the transfer task.  
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Abstract
Dewaele and Furnham predict that in oral language
Extraverts prefer to produce what they term im-
plicit language. They use: more pronouns, adverbs
and verbs; and fewer nouns, adjectives and prepo-
sitions. However, communication in a computer-
mediated environment, such as e-mail, might dis-
rupt these preferences. Also, other personality di-
mensions, such as Neuroticism, may be related to
implicitness. The study exploited an existing cor-
pus of e-mail texts written by native English speak-
ers of known personality. Stratied corpus com-
parison used n-gram-based techniques from statisti-
cal natural language processing, to compare relative
frequencies of use of (sequences of) parts-of-speech.
Implicitness eects were found, and Neuroticism ap-
peared to have a clearer impact than Extraversion.
Personality and language
Individuals dier in the way they speak and write.
Some of those dierences are systematic, and can
be attributed to apparently deeper dierences, such
as personality traits, like Extraversion and Neuroti-
cism. Extraversion is a trait strongly related to
interpersonal interaction and sociability, whereas,
Neuroticism, or Emotional Stability, is related to
internal emotional states, rather than interaction.
In the past, it has been found that both these per-
sonality traits do signicantly influence an individ-
ual’s language production behaviour in a variety of
contexts (Pennebaker and King, 1999; Dewaele and
Furnham, 1999). Recent work has investigated e-
mail text, and suggested that there are characteristic
sequences of words and punctuation associated with
each end of both dimensions (Extravert or Neurotic)
(Gill and Oberlander, 2002, 2003).
However, Mehl and Pennebaker (2003) note that
linguistic style is more consistently described by its
syntactic component, than by content. So, it could
be that the relative use of dierent parts-of-speech
(POSs) is a more important indicator of personality
than the relative use of words or strings of words.
The work by Dewaele and Furnham suggests that,
at least for Extraversion, there are real eects to be
found in spoken language, at the level of POSs. In
their account, implicit language involves a preference
for pronouns, adverbs and verbs, whereas explicit
language involves a preference for nouns, adjectives
and prepositions. Heylighen and Dewaele (2002)
suggest that Extraversion leads to implicitness due
to greater visual-spacial capacities, and this is part
of an overall preference for informal language. How-
ever, this work leaves open whether or not implicit-
ness eects will be found for Neuroticism. Gill and
Oberlander’s work suggests that formality may also
be a factor in Neurotic language behaviour, because
the reduced resources of high Neurotics do not en-
able detailed language planning. But that work did
not investigate implicitness in patterns of POS use.
It would therefore be interesting to know whether
Dewaele and Furnham’s ‘Implicit-Extravert hypoth-
esis’ applies in the genre of e-mail text|a genre close
to spoken language|and if so, how.
To address this question, the rest of this paper
is structured as follows. First, we give some back-
ground to help frame implicitness hypotheses that
gives POS predictions for both Extraversion and
Neuroticism. We then present the stratied cor-
pus comparison methods used in analysing POS use
in the e-mail corpus. Results were somewhat unex-
pected, in that implicitness predictions appear to be
conrmed for Neuroticism, but not for Extraversion.
We discuss possible ways of resolving the issue.
Background
Two personality traits
Extraversion and Neuroticism are traits which are
common to the two major trait theories of person-
ality: Eysenck’s three factor model (Eysenck and
Eysenck, 1991); and the ve factor model developed
by Costa and McCrae (Costa and McCrae, 1992)
and others.
They are described as follows: High Extraverts
are said to be sociable, easy-going, and optimistic,
and to take chances. Low Extraverts (or Intro-
verts) are said to be quiet, and reserved, and to
plan ahead, and dislike excitement. High Neurotics
are said to be: anxious, worrying, over-emotional,
and frequently depressed. Low Neurotics are said to
be: calm, even-tempered, controlled, and unworried
(Eysenck and Eysenck, 1991).
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Furnham (1990) has proposed the following features
of Extravert and Introvert language. Extravert lan-
guage: is less formal; has a more restricted (rather
than elaborated) code; uses vocabulary more loosely,
where this is dened in terms of how correctly
words are used, and how unusual they are. And
it uses more verbs, adverbs and pronouns (rather
than nouns, adjectives, and prepositions). This last
tendency directly involves POSs. Using factor anal-
ysis of syntactic tokens produced by L2 speakers,
Dewaele and Furnham (2000) describe implicit lan-
guage as a preference for pronouns, adverbs and
verbs, and they contrast it with explicit language,
seen as a preference for nouns, modiers and prepo-
sitions. So Extraverts prefer implicitness, and In-
troverts prefer explicitness. For the purposes of this
paper, we shall term this the Implicit-Extravert Hy-
pothesis. The hypothesis appears to hold in both in-
formal and formal situations, and is consistent with
previous analyses of the individual linguistic cate-
gories (Dewaele, 2001). Cope (1969) also notes a
lower lexical diversity (measured as type-token ra-
tio), for Extravert native French speakers, with this
also the case for non-native speakers of English (De-
waele and Furnham, 2000).
However, although they have discussed varieties
of anxiety and their eects on communication, De-
waele and Furnham have not attempted to predict
which part-of-speech patterns might be characteris-
tic of the related trait Neuroticism. What might we
expect to nd?
An extension: Implicit-Neuroticism
Previous work by Gill and Oberlander (2002, 2003)
gathered a corpus of e-mail messages, and analysed
it for characteristic words and sequences of words.
The corpus comprised 210 texts produced by 105
University students or recent graduates (37 males,
68 females). Each participant composed two e-mails
to a good friend whom they hadn't seen for quite
some time, spending around 10 minutes on each
message. The rst e-mail concerned their activities
in the past week, the second discussed their plans
for the next week. The total corpus size is around
65,000 words.
Following analysis of occurrences of individual
words, and sequences of words, it was reported that
the corpus results on Extravert words were broadly
consistent with previous ndings, for instance us-
ing informal language, looser punctuation, vaguer
quantication and more co-ordination. This there-
fore appears to t the Implicit-Extravert hypothesis;
however, no POS analysis was reported.
However, there were also results on Neurotic lan-
guage use. Pennebaker and King (1999) previously
argued that High Neuroticism was associated with a
language factor for ‘Immediacy’. Gill and Oberlan-
der (2003) extended these results, suggesting that
‘High Neurotics show a preference for forms occur-
ring frequently in speech, for example, I, and, that,
rather than less common words such as abject, suspi-
cion, tether. This preference for common words con-
tributes towards the very low lexical density found
in highly Neurotic texts, demonstrated by the high
level of repetition over ten-word sections of text.’
What is interesting about this is that it suggests
that Dewaele and Furnham’s ideas about formality
and implicitness might be as relevant to the Neu-
roticism dimension as they are to the Extraversion
dimension. If they are, then we would expect that|
like High Extraverts|High Neurotics will use more
verbs, adverbs and pronouns, while Low Neurotics
will use more nouns, adjectives, and prepositions.
We call this the Implicit-Neurotic Hypothesis (INH).
It obviously raises the question of whether or not
both dimensions are related to implicitness, and the
relative strength of any connections.
To address this question, we here apply to the
existing e-mail corpus a series of techniques to derive
POS frequencies, and POS sequences.
Syntactic Analysis of the Corpus
Method
The personality corpus was acquired as described
above. It was tagged using the Penn part-of-speech
tagset, using the MXPOST tagger (Ratnaparkhi,
1996). Further processing removed the original
words, leaving their associated POS tags. A subse-
quent stage of processing reduced the POS tags from
the detailed Penn tagset to more general syntactic
categories. The 45 Penn tags (see Marcus, Santorini,
and Marcinkiewicz, 1994, for more details) were con-
verted to 10 broader categories, as implemented in
the electronic version of the Shorter Oxford En-
glish Dictionary which is incorporated into the MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1987). These
are: Noun (nn), Adjective (adj), Verb (vbn), Ad-
verb (adv), Preposition (prp), Conjunction (conj),
Pronoun (prn), Interjection (int), Past Participle
(vpp), and Other [syntactic categories] (o). In ad-
dition to these categories, we also make use of hpi
indicating punctuation, and ‘NA’, which indicates
that a feature does not belong to any of the above
categories and generally represents the hENDi, end
of text marker. Note that here we use a dierent
set of labels to enhance intelligibility, and these do
not co-incide exactly with those used in the MRC
database: for instance, we use ‘prp’ instead of ‘R’.
The reduced-tag corpus|with the more general
syntactic categories|was then divided into strati-
ed sub-corpora. In stratifying, we isolate a ‘refer-
ence corpus’ of text from authors with a personal-
ity prole which is not extreme on any of the mea-
sured dimensions. We can then compare authors
from each of the extreme personality groups with
this ‘neutral’ (here termed ‘mid’) group. Thus, High
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and Low personality group samples were created by
splitting them at greater than 1 standard deviation
above and below the EPQ-R score for each dimen-
sion. The additional requirement was made that au-
thors had to be within 1 standard deviation on the
dimensions other than the one for which they were
extremely high or low. Additionally, all texts which
were within 1 standard deviation across all personal-
ity dimensions were assigned to the personality ‘neu-
tral’ Mid sub-corpus. Thus, on any dimension, we
have three groups to compare (High, Mid, and Low).
The resulting sizes of the subcorpora are as fol-
lows: Around 6,000 words for the high Extraversion,
and over 2,000 words for the low Extraversion groups
(11 and 4 authors respectively); Over 3,000 words for
the high Neurotic and around 6,000 words for the
low Neurotic groups (6 and 9 authors). The Neutral
group was around 10,000 words (23 authors).
To identify collocations in the tagged sub-corpora,
we calculate 1{5 word n-grams, and do not use a
rank or frequency cut-o during calculation, but
only present features with a frequency 5. This
enables an accurate log-likelihood statistic (G2) of
their occurrence between groups to be calculated (cf.
Rayson, 2003). We use N-gram software (Banerjee
and Pedersen, 2003) to compute G2 for 2- and 3-
grams. To identify those robust collocations which
distinguish one group from another, we need to make
a three-way comparison of the linguistic features
across the high-mid-low corpora for each group. We
calculate the relationships between the three groups,
and for each feature in each corpus we identify its
frequency and relative frequency, and then where rel-
evant its relative-frequency ratio and log-likelihood
between High-Low, High-Mid and Low-Mid groups.
This allows us to compare the relative usage and
statistical signicance of the dierence in the use of
features between groups.
Results
We rst report the results of the unigram analysis for
Extraversion and Neuroticism dimensions, we then
report the ndings of the overall n-gram analyses
(1{5 item sequences). Following this, the results for
Extraversion and Neuroticism are outlined.
Unigram Syntactic Analysis
Results of the unigram analysis for the reduced set
of syntactic tags can be found in Tables 1 and 2. We
display the results for all tags present in our data;
however G2 values which achieve signicance of p 
0:05 or p  0:01 are noted by  or  respectively.
In this presentation of the results, we draw at-
tention to features which are characteristic of the
High or Low groups, compared with the usage of
the feature more generally. In the tables, we dis-
tinguish whether a feature is under- or over-used by
one of the three groups (High, Mid or Low), relative
to the two other groups; this information is given
High Extraverts [conj]
Mid Extraverts {
Low Extraverts [vpp]
High Neurotics [conj] [prn]
Mid Neurotics {
Low Neurotics [adj] [nn]
Figure 1: Summary of unigram POS analysis
in the nal three columns of each table, with over-
use indicated by + and under-use by −. However,
a more concise view of the results can be gained
in the following way. At least two kind of features
can be associated with (say) High Neuroticism: un-
igrams which are over-used by High Neurotics; and
unigrams which are under-used by Low Neurotics.
Thus, Figure 1 lists, for each dimension and each
sub-group, the features which are associated with
that group either via their over-use of the feature,
or an opposite group’s underuse.
For Extraversion, conjunction (conj) is charac-
teristic of High Extraverts, and past participle verbs
(vpp) of Low Extraverts. The Mid Extravert group
shows no signicant under- or over-use of the gen-
eral tags. For Neuroticism, conjunction (conj) and
pronouns (prn) are characteristic of High Neurotics,
and adjectives (adj) and nouns (nn) of Low Neu-
rotics. The Mid Neurotic group shows no signicant
under- or over-use of the general tags.
For these results, we note the generally modest
levels of signicant dierences we found between per-
sonality groups. We may take this to indicate that
these groups generally use relatively similar propor-
tions of the relevant parts of speech. However, the
POSs may also occur in dierent contexts or se-
quences, thus indicating dierences in they way they
are used. We therefore turn to the results of the n-
gram analysis of the syntactic tag data.
N-gram Syntactic Analysis
There is insucient space to display the full results.
A concise view is therefore given in Figure 2. Notice
that for the Mid groups, we have to distinguish fea-
tures labelled specically as under-use, since this is
of course relative to both the High and Low groups.
The features here reach much higher levels of sig-
nicance than the unigrams, so here we only discuss
those which reach the critical value of 10.83 (i.e.,
p  0:001). 32 n-gram features reach this value for
Neuroticism, and 25 for Extraversion. Of these, the
majority in each case reach the 15.13 critical value
(p  0:0001): 23 and 17, respectively. The fea-
tures reaching this higher value are predominantly
bigrams, exceptions being the longer n-grams for
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Feature Rank High High Mid Mid Low Low High- Low- High- High Mid Low
Freq. R.Freq Freq. R.Freq Freq. R.Freq Mid G2 Mid G2 Low G2 Use Use Use
VPP 1 118 0.0173 202 0.0185 66 0.0260 0.34 5.43* 6.73** +
CONJ 2 258 0.0378 338 0.0310 88 0.0347 5.80* 0.88 0.50 +
ADV 3 562 0.0824 963 0.0882 238 0.0938 1.67 0.71 2.76
PRP 4 679 0.0995 1100 0.1008 231 0.0910 0.06 2.02 1.40
O 5 1071 0.1570 1714 0.1570 369 0.1454 0.00 1.82 1.64
VBN 6 1156 0.1695 1804 0.1652 449 0.1769 0.44 1.65 0.60
hpi 7 667 0.0978 1048 0.0960 228 0.0898 0.14 0.84 1.23
ADJ 8 404 0.0592 617 0.0565 136 0.0536 0.53 0.32 1.03
NA 9 23 0.0034 47 0.0043 9 0.0035 0.95 0.30 0.02
PRN 10 696 0.1020 1118 0.1024 277 0.1091 0.01 0.89 0.89
NN 11 1177 0.1725 1945 0.1782 442 0.1742 0.76 0.19 0.03
INT 12 11 0.0016 21 0.0019 5 0.0020 0.23 0.00 0.13
Table 1: Reduced syntactic tag unigram analysis, Extraversion.
Note. p < :05,   p < :01, df = 1.
Feature Rank High High Mid Mid Low Low High- Low- High- High Mid Low
Freq. R.Freq Freq. R.Freq Freq. R.Freq Mid G2 Mid G2 Low G2 Use Use Use
ADJ 1 193 0.0501 617 0.0565 447 0.0660 2.15 6.15* 10.50** +
CONJ 2 155 0.0403 338 0.0310 210 0.0310 7.09** 0.00 6.01* +
NN 3 625 0.1624 1945 0.1782 1230 0.1815 4.13* 0.27 5.22* −
PRN 4 424 0.1102 1118 0.1024 648 0.0956 1.62 1.93 5.06* +
INT 5 9 0.0023 21 0.0019 6 0.0009 0.23 3.19 3.48
VPP 6 63 0.0164 202 0.0185 146 0.0215 0.74 1.95 3.44
VBN 7 688 0.1787 1804 0.1652 1132 0.1671 3.04 0.09 1.94
NA 8 13 0.0034 47 0.0043 19 0.0028 0.63 2.63 0.26
PRP 9 352 0.0915 1100 0.1008 650 0.0959 2.55 0.99 0.53
O 10 627 0.1629 1714 0.1570 1035 0.1528 0.62 0.48 1.60
ADV 11 318 0.0826 963 0.0882 595 0.0878 1.04 0.01 0.78
hpi 12 382 0.0992 1048 0.0960 657 0.0970 0.31 0.04 0.13
Table 2: Reduced syntactic tag unigram analysis, Neuroticism.
Note. p < :05,   p < :01, df = 1.
punctuation found for Neuroticism. In interpreting
this data, we seek distinctive POS collocations. Ta-
ble 3 shows, for each sub-group, how many distinc-
tive collocations involving each POS were found.
Extraversion From the unigram analysis, we are
particularly interested in collocations involving con-
junctions (for the High E group) and past participle
verbs (for the Low E group). As far as conjunctions
are concerned, High Extraverts are associated with
the use of [conj vbn] and [conj adv], while Low
Extraverts are associated with the use of [conj vbn
prn]. The latter oers a particularly distinctive col-
location, since the pronoun switches the preference
from High to Low E. Turning to past participles, we
nd that High E prefer [vpp prp], but there are no
preferred collocations for Low Extraverts.
Given Table 3, the remaining discrepancies be-
tween the High and Low E groups are as follows.
Allowing that there are substantially more distinc-
tive collocations for the High E group overall, we
nd that the High E group has notably more col-
locations involving: punctuation, adjectives, nouns,
and POSs in the Other category. The Low E group
has notably more collocations involving verbs and
pronouns.
Neuroticism Here, we are most interested in col-
locations involving pronouns and conjunctions (for
the High N group) and adjectives and nouns (for
the Low N group). Taking pronouns rst, we nd
a High Neurotic preference for [adj prn vbn], [adj
prn] and [vbn prn o]. Turning to conjunctions,
they also show a preference for [vbn adj conj].
Three of these collocations also involve adjectives,
which are used overall more by Low Neurotics. How-
ever, the rest of High N preferences for colloca-
tions involving pronouns instead involve adverbs:
[vbn prn o adv vbn], [vbn prn o adv], [prn
vbn prn o adv] and [adv prn vbn prn]. While
Low Neurotics have only one pronoun collocation
involving an adjective|[prn adj]|the other three
of their preferred pronoun or conjunction colloca-
tions also involve adverbs: [prn adv], [adv prn]
and [conj adv].
Given Table 3, and allowing that there are rather
more distinctive collocations for the High Neurotic
group overall, we nd that the High Ns have no-
tably more collocations involving verbs, and POSs in
the Other category. The Low Ns have notably more
collocations involving: past participle verbs and ad-
verbs.
Discussion
Dewaele and Furnham’s original Implicit-Extravert
Hypothesis predicted that in spontaneous speech
High Extraverts will use more verbs, adverbs and
pronouns, and that Low Extraverts will use more
nouns, adjectives, and prepositions (see Heylighen
and Dewaele, 2002, for a discussion as to why cer-
tain POSs are preferred by Extraverts). The uni-
gram analysis did not support these predictions. It
indicated that High E use more conjunctions, and
that Low E use more past participle verbs. No other
overall dierences were found, although it is perhaps
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High Extraverts [conj vbn] [nn nn] [adv hpi] [prn
nn] [hpi o] [adv o] [adj hpi] [nn adv] [conj adv]
[vpp prp] [adj o] [hpi adj] [prn o adv] [vbn o nn
hpi] [prn o adv vbn] [hpi o vbn adj hpi] [hpihpihpi]
Mid Extraverts Underuse: [hpi adv] [hpi nn]
Low Extraverts [adv prp] [prn adv] [vbn prn o]
[vbn prn adv] [conj vbn prn] [vbn hpi prn]
High Neurotics [vbn prp] [hpi o] [hpihpihpihpihpi]
[hpihpihpihpi] [hpihpi] [hpihpihpi] [vbn prn o] [adj
prn vbn] [prp adj] [vbn o vbn adv] [prn vbn prn
o adv] [vbn adj conj] [adj prn] [vbn prn o adv
vbn] [vbn prn o adv] [adv prn vbn prn]
Mid Neurotics Underuse: [prn hpi adv] [nn vbn o
adj] [nn vbn o adj nn] [prn o vbn hpi]
Low Neurotics [hpi adv] [prn adv] [adv adv] [adj
hpi] [adv o] [vpp adv] [o adv] [adv prn] [conj adv]
[adv vpp] [prn adj] [vpp prp]
Figure 2: Summary of n-gram POS analysis
worth noting that since we have both past partici-
ples and general verbs, our categories are slightly
more ne-grained, which may aect the result.
The new Implicit-Neurotic Hypothesis predicted
that High Neurotics will use more verbs, adverbs
and pronouns, and that Low Neurotics will use more
nouns, adjectives, and prepositions. The unigram
analysis partially supported these predictions. It
found that High N use more pronouns (and conjunc-
tions), and that Low N use more nouns and adjec-
tives. However, no overall dierences were found for
verbs, adverbs or prepositions.
At rst glance, then, it appears that the Neuroti-
cism dimension is more closely related to implicit-
ness than the Extraversion dimension, in this corpus
POS Extraversion Neuroticism Total
High Mid Low High Mid Low
hpi 7 2 1 5 2 2 19
adj 4 0 0 4 2 2 12
adv 6 1 3 5 1 9 25
conj 2 0 1 1 0 1 5
nn 4 1 0 0 2 0 7
prn 3 0 5 7 2 3 20
prp 1 0 1 2 0 1 5
vbn 4 0 4 9 3 0 20
vpp 1 0 0 0 0 3 4
o 7 0 1 6 3 2 19
na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 39 4 16 39 15 23 136
Table 3: Distinctive collocations involving a given
POS.
of e-mail text. Two potential explanations emerge
to explain the dierence between this and Dewaele
and Furnham’s results: Firstly, they were study-
ing spoken, rather than written, language; and sec-
ondly, that they were largely dealing with L2 speak-
ers. Perhaps implicitness is more closely related to
Neuroticism in written language, and for Extraver-
sion in spoken language; likewise it may have dier-
ent eects for native and non-native language users.
However, before following this line of reasoning, we
should also consider the results of the n-gram anal-
ysis. At least two gross patterns are interesting.
First, where a High and Low group do not dier
overall in the relative frequency of use of a POS,
one group may have rather more types of distinc-
tive collocation involving that POS than the other
group. If overall use does not dier, it means that
one group is using the POS in many dierent con-
texts; the other may be using it in a narrower, or
perhaps more stereotypical, range of contexts. Let
us call the greater-range case ‘pervasive’ use. Sec-
ondly, where a High and Low group do dier in rel-
ative frequency of use of a POS, it is interesting to
note whether higher frequency is associated with a
greater set of collocations involving that POS, or a
smaller set. Intuitions here are not rm; but we
might expect that greater relative frequency is asso-
ciated with a greater range of use|and hence, with
perhaps fewer stereotypical collocations. If so, fre-
quency may track pervasiveness.
So, consider again the original Implicit-Extravert
Hypothesis: High Extraverts will use more verbs,
adverbs and pronouns, and Low Extraverts will use
more nouns, adjectives, and prepositions. We nd
that High E prefer conjunctions overall, but that it
is the Low E who tend towards POS-collocations in-
volving verbs and pronouns. So High E use of verbs
and pronouns may not be not greater overall, but it
is pervasive. Equally, Low E prefer past participle
verbs overall, but it is the High E who tend towards
POS-collocations involving nouns, adjectives, punc-
tuation, and the Other category. Perhaps Low E use
of adjectives and nouns is pervasive. And since Low
Extraverts actually use proportionately more vpp,
their complete lack of distinctive robust collocations
suggests that they use vpp pervasively.
Now, let us turn to the new Implicit-Neurotic Hy-
pothesis. High Neurotics will use more verbs, ad-
verbs and pronouns, and Low Neurotics will use
more nouns, adjectives, and prepositions. We nd
that High N prefer pronouns and conjunctions over-
all, but that it is the Low N who tend towards POS-
collocations involving past participle verbs and ad-
verbs. So perhaps High N use of past participle verbs
and adverbs is pervasive. Equally, Low N prefer ad-
jectives and nouns overall, but it is the High N who
tend towards POS-collocations involving verbs and
the Other category. And again, perhaps Low N use
of verbs and Other is pervasive.
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This pattern is not quite so simple as the Ex-
travert case, and this may in part be because we
have split the verb category in two, distinguishing
past participle verbs from verbs in general. Putting
this to one side, however, we do nd High N use of
adverbs to be pervasive; and this at least ts the
picture of pervasiveness that seemed to be emerging
with Extraversion.
Conclusion
This paper set out to establish whether Dewaele and
Furnham’s Implicit-Extravert Hypothesis for oral
language applies in the genre of written e-mail text
produced by native English speakers.
At the simple unigram level, it appears that Neu-
roticism rather than Extraversion ts the implicit-
ness predictions concerning frequency of use of parts-
of-speech. However, we can drill down to the collo-
cations level, and we may assume that the pervasive
use of a POS tends to reduce the likelihood of nd-
ing stereotypical collocations involving it. If we do,
then Extraversion does involve implicitness after all.
On this interpretation, a POS can be characteris-
tic of some personality group not because they use
it more frequently than other groups; rather, it is
characteristic because they use it more pervasively.
Applications of this work include aective text
categorisation, and therefore could contribute to-
wards the rapidly expanding eld of sentiment classi-
cation. In taking this work further, we need to give
the idea of pervasiveness a more solid basis. But this
is only worth pursuing if the idea is really needed to
explain the data. And we will only know this once
we have tested the hypotheses against larger corpora
in other domains. The corpora could be brand new;
but it would certainly be possible to apply the an-
alytic techniques presented here to other previously
gathered personality corpora.
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Abstract  
Scenes are composed of numerous objects, textures and colors 
which are arranged in a variety of spatial layouts. This presents the 
question of how visual complexity is represented by a cognitive 
system. In this paper, we aim to study the representation of visual 
complexity for real-world scene images. Is visual complexity a 
perceptual property simple enough so that it can be compressed 
along a unique perceptual dimension? Or is visual complexity 
better represented by a multi-dimensional space? Thirty-four 
participants performed a hierarchical grouping task in which they 
divided scenes into successive groups of decreasing complexity, 
describing the criteria they used at each stage. Half of the 
participants were told that complexity was related to the structure 
of the image whereas the instructions in the other half were 
unspecified. Results are consistent with a multi-dimensional 
representation of visual complexity (quantity of objects, clutter, 
openness, symmetry, organization, variety of colors) with task 
constraints modulating the shape of the complexity space (e.g. the 
weight of a specific dimension). 
 
Introduction 
 
Real-world scenes are composed of numerous objects, 
textures and colored regions, which are arranged in a variety 
of spatial layouts. Although natural images are visually 
complex, we are able to form a coherent percept amid 
numerous regions, and identify a complex scene at a glance 
(Potter, 1976), even in the face of visually degraded 
conditions (Schyns & Oliva, 1994). This presents the 
question of how a cognitive system may represent the level 
of complexity of a scene. Specifically, the following 
question motivated the experiment presented in this paper: 
can visual complexity be conceptualized along a single 
dimension? Or is visual complexity better represented as a 
multi-dimensional space where the axes might correspond 
to meaningful perceptual dimensions? 
Visual complexity 
 
The perception of visual complexity has been studied with 
natural texture images (e.g. Heaps & Handel, 1999; Rao & 
Lohse, 1993) and simple patterns (see Palmer, 1999 for a 
review). Heaps and Handel had participants rank texture 
images along several perceptual dimensions including 
complexity, connectedness, depth, orientation, 
repetitiveness, and structure. The authors defined 
complexity as “the degree of difficulty in providing a verbal 
description of an image”. They observed that the complexity 
of a texture could be estimated along a one dimensional axis 
representing the degree of perceivable structure: textures 
with repetitive and uniform oriented patterns were judged 
less complex than disorganized patterns.  This finding 
correlates with results in the domain of perceptual grouping 
by acknowledging that the presence of regularities (e.g., 
symmetry, repetition, similarity) simplifies a visual pattern 
(Feldman, 1997; Palmer, 1999; Van der Helm, 2000). 
 
How can we represent the complexity of a stimulus like a 
scene, which has a high variability of parts and spatial 
layout organization? According to Heylighen (1997), the 
perception of complexity is correlated with the variety in the 
visual stimulus. Figure 1 illustrates two instances of variety. 
First, the perceived visual complexity can increase as a 
function of the quantity and range of objects. Second, the 
perceived visual complexity can increase as a function of 
the variety of materials and surface styles while the number 
of objects and surfaces remain constant. The representation 
of a real-world scene is likely to combine both levels of 
varieties (parts and surface styles). Intuitively, complex 
scenes should contain a larger variety of parts and surfaces 
styles, as well as more relationships between these regions 
than do simpler scenes.  
 
A visual pattern is also seen complex if its parts are difficult 
to identify and separate from each other. Yet, paradoxically, 
when the parts are separated or conceptualized as a whole, 
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the valence of the complexity changes and the pattern 
becomes simpler (Heylighen, 1997). This suggests that the 
perceived complexity of an image also depends on the 
amount of perceptual grouping, a characteristic independent 
of the quantity of parts, an observer perceives in the scene. 
Additionally, the perception of visual complexity is likely to 
be dependent on the scale of observation (e.g. looking at a 
bookshelf or the books level), preexisting schemas and 
familiarity with the scene. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of how visual complexity evolves as a 
function of object variety (top) and surface variety (bottom). 
 
If the perception of visual complexity is an interaction 
between the information in the image and task constraints, 
can we still identify a set of perceptual properties that 
participants consistently use to characterize visual 
complexity of real world scenes?  The shape of the visual 
complexity representation could take three forms:  
(1) Unique Perceptual Dimension: the properties of 
complexity are combined into one principal dimension, 
robust to subjectivity and task constraints. This is the case 
of the naturalness dimension in real world scenes (e.g. 
judging if a scene image is a natural or a man-made 
environment, Oliva & Torralba, 2001). 
(2) Multi-dimensional Space Representation: most of visual 
complexity variability is explained by an identifiable 
number of perceptual dimensions. The weight of each 
dimension may vary with task constraints, but the principal 
dimensional vocabulary remains the same (Gardenfors, 
2000). This seems to be the case of the representation of 
basic-level scene categories (e.g., beach, street, Oliva & 
Torralba, 2001). 
(3) Flexible Space Representation: the properties that 
human observers use to represent the visual complexity of a 
particular scene vary with image characteristics (e.g., 
structure, clusters), tasks constraints, and attentional 
mechanisms. There is no specific vocabulary that is used for 
representing visual complexity. 
These three levels of representation are not incompatible: 
for a particular task, the visual complexity space could be 
skewed towards a line (e.g. one perceptual property is 
dominant), but for a different task, the space of visual 
complexity might take into account multiple dimensions. 
The experiment presented below evaluates the format and 
content of the representation of visual complexity with the 
aim to tease apart the three levels of representation 
suggested above. 
 
Experiment 
The goal of the experiment is to study the representation of 
visual complexity while two groups of participants are told 
different definitions of visual complexity. Both groups 
performed a hierarchical grouping task with images of 
various levels of visual complexity. A hierarchical grouping 
task allows for identifying the explicit criteria participants 
used to perform a grouping task (see Oliva & Torralba, 
2001) and helps to give a psychological interpretation of the 
axes provided by a multi-dimensional scaling algorithm (see 
Results section).  
 
Method 
Subjects Thirty-four students from an introduction to 
psychology course at Michigan State University participated 
in the study for course credits. Half were in the control 
group and the other half in the structure group. 
 
Materials The present study used 100 pictures of indoor 
scenes. This subset was selected at random from a database 
of 1000 scenes previously ranked on their subjective visual 
complexity. The subset had the constraints to represent all 
levels of complexity along a scale from 1 to 100. The 
general scene database was originally composed from 
sources such as the web, magazines and various image 
databases. Since the volume of the space that a scene image 
represents is correlated with a given range of clutter 
(Torralba & Oliva, 2002), only scenes of a small volume 
range (indoors) were kept for this present study. Moreover, 
indoor scenes contain a greater variety of colors and objects 
in a variety of layouts compared to larger scaled 
environments (e.g. natural space, Oliva & Schyns, 2000). 
 
Procedure The hierarchical grouping task was performed as 
follows (see Figure 2): starting with 100 pictures shown in a 
grid on a 23” Apple monitor, participants were asked to 
separate images into two groups on the screen, 
corresponding respectively to the most complex vs. the 
simplest scenes. In a second step, they were asked to split 
each group into two more subdivisions, and in a third step, 
split the four groups into two groups each, leading to a total 
of eight groups. For each subdivision, they were asked to 
follow a criterion corresponding to visual complexity 
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(simplicity) and give a verbal description of it. Participants 
could move each picture across boundaries at any stage, and 
see an enlarged version of the image by double clicking on 
it. Similarly to Heaps and Handel (1999), our Control group 
was told the following instruction: “Visual simplicity is 
related to how easy it will be to remember the image after 
seeing it for a short time. Visual complexity is related to 
how difficult it will be to give a verbal description of the 
image and how difficult it will be to remember the scene 
after seeing it for a short time.” For the Structure group, the 
following instructions were given in addition to the control 
instructions: “Visual complexity is related to the structure of 
the scene and therefore, is not merely related to color or 
brightness. Simplicity is related to how you see that objects 
and regions are going well together. Complexity is related to 
how difficult it is to make sense of the structure of the 
scene”. Both groups were forbidden to use a criterion 
related to the semantic class of the scene (e.g. kitchen) or 
the presence of a specific object or color. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 summarizes a taxonomy corresponding to the most 
common criteria from the descriptions given by participants 
at the primary and secondary divisions. Each verbal 
description was recoded as a class of concepts. Some 
descriptions were a composition of concepts (e.g. pictures 
on the left seemed more cluttered whereas the ones on the 
right seemed more open in space), others were unique (e.g. 
quantity of objects). The percentage in Table 1 should be 
seen as an indicator of the strength of a perceptual property 
(most of the time used, often used or almost never used) and 
not as a fixed value, as variability among individual 
descriptions was high. 
 
Table 1:  Criteria of visual complexity used for the primary 
and secondary divisions and their % for both groups. 
 
Criteria Group:Structure Group:control 
Quantity of:   
    object 19    32 
    detail 8        8 
    color 2       19 
Quantity total 29       59 
Clutter 18    5 
Symmetry 15      2.5 
Open Space 18      10 
Organization 13        7 
Contrast <1        8 
 
For the control group, where complexity was defined as a 
difficulty of verbal and visual recording, the criteria 
corresponding to variety and quantity of objects and color 
dominated the representation of complexity. In the second 
group where complexity was defined as relating to the 
structure of the scene, participants evenly used a set of 
criteria that the control group mentioned less frequently. 
The primary criterion of the structure group still concerns 
the quantity and variety of parts, participants referring either 
to the quantity of objects per se (19%), or the relationship 
between quantity of objects and spatial arrangement (18%, 
clutter). The other criteria were mostly concerned with 
spatial layout (symmetry, open space and organization {e.g. 
grid, centralized, cluster}). 
 
For each condition, we investigated the consistency of the 
complexity ratings for the 100 images across subjects by 
computing a Spearman's rank-order correlation for each 
possible pairing of subjects (images within each subgroup 
were given the same complexity value, from 1 to 8). If 
participants were consistent, correlations among 
participants’ rankings should be high. In both groups, 
Spearman's correlations were all statistically significant (p < 
.01) and were moderate to large in magnitude. Mean 
correlations of all the pair-wise comparisons were the same 
in the control and structure group, respectively, r = 0.62 and 
r=0.61; (stdev = 0.15 and 0.14).  
 
Next, we applied a nonlinear dimensional reduction method 
(Isomap, Tenenbaum, de Silva, & Langford, 2000) onto a 
dissimilarity matrix constructed from participants’ grouping 
for each condition (control and structure). To do so, a 
symmetric 100 x 100 matrix was constructed for each 
participant. Pairs of images placed in the same group versus 
in a different group were given respectively a score of 0 or a 
score of 1. Dissimilarity matrices from all participants from 
each condition were summed to create two pooled 
dissimilarity matrices. The Isomap analysis uses the 
dissimilarities of judgments given by human observers and 
provides a low dimensional visual representation of the 
mapping of proximities (i.e., distances) existing between 
images of various levels of complexity.  
 
Figure 3 shows a two dimensional projection of the 100 
images given by Isomap for the Structure group. The 
representation corresponds to the number of independent 
ways in which visual scenes can be perceived to resemble or 
differ in visual complexity. Although the dimensions per se 
are difficult to interpret and further experiments will be 
needed to assess more accurately the underlying dimensions 
of the space shown in Figure 3, it shows indeed a first 
principal direction corresponding to increasing “clutter” and 
quantity of objects. The second axis, illustrated in Figure 4, 
suggests an ordering along mirror symmetry and layout 
organization.  
 
Albeit the correlation between the two first axes given by 
the Isomap representation for the structure and control 
group is nearly identical (0.98), the correlation between the 
ranks of images along the two second axes drops to 0.33 
(see Figure 4), suggesting that participants used a different 
combination of criteria beside quantity while ranking the 
visual complexity of scenes. In the control group, 
participants were told that complexity was related to the 
difficulty of verbally describing an image. Consequently, 
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they estimated complexity almost exclusively based on the 
quantity and variety of objects and colors. In the structure 
group, participants were sensitive to spatial layout criteria, 
such as symmetry and open space. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Sample of images projected onto the second 
principal dimension of Isomap for the structure group (top) 
and the control group (bottom). For the structure group, the 
images are organized from the top-left to the bottom-right 
following a property that resembles mirror symmetry.  For 
the control group, the images are organized following a 
different combination of properties. These projections 
illustrate the differences in the criteria used between the two 
groups. 
 
Discussion  
The high correlations across participants for both groups 
(average of 0.61) suggest that participants used a same (or 
similar) set of holistic perceptual dimensions to represent 
complexity. The dimensions of visual complexity listed in 
Table 1 are not exhaustive: one can imagine that the 
perceived complexity of scenes of a larger volume of space 
(e.g., urban environments) might require new dimensions 
better suited to representing these spaces (e.g., perspective). 
However, the fact that there exists a set of defined properties 
that most people are sensitive to is appealing for modeling 
the visual complexity, where each dimension would be 
represented as a combination of low-level (e.g. contours, 
junctions) and medium-level features (e.g. connectedness, 
symmetry, Mack & Oliva, 2004). Furthermore, finding the 
true meaningful axes in the space generated by a multi-
dimensional scaling algorithm, as well as the status of these 
dimensions (separable, integral, Garner, 1974; Gardenfors, 
2000; Maddox, 1992) will be the subject of a follow-up 
study.  
Conclusion  
The goal of this study was to characterize the representation 
of visual complexity and its modulation by task constraints. 
The complexity ratings provided by observers on 100 
pictures of (indoor) real-world scenes are consistent with a 
multi-dimensional representation of visual complexity. 
While the contribution of the dimensions are modulated by 
task constraints, visual complexity is principally represented 
by the perceptual dimensions of quantity of objects, clutter, 
openness, symmetry, organization, and variety of colors.  
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Figure 2: Illustration of the hierarchical grouping task after completion (organization made by subject 1 in the Structure 
group). Most complex scenes are in the top left corner, and most simple scenes are the bottom right corner. 
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Figure 3: Representation given by Isomap for the structure group. The space shows on the arrow axis, a principal direction 
corresponding to increasing quantity of objects and clutter. The images that are far away from that direction are images that 
exhibit the highest amount of variability in how they were grouped in relation to other images. Scenes of medium and low 
level of clutter exhibit more variations along a second direction, possibly related to symmetry and spatial arrangement (cf. 
Figure 4). 
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Abstract
An important aspect of language acquisition involves learning
the syntactic nonadjacent dependencies that hold between
words in sentences, such as subject/verb agreement or tense
marking in English. Despite successes in statistical learning of
adjacent dependencies, the evidence is not conclusive for
learning nonadjacent items. We provide evidence that
discovering nonadjacent dependencies is possible through
statistical learning, provided it is modulated by the variability
of the intervening material between items. We show that
generalization to novel syntactic-like categories embedded in
nonadjacent dependencies occurs with either zero or large
variability. In addition, it can be supported even in more
complex learning tasks such as continuous speech, despite
earlier failures.
Introduction
Statistical learning – the discovery of structural
dependencies through the probabilistic relationships
inherent in the raw input – has long been proposed as a
potentially important mechanism in language development
(e.g. Harris, 1955). Efforts to employ associative
mechanisms for language learning withered during
following decades in the face of theoretical arguments
suggesting that the highly abstract structures of language
could not be learned from surface level statistical
relationships (Chomsky, 1957). Recently, interest in
statistical learning as a contributor to language development
has reappeared as researchers have begun to investigate how
infants might identify aspects of linguistic units such as
words, and to label them with the correct linguistic abstract
category such as VERB. Much of this research has focused
on tracking dependencies between adjacent elements.
However, certain key relationships between words and
constituents are conveyed in nonadjacent (or remotely
connected) structure. In English, linguistic material may
intervene between auxiliaries and inflectional morphemes
(e.g., is cooking, has traveled) or between subject nouns and
verbs in number agreement (the books on the shelf are
dusty). The presence of embedding and nonadjacent
relationships in language was a point of serious difficulty
for early associationist approaches. It is easy to see that a
distributional mechanism computing solely neighbouring
information would parse the above sentence as …*the shelf
is dusty. Despite the importance of detecting remote
dependencies, we know relatively little about the conditions
under which this skill may be acquired by statistical means.
In this paper, we present results using the Artificial
Language Learning (ALL) paradigm designed to test
learning of nonadjacent dependencies in adult participants.
We suggest that a single statistical mechanism might
underpin two language learning abilities: detection of
nonadjacencies and abstraction of syntactic-like categories
from nonadjacent distributional information.
Despite the fact that both infants and adults are
able to track transitional probabilities among adjacent
syllables (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996), tracking
nonadjacent probabilities, at least in uncued streams of
syllables, has proven elusive in a number of experiments
and the evidence is not conclusive (Newport & Aslin, 2004;
Onnis, Monaghan, Chater, & Richmond, submitted; Peña,
Bonatti, Nespor, & Mehler, 2002). Thus, a serious empirical
challenge for statistical accounts of language learning is to
show that a distributional learner can learn dependencies at
a distance. Previous work using artificial languages (Gómez,
2002) has shown that the variability of the material
intervening between dependent elements plays a central role
in determining how easy it is to detect a particular
dependency. Learning improves as the variability of
elements that occur between two dependent items increases.
When the set of items that participate in the dependency is
small relative to the set of elements intervening, the
nonadjacent dependencies stand out as invariant structure
against the changing background of more varied material.
This effect also holds when there is no variability of
intervening material shared by different nonadjacent items,
perhaps because the intervening material becomes invariant
with respect to the variable dependencies (Onnis,
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Christiansen, Chater, & Gómez, 2003). In natural language,
different structural long-distance relationships such as
singular and plural agreement between noun and verb may
in fact be separated by the same material (e.g. the books on
the shelf are dusty versus the book on the shelf is dusty). We
call the combined effects of zero and large variability the
variability hypothesis.
Very similar ALL experiments tested have failed to
show generalization from statistical information unless
additional perceptual cues such as pauses between words
were inserted, suggesting that a distributional mechanism
alone is too weak to support abstraction of syntactic-like
categories. On these grounds Peña et al. (2002) have argued
that generalization necessitates a rule-based computational
mechanism, whereas speech segmentation relies on lower-
level statistical computations. However, these experiments
tested nonadjacency learning and embedding generalization
with low variability of embedded items, which we contend
is consistent with the variability hypothesis that learning
should be hard. Our aim is to show that at the end-points of
the variability continuum, i.e. with either no or large
variability, generalization becomes possible. In Experiment
1, we present results suggesting that both detection of
nonadjacent frames and generalization to the embedded
items are simultaneously achieved when either one or a
large number of different type items are shared by a small
number of highly frequent and invariant frames. In
Experiment 2 we also investigate whether tracking
nonadjacent dependencies can assist speech segmentation
and generalization simultaneously, given the documented
bias for segmenting speech at points of lowest transitional
probability (Saffran et al. 1996a,b).
We conclude that adult learners are able to track
both adjacent and nonadjacent structure, and the success is
modulated by variability. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that a learning mechanism uses statistical
information by capitalizing on stable structure for both
pattern detection and generalization (Gómez, 2002, Gibson,
1991).
Generalising under variability
The words of natural languages are organized into
categories such as ARTICLE, PREPOSITION, NOUN,
VERB, etc., that form the building blocks for constructing
sentences. Hence, a fundamental part of a language
knowledge is the ability to identify the category to which a
specific word, say apple , belongs and the syntactic
relationships it holds with adjacent as well as nonadjacent
words. Two properties of word class distribution appear
relevant for a statistical learner. First, closed class words
like articles and prepositions typically involve highly
frequent items belonging to a relatively small set (am, the, -
ing , - s , are) whereas open class words contain items
belonging to a very large set (e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives).
Secondly, Gómez (2002) noted that sequences in natural
languages involve members of the two broad categories
being interspersed. Crucially, this asymmetry translates into
patterns of highly invariant nonadjacent items, or frames,
separated by highly variable material (am cooking, a m
working, am going, etc.). Such sequential asymmetrical
properties of natural language may help learners solve two
complex tasks: a) building syntactic constructions that
sequentially span one or several words; b) building relevant
abstract syntactic categories for a broad range of words in
the lexicon that are distributionally embedded in such
nonadjacent relationships. Frequent nonadjacent
dependencies are fundamental to the process of
progressively building syntactic knowledge of, for instance,
tense marking, singular and plural markings, etc. For
instance, Childers & Tomasello (2001) tested the ability of
2-year-old children to produce a verb-general transitive
utterance with a nonce verb. They found that children were
best at generalizing if they had been mainly trained on the
consistent pronoun frame He`s VERB-ing it  (e.g., He`s
kicking it, He`s eating it ) rather than on several utterances
containing unsystematic correlations between the agent and
the patient slots (Mary`s kicking the ball, John`s pushing the
chair, etc.).
Gómez (2002) found that the structure of sentences
of the form AiXjBi, where there were three different Ai_Bi
pairs, could in fact be learned provided there was sufficient
variability of Xj words. The structure was learned when 24
different Xs were presented, but participants failed to learn
when Xs varied from sets of 2, 4, 6, or 12, i.e. with low
variability. Onnis et al. (2003) replicated this finding and
also found that learning occurred with only one X being
shared, suggesting the nonadjacent structure would stand
out again, this time as variant against the invariant X.
While Gómez interpreted her results as a learning
bias towards what changes versus what stays invariant, thus
leading to “discard” the common embeddings in some way,
we argue here that there may be a reversal effect in noting
that common elements all share the same contextual frames.
If several words – whose syntactic properties and category
assignment are a priori unknown – are shared by a number
of contexts, then they will be more likely to be grouped
under the same syntactic label, e.g. VERB. For instance,
consider a child faced with discovering the class of words
such as break, drink, build. As the words share the same
contexts below, s/he may be driven to start extracting a
representation of the VERB class (Mintz, 2002):
I am-X-ing
dont-X-it
Lets-X-now!
Mintz (2002) argued that most importantly, in hearing a new
word in the same familiar contexts, for instance eat in am-
eat-ing, the learner may be drawn to infer that the new word
is a VERB. Ultimately, having categorized in such a way,
the learner may extend the usage of eat as a VERB to new
syntactic constructions in which instances of the category
VERB typically occur. For instance s/he may produce a
novel sentence Lets-eat-now! Applying a category label to
an word (e.g. eat belongs to VERB) greatly enhances the
generative power of the linguist system, because the labeled
item can now be used in new syntactic contexts where the
category applies. In Experiment 1 we tested whether
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generalization to new X items in the A_X_B artificial
grammar used by Gómez (2002) and Onnis et al. (2003) is
supported under the same conditions of no or large
variability that affords the detection of invariant structure.
Hence, if frames are acquired under the variability
hypothesis, generalization will be supported when there is
either zero or large variability of embeddings. Likewise,
because invariant structure detection is poor in conditions of
middle variability, generalization is expected to be equally
poor in those conditions too.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects
Thirty-six undergraduate and postgraduate students at the
University of Warwick participated and were paid £3 each.
Materials
In the training phase participants listened to auditory strings
generated by one of two artificial languages (L1 or L2) of
the type AiXjBi. Strings in L1 had the form A1XjB1, A2XjB2,
and A3XjB3. L2 strings had the form A1XjB2, A2XjB3, A3XjB1.
Variability was manipulated in 3 conditions – zero, small,
and large– by drawing X from a pool of either 1, 2 or 24
elements. The strings, recorded from a female voice, were
the same that Gómez used in her study and were originally
chosen as tokens among several recorded sample strings in
order to eliminate talker-induced differences in individual
strings.
The elements A1, A2, and A3 were instantiated as
pel, vot, and dak; B1, B2, and B3, were instantiated as rud,
jic, tood. The 24 middle items were wadim, kicey, puser,
fengle, coomo, loga, gople, taspu, hiftam, deecha, vamey,
skiger, benez, gensim, feenam, laeljeen, chla, roosa, plizet,
balip, malsig, suleb, nilbo, and wiffle. The middle items
were stressed on the first syllable. Words were separated by
250-ms pauses and strings by 750-ms pauses. Three strings
in each language were common to all two groups and they
were used as test stimuli. The three L2 items served as foils
for the L1 condition and vice versa. The test stimuli
consisted of 12 strings randomized: six strings were
grammatical and six were ungrammatical. The
ungrammatical strings were constructed by breaking the
correct nonadjacent dependencies and associating a head to
an incorrectly associated tail, i.e. *AiXBj.. Six strings (three
grammatical and three ungrammatical) contained a
previously heard embedding, while 6 strings (again three
grammatical and three ungrammatical) contained a new,
unheard embedding. Note that correct identification could
only be achieved by looking at nonadjacent dependencies,
as adjacent transitional probabilities were the same for
grammatical and ungrammatical items.
Procedure
Six participants were recruited in each of 3 Variability
conditions (1, 2 and 24) and for each of two Language
conditions (L1, L2) resulting in 12 participants per
Variability condition. Learners were asked to listen and pay
close attention to sentences of an invented language and
they were told that there would be a series of simple
questions relating to the sentences after the listening phase.
During training, participants in the two conditions listened
to the same overall number of strings, a total of 432 token
strings. This way, frequency of exposure to the nonadjacent
dependencies was held constant across conditions.
Participants in set-size 24 heard six iterations of each of 72
type strings (3 dependencies x 24 middle items),
participants, in set-size 2 encountered each string 12 times
as often as those exposed to set size 24, and so forth. Hence,
whereas nonadjacent dependencies where held constant,
transitional probabilities of adjacent items decreased as set
size increased.
Training lasted about 18 minutes. Before the test,
participants were told that the sentences they had heard were
generated according to a set of rules involving word order,
and they would now hear 12 strings, 6 of which would
violate the rules. They were asked to give a “Yes/No”
answer. They were also told that the strings they were going
to hear may contain new words and they should base their
judgment on whether the sentence was grammatical or not
on the basis of their knowledge of the grammar. This is to
guarantee that participants did not select as ungrammatical
all the sentences with novel words simply because they
contained novel words.
Figure 1. Generalisation under variability - Exp.1
Results and discussion
An analysis of variance with Variability (1 vs. 2 vs. 24) and
Language (L1 vs. L2) as between-subjects and
Grammaticality (Trained vs. Untrained strings) as a within-
subjects variable resulted in a main Variability effect,
F(2,30)= 3.41, p< .05, and no other interaction. Performance
across the different variability conditions resulted in a U-
shaped function: a polynomial trend analysis showed a
significant quadratic effect, F(1, 35) =7.407, p <.01. Figure
1 presents the percentage of endorsements for total accuracy
in each of the three variability conditions. These results add
considerable power to the variability hypothesis: not only
can nonadjacencies be detected, but generalization too can
occur distributionally, and both processes seem to be
modulated by the same conditions of variability. In addition,
generalization with zero variability allows us to
disambiguate previous results, in that the high performance
obtained by Onnis et al. (2003) could have been due to a
simple memorization of the 3 strings repeated over and over
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again during training. However, in Experiment 1 correct
classification of new strings as grammatical can only be
done on the basis of the correct nonadjacencies. Thus, it
seems that learning on zero or large variability conditions is
supported by a similar mechanism. Finally, we note that A
and B words are monosyllabic and X words are bysillabic,
participants could simply learn a pattern S-SS-S (where
S=syllable). However, because all sentences display such
pattern across conditions  this cannot explain the U-shape of
the learning curve.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 the items of the grammar are
clearly demarcated by pauses. It can be argued that this
makes the task somewhat simplified with respect to real
spoken language, which does not contain for instance such
apparent cues at every word boundary. In addition, the
embedded item X was instantiated in bisyllabic words (as
opposed to monosyllabic A and B words), providing an extra
cue for category abstraction. In this context, Peña et al.
(2002) have argued that generalization and speech
segmentation are separate processes underpinned by
separate computational mechanisms: statistical
computations are used in a segmentation task but this is not
performed simultaneously with algebraic computations that
would permit generalizations of the structure. Once the
segmentation task was solved by introducing small pauses
in the speech signal, their underlying structure was learned.
Hence it is important to test these claims in the light of the
variability hypothesis, which we argue might provide the
key to learning nonadjacencies and generalizing altogether,
even in connected speech, without invoking two separate
mechanisms.
Recent attempts to show statistical computations of
a higher order at work in connected speech with a similar
AXB language have met with some difficulty: Newport &
Aslin (2004), for instance, exposed adults to a continuous
speech stream, created by randomly concatenating AXB
words with 3 A_B  syllable dependencies and with 2
different middle X syllables. A sample of the speech stream
obtained would be …A1X3B1A2X2B2A3X1B3…. In this case
participants were unable to learn the nonadjacent
dependencies. Concatenating words seamlessly adds
considerable complexity to the task of tracking statistical
information in the input for two main reasons: first,
transitional probabilities between words of a language
containing, say 3 dependencies and 3 Xs, p(B|A)= 0.5 are
higher than within words, p(X|A) and p(B|X)= 0.33, and this
pressures for segmentation within words (Saffran, Aslin, &
Newport, 1996ab). Secondly, assuming the statistical
mechanism is sensitive to nonadjacent dependencies as
seems the case in Experiment 1, concatenating items entails
the additional burden of tracking nonadjacent transitional
probabilities across word boundaries, e.g. X3_A2, B1_X2, and
dependencies spanning n words away can in principle also
be attended to, e.g. two items away (B2_ _A3…,etc.). One
can readily see that if all transitional probabilities of
different order were to be computed this scenario would
soon create a computational impasse. The insight from
Gómez (2002) and Experiment 1 is that variability plays a
key role, in that it allows adjacent dependencies to be
overcome in favour of nonadjacent ones, but it remains to be
seen whether this can be done in connected speech too.
Peña et al. (2002) tested participants on whether
they learned to generalize from the rules of an A X B
language very similar to Newport & Aslin (2004) in
unsegmented speech. Again AXB items were instantiated in
syllables and formed words concatenated one to the other
seamlessly. At test, participants demonstrated no preference
for so-called “rule-words”, new trigram sequences that
maintained the A i_Bi nonadjacent dependencies but
contained a different A or B in the intervening position (e.g.,
A1B3B1), compared to part-words, i.e., sequences that
spanned word boundaries (e.g., X2B1A3, or B 3A1X2). In a
further manipulation, 25-ms gaps were introduced between
words during the training phase of the experiment, and now
participants generalized as indicated by a preference for
rule-words over part-words. Peña et al. claimed that altering
the speech signal resulted in a change in the computations
performed by their participants. Statistical computations
were used in a (previously successful) segmentation task but
this was not performed simultaneously with algebraic
computations that would permit generalizations of the
structure. They argued that once the segmentation task was
solved by introducing small gaps in the speech signal, the
underlying structure would be learned. However, using the
same stimuli and experimental conditions as Peña et al.
Onnis, Monaghan, Chater & Richmond (submitted) found
that rule-words were preferred over part-words in both
segmentation and generalization tasks even when the
nonadjacent structure was eliminated: participants reliably
preferred incorrect rule-words *A1B3B2 to part-words B1A2X,
due to preference for plosive sounds in word-initial position.
Hence such preference did not reflect learning of
nonadjacent dependencies. Although discouraging at first
sight, all these negative results are not inconsistent with the
variability hypothesis. In fact, they are all cases structurally
similar to the low-variability condition in Gómez (2002) and
Experiment 1. Thus, in Experiment 2 we tested whether
with sufficiently large variability:
a) tracking higher-order dependencies can be used to
segment speech. This is a difficult task because it implies
overriding even lower transitional probabilities p(X|A) than
previously tested and this pressures for segmentation within
word boundaries (Saffran et al. 1996);
b) generalization of the embeddings can occur
simultaneously to speech segmentation, i.e. on-line in
running speech, and can be done by statistical analysis of
the input alone, i.e. without additional perceptual cues such
as pauses. We tested this using the same material and
training conditions as Peña et al. for their unsuccessful
pause-free generalization task, but increasing the variability
of the X syllables to 24 items as in Experiment 1.
Method
Subjects
20 undergraduate and postgraduate students at the
University of Warwick participated for £1. All participants
spoke English as a first language and had normal hearing.
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Materials
We used the same nine word types from Peña et al.’s
Experiment 2 to construct the training speech stream in our
Experiment 2. The set of nine words was composed of three
groups (Ai_Bi), where the first and the third syllable were
paired, with an intervening syllable (X) selected from one of
either three syllables (low variability condition) or 24
syllables (high variability condition). The syllables were
randomly generated from the following set of consonants:
/p/,/b/,/g/,/k/,/d/,/t/,/l/,/r/,/f/,/tß/,/dΩ/,/n/,
/s/,/v/,w/,/m/,/†/,/ß/,/z/and the following vowels:
/´i/,/uw/,/a/,/iy/,/au/,/oi/,/ai/,/æ/,/œ/.
Consonants and vowels were permuted, then joined
together. No syllables occurred more than once in the set of
33 generated. Each participant listened to a different
permutation of consonant-vowel pairings. Notice that the
language structure in the two conditions match very closely
those of small and large variability in Experiment 1. Unlike
Experiment 1 all items were monosyllabic and equally
stressed.
Words were produced in a seamless speech stream,
with no two words from the same set occurring adjacently,
and no same middle item occurring in adjacent words.
Hence, adjacent transitional probabilities were as follows:
for the small variability condition, and within words, p(X|A)
and p(B|X)= 0.33; between adjacent words p( Bj|Ai)= 0.5.
Nonadjacent transitional probabilities were p(Bi|Ai)= 1,
p(Ai|Xprevious)= 0.33, p(Xj|Bprevious)= 0.33. For the large
variability condition all probabilities were the same except
within word adjacent probabilities p(X|A) = 0.041.
Therefore, the predicition is that if learners
computed adjacent statistical probabilities they should
prefer part-words and perhaps significantly more in the
large variability condition. Conversely, if they computed
nonadjacent dependencies they would rely on the most
statistically reliable ones, namely p(Bi|Ai)= 1, i.e. they
would segment correctly at word boundary.
We used the Festival speech synthesizer using a
voice based on British-English diphones at a pitch of 120
Hz, to generate a continuous speech stream lasting
approximately 10 minutes. All syllables were of equal
duration, and were produced at a rate of 4.5
syllables/second. Words were selected randomly, except
that no Ai_Bi pair occurred twice in succession. The speech
stream was constructed from 900 words, in which each
word occurred approximately 100 times. The speech stream
faded in for the first 5 seconds, and faded out for the last 5
seconds, so there was no abrupt start or end to the stream. In
addition, and crucially, for each participant, we randomly
assigned the 9 syllables from the first experiment to the Ai,
Bi and Xj positions. Thus, each participant listened to speech
with the same structure containing the nonadjacent
dependencies, but with syllables assigned to different
positions. This was to avoid any bias towards choosing a
rule-word because of a preference for plosive sounds, as
Onnis et al. (submitted) demonstrated. Part-words were
formed from the last syllable of one word and two syllables
from the following word (BiAjX ), or from the last two
syllables of one word and the first syllable from the
following word (XBiAj).
Procedure
In the training phase, participants were instructed to listen to
continuous speech and try and work out the “words” that it
contained. They then listened to the training speech. At test
part-words were compared to “rule-words”, which were
composed of Ai__Bi pairs with an intervening item that was
either an Aj or a B j from another Aj_Bj pair. Participants
were requested to respond which of two sounds was a
“word” in the language they had listened to. They were then
played a “rule-word” and a part-word separated by 500 ms,
and responded by pressing either “1” on a computer
keyboard for the first sound a word, or “2” for the second
sound a word. After 2 seconds, the next rule-word and part-
word pair were played. In half of the test trials, the “rule-
words” occurred first. Five participants heard a set of test
trials with one set of words first, and the other 5 participants
heard the other set of words first.
Results
The results are shown in Figure 2. In line with the original
Peña et al.’s experiment, we found no evidence for
participants learning to generalize from the nonadjacent
structure of the stimuli in the low-variability condition.
Participants responded with a preference for rule-words over
part-words 41.9% of the times, which was significantly
lower than chance, t(9) = -2.73, p < .05. Conversely, in the
high-variability condition participants preferred rule-words
63.3% of the times, significantly higher than chance, t(9)= -
3.80, p  = .0042. In addition, there was a significant
difference between the low variability and the high
variability condition, t(18) = -4.68, p < .001.
Figure 2. Generalisation in unsegmented speech - Exp. 2
General Discussion
Statistical learning of dependencies between adjacent
elements in a sequence is fast, robust, automatic and general
in nature. In contrast, although the ability to track remote
dependencies is a crucial linguistic ability, relatively little
research has been directed toward this problem.
Nonadjacent structure in sequential information seems
harder to learn, possibly because learners have to overcome
the bias toward adjacent transitional probabilities. In fact, a
statistical learning mechanism that kept track of all possible
adjacent and nonadjacent regularities in the input, including
syllables one, two, three away, etc., would quickly
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encounter a computationally intractable problem of
exponential growth. It would seem that either statistical
learning is limited to sensitivity to adjacent items, or there
may be statistical conditions in which adjacencies become
less relevant in favour of nonadjacencies. It has been
suggested that this applies under conditions of large
variability of the intervening material (Gómez, 2002) or
zero variability (Onnis et al., 2003). This paper contributes
some steps forward: first, Experiment 1 shows that
variability is the key not only for detection of remote
dependencies but also for generalization of embedded
material, fostering the creation of abstract syntactic-like
classes, which is often assumed to require higher-level
algebraic computation. Secondly, in Experiment 2
segmentation and generalization are achieved
simultaneously, without the assist of pauses (a difference in
signal) as Pena et al. claimed. Consequently, rather than
supporting a statistical/algebraic distinction our results
suggest specific selectivities in learning patterned
sequences. The specific characterization of such selectivities
may not be simple to identify: Newport & Aslin (2004)
found that nonadjacent segments (consonants and vowels)
could be learned but not nonadjacent syllables, and
proposed that this accounts for why natural languages
display nonadjacent regularities of the former kind but not
of the latter. Experiment 2, however, shows that with large
variability nonadjacent syllabic patterns can in fact be
learned. The key factor for success is again variability.
Experiment 2 also shows that learners are indeed able to
track nonadjacent dependencies in running speech, despite
the well documented bias for adjacent associations and the
preference for segmenting continuous speech at points of
lowest transitional probabilities.
Overall, the results suggest that the learning
mechanism entertains several statistical computations and
implicitly “tunes in” to statistical relations that yield the
most reliable source of information. This hypothesis was
initiated by Gómez (2002) and is consistent with several
theoretical formulations such as reduction of uncertainty
(Gibson, 1991) and the simplicity principle (Chater, 1996)
that the cognitive system attempts to seek the simplest
hypothesis about the data available. In the face of
performance constraints and way too many statistical
computations, the cognitive system may be biased to focus
on data that will be likely to reduce uncertainty.
Specifically, whether the system focuses on transitional
probabilities or nonadjacent dependencies may depend on
the statistical properties of the environment that is being
sampled.
Our work ties in with recent acquisition literature
that has emphasized the constructive role of syntactic
frames as the first step for building more abstract syntactic
representations (Tomasello, 2003 for an overview).
Children’s syntactic development would build upon several
consecutive stages from holophrases such as I-wanna-see-it
(at around 12 months), to pivot-schemas (throw-ball, throw-
can, throw-pillow, at about 18 months), through item-based
constructions (John hugs Mary, Mary hugs John, at about
24 months), to full abstract syntactic constructions (a X, the
Xs, Eat a X).
Statistical learning seems, at least in adults,
powerful enough to allow the discovery of complex
nonadjacent structure, but simply not any condition will do:
we have suggested that variability such as that emerging
from the asymmetry between open and closed class words
may be a crucial ingredient for understanding the building
of language.
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Abstract 
 
This study examined the effects of self-explanation 
reading strategy training (SERT) and Preview training on 
high-school students’ comprehension of a science text. 
The students (n=136) were from a middle to lower SES, 
inner-city Virginia high school. They were assessed in 
terms of their science knowledge and reading skill. Nine 
biology classes were then randomly assigned to SERT, 
Preview, or Control conditions. Science comprehension 
was assessed both immediately after training and after a 
one-week interval. The results indicated that after the 
one-week retention interval, SERT participants 
outperformed both Preview and Control participants on 
passage comprehension. This comprehension advantage 
was particularly enhanced for low-knowledge readers. 
This result replicates with high-school student findings 
reported by McNamara (in press) with college students. 
 
Introduction 
 
  Many high-school students encounter difficulties 
comprehending their textbooks, particularly those 
covering scientific material (Bowen, 1999; Snow, 
2002). Problems with comprehension can occur for a 
variety of reasons. One source of difficulty occurs from 
text specific factors, such as text cohesion (Beck, 
McKeown & Gromoll, 1989; McNamara, Kintsch, 
Songer, & Kintsch, 1996). Another source of problems 
stems from the reader’s aptitudes. Of course, efficient 
decoding abilities are necessary for the reader to 
understand the words in the sentences (e.g., Perfetti, 
1985). However, comprehension difficulties also occur 
even for readers who understand the words. These 
comprehension problems can emerge from the inability 
to draw inferences (e.g., Long, Oppy, & Seely, 1994) 
and the failure to apply other higher-level reading 
skills, such as meta-cognitive reading strategies 
(Cornoldi & Oakhill, 1996).  
The recent RAND report on Reading for 
Understanding (Snow, 2002) documents the pressing 
need to improve reading comprehension. The RAND 
report also provides a useful heuristic for 
conceptualizing reading comprehension, which includes 
four interactive components: Characteristics of the text, 
the reader, the comprehension activities, and the socio-
cultural context. Accordingly, these factors rarely 
operate in isolation, and as such, potential interactions 
between attributes associated with these factors need to 
be considered in order to develop a more complete 
understanding of reading comprehension processes.  
In terms of text characteristics, research has shown 
that the structure of the text plays a major role in 
comprehension. For example, in an analysis of the 
cohesion of social studies texts, Beck et al. (1989) 
found that many texts have structures that are far from 
optimal in terms of promoting deep comprehension.  
Texts often present too much information with too little 
detail, contain loose unconnected statements, and have 
poor integration with previous sections. Overall, the 
manner in which many informational texts are written 
present challenges for comprehension. 
The knowledge and skills readers bring into the 
reading situation play an important role in the 
comprehension of informational texts (McNamara & 
Kintsch, 1996; Voss & Silfies, 1996). For example, 
Voss and Silfies found that prior knowledge helps the 
reader spell out causal links between concepts, whereas 
reading skill contributes to a better textbase 
understanding. Indeed, other research has shown that 
conceptual gaps in text are most easily repaired with 
domain knowledge (McNamara et al, 1996; cf. 
McNamara, in press).  
Comprehension activities, or the use of higher level 
reading strategies, also have a major impact on learning 
(Pressley, Wood, Woloshyn, Martin, King, & Menke, 
1992). For example, Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, and 
LaVancher (1994) have found positive learning gains 
for a technique called self-explanation. Students who 
were asked to explain what they learned from a biology 
text made more inferences, integrated more information 
across topics, and developed a deeper understanding of 
the text than did Control students.  
Similarly, McNamara (in press; McNamara & Scott, 
1999) developed a comprehensive reading strategy 
intervention called self-explanation reading strategy 
training (SERT). SERT helps improve comprehension 
by encouraging students to make use of various reading 
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strategies to build connections between the reader’s 
knowledge and the text. It teaches students to use active 
reading techniques including comprehension 
monitoring, logic and common sense, elaboration, 
paraphrasing, bridging inferences, and prediction to 
improve their ability to explain a text and understand it 
at a deeper level. McNamara (in press) found that 
college students who were trained to use SERT 
outperformed controls on measures of text 
comprehension. This improvement was especially 
enhanced for low-knowledge readers on text-based 
questions (assessing knowledge of information 
explicitly stated in the text). 
While the effects of SERT have been beneficial in 
improving comprehension with college students, the 
effects of SERT training on high-school students has 
not been tested. Examining the influence of learning 
strategies is especially important in high-school 
populations because there is a dearth of strategic 
reading interventions being taught and used in 
classrooms (Cox, 1997, Garner, 1990). Moreover, in 
comparison to other countries, students in the United 
States are falling behind students in other countries on 
measures of reading comprehension (Snow, 2002). 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect 
of SERT training on high-school students’ ability to 
comprehend science texts. We compared students’ 
comprehension of science texts after they had received 
either SERT training, Preview training, or a reading 
Control condition. Previewing is a reading strategy 
designed to help students better comprehend texts by 
encouraging them to preview various subsections of the 
text before they read. This strategy training is based on, 
and includes the K-W-L instructional technique 
developed by Ogle (1986). The use of preview 
techniques is relatively common and has been 
associated with comprehension gains (Johnston & 
Allington, 1991).  
Our goal was to examine whether SERT or Preview 
training helped students to better understand the science 
passages in comparison to the Control condition. First, 
we predicted that students trained with SERT and 
Previewing would outperform students in the reading 
Control group who did not receive reading strategy 
training. We expected both types of interventions to 
facilitate students’ science text comprehension.  
However, we expected the benefits of SERT and 
Previewing to depend on the students’ level of prior 
knowledge. This prediction arises from the way in 
which each technique encourages the use of prior 
knowledge. Previewing focuses on the activation of 
relevant prior knowledge before reading the text to 
provide a mental schema of the contents. While prior 
research has clearly shown the benefits of schemas to 
improve comprehension, we doubt that they will be 
particularly useful if the student has little prior 
knowledge about the topic. As such, we expect the 
benefits of previewing to depend largely on the amount 
of prior knowledge the student has about the text topic, 
primarily benefiting relatively high-knowledge 
students. In contrast, SERT encourages students to 
actively process texts (e.g., elaborate and link 
information contained in the text). The student learns to 
use whatever knowledge available, including logic and 
general knowledge, to make sense of the text. Our 
previous research demonstrated that SERT was 
primarily beneficial to low-knowledge students 
(McNamara, in press). We expect similar results here.    
 
Method 
 
Nine biology classrooms within an inner-city school 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 
SERT, Preview, or Control.  Students in the three SERT 
classrooms were provided training on how to self-
explain text using five reading sub-strategies. Preview 
participants were taught how to preview the text before 
they read it. Control classrooms were simply asked to 
read the text. After reading, they were asked to focus on 
any strategies they used to help them better remember 
the text. Comprehension was assessed using two 
science passages taken from school science texts. The 
passages differed in topic and length, which allowed us 
to examine whether the strategies were used across 
different science texts. We used both text-based and 
bridging-inference questions to assess students’ 
comprehension of the science passages.  
 
Participants  
 
The sample consisted of 136 ninth and tenth-grade 
biology classes. Students were of mixed gender and 
ethnicity. The high school was located in an inner city 
region of Norfolk, Virginia.  
Materials  
 
Student aptitudes were measured with two tests; a 
modified version of the Gates-MacGinitie Reading Skill 
Test and a Prior Knowledge Test. The Gates-
MacGinitie test is a standardized reading 
comprehension test, designed for grades 10-12. The test 
consisted of 40 multiple-choice questions designed to 
assess student comprehension on several short text 
passages (Cronbach’s Alpha α=.91). Due to time 
constraints, the vocabulary section of the test was not 
administered, and the time limit for the comprehension 
question section was reduced to 15 minutes. The prior 
knowledge test consisted of 35 multiple-choice items 
which tap knowledge of different science domains 
including biology, scientific methods, mathematics, 
earth science, physics, mathematics, and chemistry 
(Cronbach’s Alpha α=.74).   
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To examine immediate and long-term retention, there 
were two comprehension testing sessions; one 
immediately following training, and again one week 
after training. A text on viruses, describing the 
structure, and reproduction of viruses as well as some 
examples of viruses and how they relate to disease, was 
used during the immediate test. The passage was 1216 
words in length with a Flesch Reading Ease of 45.1 and 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade level of 10.6. One week later, we 
administered a text about earthquakes, which described 
the causes of earthquakes and the conditions under 
which they occur. The earthquake text was 749 words 
in length with a Flesch Reading Ease of 65.1 and 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade level of 7.5. In an ideal 
laboratory setting, the order of the texts would be 
counterbalanced between testing sessions. However, 
this was not possible due to logistical constraints (e.g., 
high rates of absenteeism and movement of students 
between classes). 
Reading comprehension was assessed with a set of 8 
open-ended and 8 multiple-choice questions; half were 
text-based and half were bridging-inference questions. 
For each comprehension assessment, students were 
asked to indicate whether they had finished reading 
and, if not, how far they had read.   
Self-Explanation Reading Training (SERT) was 
delivered in three main phases; introduction, 
demonstration, and practice (see McNamara, in press). 
During the introduction phase, participants were 
provided with a description and examples of self-
explanation. The instructor defined and provided 
examples for five reading strategies: comprehension 
monitoring, paraphrasing, elaboration/logic and 
common sense, prediction, and bridging.   
During the demonstration phase, participants watched 
a video depicting a student reading and self-explaining 
a text about forest fires. Participants could refer to the 
accompanying video transcript during viewing. The 
video was paused at various points, and participants 
identified and discussed the strategies being used by the 
student in the video. In the practice phase, the 
participants worked in pairs to practice self-explanation 
while reading a chapter from their science textbook.  
The participants took turns self-explaining, alternating 
after each paragraph. At the end of each paragraph, the 
partner who was listening (and not self-explaining) 
summarized the paragraph.  
Preview training was also delivered in the form of 
three phases. During the introduction, participants were 
given a description of the basic Preview strategy; a 
review of subsections in a text that can be previewed 
(Title, introduction, objectives bold italics, 
pictures/figures, conclusion and chapter review 
questions) and strategies for note-taking during reading 
(questions such as, What I know, What I need to know. 
What I found out). During demonstration, the instructor 
demonstrated the Preview strategies to the class with a 
text on forest fires. Finally, during practice, the students 
practiced using the preview techniques on a chapter 
taken from their textbook. 
In the Control condition, participants read the science 
texts to which trained groups were exposed during 
training. Participants wrote down strategies they used 
while reading, but did not discuss the strategies.  
 
Design and Procedure 
 
Each class was randomly assigned to one of the three 
conditions; SERT, Preview, or Control (three classes 
were assigned to each condition). Experimental 
sessions were conducted during students’ regular 
classroom time by two experimenters. Prior to training, 
students completed the prior knowledge and Gates-
McGinitie Reading test. A 15-minute time limit was 
given for each test. The prior knowledge test was 
administered first.  
SERT and Preview training were conducted during 
two class periods conducted on consecutive days. 
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was 
to learn strategies that would help them to better 
understand and remember what they read. The total 
amount of time spent learning the experimental 
interventions during the two days was approximately 
the same. The Control condition required one class 
period. Students in the Control condition were told that 
the purpose of the training was to find out about the 
strategies they use when reading their textbooks.  
Immediately after training and after a one-week 
interval, participants were given 30 minutes to read the 
science passage and answer comprehension questions. 
In the experimental conditions, the experimenter briefly 
reviewed the strategies for either SERT or Preview 
before beginning the comprehension test. For both the 
virus and earthquakes texts, the students did not have 
the text available when they answered the questions.  
 
Results 
 
Pre-test Scores 
 
Scores on the pretest measures of prior knowledge 
and reading skill were examined as a function of 
condition to ensure that the groups were comparable on 
these measures. To do this, we conducted two 
univariate ANOVAs, with condition as the between-
subjects factor (SERT, Preview, and Control) and 
student aptitude scores (either prior knowledge or 
reading Gates-MacGinitie). There were no reliable 
differences in prior knowledge scores (F(2,135)=0.74, 
MSE=0.017, p>0.05) or Gates-MacGinitie scores 
(F(2,134)=0.77, MSE=41.192, p>0.05) as a function of 
condition. 
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To examine the effects of individual differences, we 
used a median split to divide students into high and 
low-knowledge groups, or high and low reading 
comprehension skill groups.  
 
Effects of Training Condition 
 
To assess the effectiveness of SERT training on 
students’ comprehension of the virus and earthquake 
texts, we conducted two sets of mixed model ANOVAs. 
The within-subjects factors were question type (text-
based or bridging-inference), question format (multiple-
choice or open-ended) and the between-subjects factors 
condition (SERT, Preview, or Control) and either 
reading skill (high or low) or prior knowledge (high or 
low). A combined analysis of reading skill and prior 
knowledge could not be performed because there were 
too few participants. To avoid conflating effects of 
reading skill with prior knowledge, the participants’ 
scores on the prior knowledge measure were entered as 
covariates in the reading skill analysis, and vice versa, 
the participants’ scores on the reading skill measure 
were entered as covariates in the prior knowledge 
analysis.   
There were no reliable main or interaction effects of 
condition on the immediate comprehension test (virus 
text). In contrast, the earthquake text administered one 
week later revealed reliable effects of training 
condition. Therefore, the present analysis focuses on 
the latter results. 
 
Reading Skill Analysis 
 
In the first analysis, reading skill was treated as a 
between-subjects variable, while prior knowledge was 
included as a covariate. There was a main effect of 
condition (F(2,124)=3.72, MSE=0.268, p<0.05), 
indicating that SERT participants (M=0.43, SD=0.15) 
outperformed Control (M=0.36, SD=0.16) and Preview 
(M=0.36, SD=0.12) participants (see Figure 1). A post-
hoc analysis using Least Significant Difference 
confirmed this trend showing that SERT participants 
performed better than Preview (p<0.05) and Control 
participants (p<0.05); however, Control and Preview 
did not differ (p<0.05). There was also a main effect of 
reading skill (F(1,124)=11.08, MSE=0.798, p<0.05), 
indicating that high reading skill students (M=0.43, 
SD=0.15) better understood the earthquake passage 
than did low reading skill students (M=0.34, SD=0.13).   
Our analysis also showed effects for question format 
and question type, which were independent of training 
condition. There was a significant effect for question 
format (F(1,124)=16.86, MSE=0.664, p<0.05) 
indicating that more multiple-choice questions 
(M=0.48, SD=0.19) were answered correctly than open-
ended questions (M=0.29, SD=0.15). There was also a 
significant main effect for question type 
(F(1,124)=6.63, MSE=0.286 p<0.05), indicating that 
students answered more questions based on the text 
correctly (M=0.46, SD=0.18) than questions requiring 
bridging-inferences (M=0.31, SD=0.17). No other 
effects were significant. 
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Figure 1. Proportion correct on Earthquakes 
comprehension test as a function of condition  
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Figure 2. Proportion correct on Earthquakes 
comprehension test as a function of condition and 
prior knowledge 
 
Prior Knowledge Analysis 
 
This section examines how the effects of condition 
depended on students’ prior knowledge by including 
prior knowledge as a between-subjects variable, and 
reading skill as a covariate. As reported above, the main 
effects of condition, question format, and question type 
were reliable There was also a main effect of prior 
knowledge (F(1,124)=11.10, MSE=0.783, p<0.05), 
indicating that high-knowledge (M=0.43, SD=0.14) 
students better understood the passage than did low-
knowledge students (M=0.34, SD=0.13). This main 
effect was qualified by a significant interaction between 
knowledge and condition (F(2,124)=3.84, MSE=0.271, 
p<0.05). A Post hoc Least Significant Difference 
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analysis indicated for low-knowledge students, SERT 
participants (M=0.43, SD=0.15) outperformed Control 
(p<0.05) (M=0.30, SD=0.16) and Preview (p<0.05) 
participants (M=0.30, SD=0.12) (see Figure 2). There 
was no difference between Control and Preview 
participants (p<0.05). In contrast, the effect of 
condition was not evident for high-knowledge 
participants (F(2,67)=0.41, MSE=0.036, p>0.05). 
 
Discussion 
 
Our findings indicate that SERT training helps 
students comprehend science texts. Specifically, SERT 
students performed better on the earthquake 
comprehension assessment than did Preview or Control 
students. Moreover, our findings also suggest that 
SERT training is particularly beneficial to facilitating 
comprehension among low-knowledge students, as 
evidenced by the finding that low-knowledge students 
trained with SERT performed better on the earthquake 
comprehension test than did low-knowledge students in 
the Preview and Control conditions.  
The finding that the effect of SERT training emerged 
one week after training is encouraging because it 
suggests that students remember and use the strategies 
beyond the time of training. We expect that the lack of 
training effects on the immediate comprehension test is 
likely due to a fatigue effect following training.   
Overall, our findings replicate those of McNamara 
(in press), which showed that SERT training facilitated 
readers’ comprehension of scientific texts. Most 
importantly, both McNamara’s study and the present 
results show that low-knowledge students tend to 
benefit most from SERT training in terms of 
comprehension gains. This is a very important finding 
because it suggests that the SERT method may be an 
effective technique for supporting comprehension 
among low-knowledge students most at risk from 
comprehension problems while reading difficult 
textbooks.  
We predicted that SERT and Previewing would have 
differential effects on comprehension.  We predicted 
that Preview technique would be less effective for low-
knowledge students because using the Preview 
technique requires students to activate their prior 
knowledge before reading (i.e., when previewing the 
titles and subtitles). Thus, we expected Previewing to 
help high-knowledge students and SERT to benefit low 
knowledge students. Although we confirmed the latter 
prediction, we did not find benefits for previewing. This 
result may be because the students were relatively low 
knowledge overall. Perhaps the benefits of Previewing 
depend on a greater availability of prior knowledge than 
possessed by these inner-city high-school students. 
Indeed, a majority of students may not have sufficient 
knowledge to make use of previewing (Snow, 2002).  
We expected the use of the SERT method to facilitate 
comprehension because of the manner in which the 
student engages with the material during the application 
of the SERT techniques. Specifically, the reader 
engages in on-line comprehension monitoring, while at 
the same time applying techniques known to aid 
comprehension, such as elaboration and bridging (Chi 
et al, 1994). This on-line method allows the student to 
process information effectively, which, in turn, supports 
comprehension. SERT strategies may provide a 
scaffold by which the student can integrate new 
information into their existing knowledge schemas, 
even in the absence of domain knowledge. Conversely, 
when using the Previewing method, students do not 
necessarily engage in on-line comprehension 
monitoring and reading strategy techniques. Rather, the 
Preview method encourages readers’ to use 
comprehension monitoring prior to reading. A potential 
problem with this method is that it does not engage the 
reader as effectively with the text and the information 
they are reading. 
In terms of understanding the reading process, our 
study supports the view that the comprehension 
activities used by the reader play a critical role in 
reading comprehension (e.g., Pressley et al, 1992). That 
is, students who have better comprehension skills, as 
reflected in their use of comprehension monitoring 
practices and utilization of active reading strategies, are 
likely to make comprehension gains (Chi et al, 1994). 
Of course, to understand the links between reading 
strategy use (e.g., self-explanations) and 
comprehension, it is necessary to investigate the 
associations between strategy use and comprehension.  
For example, McNamara (in press) investigated the 
links between styles of self-explanation and 
performance on a science comprehension test. She 
found a reliable positive correlation between college 
students’ comprehension scores and their use of logic 
and common sense self-explanations. In a similar vein, 
O’Reilly, Sinclair, and McNamara (in press) also found 
correlations between self reported use of individual 
SERT strategies and comprehension. However, more 
research is needed in this area to understand more fully 
the ways in which students use strategies to facilitate 
comprehension actually support learning gains.  
In conclusion, our findings suggest that SERT 
training is a useful method of reading strategy training, 
which can be used to enhance comprehension at the 
high-school level. Indeed, McNamara and colleagues 
are currently working on integrating the SERT method 
of teaching into the high-school classroom. McNamara, 
Levinstein, and Boonthum (in press) have developed an 
interactive, automated version of SERT training, 
designed to be integrated into classrooms. The long-
term aim is to develop a SERT intervention which is 
tailored to the needs and level of the student. In its 
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current form, the automated trainer, iSTART 
(Interactive Strategy Trainer for Active Reading and 
Thinking) teaches students the SERT strategies. The 
program comprises the three basic components used in 
the tutor delivered training: introduction, 
demonstration, and practice. During the practice 
section, in which students practice using the strategies, 
the iSTART system assesses the quality of the self-
explanations and provides feedback to the student to 
encourage deep processing of the text (McNamara et 
al., in press). 
Several preliminary examinations of the iSTART 
system have indicated that the computerized version of 
SERT training is as effective as live SERT training 
(O’Reilly, Sinclair, & McNamara, in press). Overall, 
the present findings and those collected from the 
iSTART studies indicate that SERT is an effective 
reading strategy intervention, which can be used in the 
classroom to help students comprehend difficult 
textbooks. 
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Abstract 
 
This study examined the effectiveness of Self-
Explanation Reading Training (SERT) and an automated 
version of this intervention called Interactive Strategy 
Training for Active Reading and Thinking (iSTART) in 
improving science text comprehension.  College students 
(N=297) were assigned to one of three conditions: SERT 
(trained by a human instructor), iSTART (trained by a 
computer), or no treatment control.  Participants read a 
text on cell mitosis and answered text-based and bridging 
inference questions.  There was a significant overall 
effect of condition indicating that both iSTART and 
SERT out performed controls on comprehension.  
However, this effect was modulated by question type: 
both SERT and iSTART significantly enhanced 
comprehension for text-based questions, but the effect 
was not reliable for bridging inference questions. 
 
Introduction 
 
Many students have difficulty understanding what 
they read; in particular, many students have trouble 
comprehending science texts (Bowen, 1999; Snow, 
2002).  Problems associated with comprehension are 
augmented by the lack of strategic reading interventions 
in classrooms: students seldom use high-level 
comprehension strategies that promote deep 
comprehension (Cox, 1997; Garner, 1990). 
One way to improve comprehension is to teach 
reading strategies that encourage deeper processing of 
the text.  Interventions that promote deeper processing 
such as self-explanation and elaborative interrogation 
have been successful in improving student 
comprehension (e.g., Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, & 
LaVancher, 1994; Pressley, Wood, Woloshyn, Martin, 
King, & Menke, 1992).  For example, McNamara (in 
press) has reported positive learning gains for her Self–
Explanation Reading Training (SERT).  SERT is a 
modified version of the self-explanation learning 
strategy (e.g., Chi et al., 1994).  The SERT training 
program helps improve comprehension by encouraging 
students to utilize various sub-strategies to build strong 
connections between the reader’s knowledge and the 
text.  SERT teaches students various reading strategies, 
including comprehension monitoring, logic and 
common sense/elaboration, paraphrasing, bridging 
inferences, and prediction to improve their ability to 
explain text and understand it at a deeper level.   
McNamara (in press) examined the effectiveness of 
SERT with college students who varied in prior 
knowledge of science.  Half of the participants learned 
to self-explain and use reading strategies while reading 
four science texts.  The other half of the participants 
read aloud the texts and answered questions concerning 
them.  After the training phase, the two groups’ ability 
to self-explain was compared.  They also answered 
text-based and bridging-inference questions about the 
text that they had all self-explained.  The results 
indicated that low-knowledge readers who were trained 
to use SERT outperformed control participants on 
measures of text comprehension.  However, this 
advantage only occurred for text-based questions.  In 
addition, protocol analyses of the readers’ self-
explanation indicated that the low-knowledge readers 
improved in terms of their ability to paraphrase the text, 
and more importantly, in their ability to use domain-
general knowledge (or logic and common sense) to 
make sense of the text.  Not having the requisite 
knowledge, they were not able to make inferences 
requiring domain specific knowledge while reading.  
Nonetheless, they showed the same level of 
comprehension on the text-based measures as did the 
high-knowledge readers, and substantially greater 
performance than their low-knowledge counterparts. 
These findings are particularly encouraging because it 
demonstrates improvement for the students who need 
the training the most: the low-knowledge students. 
The present study compares the effectiveness of 
SERT and a similar, but automated version of the 
training, called Interactive Strategy Training for Active 
Reading and Thinking (iSTART; McNamara, 
Levinstein, & Boonthum, in press).  Automating the 
core aspects of SERT training has several advantages 
including self-paced learning and standardized training.  
iSTART is a computer program that uses automated 
agents to provide SERT-based training to students.  The 
program, like SERT, has three sections, introduction, 
1059
demonstration, and practice.  The program has both 
vicarious and interactive components to enhance 
learning.  The students learn vicariously by watching 
“agent students” interact and learn strategies taught by a 
“teacher agent.”  Later the student interacts with the 
program, and the system provides feedback on the 
student’s performance.   
While automating the SERT intervention has several 
advantages, one potential problem is that automation 
may influence the effectiveness of SERT.  For example, 
during live SERT training, students practice with a 
partner while self-explaining.  In iSTART, human peer 
interaction does not occur.  In light of the work on 
reciprocal teaching (e.g. Palincar & Brown, 1984), 
removing human peer interaction may diminish the 
effectiveness of the training.  The goal of this study was 
to examine whether the automated iSTART was as 
effective at improving comprehension as the live SERT 
training.  Participants were assigned to one of three 
conditions: live SERT (trained by a human instructor), 
iSTART (trained by the computer program) and a 
control condition which had no training (and instead 
read a text and answered questions concerning it).  One 
week after the training phase, participants read a 
passage on cell mitosis (see McNamara, 2001; 
McNamara, in press).  The dependent measure was the 
total proportion of correct answers (both text-based and 
bridging-inference questions) based on the passage.  It 
was expected that SERT would out perform controls 
because previous research showed a facilitative effect 
of SERT on comprehension (McNamara, in press).  It 
was expected that iSTART training would also improve 
comprehension compared to controls.  This prediction 
was made based on research that has shown the benefits 
of automated agents on learning (e.g., Anderson, 
Corbett, Koedinger, & Pelletier, 1995; Du Boulay, 
2000; Graesser & Person, 1994).   
Finally, we were also interested in uncovering any 
spontaneous strategies used by control students in our 
study.  Prior research has indicated that the average 
student is not particularly strategic when learning from 
text (Cox, 1997; Garner, 1990).  After reading the 
passage on mitosis, participants in all three conditions 
were asked to indicate what strategies they used to help 
them understand what they read.  We predicted that 
both the SERT and iSTART conditions would indicate 
strategies such as those taught in the training session.  
A higher reported use of SERT strategies in the training 
condition serves as a manipulation check for whether 
the trained participants actually used the strategies to 
comprehend the text.  Moreover, our secondary goal 
was to examine what, if any, strategies would be 
reported by the untrained participants.   
 
Method 
 
Participants  
 The sample consisted of 297 biology college students 
from Old Dominion University.  There were 87 males 
and 210 females and the average age was 21 years old 
(SD=4.58).  The students participated during the 
laboratory sessions of their Introductory Biology 
Course.  Each lab was randomly assigned to one of the 
three conditions.  The students received extra credit in 
the course for participation.  
 
Materials  
 
Two sets of individual difference measures were used 
to gauge students’ cognitive ability: reading skill and 
prior knowledge.  Reading skill was measured by 
Nelson-Denny Reading Skills Test.  The test consisted 
of 38 multiple-choice questions designed to assess 
comprehension on several short text passages.  Prior 
knowledge was measured by a 54-item multiple-choice 
test on general science knowledge and the humanities.  
The test consisted of questions drawn from biology, art, 
literature, history, geology, political science, and 
psychology. 
Participants in the SERT condition were given a short 
list of five reading strategies (i.e., comprehension 
monitoring, paraphrasing, elaboration, prediction, and 
bridging), a video transcript and note sheet (used during 
the video segment of training), and a booklet with more 
detailed descriptions of the strategies and examples of 
their use in self-explanations.  Participants in the 
iSTART condition were given written instructions on 
how to use the iSTART system, and a short list of the 
reading strategies. 
A passage on cell mitosis described the sequential 
stages involved in cell division, and included all the 
information required to subsequently answer a set of 
comprehension questions.  The text was 650 words in 
length and had a Flesch Reading Ease 52 and a Flesch-
Kincaid Grade Level 9.1.  Comprehension was assessed 
using a set of 12 open-ended questions: six text-based 
and six bridging-inference questions.  The answers to 
the text-based questions could be found in a single 
sentence within the passage, while the bridging-
inference questions required the reader to integrate 
information from two or more sentences within the 
passage.  Participants were also given a sheet of paper 
which asked if they had finished reading the text and 
which, if any, strategies they used to help them 
understand the text.  Finally, participants were given a 
260 word text on thunderstorms with a Flesch Kincaid 
Grade level of 8.6 and a Flesch Reading Ease 56.  For 
control participants the text was accompanied by 8 
open-ended questions. 
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Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment had three phases: pre-testing, training 
and post-testing.  All participants were given the 
individual difference measures during the pre-test 
phase.  Participants first took the prior knowledge test 
(20 minutes) followed by the Nelson-Denny reading 
skill test (15 minutes).  The following day the 
experimental training and control phases were 
conducted in a 2-hour session.  The post-test phase 
occurred after a one-week retention period, during 
which all participants read and answered questions for 
the mitosis passage.  Participants were given 30 
minutes to read the passage and answer the questions.  
Students did not have the text available to help them 
once they began answering the questions. 
Training 
SERT: The SERT training session was conducted in 
a 2-hour session.  SERT participants were told that the 
purpose of the study was to teach them strategies that 
would help them to better understand and remember 
what they read.  Participants were first provided with a 
description and examples of self-explanation.  The 
instructor then defined and provided examples for five 
reading strategies: comprehension monitoring, 
paraphrasing, elaboration, prediction, and bridging.   
Participants then watched a video depicting a student 
reading and self-explaining a text about forest fires.  
Participants could refer to the accompanying video 
transcript during viewing.  The video was paused at 
various points, and participants identified and discussed 
the strategies being used by the reader in the video. 
Finally, the participants worked in pairs to practice 
self-explanation while reading the thunderstorms text.  
The participants took turns self-explaining, alternating 
after each paragraph.  At the end of each paragraph, the 
partner who was listening (and not self-explaining) 
summarized the student’s self-explanation.   
iSTART: The iSTART training session was 
conducted in a 2-hour session.  Participants in the 
iSTART condition were told that the purpose of the 
study was to teach them strategies that would help them 
to better understand and remember what they read.  
Participants were then given instructions on how to use 
the iSTART system, and they proceeded to go through 
the three sections of the program: introduction, 
demonstration, and practice.  The practice section 
involved reading and self-explaining a text about 
thunderstorms one sentence at a time.  Participants 
typed their self-explanations into the computer. 
Control: Participants were told that the purpose of the 
study was to determine the types of strategies students 
use when they read.  Participants read the 
thunderstorms text and indicated the strategies they 
used while reading.  The participants answered 
corresponding questions to assess comprehension. 
Testing  
One week following training, all three groups of 
participants were asked to read the science text about 
cell mitosis (i.e., the low-coherence version used in 
McNamara, 2001).  The participants were asked to use 
the strategies that they had learned or talked about the 
previous week.  After reading the text, participants were 
asked to indicate what strategies they used to help them 
understand the text.  They were then given the 12 open-
ended questions to assess comprehension.  Participants 
were given 30 minutes to read the text and answer the 
questions.  The text was not available to the students 
once they began answering the questions.   
 
Results 
The effect of training on reported strategy use. 
 Our first question was whether training condition 
affected students’ reported use of strategies one week 
after training when reading the cell mitosis text.  Table 
1 lists the percent of participants who indicated using 
SERT strategies, while Table 2 indicates the percent of 
participants who reported using non-SERT strategies.  
Students’ self-reports of strategy use during reading 
were tabulated into 17 categories.  The categories were 
devised based on a combination of a priori strategies 
reported in the literature, and strategies that were 
frequently mentioned in the students’ responses.  It is 
important to note that category membership is not 
mutually exclusive.  That is, a participant could have 
listed more than one strategy, and therefore the 
percentages per condition will not sum to 100%.  
 
Strategy Control iSTART SERT 
Bridging 0% 39.8% 38.5% 
Prior 
Knowledge 
 
7.3% 
 
15.1% 
 
17.7% 
Elaboration 0% 17.2% 21.9% 
Prediction 0% 14% 13.5% 
Self-
explanation 
 
0.9% 
 
23.7% 
 
19.8% 
Paraphrase 0% 46.2% 46.9% 
 
Table 1 Percent of self-reported SERT/iSTART 
strategies by condition 
 
Further calculations revealed that 77.2% of iSTART 
and 72.9% SERT participants reported using at least 
one of the reading strategies taught by the 
iSTART/SERT, whereas only 8.3% of control 
participants reported using these strategies 
(χ(2,297)=123.30, p<0.05). A chi-square also revealed 
that more control participants (58.9%) indicated using 
more non-SERT strategies (i.e., 10 strategies listed in 
table 1 other than the six SERT strategies) than 
iSTART (10.9%) or SERT (30.25%) participants 
(χ(2,297)=60.79, p<0.05).  Although this measure does 
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not indicate whether they actually used these strategies 
(nor whether  their self reports were all inclusive, i.e., 
they may not have reported some strategies) it does 
reveal that iSTART and SERT participants become 
sensitive to the notion of active reading strategies 
through training, and that this was retained one week 
later.     
 
 
Strategy Control iSTART SERT 
Imagery 7.3% 0% 4.2% 
Re-Read to 
understand 
  
11.9% 
 
1.1% 
 
1.0% 
Summarize 1.8% 0% 2.1% 
Mnemonics 6.4% 1.1% 4.2% 
Skim text 4.6% 2.2% 2,1% 
Note taking 5.5% 0% 1.0% 
Memorization 3.7% 0% 2.1% 
Repetition 30.3% 8.6% 25% 
Focus 9.2% 0% 2.1% 
Key points 14.7% 1.1% 7.3% 
No Strategy 16.5% 4.3% 1.0% 
 
Table 2 Percent of self-reported non-SERT/iSTART 
strategies by condition. 
 
The effect of strategy training on comprehension. 
Our second question was whether SERT and iSTART 
training successfully improved comprehension for those 
students who reported using the strategies.  All control 
participants (N=109) were included in this analysis.  
However, in the iSTART and SERT conditions, only 
participants who explicitly stated that they used one or 
more of the SERT strategies (comprehension 
monitoring, self-explanation, paraphrasing, prediction, 
bridging, elaboration, and prior knowledge use) were 
included in the analysis.  We restricted this analysis to 
training participants who reported using the strategies 
after training because our question regarded the effects 
of training for those participants who attempted to use 
the SERT strategies to read and understand the cell 
mitosis text.  Therefore, this manipulation check 
reduced the number of participants in the iSTART 
condition from N=92 to N=71, and reduced the number 
of participants in the SERT condition from N=96 to 
N=70.  While it is interesting in itself that about 25% of 
the training participants did not attempt to use the 
reading strategies after training, there are many reasons 
why they might not (e.g., lack of motivation in the 
laboratory setting, lack of sufficient learning of the 
strategies, preference for other strategies).  However, 
we cannot identify these reasons and those participants 
are not the focus of this particular analysis.  The 
exclusion of participants who did not report any SERT 
strategies is a conservative effort.  The self-report 
measure includes both participants who actually used 
the SERT strategies and those who said they used them, 
but did not use them in practice.  In a similar vein, by 
retaining all the control participants, the control 
condition has an advantage because the analysis 
includes the participants who may use higher-level 
strategies and who may, therefore, be expected to score 
as well as the trained participants.  A similar set of 
analyses which also excluded control participants who 
did not report any strategies produced a similar pattern 
of results as the analysis used here that did not exclude 
any control participants.  Hence, the analyses reported 
below included all control participants 
Differences in pre-test abilities 
A one-way between-participants ANOVA was 
conducted on the student’s pre-test level of prior 
knowledge to determine whether the groups differed as 
a function of pre-treatment knowledge.  The results 
indicated that there were no differences between 
conditions, F(2,233)= 1.47, MSE= 72.25, p>.05, 
indicating that any difference between the conditions 
are unlikely due to pre-treatment levels of knowledge. 
Likewise, a between-participants analysis was 
conducted on the students’ reading skill scores to 
determine whether the pre-treatment reading skill 
differed as a function of condition.  The analysis 
revealed that there was no significant effect of pre-test 
reading skill, F(2,233)= 2.05, MSE= 71.31, p>.05, and 
thus, differences among the conditions are unlikely due 
to pre-treatment differences in reading skill. 
 
Effects of condition 
A repeated measures analysis of variance was 
conducted on comprehension scores including the 
within-participants variable of question type (text-
based, bridging inference) and the between-participants 
variables of training condition and knowledge with 
reading skill as a covariate.  There was a significant 
effect of question type, F(1,229)= 23.57, MSE= 0.602, 
p<.05, indicating that more text-based questions 
(M=0.52, SD=0.26) were answered correctly than 
bridging questions (M=0.22, SD=0.17).  There was also 
an effect of knowledge, F(1,229)= 35.14, MSE= 1.85, 
p<.05) indicating that high-knowledge students 
(M=0.28, SD=0.15) scored higher than low-knowledge 
students (M=0.45, SD=0.17).  The analyses revealed a 
significant effect for training condition, F(2,229)= 3.94, 
MSE= 0.207, p<.05) indicating that both iSTART 
(M=0.39, SD=0.21) and SERT (M=0.39, SD=0.19) 
participants scored higher than controls (M=0.33, 
SD=0.22).  This effect was qualified by a significant 
interaction of question type and condition, F(2,229)= 
2.98, MSE= 0.076, p<.05).  Post hoc Least Significant 
difference tests revealed that SERT (M=0.55, SD=0.23, 
p<.05) and iSTART (M=0.54, SD=0.24, p<.05) 
participants scored higher than controls (M=0.45, 
SD=0.27) on text-base questions, but not bridging 
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questions (see Figure 1).  No other effects were 
significant. 
The results of the present study are congruent with 
research demonstrating beneficial effects of reading-
strategy training on understanding and learning (Chi et 
al., 1994; Pressley et al., 1992).  First, the majority of 
SERT and iSTART participants reported the use of 
SERT strategies such as elaboration, using prior 
knowledge and making bridging inferences.  Research 
has shown that high-level strategies such as prior 
knowledge use (Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 
1979) and elaboration (Pressley et al., 1992) are much 
more effective than low-level strategies such as 
repetition.  The current results suggest that both SERT 
and iSTART training encourage the use of higher-level 
strategies during reading, and that the self reported use 
of these strategies correlates with comprehension.  The 
present findings also seem to support the views of Cox 
(1997) and Garner (1990): average untrained students 
are spontaneously unlikely to use higher-level strategies 
to help them better understand what they read.  
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Figure 1. Proportion correct on the mitosis passage 
score as a function of condition and question type 
 
To examine effects of reading skill, a second repeated 
measures analysis of variance was conducted on 
comprehension including the within-participants 
variable of question type (text-based, bridging-
inference) and the between-participants variables of 
training condition and reading skill, with knowledge as 
a covariate.  The analysis revealed a significant effect 
for question type, F(1,229)=5.07, MSE=0.147 p<.05, 
indicating that more text-based questions (M=0.52, 
SD=0.26) were answered correctly than bridging 
questions (M=0.23, SD=0.17).  The main effect of 
training condition was reliable, F(2,229)=4.69, 
MSE=0.239 p<.05, indicting that iSTART (M=0.39, 
SD=0.21) and SERT (M=0.41, SD=0.19) participants 
scored higher than control participants (M=0.33, 
SD=0.22).  This main effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction with question type, 
F(2,229)=2.98, MSE=0.076 p<.05.  Post hoc Least 
Significant Difference tests revealed that iSTART 
(M=0.54, SD=0.24, p<.05) and SERT (M=0.58, 
SD=0.23, p<.05) participants scored higher on text-
based questions compared to control participants 
(M=0.46, SD=0.27). But this effect was not found for 
bridging-inference questions. In sum, both SERT and 
iSTART improved students’ comprehension compared 
to controls, particularly at the textbase level of 
understanding.   
In a related study, Best, Ozuru, and McNamara 
(2004) analyzed the content of students’ self-
explanations while interacting with iSTART.  The 
researchers found that several of the participants 
indicated the use of high quality elaborations including 
logic/common sense and scientific reasoning.  Many of 
these elaborations were knowledge building, which 
helps the reader more effectively explain the current 
sentence.  However, the quality of the elaborations 
depended upon both the sentence difficulty and 
individual differences.  In short, iSTART seems to 
promote the use of both high-level and high-quality 
comprehension strategies. 
Second, and more importantly, the self-report data is 
bolstered by the findings from the comprehension data.  
Participants in both the SERT and iSTART conditions 
answered more text-based questions correctly than did 
control participants.  Hence, the current study suggests 
that SERT and iSTART training encouraged many of 
the learners to use higher-level strategies, and when 
they did, comprehension for text-based information was 
facilitated.  These findings are congruent with results 
reported by McNamara (in press) showing positive 
learning gains for students who were given SERT 
training.  In that study, McNamara (in press) found 
evidence that SERT helped participants by encouraging 
them to use logic, common sense and general world 
knowledge.  Moreover, the beneficial effects of training 
were most prominent for low-knowledge readers; that 
is, for the readers who need the training the most. 
Finally, correlations between each of the 18 self-
reported strategies and the total proportion correct on 
the mitosis passage. Six strategies were significantly 
correlated to comprehension.  Five of the strategies 
were taught by the SERT/iSTART technique bridging, 
r=.25, self-explanation, r=.19, elaboration, r= .14, 
paraphrasing, r=. .25, predictions, r=.12, and one non-
SERT/iSTART strategy, reread to understand, r=.15. 
As in McNamara (in press), the facilitative effect of 
training in the current study did not extend to bridging-
inference questions.  One possible explanation is that 
participants did not have the specific domain 
knowledge required to make effective bridging 
inferences (cf., McNamara, in press).  This 
interpretation is in accordance with the finding that 
 
Discussion 
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prior knowledge is important in generating inferences 
(e.g., Singer & Ritchot, 1996), particularly when text 
cohesion (the degree to which relations are made 
explicit) is low (McNamara, 2001).  The mitosis text 
used here was taken from McNamara (2001), who 
manipulated text cohesion as an independent variable.  
The current study utilized the low-cohesion version of 
the mitosis text.  Because text cohesion was low, 
readers require a greater degree of specific domain 
knowledge to generate the necessary inferences. 
As found in previous studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 
1995; Du Boulay, 2000; Graesser & Person, 1994), this 
research also confirms the effectiveness of 
computerized training, particularly those using 
automated agents as tutors.  The benefits of automated 
tutors include self-paced learning, standardized 
training, and feedback tailored to the individual’s 
progress.  The results of the present work support the 
effectiveness of an automated tutoring system by 
showing that a computerized presentation of the SERT 
strategies (iSTART) was as effective as a presentation 
of the strategies by a human instructor.  Given the 
current trend towards increasing classroom size and 
cutbacks in educational funding, this result suggests 
that automated trainers may provide a means for 
reducing the load on resource-strained educators. 
In sum, this study adds to the literature by 
demonstrating that SERT and iSTART training increase 
the reported use of higher-level strategies during 
reading, and when used, the SERT and iSTART 
strategies enhance comprehension, at least for text-
based information.  More encouraging is the finding 
that the self-paced computer version of the training is as 
effective as the human delivered training.   
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Abstract 
 
Scientific reasoning involves the use of scientific skills, practices, and domain 
knowledge to solve science problems.  A little emphasized tool that experts 
use to help them reason is to refer back to previous problem solving 
experiences, interpreting and applying those experiences as they solve 
problems. Results from a pilot study conducted Fall Semester 2002 suggest 
that improvement in interpreting and applying expert cases to solve a problem 
may also lead to improvement in certain scientific reasoning skills.  In this 
paper, we seek to explore the connection between case application and 
scientific reasoning skills, namely, using evidence to justify a claim, 
generating hypotheses, making predictions, and explaining scientific 
phenomena.    
 
Introduction 
Scientific reasoning involves the use of scientific skills, 
practices and domain knowledge to solve science problems. 
Much research has been done to understand how students can 
develop more expert-like scientific reasoning skills (e.g. 
Kuhn, 1993; Schauble et. al., 1995), and much research has 
been done to promote more expert use of scientific reasoning 
skills in educational settings (e.g. Bell & Davis, 2000; Reiser, 
et. al., 2000).  However, little attention has been given to the 
role case interpretation and application might play in learning 
to reason scientifically.  There is evidence that scientists use 
cases extensively in their reasoning.  For example, when 
trying to analyze a series of unexpected results, scientists will 
refer to cases that may seem unrelated but that have similar in 
order to explain why those unexpected results may have 
occurred (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001). 
      In educational settings, it is often difficult to support 
students as they attempt to acquire and carry out expert- 
reasoning processes.  In many cases, the expert-reasoning 
process may be too complex to pare down in such a way that 
students can engage in it without getting lost in all of the 
complexity (Reiser, 2000). In other cases, because the expert-
reasoning process is not fully understood, it becomes difficult 
to assess where students may experience difficulty, and when 
they do, it is difficult to know what kind of help to provide.   
     We have sought to address these difficulties for one 
complex skill: case application.  Fall semester 2002, we 
conducted a study to understand the effectiveness of the Case 
Application Suite (CAS) (Owensby & Kolodner, 2004), a set 
of tools designed to support middle-school students in project-
based inquiry classrooms as they interpret and apply the 
experiences of experts to solve design problems.  In particular, 
we were interested in understanding how effective our system 
of scaffolds was at supporting students as they interpreted and 
applied expert cases, whether the distribution of scaffolding 
responsibilities across teacher and software was effective, how 
well students were able to use case application skills in the 
absence of the scaffolding, and whether the distribution of 
scaffolding responsibilities could be articulated in a cognitive 
apprenticeship (Collins, Brown & Newman, 1989) framework. 
     Analysis of the data showed that CAS was effective at 
supporting students in case application, showing significant 
differences for interpretation and trends for application.  In 
addition, the trends in the data suggested an unexpected 
finding—that case application supports the learning of 
scientific reasoning skills.  Our analysis of this phenomenon 
suggests that this is because case application and scientific 
reasoning  share foundational skills, namely using evidence to 
support a claim, generating hypotheses, making predictions, 
and explaining phenomena scientifically. This paper seeks to 
explore the connection between case application and scientific 
reasoning skills to suggest that improvement of certain case 
application skills will promote improvement in these aspects 
of scientific reasoning.  As part of our exploration, we will 
show how we’ve used software-realized scaffolding (Guzdial, 
1994) to support the acquisition of case application skills 
among middle-school students in project-based inquiry 
science (Blumenfeld, et al., 1991).   
 
Case Application and Scientific Reasoning 
Case application is the process of interpreting, analyzing, and 
applying experiences to address challenges or solve problems 
(Owensby & Kolodner, 2003; the CBR literature, e.g., 
Kolodner, 1993).  It involves three high-level steps:  
interpretation, application, and assessment.  Interpretation 
involves, at the time of encountering the case, it, focusing on 
extracting the connections between its criteria and constraints 
and the solution chosen to address its challenge, making 
connections between the solution chosen and the outcomes 
that happened, and identifying what can be learned from the 
experience, and at the time of working toward applying it, 
making connections between the case (acting as a source case) 
and the new situation (target).  Application involves applying 
those lessons to the new situation or target case, either directly 
or via adaptation.  Assessment involves analyzing the 
applicability and quality of the proposed solution either by 
making predictions about the target case’s solution or by 
testing the target case’s solution and analyzing the outcomes 
that result. 
1065
  
     Case application is integral to the practices of experts.  
Medical experts use cases to diagnose as well as to refine 
treatments for patients.  Architects keep file cabinets of cases 
to go back to when working on new projects.  Lawyers refer to 
previous cases and decisions when constructing a strategy to 
prosecute someone or to defend a client. 
    Analogical reasoning has long been recognized as an 
important aspect of scientific reasoning (e.g. Gentner, 1999; 
Anderson, 2000, Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001).  Case 
application extends standard analogical reasoning.  In addition 
to mapping the solution for one problem onto the solution for 
another problem, we include in case application the analysis 
and interpretation of a case at the time it is encountered that 
allows its application.  We also include in case application the 
identification of those nuggets of an encountered case that 
might apply in a new situation.  When the cases being used are 
those of others, this interpretation process involves significant 
reading for understanding. While reading is taught in schools, 
rarely does science class focus on helping learners read. Yet 
real science practice is impossible without the skills involved 
in reading a scientific case for understanding and reasoning 
through its application. 
Understanding requires identifying claims, the evidence used 
to support its claims, and the quality of explanations put forth, 
while applying what is in a science case requires making 
predictions based on those claims and finding particularly 
useful information in a big document.    
     In order to use evidence to support a claim, one must 
interpret the experience from which the claim arose in such a 
way that he/she recognizes that the evidence applies.  Then, 
one must interpret the evidence in such a way that the aspects 
that apply to the claim can be identified.  Next, one must be 
able to articulate how the relevant aspects of the evidence 
support the claim and make predictions for future use of the 
concept, skill, or claim.  Understanding the experience from 
which the claim and evidence put forth involves interpreting 
the experience and drawing out the lessons that can be learned 
from the experience.  Articulating how the evidence supports 
the claim involves articulating the lessons learned from the 
evidence and the experience that the claim rises from and then 
applying those lessons to explain how the evidence supports 
the claim and then making predictions about how the claim 
might be useful in the future.  It does make sense, then, that 
supporting students as they learn how to interpret and apply 
cases illustrating the evidence of scientific phenomena and the 
application of scientific principles could help those same 
students become better scientific reasoners. 
 
Our approach to supporting the development of 
case application skills 
To help middle schoolers interpret cases and apply them in 
new situations, we have designed a suite of software tools 
called the Case Application Suite (CAS) to play the role of 
coach within a cognitive apprenticeship framework (Collins, 
Newman & Brown, 1989).  In a cognitive apprenticeship 
approach to learning complex skills, the teacher models the 
skills and explains his/her reasoning to the students and then 
coaches and hints as students begin to carry out parts of that 
reasoning.  As students become more capable, they, in turn, 
model for their peers and coach them to their next levels of 
capability.   But when students work in small groups, there 
may not always be a group member expert enough to be able 
to apply that coaching to the rest of the group.  CAS supports 
students as they work in small groups by asking the kinds of 
questions and making the kinds of suggestions that a teacher 
or more able student might make if he/she were available. 
 The design of CAS was informed by suggestions 
made by the skills acquisition, case-based reasoning, transfer, 
and cognitive apprenticeship literatures (Anderson, et. al, 
1981; Anderson, 2000; Kolodner 1993; Branford, Brown & 
Cocking, 1999; Collins, Brown & Newman, 1989, 
respectively).  CAS contains three tools.  The Case 
Interpretation Tool helps students identify problems the 
experts encountered in achieving their goals, solutions they 
attempted and why they chose those, criteria and constraints 
that informed those solutions, results they accomplished and 
explanations of those, and any lessons learned, or rules of 
thumb, that can be extracted from the experience.  The Case 
Application Tool guides students through attempting to apply 
the rules of thumb gleaned from the case, prompting them to 
consider whether a rule of thumb is applicable and then 
helping them explore ways they can apply it to their solution.  
The Solution Assessment Tool helps students make 
predictions about the success of their solution, analyzing the 
impacts they expect their solution to make as well as where 
they expect their solution to fall short. 
     The system of scaffolds in CAS includes five different 
types of scaffolds:  (1) the structure of the suite serves as a 
scaffold as each tool corresponds to a major step in the case 
application process; (2) the prompts in each tool’s center 
frame focus students’ attention on important aspects of the 
case; (3) hints are provided with each prompt to give more 
specific help; (4) examples are provided with each prompt to 
help students see what they need to be accomplishing; and (5) 
charts and templates serve as organizers to help students with 
creating an analyzing the applicability of the rules of thumb 
they have gleaned.   
     Each tool is divided into three frames (Owensby & 
Kolodner, 2003; Owensby & Kolodner, 2004).  In the left 
frame is the expert case and interpretations that have already 
been done of it.  The middle-frame shows the prompts for the 
tool the group is currently working on.  The right frame shows 
hints and examples (Figure 1). 
 
Use of CAS in the Classroom 
We’ve tried CAS out in classrooms engaging in the Learning 
by Design (LBD; Kolodner et al., 2003) project-based inquiry 
unit called Tunneling Through Georgia.  In this challenge,  
student teams serve as consultants for the design of several 
tunnels needed for a transportation system that will run across 
the state of Georgia.  Four tunnels need to be designed, each 
for a different geological area of the state—mountainous, 
sandy, and so on.  Students need to address several issues—at 
what depth to dig the tunnel, what methods to use for the 
digging, and what support systems are needed in the tunnel’s 
infrastructure.  Cases are used extensively in the unit to 
suggest which geological characteristics of the tunnel location 
they need to learn more about to address the challenge, to 
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introduce students to different kinds of tunneling technologies, 
and to give them an appreciation of the complexity of tunnel 
design.  For example, the story about the design and 
construction of the Lotchberg Tunnel in Switzerland, shows 
 
 
Figure 1: Case Application Tool 
 
some of the problems the experts faced trying to tunnel 
through the summit of a mountain that has two peaks 
separated by a river and suggests understanding the 
composition of a mountain by using test shafts and core 
sampling can help to identify and possibly avoid problems like 
crumbling rock, flooding, and cave-ins.  
   The Tunneling unit is preceded by another unit that requires 
case application.  In that unit, students learn about earth’s 
surface processes as they engage in the challenge of designing 
and constructing (in a stream table) a way of managing 
erosion around a basketball court.  They read two cases during 
this unit, one about the dustbowl and another about landslides 
on the U.S.’s West Coast.  The teacher helps them read and 
understand the cases together as a class and moves around the 
room coaching them as they work in small groups to apply 
what they’ve learned to their challenge.  In addition, students 
use a template to keep track of important aspects of the cases 
they are reading about.  The template, created by the teacher 
and based on the My Case Summary Design Diary page 
(Puntambekar & Kolodner, 1998), organizes a page into 
columns representing Case Summary, Problems, Ideas, 
Learning Issues, and Questions. 
 As they get started with the Tunneling unit, the 
teacher again models case application for students as they 
analyze the Lotschberg Case together as a class.  After 
analyzing the Lotschberg Case, student groups are assigned 
one of four tunnel cases to interpret and present to the rest of 
the class.  They are introduced to CAS‘s Case Interpretation 
Tool to support them as they interpret the case on their own in 
small groups.  This is followed by presentation of their 
interpretations of their cases to the class and discussion of the 
lessons that can be pulled from them.  When it is time to apply 
what’s been learned from the cases to their own tunnel 
challenge, students use the Case Application Tool to create a 
solution.  This sequence is repeated a second time as groups 
read another set of four cases.  Later, they sometimes use the 
Solution Assessment Tool to make predictions about how well 
their proposed designs might work, what they might have 
overlooked, and what they would do differently if given 
another chance 
 
Our Study 
We were interested in learning how to help students learn to 
interpret and apply cases to project challenges and in 
understanding the effects of adding software designed to 
augment the teacher’s modeling and coaching to a cognitive 
apprenticeship.  Our study collected data to answer three 
questions:  (1) How are students’ abilities to interpret and 
apply cases to their project challenge affected by such 
scaffolding? (2) To what extent would students’ ability to 
apply cases in the absence of the suite be influenced by its use 
during a project? (3) To what extent does the suite enable 
students to articulate the processes involved in case 
application?  When we noticed that some students’ scientific 
reasoning capabilities were improved, we also analyzed to 
answer a fourth question:  To what extent does case 
application capability predict scientific reasoning capability? 
 
Methods 
Procedures 
We report here on a study where we used CAS in the 
classrooms of an 8th grade teacher (Mrs. K) (Owensby & 
Kolodner, 2003) who had only 4 computers available for her 
class.  Because of this, only a subset of the students were able 
to use the software; the rest engaged in all of the same 
activities but had available only the template as scaffolding as 
they were interpreting and applying cases.   All students in the 
study engaged together in solving the erosion challenge and in 
doing Tunneling Through Georgia activities, and all were 
exposed to the same teacher modeling.  Overall, students 
engaged in case interpretation and application activities five 
times – twice during the erosion challenge, once with the 
teacher at the beginning of the Tunneling unit (the Lotchberg 
Case), and twice more in small groups.  Each time, groups 
work together to interpret a case and draw out the lessons it 
teaches; they present their case interpretations to the class, and 
they lead discussion about their case.  Comparison students 
(n=33 students; 9 groups) used the template to scaffold their 
case interpretation and application as they interpreted and 
applied cases after the Lotschberg Case, while experimental 
students used CAS (n=14 students; 4 groups).  We compared 
the capabilities of students who had the software available to 
those who did not as students engaged in the unit and after its 
completion. 
     Software groups were videotaped as they used the 
software, and software and non-software groups were 
videotaped as they presented their interpretations to the class.  
In addition,  templates and logs of CAS use were collected for 
analysis. 
     At the end of the unit, a performance assessment was 
given.  Called the Bald Head Island Challenge, students 
worked in their Tunneling Through Georgia groups to make 
recommendations about the design of two subdivisions on an 
island off the coast of Georgia. They read a case about Bald 
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Head Island and used it to give advice.  They  were asked to 
identify the risks involved with the project, identify possible 
management methods, create rules of thumb (Part 1), design a 
plan for designing and constructing the subdivisions, and 
make final recommendations about whether the project should 
move forward with the given time and budget constraints (Part 
2).  Groups were videotaped as they discussed their ideas.  All 
groups had only template scaffolding available as they 
engaged in this activity, organized into columns representing 
Risk, Why Is This A Risk, Ways To Manage The Risk, Pros, 
and Cons.  
 
Analysis 
Video data was analyzed using a coding scheme that described 
the data for specific interpretation and application dimensions.  
Two coders analyzed video-recorded group performance for 
interpretation on dimensions shown in Table 1 and for 
application and assessment on dimensions shown in Table 2, 
treating each of the two parts of the performance assessment 
as an episode.  A five-point Likert scale was used for each, 
with one representing no evidence of presence of the quality 
being rated and 5 representing that the group fully displayed 
the quality being rated.  Differences in ratings were negotiated 
by discussion, and inter-rater reliability was calculated. 
 
Results 
The results that follow provide evidence that case application 
can be supported in educational settings despite its difficulties, 
that distribution of scaffolding responsibilities across teacher 
and software in a cognitive apprenticeship framework seems 
to be a viable approach for promoting case application, and 
that particular scientific reasoning skills among students who 
used the software tools seem to be more sophisticated.  We 
first discuss the differences between students who used the 
software and those who did not as they were engaging in 
classroom activities of the Tunneling challenge.  We then 
discuss student capabilities while engaging in the performance 
assessment, completed by all students after the Tunneling unit 
was completed and without software scaffolding. The results 
are discussed with respect to using evidence to justify a claim, 
generating hypotheses, making predictions, and explaining 
scientific phenomena.  
 
Case Application During Class Activities 
Examination of student artifacts and presentations of case 
interpretations for groups using CAS vs. the case study  
template showed three major differences.  First, the software 
groups better identified the reasons for positive and negative 
outcomes.  For example, in learning about the Queens 
Midtown Tunnel, one software group told us: “They wanted to 
build [the tunnel] straight [through the city] but couldn’t, so 
they continued it further underground in an S-shape under 
First Avenue and they took different core samples”.  This 
group was specific about the goals of the experts, the 
constraints that kept them from achieving those goals if they 
tried the obvious solution, what they did instead, and the 
activities they had to engage in to do that successfully. The 
typical non-software group, on the other hand, provided 
general descriptions about the experts’ goals, neither 
mentioning the constraints’ impact on the outcomes nor 
alternatives.  For example, one non-software group told us: 
“The Manhattan side [was] on a large bluff higher than 
Queens[, so they ] continued tunnels underground in a slope 
under First [Avenue].”  
     Second, the groups who used the software included more 
sophisticated causality in their rules of thumb.  For example, 
the non-software groups’ rules of thumb are in the form of 
simple imperative statements (e.g., “Control water problem”, 
“Take core samples”), while the software groups’ rules of 
thumb explain why (e.g., “Take core samples—they can save 
your life because if you hit the wrong kind of rock, you can 
get hurt”, “You should always have an oxygen pass so the 
toxic fumes can get out.” 
 
Case Application at Completion of the Unit 
In the performance assessment, groups discussed their answers 
in preparation for writing individual recommendations.  We 
analyzed the video for interpretation and application 
capabilities. 
 Table 1 shows results for case interpretation 
(reliability 89%).  Software groups tended to be better at all 
case interpretation capabilities and significantly better at 
specifying expert problems, identifying relevant aspects of the 
case to apply, and using the case to understand the context in 
which the risks/problems arose.
 
Table 1. Performance Assessment Results for Part 1 - Interpretation 
Coding Characteristic (bold denotes significant difference, 
p<0.05) 
Software 
group 
Standard Dev. 
(software group 
Non- 
Software 
group 
Standard Dev. 
(non-software 
group) 
Recognizes that the case should be used to solve the challenge  3.88 0.25 2.66 0.71 
Makes direct reference to the case to justify an argument or 
position  
3.135 0.25 2.33 0.82 
Able to identify expert problems  3.00 0.00 2.42 0.61 
Able to identify expert “mistakes” 2.63 0.75 2.00 1.17 
Able to identify relevant aspects of the case that can be applied 
to the challenge  
3.88 0.25 1.83 0.98 
Identifies risks based on prior experience with another 
LBD/software case 
1.88 1.44 1.33 0.41 
Able to identify criteria and constraints  3.38 1.11 1.58 0.66 
Uses the case to understand the context of the risks  2.88 0.25 1.67 0.61 
Identifies rules of thumb 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 
 
Software groups tended to describe expert problems 
on a finer-grained level than non-software groups 
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(3.00 vs. 2.42, p<0.05).  For example, non-software  
groups identified “sand” as a risk, while software 
groups identified the “incompatibility of the old sand 
and the beach with the new sand dug when the 
channel was deepened” as a risk, or expert problem.  
In the case, there are a number of risks or problems 
that involve sand, so being able to distinguish 
between those problems is important.  
     Software groups tended to discuss whether a 
management method made sense for their challenge, 
analyzing how the management method would play 
out in their challenge and questioning each other 
about the feasibility of a proposed management 
method (3.88 vs. 1.83).  Non-software groups tended 
to discuss management  methods  only if they were 
different from what they expected.  
   Software groups tended to use the case not only to 
identify the problems the experts encountered, but 
also to understand the context in which those 
problems arose (2.88 vs. 1.67, p<0.05).  They sought 
to understand what was happening in the 
environment that caused the problems to occur or to 
grow worse.  Non-software groups tended to look for 
keywords that they were familiar with when 
identifying problems and management methods.  For 
example, while flipping through the case, one non-
software student declared , “Oh!!  I see erosion 
here—erosion is a problem.”  In a similar incident in 
which one software group member stated that erosion 
was a problem, another member of that group 
declared, “but it says here that the problem is the 
shoreline eroding.”  This discussion resulted in the 
software group providing more detail about the 
erosion problem.  In addition, for interpretation, we 
looked specifically at how well software students 
used evidence (the case) to justify a claim, and found 
that software students tended to do a better job than 
non-software students. 
  
 
Table 2. Performance Assessment Results for Part 2 – Application and Assessment 
Coding Characteristic (bold denotes significant difference, p<0.05) Software 
group 
Stadard Dev. 
(software 
group) 
Non-Software 
group 
Standard Dev. 
(non-software 
group) 
Identifies issues or problems not explicitly stated in the case 2.88 0.25 2.00 1.02 
Able to identify relevant aspects that can be applied to the challenge 2.50 1.08 1.67 1.03 
Suggests incorporating a solution found in the case 2.50 0.58 1.92 0.92 
Notices that a management method used by the experts cannot be 
applied as is but must be adapted 
1.63 0.58 2.08 0.88 
Notices that a solution used by the experts cannot be applied as is 
but must be adapted 
2.38 0.95 2.33 0.68 
Justifies use, modification, or abandonment of an expert solution 
based on criteria and constraints of group’s challenge 
2.75 0.25 2.25 0.76 
Applies a solution used by the experts directly to their challenge 1.75 1.03 1.33 0.82 
Suggests that an expert solution should be abandoned 1.25 0.50 1.25 0.61 
Applies the case to the challenge using rules of thumb 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 
For the video-recorded data for Part 2, application  
and assessment, reliability was 86% and results show 
trends toward better performance by software groups 
on several dimensions. First, software groups tended 
to suggest that a solution from the case would be 
good to incorporate into their challenge solution 
(2.50 vs. 1.92).  This seems to result from the fact 
that software groups tended to refer back to the risks 
and solutions they identified in the expert case in Part 
1.  They would discuss those solutions to figure out 
whether they made sense to use in their challenge 
solution.   
     Second, software groups tended to justify the use, 
modification, or abandonment of an expert solution 
based on the criteria and constraints of the group’s 
challenge (2.75 vs. 2.25).  For example, one software 
group member suggested that the group build a sea 
wall out of an expensive material.  His fellow group 
member pointed out that that particular material 
would be very expensive and given that they only had 
2 million dollars to work with, they should consider  
 
another material.  Few non-software groups even 
mentioned criteria and constraints when deciding 
whether an expert solution or management method  
should be used.  Again, justification of a claim using  
 
evidence was analyzed directly and software groups 
showed better performance than non-software 
groups. 
 
Discussion 
The goals of this paper are two-fold: (1) to show that  
through repeated use of scaffolding that supports case 
interpretation and application students do indeed 
become better users of cases and (2) to point out the 
connection between interpretation and application of 
expert cases and scientific reasoning.  The first is 
shown in the data that has been reported.  The second 
can be seen by connecting what students did while 
interpreting and applying cases to scientific 
reasoning.  
 It seems that using evidence to support a claim and 
explaining scientific phenomena is important in both 
case application and scientific reasoning, while 
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analysis of the data suggests that certain case 
application skills (i.e. understanding the context of 
problems, understanding criteria/ constraints, 
identifying relevant aspects of the case to apply) may 
be important in generating hypotheses and making 
predictions.  For example, understanding the 
connection between addressing criteria/constraints 
and the outcomes that result seems to involve the 
same reasoning as generating a hypothesis and 
analyzing the results to determine whether the 
hypothesis is supported or rejected.  This seems to 
suggest several things: 
1. Understanding how to better support case 
application may lead to understanding how to 
better support certain scientific reasoning skills.  
2. Students can be supported in case application 
despite its complexity, and students can improve 
case application skills.  As such, support that 
leads to improvement in case application skills 
may also lead to improvement in certain 
scientific reasoning skills.   
3. Using a cognitive apprenticeship framework and 
distributing scaffolding responsibilities across 
teacher and software seems to be effective at 
supporting case application skills that seem to be 
connected to certain scientific reasoning skills.  
As such, this same approach may be useful in 
supporting other scientific reasoning skills.  
To make these suggestions stronger or to make 
stronger claims about the connection between case 
application and certain scientific reasoning skills, the 
data would need to be coded using dimensions to 
describe more specifically what is happening with 
students’ scientific reasoning skills as their case 
application skills are improving.  Though this was not 
the focus of this study, the trends that emerged and 
the suggestions that arose certainly suggest that this 
connection between case application and scientific 
reasoning is worthy of further exploration. 
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Abstract 
 
Our study investigated the importance of reader aptitudes 
(prior knowledge and reading skill) in the processing of an 
expository text. We analyzed self-explanations produced by 
42 high-school students while reading an expository text 
about thunderstorms. Specifically, we focused on students 
attempts to paraphrase information (i.e., restate sentences in 
their own words) and elaborate on the sentence content 
(e.g., connect information in different sentences to build a 
global representation of the text). Our findings suggest that 
reading skill is important for the active processing of 
expository texts. Skilled readers produced more 
elaborations than less skilled readers, and also a more 
diverse range of strategies, which may be crucial for 
supporting learning. Implications for learning from text are 
discussed.  
 
Introduction 
 
Successful reading comprehension requires the 
efficient co-ordination and integration of a number of 
underlying processes (Vellutino, 2003). These 
processes may include identification of words, 
decoding of word meanings, integrating the meaning 
of individual words into a coherent sentence level 
meaning using sentence syntax, and finally building a 
more global level representation of the text by 
continuously integrating the individual sentences into 
meaningful discourse level representation.  
 Our focus is on the higher level processes involved 
in reading comprehension, in particular, on how 
readers construct global mental representations of 
situations, and/or topics described by written material 
(van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Further, we focus on the 
impact of two reader-related factors on reading 
comprehension at this higher level of processing.  
The first of these factors concerns the readers’ 
knowledge of the topic of the text. As readers 
comprehension processes move from lower levels 
(e.g., word meaning) to higher levels (e.g., 
sentence/discourse processing), comprehension 
becomes increasingly influenced by the reader’s 
knowledge about the topic of the text (Kintsch, 
1988). General knowledge clearly influences the 
comprehension of narrative text (e.g., McNamara & 
McDaniel, 2004). Moreover, general and domain-
specific knowledge is particularly critical for 
successful comprehension of expository texts (e.g., 
chemistry, biology). A great deal of research has 
shown that readers' knowledge facilitates 
comprehension and learning from expository texts 
(e.g., Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979; McNamara & 
Kintsch, 1996).  
However, there are reasons to believe that other 
individual difference factors influence higher level 
processing of texts. In particular, factors associated 
with general reading skill, such as working memory 
capacity (Just & Carpenter, 1992), reading strategy 
knowledge (Guthrie, Anderson, Alao, & Rinehart, 
1999), and meta-cognition (Baker, 2002) appear to be 
important. For example, McNamara and colleagues 
(McNamara, in press; O’Reilly, Best, & McNamara, 
in press; O’Reilly, Sinclair, & McNamara, in press) 
have shown that meta-cognitive reading strategy 
training improves science text comprehension, 
particularly for low-knowledge readers. Thus, active, 
strategic processing of text is particularly important 
to the comprehension of expository texts.  
We explore here how reading skill is beneficial to 
comprehension of expository texts beyond the impact 
of prior knowledge found in various past research 
(e.g., Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979) A possibility 
explored here is the notion that general reading 
ability is associated with a set of skills that facilitate 
active processing of expository texts.  
We hypothesized that knowledge level and reading 
ability would be associated with different aspects of 
the reading comprehension of expository texts. 
Specifically, whereas “knowledge” should be 
important for how easily one can comprehend the 
material, “reading ability” or “skill” should influence 
active, deep level processing of the material. Thus, 
our goal in this paper is to examine how reading 
ability as well as prior knowledge contributes to the 
“process of learning” from expository texts. We use 
the phrase “process of learning” here to refer to the 
processes engaged by students to acquire new 
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information from a text and integrate it into their own 
knowledge structures.  
According to constructivist framework, learning 
occurs as a function of constructive activity one 
engages at the time of processing the materials 
(Cobb, 1994). We hypothesized that reading ability is 
associated with a set of skills that help readers engage 
in constructive activities such as elaborative 
inferences during reading, hence contributing to 
learning from the materials.  
To tap into the effect of reading ability on “the 
process of learning,” we analyzed self-explanations 
students produced when reading an expository text. 
Think aloud protocols are known to be useful for 
obtaining an insight into thought processes associated 
with problem solving (e.g., Chi, Bassok, Lewis, 
Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Ericsson & Simon, 1993) 
and reading (Chi, 2000). Evidence further indicates 
that eliciting self-explanations during reading leads 
some readers to engage in active reading strategies 
that improve text comprehension (Chi, de Leeuw, 
Chiu, & Lavancher, 1994). Finally, there is evidence 
showing that the number of self-explanations (e.g., 
elaborative inferences) is correlated with learning 
(Chi, 2000). These studies reveal strong relations 
between self-explanation and the “process of 
learning.” Thus, the analysis of self-explanations 
should afford an effective method of gaining insight 
into the “process of learning” that occur while 
students are reading expository texts.   
Assuming skilled and less skilled readers possess 
different degrees of reading related aptitudes (e.g., 
motivation, working memory, effort, strategies) to 
deal with the reading comprehension situation, we 
expect variations to emerge in the type of reading 
strategies observed in the self-explanations generated 
while reading an expository text. In particular we 
hypothesize that reading ability will be associated 
with high frequency of constructive activities such as 
elaborative inferences.  
The self-explanation protocols analyzed in this 
paper were collected during computerized reading 
strategy training, in which students typed their self-
explanations to expository texts (see also, Best, 
Ozuru, & McNamara, 2004). The computerized 
trainer, called iSTART (Interactive Strategy Trainer 
for Active Reading and Thinking), is an automated 
reading strategy training program developed by 
McNamara, Levinstein, and Boonthum (in press). 
iSTART has been shown to be as effective in training 
reading strategies as its parallel, live version, called 
SERT (McNamara, in press; O’Reilly et al., in press).  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants  
 
The sample consisted of 42 eighth and ninth grade 
children from an east coast suburban school. The 
students were enrolled in a learning program, called 
Learning Bridge, designed to provide summer school 
to students from under-privileged backgrounds.   
 
Design and Materials  
Individual differences were measured with two 
tests; a modified version of the Gates-MacGinitie 
Reading Skill Test and a Prior Knowledge Test. The 
Gates-MacGinite test is a standardized reading 
comprehension test, designed for grades 10-12. The 
test consisted of 40 multiple-choice questions that 
assess students’ comprehension on several short text 
passages (Cronbach’s Alpha α=.91). Due to time 
constraints we omitted the vocabulary comprehension 
section. The prior knowledge test had 35 multiple-
choice items, which tap knowledge of different 
science domains, including biology, scientific 
methods, mathematics, earth science, physics, and 
chemistry (Cronbach’s Alpha α=.81).   
The iSTART system (McNamara et al., in press), 
in which the self-explanations were collected, 
consists of three phases: Introduction (introduces 
concept of self-explanation and reading strategies), 
Demonstration (shows users examples of self-
explanation) and Practice (requires students to 
generate self-explanations). 
In the practice section, students are presented with 
science texts one sentence at a time on the computer 
screen. For each sentence, they are asked to type a 
self-explanation. iSTART assesses the quality of the 
self-explanation and provides the feedback to 
students via the pedagogical agent, Merlin. The 
feedback is largely based on the degree of argument 
overlap between the students’ self-explanation and 
the target sentence. The system is designed such that 
it encourages students to use information that is not 
in the target sentence (e.g., elaboration based on 
commonsense and previous sections of the text.). For 
example, Merlin might respond with “Try adding 
some more information that explains what the 
sentence means” when the self-explanation is too 
similar to the target sentence. Thus, feedback differs 
for each user, depending on the quality of self-
explanations produced.  
The self explanations analyzed in this paper are the 
final versions that the students provided for each 
sentence. Thus, they have been affected by the 
feedback of the system in that the final self-
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explanations reflect better quality protocols than 
would otherwise have been provided under 
spontaneous circumstances. However, the system 
tends to reduce the difference between high and poor 
quality self explanations because there is a certain 
threshold for the acceptance. In this sense, the effects 
of individual differences reported in this paper are 
unlikely to be artifacts of the system’s feedback. 
Students self-explained two texts in the practice 
phase, “Stages of Thunderstorm Development” and 
“Origin of Coal.” The present analysis focuses on self 
explanations for the thunderstorm text. This text, 
which was extracted from a school textbook, has 13 
sentences and 197 words, with Flesch-Kincaid Grade 
level of 9.4.  
 
Procedure 
Individual difference measures were collected 
shortly before iSTART training. Students completed 
the prior knowledge test followed by the Gates-
MacGinite reading test. They were given 15 minutes 
to complete each assessment. The students then 
completed the training with iSTART program.  
During the practice phase, they provided explanations 
to the Thunderstorms text.  
 
Coding  
Students typed their self-explanations, which were 
automatically recorded in the database. Two 
independent coders analyzed the self-explanations in 
terms of the following five dimensions: 1) presence 
of comprehension monitoring; 2) presence of 
paraphrasing (none, topic identification, repetition, 
and paraphrasing); 3) distance of paraphrasing from 
the target sentence; 4) accuracy of the paraphrasing; 
and 5) presence of elaborations. 
 Coding of comprehension monitoring assessed 
whether self-explanations incorporated the 
monitoring of students’ understanding. Explanations 
were coded for the presence or absence of 
comprehension monitoring statements (e.g., ‘I don’t 
understand X’). The presence of paraphrasing was 
judged on students’ attempt to restate the target 
sentence in their own words. For this coding, a self 
explanation was categorized as one of the following: 
1) a paraphrase that was a restatement of the sentence 
using different words, 2) a repetition of the sentence 
that was lexically too similar to the target sentence, 
3) a simple topic identification (e.g., ‘this is about 
storms’), or 4) no paraphrase, repetition, or topic 
identification. If the explanation was categorized as a 
paraphrase, the paraphrase was further coded for 
accuracy and distance from the target sentences. 
Accuracy has three levels (inaccurate, partially 
accurate, and accurate); and distance has two levels 
(distant and close).  Close paraphrases were closely 
aligned to the original sentence in terms of sentence 
structure and/or content words. Distant paraphrases 
contained the same semantic content as the target 
sentence, but did not have the same sentence 
structure or content words.   
Coding of the elaborations was based on whether 
the self-explanations included any ideas that were not 
explicitly present in the target sentence. Once a self-
explanation was found to contain an elaboration, it 
was further coded for the nature of its contribution: 
1) relevant to the comprehension of neither the 
current sentence nor the overall text; 2) relevant and 
contributes to the comprehension of only the target 
sentence; and 3) relevant and contributes to a global 
level of comprehension that goes beyond the current 
sentence (e.g., actively building the large picture 
depicted by overall text). We also coded the 
elaborations in terms of their source and accuracy. 
However, since the present analysis does not focus on 
these aspects, they are not described here (see Best et 
al., 2004).  
Reliability of the coding was evaluated using 
Cohen’s Kappa and simple agreement (when the 
coding is binary). Reliability between the coders was 
85% or above for all coding dimensions. 
Disagreements were resolved via a discussion 
between the coders. 
  
Results 
 
To explore the role of the reading skill and prior 
knowledge, we adopted a median split method; 
students were divided into high and low reading 
comprehension skill, or high and low-knowledge 
groups, using the median scores of The Gates-
MacGinite test or Prior Knowledge test. The 
correlation between the Gates-MacGinite test and the 
prior knowledge test was high, r = 0.604, p < .001.  
Our data indicated that students’ often attempted to 
paraphrase (91.0%) and elaborate (41%), but seldom 
expressed comprehension monitoring (4%). Thus, the 
subsequent analysis focuses on paraphrase and 
elaborations.  
We used analysis of variance (ANOVA) to analyze 
the students’ use of the strategies.  The univariate 
ANOVAs comprised reading skill (high or low) or 
knowledge (high or low) as the between-subjects 
factor and strategy type (e.g., paraphrases) as the 
dependent variable.  
 
Frequency distribution of strategy use 
Our first analysis investigated the frequency of four 
types of strategy used by different types of readers 
(low and high reading skill or knowledge students). 
For this analysis, we classified all the self-
explanation into one of four categories: 1 = 
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Repetition or topic identification only; 2 = 
Paraphrasing only; 3 = Elaboration I (irrelevant or 
current sentence); and 4 = Elaboration II (knowledge 
building). 
It is important to note that elaboration (both type I 
and II) may or may not contain paraphrasing.  
Elaboration I and Elaboration II were treated 
separately because knowledge building elaborations 
are indicative of the investment of a greater effort to 
understand the text (i.e., building a more global 
representation of the text). Irrelevant elaborations 
were coded under Elaboration I because they indicate 
that the student is investing an effort to integrate the 
information into their knowledge structures. 
The levels of the classification scheme reflect an 
increase in the construction of integrated and global 
representations of the situation described by the text. 
For example, repetition does not require any 
integration because it only involves rewriting the text 
information.  In contrast, paraphrasing requires the 
restatement of the situation using different words or 
sentence structure, revealing how students 
understood the meaning of the sentence.  Similarly, 
Elaboration I indicates that students are making an 
effort to understand the target sentence by relating, 
integrating, or comparing the information in the 
sentence with what they already know. Finally, 
Elaboration II involves effort to integrate information 
appearing on a multiple sentences into a coherent 
model. Therefore, this analysis can examine the 
degrees of constructive activities carried out by the 
student.  
 The first analysis investigated the self-explanation 
strategies used by skilled and less skilled readers. As 
shown in Table 1, skilled readers were more likely to 
use elaboration strategies whereas less skilled readers 
were more likely to repeat or paraphrase only.  
 We performed two separate ANOVAs, assessing 
the frequency with which skilled and less skilled 
readers used elaboration types I and II.  Skilled 
readers produced more current sentence focused 
elaborations (elaboration I), F(1, 39) = 6.75, MSE = 
.053, p = .01, and knowledge building elaborations 
(elaboration II), F(1, 39) = 7.6, MSE = .003, p < .01, 
than did less skilled readers. The difference between 
skilled and less skilled readers in current sentence 
focused elaboration (Elaboration I) is not solely 
attributable to irrelevant elaborations included in 
Elaboration I because the difference remained 
marginally significant after excluding irrelevant 
elaborations: (less skilled readers M=.22 SD=.22) and 
(skilled readers M=.33 SD=.20), F(1, 39) = 2.95, 
MSE = .043, p =.094.   
 
 
 
Table 1. Strategy use and comprehension skill 
Strategy use Less Skilled 
 
Skilled 
 
Repetition/Topic 
identification .08 (.07) .03 (.07) 
Paraphrasing .62 (.20) .46 (.23) 
Elaboration I .29 (.23) .46 (.22) 
Elaboration II .01 (.02) .05 (.07) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
The previous analysis was repeated with 
knowledge as the between-subjects variable. As 
shown in Table 2, there were few differences in the 
distribution of strategies used by high and low-
knowledge readers. ANOVAs confirmed this 
conclusion: there was no difference in the frequency 
with which low-knowledge and high-knowledge 
students used Elaboration I, F(1,39) = 1.04, p = ns, or 
Elaboration II, F(1, 39) = .017, p = ns. There was no 
difference, again, in Elaboration I even after 
excluding irrelevant elaborations:  low-knowledge 
(M= .28 SD =.24) and high-knowledge (M= .28 SD = 
.19) students.   
 
Table 2.  Strategy use and knowledge 
Strategy use Low 
Knowledge 
 
High 
Knowledge 
 
Repetition/Topic 
identification .07 (.06) .04 (.09) 
Paraphrasing .55 (.27) .53 (.20) 
Elaboration I .35 (.26) .40 (.23) 
Elaboration II .03 (.06) .03 (.10) 
Note: Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
 
Variety of strategy use 
 Next, we were interested in how skilled and less 
skilled readers and high and low-knowledge readers 
differed in terms of the diversity of the strategies they 
use in self-explaining the 13 sentences of the text.   
We hypothesized that less skilled readers would be 
relatively uniform in their strategy use (i.e., use only 
one type of strategy). In contrast, skilled readers 
would frequently change their strategy use (i.e., adapt 
their strategies to different sentences). On the other 
hand, we predicted that knowledge level would make 
little difference in terms of the variety of strategies 
students’ used.  
To conduct this analysis, we counted how many of 
the aforementioned strategies (paraphrase, type I 
elaboration, and type II elaboration) each student 
used to self-explain the 13 sentences. We did not 
count repetition/topic identification as a strategy 
because it is a default technique. Accordingly, the 
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score each student obtained varied from 0 (no 
strategy used) to 3.    
The analysis showed that reading skill was an 
important determiner with regard to the variety of 
self-explanation strategies used. An ANOVA 
indicated that skilled readers used a greater variety of 
self-explanation strategies (M = 2.4, SD = 0.6) than 
did less skilled readers (M = 2.0, SD = 0.5), F(1, 39) 
=5.9, MSE = .277, p = .02. 
On the other hand, the analysis based on readers’ 
knowledge indicated that there was no reliable 
differences in the range of self-explanation strategies 
used by high (M = 2.3, SD = 0.5) and low-knowledge 
students (M = 2.1, SD = 0.3), F(1,39) = 1.45, ns. 
 
Effect of prior knowledge and reading skill on the 
quality of paraphrases 
Thus far, our analyses have indicated that reading 
skill, rather than prior knowledge is an important 
factor in determining the frequency of elaborative 
inferences and variety of self-explanation strategies 
students employ. Does this mean that prior 
knowledge does not play an important role in the 
reading comprehension process? According to our 
argument, and existing literature, prior knowledge 
should have a large influence on comprehension level 
of expository texts. In order to examine the effect of 
prior knowledge on comprehension, we analyzed the 
quality of paraphrases. Given that paraphrasing 
involves describing the gist of a sentence using one’s 
own words, the quality of paraphrases should reflect 
the students’ understanding of sentence meaning. 
Our analysis focused on two different qualities 
related to successful paraphrasing: 1) accuracy of the 
paraphrase and 2) distance of the paraphrase. For 
accuracy, a score of 0, 0.5 and 1.0 was assigned for 
inaccurate, partially accurate, and accurate 
paraphrases, respectively. The two sets of univariate 
ANOVAs on the accuracy scores indicated that there 
were no effects of individual differences. This rather 
disappointing result is possibly due to the fact that the 
target sentence was available for reference while 
students self-explained the sentence.  
 Turning to the distance of paraphrase, we 
compared the frequency of distant paraphrases 
produced by high and low-knowledge and/or by 
skilled and less skilled students. Two sets of 
univariate ANOVAs on the frequency of distant 
paraphrases indicated that distant paraphrases 
occurred more frequently for high-knowledge (M = 
0.63, SD = 0.22) than low-knowledge students (M = 
0.44, SD = 0.24), F (1, 39) = 8.153, MSE = .051, p 
<.01. Also the main effect of reading comprehension 
skill was marginally significant, with more distant 
paraphrases produced by skilled readers (M = 0.61, 
SD = 0.29) than less skilled readers (M = 0.47, SD = 
0.24), F (1, 39) = 2.891, MSE = .057, p =.097. 
We also examined accuracy of distant and close 
paraphrases by dividing all of the items into distant or 
close paraphrases, and analyzing whether the 
accuracy differed across distant and close 
paraphrases. The analysis revealed that accuracy does 
not differ between distant (M =.62, SD = .22) and 
close paraphrases (M =.69, SD = .20), F(1, 38) = 
2.215, p > 0.1, suggesting that distant paraphrases are 
not necessarily less accurate. Overall, these analyses 
indicate that students’ prior knowledge has a larger 
effect on the production of distant paraphrases. Given 
that producing a distant paraphrase without distorting 
the meaning of the sentence requires accurate 
comprehension of the sentence, this finding confirms 
previous findings for effects of knowledge on 
comprehension level of the expository text.     
 
Discussion 
 Overall, the analyses support our prediction that 
reading comprehension ability is closely associated 
with the effort and strategies that readers expend to 
understand the expository text, whereas knowledge is 
more closely associated with the actual 
comprehension level of the material (as indicated by 
the distance of the paraphrase analysis). Skilled 
readers’ self-explanations tend to include more 
constructive activities, such as elaborative inferences 
and linking different parts of the text to obtain a 
“larger picture.” This finding is remarkable because it 
demonstrates that skilled readers’ are able to generate 
these elaborative and bridging inferences even when 
they are dealing with relatively unfamiliar materials 
(i.e., an expository text about thunderstorm as 
opposed to narrative texts used in Gates-MacGinite 
test). One interpretation of this finding is that skilled 
readers possess skills/strategies to effortfully activate 
relevant information from relatively unfamiliar text-
based information (McNamara, in press). This ability 
is associated with constructive activities such as 
bridging inferences, and elaborative inferences. Use 
of these types of strategies, either naturally or after 
being trained to do so, contributes positively to 
learning from expository texts. 
One limitation of our study is that it focuses solely 
on the processes readers employ while reading the 
text, and hence, does not directly show learning gains 
for skilled readers. However, research supports the 
assumption that greater use of elaboration is 
associated with learning gains (Chi, 2000; 
McNamara, in press).  
There are two contrasting views regarding how 
elaborations contribute to learning: the incomplete 
text view and the self-repair view (Chi, 2000). These 
views differ critically with respect to whether (or to 
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what extent) the accuracy of readers’ elaborations 
affect leaning. In line with Chi’s (2000) view, our 
assumption here is that elaborations facilitate 
learning, regardless of whether they are accurate (see 
also, McNamara, in press). But, of course, we do not 
rule out the likelihood that there are several different 
ways in which elaborations can contribute to leaning. 
Accuracy of elaborations may well have important 
implications for the learning process, particularly 
when the reader does not have the opportunity to 
repair inaccurate elaborations based on information 
encountered later in the text. 
In conclusion, the present research highlights the 
important role active reading strategies play in the 
comprehension of and learning from expository texts.   
Given that active strategies are beneficial, future 
work should explore, in more detail, the reader 
related factors (e.g., metacognition, knowledge on the 
strategies, etc) that underlie the use of the strategies, 
and the text-related factors (e.g., sentence difficulty, 
that affect active reading.     
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Abstract 
Whereas reliance on information from one’s proximal 
social environment for generalizing about the population 
has often been associated with erroneous judgments, this 
information is often valuable and can be exploited for 
making accurate inferences. The social circle heuristic is a 
judgment mechanism in which the content and structure 
of people’s social networks are used for making inferences 
about frequencies in the population in a paired 
comparison task. Because the heuristic has a stopping 
rule, judgments generated by it will often be based on 
small samples sizes. In this paper we present experimental 
evidence that shows both that the social circle heuristic 
can compete with a more thorough strategy, and that 
people actually apply it.  
Samples as Reflections of the Environment 
Scarcity of information is one of the central properties of 
everyday decision making. For many judgment problems in 
the real world, neither direct knowledge of the to-be-judged 
values nor complete knowledge of all relevant facts that 
might help predict the correct value are available. Instead, 
inferences have to be made under uncertainty, based on 
information that is more or less predictive of the criterion. 
What processes underlie people’s inferences in such 
situations? Recent approaches to judgment under 
uncertainty that acknowledge the bounded rationality of 
humans have advanced the notion of fast and frugal 
decision making (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research 
Group, 1999). The heuristics proposed by this program are 
based on Brunswik’s (1955) idea that judgments are made 
on the basis of cues that are probabilistically related to the 
target criterion. As Gigerenzer et al. (1999) have shown, 
such mechanisms can be astonishingly accurate despite 
using only a limited amount of information.  
Typically, fast and frugal heuristics rely on cues that are 
qualitatively different from the criterion (e.g., considering 
whether or not there is rent control in a city to predict which 
of two cities has a higher homeless rate). In the case of 
frequency judgments, however, the target criterion can be 
inferred by sampling instances of it from a population. For 
example, which first name occurs more often in the 
population: Martin or Simon? Or, does bladder cancer or 
renal cancer have a higher annual incidence rate? For these 
inference problems concerned with environmental 
frequencies, it is possible that—rather than accessing 
proximal cues—samples consisting of instances of the 
criterial event are drawn from the proximal environment. As 
such, samples can also serve as “keys to assessing the distal 
environment” (Fiedler, 2000, p. 661), and in the absence of 
direct knowledge about the environment, these “reflections” 
of the environment are used to infer its latent properties.  
That humans use proximal samples when making 
inferences about the entire population has been argued in 
various forms. For instance, in one interpretation of the 
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; see also 
Sedlmeier, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 1998), frequencies in the 
environment are judged by accumulating easily accessible 
instances of the target event (e.g., Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). Judgment phenomena 
such as the false consensus effect (Ross, Green, & House, 
1977) or the optimistic bias (Weinstein, 1980), have been 
attributed to the employment of the availability heuristic, 
and the use of such a small-sample-based heuristic has 
therefore been associated with the fallibility and irrationality 
of human decision making.  
 
In contrast, we ask how humans can achieve fairly 
accurate judgments in spite of the scarcity and cognitive 
boundedness they have to face in the real world, and 
examine what processes contribute to this achievement (cf. 
Krueger & Funder, in press). Elaborating on the idea of 
sample-based judgments, we propose and test a simple 
heuristic for paired comparisons that exploits frequency 
information in one of people’s most proximal environment: 
their social network.  
The Social Environment as Sample Space 
People’s inferences have been shown to be strongly 
sensitive to information in their social environment. 
Prominent examples are attitude formation (e.g., Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975), conformity behavior (Hirshleifer, 1995; 
Latané, 1981) or risk frequency judgments (Benjamin, 
Dougan, & Buschena, 2001; Hertwig, Pachur, & 
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Kurzenhäuser, 2003). Furthermore, there is evidence that 
information obtained from individuals is accessed and used 
more readily than is the same information obtained in an 
abstract, statistical format when making judgments (Borgida 
& Nisbett, 1977)—even when it is pointed out that the 
concrete individual represents a highly unrepresentative 
instance (Hamill, Wilson, & Nisbett, 1980).  
Apart from the well-known vividness argument, 
information obtained about concrete individuals could 
receive special prominence for several reasons: First, as no 
mediating factor can distort it, information directly obtained 
or observed about the members of one’s own social network 
is highly reliable. Second, the observations of instances of 
the target criterion are per se a valid indicator of the 
criterion. Further, the information is easily accessible, as 
information about social network members represents a 
constantly recurring and thus well-rehearsed event. Finally, 
observations of criterial events in one’s social environment 
are naturally sampled, that is, encountered sequentially and 
represented as natural frequencies. This format has been 
shown to foster probabilistic reasoning (Hoffrage, Lindsey, 
Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000).  
Based on these reasons, we propose that people use their 
social network as a sample space to search for information 
they use to draw numerous inferences. Specifically, we 
propose one heuristic, the social circle heuristic, which 
makes inferences about which of two events occurs more 
frequently in the entire population: With the heuristic, 
instances of the events in question are sampled from a 
person’s social network.  
How Social Circles Guide Search and Stop Search 
In light of the computational limitations of human cognition 
and the fact that inferences often have to be made without 
an exhaustive search of available information (Simon, 
1956), the question of when to stop information search 
arises. In other words, when does one stop sampling from 
one’s social network?  
An individual’s social network is no homogenous entity 
of identical types of relationships. Rather, one can argue 
that social networks have a hierarchical structure, with the 
relationships that a person has to the members of his or her 
social network differing in genetic relatedness, frequency of 
contact, emotional closeness, content of contact, and 
function (e.g., Milardo, 1992). Collapsing across these 
dimensions, we will differentiate among the following 
social circles: family, friends, and acquaintances.  
A central idea of the social circle heuristic is that the 
structure of the social network is used during the sampling 
process, that is, the heuristic exploits the hierarchical 
structure of the social environment to guide and stop the 
sampling process. A popular notion in social network 
research has been to represent the hierarchical structure of a 
social network as concentric circles (Moreno, 1936; Kahn & 
Antonucci, 1980), with the person whose network is 
described in the focal circle, and persons of increasing 
“distance” to the person occupying increasingly peripheral 
circles. For instance, one’s family might fall in the circle 
second closest to the middle, friends in the third circle, and 
one’s acquaintances in the outer circle. As described in the 
next section, the social circle heuristic works by 
sequentially sampling instances of the events in question 
from the different circles, starting with the focal circle. As 
soon as the search of a complete circle favors one of the two 
alternatives, the sampling process is terminated and no 
further circles are looked up. Note that moving outwards, 
the number of the circles’ members increases 
monotonically, and, as a consequence, so too does the 
sample size on which an inference can be based.  
The Social Circle Heuristic 
After defining the sample space and its structure, we are 
now in the position to describe the social circle heuristic in 
more detail. Consider the following inference problem: 
Which disease occurs more often in the population, hepatitis 
or tuberculosis? The social circle heuristic is a heuristic for 
such pair comparisons in which events (or characteristics) 
are judged according to their population frequency.  
The heuristic consists of four building blocks and starts 
with the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002).1 The social circle heuristic has a search rule, which 
specifies where to search, a stopping rule, which specifies 
when to stop sampling, and a decision rule, which specifies 
how to make an inference based on the information gathered 
through sampling (for different building blocks of heuristics 
see Gigerenzer et al., 1999).  
Figure 1: Flow chart of the social circle heuristic and the 
relationship of the sampling process to the recognition 
principle and inferences based on other cues (such as Take 
the Best; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
 
It operates as follows:  
Step 0 – Use the recognition heuristic. If the name of only 
one of the two events is recognized, then predict that 
the recognized one is more prevalent than the 
                                                          
1 This latter point also illustrates how fast-and-frugal heuristics can 
be combined by nesting. 
Recognition
Oneself
Family
Friends
Other cues
Choose the alternative to 
which the cue/heuristic points
Guess
+ -
+ -
+ -
+ -
- -
+ +- -
+ +- -
+ +
- -
- -/++
Which event is more frequent in population: A or B  ?
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+ +
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+ +- -
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unrecognized one. If the names of both events are 
recognized, recruit the social circle heuristic.  
Step 1 – Search rule: Search the social circle for instances 
of the events, running sequentially through the circles, 
starting with the focal circle.  
Step 2 – Stopping rule: If search within a circle favors one 
event, stop search. If; within a circle; the same number 
of instances is found for both events, continue the 
search in the next circle.  
Step 3 – Decision rule: Predict that the event for which a 
higher number of instances is found is the more 
prevalent in the population. If the sampled information 
does not discriminate between the alternatives (and no 
other information is known), then guess after the last 
circle is searched.  
 
Due to the stopping rule, the search process will often be 
terminated early, and an inference based on information 
gathered with the social circle heuristic will be derived from 
samples of small sizes. Note that this also implies that as 
soon as search is stopped at a particular circle, information 
in more peripheral circles that might overturn the decision, 
is not considered. In this sense, the heuristic is non-
compensatory. To rely on small samples has often been seen 
as unreasonable (“belief in the law of small numbers”; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), and only recently a few 
authors have highlighted the possible value of such a 
strategy (e.g., Dawes, 1989; Fiedler & Kareev, 2004; 
Kareev, 2000).  
How Accurate Is the Social Circle Heuristic? 
In order to test the accuracy of the social circle heuristic, we 
conducted a computer simulation where the task of the 
heuristic was to judge which of two events, A or B, occurs 
more frequently in the entire population. For this task, the 
heuristic could search for instances of the events in its 
spatial vicinity. The population consisted of 2,500 agents, 
represented in a 50×50 matrix in which each cell 
represented one agent (see Figure 2, which shows the 
environment simplified to a population with 100 agents in a 
10×10 matrix). We used the city block metric to define the 
distance between the agents. For instance, in Figure 2—
which shows the social network of agent #45 in a population 
of 100—agent #44 is at a distance of 1 from agent #45, 
agent #34 is at a distance of 2 from agent #45, agent #33 is 
at a distance of 3 from agent #45 etc. It is assumed that each 
agent’s social network consists of 40 other agents that differ 
with regard to their distances to the agent. Thus, an agent 
could maximally sample information about 41 agents 
(including himself). This social network is divided into 
different social circles: Circle 1, that only includes the agent 
itself, Circle 2, including all neighboring agents with a 
distance of 1 (4 agents), Circle 3, including all neighboring 
agents with a distance of 2 (8 agents), and Circle 4, 
including all neighboring agents with a distance of 3 or 4 
(28 agents).2 
 
Figure 2: Environment in the computer simulation (here 
simplified as a 10×10 population). 
 
Two environments were used to test the performance of 
the social circle heuristic. In the first environment, instances 
of 10 event categories were distributed randomly across the 
2,500 agents (see Figure 3). The 10 events mimicked the 
frequency distribution of a real world environment used in 
the experiment (discussed further below): occurrences of 
infections in Germany. As can be seen from Figure 3, the 
distribution of the proportions of the infections is very 
skewed and falls into a J-shaped distribution, a pattern 
found in many real-world domains (Hertwig, Hoffrage, 
Martignon, 1999). The proportions of the 10 most frequent 
infections (from a set of 24) were chosen because their 
proportional distribution could be represented in a 
population of 2,500 agents. The most frequent event was set 
at a frequency of 2,000; the 9 other events were distributed 
according to this anchor and the proportions reported by the 
Robert Koch Institute (for details see Pachur, 2002).  
Secondly, we constructed an environment in which the 
same overall number of instances in the population was 
distributed across the 10 event categories such that the 
frequency across the 10 events was linearly increasing. As a 
result, this linear environment and the skewed environment 
differed substantially with regard to the dispersion of the 
frequency distribution. We were interested in the effect of 
the frequency distribution of the events as this property can 
have an effect on the success of a strategy (Hertwig, 
Hoffrage, Martignon, 1999). 
To make an inference, the social circle heuristic starts 
with Circle 1 and looks whether event A or B is present. If 
one is and the other not, no further circles will be looked up, 
irrespective of what information is present in the other 
circles, and it will be inferred that the sampled event is more 
frequent in the population. If neither of the events is present 
in Circle 1, the agents in Circle 2 will be looked up. If one 
                                                          
2 The matrix was a wrapped environment, that is, the agents at the 
borders had neighbors at the opposite side. For instance, in Figure 
2, the left-hand neighbor of agent #41 is agent #50.  
Distance = 0
Circle 1
Distance = 3 or 4
Circle 4
Distance = 1
Circle 2
Distance = 2
Circle 3
1079
event occurs more frequently in Circle 2, search is stopped 
and an inference is made after looking up only four agents. 
The same rule applies to Circle 3. Only if the number of 
instances in the first three circles does not discriminate, then 
Circle 4, and thus the maximum number of 41 agents will be  
looked up. If even circle 4 does not discriminate, one of the 
events is picked randomly. 
Figure 3: Distribution of the 10 events in the two 
environments used in the computer simulation. 
 
As a benchmark for the social circle heuristic, its 
performance was compared with the performance of an 
exhaustive sampling strategy. For an inference of whether 
event A or event B occurs more often in the entire 
population, this strategy, normatively more appropriately, 
always looks up all 41 agents in the social network (that is, 
this strategy aggregates information across all circles). The 
event for which more instances can be sampled is inferred to 
be more frequent in the entire population. If an equal 
number of instances is sampled for both events, or if no 
instances can be sampled at all, one of the events is picked 
randomly. 
For each of the two environments, the random distribution 
of the 10 events (totalling around 2,400 instances) was 
repeated 100 times, and each time 100 agents were picked 
randomly as starting points for the two strategies. At each 
run, the 10 events were combined in a pair comparison 
(yielding 45 pairs) and the task was to infer which event is 
more frequent in the entire population. 
How well does the simple social circle heuristic perform 
compared to the exhaustive sampling strategy? In the 
skewed environment, derived from a real-world distribution, 
surprisingly, both strategies showed an identical proportion 
of correct inferences with a median of 77.8% (arithmetic 
means: social circle heuristic 76.3%, exhaustive sampling 
strategy 77.5%). Showing a similar level of performance, 
the social circle heuristic looked up, on average, only 24.7 
agents, which is approximately 55% of the amount of 
information that the exhaustive sampling strategy used 
(which always looks up all 41 agents).  
In the linear environment, the picture was different: here 
the exhaustive strategy clearly achieved a higher accuracy 
than the social circle heuristic. Whereas the social circle 
heuristic a median of 75.6% correct choices (mean 75.2, SD 
=8.9), the exhaustive strategy 84.4% (mean 83.1, SD=6.3).  
Table 1 shows the performance of the social circle 
heuristic in more detail. Because of the stopping rule, the 
social circle heuristic terminated for some inferences the 
search at Circle 1, for some at Circle 2, for some at Circle 3, 
for some at Circle 4, and for some a guess had to be made. 
The second column of Table 1 reports for each circle the 
percentage of choices for which search was stopped at the 
circle. The social circle heuristic had to guess in 31.6% of 
the cases (whereas the exhaustive sampling strategy had to 
guess in 33.6% of all choices). The rightmost columns 
shows the percentage of correct inferences for these choices. 
Note that in the skewed environment, contrary to normative 
expectations, the accuracy decreases from Circle 1 to Circle 
3. In the linear environment, in contrast, the accuracy 
increased.  
 
Table 1: Proportion and accuracy of choices after search 
was terminated for the SCH in the two environments. The 
ns in the first column refer to the number of agents looked 
up.  
Circles  % of choices 
stopped at each 
circle 
  
% of correct 
choices 
 Skewed Linear Skewed Linear 
Circle 1 (n=1) 19.2 18.8  95.7 69.7 
Circle 2 (n=5) 13.2 38.4  88.2 74.0 
Circle 3 (n=13) 13.8 26.2  84.2 78.1 
Circle 4 (n=41) 22.3 13.7  85.5 85.8 
Guessing 31.6 3.0  50.0 50.0 
 
Thus, we have accumulated a number of arguments for 
the usefulness of the social circle heuristic. First, it is a 
simple strategy that can be assumed to be easily performed 
by a boundedly rational agent. By restricting the search 
process and the amount of information on which an 
inference is based to a minimum, the social circle heuristic 
allows for very quick judgments. Second, as we have seen, 
it performs equally well as a more thorough strategy that 
takes much more information into account, and this 
performance seems to hinge on the statistical structure of 
the environment. Overall, the social circle heuristic achieves 
an astonishingly high proportion of correct inferences. But 
can we find evidence for people’s use of such a simple and 
efficient strategy for making inferences about event 
frequencies?  
Do People Use the Social Circle Heuristic? 
The 24 infectious diseases (the proportions of 10 of these 
were also used in the computer simulation) for which 
official records are kept by the Robert Koch Institute were 
combined in a complete paired comparison (yielding 276 
pairs), and 40 participants were asked to choose the 
infectious disease that has a higher annual incidence rate in 
Germany. After this test, participants indicated for each 
infection and each of their circles (self, family, friends, and 
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acquaintances) how many, if any, people in their circles had 
been affected by the infection. They also indicated whether 
they recognized the name of the infection. From this 
information, we calculated how often participants had an 
opportunity to choose in accordance with the social circle 
heuristic and determined which prediction the social circle 
heuristic made in each of these cases (only pairs where both 
infections were recognized and the reported number of 
instances in the social network discriminated between the 
two infections were included). Overall, only relatively little 
occurrences of the infections were reported by the 
participants, which is not surprising given the rarity of 
infections. The social circle heuristic made predictions for 
33 participants, and was applicable (i.e., discriminated 
between the infections), on average, with 11.1% of all 
choices. Figure 4 shows how often these 33 participants 
made a choice in accordance with the prediction of the 
social circle heuristic.  
For each participant, the bar indicates the percentage of 
choices that were in line with the prediction of the social 
circle heuristic. Overall, the median proportion of inferences 
in accordance with the social circle heuristic was 79.5% 
(mean 77%, SD=15.9). It seems fair to conclude that the 
social circle heuristic did quite a good job in describing 
participants’ judgments (focusing on those in which it was 
applicable).  
Figure 4: How often the 33 participants who reported 
instances of the infections in their social network made 
choices in accordance with the social circle heuristic. 
How Ecologically Rational Is the Social Circle 
Heuristic? 
The social circle heuristic is a psychologically plausible 
strategy: people appear to use it when trying to infer with of 
two risk events is more frequent. But how accurate a 
strategy is the heuristic when applied to the infections and 
based on the occurrences of the infections recalled by our 
participants? In other words, how ecologically rational are 
the inferences of the social circle heuristic in the task that 
our participants solved? In a second analysis, the predictions 
of the social circle heuristic for each individual were 
compared with the correct choices, that is, according to the 
actual incidence rates (averaged values from a 5-year period 
were used to eliminate year-to-year fluctuations).  
An index for the ecological validity was defined as the 
number of correct inferences made by the social circle 
heuristic divided by the number of pairs where it was 
applicable. This index was calculated separately for each 
participant. The median ecological validity was .83 (mean 
.78), indicating that, overall, strictly following the social 
circle heuristic when it was applicable would have led to an 
accuracy of over 80% correct choices.  
In contrast, how did the non-adherence to the social circle 
heuristic affect participants’ performance? As indicated by 
the ecological validity index, strictly following the social 
circle heuristic would have yielded over 80% correct 
choices (which is far above the performance the participants 
achieved overall). Analyzing the choices that were in line 
with the predictions of the social circle heuristic and those 
that were not in line with it, it turned out that when the 
participants could apply the heuristic and did, they achieved 
on average 83.4% (SD=18.5) correct choices, whereas when 
they could but did not apply the heuristic, they achieved on 
average only 45% (SD=25.5) correct choices. 
To be able to evaluate the accuracy of the social circle 
heuristic for the domain of infections, we also tested the 
strategy that always takes all instances that our participants 
reported into account. The exhaustive strategy showed a 
very similar fit with our participants’ choices (median 
81.8% mean 77.6% of choices in line with the predictions of 
this strategy), but was applicable in slightly fewer cases. In 
terms of ecological validity, the predictions of this strategy 
achieved no higher accuracy than the social circle heuristic 
(median ecological validity of .83, mean .79), which is in 
line with the results of the computer simulation.  
 
Discussion 
In the real world, inferences from small samples need must 
not be less accurate than inferences from larger samples. In 
this paper we investigated, both in a computer simulation 
and in an empirical study, a simple decision mechanism that 
exploits a person’s social network as an easily accessible 
sample space for judging event frequencies in paired 
comparisons. The results show that the social circle 
heuristic allows one to judge accurately, with simple search, 
stopping, and decision rules, the environmental frequencies 
of randomly distributed events in a paired comparison task. 
At the same time, this mechanism describes people’s 
choices rather well. Thus, the performance of the social 
circle heuristic provides another instance for the argument 
that small samples can be an efficient basis for judgments in 
the real world (cf. Fiedler & Kareev, 2004; Kareev, 2000).  
This paper was intended to explore the appropriateness of 
this heuristic in an environment that has a naturally 
occurring statistical structure, and it was shown that the 
heuristic works particularly well in such an environment. A 
question for future research is why the heuristic works so 
well under these conditions and how it performs in 
environments in which events occur in clusters.  
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By virtue of its reliance on the structure of social 
networks, the social circle heuristic represents another 
example of a judgment policy in which the mind is a mirror 
image of the environment. The social circle heuristic thus 
follows in the footsteps of the pioneering work by Egon 
Brunswik (1955), John Anderson (e.g., Anderson & 
Schooler, 1991), and Roger Shepard (e.g., 1994). 
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Abstract 
Quantities are ubiquitous and an important part of our 
understanding about the world – we talk of engine 
horsepower, size, mileage, price of cars; GDP, population, 
area of countries; wingspan, weight, surface area of birds, and 
so on. In this paper, we present cognitively plausible symbolic 
representations of quantity and principles for generating those 
representations. Bringing together evidence in linguistics and 
psychology, we argue that our representations must make two 
kinds of distinctions – dimensional, those that denote changes 
of quantity, e.g., large and small; and structural, those that 
denote changes of quality, e.g. boiling point and poverty line. 
We present results of a pilot experiment that suggests that 
there is a significant agreement between people about the 
dimensional distinctions. We then describe a computational 
model CARVE, which is a system that learns to make 
dimensional and structural distinctions on quantities by being 
exposed to examples.   
1 Introduction 
Our knowledge about quantities is of various kinds – we 
understand that there are Expensive and Cheap things, 
that Canada is larger (in area) than the USA, that 
basketball players are usually tall, that the boiling 
point of water is 100 degrees Celsius. A key part 
of such knowledge seems to be a symbolization of the space 
of values that a quantity can take. By symbolization, we 
mean identifying and naming intervals and points in the 
space of values of a quantity. Some examples include tall 
and short for the quantity of height of people; poverty 
line, lower class, middle class and upper 
class for income of people; freezing point and 
boiling point for the temperature of water.  
These symbolizations and their mapping onto 
quantitative values seem to be determined by a mixture of 
personal experience (e.g., what I consider to be spicy in 
regards to food), society (e.g., middle class), science (e.g., 
phase transitions). Some are task-specific – one makes more 
distinctions than freezing and boiling for bath water. 
Furthermore, some of these symbolizations have been said 
to be vague [Varzi, 2003], in the sense that it is not possible 
to tell exactly at what value of height one becomes tall, and 
is not tall if any less than that. Given these concerns, finding 
systematic principles behind such symbolizations seems to 
be a daunting task, and has not been tackled head-on in 
cognitive science. That said, there is a vast literature that 
bears on these issues. In this paper, we address the 
following two fundamental questions about people’s 
knowledge of quantities –   
1. Representational: What do our representations of 
quantity look like? Or, what representational machinery 
is needed to make the distinctions that we do? 
2. Computational: How are these representations built 
with experience?  
Large scale knowledge representation efforts like Cyc 
[Lenat and Guha, 1989] refer to quantities either purely 
numerically, or using ad hoc representations. Most existing 
computational models of retrieval and similarity cannot use 
numerical representations [Falkenhainer et al, 1989; 
Holyoak and Thagard, 1989; Hummel and Holyoak, 1997; 
Goldstone and Rogosky, 2002], leading to quantitative 
information being ignored in computation of similarity. 
There are models in case based reasoning [Ashley, 1990; 
Leake, 1996; Ram and Santamaria, 1997] that use numeric 
information, but they employ ad hoc similarity metrics that 
are not psychologically grounded. A major motivation of 
this work is to generate cognitively plausible symbolic 
representations of quantity that will enhance computational 
models of similarity, retrieval and generalization. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: We next 
present relevant research from Linguistics, Psychology, 
Qualitative Reasoning, and models of similarity and 
retrieval, which provide both background and motivation. 
Section 3 reports results of a pilot experiment measuring 
just how vague our notion of large, medium and small is. 
Section 4 proposes an answer to the representational 
question above. Section 5 describes CARVE, a 
computational model for building such representations. We 
conclude with future work in section 6. 
2 Background and Motivation 
2.1 Linguistics  
In language, one of the ways these symbolizations get 
represented is by relative adjectives like large and tall. 
Relative adjectives are different from absolute adjectives 
like rectangular, red and married in the sense that 
(1) they can imply varying degrees of the property in 
question, as opposed to all-or-none for the absolute 
adjectives, and (2) their meaning varies with context, e.g., 
tall means different things in context of men and 
buildings.  
These adjectives have been variously called degree, 
relative, gradable or dimensional adjectives [Bierwisch 
1987]. Here we will stick to the term dimensional 
adjectives, emphasizing our focus on those that denote 
quantity. It has been proposed that dimensional adjectives 
denote measure functions that maps from objects to quantity 
values/ intervals [Kennedy, 2003]. It has long been 
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recognized by linguists that dimensional adjectives convey 
an implicit reference to a norm or a standard associated with 
the modified noun [Sapir, 1944]. This implies two steps in 
interpreting a phrase like “a large x” where x can be a 
country/ insect/ etc.: (1) x establishes a comparison class. A 
comparison class is a set of objects that are in someway 
similar to x. For instance, in some cases, this comparison 
class might be the immediate superordinate of the subject 
[Bierwisch, 1971]. How to obtain the comparison class is an 
open question. Staab and Hahn (1998) propose a 
computational model that uses knowledge about correlations 
to determine comparison classes on the fly. (2) Once the 
comparison class has been found, a standard of comparison 
is computed for the class. It is usually believed that this is 
the norm value of the property for the comparison class, but 
Kennedy (2003) observes that it can also be the minimum or 
maximum (e.g., full and open).  
The norm in step 2 has not been spelled out in this 
literature. In cases where we are referring to stable 
taxonomic categories like insects and countries, it is 
believed to be some kind of central tendency. But clearly, it 
is more than a central tendency, since that would imply that 
most things in this world will be either large or small, as not 
many will be exactly equal to the norm.  
2.2 Psychology 
2.2.1 Context sensitivi ty 
Rips (1980) considers two hypotheses about how absolute 
and relative adjectives might be stored in memory – Pre-
Storage and Computational model. For absolute adjectives 
like married and pink, he accepts the pre-storage model, 
where these predicates are stored with the concept they 
apply to. But because of context dependence of relative 
adjectives like big, e.g., in, “Flamingos are big”, he argues 
against storing these predicates in memory. We might have 
a predicate pink attached to flamingo, but in order to 
decide a flamingo is larger than an eagle, we might need a 
predicate is-larger-than-an-eagle associated 
with flamingo, which then deescalates into having infinitely 
many of those like is-larger-than-turnips and so 
on. He also observes that relative adjectives don’t propagate 
in a isa hierarchy – e.g., Grasshoppers are large insects does 
not imply Grasshoppers are large animals, but if you replace 
‘large’ by ‘green’, the implication is right. He then shows 
reaction time and error rates for verifying the truth of 
statements containing relative adjectives which supports a 
different model. In his ‘computational model’ no relative 
information is stored. Attached to every predicate is a 
normal value, e.g. with insects, a normal size of quarter 
inches. An object is called large if it is bigger than this 
normal size. Once again the problem is that just storing the 
norm doesn’t tell you when the object can be classified as 
large. The representation that we propose in section 4 solves 
his concerns with pre-storage models.  
2.2.1 Reference Points 
The psychological reality of such special reference points on 
the scale of quantity has been shown in various domains. 
Rosch (1975) argued for the special status of such 
“cognitive reference points” by showing an asymmetry – 
namely that a non-reference stimulus is judged closer to a 
reference stimulus (e.g., the color off-red to basic-red) than 
otherwise, while such relationship between two non-
reference stimuli is symmetric. Existence of landmarks to 
organize spatial knowledge of the environment, similar 
asymmetries [Holyoak and Mah, 1984 among others]. Other 
relevant psychological studies that support the existence of 
reference points come from categorical perception [Harnad, 
1987] and sensitivity to landmarks [Cech and Shoben, 
1985]. Brown and Siegler (1993) proposed the metrics and 
mappings framework for real-world quantitative estimation. 
They make a distinction between the quantitative, or metric 
knowledge (which includes distributional properties of 
parameters), and ordinal information (mapping knowledge). 
2.2.2 Models of Retrieval, Similarity and Generalization 
There is converging psychological evidence for structured 
models of retrieval, similarity and generalization.  
The structure-mapping engine (SME) [Falkenhainer et 
al, 1989] is a computational model of structure-mapping 
theory [Gentner, 1983]. Given two structured propositional 
representations as inputs, the base (about which we know 
more) and a target , SME computes a mapping (or a handful 
of them). MAC/FAC  [Forbus et al, 1995] is a model of 
similarity-based retrieval, that uses a computationally cheap, 
structure-less filter before doing structural matching. It uses 
a secondary representation, the content vector, which 
summarizes the relative frequency of predicates occurring in 
the structured representation. The dot product of content 
vectors for two structured representations provide a rough 
estimate of their structural match. SEQL [Kuehne et al, 
2000] provides a framework for making generalizations 
based on comp uting progressive structural overlaps of 
multiple exemplars.  
One limitation of these models – and of other models of 
analogical processing (e.g., ACME [Holyoak and Thagard, 
1989, LISA [Hummel and Holyoak, 1997], ABSURDIST 
[Goldstone and Rogosky, 2002]) – is that they do not handle 
numerical properties well: 
Retrieval: Just as Red occurring in the probe might remind 
me of other red objects, a bird with wing-surface-area of 
0.272 sq.m. (that is the Great black-bucked gull, a large 
bird) should remind me of other large birds. This will not 
happen in the current model, unless we abstract the numeric 
representation of wing-surface-area to a symbol, say, 
Large.  
Similarity: A model of similarity must be sensitive to 
quantity.For example, in current matchers, two cars which 
are identical in all dimensions have the same similarity as 
two that differ in some dimensions, if other aspects of their 
representations are identical.  
Generalization: A key part of learning a new domain is 
acquiring the sense of quantity for different quantities. E.g., 
from a trip to the zoo, a kid probably has learnt something 
about sizes of animals. 
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A symbolic and relational representation of the kind we 
propose here would make models of analogical processing 
more quantity-aware. 
2.3 Qualitative Reasoning 
Qualitative reasoning research seeks to understand human-
like commonsense reasoning without resorting to 
differential equations and real-valued numbers. There is a 
substantial body of research in QR that has shown that one 
can, indeed, do powerful reasoning with partial knowledge. 
Qualitative reasoning has explored many different 
representations:  status algebras (normal/abnormal); sign 
algebra (– , 0, +), which is the weakest representation that 
supports reasoning about continuity; quantity spaces, where 
we represent a quantity value by ordinal relationships with 
specially chosen points in the space; intervals and their 
fuzzy versions; order of magnitude representations; finite 
algebras, among others. While these representations are very 
promising for cognitive modeling, there has been little 
psychological work to date on this. 
3 Experiment 
We conducted a pilot experiment to see how much people 
agreed on what they would call large, small or medium. We 
expected agreement across subjects on their labeling. 
Furthermore, we expected to find out how people go about 
mapping these symbols to quantity values in a specific 
scenario – being presented with all the examples at once. 
And if people indeed agreed on their partitioning, then we 
expected to gain insight about where they drew the 
boundaries.  
Method 
The experiment consisted of two tasks – Size Labeling  task 
and Country Naming task. In the size labeling task, subjects 
were presented with an outline political map of Africa. The 
countries were numbered from 1 through 54, and at the 
bottom of the map were 54 numbered blanks.  They were 
given the following instruction – “On the following page 
you will find a map of Africa. All the different countries are 
shown and numbered. For each country, we want you to 
think if you will call it LARGE, MEDIUM or SMALL on 
the basis of size (land area) as shown in the map. Below the 
map you will find numbered index of all the countries on 
the map. Please place your answer (LARGE/ MEDIUM/ 
SMALL) in the blank next to it. Please fill out all the 
blanks.” 
At the end of this task, they did the country naming task. 
Here they were presented another copy of the map, and were 
told to name as many of the countries as they could. The 
participants were 19 graduate students at Northwestern 
University. 
Results and Discussion 
We found significant agreement across the subjects. 
Subjects could correctly name very few countries (mean 6 
out of 54 countries, sd = 6.5). This suggests that prior 
knowledge should be irrelevant, and their judgments were 
based on examining the map.  
To see how much subjects agreed about their choices, 
we extracted the most frequent choice for each country, and 
the percentage of times that was chosen across subjects (e.g, 
for both Seychelles and Algeria this is 100%, as the most 
frequent choice was always picked, for Kenya it is 79% 
which is how often it was called medium). In figure 1 we 
show the most frequent, second most frequent and the least 
frequent choice and how often they were chosen. The most 
frequent choice was chosen an average of 81.2% of the 
times, and the second most frequent choice was chosen 
18.5%, and the least frequent 0.3% of the times. The 
difference between most frequent choice and the second 
most frequent choice is statistically significant (t(53)=12.92, 
p<0.01).  
Subjects seem to do the task in a clustering fashion. 
They would pick either small/large and start marking out the 
clearly small/large countries, then countries at the other end 
of size and then consider the cases in between. 
 
Figure 1. Agreement across subjects on their most frequent 
choice. The most frequent choice is 81.2%, significantly 
higher than the second and third chosen size labels.  
4 Representation 
A representation of quantity allows us to make certain 
distinctions – numbers allow us to make too many, and 
dividing the range of values into two equal sized parts 
doesn’t necessarily provide useful distinctions. 
Representations do not arise in vacuum. They are molded by 
the kinds of reasoning tasks we perform with them 
(reasoning constraints), and the things we are trying to 
represent (ecological constraints). We propose 
representations based on existing evidence and arguments 
from these constraints. 
4.1 Reasoning Constraints  
The three distinct kinds of reasoning tasks involving 
quantities are –   
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1. Comparison: These involve comparing two values on an 
underlying scale of quantity, e.g., “Is John taller than 
Chris?” Our knowledge of how the quantity varies (its 
distribution), and linguistic labels like Large and Small, 
are but a compressed record of large number of such 
comparisons. The semantic congruity effect [Banks and 
Flora, 1977] is the fact that we are better and faster at 
judging the larger of two large things than the smaller of 
two large things. Part of the account from experiments 
involving adults learning novel dimension words, by Ryalls 
and Smith (2000) is the fact that in usage, we make 
statements like “X is larger than Y” more often than “Y is 
smaller than X”, if X and Y are both on the large end of the 
scale. 
2. Classification: These involve making judgments about 
whether a quantity value is equal to, less than or greater than 
a specific value, e.g., Is the water boiling?, Will this couch 
fit in the freight elevator?, etc. Usually, such classifications 
involve comparisons with interesting points (called limit 
points in QR) in the space of values for a quantity, where 
conditions on either side are qualitatively distinct. The 
metaphor of phase transitions describes many such 
interesting points, although such transitions in everyday 
domains are not as sharply and well defined as in scientific 
domains (consider poverty line versus freezing point). 
 3. Estimation:  These involve inferring a numerical value 
for a particular quantity, e.g., How tall is he? What is the 
mileage of your car? This is the activity that has the 
strongest connection to quantitative scales – one can go a 
long way in accounting for the above two without resorting 
to numbers, but estimation involves mapping back to 
numbers [Subrahmanyam and Gelman, 1998]. Knowledge 
of interesting points on the scale might play an important 
role in estimation, for example in providing anchors to 
adjust from [Tversky and Kahmenan, 1974]. 
These tasks are not completely distinct – classification 
involves comparison, and estimation might be used in the 
service of classification. Two interesting aspects of our 
representations follow from these constraints: 
1. Our representations must keep track of interesting points 
on the scale of quantity, to classify, as well as to estimate.  
2. Labels like large ease making comparisons, as they 
setup implicit ordinal relationships (it is larger than most 
objects). 
4.2 Ecological Constraints  
Our representational framework must be capable of 
capturing the interesting ways in which a quantity varies in 
real-world instances of it. Below we present two different 
kinds of constraints on values a quantity can take –  
1. Distributional Constraints: Most quantities have a 
range (a minimum and a maximum) and a distribution that 
determines how often a specific value shows up. For 
example, the height of adult men might be between 4 and 10 
ft, with most being around 5-6.5ft. More than just the norm, 
we can usually talk about the low, medium, high for 
many quantities, which seems to be a qualitative summary 
of the distributional information. There is psychological 
evidence that establishes that we can and do accumulate 
distributions of quantities [refer to Malmi and Samson, 
1983; Fried and Holyoak, 1984; Kraus et al, 1993; among 
others, for more]. Given a dis tribution of values for a 
quantity, the next question of how we partition these 
distributions has not been raised at all.    
2. Structural Constraints: Quantities are constrained by 
what values other quantities in the system take, its 
relationship with those other quantities, via its relationships 
with them1. For instance, for all internal combustion engines 
– as the engine mass increases, the Brake Horse Power 
(BHP), Bore (diameter), Displacement (volume) increases, 
and the RPM decreases. These constraints  represent the 
underlying mechanism, or causal model of the object. Limit 
points decompose values into regions where the underlying 
causal story is different (e.g., ice starting to melt, at the 
freezing point), which induces extremely important and 
interesting distinctions of quality on the space of quantity.  
These two ecological constraints point us to the two 
different kinds of information about quantities, which must 
be parts of our representations –  
1. Distributional information about how the quantity 
varies. 
2. Its role in and relationship to the underlying 
structure/mechanism, and the points at which there are 
changes in underlying structure. 
4.3 Proposed Representation 
There are two kinds of distinctions that our representation of 
quantity must make –  
1. Dimensional partitions: Symbols like Large and 
Small, which arise from distributional information 
about how that quantity varies.   
2. Structural Partitions: Symbols like Boiling 
Point and Poverty Line, that denote changes of 
quality, usually changes in the underlying causal story 
and many other aspects of the objects in concern.  
These partitions may manifest as intervals centered around a 
norm, or by boundaries demarcating transitions. Let’s look 
at dimensional partitions in more detail. Dimensional 
adjectives like large depend upon the context. Consider 
area of African countries – in our experiment, people agree 
that Algeria is large, and Swaziland is small, Kenya is 
medium sized. We represent this as follows –  
(isa Algeria  
(HighValueContextualizedFn  
Area AfricanCountries)) 
High/Medium/LowValueContextualizedFn are 
functions that take two arguments – a quantity and a context 
argument and return a collection of objects. So in the above 
example HighValueContextualizedFn denotes the 
                                                                 
1 Comic books, mythology, and fantasy, for example, have the 
freedom to relax this constraint – a character can be arbitrarily 
strong, large, small or be able to fly, even though the physical 
design of the character might not be able to support it. 
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collection of large African countries, and the isa statement 
says that Algeria is an instance of that collection. The 
LowValueContextualizedFn similarly lets us 
represent the negative end, for instance small and cheap. 
 
4.3.1 Relationship to Fuzzy Logic 
The dimensional partitions are reminiscent of linguistic 
variables in fuzzy logic [Zadeh 1965]. Fuzzy variables can 
take on values like Large, Medium  and Small; and allow 
us to represent overlapping range of values for these 
symbols. Fuzzy logic thus provides a framework to 
represent what Large means. The specific mapping of 
Large-ness to area of countries, for instance, is a choice of 
the person building the representation, and is not in the 
scope of fuzzy logic. Our focus here is that mapping. So 
dimensional partitions are the answer to the question – what 
do people mean when they say “a large country,” 
specifically, what is the mapping between Large and the 
values of area?  
5 Computational Modeling 
We are developing a computational model, called CARVE, 
as an account of the generation of both dimensional and 
structural partitions. At this writing, CARVE is partially 
implemented. The input to CARVE is a set of examples 
represented as collections of facts in predicate calculus. 
Countries are an interesting domain for testing CARVE as 
there are many quantitative parameters with rich causal and 
structural relationships2. The cases for each of these 
countries were built by extracting facts about them from the 
Cyc knowledge base. Additional quantitative facts about 
attributes like population, literacy, etc., were extracted from 
the CIA Factbook knowledge base [Frank et al, 1998] and 
added to these cases. There were on average 108 facts per 
case.  
 
Figure 2. A schematic overview of how CARVE computes 
dimensional and structural partitions. 
                                                                 
2 Alas, not all of this rich structural knowledge is already 
represented in our knowledge bases.  
Dimensional Partitioning 
CARVE takes as input a set of cases. For each quantity, we 
extract all the numeric values for it in our input cases. Given 
these values, the job of the dimensional partitioning step is 
to find three partitions, corresponding to Low, Medium and 
High ranges of the values that the quantity takes.  
These partitions are currently generated using a k-
means clustering algorithm. It is possible to plug in different 
heuristics that partitions the values into ranges of values. 
Heuristics based on central tendency and percentiles do not 
work for zipf like distributions which we see in many of the 
quantities (e.g., GDP, population, area) associated with 
countries. For such distributions, means and variances are 
not intuitively meaningful at all.  
The k-means clustering algorithm fits with what people 
did in our pilot experiment. On an average across subjects, 
the dimensional partitions computed by CARVE agreed 
with people 74% of the times (sd=27). More empirical data 
is needed to conclude what set of heuristics people use to 
make these partitions, and when they work. We believe that 
depending upon the distribution of data, people will use 
different partitioning strategies. The clustering scheme used 
is useful across different kinds of distributions and can be 
used incrementally without a priori knowledge of 
distributions. 
For each fact about the value of a quantity, we then add 
a High/Medium/LowContextualizedValueFn to 
the case depending upon which range that numeric value fell 
in. These facts are used in the next step.  
Structural partitioning 
SEQL [Skorstad et al, 1988; Kuehne et al, 2000] provides a 
framework for making generalizations based on computing 
progressive structural overlaps of multiple exemplars. The 
goal of structural partitioning is to find the structural 
clusters in the cases (for instance, groups of developing and 
underdeveloped nations) and project these clusters on to 
various quantity dimensions. The cases produced at the end 
of the dimensional partitioning step are given as input to 
SEQL. In figure 2, we see the output of SEQL as three 
generalizations S1, S2 and S3 and some leftover cases that 
did not fit any of those. Let’s consider two quantities 
Quantity1 and Quantity2. The projection of a cluster on a 
quantity is the range of values for that quantity in the 
cluster. For Quantity1, we see that the projections from all 
the three generalizations overlap. On the other hand, the 
projections of the generalization on Quantity2 are non-
overlapping. We have marked by L1 and L2 the boundaries 
for these ranges. Notice the predictive power of knowing 
that for a specific case the value of Quantity2 is less than L1. 
We not only know about the quantity value, but about the 
generalization to which the case belongs, and so can predict 
a lot of other causal properties of it. For instance, when you 
know that a country is a developing country, there are rich 
causal predictions you can make.  
      The algorithm above has been implemented in CARVE. 
Unfortunately, because of the lack of rich causal/ relational 
Dimensional 
partitioning for 
each quantity  
(isa Algeria   
(HighValueContextualizedFn  
    Area AfricanCountries) 
. 
. 
. 
Add these facts to 
original cases  
Structural 
clustering 
using SEQL 
S1 
S2 S3 Cj 
Ci 
Ci* 
Quantity 1 
L2 L1 
Quantity 2 
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knowledge in the cases, it does not yet find any interesting 
structural partitions. Structural partitions are a reflection of 
our deep understanding of the causal and correlational 
structure of examples. In science, phase transit ions, and 
structural distinctions in socio-economic dimensions were 
not easily discovered. We hope that by adding more 
knowledge we will get better structural partitions.  
 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
Based on cognitive and linguistic evidence, and arguments 
from reasoning and ecological constraints, we presented 
symbolic representations for quantity. We find significant 
agreement between subjects on dimensional partitions. We 
presented a computational model for automatically 
generating these representations.  
Currently all the cases are given as input to CARVE. 
One important way to extend this will be for it to 
incrementally build and update its representations. Further, 
we need to create rich structured cases with causal and 
correlational information and test CARVE.  
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Abstract
An experiment is reported which investigates the dis-
torting eects of various graphical features in three dif-
ferent diagrammatic representations of the same infor-
mation. The experiment revealed signi+cant distortions
in users’ perceptual judgements of distance both be-
tween the dierent diagrams and within each diagram.
The results of the experiment are interpreted as indi-
cating the crucial role of anchor points such as axis tick
marks along dimensions.
Introduction
Presenting large, complex data sets to a broad and non-
specialist audience is a challenging task if one is to be
sure that the information is to be interpreted in an ap-
propriate manner. Choosing the most suitable represen-
tation for a particular communicative goal is an impor-
tant aspect of the task and designers of information arte-
facts must be aware of how the low-level visual features
of individual graphical representations can facilitate or
hinder the interpretation of information.
Many studies have shown that the perception of one
or more graphical elements in a figure can be distorted
by the relationships between them (see, e.g., Dere¸gowski,
1980; Schiffman, 1995). A famous example is the Mu¨ller-
Lyer illusion shown in Figure 1a which illustrates how
perceptual judgements of line length can be distorted by
the acuity of angles subtended by connecting lines. In
this illusion, the line on the right of Figure 1a is perceived
to be shorter than that on the left, although their lengths
are actually the same.
Distortions in the perception of line length can also be
caused by a number of so-called contrast illusions, for ex-
ample the parallel lines illusion (Jordan & Schiano, 1986;
Schiano, 1986) in which viewers of two parallel lines can
perceive the lengths of the lines to be closer than they
actually are (assimilation) or more different than they
actually are (contrast), depending on the ratio of the
line lengths and the distance between them. An exam-
ple is shown in Figure 1b in which the perceived lengths
of the lines in each pair are distorted by the length of
the line next to it so that viewers see the lengths of the
two paired lines as being more similar than they actu-
ally are. This has the effect of distorting the perceived
length of the right-most line in each pair to make that
on the right of the figure seem shorter than that on the
left when, in fact, their lengths are the same.
Previous research has shown that visual illusions can
have a strong effect on people’s perceptual judgements in
commonly used diagrams (e.g., Poulton, 1985). Zacks,
Levy, Tversky and Schiano (1998) studied, among other
things, the effect of the length of neighbouring elements
on judgements of bar height and magnitude compari-
son in bar charts and their experiments demonstrated
that the accuracy of participants’ judgements depended
of the relative height of the target bar and neighbouring
graphical elements.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Two visual illusions affecting the perception of
line length: (a) The Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion, (b) The parallel
lines illusion.
In addition to issues relating to visual features, dia-
gram designers must also be mindful of user familiar-
ity. Using a form of diagram that is unfamiliar to a tar-
get audience can be problematic as users must expend
additional cognitive effort to learn the new representa-
tion, something that could discourage engagement with
the diagram or result in misinterpretation. Employing
a novel representation can be justified, however if it can
be demonstrated that the particular representation of
information provided by the diagram facilitates a spe-
cific set of interpretive tasks. For example, in a series
of experiments, Peebles and Cheng (2001, 2002, 2003;
Peebles, Cheng, & Shadbolt, 1999) compared the rep-
resentational and computational properties of two types
of Cartesian coordinate (x,y) graph which, according to
participant ratings, varied significantly in terms of their
familiarity. Our experiments demonstrated that users
of the less familiar graph type were able to retrieve in-
formation and solve certain problems significantly faster
than users of the more familiar form. Eye movement
and modelling analysis showed that this was because the
graphical format of the unfamiliar representation facili-
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tates certain basic reading and lookup procedures.
These issues are not only of academic concern. They
have been brought into the public arena recently by the
decision of the UK government to publish its national
police performance data in the form of a set of diagrams
that are relatively unfamiliar to the general public. With
much media attention and at a reported cost of £70,000
(approx. US $128,688), the UK government developed
the performance monitor (Police Standards Unit, 2003,
20041), a variation of a diagram otherwise known as a
spidergram, radar or kiviat chart. The purpose of the
performance monitor is to present in summary form per-
formance data for individual police forces in five key ar-
eas or “domains” (citizen focus, promoting public safety,
resource usage, investigating crime, and reducing crime)
and to allow easy comparison with average performance
computed from a set of police forces most similar to the
individual force in terms of socio-economic, demographic
and geographic makeup.
Figure 2: Kiviat chart used in the experiment.
An example of such a diagram is shown in Figure 2.
This diagram is taken from the experiment reported here
but it is identical in form to the police performance mon-
itor. The subject matter of the diagrams was changed
for the experiment to the (fictitious) performance of UK
local authorities in five domains (the environment, hous-
ing, education, transport and leisure), each of which is
indicated by a point on a spoke. The points are con-
nected by straight lines to form a pentagon and the regu-
lar shaded pentagon represents the average performance
of a set of most similar local authorities. Better perfor-
mance is shown further out from the centre.
In the most recent version of the police performance
report, the central performance monitor diagram has
1A hypertext version of the current Home Office document
is available on the Web as performancemonitors.html at
http://www.policereform.co.uk/docs/
been augmented with five bar charts that illustrate the
spread of performance for the most similar police forces
in each of the domains. The bar charts are similar in
form to the one displayed in Figure 3. In the police per-
formance bar charts, each bar represents the value on
that domain of one of the forces from which the average
has been computed.
Figure 3: Bar chart used in the experiment.
One striking feature of both the kiviat and bar charts
used in the police performance report is the lack of any
tick marks on the spokes or axes. Usually the purpose
of a scale of numbered tick marks on a chart or graph is
to provide numerical values relating to locations in the
chart. When numerical values are not deemed neces-
sary, (perhaps because the purpose of the chart is simply
to display relative magnitudes), tick marks still provide
an objective reference frame within which to compare
lengths. Without such a reference frame, it may be the
case that perceptual judgements of quantities such as
line length become more susceptible to distortion by vi-
sual illusions.
For example, in kiviat charts, the two lines connecting
a point on a spoke with the two points on the adjacent
spokes form a wide range of shapes and angles. In the
absence of anchoring tick marks on the spokes, it may
be the case that perceptual judgements of distance will
be distorted by these angles and shapes by processes
analogous to those involved in the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion.
Similarly, in bar charts, the lack of tick marks may also
permit distortions in perceptual judgements of distance
to occur because of the parallel lines illusion.
Another widely used diagram that shares many prop-
erties with bar charts is the line graph (see Figure 4),
the main obvious difference being that points plotted
against the y-axis are joined by lines rather than being
represented as the top of a column. In the context of
this study, however, an important consequence of this
difference is that judgements of distance would not be
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susceptible to the parallel lines illusion in line graphs.
Experiment
The primary purpose of the performance monitors and
bar charts is to allow a rapid visual comparison of an
individual institution’s performance with a meaningful
average. This could be either at a global level (i.e. to
determine how much better or worse than average the
institution is overall), or at the level of specific domains.
The purpose of the experiment reported here is to deter-
mine whether the perceptual judgement of this distance
for a particular target domain is affected by the values
of the surrounding domains.
Figure 4: Line graph used in the experiment.
Method
Design The experiment was a mixed design with one
between-subjects variable and two within-subjects vari-
ables. The between-subjects variable was the type of
diagram used (kiviat chart, bar chart, or line graph).
The within-subjects variables were the value of the tar-
get domain that subjects were required to rate and the
values of the two domains adjacent to the target domain.
Participants Sixty-three members of staff from the
University of Huddersfield took part in the experiment.
The occupations of participants varied from academic,
clerical and technical positions to graduate students.
Materials The experiment was conducted using three
identical PC computers with 17-inch (43-cm) displays.
The stimuli used in the experiment were diagrams sim-
ilar to those in Figures 2–4. The information content
of the diagrams was the performance of 150 UK local
authorities across five domains.
In order to generate a manageable range of values, the
spokes of the kiviat chart and the y axes of the bar chart
and line graph were divided into six equally sized sections
numbered 0 to 6 (although these divisions or numbers
were not visible to the participants). The numbers 0
and 6 were situated at the bottom and top of the y axes
and the centre and outermost points of the kiviat spokes
respectively. Only the numbers 1 to 5 were used in the
experiment and the locations of these on the diagrams
can be seen in Figures 2–4. For example in Figure 2,
Derry council has a housing value of 1, a transport value
of 2, a leisure value of 3, an environment value of 4, and
an education value of 5. The locations of the values on
the y axes of the bar chart and line graph are illustrated
in Figure 3, where Shropshire council has a housing value
of 1, an education value of 2, a leisure value of 3, an
environment value of 4, and a transport value of 5.
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Figure 5: Mean response to target 1, all three diagrams.
The average value was the number 3 located at the
centre of the y axes and kiviat spokes. In the bar chart
this was represented by a horizontal red line and in the
line graph as the same red line with red squares as mark-
ers (to conform to the format of the line graph). In the
kiviat chart, the average was represented by a red regu-
lar pentagon formed by joining the centre points on the
five spokes. This produced a kiviat chart identical to
those used in the police performance document.
Below each diagram was a scale consisting of 31 but-
tons. The centre button in the scale was the same red
colour as the average marker on the diagrams and un-
derneath it was written the word “average” in red. The
15 buttons on either side of the centre button allowed
the scale to be divided into six equally sized units, each
containing four buttons. Below the scale were two ar-
rows indicating that increases in performance were rep-
resented by buttons further to the right of the scale.
To test the full range of target and neighbouring
lengths, each of the five target values was combined with
the 15 possible permutations of two adjacent values (1,1;
1,2; 1,3; 1,4; 1,5; 2,2; 2,3; 2,4; 2,5; 3,3; 3,4; 3,5; 4,4; 4,5;
5,5) to create a total of 75 triplets.
In the kiviat charts, each domain spoke has an ad-
jacent domain on either side but in the bar charts and
line graphs, two domains (environment and leisure) have
only one adjacent domain. To ensure that the target do-
main on each trial had an adjacent domain on either side,
therefore, if the target value was 1, 2, 4, or 5, the target
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domain was selected randomly from housing, education,
and transport, as these had two adjacent values in the
bar and line graphs. If the target value was 3, however,
the target domain was randomly selected from all five
domains. The values of the two remaining domains not
adjacent to the target domain were randomly allocated a
value of between 1 and 5. Responses to the target value
of 3 were not to be included in the analysis as they were
expected to be rapid and accurate for all graph condi-
tions as this value was marked on both the graph and
the scale.
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Figure 6: Mean response to target 2, all three diagrams.
Procedure Participants were randomly allocated to
one of the diagram conditions. Before starting the task,
participants were shown an example of the diagram they
were to use and given as much time as they required
to become familiar with it. The format of the exam-
ple was the same for each diagram and was modelled
closely on the format used in the Home Office document.
When the participant had finished studying the exam-
ple, the experimenter then explained the diagram fur-
ther, explaining the subject matter, highlighting salient
points and making sure that they were completely fa-
miliar with it. Participants were then told that on each
trial of the experiment their task was to judge how much
better or worse than average the performance of a partic-
ular authority was on a given domain. Participants were
also shown how to enter their judgement by clicking the
mouse on the scale below the diagram. It was stressed
to participants that they should attempt to respond as
rapidly but also as accurately as possible.
On each trial of the experiment, the target domain was
first presented in the centre of the screen for 1500 ms,
after which it was removed from the screen and replaced
by a diagram. As soon as the participant had clicked
the mouse cursor on one of the scale buttons the dia-
gram was removed from the screen and, after a pause of
500 ms, the next target domain was presented for a new
trial. Response times were recorded from the onset of the
diagram to the mouse click on a scale button. Partici-
pants saw all 75 triplets twice—a total of 150 trials—in
random order and were given the opportunity to take a
brief, self-terminated break after 50 and 100 trials.
Results
Participants’ responses were coded to re,ect the underly-
ing scale of the diagrams. A response click on the button
to the extreme left of the scale was given the value 0 and
each successive button was incremented by 0.2 to end at
a final value of 6 at the extreme right of the scale.
An initial examination of the data revealed the ex-
istence of several outlying values that were not associ-
ated with a specific participant or condition but were
sufficiently large to distort the mean for a specific cell.
To reduce the in,uence of these outliers, the 42 val-
ues in each cell were standardised and those cases at
the extreme end of the distribution (i.e. with a z score
greater than 3.29, p < .001, two-tailed test) were dis-
carded (Tabachneck & Fidell, 2001). From the original
set of 9450 data points, this procedure resulted in the re-
moval of 165 cases (1.75%) of the response data and 128
(1.35%) cases of the RT data. Data from the target value
= 3 condition were not included in the analysis because,
as predicted, responses were almost entirely accurate for
all of the diagrams.
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Figure 7: Mean response to target 5, all three diagrams.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out on
the response data. In the ANOVA, Mauchly’s test of
sphericity was significant for the target value (Mauchly’s
W = .23, df = 5, p < 0.01) and adjacent values
(Mauchly’s W = .25, df = 104, p < 0.01) so the more
conservative Greenhouse-Geisser test was used in the
analysis. The ANOVA showed that there was a signifi-
cant main effect of the diagram used, F(2, 59) = 15.48,
p < .001, the target value F(1.66,97.66) = 4847.11, p
< .001 and the adjacent values, F(9.87,582.49) = 3.96,
p < .001, together with significant interactions between
the adjacent value and diagram, F(19.75,582.49) = 2.84,
p < .001, and between target value and adjacent value,
F(16.07,974.94) = 2.51, p < .01. The ANOVA also re-
vealed a three-way interaction between diagram, target
value and adjacent value, F(32.13,974.94) = 1.56, p <
.05. Although response times were also recorded, due to
lack of space, the data are not reported here. The main
difference observed was that responses were slower in the
kiviat condition than in the other two, probably due to
the greater degree of unfamiliarity.
The complex effects revealed by the ANOVA are most
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Figure 8: Kiviat charts illustrating a target value of 1 (education) with adjacent values 1,1 (left) and 2,3 (right).
clearly illustrated in Figures 5–7 which present the mean
response for target values 1, 2, and 5 respectively as a
function of the adjacent values. In these graphs, each
labelled tick mark on the y-axis represents a button on
the scale. The graphs show a large degree of variation in
responses to individual target values both for individual
diagrams and between the different diagram types.
One of the most striking differences in responses be-
tween the diagrams is shown in Figures 5 and 6, both
of which show that participants viewing the line graphs
consistently perceive target values of 1 and 2 to be closer
to the average than bar chart users, despite the fact
that the values are represented at exactly the same loca-
tions in the coordinate system in the two diagrams. This
marked difference between the graphs is not present for
target values of 4 and 5, however, and this may provide
a possible explanation. Unlike points in a line graph,
bars are attached to and proceed from the x-axis and so
form a concrete object. When comparing the distance
between the top of a bar with the mean line, therefore,
participants’ attention is drawn to the length of the bar
in comparison to the height of the mean line, (rather
than to the distance between them), which may serve to
accentuate the perceived difference. In contrast, partici-
pants using the line graph may simply attempt the more
accurate procedure of judging the distance between the
points on the plotted and mean lines.
According to this account, the lack of such a major
difference when the target values are 4 and 5 is because
users of the bar chart are still judging the length of the
bar but, this time are comparing it to the mean line
below it. This is very similar to the procedure carried
out by the line graph users in that both are judging
the same distance. At the moment this is a plausible
hypothesis that remains to be tested in a further eye
movement study.
Figure 5 also illustrates the wide range of responses
that users of the kiviat chart gave to the same target
value. It is clear that the perception of the difference
between the target value 1 and the mean value 3 is af-
fected by values of the adjacent domains. To provide
a clearer demonstration of this effect, two of the dia-
grams resulting in widely differing ratings are shown in
Figure 8. In both diagrams, the target value of 1 is rep-
resented on the education domain. The chart on the left
has adjacent values of 1,1, for which the mean rating is
0.67, whereas that on the right has adjacent values of 2,3,
given a mean rating of 1.0. A t-test shows the difference
between these ratings to be significant t(60.11) = 3.10,
p < .001. Figure 5 shows that participants viewing the
kiviat charts perceive the target value of 1 to be much
closer to the average when surrounded by the values 2
and 3 than for any other combination but that the sur-
rounding values of 1 and 1 were perceived as relatively
far from the average. Although a precise explanation for
this is still being considered, it is clear that the shape
produced by the lines connecting the target value and
the adjacent values has a distorting effect on viewers’
perception of distance. Figure 5 shows that this effect
is not a simple linear function in which greater adjacent
values result in a larger perceived target value.
The distortion of perceived distance in the bar chart
condition is perhaps best illustrated in Figure 7 which
reveals a wide range of responses to the target value 5.
As with the kiviat charts, the pattern of results does
not conform to a simple analysis. At least one example,
however, may be best explained by reference to the par-
allel lines illusion. The two bar charts in Figure 9 were
given ratings at the extreme ends of the range. Both
represent a target value of 5 on the education domain
and the chart on the left has adjacent values of 1,1, for
which the mean rating was 5.07, whereas that on the
right has adjacent values of 4,4, given a mean rating of
4.69. A t-test shows the difference between these rat-
ings to be significant t(76.02) = 3.88, p < .001. The
target domain in the chart on the left of Figure 9 was
perceived as being further away from the average line
than that in right-hand chart. This can be explained in
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Figure 9: Bar charts illustrating a target value of 5 (education) with adjacent values 1,1 (left) and 4,4 (right).
terms of the parallel lines illusion as it re,ects the phe-
nomena of contrast and assimilation described earlier.
The target domain in the left-hand chart is seen as be-
ing larger because it contrasts with two relatively small
adjacent values. The target domain in the right-hand
chart, however, was perceived as being smaller because
viewers perceived the lengths of the target and adjacent
bars to be closer than they actually are (assimilation).
It is also interesting to note in Figure 7 that this pattern
of responses is not found in the line graph condition.
Discussion
The results of this experiment provide concrete evidence
of distortions in perceptual judgements of distance in
two graphical representations of a type currently being
employed to present public data in the UK. Specifically,
the three examples clearly illustrate that simple compar-
ative judgements between two points on a dimension can
be significantly affected by the values of adjacent vari-
ables. Further work is required before firm conclusions
can be drawn but from this initial analysis it seems that,
as currently designed, the kiviat and bar charts in the
UK government’s police monitoring documents may be
susceptible to the distorting effects highlighted here.
The use of anchor points, typically tick marks on axes,
is generally seen as a way of facilitating the accurate
reading of locations relative to a scale. Whether the
incorporation of such anchor points into these diagrams
reduces the distortions in distance judgements observed
in this experiment is to be tested in a future study.
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Abstract 
We propose a general framework for reasoning and deciding 
in uncertain scenarios, with possibly infinite source of 
information (open world). This involves representing 
ignorance, uncertainty and contradiction; we present and 
analyze those concepts, integrating them in the notion of lack 
of confidence or perplexity. We introduce and quantify the 
strength of the beliefs of an agent and investigate how he can 
do explicit epistemic actions in order to supply information 
lacks. Next we introduce a simple distributed game (RBG) 
and we use it as a testbed for comparing the performance of 
agents using the (classical) “expected utility maximization” 
and the “perplexity minimization“ strategies.  
Introduction 
In an “open world” uncertainty and ignorance are difficult 
categories to deal with; how much can I be certain of a 
belief of mines? how much information there is that I have 
not considered and I should?  
The first aim of the present work is to provide an analysis of 
epistemic dimensions such as strength of belief, uncertainty, 
contradiction and ignorance (or ambiguity). A special focus 
will be given to the third dimension. In Economical 
literature the notion of ignorance has been extensively 
investigated (Shackle, 1972) and ways to quantify it have 
been proposed (Shafer, 1976). In those approaches “lack of 
information” has been shown to affect the decision process 
and ambiguity aversion in subject has been identified; see 
Camerer & Weber (1992) for a review of the literature on 
decisions under ambiguity. We will argue in the following 
analysis that Ignorance is a subjective evaluation of actual 
lack of information on the basis of cognitive evidential 
models. The agent has a model (script) of his sources that 
allows him to evaluate that a certain type and a certain 
number of sources can provide sufficient information for 
reducing ignorance close to zero. In this way the strength of 
the belief and the (perceived) ignorance are two different 
measures, the second belonging to the meta-level. The 
second aim of the present work is  to investigate the 
decision dynamics in an open  world, with conflicting 
beliefs and multiple sources of information. We will 
formalize the process that leads the agent to acquire new 
information from the world (from witnesses) and that leads 
the agents to be “ready” to decide. We will claim that this 
process involves strength of beliefs that are relevant for 
deciding, as well as uncertainty and ignorance. The results 
of the current work are suitable e.g. for MAS environments, 
where an agent has to take decisions in open worlds. 
The Red-or-Blue Card Game (RBG) 
We introduce a simple distributed game that is suitable for 
Multi-agent system simulations as well as for human 
experiments: the agents (players) have to bid on the color of 
a card (red or blue) and they have many sources of 
information (their perception and potentially infinite 
witnesses); the game can last an indefinite number of turns. 
The bidding game is the following: a card is shown (very 
quickly) to the player; it can be either red or blue and the 
player has to bid on the right color (he starts with 1000 
Credits). We assume that he cannot be totally sure of his 
own perception (e.g. it is shown very quickly, or the lights 
in the room are low), but he is able to provide a degree of 
certainty about the color. Before bidding he can ask for help 
to a (potentially) infinite number of witnesses that have 
observed the scene and provide the answer “red” or “blue” 
(without degrees of certainty); those new information can 
lead the agent to confirm or revise his beliefs. Asking a 
witness has not a cost in Credits but it costs 1 Time. Credits 
and Times can be aggregated in different ways. 
When he decides that he is “ready”, he can bid from 0 to 10 
Credits on the color he wants. The true card color is shown: 
if he was right, he gains two times the bid; otherwise he 
loses the bid. The game lasts an indefinite number of turns; 
between the turns, depending on the result, the agent can 
revise the reliability he attributes to his sources: his 
perception and the witnesses (depending for example on the 
number of correct answers they provided) as well as his 
SCAI. Besides, his perception and the witnesses have true 
reliability values that determine the average correctness of 
their answers. True values are not known by the player; at 
the first game round they are initialized and they do not 
change during the game. At the end of the game the agent 
will collect a certain amount of Credits; a set of reliability 
values for his sources; a SCAI and he will have spent a 
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certain amount of Time. Using this game as a testbed, we 
compare different kinds of agents having many possible 
heuristics in order to collect information and Credits1. 
Theoretical Foundations 
We present first an evidential notion of ignorance: 
ignorance is determined by the lack of belief sources. In our 
approach, following the cognitive approach of Castelfranchi 
(1995), the strength of a belief (i.e. how much I rely on one 
of my beliefs) depends on the reliability of its sources (i.e. 
the beliefs it is grounded on). Sources include: direct 
experience (such as perceptive evidences); information 
provided by other agents; reasoning (about other beliefs) 
and categorization (reasoning about classes and 
similarities). Since in an open world in principle there are 
infinite sources to take into account, the agent can never 
conclude that his own ignorance is zero. We propose in the 
present model a solution to the problem of ignorance 
quantification by identifying Classes of Ignorance 
Acceptance that reduce ignorance to finite values. 
Uncertainty and contradiction have the same status of the 
notion of ignorance: they are meta-cognitive notions, i.e. 
agent’s evaluations about his own “epistemic state”. We are 
interested in this paper in investigating how those different 
epistemic states affect the decision process, and especially 
how they affect the way the agent decides to execute a 
pragmatic action (e.g. bet) or an epistemic one (e.g. query). 
For example, if the agent feels to be too much ignorant or 
uncertain he can decide to query, to bid a little amount, or 
not to bid at all. Here we describe the epistemic dimensions. 
Ignorance 
Intuitively ignorance depends on how much information I 
have with respect to how much it exists; in an open world 
there is a potentially infinite number of witnesses that have 
not been questioned; so if we calculate ignorance in this 
way the agent has always the maximum degree of 
ignorance. The agent does not know how many witnesses he 
can consider at most or better he does not know how he can 
reduce his ignorance close to zero. A qualitative and 
cognitive analysis is here required. Here we shift the issue to 
an evidential and subjective level2.  We introduce the notion 
of Structure of Classes of Acceptable Ignorance (SCAI). 
                                                           
1Since it is an “open world” (there are an infinite number of 
witnesses and an indefinite number of turns) it is not possible to  
perform full search. More,  it is not possible to perform a long-term 
maximization because the agents don’t know when the game will 
end (this condition is called “shadow of the future”). 
2 Our notion of ignorance is very close to the notion of ambiguity 
identified in some recent economical and psychological literature 
where is stressed that decision making is affected by the decision 
maker’s evaluation of his or her actual available information and 
competence to make judgments in specific domains (Heat & 
Tversky, 1991). Instead, our notion of ignorance is quite far from 
Sample Space Ignorance in Support Theory (Tversky & Koehler, 
1994) where it is claimed that people do not follow the extensional 
logic of conventional probability theory. In Support Theory an 
agent can actually “ignore” actual information in the sense that he 
Classes of Acceptable Ignorance 
Each agent has a SCAI that includes several Classes of 
Acceptable Ignorance (CAI) that include one or more 
sources (e.g. Witnesses), each having its reliability value. 
For instance, CAI_1 = (witness 1, witness 2, witness 3) 
could be one of those classes. Classes of acceptable 
ignorance can be intersected and unified (see Fig. 1): they 
have the normal properties of sets in set theory. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Structure of Classes of Acceptable Ignorance (SCAI). 
 
The agent knows that testing all witnesses in a given class is 
enough for making the ignorance acceptably close to value 
zero. Imagine for example that the agent wants to know if 
tomorrow will rain or will be sunny. He has several classes 
of acceptable ignorance. For instance he can believe that by 
acquiring information about tomorrow’s weather from 
source 1 = “New York Times” and source 2 = “CNN” is 
enough for making ignorance acceptable. Moreover, the 
following points are crucial for understanding how the 
relation between SCAI and agents works. 
A. The agent has explicit models (meta-level) of Classes of 
Acceptable Ignorance as shown in Fig.1. There are 
witnesses who are included in classes of acceptance but also 
witnesses who are not included in any class. 
B. The agent can also make “queries” to witnesses who are 
not in the SCAI. Indeed the number of classes is finite even 
if, according to the agent, the set of witnesses he can make a 
query is indefinite. The agent can make a query to whatever 
witness even if this witness is not included in the structure 
of ignorance. In principle the agent can ask witness_10000 
and he will always get an answer. Witnesses that are not in 
the structure do not have a value of reliability. A default 
value is assigned to them (through feature value assignment) 
whenever a query is made to them. After the query the 
witness belongs to the SCAI as a witness who is not 
included in any CAI (for example witness 8 in Fig.1). 
C. The value of Ignorance is calculated at a meta-level 
whereas the value of reliability of a witness is calculated at a 
base-level. 
                                                                                                  
is not explicitly evaluating that evidences concerning a certain 
event e1 are also evidences concerning another event e2. Indeed it 
has been shown that unpacking (making information available for 
explicit evaluation) a compound event into disjoint components 
tends to increase the perceived likelihood of that event. An 
immediate implication is that unpacking an hypothesis and/or 
repacking its complement will increase the judged likelihood of 
that hypothesis.  
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Quantifying Ignorance through SCAIs 
Class-Ignorance is given for each class at a certain point of 
a query sequence (q1,…, qn) and is defined as the total 
number of witnesses in the class minus the number of tested 
witnesses in that class, weighted for the inverse of the total 
number of witnesses in the class.  
Absolute-Ignorance is defined as the minimal value of 
Class-Ignorance among all CAIs. 
Class-Ignorance (Class n, qi) =  
(n.wit. (Class n, qi) - n.queried.wit. (Class n, qi) Agent x, qi )/ 
n.wit. (Class n, qi) Agent x, qi  
Absolute-Ignorance (qi)  = 
Min Class x (Class-Ignorance (Class x, qi) Agent x, qi) 
We have already pointed out that after a query is made to a 
witness who does not belong to SCAI, the witness will be 
included in SCAI as a witness who is not included in any 
class (such as witness 8 and 9 in Fig.1). The measure of 
Absolute-Ignorance is not fixed: it depends on the single 
agent categorization and classes organization. That measure 
varies through learning, as new witnesses are added. 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a measure of the difference between the 
value of strength of the belief “the card is red” and the value 
of strength of the belief “the card is blue”. When the 
difference is 0 the value of uncertainty is maximal, when the 
difference is 1 the value uncertainty is minimum. This 
dimension takes into account the difficulty of deciding when 
the two strengths of beliefs are too close. 
Contradiction 
Contradiction is a (logical) inconsistency in a belief set; for 
example I can not believe consistently that (in the previous 
example) the ball in an urn is both red and black. In a 
normal (statistical) analysis there is contradiction if the sum 
of the two strengths of beliefs is more than 1. In the 
evidential approach the threshold of perceived contradiction 
(α) can be fixed at different values depending on cognitive 
biases (e.g. more or less contradiction tolerant). 
 
If(Strength.belief(CardRed, qi) +  
Strength. Belief(CardBlue, qi)) ≤ α  then  
Perceived.contradiction(qi)  = 0 
 
If(Strength.belief(CardRed,qi) + 
Strength.Belief(CardBlue,qi)) > α  then  
Perceived.contradiction(qi) =  
(Strength.belief(CardRed,qi) + 
Strength.Belief(CardBlue,qi)) – α 
Perplexity  
Ignorance, Uncertainty and Contradiction are three meta-
level epistemic information that an agent can take into 
account in order to “decide if he is ready to decide”. In order 
to model this kind of decisions we propose to integrate 
ignorance, uncertainty and contradiction in a single measure 
called Perplexity (i.e. lack of confidence). In calculating 
Perplexity, the three dimensions can be aggregated in 
different ways, depending on some more cognitive biases 
(e.g. Agents that are biased to consider ignorance, or 
contradiction, or uncertainty). The basic heuristic is 
summing them (and normalizing). 
Value of Information: Epistemic Actions 
An Epistemic Action (EpA) is any action aimed at 
acquiring knowledge from the world; any act of active 
perception, monitoring, checking, testing, ascertaining, 
verifying, experimenting, exploring, enquiring, give a look 
to, etc. (Castelfranchi & Lorini, 1998). The notion of 
epistemic action has been extensively considered both in 
psychology and in economics. The centrality of this notion 
comes from the fact that epistemic actions have a role in 
different cognitive functions. In the present model an 
Epistemic Action is always towards a witness (i.e. making a 
query). Epistemic Actions are directed either to reduce 
perplexity (or one of its dimensions) given a certain 
“perplexity aversion” threshold of the agent (first function); 
or to acquire new information in order to make a better 
decision (second function). 
In both cases a value is assigned to epistemic actions. The 
first value is a measure of the capacity of a given witness of 
reducing perplexity: we call it informativeness. The second 
value is called value of information and has been 
extensively investigated in economical literature in the sense 
of “how much the agent is disposed to pay for obtaining that 
information?” In that approach a possible way to calculate 
the value of information is given with respect to utility 
functions. These two notions can lead to different decision 
strategies; in order to compare them, we have designed the 
simulative testbed “Red-or-Blue Card Game” (see above). 
Considering the Sources 
Strength of beliefs depends on its sources (perception; more 
or less reliable witnesses). Those sources are not all equal: 
in order to represent their relative contribute, we aggregate 
them using Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (Kosko, 1986). In order 
to represent the fact that there are diverging sources (and 
they aggregate in a different way with respect to converging 
ones) our FCMs have two “competing” branches for 
representing the competing beliefs “the card is red” and “the 
card is blue”. FCMs are additive fuzzy systems with 
feedback, having nodes and edges. The weight of the nodes 
represents the strength of a belief (e.g. “I am pretty sure that 
the card is red”); the edges are weighted and they represent 
the impact of a belief over another. The FCM that we use 
can be seen as divided into two branches, each aggregating 
the values either for “red” or “blue”. These nodes receive 
input from intermediate nodes (“perception for red” and 
“witnesses for red” the first; “perception for blue” and  
“witnesses for blue” the second); these edges are weighted 
by two fixed factors κ, λ representing the relative impact of 
perception and witnesses. The nodes “perception for red” 
and “perception for blue” assume either the value 0 or 1 
depending on the perceptual input; their edges have the 
value of perception reliability (according to the agent). The 
“witnesses for red” and “witnesses for blue” nodes receive 
as input the information of the queried witnesses (either 0 or 
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1); the edges between each witness and “witnesses for 
<color>” have the value of the witnesses’ reliability. There 
are also negative-weighted edges between the “red” and 
“blue” nodes, as well as for each source. In this way the 
contribute of diverging sources is modeled, because each 
positive evidence in a branch counts also as a negative one 
in the other branch. So, starting from the input values (the 
contributes of perception and the queried witnesses) the 
FCM calculates the final values for the strength of belief in 
“the card is red” and “the card is blue”. There is not fixed 
“sum 1” between the two final values, so it is possible to 
model contradictory beliefs (that the agent can reduce 
performing epistemic actions). The FCM structure is the 
same for all the agents, but at each step it can be updated 
(e.g. modifying the impact of the edges, i.e. reliability 
values). 
Player Agents and Decision Strategies 
Here we describe three classes of decision strategies, 
implemented into three Agents. Normative Agent and 
Satisficing Agent do not use the notions of ignorance, 
uncertainty and contradiction. Perplexity Reducing Agent 
uses them in order to select the witness to be tested. 
Normative Agent 
A normative agent decides either to bet a certain amount of 
credits on a given option (either “the card is red” or “the 
card is blue”) or to make a query to a specific witness as 
follows (this agent is not affected by perplexity).  
The agent calculates the value of information obtainable 
from a given witness for all witnesses in the Structure of 
Classes of Ignorance Acceptance. The value of information 
obtainable from witness z is determined as:  the average of 
the max value of expected utility given the information “the 
card is red” given by wit. z (which impacts on the agent’s 
beliefs) and the max value of expected utility given the 
information “the card is blue” given by wit. z minus the max 
value of expected utility given the actual information. 
Afterwards the agent is able to decide. If the max value of 
information obtainable from witnesses is more than 0 then 
the agent decides to make a query to the witness who 
maximizes that value; otherwise he decides to bet a quantity 
y of credits on “the card is x” that maximizes his actual 
expected utility. We have not included the costs of making a 
query in the utility function (we assume only the cost in 
Time). 
Potential-Chosen-Bet (qi) = BET.yONx   
such that  
Max x,y (Strength.belief (x, qi) credits (y, qi)) 
where x is either “the card is blue” or “the card is red” and y 
is whatever sub-amount of the total amount of credits at a 
given point in the query sequence (q1,…, qn). This agent has 
a very time consuming policy (minimizing the lack of 
information) and is not well suited for real time situations. 
Another agent can be introduced that limits Time spent.  
Value-Information (wit.z, qi) =  
(Max x,y ((Strength.belief (x, qi+1) ←  
speech (wit.z, CardRed, qi+1)) credits(y, qi)) +  
Max x,y ((Strength.belief (x, qi+1) ←  
speech (wit.z, CardBlue, qi+1)) credits(y, qi)))/2 –  
Max x,y (Strength.belief (x, qi) credits (y, qi)) 
 
Effective-Choice (qi) = 
1. If Max wit. z (Value-Information (wit.z, qi)) > 0 then  
Effective-choice (qi) = QUERY.wit. z such that  
Max wit. z (Value-Information (wit.z, qi)) 
2. If Max wit. z (Value-Information (wit.z, qi)) ≤ 0 then  
Effective-choice (qi) = BET.yONx such that  
Max x,y (Strength.belief (x, qi) credits (y, qi)) 
Satisficing Agent  
The Satisficing Agent makes sequential search through the 
witnesses in his SCAI. He starts with a given threshold γ for 
expected utility. At each step, he randomly calculates either 
the expected utility value associated with BET.yONx or the 
expected utility value associated with BET.yONx after that 
a given witness will be questioned. This value is the average 
of the expected utility value associated with BET.yONx in 
case the witness will say “Red Card” and the expected 
utility value associated with BET.yONx in case the witness 
will say “Blue Card”. The first option during the sequential 
search that overcomes threshold γ is chosen. If no suitable 
option is found after n (fixed value) steps, the agent lowers 
the threshold of a certain value ∆δ. With respect to the 
Normative Agent, the Satisficing Agent makes less queries 
and it is better suited for open worlds (Simon, 1990). 
Perplexity Reducing Agent 
The Perplexity Reducing agent has the goal to reduce the 
level of perplexity below a given threshold δ before betting. 
Since the only way to reduce perplexity is through queries, 
the agent starts choosing the witness to test: he makes a 
sequential search on witnesses and takes the first witness 
whose information is able to reduce perplexity under the 
threshold. If not suitable witness is found, the agent reduces 
the value of the threshold of a certain value ∆δ and restarts 
with the same strategy. The expected capacity of a witness 
of reducing (or augmenting) perplexity represents the 
expected informative contribute of the epistemic act of 
querying him. This value is called expected informativeness 
and it is calculated as the actual value of perplexity minus 
the average of the value of perplexity after that witness z 
says “the card is red” and the value of perplexity after that 
witness z says “the card is blue”3. 
Expected-Informativeness (wit.z, qi) =  
(Subj.unconfidence(qi)) –  
((Subj.unconfidence(qi+1) ← speech (wit.z, CardRed, 
qi+1))+ (Subj.unconfidence(qi+1) ← speech (wit.z, 
CardBlue, qi+1)))/2 
Expected informativeness is quite different from the value of 
information as defined for the Normative Agent. The 
difference between those two definitions indicates two 
different theoretical perspectives: while the Normative 
Agent maximizes utility values (for bidding) the Perplexity 
Reducing Agent uses a cognitive theory of sources in order 
                                                           
3 It follows from the definition that there could be negative values 
of expected informativeness.  
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to consider the contribute of the witnesses in the cognitive 
dimensions of uncertainty, ignorance and contradiction. The 
Perplexity Reducing Agent is implicitly biased to make 
queries to witnesses that are in the CAIs, since by definition 
they lower the value of absolute ignorance more than 
witnesses that are not in any CAIs. The Perplexity Reducing 
Agent should be combined with the two others agents 
(Normative or Satisficing).  Once the level of perplexity is 
under the threshold, he could decide either which color and 
how much to bid or decide to make a query to another 
witness using his optimization methods. However, in order 
to simplify our experiments we did not allow perplexity 
reducing agents to carry on making queries to witnesses 
once the degree of perplexity was reduced under the 
threshold δ. This simplification is plausible for maintaining 
completely distinct the 2 different functions of epistemic 
actions: the function of perplexity reduction and the 
function of “increase” of expected utility.   
Learning During the Game 
The RBG game has many turns, so it is possible to learn 
between them. In the epistemic perspective, it is interesting 
to model how agents revise information about sources of 
beliefs. 
Updating Reliability Values 
All the agents have a representation of the witnesses 
reliability and are able to update these values depending on 
past interactions. Since reliability updating strategies are 
outside the scope of this paper, we used a linear statistical 
heuristic for all players: witnesses' reliability is lowered if 
they furnished a wrong advice, augmented otherwise, of a 
fixed amount ∆φ. 
Updating Classes of Acceptable Ignorance   
The Perplexity Reducing Agent is also able to change its 
SCAI adding or removing the witnesses in the Classes of 
Acceptable Ignorance. At the beginning of the game the 
SCAI is set randomly (e.g. the one shown in Fig.1) and it 
can be updated after each turn extending or contracting its 
CAIs. Imagine that the agent has queried in sequence w1, 
w2, w3, w4, w8 before deciding. Imagine he has verified 
that after the second test the value of perplexity has not 
changed so much (i.e. less than a threshold α). Since w1 and 
w2 belong to the same Class1, Class1 can be contracted 
eliminating w2 (that resulted not very informative). Imagine 
also he has verified that after the fifth test the value of 
perplexity has changed quite a lot (over a threshold β). 
Since w4 and w8 do not belong to the same Class, the class 
of w4 can be extended adding w8, that proved to be so 
informative. We do not describe here the full algorithm for 
CAIs contraction and extension4. We want only to present 
verbally its structure. 
                                                           
4 The variable φ for reliability updating, as well as thresholds α e β 
in classes of Acceptable Ignorance updating depend from cognitive 
biases towards belief revision. It is relevant to notice that for 
1. Given a previous sequence of queries (q1,…, qn), if 
during that sequence there were two queries qi and 
qi+1 for witness A ← qi and witness B ← qi+1 and 
witness A and witness B belong to the same CAI x 
and the degree of perplexity did not vary so much 
(in absolute value given threshold α) from qi to qi+1  
then the witness B is taken out from CAI x. 
2. Given a previous sequence of queries (q1,…, qn), if 
during that sequence there were two queries qi and 
qi+1 for witness A ← qi and witness B ← qi+1 and 
witness A belongs to CAI x whereas witness B 
belongs to the SCAI but not to CAI x, and the 
degree of perplexity varied a lot (in absolute value 
given threshold β) from qi to qi+1  then witness B is 
inserted into CAI x. 
Experimental Setting and Variables 
Here we show the comparison between three players: 
Normative (N), Satisficing (S), Perplexity Reducing (E). 
There are also two baselines: Random Bidder (B1) that 
chooses at random to test or to bid (and how much); and 
Perceptive Bidder (B2) that bids only according to his 
perceptive input. 
The three independent variables we use are: perception 
reliability (PR); average witnesses reliability (AWR); 
witnesses’ convergence (WC). The first one describes how 
reliable in absolute is the perception of the agent; the second 
one indicates how reliable are in average the witnesses 
answers. They reflect also the “difficulty” of the task. The 
third one describes how convergent are the answers of the 
witnesses; this influences the final uncertainty value. We 
have built three scenarios: good perception (where PR is 
higher than AWR); good witnesses (the inverse); high 
uncertainty (where WC is set to a low value, and PR and 
AWR have the same value)5. 
Results and Discussion 
In the following tables we present the preliminary results of 
our experiments (for Credits and Time) of the three 
Scenarios (250 simulations, 100 bid turns)6. As an indirect 
                                                                                                  
relatively high values of α and relatively low values of β and φ the 
agent is relatively closed-minded and conservative (he is less 
biased to revise the structure of classes of acceptance and the 
reliability values). But for relatively low values of α and relatively 
high values of β and φ the agent is relatively open-minded. This 
distinction is very close to the typology of cognitive epistemic 
styles in (Sorrentino et al., 1986). 
5We use many thresholds and variables in our model: Close Mind 
agents vs. Open Mind agents in SCAI revision strategies 
(thresholds α and β); strong vs. weak need for low degree of 
perplexity (threshold δ); degree of satisfaction in expected utility 
(threshold γ); different way to weight different kinds of sources 
(bias towards perception or witnesses). In order to eliminate their 
effects we have randomly varied them through the experiments 
(three dimensions for each variable on average). 
6The simulations were performed using the cognitive architecture 
AKIRA, developed at ISTC-CNR (http://www.akira-project.org/). 
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measure of “algorithm performance”, we introduced also 
Hypothesis Time: it measures how many witnesses an 
Agent has considered (but not questioned) before deciding. 
 
Table 1:  Good Perception Scenario. 
 
Agent Credits Time H. Time 
B1 981 102 0
B2 1202 0 0
N 1641 6112 112453
S 1388 987 13936
E 1622 409 10681
 
Table 2:  Good Witnesses Scenario. 
 
Agent Credits Time H. Time 
B1 1009 101 0 
B2 799 0 0 
N 1306 9207 144582 
S 1102 997 19103 
E 1298 603 13190 
 
Table 3:   High Uncertainty Scenario. 
 
Agent Credits Time H. Time 
B1 1007 99 0
B2 999 0 0
N 1803 8834 137866
S 1551 1156 21033
E 1563 673 15943
 
In the first and second Scenarios the Perplexity Reducing 
Agent performs very well with respect both to gained 
Credits and temporal measures (Time and Hypothesis 
Time): it performs at the same level of Normative agent 
with respect the final amount of credits but his temporal 
measures are much better. The comparison with the 
Satisficing agent is even better. Not surprisingly, in the third 
Scenario he needs to query more witnesses and it is not able 
to perform as the Normative. Results in bold are significant 
with respect to the Perplexity Reducing Agent. These results 
show that Perplexity Reducing Agents are very suited in 
open world conditions where search of new information is 
in general very costly.   
Moreover, a qualitative analysis allows to get a nice result 
about SCAIs updating: the final SCAIs are in average 
populated with small CAIs of very reliable witnesses: the 
average reliability changes from 0.5 to 0.7 in the three 
scenarios and the number of witnesses remains less to 20 in 
all simulations. The fact that final CAIs are small and 
include reliable witnesses is in accordance with the way we 
learn about belief sources. The more you know an 
environment, the less you need to question. Moreover, you 
prefer to question very reliable sources. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
We have proposed a theoretical foundation of some 
cognitive categories such as ignorance, uncertainty and 
contradiction that are generally difficult to quantify in an 
open world. We have introduced a MAS game (RBG) as a 
simulation setting in order to compare many agents that take 
or do not take into account epistemic dimensions. Our 
preliminary results show that perplexity reduction is a good 
heuristic for dealing with open world scenarios, and the 
Structure of Classes of Acceptable Ignorance can be used in 
order to quantify ignorance and reasoning about it. It would 
be interesting to test mixed decision strategies (e.g. 
considering the perplexity in the utility function; or using 
the Perplexity Reducing Agent as a filter). Another 
interesting direction is comparing simulation data with data 
from human experiments; actually the RBG game is being 
used as an experimental setting in order to collect such data. 
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Abstract
The ability to selectively focus attention on stimulus di-
mensions appears to play an important role in human cat-
egory learning. This insight is embodied by learned di-
mensional attention weights in the ALCOVE model (Kr-
uschke, 1992). The success of this psychological model
suggests its use as a foundation for efforts to under-
stand the neural basis of category learning. One obsta-
cle to such an effort is ALCOVE’s use of the biologi-
cally implausible backpropagation of error algorithm to
adapt dimensional attention weights. This obstacle may
be overcome by replacing this attention mechanism with
one grounded in the reinforcement learning processes
of the brain’s dopamine system. In this paper, such a
biologically-based mechanism for dimensional attention
is proposed, and the fit of this mechanism to human per-
formance is shown to be comparable to that of ALCOVE.
Introduction
Human category learning performance cannot be easily
explained without recourse to a mechanism for selec-
tive dimensional attention (Shepard et al., 1961). Di-
mensional attention is the cognitive process which em-
phasizes task relevant stimulus dimensions while deem-
phasizing others. Thus, contemporary formal models of
categorization, such as the Generalized Context Model
(GCM) (Nosofsky, 1984), have incorporated adaptable
dimensional attention parameters. By adjusting these pa-
rameters in a category-specific fashion, the GCM has re-
peatedly provided excellent fits to human data reflecting
the frequency (or probability) with which each stimulus
is recognized as an instance of a target category. When
the GCM is applied to experimental results, dimensional
attention parameters are freely varied to optimize the
model fit. This means that, while the GCM provides a
powerful account of learned categorization performance,
it offers no explanation for how dimensional attention is
adjusted over the course of learning.
This shortcoming of the GCM has been addressed by a
connectionist model called ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992).
ALCOVE incorporates the GCM’s formalization of cat-
egory knowledge, but it also provides a precise algo-
rithm for modifying the attentional “weight” assigned to
each stimulus dimension, based on feedback provided
to learners on their categorization judgments. In a typ-
ical category learning experiment, learners are presented
with stimulus objects, one at a time, and are asked to
make classification judgments for each. Immediately fol-
lowing each judgment, feedback is provided, typically
informing the learner of the correct category label for the
preceding stimulus. Once learning is complete, catego-
rization judgments on transfer stimuli, for which no feed-
back is provided, can provide a window into the structure
of the learned category knowledge. The ALCOVE model
uses the feedback provided during training to calculate
an “error signal”, which is simply the difference between
the category assignment made by the model and the spec-
ified “true” category. A variant of the backpropagation
of error learning algorithm (Rumelhart et al., 1986) is
used to communicate this error signal to an early stage
of stimulus encoding, and this backpropagated error sig-
nal is used to adjust ALCOVE’s dimensional attention
weights. Like the GCM, ALCOVE provides good fits to
human performance data on learned categories. Unlike
the GCM, ALCOVE provides a detailed account of how
dimensional attention is shaped by experience.
ALCOVE has been proposed as a model of psycho-
logical processes, with virtually no aspiration to explain
the neural basis of human category learning. Despite this
fact, the empirical successes of ALCOVE and its con-
nectionist formalization make the model a tempting can-
didate for a coarse characterization of associated brain
mechanisms. Perhaps ALCOVE can be refined, with
each of its proposed psychological mechanisms mapped
onto a corresponding detailed account of the underlying
neural machinery. One feature of ALCOVE that stands
in the way of such a theoretical reduction is its use of
the backpropagation of error algorithm in order to learn
dimensional attention weights. This powerful learning
algorithm has long been criticized for its lack of biolog-
ical plausibility (Crick, 1989), suggesting that the brain
cannot be adapting dimensional attention based on such
a gradient-based technique (c.f., O’Reilly (1996)).
As a first step toward a biological model of category
learning, we replaced the backpropagation-based dimen-
sional attention mechanism used by ALCOVE with a re-
inforcement learning mechanism intended to reflect the
role of the brain’s dopamine (DA) system in learning.
This role for dopamine has been formalized by other re-
searchers in terms of an algorithm called temporal dif-
ference (TD) learning (Sutton, 1988; Montague et al.,
1996). Versions of ALCOVE which adapt dimensional
attention weights using the biologically supported TD
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learning method, instead of the more computationally
powerful but biologically implausible backpropagation
method, were found to fit human performance data about
as well as the original ALCOVE. Thus, this work offers
a more biologically realistic model of the adaptation of
dimensional attention without sacrificing accuracy in ac-
counting for human categorization behavior. Also, the
ability to capture human performance with the highly
stochastic TD learning method suggests that cognitive
mechanisms for adapting dimensional attention may not
need to be particularly precise.
Background
ALCOVE Architecture
The ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) model of category
learning is a feedforward connectionist model that in-
volves three layers of processing units (see Figure 1(a)).
The input layer consists of a set of units that each cor-
respond to a single dimension in the stimulus psycho-
logical space. Explaining the structure of this perceptual
representation is outside of ALCOVE’s scope. When fit-
ting ALCOVE to human data, multidimensional scaling
(MDS) techniques are typically applied to collected stim-
ulus similarity ratings in order to discern the psychologi-
cal space used by human learners (Shepard, 1962a; Shep-
ard, 1962b). Each input unit has its own dimensional at-
tention weight, αi. These weights are non-negative scalar
values that modulate the amount of attention paid to
the corresponding stimulus dimension. Higher αi values
magnify the differences between stimuli along the given
dimension, making them easier to discriminate based on
that dimension. As learning progresses, these weights
are adjusted via the backpropagation of error algorithm.
The hidden layer in ALCOVE contains a set of units
that are arranged in psychological space, one for each
training exemplar. The activation level of each hidden
unit is determined by the following equation:
ahidj   exp

c  ∑
i
αi 

h ji

aini 

r 
r  q 	

where ahidj is the activation of hidden unit j, c is the
specificity of the hidden units, αi is the attention weight
for input unit i, h ji is the preferred stimulus input for hid-
den unit j along stimulus dimension i, aini is the activa-
tion value of input unit i, r is the psychological distance
metric, and q is the similarity gradient. Hidden unit activ-
ity is at a maximum when the inputs match the preferred
stimulus of the unit (i.e., aini matches h ji). This activation
fades exponentially as the stimulus becomes more distant
from the preferred exemplar in psychological space, with
the c, r, and q parameters controlling exactly how activa-
tion decreases with psychological distance.
Finally the output layer contains a set of units re-
ceiving activation from the hidden layer via association
weights. Each output unit corresponds to a category la-
bel that might be assigned to a stimulus. These units
are standard linear units, with their activation levels, aoutk ,
computed as the sum of exemplar unit activation levels,
ahidj , weighted by the corresponding association weights,
wk j . Output unit activations are mapped onto response
probabilities using an exponential Luce choice rule:
P  K 
 
exp  φaoutK  ∑
k
exp  φaoutk 
where P  K  is the probability of selecting category K for
the current stimulus, and φ is a gain term. These response
probabilities may be used to compare network responses
with human performance data.
After the presentation of each stimulus and the conse-
quent outputs are produced, the output unit correspond-
ing to the correct response is presented with a target acti-
vation level of  1, and other units are presented with tar-
gets of

1. An error signal consisting of the difference
between aoutk and these targets is used to adjust weight
values (though output units that “overshoot” their target
values are assigned zero error). The association weights
are then adjusted using this error signal directly (i.e., us-
ing the delta rule), but the selective attention weights are
adjusted based on a backpropagated error signal. The re-
sulting weight update equations are:
∆woutk j   λw  tk

aoutk  a
hid
j
∆αi
 
λα ∑
j 
∑
k
 tk

aoutk  wk j  a
hid
j c 

h ji

aini 

where ∆woutk j is the adjustment value for the association
weight from hidden unit j to output unit k, ∆αi is the ad-
justment value for the attention weight for input unit i,
λw and λα are the learning rate parameters for the associ-
ation weights and attention weights, respectively, and tk
is the target value for output unit k.
Temporal Difference Learning
Electrophysiological studies of the dopamine neurons
of the basal ganglia have suggested that the firing rates
of these cells code for changes in expected future re-
ward (Shultz et al., 1997). This is particularly interesting
because a measure of change in expected reward is the
key variable of a reinforcement learning method called
temporal difference (TD) learning (Sutton, 1988). This
has led a number of researchers to develop TD learning
models of the role played by the midbrain dopamine sys-
tem in learning (Barto, 1994; Montague et al., 1996).
In the TD framework, a continuous reward value (r) is
delivered on each time step (t), with positive reward be-
ing desirable. A neural system called the adaptive critic
learns to predict expected future reward (V ), given fea-
tures of the current situation. When future rewards are
exponentially discounted by a factor, γ (between 0 and 1),
with immediate rewards being valued more than tempo-
rally distant ones, the change in expected future reward
between two consecutive time steps is given by:
δ  t 
 
r  t  γV  t 

V  t

1 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This δ value is called the temporal difference (TD) error.
The global TD error value can be used to drive learn-
ing in the adaptive critic, improving predictions of fu-
ture reward, and it can also be used to adapt connection
weights in neural networks which select actions, push-
ing those choices toward actions that regularly lead to
reward. Models of this kind have been used to explain
motor sequence learning in the striatum (Barto, 1994) as
well as other forms of learning. We propose that this
form of reinforcement learning may also be used to learn
dimensional attention weights that lead to correct cate-
gorization responses and, thus, reward.
Modeling Approach
Applications of TD learning typically focus on choosing
an action from a discrete set. There is currently no clear
understanding of how to apply these methods to domains
in which a continuous output is needed. Dimensional at-
tention weights are continuous parameters, however, so
some modification to standard TD learning is needed to
apply this technique to the adaptation of dimensional at-
tention. We have devised two novel connectionist archi-
tectures to accomplish this. Our strategy encodes atten-
tional weight vectors (with one αi weight per dimension)
across a single layer of standard connectionist process-
ing units, called the attention map layer. Each unit in
this layer possesses a fixed preferred attentional weight
vector, and activation of a unit encourages the use of that
unit’s preferred dimensional attention weights. The acti-
vation level of each unit is largely determined by its indi-
vidual bias weight, and the TD learning method is used
to adapt these bias weights so as to optimize reward.
At the start of each trial, each of these attention map
units is activated, to some degree, by its bias weight.
The units then compete to determine the set of dimen-
sional attention parameters to be used by ALCOVE, and
the result of this competition is a set of such attention
weights. ALCOVE then processes the current stimulus
in its usual fashion, producing a categorization judgment.
ALCOVE’s association weights are then modified in the
usual way, using the delta rule, but the dimensional atten-
tion weights are handled differently. If ALCOVE confi-
dently chooses the correct category, it is rewarded. Oth-
erwise, it is not. The TD error, δ, is calculated based on
this reward signal, and this error is used to modify the
bias weights of all active attention map units.
Two different architectures for the attention map layer
were investigated. The first of these used conjunctive
coding, resulting in a localist representation of dimen-
sional attention. Under this scheme, the preferred atten-
tional weight vectors of processing units were distributed
evenly throughout the weight vector space. Thus, each
unit corresponded to a position in attention weight vec-
tor space, and the positions of all of the units in the at-
tention map layer formed a uniform grid in this space.
On each trial, a simple winner-take-all competition deter-
mined the one unit whose preferred weight vector would
specify the distribution of attention for that trial. Learn-
ing occurred only for the winning unit, using the follow-
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) ALCOVE Network Architecture. (b) Tile
Coding Of The Attention Map Layer — A single unit is
centered in each tile.
ing weight update equation for its single bias weight:
∆wi
 
λr  r

ai  f    neti 
where λr is the attention map learning rate, r is the re-
ward for the current trial, ai is the activation value of the
winning attention map unit, and f
 
 neti  is the derivative
of the unit’s activation function (which was the standard
logistic sigmoid). Note that this is the standard method
for updating weights based on TD error, under the con-
dition of absorbing reward (i.e., we don’t predict reward
past the end of the trial). In this case, ai acts as our reward
prediction (V  t

1  ), and we do not predict beyond this
trial, so V  t 
 
0 and δ
 
r

ai. A reward value (r) of
 1 was delivered to the network on trials in which AL-
COVE selected the correct category label and produced
a confident response (i.e., all output units within 0  5 of
their targets). A reward of 0 was delivered, otherwise.1
Our second attention map architecture used tile cod-
ing, resulting in a distributed representation of dimen-
sional attention. In this case, the attention map layer
was partitioned into disjoint tilings, where each tiling
contained a set of units with preferred dimensional at-
tention weight vectors that uniformly spanned the full
weight space. The preferred weight vectors of the units
in the various tilings were not identical, however, be-
cause each tiling was “offset” from the others, as shown
in Figure 1(b). To precisely represent a position in the
attention weight space, one unit in each tiling is acti-
vated, with the overlap in the tiles surrounding the po-
sitions of these units determining the dimensional atten-
tion weights to be used. This kind of distributed rep-
resentation was originally used in the Cerebellar Model
Articulation Controller (CMAC) (Albus, 1975), and im-
proved generalization in TD learning systems has been
1An obvious alternative reward schedule involves stochas-
tically making category judgments based on P  K  and reward-
ing any correct judgment. While we are currently investigat-
ing this approach, it is likely that it will produce behavior that
deviates substantially from that of standard ALCOVE. Dimen-
sional attention weights do not change much in ALCOVE until
the network starts to make strong responses. This is part of
the “three-stage learning” profile that ALCOVE exhibits. Our
reward schedule encourages this pattern of learning.
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found to result from their use (Sutton, 1996). Previous
models have used such representational schemes to en-
code network inputs, but here they have been used in a
novel way to select dimensional attention weights. As in
the conjunctive coding architecture, each attention map
unit is activated by a bias weight, and a competition en-
sues between units. In the tile coding scheme, the most
active unit across all tilings restricts activity in the other
tilings to those that are close to the winning unit (i.e.,
units whose tiles overlap with that of the winning unit).
This competitive process is recursively applied to tilings
that do not contain the winning unit until one unit is ac-
tive in each tiling, and the tiles corresponding to these
units all overlap. The attention weight vector at the cen-
ter of this overlapping region is then used by ALCOVE
to process the current stimulus. Once feedback is pro-
vided, reward is calculated as in the conjunctive coding
case, and TD learning is used to adjust the bias weights
of all of the winning units in the attention map layer.
In standard ALCOVE, the initial attention weights are
often set to be all equal and to sum to one. This effec-
tively emphasizes all dimensions equally at the start of
training. We selected initial bias weights in the attention
map layer so as to form a similar initial bias in our mod-
els. The unit in the attention map whose preferred at-
tention weight vector matched ALCOVE’s standard ini-
tial attention weights was given a maximum bias weight
(0  05), and the bias weights assigned to other units fell
off in a Gaussian fashion as the distance from this peak
increased (in attention weight space), bottoming out at

0  05. A small amount of uniformly sampled noise was
then injected into each bias weight, and the result was
clipped to the  

0  05  0  05  range. The variance of the
Gaussian and the range of the injected noise were free
parameters of the model.
Results
In order to assess the ability of our reinforcement-based
dimensional attention mechanism to account for human
performance, we applied our models to several previ-
ously reported category learning studies. The perfor-
mance of our modified version of ALCOVE was com-
pared to that of the standard version of ALCOVE and to
the performance of the GCM. In all cases, the values of
dimensional attention weights were bound between zero
and one. (This was only a new upper bound for AL-
COVE, which standardly forces these weights to be non-
negative.) In all of the learning models, weights were
updated after every simulated trial.
Dimensional Attention & Learning Difficulty
Shepard et al. (1961) examined the effect of category
structure on the relative speed with which a category
is learned. Stimuli were composed of three easily sep-
arable binary dimensions, for a total of eight possible
stimuli. Six category structures were examined, ordered
approximately by increasing number of relevant dimen-
sions. Thus, the Type 1 category structure requires at-
tention to only one binary dimension to solve the task,
the Type 2 structure requires that only two of the di-
mensions be attended, while Types 3, 4, 5, and 6 all
require attention to all three, in order of increasing di-
mensional significance. The speed with which humans
learn these categories matches this ordering of tasks, but
models that lack a dimensional attention mechanism fail
to learn Type 2 categories faster than some of the more
difficult categories. Kruschke (1992) showed that AL-
COVE, with its adaptive dimensional attention mecha-
nism, learned Type 2 tasks at a relative rate comparable
to human learners. We have replicated these simulations
(using bounded attention weights and learning after ev-
ery trial), and the results are shown in Figure 2.
We applied our reinforcement learning version of AL-
COVE to these six categorization tasks. Since stimuli
had three dimensions, the attention weight space was
three-dimensional. The conjunctive coding model used
a 15  15  15 unit topology in its attention map layer
(3375 units total), while the tile coding model used five
tilings of 9  9  9 units each (3645 units total). The re-
sults of these simulations are shown in Figure 2. Note
that our models learn Type 2 categories faster than the
higher numbered types, just as ALCOVE does. Model
parameter values were manually selected to produce per-
formance that matched the category learning times ex-
hibited by ALCOVE. These results demonstrate that TD
learning can adapt dimensional attention weights so as to
speed category learning.
Categorization of Continuous Separable Stimuli
In order to demonstrate the ability of our models to quan-
titatively fit human performance on categorization tasks
involving stimuli with continuous and separable dimen-
sions, we applied these models to an experiment con-
ducted by Nosofsky (1986) . The stimuli in this experi-
ment consisted of semicircles that varied in size and con-
tained a radial line oriented at different angles. These
stimuli were to be categorized as members of one of two
categories, and four different category structures were
explored (see Figure 3). The frequency with which each
of the sixteen possible stimuli were placed in a target cat-
egory was measured after training, and the GCM was fit
to these response probabilities.
We fit both standard ALCOVE and our reinforcement
learning models to this data, as well. Since the stimu-
lus space was two-dimensional, our models used a two-
dimensional attention map layer. In the conjunctive cod-
ing case, a 15  15 unit topology was used (225 units
total), and the tile coding model used 9 tilings of 5  5
units each (225 units total). While both schemes used
the same number of units, the tile coding model dis-
cretized the space with a much greater resolution. Stim-
uli were presented to the models using the MDS code
found by Nosofsky. Free parameters of the models were
fit to Nosofsky’s Subject 1 data for each category struc-
ture separately. A simple hill-climbing optimization al-
gorithm on sum-squared error was used.
The quality of the resulting fits are summarized in Ta-
ble 1. While the original ALCOVE model provided the
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Figure 2: Model Learning Curves For Shepard’s 6 Tasks — One epoch involves one trial with each distinct stimulus.
Category Structure
Model 1 2 3 4
GCM 99.93% 94.73% 84.52% 98.31%
ALCOVE 99.65% 96.45% 86.62% 98.61%
Conj. Code 99.51% 95.84% 86.01% 97.72%
Tile Code 99.54% 95.62% 83.55% 97.72%
Table 1: Model Fits To Nosofsky (1986) – Percent Vari-
ance Accounted For
Category Structure
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
GCM 99.10% 98.30% 97.20% 99.80% 98.20% 99.20%
ALCOVE 98.56% 99.29% 93.53% 99.79% 98.34% 98.71%
Conj. Code 98.44% 98.16% 92.51% 99.57% 97.94% 98.53%
Tile Code 98.25% 97.27% 91.15% 99.15% 97.80% 97.30%
Table 2: Model Fits To Nosofsky (1987) – Percent Vari-
ance Accounted For
best overall fits, our models matched the data almost as
well, and all general trends in the ALCOVE and GCM
fits are present in our models. This suggests that our
mechanisms for learning dimensional attention can quan-
titatively capture human performance on learning tasks
that require selective attention to separable dimensions.
Categorization of Continuous Integral Stimuli
Integral stimulus dimensions often entail a difficulty in
focusing attention on individual dimensions. Despite
this fact, Nosofsky (1987) showed that models equipped
with a dimensional attention mechanism fit human cat-
egorization performance on such stimuli slightly better
than models that lacked such a mechanism. This study
involved 12 different color chips which varied in satu-
ration and brightness. Six different category structures
were used, and these are shown in Figure 3. The fre-
quency with which each of the 12 stimuli were placed in
a target category was measured after training, and, once
again, the GCM was fit to these response probabilities.
We applied both the original ALCOVE and our re-
inforcement learning versions to this human data. The
same attention map layer sizes as used in the previous
simulations were used here, and, as before, MDS repre-
sentations of the stimuli were presented to the models. A
summary of the model fits is shown in Table 2.
The GCM provides the best fits to the data in this
study. It seems that the ALCOVE model and our models
had trouble learning Category Structure 3. This is a dif-
ficult category structure which benefits little from selec-
tive attention to specific dimensions. Note, however, that
the fits of our reinforcement learning models are close to
the standard ALCOVE fits, and our models continue to
exhibit the same trends in learning as ALCOVE.
Discussion
Our results show that established computational models
of the brain’s dopamine system can provide an adequate
replacement for the biologically implausible backprop-
agation of error method for adapting dimensional atten-
tion during category learning. The new models were able
to learn useful dimensional attention weights from their
less-informative global reinforcement signal. This sug-
gests that cognitive mechanisms for allocating dimen-
sional attention may not be as precise as those posited
by the original ALCOVE model.
One noteworthy feature of our reinforcement learning
models was their tendency to exhibit fluctuations in per-
formance over training, rather than smooth and mono-
tonic learning as displayed by the original ALCOVE
model. If each network model is to mirror the perfor-
mance of an individual learner, these performance fluc-
tuations may reflect stochasticity commonly observed in
individual behavior. Also, if performance is averaged
across multiple “simulated individuals”, smooth learning
curves, like those generated by ALCOVE, are produced.
Our models encoded dimensional attention weights in
a fairly conjunctive fashion, with individual units in the
attention map layer specifying levels of attention for all
of the dimensions. This is needed because the appropri-
ateness of attention to one dimension depends on how
attention is allocated to the other dimensions. Such a
conjunctive encoding requires very large attention map
layers, however, and this may limit the scalability of this
approach. In order to address this issue, we are currently
exploring more compact distributed representations for
dimensional attention weight vectors.
Eventually we hope to modify ALCOVE to make use
of additional biologically plausible mechanisms of neu-
ral computation. This work represents the first step in
this process, identifying a biologically realistic method
for governing dimensional attention.
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Figure 3: Category Structures Used In Nosofsky (1986) and Nosofsky (1987)
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Abstract 
Recent evidence suggests that perceivers have consistent 
intuitions regarding the boundedness properties of objects and 
events (Solomon, Proctor, & Rips, in preparation). This paper 
presents a self-paced reading study examining the speed and 
accuracy with which readers draw such telicity inferences 
during on-line language comprehension. Participants read 
sentences containing either a consumption verb (“consume”) 
or an observation verb (“monitor”) followed by either a mass 
or a count object (“ice water” vs. “ice cube”). Each sentence 
ended with an adverbial phrase that was either consistent or 
inconsistent with the telicity of the preceding event 
description (“in” or “for” adverbials), along with a 
comprehension question. Reading-time results suggest that 
comprehenders are slow to draw telicity inferences, even 
when the type of verb unambiguously determines the telicity 
of the sentence.  However, responses to post-sentential 
comprehension questions suggest that verb and noun 
information together have a surprisingly robust influence on 
comprehenders’ telicity inferences, even in the face of 
supposedly unambiguous adverbial information. Together, 
these results suggest that comprehenders make use of all 
relevant information in making telicity inferences, but that 
they do so much more slowly than strongly incremental 
models of natural language understanding would predict (e.g., 
Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980). 
Introduction 
We readily distinguish two types of physical entities in the 
world—individuated objects and substances. We refer to 
these two types of entities with different types of nouns: 
substances are often referred to with mass nouns (e.g., tea) 
and objects with count nouns (e.g., cat). These distinctions 
seem to rest on the boundaries of the physical entities: count 
nouns typically refer to objects with well-defined 
boundaries, such as mouse or iceberg, while mass nouns 
typically refer to substances1 without clear boundaries, such 
as mud or water.  
                                                
1 It should be noted, however, that this distinction between mass 
and count nouns does not strictly coincide with the 
substance/object distinction.  Jackendoff (1991) notes that, in 
The domain of events can be divided up similarly. Events 
can be classified according to whether or not they have an 
endpoint, or temporal boundary.  Actions described by atelic 
verbs have no inherent endpoint or boundary; these actions 
have the potential to go on without end (e.g., singing).  Verb 
phrases describing atelic or unbounded events go naturally 
with for adverbials, which describe the duration of an event, 
and less naturally with in adverbials, which presuppose the 
endpoint of an event. “She sang for an hour” sounds much 
more natural than “She sang in an hour.” Actions described 
by telic verbs such as delivering, on the other hand, have an 
inherent endpoint; once an object has arrived at its 
destination, delivering has reached its end, and cannot 
logically continue.  Verb phrases describing telic or 
bounded events go naturally with in adverbials and less 
naturally with for adverbials: “She delivered the package in 
an hour” sounds much more natural than “She delivered the 
package for an hour.”  These distinctions among verbs or 
verb phrases are commonly referred to as lexical aspect 
(e.g., Vendler, 1967; Dowty, 1979).   
The current experiment explores how these lexical aspect 
distinctions are computed during sentence comprehension.  
It also examines when perceivers draw inferences about the 
boundedness of events, just as they must draw inferences 
about the boundaries of physical entities (see Solomon, 
Proctor, & Rips, in preparation). There has been some 
previous work exploring the cost of modifying or retracting 
such inferences once they have been drawn:  Piñango, Zurif, 
and Jackendoff (1999) and Todorova, Straub, Badecker, and 
Frank (2000) demonstrate that encountering information 
(such as a for adverbial) that forces an event to be construed 
as atelic causes processing difficulty if previous information 
had suggested it was telic. The current experiment uses this 
effect to explore when telicity inferences are drawn on-line. 
                                                                               
addition to substances, aggregates of individuated objects can act 
like mass nouns.  For instance, the terms cattle and change behave 
like mass terms, even though each refers to individuated objects 
(cows and coins, respectively) and not to an unindividuated 
substance. 
1107
Parallels Between Noun and Verb Contrasts   
Several authors have noted that strong parallels exist 
between mass nouns and atelic events, and between count 
nouns and telic events (Bach, 1986; Langacker, 1987; 
Vendler, 1967).  Just as masses have no intrinsic physical 
bound, atelic events, such as running, painting, or watching, 
have no intrinsic temporal bound.  In contrast, just as 
counted objects have inherent physical boundaries, telic 
events, such as delivering, drowning, or walking a mile, all 
have an intrinsic temporal bound.  One cannot continue 
delivering after a package has reached its destination, 
drowning after one is dead, or walking a mile after that 
distance has been crossed.  Once the endpoint is reached, 
the action is completed.  The present experiment is 
concerned with one subtype each of atelic and telic verbs:  
activities and accomplishments, respectively. 
Another key parallel between actions and objects involves 
the extent to which a part of an object or action can be 
considered to be in the same category as its whole.  For both 
masses and activities, a subpart (down to some lower limit) 
of the whole is qualitatively equivalent to the whole—any 
part of chocolate sauce is still chocolate sauce, just as any 
part of eating is eating.  This subpart or subinterval property 
(Bennett & Partee, 1978) does not hold for counted objects 
and accomplishments, however—any part of an aluminum 
boat is not, itself, an aluminum boat, nor is any part of 
lighting a fire (e.g., crumpling up newspaper) itself lighting 
a fire. 
Interactions Between Noun and Verb Boundaries 
The physical boundaries of objects influence the temporal 
boundaries of events affecting them. Several authors have 
noted that the telicity or boundedness of an event often 
depends on whether the verb describing it takes a mass or 
count noun as its object (Pustejovsky, 1991, 1995; Verkuyl, 
1993). When a consumption verb, such as eat, takes a count 
noun as its object, readers should infer that the VP is an 
accomplishment—the depletion of the object must end when 
the object’s boundary is reached.  When such a verb takes a 
mass noun as its object, however, the VP is an activity—
since the substance is unbounded, the depletion could 
potentially go on indefinitely.  These telicity shifts only hold 
for a subset of verbs such as consumption and creation 
verbs, which describe events that cannot easily be repeated 
and that entail an irreversible effect on their objects (Krifka, 
1998).  Verbs that do not entail an irreversible effect on 
their objects should not demonstrate such an aspectual shift.  
For example, whether a mass or count noun appears as the 
object of a verb of observation (e.g., watching) should not 
have an effect on the VP’s telicity—the action of watching a 
mug should be just as unbounded as the action of watching 
soup. 
To date, there is limited evidence regarding how 
perceivers draw these telicity inferences during 
comprehension.  Solomon and her colleagues (in 
preparation) provide evidence from off-line reasoning tasks 
suggesting that readers are sensitive to the boundedness of 
different events, and that their reasoning about event 
boundedness parallels their reasoning about the 
boundedness of physical objects. Further, readers make 
inferences about lexical aspect on-line, re-interpreting their 
default assumptions regarding the boundedness of an event 
in order to bring it in line with the temporal characteristics 
of the context in which it appears (Piñango et al., 1999; 
Todorova et al., 2000).  For example, “jump” might be 
interpreted to be an iterative action when it appears in the 
sentence “He jumped all day.”   
Studies examining aspectual coercion have demonstrated 
that sentential aspect is sensitive to parts of the sentence 
other than the verb.  However, they do not directly examine 
how the boundedness of a verb’s object or the verb itself is 
capable of influencing telicity inferences.  If perceivers 
draw inferences about a sentence’s temporal profile 
incrementally, they should show early sensitivity to the 
difference between observation verbs (whose boundedness 
does not depend on the properties of the following object) 
and consumption verbs (whose boundedness does depend 
on the object). Similarly, if perceivers are actively and 
predictively computing telicity based on verb and object 
information, they should show evidence of an interaction of 
verb and object information at the position of the object:  
perceivers’ comprehension of a sentence should be affected 
by whether an object is a mass or count noun only if the 
verb preceding it is a consumption verb, not if it is an 
observation verb.  Strongly incremental views of language 
understanding (e.g., Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980; Clark, 
1996) predict such early inferencing.   
Overview 
Is it the case that when we read a sentence in which an 
(unbounded) activity verb, describing the consumption of its 
object, takes a (bounded) count noun as its object, we then 
interpret the sentence as if the verb phrase were bounded?  
If, for instance, we read “Carol ingested Henderson Foods' 
rice cake merrily for ten minutes” will we interpret that 
action as being more temporally bounded than we would if 
we had read that she had ingested Henderson Foods’ rice 
cereal?  When do we make these inferences?  Do we begin 
to draw inferences regarding telicity as soon as we 
encounter a verb?  Do we compute a sentence’s aspect as 
soon as we have both the verb and noun information?  Or do 
we hold off making inferences until all potentially 
informative information is available, until late in the 
sentence?  Previous results suggest that drawing telicity 
inferences can be cognitively costly (see Piñango, et al., 
1999; Todorova, et al., 2000); the present experiment uses 
this finding to address these questions.   
The Experiment 
We presented participants with sentences describing 
characters either consuming or observing a mass or a 
counted object (see Table l for examples).  Sentences were 
divided  into  five segments,  and  participants  read  through  
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Table 1:  Sample Set of Sentences 
 
these sequentially at their own pace while their reading 
times were recorded.  The first segment contained either a 
consumption or an observation verb, while the third 
segment contained either a mass or a count noun.  A fourth 
segment consisted of a manner adverbial, which served as a 
wrap-up segment.  The final segment specified an interval 
of time, preceded by either a for-adverbial (e.g., for eight 
minutes) or in-adverbial (e.g., in eight minutes).  Recall that 
these adverbials typically appear with VPs describing 
activities and accomplishments, respectively, and rarely 
with the opposite type of event. 
If incremental views of language understanding are 
correct that readers will begin to draw inferences about the 
temporal profile of a described event as soon as they 
encounter relevant information, we would expect to find an 
effect of verb at the first segment.  Specifically, we would 
expect to find that reading times for segments containing 
observation verbs (e.g., “Leslie monitored”) would be 
longer than those for segments containing consumption 
verbs (e.g., “Leslie ingested”).  Observation verbs license 
immediate telicity inferences (since the telicity of such 
events is independent of noun information later in the 
sentence), but the telicity of consumption verbs depend on 
noun information.  Such a cost could conceivably continue 
through the second and third segments. 
Furthermore, if inferences about an event’s aspect are 
occurring early on-line (as in the incremental view) and are 
associated with a processing cost, then we would expect to 
find slowed reading times at the third and/or fourth segment 
(near the time of the object noun information) of sentences 
containing consumption verbs.  In the case of Leslie, for 
example, if there were immediate processing costs 
associated with integrating noun and verb boundary 
information, we would expect participants to be slower to 
read that she had consumed “ice cube” than “ice water.”  
Such a cost could conceivably carry over to the following 
segment, in which case we would expect slower reading of 
“with zeal” among readers who had read the count version 
relative to those who had read the mass version.   
If, on the other hand, participants delay drawing 
inferences about the telicity of described events until all 
relevant information is available (until after verb and noun 
information has been encountered), we would not expect to 
see an effect of verb at the first segment, nor would we 
expect an interaction between noun and verb later on.   
 
In the absence of slowing at segments three or four, we 
could still determine that inferences about aspect were being 
made based on a combination of a consumption verb with a 
mass or count noun if we were to find slowing due to 
mismatching of grammatical information at segment five.  If 
participants are making inferences about the aspect of the 
sentences (e.g., inferring that eating a chocolate bar is an 
accomplishment) and are then presented with a final adverb 
(e.g., for ten minutes) that contradicts this inference, their 
reading times at that final segment may be slowed. 
As an additional test of readers’ inferences about the 
aspect, we presented participants with a follow-up question 
immediately after they had read through each sentence.  For 
example, after reading about Leslie consuming ice water, 
participants were presented with the question, “After four of 
those eight minutes, had Leslie actually ingested Polar 
Purity’s ice water?” The questions were modeled after an 
inferential test (Dowty, 1979) that distinguishes between 
activities and accomplishments by assessing whether the 
subinterval property applies to the action.  If a participant 
believes that the action was an activity, he or she should be 
willing to ascribe the subinterval property to it.  We thus 
expected that participants would be more likely to respond 
“yes” to the follow-up question after they had read about 
Leslie consuming ice water than if they had read about 
Leslie consuming Polar Purity’s ice cube, since the 
consumption of a bounded object should lead participants to 
interpret the action as telic.  Observation verb sentences 
should have the subinterval property ascribed to them 
regardless of whether they contain a mass or count noun, as 
the action has no effect on the object.  We expected the 
pattern for sentences ending with the in-adverb to be 
qualitatively similar to that for sentences ending with the 
for-adverb.  However, overall likelihood of an atelic 
response should be lower for in, given the strong association 
of in-adverbials with telic actions. 
Methods 
Procedure  In this study, participants completed a self-
paced reading task.  They read through sentences, presented 
on a computer screen while we recorded their reading times.  
We instructed participants to read through each segment at 
their normal pace, and to progress through the segments by 
pressing the spacebar.  The segments appeared sequentially 
 Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5 Adverb Verb Noun 
a Leslie consumed Polar Purity’s ice water with zeal for eight minutes. For Telic Mass 
b Leslie consumed Polar Purity’s ice cube with zeal for eight minutes. For Telic Count 
c Leslie monitored Polar Purity’s ice water with zeal for eight minutes. For Atelic Mass 
d Leslie monitored Polar Purity’s ice cube with zeal for eight minutes. For Atelic Count 
e Leslie consumed Polar Purity’s ice water with zeal in eight minutes. In Telic Mass 
f Leslie consumed Polar Purity’s ice cube with zeal in eight minutes. In Telic Count 
g Leslie monitored Polar Purity’s ice water with zeal in eight minutes. In Atelic Mass 
h Leslie monitored Polar Purity’s ice cube with zeal in eight minutes. In Atelic Count 
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and disappeared from view once they had been read; 
participants could not return to a previously-viewed 
segment.   
A follow-up question appeared immediately after 
participants had read the final segment of the sentence.  The 
follow-up question appeared with two possible responses 
(“yes” and “no” for the experimental sentences), one 
appearing on the left, and the other on the right.  For each 
list, participants saw “yes” on the left for half of the 
experimental sentences, and “no” on the left for the other 
half.  We instructed participants to press one key (d) if they 
felt that the response on the left was correct and another (k) 
if they felt that response on the right was the better choice.   
Each participant saw the sentences and their associated 
follow-up questions in a different random order. 
 
Materials  We constructed 80 sentences, all describing a 
character performing some action on an object or substance 
over a specified interval.  For each of these sentences, we 
varied the type of verb (observation verbs vs. consumption 
verb), the boundedness of the noun (mass vs. count noun), 
and the final adverb (for X minutes vs. in X minutes), 
yielding a set of eight variations on each of the 80 base 
sentences.  Each sentence contained five segments (an 
example set of segmented sentences appears in Table 1).  
The 640 experimental sentences were separated into eight 
lists, such that each of the eight variations of any given base 
sentence was assigned to a different list, and each list 
contained ten of each of the variation types.  Thus, 
participants saw only one version of each base sentence, but 
saw an equal number of each of the verb/noun/adverb 
combinations.  Each list also contained 32 additional 
sentences, unrelated to the experimental sentences, which 
served as filler items (e.g., “At the break, | Emily | had 
already | finished the memo, | to her boss's relief.”) 
Follow-up questions were constructed for all the 
sentences.  The follow-ups asked whether the character had 
actually completed the specified action halfway through the 
mentioned interval (an example set of follow-up questions is 
presented in Table 2).  If, during the course of reading a 
sentence, the participant inferred that the described event 
was atelic, then the subinterval property should apply, and 
the expected response would be “yes”.  If, on the other 
hand, the participant inferred that the described event was 
telic, he or she should respond “no”. 
 
Table 2:  Sample Set of Follow-up Questions 
 
a, e After four of those eight minutes, had Leslie 
actually consumed Polar Purity’s ice water? 
b, f After four of those eight minutes, had Leslie 
actually consumed Polar Purity’s ice cube? 
c, g After four of those eight minutes, had Leslie 
actually monitored Polar Purity’s ice water? 
d, h After four of those eight minutes, had Leslie 
actually monitored Polar Purity’s ice cube? 
 
Participants  Forty-eight undergraduate students enrolled at 
Northwestern University participated in this experiment.  
Participation was part of a course requirement in an 
introductory psychology course.  All participants were 
native English speakers.   
Results 
An examination of the reading time data suggests that 
readers did not begin generating telicity inferences as soon 
as they encountered the relevant verb or verb+object 
information.  Reading times were, however, longer for 
sentences in which the final adverbials were inconsistent 
with the telicity of the preceding verb+object combination, 
indicating that the verb+object information was used in 
generating inferences about the telicity of these described 
events.  Responses to follow-up questions suggest that these 
inferences were surprisingly robust: even in cases where the 
sentence-final adverbial conflicted with the telicity of the 
preceding verb phrase, participants showed some evidence 
of having stuck with their original telicity inference. 
Analyses on reading times and responses to follow-up 
questions were computed separately using participants and 
items as random factors.   
 
Reading-Time Analyses  Mean reading times for each 
segment are presented in Figure 1.  Reading times that were 
over 10 seconds or under 100 milliseconds were excluded 
from the analysis.  These responses consisted of less than 
2% of the data.   
Segment-by-segment reading time analyses revealed a 
significant effect of verb type at segment one (FP(1,47) = 
7.21; FI(1,79) = 4.11, p < .05 for both); however, this effect 
was in the direction opposite to that expected under a 
strongly incremental view—observation verbs were read 
more quickly than consumption verbs.  There was no 
evidence of additional inferencing work going on in the 
atelic conditions.2  
Also speaking against the predictions of an incremental 
account is the finding that there were no significant 
differences at segment three (the count/mass noun segment) 
or segment four (the manner adverbial segment), indicating 
there is no immediate processing cost associated with 
drawing telicity inferences based on the integration of noun 
and verb information.   
Despite the lack of immediate processing, an examination 
of the reading times for the final segment (see Figure 2) 
provides some evidence that participants were combining 
the verb and noun information to generate inferences about 
the telicity of the events.  Analyses of segment five reading 
times reveal evidence of processing costs when participants 
encounter grammatical information conflicting with    
telicity     inferences.        A     2x2x2    repeated     measures  
                                                
2 This main effect may have been the result of a confound with 
word frequency—the mean frequency (Kučera & Francis, 1967) of 
the observation verbs was significantly higher than that of the 
consumption verbs (t(59) = 3.64, p < .01). 
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Figure 1:  Mean Reading Times 
 
ANOVA revealed a three-way interaction between noun, 
verb and final adverb (FP(1,47) = 4.29, FI(1,79) = 4.46, both 
p < .05).  This interaction reflects both the relatively long 
segment five reading times for sentences whose final 
adverbs conflict with the telicity information contained in 
earlier segments (types e, g, and h).  This difference was 
confirmed with planned contrasts (FP(1,47) = 11.23, FI(1,79) 
= 33.01, p < .01 for both). 
Looking at the for-adverbial conditions alone, there was a 
two-way interaction of verb and noun type with slower 
reading times for sentences with consumption verbs and 
count nouns than sentences with consumption verbs and 
mass nouns, though it was only marginally significant in the 
items analysis (FP(1,47) = 9.72, p < .01; FI(1,79) = 3.71, p < 
.06).  This suggests that participants had successfully drawn 
telicity inferences based on verb and noun information 
earlier in the sentence. 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Reading Times for Segment 5 
 
Follow-up Question Data  Responses to the follow-up 
questions indicate that the participants were sensitive to the 
experimental manipulations.  Repeated measures ANOVAs 
revealed main effects for final adverb (FP(1,47) = 66.84; 
FI(1,79) = 757.12, both p < .001), verb (FP(1,47) = 64.08; 
FI(1,79) = 131.67, both p < .001) and, though only marginal 
in the items analysis, for noun (FP(1,47) = 4.27, p < .05; 
FI(1,79) = 3.14, p = .08).  This pattern of responses 
indicated that, as expected, participants were more likely 
respond “yes” (indicating an atelic interpretation) to the 
questions following sentences that contained for adverbs, 
atelic verbs, and mass nouns than they were for sentences 
containing in adverbs, telic verbs, and count nouns, 
respectively (see Figure 3).  There were no significant 
interactions.  Planned t-tests comparing responses to 
questions following mass and count versions of the critical 
consumption/for sentences revealed that participants were 
more likely to attribute the subinterval property to an event 
if it involved the consumption of a mass than a counted 
object, though the difference was only marginal in the items 
analysis (tP(47) = 2.23, p <.05; tI(79) = 1.97, p = .05), 
indicating that they were more likely to treat a 
consumption/mass action as an activity than a 
consumption/count action.  This pattern occurred despite the 
presence of the for-adverbial, which should force an atelic 
interpretation.  
 
Figure 3:  Follow-up Question Responses 
General Discussion 
An incremental view of language understanding would 
predict that participants should begin drawing telicity 
inferences as soon as those inferences are licensed by the 
text.  In the current study, such a view predicts that 
participants should show slowed reading times at the first 
segment (the verb segment) for observation verbs (relative 
to consumption verbs) since such verbs license immediate 
inferences about the telicity of the events they describe, 
whereas consumption verbs do not.  The present study 
found little support for this prediction—the main effect of 
verb found at the first segment was in the opposite direction 
of that predicted.  
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An incremental view further predicts an interaction 
between noun and verb at the third and fourth segments (the 
noun and manner adverbial segments).  If drawing 
inferences about the telicity of a VP based on verb and noun 
boundaries were costly, we would expect to see a slowing in 
reading times as soon as conflicting information appeared 
(e.g., when a count noun followed a consumption verb).  
This prediction also failed—there was no such interaction.  
Nevertheless, participants were using the combined verb 
and object information to make inferences about the 
boundedness of events.  Both reading time differences at 
segment five and responses to follow-up questions provide 
support for these inferences.  In the former case, reading 
times increased when a final adverbial was inconsistent with 
the verb+object combination.  In the latter case, participants 
were more likely to agree with the subinterval property for 
the consumption of a mass than for the consumption of a 
counted object.    
Conclusions 
Earlier work shows that there is a processing cost for 
drawing inferences about the telicity of events (Piñango et 
al., 1999; Todorova et al., 2000).  The present study 
investigated the time course of such inference-drawing.  
Two strong possibilities presented themselves at the outset:  
participants could either make inferences early, as the 
relevant information was presented to them (as in an 
incremental account) or, alternatively, they could hold off 
making telicity inferences until late in sentence processing, 
when all information was available (minimally, until after 
verb and noun information was available; Pustejovsky, 
1991, 1995; Verkuyl, 1993).  The reading time results from 
the present study support the second alternative—there is no 
indication that participants made rapid use of either the verb 
or verb+object information to draw boundedness inferences.  
Instead, it seems that all the costly inferencing work was 
carried out at the final segment.  This finding is consistent 
with other work: for example, Todorova and her colleagues 
(2000) find no cost for combining a telic verb (such as send) 
with a bare plural noun (such as letters), even though the 
bare plural forces an atelic interpretation for the verb phrase. 
The absence of such a cost is surprising under strongly 
incremental views of natural language interpretation 
(Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980; Altmann & Kamide, 
1999). This pattern is also consistent with the possibility 
that drawing (or delaying) inferences regarding telicity may 
be a relatively cost-free process, much as delaying choosing 
among different metonymic or metaphoric uses of a 
polysemous noun (such as newspaper) (Rayner & Frazier, 
1989).  In the domain of telicity, participants are willing to 
hold off on doing costly inferences until they are forced to 
make an interpretation.   
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Abstract 
Traditionally, cognition has been regarded as the outcome of 
internal cognitive processes manipulating mental 
representations. More recently, however, it has become clear 
that cognition cannot be separated from the social and 
material environment in which people live and act, and that in 
many cases cognition is distributed among individuals and 
environmental properties. One important aspect has turned out 
to be artefacts and their use, and there is growing interest in 
understanding how tool use affects cognition. However, even 
with this increased awareness of the role of artefacts, the 
focus has mainly been on the cognitive processes and 
representations of individuals, while the social role of 
artefacts has received less attention. An ethnographically 
inspired field study, observing a hospital’s children admission 
unit, was conducted to investigate the way individual and 
collaborative work are affected by the use of artefacts within a 
given social context. The results indicate that the use of 
artefacts is closely coupled to the social environment, that to 
some degree social interactions are transformed into more 
indirect, individual processes, and that artefacts are crucial for 
high-level processes such as memory and coordination. 
Introduction 
Most work in cognitive science has for a long time been 
based on a general consensus that cognition is best 
described and analysed in terms of internal, often symbolic, 
representations and computational processes manipulating 
them. Thus, cognition has been considered to take place 
largely within the individual mind, with a focus on mental 
representations and processes, while the environment 
largely has been reduced to inputs and outputs (e.g., 
Pylyshyn, 1990). However, since the mid-1980s there has 
been a growing awareness that individuals are socially and 
culturally situated and that the environment needs to be 
considered in order to understand cognition (Clancey, 1997; 
Clark, 1997; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Hutchins, 1995; 
Suchman, 1987). Humans are, for instance, very proficient 
in using environmental properties as cognitive aids (Clark, 
1997; Kirsh, 1995, 1996), and there is growing interest in 
finding out how artefacts/tools affect cognition (e.g., 
Preston, 1998). The terms artefact, tool, and tool use are not 
particularly well defined, even though there are numerous 
definitions, resulting from differing focuses in different 
areas (see, e.g., Gibson & Ingold, 1993; Neuman & 
Bekerman, 2000; Preston, 1998). In this paper, artefact and 
tool are used, in accordance with much of the literature, 
more or less interchangeably.  
Despite an increasing interest in cognition and artefacts 
(see, e.g., Norman, 1993), there is so far a limited 
understanding of the way artefacts affect the individual 
within a social context. The present paper aims to contribute 
to the understanding of the way people are affected by 
artefacts, and the role artefacts can have in a certain social 
context. A field study was conducted in a Swedish hospital, 
at the children’s admission, where artefacts (as it turned out) 
constitute an important part of work tasks. The results 
indicate that artefacts play an important role in the social 
context, in a manner different from their role when 
considered in relation to an individual.  
The next section elaborates in some more detail work on 
situated, distributed and social cognition that constitutes the 
background for the work of the present paper. Then 
methods, analysis, and results are described, followed by a 
discussion.  
Situated, Distributed, and Social Cognition 
Situated cognition has become an influential approach in 
many different areas, such as artificial intelligence (e.g., 
Brooks, 1999), cognitive anthropology (Hutchins, 1995), 
cognitive psychology (e.g., Barsalou, 1999), and 
developmental psychology (e.g., Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
Although there is not yet any universally accepted notion or 
definition of ‘situatedness’ (cf. Clancey, 1997; Wilson, 
2003; Ziemke, 2002), generally speaking there is an 
agreement that cognition is a continuous process (e.g., 
perception-action-loops) with changing boundaries, and that 
cognition is more than what takes place within the 
individual mind (e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 1999; 
Susi et al., 2003). The context in which human activities 
take place is equally important. Hence, there is a growing 
interest in understanding the role of scaffolds or ‘wideware’, 
i.e., external structures such as artefacts, in cognition (e.g., 
Clark, A., 1997, 1999, 2003; Hutchins, 1995). In itself an 
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artefact may not be much, but coupled with human 
cognitive abilities artefacts can become powerful tools, and 
it has been argued that they extend cognitive abilities such 
that ‘thinking’ cannot be reduced to internal cognitive 
processing (Chalmers & Clark, 1998). Hence, the use of 
scaffolds or (cognitive) artefacts amplifies cognition. 
However, it has been pointed out that artefacts actually do 
not amplify cognition as such (Cole & Griffin, 1980; 
Hutchins, 1995). Even though a tool may appear to amplify 
cognition, it is really a coordination of different cognitive 
processes, which can be aided by using appropriate tools, 
but no cognitive ability, or process, has been amplified. 
Other considerations on the topic of artefacts and cognition 
concern, for instance, that tool use extends the body and a 
person’s body schema (Bateson, 1972; Berti & Frassinettis, 
2000; Maravita et al. 2001; Maravita & Iriki, 2004). We are 
also spatial beings, and, subsequently, all actions are taken 
in relation to the environment (Kirsh, 1995). People 
continuously organise and reorganise, for instance, their 
work environments to reduce the cognitive effort needed.  
For a long time tool use and technology were degraded to 
‘by-products’ of cognitive evolution (Saito, 1996), but with 
increased knowledge it has become clear that artefacts and 
their use have a considerable effect on cognitive processes. 
This issue received much attention already by Vygotsky and 
his followers (see, e.g., Gal’perin, 1969; Haenen, 1996; 
Vygotsky, 1978, 1981). However, in order to understand 
this relation further research is needed concerning questions 
such as what makes an object become a tool, and the 
development of tool use behaviour (Preston, 1998).  
The fact that artefacts, for a long time, have received 
relatively little attention in cognitive science is somewhat 
surprising. Nowadays they are commonly described as the 
“the other major form of cognitive mediation between 
individual and world” (Preston, 1998, p. 514), besides 
language, but obviously language has always played a much 
more central role in cognitive science. Artefacts also played 
a crucial role, as controlling behaviour from the outside, in 
the cultural-historical school in psychology, in particular the 
work of Vygotsky (1978, 1981), but with the advent of 
cognitive science attention, for the abovementioned reasons, 
for a long time shifted towards internal, individual processes 
and representations.  
Recent work on distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995) 
has in some sense rediscovered the integral role that 
artefacts play in both individual and collaborative cognitive 
processes that are distributed over people and the material 
resources they use. This view takes an interest in the way 
information is represented, transformed, and propagated in  
the material and social environment. That way, cognitive 
processes can be described in terms of functional 
relationships between brains, other people, and external 
objects. The role of artefacts as mediators of social 
cognition, however, is far from being fully understood. The 
present paper considers cognition from a situated and 
distributed perspective, i.e., it views high-level cognition as 
resulting from a close interplay between brain, body, and 
the social and material environment in which humans live 
and act.  
Like most of cognitive science, research in social 
cognition has traditionally focused on individual cognitive 
processes involving social information, such as attention, 
perception, and memory, and the internal representations 
they generate or manipulate (e.g., Augoustinos & Walker, 
1995; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Gilbert, Fiske & Lindzey, 
1998). Hence, few studies have taken a situated perspective 
(Semin & Smith, 2002). However, people are also socially 
situated, which means, one the hand, social interaction 
between individuals, and, on the other hand, that cognition 
is situated within a wider social and cultural context (Lave, 
1988; Wertsch, 1993; Semin & Smith, 2002). Hence, 
besides interactional aspects, cognition is also affected by 
(cultural) artefacts (Levine & Resnick, 1993). Due to the 
fact that they constitute part of a culture’s intellectual 
history, their use actually turns even seemingly individual 
activities into a social process as artefacts are affected by 
social aspects (Resnick, 1993). As pointed out by Hutchins 
(1995, p. xiv), “human cognition is not just influenced by 
culture and society, but ... is in a very fundamental sense a 
cultural and social process”. 
Case study  
Most research on cognition and artefacts has to a large 
extent focused on the individual (e.g., Norman, 1991, 1993) 
while contextual and environmental aspects largely have 
been disregarded, with some notable exceptions (e.g. 
Hutchins, 1995). Subsequently there is a limited 
understanding as to how artefacts affect the individual 
within a social context. Further research is needed that 
considers both social interactions and tool use to gain 
further understanding of the relation between artefacts, 
individual, and social cognition. Accordingly, the 
underlying question for the present study was “how does 
tool use affect individual cognitive processes within a social 
context”? The term ‘artefacts’ in this case refers to objects 
that are significant for everyday work tasks, while 
’cognitive processes’ here refer to high-level processes such 
as attention, memory, and coordination.  
Method and Setting 
In order to investigate the above questions, a field study was 
conducted at the children’s admission in a Swedish hospital. 
Such work places are indeed highly social work places: well 
functioning daily work requires well-organised cooperation 
between the members of the staff, as well as between 
different wards. The work tasks at the children’s admission 
are individual in the sense that most work is carried out 
individually. For example, parents and children arriving at 
the admission would usually first meet an administrator who 
registers their arrival, then a nurse who, for example, might 
draw a blood sample, and eventually a doctor. At the same 
time though, all these individual activities are, of course, 
socially situated and have a strong coupling to the social and 
environmental context.  
In the children’s admission, we chose (a part of) the 
central office (which functions as a communication, 
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coordination, and administrative centre), as the setting for 
the study. The office has three units: a reception, an 
administrative unit, and a unit where all incoming phone 
calls are handled. The study was limited to the 
administrative unit (see Figure 1), since it is a central place 
for much of the daily activities, and nurses frequently visit 
this unit. There are always three to four nurses working at 
the same time, and the study focused mainly on their work. 
However, other people also visit the administrative unit 
during the day, e.g., doctors who come by to collect patient 
records. The main part of the nurses’ work consists of taking 
care of patients that have an appointment, as well as urgent 
cases that appear during the day. They also handle 
administrative tasks, phone counselling, and patient-related 
tasks, e.g. drawing blood samples. Each member of the staff 
is responsible for certain tasks, but must also be aware of 
the others’ tasks and responsibilities in order to coordinate 
their work. On an overall level, the daily routine consists of 
registering patients on their arrival, and getting each 
patient’s medical record from the archive. Patients that are 
expected during the day are listed on a patient list. A nurse 
carries out an initial examination (weight, etc.), and if the 
patient has a doctor’s appointment, he or she is shown into a 
consultation room. In cases where some kind of a sample 
needs to be drawn or collected, the doctor notifies a nurse. 
The study was inspired by cognitive ethnography (Hollan 
et al. (2000), with observations (moderate participation; 
DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002), video recordings, and interviews. 
The combination of such techniques provides a means for 
gaining insight into the interactions between people and 
their use of artefacts, and subsequently cognitive processes. 
The staff was informed that the office was the subject of a 
study, and the time when it was to take place. Initial 
interviews were conducted to gain information about the 
staff, their work tasks, and the setup of the office. 
Observations were made during two days, and when 
necessary, questions were asked during the observation. 
During the observations the office was also videotaped. 
When all material had been analysed, another interview took 
place to verify that, e.g., work tasks had been correctly 
understood.  
Analysis and Results  
The videotaped material (three hours in total) and notes 
taken during the observations were analysed from the 
perspective of the staff’s work tasks and activities, and the 
function of artefacts used in relation to the identified 
activities.  
A highly social work setting, such as the observed 
children’s admission, requires well functioning cooperation, 
interaction, communication, shared knowledge about 
routines, others’ tasks, etc. In this particular setting the staff 
uses various artefacts with varying functions, which requires 
an additional interpersonal understanding of their different 
functions. In the present study a number of artefacts turned 
out to be crucial with respect to processes such as 
coordination of the ongoing work. However, due to space 
limitations, only a few artefacts are discussed here in some 
detail.  
Most activities in the administrative unit take place 
around a small table, on which various items are kept and 
placed (cf. Figure 1). The structure of the office unit also 
provides structure to the work tasks since the artefacts draw 
attention to what is going on and what needs to be done.  
 
Patient’s record One of the most important artefacts in this 
particular setting is the patient’s medical record. Basically, 
it is a folder containing a collection of documents with 
information about a patient. All the documents are sorted in 
a specific manner in order to reduce the effort of finding the 
right information (a document out of its proper placement 
causes disturbances in the work-flow), and when a patient 
visits the children’s admission new information is added. 
The patient record has several functions, besides the obvious 
one of storing information about patients. Clearly, no single 
person could keep all the information in the head, and there 
is no need to either, as the patient record provides an 
external memory (on some rare occasion a patient’s medical 
record has been displaced, which caused serious problems). 
As different people handle the patient record, more 
information is added to it, and its contents (the 
representations) become transformed. Commonly, patients 
do not meet the same nurses and/or doctors each time they 
come to the children’s admission, but information 
concerning the patient is transferred between staff members 
through the patient record, which functions as a 
‘communicator’ between different people. That way the 
contents of a patient’s record transform intrapersonal 
knowledge to interpersonal knowledge shared by several 
people. The patient records also contribute to an overall 
coordination of work processes since, depending on where a 
patient record is placed, it causes different people to take 
different actions. Placed in the reception’s tray, it triggers a 
nurse to take the patient record into the administrative unit, 
while placed in a tray labelled with a doctor’s name it 
informs the doctor that a patient is waiting, etc. 
 
The patient list Another highly crucial artefact is the 
patient list placed on the wall above the small table (cf. 
Figure 1) (another list is in the reception, but that was not 
included in the study). The list actually consists of nine 
smaller lists (together referred to as the patient list), each 
corresponding to a consultation room (each doctor uses the 
same consultation room throughout the day). Thus the list 
tells, not only who is coming when, but also in which room 
the patient will be received and by whom. The list also 
contains information about each patient and the measures to 
be taken. The list is computer-generated, and during the day 
the nurses make additional markings by hand. The markings 
consist of symbols that are typically understood only by the 
staff. For instance, a certain symbol next to a name on the 
list means that the patient is waiting in the consultation 
room (which the list concerns), another symbol means that a 
doctor has been delayed, and yet another one means that the 
patient has left the admission. All markings are made in red 
so that they are highly visible and easy to perceive. During 
the observation it became clear that the nurses had no 
difficulties in understanding the added markings, and hence 
the list provides a means for communication and 
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coordination between people, even when they do not 
interact directly.  
Another function of the list is that it provides a (shared) 
external memory, providing everyone with the same 
necessary information. No one needs to memorise the 
information, as it is ‘there’ all the time, visible to those who 
need it, as they need it. As symbols are added to the list, the 
information becomes transformed and it is propagated from 
one individual to another when needed. The list also 
provides an overview and a visualisation of the consultation 
rooms, and each doctor only needs to pay attention to that 
part of the list that is related to their room, which in turn 
delimits the amount of information that needs to be attended 
to.  
 
Paper trays There are a number of trays1 in the office, each 
with its own function(s) and assigned meaning. As patients 
are registered on their arrival, their medical records are 
withdrawn and placed in a paper tray in the reception. A 
patient’s record in the tray is a signal to the nurses that a 
patient has arrived. The patient records are brought by the 
nurses to the administrative unit, and, eventually, they are 
placed in trays labelled with the name of the doctor that the 
patient is going to see. Usually there are four to five doctors 
working at the same time, and their (labelled) trays are 
placed on a shelf under the small table (cf. Figure 1). Trays 
belonging to doctors who are not on duty are placed 
somewhere else (top shelf to the left of the small table, cf. 
Figure 1). During the day each doctor collects the patient 
records that are placed in their tray. When a sample needs to 
be drawn or collected, the doctor notifies it by leaving 
                                                           
1 The items containing documents that are discussed in this 
paragraph are not all paper trays in the real sense of the word, but 
are here, for simplicity sake, collected under the label of ‘trays’. 
follow-up instructions in a blue tray (to the right on the 
small table in Figure 1). When a nurse has performed the 
procedure, a filled-in document concerning the sample is 
placed in an orange tray (on the bench to the lower left in 
Figure 1). Thus, the spatial arrangement of the trays (and 
other artefacts) contributes greatly to structuring the 
ongoing work. 
Besides containing documents, the trays have several 
other functions. For instance, rather than having to keep 
each ongoing process of the work place in memory, the 
trays, and their contents, provide information about what is 
going on and matters that need to be taken care of, thereby 
providing an external memory. The trays also serve as a 
means of indirect communication between individuals. The 
nurses, for instance, do not have to tell a doctor, in person, 
that a patient is waiting. Instead that information is mediated 
through the contents of the labelled tray. That way each 
person can attend his or her own individual work tasks, 
while at the same time, on an overall level, the indirect 
communication contributes to a well-functioning operation. 
The trays also limit the amount of information that needs to 
considered. A doctor, for instance, only needs to pay 
attention to one labelled tray (or one part of the patient list). 
Other artefacts There are also a number of other artefacts, 
equally important but taken for granted to the extent that 
they become ‘invisible’ (Gauvain, 2001). One such artefact 
that should be mentioned here is the small table (Figure 1), 
which plays a crucial role in the organisation of the daily 
work. Such a common artefact might seem trivial to discuss, 
but in this case it is an important part of the spatial 
arrangement that contributes to the overall structure of work 
tasks (cf. Kirsh, 1995). People know that it is the place 
where things that are used or needed often, are kept, and that 
it is a place for important information. Thus it provides, e.g., 
Figure 1. The observed administrative unit. In the upper corner is the small table with a tray 
(follow-up instructions), and with labelled trays on the shelf below. On the left wall above the table 
is the patient list(s). On the bench to the lower left is the (orange) tray for filled in sample 
documents. The cameras indicate the two placements of the (one) camera during the observation. 
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an external memory, and people often take a glance at the 
table before leaving the room, to see if they left anything 
there as they entered the room (as is often done), or if there 
is something they need to take care of. The table is also used 
as a message board, where people leave notes for others.  
Discussion 
The question guiding our study was “how does tool use 
affect individual cognitive processes within a social 
context?”. One perspective of interest in the present analysis 
is the ecological perspective (Gibson, 1986), since an 
artefact’s function is closely related to its appearance 
(affordance). However, due to space limitations that 
discussion has been left out in this paper.  
Obviously, a two-day study has its limitations, and can 
only provide a rough understanding of the complexities of a 
work setting, artefacts, the relations between individuals and 
social contexts, etc. Nevertheless, despite possible 
shortcomings, this study is an important step in what we 
consider an important research direction. Even limited 
studies can provide valuable insights, and this particular 
study illustrates some aspects of the relation between 
artefacts, individuals, and social context.  
On a general level, the study shows the importance of the 
artefacts used in this particular setting, and the way they 
contribute to a well-functioning operation where much of 
the activities are coordinated in an implicit manner. It can 
also be argued that just how powerful artefacts are becomes 
evident only when considered within the social context in 
which they are used. Some artefacts, such as a patient list, 
only make sense to and are understood by those who use 
them (cf. Levine & Moreland, 1993). As it turned out, it is 
not only the way an artefact is used that is important for 
cognition, but also where it is used (cf. Kirsh, 1995). The 
environmental structure and spatial arrangements partly 
determine the function and the meaning of an artefact. For 
instance, the labelled trays have different meanings 
depending on where (on which shelf) they are placed, and 
patient records trigger different activities depending on 
where they are placed (cf. also Clark, H., 2003). Artefacts 
also provide a scaffold for different cognitive processes 
depending on who the user is, i.e., the user’s role in the 
overall social arrangement. Artefacts play an important role 
as organisers: the state of an artefact (e.g., a tray that is 
empty, or not) helps the individuals to organise their work, 
and on the social level they contribute to coordination, 
cooperation and structure. Some artefacts make information 
available and visible, and contribute to the propagation of 
information between people and artefacts.  
As discussed by Hollan et al. (2000), the activities of a 
group cannot be fully understood from the individual’s 
perspective, rather the functional relationships of people and 
artefacts need to be considered. Thus, individual actions 
cannot be explained without considering what others are 
doing, the interpersonal codes, knowledge, and shared 
understanding of the functions of all the artefacts they use 
(e.g., Leont’ev, 1978; Thompson & Fine, 1999). Another 
important aspect is the way artefacts transform individual 
processes into social processes, and vice versa. For instance, 
when a nurse adds a marking to the patient list the 
information becomes part of a social activity and individual 
knowledge becomes shared knowledge (in a sense 
propagated ‘on demand’ only). Likewise, social or shared 
activities may become individual activities, e.g., when the 
nurse attends to information added by others. 
To summarise, the artefacts analysed in this study 
function as mediators of distributed social cognition, i.e., 
they constitute or facilitate shared memory, coordination, 
communication, and sharing of information. Many artefacts 
have the same, or similar, functions¸ which however vary 
depending on who is using them, where (spatially) they are 
used, their functional coupling to other artefacts, and the 
social context. As illustrated in this paper, artefacts in many 
cases transform social interactions into individual processes, 
but at the same time they also mediate the indirect 
interaction of these processes¸ and thus maintain their social 
nature (cf. Susi & Ziemke, 2001).  
This study has illustrated that, in order to understand 
artefacts and their role in individual and social cognitive 
processes, we need to consider artefacts, individuals, the 
social context, and their functional interrelations. Much of 
the work addressing these issues, including this paper, has 
been presented in the form of examples, anecdotal evidence, 
case studies, etc. Future work will have to further address 
the development of a more systematic, principled 
understanding of the role that artefacts play in distributed 
social cognitive processes.  
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Abstract 
A hierarchical framework suggesting how graph readers go 
beyond explicitly represented data to make inferences is 
presented. According to our hierarchical framework, graph 
readers use read-offs, integration and pattern extrapolation to 
make inferences. Verbal protocol data demonstrates high-
level differences in the way inferences are made and eye track 
data examines these processes at the perceptual level.  
Introduction 
Imagine a scientist examining Figure 1 in order to infer 
which county in California is going to be hit next by the flu 
epidemic. How would the scientist go about making this 
prediction? 
  
 
Figure 1. Cases of the flu in California.  
 
Making inferences from graphs is considered one of the 
more complex skills graph readers should possess. 
According to the National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics (NCTM) the simplest type of question 
involves the extraction or comparison of a few explicitly 
represented data points (read-offs) (NCTM: Standards for 
Mathematics, 2003). A more difficult question is an 
integration question where multiple data points need to be 
extracted and integrated by some mental operation. The 
most difficult type of question requires the graph reader to 
make inferences from the graph. Because the information is 
not explicitly represented in the data, the graph reader is 
forced to extrapolate from the current data to make a 
prediction (Trickett, Ratwani, & Trafton, under review).   
 How do graph readers go beyond the explicitly 
represented data to make inferences from graphs? Less is 
known about how inferences are made from graphical 
representations, despite the importance of having this skill. 
Most of the classical theories of graph comprehension 
(Kosslyn, 1989; Lohse, 1993; Pinker, 1990) do not go into 
detail about how integration and inferences are made, but 
instead focus on read-offs from fairly simple graph types. 
One of the reasons that current theories of graph 
comprehension do not have much to say about making 
inferences from graphs is the paucity of data. There are, in 
fact, very few empirical papers that have systematically 
investigated how graph readers make inferences from 
graphs.   
We propose a hierarchical framework of graph 
comprehension for how these different types of questions 
(read-off, integration, inference) are answered. The most 
basic type of information extraction is the read-off of 
explicitly represented data. The more difficult integration of 
information requires the use of read-off’s and spatial 
transformations (Trafton, Marshall, Mintz, & Trickett, 2002; 
Trickett & Trafton, in press). For example, in order to 
integrate information in choropleth graphs (see figures 1 and 
2), graph readers read-off specific data points and use 
spatial transformations by forming clusters of proximate 
same colored counties and then reason with and compare 
those clusters (Ratwani, Trafton, & Boehm-Davis, 2003). 
Finally, in order to make inferences from graphs, we believe 
graph readers use the same processes used to integrate 
information (read-off’s and spatial transformations) and in 
addition use pattern extrapolation and mental models 
(Trafton et al., 2002).  
Going beyond the limits of the current data in order to 
make an inference requires the use of extrapolation (Bott & 
Heit, 2004); when graph reader’s go beyond the limits of 
visible data, pattern extrapolation may be used. Pattern 
extrapolation is a process by which graph readers examine 
known data points and then, based on the pattern of these 
data points, make an inference.   
While the hierarchical framework suggests what cognitive 
processes graph readers will use when extracting different 
types of information from graphs, graph readers are likely to 
use the simplest process to extract the information they 
desire. For example, when integrating information, if 
possible, graph readers will use mostly read-offs because 
read-offs are a simple way of extracting information from 
graphs and require very little cognitive effort in comparison 
to spatial transformations or mental model building. 
Similarly, if a graph reader needs to integrate information 
from a graph, they are not likely to need to build mental 
models and extrapolate patterns.  
In this paper, we examine which processes are used to 
make inferences from graphs. We focus on inferences 
because read-offs are quite well understood (Kosslyn, 1989; 
Lohse, 1993; Pinker, 1990), there is a preliminary 
framework for integration of graphical information 
(Ratwani, Trafton, & Boehm-Davis, 2003), but there are no 
theories that can adequately describe how inferences are 
made. Previous research examining graphical inferences has 
focused on the use of mental models, spatial transformations 
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and the role of domain knowledge (Hegarty, Shimozawa, & 
Canham, under review; Trafton et al., 2000). We are 
interested in how all of these processes are combined in 
order to make inferences from graphs. In this paper, we 
focus on read-offs, integration and pattern extrapolation 
because it is relatively straightforward to identify read-offs, 
integration, and pattern extrapolation and much more 
difficult to identify spatial transformations or mental model 
building. 
If the hierarchical framework of graph comprehension is 
correct, graph readers will make inferences by reading-off 
explicit information, using pattern extrapolation and 
integrating information. Experiment 1 serves to explore 
higher-level thinking about how graph readers make 
inferences from graphs by using the protocol analysis 
methodology. Experiment 2 further investigates the 
processes used to make inferences by using an eye tracker to 
examine graph readers’ eye movements.  
Experiment 1 
The first experiment was designed to explore the types of 
processes graph readers use to make inferences from 
multiple choropleth graphs. Choropleth graphs depicting 
population densities were selected for use in this 
experiment; these graphs use different colors, shades of 
gray, or patterns to represent different quantities.  
Choropleth graphs were chosen for multiple reasons. First, 
they are more complex than the graph types used in more 
traditional studies of graph comprehension and better reflect 
how graphs are used in the real-world. Second, these 
particular graphs do not require a great deal of domain 
knowledge and can be presented to undergraduates without 
much training. Finally, choropleth graphs represent a class 
of graphs that are commonly used by scientists in such 
domains as meteorology, geology and oceanography.  
Method 
Participants 
Three George Mason University undergraduate psychology 
students served as participants for course credit. Informed 
consent was received from all participants.  
 
Materials 
Twenty sets of choropleth graphs were created; each set 
consisted of three conceptually related graphs. The graphs in 
each set displayed the population densities of fifty fictitious 
counties. The first graph in each set displayed the 
population from the year 1990, the second graph displayed 
1995 and the third graph displayed the population from the 
year 2000 (See Figure 2 for an example).  Only one county 
in each set of graphs was labeled with a county name 
(referred to as the target county) in order to reduce search 
time. Previous studies found that graph readers spent a great 
deal of time searching for the county of interest when every 
county was labeled (Ratwani et al 2003). One inference 
question was asked of each set of graphs: What will the 
population of the target county be in the year 2005?  
Design 
Five sets of graphs showed a clear decrease in the overall 
population densities from 1990 to 2000 while the population 
of the target county did not change in any of these graphs. 
These counties surrounding the target county had a powerful 
contextual indication that the population was decreasing. 
Five sets of graphs showed a clear increase in the overall 
population densities from 1990 to 2000 while the population 
of the target county did not change. These counties 
surrounding the target county had a powerful contextual 
indication that the population was increasing. Ten of the sets 
of graphs served as fillers and were removed from all 
analyses; the populations were jumbled and had increasing, 
decreasing or no clear pattern to the population movement 
across the graphs. The purpose of these sets was to 
randomize the patterns of increasing and decreasing 
population in the ten sets of interest. The order in which the 
twenty sets of graphs were presented was randomized for 
each participant. The increasing and decreasing sets were 
combined in the analyses below.  
 
Procedure 
All participants first read the question for the set of graphs 
they were about to view and then examined the graphs. For 
example, the participant would read the question, “What 
will the population of county x be in the year 2005?” After 
reading the question the participant would then view the 
graphs from the three time periods and make their 
prediction. This process continued for each of the twenty 
sets of graphs. 
The participants could view each of the graphs for as long 
as they desired, and the participants were permitted to look 
back to any of the graphs within a particular set as needed. 
Each graph was presented on a single sheet of paper. After 
answering each question, the participant went on to the next 
set of graphs. Each participant provided a talk-aloud 
protocol (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) as they examined the 
graphs and answered the questions. The participants’ verbal 
protocols and the graphs they were examining were 
videotaped.  
 
Coding Scheme 
Transcriptions of the verbal protocols were made prior to 
data analysis. The first step was to segment the protocols 
into individual utterances. Utterances were defined as a 
single thought and utterances that were not germane to the 
task at hand were coded as “off task” and eliminated from 
further analysis. Each remaining utterance was then coded 
according to our hierarchical framework. The utterances 
were coded as either being a target read-off (extracting 
information regarding the target county of interest only) or 
integrative (extracting general trend information from the 
graph).  All the answers were, by definition, inferences. 
There were no non-target read-off’s in any of the utterances 
made by the participants. Table 1 shows examples of each 
utterance type.  
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Figure 2. Graphs depicting population growth from 1990, 1995, and 2000 (left to right).  
     
 
Code Example 
Target read-off In 1990 Stow County was 20,000 to 
30,000 
 
Integrative All the other areas are increasing in 
population 
Table 1: Examples of each extraction type.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Our main goal was to explore how graph readers made 
inferences from graphs. We first examined the types of 
extractions made by each graph reader and then compared 
these extractions to the answer given to the inference 
questions. The participants gave a numerical answer 
indicating that the population of the target county would 
either change or not change. Of the three participants, one 
participant made change responses the majority of the time, 
one participant made non-change responses the majority of 
the time and one participant had mixed responses. Thus, 
graph readers were not always using the same strategy to 
make these inferences. When participants made a change 
response, their inference was in the direction consistent with 
the surrounding counties. For example, when the participant 
made a change response and inferred that the population of 
the target county would grow in the future, the surrounding 
counties were also growing.  
As figure 3 suggests, when graph readers said the 
population of the target county would not change in the 
future all of their extractions were target read-offs. When 
graph readers said that the target county would change in 
the future, the graph readers made some target read-offs but 
made a significantly greater number of integrative 
extractions, χ2(1) = 4.9, p < .05. In addition, when a non-
change response was given, graph readers made a 
significantly greater number of target read-offs than when a 
change response was made, χ2(1) = 8.02, p < .01.  
The verbal protocol data indicates that when graph 
readers performed mostly target read-off’s they made a non-
change response to the inference questions. That is, despite  
 
 
 
the fact that the powerful overall context of the three graphs 
suggested that the population was increasing (for example),  
the graph reader inferred that the population of the target 
county would not change in the future. However, when 
graph readers looked beyond the target and used the global 
context of the graphs the graph readers used context to infer 
that the growth would continue to the target county and that 
the target county would change in the future.  
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Figure 3: Number of extractions by response.   
 
These data suggest there are differences in the way people 
think about making inferences. Based on the type of 
extractions the graph reader made, their response could be 
categorized as either inferring a change or not inferring a 
change in the future population. There appear to be two 
general ways in which graph readers made inferences from 
these graphs. One way was to focus only on the target 
county in each of the three time periods and, based on how 
the population changed in the target county, an inference 
was made as to the future population. For example, if the 
target county did not change population in any of the three 
time periods then it would not change in the future. This no 
change response appears to be based solely on pattern 
extrapolation of the target county. Alternatively, when 
making change responses, graph readers appeared to be 
making read-off’s for pattern extrapolation and taking into 
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consideration the contextual influences of the graph. Some 
aspects of the global context of the graph were being 
integrated with the population of the target county in order 
to make the inference.  When participants made change 
responses, their verbal protocol data is consistent with an 
interpretation of them creating a dynamic mental model:  
participants were imagining the growth in the counties 
extending to nearby counties, eventually “hitting” the target 
county.  While we are not directly measuring mental model 
formation in this paper, we are interested in what 
information is needed to form those mental models. 
Based on our hierarchical framework, we would expect 
graph readers to make inferences by both reading-off 
information for pattern extrapolation and integrating 
information. It appeared that when graph readers made a 
non-change response, they extracted target information 
only, noticed it did not change, and extrapolated that it 
would not change in the future.  They did not seem to 
explicitly extract information from nearby counties. Graph 
readers who made a change response appeared to be using 
read-offs, pattern extrapolation and integration as our 
hierarchical framework suggests.  
Experiment 1 showed that people had different strategies 
when answering inference questions: a change strategy and 
a non-change strategy.  It could be that at the perceptual 
level these strategies are identical.  For example, it could be 
that participants who made a no-change answer did, in fact, 
look all over the graph but decided to simply ignore that 
information, or assume that the target county was the most 
important determinant of future change.  Additionally, the 
protocol data did not show how or what types of 
information was extracted by change-response participants.  
Experiment 2 investigates these issues. 
Experiment 2 
How, then, did participants make inferences from these 
graphs?  By performing a small task analysis, it is obvious 
that when information needs to be integrated, it can be 
integrated in at least two ways: within a specific graph and 
between related graphs.  If a participant integrates 
information within a specific graph, the participant would 
presumably examine nearby counties to see how their 
population was different from the target county.  If a 
participant integrates information between related graphs, 
the participant would probably examine graphs that had 
changed over time.   
Experiment 2 will explore three main issues.  First, do 
participants who answer change and non-change have 
different perceptual strategies?  Second, what types of 
integration do change participants engage in (within graphs, 
between graphs, or both)?  Third, what is the proportion of 
read-offs and integration used in order to answer inference 
questions and how do those proportions relate to the 
answers that participants gave? 
 Method 
Participants 
Thirteen George Mason University undergraduate 
psychology students served as participants for course credit. 
Informed consent was received from all participants. 
 
Materials 
The same sets of graphs used in the first experiment were 
used in the second experiment. In this experiment the 
materials (graphs and questions) were displayed on a 
computer screen. Eye track data was collected using an LC 
Technologies Eye gaze System eye tracker operating at 
60Hz (16.7 samples/second).  
 
Design 
The design was the same as Experiment 1.  
 
Procedure 
The procedure was very similar to that used in Experiment 
1; however, the use of the computer and eye tracker did 
necessitate some changes. The participants were seated at a 
comfortable distance from the monitor and used a chin rest. 
Participants first were calibrated on the eye tracker. 
Participants were then shown the question at the top of a 
blank screen and read the question out loud. Previous 
studies (Ratwani et al., 2003) have shown that the process of 
collecting eye track data was not hindered by the participant 
talking. After reading the question the participant proceeded 
to the first graph. The interface allowed the participants to 
progress from graph to graph within a set with a button-
click. The participants were instructed to say their answer 
out loud when they made their inference. After answering 
the question, the participant could progress to the next 
question and set of graphs.  
 
Coding Scheme 
A gaze was defined from each sample being no more that 10 
pixels in Euclidian distance from the center of gravity of the 
previous point for at least 100 milliseconds. Frequencies 
were created by counting the number of gazes to different 
areas of the graph. The areas of the graph that were coded 
were: the legend, the title of the graph, and the main part of 
the graph itself.  
Participant’s gazes to the main part of the graph were 
coded to examine how much reading-off and how much 
integrating the participants were doing. Gazes to the target 
county were coded to examine how often participants were 
making read-offs. Gazes to locations other than the target 
were coded in order to examine whether graph readers were 
integrating information within the graph. In order to capture 
how far away from the target county participants were 
gazing the location of the gaze relative to the target county 
was coded for. For example, if a participant gazed at a 
county that was three counties away from the target this 
distance was coded.  
Integration of information between graphs was coded by 
examining areas of change relative to the previously viewed 
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graphs. If a gaze to the graph was to a county where the 
population value changed from a previously viewed graph 
this was coded for. For example, if the participant gazed to a 
county in 1995 that had changed in population relative to 
the map from 1990 then this was coded as a change gaze. 
Thus, the first map viewed by each participant in every set 
did not have any change gazes.  
Results and Discussion  
Experiment 2 was designed to examine what processes 
occurred at the perceptual level when graph readers made 
inferences from graphs. Specifically, we wanted to further 
investigate the process differences when graph readers made 
a change response as compared to when they made a non-
change response.  
The responses made by graph readers were mixed, but 
mostly (76%) change responses were made. The raw 
frequencies of gazes were normalized by dividing the 
frequency of gazes by the number of responses in either the 
non-change or change category.  
There were no significant differences in the number of 
target gazes when participants made a non-change response 
as compared to a change response as figure 4 suggests, χ2(1) 
= .34, p = .56. Participants appeared to be reading off the 
same amount of target information regardless of what type 
of response they made. Thus, participants were reading off 
information nearly equally when making inferences.  
However, participants who made change responses did 
more integration within the graph than participants who did 
not make change responses. As figure 4 suggests, those who 
made change responses on average made a greater number 
of gazes to counties other than the target, χ2(1) = 4.52, p < 
.05.  
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Figure 4. Number of coded gazes.  
 
How far away from the target did participants look? In 
order to examine this issue, we created histograms showing 
the location of the counties that were gazed at based on the 
participants response.  Figures 5 shows the frequency of 
gazes participants made to the target and to counties other 
that the target. The x-axis shows how far away the county 
gazed at was from the target. Zero represents the target and 
one through eight represent how far away the county gazed 
at was from the target. The patterns in these histograms are 
significantly different, χ2(8) = 22.82, p < .01, suggesting 
that when graph readers made a change response, they 
frequently looked at the target and counties away from the 
target, whereas graph readers who made a non-change 
response focused primarily on the target. Consistent with 
this interpretation, the proportion of change gazes to non-
targets (68%) was far greater than the proportion of non-
change gazes to non-targets (37%), χ2(1) = 9.2, p < .005.  
Graph readers who made a change response were frequently 
looking at counties as far as 6 away from the target county.  
Did graph readers integrate information between graphs 
when they were making inferences? Integration between 
graphs was examined by looking at the number of gazes to 
areas of change from one graph relative to another. As 
figure 4 suggests, participants who made change responses 
made a significantly greater number of gazes to areas of 
change as compared to participants who made non-change 
responses, χ2(1) = 4.88, p < .05. This suggests participants 
who made change responses were integrating information 
between graphs by comparing the areas that changed in 
population. 
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Figures 5.  Histogram of distance by response.  
 
The process of integrating information between graphs is 
further supported be examining the number of times graph 
readers examined each of the three graphs. For example, 
some participants viewed each graph once; the sequence of 
graphs they looked at was 1→2→3. Whereas other graph 
readers examined each graph more than once and had a 
sequence such as 1→2→1→2→3→2→3. Participants who 
made change responses looked at the three graphs in each 
set more often in order to compare the counties that changed 
population between graphs, χ2(2) = 5.24, p < .05. Thus, 
graph readers who made change responses integrated 
information between graphs by paying attention to areas that 
changed in the graphs and looking at the graphs frequently 
in order to make these comparisons.   
When participants made non-change responses, their eye 
movements suggest they are primarily examining the target 
county. These participants generally looked at each map 
only once. Furthermore, they appeared to be reading-off 
target county information in each graph, noticing the pattern 
does not change, and then using pattern extrapolation to 
infer that the pattern will not change in the future.  
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Graph readers making change responses appeared to read 
off target county information and also focused a great deal 
of attention on non-target counties. These gazes to non-
target counties appeared to be a way to integrate the 
information from the other counties with the information 
about the target county. These graph readers also integrated 
information between graphs by paying attention to areas of 
change between the graphs. Finally, they compared areas of 
change to infer the future population by looking back and 
forth at the graphs in each set. This is suggestive evidence 
of the formation of dynamic mental models which may be 
used to understand how the contextual growth or decay is 
influencing the target county.  
General Discussion 
How do people make inferences from graphs?  Most classic 
theories do not provide any mechanisms for making 
graphical inferences.  These studies examined inferences at 
a high-level by focusing on graph reader’s thought 
processes with the verbal protocol data and also at the 
perceptual level by examining graph reader’s eye 
movements. These studies demonstrate that people certainly 
can make inferences, and that people make inferences in 
different ways. One way that people make inferences is to 
examine the specific object that will change over time 
(target county in our case).  Depending on the type of 
change that is observed, a pattern is extracted and then 
extrapolated.  In our studies, approximately a quarter of the 
answers conformed to this strategy.  The remainder took 
context into account.  That is, they observed the surrounding 
counties (especially the ones that changed from graph to 
graph) and presumably imagined the change affecting the 
target county. 
Our hierarchical framework of graph comprehension is 
consistent with both views, though it is supported more 
strongly by the participants who made change answers.  In 
order to make inferences, the hierarchical view framework 
suggests that people need to extract specific information 
from graphs (well described by most theories of graph 
comprehension), integrate information into a reasonable 
whole (in this case by combining information between and 
within graphs), use that information to extrapolate beyond 
the given data, mentally manipulate the graphical 
information by spatial transformations and build mental 
models.  It is interesting that when non-change answers 
were made, only a subset of this framework was used:  the 
evidence for integration in particular was quite weak.  It 
seems that when non-change answers were given, 
participants simply took in the specific information for the 
target county, performed simple extrapolation, and then 
gave an answer.  Using the surrounding counties was just 
not a priority for these participants.   
Finally, how inferences are made from graphs is more 
complex than we have described here. Our hierarchical 
framework identifies the processes used to make inferences; 
however, further empirical data is needed to understand how 
read-offs, integration, spatial transformations, mental 
models and pattern extrapolation are combined in the 
process of making inferences. In addition the processes 
outlined by our hierarchal framework are likely to be 
dependent on many factors such as knowledge of the 
graphical display and domain knowledge (Hegarty et al., 
under review). 
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Abstract 
The goal of this study was to extend prior reports of 
implicit learning in visual search (e.g., Chun & Jiang, 
1999) by employing eye movement monitoring and 
reaction time measures to contrast implicit and explicit 
learning.  Towards this end, participants’ eye movements 
were monitored as they performed a visual search task in 
the ‘change blindness’ flicker paradigm.  In each trial, 
participants were asked to detect a letter that differed in 
shape or color across otherwise identical alternating letter 
arrays.  In a subset of trials, for some participants the 
background luminance covaried with target color (Color 
rule condition) and for other participants letter thickness 
covaried with target shape (Shape rule condition).  In 
addition, half of the participants were told of the existence 
of a covariation (Informed group) and the other half were 
not notified of this regularity and in a post-experimental 
interview reported no awareness of this covariation 
(Uninformed group).  In both groups, reaction time data 
indicated that visual search was facilitated for trials that 
contained the covariation, and eye movement data showed 
that participants guided eye movements to potential targets 
based on the covariation information.  Further, Informed 
participants in the Color rule condition were able to use 
covariation information to a greater extent than those in the 
Shape rule condition.  In contrast, no differential sensitivity 
across rule conditions was found for Uninformed 
participants. Implications to the study of implicit learning 
in visual search are discussed. 
Introduction 
Cognitive psychologists regularly differentiate cognitive 
processing as being either implicit or explicit in nature.  
However, there still exists debate in the field over whether 
these processes are indeed distinct (e.g., Shanks and St. 
John, 1994).  One way to strongly support such a 
separation would involve demonstrating qualitative 
differences between these processes (e.g., Cheesman & 
Merikle, 1986; Dienes & Berry, 1997; Dixon, 1981; Neal 
& Hesketh, 1997; Reingold & Merikle, 1990; Shevrin & 
Dickman, 1980; Stadler & Frensch, 1994).  As such, the 
present investigation attempts to make progress towards 
this goal by extending research demonstrating implicit 
learning in visual search (e.g., Chun & Jiang, 1999; Chun 
& Nakayama, 2000; Durgin, 1999; Flowers & Smith, 
1998; Miller, 1991).  For example, in a study by Chun and 
Jiang (1999), participants performed a visual search task 
where they were instructed to look for an object 
symmetric around the vertical axis.  There were two 
display conditions: in the first condition each of the 
targets was paired with a distractor set and this pairing 
was preserved throughout the experiment, and in the 
second condition the pairings of distractor sets and targets 
was varied randomly across trials.  Chun and Jiang (1999) 
reported that search efficiency in the consistent pairing 
condition was significantly better than in the randomized 
pairing condition.  Importantly, an evaluation of 
participants’ awareness of the experimental manipulation 
indicated that the benefit participants derived from 
consistent pairing reflected implicit rather than explicit 
learning.  Based on these results Chun and Jiang argued 
that following implicit learning of the pairing of targets 
and distractor sets, distractor identity information (i.e., 
context information) could cue knowledge of target shape 
information, reducing search time.   
In the present study we employed eye movement 
monitoring as an index of learning in addition to reaction 
time.  Eye movements have been shown to be a tangible 
trace of perceptual and attentional processes, and 
represent an ideal indirect measure of processing which 
can be recorded unobtrusively, concurrent with direct 
discrimination measures of performance.  This may allow 
for demonstrating dissociations between some aspects of 
eye movement behavior, such as saccadic selectivity, and 
overt task performance, such as reaction time.  Employing 
such methodology, this research investigates whether we 
can learn to make a more efficient visual search based on 
a covariation that across search displays provides target 
identity information, as well as addressing how awareness 
of this information affects search performance.  In 
addition, by employing multiple methodologies to 
empirically investigate implicit and explicit learning, we 
hope to make progress towards the goal of demonstrating 
qualitative differences between these processes. 
   To this end, we exploited a well-established finding in 
the eye movement and visual search literature that 
demonstrates a bias in the distribution of saccadic 
endpoints toward distractors that share stimulus 
dimensions and features with the target including color, 
shape, contrast polarity, and size (e.g., Findlay, 1997; 
Hooge & Erkelens, 1999; Pomplun, Reingold, & Shen, 
2001, 2003; Pomplun, Reingold, Shen, & Williams, 2000; 
Scialfa & Joffe, 1998; Shen & Reingold, 1999; Shen, 
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Reingold, & Pomplun, 2000, 2003; Shen, Reingold, 
Pomplun, & Williams, 2003; Williams & Reingold, 
2001).  This finding is typically referred to as saccadic 
selectivity.  
    In the present study participants performed a visual 
search task in the ‘change blindness’ flicker paradigm 
(Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997).  As shown in Figure 
1, participants were asked to detect a letter (target) that 
differed in color (see Panel A) or shape (see Panel B) 
across otherwise identical alternating letter arrays.  In a 
subset of trials, there was a covariation embedded in the 
task that reduced the target to half of the display items.  
Reaction times for the trials containing the covariation 
(Covariant trials), were compared to the reaction times 
obtained for the trials that did not contain covariation 
information (Random trials).  In addition, half of the 
participants were told of the existence of a covariation 
(Informed group) and the other half were not notified of 
this regularity (Uninformed group).  Learning of the 
covariation rule would be expressed by faster reaction 
times for the Covariant trials than for the Random trials.    
In addition, learning of the covariation rule would provide 
target identity information and may be manifested as a 
bias towards fixating on the letters that have the same 
shape or color as the target (i.e., saccadic selectivity).  
Finally, we were also interested in determining if there 
would be differential search performance across the 
Informed and Uninformed groups reflecting qualitative 
differences between implicit and explicit learning. 
Methods 
Participants 
Forty-eight participants were paid $20 for their 
involvement in the two hour experiment: 24 participants 
searched for the letter that differed in shape and 24 
participants searched for the letter that differed in color.  
Half of the participants in each group were informed of 
the covariation information (Informed group), while the 
other half were not (Uninformed group).  Participants 
were tested individually, and all had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. 
Apparatus 
The eyetracker employed in this research was the SR 
Research Ltd. EyeLink system. This system has high 
spatial resolution (0.005°), and a sampling rate of 250 Hz 
(4 msec temporal resolution). The EyeLink headband has 
three cameras, allowing simultaneous tracking of both 
eyes and of head position for head-motion compensation.  
By default, only the participant's dominant eye was 
tracked in our study. The EyeLink system uses an 
Ethernet link between the eyetracker and display 
computers for real-time saccade and gaze position data 
transfer.  In the present study the configurable 
acceleration and velocity thresholds were set to detect 
saccades of 0.5° or greater. 
Figure 1: An illustration of the change blindness 
paradigm. Panel A shows a target changing color, and 
Panel B shows a target changing shape. The targets are 
circled for illustration purposes only. 
 
   Stimulus displays were presented on two monitors, one 
for the participant (a 17-inch Viewsonic 17PS) and one 
for the experimenter. The experimenter monitor was used 
to give feedback in real-time about the participant’s 
computed gaze position. This feedback was given in the 
form of a cursor measuring 1° in diameter which was 
overlaid on the same image being viewed by the 
participant. This allowed the experimenter to evaluate 
system accuracy and to initiate a recalibration if 
necessary.  In general, the average error in the 
computation of gaze position was less than 0.5° of visual 
angle. 
Materials and Design 
As shown in Figure 1, the change blindness flicker 
paradigm was used (Rensink et al., 1997).  As can be 
seen, in each trial, the screen flickered between the 
80 ms 
200 ms 
200 ms 
Panel A    
Panel B    
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display and a blank screen (200ms display/80ms blank 
screen/200ms display). Displays were composed of 18 
letters (1 target, 17 distractors) that were arrayed on three 
invisible concentric rings.  On all trials there was an equal 
number of letters of each color and shape.  The radii of 
the rings were 2.8, 5.6, and 8.3 degrees of visual angle (at 
a distance of 70 cm). The minimum distance between 
items was set at 3.5 degrees.  Individual letters subtended 
0.86 degrees both horizontally and vertically.  Colors 
were matched in luminance and saturation (CIE 
coordinates: x, y, red: 0.578, 0.350, green: 0.327, 0.549, 
blue: 0.170, 0.117 and yellow: 0.446, 0.454).  The 
location of the target and the configuration of the 
distractor items were randomized for every trial. 
As the screen flickered, the participants’ task was to 
detect the letter (target) that differed in color or shape.  
For trials where the target changed color, half of the 
displays contained an equal number of X’s and O’s (X/O 
displays), and half of the displays contained an equal 
number of C’s and T’s (C/T displays).  In both cases, an 
equal number of red, green and blue letters was displayed, 
one of which was chosen at random to change color.  For 
example, Figure 1, Panel A shows an X/O display where 
the target (which is circled for illustrative purposes) 
changes color from red to blue.  In this trial the screen 
would alternate between the display with the red target 
letter, the blank display, and the display with the blue 
target letter, until the participant found the target.  
Alternatively, for trials where the target changed shape, 
half of the displays contained an equal number of green 
and red letters (green/red displays), and half of the 
displays contained an equal number of yellow and blue 
letters (yellow/blue displays).  In both cases, an equal 
number of X’s, O’s, and H’s was displayed, one of which 
was chosen at random to change shape.  For example, 
Panel B shows a green/red display where the target 
changes shape from an O to an X.  In this trial the screens 
would alternate between the given displays until the 
participant located the target changing shape.   
In a subset of each of these types of trials, there was a 
covariation embedded in the task that reduced the possible 
target locations to half of the display items. Two 
covariation rules were used as illustrated in Table 1.  In 
the Shape rule condition, the displays contained either 
thick letters or thin letters.  Letter thickness predicted 
target shape in the Covariant trials, but not the Random 
trials.  In the example in Table 1, X/O displays 
correspond to Covariant trials, in which thick letter 
displays predicted the target to be an X and thin letter 
displays predicted the target to be an O.  In contrast, C/T 
displays correspond to the Random trials, in which letter 
thickness did not predict target shape.  
In the Color rule condition, the displays contained 
either a light or a dark background.  Background 
luminance predicted target color in the Covariant trials, 
but not the Random trials.  In the example in Table 1, 
Table 1: An illustration of the covariation rules for the 
Shape and Color conditions. 
 
  Trials 
Rule 
Condition Display type Covariant Random 
C -> C  
Thick Letter  X -> X 
or  T -> T 
C  -> C 
Shape 
(Fig. 1 
Panel A) 
Thin Letter O -> O 
or  T  -> T 
O -> X 
Light Background O -> X 
or O -> X 
O -> X 
Color 
(Fig. 1 
Panel B) Dark Background O -> X 
or O -> X 
  
green/red displays correspond to Covariant trials, in 
which a light background predicted the target to be green 
and a dark background predicted the target to be red.  In 
contrast, yellow/blue displays correspond to the Random 
trials, in which background luminance did not predict 
target color. 
Each participant performed 624 trials. The order of the 
stimulus displays was random under the restrictions that 
there be no more than 4 displays of a given display type 
or trial type in a row, and that each 48 trial block 
contained an equal number of trials of each display type 
and each trial type (Covariant, Random).  Mapping of the 
display types to conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Procedure 
The experiment was run in a lighted room with a 
luminance of approximately 30 cd/m2. Before beginning 
the task, the participants were informed that stimulus 
displays would consist of letters that would flash 
intermittently, and that their task was to search for and 
detect the single letter that was changing shape, for 
participants in the Color rule condition, or changing color, 
for participants in the Shape rule condition.  Participants 
were asked to locate the target as quickly as possible and 
terminate the trial by maintaining fixation on the target. 
Participants then completed 48 practice trials, followed by 
2 blocks of 288 experimental trials.  Every 48 trials 
participants were given a rest break. 
At the beginning of each trial, a fixation point was 
presented in the center of the computer screen in order to 
correct for drift in gaze position.  A button press from the 
participant initiated the trial and it ended 700 ms after the 
participant fixated on the target (gaze-controlled 
response).  The time between display onset and the 
participant’s gaze-controlled response was recorded as the 
response time (RT).  In addition, the participant’s eye 
movements, monitored via the EyeLink tracking system, 
were recorded.   
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In order to compare explicit and implicit covariant rule 
learning, following completion of the practice block, half 
of the 24 participants in the each rule condition were told 
that there was a 100% covariation between the relevant 
features in one of the two display types (the Informed 
group).  However, they were not told which display type 
contained the covariation.  The other half of participants 
were not told anything about this relationship (the 
Uninformed group).  At the end of the experiment a 
structured questionnaire was given to investigate 
awareness of the covariation.  
Results 
Reaction Time 
For each participant and condition the mean RT was 
calculated, excluding those trials that were greater than 3 
standard deviations from the mean.  This resulted in less 
than 3% of trials being omitted.  As Figure 2 reveals, RTs 
improved over the course of the experiment (F (2, 88) = 
101, p <.001) and were faster for Covariant than Random 
trials (F (1, 44) = 31.6, p <.001).  Importantly, 
participants improved more over time for Covariant trials 
than for Random trials, demonstrating a reaction time 
benefit for learning the covariation, F (2, 88) = 3.87, p = 
.025.  Moreover, this RT benefit of Covariant trials over 
Random trials was significant for both the Informed (F (1, 
22) = 96.9, p < .001) and Uninformed (F (1, 22) = 9.40, p 
< .01) groups.  There were no RT differences for the 
practice block across trial type (t (1, 47) = .82, p > .4). 
As can be seen upon further inspection of Figure 2, the 
instruction manipulation (Informed, Uninformed) affected 
the degree to which participants benefited from the 
covariation information.  Specifically, there was a greater 
benefit for the Covariant trials over the Random trials for 
participants in the Informed group (mean difference = 
1010 ms) as compared to participants in the Uninformed 
group (mean difference = 165 ms), F (1, 44) = 53.1, p < 
.001.  Further, Informed participants showed significantly 
greater RT advantages for Covariant trials than for 
Random trials in the Color rule condition (mean 
difference: 1520 ms, SE = 180) when compared to the 
Shape rule condition (mean difference: 500 ms, SE = 
98.0), F (1, 22) = 24.7, p < .001).  In contrast, the 
Uninformed participants showed no differential RT 
benefit across rule conditions (F (1, 22) < 1, mean 
difference: 155 ms, SE = 81.2, for the Color rule 
condition vs. mean difference: 175 ms, SE = 70.8, for the 
Shape rule condition).  These differences manifested 
themselves as a trial type by instruction by rule condition 
interaction, F (1, 44) = 20.1, p < .001. 
Saccadic Selectivity 
Saccadic selectivity was computed by assigning saccadic 
endpoints to the closest display item and calculating the 
percentage of saccades directed towards the 7 distractors 
out of the total of 17 distractors that shared shape with the 
target in the Shape rule condition or color with the target  
in the Color rule condition. Accordingly, chance 
performance on the saccadic selectivity measure (i.e., 
when all distractors have an equal probability of being 
fixated) was expected to be 47.06%.  Consistent with this, 
saccadic selectivity was at chance (Mean = 47.06; all t’s 
(1, 47) < 1, p’s > .5) for the Random trials over the course 
of the experiment.  In contrast, as can be seen in Figure 3, 
while saccadic selectivity did not significantly differ from 
chance for Covariant trials for the practice block (Mean = 
47.06; t (1, 47) = 1.24, p > .2), participants’ saccadic 
selectivity increased over time, demonstrating a 
behavioral consequence for learning of the covariation, F 
(2, 88) = 81.3, p < .001.  This bias towards fixating on the 
letters that had the same shape or color as the target 
occurred more strongly for the Informed participants (F 
(1, 22) = 27.5, p < .001), than the Uninformed participants 
(F (1, 22) = 10.3, p < .005).  Further, Informed 
participants showed significantly greater saccadic 
selectivity in the Color rule condition (mean = 75.3%, SE 
= 1.57) as compared to the Shape rule condition (mean =  
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Figure 2: Reaction time by trial Block is shown for both the 
Covariant and Random trials by rule condition (Shape, 
Color).  The top panel contains the results for the Informed 
group, and the bottom panel contains the results for the 
Uninformed group.   
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 59.1%, SE = 2.43), F (1, 22) = 31.5, p < .001).  In 
contrast, the Uninformed participants showed no 
differential saccadic selectivity across rule conditions (F 
(1, 22) = 3.05, p = .095; mean = 49.3%, SE = .482 for the 
Color rule condition, mean = 48.2%, SE = .476 for the 
Shape rule condition).  These differences manifested 
themselves as an instruction by rule condition interaction, 
F (1, 44) = 25.71, p < .001. 
The effectiveness of the instructions was further 
evaluated by a retrospective report in the form of a 
structured questionnaire and intensive questioning.  It was 
found that participants in the Uninformed group reported 
being unaware of the covariation, while those in the 
Informed group could explain the covariation, consistent 
with instructions.  In fact, most Uninformed participants 
expressed disbelief when they were told of the 
covariation, reporting that they thought that letter 
thickness (for those in the Shape rule condition), or 
background luminance (for those in the Color rule 
condition), were irrelevant. 
Discussion 
In an attempt to make progress towards the goal of 
demonstrating qualitative differences between implicit 
and explicit processing, the present study employed eye 
movement monitoring as an index of learning, in addition 
to reaction time, to further explore implicit learning in the 
context of visual search.  It was found that participants 
can enhance visual search efficiency by utilizing a 
covariation that provided target identity information, and 
that such learning occurs even when participants are 
uninformed and claim to be unaware of this information.  
Implicit learning was most strongly demonstrated by the 
response time measure.  Specifically, for the Uninformed 
participants, while the RT measure showed savings for 
trials containing the covariant rule condition (165ms in 
both the Shape and Color rule conditions), only a slight 
saccadic selectivity (1% bias in the Shape rule condition 
and 2% bias in the Color rule condition) favoring relevant 
distractors was demonstrated.  In contrast, participants 
who were informed of the covariation rule showed 
substantial learning of the covariation in the form of a 
reaction time advantage (500ms in the Shape rule 
condition and 1520ms in the Color rule condition) and 
saccadic selectively (12% bias in the Shape rule condition 
and 28% bias in the Color rule condition).  Taken 
together, saccadic selectivity seems to be one mechanism 
by which Informed participants made their search more 
efficient, whereas the weak selectivity displayed by the 
Uninformed participants suggests that this was not the 
primary mechanism employed by this group.  Future 
investigation into what other means the Uninformed 
participants were using to improve search efficiency is 
warranted.  The different picture portrayed by the RT and 
saccadic selectivity results points to the importance of 
using multiple concurrent measures of performance in 
attempting to more conclusively document implicit 
learning and in attempting to better understand the 
mechanisms underlying variation in performance 
associated with the presence or absence of claimed 
awareness pertaining to the learned covariation.   
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Figure 3: Percent eye-movement guidance by trial Block 
for the Covariant trials by group (Informed, 
Uninformed) and rule condition (Shape, Color).  Chance 
guidance is shown by a dashed line at 47.08%.  The 
practice block contains 48 trials, and Blocks 1 and 2 
average 288 trials each. 
The present finding of implicit learning in visual search 
is consistent with previous evidence using other visual 
search paradigms (e.g., Chun & Jiang, 1999; Chun & 
Nakayama, 2000; Durgin, 1999; Flowers & Smith, 1998; 
Miller, 1991).  A benefit to our use of the change 
blindness paradigm was that it allowed us to create a 
methodology whereby no target-absent trials were needed 
and where the covariant rule involved a dimension that 
was seemingly irrelevant to the search task.   
Finally, the rule condition (Color, Shape) differentially 
influenced performance in the Informed and Uninformed 
groups.  Specifically, the Informed participants in the 
Color rule condition were able to use the covariation 
information to a greater extent than those in the Shape 
rule condition, as shown by both the RT and saccadic 
selectivity results (see Figure 2 and 3, respectively).  In 
contrast, no such differential sensitivity across rule 
condition was found for the Uninformed participants for 
either of these measures.  We believe that the 
demonstration of differential search performance across 
groups and conditions in the present study constitutes 
progress toward the crucial goal of establishing 
qualitative differences between implicit and explicit 
learning in the context of visual search. 
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Abstract
The poverty of stimulus argument is one of the most
controversial arguments in the study of language acquisition.
Here we follow previous approaches challenging the
assumption of impoverished primary linguistic data, focusing
on the specific problem of auxiliary fronting in polar
interrogatives. We develop a series of child-directed corpus
analyses showing that there is indirect statistical information
useful for correct auxiliary fronting in polar interrogatives,
and that such information is sufficient for producing
grammatical generalizations even in the absence of direct
evidence. We further show that there are simple learning
devices, such as neural networks, capable of exploiting such
statistical cues, producing a bias to correct aux-questions
when compared to their ungrammatical counterparts. The
results suggest that the basic assumptions of the poverty of
stimulus argument need to be reappraised.
Introduction
How do children learn aspects of their language for which
there appears to be no evidence in the input? This question
lies at the heart of the most enduring and controversial
debates in cognitive science. Ever since Chomsky (1965), it
has been argued that the information in the linguistic
environment is too impoverished for a human learner to
attain adult competence in language without the aide of
innate linguistic knowledge. Although this poverty of the
stimulus argument (Chomsky, 1980; Crain & Pietroski,
2001) has guided most research in linguistics, it has proved
to be much more contentious within the broader context of
cognitive science.
The poverty of stimulus argument rests on certain
assumptions about the nature of the input to the child, the
properties of computational learning mechanisms, and the
learning abilities of young infants. A growing bulk of
research in cognitive science has begun to call each of these
three assumptions into question. Thus, whereas the
traditional nativist perspective suggests that statistical
information may be of little use for syntax acquisition (e.g.,
Chomsky, 1957), recent research indicates that
distributional regularities may provide an important source
of information for syntactic bootstrapping (e.g., Mintz,
2002; Redington, Chater and Finch, 1998)—especially
when integrated with prosodic or phonological information
(e.g., Christiansen & Dale, 2001; Morgan, Meier &
Newport, 1987). And while the traditional approach only
tends to consider learning in highly simplified forms, such
as “move the first occurrence of X  to Y”, progress in
statistical natural language processing and connectionist
modeling has revealed much more complex learning
abilities of potential relevance for language acquisition (e.g.,
Lewis & Elman, 2001). Finally, little attention has
traditionally been paid to what young infants may be able to
learn, and this may be problematic given that recent
research has demonstrated that even before one year of age,
infants are quite competent statistical learners (Saffran,
Aslin & Newport, 1996—for reviews, see Gómez &
Gerken, 2000; Saffran, 2003).
These research developments suggest the need for a
reappraisal of the poverty of stimulus argument, centered on
whether they together can answer the question of how a
child may be able to learn aspects of linguistic structure for
which innate knowledge was previously thought to be
necessary. In this paper, we approach this question in the
context of structure dependence in language acquisition,
specifically in relation to auxiliary fronting in polar
interrogatives. We first outline the poverty of stimulus
debate as it has played out with respect to forming
grammatical questions with auxiliary fronting. It has been
argued that the input to the child does not provide enough
information to differentiate between correct and incorrect
auxiliary fronting in polar interrogatives (Chomsky in
Piatelli-Palmarini, 1980). In contrast, we conduct a corpus
analysis to show that there is sufficiently rich statistical
information available in child-directed speech for generating
correct aux-questions—even in the absence of any such
constructions in the corpus. We additionally demonstrate
how the same approach can be applied to explain results
from studies of auxiliary fronting in 3- to 5-year-olds (Crain
& Nakayama, 1987). Whereas, the corpus analyses indicate
that there is rich statistical information available in the
input, it does not show that there are learning mechanisms
capable of utilizing such information. We therefore conduct
a set of connectionist simulations to illustrate that neural
networks are capable of using statistical information to
distinguish between correct and incorrect aux-questions. In
the conclusion, we discuss our results in the context of
recent infant learning results.
The Poverty of Stimulus and Structure
Dependence in Auxiliary Fronting.
Children only hear a finite number of sentences, yet they
learn to speak and comprehend sentences drawn from a
language that can contain an infinite number of sentences.
The poverty of stimulus argument suggests that children do
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not have enough data during the early stages of their life to
learn the syntactic structure of their language. Thus,
learning a language involves the correct generalization of
grammatical structure when insufficient data is available to
children. The possible weakness of the argument lies in the
difficulty to assess the input, and in the imprecise and
intuitive definition of ‘insufficient data’.
One of the most used examples to support the poverty
of stimulus argument concerns auxiliary fronting in polar
interrogatives. Declaratives are turned into questions by
fronting the correct auxiliary. Thus, for example, in the
declarative form ‘The man who is hungry is ordering
dinner’ it is correct to front the main clause auxiliary as in 1,
but fronting the subordinate clause auxiliary produces an
ungrammatical sentence as in 2 (Chomsky, 1965).
1. Is the man who is hungry ordering dinner?
2. *Is the man who hungry is ordering dinner?
Children can generate two types of rules: a structure-
independent rule where the first ‘is’ is moved; or the correct
structure-dependent rule, where only the movement of the
‘is’ from the main clause is allowed. Crucially, children do
not appear to go through a period when they erroneously
move the first is to the front of the sentence (e.g., Crain &
Nakayama, 1987). It has moreover been asserted that a
person might go through much of his or her life without
ever having been exposed to the relevant evidence for
inferring correct auxiliary fronting (Chomsky, in Piatelli-
Palmarini, 1980).
The purported absence of evidence in the primary
linguistic input regarding auxiliary fronting in polar
interrogatives is not without debate. Intuitively, as
suggested by Lewis & Elman (2001), it is perhaps unlikely
that a child would reach kindergarten without being exposed
to sentences such as 3-5.
3. Is the boy who was playing with you still there?
4. Will those who are hungry raise their hand?
5. Where is the little girl full of smiles?
These examples have an auxiliary verb within the subject
NP, and thus the auxiliary that appears initially would not
be the first auxiliary in the declarative, providing evidence
for correct auxiliary fronting. Pullum & Scholz (2002)
explored the presence of auxiliary fronting in polar
interrogatives in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). They found
that at least five crucial examples occur in the first 500
interrogatives. These results suggest that the assumption of
complete absence of evidence for correct auxiliary fronting
is overstated. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the WSJ
corpus is not a good approximation of the grammatical
constructions that young children encounter and thus it
cannot be considered representative of the primary linguistic
data. Indeed, studies of the CHILDES corpus show that
even though interrogatives constitute a large percentage of
the corpus, relevant examples of auxiliary fronting in polar
interrogatives represent less than 1% of them (Legate &
Yang, 2002).
Although the direct evidence for auxiliary fronting in
polar interrogatives may be too weak to be helpful in
acquisition—as suggested by Legate & Yang (2002)—other
more indirect sources of statistical information may provide
sufficient basis for making the appropriate grammatical
generalizations. Recent connectionist simulations provide
preliminary data in this regard. Lewis & Elman (2001)
trained simple recurrent networks (SRN; Elman, 1990) on
data from an artificial grammar that generated questions of
the form ‘AUX NP ADJ?’ and sequences of the form ‘Ai
NP Bi’ (where Ai and Bi represent a variety of different
material) but no relevant examples of polar interrogatives.
The SRNs were better at making predictions for correct
auxiliary fronting compared to those with incorrect auxiliary
fronting. This indicates that even without direct exposure to
relevant examples, the statistical structure of the input
nonetheless provides useful information applicable to
auxiliary fronting in polar interrogatives.
However, the SRNs in the Lewis & Elman simulation
studies were exposed to an artificial grammar without the
complexity and noisiness that characterizes actual child-
directed speech. The question thus remains whether the
indirect statistical regularities in an actual corpus of child-
directed speech are strong enough to support grammatical
generalizations over incorrect ones—even in the absence of
direct examples of auxiliary fronting in polar interrogatives
in the input. Next, in our first experiment, we conduct a
corpus analysis to demonstrate that the indirect statistical
information available in a corpus of child-directed speech is
indeed sufficient for making the appropriate grammatical
generalizations in questions involving auxiliary fronting.
Experiment 1: Measuring Indirect Statistical
Information Relevant for Auxiliary Fronting
Even if children only hear a few relevant examples of polar
interrogatives, they may nevertheless be able to rely on
indirect statistical cues for learning the correct structure. In
order to assess this hypothesis, we trained bigram and
trigram models on the Bernstein-Ratner (1984) corpus of
child-directed speech and then tested the likelihood of novel
example sentences. The test sentences consisted of correct
polar interrogatives (e.g. Is the man who is hungry ordering
dinner?) and incorrect ones (e.g. Is the man who hungry is
ordering dinner?)—neither of which were present in the
training corpus. We reasoned that if indirect statistical
information provides a possible cue for generalizing
correctly to the grammatical aux-questions, then we should
find a difference in the likelihood of these two alternative
hypotheses.
Bigram/trigram models are simple statistical models
that use the previous one/two word(s) to predict the next
one. Given a string of words or a sentence it is possible to
compute the associated cross-entropy for that string of
words according to the bigram/trigram model trained on a
particular corpus (from Chen & Goodman, 1996). Thus,
given two alternative sentences we can compare the
probability of each of them as indicated by their associated
cross-entropy as computed in the context of a particular
corpus. Specifically, we can compare the two alternative
1132
generalizations of doing auxiliary fronting in polar
interrogatives, comparing the cross-entropy associated with
grammatical (e.g., Is the man who is in the corner
smoking?) and ungrammatical forms (e.g., Is the man who
in the corner is smoking). This will allow us to determine
whether there may be sufficient indirect statistical
information available in actual child-directed speech to
decide between these two forms. Importantly, the Bernstein-
Ratner corpus contains no examples of auxiliary fronting in
polar interrogatives. Our hypothesis is therefore that the
corpus nonetheless contains enough statistical information
to decide between grammatical and ungrammatical forms.
Method
Models For the purpose of corpus analysis we used bigram
and trigram models of language (see e.g., Jurafsky &
Martin, 2000). The probability P(s) of a sentence was
expressed as the product of the probabilities of the words
(wi) that compose the sentence, with each word probability
conditional to the last n-1 words. Then, if s = w1…wk we
have:
P(s) = Πi P(wi|wi-1i-n+1)
To estimate the probabilities of P(wi|wi-1) we used the
maximum likelihood (ML) estimate for P(wi|wi-1) defined as
(considering the bigram model):
PML(wi|wi-1) = P(wi-1wi) /P(wi-1)=(c(wi-1wi)/Ns)/(c(wi-1)/Ns);
where Ns denote the total number of tokens and c(α) is the
number of times the string α occurs in the corpus. Given
that the corpus is quite small, we used the interpolation
smoothing technique defined in Chen & Goodman (1996).
The probability of a word (wi) (or unigram model) is
defined as:
PML(wi) = c(wi)/Ns;
The smoothing technique consists of the interpolation of the
bigram model with the unigram model, and the trigram
model with the bigram model. Thus, for the bigram model
we have:
Pinterp(wi|wi-1) = λPML(wi|wi-1) + (1-λ)PML(wi)
Accordingly for trigram models we have:
Pinterp(wi|wi-1wi-2) = λPML(wi|wi-1wi-2) + (1-λ)(λPML(wi|wi-1)
+ (1-λ)PML(wi)),
where λ is a value between 0 and 1 that determines the
relative importance of each term in the equation. We used a
standard λ = 0.5 so that all terms are equally weighted. We
measure the likelihood of a given set of sentences using the
measure of cross-entropy (Chen & Goodman, 1996). The
cross-entropy of a set of sentences is defined as:
1/NT Σi -log2 P(si)    (where si is the i
th sentence).
The cross-entropy value of a sentence is inversely correlated
with the likelihood of it. Given a training corpus, and two
sentences A and B we can compare the cross-entropy of
both sentences and estimate which one is more probable
according to the statistical information of the corpus. We
used Perl programming in a Unix environment to implement
the corpus analysis. This includes the simulation of bigram
and trigram models and cross-entropy calculation and
comparisons.
Materials We used the Bernstein-Ratner (1984) corpus of
child-directed speech for our corpus analysis. It contains
recorded speech from nine mothers speaking to their
children over 4-5 months period when children were
between the ages of 1 year and 1 month to 1 year and 9
months. This is a relatively small and very noisy corpus,
mostly containing short sentences with simple grammatical
structure. The following are some example sentences: Oh
you need some space; Where is my apple?; Oh. That’s it’.
Procedure We used the Bernstein-Ratner child-directed
speech corpus as the training corpus for the bigram/trigram
models. The models were trained on 10,082 sentences from
the corpus (34,010 word tokens; 1,740 word types). We
wanted to compare the cross-entropy of grammatical and
ungrammatical polar interrogatives. For that purpose, we
created two novel sets of sentences. The first one contained
grammatically correct polar interrogatives and the second
one contained the ungrammatical version of each sentence
in the first set. The sentences were created using a random
algorithm that selected words from the corpus, and created
sentences according to syntactic and semantic constraints.
We tried to prevent any possible bias in creating the test
sentences. The test sets only contained relevant examples of
polar interrogatives of the form: “Is / NP/ (who/that)/ is / Ai/
Bi?”, where Ai and Bi represent a variety of different
material including VP, PARTICIPLE,NP, PP, ADJP (e.g.: “Is the
lady who is there eating?”; “Is the dog that is on the chair
black?”). Each test set contained 100 sentences. We
estimated the mean cross-entropy per sentence by
calculating the average cross-entropy of the 100 sentences
in each set. Then we compared the likelihood of pairs of
grammatical and ungrammatical sentences by comparing
their cross-entropy and choosing the version with the lower
value. We studied the statistical significance of the results
using paired t-test analyses.
Results
We found that the mean cross-entropy of grammatical
sentences was lower than mean cross entropy of
ungrammatical sentences. We performed a statistical
analysis of the cross-entropy difference, considering all
pairs of grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. The
cross-entropy difference was highly significant ( t(99),
p<0.0001) (see Table 1). These results show that
grammatical sentences have a higher probability than
ungrammatical ones. In order to compare each grammatical-
ungrammatical pair of sentences, we defined the following
criterion: When deciding between each grammatical vs.
ungrammatical polar interrogative example, choose the one
that has lower cross-entropy (the most probable one).
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Table 1: Comparison of mean cross-entropy in Exp.1.
Mean cross-entropy
Gram.          Ungramm.
 Mean
difference
t(99)
p-value
Bigram 22.92 23.73 0.83 < 0.0001
Trigram 21.81 23.07 1.26 < 0.0001
A sentence is defined as correctly classified if the chosen
form is grammatical. Using that criterion, we found that the
percentage of correctly classified sentences using the bigram
model is 92% and using the trigram model is 95%. Figure 1
shows the performance of the models according to the
defined classification criterion. Of the 100 test sentences,
the trigram model only misclassified the following five: Is
the lady who is here drinking?; Is the alligator that is
standing there red?; Is the jacket that is on the chair
lovely?; Is the one that is in the kitchen scared?; Is the
phone that is in the office purple?
The bigram model in addition to the above five
sentences also misclassified the next three test sentences: Is
the bunny that is in the car little; Is the baby who is in the
castle eating?; Is the bunny that is sleeping black?
It is possible to calculate the probability of a sentence
from the cross-entropy value. Figure 2 shows the
comparison of mean probability of grammatical and
ungrammatical sentences. We found that the mean
probability of grammatical polar interrogatives is almost
twice the mean probability of ungrammatical polar
interrogatives according to the bigram model and it is more
than twice according to the trigram model.
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Figure 2: Mean probability of grammatical sentences vs.
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Experiment 2: Testing Sentences with
Auxiliary Fronting Produced by Children
Although Experiment 1 shows that there is sufficient
indirect statistical information available in child-directed
speech to differentiate reliably between the grammatical and
ungrammatical aux-questions that we had generated, it
could be argued that the real test for our approach is whether
it works for actual sentences produced by children. We
therefore tested our models on a small set of sentences
elicited from children under experimental conditions.
Crain & Nakayama (1987) conducted an experiment
designed to elicit complex aux-questions from 3- to 5-year-
old children. The children were involved in a game in which
they asked questions to Jabba the Hutt, a creature from Star
Wars. During the task the experimenter gives an instruction
to the child: ‘Ask Jabba if the boy who is watching Mickey
Mouse is happy’. Children produced sentences like a) ‘Is the
boy who is watching Mickey Mouse happy?’ but they never
produced sentences like b) ‘Is the boy who watching Mickey
Mouse is happy?’. The authors concluded that the lack of
structure-independent errors suggested that children
entertain only structure-dependent hypotheses, supporting
the existence of innate grammatical structure.
Method
Models Same as in Experiment 1.
Materials  Six example pairs were derived from the
declarative sentences used in Crain & Nakayama1(1987):
6. The ball that the girl is sitting on is big
7. The boy who is unhappy is watching Mickey Mouse
8. The boy who is watching Mickey Mouse is happy
9. The boy who is being kissed by his mother is happy
10. The boy who was holding the plate is crying
11. The dog that is sleeping is on the blue bench
The grammatical and ungrammatical aux-questions were
derived from the declaratives in 6-11. Thus, the sentence ‘Is
the dog that is sleeping on the blue bench?’ belonged to the
grammatical test set whereas the sentence ‘Is the dog that
sleeping is on the blue bench?’ belonged to the
ungrammatical test set. Consequently, grammatical and
ungrammatical test sets contained 6 sentences each.
Procedure The bigram/trigram models were trained on the
Bernstein-Ratner (1984) corpus as in Experiment 1, and
tested on the material derived from Crain & Nakayama
(1987).
Results
Consistently with Experiment 1, we found that the mean
cross-entropy of grammatical sentences was significantly
lower than the mean cross entropy of ungrammatical
sentences both for bigram and trigram models (t(5) p<0.013
and p<0.034 respectively). Table 2 summarizes these
results.
                                                           
1 As some of the words in the examples were not present in the Bernstein-
Ratner corpus, we substitute them for semantically related ones: Thus, the
words: “mother”, “plate”, “watching”, “unhappy” and “bench” were
replaced respectively by “mommy”, “ball”, “looking at”, “crying” and
“chair”.
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Using the classification criterion defined in Experiment
1, we found that all six sentences were correctly classified
using the bigram model. That is, according to the
distributional information of the corpus, all grammatical
aux-questions were more probable than the ungrammatical
version of them. When using the trigram model, we found
that five out of six sentences were correctly classified.
Table 2: Comparison of mean cross-entropy in Exp.2.
Mean cross-entropy
Gram.           Ungramm.
 Mean
difference
t(5)
p-value
Bigram 26.99 27.89 0.90 < 0.013
Trigram 25.97 26.86 0.89 < 0.034
Experiment 3: Learning to Produce Correct
Sentences with Auxiliary Fronting
While Experiments 1 and 2 establish that there is sufficient
indirect statistical information in the input to the child to
differentiate between grammatical and ungrammatical
questions involving auxiliary fronting—including questions
produced by children—it is not clear whether a simple
learning device may be able to exploit such information to
develop an appropriate bias toward the grammatical forms.
To investigate this question, we took a previously developed
SRN model of language acquisition (Reali, Christiansen &
Monaghan, 2003), which had also been trained on the same
corpus, and tested its ability to deal with aux-questions.
Previous simulations by Lewis & Elman (2001) have
shown that SRNs trained on data from an artificial grammar
were better at predicting the correct auxiliary fronting in
aux-questions. An important question is whether the results
shown using artificial-language models are still obtained
when dealing with the full complexity and the general
disorderliness of speech directed at young children. Thus,
we seek to determine whether a previously developed
connectionist model, trained on the same corpus, is sensitive
to the same indirect statistical information that we have
found to be useful in bigram/trigram models. SRNs are
simple learning devices that have been shown to be sensitive
to bigram/trigram information.
Method
Networks We used the same ten SRNs that Reali,
Christiansen & Monaghan (2003) had trained to predict the
next lexical category given the current one. These networks
had initial weight randomization in the interval [-0.1; 0.1].
A different random seed was used for each simulation.
Learning rate was set to 0.1, and momentum to 0.7. Each
input to the network contained a localist representation of
the lexical category of the incoming word. With a total of 14
different lexical categories and a pause marking boundaries
between utterances, the network had 15 input units. The
network was trained to predict the lexical category of the
next word, and thus the number of output units was 15.
Each network had 30 hidden units and 30 context units. All
networks were simulated using the Lens simulator in a Unix
environment. No changes were made to the original
networks and their parameters.
Materials We trained and tested the networks on the
Bernstein-Ratner corpus similarly to the bigram/trigram
models. Each word in the corpus corresponded to one of the
14 following lexical categories from CELEX database
(Baayen, Pipenbrock & Gulikers, 1995): nouns, verbs,
adjectives, numerals, infinitive markers, adverbs, articles,
pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, interjections, complex
contractions, abbreviations, and proper names. Each word in
the corpus was replaced by a vector encoding the lexical
category to which it belonged. We used the two sets of test
sentences used in Experiment 1, containing grammatical and
ungrammatical polar interrogatives respectively. However,
as the network was trained to predict lexical classes, some
test sentences defined in Experiment 1 mapped onto the
same string of lexical classes. For simplicity, we only
considered unique strings, resulting in 30 sentences in each
test set (grammatical and ungrammatical).
Procedure The ten SRNs from Reali, Christiansen &
Monaghan (2003) were trained on one pass through the
Bernstein-Ratner corpus. These networks were then tested
on the aux-questions described above. To compare network
predictions for the ungrammatical vs. the grammatical aux-
questions, we measured the networks’ mean squared error
recorded during the presentation of each test sentence pair.
Results
We found that in all ten simulations the grammatical set of
aux-questions produced a lower error compared to the
ungrammatical ones. The mean squared-error per next
lexical class prediction was 0.80 for the grammatical set and
0.83 in the ungrammatical one, this difference being highly
significant (t(29) p <0.005). Out of the 30 test sentences, 27
grammatical sentences produced a lower error than its
ungrammatical counterpart. On the assumption that
sentences with the lower error will be preferred, SRNs
would pick the grammatical sentences in 27 out of 30 cases.
It is worth highlighting that the grammatical and
ungrammatical sets of sentences were almost identical, only
differing on the position of the fronted “is” as described in
Experiment 1. Thus, the difference in mean squared error is
uniquely due to the words’ position in the sentence. Despite
the complexity of child-directed speech, these results
suggest that simple learning devices such as SRNs are able
to pick up on the existing distributional properties showed
in Experiment 1. Moreover, differently to Experiment 1,
here we explored the distributional information of the
lexical classes alone and thus the network was blind to the
possible information present in word-word co-occurrences.
Conclusion
In the corpus analyses, we showed that there is sufficiently
rich statistical information available indirectly in child-
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directed speech for generating correct complex aux-
questions—even in the absence of any such constructions in
the corpus. We additionally demonstrated how the same
approach can be applied to explain results from child-
acquisition studies (Crain & Nakayama, 1987). These
results indicate that indirect statistical information provides
a possible cue for generalizing correctly to grammatical
auxiliary fronting.
Whereas the corpus analyses indicate that there are
statistical cues available in the input, it does not show that
there are learning mechanisms capable of utilizing such
information. However, previous results suggest that children
are sensitive to the same kind of statistical evidence that we
found in the present study. Saffran, Aslin & Newport (1996)
demonstrated that 8 month-old children are particularly
sensitive to transitional probabilities (similar to our bigram
model). Sensitivity to transitional probabilities seems to be
present across modalities, for instance in the segmentation
of streams of tones (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport,
1999). These and other results on infant statistical learning
(see Gómez & Gerken, 2000) suggest that children have
mechanisms for relying on implicit statistical information.
SRNs are simple learning devices whose learning properties
have been shown to be consistent with humans’ learning
abilities. Even though it was originally developed in a
different context (Reali, Christiansen & Monaghan, 2003),
our SRN model proved to be sensitive to the indirect
statistical evidence present in the corpus, developing an
appropriate bias toward the correct forms of aux-questions.
In conclusion, this study indicates that the poverty of
stimulus argument may not apply to the classic case of
auxiliary fronting in polar interrogatives, previously a
corner stone in the argument for the innateness of grammar.
Our results further suggest that the general assumptions of
the poverty of stimulus argument may need to be
reappraised in the light of the statistical richness of the
language input to children.
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Abstract
It is the usual case in cognitive modeling that a model's
output is compared to the average of a number of
subjects, in which case the enterprise of modeling is
apparently to capture the behavior of the typical
individual. Our approach is to administer two simple
tasks to each subject, using performance on those tasks
as measures of individual ability. Those measures are
then used as the values for parameters in an ACT-R
model of a more complex task, so that the model can
predict individual performance on that task.
Introduction
Work in cognitive modeling, when it seeks validation
in the performance of human subjects, is almost
unanimously concerned with the average performance
of many subjects. For many purposes, however, it is
desirable to be able to model or predict individual
performance. We present here the first work to use a
fine-grained cognitive model to predict individual
performance in a complex task.
The ACT-R architecture, the basis of a great deal of
work in cognitive modeling, has a detailed, well-
developed theory of cognition – perception, learning,
performance, and so on (Anderson and Lebiere,
1998). The architecture by necessity contains a
number of parameters that can be used to fix levels of
performance in, e.g., memory, to realistic levels. The
ACT-R community has by custom sought universal
values for these parameters wherever possible, finding
values work across tasks, optimizing how well the
model fits the data of the average subject. These
parameters are each meaningful, each parameter
determining the model's behavior in one specific way.
For example, there is a parameter called W that
determines the sum of the activations of all the pieces
of information that may be retrieved at any point in
time. It therefore controls the model's working
memory capacity. Extensive empirical work in ACT-
R modeling (again, of the kind where the model was
meant to predict the average subject) found that a W
value of 1.0 produces very good fits with subject data.
It was later postulated, however, that the W
parameter could be meaningfully varied in order to
model individual differences in working memory
capacity (Lovett, Reder, & Lebiere, 1999). This was
later demonstrated empirically by using individual
performance in one simple memory task to measure
the W value that best fit the individual's performance.
The diagnostic memory task is called MODS, or the
modified digit span task. In each MODS trial, subjects
are presented strings of digits to be read aloud in
synchrony with a metronome beat and are required to
remember the final digit from each string for later
recall. After a certain number of digit strings are thus
presented, a recall prompt cues the subject to report
the memory digits in the order they were presented.
Each subject's MODS score was used to estimate their
individual W value, which was then plugged into an
ACT-R model of a separate working memory task,
and the model output was used to predict individual
data on that second task (Daily, Lovett, & Reder,
2001).
Previous and concurrent work by other groups
suggested a number of positive characteristics that
might be combined into a single, more powerful
methodology. ACT-R parameters had been
manipulated (Taatgen, 2001) in a model of individual
differences in learning, although the “individuals” in
that work were simulated, and corresponded to types
of individuals, not to actual subjects. In that work,
performance in a complex task was related to
individual difference parameters across the simulated
individuals. Earlier work in modeling also accounted
for relationships between ability in one task and
ability in another, but making assessments on the
group, not individual, level (Just, Carpenter, and
Shell, 1990). A complementary approach measures
individual performance on complex tasks, and utilizes
statistical methods such as intercorrelation matrices,
allowing predictions of individual performance on
one task based upon measurements of performance on
other tasks in the matrices, making no use of any
particular theory of cognition (for example, Ackerman
and Kanfer, 1993).
All of this previous work, we felt, pointed towards
a methodology that combined a number of positive
features from these complementary approaches into a
1137
single, more comprehensive modeling paradigm. In
the methodology we envisioned, one or more simple
tasks could be administered to an individual, allowing
us to estimate their individual parameters; then, by
plugging the individual's parameter values into the
ACT-R architecture, we could predict the individual's
performance on any task for which an ACT-R model
exists. Because ACT-R models produce predictions
with a grain size of tens to hundreds of milliseconds,
this provides us with a detailed model of individual
performance, offering the potential for predictions on
the trial level, or predictions of novel measures of
performance that emerge from lower-level detail –
potentially allowing predictions of almost any
measure that can be made of subjects. Because our
approach builds atop the platform of the rich ACT-R
theory, it is realistic to expect that these
individualized model runs will be somewhat
meaningful in their details, not just a way to arrive at
a final, aggregate performance metric of some kind.
In order to take the next step beyond the Daily,
Lovett, & Reder study that involved only two simple
memory tasks, we decided to pick a more complex,
interactive task. In order to capture a broader
spectrum of individual differences, we chose to
measure two parameters per subject: the W parameter
as well as a measure of perceptual and motor ability,
henceforth referred to as P/M. This is not a part of the
standard ACT-R architecture, but seemed to be an
important kind of individual variation. Thus far, we
have used only one parameter, which represents as
though they were one individual perception and motor
speed. We allow that those may covary freely among
individuals, but we have so far had success using the
one parameter alone for this.
The AMBR Task
Given the preceding considerations, we chose as our
more-complex task the AMBR simulation, an air
traffic control task that already had a foundation as a
test bed for cognitive models in a project organized by
the Air Force Research Laboratory (Gluck and Pew,
2001). This task already had an ACT-R model
implemented (Lebiere, Anderson, and Bothell, 2001),
which not only facilitated our project, but also
provided a gauge of the modularity of our approach;
ideally, we would be able to plug parameters into this
off-the-shelf model and obtain good results without
modifying it in any other way.
The task places the subject in the role of an air
traffic controller whose job is to process aircraft (AC)
as they enter and leave the airspace zone, central in
the simulated radar display, for which he or she is
responsible. This primarily consists of issuing, via a
graphical interface, two commands to an AC as it
enters one’s zone from a neighboring zone of
airspace, and issuing two commands to an AC as it
departs for another zone. The same AC must thereby
be issued a total of four commands if it passes into
and subsequently out of the central zone during a
scenario. In some cases, the AC will only enter the
central zone, or only depart the central zone, during
the duration of a scenario, in which case that AC will
require only a total of two commands. In addition, a
fifth type of command is required if an AC requests a
speed change, which requires the subject to make a
trivial judgment as to whether or not the AC is on
course to catch, from behind, any other AC; if so, the
speed change request should be denied, and
otherwise, it should be accepted. AC arrivals can be
detected both from the radar display and from text
messages appearing in windows to the side of the
display. Speed change requests can be cued only via
text messages. The departure of an AC from the
central zone can be detected only via the radar
display. Under the assumption that AC are at different
altitudes, however, collisions cannot take place in this
simulation, nor do AC land or take off in the
simulation. The subject is scored based on issuing all
commands in a timely fashion that permits AC to
move freely without ever reaching the border of the
central zone while still awaiting one of the required
commands. If an AC does reach the zone border
without having received all necessary commands, it
will go into a hold, thereby turning the AC red in the
display, halting the AC’s motion, and penalizing the
subject 1 point. The score at the end of the run is the
sum of the errors the subject makes, lower score
thereby signifying better performance. Subjects were
also penalized for making interface errors of the sort
that the model never made. Subject and model
performance levels can thereby be compared on the
basis of hold errors. A static image of the display is
visible in Figure 1.
We were required to modify one aspect of the
AMBR task in order to eliminate uncontrolled
strategic variation among the subjects. AMBR’s
original implementation has a more baroque scoring
system where some errors lead to penalties of 1 point
and other errors up to 50 points. In response to that
scoring system, some subjects tried to avoid all errors
while other subjects opportunistically allowed low-
penalty errors when that helped them avoid any
occurrences of high-penalty errors. That strategic
variation was noticed only when some data had been
collected; this is an indication of the subtle difficulties
that can arise when modeling tasks at the level of
complexity of AMBR. The difficulty of producing a
suitably correct Cognitive Task Analysis was roundly
reported by the four cognitive modeling groups
involved in the AFRL’s AMBR modeling project.
Unconstrained by the need to need to coordinate with
other groups, we changed the task.
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Figure 1: The AMBR Display
Sources of individual difference
Having introduced AMBR as our complex task, we
acknowledge that the term "complex" is a relative
one, and in seeking a complex task for our work, we
were actually seeking an appropriate kind of
complexity. We distinguish between distinct kinds of
individual difference factors, postulating that
architectural differences are those differences that
pertain to relatively permanent characteristics of the
individual, not shaped by particular episodes in the
individual’s experience. (We make no claims about
how development shapes architectural differences
throughout an individual’s life.) Knowledge-based
differences, on the other hand, can arise through
specific instances of learning declarative information;
the state of an individual’s knowledge can only be
described (or tested) in a very expansive manner, and
this is not our enterprise. A third type of individual
difference, strategic differences, could be broken
down into either of the two previously mentioned
types. It is not our goal to measure the encyclopedic
total of an individual’s knowledge, but we do
anticipate that certain differences in how an individual
chooses a strategy for a given task will depend upon
and emerge from architectural differences. Cases
where we can predict strategic differences based upon
architectural differences will serve to validate our
approach. We recognized that we would have trouble,
however, with any task that invited strategic variation
between subjects that could not be predicted from
architectural differences. In such a case, our
individual-difference approach would risk the same
pitfalls that a non-individual-approach can lead to
when subject strategies vary (Newell, 1973; Siegler,
1987).
Initial results
In two distinct experiments, with two sets of subjects,
we applied the methodology of administering initial
tests to measure the W and P/M parameters. The P/M
parameter was actually calculated based upon the
speed of mouse clicks in the AMBR training. Our
procedures for calculating the parameters produce
values of W and P/M which both have population
means of about 1.0 and standard deviations of about
0.2 (for Carnegie Mellon undergraduates). High W
means better working memory capacity, while high
P/M means slower perceptual and motor responses –
it is a multiplier, so that P/M = 1.2 means responses
20% slower than average). Therefore, where we find
significant effects, W correlates negatively with error
counts and P/M positively.
Subjects were trained on the AMBR task until they
understood it quite thoroughly, and then participated
in a number of AMBR scenarios, the data from which
we compared to individualized model runs for each
subject. Experiment 1 featured 10 AMBR scenarios,
each 9 minutes long, and alternating between very
easy and very difficult. Experiment 2 had 9 scenarios,
each 4.5 minutes long, varying evenly along a
continuum in terms of difficulty from easy to difficult.
As an informal measure of difficulty, we have taken
the number of AC per scenario times the average
speed of those AC, divided by the scenario length.
Using the idiosyncratic units of our simulations,
Experiment 1 scenarios had difficulty ratings of 26
(easy) and about 180 (hard). Experiment 2 scenarios
ranged in difficulty from 40 to 200.
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It is instructive to note the analysis that would be
performed if this were not an individual difference
study. Aggregate group performance, measured in
hold errors, as a function of scenarios was predicted
well by the aggregate model runs (Experiment 1: r =
0.975; Experiment 2: 0.929). This was almost the
same analysis, from the very same ACT-R model,
presented in Lebiere, Anderson, and Bothell (2001),
and used to argue for a good fit between subjects and
model.
The model correctly predicted that the AMBR task,
as originally conceived, is more sensitive to variation
in P/M than in W. This is seen clearly in the
correlations of subject holds with P/M (r = 0.658) and
W (r = -0.266). Not only can the model be used to
generate predictions for specific subjects, but it can
also be used to probe the effects of one parameter by
varying that parameter while holding the other one
neutral (at the population mean of 1.0). (Note that
holding one parameter fixed while varying another
among the subjects is a very difficult practical
matter.) This use of the model shows a strikingly
greater effect upon holds from P/M than W. This is in
agreement with data on the actual air traffic controller
task (which, it should be noted, has several distinct
differences from the AMBR task, not the least of
which being that it involves voice communication, not
a graphical user interface alone), which documents
that only a small number of errors are due to memory
failures (Billings and Cheaney, 1981).
Studies of AMBR traces reveal that the reason for
this is that hold errors are primarily an outgrowth of
time pressure when the time demands on a subject
exceed the time that is available. For 3 of the 5 types
of command in AMBR, the subject is shown the name
of an AC in the text cue, and must click on the AC as
part of the subsequent action sequence. Memory
becomes a factor in AMBR performance primarily in
that if a subject cannot remember the location of an
AC based upon its name, then the display must be
searched for the AC. This turns out to be a small
factor because visual search is fast – slower than
memory, perhaps, but the difference is on the order of
a fraction of a second, while clicking in a command
sequence takes several seconds whether the AC
location is remembered or not. W, then, is logically a
small factor in the original AMBR task, and for a
small portion of the variance.
Designing for science
In order to improve upon the studies described above,
we designed a follow-up study that modified the
scenario difficulty, the measures of performance that
we used, and even the task itself. It was obviously
necessary to decrease scenario difficulty into the
range for which the model produced a good fit to
subject data. This also allowed us to use one
performance measure that is more sensitive than hold
errors – the reaction time between an action’s cue and
the subject’s response to that cue (we used the time
for an action sequence to end, meaning the third or
fourth click in all). In order to emphasize the W effect
relative to the P/M effect (since cognitive modeling,
and not motor/kinesthetic modeling is our chief
interest), we modified the task so as to create a greater
penalty for failures in recall. We did this by removing
AC names from the display by default, and showed
the name of an AC only when the subject clicked on
the AC. Moreover, only one AC name could be seen
at a time, and this would appear after a delay. This
change meant that the speedy visual searches of the
earlier experiments would be impossible, and any
failure to recall an AC’s location would entail an
excruciatingly slow manual search. This task
modification also had the merit of giving us data on
searches, and let us emphasize a performance measure
that calculated what on what proportion of commands
a subject found the correct AC on the first click. In
other ways, Experiment 3 was similar to Experiments
1 and 2. Each subject was to participate in 5 AMBR
scenarios that were easy – hold errors confound
reaction time, so we needed them to be fairly rare in
order to use RT as a performance measure. In the
units of scenario difficulty mentioned earlier, all
Experiment 3 scenarios gauged 17 or lower.
Before the study began, we ran the model, which
was revised to allow for the task modification
involving name-hiding, on the Experiment 3
scenarios, and it seemed not to work correctly. Instead
of performing manual searches for AC names, it
would guess which AC it was looking for and click
through the entire action sequence without bothering
to verify that it had clicked the right AC. While work
on the model, to fix this “problem” was underway, the
first subjects ran in the experiment. They behaved the
same way. We had set the delay that one must wait,
after clicking on an AC, for its name to appear, too
long, and subjects preferred to hope that they had
guessed right correctly rather than perform the
laborious verification process. ACT-R came to the
same conclusion based upon the undesirably large
cost associated with clicks that required several
seconds before the desired consequence took place.
We modified the task again, shortening the delay
before the name appeared, and both the model and the
subjects performed manual search in the way we had
hoped. This demonstrates one possible application of
our approach – tasks (experimental or otherwise) can
be designed with the model’s predictions taken as a
serious indicator of subject performance, individual or
otherwise.
Experiment 3 produced the subject characteristics
we had sought. Our three measures of individual
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performance correlated significantly with W (Holds: r
= -0.444; RT: r = -0.314; First-clicks: r = 0.314). P/M
had about as large an impact on performance (Holds: r
= 0.508; RT: r = 0.485; First-clicks: r = -0.172), but,
as we desired, it did not dominate as in the first two
experiments.
The result most central to our intent was the
prediction of individual performance with model
output (Holds: r = 0.461; RT: r = 0.436; First-clicks: r
= 0.406). These correlations are distinctly less than
what is often possible when averaging multiple model
runs against the average of many subjects, but are
very much in line with the kinds of correlations found
in task intercorrelation matrix approaches (Ackerman
and Kanfer, 1993; Joslyn and Hunt, 1998).
To demonstrate the possibility of precise, instance-
level predictions, we looked at model predictions
across all three experiments, as to whether or not, for
each scenario, an individual subject would commit at
least one hold error. The model predicted correctly
91.7% of the time, as detailed below in Table 1.
Subject scenarios
with errors
Subject scenarios
with no errors
Model
scenarios
with
errors
205 4
Model
scenarios
without
errors
21 70
Table 1: Prediction of Error Situations
Future directions
For a variety of goals, both applied and scientific, it is
and will be desirable to be able to predict individual
performance on a fine-grained level. It seems certain
that the methodology we are exploring will be
expanded upon and utilized for such applications in
the future. At present, it is possible to point to the
range and extent of our successes and note the
particular difficulties that individual difference
modeling entails.
One avenue to explore is to involve a larger number
of individual difference factors. ACT-R has many
parameters built into it, and future work may be able
to predict individual performance more accurately by
making use of pre-tests besides the two we now use.
Because our model is fine-grained, it permits many
measures of performance, on the subject, scenario,
command, or click level. Ways in which the model
fits, or alternately does not fit, subject data highlights
many areas where future work is required. For
example, we have observed in the subject data from
Experiment 3 some phenomena of interest that the
model does not predict. These include a correlation
between higher W and the frequency with which a
subject completes a sequence of command clicks
without waiting for the AC name to appear. We
believe that we can capture this with additional
refinements to the model, taking advantage of ACT-
R's utility-learning mechanisms. A second
discrepancy between the subject data and the model
predictions are that the model does not recall AC
locations as well as the subjects do, and we believe
that this stipulates that the model should include
rehearsals of AC location between the time that
information is learned and when it is needed. A third
difference is that subjects often respond to Welcome
commands, which are always the second of a pair of
commands regarding a given AC, much faster than
the model does. In fact, some subjects respond much
faster than other subjects in this regard, and it is clear
that strategic variation has intruded into our study –
something that is difficult to prevent absolutely with a
task of AMBR's complexity. In upcoming
experiments, we will try to instruct all subjects to
anticipate Welcome commands when they can, and
will change the model so that it does so as well.
Subject phenomena that are not captured by the
model, we believe, stem from the problem of deriving
a valid Cognitive Task Analysis, which is known to
be difficult for a novel, complex task. It is striking
how much simpler AMBR is than many tasks (for
example, real  air traffic control), and yet how
challenging it is to model it precisely. It has not only
been a challenging task to which to extend the
individual difference methodology from memory to
more complex tasks; it is also at the right level of
complexity for the next stages of work as we try to
model it still more accurately and over a variety of
task modifications.
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Abstract
While their eye movements were being recorded, participants
spoke extemporaneously about a TV show whose cast members
they were viewing. Later, other participants listened to these
speeches while their eyes were tracked. Within this naturalistic
paradigm using spontaneous speech, a number of results linking
eye movements to speech comprehension, speech production
and memory were replicated. More importantly, a cross-
recurrence analysis  demonstrated that speaker and listener eye
movements were coupled, and that the strength of this
relationship positively correlated with listeners’ comprehension.
Just as the mental state of a single person can be reflected in
patterns of eye movements, the commonality of mental states
that is brought about by successful communication is mirrored
in a similarity between speaker and listener’s eye movements.
Introduction
Imagine standing in front of a painting, discussing it with a
friend. As you talk, your eyes will scan across the image,
moving approximately three times a second. They will be
drawn by characteristics of the image itself, areas of contrast
or detail, as well as features of the objects or people
portrayed. Eye movements are driven both by properties of
the visual world and processes in a person’s mind. Your
gaze might also be influenced by what your friend is saying,
what you say in reply, what is thought but not said, and
where you agree and disagree. If this is so, what is the
relationship between your eye movements and those of your
friend? How is that relationship related to the flow of
conversation between you?
Language use often occurs within rich visual contexts
such as this, and the interplay between linguistic processes
and visual perception is of increasing interest to
psycholinguists and vision researchers (Henderson &
Ferreira, 2004). As yet, however, such processes have been
limited to experiments that examine the eye movements of
the speaker or the listener in isolation. Language use, more
often than not, occurs within a richer social context as well.
Direct eye contact between conversants plays an
interesting, crucial role in coordinating a conversation
(Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 2002), and in conveying
various attitudes or social roles (Argyle & Cook, 1976). The
focus of the current experiment, however, is cases such as
those introduced at the outset, where conversants are not
looking at each other, but at some visual scene that is the
topic of the conversation. More common examples might be
discussing a diagram drawn on a whiteboard, figuring out
together how to do something on a computer, or talking
during a movie.
Uniquely poised between perception and cognition, eye
movements can reveal cognitive processes such as speech
planning, language comprehension, memory, mental
imagery and decision making. The current experiment
investigates whether the eye movements of a speaker and a
listener to a visual common ground can provide insight into
a discourse.
Eye movement Research
Eye movements of a speaker
If a speaker is asked to describe a simple scene, they will
fixate the objects in the order in which they are mentioned,
around 900ms before naming them (Griffin & Bock, 2000;
Meyer, Sleiderink, & Levelt, 1998). Since such pictures can
be identified rapidly, it is argued that during this time
speakers are not just retrieving words but selecting and
planning which to use.
Eye movements of a listener
Eye movement research has shown that there is a tight
interdependence between speech recognition and visual
perception. Eye movements to potential referents for a word
can provide evidence for a lexical item being recognized
before the word is finished being spoken. The link between
visual and linguistic processing can also be seen in eye
movements that disambiguate syntactic structures
(Tanenhaus, Spivey Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995)
and anticipate the future agents of actions (Kamide,
Altmann, & Haywood, 2003). Recent studies of the eye-
movements of a participant engaged in a conversation with
another naïve participant reveal a remarkable sensitivity to
the referential domains established by the task, the visual
context and the preceding conversation (Brown-Schmidt,
Campana, & Tanenhaus, 2004). Qualitatively, eye
movement research reveals a very close, time-locked
integration between visual and linguistic processing
(Tanenhaus, Magnuson, Dahan, & Chambers, 2000).
Although fixation times are heavily modulated by context,
as a very rough quantitative guide, research suggests that
listeners will fixate an object around 400-800ms after the
name onset.
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Eye movements of a thinker
Since participants will make systematic eye movements to
entirely empty and uninformative regions of space when
retrieving information from memory (Richardson &
Kirkham, in press; Richardson & Spivey, 2000) or listening
to a story (Spivey & Geng, 2001) it is clear that they can be
governed by cognitive as well as perceptual processes.
Influencing how the eye moves across an image can have
profound effects on mental processes. Researchers have
recorded the eye movements of participants interpreting an
ambiguous picture in a particular way, or solving a difficult
deductive problem from a diagram. Using low level visual
cues, a second set of participants were then influenced to
attend to the same regions of the picture. The second set of
participants were more like to form the same interpretation
of the ambiguous picture (Pomplun, Ritter, & Velichkovsky,
1996), and remarkably, were more likely to solve the
deductive problem (Grant & Spivey, 2003). If forced
similarity between participants’ eye movements can result in
similar cognitive states, then will the similar cognitive states
that are brought about by successful verbal communication
result in similar eye movement patterns between speaker
and listener?
Experiment
Speech production and speech comprehension have
previously been studied in separate eye tracking paradigms.
Yet if both are indeed closely linked to eye movements, the
eye movement patterns of two people engaged in a natural,
unscripted conversation may bare some relationship to each
other. Moreover, it raises the intriguing possibility that the
strength of the relationship between conversants’ eye
movements will parallel the success of their linguistic
relationship.
The current experiment approximates a conversation
between naïve conversants by asking participants to speak
spontaneously, with neither a script nor a rehearsal for an
extended period of time about a TV show, whose characters
were displayed in front of them. These speeches were then
played back to other participants who were looking at the
same display. Crucially, both the speakers’ and the listeners’
eye movements were tracked throughout. The listeners’
comprehension was then measured by a series of content
questions. Thus in addition to extending various eye
movement-language results to natural, spontaneous speech,
the current experiment was able to investigate a number of
entirely novel hypotheses regarding the linkage between
speaker and listener eye movements, and its relation to the
listener’s comprehension.
Methods
The first four participants recruited to take part in this
experiment were designated as speakers, and the remainder
were listeners. The methods for both stages will be
described below.
Participants
40 Stanford undergraduates took part in the experiment in
exchange for course credit.
Apparatus
An ASL 504 remote eye tracking camera was positioned at
the base of a 17” LCD stimulus display. Participants were
unrestrained, and sat approximately 30” from the screen.
The camera detected pupil and corneal reflection position
from the right eye, and the eye tracking PC calculated point-
of-gaze in terms of co-ordinates on the stimulus display.
This information was passed every 33ms to a PowerMac G4
which controlled the stimulus presentation and collected
looking time data. Prior to the experimental session, the
participants went through a 9 point calibration routine,
which typically took between 2 and 5 minutes.
Speakers’ voices were recorded by microphone, and
listeners made responses using the two buttons of a mouse
held in their lap.
Design – Speakers
The intention was to record participants speaking
spontaneously about a TV show while looking at a picture
of the cast members. In the first case, a picture of the 6
principal characters of the cast of the TV sitcom Friends
was used. The characters were shown individual in 6
separate pictures. Potential speakers were asked if they
knew they show and would like to talk about it, and two
speakers were selected who were knowledgeable and
reasonably gregarious. Speakers were instructed to ‘Talk
about the show for a couple of minutes. You could talk
about the relationships between the characters, your opinion
of them, or your favourite episode’. In the second case, two
participants were shown a 5 minute scene from T h e
Simpsons during which they undergo family therapy. These
participants were then shown a picture of the five family
members and their therapist. The participants were asked to
‘Describe what went on in the scene and what you thought
about it’.
As they spoke, the speakers’ eye movements were tracked
and their voices were recorded by microphone. These
recordings were trimmed so that they were all roughly one
minute long, and the text was transcribed for later analysis.
Design - Listeners
Participants listened while looking at the same picture of the
six cast members that had been in front of the speaker. Since
there could not be systematic looks to the cast members if
the participant did not recognize any of them, participants
were first asked if they were familiar with either show. On
this basis, the listeners were presented with one or both of
the Friends  and Simpsons stimuli, and were randomly
assigned one of the two speakers.
Listeners heard a minute of speech, and then a screen
appeared warning them that the question period was about
to start. In the four question trials, participants saw six solid
grey circles or squares in the locations where pictures of the
individual cast members had previously appeared. After a
1000ms pause, they heard a question and responded yes or
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no using the two mouse buttons. There followed a 2000ms
ISI during which the screen was blank.
The questions were recorded by the experimenter and
were of the form, “Did the speaker say…?”. The questions
were designed such that they could not be answered on the
basis of knowledge about Friends or The Simpsons alone,
but were specific to the information mentioned (or not) by
that particular speaker. The correct answer to half the
questions was yes and half no.
Data Coding
Roughly half of our listeners were familiar with both TV
shows and half knew the characters from only one. All
analyses are based on 49 usable listener-speaker dyads. A
further 9 cases were dropped due to problems with the
equipment or the calibration procedure.
The eye movements of the speaker and of the listener
during the minute of speech were analyzed in exactly the
same way. The eye movement data relayed which, if any, of
the six pictures were being fixated every 33ms. The data
were cleaned for blinks and saccades across a picture - only
stable fixations longer than 99ms were analyzed – and then
expressed in terms of a sequences of gaze onsets and offsets
in the six pictures.
The speakers’ recordings were transcribed with onset
times for each word spoken. In addition, words were flagged
if they were names of any of the six characters pictured.
Listener responses to the questions were coded for accuracy,
and their looking times to each of the pictures while
answering were calculated.
Results and Discussion
This experiment provided precise timing information about
speakers’ speech and gaze onsets, and listeners’ gaze onsets.
This information can depicted graphically in what we call a
‘scarf plot’, which represents a transcript of the speech
together with the timing of word onsets and the eye
movements of both speaker and listen. Figure 1 shows an
nine second segment of a scarf plot for one speaker-listener
dyad. Such eye movement data can be statistically analyzed
and compared with the objective measure of the listeners’
understanding of the speech provided by their performance
answering four comprehension questions.
Before the detailed inferential analyses begin, it is useful
to get a rough sense of the behavior being studied. On
average, speakers used 160 words, only 12 of which were
the names of the characters depicted. It is important to note
that the speeches were not edited for content, and include all
the deviations, hesitations and repetitions that are typical of
just a minute of normal, spontaneous speech.
Speakers and listeners switched their gaze between
pictures around 120 times. For each occasion, they spent
about 500ms looking at the picture. Since the average eye
fixation lasts 200-300ms, it is reasonable to assume that this
represents two fixations within the same picture.
Speaker Fixations Prior To Naming
For each occasion that the speaker named character X, their
eye movement data were consulted to find the point at
which X was last previously fixated. The difference between
the gaze onset and the name onset was computed for every
name used by every speaker. On average, a character was
fixated 860 ms prior to being named.
This lag is exactly in the range reported by the speech
production literature (Griffin & Bock, 2000), where
typically participants are explicitly instructed to describe a
simple picture. We have found a lag of the same magnitude
with spontaneous, natural speech, when participants are
describing not what is front of them per se, but things that
are not depicted - stories, opinions, relationships – that
relate to those characters.
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Figure 1. Scarf Plot of a 9 second segment of one dyad.
The speaker’s words are shown on the left, with nouns
highlighted. The speaker’s and listener’s eye movements
are  shown in the middle and right columns respectively.
Time is on the y axis, increasing down the page.
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Relationship Between Speaker And Listener Eye
Movements
To what degree were speaker and listener looking at the
same thing at the same time?
We quantified this question by generating categorical
cross-recurrence plots between the speaker and listener time
series of fixations (Dale & Spivey, in submission).  These
plots permit visualization and quantification of recurrent
patterns of states between two time series (see Shockley,
Santana & Fowler, 2003, for a fuller introduction; see
Eckmann, Kamphorst & Ruelle, 1987; Zbilut & Webber,
1992 for foundational treatises).  In our case, the cross-
recurrence plot portrays the extent to which dyad fixations
are overlapping temporally.
To begin, windows of a given length are moved along
each time series, forming individual windows at every time
index.  The windows of each time series are then compared
to all those of the other time series (comparing every time
index).  At time index i for the first time series and j for the
second, if their windows are sufficiently similar, a point (i,
j) is recorded on a two-dimensional plot.  By comparing
every window in the first to the second time series, we can
generate a full plot of points in which the two time series are
close to each other – a cross-recurrence plot.
For simplicity, we used a window size of 1 for our
analysis.  By using a categorical metric (see Dale & Spivey,
in submission, for details), we have the criterion that dyad
fixations are recurrent if falling on the same object for
33ms.  We generated plots using this metric between every
speaker-listener pair. Figure 2 shows example cross
recurrence plots between a speaker and (a) a listener who
answered all comprehension questions correctly (b) a
listener who answered few correctly, and (c) a listener with
their eye movement data placed in a random order. There
are three things to notice here. Firstly, the good listener has
higher density in their plot, indicating more points of
recurrence with the speaker. Secondly, both listeners have
more structured plots compared to the randomized series.
Lastly, one can see that for the two real listeners there is a
higher density in the region on and below the i=j diagonal.
This indicates that the speaker and listeners’ eye movements
overlapped more when the listeners’ eye movements lagged
behind the speakers.
We employed a further analysis to find out exactly what
temporal lag between the listener and the speaker would
produce the greatest degree of recurrence, or overlap,
between their eye movement patterns. Listener time series
were successively lagged by 330ms.  On the line defined by
i = j in the plot (the line of incidence), any point indicates
that in the same temporal context fixations are recurrent.
Thus, by lagging the listeners’ time series, and recording
maximal recurrence along the line of incidence within each
lag, we get a measure of the extent to which dyads’ eye
movements are related.  Though our chosen window size is
small, the results are quite compelling.
Figure 3 shows the degree of recurrence between speaker
and listener at different time lags, averaged across all 49
dyads. We also randomized listeners’ eye movement data
and calculated its recurrence with the speakers’. This
randomized series serves as a baseline of looking ‘at
chance’ at any given point in time, but with the same overall
distribution of looks to each picture as the real listeners.
 A 2 (listeners/randomized listener) x 40 (lag times)
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of listener type
(F(1,45)=785.5, p<.0001) and a main effect of lag
(F(40,1800)=25.2, p<.001). Moreover, there was a
signif icant  interact ion between the factors
(F(40,1800)=24.7, p<.001).
Clearly, the real listeners are not looking around these
displays randomly. Rather their eye movements are linked
to the speakers’, and this relationship has a temporal
character. More precisely, the maximum recurrence between
the speakers and listeners, the lag time at which their eye
movements overlap the most, is at 1650ms
These results are exactly what one would expect from the
combination of the speech production and speech
comprehension eye movement literature. Typically,
speakers will fixate an item 900ms before naming it and
listeners will fixate an object around 800ms after the name
onset. Very roughly this would suggest we would find a lag
of 900+800=1700ms between speaker gaze onsets and
listeners’. This derived value corresponds both to the exact
lag that produces a maximum recurrence value, 1650ms,
and the general region of higher recurrence in the 1000-
2000ms range.
Figure 2. Example CRPs
Figure 3. Cross recurrence at different time lags
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The speech production and comprehension literatures,
however, deal with cases where an object or person is
explicitly named. Perhaps it is the case that the differences
between critical and non-critical gaze onset lag distributions
observed here are due mainly to the occasions when the
speaker planned and spoke out loud a name of one of the
characters pictured.
This question was addressed by examining a subset of the
data. The name-subset includes only speaker fixations to
person X that were immediately prior to the speech onset of
name X. As noted previously, since there were on average
12 cases of name use, this constituted about 10% of the 120
fixations the average speaker made.
Figure 4A plots the recurrence at different time lags for
the name subset of our data. The 2 (listeners/randomized
listener) x 40 (lag times) ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of listener type (F(1,45)=192.3, p<.0001) and a
main effect of lag (F(40,1800)=28.1, p<.001). As before,
there was a significant interaction between the factors
(F(40,1800)=27.5, p<.001).
 For the subset of speaker fixations that precede a name,
there is a highly pronounced difference between the speaker
and the listener and the speaker and randomized looking.
Once more, the greatest extent of this difference is just
before 2000ms. Again, this would be predicted by the
speech production and comprehension eye movement
literatures. Is it the case, then, that the current experiment
has simply replicated these name-use results using
spontaneous speech?
To answer this question the data excluded from the name
analysis above were analyzed in isolation. Figure 4B plots
the ‘non name dataset’ that corresponds to the 90% of
speaker fixations to person X which were not immediately
followed by X being named out loud. The ANOVA showed
a similar pattern of results: main effect of listener type
(F(1,45)=559, p<.0001), a main effect of lag
(F(40,1800)=25.8, p<.001). and a significant interaction
between the factors (F(40,1800)=25.0, p<.001). Although
subtracting the cases of name use from the full data set
appeared to attenuate somewhat the differences between
critical and non-critical gaze onset lags, it is certainly the
case that these distributions still differ. In other words, it is
not just the when the speaker names a character that speaker
and listener eye movements are linked. It must be other
properties of the discourse (implicit reference, anaphor,
topics, agents, for example) which drive the speakers eye
movements while they are being planned, and a few seconds
later, influence the listener’s eye movements once they are
spoken.
Speaker-Listener Eye Movement Linkage and Listener
Comprehension
The degree to which eye movements were linked in a given
speaker-listener dyad were compared with the listener’s
comprehension of what had been said. For each dyad, we
computed the degree of recurrence (REC%) at a lag of
1650ms between speaker and listener. This is the lag that
produced the greatest recurrence across our whole data set,
and hence serves as a baseline to compare the linkage
between individual speaker-listener dyads. The performance
of listeners answering four comprehension questions was
taken as an objective measure of how well they had
comprehended the one minute of speech.
A regression analysis was performed on this data, and
found that a linear fit had  r2=0.14. Although it may not
account for a large portion of the variance in participants’
behaviour, an ANOVA shows that this relationship is
significant (F(1,47)=7.39, p<.01).
Figure 5. Correlation Between Speaker-Listener Eye
Movements Coupling and Listener Comprehension
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 General Discussion
The current experiment uses a naturalistic paradigm that
elicits and presents spontaneous speech. The language-use
in this experiment is grounded in the visual items presented
on the display, but is not a description of them per se, or an
explicit instruction relating to their presence or appearance.
Nevertheless, this single paradigm replicates several results
obtained in more constrained circumstances concerning the
relationship between eye movements, speech production,
and speech comprehension.
More importantly, this experiment provides what could be
the first demonstration that during the production and
comprehension of a spontaneous discourse, the eye
movements of a speaker and a listener are coupled.
Moreover, this relationship between eye movement patterns
is not driven by cases in which the speaker explicitly names
people who are depicted. It seems to be that the planning of
more diverse types of reference and foregrounding may be
influencing the speaker’s eye movements, and, a few
seconds later via the speech stream, influencing the
listener’s eye movements. Crucially, the strength of
relationship between the speaker’s and the listener’s  eye
movements appears to predict the degree to which the
listener successfully comprehended the speech.
Instances of new paradigms such as this inevitably raise
many questions for future research. Is it the case that a tight
coupling between speaker and listener eye movements is an
overall indication of listener attentiveness, which also
predicts listener comprehension? Or is it that by rapidly
bringing their eyes to bear on the same item as the speaker,
good listeners receive appropriate visual information that
supports the verbal input? Or perhaps it is not so much that
moving the eyes closely in step with a speaker brings in
visual content, but rather it is an indication (or a cause) that
the listener is using spatial information to cognitively
structure the information in the same way as the speaker?
The close relationship between speaker and listener eye
movements and the success of the discourse clearly aligns
with a view of language use as a joint activity (Clark, 1996),
in which successful communication is brought about by a
successful coordination of information in the common
ground. The human eye only receives detailed information
from 2º of its visual field: therefore, if the speaker and
listener are looking at exactly the same thing, then they are
certainly sharing a higher, common ground.
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Abstract 
We developed a picture-mapping task (Richland Picture 
Analogies, RPA) to examine the roles of inhibition and 
working-memory load on children’s development of 
analogical reasoning.  Children of ages 3-4, 6-8, and 13-
14 were instructed to use relational correspondences 
between source and target pictures to select the target 
object corresponding most directly to a specified source 
object.  The study examined age trends in children’s 
proficiency with analogical reasoning. Relational 
complexity and perceptual distraction were manipulated 
to investigate how maturational constraints interact with 
each other and with age. Results indicate that children’s 
development of the capacity to reason analogically 
interacts with increases in working-memory capacity and 
inhibitory control. 
 
 
Children’s higher-order reasoning skills are central to 
their ability to transfer knowledge from an initial learning 
context to future environments.  This process enables 
children to understand novel situations and contexts, to 
build on their everyday learning experiences and to 
develop a flexible body of knowledge (Gentner, Holyoak 
& Kokinov, 2001; Gentner & Rattermann; 1991; 
Holyoak, Junn & Billman, 1984).  Following Gentner 
(1983), analogy is defined as a conceptual strategy in 
which a source object is represented as similar to a target 
object, and correspondences are mapped between the two 
analogs.  Although there is wide agreement that this 
conceptual process is central to children’s everyday 
learning, the mechanisms underlying and constraining the 
development of analogical reasoning are not yet well 
understood.   
The process of constructing an analogy requires a 
reasoner to represent source and target analogs, maintain 
both representations in working memory (WM; Hummel 
& Holyoak, 1997, 2003), and construct a mapping 
between elements of the source and target based upon 
correspondences between relations in each (Gentner, 
1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989).  Critically, the 
relational correspondences may compete with more 
superficial perceptual or semantic similarities between 
individual objects, requiring inhibitory control when 
relational and more superficial responses conflict 
(Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Morrison et al., 2004; 
Viskontas et al., in press). 
 
Proposed Developmental Mechanisms 
Researchers have proposed three developmental 
mechanisms to explain age-related changes in children’s 
performance on analogical reasoning tasks:  increased 
domain knowledge, a relational shift, and increased WM 
capacity for manipulating relations. 
Goswami (1992, 2001) proposed domain knowledge as 
the primary mechanism underlying developmental 
changes in analogical reasoning.  According to her 
relational primacy hypothesis, analogical reasoning is 
available as a capacity from early infancy, but children’s 
analogical performance increases with age due to 
increased knowledge about relevant relations.  This 
hypothesis was developed in reaction to Piagetian studies 
suggesting that children are unable to reason analogically 
prior to achieving formal operations, approximately at age 
13 or 14 (Piaget, Montangero & Billeter, 1977).  Piaget’s 
tasks frequently involved uncommon relations, such as 
“steering mechanism”, which would likely have been 
unfamiliar to younger children.  In contrast, research has 
since shown children can reason analogically at much 
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younger ages (e.g. Gentner 1977, Holyoak et al.,  1984).  
Goswami and Brown (1989) argued that children as 
young as 3 years old were successful on analogical 
reasoning tasks when they demonstrated knowledge about 
the relevant relations.  Goswami and Brown presented 
children with complex versions of analogy tasks in which 
two physical, causal relations (e.g., cutting and wetting) 
were imposed on a source object “a” to become source 
object “b.”  Children were required to map on the basis of 
these relations to complete an analogy of the form 
a:b::c:d.  The investigators found that children were fairly 
competent on these problems with 2 relational changes 
when they showed knowledge of the relations. 
These data provided some evidence that domain 
knowledge is related to successful analogical reasoning, 
but the methodology of this study has been criticized.  
Rattermann and Gentner (1998) found that when a 
substantial perceptual distractor was included in the 
Goswami and Brown stimuli, children younger than age 
five were likely to select a perceptual match in spite of 
knowledge of the relations and explicit analogy 
instructions.  Gentner and Rattermann (1991; Rattermann 
& Gentner, 1998) posited that a “relational shift” occurs 
between the ages of four and five.  Before the relational 
shift, they argue that children primarily attend to 
perceptual similarity and will reason on the basis of 
perceptual features if available.  Following the relational 
shift, children can and do reason on the basis of relational 
features even when faced with perceptual distractors.  The 
authors suggest that domain knowledge is integral to the 
relational shift, though the mechanism is not explicitly 
postulated.   
An alternative explanation for the relational shift is that 
children younger than age five were unable to inhibit their 
responses to perceptual similarity, although they were 
aware that the task required attention to relational 
similarity.  It is well-established that children’s inhibition 
capacity develops with age (Diamond, Kirkham & Amso, 
2002), and follows similar age-related patterns as does 
analogical reasoning.  Accordingly, development of 
children’s inhibitory capacity, one aspect of the human 
working memory system, may underlie children’s patterns 
of success and failure on analogical reasoning tasks.    
Finally, WM constraints have been proposed to explain 
developmental change in analogical reasoning.  In 
particular, relational complexity has been argued to 
constrain children’s performance on analogical reasoning 
tasks (Halford, 1993).  Two primary definitions of 
relational complexity have been advanced.  Zelazo et al, 
(2003, 1998; Frye & Zelazo, 1998; Frye et al., 1996) 
define complexity as the number of hierarchical rules that 
must be maintained in working memory in order to 
accomplish a task, a view proposed as Cognitive 
Complexity and Control (CCC) theory.  For example, in 
the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task, children 
were asked to follow a rule to sort by color (e.g., “if red ... 
here” and “if blue ... here”) and a rule to sort by shape 
(e.g. “if rabbit... here” and “if boat...here”). Children ages 
3-4 were successful on these sorting tasks when 
performing them separately, but failed when required to 
integrate these two within a higher-order rule.   
Halford (1993; Andrews & Halford, 2003; Halford et. 
al, 2002) has argued that relational complexity is more 
generally a constraint on the number of distinct units of 
information that must be processed in parallel while being 
maintained in WM in order for a reasoner to complete a 
task. Using this metric of relational complexity, Halford 
has argued for a developmental continuum in children’s 
relational complexity capacity such that until 
approximately age four, children can process binary 
relations (a relationship between two objects) but not 
ternary relations (relationships among three objects, 
equivalent to the integration of 2 binary relations).  
The three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and 
the relationships among the empirical factors emphasized 
by each model have not been fully examined. The present 
project examines the interactions among the constraints at 
the heart of the three models: the role of domain 
knowledge, inhibition of perceptual distraction, and 
relational complexity.      
 
Picture Analogy Task 
We developed a set of materials for a picture-analogy 
task suitable for children across a wide age range. The 
general structure of the stimuli was modeled after those 
developed by Markman and Gentner (1993), with 
inclusion of additional controls and using content 
accessible to young children.  Our picture set (Richland 
Picture Analogies, or RPA task; available from first 
author upon request) was designed to examine the impact 
of relational complexity and perceptual distraction (i.e., 
need for inhibition) on children from age 3 yrs, while 
controlling for domain knowledge.  The RPA stimuli 
depict relational motion verbs of the type learned early in 
children’s vocabulary acquisition (e.g., Golinkoff et. al., 
1996; Golinkoff et al, 1995; Gentner, 1978).  Relations 
were motion verbs with perceptually available meanings 
that are familiar to young children by the age of 3 (e.g., 
“kiss”, “chase” and “feed”).  The objects used to represent 
these relations were items regularly encountered by 
preschool age children, including humans, animals, and 
dolls.  Counterbalanced versions of each picture set 
factorially varied number of relevant relations (1 or 2) and 
presence vs. absence of a perceptual distractor in a 2x2 
design.  Perceptual distractors were either exact matches 
to the source object located within the target picture or 
were slight variations of the same object (e.g., a cat 
chasing and a cat sitting).  In the no distractor conditions, 
a neutral object replaced the featural match.  The spatial 
location was held constant.  Unlike in the Markman and 
Gentner stimuli, distractors were never placed in key 
relational roles (allowing perceptual and relational errors 
to be coded separately), and the number of objects in each 
picture was controlled.  
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Method 
Participants 
The participants were 68 children: 22 aged 3-4 years, 
21 aged 6-8, and 25 aged 13-14.  They were enrolled in 
preschool, elementary, and junior high school programs in 
the New York City and Los Angeles areas.   
 
Materials and Design 
The RPA task consists of 20 pairs of source and target 
pictures in which objects in the paired pictures depict the 
same relationship using unique objects.  On a single page, 
participants viewed the two pictures in a set.  An arrow 
pointed to a source object in the top picture, and the 
participant was asked to select the corresponding object in 
the bottom picture (cf. Markman & Gentner, 1993).  For 
the example in Figure 1, the top picture represents “dog 
chasing cat chasing mouse” and the bottom picture 
represents “woman chasing boy chasing girl”. If an arrow 
pointed to the cat, the correct relational response would be 
the boy in the bottom picture.  All pictures contained 
extra items not depicting the relevant relationship, and the 
number of total objects was standardized across pictures 
per condition.  Most image sets contain a total of five 
objects.   
Four versions of each picture set were constructed in 
order to manipulate two variables in a 2x2 design.  The 
first variable was the presence or absence of a perceptual 
distractor in the target picture, defined by strong featural 
similarity to an object in the source picture.  The featural 
distractor was either an identical match to an object in the 
source picture or was the same object in a slightly 
different position.  For example, in Figure 1 (top) the cat 
is depicted sitting in the target picture but is not involved 
in the chase.  The featural distractor is never involved in 
the relational structure of the target picture. In Figure 1 
(bottom), the correct relational response is the boy; 
however the participant must inhibit the featural match to 
make this choice.  When present, the featural distractor 
spatially replaces an alternative object in the target 
picture.  As a control to ensure that the featural distractors 
were indeed perceptually distracting, ten undergraduates 
were asked to select the most perceptually similar object 
to the target in the 2R-D version of each stimuli.  
Participants selected the intended featural match 96% of 
the time, indicating that the manipulation of perceptual 
similarity is valid. 
The second variable was the number of relations, one or 
two, that participants were required to process 
simultaneously in order to accurately select a target 
object.  When two relations were involved, the correct 
target object was both agent and recipient of a relation.  
For example, in Figure 1 the top picture represents “dog 
chases cat” and “cat chases mouse”, whereas the bottom 
picture depicts “mom chases boy” and “boy chases girl”. 
If the participant only considered one of the relations in 
each picture, there would be two equally plausible answer 
choices, and participants would be expected to perform at 
a 50% level at best.  In this example the boy is the correct 
relational response because he (uniquely) is both being 
chased and is chasing. Making this determination requires 
integration of two binary relations in each picture. 
 
 
Problem 2-2a
 
Figure 1.  Sample stimuli, two relations with distractor 
(R2-D).  The cat in the top picture (both chaser and 
chased) maps relationally to the boy in the bottom picture. 
  
 The 2x2 repeated-measures portion of the design 
generated four conditions: one relation, no featural 
distractor (R1-N), one relation with featural distractor 
(R1-D), two relations, no featural distractor (R2-N), two 
relations, featural distractor (R2-D).  Packets of picture 
pairs for each participant were organized such that five 
examples of each condition were included in a random 
order.  The assignment of specific picture pairs to each of 
the four conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants in each age group. The three age groups 
constituted an additional between-subjects factor. The 
dependent variable was participants’ object choice within 
target pictures.  
 
 
Procedure 
The task was administered to participants in paper 
form. All participants were given two sample problems, 
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one involving one relation and the other involving two 
relations.  The instructions stated that “a certain pattern 
exists in both the top picture and the bottom picture, and 
the child’s job is to find this pattern.”  Following the first 
sample problem, (a 1R-D problem), it was explained that 
“some pictures have two parts of the pattern like that one, 
and others have three parts” (demonstrated subsequently 
in the 2-relation sample problem). The child was taught 
that an object in the top picture would be highlighted by 
an arrow, and they were to point or draw an arrow to the 
corresponding object in the bottom picture.  For both 
sample problems, children were asked to point to the 
correct answer and then were given feedback.  Feedback 
was repeated until they gave the correct answer.  If they 
failed initially on both sample problems, their 
performance on the first 5 problems was used as criteria 
for exclusion.  If participants failed on more than 3 
problems, their data was excluded from analysis.   
The problems were presented in random order 
following the sample problems.  The task was 
administered to the 13-14 year old participants in groups; 
all other children were tested individually by a single 
experimenter.   
 
Results 
 
Figure 2 presents the proportion of correct relational 
responses for each of the four picture conditions as a 
function of age. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed to examine the effects of age, relational 
complexity, and distractor condition on children’s 
proportion of correct relational choices.  The ANOVA 
revealed main effects of age, F(2, 65) = 78.15, p<.001, 
featural distraction, F(1, 65) = 26.07, p<.001, and 
relational complexity, F(1, 65) = 24.83, p< .001. These 
results establish that the RPA task is sensitive to age, that 
the picture manipulations were effective at creating 
distraction and increasing WM load, and that these 
constraints actively impede children’s analogical 
reasoning. 
Interactions were examined among age, relational 
complexity, and distraction.  The interaction between age 
and distractor condition was reliable, F(2, 65) = 3.15, 
p=.05, whereas that between age and relational 
complexity was not, F(2, 65) = .57, p= .57.  Importantly, 
the 3-way interaction was significant, F(2, 65) = 3.28, p< 
.05.  
The pattern of interaction was investigated using 
repeated-measures ANOVAs for each age group 
separately.  Results show that for the youngest children, 
ages 3-4, there was a main effect of relational complexity, 
F(1, 21) = 4.44, p< .05, a main effect of distractor, F(1, 
21) = 14.08, p<.01, and a significant interaction between 
relational complexity and distraction, F(1, 21) = 4.21, 
p=.05.  For the 6-7 yr old children there was a main effect 
of relational complexity, F (1, 20) = 10.43, p< .01 and of 
distraction, F(1, 20) = 10.31, p< .01, but no reliable 
interaction between these variables, F(1, 20) = 2.71, p = 
.116.  Data for the 13-14 yr olds revealed a main effect of 
relational complexity, F(1, 24) = 17.66, p< .001 but not of 
distraction, F(1, 24) = 2.21, p= .15, nor was there a 
reliable interaction, F(1, 24) = 1.67, p=.21. 
These data reveal that young children responded 
correctly well above chance on the one relation, no 
distractor condition; however, their accuracy fell when 
either a distractor or an added level of relational 
complexity (or both) was added.  With age this pattern 
remained similar for 6-7 year olds, but as children reached 
adolescence, the negative effects of distractor and 
relational complexity were minimized. 
Chance was calculated conservatively as the percent 
likelihood that a subject would select the correct relational 
match within the set of reasonable choices.  These 
included relational errors and featural errors, but not 
extraneous objects.  With this criteria, chance differed by 
condition reflecting the differential number of potential 
errors ranging from 50% (2 relevant possible answers) for 
1R-N to 25% (4 relevant possible answers) for 2R-D.  
Paired t-tests revealed that the youngest children were 
above chance on all conditions (1R-N: t(21) = 2.71, p< 
.05; 2R-N:  t(21) = 2.43, p< .05; 2R-D: t( 21) = 2.35, p< 
.05) except for the 1R-D condition (t(21) = 1.10, p=.29).   
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Figure 2.  Proportion correct relational responses as a 
function of distraction and number of relations across age 
groups.   
 
 
Error analysis 
Children’s responses were categorized into four types 
(see Table 1). Reponses were coded as either (1) 
relationally correct; (2) relational errors (an object in the 
correct relation but wrong role); (3) featural errors (the 
featural match in distractor conditions, or an unrelated 
object in the corresponding spatial location in no-
distractor conditions); or (4) other errors. A repeated-
measures ANOVA was performed to examine the 
relationship between age and participants’ featural errors 
across the four picture conditions. Children’s choice of 
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the featural match on the distractor conditions was 
compared with their choice of a non-featural, matched 
object in the same spatial location for the no distractor 
conditions.  The main effect of age was reliable, F(2, 65) 
= 49.78, p < .001, as was the main effect of distractor, 
F(1, 65) = 126.54, p < .001, confirming that the featural 
match was an effective distractor. There was also a 
significant interaction between age and distractor, F(2, 
65) = 20.15, p< .001, supporting the hypothesis that 
perceptual inhibition is a developmental constraint on 
analogical reasoning.  No other interactions were reliable.  
 
Table 1. Proportion of each response type across age and 
condition. 
 
                 Age R1-N R1-D R2-N R2-D 
3-4 65 38 46 36 
6-7 82 64 61 55 
Correct 
Relational 
13-14 97 95 90 90 
3-4 8 46 11 46 
6-7 0 25 4 27 
Featural 
Errors 
13-14 0 5 0 8 
3-4 15 9 6 9 
6-7 13 7 19 8 
Relational 
Errors 
13-14 2 1 4 4 
3-4 9 4 21 6 
6-7 5 5 15 10 
Other 
Errors 
13-14 2 0 4 5 
 
A separate repeated-measures ANOVA was performed 
on relational errors. Note that there was one possible 
relational error choice in the R1 conditions, and two such 
possible error choices in the R2 conditions.  The ANOVA 
revealed main effects of age, F(2, 65) = 23.41, p< .001, as 
well as relational complexity, F(1, 65) = 59.56, p< .001.  
There was also a significant interaction between the 
presence of a distractor and age on children’s relational 
errors, F(2, 65) = 5.85, p< .01.  At younger ages children 
made relational errors more frequently when there was no 
perceptual distractor available as an option.  This finding 
suggests that young children unsure about the correct 
answer first attempted to make a feature-based selection; 
if no perceptually similar choice was available, then they 
made a guess among objects participating somehow in the 
relevant relation.   
 
Discussion 
 
Data from the RPA task at ages 3-4, 6-7 and 13-14 
provide insight into the roles of relational knowledge, the 
relational shift, and maturational capacity in children’s 
development of analogical reasoning.  Patterns in 
participants’ correct relational responses revealed main 
effects of age, distraction, and relational complexity, 
supporting the validity of the task manipulations.  These 
main effects support theories of analogical reasoning 
development based on relational complexity and the 
relational shift.   
Conversely, because the 3-4 year olds’ performance on 
the 1R-N condition was high, their subsequent increases 
in errors in conditions with featural distraction or 
relational complexity provide support against the theory 
that domain knowledge alone is the mechanism 
underlying age-related development of children’s 
analogical reasoning.   
Interactions between age, distraction, and relational 
complexity indicate that in spite of children’s capacity to 
perform analogical mapping based on these relations, as 
evidenced by their success on the R1-N condition, 
maturational factors may interact to constrain children’s 
capacity to perform successfully on picture analogies that 
require more WM or perceptual inhibition.    
Further, the error patterns suggest that perceptual 
distraction may be a primary constraint on children’s 
reasoning and relational complexity a secondary 
constraint.  Error analysis provided support for the claim 
that participants’ patterns of failure were associated with 
age-related inhibition and relational complexity 
constraints.  Participants were likely to make featural 
errors when the perceptual distractor was present, 
highlighting the validity of the distraction manipulation 
within the task.  Supporting the relational shift hypothesis, 
at 3-4 yrs children were more likely to make featural 
responses when available than relational errors, even for 
the 2R-D condition, suggesting that inhibition was a more 
powerful constraint than relational complexity.  However, 
relational errors were also made by children of all age 
groups, in highest numbers in the 2R-N condition, 
indicating that relational complexity is an important 
constraint on young children’s analogical reasoning but 
may operate secondarily to featural distraction.  One 
possible explanation for this is that inhibition is a core 
mechanism necessary for the WM system to operate on 
multiple relations (see Viskontas, in press) 
The mechanism underlying featural distraction 
proposed by Rattermann and Gentner (1998; Gentner & 
Rattermann, 1991) is domain knowledge; however, this 
hypothesis is not supported by the current data, as the 
pictures were simple and counterbalanced across all 
conditions.  The alternative explanation based on an 
inhibition mechanism is supported by the great difference 
between children’s performance on the R1-N and R1-D 
conditions, as well as the similarity between the R1-D and 
R2-D conditions.   
In sum, the RPA task provides a new paradigm for 
using children’s interpretations of picture analogies to 
gather information about children’s development of 
analogical reasoning, and specifically reveals interactions 
between the roles of perceptual inhibition/ distraction and 
relational complexity across age.   
1153
Acknowledgments 
The authors wish to thank the Spencer Foundation 
(Dissertation Fellowship: Lindsey Richland), the National 
Institute of Mental Health (MH-64244-01A1; Robert 
Morrison), Xunesis (www.xunesis.org; Robert Morrison) 
and the Institute of Education Science (R305H030141; 
Keith Holyoak) for their generous support. We also thank 
Ann Fink for drawing the pictures used in the RPA 
materials. The RPA task is available from the first author 
upon request. 
.References 
Bassok, M. (2001). Semantic alignments in mathematical  
word problems. In D. Gentner, K. J. Holyoak, & B. N. 
Kokinov (Eds.), The analogical mind: Perspectives 
from cognitive science (pp. 401-433).  Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Brown, A. L., & Kane, M. J. (1988).  Preschool children  
can learn to transfer: Learning to learn and learning 
from example.  Cognitive Psychology, 20, 493-523.   
Frye, D., & Zelazo, P. D. (2003). The development of  
young children’s action control and awareness. In J.  
Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and self-awareness: 
Issues in philosophy and psychology. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Frye, D., Zelazo, P. D., Brooks, P. J., & Samuels, M. C.  
(1996). Inference and action in early causal reasoning.  
Developmental Psychology, 32, 120–131. 
Frye, D., Zelazo, P. D., & Burack, J. A. (1998). Cognitive  
complexity and control: Implications for theory of mind 
in typical and atypical development. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 7, 116–121. 
Gentner, D. (1977). If a tree had a knee, where would it 
be? Children’s performance on simple spatial 
metaphors. Papers and Reports on Child Language 
Development, 13, 157-164. 
Gentner, D.  (1983).  Structure-mapping: A theoretical  
framework for analogy.  Cognitive Science, 7, 155-170. 
Gentner, D., & Rattermann, M. J. (1991). Language and 
the career of similarity. In S. A. Gelman & J. P. Byrnes 
(Eds.), Perspectives on language and thought: 
Inetrrelations in development (pp. 225-277). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Gentner, D., & Toupin, C.  (1986).  Systematicity and 
surface similarity in the development of analogy.  
Cognitive Science, 10, 277-300. 
Gentner, D., Holyoak,, K., & Kokinov, B. (2001). The  
analogical mind: Perspectives from cognitive science.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gentner, D., & Holyoak, K. (1997).  Reasoning and  
learning by analogy: Introduction.  American 
Psychologist, 52, 32-24.  
Gick, M.L., & Holyoak, K. L. (1980).  Analogical  
problem solving.  Cognitive Psychology, 15, 306-355. 
Gick, M.L. & Holyoak, K. L.  (1983).  Schema induction 
and analogical transfer. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 1-38. 
Golinkoff, R. M., Jacquet, R., Hirsh-Pasek, K., & 
Nandakumar, R. (1996). Lexical principles may 
underlie the learning of verbs. Child Development, 67, 
3101-3119.  
Golinkoff, R. M., Hirsh-Pasek, K., Mervis, C. B., 
Frawley, W., & Parillo, M. (1995). Lexical principles 
can be extended to the acquisition of verbs. In M. 
Tomasello & W. Merriman (Eds.), Beyond names for 
things: Young children's acquisition of verbs (pp. 185-
222). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Holyoak, K. J., Junn, E. N., & Billman, D. (1984). 
Development of analogical problem-solving skill. Child 
Development, 55, 2042-2055. 
Holyoak, K., Novick, L., & Melz, E.R. (1994).   
Component processes in analogical transfer: Mapping, 
pattern completion, and adaptation.  In K. J. Holyoak & 
J. A. Barnden (Eds.), Advances in connectionist and 
neural computation theory, Vol 2: Analogical 
connections (pp. 113-180).  Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Hummel, J.E., & Holyoak, K.J. (1997).  Distributed  
representations of structure: a theory of analogical 
access and mapping.  Psychological Review, 104, 
427-466. 
Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (2003). A symbolic  
connectionist theory of relational inference and 
generalization. Psychological Review, 110, 220-264. 
Morrison, R. G., Krawczyk, D. C., Holyoak, K. J., 
Hummel, J. E., Chow, T. W., Miller, B. L., & 
Knowlton, B. J. (2004). A neurocomputational model 
of analogical reasoning and its breakdown in 
Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 260-271. 
Piaget, J., Montangero, J., & Billeter, J. (1977). La 
formation des correlats. In J. Piaget (Ed.) Recherches 
sur l'abstraction reflechissante I (pp. 115-129). Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France. 
Ross, B.  (1987). This is like that: The use of earlier 
problems and the separation of similarity effects.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 13, 629-639. 
Viskontas, I.V., Morrison, R.G., Holyoak, K.J., Hummel,  
J.E., &  Knowlton, B.J.,  (in press) Relational 
integration, inhibition and analogical reasoning in older 
adults. Psychology and Aging. Zelazo, P. D., & Frye, 
D. (1998). Cognitive complexity and control: The 
development of executive function. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 7, 121–126. 
1154
A Neural Model of Episodic and Semantic Spatiotemporal Memory 
 
Gerard J. Rinkus (rinkus@comcast.net) 
468 Waltham St. 
Newton, MA USA 
 
 
Abstract 
A neural network model is proposed that forms sparse 
spatiotemporal memory traces of spatiotemporal events 
given single occurrences of the events. The traces are 
distributed in that each individual cell and synapse 
participates in numerous traces. This sharing of 
representational substrate provides the basis for similarity-
based generalization and thus semantic memory.  
Simulation results are provided demonstrating that similar 
spatiotemporal patterns map to similar traces. The model 
achieves this property by measuring the degree of match, 
G, between the current input pattern on each time slice and 
the expected input given the preceding time slices (i.e., 
temporal context) and then adding an amount of noise, 
inversely proportional to G, to the process of choosing the 
internal representation for the current time slice. Thus, if G 
is small, indicating novelty, we add much noise and the 
resulting internal representation of the current input pattern 
has low overlap with any preexisting representations of 
time slices. If G is large, indicating a familiar event, we add 
very little noise resulting in reactivation of all or most of 
the preexisting representation of the input pattern. 
Introduction 
Any realistic cognitive model must exhibit both episodic 
and semantic memory. And, as emphasized by Ans, 
Rousset, French, & Musca (2002), it must demonstrate 
these properties for the spatiotemporal (or, sequential) 
pattern domain. Thus, the model must be able to recall, 
without significant interference, large numbers of 
spatiotemporal patterns, which we will call episodes, 
given only single presentations of those episodes. 
Furthermore, it must exhibit human-like similarity-based 
generalization and categorization properties that underlie 
many of those phenomena classed as semantic memory. 
We propose a sparse, distributed neural network model, 
TESMECOR (Temporal Episodic and Semantic Memory 
using Combinatorial Representations), that performs 
single-trial learning of episodes. The degree of overlap 
between its distributed memory traces increases with the 
similarity of the episodes that they represent. This latter 
property provides a basis for generalization and 
categorization and thus, semantic memory. The model 
achieves this property by computing, on each time slice, 
the similarity, G, between the expected and actual input 
patterns and then adding an amount of noise inversely 
proportional to G into the process of choosing an internal 
representation (IR) for that time slice. When expected and 
actual inputs match completely, no noise is added, 
allowing those IR cells having maximal input via 
previously modified weights to be reactivated (i.e., fully 
deterministic recall). When they completely mismatch, 
enough noise is added to completely drown out the 
learned, deterministic inputs, resulting in activation of an 
IR having little overlap with preexisting traces. 
The opposing purposes of episodic memory and pattern 
recognition (i.e., semantic memory)—i.e., remembering 
what is unique about individual instances vs. learning the 
similarities between instances—has led other researchers 
to propose that the brain uses two complementary 
systems. McClelland et al (1995) and O’Reilly & Rudy 
(1999) propose that the purpose of the hippocampus is to 
rapidly learn new specific information whereas the 
purpose of neocortex is to slowly integrate information 
across individual instances thus coming to reflect the 
higher-order statistics of the environment. The 
hippocampus then repeatedly presents its newly acquired 
memory traces to neocortex, acting as trainer facilitating 
the gradual transfer of information to neocortex during the 
period of memory consolidation. We point out that 
TESMECOR is not such a two-component model. Rather, 
it is a monolithic model, i.e., it has a single local circuit 
architecture and processing algorithm (envisioned as an 
analog of the cortical mini-column) that satisfies the 
opposing needs. 
Episodic Spatiotemporal Memory 
Rinkus (1995) introduced a neural network model, 
TEMECOR, of episodic memory for spatiotemporal 
patterns. As shown in Figure 1, the model’s. Layer 1 (L1) 
consists of binary feature detectors and its layer 2 (L2) 
consists of competitive modules (CMs). The L2 cells are 
nearly completely connected via a horizontal matrix 
(H-matrix) of binary weights. 
The model operates in the following way. On each time 
step, a pattern is presented to L1. On that same time step, 
one L2 cell is chosen at random to become active in each 
CM corresponding to an active L1 cell. In addition, the 
horizontal weights from the L2 cells active on the prior 
time slice to those that become active on the current time 
are increased to their maximal value of one. In this way, 
spatiotemporal memory traces are embedded in the 
H-matrix. Later on, if we reinstate a set of L2 cells that 
was coactive in the past while learning an episode, the 
remainder of that episode will be read out in time. That is, 
the model recalls spatiotemporal memories. 
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Figure 1: TEMECOR architecture showing how spatiotemporal memory traces are laid down amongst the horizontal 
connections of Layer 2. Features {b,c,d} are active at t = 1, {e,f,h} at t = 2, and {i,j,k} at t = 3. Each L2 cell has horizontal 
connections to all other L2 cells except those in its own CM. Only the connections increased while processing this particular 
spatiotemporal pattern (episode) are shown. Note that although this figure shows each time slice of the episode being handled 
by a separate portion of the network, this is purely to keep the figure uncluttered. In fact, all L1 cells and all L2 CMs are 
eligible to become active on every time slice. 
 
TEMECOR exhibits high capacity, as shown in Figure 
2, as well as other essential properties of episodic 
memory, e.g., single-trial learning. The model’s beneficial 
properties derive principally from its use of a sparse 
distributed, or combinatorial, representational framework, 
a framework underlying many other models—Willshaw, 
Buneman & Longuet-Higgins, 1969; Lynch, 1986; Palm, 
1980; Moll & Miikkulainen, 1995; Coultrip & Granger, 
1994. The key to its high capacity is that by randomly 
choosing winners in the CMs, it minimizes the average 
overlap amongst the memory traces. 
 
Figure 2: Capacity Results 
 
Table 1 provides the data for the bold curve in the 
figure. It gives the maximal capacity, E, and other 
statistics for networks of increasing size, L. All episodes 
had T = 6 time slices and each time slice had S = 20 (out 
of M = 100) active features, chosen at random. The 
bottom row of the table shows that a network containing 
4000 L2 cells, i.e., 100 CMs having K = 40 cells each, 
can store 5693 such episodes. 
 
Table 1: Capacity Test Results 
 
E E/L F K L V Rset H 
237 0.30 285 8 800 36 96.3 52.3 
943 0.59 1132 16 1600 71 97.0 52.1 
2104 0.88 2524 24 2400 105 97.0 51.8 
3691 1.15 4430 32 3200 138 97.2 51.4 
5693 1.42 6831 40 4000 171 97.4 50.9 
 
Table 1 was generated as follows. For each K, the 
maximal number of episodes, E, which could be stored to 
criterion average recall accuracy, 96.3%, was determined. 
Recall accuracy, Re, for a given episode e, is defined as: 
)()( eeeee ICDCR +-=       (1) 
where Ce is the number of L2 cells correctly active during 
recall of eth episode, De is the number of deleted L2 cells, 
and Ie is the number of intruding L2 cells. The table 
reports Rset, the average of the Re values for a whole set of 
episodes. All episodes were presented only once. 
The other statistics in Table 1 are as follows.  E/L is the 
ratio of stored episodes to the number of cells in L2, 
which increases linearly. F is the average number of 
instances of each feature across the entire set of episodes. 
V is the average number of times each L2 cell in a given 
CM became active to represent the corresponding feature. 
H is the percentage of weights increased, which is nearly 
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constant, at just over 50%, across rows. As we allow the 
fraction of weights to increase beyond 50%, more 
episodes are stored, but with a lower average recall 
accuracy due to the increase in intrusion errors resulting 
from saturation of the weights. 
While TEMECOR exhibited the major properties of 
episodic memory it was not initially intended to model 
semantic memory and, due to its completely random 
method of choosing sparse internal representations at L2, 
it did not exhibit the generalization and categorization 
properties that underlie semantic memory. The successor 
version of the model, TESMECOR was developed to 
address this shortcoming (Rinkus, 1996). 
Semantic Spatiotemporal Memory 
TESMECOR is shown in Figure 3. It has some 
architectural differences with the original version 
(essentially, relaxations of some of the original’s 
structural constraints) and a greatly modified winner 
selection process. The H-matrix of L2 is as before but the 
vertical projection is generalized. There is no longer a 
1-to-1 correspondence between L1 cells and L2 CMs. 
Rather; each L1 cell connects to a fraction of all the L2 
cells chosen at random in simulations. In TESMECOR, 
all CMs are active on every time slice. In addition, the 
bottom-up, or forward, connections (F-weights) and the 
top-down, or reverse, connections (R-weights) are now 
modeled separately and are modifiable. 
 
Figure 3: TESMECOR architecture. 
 
The most significant change between TEMECOR and 
TESMECOR however is in the processing algorithm. 
Specifically, TESMECOR adds circuitry implementing 
spatiotemporal matching operations, both locally within 
each CM and globally over the entire L2. On each time 
slice, the global degree of match between the actual 
current input and the expected input, given the 
spatiotemporal context of the current input, modulates the 
amount of noise injected into the process of selecting 
which L2 cells will become active. The smaller the match, 
the more noise that is added and the greater the difference 
between the internal representation (IR) that would have 
become active purely on the basis of the deterministic 
inputs reflecting prior learning and the IR that actually 
does become active. The greater the match, the less noise 
added and the smaller the difference between the most 
highly implicated IR (on the basis of prior learning) and 
the actually chosen IR. 
Figure 4 illustrates the basic principles by which the 
model computes, on each time slice, the degree of match, 
G, between its expected input and the actual input and 
then uses G to determine how much noise to add to the 
internal representation selection scheme. Figure 4a shows 
a pattern, A, presenting at t = 1. The H-weights are 
increased (represented by the dotted lines) from the active 
L1 cells onto an internal representation, IRA, comprised of 
the three L2 cells that emerge as winners in their 
respective CMs. For purposes of this example, these three 
winners can be assumed to be chosen at random. 
Figure 4b shows another pattern, B, presenting at t = 2. 
As with IRA, IRB can be assumed to be chosen at random. 
Here, we see the both H- and F-weights being increased. 
Figure 4c shows another trial with pattern A presenting 
at t = 1. This time, IRA becomes active due to the 
deterministic effects of the previously increased weights 
(which are now shown as solid lines). The cells of IRA 
now send out signals via the H-matrix which will arrive at 
the other CMs at t = 2. 
At this point, it is convenient to portray the t = 2 time 
slice in two steps. Figures 4d and 4e show these two 
steps. Figure 4d shows the signals arriving via the 
H-matrix at the same time that that signals arrive via the 
F-matrix from currently active L1 cells. Thus, the L2 cells 
in the three CMs on the right simultaneously receive two 
vectors each carrying possibly different expectations 
about which IR should become active (or equivalently, 
different hypotheses about what the current state of the 
world is). It is these two vectors that TESMECOR 
compares. In this particular case, the three cells of IRB are 
receiving full support via the H-matrix. In other words, 
the temporal context says that IRB should become active. 
However, these cells are receiving only partial support 
(two out of four L1 cells) via the F-matrix. Indeed, this is 
a novel input, pattern C, which has presented. Thus, the 
current spatial context does not contain sufficient 
information (given this network’s history of inputs) to 
clearly determine what IR should become active. We 
represent this less-than-maximal support for IRB by the 
gray shading of its cells. Because of this mismatch, i.e., G 
< 1.0, we add some noise into the winner selection 
process. The final result is that a different L2 cell than the 
one most strongly implicated by the deterministic inputs 
ends up winning the competition in one of the three CMs 
(the bottom right-hand one) active at t = 2. Thus, Figure 
4e shows a new IR, IRC, representing the novel pattern, C. 
 
Global
Match
Noise
Generation
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Figure 4: Sketch of TESMECOR’s spatiotemporal pattern comparison and noise-modulated internal representation selection 
scheme. See text for explanation. As in Figure 2, the division of the L2 CMs into separate groups for different time slices is 
purely to avoid clutter. In the model’s actual operation, all CMs are active on every time slice. 
 
Figures, 4f, 4g, and 4h, show another possible scenario. 
This time, we will again present pattern B at t = 2. However 
a novel pattern, D, having only two features in common 
with A, presents at t = 1. As this is the first time slice of this 
new trial, there is no prior context vector active in the 
H-matrix. For concreteness, let’s assume that this degree of 
mismatch causes a new winner to be chosen in two of the 
three CMs active at t = 1, resulting in a new IR, IRD. When 
B presents at t = 2, the F-vector lends maximal support for 
IRB but the H-vector has great uncertainty; only 1/3 of the 
maximal possible horizontal input arrives at the cells of IRB. 
This seems like even a worse match than in Figure 4d 
(shown by an even lighter shading of the IRB cells than in 
Figure 4d). Consequently, more noise is added to the winner 
selection process. Let’s assume that this degree of mismatch 
leads to a new winner in two of the three CMs active at t = 
2, resulting in a new IR, IRB*, for pattern B.  
With this example of the desired behavior in mind, we 
now give TESMECOR’s processing algorithm, which is 
computed on each time slice for each L2 cell. 
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In step 1, each L2 cell, i, computes its total weighted 
input, y i,t, from the set, G t, of currently active L1 cells. In 
step 2, the y  values are normalized within each CM. That is, 
we find the maximum y  value, in each CM and divide all 
the individual values by the greater of that value and 
a) t=1 b) t=2
c) t=1 d) t=2a
f) t=1 g) t=2a h) t=2b
e) t=2b
) t b) t=2
t d) t=2a
g) t=2a h) t=2b
e) t=2b
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F-matrix threshold, FQ t. FQ t is needed to ensure that small 
feedforward signals are not amplified in subsequent 
normalization steps. F Q t is a parameter that can vary from 
one time slice to the next but we omit discussion of this 
detail in this paper due to space limitations. 
Steps 3 and 4 perform analogous operations for the 
horizontal inputs. In step 3, i, computes its total weighted 
input, f i,t, from the set, D t-1, of L2 cells active on the prior 
time slice. In step 4, the f  values are normalized within each 
CM. That is, we find the maximum f  value, in each CM and 
divide all the individual values by the greater of that value 
and an H-matrix threshold, H Q t. H Q t is needed to ensure that 
small H values are not amplified in subsequent 
normalization steps. H Q t also varies from one time slice to 
the next but again, space limitations force us to omit 
discussion of this detail. Note that steps 3 and 4 are only 
applicable on non-initial time slices (t > 0) of episodes. 
Step 5 works differently on the first time slices of 
episodes than on the rest. When t > 0, we multiply the two 
pieces of evidence, Y i,t and F i,t, that cell i should become 
active but we do this after passing them through separate 
exponential filters. Since Y i,t and F i,t, are both between 0 
and 1, the final c i,t values output from this step are also 
between 0 and 1. The exponential filters effect a 
generalization gradient: the higher the exponents, u and v, 
the sharper the gradient and the more sensitive the model is 
to differences between inputs (i.e., the finer the 
spatiotemporal categories it would form) and the less 
overlap between the internal representations chosen by the 
model. When t = 0, we do not have two vectors to compare. 
Instead, we simply pass the Y  values through an exponential 
gradient-controlling filter. The three different exponent 
parameters, u, v, and w, simply let us fine-tune the model’s 
generalization gradients. For example, we might want the 
model’s sensitivity to featural similarity to be stricter at the 
beginning of episodes than on the successive time slices of 
episodes; thus we would set w higher than u. 
In step 6, we normalize the combined evidence vector, 
again subject to a threshold parameter, c Q t, that prevents 
small values from erroneously being amplified. In step 7, 
we simply determine the maximum value, p i,t, of the C i,t 
values in each CM. These p  values constitute local, i.e., 
within each CM, comparisons between the model’s 
expected and actual inputs. In step 8, we compute the 
average of these local comparison results across the Q CMs 
of L2, resulting in the model’s global comparison, Gt, of its 
expected and actual inputs.  
In step 9, we convert the C i,t values back into a 
probability distribution whose shape depends on Gt. We 
want to achieve the following: if Gt is 1.0, indicating that 
the actual input has perfectly matched the model’s expected 
input, then, in each CM, we want to choose, with probability 
1.0, the cell belonging to the IR representing that expected 
input. That cell, in each CM, is the one having the highest C  
value. Since, in general, other cells in that cell’s CM could 
have non-zero or even high C  values, we need to filter the 
values by an expansive nonlinearity, f, so that the cell with 
the maximal C  value maps to a probability, pi,t, of 1.0 and 
the rest of the cells end up mapping to pi,t = 0.0. On the 
other hand, if Gt = 0, indicating that the actual input is 
completely unexpected in the current temporal context 
given all of the model’s past experience, then we want to 
make all the cells, in any given CM, be equally likely to be 
chosen winner. Thus, in this case, f should be a compressive 
nonlinearity that maps all cells in the CM to p= 1/K, where 
K is the number of cells in the CM. Without going into 
details, the function, f, is a sigmoid that meets the above 
goals. In the last stage of step 9, we simply choose the 
winner in each CM according to the resulting distribution. 
To summarize, on each time slice, every L2 cell compares 
two evidence vectors, the H-vector, reflecting the sequence 
of patterns leading up to the present time slice (temporal 
context), and the F-vector, reflecting the current spatial 
pattern (spatial context). These vectors are separately 
nonlinearly filtered and then multiplicatively combined. The 
combined evidence vector is then renormalized and 
nonlinearly filtered before being turned into a probability 
distribution that governs the final selection of L2 cells to 
become active. Note that this basic scheme can be extended 
to simultaneously compare other evidence vectors as well. 
This is one of our intended lines of future research: 
specifically, we will examine incorporating a hippocampal 
component to the model, which will provide a third 
evidence vector to the L2 cells. 
The concept of controlling the embedding of internal 
representations (IRs) based on comparing the expected and 
actual inputs is common to other cognitive models, e.g., 
Grossberg (1987). However, TESMECOR’s use of 
distributed IRs, rather than singleton IRs, requires a 
generalized comparison scheme. Specifically, with 
distributed IRs, there exists a range of possible degrees of 
overlap between IRs. We want to use that range to represent 
the spatiotemporal similarity structure of the environment to 
which the model has been exposed. Therefore, rather than 
having a single threshold for judging the similarity of the 
current input and expected inputs (e.g., ART's vigilance 
parameter), TESMECOR's continuous-valued similarity 
measure, G, is used to inject a variable amount of noise into 
the IR-selection process, which in turn allows for selecting 
IRs whose degrees of overlap are correlated with their 
spatiotemporal similarities. 
Simulation Results 
In this section, we provide the results of preliminary 
investigations of the model demonstrating that it performs 
similarity-based generalization and categorization in the 
spatiotemporal pattern domain. 
The four simulations described in Table 2 were performed 
as follows. In the learning phase, E episodes were presented, 
once each. Each episode consisted of 5 time slices, each 
having 20 (out of 100) randomly selected features present. 
Then, perturbed versions, differing by d = 2, 4, 6, or 8 (out 
of 20) features per time slice from the original episodes 
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were generated. The model was then tested by presenting 
the first Z time slices of the perturbed episodes as prompts.  
Following the prompt time slices, the model entered a free-
running mode (i.e. cutting off any further input) and 
processing continued from that point merely on the basis of 
signals propagating in the H-projection. 
 
Table 2: Generalization/Categorization Results 
 
Simulation E d Z Rset 
1 27 2 1 92.3% 
2 13 4 1 98.0% 
3 7 6 1 98.3% 
4 13 8 2 82.7% 
 
These results indicate that the model was extremely good 
at locking into the trace corresponding to the most-closely-
matching original episode. The accuracy measure, Rset (eq. 
1) measures how close the recall L2 trace is to the L2 trace 
of the most-closely-matching original episode. The accuracy 
for simulation 4 (82.7%) may seem low. However, if the 
accuracy measure is taken only for the final time slice of 
each episode then it is close to 100% for all four 
simulations. The view taken herein is that given that the 
pattern to be recalled are spatiotemporal, the most relevant 
measure of performance is the measure of accuracy on the 
last time slice of the test episode. If the model can “lock 
into'' the correct memory trace by the end of the recalled  
trace, then that should be sufficient evidence that model has 
recognized the input as an instance of a familiar episode. 
 
Table 3: Per-Time-Slice L2 Accuracy for 
the Test Trials of Simulation 4 of Table 2  
 
Episode T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4 T=5 
1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
2 0.82 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
3 0.67 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
4 0.82 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
5 0.67 0.82 1.0 1.0 1.0 
6 0.67 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
8 0.74 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
9 0.74 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
10 0.67 0.82 1.0 1.0 1.0 
11 0.54 0.67 0.22 0.0 0.0 
12 0.48 0.21 0.0 0.0 0.0 
13 0.82 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
Table 3 shows the details of the simulation 4 in Table 2. 
Specifically, it shows the L2 accuracy on each time slice of 
each episode during the recall test. For each recall trial the 
model received a prompt consisting of degraded versions of 
the first two time slices of the original episode—
specifically, 4 out of 20 features were substituted on each 
time slice (for a total of 8 featural differences). In all but 
two cases, the model ‘locks into’ the L2 trace corresponding 
to the most-closely-matching original episode (i.e., the 
episode from which the degraded prompt was created. 
These simulations provide preliminary evidence that 
TESMECOR exhibits generalization, and in fact 
categorization, in the spatiotemporal domain, while at the 
same time exhibiting episodic memory since the episodes 
are learned with single trials. 
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Abstract
How do people learn flexible problem-solving knowledge,
rather than inert knowledge that is not applied to novel
problems?  Both the source of the knowledge – instructed or
invented – and a central learning process – engaging in self-
explanation – may influence the development of problem-
solving flexibility.  Seventy-seven third- through fifth-grade
students learned about mathematical equivalence under one of
four conditions that varied on two dimensions:  1) prompts to
self-explain and 2) invention vs. instruction on a procedure.
Both self-explaining and direct instruction helped students to
learn a correct problem solving procedure.  Self-explanation
promoted transfer, whereas direct instruction had both
positive and negative effects on transfer.  Overall, self-
explanation is an important learning mechanism underling the
acquisition of flexible problem solving with or without direct
instruction.
Introduction
Everyday, we are faced with new problems to solve.  How
do we complete our income tax return, write a new resume,
or find a new route home given recent road construction?
When faced with a problem repeatedly, we often develop
procedures for solving the problem, i.e. step-by-step
methods for solving the problem.  Ideally, we learn flexible,
relatively abstract procedures that we can appropriately
apply to a variety of tasks so that we do not need to invent
new procedures when task conditions shift. Flexible,
abstract, knowledge is also a key characteristic of expertise
(Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). Thus, understanding how
people develop flexible, abstract knowledge is crucial for
understanding learning and development and for designing
learning environments to support flexibility.
Unfortunately, people of all ages and across a large range
of domains often gain inert knowledge instead – knowledge
that is not applied to new situations (see Bransford, Brown,
& Cocking, 2001 for a review). For example, physics
students typically fail to use knowledge of physics
principles, such as Newton’s Laws, to solve everyday
problems (Halloun & Hestenes, 1985).  Indeed, even
scientists sometimes fail to use their scientific knowledge to
solve mundane tasks (Lewis & Linn, 1994).
How do people learn flexible knowledge, rather than
simply gaining inert knowledge, and how can we support
this learning?  In the current study, two processes were
evaluated:  1) The source of new knowledge – invention or
direct instruction and 2) A potential mechanism underlying
flexible learning - generating self-explanations for why and
how things work.
Invention vs. Instruction
Where do new procedures come from?  Typically, we
invent a procedure through problem exploration or we learn
a procedure from others (e.g. via imitation or direct
instruction).  Major theories of learning and philosophies of
education differ in their emphasis on the sources of new
procedures.  The current paper focuses on one source of
knowledge from other people – direct instruction – and
compares it to inventing procedures on ones own.
Invention and learning from direct instruction can both
lead to learning of the target behavior or knowledge (e.g.
Judd, 1908).  However, a major concern with discovery
learning is that a substantial proportion of learners never
invent a correct procedure or engage in correct ways of
thinking (Mayer, 2004).
Another critical issue is the relative effectiveness of each
source of knowledge for supporting flexible, generalizable
knowledge.  Direct instruction on a procedure can lead
people to learn the procedure by rote, to make nonsensical
errors and to be unable to transfer the procedure to solve
novel problems (e.g. Brown & Burton, 1978; Hiebert &
Wearne, 1986), whereas when people invent procedures,
they often use the procedures flexibly in new situations
(Hiebert & Wearne, 1996).  Thus, there appears to be a
trade-off between instruction improving problem solving on
a restricted range of problems but potentially harming
flexible problem solving on a broader range of problems.
The current study evaluates the pros and cons of direct
instruction versus encouragement to invent a procedure on a
single task and evaluates the role of self-explaining as a
learning mechanism under both conditions.
Self-Explaining
A potential mechanism underlying the impact of instruction
and invention on procedural flexibility (and learning more
generally) is learners’ attempts to generate explanations for
why and how things work.  Successful learners typically
generated explanations while studying worked-examples to
problems.  These explanations included identification of gaps
in understanding and linkages to previous examples or
sections in the text (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser,
1989).  Subsequent research indicates that learners ranging
from 5-years-old to adulthood in domains ranging from
number conservation to computer programming can learn
more if they are prompted to generate self-explanations
(Aleven & Koedinger, 2002; Bielaczyc, Pirolli, & Brown,
1995; Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994).  These
findings are cooborated by findings from classroom-based
research on individual differences and on cross-cultural
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differences in teaching practices (Stigler & Hiebert, 1997;
Webb, 1991).  In all cases, generating explanations is
associated with greater learning.  Thus, generating
explanations to explain how or why things work is a critical
learning process across the lifespan and across domains.
However, the informal theories or working hypotheses
that learners develop are not always correct.  Rather, learners
often develop incorrect theories, and engaging these incorrect
theories is critical to supporting learning (Bransford et al.,
2001).  Evidence from a variety of domains indicates that
learners’ incorrect informal theories are resistant to change
and often persist after formal instruction that contradicts their
theories (e.g. Halloun & Hestenes, 1985).
Prompting students to generate explanations for incorrect,
as well as correct, solutions, beliefs, etc, may be one method
for helping learners overcome incorrect prior knowledge.
For example, Siegler (2002) found that prompting students to
explain both correct and incorrect solutions led to greater
procedural flexibility than only explaining correct solutions.
In the current study, learners in the self-explanation condition
were prompted to explain both correct and incorrect solutions
to maximize the effectiveness of the explanation condition.
Prompting students to self-explain has been used in
conjunction with a variety of sources of new information
(reading a text, studying worked example, problem-solving
with feedback), but has not been used in combination with
direct instruction on a correct procedure nor has prior
research directly compared the role of self-explaining under
different sources of new knowledge.  Prompting students to
engage in an effective learning process after direct
instruction may help students to understand and generalize
the procedure.  Similarly, prompts to self-explain may help
students to invent and generalize correct procedures when
they do not receive direct instruction (Siegler, 2002).
The current study
These issues were evaluated in the context of children
learning to solve problems that tap the idea of mathematical
equivalence.  Mathematical equivalence is a fundamental
concept in both arithmetic and algebra.  Unfortunately, most
children in elementary and middle school do not seem to
understand equivalence, and this poses a major stumbling
block for students’ success in algebra (Kieran, 1981).  Novel
problems such as 3+4+5=3+__ challenge students’ naïve
understanding of equivalence in a familiar arithmetic
context, and approximately 70% of fourth- and fifth-graders
do not solve these problems correctly (Alibali, 1999; Rittle-
Johnson & Alibali, 1999).  In the current study, third
through fifth graders learned to solve these mathematical
equivalence problems under one of four conditions based on
two factors: 1) direct instruction on a correct procedure vs.
prompts to invent a new way to solve the problems and 2)
prompts for self-explanations vs. no prompts.
Method
Participants.  Initial participants were 121 third- through
fifth- grade students from an urban, parochial school serving
a working- to middle-class population. In line with previous
studies using mathematical equivalence problems, 34
students (29%) solved at least half of the mathematical
equivalence problems correctly at pretest and thus were
excluded from the study. One student was excluded because
he did not take the pretest, and 9 students were excluded
because they were absent on the day of the delayed posttest,
so they could not be included in the repeated-measure
analyses.   The final sample consisted of 37 third-graders,
22 fourth-graders, and 18 fifth-graders.
Design.  Students were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions based on crossing two factors: 1) instruction on a
correct procedure or prompts to invent a procedure and 2)
prompts to self-explain correct and incorrect solutions or no
prompts.  There were 20 participants in the instruction +
explain condition, 21 students each in the invent + explain
and instruction-only conditions, and 15 students in the
invent-only condition (unequal group sizes due to random
differences in absenteeism at the delayed posttest).
Procedure .  Students completed the pretest in their
classrooms.  Students who solved at least half of the
mathematical equivalence problems incorrectly participated
in a one-on-one intervention session.  During the
intervention session, there were 3 phases:  warm-up,
intervention (instruction problems and practice problems, all
with accuracy feedback), and follow-up.  At the end of this
session, students completed the immediate paper-and-pencil
posttest.  Approximately 2 weeks later, students completed
the delayed paper-and-pencil posttest in their classrooms.
Intervention session. All problems presented during this
session were in standard format (see Table 1).  At the
beginning of the session, students solved two warm-up
problems, explained how they had solved each problem, and
were told whether they had solved the second problem
correctly to motivate students to try to figure out correct
ways to solve the problems.  During the intervention phase,
all students solved 8 problems.  On all problems, students
explained how they solved the problem and then were told if
they had solved it correctly. The first two problems were the
instructional problems and were both in the format
A+B+C=A+_ (A+ problems).  For students in the
instruction conditions, the experimenter explained a correct,
add-subtract, procedure for solving the problem.  For the
problem 4+9+6 = 4+__, the experimenter said: “You can
add the 4 and the 9 and the 6 together before the equal sign
(gesture a “circle” around the 3 numbers), and then subtract
the 4 that’s over here, and that amount goes in the blank.
So, try to solve the problem using this strategy.” Students in
the invention conditions were asked to try to figure out a
new way to solve the problems.
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Table 1:  Procedural Knowledge Problem Types.
Problem Type Problem Format
Standard A+B+C=A+__ (A+)
A+B+C=__+C (+C)
No repeated addend A+B+C=D+__
A+B+C=__+D
Subtraction too A+B-C=A+__
A+B-C=__ - C
Swap sides A+__=A+B+C
__+C=A+B+C
Next, students solved 6 practice problems that alternated
between the two standard problem formats (see Table 1).
After solving each of these problems, students were also
told the correct answer to the problem.  Students in the
explain conditions were then prompted to try to explain a
correct and an incorrect solution.  They were shown the
solution that two students at another school had gotten – one
correct and one incorrect – and were asked to explain both
how each student had gotten the answer and why each
answer was correct or incorrect. The intervention trials were
presented on a laptop computer that recorded accuracy and
solution times.  At the end of the intervention, students
solved two follow-up problems without feedback and
explained their solutions.
Assessments. The pretest, immediate posttest and delayed
posttest were identical except that only a subset of the
procedural knowledge problems were presented at pretest.
The procedural knowledge assessments contained 4 types of
problems, as shown in Table 1.  Letters stand for numbers
and indicate when a number was repeated within a problem.
The standard problem formats were used during the
intervention.  One instance of each of the standard and no
repeated addend problems was presented on the pretest.
One instance of each of the problems in Table 1 were
presented on the posttests.  Students were encouraged to
show their work when solving the problems. The 5 items on
the conceptual knowledge assessment are shown in Table 2.
Table 2:  Conceptual Knowledge Assessment Items
Item Coding (2 pts)
Define equal sign Mention “the same” or
“equal” (2pts)
Rate definitions of equal sign:  Rate 4
definitions as “always, sometimes or
never true”
Rate “two amounts are
the same” as “always
true” (2 pts) or
“sometimes true” (1 pt)
Group Symbols:  Place symbols such as
=, +, <, & 5 into three groups
Group =, >, and <
together (2 pts)
Recognize use of equal sign in multiple
contexts:  Indicate whether 8 problems
such as 8=2+6 and 3+2=6-1 make sense
7 or 8 correct (2 pts);  6
correct (1 pt)
Correct Encoding:  Reproduce 4
equivalence problems from memory
Correctly reproduce
problem (.5 point each)
Table 3:  Procedures for Solving Equivalence Problems
Procedures Sample student explanation
Correct Procedures
Equalize “I added 8 plus 7 plus 3 and I
got 18 and 8 plus 10 is 18.”
Add-subtract “I did 8 plus 7 equals 15 plus
3 equals 18 and then 18 minus
8 equals 10”
Grouping “I took out the 8’s and I added
7+3.”
Incorrect Procedures
Add all “I added 8+7+3+8, which is
26”
Add to equal sign “8 plus 7equals15, plus 3
is18.”
Incorrect
Grouping
“I added 8 plus 7.”
Coding.  On the procedural knowledge assessments,
students’ percent correct was used (arithmetic slips were
ignored).  Students’ verbal explanations during the
intervention were used to code students’ procedure use on
those problems (see Table 3).  On the conceptual knowledge
assessment, each item was scored from 0-2 points for a
possible total of 10 points (see Table 2).
Results
The effects of condition were assessed on three outcomes:
procedural learning, procedural transfer, and conceptual
knowledge.  Procedural learning was assessed 3 times:
verbally at the end of the intervention and on the immediate
and delayed posttests.  Procedural  transfer and conceptual
knowledge were assessed twice – on the immediate and
delayed posttest.  Results were evaluated for each outcome
using repeated-measures ANOVAs with time of assessment
as a within-subject factor and instruction vs. invention and
prompts to explain (yes/no) as between subject factors.
Pretest conceptual and procedural knowledge were included
in all analyses as covariates.
Procedural Learning
First, consider procedural learning, which was assessed
using problems identical in form to those presented during
the intervention (see Table 1).  As shown in Figure 1,
generating explanations and, to some extent, receiving
instruction led to greater accuracy on the learning problems.
There was a main effect for explaining, F (1, 71) = 6.11, p =
.02, ηp2 = .08, and a marginal effect for instruction, F (1,71)
= 2.84, p = .10, ηp2 = .04, and no interaction between the
two conditions and no effects of time of assessment.
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Figure 1:  Effect of condition on learning problems
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Figure 2: Incorrect procedures:  Trial-by-trial use during the
intervention and follow-up, by condition.
Inspection of students’ procedure use during the
intervention provided insights into learning pathways (see
Table 3 for a description of each procedure).  First, consider
students’ use of incorrect procedures. As shown in Figure 2,
during the instruction phase (first two problems), students in
the instruction condition quickly abandoned their incorrect
procedures whereas most students in the invention
conditions persisted in using incorrect procedures.  During
the practice phase, when students first encountered a
problem in a different format (+C problem), there was a
sharp return to using incorrect procedures.  Students in the
instruction condition continued to struggle with the +C
problems, especially if not prompted to self-explain.
Students in the invent-only condition struggled across
problems – at least 50% continued to use incorrect
procedures, whereas students who were prompted to self-
explain steadily decreased in use of incorrect procedures.
Next, consider students’ use of the correct instructed
procedure – add-subtract (see Figure 3).  Students in the
instruction conditions quickly learned the add-subtract
procedure and many students persisted in using this
procedure across a majority of problems.  However, a third
of the students did not apply the procedure when the surface
structure of the problem changed (+C problems), even
though the procedure required only a very minor adaptation.
Of students in the invent conditions, about 15-20% invented
and used this procedure.  Next, consider the other
commonly used correct procedure – grouping (see Figure 4).
Students in the invent conditions gradually increased their
use of this procedure.  Prompts to explain also helped
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Figure 3: Use of Add-Subtract procedure trial-by-trial
during the intervention and follow-up, by condition.
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Figure 4: Use of Grouping procedure trial-by-trial during
the intervention and follow-up, by condition.
students to invent and maintain use of the procedure on the
follow-up problems. Finally, students in the invent
conditions also used the equalizer procedure on 12% of
intervention trials, whereas students in the instruct+explain
condition used it on 6% of trials and students in the instruct-
only condition used it on less than 1% of trials.
Overall, over half of students in the invent-only group did
not learn a correct procedure through feedback alone.  Less
than a quarter of students in the other conditions had similar
difficulty.  Rather, direct instruction quickly led children to
adopt a correct procedure, and prompts to explain helped
students to invent new procedures.
Procedural Transfer
Next consider students’ ability to transfer their procedures
to novel problems (see Figure 5).  Overall, there was a main
effect of explaining F(1, 71) = 3.93, p = .05, ηp2 = .05 and
no overall effect of instruction, interaction between the two,
or effect of test time.  Prompts to explain supported transfer
of procedures to novel problems, but instruction vs.
invention did not have a general effect on transfer (although
see below for an important caveat).  Inspection of success
on individual problems suggested that the impact of
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Figure 5:  Effect of condition on transfer performance
condition varied by problem type.  To evaluate this, a
second repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with
transfer problem type (no repeated addend, including
subtraction, swapping sides; see Table 1) as an additional
within-subject factor.  Indeed, there was an interaction
between problem type and instruction, F (2, 142) = 9.37, p <
.001, ηp2 = .12, but no interaction of explaining with
problem type.  Follow-up analyses indicated that instruction
improved performance on problems without a repeated
addend, F (1, 71) = 7.89, p = .006, ηp2 = .10.  The instructed
procedure did not need to be modified to solve problems
without a repeated addend.  Instruction had no reliable
effect on the other problem types.  However, focusing on
the most difficult individual problem (A+B-C=_-C),
receiving instruction actually harmed performance,
regardless of explaining, F (1,71) = 13.12, p = .001, ηp2 =
.16.  For example, on the delayed posttest, very few of the
students who received instruction solved the problem
correctly, whereas at least a third of students in the invent
conditions solved the problem correctly (see Figure 6).  This
may be because the invented grouping procedure is easier to
apply to this problem than add-subtract.
Conceptual Improvement
Finally, there was no effect of condition on gains in
conceptual knowledge.  Although students as a whole made
small gains in conceptual knowledge from pretest to
immediate posttest (m = 2.9 vs. 3.1 out of 10), t(76) = 2.0, p
=.05, and made even great gains after a delay (m = 3.8),
t(76) = 5.7, p < .001, the amount of gain did not vary by
condition.
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Figure 6:  Effect of condition on hardest transfer problem,
A+B-C=_-C, at delayed posttest
Discussion
Self-explanation is a critical learning mechanism that
leads to greater procedural flexibility.  The current findings
converge with past findings that better learners
spontaneously produce self-explanations and that prompting
learners to generate explanations leads to greater learning
(Aleven & Koedinger, 2002; Bielaczyc et al., 1995; Chi et
al., 1989; Chi et al., 1994).  The current findings expand
past research by demonstrating that self-explanation is an
important learning mechanism regardless of instruction.  For
students who received direct instruction on a correct
procedure, prompts to self-explain had little influence on the
use of the instructed procedure.  Rather, the prompts
promoted generation of additional correct procedures.
Indeed, 57% of students in this condition used at least two
correct procedures during the intervention, compared to
only 24% of students who received instruction but were not
prompted to explain. Using multiple procedures is a
common feature of development and is beneficial to
performance (Siegler, 2002).  Prompts to explain under
invention conditions also promoted invention of a correct
procedure (Siegler, 2002).
Overall, students in the explain conditions were better
able to solve transfer problems, regardless of instruction.
Analysis of students’ explanations revealed that students
rarely explained the rationale for why a solution was
correct.  Approximately 8% of explanations included
mention of equal sides or the importance of the equal sign.
Rather, most why explanations where ambiguous or
described the procedure for solving the problem.  Combined
with the finding that explanations did not influence
conceptual learning, this suggests that prompts to self-
explain on a problem-solving task promote exploration of
alternative procedures but not reflection on conceptual-
underpinnings of the procedure.  Self-explanations are one
promising mechanism for explaining why some learners
make improvements in conceptual understanding after
learning a new procedure while others do not (Rittle-
Johnson & Alibali, 1999), but the current study does not
support this hypothesis.
The current findings have important implications for the
debate between use of direct instruction vs. encouragement
to invent procedures.  There are serious limitations to
relying on people inventing correct procedures without
guidance on effect learning processes.  Half of the students
in the current study never invented a correct procedure when
receiving feedback on the correct answers alone.  Some
prior research has suggested that feedback is critical to
supporting invention during exploration, but even this level
of support was insufficient for many learners (e.g Lacher,
1983).  In comparison, as in previous studies, direct
instruction supported rapid adoption of a narrowly used
procedure (e.g. Alibali, 1999).  A third of the students in the
instruction groups failed to generalize the add-subtract
procedure even when receiving feedback during the
intervention, and instruction only supported transfer to a
very similar problem that required no adaptation to the
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procedure.  On the hardest problem, having received
instruction interfered with problem solving.  Overall, direct
instruction by itself appears to be a quick route to inert
knowledge.  However, promoting engagement in effective
learning processes, such as self-explaining, helped students
to avoid many of the downsides of both invention and direct
instruction.
Overall, it is not the source of procedure, but rather
engagement in a fundamental learning process, self-
explanation, that is important for promoting flexible
problem-solving.
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Abstract 
When unfamiliar non-speech sounds and visual input co-
occur, they often compete for attention, with auditory input 
overshadowing visual information for infants and young 
children (Robinson & Sloutsky, in press; Sloutsky & 
Napolitano, 2003). The current study investigated whether 
labels and familiar sounds also compete for attention with 
corresponding visual information in infancy. The results 
indicate that, unlike unfamiliar, non-speech sounds, labels 
do not compete for attention with corresponding visual 
information at 16-months of age: 16-month-olds ably 
encoded both auditory and visual information.  At the same 
time 8-month-olds only encoded the labels. When infants 
were familiarized to the same non-speech sounds that 
overshadowed visual input in Robinson and Sloutsky’s 
study, 16-month-olds encoded both auditory and visual 
information, whereas, 8-month-olds continued to encode 
only the sounds. These findings, in conjunction with the 
findings of Robinson and Sloutsky (in press) and Sloutsky 
and Napolitano (2003), point to an important 
developmental progression in processing of auditory and 
visual information.  
 
Introduction 
 
Language plays an important role in conceptual 
development. When two entities share a common label, 
children are more likely to perceive these entities as being 
more similar to each other (Sloutsky & Lo, 1999), more 
likely to group these entities together (Sloutsky, Lo, & 
Fisher, 2001), and more likely to make inferences from 
one entity to the other (Gelman & Markman, 1986; 
Sloutsky, et al., 2001). 
The effect of linguistic input on categorization appears 
very early in development. Even 9-months-olds were 
purported to benefit from linguistic input when forming 
object categories (Balaban & Waxman, 1997). In 
particular, it has been argued that “…from the onset of 
acquisition, object naming and object categorization are 
linked. Infants across the world begin the task of word 
learning equipped with a broad, universal expectation 
that directs them to link novel words to 
commonalities among objects.” (Waxman, 2003, p. 
213).  
For example, in Balaban and Waxman’s (1997) 
study, 9-month-olds who heard labels or content-
filtered speech (which retained the original prosodic 
pattern) were more likely to categorize entities at the 
basic-level than children who only heard sounds. 
Therefore, it appears that hearing the same linguistic 
input associated with different exemplars helps 
infants group these exemplars together. Labels can 
also help infants detect differences between objects 
(Xu, 2002). Here, 9-month-olds are more likely to 
differentiate two objects when the two objects are 
associated with different labels. Thus, hearing the 
same label associated with different exemplars helps 
infants group these objects together, and hearing 
different labels helps infants differentiate the objects.  
Various mechanisms have been proposed in an 
attempt to explain the importance of linguistic input 
on conceptual development. Language-specific 
explanations suggest that children understand that 
entities belong to categories, and labels highlight 
categories (Gelman & Markman, 1987). Labels may 
also be weighed heavier than other features such as 
appearance because children may be attentive to the 
prosody of human speech (Balaban & Waxman, 
1997). From a general-auditory explanation, labels 
may initially be weighed heavier than other features 
because labels are presented to the auditory modality. 
Moreover, auditory information receives privileged 
processing early in development (Robinson & 
Sloutsky, in press; Sloutsky & Napolitano, 2003). 
In support of a general-auditory explanation, 
Sloutsky and Napolitano (2003) demonstrated that 
modality preference changes throughout 
development: Four-year-olds are more likely to 
attend to auditory input, whereas adults are more 
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likely to attend to visual input. This finding suggests that 
the greater attention to auditory information may explain, 
in part, the effects of labels.  
More recently, Robinson and Sloutsky (in press) 
extended these findings with infants as young as 8-months 
of age. Here, infants were familiarized to an auditory-
visual compound stimulus (AUDoldVISold). After 
familiarization, infants were presented with four different 
test trials (AUDoldVISold and AUDnewVISnew), which 
served as within subjects controls and (AUDnewVISold and 
AUDoldVISnew), which were used to determine if infants 
were primarily attending to auditory, visual, or both 
auditory and visual components during familiarization. If 
infants attend to a specific component during 
familiarization, looking should increase when that 
component changes at test.  In sum, infants increased 
looking when either the auditory component or both 
components changed (AUDnewVISold and AUDnewVISnew); 
however, infants at 8-, 12-, and 16-months of age did not 
increase looking when only the visual component 
changed (AUDoldVISnew). This finding suggests that 
infants were primarily attending to the auditory input 
during familiarization.  At the same time, infants amply 
encoded the visual component when it was presented in 
isolation, which suggests that the auditory component 
overshadowed the visual component.  
These results point to auditory dominance early in 
development and they have several important 
implications. Most importantly, auditory dominance 
effects can provide a coherent account for many of the 
previous findings.  Recall that it has been argued that 
common labels help infants detect commonalities between 
objects, and different labels help children differentiate 
objects. Although infants in Robinson and Sloutsky (in 
press) study were presented with non-speech sounds, the 
pattern of results are identical to what would be expected 
if infants were presented with linguistic labels (i.e., the 
same visual stimulus that was presented during 
familiarization was perceived as new when paired with a 
new sound and a new visual stimulus was perceived as 
old when paired with the old sound). In short, it seems 
possible that under both speech and non-speech auditory 
input conditions, infants rely primarily on the auditory 
information. 
   The aim of Experiment 1 was to test this hypothesis by 
investigating whether linguistic labels, similar to the non-
speech sounds (Robinson & Sloutsky, in press), 
overshadow visual input. In particular, if linguistic input 
is weighed heavier than visual input because it represents 
auditory information then non-speech sounds and labels 
should reveal similar patterns of results. 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants Nineteen 8-month-olds (5 boys and 14 
girls, M = 249 days, Range = 231 - 280 days) and 
nineteen 16-month-olds (6 boys and 13 girls, M = 
489 days, Range = 470 - 501 days) participated in 
this experiment. Parents’ names were collected from 
local birth announcements, and contact information 
was obtained through local directories. All children 
were full-term (i.e., > 2500g birth weight) with no 
auditory or visual deficits, as reported by parents. A 
majority of infants were Caucasian. Seven infants 
were not included due to fussiness, and 10 infants 
were excluded because they did not reach the training 
criterion indicated below. 
 
Apparatus Infants were seated on parents’ laps 
approximately 100 cm away from a 152 cm x 127 cm 
projection screen, which was located approximately 5 
cm above the infant’s eye level. A Sony DCR-
TRV40 camcorder was used to capture infants’ 
fixations and was projected to one of two Dell flat 
panel monitors in the observation room. An NEC 
GT2150 LCD projector was mounted on the ceiling 
approximately 30 cm behind the infant (130 cm away 
from the projection screen).  Two Boston Acoustics 
380 speakers were 76 cm apart from each other and 
mounted in the wall. The speakers and camcorder 
were concealed by black felt and located directly 
below the projection screen. Two small lights were 
located behind the infant to ensure that the room was 
dimly lit throughout the entire procedure. In an 
adjacent room, a Dell Dimension 8200 computer with 
Presentation software was used to present stimuli to 
the infants, as well as to record the onset and offset of 
infant’s visual fixations. Fixations were recorded 
online by pressing a button on an Excalibur 10-button 
gamepad when infants were looking at the stimulus 
and releasing the button when infants looked away 
from the stimulus.  A second Sony DCR-PC120 
camcorder was used to record the video stream of the 
infant from the monitor indicated above, as well as to 
record the image of the stimulus presentation on a 
second Dell flat panel monitor. This split screen 
recording was used to establish interrater reliability. 
 
Stimuli Each infant was familiarized to an auditory-
visual compound stimulus (AUdoldVISold) and tested 
on four auditory/visual combinations (AUDnewVISold, 
AUDoldVISnew, AUDnewVISnew, and AUDoldVISold).  
The auditory components consisted of two infant-
directed nonsense labels (vika and kuna), which were 
presented at 65-68 dB.  The visual components 
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consisted of two three-shape patterns (circle, pentagon, 
triangle, and cross, octagon, square), and were projected 
to 25 cm x 7 cm in size. Previous research has 
demonstrated that infants can discriminate these visual 
stimuli when presented in isolation; however, they are 
overshadowed by unfamiliar non-speech sounds 
(Robinson & Sloutsky, in press; Experiment 2). 
 
Procedure The procedure consisted of 10 familiarization 
trials, 2 test trials, 3 retraining trials, and 2 more test 
trials. Each familiarization trial consisted of a compound 
stimulus that appeared for 1000 ms and disappeared for 
500 ms.  Each stimulus appeared five times during each 
trial (7500 ms trial duration). After familiarization, infants 
were present with 4 different test trials (AUDnewVISold, 
AUDoldVISnew, AUDnewVISnew, and AUDoldVISold). Test 
trials were 12 s in duration and were randomized so that 
each test stimulus had an equally likely chance of 
appearing as the first test trial, last test trial, etc. The 
retraining trials were the same as familiarization trials and 
were used to remind infants of the familiarization 
stimulus. Retraining trials always appeared between the 
first two and last two test trials. Fixations were recorded 
online by an experimenter for all training, test, and 
retraining trials. A random sample of 25% of the infants 
were coded offline by experimenters who were blind to 
the auditory and visual components presented to infants. 
No differences were found between subjects coded on- 
and offline. 
Results and Discussion 
Training Criterion. Only infants who demonstrated a 
novelty preference at test were included in additional 
analyses (i.e., looking to AUDnewVISnew  > AUDoldVISold). 
As reported above, 10 infants did not reach this criterion. 
 
Test Trials. Analysis of test trials focused on whether 
infants were primarily attending to auditory and/or visual 
input during familiarization. A difference score was 
calculated by taking the accumulated looking to each test 
stimulus and subtracting it from baseline (e.g., the effect 
of changing the auditory component = AUDnewVISold – 
AUDoldVISold). Thus, positive numbers indicate that 
looking increased as a function of changing a specific 
stimulus component, which suggests that infants encoded 
that modality during training.  As can be seen in Figure 1, 
at 8- and 16-months of age, looking increased when the 
auditory component changed and when both auditory and 
visual components changed, one-sample ts > 0, ts > 5, ps 
< .001. In contrast, only the 16-month-olds increased 
looking when the visual stimulus changed, one-sample t > 
0, t (18) =  2.88, p < .01. 
     A 2 (Age: 8-months, 16-months) x 3 (Test Trial: 
AUDnewVISold, AUDoldVISnew, AUDnewVISnew) revealed 
an effect of Test Trial and also confirmed the Age x Test 
Trial interaction, Fs > 5, ps < .01. At 8-months of age, 
changing the auditory component had a larger effect 
than changing the visual component, DIFFAUDnewVISold 
= 3435 ms > DIFFAUDoldVISnew = -552 ms, paired t (18) 
= 5.87, p < .001. This difference, however, attenuated 
at 16-months of age (DIFFAUDnewVISold = 3403 ms = 
DIFFAUDoldVISnew = 2318 ms), paired t (18) = 1.40, p > 
.1. 
 
Figure 1. Effects of changing labels and                  
visual stimuli in Experiment 1 
                  
     It is important to note that, although the nonsense 
labels overshadowed visual input at 8 months of age, 
these same visual stimuli were ably encoded by 8-
months-olds when presented in isolation (Robinson 
& Sloutsky, in press). In contrast, 16-month-olds 
encoded both the auditory and visual components. 
This pattern of results is strikingly different from 
those reported by Robinson & Sloutsky. In particular, 
when the same visual stimuli were paired with 
unfamiliar non-speech sounds (laser and static 
sounds), 8- , 12-, and 16-month-olds only encoded 
the auditory component. Thus, the results from the 
current experiment, in conjunction with Robinson & 
Sloutsky, demonstrate that both speech and non-
speech sounds overshadow visual input at 8-months 
of age. In contrast, by 16-months of age children 
encode both auditory and visual components; 
however, only when the auditory input consists of 
speech sounds. While revealing interesting 
developmental differences in effects of label on 
processing of visual information, the current study 
did not elucidate the nature of these effects.   
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Experiment 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to determine whether the 
effect of label stems from language-specific properties or 
from general-attentional effects. From a language-specific 
perspective, the different pattern of results at 16-months 
of age between Experiment 1 with those reported in 
Robinson & Sloutsky (in press) could stem from 
privileged processing of linguistic input. In particular, it is 
possible that linguistic information does not compete for 
attention with corresponding visual information, which 
allowed 16-month-olds to process both auditory and 
visual information. However, it is also possible that 
human speech represents a familiar class, and even 
familiar non-speech sounds do not compete for attention 
with corresponding visual input. Although very few 
empirical studies, if any, have compared processing of 
familiar sounds with linguistic input early in 
development, there is preliminary neurophysiological 
evidence with adults suggesting that familiar non-speech 
sounds are processed in the brain similarly to words 
(Cycowicz & Friedman, 1998). Thus, the goal of 
Experiment 2 is to determine if stimulus familiarity can 
account for differences between Experiment 1 and 
Robinson & Sloutsky (in press).  
 
Method 
 
Participants Twenty 8-month-olds (10 boys and 10 girls, 
M = 252 days, Range = 245 - 269 days) and ten 16-
month-olds (4 boys and 6 girls, M = 490 days, Range = 
474 - 504 days) participated in this experiment. 
Recruitment procedures and demographics were identical 
to Experiment 1. Two infants were not included due to 
fussiness, and 13 infants were excluded because they did 
not demonstrate a novelty preference (i.e., AUDnewVISnew  
> AUDoldVISold). 
 
Stimuli and Procedure With two exceptions, the 
procedure was identical to Experiment 1. First, the 
nonsense labels were replaced with non-speech sounds 
(laser sound and static sound). Note that these same 
sounds overshadowed the three-shape patterns in 
Robinson & Sloutsky (in press). Second, and most 
importantly, children were familiarized to the non-speech 
sounds prior to the actual experiment. In the current 
experiment children sat on parent’s laps and heard each 
non-speech sound 10 different times. As with the actual 
experiment, the auditory stimulus was presented at 65-68 
dB, and each auditory stimulus lasted for 1000 ms. 
Auditory stimuli were presented in pairs and 
pseudorandomized so that infants heard the same stimulus 
at least twice in a row and no more than 4 times in row. In 
addition, the non-speech sounds were not associated with 
the three-shape patterns or any visual stimulus. This 
ensured that children in Experiments 1 and 2, and children 
in Robinson & Sloutsky (in press) all had equal 
experience with the three-shape patterns.  After 
infants heard each sound 10 times, infants were given 
a 4 minute distracter task in which they looked at 
realistic pictures of animals. After the distracter task, 
infants were then presented with the main 
experiment.  
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, a difference score was calculated 
by taking the accumulated looking to each test 
stimulus and subtracting it from baseline. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, the pattern of results are very 
similar to Experiment 1. That is, both age groups 
increased looking when either the auditory 
component changed or when both auditory and visual 
components changed, one-sample ts > 0, ts > 3, ps < 
.01, and only the 16-month-olds increased looking 
when the visual stimulus changed, one-sample t > 0, t 
(9) =  3.86, p < .01. 
A 2 (Age: 8-months, 16-months) x 3 (Test Trial: 
AUDnewVISold, AUDoldVISnew, AUDnewVISnew) 
revealed an effect of Test Trial, F (2, 56) = 7.72, p < 
.001. Here, children looked longer when both 
components changed (DIFFAUDnewVISnew = 4401 ms) 
than when only the auditory component changed 
(DIFFAUDnewVISold = 2940 ms) or when only the visual 
component changed (DIFFAUDoldVISnew = 1819 ms), 
paired ts > 2.5, p < .01. The above analyses also 
revealed an effect of Age, F (1, 28) = 5.93, p < .05, 
with 16-month-olds (M = 4631 ms) accumulating 
more looking across test trials than 8-month-olds (M 
= 2264 ms). 
 
Figure 2. Effects of changing familiar sounds and  
visual stimuli in Experiment 2    
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General Discussion 
The results from the two experiments in conjunction with 
Robinson & Sloutsky (in press) demonstrate that 
unfamiliar non-speech sounds, familiar non-speech 
sounds, and nonsense labels all overshadow visual input 
at 8-months of age. That is, 8-month-olds do not 
discriminate visual stimuli when these images are paired 
with auditory input; however, they ably discriminate the 
same images when presented in isolation (Robinson & 
Sloutsky, in press). In contrast, 16-month-olds encode 
both the auditory and visual components; however, only 
when the visual stimuli are paired with labels or familiar 
sounds.  Interestingly, the non-speech sounds that 
children heard in Experiment 2 were the same non-speech 
sounds that overshadowed the three-shape patterns in 
Robinson and Sloutsky’s study. These findings 
demonstrate that, at 16-months of age, just hearing an 
auditory stimulus a few times affects the way children 
attend to auditory and visual input. These findings also 
demonstrate that familiar sounds and labels have similar 
effects on processing of auditory and visual information at 
8- and 16-months of age.  
Overall, the current study expands previous research 
concerning the development of attention, the role of 
familiarity in the auditory modality, and possible 
mechanisms underlying the effect of labels on conceptual 
development.  
One potential explanation of the developmental 
differences found in the current study concerns the notion 
that attentional biases and attentional resources change 
considerably throughout development.  There is a 
growing body of research demonstrating that younger 
children are more likely than adults to demonstrate a 
preference for auditory input and more likely to encode 
only one modality (Robinson & Sloutsky, in press; 
Sloutsky & Napolitano, 2003). Currently, there are 
several possible mechanisms that may explain this 
developmental pattern. First, it is possible that young 
children lack attentional resources that are needed for 
simultaneously processing auditory and visual input. 
However, it is also possible that young children either 
habituate to and/or process auditory information faster 
than visual information. Future research will need to 
address this issue. 
The current study also introduces the notion that 
familiar sounds and labels may play a similar role early in 
development. Although there is neurophysiological work 
demonstrating that familiar sounds are processed in the 
brain similarly to words (Cycowicz & Friedman, 1998), 
the current study provides behavioral evidence for this 
notion in infancy. One interesting question concerns the 
idea that labels may represent a familiar class of auditory 
stimuli. This would explain why labels and familiar 
sounds have similar effects in the adult brain, as well as in 
the current study.  
At a more general level, it is well known that 
linguistic input plays a large role in conceptual 
development. However, it is uncertain how and when 
labels become special. Even as young as 9-months of 
age, hearing the same label associated with different 
exemplars helps infants group these objects together, 
and hearing different labels helps infants differentiate 
objects (Balaban & Waxman, 1997; Xu, 2002). 
Interestingly, 8-month-olds in the current study 
demonstrated the same pattern of results when 
presented with unfamiliar non-speech sounds 
(Robinson & Sloutsky, in press), labels, and familiar 
sounds. This suggests that young children may 
initially rely on various types of auditory information 
(sounds and labels), and this initial preference for 
auditory input may help bootstrap labels into a 
special status. 
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Abstract 
We use artifact analysis to describe the process of scientific 
dissemination in a community-based program that informs 
parents and professional caregivers about early childhood 
development. We define this program as a network of 
information management and our unit of analysis are the 
sociocultural activities of dissemination, and the artifacts that 
shape them. Drawing upon activity theory, social networks 
theory, and distributed practice, we describe and analyze the 
impact, evolution, and sociocultural nature of understandings, 
goals, values, artifacts, actions, events, and organizational 
elements. Our data were collected through observations, field 
notes, focus groups, artifact collection, and stimulated recall 
interviews. Results suggest that as artifacts move from one 
environment to another, their role changes, often resulting in a 
loss or distortion of information. We describe how and why 
these problems are overlooked and the potential problems 
they may create. 
 
Studies of scientific dissemination are rich sources of 
information about cognitive processes situated in a 
sociocultural context. The dissemination process has been 
almost completely the domain of large corporate, 
government, or academic entities—universities, 
pharmaceutical companies, the National Institute of Health, 
media networks, and the like. The role of lay people and 
their communities has been largely one of end-user, with the 
assumption that they could be expected to act as recipients 
of information rather than disseminators; a passive role at 
the bottom of the organizational structure (Epstein, 1996)  
The importance of community involvement in education, 
advocacy, and decision making has been growing over the 
past decade (Minkler & Wallerstein, 2002). At the local 
level, the project team identifies community needs through 
community engagement (Minkler & Wallerstein, 2002), an 
approach to research and intervention characterized by its 
use of the community as a unit of identity, action and 
analysis. Communities may be formed around geography, 
socioeconomic status, shared emotions, or common goals. 
Facilitators are community members who bring scientific 
information to the attention of local end-users, translate 
concepts and terms, and help end-users apply the 
information in making personal decisions.  
Facilitators can also inform disseminators and scientists 
about end-user interests and needs; thus, ideally, 
information can flow in both directions. However, 
facilitators need aid in finding and organizing information, 
contextualizing scientific findings, applying them to local 
situations, providing emotional support, and serving as 
advocates and spokespeople. In short, facilitators need 
support to provide support, in terms of content, culturally 
relevant delivery, and information management. There is 
growing evidence for community-based dissemination, 
scientific communication that is culturally responsive, 
accounts for audiences’ prior knowledge and 
ability/willingness to acquire new knowledge, and is 
flexible enough to fit diverse goals, resources, and interests. 
(e.g., Minkler & Wallenstein, 2003; Shonkoff & Phillips, 
2000; Wilcox, Hadley, & Bacon, 1998). 
This creates interesting questions regarding reasoning in 
community engagement setting, especially in regard to 
facilitators and outreach personnel. They are, on a number 
of dimensions, in limbo. Regarding the scientific content, 
they are neither experts nor novices; they usually have some 
teaching or outreach experience, but they often have never 
functioned in this role with this population before. They are 
engaged in scientific dissemination, but they are not part of 
the groups usually studied in the context of dissemination 
studies, such as scientists, media, or teachers. 
Research on community-based interventions also offers 
interesting opportunities for dissemination research. A main 
reason is that facilitators are engaged in a process that 
requires a quick turnaround; their training may last few 
weeks or months and they are soon ready to work in the 
field. Updates, refresher courses, and additional training are 
put to work within a similar timeframe. This allow us to 
watch the inflow and outflow of information in a way that 
we cannot with dissemination agents whose timeline 
involves years of training or experience, such as a journalist, 
scientist, or social worker. 
In short, community engagement and community 
facilitators are playing an increasingly important role in 
scientific dissemination, they are unusual in a number of 
ways, and they also provide opportunities to watch the 
dissemination process in a compressed format. Of course, 
this can both create unusual patterns and behaviors that are 
not seen in other areas of dissemination, but it does not 
necessitate uniqueness. Therefore, it is initially important to 
examine the ways in which this format repeats patterns in 
other spheres of scientific dissemination, and the ways in 
which it reinvents these patterns or creates new ones. 
To construct a framework for this comparison process, we 
draw upon multiple streams of dissemination research in 
attempting to cover the ambiguous position of facilitators 
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and community engagement. This includes novice reasoning 
about scientific information in structured settings (Sandoval, 
2003; Schank & Ranney, 1995), and informal settings 
(Zimmermann, Bisanz & Bisanz, 1998), lay advocacy and 
policy involvement (Epstein, 1996; Margolis, 1996), 
scientists reasoning among themselves (Latour, 1987), and 
interactions between lay people and experts (Lemke, 1990).  
Using this framework, we examine a community 
engagement program providing parents and professional 
caregivers with information about new psychological and 
neuroscientific research on early childhood learning and 
development. 
Sites & Program Description 
The program that we have been following, The First 
Teacher Project (FTP), is part of a larger initiative started in 
the city of Chandler, AZ in 2002, The Steps to Learning 
Initiative (StL). Funded by an Early Learning Opportunities 
Act Grant from the U.S. Department of Education, StL was 
created to educate the community about the importance of 
early literacy and learning, develop stronger links among 
service providers working with children and families in the 
Chandler community, create a comprehensive network of 
early childhood programs, and make information and 
programs more affordable and accessible. The grant was 
secured and is overseen through the Mayor’s Literacy Task 
Force, and administered by the Chandler Public Library. 
Other partners include the Chandler Unified School District 
and the Chandler (East Valley) Regional Hospital. 
Chandler is one of the fastest growing cities in Arizona, 
with a large traditionally underserved population. In the 
2000 Census, Chandler had one of the largest Latino 
populations in the state, ranging from 25% to over 50%, 
depending on neighborhood (Morrison Institute, 2001). It is 
also an economically diverse city, home to Intel and 
Motorola, but also to a federally-designated Enterprise 
Zone. Eighty percent of Zone residents are Latinos and 68% 
of households are monolingual Spanish. Seventy percent of 
students qualify for free or reduced-price lunch, 50% of 
families earn less than $5,000/year, and almost 50% of 
adults lack a high school diploma. 
The FTP component of StL focuses on children’s 
development from ages 0 to 3. The program focuses on 
sensory development, bonding and attachment, cognitive 
skills such as categorization and language, and the value of 
play and pretense. The information provided can be used to 
identify developmental delays, sensory deficits, and other 
problems early on, as well as providing parents of 
mainstream children with new perspectives on their 
children’s learning and development. FTP involves 
disseminating a significant amount of scientific information, 
much of it relatively new even to scientists in the relevant 
fields. Topics include neural pruning, synaptic formation, 
plasticity, limbic and cortical functions, biological and 
psychological aspects of temperament and language 
acquisition.  
The FTP initiative is coordinated by a full-time outreach 
coordinator. A group of 12 paid community professionals 
(eight educators, three librarians, and the outreach 
coordinator) receive forty-five hours of training, and 
conduct mock workshops before beginning to facilitate 
parent workshops in their schools and libraries. Facilitators 
receive continuing education on a monthly basis, and have 
committed to a tenure of at least 18 months. StL is currently 
looking for ways to fund and support the program beyond 
this 18 month timeframe. 
Activity, Artifacts, Dissemination & Education 
In addition to setting up a content framework, we need also 
to construct an epistemological and methodological 
framework for the analysis. We do so in a hierarchical 
fashion. 
At the highest level, we have chosen to adopt an activity 
theory perspective. In activity theory, the unit of analysis is 
continually developing activities—events, transactions, 
practices—and the analysis is organized around objects that 
motivate, guide, and give meaning to activity. Objects have 
both physical and semiotic properties, and affect human 
interactions with their environment, as tools for physical and 
mental activity. Because of activity theory’s emphasis on 
social factors and the interaction between agents and 
objects, it is useful for capturing the process of scientific 
dissemination, the practices of which depend heavily on 
tools and networks of social interaction. 
In identifying objects that organize events and 
transactions of importance, we use Latour’s concept of 
artifact (Latour, 1987). It is a fairly broad conceptualization 
of artifact, in which artifacts are physical entities that have 
been given meaning by human beings through utilization 
and construction. 
Using this artifact-oriented approach to examine the 
dissemination of scientific information, specifically in the 
context of educational dissemination, and compare our 
findings to the existing research in other areas of scientific 
dissemination. Based on this analysis, we find that the 
scientific content is altered by organizational goals, 
available materials, etc; that it is important to distinguish 
explicit, tacit, and incidental features of artifacts; and that 
the distinction between the “scientific content” of the 
artifact and elements added during these alterations is often 
not identified by facilitators and parents.  
Method 
In this study, we take the perspective that the FTP can be 
conceived of as an activity system with the primary purpose 
of knowledge management and community dissemination. 
Drawing upon concepts from activity theory, social 
networks theory, and distributed cognition, we describe and 
analyze the development and consequences of stakeholders’ 
understandings, goals, values, artifacts, actions, and 
organizational dynamics. We collected data over the full 18 
month existence of the program, using observation, video 
recordings, field notes, focus groups and stimulated recall 
interviews, artifact collection, and surveys. 
Extended observation and videography was conducted 
throughout the life of the program; all training sessions and 
most of the parent workshops were observed and/or 
recorded, and most of the ongoing monthly meetings have 
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been observed. In addition, several meetings of the grant 
oversight committee, the Mayor’s Literacy Task Force, have 
been attended by at least one of the authors. Field notes 
provide in depth descriptions of activities, settings, and 
interpersonal dynamics, were the only means of establishing 
a record of events where we were not granted permission for 
videography, or when it was not appropriate to record a 
particular event. 
Focus groups with the facilitators took the form of 
discussions that allowed us to collect information about 
their perspective, and the meaning they attached to 
particular artifacts and events. Video-elicited and artifact-
elicited interviews are used to obtain an in-depth perspective 
of the local meanings teacher create in relation to key 
perceptions, goals, experiences, actions, and elements of this 
program. 
Artifact collection and documentation refers to the 
process of gathering/recording objects and conceptual 
symbols. Artifacts are objects that have both material and 
conceptual characteristics and that have been transformed 
through the history of this program.  This category includes 
curriculum binders, slides, handouts, props, toys, logos, 
memos, announcements, electronic newsletters, websites, 
acronyms, jargon, and definitions.   
Content area questionnaires are used to assess teachers’ 
knowledge of infant brain development before training 
began, and at intervals after training. These assessments 
include fact-based, open-ended, and problem-solving items. 
A separate motivation survey was designed to address affect 
and efficacy in relation to distinct aspects of participation; 
training, instruction, curriculum materials, trainers, and 
programmatic characteristics. 
Results & Discussion 
The First Teacher Project is best described as an activity 
system configured into a dynamic network of information 
management. This network relies upon the interconnection 
of different levels of cognitive mediation (e.g., object, 
social, organizational). Our analysis is primarily based on 
the study of how these mediations become embodied into 
the conceptual to material continuum of artifacts. We use 
Collins et al (2002) hierarchy of mediating artifacts to 
categorize what, how, why, and where-to artifacts. The what 
category refers to artifacts that serve as a means to 
achieving an object (e.g., using chart paper to write down 
parent questions). How artifacts contribute to understanding 
how to achieve purposes or goals (e.g., using a case study to 
demonstrate how routines help babies). Why artifacts 
motivates achievement of the goal (e.g., presenting statistics 
of neglect and abuse linked to academic achievement to 
encourage parent-child bonding). Where-to artifacts 
motivate the evolution of all activity elements (e.g., 
identifying a pocket population that was not targeted and re-
defining main project goals).  
Artifact analysis is primarily an in depth description of 
the history and meaning of tools and signs that evidence 
intentionality and activity of agents within this network of 
information management. Artifact analysis is a process of 
analytic induction that focuses on how artifacts evidence 
actions that occur in specific settings and in connection to 
specific meanings. We use Erickson’s (1990) five methods 
of evidentiary inadequacy to determine the degree to which 
we have a) adequate amounts of evidence, b) adequate 
variety of evidence, c) trustworthy evidence, d) adequate 
disconfirming evidence, and e) adequate discrepant case 
analysis. 
An example of an artifact is the brochure community 
professionals put together to attract participants to the parent 
workshop. At one point, this brochure may represent 
everything target parents know about the project. However, 
parents are unaware of the history of this artifact, how the 
printed language reflects interpretations of science, how 
explicit goals of the workshop relate to assumptions about 
needs in this community, or how this workshop expects to 
influence parenting. The brochure is a byproduct that 
reflects negotiated goals, program priorities, perceptions of 
the target population, and a way to sum up the essential 
components of a newly developed expertise. The final draft 
of the brochure is edited by the project coordinator after 
asking community professionals to develop drafts, after 
discussing these drafts during taskforce meetings, and after 
receiving approval from all stakeholders. In this way, the 
development of a simple communication product is 
informative of the way this project is represented to the 
larger target population, the role of distributed cognition and 
distributed practice, and the protocols and the organizational 
structure necessary to develop this double-sided page.   And 
the workshop brochure is just the entry point to the vast 
world of artifacts that are part of this BBE curriculum. As 
the parent arrives to the actual workshop he/she will be 
exposed to graphs, binders, slides, toys, props, sounds, 
video-clips, case studies, analogies, metaphors, acronyms, 
jargon, and abstract ideas.  
It is important, too, to recognize that artifacts are not 
necessarily bounded physically, but by the role they play in 
a network of activity. We address this in our analysis by 
examining agent-artifact units, i.e. units comprised of an 
artifact and the agent who is currently making use of the 
artifact. Thus, a brochure handed to a parent by their child’s 
teacher is a different agent-artifact unit than a brochure 
taken from a stand at the door of a library. 
Content transformations 
The main goal of the FTP is to translate neuroscience into 
recommended practices that will improve parenting and 
normal child development outcomes. Research techniques 
and directions, however, often do not directly support this 
goal. Much of the neuroscientific research available, 
however, has been conducted using deficit models, and 
highly constrained tasks and environments. Therefore, 
application to normal developmental practices is rarely an 
explicit element of the scientific report. Thus, when a report 
in a journal is read by a curriculum developer, the 
developer-report unit is a different entity than the scientist-
report unit, and the report is used for different purpose 
(developing parenting recommendations vs. informing peers 
of experimental results), establishes credibility in different 
ways (appearance in a prestigious journal vs. surviving the 
actual peer-review), and becomes a symbol for establishing 
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authority rather than a document containing information to 
be examined. 
The effects of this transformation are several. One way in 
which this is done is through broad generalizations into 
maxims that would be difficult to find objectionable. 
Statements that encourage parents to provide a stimulating 
but not overwhelming environment, to not neglect their 
children emotionally or physically, to create a loving and 
protective environment. The training providers believe that 
by taking these unobjectionable messages and pairing them 
with laboratory research that is tenuously connected, they 
will make these messages more persuasive by making them 
more authoritative and making them appear to be based in 
“science.” 
Another approach is to take deficit model findings and 
transform them into “best practice” recommendations. The 
logic, roughly, is that if the absence of certain elements has 
a deleterious effect, then parents should be encouraged to 
make sure these elements are present. While this is not 
always faulty logic, it can at times produce the implication 
that since less is bad, more is better, and that greater 
amounts of play, visual stimulation, exposure to human 
faces, and so on, will have a beneficial effect beyond that 
which normal caregiving would provide. Research studies 
based on abnormal case studies produce dramatic research 
findings on how neurological disorders, neglect and abuse 
can adversely affect brain development. However, this 
program is not designed to target parents of children with 
major disabilities, but to target the general population. In 
this way, research findings from deficit models are 
discussed outside of their context, and derived applications 
may involve unwarranted alterations of the science content. 
For example, facilitators are taught that physiological and 
psychological traumatic events can chronically elevate an 
individual’s cortisol levels, which in turn may result in the 
destruction of neurons or a reduction of synaptic 
connections. Children who have high levels of cortisol in 
response to trauma have been shown to experience more 
developmental delays (Gunnar, 1996). A key artifact here is 
a video-clip interview of neuroscientist who explains how 
cortisol levels show how the brain responds to stress levels. 
In the context of a parent workshop or facilitator training, 
this functions not so much as a way to deliver information 
but to prove the curriculum’s scientific backing. That 
sustained high levels of cortisol can cause delays does not 
imply either that transient elevation from minor stresses will 
cause problems, nor does it imply that extremely low stress 
will facilitate development. With community facilitators 
there is a tendency to blur two distinctions: the difference 
between stress and trauma, and the distinction between 
temporary and permanent changes in cortisol levels.  
The content may also be transformed because of the 
physical constraints imposed as artifacts are paired with new 
agents. An example is the inclusion of infant massage 
experiments in the curriculum. A meta-analysis conducted 
by the Cochrane Review found the evidence to be weak, 
though in the direction of supporting the use of massage 
with infants receiving neo-natal intensive care (Vickers, 
Ohlsson, Lacy, & Horsley, 2004). Findings regarding its use 
in other areas appear likewise ambiguous.  
Those experiments supporting infant massage as 
beneficial are incorporated into popular books (e.g., Field, 
2000) by clinicians and researchers that wish to make their 
case with the public. These are then taken by curriculum 
developers and integrated with specific how-to activities and 
instructions that guide parents into giving leg, foot, arm and 
hand, face and head massages to infants. How-to activities 
often have not been equally researched, though this 
distinction is not made in the materials given to facilitators 
during training. A focal artifact here is a written description 
created by the curriculum developers where they describe 
that, ideally, parents are to take into consideration the age of 
the child to determine the type, duration and frequency of 
massaging a baby: A massage for a newborn baby should be 
limited to 3-5 minutes, while a month old baby can receive a 
10 minute massage. In addition, it is said that parents should 
be attentive to determine individual differences in 
responding and tolerating touch. When the community 
professionals attended their training, these written 
instructions are verbally described by the trainers who also 
modeled concepts by using realistic baby dolls. Participants 
practice the massage on these dolls, which then become part 
of their representation of infant massage. 
However, the specifics of the infant massage curriculum 
are not covered in the same fashion by facilitators as they 
bring this information to parents. The infant massage 
demonstration and hands-on activity is time-consuming, so 
the facilitators do not have the same opportunity to 
emphasize this topic as do the developers. Moreover, they 
have only one doll, making even demonstrating to a group 
somewhat difficult. The facilitators rely on slides showing 
bullet points that summarize the main ideas on how touch 
enhances bonding.  Moreover, we observed that discussions 
often wandered onto interesting but misleading tangents, 
such as formal training in infant massage therapy. The 
superficial overview in the context of such a discussion is 
misinterpreted by some parents as a need to seek a special 
training. There is not a deliberate plan to distort information, 
but the way information is presented has an unexpected 
effect. 
Artifacts & Expectations 
During the initial intensive period of training, NDI 
structured the content of its curriculum around two 
acronyms STEPS for security, touch, eyes, play, and sound 
and ABC’s of learning for attention, bonding, and 
communication. These acronyms were developed as a way 
to organize the curriculum, and resulted from feedback of 
prior FTP programs that had been implemented in different 
communities. Those prior programs received a similar 
training with very little organizing structure, and limited 
curriculum materials. FTP trainees received a binder with 
five major divisions that corresponded to the STEPS 
acronym, their training was structured around these topics, 
and each of the STEPS concepts was discussed as relating to 
the ABC’s. In addition, NDI developed a wide array of 
materials that included slides, power-point presentations, 
video-clips and activity sets called the brain boxes. In turn, 
the facilitators structured their first parent workshop series 
as five meetings, each of which reflected the STEPS 
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structure. The different sites reported that five workshops 
proved to have a high turnover, and StL decided along with 
NDI to structure the curriculum around 3 meetings. Then, 
the curriculum started to be reorganized around the ABC’s 
as the guiding acronym, with the STEPS concepts 
subsumed. These acronyms are artifacts that reflect which 
concepts are central to NDI, how those concepts help 
organize activity, and the affordances those acronyms have. 
These acronyms are just one way of organizing knowledge 
that links neuroscience with parenting and child 
development, and they in fact seem to be useful in 
organizing workshops and discussions. Our preliminary 
findings suggest that these acronyms act as a paradigm 
through which experts, trainees, and parents think about and 
recall infant brain development information. For example, 
during a focus group activity we asked facilitators to write 
down which are the most compelling ideas they take from 
this training, and most participants referred to the acronyms. 
Other ways in which this acronyms influence information 
management and distributed cognition is that they implicitly 
convey the idea that these categories are all encompassing, 
and that scientific information is stable.  We discuss these 
ideas further in the next section. 
Artifacts may set up expectations because of their 
appearance or immediately perceived function. If they are 
improperly designed, or if the design is misinterpreted, 
problems can occur. To illustrate this point we refer to the 
script NDI puts together for facilitators to guide their 
presentation as they conduct the parent workshops. The 
script is text that corresponds to a particular slide and 
elaborates the main ideas represented. The parent workshop 
is usually structured around a series of slides, and the series 
of slides are connected through an overarching curriculum 
concept (e.g., security, eyes, touch).  Most facilitators plan 
their parent workshops by reviewing this script, and they 
often refer back to the script as they conduct their 
presentations. This way of implementing the workshop is 
efficient in conveying many concepts to the parents who are 
part of the audience, and it also creates consistency and a 
good point of reference across facilitators. On the other side, 
the script winds up dictating most of what is said during the 
parent workshop. The script sets the tone for the 
presentation of information slide after slide, with facilitators 
either rephrasing or reading off the script. As a result, it is 
not infrequent to observe that the workshop is run as a forty-
slides presentation with very few questions asked. 
Therefore, the script drives the workshop, leaving a small 
amount of time for unscripted events, which is taken up 
making introductions, allowing for breaks, doing take-home 
activities, and checking out materials.  
Furthermore, the script and slides seem to endorse the 
perception that these curriculum materials are a self-
contained representations of brain-research; sufficient to 
achieve the main goals of the workshop. Facilitators do not 
feel the need to continue exploring the science beyond this 
point. During continuous support meetings, NDI has 
emphasized the importance of speaking more explicitly 
about the specific brain research facts and language. 
Facilitators try to adjust by using the language that is part of 
the script, but do not go beyond this information.  
As facilitators become more experienced in conducting 
the parent workshop, however, they take greater ownership 
of the content. They rely less on the script and make use of 
personal examples that have been effective in the past. Still, 
when parents ask questions that relate to more specific 
details of the research, facilitators have difficulty addressing 
those questions. A parent asked how scientists know that 
children see blurry at first and they see faces very clearly 
around three months. Even though an explanation of 
techniques used to determine babies’ responses is provided 
for facilitators, they only seem reliably aware of the 
information presented through the script. They have a very 
hard time addressing those issues if they feel the question 
must have a right answer that is lying somewhere in a 
library. Facilitators are often more successful if they can 
find examples that relate to their own personal experiences 
as caregivers or teachers. They are capable of finding 
connections that are relevant and that help illustrate the 
main points, but when questions are asked about the 
scientific content that cannot be grounded in case from their 
experience, facilitators quickly face difficulties. 
Conclusions 
The unique characteristics of community based programs 
for the dissemination of scientific information include a 
rapid training turnaround and the opportunities to document 
how science concepts are transformed through actions, 
objects, social interaction, and organizational elements.  
Community-based programs for the dissemination of 
science are complex activity systems that manage 
information in ways that reflect elements such as 
organizational knowledge, learning, and culture. In this 
particular case, the FTP program based high-level goals by 
presenting them as truisms that are difficult to challenge 
(e.g., parents should create a loving environment), while 
tacit low-level goals go underdetermined (e.g., research 
based on deficit models is applied to the general 
population). As a result, neuroscience is translated in ways 
that bypass issues of ecological validity. 
Artifacts with flawed designs, or artifacts that are 
misinterpreted are likely to create problems that can go 
unidentified. Scripts that are meant to guide facilitators end 
up dictating the pace of the parent workshops in ways that 
limit parents’ active participation, and in ways that 
communicate  to facilitators that these materials are a 
finished-all-inclusive product. Finally, the development of 
artifacts such as communications (e.g., newsletters, 
brochures) give insight into how goals are proposed, 
negotiated, and enacted. This analysis also illustrates how 
the entire system works as a network that manages 
information. 
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Abstract 
Previous research has demonstrated that students can learn by 
tutoring other students.  Tutors are thought to learn because 
they generate instructional explanations and monitor their 
own understanding while teaching.  We analyzed verbal data 
from tutorial sessions to explore how the tutees influence this 
process.  We found that tutors were primarily responsible for 
introducing topics, but the tutees stimulated more thorough 
discussions of topics.  We also found that tutee questions 
influenced tutor explanations and metacognition.  Tutor 
responses to “deep” questions were more likely to contain 
inferences and self-monitoring than responses to “shallow” 
questions. In sum, tutees had a significant and positive 
influence on the tutors’ learning activities and opportunities. 
Introduction 
Peer tutoring and cross-age tutoring are popular and cost-
efficient educational interventions in which students provide 
instruction for other students.  One reason for the 
widespread use of these interventions is their effectiveness – 
with training, students seem quite capable of successfully 
teaching each other and younger pupils (e.g. Cohen, Kulik, 
& Kulik, 1982; Greenwood, Carta, & Hall, 1988).  Another 
reason for the popularity of peer and cross-age tutoring 
programs is the robust finding that the tutors also benefit 
academically from the teaching experience (e.g. Allen & 
Feldman, 1973; Annis, 1983; Cloward, 1967; Cohen et al., 
1982; Greenwood et al., 1998; Morgan & Toy, 1970; 
Rekrut, 1992).  Based on such findings, some researchers 
have advocated reciprocal tutoring programs in which the 
participating students take turns being the tutor and tutee. In 
general, these programs are educationally effective (e.g. 
Fantuzzo, King, & Heller, 1992; Fantuzzo et al., 1989; 
Fuchs et al., 1997; King, Staffieri, & Adelgais, 1998; 
Palincsar & Brown, 1984). 
Why do students learn by tutoring?  Some evidence 
suggests that tutors learn by generating instructional 
explanations, which facilitates integration and organization 
of knowledge. For example, Coleman, Brown, & Rivkin 
(1997) found that when students were told to teach a peer by 
explaining, they learned better than students told to teach by 
summarizing and better than students who did not teach.  
Similarly, Fuchs et al. (1997) showed that training students 
to give each other conceptually-rich explanations during 
reciprocal tutoring was more effective than classroom 
instruction and reciprocal tutoring without such 
explanations. Additional evidence indicates that tutoring 
may also encourage students to engage in metacognitive 
self-monitoring, which helps learners to detect and repair 
missing knowledge and misconceptions.  For example, King  
et al. (1998) trained reciprocal tutors to give quality 
explanations and to ask each other questions that stimulated 
critical thinking and self-monitoring.  They found that these 
explaining and metacognitive activities resulted in better 
learning than explaining activities alone.  Explaining and 
self-monitoring have also been shown to improve learning 
in solo studying (e.g. Chi, 2000; Chi, deLeeuw, Chiu, & 
LaVancher, 1994) and collaborative learning (e.g. Coleman, 
1998; Webb, Troper, & Fall, 1995), which further highlights 
the efficacy of these activities. 
In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that tutees 
influence the learning activities of the tutors in important 
ways.  In other words, tutors might be able to learn by 
explaining and self-monitoring, but tutees may affect how 
and whether these activities occur.  One way that tutees may 
guide the tutorial session is by choosing which topics are 
discussed and in how much detail, thus creating or limiting 
opportunities to think about the underlying ideas.  Another 
powerful way in which tutees may influence the learning 
activities of the tutor is through the kinds of questions they 
ask.  As described above, King (e.g. King, 1994; King et al., 
1998) has shown that when students construct and ask each 
other questions based on high-level question stems (i.e. 
questions prompting for comparisons, justifications, causes-
and-effects, evaluations, etc.), they produce better 
explanations and learn more effectively.  Coleman (1998) 
has demonstrated very similar findings in collaborative 
learning settings with students using high-level explanation 
prompts.  Research on naturalistic tutoring has shown that 
tutees do  occasionally ask “deep” questions in tutoring 
sessions, although the majority of questions are “shallow” 
(Graesser & Person, 1994).  These deep questions, although 
they may be rare, should stimulate deeper responses. 
In order to address these hypotheses about the influence 
of the tutee on tutor learning, we analyzed tutor learning in a 
non-reciprocal and naturalistic (i.e. little or no training) 
tutoring context.  This design allowed us to be more 
sensitive to the benefits and processes of tutoring.  In 
reciprocal tutoring, by definition, students learn from both 
teaching and being taught, and thus it is almost impossible 
to assess the specific contribution of tutoring activities to 
learning in these settings.  Similarly, it is possible that when 
tutoring programs are highly structured (i.e. training on 
when and how to explain, ask and answer questions, etc.), 
important aspects of spontaneous tutoring behaviors that 
positively or negatively impact learning may be obscured.   
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Method 
Background 
In a larger study, we compared learning by self-explaining 
to learning by explaining-to-others.  Overall, we found that 
self-explaining was superior to explaining-to-others on 
measures of both deep and shallow learning.  Self-
explaining also seemed to more naturally foster productive 
learning activities.  However, the focus of the current 
analyses is on the learning outcomes and activities 
associated with providing instruction for other students. 
Conditions 
The data we analyze here was obtained from two tutoring 
conditions.  In one condition, a student who had read and 
studied a text about the human eye and retina (the tutor) 
taught this information to another undergraduate (the tutee) 
in a face-to-face setting.  In a second condition, a student 
who had read and studied the human visual system test (the 
tutor) produced a videotaped explanatory lesson that could 
be later used by a different student to learn the material (an 
“anticipated” tutee).  The face-to-face tutoring condition can 
be conceptualized as an “instructional dialogue” whereas the 
videotape condition can be thought of as an “instructional 
monologue.”  The participants received no formal training 
for the tutoring task.  The tutors were simply instructed to 
explain the text information by “going beyond what the text 
says.”  Students in the instructional dialogue condition were 
encouraged to try to answer the tutees’ questions. 
Participants 
Twenty-four college undergraduate students participated in 
the instructional dialogue (n = 7 tutor/tutee pairs) and 
instructional monologue conditions (n = 10 tutors) of the 
original study.  In order to ensure that all participants had 
low prior knowledge about the learning domain (the human 
eye and retina), students who had taken certain biology, 
physiology, and neuroscience courses were not eligible to 
participate.  Participants were paid for their time. 
Materials 
Human Visual System Text  All tutors initially read and 
studied a short text describing the structure and functions of 
the human eye and retina.  The text was divided into topic-
based sections, with each topic presented on a separate page.  
These topics included both familiar, everyday concepts (e.g. 
the pupil) and unfamiliar, technical ideas (e.g. refractive 
properties of the vitreous humor), thereby providing ample 
opportunities to make connections with prior knowledge 
and explore new ideas.  However, the text itself provided 
few examples or analogies.  The text was accompanied by a 
labeled cross-section diagram of the whole eye and a 
schematic diagram of the retina.  Prior research has shown 
that the availability of diagrams can support and stimulate 
effective explaining (Ainsworth & Loizou, 2003).   
 
Learning Assessments  Learning outcomes were assessed 
using two written measures.  For the Definition Test, 
students provided definitions of key terms.  For the 
Question Test, students responded to short-answer questions 
testing recall, integration, and application of information. 
The Definition Test can be viewed as a measure of the 
students’ shallow learning, and the Question Test can be 
considered a measure of deeper learning.   Both measures 
were scored by tabulating the number of correct and 
relevant ideas produced. 
Procedure 
The study was divided into two sessions in order to facilitate 
recruitment and scheduling of participants.  In the first 
session, the tutors read and studied the text for 30 minutes 
and then completed both learning assessments (tutor pre-
test).  It should be noted that the tutors studied the text 
without foreknowledge of their future teaching task.  The 
purpose of this design was to bypass complications due to 
preparation-to-teach effects (Bargh & Schul, 1980; Renkl, 
1995).  The tutees also completed both learning assessments  
in this phase, but did not have the opportunity to read about 
the visual system (tutee pre-test).  In the second session, the 
tutors either taught an actual tutee or produced a videotaped 
lesson (30 minutes duration).  Afterwards, the tutors and 
tutees completed the learning assessments again (post-test).  
Coding of Tutor Activities 
The tutorial sessions of the dialogue and monologue 
conditions were transcribed and segmented according to 
changes in the topic of discussion.  These segments formed 
the boundaries of episodes, which were categorized by the 
type of learning activity that occurred.  Several different 
activities were observed and are briefly described below. 
 
Summary In “basic” summaries, the tutor paraphrased the 
current contents of the text without elaborating on the text 
ideas.  In “elaborated” summaries, the tutor paraphrased the 
text, but also provided additional information or inferences 
not contained in the text.  Neither type of summary was 
significantly correlated with learning outcomes. 
 
Review In “basic” reviews, the tutor reviewed previously 
discussed information without elaboration.  In “elaborated” 
reviews, the tutor reviewed previously covered material, but 
also provided new information and inferences. Elaborated 
reviews were highly metacognitive (i.e. students monitored 
themselves for understanding and accuracy) and positively 
correlated with learning outcomes. 
 
Sense-Making In sense-making episodes, the tutor 
generated inferences and integrated text concepts in order to 
address a perceived misconception or one’s own curiosity.  
Sense-making episodes were highly metacognitive (i.e. 
students monitored themselves for understanding and 
accuracy) and positively correlated with learning outcomes. 
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Analyses and Results 
Tutor and Tutee Learning 
Our results indicated that the two tutoring conditions were 
not equally effective for learning (Table 1).  Tutors in the 
instructional dialogue condition performed better than tutors 
in the instructional monologue condition on  post-test 
measures of shallow learning (Definition Test) and deeper 
learning (Question Test), although only the Definition Test 
difference was statistically significant after controlling for 
pre-test differences, F(1,14) = 9.22, p = .009.  
In order to establish that the dialogue tutors were effective 
instructors, we compared the tutors’ final scores to their 
tutee’s final scores.  For both tests, the tutees performed 
almost as well as their tutors, suggesting that the tutors were 
mostly successful in teaching their pupils (Table 1). Neither 
difference was significant.  Although the tutees learned 
somewhat less than the tutors, it is still quite impressive 
given that the tutees were exposed to the material only once 
(the tutoring session) and never read the text. 
 
Table 1:  Mean Definition Test and Question Test scores. 
 
Spontaneous and Elicited Tutor Activities 
These learning outcome differences were paralleled by the 
extent to which the tutors engaged in episodes of integrative 
and metacognitive activity (Table 2).  Overall, the dialogue 
tutors produced more elaborated review and sense-making 
episodes than monologue tutors, F(1,14) = 5.47, p = .035 
and F(1,15) = 16.22, p = .001, respectively.  No other 
differences were significant. 
 
Table 2:  Overall mean frequency of episodes. 
 
 
In order to examine this finding more closely, we further 
distinguished between activities that the tutors self-initiated 
and activities that were elicited by the tutee.   An episode 
was coded as “tutee-initiated” if the tutee selected the topic 
or asked a question leading the tutor to engage in some 
activity.  All other episodes were categorized as “tutor-
initiated”.  All of the monologue tutors’ activities were 
counted as tutor-initiated because no tutee was present.  
The pattern of episode frequencies (Table 3) suggests that 
tutors in both conditions preferred to summarize the text, 
while tutees in the dialogue condition elicited most of the 
reviewing activities.  Direct comparisons of the mean 
frequencies of tutor and tutee-initiated activities confirmed 
this impression.  Dialogue tutors initiated significantly more 
basic and elaborated summaries than dialogue tutees;  
F(1,12) = 8.2, p < .05 and F(1,12) = 8.3, p < .05, 
respectively.  However, the tutees initiated significantly 
more basic and elaborated reviews; F(1,12) = 7.5, p < .05 
and F(1,12) = 5.3, p < .05, respectively. 
 
Table 3:  Mean frequency of tutor-initiated and tutee-
initiated episodes. 
 
 
Episode 
Category 
Monologue 
Tutor- 
Initiated  
Dialogue 
Tutor- 
Initiated 
Dialogue 
Tutee- 
Initiated 
Summary    
     Basic 10.5 9.7 3.3 
     Elaborated 4.4 4.7 0.7 
Review    
     Basic 3.1 1.3 5.3 
     Elaborated 0.2 0.2 1.5 
Sense-Making 0.4 2.3 1.4 
 
The critical difference between the monologue tutors’ 
activities and the tutor-initiated activities of the dialogue 
tutors  was in the occurrence of sense-making episodes; 
F(1,15) = 4.5, p < .05. No other difference was significant.  
Tutors engaged in sense-making when they realized that 
they had a flawed or incomplete understanding of some 
concept and needed to revise their own knowledge.  Thus, in 
addition to eliciting productive reviewing of the material, 
the tutees seem to also directly and indirectly facilitate the 
tutors’ recognition and repair of their own misconceptions.  
Perhaps the tutee’s misunderstandings and questions served 
as a signal to the tutor that the tutor’s explanations were 
incorrect or unclear, and this realization spurred the tutor to 
engage in sense-making in order to understand the material 
better and to be a more effective teacher. 
In sum, these results provide evidence that tutors in non-
reciprocal tutoring settings, and with minimal training, can 
learn from generating instructional explanations and self-
monitoring.  However, when tutors provided instruction to 
an actual tutee, they learned and explained more effectively.  
Thus, it appeared the tutees did in fact contribute to the 
tutors’ learning activities in meaningful ways. In the next 
sections, we explore two hypothesized mechanisms for this 
influence, topic selection and tutee questions. 
Topic Coverage 
One way that tutees may guide the tutorial session is by 
choosing which topics are covered and how much time is 
spent on those topics.  Topics that receive more thorough 
consideration should be better learned.  To examine the 
coverage of topics in the tutoring sessions, each episode was 
coded by whether it contained a novel topic (i.e. topic was 
 
Measure 
Monologue  
Tutors  
Dialogue 
Tutors 
Dialogue
Tutees 
Definition Test  21.3 33.0 27.5 
Question Test 20.2 28.0 25.4 
 
Episode Category 
Monologue  
Tutors  
Dialogue
Tutors 
Summary   
     Basic 10.5 13.0 
     Elaborated 4.4 5.4 
Review    
     Basic 3.1 6.3 
     Elaborated 0.2 1.7 
Sense-making 0.4 3.7 
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introduced in that episode) or whether it contained a 
continuation of a previous topic.  A continuation episode 
could contain a review or elaboration of the topic, and thus 
represents a deeper or more thorough discussion (Table 4).   
Overall, we observed a clear pattern in which the tutors 
were primarily responsible for introducing new topics in the 
tutoring session (76% of novel episodes were tutor-
initiated), whereas tutees stimulated much of the subsequent 
discussion of topics (61% of continuation episodes were 
tutee-initiated).  This pattern was statistically significant; 
χ2(1,N=349 episodes) = 50.0, p < .001, and indicates that 
tutees directly influenced opportunities for  tutors to delve 
more deeply into the text information by selecting topics for 
review or elaboration. 
 
Table 4:  Introduction and continuation of topics of 
discussion by tutors and tutees. 
 
Topic 
Selector 
Novel 
Topic 
Continued 
Topic 
Tutor 134 (76%) 67 (39%) 
Tutee 42 (24%) 106 (61%) 
Totals 176 173 
Tutee Questions and Tutor Responses 
Another important mechanism by which tutees might 
influence the learning activities of the tutor is through 
asking questions.  By asking deeper questions, tutees may 
stimulate a more enriched discussion and higher quality 
tutor explanations, which should facilitate learning.  
Because the episodes used in previous analyses could 
contain multiple tutee questions, we re-segmented the 
dialogue tutoring protocol data using “question-response 
exchanges” as the unit of analysis.  A “question” was 
defined as an interrogative statement in which the tutee 
requested information (or verification of information).  For 
the purposes of this paper, we excluded questions that were 
not directly relevant to the content (i.e. questions about task 
procedures or off-topic issues were not counted).  A 
“response” was defined as any information or feedback (or 
lack thereof) provided by the tutor in answer to the question. 
Tutee questions were then labeled as either “shallow” or 
“deep.”  A deep question was one that either required the 
tutor to generate an inference or contained a tutee-generated 
inference that the tutor had to evaluate.  A shallow question 
was one that did not contain or require any information 
beyond the text contents.  Tutor responses to these questions 
were similarly coded as “shallow” or “deep,” depending on 
whether they contained inferences or novel elaborations of 
the text.  Tutor responses were further classified as being 
“metacognitive” or “non-metacognitive,” based on whether 
they contained self-monitoring statements (a statement such 
as “I don’t know that” or “This is easy to remember”). 
Out of a total of 240 content-relevant questions asked 
across the seven dialogue tutoring pairs, 37% (88 questions) 
were classified as deep and 63% (152 questions) were 
shallow.  Our results indicated that shallow questions were 
much more likely to receive a shallow response, but deep 
questions were equally likely to elicit a deep or shallow 
response (Table 5).  In other words, deep questions were 
more likely to receive a deep response (41%) than were 
shallow questions (14%).  It was fairly rare for a question to 
be ignored (receive no response).  The overall pattern was 
significant; χ2(2,N=240 questions) = 26.1, p<.001.   
     
Table 5:  Tutee questions and subsequent shallow or deep 
tutor responses. 
 
Question 
Depth 
No 
Response 
Shallow 
Response 
Deep 
Response 
 
Totals 
Shallow 15 (10%) 116 (76%) 21 (14%) 152 
Deep 12 (14%) 40 (46%) 36 (41%) 88 
 
Analyses of self-monitoring in tutor responses to tutee 
questions showed a similar pattern (Table 6).  Shallow tutee 
questions tended to elicit non-metacognitive responses.  
However, the tutees’ deep questions elicited metacognitive 
responses from the tutors about half the time.  This pattern 
was significant; χ2(1,N=240 questions) = 20.8, p<.001. 
 
Table 6:  Tutee questions and subsequent metacognitive or 
non-metacognitive tutor responses. 
 
 
Question 
Depth 
 
Metacognitive 
Response 
Non- 
Metacognitive 
Response 
 
 
Totals 
Shallow 32 (21%) 120 (79%) 152 
Deep 42 (48%) 45 (52%) 88 
     
In order to confirm that tutor responses to deep questions 
were both deep and metacognitive (rather than one or the 
other), we cross-tabulated tutors’ shallow versus deep and 
metacognitive versus non-metacognitive responses (Table 
7).  This analysis generally confirmed that deep, inferential 
responses were more likely to contain self-monitoring 
statements.  Shallow responses were more likely to be non-
metacognitive.  This pattern was significant; χ2(1,N=212 
responses) = 43.3, p<.001.   
 
Table 7:  Tutors’ deep and metacognitive responses 
 
 
Response 
Type 
 
Metacognitive 
Response 
Non- 
Metacognitive 
Response 
 
 
Totals 
Shallow 29 (19%) 127 (81%) 156 
Deep 37 (66%) 19 (34%) 56 
 
In summary, the nature of the tutees’ questions had an 
substantial impact on the subsequent integrative and 
metacognitive activities of the tutors.  When tutees asked 
shallow questions, the tutors responses were frequently 
shallow and non-metacognitive.  However, when tutees 
asked deep questions that contained or required an 
inference, the tutors were more likely to respond with a deep 
and metacognitive response.  
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Examples of Question-Response Exchanges 
The following excerpts demonstrate how these processes 
occurred in a tutorial session.  In the first example, a tutor 
and tutee are discussing the blind spot in the retina.  The 
tutor summarizes background information and the tutee 
follows up with a deep question that leads the tutor to 
generate a novel analogy.  The text provided only a 
structural description of the blind spot with no analogies. 
 
Tutor:  This is the blind spot [points to diagram].  You can’t see 
anything there because that’s where the optic nerve 
leaves the eye.  So there aren’t receptors right there. 
(paraphrase) 
Tutee:  Okay, wait.  The blind spot is where all the nerves are 
located?  (shallow question) 
Tutor:  Yeah.  Like, that’s where all of the optic nerves come 
together.  They go all around and that’s where they all 
pull together and go back to the eye.  Or back to the 
brain.  So right there, there aren’t any receptors. 
(shallow, text-based response) 
Tutee:  So how does that affect your vision?  (deep question) 
Tutor:  If something comes in and your lens refracts it to that 
point then you don’t see it. (new inference) 
Tutee:  Oh, okay. 
Tutor:  So, it’s just like when you’re driving and there’s that 
little spot in the mirror where you just won’t see the 
person behind you.  It’s like that, except for the eyes.  
(deep response; novel analogy) 
 
In the second example, a tutor and tutee are talking about 
the relationship between the iris and the pupil.  The tutee’s 
deep question causes the tutor to engage in sense-making 
activity, drawing on her prior knowledge in order to 
visualize and better understand these eye components.  The 
text only discussed how the iris/pupil regulates the amount 
of light that can enter the eye, but did not describe how the 
iris reacts to light. 
 
Tutor:  The iris is the colored part of your eye.  And it can 
expand or contract radially or circularly (paraphrase). 
Tutee: What’s radially?  Like outward?  (shallow question) 
Tutor:  Um.  It explains that on the next page [skims text].  
Yeah.  That’s outward.  And when the radial muscles 
contract, the pupil gets larger. (shallow, text-based 
response) 
Tutee:  Okay.  So, pretty much… contract is to make it smaller.  
So wouldn’t the iris get smaller?  (deep question) 
Tutor:  Oh.  That makes so much sense now.  Yeah.  Like when 
your iris gets smaller, your pupil gets bigger.  Like 
when someone’s coming out of dark room or they get 
surprised. Your pupil gets really big and your iris gets 
really small. (new inference; draws on prior 
knowledge to visualize) 
Tutee:  Mm hmm. 
Missed Opportunities for the Tutors 
It is important to note that the mapping between tutee 
question quality and tutor response quality was far from 
perfect.  About half of the tutees’ deep questions failed to 
elicit a deep, metacognitive response from the tutor.     
There are several potential explanations for this problem.  
One explanation is that the tutee’s deep question contained 
an obvious inference and the tutor did not feel it was 
necessary to elaborate.  Another explanation is that the tutor 
evaded the question because he or she did not have the 
requisite knowledge to answer it.  A third reason might be 
that the tutor did not recognize the depth of the tutee’s 
question.  Chi, Siler, & Jeong (in press), have shown that 
even adult, non-peer, tutors often fail to diagnose a tutee’s 
understanding.  In all cases, the tutors miss out on an chance 
to build on their existing knowledge, fill knowledge gaps, or 
remediate errors – to learn, in other words.   
The following excerpt provides an example of one of 
these missed opportunities.  In this example, a tutor and 
tutee are discussing light refraction and the role of the 
cornea and lens in that process.  The tutee asks two deep 
questions about the function of the cornea.  Unfortunately, 
the tutor cuts this potentially productive exchange short 
rather than attempting to repair his knowledge gap.   
 
Tutor:   I’m going to talk about refraction, which is bending of 
the light. Most of it is done with the cornea [points to 
diagram]. But there’s additional light bending done 
through the pupil.  Or through the lens, I mean.  And 
this is changed by altering the thickness of the lens. 
(paraphrase) 
Tutee:   The cornea doesn’t change at all? (deep question) 
Tutor:   The cornea just stays the same. (new inference) 
Tutee:  Okay.  Then how is it responsible for 70% of the 
focusing power?  (deep question) 
Tutor:   I don’t know.  It doesn’t say. (expresses ignorance and 
misses opportunity to repair this knowledge gap) 
Conclusion 
Previous research has established that students benefit 
academically from teaching other students.  These learning 
outcomes have most often been attributed to the tutors’ 
generation of instructional explanations and metacognitive 
self-monitoring while teaching.  However, these 
mechanisms have been relatively understudied outside of 
reciprocal tutoring settings, which confound the benefits and 
processes of tutoring and being tutored.  The analyses 
presented in this paper provide some converging evidence 
from a non-reciprocal tutoring setting that students learn by 
teaching due to explaining and self-monitoring activities.  In 
addition, these behaviors were unstructured, indicating that 
tutors can learn even without a great deal of support and 
training (although well-structured interventions probably 
support more efficient and consistent learning behaviors).    
Our findings show that the tutees played a very important 
role in shaping the learning activities and learning 
opportunities of the tutors.  Although tutors paraphrased the 
text and introduced many of the topics discussed in the 
tutoring sessions, tutees stimulated much of the reviewing 
activity in which topics were covered more thoroughly.  
Tutees also directly and indirectly facilitated sense-making 
activities in which the tutors became aware of their own 
misconceptions and then attempted to repair them.  These 
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elaborated reviewing and sense-making activities were 
likely guided by the kinds of questions that the tutees asked. 
Shallow questions tended to receive shallow and non-
metacognitive responses from the tutors.  However, deep 
questions asked by the tutees provided an important (if not 
always consistent) impetus for integrating ideas, generating 
inferences, and self-monitoring.    More research is needed 
to understand how and why “missed opportunities” occur. 
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Abstract 
Recent trends in the philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science can be fruitfully characterized as part of the 
ongoing attempt to come to grips with the very idea of 
homo sapiens—an intelligent, evolved, biological agent—
and its signature contribution is the emergence of a 
philosophical anthropology which, contra Descartes and 
his thinking thing, instead puts doing at the center of 
human being.  Applying this agency-oriented line of 
thinking to the problem of representation, this paper 
introduces the guidance theory, according to which the 
content and intentionality of representations can be 
accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance 
for action.  We offer a brief account of the motivation for 
the theory, and a formal characterization. 
Introduction and Background 
Recent trends in the philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science can be fruitfully characterized as part of the 
ongoing attempt to come to grips with the very idea of 
homo sapiens—an intelligent, evolved, biological agent—
and its signature contribution is the emergence of a 
philosophical anthropology which, contra Descartes and 
his thinking thing, instead puts doing at the center of 
human being.  Work that falls under this broad umbrella 
includes accounts of human cognition which stress 
embodiment and environmental situatedness (Anderson, 
2003; forthcoming-a; Ballard et al., 1997; Clancey, 1997; 
Clark, 1995; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), 
pragmatic and evolutionary accounts of human 
knowledge and culture (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
1992; Guignon, 1983; Hacking, 1983; Munz, 1993; 
O’Donovan-Anderson, 1997; Rescher, 1990) and action-
oriented accounts of perception (Aloimonos, 1992; 
Ballard, 1991; Gibson, 1966; Milner & Goodale, 1995; 
O’Regan & Noë, 2001), to name only a few categories, 
and a few of the many works in each. The current essay 
introduces the results of our effort to build a theory of 
representation on the basis of the same kind of agency-
oriented approach.  It is only an introduction, and many 
difficult issues will have to be treated briefly, or not at all.  
The interested reader is encouraged to consult the fuller 
treatment given in (Rosenberg & Anderson, forthcoming). 
A representation is something that stands in for, is in 
some sense about, something else.  How is one thing ever 
about another?  To answer this question is usually to 
analyze this relation of aboutness—the intentionality of a 
representation—in terms of some other, presumably more 
basic relation.  For instance, a typical causal theory of 
representation might hold that a given representation R is 
about E just in case it has a certain specified set of causal 
relations to E, for instance, that perceiving an instance of 
E will cause one to represent with R (Fodor, 1981; 1987). 
Likewise an information-content approach might hold that 
a given representation is about that object from which the 
information it contains in fact derived (Dretske, 1981; 
1986; 1988).  Conceptual role theories, on the other hand, 
try to analyze meaning in terms of the role played by the 
concept in inferential and other conceptual/cognitive 
processes: roughly speaking, the representation R is about 
E just in case it is used to make warranted inferences 
about E (Harman, 1982; 1987). Naturally, there are also 
theories that try to combine these two approaches, 
producing the so-called “two-factor” accounts (Block, 
1986; Loar, 1981; Lycan, 1984).  There is no need, nor is 
this the place, to rehearse the standard critiques of these 
various theories (but see Anderson, forthcoming-b).  
However, by way of situating and introducing our own 
account of representational content, let us say that we find 
the various causal approaches too input focused, meaning 
they give too much importance to the ways in which the 
environment affects the organism to endow its states with 
representational meaning, and while the conceptual role 
theories seem to us a step in the right direction in that they 
draw attention to the importance of cognitive actions 
taken by the subject with its representations, none of the 
theories outlined above give sufficient weight to the full 
range of what a subject does with its representations.   
In contrast, we ask first not what a representation is, but 
what it does for the representing agent, and what the agent 
does with it; what is a representation for?  Our contention 
is essentially that representations are what representations 
do, and that what a representation does is provide 
guidance for action.  Whatever the details of its 
instantiation or structure, whatever its physical, 
informational, or inferential features (and these are quite 
various across different representing systems), what 
makes a given item representational is its role in 
providing guidance to the cognitive agent for taking 
actions with respect to the represented object.  In our 
view, each of those other special features a given 
representing token might possess—e.g. co-variance with, 
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openness to the causal influence of, or resemblance to its 
object—correspond to one of the range of strategies that 
our various representation-forming and representation-
consuming systems have evolved to solve the biologically 
fundamental problem of providing autonomous organisms 
with guidance for action. 
On the guidance theory action is fundamentally 
intentional: it is first and last a directed engagement with 
the world. Our basic claim is that representations come 
into existence and derive their content from their role 
supporting the basic intentionality of action.  The fact that 
subjects take action with respect to things is what confers 
content on representations; it is how representations reach 
outside the organism and touch things in the world. The 
guidance theory presumes, then, that the intentionality of 
representation can be grounded in the intentionality of 
action. 
A Formal Account of the Guidance Theory 
Let us say that a token provides guidance to a subject by 
making its features available to the subject’s motor 
systems and rational control processes for use in making 
discriminating choices between possible actions or 
possible ways of executing actions. Below we introduce 
the foundations of the guidance theory in terms of a set of 
propositions, which together characterize the most central 
features of the theory. 
(1) An entity is anything that can be represented: a 
property, a concrete particular, an aspect of a thing, a state 
of affairs, a number, etc.  
(2) A subject is any representation-consuming 
cognitive engine. To be a representation consumer, it 
must be capable of interacting in the world in a rational, 
goal directed way due at least partly to guidance it 
receives from tokens within its cognitive systems.  
(3) A circumstance is a circumstance of the subject. A 
circumstance consists in the subject’s internal states, 
including the subject’s bodily changes, registrations, 
representations, expectations, priorities, values, options 
for action, homeostatic self-evaluations, procedural 
knowledge, motor schemas and also the subject’s 
immediate environment.  
(4) A subject standardly uses tokens (of a type) to 
provide guidance with respect to an entity E in a given 
(type of) circumstance C if, and only if, the subject has an 
enduring conscious preference or conditioned reflex to 
use the tokens (i.e., members of the type) to provide 
guidance with respect to E when in circumstance C. 
(5) An action can be a motor process or a cognitive 
process. This yields two clauses in the definition of 
action:   
(5.1) In the case of a motor process, a motor process 
is an action if, and only if, it is activated under 
control of perceptual/cognitive feedback processes 
capable of effectively modulating or bringing about 
changes in the organism or in the world 
(5.2) In the case of cognitive processes, a cognitive 
process is an action if, and only if, it is a mental 
process under intentional control whose results 
contribute to circumstances (as defined above) used 
to direct motor processes. A cognitive process is 
under intentional control if the working of that 
cognitive process is subject to modification by 
processes of attention, short-term memory, valuation, 
assent and dissent, practiced learning, and 
consciously administered self-criticism and praise. 
As mentioned already, the fact that subjects take action 
with respect to things is what confers content on 
representations; it is how representations reach outside the 
organism and touch things in the world. The central 
importance of the intentionality of action means that it is 
vital to correctly understand—without regress—what it is 
for an action to be taken with respect to something. 
(6) An action is taken with respect to an entity E if, and 
only if,   
(6.1) The action is a motor program, E is the focus of 
the intended change or efforts at control in the world; 
or  
(6.2) The action is a motor program and an 
assumption of information about E is a motivating 
reason that the given action, rather than some 
alternative non-E involving action, was undertaken; 
or 
(6.3) The action is a cognitive process undertaken to 
discover or confirm facts, to modify values, or to 
decide between alternative actions, and an 
assumption of information about E is necessary if the 
process as a whole is to provide guidance for the 
subject’s motor actions. 
This definition uses three further terms—motivating 
reason, focus, and assumption of information—that 
present the potential for regress and require further 
discussion. 
Motivating Reason 
For an account of motivating reason, we hold only that 
any analysis must be such that it would be applicable to 
goal-directed behavior of entities that do not have 
representations at all. For example, it must be of a piece 
with how we would identify the motivating reasons for 
why a plant turns toward the sunlight. The plant’s 
behavior is goal-directed behavior even if it is not action 
in the sense defined above, and the motivating reason for 
the behavior is to maximize the amount of sunlight 
available for photosynthesis. Because the plant does not 
have representations, a correct account of motivating 
reason cannot appeal to representational content.  
We also distinguish motivating reasons from 
applications of causal force. A child may go to bed early 
on Christmas Eve to encourage Santa Claus to bring 
presents, and this may be the child’s motivating reason, 
even though Santa Claus is not capable of applying causal 
force on the child’s mind. A hungry wolf may look for 
prey and its motivating reason may be a future state of 
satiety, even if the cause of its behavior is a present 
internal state. Any account of motivating reasons must 
allow for motivating reasons that are non-representational 
facts and entities, even for agents that possess 
representations. 
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At its heart, the concept of a motivating reason is 
deeply tied to concepts of rational interpretation like the 
one found in Daniel Dennett’s description of the 
intentional stance (Dennett, 1987). We take no position 
here on the basis of, or constraints on, any specific 
standards of rational interpretation. 
Focus 
As it is used above, the idea of an action’s focus is 
intended to express a functionalist concept. When a 
subject is performing an action it places itself into a 
potential feedback loop with its environment. Its purpose 
is to monitor the result of the action and to plan 
adjustments to its course of action.  
(7) The focus of an action is the ultimate entity being 
monitored through the feedback channels taken to provide 
indications of its status.   
A subject may monitor the focus directly, or indirectly 
by monitoring the status of some entity being used as an 
indicator of facts about the focus. Because indicators are 
made part of an extended guidance control system, 
indications about the focus will cause in the subject 
beliefs, decisions or equivalent states about further 
appropriate actions or perhaps that action may cease.  
When the focus is monitored through an indicator the 
subject may have an indirect causal connection to the 
focus or even no causal connection at all. An example of 
an indirect causal connection to a focus would be an 
engineer monitoring a gauge that is itself monitoring 
engine pressure. Examples of focii to which there is no 
causal connection are things like the time of day or a 
mathematical operation on numbers. To monitor the first 
we might monitor an indicator like a clock face and to 
monitor the second we might monitor a progression of 
numerals manipulated according to established rules. In 
both of these cases the focus of the action is something 
that is not present and to which the subject is not even 
indirectly causally connected, but which can be monitored 
nevertheless, despite the lack of causal causation, by 
establishing a connection to something else that can be 
manipulated to vary systematically with facts about the 
focus.  
Identifying the focus of an action in a given case 
requires establishing the facts about what the subject is 
monitoring in its circumstances, and understanding these 
facts in terms of the subject’s motivating reasons. 
Assumption of Information 
An assumption of information is to be cashed out in terms 
of facts about the actual operation of the representing 
system (or subject). Beginning with an example will make 
the concept easier to grasp. Imagine a computer 
processing a user’s command to print a document. To do 
this, the computer must determine to which printer it 
should send its own commands. To guide this action, the 
computer reads several character strings contained on its 
hard disk, one identifying the printer and others with other 
information about the printer. These strings guide it 
regarding where it should send its print commands and 
what protocol it should use to communicate with the 
printer.  From the perspective of the guidance theory, here 
is the key fact: these character strings represent what they 
do both because of the circumstances in which the 
computer is reading them and also because of the 
assumptions built into those circumstances. The computer 
processes the strings as if they conveyed information 
about the printer to which it sends its commands and 
which communication protocol it should use. There is no 
regress involved in claiming it makes this assumption, 
because the assumption itself is not a matter of having 
representational content. There is no representation inside 
the computer with the content: I assume that this string 
has information about the printer. Even more strongly, its 
ability to make an assumption of information does not 
require that the computer actually possesses information, 
nor that it ever did.1 In the case described, the character 
string the computer accesses could have been placed on 
the disk via the output of a random number generator and 
by coincidence be effective in directing it to the printer. 
Even were that to be true, the string still would be 
providing guidance and the computer would still be 
making an assumption that the string contained 
information about the correct printer. Therefore, the 
ability to make an assumption of information does not 
require an ability to have or obtain information.  
Rather, the assumption of information about the printer 
is a matter of know-how that is built into the architecture 
of the computer: how it accesses representations, in what 
circumstances it accesses them, how it reads and 
interprets their structure, what actions it initiates and 
monitors upon accessing them, how those actions cause it 
to interact with the world, and so forth. We can provide a 
candidate analysis of this know-how. To do this, we first 
need to define, for any given token, the class of actions it 
supports. The class of actions a token T supports is 
relative to the kinds of circumstances C where the system 
is prepared to use the token for guidance. It consists of all 
the actions the system can initiate or modulate in C due to 
its processing of T. Let us label this class of supported 
actions Asupp.  
(8) An action A is a member of the class of actions, 
Asupp, supported by a token T used by a subject S in 
circumstances C if, and only if, S in C would use T for 
guidance regarding the initiation or manner of execution 
of A. 
We should think of the actions in Asupp as focus-neutral 
descriptions of an action in need of association with a 
focus in particular initiations. So, for example, if in some 
circumstances a system is prepared to use a token for 
guidance in running, the action running is the focus 
neutral description. If the specific initiation of this action 
occurs when the focus of the action is a bear, the focus-
neutral action “running” is initiated as the focus-specific 
action “running away from a bear.” Actions obtain a focus 
in the way discussed above. 
Furthermore, since subjects do not initiate actions at 
random, for each action in Asupp, there will be a (possibly 
                                                 
1 This, assuming that possessing information depends on causal 
history and connection, which may not be the case. 
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very large but) finite set of circumstances capable of 
triggering the initiation of the action. We can call this set 
of triggering circumstances Acirc. The number of triples 
<A ∈Asupp, C ∈ Acirc, Focus> representing supported 
actions A initiated in circumstances C with focus Focus 
provides a class of counterfactual action scenarios, Ascene, 
in which the token T provides guidance for a subject. 
These are the action scenarios in which T participates. 
Most actions are complex, both in the sense that they 
have many different specific features that must be 
managed (e.g., the trajectory and velocity of a running 
motion), and in the sense that they almost always require 
initiating smaller or tangential actions involving entities 
besides its focus if they are to succeed in affecting their 
intended change or control (e.g., jumping over the branch 
on the ground while running from the bear). Because of 
the complexity of action, subjects needing to execute an 
action will almost always use representations other than 
the tokens representing the focus of the action. In fact, 
activation of these further tokens is necessary to fill out 
the circumstances in which all the tokens are used.  
These other active representations will fall into several 
categories: conscious representations with foci of their 
own serving the larger action program; unconscious but 
potentially conscious representations supporting the 
interpretation of the circumstances and manner in which 
the action is executed; and sub-conscious representations 
that can never be conscious but that provide support for 
basic perception, adjusting bodily movements, and 
triggering emotion. We should construe the entities 
towards which the supporting tokens provide guidance as 
sub-foci in sub-actions lying under the umbrella of the 
main action. Therefore, these further tokens, the ones that 
support the guidance for the main action within a given 
Ascene, have functional roles determined by their potential 
relationships to their own foci within the circumstances C 
of Ascene. 
Relative to these action scenarios, the guidance theory 
supposes that in each Ascene where an active token 
succeeds in having reference2 the token can be mapped to 
an entity through its functional role under the rational 
constraints associated with assigning motivating reasons 
to their sub-actions. This supposition is justified because, 
in providing guidance, a token will make features of itself 
available to the subject, which the subject can use to 
differentially control its actions with respect to an entity 
which is a focus or sub-focus of a given action. 
The know-how involved in an assumption of 
information, then, is a question of the way that the 
subject’s decoders and action mechanisms process and/or 
respond to representations (i.e., how it accesses 
representations, in what circumstances it accesses them, 
how it reads and interprets their structure, what actions it 
initiates and monitors upon accessing them, how those 
actions cause it to interact with the world, and so forth) 
given the subject’s capabilities, needs, environment, and 
cognitive architecture. The general idea is that 
                                                 
2 The concept of error will be defined formally in the next 
section.  
assumptions of information consist in non-
representational facts about how the subject works, not in 
further representational facts about, or representations 
used by, the subject.  Although this account is clearly 
preliminary, it does at least show how the idea of an 
assumption of information can be interpreted, and used as 
part of the machinery involved in determining the content 
of a representation, without initiating a vicious regress or 
involving circular appeals to representational content. 
This brings us, finally, to the cumulative definition of 
representation. On the guidance theory, representation is 
simply tracking in the sense defined below: 
(9) A token T tracks an entity E for a subject S in token 
circumstances C if, and only if, T is standardly used to 
provide guidance to S for taking action with respect to E 
in C. 
(10) A token T represents an entity E for a subject S in 
token circumstances C if, and only if, T tracks E for S in 
C. 
By linking representation to guidance in this way, the 
guidance theory distributes responsibility for the existence 
of representational content across a representational token 
(the representation) and an interpretative decoding 
mechanism (the decoder) integrated with a subject’s 
action-determining processes. The effect of distributing 
responsibility is to introduce new degrees of freedom 
regarding the exact physical or informational 
requirements for something to be a representation, as the 
requirements on the representation will depend on the 
capabilities of the decoder and the circumstances in which 
it is used. In general, the demands on each part of the 
coupled system vary inversely with the demands on the 
other. A representation that is highly structured and 
closely coupled with what it represents needs a less 
sophisticated decoding mechanism, while a very 
sophisticated (or very rigid and simple) decoding 
mechanism may embody (or presume) so much implicit 
domain knowledge that it can get by with very sparse 
representations. 
Representation and Misrepresentation 
One of the most important problems that any theory of 
representation must solve is the problem of normativity: 
representations are assessable for accuracy, and therefore 
they can be in error. To be complete, the guidance theory 
must account for this feature of representations. Because 
the guidance theory is an action-based theory of 
representation, the natural thing to do is to base error on 
the failure of action and the way that a representation’s 
guidance contributes to that failure. The intuitive idea, 
then, is that a representation is in error if it provided 
guidance to an action that failed in its intent, and it failed 
partly or wholly because of the guidance provided by that 
representation.  This intuitive idea can be formalized as 
follows: 
(11) An action fails in its intent if, and only if,  
(11.1) It is a motor action and the intended change is 
not achieved or the intended process is not brought 
under control; or 
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(11.2) It is a cognitive process and it (a) confirms a 
representation that is in error3; or (b) disconfirms a 
representation that is not in error; or (c) modifies a 
value in a way that the subject later regrets; or (d) 
recommends a course of action that fails. 
(12) An action A fails in its intent because of R if, and 
only if, (a) A failed; and (b) A was taken with respect to 
an entity E; and (c) R provided guidance for A w.r.t. E; 
and (d) R has feature F; and (e) R with F represents that 
E has property P; and (f) A failed because E was not P. 
Note that the term “represents” in clause (e) is to be read 
in light of the current theory of representation. 
(13) A token representation R is in error for subject S 
and action A in token circumstances C if, and only if, A 
would fail because of R if taken by S in C.  
The representation may be said to be in error for S 
simpliciter if and only if the class of actions for which R 
provides guidance in S’s circumstances C is dominated by 
actions that would fail because of R.  
Comparison to Related Work 
The guidance theory, broadly speaking, takes both a 
naturalistic and a functional perspective on representation. 
It is motivated by the same fundamental insight regarding 
the epistemic importance of action and interaction as gave 
rise to the theory of interactive representation (Bickhard, 
1993; 1999). However, we offer a significantly different 
development and formalization of this shared insight. For 
instance, Bickhard’s analysis relies heavily on control 
theory, cashes out representational content in terms of 
‘environmental interactive properties’, and assumes some 
version of process ontology. The guidance theory, while 
compatible with these possibilities, does not require them. 
Still, the relative advantages of these two analyses remain 
largely to be determined. While there are many other 
naturalistic theories of representation on offer, very few 
adopt the functional perspective in as thoroughgoing a 
way as we do. For instance, Dretske (1986; 1988) adopts 
the functional perspective largely as a post-hoc fix to 
what remains an information-content approach to 
representation, so as to be better able to account for 
misinformation. In contrast, Ruth Millikan does take the 
functional perspective as the starting point for her theory 
of representation, and the guidance theory thus bears the 
most resemblance to hers (Millikan, 1984; 1993). Thus, 
although the current article is meant only as a concise 
introduction to the guidance theory, and is not the place 
for any detailed comparisons with rival theories, it is 
nevertheless worthwhile to say a few words about 
Millikan’s theory in particular.   
The resemblance between the guidance theory and 
Millikan’s own biologically inspired theory is strongest 
when she writes things like: “Cognitive systems are 
designed by evolution to make abstract pictures of the 
organism’s environment and to be guided by these 
pictures in the production of appropriate actions.” 
(Millikan, 1993:11) However, the impression of similarity 
                                                 
3 This clause in the definition is an embedded recursion, not a 
circularity. 
fades quickly as the details are examined.  For while we 
agree on this very general characterization of cognitive 
systems, we differ as to the core point: that mental 
representations must be pictures and, even when they are 
pictures, we differ as to what makes such “abstract 
pictures” representations.  
There are three main components to this very basic 
disagreement.  First, on our view, a given mental token is 
a representation just in case it is standardly used by a 
given organism to guide its behavior with respect to the 
intended object; Millikan, in contrast, suggests that it is 
only a representation if it is the result of (or consumed by) 
a properly functioning system, performing the function it 
was selected to perform:  “It is not the facts about how the 
system does operate that make it a representing system 
and determine what it represents. Rather, it is the facts 
about what it would be doing if it were operating 
according to biological norms.” (Millikan, 1993:10-11)   
Second, and deeply related to the first, Millikan relies 
heavily on the notion of such a “proper function” to 
explain the possibility of representational error (a 
representation is in error when the relevant 
representation-producing or representation-consuming 
system is not functioning according to biological norms).  
In contrast, our theory allows for the possibility that a 
system serving some function other than that for which it 
was selected, or mal-functioning in some very lucky way, 
could, in its use of mental tokens, be representing just in 
case (roughly speaking) the mental tokens in question 
were being used to (successfully) guide the agent’s 
actions with respect to the indicated objects. Rather than 
analyze representational error in terms of mal- or non-
standardly-functioning systems, we cash it out in terms of 
failure of action. Although we think representational 
systems did evolve, and attention to their evolutionary 
history can help us understand how and why they function 
as they do, we believe a system can sometimes 
competently perform a function, including representing, 
for which it was not selected, and in these cases its 
unusual provenance should be no barrier to recognizing 
this fact.  
Third (and finally), whereas Millikan’s view of 
behavior and action revolves around the function or 
purpose of the organism or its parts (a movement by the 
organism is only a behavior of that organism if it can (or 
perhaps must) be understood in terms of the organism’s 
proper function or biological purposes), our own 
definition of action includes motor and cognitive 
processes effected for a broader range of motivating 
reasons. Although some element of teleology is 
apparently necessary to ground the idea of a motivating 
reason for acting, it is not clear to us that this must 
necessarily be accounted for in terms of natural selection. 
It could be the teleology of the subject itself, understood 
as having a subjective purpose like maintaining its 
homeostatic condition, pursuing hedonic value, or 
maintaining adherence to a moral, political, or aesthetic 
principle. A more detailed discussion relating the 
guidance theory to some alternative theories, including 
Millikan’s, can be found in (Anderson, forthcoming-b). 
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Conclusion 
The guidance theory is an action-focused theory of 
representation according to which content is derived from 
the role a representational vehicle plays in guiding a 
subject’s actions with respect to other things. What 
qualifies an element of experience as a representation is, 
strictly speaking, only that the element of experience be 
capable of providing a subject with guidance for its 
actions with respect to entities. To be capable of 
providing guidance an element of experience only needs 
to have features useful for exploitation by the subject’s 
action-producing mechanisms.  
In the full formalization, we show that the guidance 
theory can account for various problem cases of 
representational content such as abstract, fictional and 
non-existent objects (Rosenberg & Anderson, 
forthcoming). Twin-Earth and swampman are discussed 
in (Anderson, forthcoming-b). Future work will consider 
the evolutionary development of representation in more 
detail, and the implications of the guidance theory for the 
correspondence theory of truth, for scientific realism, and 
for consciousness and phenomenal content (Rosenberg, 
2004).  
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Abstract
In this study, we design a learning environment that sup-
ports reﬂective activities for information seeking on the
Web and evaluate its educational eﬀects. The features
of this design are: (1) to visualize the learners’ search
processes as described, based on a cognitive schema,
(2) to support two types of reﬂective activities, such
as “reﬂection-in-action” and “reﬂection-on-action,” and
(3) to facilitate reﬂective activities by comparing their
own search processes to other learners’ search processes.
We have conducted an experiment to investigate the
eﬀects of our design. The experimental results con-
ﬁrm that (1) the participants’ search performance in
the instructional group supported by our instructional
design improved eﬀectively than in the control group,
(2) they changed their ideas about important activities
when seeking information on the Web, and (3) they ac-
tivated their search cycles more than the control group
did.
Introduction
In the ﬁeld of learning science, many researchers have in-
vestigated metacognitive activities that facilitate learn-
ers’ problem solving and deep understanding (Lin &
Lehman, 2001). Metacognition is generally referred to
as knowledge and activities to monitor, control, and ma-
nipulate individual cognitive processes (Brown et al.,
1983). Several studies have shown that experts or good
learners practice metacognitive strategies more actively
than novices or poor learners (Chi et al., 1989; Ert-
mer, Newby, and MacDougal, 1996; Leinhardt & Young,
1996). Additionally, based on the ﬁndings from these
studies, various systems or instructional designs that
support learners’ metacognitive activities have been de-
veloped, and their educational eﬀects have been ex-
amined (Aleven & Koedinger, 2002; Hershkowitz &
Schwarz, 1999).
Metacognitive activities to monitor and control indi-
vidual cognitive processes are fostered by various ac-
tivities connected with cognitive eﬀorts, such as self-
explanation, self-regulation, and reﬂection. We focus on
reﬂective activities within these metacognitive activities.
Reﬂection is deﬁned as a cognitive activity for monitor-
ing, evaluating, and modifying one’s thinking and pro-
cess (Lin, Kinzer, & Secules 1999). In this study, based
on the standpoint that metacognitive activities help stu-
dents learn with greater understanding, we examine ef-
fective methods for supporting reﬂective activities.
Lin et al. (1999) proposed that there are at least two
levels of reﬂection in learning: reﬂection on a product
and its value and reﬂection on a process by which the
product was created. They suggested that supports re-
ﬂection on a process is more important because the pro-
cess is less explicit than the product for learners. More-
over, they identiﬁed a process display as one of the scaf-
folds that supports reﬂection on the processes. A pro-
cess display shows learners explicitly what they are do-
ing to solve a task or learn a concept. This method al-
lows learners to observe and analyze their own problem-
solving processes and evaluate the eﬀectiveness of their
learning. For example, Geometry Tutor, which was de-
signed by Anderson, Boyle, & Reiser (1985) to help stu-
dents learn geometry, displays learners’ geometric rea-
soning processes as a proof graph that consists of tree
diagrams of their own solution paths between the “given”
and “goal” states of problem-solving. Schauble, Ragha-
van, & Glaser (1993) also developed the Discovery and
Reﬂection Notation (DARN) system, which shows stu-
dents a graphical trace notation to support students’ re-
ﬂection on their scientiﬁc reasoning with computer-based
laboratories. Although many studies have developed sys-
tems that provide students with learning processes, the
educational eﬀects of reﬂection on the problem-solving
processes are not clear. It is also necessary to examine
how we should show learners their problem-solving pro-
cesses and how learners should reﬂect on their problem-
solving processes. In this study, we design a learning en-
vironment that supports learners’ reﬂection on problem-
solving processes when seeking information on the Web
and evaluate its educational eﬀects.
First, in order to show learners their problem-solving
processes, we have developed a feedback system for
search processes that provides learners with their own
information-seeking processes, which are described based
on a cognitive schema. In problem-solving studies, a
cognitive schema has been widely used to describe hu-
man problem-solving processes. We use such a cognitive
schema to visualize learner’s problem-solving processes
and provide them with learners. We then investigate
whether a cognitive schema can be applied as a cogni-
tive tool in learning science. We will explain our system
and the cognitive schema in the next chapter. Second,
in order to help learners reﬂect on their problem-solving
processes more eﬀectively, we focus on two types of re-
ﬂective activities that are referred to as “reﬂection-in-
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action” and “reﬂection-on-action,” proposed by Scho¨n
(1987). Scho¨n categorized reﬂection as “reﬂection-in-
action” and “reﬂection-on-action” from the viewpoint of
a context and time. The former refers to monitoring
ongoing learning activities, while the latter means revis-
iting and monitoring critical events in one’s own learn-
ing experiences after learning activities. Scho¨n suggested
that these two types of reﬂection are imperative factors
for learning in any ﬁeld with the purpose of eﬀective
learning transfer. In this study, we investigate an edu-
cational design to support these two types of reﬂective
activities.
A Search Process Feedback System
We constructed a feedback system for search processes
that supports learners’ reﬂections on their problem-
solving processes when seeking information on the Web.
This system supports learners’ reﬂection on their own
search processes by (1) providing visual support for their
search processes, and (2) prompting searchers to reﬂect
on their search processes.
A Search-Process Describing Schema
The system describes learners’ information-seeking pro-
cesses on the Web based on a schema for describing
search processes, and allows these processes to be shown
in real time. The search-process description schema
was proposed to analyze searchers’ processes for seek-
ing information on the Web (Saito & Miwa, 2002). This
schema was constructed based on the Problem Behav-
ior Graph (PBG), proposed by Newell & Simon (1972),
which is well known as one of the most fundamental
schema for describing the subjects’ problem-solving pro-
cesses.
Usually, we begin the search with a search engine when
we want to ﬁnd something on the Web. Following that,
we consider keywords and search queries to input to a
search engine, and browse the results of a search or each
Web page. In this schema, a phase in which keywords
and search queries are considered is deﬁned as a search
in the Keyword space, while a phase in which informa-
tion on the Web, such as the results of a search and
Web pages, is searched is deﬁned as a search in the Web
space. Furthermore, the Web space is subdivided into
the Result-of-Search space and the Web-Page space. Fig-
ure 1 shows a sample description of the search-process
description schema.
The searchers’ processes are described as transitions of
nodes and operators through these three search spaces.
A node represents a searcher’s behavioral state, and each
node’s components diﬀer from space to space. In the
Keyword space, a node consists of a serial number and
search queries, a node in the Result-of-Search space con-
sists of a serial number, search queries, and the number
of search results page, and a node in the Web-Page space
includes a serial number and the depth of links. An op-
erator shows an operation to the node. The following six
operators are deﬁned in this schema:
Search: searching with a search engine
wedding
Korea
249,wedding
Korea,1 287,249,1 335,287,2
287,249,1
wedding
Korea plant
255,wedding
Korea plant,1
256,wedding
Korea plant,2
Pebeku 274,Pebeku,1 415,274,1
274,Pebeku,1 415,274,1
return
return
search
search link
next
search link
Keyword Space
Web-Page Space
Web Space
Result-of-Search Space
link
jump
return
Figure 1: Sample description of the search-process de-
scription schema.
Link: going to a page connected with a link
Next: going forward to the next page after having gone
backward
Return: going backward to the last page just visited
Jump: revisiting a page
Browse: browsing search results just obtained
Prompting
The system prompts questions to help learners reﬂect
on their own search processes presented by the system.
When the system prompts a question, learners are re-
quired to answer the question while referring to the
learners’ own search processes. Table 1 shows each type
of question presented by the system. The following three
types of questions were used: (a) questions on the Key-
word space, (b) on the Result-of-Search space, and (c)
on the Web-Page space.
Experiment
We have devised an instructional design that includes
the search process feedback system as a core part of the
design and two types of reﬂection. In this section, we
conducted an experiment to evaluate how support for
reﬂection aﬀects learners’ problem-solving processes and
their search performance.
Participants
Thirty-eight university freshmen participated in our ex-
periment as a part of a class. The participants were
divided randomly into two groups. One group (the in-
structional group) was supported based on our instruc-
tional design, whereas the other (the control group) was
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Table 1: Each type of prompt presented by the system.
Types of Prompts Questions
Keyword Space What kinds of keywords did you use, or how did you combine these keywords ?
Result-of-Search Space How many results of search pages did you browse per search ?
Web-Page Space How many links did you click on per page ?
 INSTRUCTIONAL GROUP 
 
CONTROL GROUP 
 Phase 1 
Phase 1.1 The pre-test 
(a) Questionnaires about daily Web use 
(b) Listing important activities to find information on the Web effectively 
(c) Two information-seeking tasks 
Phase 1.2 Reflection in information-seeking activities 
The participants are asked to solve a search task. 
(a) The system prompts every three minutes, and the participants are then 
presented with their search processes 
(b) Answering the questions raised by the prompts while referring to a 
diagram of their own search processes 
Phase 1.3 Reflection on information seeking activities 
Analyzing and evaluating the participants’ own search processes
Phase 1 
Phase 1.1 The pre-test 
(a) Questionnaires about daily Web use 
(b) Listing important activities to find information on the Web effectively
(c) Two information-seeking tasks 
Phase 1.2 Information-seeking activities 
The participants are asked to solve a search task.
Phase 2 
Phase 2.1 Reflection on information seeking activity 
Analyzing and evaluating the participants’ own search processes while 
comparing their search processes with other three learners’ processes  
Phase 2.2 The post-test 
(a) Two information-seeking tasks 
(b) Listing important activities to find information on the Web effectively 
Phase 2 
Phase 2.1 The post-test 
(a) Two information-seeking tasks 
(b) Listing important activities to find information on the Web effectively
Figure 2: Summary of the experimental procedure.
not supported. The instructional group comprised 19
participants, as did the control group. We examined
the participants’ experiences of using the Web. The
average time consumed per day was 26.5 minutes for
the instructional group and 33.3 minutes for the control
group. There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
two groups (t(37) = .879, n.s.).
The experiment consisted of two phases, which were
separated by an interval of at least one day. Figure 2
shows a summary of the experimental procedure. In the
following, we explain the experimental procedures.
Pre- and Post-tests
We conducted the pre- and post-tests to conﬁrm whether
the participants’ search performance and their ideas
about information seeking on the Web improve through
their reﬂective activities. Each test consisted of (1) list-
ing at least ﬁve important activities to ﬁnd information
on the Web eﬀectively, and (2) solving two information-
seeking tasks to measure the participants’ search per-
formance. In the information-seeking tasks, the par-
ticipants were asked to ﬁnd target information within
ten minutes for each task, using a normal Web browser,
where none of the participants were provided with their
search processes. The tasks were counterbalanced be-
tween the participants.
The instructional group
Phase 1.2 Reflection in information-seeking ac-
tivities In Phase 1.2, the participants in the instruc-
tional group experienced “reﬂection-in-action,” wherein
the participants reﬂect on their own search processes
while seeking information on the Web. Following the
pre-test, we explained to them the experimental task and
how to use the system. Next, they were asked to solve a
search task using the system. The search task lasted for
about 20 minutes, and the participants in the instruc-
tional group were shown a prompt every three minutes
then presented with their search processes described by
the system. They considered the questions raised by the
prompts while referring to a diagram of their own search
processes, and entered their answers to the answer sheet.
Phase 1.3 Reflection on information-seeking ac-
tivities In Phase 1.3, the participants in the instruc-
tional group experienced “reﬂection-on-action.” After
the search task, the participants reﬂected on their own
search activities, analyzing and evaluating their own
search processes for twenty minutes as instructed by an
experimenter. First, they analyzed their search processes
based on the perspective of a search among the three
spaces (the Keyword space, the Result-of-Search space,
and the Web-Page space) while referring to their own
search processes. Second, they considered the advan-
tages and disadvantages of their search processes and
how to improve those disadvantages. Following that,
they ﬁlled in their answer sheets with their ideas.
Phase 2.1 Reflection on information-seeking ac-
tivities In Phase 2.1, the participants in the instruc-
tional group also experienced “reﬂection-on-action.” In
contrast to Phase 1.3, the participants reﬂected on their
search activities through comparing their own search
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Process CProcess A Process B
Figure 3: The three processes presented to the partici-
pants in the instructional group.
processes with the other three learners’ processes that
had been selected from the control group by one of the
authors.
The presented three processes are shown in Figure 3.
Process A is a process by a participant who found a
correct answer. One feature of this process is that the
balance of searching each space is relatively well coordi-
nated (balanced search). Process B and Process C are
processes of participants who could not ﬁnd a correct
answer. In contrast to Process A, these processes tend
to cling to a search of one or two of the three spaces.
The participant followings Process B hardly searched the
Web-Page space at all. He or she repeatedly shuttled
between searching in the Keyword space and the Result-
of-Search space (breadth-ﬁrst search).
The participant followings Process C searched the
Web-Page space in great detail (depth-ﬁrst search). The
instructional group was provided with these three pro-
cesses plus information on whether each participant
found the correct answer. Then, they analyzed and eval-
uated their own search activities while comparing their
own search processes to the three typical processes, just
as in Phase 1.3.
The control group
The participants in the control group engaged in the
pre- and post-tests and the search task in Phase 1.2. In
Phase 1.2, the participants in the control group solved
the search task without receiving the prompts and the
presentation of their own search processes.
Eﬀectiveness of the instructional design
In this section, we evaluate the eﬀects of our instruc-
tional design based on the experimental results. We
compare changes from the pre- to post-tests in the in-
structional group with those in the control group based
on the following three points: (1) the participants’ search
performance, (2) their ideas about important activities
in information-seeking on the Web, and (3) their search
processes.
Three out of thirty-eight participants were eliminated
because one did not understand the experimental in-
struction and the others did not participate in Phase
2. Therefore, we analyzed the results of the 35 partici-
pants: 17 participants from the instructional group and
18 participants from the control group.
Search Performance
The scores of the search tasks in the pre- and post-tests
were estimated to determine whether the participants
could locate Web pages containing the target informa-
tion. The participants’ performances in the pre- and
post-tests are shown in Table 2. Each score (0, 1, and
2) shows the number of tasks in which the participants
could ﬁnd a correct answer, and each frequency in each
cell of this table show the number of the participants
getting each score. We compared the number of partic-
ipants who increased their scores from the pre-test to
post-test with the number of participants who did not.
From the result of the chi-square test, Groups (the
instructional/control groups) × Performances (improv-
ing/not improving), we found that the number of par-
ticipants who improved their search performance from
the pre- to post-tests signiﬁcantly diﬀered for the two
groups (χ2(1) = 4.13, p < .05). This result indicates that
the participants, who engaged in reﬂective activities sup-
ported by our instructional design, improved their search
performance more eﬀectively.
Table 2: Participants’ performances in pre- and post-
tests.
(a) Instructional group
Post Test
0 1 2 Sum
0 9 7 0 16
1 1 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0
P
re
T
es
t
Sum 10 7 0 17
(b) Control group
Post Test
0 1 2 Sum
0 11 1 0 12
1 2 2 0 4
2 0 0 0 0
P
re
T
es
t
Sum 13 3 0 16
Important activities in information seeking
on the Web
In the pre- and post-tests, the participants were asked
to propose ﬁve activities that they considered important
in information-seeking on the Web. The participants’
answers in each test were categorized into the following
eight types.
Keyword space: activities with search in the Keyword
space
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Figure 4: Average number of answers in each category
in the pre- and post-tests.
Results-of-Search space: activities with search in the
Results-of-Search space
Web-Page space: activities with search in the Web-
Page space
Interaction: activities with transitions among multiple
spaces
Ability: necessities of abilities and attitudes
Knowledge: knowledge required in information seeking
on the Web
System: functions of a search system, such as a search
engine
Figure 4 shows the average number of items in each
category in the pre- and post-tests. In the instruc-
tional group, paired t-tests indicated signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences in the increase of the number of items in “Results-
of-Search space” (t(16) = 2.582, p < .05), “Web-Page
space” (t(16) = 3.846, p < .01), “Interaction” among
spaces (t(16) = 2.954, p < .01) and a slight diﬀerence
in the increase of the number of items in “Keyword
space”(t(16) = 2.073, p < .10).
The items above were related to the search processes
on which the participants reﬂected. On the other hand,
in the control group, paired t-tests indicated signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the increase of the number of items in
“Web-Page space” (t(17) = 2.557, p < .05) and “Knowl-
edge” (t(17) = 2.204, p < .05). These results indicate
that the participants who reﬂected on their search pro-
cesses in the instructional group acquired diﬀerent no-
tions as important concepts for the Web search than
those in the control group; in particular, they realized
their own search activities more profoundly.
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Figure 5: Average number of search cycles in the pre-
and post-tests.
Search processes
Finally, we discuss whether the participants’ processes
improved with our instructional design by comparing the
pre- and post-tests in each group. In this study, we con-
sider learners’ information seeking processes as a cycle
of search in the Keyword space and the Web space. This
approach, where problem solving is considered to be a
search for multiple spaces, has been widely approved in
the studies on scientiﬁc discovery and creative processes.
These studies have suggested that target activities are
developed while repeating the cycle of searching multiple
spaces. Therefore, we focused on the cycle of searching
multiple spaces. We deﬁned one search cycle as “a set
of transitions from the Keyword space to the Web-Page
space.” We counted the number of search cycles in each
task, and Figure 5 shows the average number of search
cycles in each group.
The number of search cycles was analyzed in a
two-way mixed ANOVA with the group (the instruc-
tional/control) as a between-subjects factor and the
test (pre-test/post-tests) as a within-subjects variable.
There was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of the test (F (1, 33) =
6.37, p < .01), indicating that the number of cycles in-
creased from the pre-test to the post-test. The Group ×
Test interaction was also found to show a trend toward
signiﬁcance (F (1, 33) = 3.07, p < .10), which indicates
that the participants in the instructional group more ef-
fectively increased the number of cycles than did in the
control group. These results prove that the participants
in the instructional group searched two spaces more ac-
tively in the post-test than in the pre-test.
Discussions and Conclusions
In this study, we proposed an instructional design
that supports reﬂective activities by presenting learners’
problem solving processes in information seeking on the
Web and evaluated its educational eﬀects. We conducted
an experiment to evaluate the eﬀects of our design. Ex-
perimental results revealed that the participants’ search
performance in the instructional group improved more
eﬀectively than in the control group. Additionally, their
ideas about important activities in information-seeking
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Table 3: Multiple scaﬀolds in our instructional design.
Reﬂection in Action Reﬂection on Action
Process Display © ©
Process Prompt © ×
Process Models × ©
Reﬂective social discourse × ×
on the Web and that their search processes also changed
from the pre-test to the post-test in comparison with
the control group. These results indicate that our design
helps learners improve their search performances and ac-
quire search skills.
Finally, we discuss scaﬀolds in our instructional de-
sign. In this study, we focused on the process display,
pointed out by Lin et al. (1999) to support learners’
reﬂection on their problem-solving processes. Further-
more, they also proposed the following three scaﬀolds
for reﬂective thinking:
Process prompts: prompting students’ attention to
speciﬁc aspects of processes while learning is in action
Process models: modeling of experts’ thinking pro-
cesses that are usually tacit so that students can com-
pare and contrast with their own process in action
Reflective social discourse: creating community-
based discourse to provide multiple perspectives and
feedback that can be used for reﬂection
Lin et al. (1999) suggested that it is important to in-
corporate all four scaﬀolds when developing designs be-
cause each method supports a diﬀerent aspect of reﬂec-
tive thinking. We designed a learning environment in
which learners could experience two types of reﬂection,
such as “reﬂection-in-action” and “reﬂection-on-action”,
providing multiple methods for scaﬀolds referred by Lin
et al. (1999) to support learners’ reﬂective activities.
Table 3 summarized types and methods of scaﬀolds in
our design. In this paper, we empirically veriﬁed the ef-
fectiveness of combining these multiple methods for sup-
porting reﬂective thinking.
Additionally, experimental results also imply that a
cognitive schema is useful for not only analyzing human
cognitive processes, but also supporting learning activ-
ities. However, we need to conduct further investiga-
tions on how each component in our educational design,
such as a cognitive schema, “reﬂection-in-action,” and
“reﬂection-on-action,” and above scaﬀolds, aﬀects the
learners’ improvements.
References
Aleven, V. & Koedinger, K. R. (2002). An eﬀec-
tive metacognitive strategy: learning by doing and
explaining with a computer-based cognitive tutor.
Cognitive Science, 26(2):147–179.
Anderson, J. R., Boyle, C. F., & Reiser, B. J. (1985).
Intelligent tutoring systems. Science, 228:456–462.
Brown, A. L., Bransford, J. D., Ferrara, R. A., & Cam-
pione, J. C. (1983). Learning, remembering, and
understanding. In Flavell, J. & Markman, E., edi-
tors, Cognitive Development. John Wiley and Sons,
New York. Handbook of child psychology: Vol. III.
Chi, M. T. H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M. W., Reimann, P.,
& Glaser, R. (1989). Self-explanations: how stu-
dents study and use examples in learning to solve
problems. Cognitive Science, 13(2):145–182.
Ertmer, P. A., Newby, T. J., & MacDougal, M. (1996).
Students’ responses and approaches to case-based
instruction: the role of reﬂective self-regulation.
American Educational Research Journal, 33(3):719–
752.
Hershkowitz, R. & Schwarz, B. (1999). Reﬂective pro-
cesses in a mathematics classroom with a rich
learning environment. Cognition and Instruction,
17(1):65–91.
Leinhardt, G. & Young, K. M. (1996). Two texts, three
readers: distance and expertise in reading history.
Cognition and Instruction, 14(4):441–486.
Lin, X., Hmelo, C., Kinzer, C. K., & Secules, T. J.
(1999). Designing technology to support reﬂection.
Educational Technology Research and Development,
47(3):43–62.
Lin, X. D. & Lehman, J. (2001). Designing metacog-
nitive activities. Educational Technology Research
and Development, 49(2):23–40.
Newell, A. & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human Problem Solv-
ing. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliﬀs, N.J.
Saito, H. & Miwa, K. (2002). Discovery process on
the www: Analysis based on a theory of scientiﬁc
discovery. In Proceedings of the 5th International
Conference on Discovery Science (DS 2002), LNCS
2534, (pp. 449–456).
Schauble, L., Raghavan, K., & Glaser, R. (1993). The
discovery and reﬂection notation: A graphical trace
for supporting selfregulation in computer-based lab-
oratories. In Lajoie, S. & Derry, S., editors, Com-
puters as Cognitive Tools. Lawrence Erlbaum Asso-
ciates, Hillsdale, N.J.
Scho¨n, D. A. (1987). Educating the Reflective Practi-
tioner. Heath, Boston.
1196
Modeling Effects of Age in Complex Tasks: A Case Study in Driving
Dario D. Salvucci Alex K. Chavez Frank J. Lee
(salvucci@cs.drexel.edu) (achavez@drexel.edu) (fjl@cs.drexel.edu)
Department of Computer Science, Drexel University
3141 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104
Abstract
While computational cognitive modeling has made great
strides in addressing complex dynamic tasks, the
modeling of individual differences in complex tasks
remains a largely unexplored area of research.  In this
paper we present a straightforward approach to modeling
individual differences, specifically age-related cognitive
differences, in complex tasks, and illustrate the
application of this approach in the domain of driving.  We
borrow ideas from rigorous work in the EPIC cognitive
architecture (Meyer et al., 2001) and extend them to the
ACT-R architecture (Anderson et al., in press) and a
recently-developed ACT-R driver model (Salvucci, Boer, &
Liu, 2001) to model the effects of age on driver behavior.
We describe two validation studies that demonstrate how
this approach accounts for two important age-related
effects on driver performance, namely effects on lateral
stability and brake response during both normal driving
and driving while performing a secondary task.
Introduction
Computational architectures and cognitive modeling have in
recent years begun to account for increasingly complex and
dynamic tasks, in domains such as piloting combat aircrafts
(Jones et al., 1999) and controlling air traffic (Lee &
Anderson, 2001).  While such models have captured many
aspects of human cognition and performance  in these tasks,
one aspect of complex tasks, namely individual differences,
remains a largely unexplored area of research.  The modeling
community has seen several rigorous studies of individual
differences in the context of cognitive architectures, perhaps
most notably the work of Meyer et al. (2001) in the EPIC
cognitive architecture (Meyer & Kieras, 1997) and that of
Lovett, Daily, and Reder (2000) in the ACT-R architecture
(Anderson et al., in press).  However, due to their emphasis
on specific sources of individual differences, these studies
focused on relatively short laboratory tasks in controlled
environments rather than more complex continuous tasks in
dynamic environments.
Our goal in this paper is to generalize ideas from
existing work on individual differences in simpler tasks to
account for individual differences in complex dynamic
tasks.  We illustrate our approach in the domain of driving,
a complex task that people perform on daily basis.  There
now exist several so-called “integrated driver models” (e.g.,
Aasman, 1995; Levison & Cramer, 1995) that attempt to
combine the lower-level aspects of driving (e.g., steering
control) with the higher-level aspects of the task (e.g.,
decision making, navigational planning).  In particular,
Salvucci, Boer, and Liu (2001) have developed and refined
an ACT-R driver model that predicts many aspects of driver
control, situational awareness, and decision making during
common highway driving.  However, to date, no integrated
models of driving, including the ACT-R driver model, have
accounted rigorously for any individual differences in driver
behavior and performance.
This paper builds on previous work by presenting an
account of individual differences, specifically age-related
differences, in the complex task of driving.  Not
surprisingly, age plays a significant role in driver
differences, often couched in broad terms as differences
between younger drivers (roughly 20-30 years of age) and
older drivers (roughly 60-70 years of age).  Our approach
borrows recent results of Meyer et al. (2001), who explored
models of age-related individual differences in the context of
the EPIC cognitive architecture.  Age effects on driving
offer a particularly interesting challenge to computational
cognitive modeling: on the one hand, some studies have
found that older drivers exhibit performance equal to that of
younger drivers for certain combinations of driving and/or
secondary tasks; on the other hand, other studies have found
that older drivers sometimes experience extremely reduced
performance, particularly in the presence of secondary tasks
(e.g., using a cell phone).  Thus, the effects of age are far
from trivial and must be taken in the fuller context of both
the complex behavior necessary for driving and also the
complex interaction between the driver and the “artifact”
(i.e., vehicle, road, etc.) through which the driver’s behavior
is externalized.
In the next section of the paper, we describe our basic
approach and its instantiation in the ACT-R cognitive
architecture.  We then present two modeling studies that
validate our approach for complementary tasks and aspects
of behavior, namely drivers’ ability to maintain lateral
stability on the road and drivers’ ability to respond (i.e.,
brake) to sudden external stimuli.  While our work in this
paper emphasizes driver behavior and the ACT-R cognitive
architecture, the fundamental ideas generalize well to other
complex task domains and other modeling frameworks.
Thus, our ultimate goal is to explore the interaction between
basic individual differences and their downstream effects on
performance in complex dynamic task environments.
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Modeling Age Effects in Driving
The various types of age-related differences that might arise
in driving can be categorized  broadly in terms of
“hardware” and “software” differences (Meyer et al., 2001).
Hardware differences arise from fundamental changes to the
human system — for instance, a slowdown in cognitive
processing, visual processing, or motor movement.
Software differences arise in modifications or differences in
the strategies used to accomplish tasks — for instance,
intentionally slowing down and backing away from a lead
vehicle when talking on the phone.  In this paper, we focus
on hardware differences, specifically differences in cognitive
processing.  While there is no doubt that both hardware and
software differences play a role in effects on driver
performance, we wish to explore to what extent modeling of
basic hardware differences can account for critical effects on
performance found in recent driver studies.
The ACT-R Cognitive Architecture
The ACT-R cognitive architecture (specifically version 5.0:
Anderson et al., in press; see also Anderson & Lebiere,
1998) is a production-system cognitive architecture based on
two types of knowledge stores, declarative and procedural.
Declarative knowledge embodies “chunks” of symbolic
information including factual (‘3+4=7’), perceptual (‘car
10 m in front’), and goal-related (‘driving to the grocery
store’) information.  Procedural knowledge operates through
condition-action “production rules” that evaluate the current
state of declarative knowledge (e.g., ‘if my goal is to pass
the lead car’) and enact changes on memory and/or the
environment accordingly (e.g., ‘check that there is sufficient
room in the left lane’).  Each production rule firing
(instantiation and execution) requires 50 ms of cognitive
“effort” time, in addition to any time needed to wait for
conditions to be met, such as the completion of a memory
retrieval. Overall, the ACT-R architecture has a number of
built-in functions that enable human-like behavior (e.g.,
interaction of memory and perceptual-motor processes) as
well as built-in limitations on behavior (e.g., forgetting
declarative chunks after a period of inactivity).  An in-depth
discussion of the architecture is beyond the scope of this
paper; interested readers may wish to consult Anderson et
al. (in press) for more information.
ACT-R and Age Effects
To model age effects, specifically hardware-related effects on
cognitive processing, we base our approach on recent work
by Meyer et al. (2001).  Meyer et al. found that one of the
most robust differences between younger and older people
arose in the speed of cognitive processing.  In particular,
they found that, in the context of their EPIC architecture
(Meyer & Kieras, 1997), the time for a production-rule
firing increases from 50 ms for a younger person to 56.5 ms
for an older person — a 13% increase.  They offer several
pieces of evidence to back their claim.  First, for the initial
claim of a 50 ms firing time, they argue that this value has
a neurological correlate in the average period between zero
crossings in the brain’s alpha rhythm for younger adults,
which has a positive relationship with mean simple
response time (see Callaway & Yeager, 1960; Surwillo,
1963; and Woodruff, 1975, as cited by Meyer et al.).  For
older adults, they argue that mean zero-crossing periods for
alpha rhythms is about 10-15% higher for subjects with an
age close to 70 when compared to young adults; older
subjects’ mean simple response times also show a 10-15%
increase (see Cerella, 1985; Somberg & Salthouse, 1982, as
cited by Meyer et al.).  These data lead the authors to
conclude that the mean cognitive processor time increases
by 13% for older adults and that this is a robust finding
independent of task.
The work of Meyer et al. has a straightforward
interpretation in the ACT-R architecture.  ACT-R, like
EPIC, uses a 50 ms cycle time for production rules. To
model an older person, we simply incorporate the same
cycle-time increase as Meyer et al. — namely, we increase
the cycle time for production rules (called “effort” times in
ACT-R) by 13%.  As we will show, this change impacts
performance in non-trivial ways: instead of a 13% impact on
performance across measures, the change produces no effects
for some measures and large effects for others depending on
the emergent interactions between model and task.
In this paper, we focus in particular on the effects of
cognitive cycle time and ignore potential changes in the
timing of perceptual and motor processes.  Meyer et al. also
explored how perceptual and motor processes are affected by
age; however, the mapping of their results to the ACT-R
architecture is not as straightforward as the mapping for
cognitive cycle time, and thus we leave this for future work.
Nevertheless, we demonstrate in this paper that at least
some significant aspects of age-related individual differences
in driving can be successfully accounted for simply by
incorporating basic differences in cognitive processing.
Driving and Age Effects
Modeling the effects of age on driver performances centers
on our use of the ACT-R integrated driver model (Salvucci,
Boer, & Liu, 2001).  The driver model, as mentioned,
incorporates both the lower-level aspects of vehicle control
with the higher-level aspects of driver situational awareness
and decision making.  The model can navigate a variety of
highway environments, the most common being a multi-
lane highway with automated traffic and realistic vehicle
dynamics, as pictured in Figure 1.  While driving, the
model interacts with the simulated environment through a
virtual steering wheel and pedals, producing behavioral
protocols completely analogous to those of human drivers
in the simulator — recording, for example, steering and
pedal depression over time along with eye movements to
visual regions.  The model has been validated with respect
to various aspects of basic driver behavior, such as curve
negotiation and lane changing (e.g., Salvucci, Boer, & Liu,
2001), and also with respect to effects of secondary tasks on
performance (e.g., Salvucci, 2001).
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Figure 1: Sample driving simulation environment.
To model the effects of age on driver behavior, we
incorporate the 13% cycle-time increase into the driver
model.  The increase affects all production rules across the
model — most importantly, slowing down the iterating
control cycle that handles the updates for steering and speed
control.  As mentioned, this has non-trivial downstream
effects on performance rather than a simple 13% effect across
measures of performance.  The next two studies demonstrate
how such a small change at the “hardware” level can result
in very interesting emergent behavioral predictions.
Study 1: Age Effects on Lateral Stability
Our first validation study addresses effects of age on drivers’
ability to maintain lateral stability — that is, side-to-side
stability as measured by lateral velocity.  Reed & Green
(1999) compared the performance of younger and older
human drivers in a simulator and on the road while
executing a secondary task (dialing phone numbers).  We
focus our analysis on their simulator data, comparing the
performance of their drivers to the predictions of the driver
model in a simulator with the same task.
Human Data
In Reed and Green’s (1999) study, drivers navigated a
simulated straight road at a constant speed of roughly 60
mph and were occasionally cued verbally to perform a
secondary task, namely dialing an 11-digit phone number
(including ‘1’ and an area code: e.g., ‘1-215-555-1212’).
On cue, drivers picked up the phone, dialed the 11-digit
number presented on a card located at the center console,
and pressed a “Call” button to initiate the call.  The driver
then received a voice confirmation that the number was
dialed correctly, and finally the driver pressed “End” to end
the call.  Reed and Green collected data from a total of
twelve drivers, six of whom were older than 60 years of age,
six of whom were between the ages of 20 and 30.  They
measured lateral stability as the mean lateral (side-to-side)
velocity of the vehicle both during the secondary task and
during normal driving.
Model Simulations
The model for the Reed and Green task was derived in a
straightforward manner.  The ACT-R driver model was
integrated with a task environment analogous to that in the
Reed and Green study — that is, a simulated one-lane
straight road.  The one difference in the model’s task
environment from that of Reed and Green arose in speed
control: because the model has no speedometer with which
to monitor speed, the model was given a lead vehicle
driving at a constant speed, which it used to monitor its
own speed.  The model was then extended to include a
model for the secondary task of phone dialing.  This
secondary-task model derived directly from a similar
previous model of dialing (Salvucci et al., 2004) specified
in the ACT-Simple framework (Salvucci & Lee, 2003),
which is essentially a shorthand notation for standard ACT-
R production rules.  The model, shown in Table 1, differed
from the previous model only in that it dialed the prefix “1”
before the area code and phone number and that it looked at
the cue card for the number rather than recalling it from
memory.  The “pop” marking in the table denotes
commands after which the dialing model passed control to
the driving task.  Because the control characteristics of the
Reed and Green simulator (e.g., steering force feedback)
differed from those of the simulator used to validate the
original driver model, three parameters1 of the model that
control overall steering were adjusted to produce the best fit
in the results below.  However, it should be noted that the
model immediately produced the desired qualitative
fit — this estimation only improved the quantitative fit.
The younger and older driver models differed only in the
13% increase in cognitive cycle time for the older driver
model.  The model data reported below represents roughly
4-5 minutes of driving in which the model performed eight
secondary-task trials with a 20 s delay between task trials.
Table 1: Secondary-task model for Study 1.
(move-hand device pop)
(think pop)
(press-button key1 pop)
(look-at device pop)
(think pop)
(press-button key2)
(press-button key1)
(press-button key5 pop)
(look-at device pop)
(think pop)
(press-button key8)
(press-button key6)
(press-button key7 pop)
(look-at device pop)
(think pop)
(press-button key5)
(press-button key3)
(press-button key0)
(press-button key9 pop)
(think pop)
(press-button send pop)
                                                
1 
€ 
k far  = 13, 
€ 
knear  = 5.6, 
€ 
kI  = 1
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Results
Figure 2(a) shows the lateral-velocity results taken from the
human drivers in the Reed and Green study.  In the No-Task
condition, the younger and older drivers performed equally
and there were no effects of age.  In the Task condition,
while the performance of both younger and older drivers
degraded significantly, the performance of the older drivers
was affected far more dramatically, with older drivers
exhibiting a mean lateral velocity of .44 m/s and younger
drivers a mean lateral velocity of .22 m/s in this condition.
Figure 2(b) shows the models’ predictions for the same
conditions, R=.99. The models, like human drivers, exhibit
no age effect in the No-Task condition.  Here the 13% cycle-
time increase is not large enough to affect the downstream
performance with respect to lateral velocity, effectively
adding only tens of milliseconds to the overall control-cycle
time: while the younger model updates control every
200 ms, the older model updates every 226 ms, and the
extra 26 ms does not affect overall steering performance.
However, also like human drivers, the model exhibits
differential effects of age and task on performance.  The
younger model exhibits reduced performance because of less
time devoted to control, as we have observed in previous
studies (e.g., Salvucci,  2001).  The older model exhibits an
even greater degradation because of occasional, somewhat
severe steering corrections: in situations where the younger
model may not update control for, say, 1 s, the 13%
increase for the older model would exceed 100 ms —
enough time for the vehicle to travel roughly 2.7 m at the
given speed and move significantly off-center in the lane.
The model, seeing the large offset from lane center,
performs a hard steering correction and generates a large
lateral velocity.  In fact, the younger model also experiences
such corrections; however, the corrections are both more
frequent and more severe for the older model.
Study 2: Age Effects on Brake Response
Our second validation study addresses effects of age on
drivers’ ability to respond to sudden external events via
braking.  Hancock et al. (2003) ran an empirical study on
younger and older drivers to investigate differential effects
of cell-phone distraction on braking performance.  We now
examine their task and results and show how the same
driver model can account for this very different aspect of
driver behavior and performance.
Human Data
In Hancock et al.’s (2003) study, drivers drove down a test
track at approximately 25 mph toward an intersection with a
stoplight.  During some trials, the driver was cued by tone
to perform a secondary task: they looked at a digit on
mounted screen and pressed a key to indicate whether or not
this digit corresponded to the first digit of a previously-
memorized number.  Also during these trials, the stoplight
turned red 0.5-1 s after the onset of the secondary task,
causing the driver to brake in response.  During other trials,
the driver only responded to the red stoplight without a
secondary task.  Hancock et al. collected data from 36
drivers — 19 between the ages of 25 and 36, and 16
between the ages of 55 and 65.  Overall, they measured
brake response time with and without the task as the time
delay between the onset of the red stoplight and the initial
depression of the brake.
Model Simulations
To model the Hancock et al. task, we took the model from
the Reed and Green task and modified only the task
components of the model.  The driver model does not
currently have the ability to encode and monitor stoplights,
and thus we modified the environment such that the lead
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Figure 2: Lateral velocity, (a) human drivers (Reed & Green, 1999) and (b) model predictions.
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vehicle’s brake lights would turn red 0.5-1 s after the onset
of the secondary task, keeping the basic temporal structure
of the Hancock et al. task.  The secondary-task model was
derived by modifying the Reed and Green task model to
type only 1 keypress as opposed to 11; the task model is
shown in Table 2.  All parameter values were taken directly
from the model in Study 1.  However, we had to modify
one braking-related parameter because of the nature of this
task: the standard driver model requires 500 ms to move its
foot from accelerator to brake, but because of the emergency
nature of this task, we instead used a time of
310 ms — recently reported by Lee et al. (2002) as the
minimum time for this movement — and eliminated motor
preparation time due to the drivers’ pre-preparation of the
movement as they approached the intersection.  Again, the
younger and older driver models differed only in the 13%
increase in cognitive cycle time for the older driver model.
The model data below includes roughly 5 minutes of
driving in which the model performed 16 secondary-task
trials with a 10 s delay between task trials.
Table 2: Secondary-task model for Study 2.
(move-hand device pop)
(look-at device pop)
(think pop)
(press-button key5 pop)
Results
Figure 3(a) shows the results for the human drivers.  We see
a similar pattern emerge in this study as we saw in Study 1.
First, younger and older drivers showed no significant
difference in the No-Task condition.  Second, the secondary
task significantly degraded the performance of both groups
in the Task condition.  Third, the task has a greater effect on
the older drivers than the younger drivers.  We should note
that, although the graphs for Studies 1 and 2 are visually
similar, they show very different aspects of behavior; the
similarity is rather surprising given that one study examines
lateral stability while the other emphasizes response time for
longitudinal (braking) behavior.
Figure 3(b) shows the results for the model
simulations, R=.94.  As in Study 1, the models nicely
account for the human drivers’ behavior.  The younger and
older models show equivalent braking response times in the
No-Task condition.  Again, the slightly longer control
update cycle for the older model is not enough to produce a
significant effect.  At the same time, the models show large
effects of task in the Task condition, and the older model
shows a significantly larger effect than the younger model.
As in Study 1, the 13% cycle-time increase for the
secondary task model increases pauses in control by 100 ms
or more, thus producing an effect of roughly this size
between the younger and older models.  One might expect
that the age effect for brake response might be heavily tied
to differences in motor-movement speeds (from accelerator
to brake), and given that the interaction effect in the human
data is slightly larger than that for the model, this could
indeed be one factor.  Nevertheless, these results show that
differences in cognitive processing are also a major
component of this interaction and accounts for critical
aspects of the human data.
General Discussion
In this paper we present a straightforward method of
accounting for age-related differences in driver performance,
focusing on “hardware” differences in cognitive processing
time.  While the idea of slowing processing time by 13%
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Figure 3: Brake reaction time, (a) human drivers (Hancock et al., 2003), and (b) model predictions.
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for older people seems simple enough, it should be noted
that the resulting predictions are far from trivial.  Indeed,
one might at first expect the slowdown to result in
analogous performance decrements — for instance, a 13%
degradation in lateral velocity and braking response.
However, for complex dynamic tasks, this situation is much
more complicated: the model’s behavior is filtered through
both the perceptual-motor processes and the vehicle
dynamics, resulting in predictions that can only be
generated and tested through “embodied” cognitive models
that interact directly with realistic task environments.  The
two validation studies show that the ACT-R driver model,
in the context of such a realistic environment, successfully
accounts for these complex interactions in the driving
domain, namely for both the lack of effects (in the No-Task
condition) and larger-than-expected effects (in the Task
condition) for lateral and longitudinal measures.
This work also illustrates one of the important
advantages to working in the context of a cognitive
architecture — namely, the sharing and re-use of ideas and
model implementations within an architecture and even
across different architectures.  Not only does the work of
Meyer et al. (2001) have large implications for their own
EPIC architecture (Meyer & Kieras, 1997), the work
translates well to other architectures such as ACT-R.  In
addition, this type of foundational work has immediate
implications for all models developed in the architectures;
for instance, other ACT-R models of complex dynamic
tasks (or any tasks general) could incorporate the 13% cycle-
time increase to immediately derive age-related predictions,
enabling comparison to human data for a host of new
measures.  Such work would nicely complement recent
work on other aspects of individual differences, such as
differences in working memory (Lovett, Daily, & Reder,
2000).  These studies of individual differences bring to light
the predictive power inherent in cognitive architectures and
help to make further strides toward Newell’s (1990) vision
of more “unified theories of cognition.”
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Abstract
We propose a methodological framework for the study
of emotional control based on extensive computer sim-
ulations with arti+cial agents implementing emotional
control mechanisms and demonstrate the methodology
with simulations experiments in an arti+cial environ-
ment. Speci+cally, a biologically plausible schema-based
model of basic forms of fear and anger is proposed and
tested with respect to a variety of parameter ranges.
Introduction
Emotions are an integrative part of our mentality. At
the level of the functional architecture they serve sev-
eral crucial roles, from fast perceptions of threats, to
focusing and redirecting attention, to in,uencing mem-
ory storage and retrieval, to social regulation through
expression and perception of emotions, and many more
(Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Fredrickson, 1998; Bless,
Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996; Schwarz, 1990; Blaney, 1986;
Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997; Clore, Gasper, &
Conway, 2001; Frijda, 2000; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).
Several circuits have been hypothesized to be involved
in emotional processing in mammalian brains, yet only
a few computational models (mostly of fear mechanisms)
have been proposed and implemented in an effort to
test theoretical predictions about emotion processes and
mechanisms. Moreover, these models are limited to very
specific processes (e.g., Pavlovian fear conditioning) and
do not specify other parts of an architecture that are
required for a complete, functional control system (e.g.,
homeostatic control mechanisms, various forms of per-
ceptual processing, action selection mechanisms, etc.).
Hence, they leave out and cannot address many other
emotional states that essentially depend on additional
processing components (e.g., such as social emotional
states that depend on the expression and perception of
emotions).
One way to study the effects of emotional control cir-
cuits for individual agents as well as groups of agents
is to conduct simulations with artificial agents that are
controlled by architectures that define emotion models.
Such simulation studies have the advantage that the role
of emotions and the consequences of emotional distur-
bances can be analyzed at several different levels at the
same time: the mechanistic level of the implementation
of the model (e.g., a neuronal level), the individualis-
tic level (e.g., the control loops between emotion circuits
and the agent body), and the social level (e.g., the effects
of emotional signaling for the well-being or functioning
of a group).
In this paper we will (1) propose a methodological
framework for the study of emotional control based
on extensive computer simulations with artificial agents
implementing emotional control mechanisms and (2)
demonstrate the methodology with simulations experi-
ments in an artificial environment. Specifically, a bi-
ologically plausible schema-based model of basic forms
of fear and anger is proposed and tested with respect
to a variety of parameter ranges. The results show
where emotional control is successful and better than
non-emotional strategies, but also where it fails.
Background on Computational Models of
Emotions
While several suggestions about the neural and func-
tional organization of emotional circuits exist in the lit-
erature, there are currently only a few proposals for com-
putational models that implement and test them. The
existing computational models can be categorized into
two main classes, based on whether they are aimed at
explaining low-level neurological structures and mecha-
nisms, or whether they are intended to model higher-
level emotional processes. The low-level models can fur-
ther be divided into general processing models of brain
mechanisms and specific emotion models of particular
brain structures.
The most extensively developed low-level models
among the first kind are Grossberg’s CogEM models
(e.g., (Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1987)), which are models
of learning cognitive, emotional, and motor properties.
CogEM models can account for several effects in Pavlo-
vian fear conditioning (e.g., secondary conditioning or
attentional blocking), but have not been directly applied
to empirical data (e.g., data from fear conditioning stud-
ies with rats).
Another class of low-level neural models is targeted
specifically at modeling the amygdala, which performs
several functions in emotion processing (LeDoux, 1996;
Rolls, 1995). The lateral amygdala, for example, has
been shown to exhibit associative plasticity during fear
learning (Blair, Tinkelman, Moita, & LeDoux, 2003)
and a preliminary computational model of associative
learning in the amygdala has been developed and tested
in three associative learning tasks (Balkenius, 2000).
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Moreover, recent evidence from studies with rats sug-
gests that the amygdala, in particular, the frontotem-
poral amygdala, which is taken to integrate sensory in-
formation, encodes hedonic values of an unconditioned
stimulus as part of the fear memory (Fanselow & Gale,
2003). LeDoux and colleagues have hypothesized a dual
pathway model of emotional processing in the amygdala,
which they tested in auditory fear conditioning studies
(Armony, Servan-Schreiber, Cohen, & LeDoux, 1995).
These models have been also used in simulated lesion
studies and successfully compared to data from actual
lesion studies with rats.
While most research on emotional modeling in low-
level models is focused on Pavlovian conditioning and
targeted at neural structures and processing mecha-
nisms, higher-level models of emotions are intended to
capture the processing sequence involved in emotion pro-
cesses and are typically concerned with a wider range of
emotions. While all low-level models are neural network
models, higher-level models comprise both connectionist
and symbolic approaches.
An example of a high-level connectionist approach is
the ITERA model (Nerb & Sperba, 2001), which is in-
tended to study how media information about environ-
mental problems in,uences cognition, emotion, and be-
havior. Facts, input types, emotions, and behavioral in-
tentions are all represented in terms of individual neural
units that are connected via excitatory and inhibitory
links and compete for activation.
Most attempts to model emotions at higher levels,
especially in artificial intelligence research, are how-
ever based on symbolic architectures (e.g., Soar (Newell,
1990) or ACT (Anderson, 1993)). They typically fo-
cus on the OCC model (Ortony, Clore, & Collins,
1988), which hypothesizes prototypical “update rules”
for changes in emotional state that can be directly imple-
mented in rule-based systems (e.g., (Marsella & Gratch,
2002).
What is common to all the above emotion models is
that they have been implemented and tested in isolation
from any body model. Consequently, it is difficult if not
impossible to investigate crucial aspects of emotion pro-
cessing that need a body for control and thus go beyond
functional properties (like the effects of Pavlovian condi-
tioning), which can be tested in stand-alone models (e.g.,
by applying a stimulus and measuring the output).
While some attempts have been made to implement
connectionist emotion models on robots, where different
emotions types are represented as connectionist units
that compete for activation, which in turn cause the
robot to exhibit a particular behavior (e.g., (Michaud
& Audet, 2001; Breazeal, 2002; Arkin, Fujita, Takagi, &
Hasegawa, 2003)), these architectures do not attempt to
model any specific psychological or neurobiological the-
ory of emotions (e.g., in an effort to verify or falsify its
predictions). Rather, they are mainly concerned with
the applicability of a particular control mechanism from
an engineering perspective. Moreover, these models typ-
ically lack a systematic evaluation of their performance
(an exception is (Breazeal, 2002)). Finally, no experi-
ments have been performed with these robotic architec-
tures to investigate the effects of “emotional malfunc-
tioning”.
Probably the most significant restriction of current ef-
forts to model emotions is that they have not been ex-
tended to multi-agent environments. Yet, social aspects
of emotions (such as signaling emotional states through
facial expressions, prosody, gestures, etc.) and the re-
sultant effects at the group level cannot be studied in
a single, isolated agent. Rather, multiple interacting
agents with emotional control systems are required, espe-
cially for arguments about the adaptive role of emotions
(e.g., (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000)). To our knowledge
only one project (Dulk, Heerebout, & Phaf, 2003) uses
an artificial life simulation to study some evolutionary
aspects related to emotional processing, specifically, the
evolutionary justification for LeDoux’s dual-route fear
processing proposal (LeDoux, 1996). However, the em-
ployed neural network does not and is not intended to
implement emotions or model emotional circuits. And
while the employed neural network suggests some inter-
esting conclusions about the circumstances under which
dual processing routes might be beneficial, it does not
capture emotional circuits, and is, therefore, silent about
emotional phenomena.
Simulations of Emotional Agents
Over the last few years we have developed an agent-based
simulation environment SWAGES to investigate differ-
ent agent architectures and architectural mechanisms. In
particular, two main roles of emotions in agent control
systems have been studied in extensive simulations in an
effort to evaluate the utility of emotional control (com-
pared to other non-emotional control strategies): the role
of emotions for individual agents (e.g., the selection of
actions) and the role of emotion for social groups (e.g.,
in con,icts with conspecifics and individuals from other
species).
Results from simulation experiments with agents per-
forming foraging tasks, for example, show that action
selection based on emotional states can be very effective
in the competition for resources in hostile multi-agent en-
vironments (e.g., (Scheutz, 2001) and that motivational
“hunger” and “thirst” states as well as emotional “fear”
and “anger” states are likely to evolve in a variety of
competitive multi-agent environments (Scheutz & Slo-
man, 2001)).
In general, we found that agents with emotional con-
trol mechanisms performed much better in a variety of
foraging and survival tasks in environments with little to
no structure than agents with much more sophisticated
cognitive control systems if the “cost of deliberation”
is taken into account (e.g., (Scheutz & Schermerhorn,
2002)).
On the social side, we found that expressing emotions
and being able to react to emotional expressions of others
can have a beneficial regulatory effect in social groups
and lead to superior con,ict resolution strategies (e.g.,
(Scheutz & Schermerhorn, 2004)).
In all these studies, we construed emotions as con-
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trol processes that initiate, interrupt, suppress, reprior-
itize, or in general modify behavior or behavioral dispo-
sitions. Emotions are implemented in terms of control
components (typically, in neural networks) that are con-
nected in appropriate ways to sensors and effectors of
agent body models. The underlying assumption is that
the level of control components is appropriate for ana-
lyzing and understanding the functional organization of
emotion mechanisms. In the following we brie,y outline
our architectural approach to the study of emotions and
present some experimental results.
Basic Motivations and Emotions as Control
Processes
Motivations may be considered desire-like states in that
they in,uence and bias an agent’s behavioral dispositions
in such a way as to contribute to the realization of a
desired change in the environment and/or agent. We use
the term “basic motivations” to refer to motivations that
have little to no cognitive involvement and are primarily
linked to “basic needs” of an agent (e.g., to maintain
a certain energy level). For some of these, the familiar
term “drive” is appropriate, namely if the agent is driven
in a mostly reactive way to act so as to eliminate the
disparity between a desired and an actual state that was
the cause for the motivation. For example, a state of an
agent’s control system qualifies as a “hunger” state if it
is caused by lack of energy and results in food-seeking
behavior (McFarland, 1981).
It is possible to use control components, whose outputs
control gain values of motor controllers, to implement
the kind of control system that will be able to instan-
tiate basic motivations. For example, “hunger” could
be instantiated by a proportional controller P (O¨zbay,
2000) such that input to P comes from an internal sensor
S that measures the current energy level. P compares a
desired equilibrium energy level (i.e. set point), edes, to
the actual energy level eact and scales the difference by
a gain factor ge: P = ge · (edes   eact). The output then
is a measure of the urgency with which the system re-
quires energy. Hence, the intensity of basic motivations
is modeled by the magnitude of the control circuits’ out-
puts that can in turn modulate behavior.
Emotions may also be considered to be desire-like in
that they in,uence and bias an agent’s behavior. Again,
we use “basic emotion” to refer to states with little or
no cognitive involvement. For our purposes, we distin-
guish basic emotions from basic motivations in that basic
emotions need not be related to a perceived difference
between an actual and a desired state. Furthermore,
basic emotions themselves can be states that the agent
does or does not desire whereas basic motivations are
directed towards or away from what the agent desires.
“Fear”, for example, in and of itself is an undesirable
state of an agent in that it is indicative of danger. As
such, it causes the agent to behave in such a way as to
be prepared for or avoid danger. Hence, while “fear” can
be also motivational in the sense that it may move the
agent away from the cause of fear it is also emotional
as it itself is not a desired state. A fear state with no
clearly discernible danger present, which causes an agent
to be more cautious and alert, may itself not instantiate
a motivational state that is connected to a particular
goal such as running away from a particular threat.
“Fear”, as discussed above, can be instantiated by a
controller C, which integrates over time the frequency
of occurrence of fear triggering conditions. Input to C
comes from an internal sensor S that is activated by
a fear triggering condition. C integrates these inputs
over time and outputs a signal that corresponds to the
intensity of “fear” and modulates behavior to be more
alert and ready for sudden activity. A neural control
circuit implementing an appropriate response character-
istic (similar to that given by g(t) = e−t to a unit im-
pulse, which is generated by the sensor or the perceptual
system detecting a dangerous stimulus), could use an in-
teractive activation and competition (IAC) unit (McClel-
land & Rumelhart, 1988), whose change in activation is
given by ∆act = S · gS · act + decay · act, where act is
the current activation level of the control system, gS is
the gain for the sensor input and decay is the discount
value for past activations.
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Figure 1: The schema-based architecture for the simu-
lated emotional agents (see the text for details).
To be able to instantiate a fear state, the above con-
troller needs to control the agent’s effectors in a way that
the positive output from the controller can in,uence and
bias the agent’s behavior towards avoiding or attempt-
ing to avoid dangerous objects. As such, the intensity
with which the agent avoids or attempts to avoid these
objects depends on the magnitude of the output of the
controller: the agent’s behavior is modulated by its level
of fear.
A Schema-Based Agent Architecture
Using the above control elements to implement basic
motivations and emotions, we have compared the per-
formance of agents with mechanisms to implement fear
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and anger to that of agents without these mechanisms
in a hostile multi-agent environment, where agents need
to forage for resources in order to survive and procre-
ate. The employed architecture is a biologically plau-
sible schema-based architecture (Arbib, 1992) for both
agent kinds, which allows the agents to forage for food
and water. In this architecture, the behavior of an agent
depends at any given time on the relative contributions
from a variety of motor schemas. While non-emotional
agents have fixed behavioral dispositions to deal with
competitors for resources, emotional agents use their
emotional control circuits to adapt their behaviors based
on past encounters.
Figure 1 shows the architecture for the emotional
agents (their emotional subsystem is an implementa-
tion of the higher-level functional organization of the ba-
sic mammalian “fear/anger system” in the terms of the
above suggested control units, e.g., (Berkowitz, 2003)).
Schemas are depicted by large circles where the names
indicated their function.1 Small crossed circles indicate
gains of schemas (i.e., behavioral dispositions) that are
taken as architectural parameters to be varied in the
experiments: the degree to which an agent is attracted
to food (gf ), to water (gw), and to other agents (ga).
The bold-face circles labeled “Fear” and “Anger” rep-
resent the “fear schema” and “anger schema”, respec-
tively. They are only present in the architecture of
emotional agents. Both emotion schemas are connected
to an “alarm schema” (Acol), which is triggered if an
agent touches other agents. This mechanism changes
the agent’s propensity to fight other agents or to ,ee:
the higher the output of a controller, the more stronger
the behavioral disposition (i.e., to fight for anger, or ,ee
for fear).
More formally, let Ent = {f, w, a} be an index set of
the three types of objects in the simulation environment:
food, water, and agents. For each object type in Ent, a
force vector Fi is computed, which is the sum, scaled
by 1/|v|2, of all vectors v from the agent to the objects
of type i within the respective sensory range, where |v|
is the length of vector v. These perceptual schemas are
mapped into motor space by the transformation function
T (x) =
∑
i∈Ent gi · Fi(x), where the gi are the respec-
tive gain values of the perceptual schemes. The gain
values simply scale the effect of sensory input, provid-
ing a means by which to prioritize certain inputs (e.g.,
if food is especially important, its gain value could be
higher than the other gain values, so that sensing food
has a greater impact on the direction chosen than sensing
other entities).
All feedback controllers are implemented in a feed-
forward three-layer interactive activation and competi-
tion neural network (with three input units in, three hid-
den units hid, and three output units out). The input
units receive their activations (via appropriate scaling
functions) from the Water (inw) and Energy level sen-
sors (inf ) via the perceptual Awat and Aeng schemas
as well as from the Touch sensor via the Acol schema
1For space reasons we cannot describe all the details of
the architecture here.
(ina), respectively.
The output units are connected to the gain values
in the motor scheme via individual scaling functions
fi(x) = x · ci + bi (where bi is the base gain value and ci
the scaling factor for the activation of outi).
The activation value acti(t) of an IAC unit i at time
t is defined by
acti(t) =



(max   acti(t   1)) · neti(t)   decay,
neti(t) ≥ 0
(acti(t   1)   min) · neti(t)   decay,
neti(t) < 0
where min and max are the minimum and maximum
activation level, respectively, decay is a decay factor de-
fined by d · (acti(t)   rest) (where d is a constant), rest
the rest level, and neti(t) the weighted sum of all inputs
to unit i at time t.
The choice of IAC units over standard perceptrons is
based on their update rule, which is particularly suited
to implement important temporal features of some emo-
tional states in that it (1) takes into account the previ-
ous activation (hence, can be used to implement “inner
states”), and (2) incorporates a decay term to raise or
lower the activation to a predetermined base level.
Non-emotional agents have a constant ga gain (i.e.,
their ci = 0), hence their behavioral dispositions to-
wards other agents are fixed. Emotional agents, on the
other hand, can adapt their behavior dispositions, i.e.,
their ga gain, by virtue of the feedback controllers imple-
mented in the neural net (their ci 6= 0). Depending on
whether ga is positive or negative, they can implement
basic “anger” or “fear” states (as argued in (Scheutz,
2001)).
The Utility of Anger and the Limits of Fear
We report results from two classes of experiments study-
ing the role of emotions in foraging and survival tasks.2
In the first class, the gain ga is set to a negative value for
both agent kinds, thus making them disposed to avoid
other agents. For the second class, ga is positive for both
agent kinds, thus making them disposed to be aggres-
sive towards other agents. Performance was measured
in terms of the number of surviving agents after 10000
simulation cycles averaged over 40 runs with random ini-
tial conditions. The upper and lower parts of Figure 2
show the results from both classes of experiments for
both agent kinds for two architectural variations: agent
gain and water gain (i.e., 25 sets of 40 experimental runs
each). All runs started with 10 agents of each of the two
kinds placed at random location in the environment to-
gether with 20 randomly placed food and 20 randomly
placed water items; new food and water items are gen-
erated on every 4 and 6 cycles in random locations, re-
spectively.
While emotional agents in the first set have a perfor-
mance peak (of 23.625) that is slightly higher than that
of non-emotional agents (of 23.35), the difference is not
2For more details about simulation setup and simulation
parameters see (Scheutz, 2001).
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Figure 2: The performance space of the emotional vs.
and non-emotional agents (fearful top, angry bottom)
based on variations along two architectural dimensions.
significant (t-test, p > 0.1). Consequently, being fear-
ful in addition to having the behavioral disposition of
avoiding other agents does not increase the overall per-
formance, it may in fact reduce it for some settings of the
gain values (e.g., ga =  20 and gw = 30). For emotional
agents in the second class of experiments, however, we
find a marginally significant global maximum at ga = 10
and gw = 30. Consequently, in the kinds of environ-
ments studied, “anger” does sometimes prove useful for
survival.
Discussion
The results reported here are only a very small part of a
large set of experiments, in which up to five architectural
dimensions were varied in an effort to determine the cir-
cumstances in which emotional control is beneficial and
where it might be detrimental. The methodology on
which they are based consists of a four step process: (1)
emotion concepts are analyzed and defined in terms of
architectural capacities of agent architectures (Sloman,
2002). (2) Agent architectures with particular emotional
control mechanisms (as defined in (1)) are constructed
for a given task, for which also a performance measure
is defined. (3) Simulations experiments are carried out
with the so-defined emotional agents and their perfor-
mance is determined for a predetermined set of architec-
tural and environmental variations. The outcome then
is a performance space that corresponds to the varied
parameters. The last two steps are repeated with agents
implementing non-emotional (or, in general, other) ar-
chitectures. (4) All resulting performance spaces are
then compared with respect to the agents’ performance-
cost tradeoffs, i.e., their performance taken relative to the
(computational) cost necessary to maintain and run the
instantiated architecture (in the reported experiments
the cost for both architectures was taken to be the same).
The last point is crucial as it may well be that emo-
tional agents do not perform better than non-emotional
ones on a given task in absolute terms, but that they do
much better in relative terms, i.e., with fewer resources
(which is usually believed to be the case by emotion re-
searchers). Especially from an evolutionary perspective
relative performance is the relevant measure.
We believe that the proposed methodology to experi-
ment with agent architectures in an artificial life environ-
ment cannot only form the basis for a thorough compar-
ison of the different emotion models that can otherwise
not be studied easily (e.g., social emotions and their role
in the control of agents), but can also inform emotion
researchers interested in clinical aspects of emotions by
performing simulated lesion studies, where parameters
of functional agents are modified or components of the
architecture are removed. This, in turn, might help us
isolate not only the functional roles of emotions in the
control of creatures, but also the ways in which emo-
tional control can fail and how it might be possible to
reestablish normal functioning in dysfunctional systems.
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Abstract 
Based on the theory of conceptual metaphor we investigated 
the evaluative consequences of a match (or mismatch) of 
different conceptual relations (good vs. bad; abstract vs. 
concrete) with their corresponding spatial relation (UP vs. 
DOWN). Good and bad words that were either abstract or 
concrete were presented in an up or down spatial location. 
Words for which the conceptual dimensions matched the 
spatial dimension were evaluated most favorably. When 
neither of the two conceptual dimensions matched the spatial 
dimension, ratings were not as favorable as when the 
dimensions did match, but were still significantly more 
favorable than when one conceptual category was matched 
with the spatial category (e.g., UP and abstract), while the 
other one was not (e.g., UP and bad). Results suggest that a 
metacognitive feeling of fluency can produce an additional 
layer of evaluative information that is independent of actual 
stimulus valence.  
Background 
A recent theory of conceptual structure proposes that bodily 
processes influence and constrain cognitive information 
processing, and that the resulting knowledge is structured in 
a largely metaphorical way (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980, 1999). According to this view, the body is a 
source of knowledge, and by means of conceptual 
metaphors, very basic “embodied” concepts are mapped 
onto more abstract concepts. For instance, the basic 
orientation of the human body in space (certain things are 
“up” or “down”, relative to the body) is used when 
conceptualizing abstract categories, such as emotions, when 
metaphorically talking about “feeling up” or “down”. Thus, 
metaphor, defined as “understanding and experiencing one 
kind of thing in terms of another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 
p. 5, emphasis in original),” does not merely concern 
language usage. How we use metaphor to talk about things 
also has implications for how we act upon, and think about 
those things. 
Central to the theory of conceptual metaphor is the notion 
of “image schema” (Johnson, 1987, 1999), which describes 
a pattern of perceptual experience that emerges from very 
basic bodily activities. For instance, the sensorimotor 
experience of moving with one’s own body through space 
results in the image schema of VERTICALITY, or the 
understanding that we usually function in an upright 
position, with a clear up-down orientation. Indeed, spatial 
perceptions and spatial language are closely intertwined 
(Hayward & Tarr, 1995; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; 
Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Tolaas, 
1991). Spatial metaphors derived from the concrete concept 
of VERTICALITY can be used to describe various abstract 
concepts:  
 
GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN:  
Things going downhill; Feeling down in the dumps 
ABSTRACT IS UP; CONCRETE IS DOWN:  
Higher-order categories; sub-types 
 
Thus, many image schemata are hypothesized to be 
derived from the basic experience of the body functioning in 
three-dimensional space: By definition, all human behavior 
takes place in space. As a consequence, the source domain 
of space provides a metaphor for multiple target domains 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999).  
Indeed, evidence has been obtained supporting the notion 
that concrete spatial relations provide opportunities for 
mapping conceptual relations. For instance, time is often 
conceptualized as movement through space (Boroditsky, 
2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gentner & Imai, 1992; 
Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 2002). Graphs are easier to 
understand when an increase in quantity is represented by an 
increase in slope, corresponding to the spatial metaphor of 
MORE IS UP (Gattis & Holyoak, 1996). Inferences about 
given premises are more accurate when the premises are 
mapped onto a spatial medium, compared to when they are 
not (Schnall & Gattis, 1998). Positive words are categorized 
faster when they are presented in an upward location, 
whereas negative words are categorized faster whey they are 
in a downward location (Meier & Robinson, 2004). Thus, 
when spatial relations can be mapped onto corresponding 
conceptual relations, cognitive operations are facilitated.  
In the current study we investigated the confluence of 
spatial relations and conceptual relations. As noted earlier, 
spatial concepts, such as VERTICALITY, serve as the 
source domain for various target domains, such as 
goodness/badness, and concreteness/abstractness. Figure 1 
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describes the relationship between the source domain 
VERTICALITY and those two target domains. Both target 
domains have an implicit connection with the source 
domain. For example, the concept “ love”  is good and 
abstract, and both those conceptual categories are 
conceptualized as UP.  
 
 
Table 1: Relationship between spatial and conceptual 
dimensions. 
 
 
    CONCEPT 
 
                VALENCE   CONCRETENESS 
 
           UP                 Good               Abstract 
  SPACE 
               DOWN      Bad               Concrete 
 
 
 
The goal of the current study was to investigate the effect 
of a match (or mismatch) of two different conceptual 
relations with their corresponding spatial relation. The 
spatial dimension we investigated was VERTICALITY (UP 
vs. DOWN), and the two conceptual dimensions were 
VALENCE (good vs. bad) and CONCRETENESS 
(concrete vs. abstract). The spatial dimension was varied by 
a simple perceptual manipulation: The stimulus word, which 
consisted of a good (or bad) word that was either abstract 
(or concrete) was placed either on top, or on the bottom of 
the page on which participants evaluated the word.  
Table 2 describes the different ways in which the relations 
can either be matched or mismatched. Congruent relations 
are present when both relations are matched, such as when 
good, abstract concepts are UP (top panel of Table 2, 
denoted by “ + +” ), but also when both relations are 
mismatched, such as when bad, concrete concepts are UP 
(denoted by “ - -“ ). In the latter case neither of the 
conceptual dimensions matches the spatial dimension, 
therefore no conflict between the spatial and conceptual 
relations exists. In contrast, incongruent relations are 
present when only one of the two conceptual dimensions 
matches the spatial dimension, and the other one does not.  
We expected that the extent to which the two conceptual 
dimensions were in accordance with the spatial dimension 
would influence the perceived valence of the stimulus 
words. Specifically, we predicted that when both 
relationships are matched, as is the case for the congruent 
“ + +”  conditions, stimuli should be rated more favorably. 
Further, for the congruent “ - -“  conditions, stimuli should be 
perceived as less positive than in the congruent “ + +”  
conditions, but as more positive than in any of the 
incongruent “ + -“  “ - +”  conditions. This hypothesis 
regarding the mapping of spatial and conceptual dimensions 
was tested by presenting participants with strongly positive 
and strongly negative words that were either abstract or 
concrete, and thus the content of the words crossed both 
conceptual dimensions of goodness/badness and 
abstractness/concreteness. Each word was presented either 
on top, or on the bottom of a piece of paper, and participants 
evaluated how good the word was.  
 
 
Table 2: Congruent (“  + +”  “ - -“ ) and incongruent         
(“ + -“  “ - +” ) relations of spatial and conceptual dimensions. 
 
 
        SPACE      VALENCE       CONCRETENESS 
Stimulus                             Good = UP                Abstract = UP 
                                                   Bad = DOWN           Concrete = DOWN 
 
   Good           
 Abstract           UP 
e.g., talent 
 
   Good           
 Concrete          UP 
e.g., palace 
 
   Bad           
 Abstract           UP 
e.g., malice 
 
   Bad           
 Concrete          UP 
e.g., bullet 
 
    Bad           
 Concrete      DOWN 
e.g., blister 
 
    Bad           
 Abstract       DOWN 
e.g., neglect 
 
    Good           
 Concrete      DOWN 
e.g., circus 
 
    Good           
 Abstract       DOWN 
e.g., passion 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 61 undergraduate students from the 
University of Virginia who received course credit.  
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Procedure 
Participants filled out a survey as part of an experimental 
session. Instructions specified that the participant’s task was 
to make a judgment about how good or how bad certain 
words were. It was emphasized to participants that they 
should go with their first intuition, and that judgments 
should be made according to what they personally thought, 
rather than what other people might think.  
The word stimuli were presented in the following manner 
(see Figures 1 and 2). Each stimulus was printed on a 
separate sheet of paper measuring 4 ¼ by 5 ½ inches. A 
horizontal line was drawn in the middle of the paper to 
emphasize up and down locations. The stimulus word was 
printed either in the space on top of the line (in the upper 
half of the page), or below the line (in the lower half of the 
page). Each word was followed by a rating scale on which 
the participant evaluated the word from 1 (very good) to 7 
(very bad). All stimuli were assembled into a booklet that 
presented the stimuli in a fixed random order. Half of the 
stimuli were strongly positive words, the other half were 
strongly negative words. These words were selected from a 
word list for which normative affective ratings have been 
established (Bradley & Lang, 1999), and were matched for 
word length and word frequency. For each valence, half of 
the words were abstract (e.g., “ honor,”  “ greed” ), the other 
half were concrete (e.g., “ bouquet,”  “ thief” ), thus resulting 
in eight different experimental conditions. Each stimulus 
was presented only once, and each participant received all 
conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Spatial set-up of survey: “ Good” abstract item in 
upward location. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Spatial set-up of survey: “ Bad” concrete item in 
downward location. 
 
 
 
Table 3: List of word stimuli. 
 
 
               Good Words                        Bad Words 
 
             Abstract      Concrete          Abstract     Concrete 
 
joy    toy  sin    fat 
fun    kiss  scorn    tomb 
wise    gift  greed    bomb 
honor    jewel  upset    thief 
brave     dinner  devil    bullet 
talent    palace  deceit    prison 
fantasy    circus  malice    poison 
miracle     delight  misery    blister 
passion     sunset  hatred    morgue 
kindness    bouquet failure    garbage 
intimate    treasure neglect    hostage 
ambition   sunlight jealousy    mosquito 
affection   butterfly ignorance  hurricane 
 
 
Results 
Because the valence of the words was strongly positive or 
strongly negative, and no interaction effect of valence and 
spatial position was expected (i.e., positive words were not 
expected to be rated as negative, or negative words as 
positive depending as a function of their spatial location), 
separate within-subjects ANOVAs were conducted for 
positive and negative items. For “ good”  words, the 
KINDNESS 
 Very    Very 
Good    Bad 
           1    2    3      4     5     6     7 
 
 
GARBAGE 
 Very    Very 
Good    Bad 
           1    2    3      4     5     6     7 
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interaction of spatial position and level of abstractness was 
significant, F(1, 60) = 64.48, p < .0001, with the highest 
mean for the congruent condition, namely abstract positive 
words presented in the up location (M = 5.43, SD = .40)(see 
Figure 3). Subsequent paired-samples t-tests showed that 
words in the congruent condition received significantly 
higher positive ratings than concrete positive words in the 
up location (t(60) = -15.95, p < .0001), abstract positive 
words in the down location (t(60) = -2.18, p < .03), and 
concrete positive words in the down location (t(60) = -7.91, 
p < .0001). Thus, when the perceptual dimension (UP) was 
matched with both conceptual dimensions (good and 
abstract), evaluations of the positive words became even 
more positive compared to when they were not.  
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Figure 3: Mean ratings for “ good”  words. 
 
 
For the “ bad”  words, there was also a significant 
interaction of space and level of abstractness, F(1, 60) = 
54.60, p < .0001. Words in the congruent condition, that is, 
concrete negative words presented in the down location 
received the most positive ratings (M = 1.39, SD = .39), and 
differed significantly from abstract negative words in the 
down location (t(60) = 11.06, p < .0001), concrete negative 
words in the up location (t(60) = 9.24, p < .0001), and 
abstract negative words in the up location (t(60) = 10.68, p 
< .0001) (see Figure 4). Remarkably, this match between the 
perceptual dimension and its corresponding two conceptual 
dimensions did not result in making the negative words 
more extreme, and thus more negative; rather, as was the 
case for the positive words, it led to more positive ratings 
for the negative words.  
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Abstract Concrete
1 
=
 
v
er
y 
ba
d 
7 
=
 
v
er
y 
go
o
d
Up
Down
 
Figure 4:  Mean ratings for “ bad”  words. 
 
 
The analyses so far have dealt with the “ + +”  match 
conditions of perceptual and conceptual dimension, denoted 
with two plus signs in Table 2. In addition, more positive 
ratings were also observed for the “  - -“  match conditions, 
denoted with two minus signs in Table 2, where the spatial 
dimension neither matched the valence, nor the level of 
abstractness of the words.  
To compare specifically the congruent “ + +”  with the 
congruent “ - -“  conditions, as well as with the incongruent 
“ + -“  “ - +”  conditions of spatial dimension with the two 
conceptual dimensions, composite scores were computed. 
As predicted, the composite average rating for the two 
congruent  “ + +”  conditions (M = 3.41, SD = .23) was 
significantly more positive than the composite average 
rating for the two congruent “ - -“  conditions (M = 3.12, SD 
= .26), t(60) = -8.49, p < .0001 (see Figure 7). In addition, 
the composite average rating for the two congruent “ - -“  
conditions was significantly more positive than the 
incongruent “ + -“  “ - +”  conditions (M = 2.72, SD = .23), 
t(60) = -9.83, p < .0001.  
 
Figure 5:  Composite ratings for congruent and incongruent 
matching conditions. 
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To summarize, abstract positive words presented in an up 
location, and concrete negative words presented in a down 
location were evaluated most favorably. Furthermore, when 
neither of the two conceptual dimensions matched the 
spatial dimension, that is when abstract good words were 
down, or when concrete bad words were up, ratings were 
not as favorable as when the dimensions did match, but 
were still significantly more favorable than when one 
conceptual category was matched with the spatial category 
(e.g., UP and abstract), while the other one was not (e.g., UP 
and bad).  
Discussion 
We found evidence for a connection between a spatial 
source domain and two conceptual target domains. A match 
between the source domain of VERTICALITY and the two 
corresponding target domains of goodness/badness and 
abstractness/concreteness resulted in more positive 
evaluations for affectively toned material, regardless of 
whether this material was positive or negative in valence. 
Abstract good things were rated as even better when they 
were presented on top of the page, but concrete bad things 
were also rated as better when they were presented on the 
bottom of the page.  
The finding regarding the negative words might be 
considered surprising. A different outcome might have been 
that the meaning of bad things was intensified with 
congruent spatial and conceptual dimension, so that bad 
things became even worse. But this is not what we found. 
How can this somewhat counterintuitive finding be 
explained? One possibility is that if conceptual relations are 
indeed as inherently connected to spatial relations as our 
findings suggest, then people are more familiar with 
spatially represented conceptual structure. As a consequence 
of this familiarity, these mappings are experienced as more 
pleasant. Indeed, it has been well documented that the 
repeated presentation of a stimulus is sufficient to increase 
positive affect toward that stimulus, relative to a stimulus 
that has not been presented repeatedly. In a classic study 
originating the work on the so-called mere exposure effect, 
Zajonc (1968) presented Chinese-looking characters, 
nonsense words, or yearbook photographs for either 0, 2, 5, 
10 or 25 times to participants. Participants subsequently 
rated how “ good”  or “ bad”  the meaning of the Chinese 
characters, or of the nonsense words was, and how much 
they liked the person shown in the photographs. For all 
three kinds of stimuli, participants’ ratings became more 
positive with increased number of presentation. Many 
studies have since replicated and extended this basic effect, 
suggesting that the mere exposure effect is a very robust 
phenomenon (Bornstein, 1989). 
Thus, it is possible that external conceptual organization 
that conforms with one’s own representational structure is 
perceived as more familiar, and therefore, as more pleasing. 
Perhaps our results may be regarded a representational  
mere exposure effect, where the highest positive valence is 
assigned to those conceptual organizations that have the 
highest degree of familiarity. In this regard, it is instructive 
to review the explanations that have been put forward to 
explain the mere exposure effect.  
Some have proposed that fluency of cognitive operations 
can explain why people like things better the more often 
they experience them. Fluency refers to properties of 
continuous information processing, such as the speed, or 
ease of processing (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989). These 
properties emerge as a feature of the process, rather than the 
content of cognitive functioning (Winkielman, Schwarz, 
Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Generally, high fluency, that 
is, fast and effortless processing of information, signals 
positive states of the environment, and of one’s cognitive 
processes. As a consequence, fluency can result in positive 
affect, as well as positive evaluations of target stimuli 
toward which fluency is experienced.  Research on this 
effect has generated compelling evidence for the fluency 
hypothesis (Winkielman et al., 2003). 
Further, studies involving affective evaluations in 
particular demonstrate an asymmetric effect, such that only 
positive evaluations, but not negative evaluations, are 
influenced by fluency manipulations, regardless of how 
questions concerning the ratings are worded. For instance, 
Reber et al. (1998) found that high fluency led to increased 
judgments of liking and decreased judgments of disliking. 
Similarly, Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) instructed half 
of their participants to report positive affect, and half of the 
participants to indicate negative affect after a fluency 
manipulation. Only those reporting on positive affect 
showed increased positive affect when exposed to high 
fluency, whereas those reporting negative affect did not 
show such an effect. Our finding that congruence between 
spatial and conceptual dimensions led to increased positive 
ratings even for negative words is consistent with this 
documented asymmetric effect where only positive 
evaluations increase as a function of fluency, but not 
negative evaluations.  
An additional finding in the present study was that not 
only words in the congruent “ + +”  conditions, but also 
words in the congruent “ - -“  conditions were rated more 
positively than words in the incongruent “ + -“  “ - +”  
conditions. Other data are consistent with the present 
finding that sometimes two negatives combine to make a 
positive, so to speak. For instance, according to the affective 
certainty model (Tamir, Robinson and Clore, 2002), when 
personality traits match with current affective states, people 
experience facilitated performance on motivationally 
relevant cognitive tasks. Thus, people who are generally 
happy, and who found themselves in a happy mood, were 
more successful at processing affectively valenced 
information, but the same was true of people who are 
generally unhappy and found themselves in an unhappy 
mood, compared with people who are in conflict regarding 
their beliefs about themselves, and their actual experiences. 
Similarly, in the present study, more fluency, and therefore 
higher positive ratings was the result of a lack of 
representational conflict between the source domain and the 
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target domain, even if that meant that neither of the target 
domains could be mapped onto the source domain.  
In conclusion, we found that “ metaphorical”  mappings 
between inherent spatial and conceptual relations can 
produce an additional layer of complexity, where the 
confluence of source domain and target domains has 
emergent affective properties: Both good and bad things are 
evaluated as more positive when an explicit spatial 
representation fits with implicit conceptual structure. In 
such situations, metacognitive processes involving 
perceived fluency provide information that goes well 
beyond representational content itself.  
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Abstract
A necessary condition for correctly assessing causality is the
absence of confounding causes. This set of experiments
assesses whether people are sensitive to confounding when
they infer causation.  Two stories were constructed, one in
which two candidate causes and an outcome perfectly
covaried (confounded), and one in which one candidate cause
occurred independently of a second candidate cause that
perfectly covaried with an outcome (unconfounded). If people
reason by forming contrast groups that hold alternative causes
constant, then in the confounded case, subjects should say that
it is impossible to determine causality when two candidate
causes are confounded.  In the unconfounded case, subjects
should be able to say that the candidate is causal.  If people
are not sensitive to confounding, then they should attribute
causality to both candidates in the confounded case, and the
results for the target candidate should be the same as those in
the unconfounded case. This experiment was conducted with
children and adults. Children saw one of the two conditions,
while adults saw both conditions. Both children and adults
make a distinction between confounded and unconfounded
causes when making attributions of causality.  Our results
show that children are able to state the indeterminacy of
confounded causes at an age much earlier than
previously documented.
Introduction
         One view of how children learn is that they approach
the world as scientists and form theories about the world
(e.g. Gelman, 1996) using information about variation and
covariation to establish causal connections (Gopnik, Sobel
& Schulz, 2001).  Further, they intervene upon the world in
order to discover these relationships (Schulz, 2003).
Although children may have misconceptions in their
explanations, as when a child states that he thinks God made
the sun out of gold and lit it with fire (Siegler, 1998), the
presence of such misconceptions does not mean that
children are unable to use the data present in the
environment to form correct causal attributions. Given that
adults have had many more experiences than children, we
should not expect children’s theories to be the same as
adult’s theories, especially for complex phenomena.  What
is important is whether the same process is utilized when
determining causality. In particular, this paper seeks to
examine whether both children and adults are sensitive to
confounding when there are two candidate causes for a
novel outcome.
   As well as being a potential means of improving science
instruction and for examining whether children assess
causality in the same manner as adults, assessing children’s
sensitivity to confounded causes is also important for
differentiating between two models of causal attribution: the
unconditional ∆P model (Jenkins & Ward, 1965), and the
focal sets approach (Cheng and Novick, 1992).
   Under the unconditional ∆P model, people compare the
frequency of e, an effect of interest, when c, a potential
cause, is present, with the frequency of e when the potential
cause is not present:
∆P = P(e|c) – P(e|~c)
If ∆P = 0, then the candidate is considered noncausal; if ∆P
is noticeably greater than 0, then the candidate is thought to
cause the outcome, and if ∆P is noticeably less than 0, the
candidate is thought to prevent the outcome. In the
unconditional version of this model, people ignore
confounding and pool over all the information known about
the candidate cause. Using this formulation, if both
candidate causes perfectly covary with each other and the
outcome, then both will be judged as causal. Under the focal
sets approach, the same formula can be used, but is
evaluated only when comparing across groups where
alternative causes are held constant.  If people utilize the
focal sets approach, they could make a determination when
no confounding was present, but would be indeterminate in
the case of perfect covariation because no focal set could be
formed.
   One study looking at third, sixth and ninth graders, as well
as non college young adults and undergraduate college
students found that before the ninth grade, students were
unlikely to state that there was insufficient evidence to
determine causality when there is confounding (Kuhn,
Amsel, O’Loughlin, 1988). But, these experiments involved
causes for which the students were likely to have prior
theories, and people interpret ambiguous data in ways that
are consistent with their prior beliefs (Darley & Gross,
1983). Kuhn et. al. do not indicate whether students who did
not notice the indeterminacy were answering in a manner
consistent with their prior theory. Also, this set of studies
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focuses on the coordination of theory and evidence, and one
of criteria used for assessing student’s answers was their
ability to justify their responses.  If this is an unconscious
process, students might be sensitive to the differences
between conditions, yet unable to justify their responses.  In
the present study, the task is made much simpler, by
presenting the students with a novel effect and asking for
their causal attribution without asking for a justification.
   Data from two experiments are presented.  Both
experiments assess whether people differentiate between
confounded and unconfounded causes. In one experiment,
the subjects are undergraduates, while in the other
experiment the subjects are pre-school age children.  In
both experiments, participants were presented with two
possible causes for a novel event, and were asked to
determine the cause of the novel event.  In one condition
the two possible causes were independently occurring,
while in the other conditions, the two candidate causes
always occur together.  If people are sensitive to
confounding they should be able to make a causal
attribution in the first condition but not the second.
Methods
These experiments were designed to assess the extent to
which people are sensitive to the independent occurrence of
potential causes of an effect when making judgments of
causality.  The first experiment was conducted on adults.
Even if adults are able to succeed in this task, it could easily
be due to prior training. The second experiment was
conducted on children.  The similar materials were used for
both experiments.  Below we describe the methods for both
experiments before reporting the results.
Experiment 1
Participants 10 undergraduates at the University of
California, Los Angles enrolled in the Introduction to
Psychology Course participated in the study.  Students
receive class credit for participating in the study and were
recruited using an on-line bulletin board for this course.
Design This experiment had two conditions and utilized a
within subjects design.  In one condition, the two possible
causes of an unusual event were perfectly correlated
(confounded).  In the other condition, the same two possible
causes occurred independently of one another.  Subjects
were asked about the causality of the candidate causes in
turn. The ordering of the stories, as well as the order in
which the subject was asked about each candidate cause,
was counterbalanced across subjects.
Materials Two passages of approximately the same length
were constructed, (one story was 668 words and the other
was 681 words).  Both passages tell the story of bunny
rabbits that went to two different parties.
   In both stories, the parties occur at the same time and on
the same day.  The day of the party, half of the bunnies ate
candy.  At one of the parties the bunnies ate cake, while at
the other party they did not. In the confounded condition all
the bunnies who ate candy also ate cake, in the non-
confounded condition half of the bunnies who ate candy
also ate cake, and vice versa. All the bunnies at the cake
party grew new pink wings; none of the bunnies at the “no
cake” party did.  Two avoid confusion between the two
stories, in one story, the bunnies ate green grass candy and
yellow cheesecake; in the other story the bunnies ate blue
berry candy and orangey orange cake.
   At the end of the story, participants were asked about the
causality of each of the causal candidates in the story.
1) Does Yellow Cheese Cake/ Blue Berry Cake all by
itself make bunnies grow new pink wings? Yes,
No, Impossible to tell.
2) Does Green Grass Candy/ Orangey Orange Candy
all by itself make bunnies grow new pink wings?
Yes, No, Impossible to tell.
   The text of the story was accompanied by illustrations,
with an appropriately colored wedge in the bunnies’
stomachs representing the cake, and a candy shaped object
in the bunnies’ stomach representing green grass candy.
   Because we were attempting to revise the stimuli in order
to make the directions clearer for the children, the stimuli
underwent slight modification across the 10 subjects.  The
conditions remained the same, but there were slight changes
in wording and pictorial presentation across groups.
   The stories were shown as a power point presentation on a
15” computer screen.
Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to
conditions that differed based on the ordering of the stories
and assessment questions.  Participants were then told that
they were going to hear a story about bunny rabbits in two
little bunny towns; that something interesting was going to
happen to these bunny rabbits, and that they were going to
try to figure out what happened.
   Participants looked at the illustrations on the screen as the
experimenter read the story aloud. At the end of the story,
participants were asked about the causality of each of the
causal candidates in the story.
   The experimenter wrote down their answers on an answer
sheet as they progressed through the story.
Experiment 2
Participants 16 pre-school children from the Bellagio day
care center at the University of California, Los Angeles
participated in the study.  Nine male and seven female
children between the ages of 4;5 and 5;7, with a mean age of
4;11 participated in the study. One student was excluded
from the analysis for answering incorrectly on questions
about the facts of the stories presented.  The rest of the
students answered all of the questions correctly (as
explained later).
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Design This experiment had two conditions and utilized a
between subjects design.  In one condition, the two possible
causes of an unusual event were perfectly correlated
(confounded).  In the other condition, the two possible
causes of an unusual event occurred independently of one
another. The order in which children were asked about each
candidate cause was counterbalanced across  conditions.
Materials The stories presented to the children had the
same content as the stories presented to the adults, with two
differences. In both conditions, children saw green grass
candy and yellow cheesecake.  (This was possible because
subjects only saw one story, which ruled out the possibility
of carryover between stories.) The children’s assessment
procedure also differed from that of the adults.
   Children were first asked for their spontaneous attribution.
“Do you think that it is possible to figure out why the
bunnies grew new pink wings?”.  If the child answered yes
then the following questions were asked.
1) Why do you think these bunnies [pointing to those
who went to the cake party] grew new pink wings?
2) Why do you think these bunnies [pointing to those
who went to the no cake party] did not grow new
pink wings? The ordering of these two questions
was counterbalanced across conditions.
   Because children sometimes do not answer in the free
response, do not address both of the causal candidates, or do
not address the causal candidates in their responses (i.e.
“Bunnies grew wings because they wanted to”), additional
probes were added, asking about each of the candidate
causes separately.  Children were told about statements that
other children had made while reading this story. Children
were asked to say whether they thought these statements
were “definitely right, definitely wrong, or impossible to
tell.”  The statements they were asked to judge were
1) GREEN GRASS candy all by itself makes bunnies
grow pink wings.
2) YELLOW CHEESE CAKE all by itself makes
bunnies grow pink wings.
3) YELLOW CHEESE CAKE and GREEN GRASS
candy together make bunnies grow pink wings.
If the child had previously indicated that the yellow
cheesecake was causal, they were not asked about the
yellow cheesecake again, (and the same for the other
candidates).
Procedure Children were randomly assigned to conditions.
Children were video taped during the session.  In order to
accustom children to the camera, they were first introduced
to the camera and allowed to see themselves on the LCD
screen.  Children were then told that they were going to hear
a story about bunny rabbits in two little bunny towns; that
something interesting was going to happen to these bunny
rabbits, and that they were going to try to figure out what
happened.
   Participants looked at the illustrations on the screen as the
experimenter read the story aloud. At the end of the story,
children were asked 4 questions to assess whether they
understood and remembered the content of the story.  The
experimenter pointed to a picture of the bunnies with the
candy in their tummies and asked “What did these bunnies
eat?”, the correct answer being candy (or cake and candy in
the confounded case).  The experimenter then pointed to the
bunnies without candy in their tummies and asked “Did
these bunnies eat candy?”, the correct answer being no. The
experimenter then pointed to a picture of the bunnies at the
cake party and asked “What did these bunnies eat at the
party?” (this question was omitted in the confounded
condition if children answered cake and candy to the first
question above), the correct answer being cake.  The
experimenter then pointed to a picture of the bunnies at the
no-cake party and asked “Did these bunnies eat cake?”, the
correct answer being no.  Children who did not correctly
answer all questions were excluded from the study.
Results
Experiment 1
Adults subjects were sensitive to confounding when they
make causal judgments.  In the confounded condition, when
asked whether cake caused new pink wings, all 10 subjects
said it was impossible to tell.  When asked whether candy
caused new pink wings, all 10 subjects said it was
impossible to tell.  In the unconfounded condition, when
asked whether cake caused new pink wings, 8 subjects said
cake did cause pink wings (the correct answer); 1 subject
said it was impossible to tell; and 1 subject said cake did not
cause pink wings. When asked whether candy caused pink
wings, 6 subjects said candy did not cause pink wings (the
correct answer); 4 subjects said it was impossible to tell.
  Using McNemar’s test for 2-related samples of categorical
data, we see that the pattern of responses differed across
conditions for both of the causal candidates.  Subjects were
more likely to say the cake was causal in the unconfounded
condition than in the confounded condition, and more likely
to say it was impossible to assess causality in the
confounded condition than in the confounded condition (p <
0.05, exact statistic, binomial distribution used).  Subjects
were more likely to say that the candy was not causal in the
unconfounded condition than in the confounded condition,
and were more likely to say it was impossible to tell in the
confounded condition than in the unconfounded condition
(p < 0.05, exact statistic, binomial distribution used).
  Using a C2 for each set of data, we see that subjects are
picking the response that corresponds with the focal set
theory reliably better than chance in most cases. Each of
following C2 analyses uses three cells, corresponding to the
three possible responses for the task (yes, no , impossible to
time). In the confounded condition, subjects all said that it
was impossible to tell if the cake was causal (C2 = 20,df=2,
p<0.05) and it was impossible to tell if the candy was causal
(C2 = 20,df=2, p<0.05). In the unconfounded condition,
subjects were more likely to say that the cake was causal
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than any other answer choice (C2 = 9.8,df=2, p<0.05). None
of the subjects said the candy was causal (X2 = 10, df=1,
p<0.05) and were evenly split between saying the candy was
not causal or that there was not enough information to
assess the relationship.
Experiment 2
Children were also sensitive to confounding when they
make causal judgments, but this data has more variability
associated with it than the adult version of the experiment.
  Children were categorized into one of five causal
attribution categories: the cake is causal, the candy is causal,
both causal (jointly or independently), it is impossible to
tell, and other causal attribution.  If children made a
spontaneous causal attribution, this was taken as the value
for the measure.  Otherwise, the value for this measure was
taken from the child answers to questions about each
individual candidate.
  Using a C2 analysis for this data, we see that the pattern of
responses differed across conditions, (C2 = 10.18,df=4,
p<0.05).  In the confounded condition, 3 children said both
were causal and 4 children said it was impossible to tell.  No
other responses were given by children in the confounded
condition.  In the unconfounded condition, 4 children said
cake was causal, 1 child said candy was causal, 2 children
said they both were causal, and one child gave an alternate
attribution.  No children said that it was impossible to
establish causality.
Conclusions
 Both children and adults make a distinction between
confounded and unconfounded candidate causes when
making attributions of causality.  All adults said that it was
impossible to tell whether the cake or the candy alone
caused the wings in the confounded conditions.  Because the
conditions used in this experiment are consistent with
examples used in scientific methodology classes, it is
possible that the adults have had prior experience in science
classes that train them to be able to do this.    The same is
not true of the children, however.
   The child data suggests that children are able to state that
is impossible to attribute causality when two candidate
causes perfectly covary at a much earlier age than
documented by previous studies. Children as young as 4
years old, less than a third as old as previously believed,
made such attributions.  They were also able to use
frequency data to make a causal attribution.
  The difficulty in using data to prove that a theory is correct
or incorrect may not be due to student’s inattention to
confounded causes.  Instead, it may be that that having to
justify their responses, or an interaction with prior
knowledge is the problem.  When introducing children to
the abstract idea of confounding, it may be useful to build of
their intuitions of causal attribution by first having them
make judgments of potential causes of novel effects.  Their
answers to these problems could then be used as a basis for
discussion about the abstract concept of confounding.
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Abstract 
Recent publications about humans controlling dynamic 
systems have emphasized the role of specific rules or 
exemplar knowledge. Although it has been shown that 
small systems can be controlled with these types of 
knowledge, there is evidence that general knowledge about 
the structure of a system plays an important role, too, 
particularly when dealing with systems of higher com-
plexity. However, teaching structural knowledge has often 
failed the expected positive effect. The present work 
investigates details of acquisition and use of structural 
knowledge. It is hypothesized that guiding subjects to focus 
on dependencies rather than effects supports them in apply-
ing structural knowledge, especially when the application is 
practiced in a strategy training. An experiment with N=95 
subjects supported the hypothesis of the usefulness of the 
dependency perspective, but revealed an adverse effect of 
the strategy training. Differences between subgroups 
studying different majors have been found that give rise to 
questions about the relation between prior knowledge and 
instruction. The results have interesting implications for 
models of how structural knowledge is represented as well 
as for methods of teaching system control efficiently.  
 
Humans have to deal with dynamic systems throughout 
their lives. Especially in industrial environments, people 
are confronted with new systems such as production lines 
frequently. Therefore it is worthwhile to study how 
humans learn to control dynamic systems, and how 
instruction can support the learning process. 
In cognitive psychology, a common paradigm for 
studying the control of dynamic systems can be character-
ized by the following features: The systems simulate 
some fictitious device or environment that most people 
have no specific experience with (e.g. a tank with sea 
animals in a biology lab, used by Vollmeyer, Burns, & 
Holyoak, 1996). This is to ensure an equally low level of 
prior knowledge. Discrete linear additive equations are 
used for simulation, one equation per output variable. 
There is the opportunity to assign values to the input 
variables in each simulation step, which is referred to as 
“trial”. A number of trials, e.g. six simulated hours, make 
up a “round”. The objective for participants is to attain a 
specific goal state either at the end of a round, or as soon 
as possible and to maintain the state. A prominent, yet 
simple example is the “Sugar Factory” (Berry & Broad-
bent, 1984) that has been used to investigate questions 
about implicit vs. explicit knowledge and about rule vs. 
exemplar learning (e.g. Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Fum & 
Stocco, 2003; Lebiere, Wallach, & Taatgen, 1998) 
Research with this paradigm has shown that subjects 
largely prefer acquiring and using exemplar knowledge 
rather than structural knowledge, i.e. subjects memorize 
specific actions taken in specific situations together with 
their outcomes. This strategy can be successful under 
certain conditions: First, when the system has a small 
problem space like, for example, the Sugar Factory (144 
states); second, when the same goal state has to be attain-
ed repeatedly (Vollmeyer et al., 1996), which means that 
only a small fraction of a possibly large problem space is 
relevant. Simulation studies with the Sugar Factory have 
shown that it can be successfully controlled by using 
either declarative representations of specific actions 
(Lebiere et al., 1998), or learned production rules that also 
represent specific interventions (Fum & Stocco, 2003). In 
conditions, however, where subjects have to deal with 
huge problem spaces (e.g. because the system is more 
complex and subjects have to attain a number of different 
goal states), the exemplar strategy is no longer useful1. 
Instead, it is more reasonable to use general knowledge 
about the causal structure of the system to navigate 
through the problem space. I will refer to this type of 
knowledge as “structural knowledge”. 
In principle, complete structural knowledge is suffici-
ent to control a system even without specific experience. 
Although correlations between structural knowledge and 
performance have been reported (Funke, 1993), experi-
ments where structural knowledge was taught, usually 
failed to demonstrate its superiority (Putz-Osterloh, 1993; 
Schoppek, 2002). One reason for this is that deriving 
                                                          
1 The inclination to use exemplar knowledge even when it is 
inappropriate may explain why subjects generally perform at 
very low levels when they are asked to control complex 
dynamic systems that are new to them. 
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specific actions from structural knowledge is a skill that 
has to be practiced in addition to learning the structure. 
This view is corroborated by results from studies where 
the application of structural knowledge has been practiced 
extensively (Preussler, 1998). A second reason for the 
difficulties of applying structural knowledge is that know-
ledge about causal relations is acquired under a different 
perspective than it is applied when controlling a system. 
This issue is elaborated in the following paragraphs. 
Verbal protocols of successful system controllers and 
simulation studies (Schoppek, 2002) have helped identify 
efficient strategies for acquisition and application of 
structural knowledge. A good strategy for exploring the 
causal structure of a system is to vary input variables one 
at a time to identify the immediate effects of the input 
variables and the momentum of the system, which is 
produced by effects of output variables onto each other. 
For example, a subject could put some lime into the 
animal tank to observe the effect onto the oxygen content 
of the water, then set lime input back to zero and observe 
how the oxygen content changes on its own. 
A common application strategy starts with (1) predict-
ing the next state of the system under the assumption of 
no interventions, continues with (2) calculating the differ-
ences between the predicted and the desired state, (3) 
selecting a free input variable, (4) calculating the input 
value, and ends with (5) applying the intervention. In the 
course of this strategy, for each output variable all their 
dependencies are considered in turn. This consideration of 
dependencies is a marked difference compared with the 
focus on effects that is prevalent during acquisition of 
structural knowledge.  
Thus we can distinguish two perspectives on causal 
relations: One looking for effects of a given cause, the 
other looking for possible causes of a given effect. The 
first perspective is prevalent during exploration of a new 
system, the second is more adaptive during system 
control. In the following, I will use the word “effects” to 
characterize constructs related to the first perspective, and 
“dependencies” to characterize the second perspective. 
The distinction of perspectives on causal relations has 
a number of implications. The first has to do with the 
question what given information cues the retrieval of 
what other information. During exploration, when input 
variables are manipulated and effects are observed, 
associations from cause to effect are learned, resulting in 
a structure where representations of input manipulations 
act as cues for representations of changes in output 
variables. When the task is to control a system and the 
dependencies of output variables are considered, output 
variables should be learned as cues for input variables.  
A second implication concerns the mechanism of 
chunking, which plays an important role in successful 
problem solving (Newell, 1990, Gobet & Simon, 1996). 
The effect perspective suggests chunking together single 
effects of a variable (which can be an input or an output 
variable), whereas the dependencies perspective suggests 
chunking together all dependencies of an output variable. 
Again, the second possibility seems to be more adaptive 
in system control, because having all dependencies in one 
chunk relieves the problem solver from extensive memory 
search, a process that consumes much time, poses high 
demands on working memory, and is thus error prone. 
A second issue in the context of helping humans to use 
structural knowledge has to do with strategy instruction. 
Undoubtedly, extensive practice under supervision of 
experienced operators is effective, but also very costly. 
Thus it is important to find ways of leveraging structural 
knowledge efficiently. The way followed here was to base 
a training program on a strategy that has proven success-
ful in a computer simulated cognitive model of controll-
ing a system similar to the present one (Schoppek, 2002). 
To summarize, the aim of the present work is to 
investigate ways of teaching structural knowledge about 
dynamic systems, either indirectly by manipulating the 
perspective on causal relations, or directly by practicing 
the application of structural knowledge. Specifically, I 
tested the hypothesis that guiding subjects to focus on 
dependencies rather than effects enhances performance. 
By measuring access to causal knowledge with a speeded 
judgment task I investigated if the different perspectives 
are also reflected in the representation of structural 
knowledge. The results may show new ways of teaching 
structural knowledge and extend our understanding of the 
use of this type of knowledge. 
Experiment 
The system I used in this experiment is a simulation of the 
influences of three fictitious medicines onto the levels of 
three fictitious peptides in the blood. The medicines are 
called MedA, MedB, and MedC; the peptides are called 
Muron, Fontin, and Sugon. The effects of the substances 
onto each other are simulated with the following discrete 
linear equations: 
 
(1) Muron t = 0.1 Muron t-1 + 2 MedA t 
(2) Fontin t = 
  Fontin t-1 + 0.5 Muron t-1 – 0.2 Sugon t-1 + MedB t
(3) Sugon t = 0.9 Sugon t-1 + MedC t 
In a neutral state with Muron = Sugon = 0 and Fontin = x, 
the system is stable. Once some of the medicines are 
administered, the system gains momentum. Note that the 
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amount of Fontin in the blood can only be reduced 
through Sugon, which depends on MedC. Since Sugon 
decomposes slowly, large time delays of changes in 
medication have to be dealt with. Subjects interacted with 
the system through an interface consisting of two tables 
showing the states of the variables in all trials, and input 
boxes where they could enter values for the medicines. 
One round comprised six trials, introduced to the subjects 
as “simulated hours”. 
Structural knowledge was tested with a speeded causal 
relation judgment task. All names of input and output 
variables were shown on a screen in a spatial arrangement 
that matched that of the simulation interface. This was 
done to assure that variables could be identified by both, 
their names and their locations. Then the name of an 
output variable was highlighted on the right side of the 
screen, followed by the highlighting of another variable 
name on the left side with an ISI of 500 ms. The subject 
was asked to respond with pressing one of two keys as 
quickly and accurately as possible to indicate her judg-
ment if there was a causal relation between the high-
lighted variables or not. All 18 possible input-output and 
output-output relations were shown in one test. Eight of 
these relations had to be answered with yes, 10 with no. 
The procedure was arranged such that knowledge of 
dependencies should result in faster judgments compared 
with pure knowledge of effects. This is expected because 
the variable that was highlighted first (the effect) is 
assumed to act as a prime for the variable highlighted 
second (the cause) only when causal relations have been 
memorized under the perspective of dependencies. 
 
Subjects and Design 
N=95 subjects, studying different majors at the University 
of Bayreuth, participated in the experiment. Subjects were 
paid 10 € for their participation.  
The factor “type of knowledge” with the levels “know-
ledge of effects” (Eff) and “knowledge of dependencies” 
(Dep), and the factor “strategy training” with the levels 
“no training” and “training” were varied between sub-
jects. A third, quasi-experimental factor “field of study” 
with the three levels arts/humanities, law/economy, and 
science was also analyzed. In principle, subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. A few 
exceptions from complete randomization were due to the 
objective to have approximately equal distributions of 
field of study in each condition. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment began with a general instruction about the 
system. All subjects went through a standardized explo-
ration phase guided by the experimenter. The exploration 
was designed to demonstrate all causal relations between 
the variables of the system. Subjects were guided to 
analyze the observed effects and asked to enter them in 
cards provided by the experimenter. The procedure in this 
phase was different for the two knowledge conditions: In 
the Dep condition, the experimenter consistently asked 
for dependencies, and the cards were sorted by the 
“dependent” variables Muron, Fontin, and Sugon. In the 
Eff condition, the experimenter consistently asked for 
effects, and the cards were sorted by the “independent” 
variables MedA, MedB, and MedC. At the end of this 
phase, the experimenter examined the knowledge of the 
subject orally, again consistently asking either for dep-
endencies or for effects. Subjects had to recall all possible 
relations with the respective numeric weights before 
moving on to the next phase (all subjects achieved that).  
Subjects in the “no strategy training” condition could 
then explore the system for one round (six simulated 
hours) on their own. Subjects in the “strategy training” 
condition went through a number of exercises where they 
practiced a method of predicting future states of the 
system. As mentioned above, this was the first part of a 
strategy tested earlier in a cognitive model. Only a part of 
the complete strategy was selected to keep the training 
short. Nevertheless, all effects (condition Eff) or depen-
dencies (condition Dep) were needed and rehearsed in 
these exercises. 
Next, all subjects were given the control problems. All 
problems comprised six simulated hours and were given 
with the objective that the goal states had to be reached as 
soon as possible, and to be maintained. Table 1 shows the 
initial states and the goal states for the four control 
problems. Initially, all variables except Fontin were zero. 
In order for the subjects to familiarize themselves with the 
control task, they were given two rounds for Problem 1. 
Table 1: The four control problems given to the subjects 
Problem 1: Fontin = 50 Æ Muron = 200 , Fontin = 1000 
Problem 2: Fontin = 900 Æ Muron = 100  
Problem 3: Fontin = 2000 Æ Fontin = 1000 
Problem 4: Fontin = 50 Æ Muron = 400 , Fontin = 900 
  
Results 
To measure control performance, the solution error was 
calculated by summing the natural logs of the absolute 
differences between the goal values and the actual values 
for each time step of a round (Müller, 1993). A perfect 
solution is indicated by a solution error of zero. Since the 
results of Problem 2 were close to ceiling, they were 
excluded from the analysis. I analyzed the mean solution 
error of the remaining problems as dependent variable in 
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an ANOVA with the factors “type of knowledge” 
(knowledge about effects, “Eff” vs. knowledge about 
dependencies, “Dep”), “strategy training” (with vs. 
without training), and the quasi-experimental factor “field 
of study” of the participant (arts/humanities, 
law/economy, science). The means aggregated across all 
fields of study are listed in Table 2. 
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DepThe ANOVA yielded significant main effects of all 
three factors, “type of knowledge” (F = 3.94, df = 1, 
MSE = 5.57, p = .05), “strategy training“ (F = 5.97, 
df = 1, MSE = 8.45, p < .05), and “field of study” 
(F = 13.24, df = 2, MSE = 18.75, p < .01). As expected, 
subjects who were guided to acquire knowledge of 
dependencies were more successful in controlling the 
system (mean solution error = 2.1, SD = 1.3) than 
subjects who were guided to acquire knowledge of effects 
(M = 2.6, SD = 1.5). Contrary to expectation, subjects 
who underwent the strategy training performed lower 
(M = 2.6, SD = 1.5) than those without strategy training 
(M = 2.0, SD = 1.3). Subjects studying arts or humanities 
performed worst (M = 3.2, SD = 1.4, n = 33), followed by 
subjects studying law or economy (M = 2.3, SD = 1.2, 
n = 30). Most successful in controlling the system were 
science students (M = 1.6, SD = 1.1, n = 32). 
There is a significant interaction between “field of 
study” and “type of knowledge“ (F = 3.29, df = 2, 
MSE = 4.65, p < .05). Detailed analyses revealed that a 
strong effect of “type of knowledge” was only present in 
the group of subjects who studied arts/humanities (see 
Figure 1). No other effects reached statistical significance 
(all p > .05). 
 
Table 2: Solution error of system control in the various 
conditions of the experiment   
  Eff Dep  
yes 
2.9  (1.5) 
n = 24 
2.4  (1.5) 
n = 26 
2.6  (1.5)
n = 50 
Strategy 
training 
no 
2.4  (1.5) 
n = 22 
1.7  (0.9) 
n = 23 
2.0  (1.3)
n = 45 
  2.6  (1.5) 
n = 46 
2.1  (1.3) 
n = 49 
2.4  (1.4)
n = 95 
 
To test the expectation that knowledge of dependencies 
results in faster response times in the speeded structural 
knowledge test, I calculated an ANOVA with the same 
factors as described above and the mean response times 
for hits in the first test as dependent variable. (Three 
subjects with mean response times of greater than 3800 
ms were excluded from the analysis. Raw values were ln-
transformed for the ANOVA). The expected effect of 
“type of knowledge” was confirmed by the analysis 
(F = 7.83, df = 1, p < .01), (1559 ms vs. 1237 ms, Dep 
faster). However unexpectedly, there was also a main 
effect of “strategy training” (F = 11.24, df = 1, p < .01), 
(1576 ms vs. 1236 ms, with training faster). No other 
effects were significant at the level of α = .05. The results 
of the second structural knowledge test were analogous to 
the first test. 
Figure 1: Means and standard errors of solution 
error of controlling the system (smaller values 
indicating better performance) 
Similar analyses with the discrimination index (an 
index of how well subjects can discriminate between 
relations and no relations, cf. Snodgrass & Corvin, 1988) 
as dependent variable yielded no significant effects. 
Discrimination indices were relatively high in all 
conditions (di = 0.89). 
Discussion 
The experiment has confirmed the hypothesis that guiding 
subjects to focus on dependencies of output variables 
rather than on effects of input variables can enhance per-
formance in controlling a complex dynamic system. 
Although there is an effect in the complete sample, the 
major contribution came from the subjects studying arts/ 
humanities. Presumably, this group has the least experi-
ence with abstract representations of dynamic systems 
and thus learned something new when focusing on 
dependencies instead of effects. If the other groups did 
not benefit from the manipulation because they take the 
dependencies perspective on their own, or because of 
some other strategy cannot be told with the present data.  
The results of the speeded causal judgment task indi-
cate that focusing on dependencies vs. effects affects the 
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mental representation of causal relations. The task was 
arranged to enable priming from output to input variables, 
but not the other way round. Subjects in the Dep con-
dition were significantly faster in judging the relations, 
supporting the assumption that they have established 
stronger associations between output to input variables 
than subjects in the Eff condition. 
The two findings are raising the question about their 
relation. Are these stronger associations a cause for better 
performance or are they just a side effect of the ex-
perimental manipulation? If the relation was causal, there 
should be a substantial (negative) correlation between 
response time in the causal judgment task and solution 
error in the control problems. The respective correlation is 
r=.05 in the whole sample. Hence, the faster reaction 
times in the Dep condition are probably a side effect of 
the manipulation. This, in turn, supports the hypothesis 
that the positive effect of knowledge of dependencies on 
performance is based on the chunking aspect, i.e. the inte-
gration of single effect representations according to 
output variables. It is possible that especially science 
students have built such chunks on their own, even in the 
Eff condition. (Note that subjects in the Eff condition 
were not prevented from gaining knowledge of depen-
dencies). Figure 2 shows a sketch of the hypothetical 
structure of a dependency chunk “Dep01” (the causal 
weights are omitted for clarity). The shaded substructure 
“Eff01” is a chunk that represents the single causal 
relation between MedC and Sripon. The structure, whose 
construction in a learning process appears straightfor-
ward, mirrors the equations defining the behavior of the 
system remarkably. The solid lines indicate slot-value 
relations. Dotted lines indicate the associations between 
the name of the dependent variable and names of 
influencing variables, which may have been learned under 
the Dep condition. These associations can explain the 
effects in the speeded judgment task, but are not neces-
sary for the usefulness of dependency chunks in control 
tasks. This interpretation is in line with the assumption of 
Boucher & Dienes (2003) that there are two ways of 
learning associations, one resulting in activating relations, 
the other resulting in chunks that combine the associated 
information. Baker, Murphy and Vallée-Tourangeau 
(1996) suppose that these two ways may be attributed to 
different modules of the mind. Research on causal reason-
ing has discovered many other cases where concept-
driven symbolic processing must be assumed in addition 
to pure associative learning to explain the phenomena 
(Waldmann, 1996). 
Unexpectedly, the strategy training had an effect on 
answering speed in the causal judgment task (with train-
ing faster). According to the above interpretation subjects 
must have rehearsed relations between each output vari-
able y and the variables affecting y during the training. In 
the Dep condition, this is obvious. Since in the Eff 
condition subjects were asked for all variables that had an 
effect on the output variable in question, they had to 
search memory for names of input variables while the 
name of the output variable was present in working 
memory. Thus, subjects have learned associations from 
output to input in that condition, too. 
The adverse effect of the strategy training was also 
unexpected. The training had been inspired by results 
from cognitive tutoring that subskills can effectively be 
trained based on single production rules (Anderson, 
1993), and thus, practicing only the most difficult part of 
a larger strategy appeared reasonable. However, the suc-
cess of this kind of training depends on the compatibility 
of the practiced subskills with the subjects’ own strate-
gies. This condition seemed to be hurt in the present case. 
Subjects might have applied the practiced method of 
predicting the next state, and after successful completion 
were unclear about what to do next and how to use the 
result. An alternative explanation is that the practiced 
strategy has interfered with the subjects’ own strategies, 
resulting in mixtures of incompatible strategy fragments. 
(see e.g. Vosniadou, 1997 for the difficulties of integrat-
ing new knowledge with prior knowledge). 
In future efforts to train the application of structural 
knowledge it should be assured that subjects have at least 
an idea of the whole strategy. This could be achieved by 
introducing abstract labels for all subgoals and practicing 
the whole strategy at least once before possibly focusing 
on the most difficult part of it (Catrambone, 1998). 
Figure 2: Hypothetical structure of a dependency 
chunk; solid lines indicate slot-value relations, dotted 
lines indicate associations. 
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In general, the results of the experiment show that 
variations of structural knowledge do affect performance 
in the control of dynamic systems. This extends the view 
that mainly exemplar knowledge or very specific rules are 
used for controlling systems (Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Fum 
& Stocco, 2003; Lebiere et al., 1998). It is important to 
note that not knowledge about single causal relations as 
measured by the discrimination index of the causal 
judgment task makes the difference (there were no effects 
of the experimental factors on di), but rather the way of 
using it, obviously depending on prior knowledge, and the 
way of chunking it into larger units.  
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Abstract 
We proffer the thesis that, in the process of defeating an 
inference on the basis of a factual truth that falsifies it, people 
move from a hypothetical truth-value to a factual truth-value of the 
conclusion. We will present evidence that shows (a) that some 
people spontaneously make a truth assumption and constrain their 
inferences to logically valid inferences, (b) that people tend to 
abandon the truth-assumption when they have factual evidence to 
the contrary, (c) that people, however, can and do in fact reason 
logically when they are informed about the rules of the language 
game (i.e., the truth-assumption) and (d) that adhering to the truth-
assumption in the face of conflicting evidence to the contrary 
requires an investment of time and effort. The findings are 
discussed in relation to contemporary theories of human reasoning. 
 
General Introduction 
We all reason: We draw inferences from the multiple 
sources of information we are confronted with and make 
decisions based on them. This allows us to move around in a 
changing world where the capability to comprehend the 
contingent nature of our environment determines for a large 
part our successes as an individual, as well as a species. The 
study of human reasoning is therefore important to advance 
our understanding of the general mechanisms of thought.  
The turn of the century has provided the stage of a 
paradigm shift in human reasoning research. The nineties 
provided the scene for polemical debates as regards basic 
human reasoning competence. This basic reasoning 
competence (i.e., the basic machinery that allows us to draw 
inferences) was mostly studied by means of abstract 
knowledge-lean inference problem. By using arbitrary 
relations (e.g., ‘if the letter is an A, then the number is a 2") 
no content-specific background knowledge would be 
triggered to influence the reasoning process towards 
accepting or rejecting the conclusion. Abstraction was made 
of the specific content of that about which people were 
reasoning. It is within this research milieu that theories 
became specified as regards human deduction. In the study 
of human deduction one studies necessary inferences 
derived from certain premises. One asks people to draw 
logically valid inferences, and these are defined as 
inferences that must be necessarily true if the premises are 
true. Presently there is an increasingly prominent body of 
evidence that shows the pervasive influence of content and 
belief (Cummins et al., 1991). Our beliefs are uncertain (i.e., 
they are true to a certain degree: e.g., even Newton’s 
mechanics are not universally applicable). This observation 
induced a shift towards the study of the subjective 
probabilistic properties of that about which we are reasoning 
as well as commonsense reasoning or reasoning under 
uncertainty. 
The present research is situated within this timely clash 
between experimental paradigms and associated theoretical 
approaches. Theorists sometimes like to boost the polemics 
between dichotomized opposites  (it does make for simpler, 
and hence more easily publishable reading). For instance, it 
is claimed that theories that have focused on reasoning 
under certainty (i.e., deductive reasoning) are incapable of 
being extended to reasoning under uncertainty (i.e., 
probabilistic reasoning). The ‘core argument’ (Oaksford & 
Chater, 1998) is that common-sense reasoning is non-
monotonic, whereas logic systems are monotonic: valid 
inferences cannot be invalidated; they remain valid. The 
validity of everyday inferences however would be revisable. 
For instance, when being given the argument: 
‘If it is a bird, then it flies;  
Tweety is a bird who, thus, can fly” 
almost everybody will accept it. At the same time, when 
subsequently being told that Tweety is an ostrich, almost 
everybody will reject the original inference and will state 
that Tweety cannot fly. 
The rationality debate in the cognitive science of human 
reasoning is partly muddled by a failure to distinguish the 
defeasibility of a conclusion from the non-monotonicity of 
an inference. For instance, Oaksford and Chater’s (1998) 
core argument is subverted when taking count of the 
distinction between truth and validity. Monotonicity 
concerns the validity of inferences; defeasibility concerns 
the truth of conclusions and this “distinction between 
validity and truth … is basic to deductive logic [and] many 
people find the distinction difficult to grasp” (Glass & 
Holyoak, 1986, p. 338). The abovementioned definition of 
logical validity use the notion of truth but the truth of a valid 
conclusion is always hypothetical (if the premises are true, 
then the conclusion must also be true). The truth-value of a 
defeated inference however is not hypothetical. It is factual: 
it hinges on a factual truth (i.e., our belief, at a particular 
moment in time and space that something is true in the 
‘real’ world).  
The present study intends to show the importance of the 
truth-assumption and by consequence the hypothetical 
nature of the truth of logically valid inferences. We proffer 
the thesis that in the process of defeating an inference 
people move from a hypothetical to a factual truth-value of 
this conclusion. I present evidence showing (a) that at least 
some people make the truth-assumption and spontaneously 
constrain their inferences to logically valid inferences, (b) 
that people abandon a truth-assumption when they have 
factual evidence to the contrary, (c) that people, however, 
can and do in fact reason logically when they are informed 
about the rules of the language game (i.e., the truth-
assumption) and (d) that adhering to the truth-assumption in 
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the face of conflicting evidence to the contrary requires an 
investment of time and effort. In the general discussion we 
will then return to the theoretical and conceptual issues that 
are touched by the evidence for people’s propensity to 
exhibit deductive rationality in reasoning hypothetically on 
the basis of a truth-assumption. 
Experiment 
To investigate the truth-assumption in representing the 
information with which we are confronted and about which 
we reason, and its import apropos validity and deductive 
rationality in human reasoning we will make use of well-
known content effects in conditional reasoning. In the 
following I first introduce these effects. Next, I present them 
within a dual-processing framework. This yields some 
additional predictions concerning the functional and 
temporal relations of two conceptually distinct types of 
reasoning (and the corresponding distinction between 
hypothetical versus factual truth). 
 
Content Effects. Table 1 presents the most commonly 
studied conditional inference problems. These problems are 
formed by an affirmation or denial of the antecedent [p] or 
consequent [q] of a conditional of the form [if p then q]. The 
content of the conditional utterance can be almost anything, 
e.g.: 
(1) If you turn the key, then the car will start. 
(2) If you heat water to 100°C, then it will boil. 
(3) If you push the brake, then the car will stop. 
(4) If you jump into the swimming pool, then you’ll get wet. 
The content effects that are observed with such realistic 
conditional-inference problems show that the reasoning 
process is strongly affected by the factual truth of the 
premises and/or conclusion (Politzer & Bourmaud, 2002). 
At a general level the content effects are summarized as 
an effect of the number of factual counter-examples. For 
instance, the conclusions for AC and DA are falsified by 
situations that reflect the possibility that the antecedent is 
false [not-p] while the consequent is nonetheless observed 
[p]. When the conditional captures a causal statement, such 
[not-p and q]-cases reflect alternative causes. For instance, 
when we ask people to generate alternative causes for 
conditionals (1) and (2), they generally come up with 
relatively few as compared to the number of alternative 
causes they can generate for conditionals (3) and (4). The 
conclusions of MP and MT are countered by situations that 
represent the contingency where [p] is satisfied whereas [q] 
is not satisfied. When the conditional enunciates a causal 
statement, such [p and not-q]-cases reflect disabling 
conditions.  For instance, when we ask people to generate 
alternative causes for conditionals (1) and (3), they 
generally have little difficulty coming up with a relatively 
high number of factors that might prevent the effect from 
occurring. For conditionals (2) and (4) people can only 
come up with few disabling conditions. The most robust 
finding in reasoning with conditionals like (1), (2), (3) and 
(4) above, is that people are less likely to accept MP/MT 
when there are many (vs. few) disablers and are less likely 
to accept AC/DA when there are many (vs. few) 
alternatives. 
We proffer the thesis that belief effects in conditional 
reasoning and the presumed problematical nature of these 
effects for systems of deduction are due to a failure to play 
the language game of deduction. When one does not ask 
people to assume that the premises are true, people are not 
asked to reason deductively. Studies that investigate 
content-effects in conditional reasoning often do not even 
mention the truth-assumption. This implies that no 
implications can be drawn as regards people’s deductive 
rationality (i.e., their propensity or capability to infer 
logically valid inferences). To demonstrate the importance 
of the truth-assumption in deduction reasoning, we decided 
to stress the truth-assumption and its implication that any 
inference made under this assumption is hypothetically true. 
The experiment was set up so we could compare 
performance on problems that did not stress the truth-
assumption with problems that did stress the truth-
assumption. 
Expectations are relatively straightforward. When people 
are reasoning on the basis of the truth-assumption they will 
exhibit more deductive rationality as compared to situations 
where they reason in an unconstraint context. Deductive 
rationality in the present study is measured by the 
proportion of inferences that are valid relative to the norm 
of classic logic. That is, when people reason in a stressed 
truth-assumption context, they will endorse more logically 
valid MP and MT inferences. The logically invalid AC/DA 
arguments would not be affected by an increased impetus 
the hypothetical nature of inferences made under the truth 
assumption. Indeed, the counterexamples to MP/MT would 
be excluded or impossible, if the conditional were true. 
However, the counter-examples to AC/DA (i.e., alternative 
causes) are consistent with a conditional utterance of the 
form [if p then q]. Indeed, the utterance “If you jump into 
Table 1
Formal representation and standard nomenclature of the four basic conditional inference problems and their default 
conclusions. 
 
 Logically valid Logically Invalid 
 Affirmation Denial  Affirmation Denial 
Premises Modus Ponens:MP Modus Tollens:MT  Affirm consequent: AC Denial Antecedent: DA 
Major [If p then q] [if p then q]  [if p then q] [if p then q] 
Minor  [p] [not-q]  [q] [not-p] 
Conclusion [q] [not-p]  [p] [not-q] 
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the swimming pool, then you’ll get wet” does not say ‘if and 
only if you jump into the swimming pool, then you’ll get 
wet”. In sum, there should be an interaction between the 
logical-validity of the inference and the impetus that is 
placed on the truth-assumption. 
 
Dual Processing.  We noted that the present research is 
situated within the timely clash between experimental 
paradigms and associated theoretical approaches. Being 
faced with the task of reconciling the ‘old’ (deductive 
certainty) and the new (probabilistic uncertainty), there is an 
increasing popularity of so-called dual processing 
frameworks. There presently seems to be a growing 
consensus that a distinction can be made between two types 
of rationality, or systems of reasoning (see, e.g., Evans & 
Over, 1996; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Stanovich & West, 2000). 
Dual-process theories of reasoning draw on the distinction 
between, on the one hand, highly contextualized associative, 
heuristic, tacit, intuitive or implicit processes that are 
holistic, automatic, experiential in nature, and relatively 
undemanding of cognitive capacity and, on the other hand, 
de-contextualised, rule-based, analytic, explicit processes 
that are relatively slow, and demanding of cognitive 
capacity. 
There is a commonality in almost all dual-processing 
theories. About the functional relation between the two 
reasoning systems it has been argued that there is a primacy 
of System 1 processes (Stanovich & West, 2000). Evans and 
Over (1996) similarly discussed the override function of 
System 2 (Explicit, Rationality-2 in their terminology). This 
functional relation parallels the distinction and relation 
between generate and test procedures (Chater & Oaksford, 
1999) or, analogously, the conclusion formulation and 
validation stages proffered in the highly influential mental 
models approach to reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002). We can associate 
factual/probabilistic reasoning and hypothetical/deductive 
reasoning with respectively System-1 and System-2 
thinking. The override function of System-2 as regards the 
output of System-1 consequently allows us to specify some 
additional expectations concerning the potential effect of 
stressing the truth-assumption.  
In the dual-processing framework it is assumed that 
System-2 processes are secondary to the workings of 
System-1 processes. This implies that if we can inhibit 
system-2 thinking, the effects of its functionality will be 
reduced. That is, we would expect the effect of stressing the 
truth-assumption to be reduced under conditions that are not 
conducive to system-2 thinking. We can expect, the other 
way round, that when we can instigate system-2 thinking, 
the effect of its potential override function would be 
increased. This means that the effect of stressing the truth-
assumption would be strongest under conditions that allow 
people to engage in the resource-dependent and time-
consuming system-2 type of thinking.  
We asked one group to reason as quickly as possible, 
thereby reducing the potential import of the system-2 
thinking (see Schroyens, Schaeken, & Handley, 2003) and 
the expected effect of stressing the truth-assumption. A 
second group was asked to think carefully. Given that 
people are less likely to engage in system-2 thinking under 
speeded inference conditions (as compared to the standard-
inference conditions), we can expect that the inhibitory 
effect of stressing the truth-assumption will be annulled. 
That is, the other way around, only people who have the 
time and motivation to engage in system-2 type thinking 
will exhibit the effect of stressing the truth-assumption. 
Method 
Design.  Participants served as their own control as regards 
inference type (logically valid: MP/MT vs. logically invalid: 
AC/DA), the number of alternative causes (few vs. many), 
the number of disabling conditions (few vs. many), and the 
impetus that was placed on the truth-assumption (no vs. 
strong). A between-groups factor was formed by the 
impetus that was placed on speed vs. accuracy. 
 
Materials. We collected 16 conditionals utterances for 
which people in a pre-test were able to generate few or 
many alternatives and few or many disablers (see, e.g., 
items 1-4 presented above). The set contained four items for 
each of these four types of conditionals with few/many 
alternatives/disablers. Each conditional served as the major 
premise for each of the four types of inference problems 
(MP/MT/AC/DA, see Table 1). 
The inference problems were cast into two booklets. A 
first booklet contained the 32 items that did not mention the 
truth-assumption and a second booklet with 32 other items 
that stressed the truth-assumption. (The specific item 
content was counter-balanced across the two truth-
assumption conditions). Each counterbalancing set 
contained two items of an MP/AC/DA/MT argument about 
a conditional with few/many alternatives/disablers 
(2x4x2x2=32). The non-stressed condition presented the 
problems as follows. 
If you turn the key, then the car will start. 
You turn the key. 
It follows: 
The car will start. 
Participants marked their evaluation of this conclusion on 
a 7-point scale ranging from (1) very uncertain that the 
conclusion follows to (7) very certain that the conclusion 
follows. In the stressed truth-assumption condition the 
problem was presented in the following format: 
If you assume that it would always be true that: 
If you turn the key, then the car will start. 
And you know for sure: 
You turn the key. 
Then it would follow: 
The car will start. 
Participants marked their evaluation of this conclusion on 
a 7-point scale ranging from (1) very uncertain that the 
conclusion follows if one assumes that the rule is true to (7) 
very certain that the conclusion follows if one assumes that 
the rule is true.  
The instructions to the speeded inference conditions 
mentioned that they were to evaluate the problems fast and 
should not stay too long with any particular problem. After 
the 3rd and the 6th sheet of paper, with four problems per 
page, an extra page was inserted which reminded them that 
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they were to make their judgment ‘as quickly as 
possible’. In the accuracy conditions this reminder 
said that they were to ‘think carefully’ and that their 
evaluations of the conclusions should be ‘as 
accurate as possible’.  
 
Procedure. Participants received both problem 
booklets at the beginning of the session (the 
standard problems first; the truth-assumption 
problems second). About half the students in each of 
two 11th and two 12th grade classes received the 
problems with speeded-inference instructions, 
whereas the other half received the accuracy 
instructions. The students in accuracy groups were 
told that the one who generated the most correct 
conclusions of a predetermined subset would 
receive 10 Euro. To the speeded groups it was said 
that the person who solved the problems fastest (at a 
minimum accuracy level) would also receive 10 
Euro.  
 
Participants. Participants were 72 11th and 12th 
grade student from a Belgian, Flemish high school. 
Thirty-four students received the speeded-inference 
instructions; the remaining 38 pupils ended up in the 
accuracy conditions. 
Results  
Certainty ratings (1-7) were transformed to the [0,1] 
probability interval and submitted to analyses of 
variance. Figure 1 presents the effect of alternatives 
on the logically invalid inferences (AC/DA), and the 
effect of disablers on the logically valid inferences 
(MP/MT) in the standard conditions that do not 
mention the truth assumption. These standard 
problems replicate the standard findings. First, the 
number of disablers affected the certainty ratings of 
the logically valid inferences: Participants are more 
certain that the conclusion follows when there are 
few counterexamples, .81 vs. .69; F(1,70) = 53.06,  p 
< .01. Second, the invalid inferences also showed the 
standard counterexample effect of few vs. many 
alternatives: Participants rate the conclusions less 
certain when more counterexamples can be found for 
it, .81 vs. .60; F(1,70) = 153.75, p < .01. Figure 1 
also shows that the counterexample effect is larger on 
the logically invalid inference, as compared to the 
logically valid inferences; F(1,70) = 21.38  p < .01.   
 Figure 2 shows the size of the counterexample 
effect (few vs. many) as a function of the timing constraint, 
logically validity and the assumption of truth. Figure 2 
clearly shows that the counterexample effect on the 
logically valid inferences is reduced when people make the 
truth-assumption, F(1,70) = 14.21, p < .001, but only so 
when individuals reason without a timing constraint and 
focus on accuracy, F(1,70) = 19.67, p < .01. The 
counterexample effect does not approach significance in this 
condition, .866 vs. .853. The interaction between speed and 
truth at the level of the valid inferences was significant, 
F(1,70) = 5.41, p < .05. No such interaction was observed at 
the level of the invalid inferences (F = .003), and the third-
level interaction indeed tended to approach statistical 
significance, F(1,70) = 2.85, p < .10. Specific comparisons 
showed that, as expected, the counterexample effect on the 
valid inferences re-appears when people evaluate the 
conclusions as fast as possible,  .873 vs. .808: F(1,70) = 
9.66, p < .01.  That is, stressing the truth-assumption does 
not reduce the counterexample effect on the logically valid 
inferences when people are reasoning under a timing 
constraint (F < 1). At the level of the logically invalid 
inferences, we see an overall reduction of the 
counterexample effects, F(1,70) = 13.22, p < .01. This 
might suggest that stressing the truth-assumption tends to 
Figure 1 
Certainty ratings of the logically valid and invalid arguments under
standard conditions that do not mention the truth assumption. 
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Figure 2 
Counterexample effects on the logically valid and invalid arguments as a
function of a timing constraint and the explicit presence of the truth
assumption. 
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induce an overall inhibition of background knowledge. The 
fact that the truth-assumption effect on the valid inferences 
depends on the timing constraint tells us that this is not the 
entire story. Also, as noted before, the counterexample 
effects on the valid inferences are completely annulled when 
the truth-assumption is stressed (under accuracy conditions), 
whereas Figure 2 shows that they are still very much present 
on the invalid inferences under the same conditions. The 
reduced counterexample effects on the invalid inferences 
presented under truth conditions concurs with the idea that 
some people adopt a bi-conditional interpretation of ‘if’. 
The alternative causes are then theoretically or 
hypothetically (i.e., under the assumption of the truth of the 
utterance) impossible. 
Discussion  
Our findings corroborate several of the claims we have 
made regarding deductive rationality in human reasoning. 
First, in order to reason deductively one has to make and 
adhere to the truth-assumption. We observed that the 
counter-example effect on the logically valid inferences is 
indeed smaller than that on the logically invalid inferences. 
The counter-examples to logically valid inferences are 
indeed (hypothetically) impossible – this is actually why 
these inferences are logically valid. Second, though we have 
evidence that some people spontaneously exhibit deductive 
rationality in adhering to the truth-assumption, other people 
clearly abandon the truth-assumption in the light of factual 
evidence to the contrary. The probabilistic counterexample 
effects on the logically valid inferences attest to this.  
The speed/accuracy manipulation and the effects of 
stressing the truth-assumption provide strong support to our 
analyses of deductive rationality within a dual processing 
scheme. First, the overall increase in deductive rationality 
(as measured by the increase in the certainty ratings of the 
logically valid inferences) under conditions that stress the 
truth-assumption lends support the centrality of the truth-
assumption in the notion of logically validity and human 
deductive reasoning. Second, the annulment of the counter-
example effects on the logically valid inferences under 
conditions that make it clear that the truth of inferences 
about factually false utterances is a hypothetical truth, is 
also in agreement with the thesis that people inhibit factual 
knowledge that conflicts with the hypothetical truth of the 
utterances people reason about.  Third, the dependency of 
the counter-example effect annulment on the time and effort 
people take to provide an evaluation of the conditional 
inferences, concurs with (and was predicted on the basis of) 
the thesis that probabilistic content-driven reasoning is 
primary to the effortful abstract, analytic hypothetical 
reasoning processes that can serve to override the output of 
the fast and frugal heuristic processes. 
General Discussion 
Our study shows the import and importance of the truth-
assumption as regards deductive rationality in human 
reasoning. In the current general discussion we will touch 
upon some wider theoretical and conceptual issues. We will 
first consider the rational basis for the truth-assumption. 
Next, we will consider the import and importance of the 
truth-assumption as regards arguments that have been made 
in discussions of the non-monotonic and/or defeasible 
nature of human reasoning.  
 
An Implicit vs. Explicit Truth-Assumption.  We found 
support for thesis that at least some people make the truth-
assumption and actually stick to it. It remains the case, 
however, that the majority of people will abandon the truth-
assumption. The sizable counterexample effects on the 
logically valid inferences evidence this.  One can only claim 
that the truth-assumption is abandoned when it is made in 
the first place. The question that then arises is whether those 
people who do not follow the truth-assumption (by taking 
count of factual knowledge to the contrary) actually made it 
in the first place. 
It is our contention that when people form a 
representation of the utterances they are confronted with, 
they initially and implicitly make the assumption that the 
proposition expressed by it is true. This is in accordance 
with the Gricean maxims of conversation (which by 
themselves are related to Kant’s four a priori categories of 
quantity, quality, relevance and modality): we generally 
assume/ensure that our or the speaker’s contribution is 
truthful, relevant and as informative as possible, though not 
more detailed than required by the context (Grice, 1975). 
The truth-assumption is an implicit assumption (see, e.g., 
Schroyens, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 1999). It is partly 
because it is an implicit assumption (at least to start with) 
that it is easily abandoned. The rational basis of the truth-
assumption can be found in the idea of bounded rationality 
or cognitive economy. There is a representational cost 
attached to considering all possibilities, both true and false.  
Most current theories presume the truth-assumption.  This 
is not very surprising when one considers that truth is 
ontologically primordial to falsity: Non-truth presumes truth 
– as non-being presumes being. The mental-models theory 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) is the single one theory that 
is most explicit in invoking the truth-assumption. Indeed, it 
forms the basis of the truth-principle as regards the 
representation of the meaning of conditionals of the form [if 
p then q]. This principle states that people initially represent 
only represent true possibilities. Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin 
(2000) seems to have the only theory for which it is difficult 
to see whether it incorporates the truth-assumption. They do 
not seem to distinguish true from false utterances. There are 
only degrees of truth (i.e., probabilities). This restriction to 
factual truth (verisimilitude) is problematical because there 
is plenty of evidence that shows that people can reason 
hypothetically and deductively. 
  
Truth, Validity and Non-Monotonic Reasoning.  We 
situated the present study within the timely clash between 
paradigms focusing on deductive or probabilistic reasoning 
and presented the core argument that is made against logic 
theories. Theories of human deduction would not be capable 
to cope with the defeasible nature of human reasoning. 
Our introductory analyses of the core argument against 
mental logic have shown that the issues are more complex: 
The defeasibility of a conclusion does not necessarily imply 
the non-monotonicity of an inference. Let us reiterate our 
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arguments against the claim that logic is in trouble because 
it is monotonic, while commonsense reasoning would not be 
Indeed, we have come to the somewhat controversial 
conclusion that it remains an open question whether 
commonsense reasoning is non-monotonic (even though we 
know it is defeasible).  
We know that the counterexamples to the Modus Ponens 
argument (MP: if p then q, p, therefore q) are cases that 
naive reasoners (as opposed to logicians) consider 
impossible if the conditional utterance is true (Evans, Ellis, 
& Newstead, 1996). When they assume that [if p then q] is 
true, most people generally judge that it would be 
impossible that there are [p and not-q]-contingencies: 
situations wherein the consequent does not follow from the 
antecedent. In short, when people defeat a logically valid 
inference this simply indicates that peoples’ intuitive notion 
of validity does not match that of logical validity. The 
pervasive ‘belief effects’ show that reasoners are much 
more concerned with the factual truth of a conclusion 
(Tweety the ostrich does not fly), as compared to the 
hypothetical truth of such conclusions (if it were true that all 
birds fly then Tweety the ostrich would fly). 
Since logical validity encompasses the truth assumption, 
defeating a necessary inference marks the abandonment of 
this truth-assumption. By consequence it remains 
undetermined whether people have reasoned non-
monotonically (i.e., revised a judgment of logical validity 
into a judgment of logical invalidity).  When we assume, for 
arguments sake, that people actually aim to derive logically 
valid inferences, the defeasibility of inferred inferences 
shows that people shift from one notion of validity (i.e., 
logical validity, which includes the truth-assumption) to 
another notion of validity (let us call it ‘psychological 
validity’, which gives more weight to factual truth and 
allows a truth-assumption to be annulled). It seems one 
succumbs to the fallacy of equivocating two distinct 
concepts (logical and psychological validity), when 
defeasibility of an inference is taken to indicate non-
monotonicity of human reasoning.  
Because classic logic is monotonic while everyday 
reasoning is presumably non-monotonic (or at least 
defeasible), it has been stated that neither mental-models 
theories nor mental-logic theories are capable of explaining 
common-sense reasoning. It is hard to see why polemics 
have been created when defeating inferences is actually at 
the heart of mental models theory. Mental-models theory 
holds to a three-stage processing scheme. People first 
generate initial (incomplete) representations of what they 
think is possible if the premise are true (model-
construction); they then integrate the representation of the 
multiple source of information that form a reasoning 
problem (model-integration). This allows them to generate a 
putative conclusion, which, third and most importantly, at 
least some people at least sometimes attempt to test by 
looking for a counterexample. A conclusion is rejected 
and/or modified in the light of conflicting information. That 
is, defeasible reasoning is in no way beyond the reach of 
mental-models theory, quite on the contrary: 
 “It is worth given up, not the thesis that human beings are 
capable of rational thought, but the idea that what underlies 
this ability is a mental logic. There can be reasoning without 
logic. More surprisingly, perhaps, there can be valid 
reasoning without logic” (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 40). 
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Abstract
In previous research, Gerjets, Scheiter, and Tack (2000)
demonstrated that learners experience serious difficulties in
utilizing instructional examples according to their profitability
when interacting with a hypertext-based learning
environment. In this paper we focus on possible causes of
these difficulties and on different instructional methods for
improving learners' utilization of worked-out examples in
hypertext environments. The results of two experimental
studies are reported.
Learning from Worked-Out Examples:
The Role of Example Processing
Strategies and Example Design
Research over the last 15 years in the domain of learning
and problem solving has demonstrated that instructional
examples play an important role for knowledge acquisition
in domains like mathematics, physics, or programming
(Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989). In
particular for initial skill acquisition, learning from
worked-out examples seems to be superior to actively
solving training problems (Sweller, van Merriënboer, &
Paas, 1998). However, numerous findings also indicate
major drawbacks of example-based learning. In particular,
poor learners tend to overuse examples during problem
solving without reflecting on their appropriateness
(VanLehn & Jones, 1993). In addition, learners have
difficulties identifying relevant information in worked-out
examples and are often distracted by examples' surface
features (Ross, 1989). Furthermore, Renkl (1999) assumes
that students often suffer from illusions of understanding
when learning from worked-out examples. I.e., they may
have the false impression of having grasped the solution
rationale of an example problem. Finally, learners have
difficulties generalizing solutions from examples to novel
problems (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Reed, Dempster,
& Ettinger, 1985).
A number of empirical studies have identified features of
example processing strategies and example design that are
efficient for successful knowledge acquisition (cf. Atkinson,
Derry, Renkl, & Wortham, 2000).
•Important strategical aspects mainly concern the adequate
selection and elaboration of instructional examples. Reed,
Ackinclose, and Voss (1990) showed that learners failed
to select sufficiently complex instructional examples for
learning although the profitability of these examples for
subsequently solving test problems could be demonstrated.
However, Reed, Willis, and Guarino (1994) found that
learners who were allowed to select worked-out examples
while solving test problems were able to select suitable
examples. Additionally, it has been shown that self-
explanations are an important aspect of good learners’
example processing (Chi et al., 1989; Pirolli & Recker,
1994; Renkl, 1997). In particular, anticipations of solution
steps and inferences with regard to the relations between
solution steps, goals, and abstract principles have been
proven useful for knowledge acquisition.
•With respect to design issues it could be shown that
multiple examples can support schema induction which
helps learners to solve novel problems (Cummins, 1992).
Providing multiple examples with different surface
features might further improve this process of abstraction
(Quilici & Mayer, 1996). Additionally, it has been
proposed that the provision of completion problems -
where learners have to fill in some details of worked-out
examples’ solution steps - is a helpful instructional device
as it fosters self-explanations (Van Merrienboer, 1990). In
particular, presenting completion problems along with
evaluative feedback on subjects’ gap-filling performance
seems to improve learning outcomes. For instance, Stark
(1999) showed that learners benefit from such a
combination of completion problems and feedback and
stresses the point that completion problems foster example
elaboration whereas giving feedback on the learning
success might prevent learners from illusions of
understanding.
From these findings on learning from examples it can be
argued that strategies of example selection and processing
as well as features of example design have to be taken into
account to improve learning outcomes.
The aspect of adopting suitable strategies gains increasing
importance the more the control of the learning process is
left up to the learner. In learning situations where the learner
can select instructional material as well as determine the
sequence and the pace of presentation, the importance of
strategies increases (Gerjets, Scheiter, & Tack, 2000).
Therefore, an identification of suitable strategies of
information utilization and an examination of whether
learners can adopt these strategies is highly relevant when
more focus is put on self-regulated learning in the field of
instruction.
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Example-Based Hypertext Environments
One domain in which these issues of learner control are
stressed is the field of hypertext-based learning where the
user can select among different kinds of information and
where he can choose according to his goals when the
information is to be presented and in which order (Rouet &
Levonen, 1996).
On the one hand, this allows for great flexibility and
adaptivity of learning and problem solving. Generally, it is
assumed that the nonlinear structure of hypertext
environments improves learners’ ability to use knowledge in
a flexible way, so that they learn to apply one information
unit to serve different purposes in a variety of situations.
Non-linearity also enables learners to utilize information
units according to their goals and to their prior knowledge.
With regard to example-based learning, providing multiple
examples with different surface features in a nonlinear
hypertext environment allows the learner to compare
examples within one problem category as well as to
compare examples between different problem categories.
These comparisons are fundamental for processes of
abstraction in that they allow learners to identify structural
features that define different problem categories. Therefore,
non-linearity and the resulting opportunities of flexible
information utilization may be especially suitable when
learning from examples.
On the other hand, learners can "face new problems in
selecting and accessing relevant information" (Rouet,
Levonen, Dillon, & Spiro, 1996, p. 3). Problems can arise if
learners do not possess the necessary prerequisites to cope
with the demands that have been imposed to them by
redirecting control over the learning process to them (Rouet
& Levonen, 1996). Learning with a nonlinear hypertext
increases the amount of control demands by making it
necessary that learners permanently make decisions about
the profitability of individual information units with regard
to their current learning tasks. Even if all information
provided is relevant to the current task, the information
items may differ with respect to their profitability in terms
of their processing costs and their contribution to improving
the learning outcome (cf. Pirolli & Card, 1999). Therefore,
learners may have to develop adequate strategies of
information selection and processing in order to make use of
the potential benefits of hypertext-based information
presentation.
Based on these considerations a question of central
importance in example-based learning with hypertext is
whether learners are capable of utilizing examples
according to their profitability, i.e., select, sequence, and
compare them in a suitable way. Most research on learning
from examples up to now has focused on learning situations
where learners have been forced to process the examples
provided in a predefined sequence and, in some studies,
even for a fixed amount of learning time. However, it is not
clear whether these findings can be easily transferred to
more natural learning situations that allow subjects to select
information in different sequences and to control their own
pace of studying.
Results of Previous Experiments
In a series of previous experiments Gerjets, Scheiter, and
Tack (2000) demonstrated that learners experience
difficulties in hypertext environments with regard to their
ability to utilize examples according to their profitability.
These experiments were conducted using a web-based
hypertext environment for training and testing in the domain
of combinatorics (HYPERCOMB). During the learning phase
subjects could retrieve abstract information on six problem
categories from the domain of combinatorics. Depending on
the experimental condition, this abstract information was
either not augmented by any additional instructional
information or was augmented by one or three worked-out
examples that illustrated the six problem categories.
Learners could retrieve the information they wanted to
study and could determine the pace and sequence of
information presentation. When they had the impression
that they had learned sufficiently well learners could switch
to a test phase where they had to solve three test problems.
Automated logfile analyses were used to track subjects’
strategic navigation behavior. Additionally, subjects’
problem-solving performance was registered.
In order to investigate strategic adaptation to different
instructional situation Gerjets et al. (2000) studied learners
with either low or high domain-specific prior knowledge
using different instructional versions of HYPERCOMB (no or
one example or three examples per problem category) with
or without time pressure.
As a result of their experiments Gerjets et al. (2000)
showed that learners have difficulties in selecting the most
profitable information in a specific instructional situation.
A comparison among the three instructional conditions
yielded no beneficial effects of merely providing examples
compared to providing only abstract information. However,
if subjects made use of the examples in a suitable way (e.g.
by comparing different examples) this clearly improved
their learning and problem solving performance compared
to subjects who made insufficient use of the instructional
material. These findings on information profitability were
contrasted with learners' actual information utilization
behavior. Despite the fact that example processing proved to
be useful, about half of the subjects demonstrated poor
example processing strategies as they neither processed
each example in the one-example condition more than once
nor did they study more than one example per problem
category in the three-example condition.
Hypotheses: Possible Explanations for
Learners’ Problems to utilize instructional
examples according to their profitability
There might be two different explanations for learners’
problems to utilize instructional examples according to their
profitability, which will be described in the following
paragraphs. Furthermore, two experimental conditions will
be outlined that were designed to counteract these
hypothesized causes of subjects’ failures in using examples
adequately.
Non-linearity
A first explanation is related to the fact that the
experimental material is designed as a nonlinear hypertext
environment. According to Niederhauser, Reynolds,
Salmen, and Skolmoski (2000) additional control demands
caused by non-linearity may result in extraneous cognitive
load (cf. Sweller, Van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998), which in
turn impedes learning activities. Learners may suffer from
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cognitive overload due to additional control and
navigational demands caused by the nonlinear environment.
Additionally, learners may be in general overwhelmed
by the need to decide which information is profitable to
select in which situation (cf. Rouet et al., 1996). As a result
subjects may be unable to utilize examples according to
their profitability, either because of cognitive overload or
because of inadequate navigational decisions. In order to
counteract these problems of cognitive overload and of
information selection we introduced a linear-hypertext
condition of HYPERCOMB that contained exactly the same
information as the nonlinear-hypertext condition and that
forced learners to recognize every information available in a
predefined order. Thereby, only pacing was left up to the
learner. Eliminating the need to select and sequence
information should reduce extraneous cognitive load and
should free cognitive resources for processing instructional
examples adequately. Furthermore, profitability judgements
are less critical in a linear-hypertext condition.
Illusions of understanding
A second explanation for the insufficient use of the
examples provided in HYPERCOMB is not related to the non-
linearity of the information presentation but is related to the
fact that learners may suffer from illusions of understanding
when learning from worked-out examples (Renkl, 1999). To
prevent learners from such illusions we introduced an
instructional condition with incomplete examples and
feedback where we presented fragmentized example
solutions and asked the learners to complete these gaps by
selecting one of two possible multiple-choice answers. After
the completion, learners were provided with feedback
concerning the correctness of their answers. This procedure
may improve intensive example processing as it may help
learners to realize that they are far away from an in-depth
understanding of the example solutions. As a result, learners
may notice that examples proved a profitable source of
information and are helpful in order to overcome these
comprehension failures.
In experiment 1 a nonlinear version of HYPERCOMB with
three complete worked-out examples per problem category
(baseline condition) was compared to a linear version in
order to test the first hypothesis that subjects’ inadequate
use of examples results from additional navigational and
control demands in nonlinear hypertext.
In experiment 2 the baseline condition was compared to a
condition with three incomplete examples with feedback in
order to test the second hypothesis that subjects’ failures in
using examples adequately results from an illusion of
understanding.
We expected that both instructional manipulations should
increase the time spent on processing examples and thereby
improve learning outcomes. Additionally, we assumed that
the instructional devices would especially foster learning
outcomes of subjects with low prior knowledge who may
suffer from control demands as well as from illusions of
understanding to a greater extent that learners with high
prior knowledge.
Experiment 1: Linear Hypertext
Method
Participants Subjects were 80 students of the Saarland
University, Germany, who either participated for course
credit or for payment. Average age was 23.4.
Materials and procedure Subjects used the HYPERCOMB
environment for learning and problem solving. First, a short
introduction to the domain of combinatorics was presented.
During the subsequent learning phase subjects could
retrieve abstract information on six problem categories
(defined by their associated formula) from the domain of
combinatorics. Additionally, three worked-out examples
that varied with regard to their complexity and their cover
story were provided for each problem category. In the test
phase subjects were instructed to solve three probability
word problems. Neither the abstract information nor the
worked-out examples of the learning phase were available
during the test phase.
Design and dependent measures As a first independent
variable two levels of domain-specific prior knowledge
were introduced. Additionally, two different instructional
conditions were implemented (2 x 2 design):
In the nonlinear-hypertext condition (baseline) learners
could choose by themselves which information to retrieve
(i.e., abstract information and three different examples per
problem category) and in which sequence to pursue.
Learners could retrieve all information pages as often as
they wanted and they could study them as long as they
wanted. The learners themselves controlled the learning
process so they could as well neglect all the provided
information as study them very carefully. This condition
served as baseline condition.
In the linear-hypertext condition the same instructional
material as in the first condition was presented in a linear
fashion. Learners had to follow a so-called guided tour
through the hypertext environment by using “next”-buttons
to get from one page to another. All problem categories
were explained successively. For each problem category,
first the abstract information page was displayed followed
by three example pages. Every information page was
presented only once, learners could not look back to
information already seen and they could not skip any of the
information. Therefore, selection and sequencing of the
information pages were controlled by the system and only
pacing was left up to the learner.
In the test phase subjects had to solve three word problems
by marking the appropriate solution principle and the values
of two variables for each of the test problems in a multiple-
choice form. No calculations had to be made. One error was
assigned for each wrong answer (i.e., subjects could obtain
overall error rates between 0 and 9). Problem-solving time
as well as learning time on example pages and on abstract
pages was recorded by using logfiles. Following the test
phase subjects had to pass a knowledge test with multiple-
choice questions related to abstract concepts from the
domain of combinatorics. Similar questions were posed as a
pretest at the beginning of the experiment to register
subjects’ domain-specific prior knowledge. Subjects were
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assigned to high and low prior knowledge groups by means
of a median splits according to their pretest results.
Results and Discussion
First, we compared high and low prior-knowledge subjects
learning either in the nonlinear or in the linear-hypertext
condition within the two levels of prior knowledge with
regard to their pretest errors (table 1). An overall ANOVA
(instructional condition x prior knowledge) yielded no
differences between the instructional conditions (F < 1).
Table 1: Time data (in sec) and error rates (in %) as a
function of prior knowledge and instructional condition
Instructional condition Nonlinear Linear
Prior knowledge High Low High Low
Pretest errors 28.6 63.2 30.3 64.3
Time on example pages 608 465 948 1069
Problem-solving time 602 550 617 606
Problem-solving errors 33.3 42.2 27.2 39.4
Knowledge-test errors 11.0 32.0 18.5 26.5
Time data With regard to example-processing time, an
overall ANOVA (instructional condition x prior knowledge)
yielded a significant main effect of instructional condition.
Subjects in the linear-hypertext condition spent more time
on example pages than subjects in the nonlinear-hypertext
condition (F(1,76) = 36.39; M SE = 122363.7; p < .001).
Additionally, it could be shown that there was no difference
between subjects with high and low prior knowledge
concerning example processing time (F < 1). The
interaction between instructional condition and prior
knowledge was marginally significant (F(1,76) = 2.84; MSE
= 122363.7; p < .10). The increase of example-processing
time due to the linear information presentation was slightly
more pronounced for subjects with low prior knowledge (t
(38) = 5.37; p < .001) than for subjects with high prior
knowledge (t (38) = 3.13; p < .01).
Furthermore, we analyzed whether there was a trade-off
between example-processing time and problem-solving
time, in that learners in the nonlinear hypertext-condition
might need less time for studying the examples but more
time for later problem solving. However, an ANOVA for
problem-solving time yielded no significant results (all Fs <
1).
Performance data In order to test the assumption that an
increase in example-processing time leads to better
problem-solving performance, we conducted an overall
ANOVA (instructional condition x prior knowledge) that,
however, only yielded a significant main effect for prior
knowledge (F(1,76) = 5.59; MSE = 399; p < .05). There
neither was a main effect for instructional condition nor was
there an interaction between instructional condition and
prior knowledge (both Fs < 1).
Besides problem-solving performance we also analyzed
knowledge-test performance as an indicator of learning
success. An overall ANOVA (instructional condition x prior
knowledge) for knowledge-test errors yielded a main effect
for prior knowledge (F(1,76) = 10.51; MSE = 400.1; p < .01)
which was due to the high degree of item overlap between
the pretest and the knowledge test at the end of the
experiment. There was, however, no main effect for
instructional condition as well as no interaction (both Fs <
1).
To conclude, providing subjects with linear hypertext
increased example-processing time to a large extent as
expected. However, this increase in time spent on examples
was not accompanied by the expected gains in performance.
Furthermore, it could be shown that learning in the
nonlinear-hypertext condition was even more efficient
because subjects needed less example-processing time for
achieving the same level of performance without increases
in problem-solving time. Therefore, our first explanation
that subjects shallow example processing in hypertext
environments observed in previous experiments (Gerjets et
al., 2000) can not be traced back to additional control and
navigational demands caused by nonlinear information
presentation: Reducing these demands does not result in
improved performance although example utilization
behavior is intensified.
Thus, it seems that merely quantitative increases in
example-processing time are not sufficient to ensure
successful learning. Therefore, in experiment 2 we
implemented incomplete examples with feedback as an
instructional method that focuses on more qualitative
improvements of example processing instead of only
increasing example-processing time. This is in accordance
with our second hypothesis that superficial example
processing can be traced back to illusions of understanding
when learning from worked-out examples.
Experiment 2:
Incomplete Examples with Feedback
Method
Participants Subjects were 80 students of the Saarland
University, Germany who either participated for course
credit or payment. Average age was 23.7 years.
Materials and procedure Subjects used the same
HYPERCOMB environment for learning and problem solving
as the subjects in the nonlinear-hypertext condition in
experiment 1. It consisted in a short introduction to
combinatorics, a learning phase with abstract information
and three worked-out examples per problem category, and
finally a subsequent test phase with three probability word
problems.
Design and dependent measures As a first independent
variable two levels of domain-specific prior knowledge
were introduced. Additionally, two instructional conditions
were implemented (2 x 2 design):
As a baseline condition we used the nonlinear-hypertext
condition from experiment 1 where subjects could decide by
themselves which information to review (abstract
information and three fully worked-out examples per
problem category) and in which sequence to pursue.
In the feedback condition the solution steps of the worked-
out examples where fragmentized and subjects where asked
to fill these gaps by choosing among two multiple-choice
answers. It is, however, important to note that subjects
could decide by themselves whether they filled in the gaps
and used the opportunity to receive feedback or not. Every
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example solution was fragmentized two or three times and
the gaps were related to structural features of the problem
categories. After having determined the gap-filling answer
subjects automatically received feedback on whether their
answer was right or not. In case of choosing the wrong
alternative the right answer was presented.
The subsequent test phase was identical to experiment 1.
As dependent measures error rates and time date were
recorded. In the feedback condition the frequency of
feedback utilization was additionally registered. As in
experiment 1 subjects had to pass a knowledge test with
multiple-choice questions related to abstract concepts from
the domain of combinatorics after the test phase. Subjects’
answers to similar questions at the beginning of the
experiment were used to distinguish between low and high
prior-knowledge subjects.
Results and Discussion
The results of experiment 2 are shown in table 2. A first
comparison revealed that there were no differences between
the instructional conditions with respect to pretest errors (F
< 1). (cf. table2).
Table 2: Time data (in sec) and error rates (in %) as a
function of prior knowledge and instructional condition
Instructional condition Baseline Feedback
Prior knowledge High Low High Low
Pretest errors 28.6 63.2 33.6 63.7
Time on example pages 608 465 692 785
Problem-solving errors 33.3 42.2 36.4 46.1
Knowledge test errors 11.0 32.0 21.5 27.0
Time data In order to test the hypothesis that subjects in the
feedback condition process the examples more intensively
than subjects in the baseline condition, we conducted an
overall ANOVA (instructional condition x prior knowledge)
for the time spent on example pages. However, this
ANOVA only yielded a marginally significant main effect
for instructional condition (F(1,76) = 3.67; MSE = 222102.5;
p < .10) with subjects in the feedback condition spending
more time on studying example pages than subjects in the
baseline condition. There was neither a main effect for prior
knowledge (F < 1) nor an interaction (F(1,76) = 1.25; MSE
= 222102.5; p > .40).
Performance data With regard to problem-solving errors
an overall ANOVA (instructional condition x prior
knowledge) yielded no main effect for the instructional
condition (F < 1). Thus, although there was a slight increase
in example-processing time in the feedback condition this
increase was not accompanied by respective improvements
in problem-solving performance. For prior knowledge, the
analysis yielded a main effect (F(1,76) = 4,08; MSE = 658.8;
p < .05). No interaction between the two factors could be
demonstrated (F < 1).
Additionally, we conducted an ANOVA (instructional
condition x prior knowledge) for knowledge-test errors,
which yielded no significant main effect for the knowledge
test errors (F < 1). The interaction between these two factors
was marginally significant (F(1,76) = 3.56; MSE = 381.3; p
< .10).
To conclude, at first sight asking subjects to fill in gaps
and providing feedback on these gap-filling activities does
not seem to be an effective way of improving subjects’
learning outcomes in example-based hypertext
environments. However - because the use of feedback was
not obligatory - it can be expected that only subjects who
retrieved feedback sufficiently would often show better
learning outcomes.
Therefore we calculated the correlation between the
number of times subjects used feedback and the resulting
learning outcomes in the feedback condition for high and
low prior-knowledge subjects separately. These analyses
show that subjects with low prior knowledge indeed
benefited from an extended use of feedback (correlation
between frequency of feedback utilization and problem-
solving errors: r = -.45; p < .05; knowledge-test errors: r = -
.44; p < .05, one-tailed test) whereas there were no or only
weak associations between frequency of feedback
utilization and learning outcomes for high prior-knowledge
subjects (problem-solving errors: r = -.12; p > .30;
knowledge-test errors: r = -.31; p < .10).
To sum up, subjects with low prior knowledge who
made sufficient use of feedback clearly improved their
problem-solving performance compared to subjects with
low prior knowledge who made insufficient use of the
instructional material. This is in line with our second
hypothesis that the provision of incomplete examples with
feedback may be useful to reduce illusions of
understanding. These findings on the profitability of
feedback information for learners with low prior knowledge
were contrasted with their actual information utilization
behavior in a next step of analysis: Despite the fact that the
use of feedback proved useful for learners with low prior
knowledge, they did not retrieve feedback more often than
learners with high prior knowledge (t (38) = -.42; p > .60; 2-
tailed test). To conclude, although the use of feedback
fostered problem-solving and knowledge-test performance
of low prior-knowledge subjects they did not use it more
extensively. Thus, similar to the findings of example
utilization it could be demonstrated again that subjects may
experience serious difficulties in utilizing beneficial
information provided in hypertext-environments according
to its profitability.
Conclusions
With regard to the impact of two different instructional
manipulations reported in this paper the following
conclusion can be drawn. Although a linear information
presentation increases example-processing time this does
not automatically lead to improvements in learning
outcomes. Linear presentation might reduce extraneous
cognitive load due to control and navigational demands in
nonlinear hypertext environments, however, this may also
imply that learning advantages of nonlinear environments
are neutralized. I.e., learners in a linear environment no
longer have the opportunity to select and sequence
information according to their needs. This lack of
opportunity to self-control information utilization also may
impair important processes of example comparison.
Therefore, there may be a trade-off between the benefits and
the drawbacks of non-linearity.
With regard to the provision of incomplete examples
with feedback it could be demonstrated that this
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instructional device was beneficial for subjects with low
prior knowledge but that these subjects often made
insufficient use of it.
Therefore, learners do not only have problems in utilizing
worked-out examples according to their profitability for
learning but also in using feedback extensively when
learning in nonlinear environments. On the one hand,
learners skip helpful information like feedback if they can
control their learning process by themselves. On the other
hand, when restricting learner control by presenting
information in a linear environment learning becomes less
efficient.
Therefore, the development of a learning environment
where both of these findings are combined might be most
successful. It can be assumed that learning in a nonlinear
hypertext environment might be improved by forcing
subjects to recognize information units of crucial
importance for learning - like a minimal number of
examples or the use of feedback on example completions.
When developing learning environments, the specific
learning situation must be considered to guarantee the
advantages of non-linearity and at the same time to reduce
the drawbacks by forcing the user to recognize profitable
information. There must be a balance between the control
that is given to the learner and the system control.
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Abstract
Humans and animals use imitation as a mechanism for
acquiring knowledge. Recently, several algorithms and
models have been proposed for imitation learning in
robots and humans. However, few proposals oer a
framework for imitation learning in a stochastic environ-
ment where the imitator must learn and act under real-
time performance constraints. We present a probabilis-
tic framework for imitation learning in stochastic envi-
ronments with unreliable sensors. We develop Bayesian
algorithms, based on Meltzo and Moore’s AIM hypoth-
esis for infant imitation, that implement the core of an
imitation learning framework, and sketch basic propos-
als for the other components. Our algorithms are com-
putationally efficient, allowing real-time learning and
imitation in an active stereo vision robotic head. We
present results of both software simulations and our al-
gorithms running on the head, demonstrating the valid-
ity of our approach.
Imitation learning in animals and
machines
Imitation is a common mechanism for transfer-
ring knowledge from a skilled agent (the instruc-
tor) to an unskilled agent (or observer) using
direct demonstration rather than manipulating
symbols. Various forms of imitation have been
studied in apes [Visalberghy and Fragaszy, 1990,
Byrne and Russon, 2003], in children (in-
cluding infants only 42 minutes old)
[Meltzoff and Moore, 1977, Meltzoff and Moore, 1997],
and in an increasingly diverse selection of machines
[Fong et al., 2002, Lungarella and Metta, 2003]. The
attraction for machine learning is obvious: a machine
with the ability to imitate has a drastically lower cost of
reprogramming than one which requires programming
by an expert. Imitative robots also offer testbeds for
cognitive researchers to test computational theories,
and provide modifiable agents for contingent interaction
with humans in psychological experiments.
Few previous efforts have presented biologically plau-
sible frameworks for imitation learning. Bayesian
imitation learning has been proposed to accelerate
Markov decision process (MDP) learning for reinforce-
ment learning agents [Price, 2003]; however, this frame-
work chiefly addresses the problem of learning a forward
model of the environment [Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992]
via imitation (see below), and the correspondence
with cognitive findings in humans is unclear. Other
frameworks have been proposed for imitation learn-
ing in machines [Breazeal, 1999, Scassellati, 1999,
Billard and Mataric, 2000], but most of these are not de-
signed around a coherent probabilistic formalism such as
Bayesian inference. Probabilistic methods, and Bayesian
inference in particular, are attractive because they han-
dle noisy, incomplete data, can be tuned to handle realis-
tically large problem sizes, and provide a unifying math-
ematical framework for reasoning and learning. Our ap-
proach is unique in combining a biologically inspired ap-
proach to imitation with a Bayesian framework for goal-
directed learning. Unlike many imitation systems, which
implement only software simulations, this paper demon-
strates the value of our framework through both simula-
tion results and a real-time robotic implementation.
Components of an imitation learning
system
The observer must surmount a number of problems
in attempting to replicate the behavior of the instruc-
tor. Although described elsewhere [Schaal et al., 2003,
Rao and Meltzoff, 2003], we briefly reformulate them as
follows:
1. State identification: Ability to classify high-
dimensional sensor data into a lower-dimensional, rel-
evant state robust to sensor noise. State identifica-
tion should differentiate between the internal state of
the observer (proprioceptive feedback, etc.) and the
state of the environment, including the states of other
agents, particularly the instructor.
2. Action identification: Ability to classify sequences
of states in time.
3. State mapping: Transformation from the egocentric
coordinate system of the instructor to the egocentric
coordinate system of the observer.
4. Model learning: Learning forward and inverse mod-
els [Blakemore et al., 1998] to facilitate interaction
with the environment.
5. Policy learning: Learning action choices that maxi-
mize a reward function, as observed from the actions
selected by the instructor in each given state.
6. Sequence learning and segmentation: Ability to
memorize sequences of key states needed to complete
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an imitation task; ability to segment imitation tasks,
and to divide tasks into subtasks with particular sub-
goal states.
A Bayesian framework for goal-directed
imitation learning
Imitation learning systems that learn only state and ac-
tion mappings (without modeling the environment or
the instructor’s goals) ignore the separability of the
instructor’s intent from the actions needed to accom-
plish that intent. Systems that use deterministic mod-
els rather than probabilistic ones ignore the stochastic
nature of realistic environments. We propose a goal-
directed Bayesian formalism that overcomes both of
these problems. The notation st denotes the state (both
internal and external to an agent) at time t, and at de-
notes the action taken by an agent at time t. sG denotes
a special “goal state” that is the desired end result of the
imitative behavior. The key to viewing imitation learn-
ing as a model-based, goal-directed Bayesian task is to
identify:
 Forward model: Predicts a distribution over future
states given current state(s), action(s), and goal(s)—
P (st+1|at, st, sG). Models how different actions affect
environmental state.
 Inverse model: Infers a distribution over actions
given current state(s), future state(s), and goal(s)—
P (at|st, st+1, sG). Models which action(s) should be
selected to transition from one environmental state to
another.
 Prior model: Infers a distribution over actions given
current state(s) and goal(s)—P (at|st, sG). Models the
policy (or preferences) followed by a particular in-
structor in transitioning through the environment to
achieve a particular goal.
Thus the prior model involves learning an MDP (or a
partially observable MDP), while the forward model in-
volves learning a “simulator” of how the environment
(possibly including other agents) reacts to actions per-
formed within it. Learning inverse models is a noto-
riously difficult task [Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992], not
least because multiple actions could have mapped from
st to st+1. However, using Bayes’ rule, we can infer the
distribution returned by the inverse model using the for-
ward and prior models:
P (at|st, st+1, sG) ∝ P (st+1|at, st, sG) Pr(at|st, sG) (1)
Equation 1 can be used to either select the maxi-
mum a posteriori action to complete a state transi-
tion, or to sample over a distribution of alternatives,
refining the model (and representing an exploration- ex-
ploitation tradeoff reminiscent of reinforcement learn-
ing). Sampling from the distribution over actions is
also called probability matching. Evidence exists that
the brain employs probability matching in at least some
cases [Herrnstein, 1961, Krebs and Kacelnik, 1991].
Figure 1: AIM hypothesis model for infant
imitation: The AIM hypothesis of Meltzo and
Moore [Meltzo and Moore, 1997] argues that infants match
observations of adults with their own proprioceptions using
a modality-independent representation of state. Our compu-
tational framework suggests an efficient, probabilistic imple-
mentation for this hypothesis.
Fig. 1 graphically represents Meltzoff and
Moore’s Active Intermodal Mapping (AIM) hypothe-
sis [Meltzoff and Moore, 1997]. According to this cog-
nitive model, imitation begins with an infant (or other
agent) forming a representation of features in the out-
side world. Next, this representation is transformed into
a “supra-modal,” or modality-independent, representa-
tion of those features. An equivalence detector matches
the current modality-independent representation of the
instructor’s state with a modality-independent represen-
tation of the infant observer’s state. Proprioceptive feed-
back guides the infant’s motor output toward matching
the instructor’s state. Our framework for Bayesian ac-
tion selection using learned models captures this idea of
imitation as a “matching-to-target” process.
Fig. 2 depicts a block diagram of our architecture.
Like AIM, our system begins by running several feature
detectors (skin detectors, face trackers, etc.) on sen-
sor inputs from the environment. Detected features are
monitored over time to produce state sequences. In turn,
these sequences define actions. The next step is to trans-
form state and action observations into instructor-centric
values, then map from instructor-centric to observer-
centric coordinates. Observer-centric values are em-
ployed to update probabilistic forward and prior models
in our Bayesian inference framework. Finally, combin-
ing distributions from the forward and prior models as in
Eqn. 1 yields a distribution over actions. The resulting
distribution over actions is converted into a single motor
action the observer should take next, with an efference
copy conveyed to the feature detectors to cancel out the
effects of self-motion.
State and action identification
Deriving state and action identity from sensor data
involves task- and sensor-specific functions. Al-
though it is impossible to summarize the extensive
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Figure 2: Overview of model-based Bayesian imita-
tion learning architecture: As in AIM, the initial stages
of our model correspond to the formation of a modality-
independent representation of world state. Mappings from
instructor-centric to observer-centric coordinates and from
the instructor’s motor degrees of freedom (DOFs) to the ob-
server’s motor DOFs play the role of equivalence detector
in our framework, matching the instructor’s motor output to
the motor commands of the observer. Eerence copy provides
proprioceptive feedback to close the motor control loop.
body of work in action and state identification here,
we note recent progress in extracting actions from
laser rangefinder and radio [Fox et al., 2003] and vi-
sual [Efros et al., 2003] data. In most cases, computa-
tional expediency necessitates employment of dimension-
ality reduction techniques such as principal components
analysis, Isomap [Tenenbaum et al., 2000], or locally lin-
ear embedding [Roweis and Saul, 2000]. Saliency detec-
tion algorithms [Itti et al., 1998] may also help reduce
high-dimensional visual state data to tractable size.
Learning state mappings
A prerequisite for any robotic imitation task is to deter-
mine a mapping from the instructor’s state to the ob-
server’s [Nehaniv and Dautenhahn, 2002]. We view this
state mapping problem as an instance of subgraph iso-
morphism, where the goal is to match subgraphs from
the instructor (corresponding to effectors, e.g. limbs) to
their corresponding graphs in the observer. In the sim-
ulation and robotic head results shown below, the map-
pings are trivial; developing detailed graph-theoretic ap-
proaches to mapping from instructor states to observer
states remains an ongoing topic of investigation.
Learning forward models
Numerous supervised and unsupervised ap-
proaches (see e.g. [Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992,
Todorov and Ghahramani, 2003]) have been proposed
to learn models of the environment, and to discover
policies to maximize rewards obtained from the environ-
ment. Evidence demonstrates that infants learn forward
models of how their limbs, facial muscles, and other
body parts react to motor commands, a process referred
to by Meltzoff and Moore [Meltzoff and Moore, 1997]
as “body babbling.” Such forward model learning could
occur both prenatally and during infancy. We anticipate
using well-established supervised algorithms to acquire
forward models of environmental dynamics. Unsuper-
vised learning of forward and inverse models to generate
motor policies is a well-known problem in the reinforce-
ment learning community (see [Kaelbling et al., 1996]
for a survey). In reinforcement learning, an agent’s
internal reward signal alone is used to learn models
of the environment, rather than relying on examples
provided by a teacher as in imitation learning.
Sequence learning and segmentation
Realistic imitation learning systems must be able to
learn sequences of states that define actions, and to seg-
ment these sequences into meaningful chunks for later
recall or replay. Part of our ongoing work is to de-
fine how semantically meaningful chunks can be defined
and recalled in real time. Recent developments in con-
cept learning (e.g., [Tenenbaum, 1999]) suggest how sim-
ilar environmental states might be grouped together, en-
abling development of hierarchical state and action rep-
resentations in machine systems.
A Bayesian algorithm for inferring intent
Being able to determine the intention of others is a
crucial requirement for any social agent, particularly
an agent that learns by watching the actions of oth-
ers. Recent studies have revealed the presence of “mir-
ror neurons” in monkey cortex that fire both when an
animal executes an action and when it observes oth-
ers performing similar actions. These findings sug-
gest a neurological substrate for intent inference in pri-
mates [Rizzolatti et al., 2000]. One appealing aspect of
our framework is that it suggests a probabilistic algo-
rithm for determining the intent of the instructor. That
is, an observer can determine a distribution over goal
states based on watching what actions the instructor ex-
ecutes over some period of time. This could have appli-
cations in machine learning systems that predict what
goal state the user is attempting to achieve, then offer
suggestions or assist in performing actions that help the
user reach that state. The theory could lead to quantita-
tive predictions for future cognitive studies to determine
how humans infer intent in other intelligent agents.
Our algorithm for inferring intent uses applications of
Bayes’ rule to compute the probability over goal states
given a current state, action, and next state obtained
by the instructor, P (sG|st+1, at, st). This probability
distribution over goal states represents the instructor’s
intent. One point of note is that P (st+1|at, st, sG) ≡
P (st+1|at, st); i.e., the forward model does not depend
on the goal state sG, since the environment is indifferent
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to the desired goal. Our derivation proceeds as follows:
P (st+1|at, st, sG) = P (st+1, st, at, sG)
P (at, st, sG)
(2)
P (st+1|at, st, sG) = P (sG|st+1, at, st)
P (sG|at, st)
P (st+1, at, st)
P (at, st)
(3)
Because P (st+1|at, st, sG) ≡ P (st+1|at, st), and since
P (at,st)
P (st+1,at,st)
= 1
P (st+1|at,st) :
P (sG|at, st) = P (sG|st+1, at, st) (4)
P (sG, at, st)
P (at, st)
= P (sG|st+1, at, st) (5)
P (at|sG, st)P (sG, st)
P (at, st)
= P (sG|st+1, at, st) (6)
P (at|sG, st)P (sG, st) ∝ P (sG|st+1, at, st) (7)
P (sG|st+1, at, st) ∝P (at|sG, st) P (st|sG) P (sG)(8)
The first of the terms in Eqn. 8 represents the prior
model. The second term represents a distribution over
states at time t, given a goal state sG. This could be
learned by, e.g., observing the instructor manipulate an
object, with a known intent, and recording how often
the object is in each state. Alternatively, the observer
could itself “play with” or “experiment with” the object,
bearing in mind a particular goal state, and record how
often each object state is observed. The third term is a
prior over goal states; it can be derived by modeling the
reward model of the instructor. If the observer can either
assume that the instructor has a similar reward model
to itself (the “like-me” hypothesis [Meltzoff, 2002]), or
model the instructor’s desired states in some other way,
it can infer P (sG).
Interestingly, these three terms roughly match
the three developmental stages laid out by Melt-
zoff [Meltzoff, 2002]. According to our hypothesis, the
first term in Eqn. 8 corresponds to a distribution over
actions as learned during imitation and goal-directed
actions. This distribution can be used if all the ob-
server wants to do is imitate body movements (the first
step in imitation that infants learn to perform accord-
ing to Meltzoff’s theory of development). The second
term in Eqn. 8 refers to distributions over states of ob-
jects given a goal state. Because the space of actions
an agent’s body can execute is presumably much less
than the number of state configurations objects in the
environment can assume, this distribution requires col-
lecting much more data than the first. Once this second
term is learned, however, it becomes easier to manip-
ulate objects to a particular end—an observer that has
learned P (st|sG) has learned which states of an object or
situation “look right” given a particular goal. The com-
plexity of this second term could explain why it takes
babies much longer to learn to imitate goal-directed ac-
tions on objects than it does to perform simple imitation
of body movements (as claimed in Meltzoff’s theory). Fi-
nally, the third term, P (sG), is the most complex term
to learn. This is both because the number of possible
goal states sG is huge, and the fact that the observer
must model the instructor’s distribution over goals indi-
rectly (the observer obviously cannot directly access the
instructor’s reward model). The observer must rely on
features of its own reward model, as well as telltale signs
of desired states (e.g., states that the instructor tends to
act to remain in, or that cause the instructor to change
the context of its actions, could be potential goal states)
to infer this prior distribution. The difficulty of learning
this distribution could explain why it takes so long for
infants to acquire the final piece of the imitation puzzle,
determining the intent of others. We did not explic-
itly design the terms in our intent inference algorithm
to match childhood developmental stages; rather, the
derivation follows from the inverse model formulation in
Eqn. 1 and straightforward applications of Bayes’ rule.
Simulation results
Fig. 3 demonstrates imitation results in a purely sim-
ulated environment. The task is to reproduce observed
trajectories through a maze containing three different
goal states (maze locations marked with ovals). This
simulated environment simplifies a number of the issues
mentioned above: the location and value of each goal
state is known by the observer a priori; the movements
of the instructor are observed free from noise; the for-
ward model is restricted so that only moves to adjacent
maze locations are possible; and the observer can detect
when it is next to a wall (although it does not know a
priori that it cannot move through walls).
The observer first learns a forward model by interact-
ing with the simulated environment for 500 simulation
steps. The instructor then demonstrates 4 different tra-
jectories to the observer (1 to the white goal, 2 to the
light gray goal, 1 to the dark gray goal), allowing the ob-
server to learn a prior model. Fig. 3(a) shows the maze
environment used in our simulations. Fig. 3(b) shows a
sample training trajectory (black arrows) where the in-
structor moves from location (1,1) to the goal state at
(3,3). The solid white line (over arrows) demonstrates
the observer reproducing the same trajectory after learn-
ing. The observer’s trajectory varies somewhat from the
instructor’s due to the stochastic nature of the environ-
ment. Fig. 3(c) shows another training trajectory, com-
prising 47 steps, where the instructor moves toward the
white goal (goal 1). The observer’s task for this tra-
jectory is to estimate, at each time step of the trajec-
tory, a distribution over which goal state the instruc-
tor is headed toward. During the inference process, the
observer does not have direct knowledge of the actions
selected by the instructor; it must infer these by moni-
toring state changes in the environment. The graph in
Fig. 3(d) shows this distribution over goals, where data
points represent inferred intent averaged over epochs of
8 simulation steps each (i.e., the first data point on the
graph represents inferred intent averaged over simula-
tion steps 1-8, the second data point spans simulation
steps 9-17, etc., with the last epoch spanning 7 simula-
tion steps). Note that the estimate of the goal is correct
over all epochs. The algorithm is particularly confident
once the ambiguous section of the trajectory, where the
instructor could be moving toward the dark gray or the
light gray goal, is passed. Performance of the algorithm
would be enhanced by more training; only 4 sample tra-
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Figure 3: Simulated environment for imitation learn-
ing: (a) Maze environment used to train observer. Thick
black lines denote walls; ovals represent goal states. Lightness
of ovals is proportional to the probability of the instructor se-
lecting each goal state (re,ecting, e.g., relative reward value
experienced at each state). (b) Example trajectory (black
arrows) from the instructor, ending at the second goal. Re-
production of the trajectory by the observer is shown as a
solid white line overlying the arrows; inference is performed
as in Eqn. 1. The instructor required 23 steps to reach
the goal; the observer required a slightly larger number of
steps due to both the stochastic nature of the environment
and imperfect learning of the forward and prior models. (c)
Instructor’s trajectory in the intention inference task. (d)
Graph showing a distribution over instructor’s goal states, as
inferred by the observer at dierent time points in the sim-
ulation. Note how the actual goal state, goal 1, maintains a
high probability relative to the other goal states throughout
the simulation. Goal 2 brie,y takes on a higher probability
due to limited number of training trajectories.
jectories were presented to the algorithm, meaning that
its estimates of the distributions on the right hand side
of Eqn. 8 were extremely biased.
Real-time application in a robotic head
We have also implemented our probabilistic approach in
a Biclops active stereo vision head (Fig. 4(a)). The head
follows the gaze of a human instructor, and tracks the
orientation of the instructor’s head to determine where
to look next. Gaze following [Brooks and Meltzoff, 2002,
Scassellati, 1999] (Fig. 4(b)) represents a key step in the
development of shared attention, in turn bootstrapping
more complicated imitation tasks. Our system begins
by identifying an image region likely to contain a face
(based on detecting skin tones and bounding box as-
pect ratio). We employ a Bayesian pose detection algo-
rithm [Wu et al., 2000] that matches an elliptical model
of the head to the human instructor’s face. Our algo-
rithm then transforms the estimated gaze into the Bi-
clops’ egocentric coordinate frame, causing the Biclops
to look toward the same point in space as the human
instructor. We trained the pose detector on a total of 13
faces, with each training subject looking at 36 different
targets; each target was associated with a different pan
and tilt angle relative to pan 0, tilt 0 (with the subject
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Figure 4: Gaze tracking in a robotic head: (a) Bi-
clops active stereo vision head from Metrica, Inc. (b) In-
fants as young as 9 months can detect gaze based on head
direction; older infants (≥ 12 months) use opened eyes as
a cue to detect whether they should perform gaze tracking
(from [Brooks and Meltzo, 2002]). (c) Likelihood surface
for the face shown in (d), depicting the likelihood over pan
and tilt angles of the subject’s head. The region of highest
likelihood (the brightest region) matches the actual pan and
tilt angles (black X) of the subject’s face shown in (d).
looking straight ahead).
Fig. 4(c) depicts a likelihood surface over pan and tilt
angles of the instructor’s head in the pose shown in Fig.
4(d). Our system generates pan and tilt motor com-
mands by selecting the maximum a posteriori estimate
of the instructor’s pan and tilt, and performing a sim-
ple linear transform from instructor-centric to egocentric
coordinates. Out of 27 out-of-sample testing images us-
ing leave-one-out cross-validation, our system is able to
track the angle of the instructor’s head to a mean error of
±4.6 degrees. 1 Our previous efforts [Shon et al., 2003]
demonstrated the ability of our system to track the gaze
of an instructor; ongoing robotics work involves learning
policy models specific to each instructor, and inferring
instructor intent based on object saliency.
Conclusion
This paper describes a Bayesian framework for imitation
learning, based on the AIM model of imitation learning
by Meltzoff and Moore. The framework emphasizes im-
itation as a “match-to-target” task, and promotes sepa-
ration between the dynamics of the environment and the
policy a particular teacher chooses to employ in reach-
ing a goal. We have sketched the basic components for
any imitation learning system operating in realistically
large-scale environments with stochastic dynamics and
noisy sensor observations. Our model naturally leads
to a Bayesian algorithm for inferring the intent of other
1We de+ne error as:
E =
√(
θpan   θˆpan
)2
+
(
θtilt   θˆtilt
)2
where θ is the true angle, and θˆ is our system’s estimate of
the angle.
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agents. We presented preliminary results of applying
our framework to a simulated maze task and to gaze fol-
lowing in an active stereo vision robotic head. We are
currently investigating the ability of the framework to
scale up to more complex robotic imitation tasks in real-
world environments. We are also exploring the connec-
tions between our probabilistic framework and findings
from developmental psychology.
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Abstract 
A modular connectionist model covers all six established 
phenomena in transitivity development in children and 
predicts a new effect. In contrast, a symbolic-rule hypothesis 
based on logic captures none of these effects and is directly 
contradicted by one of them. In the model a constraint-
satisfaction network generates a response based on input from 
a feed-forward comparison module and the particular question 
asked. Cycles to saturate the response module implement 
response times.   
Psychology of Transitivity 
Piaget and his colleagues (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964; Piaget, 
1969) designed the transitivity problem to assess the 
development of children’s logical-inference abilities. This 
problem often employs sticks (or times) of different length, 
as shown in Figure 1. Given, for example, that a child learns 
that stick 2 is longer than stick 1, and that stick 3 is longer 
than stick 2, can the child infer that stick 3 must be longer 
than stick 1? This is not a perceptual problem in that the 
child only identifies a stick by its unique color, never seeing 
the actual stick lengths. Piaget’s evidence suggested that 
correct untrained inferences, such as comparing sticks 1 and 
3, did not emerge until around seven years of age, thus 
providing an index of the child’s entry into the stage of 
concrete operations.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A six-stick version of the transitivity task. 
 
Piaget’s long-dominant view of the transitivity task as 
being solved by logic was ultimately contradicted in an 
experiment measuring the time it took for people of 
different ages to make various inferences (Trabasso, Riley, 
& Wilson, 1975). Using a six-item version of the task like 
that in Figure 1, Trabasso et al. trained 6-year-olds, 9-year-
olds, and university students on all adjacent pairs of sticks 
and then asked about all possible pairs of sticks, varying the 
question between Which stick is longer? and Which stick is 
shorter? Five different effects were reported.   
1. A serial-position effect: learning the adjacent pairs near 
the ends of the array before the pairs near the middle.  
2. A distance effect: faster inferences about pairs that are 
farther apart in length than for pairs close together in 
length.  
3. An anchor effect: faster inferences about pairs 
involving an end anchor (sticks 1 or 6) than for pairs 
not involving an end anchor.  
4. A congruity effect: faster inferences when the term used 
in the question (e.g., longer) is compatible with an end 
anchor (e.g., the longest stick) in the pair being 
compared than when the question term (e.g., longer) is 
incompatible with an end anchor in the pair being 
compared (e.g., the shortest stick).  
5. An age effect: older participants learned the adjacent 
pairs faster and made inference comparisons faster and 
more accurately than did younger participants.  
6. Other experiments with different comparison tasks 
found that the distance effect diminished with 
increasing age (Duncan & McFarland, 1980; Sekuler & 
Mierkiewicz, 1977).  
The first four of these effects have been replicated in a 
wide range of tasks involving symbolic comparisons along a 
dimension, e.g., numerical comparisons (Banks, 1977; 
Duncan & McFarland, 1980; Leth-Steenson & Marley, 
2000; Sekuler & Mierkiewicz, 1977).  
The distance effect was particularly damaging to Piaget’s 
logical-inference interpretation because it is precisely 
opposite to what Piaget would presumably predict. 
Assuming that each inference takes some constant time, 
Piaget would have to predict that the more inferences 
required to make a comparison, the longer the comparison 
would take. For example, comparing sticks 2 and 3 requires 
no inference at all because participants are trained on such 
adjacent pairs. In contrast, comparing sticks 2 and 4 requires 
a single inference from two premises (S2 < S3 and S3 < S4, 
therefore S2 < S4). And comparing sticks 2 and 5 requires 
two inferences (the previous inference plus this one: S2 < 
S4 and S4 < S5, therefore S2 < S5). The larger the split (or 
difference) between sticks, the more inferences would be 
required. The splits are conventionally termed 1, 2, and 3 in 
these three comparisons, respectively.  
1   2   3   4   5   6  
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Because of the distance effect in their response-time data, 
Trabasso et al. concluded that people don’t use logical 
inference per se to solve this task. They argued instead that 
participants construct a spatial image of the sticks while 
being trained on adjacent pairs and then consult this image 
when asked to make another comparison. The farther the 
sticks are apart within this spatial image, the easier it is to 
make a correct comparison. Despite a recent resurgence of 
interest in studying and modeling transitivity, there has been 
no computational model that covers all six of these effects. 
It is, in fact, computationally unclear how the brain might 
construct and consult spatial images in this way.  
The purpose of the present work is to build such a model 
with cascade-correlation (CC), a neural-network learning 
algorithm that has been used to simulate many other 
phenomena in cognitive development (Shultz, 2003). 
Another reason to use CC is that it searches in topology 
space, building the network, as well as in weight space.  
Like other feed-forward neural algorithms, CC produces 
responses in more or less constant time, and thus is not 
naturally suitable for covering response-time effects. To add 
this capability, we used a modular system of two networks, 
which we call constraint-satisfaction cascade-correlation 
(CSCC). A CC network learned to judge the relative lengths 
of adjacent sticks and a constraint-satisfaction (CS) network 
used that information plus information contained in the 
question to generate a response. The number of update 
cycles that the response module required to settle into a 
steady state was taken as an index of response time.  
Method 
The CSCC modular network system is shown schematically 
in Figure 2.  
Comparison Module 
The CC comparison module is on the left side of Figure 2. 
Inputs to the comparison module describe the colors of the 
two sticks being compared and were coded in a binary nth-
unit fashion (1 for the color of a stick and 0s elsewhere for 
colors that are not involved). The 12 inputs (the same 6 
colors for each of two sticks) were fully connected to a 
single output unit having a sigmoid activation function, 
which coded a length comparison with targets of -0.5 if the 
left (L) stick is longer and 0.5 if the right (R) stick is longer. 
Comparison networks were trained on all ten adjacent pairs 
of sticks until all output values were within score threshold 
of their targets on all of these ten training pairs. Order of the 
two sticks being compared is counterbalanced across  
comparisons. 
We implemented age differences by using different values 
of score threshold: 0.5 for adults, 0.55 for 9-year-olds, and 
0.6 for 6-year-olds. This is consistent with finding that older 
people learn more from the same experiences than young 
children do (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982), a principle 
that has been successfully used to simulate age differences 
in learning in several other CC simulations (Shultz, 2003). 
Different score thresholds would also work for capturing 
developmental effects here, but these particular values 
produced overall proportions correct that were very close to 
those reported by Trabasso et al. (1975) for their different 
age groups. We ran 12 networks at each of the three score-
threshold levels, matching the ns at each age level in the 
Trabasso et al. experiment. Full details of the CC algorithm 
are discussed elsewhere (Shultz, 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: CSCC modular networks for transitivity. 
Response Module 
After training, output from the comparison module served as 
input to a three-unit response network. Activation on the 
other two units in this CS network represented the left or 
right sticks as being the correct response to the question 
being asked. As shown on the right side of Figure 2, the 
precise form of this response network varied according to 
the question being asked. Recall that the target output of the 
comparison network was 0.5 when the right stick was 
longer, and -0.5 when the left stick was longer. 
Consequently, if the question was Which stick is longer?, 
then there were positive weights (0.5, signified by a solid 
line) between the comparison unit and the right (R) unit and 
negative weights (-0.5, signified by a dashed line) between 
the comparison unit and the left (L) unit. If the question was 
Which stick is shorter?, then the signs of these weights were 
reversed; there were positive weights between the 
comparison unit and the left unit and negative weights 
between the comparison unit and the right unit. The basic 
principle underlying these weight settings is to enhance the 
activation value of the side unit corresponding to the stick 
that is longer when the question term is longer, and to 
enhance the activation value of the side unit corresponding 
to the stick that is shorter when the question term is shorter. 
More generally the idea is to activate the correct response 
and inhibit an incorrect response.  
Connections between the left and right units were always 
negative to reflect the idea that these two units are 
competing with each other. Unlike the comparison unit, 
these two side units had no external inputs; all of their input 
came from inside the response network.  
As is typical with CS networks, weights in this response 
module were bidirectional, with one weight going in each 
direction between any two units. As in other CS simulations 
(Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Shultz & Lepper, 1996), we 
assume here that these networks are constructed on the fly 
 
Shorter? 
Longer? 
L
L
R
R
Inputs
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by participants in response to their particular experimental 
setting and the question being posed to them. There is no 
assumption that participants are conscious of this 
construction. It is rather that the design of a response 
module is strongly constrained by the participant’s 
understanding of the experimental situation and question.  
All three units in a response module started out with an 
initial activation value of 0. At every cycle, three units were 
randomly selected, with replacement, to have their 
activations updated. In each such update, net input to the 
updated unit i was computed as: 
( )i
j
jiji inputexawinnet +


= ∑   (1) 
where aj is the activation of each sending unit j, wij is the 
relevant connection weight, inputi is any external input to 
the receiving unit, and in and ex are parameters scaling 
influences internal or external, respectively, to the network. 
These last two parameters were both set to 0.1 in our 
simulations, but a wide range of values work equally well.  
If this net input was positive, it was added to the receiving 
unit’s current activation ai(t) after being scaled by the 
distance of that current activation from the activation ceiling 
of 1.0: ( ) ( ) ( )( )taceilingnettata iiii −+=+1  (2) 
Alternatively, if the net input was negative, it was added 
to the receiving unit’s current activation ai(t) after being 
scaled by the distance of that current activation from the 
activation floor of -1.0: ( ) ( ) ( )( )floortanettata iiii −+=+1   (3) 
An overall measure of the degree to which a CS network 
has settled into a stable state is its goodness, computed as 
the sum of triple products of unit activation values and the 
relevant connection weight plus the sum of the products of 
external inputs and activation values: 
∑∑ +=
i
ii
ij
jiij ainputaawgoodness
 (4) 
Equations 1-4 are fairly standard in the CS-network 
literature (Shultz, 2001). In this kind of scheme, goodness 
rises as units have their activations updated and eventually 
levels off as activations stop changing. Examples are 
provided in Figure 3 in terms of goodness changes over 
update cycles for networks with three different levels of 
comparison inputs. We identified the cycle at which 
goodness starts to reach asymptote as no goodness change 
greater than .02 (asymptote-threshold parameter) for 8 
consecutive cycles (asymptote-patience parameter). These 
parameter values were selected because they correspond to 
our visual impressions of when goodness values approach 
asymptote. A range of different threshold and patience 
values works equally well, although sufficiently extreme 
parameter values can blur differences between sticks and 
between conditions. Figure 3 shows that networks settle 
quicker with higher, and more decisive, comparison 
activations.  
To cover the congruity effect, we multiplied comparison 
inputs by 0.8 whenever there was an anchor stick that was 
incompatible with the term used in the question. This is a 
computational shortcut consistent with the idea that the 
congruity effect is based on semantic interference between 
incompatible terms, some of which have to be translated to a 
compatible form to answer the question (Banks, 1977). 
When asymptote was reached, the comparison unit, left or 
right, with the higher activation was taken as the response 
module’s answer to the question that was posed.  
Before activation-update cycles began, all the connection 
weights and external inputs had their initial values 
randomized a bit by adding or subtracting up to 10% of their 
initial values in a uniform distribution. This is to reflect the 
fact that not all participants interpret the experimental 
procedures and questions in exactly the same way. A wide 
variety of randomization values work equally well to 
implement such individual differences.   
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Figure 3: Increasing goodness over activation-update cycles 
in a CS response network at three levels of comparison 
input. Arrows indicate the cycle at which a goodness 
asymptote was reached. 
Results 
Learning 
Although CC networks are capable of recruiting new hidden 
units if they are needed, none of our networks did so. This 
indicates that the problem of learning nth-unit, binary-
coded, adjacent stimulus pairs is a rather simple linearly-
separable problem. The mean number of epochs taken to 
learn the training patterns was 7.2 for score threshold of 0.6, 
7.7 for score threshold of 0.55, and 10.2 for score threshold 
of 0.5.  
The serial-position effect for training is evident in Figure 
4. A score-threshold x training-pair mixed ANOVA of 
comparison-network error yielded a quadratic trend for 
training pair, F(1, 33) = 279, p < .001. With no interaction 
with score-threshold, this shows the serial position effect at 
each age: better learning of training pairs at the ends of the 
array than in the middle. There was also a main effect of 
score-threshold, F(2, 33) = 19.59, p < .001, capturing the 
superiority of older, deeper learners. 
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Inference 
The theoretically-important distance effect is shown in 
Figure 5. In a score-threshold x split ANOVA of cycles to 
settle, the largest effect is a linear trend for split, F(1, 33) = 
582, p < .001, confirming a strong distance effect at every  
score threshold, representing the three different ages. 
Network responses were faster the larger the split between 
the sticks being compared. It is also evident that the distance 
effect diminished a bit with decreasing score threshold, 
representing increasing age.  
In Figure 6, a score-threshold x end-anchor ANOVA of 
cycles to settle reveals a main effect of anchor, F(1, 33) = 
166, p < .001, simulating the finding that performance is 
quicker when an end anchor is present. A score-threshold x 
end-anchor interaction, F(2, 33) = 6.73, p < .01, predicts 
that the anchor effect may also diminish with increasing 
age.  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
(1,2) (2,3) (3,4) (4,5) (5,6)
Training pair
M
ea
n 
er
ro
r
0.6
0.55
0.5
Score threshold
 
Figure 4: The serial-position effect: mean error for different 
training pairs and score thresholds.  
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Figure 5: The distance effect: mean cycles to settle for 
different splits and score thresholds. 
 
The congruity effect is plotted in Figure 7, in the form of 
an end-anchor x question interaction, F(1, 33) = 288, p < 
.001. This shows faster responding when there is 
compatibility between question and end anchor.  
Knowledge-representation Analysis 
Mean weights across 12 networks at each score-threshold 
level are plotted in Figure 8 in order to understand the 
knowledge representations acquired by the comparison 
networks. Recall that target output activation is negative 
when the left stick is longer, and positive when the right 
stick is longer. 
Correct performance by a network can be understood by 
considering a few example weights. A large positive weight 
from the R6 input ensures positive output compared to any 
shorter comparison stick L1 to L5. A somewhat less positive 
weight from the R5 input produces positive output except 
when compared to the longer stick L6, in which case the 
stronger negative weight from the L6 input produces a 
negative output, signaling that the left stick is longer. 
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Figure 6: The anchor effect: mean cycles to settle for 
different score thresholds and the presence of an end anchor. 
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Figure 7. The congruity effect: mean cycles to settle for 
different size anchors and question phrasing. 
 
The overall pattern of weights is V-shaped, seen most 
clearly at the lowest score-threshold of 0.5, representing 
adults. For the right sticks, weights are larger with 
increasing stick size; for the left sticks, weights are smaller 
with increasing stick size because the target output is 
negative when a left stick is longer. Fairly precise left-right 
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symmetry in weight values on each branch of the V is 
important to enable accurate judgment of pairs that are close 
together (e.g., L2 vs. R3). 
 
Serial-position Effect The fact that connection weights 
have a steeper slope near the ends of the array than in the 
middle explains the serial-position effect. More distinctive 
weights produce larger absolute comparison outputs, which 
are closer to their target values, yielding less network error.  
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Figure 8: Mean weights in comparison networks from 
various input units at different score thresholds. 
 
Distance Effect The manner in which this knowledge 
representation produces the distance effect is evident from 
the weight plot. Sticks close in size are more likely to have 
similar weights, producing small absolute comparison 
values, thus requiring more cycles to reach asymptote in the 
response module. In contrast, sticks that are farther apart in 
size are more likely to have larger differences in weight 
values, producing larger absolute comparison outputs, and 
thus requiring fewer response-module cycles.  
 
Anchor Effect The manner in which this knowledge 
representation produces the anchor effect is also evident. 
Weights for the end anchor sticks (1, 6) have more extreme 
values than do weights for the other sticks, ensuring larger 
absolute comparison values and thus quicker responses 
when end-anchor sticks are involved in a comparison.  
 
Developmental Effects The origin of developmental effects 
is also apparent from these knowledge representations. The 
lowest score-threshold of 0.5 (representing adults) produces 
the steepest V shape with the most easily distinguishable 
weights. The higher score-thresholds of 0.55 and 0.6 
(representing 9- and 6-year-olds, respectively) produce 
progressively shallower V shapes with weights that are 
closer in size. The less distinctive the weights, the smaller 
the absolute output of the comparison module and the more 
cycles required to reach asymptote in the response module. 
Discussion 
Our model is a hybrid modular system, with a feed-forward 
CC network making a length comparison and a CS network 
using this comparison information along with question 
information to generate a response. This CSCC model 
simulated all of the established psychological effects in the 
development of transitivity in humans. Captured phenomena 
include the serial-position, distance, anchor, congruity, age-
related improvement, and diminishing distance effects.  
All of these effects followed naturally from the modular-
networks model without any parameter tweaking or special 
manipulation of training patterns. In general, these effects 
were produced by the comparison network’s natural 
tendency to learn to order the stimuli by length on its 
connection weights. The serial-position and anchor effects 
were due to the fact that these weights were more distinct 
near the ends of the array than in the middle. The distance 
effect arose from the fact that the relevant connection 
weights (those with non-zero inputs) were more distinct 
with sticks of more distinct size. The congruity effect arose 
from incompatibility between an anchor and the term used 
in the questioning, which was made to cause a small 
degradation of the comparison signal. The age-related 
improvement and diminishing distance effects were 
simulated by the familiar phenomenon of older individuals 
learning the problem more deeply than younger ones do.  
Similar interpretations of the serial-position, distance, and 
anchor effects have been offered by other connectionist 
modelers (Leth-Steenson & Marley, 2000). But ours is the 
first model to capture all six effects and to offer novel 
connectionist interpretations of the congruity and 
developmental effects. Together these models show how 
transitivity phenomena can be explained in a neural fashion. 
We plan to review all of the recent simulations of human 
and animal data on transitivity in a fuller publication. 
Different models typically focus on somewhat different 
phenomena.  
Does our model confirm Trabasso et al.’s (1975) 
hypothesis that people consult a visual image of an ordered 
spatial array of sticks to answer inference questions? The 
knowledge representation learned by comparison-module 
networks certainly does order the array of sticks by length. 
This learning is based merely on information about the 
relative lengths of adjacent pairs, without any information 
on how long the sticks actually are. Whether this knowledge 
representation constitutes a visual image, either in artificial 
networks or in real brains, is debatable. One way to 
investigate this issue in real brains might be to see if visual 
cortex becomes particularly active in brain images of people 
learning and solving transitivity tasks (Behrmann, Kosslyn, 
& Jeannerod, 1996). In any case, the simulation presented 
here demonstrates a fully specified functional account of 
transitivity development, whether assumed to be located in 
visual cortex, hippocampus, or other brain regions.  
In contrast to these neural-network simulations, Piaget’s 
original logical-inference view cannot account for any of 
these transitivity phenomena. Indeed its predictions for the 
effect of distance on response time are precisely the 
opposite of what actually occurs. Because Piaget’s 
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hypothesis can be naturally framed in terms of a recursively-
applied symbolic transitivity rule, this issue can be viewed 
as another instance of the symbolic rules vs. subsymbolic 
connections debate that has dominated cognitive science for 
the past 18 years. As far as psychological development is 
concerned, results have consistently favored the 
connectionist approach because it typically covers a wider 
range of phenomena in a more principled fashion than does 
the symbolic rule-based approach (Shultz, 2003).  
In a more detailed publication, we will present data and 
analyses of correct inferences by our networks. In general 
these data also mirror the performance of participants in 
Trabasso et al.’s (1975) experiment. There is no problem 
with speed-accuracy tradeoffs in our simulations because 
response times and errors are positively related.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully 
evaluate the various alternative psychological theories of 
transitivity, these theories do not seem capable of 
accounting for all the phenomena treated here.  
Results indicated that age effects on transitivity tasks can 
reflect rather small quantitative differences in depth of 
learning, rather than major qualitative differences in type of 
processing. Similar results have been found in simulations 
of a number of other developmental phenomena, including 
seriation (Mareschal & Shultz, 1999), discrimination shift 
learning (Sirois & Shultz, 1998), and concept learning 
(Shultz & Cohen, 2004). Our explanation represents a 
radical departure from previous interpretations of these 
phenomena, which have tended to suggest that older 
children are doing something qualitatively different than are 
younger children. Because of its capacity for network 
growth, the CC algorithm is particularly well suited to 
discovering whether qualitative changes are necessary for 
capturing developmental change. Some developmental 
phenomena require such qualitative growth, while other 
developmental phenomena do not (Shultz, 2003). In 
addition, our model predicted a diminishing anchor effect 
with increasing age that could be tested with children.  
To capture the heretofore elusive congruity effect we 
implemented a (shortcut) neural version of the idea that 
semantic incompatibility between an anchor and question 
term can slow performance. We also plan to implement an 
alternative hypothesis based on the notion that particular 
combinations of question and items serve to bias the 
participant’s response at the start of a random walk towards 
one or another decision boundary (Link, 1990). Our current 
response module, with its random selection of units to 
update, might be adapted to implement the basic features of 
Link’s hypothesis. Comparing results across the two 
techniques could indicate which hypothesis provides a better 
explanation.  
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Abstract 
Two models are presented that compute a quasi-regular 
mapping. One was based on localist representations of items 
in the quasi-regular domain, the other was based on 
distributed representations. In each model, a control 
parameter termed input gain was modulated over the one and 
only level of representation that mapped inputs to outputs. 
Input gain caused both models to shift between regularity-
based and item-based modes of processing. Performance on 
irregular items was selectively impaired in the regularity-
based modes, whereas performance on novel items was 
selectively impaired in the item-based modes. Thus, each 
model exhibited a double dissociation without separable 
processing components. These results are discussed in the 
context of analogous dissociations found in language domains 
such as word reading and inflectional morphology. 
Introduction 
The quasi-regular nature of language has played a central 
role in theories of language processing in the mind and 
brain. On the one hand, language processes must be able to 
handle novel inputs, e.g., skilled readers can give reasonable 
pronunciations and conjugations to verbs that they have 
never encountered before. These abilities demonstrate how 
language usage can be generative on the basis of 
regularities. On the other hand, irregular items often exist 
for which the regularities do not apply. Thus, language 
processes must be able to override the regularities, when 
appropriate, with knowledge that is applicable to only a few 
items, or even to just one. How are language processes 
structured to handle both regularities, and the exceptions to 
those regularities? 
One answer to this question is that any given quasi-
regular domain is processed by two complementary routes. 
A regularity-based route is specialized to capture the 
regularities that span across linguistic items in the domain, 
and an item-based route is specialized to capture knowledge 
that is specific to items in the domain. For instance, in the 
words-and-rules theory (Pinker, 1999), rules are used to 
process regular inflectional morphologys (e.g., WALK-
WALKED), and a lexicon is used to process irregular 
inflections (e.g., GO-WENT). In the dual-route cascaded 
(DRC) theory of word reading (Coltheart, Curtis, Atkins, & 
Haller, 93; Coltheart et al., 2001), a set of grapheme-to-
phoneme correspondence rules is used to capture 
regularities between the spellings and sounds of words, and 
a system of lexical knowledge serves to override the rules 
when necessary (e.g., PINT does not rhyme with MINT).  
Alternatively, single-route theories have been proposed in 
which the mechanisms and representations for handling 
regularities and irregularities are inseparable. For instance, 
Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) proposed a theory in 
which a single route of processing was used to generate the 
past tense of both regular and irregular verbs (also see, e.g., 
Joanisse & Seidenberg, 1999). Kello and Plaut (2003) 
proposed a theory of word reading in which the mapping 
from spelling to sound is mediated by a single level of 
learned representations (also see Plaut & Gonnerman, 
2000). 
A wide variety of evidence has been brought to bear on 
dual-route and single-route theories of language processing 
(for reviews, see Coltheart et al., 2001; McClelland & 
Patterson, 2002; Pinker, 1999; Pinker & Ullman, 2002; 
Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996). Much of 
this evidence speaks to one or another particularity of a 
given theory. Every piece of evidence contributes to the 
overall debate, but here we focus on one kind of evidence 
that is relevant to all theories in question: dissociations 
between regularity-based and item-based processing. 
Double dissociations have been observed in language 
processing, and some have been interpreted as evidence for 
separable regularity-based and item-based components of 
the language system. In the area of inflectional morphology, 
Ullman and his colleagues (Ullman et al., 1997) reported 
evidence for a dissociation between the past tense formation 
of regular and irregular verbs in English. They found that 
Alzheimer’s patients, as well as aphasics with posterior 
lesions, were poor at generating the past tense of verbs with 
irregular inflections, but relatively normal with regular 
inflections. They found the opposite pattern for Parkinson’s 
patients and aphasics with anterior lesions. Marslen-Wilson 
and Tyler (1997; 1998) found a similar dissociation in a 
priming paradigm with language-impaired patients.  
In the area of word reading, deficits found in surface and 
phonological dyslexia have been interpreted analogously to 
those found in posterior versus anterior aphasics. For 
instance, Berhmann and Bub (1992) reported on a surface 
dyslexic patient MP for whom the ability to read exception 
words (particularly of low frequency) was greatly impaired, 
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whereas the ability to read both regular words and nonwords 
was mostly intact. By contrast, Funnell (1983) reported on a 
phonological dyslexic patient WB for whom the ability to 
read nonwords (even simple CVC nonwords) was greatly 
impaired, whereas the ability to read both easy and difficult 
words was mostly intact.  
The impairments of these and other patients have a 
straightforward explanation in terms of separable item-
based and regularity-based processing components. The 
deficits in Alzheimer’s patients, posterior aphasics, and 
surface dyslexics all reflect damage to an item-based 
component of processing (e.g., a lexicon) that is responsible 
for irregular items (not necessarily the same component 
across types of deficits). The deficits in Parkinson’s 
patients, anterior aphasics, and phonological dyslexics all 
reflect damage to a regularity-based component of 
processing (e.g., rules) that is responsible for novel items. 
These double dissociations appear to challenge single-
route theories because item-based and regularity-based 
processes are not separable in single-route theories. 
Proponents of single-route theories have responded to this 
evidence in a number of ways. In some cases, 
methodologies or interpretations of data have been called 
into question (e.g., McClelland & Patterson, 2002). In other 
cases, the data have been explained in terms of dissociations 
between semantic and phonological components of 
processing, rather than item-based and regularity-based 
components (e.g., Joanisse & Seidenberg, 1999). The 
research to date has left open the question of whether 
dissociations between the processing of novel and irregular 
items can be explained without reference to an architectural 
dichotomy in the language system. 
Current Work 
The primary aim of the current study was to demonstrate 
how a dissociation between item-based and regularity-based 
processing can occur in a single-route architecture without 
any manipulation of separable processing components, i.e., 
without reference to separable semantic and phonological 
contributions to processing. The basic idea is that a single 
component of processing can shift between two 
qualitatively different “modes” of processing as a function 
of one control parameter. Specifically, we present two 
different kinds of connectionist models that possess a 
control parameter termed input gain. We show that, in both 
types of models, input gain can cause a shift in processing 
between an item-based mode and a regularity-based mode. 
Furthermore, we show how this shift can give rise to a 
double dissociation in performance on irregular versus 
novel inputs. 
The models were built to process an abstract, quasi-
regular mapping. Properties of the mapping were analogous 
to basic properties of quasi-regularity in language domains. 
However, items did not correspond to any particular words 
in a particular language domain. The mapping was created 
primarily to facilitate analysis of the models, rather than to 
simulate a particular language phenomenon such as the past 
tense formation in English. Therefore, the models are 
intended and reported only as proofs-of-concept.  
The first model used a single level of localist nodes to 
map input patterns onto output patterns. Each node 
represented one item in the training corpus, and the 
activation of each node was a function of the similarity 
between the item it represented, and the current input to the 
model. Thus, this model could be considered as analogy-
based because both known and novel inputs were explicitly 
processed in terms of the similarity of their input patterns to 
that of all items in the corpus (see Albright & Hayes, 2003; 
Nakisa, Plunkett, & Hahn, 2000). 
The second model used a distributed level of 
representation to map input patterns onto output patterns. 
Hidden representations were learned via backpropagation 
(Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1985), and each hidden 
unit contributed to the processing of many, if not all, items 
in the training corpus. Representations learned through 
backpropagation tend to map similar inputs onto similar 
outputs (Rumelhart et al., 1995). Thus, as in the analogy 
model, the distributed model processed both known and 
novel inputs in terms of their similarity to items in the 
corpus. But unlike the analogy model, hidden 
representations were shaped by similarities among both 
input and output patterns in the corpus, as well as the 
relationships between inputs and outputs. 
In both models, input gain is a multiplicative scaling 
parameter on the net inputs to units, be they localist nodes 
or hidden units. The current simulation results show that the 
modulation of input gain at testing caused similar effects in 
both models. At low levels of input gain, both models failed 
to map irregular items to their appropriate outputs, but 
succeeded in mapping regular items and novel inputs. At 
high levels of input gain, both models succeeded at mapping 
both regular and irregular items, but performed poorly with 
novel inputs. 
The reason why input gain caused this double dissociation 
was different for each model. In the analogy model, input 
gain modulated the intensity of competition for activation 
among localist nodes. Low levels of competition caused 
outputs to be based on the summed contributions from many 
partially activated nodes. Regularities across nodes were 
extracted in these summations to the point of overriding any 
exceptions to the regularities. By contrast, high levels of 
competition caused a winner-take-all mode of processing in 
which a known input correctly activated its corresponding 
node, whereas a novel input incorrectly activated a node 
corresponding to a similar, known item. 
In the distributed model, input gain modulated the 
sharpness of a sigmoidal activation function. Low levels of 
input gain caused hidden units to operate mostly in their 
linear range, thereby emphasizing the componential (i.e., 
regular) relationships that were learned between inputs and 
outputs. High levels of input gain caused hidden units to 
operate mostly in their asymptotic range, thereby 
emphasizing the conjunctive relationships that were learned 
between inputs and outputs (for a discussion of 
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componential and conjunctive coding, see O’Reilly, 2001). 
Componential relationships supported only the processing 
of regular and novel items, whereas conjunctive 
relationships supported only the processing of known items. 
Simulation Methods 
Input and Output Representations were constructed from 
a 12 dimensional binary space. Out of 212 = 4096 possible 
input patterns, one fourth (1024) were chosen at random to 
constitute the corpus of items. Each chosen input pattern 
was associated with one output pattern. Output patterns 
were created in two steps. First, each input pattern was 
copied to its corresponding output pattern (i.e., the identity 
mapping. Note, however, that the results apply to all linearly 
separable mappings). Second, the bit value of each 
dimension, for each output pattern, was flipped with a 5% 
probability. Thus, the identity mapping was a regularity, and 
flipped values were exceptions to that regularity. This 
procedure resulted in 563 fully regular items (no flipped 
bits), and 461 irregular items with one to four flipped bits 
per item. The 3072 remaining patterns served as novel items 
during testing. 
For the analogy model, there were 12 input units 
corresponding to the 12 input dimensions, and dimension 
values were coded as activations of ±1 on the inputs. For the 
distributed model, there were 24 input units, half of which 
coded the 12 dimension values as activations of 0 or 1. The 
other half were activated as flipped values of the first half, 
i.e., 1–x, where x was each of the first 12 activations. The 
x|1–x coding scheme was used because the distributed 
model was trained via backpropagation (this scheme was 
not necessary in the analogy model because it was not 
trained; see next two sections). In backpropagation, no 
learning will occur on a unit’s sending weights when the 
activation value of that unit is zero. Therefore, the x|1–x 
coding scheme ensured that weight derivatives were 
generated for every input dimension, on every training 
episode. 
For both models, there were 12 output units 
corresponding to the 12 output dimensions, and dimension 
values were coded as targets of 0 or 1 on the outputs. 
 
Analogy Model Architecture. In the analogy model, input 
units were fully connected to 1024 “logogen” units. Each 
logogen represented one item in the corpus, and the weights 
on incoming connections from input units were set 
according to each logogen’s input pattern, i.e., +1 weights 
for positive input dimensions, and -1 weights for negative 
dimensions. Each logogen projected outgoing connections 
to all 12 output units, and the weights on outgoing 
connections were set according to each logogen’s output 
pattern (as for incoming connections). 
To process a given item, input units were first set to the 
item’s input pattern. Logogen activations were then 
calculated with the normalized exponential function (see 
Nosofsky, 1990), 
∑=
i
II
j
ij eea
γεγε
, 
where I was the net input to a unit, calculated as the dot 
product between the input vector and the incoming weight 
vector, γ  was input gain, ε  was noise sampled evenly in the 
range ±0.1, and i spanned all logogens. Each output unit was 
then calculated as the sigmoid of the dot product between 
the logogen vector and its incoming weight vector. Noise 
was included to break perfect ties between very small (e.g., 
two or three) numbers of activated logogens. Such ties 
occurred more often at high levels of input gain. 
 
Distributed Model Architecture. In the distributed model, 
the input units were fully connected to 200 hidden units, and 
the hidden units were fully connected to the output units 
The number of hidden units was determined through pilot 
testing to be about 50 units more than the minimum needed 
to learn the mapping. However, results were very similar 
over a range of hidden unit numbers. Hidden units were 
calculated with the hyperbolic tangent function, ( )jj Ia γεtanh= , 
which is analogous to the logistic, except it has asymptotes 
at ±1 instead of 0 and 1. Input gain (γ ) was fixed at 1 during 
training, and varied during testing (see next section). Noise 
(ε ) was fixed at 0.1 (as in the analogy model) during both 
training and testing. Output units were calculated as in the 
analogy model. 
Connection weights were initialized to random values in 
the range ±0.1, and weights were learned by gradient 
descent, ( )ijij wEw ∂∂=∆ η , 
where wij was the connection weight from unit j to i, η  was 
the learning rate (fixed at 0.001), and E was cross-entropy 
error (Rumelhart et al., 1995). Weight changes were made 
each time after weight derivatives had been accumulated 
over all 1024 items in the corpus. Weight derivatives were 
calculated for each item as follows: input units were set to 
the item’s input pattern, activation was propagated forward 
through the network, an error signal was calculated from the 
difference between actual and target outputs, and the error 
signal was backpropagated to generate the weight 
derivatives. Weight updates were repeated until every 
output unit was with 0.1 of its target for every item in the 
training corpus. This criterion was reached after 3000 passes 
through the corpus. 
 
Testing Procedure. For both models, performance was 
assessed on each test item by setting the input units to the 
item’s input pattern, and then determining whether the 
activation of each output unit was within 0.5 of its target 
(which was either 0 or 1). Model outputs were correct only 
when the activations of all 12 output units were within 
range. Targets for items in the corpus were set according to 
each item’s output pattern. Targets for the 3072 novel items 
were set according to each item’s input pattern, i.e., the 
identity mapping. 
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To dissociate item-based and regularity-based processing, 
input gain was varied as a single control parameter over the 
logogen units in the analogy model and over the hidden 
units in the distributed model. The reported levels of input 
gain were between 0.5 and 3 for the analogy model, and 
0.333 and 3 for the distributed model. These ranges were 
chosen to show asymptotic performance at the lower and 
upper ends, i.e., the patterns of behavior did not change 
substantially beyond these ranges. 
Simulation Results 
Mean accuracies for the analogy model are graphed in 
Figure 1 as a function of input gain and item type (regular, 
irregular, or novel). The same are graphed for the distributed 
model in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1: Mean accuracies for the analogy model 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0.33 0.40 0.50 0.67 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00
Input Gain
Pe
rc
e
n
t C
o
rr
e
ct
Regular Items
Irregular Items
Novel Items
 
Figure 2: Mean accuracies for the distributed model 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show that both models exhibited a clear 
dissociation in performance on irregular items compared 
with novel items. At low levels of input gain, generalization 
of the identity mapping to novel inputs was essentially 
perfect, as was performance on regular items. By contrast, 
performance on irregular items dropped to 0%, at which 
point all inputs resulted in the identity mapping. For 
irregular items, application of the identity mapping can be 
considered as a regularization error because, for the quasi-
regular domain constructed here, the identity mapping is the 
regular mapping. 
At high levels of input gain, performance on all items in 
the corpus was near perfect in both models. By contrast, 
mean accuracies for the novel items dropped to as low as 
16% for the analogy model, and 46% for the distributed 
model. Of all the analogy model’s erroneous responses to 
novel items at the highest level of input gain, 97% were 
output patterns that corresponded to output patterns in the 
training corpus. These responses can be considered as 
lexicalization errors because they are responses for other 
items in the model’s “lexicon”.  The same analysis of errors 
made by the distributed model showed only 27% 
lexicalization errors (where the chance rate was 25%). 
These results show that the manipulation of input gain as 
a single control parameter, over a single level of 
representation, caused a clear double dissociation in both 
models. To better understand the similarities and differences 
in processing between these models, three visualizations of 
the input-output mappings for each model are shown in 
Figure 3.  
In each visualization, all 4096 points in the 12 
dimensional input space are arranged on a grid such that all 
adjacent vertices differ by only one bit. To illustrate, near 
the lower left-hand corner of each plot is the vertex where 
all 12 input dimensions are negative. The next vertex up and 
the next vertex to the right each have one positive input 
dimension, and so on. Each grid “wraps around” such that 
vertices on the left edge are adjacent to the corresponding 
vertices on the right edge, and likewise for the top and 
bottom edges. Thus, the 2D space of each grid represents a 
portion of the similarity structure in the 12D input space.  In 
addition, 10 evenly spaced points are interpolated in each 
space between each pair of vertices. Given that each side 
has 64 vertices (642 = 4096), there are 6402 = 409,600 
points of the input space represented in each plot. 
At each point, a gray scale value is plotted that represents 
the summed activation of four output units for the 
corresponding input pattern. The same four output units 
(chosen arbitrarily) are shown at all points in all plots. The 
gray scale values are calculated such that, the darker the 
point, the closer the outputs were to 0.5. Conversely, whiter 
points indicate where the outputs were at their asymptotes 
(0 or 1). Thus, the dark borders in each plot represent the 
decision boundaries in each model, that is, where one or 
more of the four outputs crossed the middle point between 
asymptotes as a function of change in the input space. 
Plots are shown for each model, at three different levels 
of input gain: the low end (0.5 in the analogy model and 
0.333 in the distributed model; top row), the high end (3 in 
both models; bottom row), and the point at which accuracies 
for irregular items and novel items are equal (1.1 in the 
analogy model and 0.8 in the distributed model; middle 
row). Overall differences in plot densities for the analogy 
model, compared with plot densities for the distributed 
model, were due to differences in the polarity of the output 
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units: outputs in the distributed model tended to be closer to 
0 or 1, i.e., values that corresponded to white points on the 
plots. 
 
Analogy Model         Distributed Model 
  
  
  
Figure 3. Visualizations for each model at low (top), 
medium (middle), and high (bottom) levels of input gain 
 
The grid patterns seen in the top two plots of Figure 3 
show that both models processed the identity mapping at the 
low end of input gain. In fact, if all 12 outputs had been 
represented, each plot would show a 64 by 64 grid pattern, 
where the grid lines fall exactly between the vertices. Thus, 
the grid reflects the finding that, at low input gain, the 
identity mapping was generalized to all inputs, including 
those for novel and irregular items. The grid is a depiction 
of regularity-based processing in each model because the 
identity mapping was the regularity in our quasi-regular 
domain. 
The middle two plots show that the grid pattern became 
distorted for both models at moderate levels of input gain, 
and “pockets” of decision boundaries began to appear. 
Given that mean accuracies were about 80% for irregular 
items at these levels of input gain, one can infer that the 
distortions and pockets reflect the “warping” of the identity 
mapping that was necessary to process the irregular items. 
Moreover, given that mean accuracies were about 80% for 
novel items as well, one can infer that these distortions and 
pockets were mostly isolated to the irregular items. These 
plots show that a balance was struck at moderate levels of 
input gain between item-based and regularity-based 
processing. 
The bottom two plots show that, for each model, the grid 
pattern was mostly replaced by pockets of decision 
boundaries at the high end of input gain. These pockets have 
a fairly simple interpretation for the analogy model. Recall 
that, at the high end of input gain, 97% of the errors for 
novel items were lexicalizations. What this means is that the 
pockets show where known inputs were mapped correctly, 
and where novel items were mapped incorrectly to similar 
known items. These “item pockets” are a depiction of item-
based processing in the analogy model. 
In the distributed model, the pockets cannot be readily 
interpreted as item pockets because a substantial number of 
novel items were mapped correctly at the high end of input 
gain (46%), and the proportion of lexicalization errors for 
novel items was not much above chance (27%). It appears 
that the distortions needed for accurate mappings of 
irregular items had “spread out” at high levels of input gain. 
Because the mapping of regular items is mostly correct at 
the high end of input gain, one can infer that the decision 
boundaries spread out over untrained (novel) regions of the 
space more than they did over trained (known) regions. It is 
this selective spread of decision boundaries that indicates 
item-based processing at the high end of input gain. 
 Conclusions 
The current simulations provide a new demonstration of 
how double dissociations can occur without separable 
processing components (see also Devlin & Gonnerman, 
1998; Juola, 2000). Performance on novel versus irregular 
stimuli was dissociated by shifting between regularity-based 
and item-based modes of processing.  Unlike previous 
demonstrations, these modes existed at the ends of a 
continuum created by one control parameter.   
It is important to acknowledge that the current work only 
opens the door to an alternative to the rules/lexicon and 
phonology/semantics explanations of double dissociations. 
It is unclear whether input gain would provide a satisfying 
account of specific empirical results. For instance, input 
gain would not appear to handle dissociations in which all 
regular items, both novel and known, are impaired 
(Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1997, 1998; Ullman et al., 1997). 
Also, the current simulations did not include subregularities 
or variations in the frequency of items. These factors have 
been simulated successfully (Kello, Sibley, & Plaut, 
submitted), but only as demonstrations. Subregularities 
allowed for model errors that were more like patient errors, 
but further work is necessary to test the simulated errors. 
The current simulations also raise a number of larger 
questions, such as: Are there any testable differences 
between the analogy and distributed models presented here? 
Do these simulation results have implications for current 
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theories of word reading and inflectional morphology? Are 
the reported models consistent with the localization of 
regularity-based and item-based processing in the brain, to 
the extent that evidence exists for such localization? What 
might be the neural bases of input gain? These and other 
questions await further research. 
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Abstract
Jerry Fodor (1985) has joked that philosophers have always
been prone to eccentric worries such as an anxiety about the
existence of tables and chairs, but with the issue of mental
representation they have found a problem that is real and crucial
for progress in the cognitive sciences. However, given Fodor’s
‘methodological solipsism’ of computational symbols and their
‘formality condition’, Jackendoff (1992) has facetiously asked
“Why, if our understanding has no direct access to the real
world, aren’t we always bumping into things?” It is no accident
that Jackendoff’s parody recalls Samuel Johnson’s famous retort
to Berkeley’s “ingenious sophistry” by kicking a stone. There is
an acute irony in the fact that cognitive science has simply
rediscovered the philosophers’ traditional worry about tables
and chairs. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Fodor’s latest
book Hume Variations endorses the classical Empiricist ‘idea’
idea of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The paper explores Fodor’s
concept of ideas as mental objects in relation to its historical
antecedents.
Precursors
For some time, Fodor (1978, 1998) has been making hints
en passant comparing his favored theory of mind with that
of early modern Empiricist philosophers. For example, in
his Concepts, he said “To a first approximation ... the idea
that there are mental representations is the idea that there are
Ideas minus the idea that Ideas are images.” “Hume taught
that mental states are relations to mental representations,
and so too does RTM” (Fodor 1998, p. 8,9). In this light, it
is hardly surprising that modern problems might be simply
the reinvention of old problems in a new guise. Now, with
his Hume Variations (2003), Fodor has come out of the
closet, admitting to having harbored something like a
“guilty passion” for Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature.
Fodor’s enthusiasm for Hume is based on his view that
Hume’s account of the mind “seems, in a number of
respects, to anticipate the one that informs current work in
cognitive science” (p. 2). Indeed, Fodor suggests “Hume’s
Treatise is the foundational document of cognitive science:
it made explicit, for the first time, the project of constructing
an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational
theory of the mind; in effect, on the basis of the Theory of
Ideas” (p. 134). More specifically, Fodor says, “it remains
fully plausible that cognitive processes are constituted by
causal interactions among mental representations, that is,
among semantically evaluable mental particulars” (p. 135).
Translated, this means an ‘atomistic’ account of concepts, of
which he says, “To be sure, on this view, we’re not after all
so far from billiard balls” (p. 137). Fodor adds, “Either that,
or we really are entirely in the dark”. Indeed, there are
ample grounds to wonder about both the degree of current
illumination and also Fodor’s history.
Independently of his earlier obiter dicta, Fodor’s
formulations have always been evocative of traditional
accounts of ‘ideas’ as the ‘direct objects’ of perception and
understanding. This is the compelling conception according
to which we don’t perceive the objects of the world directly,
but only indirectly as mediated by our mental
representations or ideas of them. Fodor’s analysis of
‘propositional attitudes’ as “relations between organisms
and internal representations” has always suggested a tri-
partite, ‘object’ conception of concepts common to
traditional and contemporary representative theories
(Bechtel 1998, Slezak 2002):
world « representation « mind
Fodor protests that his view is a minority opinion but the
problematic tripartite structure has always been dominant
(see von Eckardt 1993, Slezak 2002), despite the periodic
complaints of ‘pragmatists’, and ‘direct perception’
advocates such as Hume’s critic Thomas Reid and his more
recent counterparts such as Hilary Putnam (2000).
Fodor suggests that Hume’s account not only anticipates
current work in cognitive science but “thinking seriously
about our theory of mind in relation to Hume’s might help
with the project” (p.2). Thus, Fodor’s small book may be
seen as an extended historical footnote or appendix to earlier
work, particularly his Concepts (1998). By ‘outing’ himself
as adherent of the classical ‘idea’ idea, Fodor illustrates an
important approach to theorizing in cognitive science.
 With some important differences, Fodor’s enterprise
shares its approach and purpose with Chomsky’s (1966)
neglected Cartesian Linguistics which sought to understand
the body of theoretical insight of the premodern period, to
appraise their contemporary relevance and to find ways to
exploit them for advancing contemporary inquiry. For his
part, Chomsky offered no explicit analysis of the relation of
Cartesian linguistics to current work on the grounds that the
modern reader should have little difficulty in drawing these
connections for himself (1966, p. 2). Chomsky was
undoubtedly too optimistic in this regard, perhaps
contributing to the neglect of this important contribution to
both classical scholarship and contemporary cognitive
science. By contrast, Fodor’s book is weighted in the
opposite direction with primary focus upon current theories
of the mind.
As Fodor points out, Hume has suffered from a
procrustean hindsight according to which most of what he
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took to be important about his own philosophy has been
dismissed as not philosophy at all, but empirical psychology
(p. 5). As Fodor notes wryly, “Mastering the science of
human nature doesn’t sound a lot like analyzing concepts”
(p. 5). The changed philosophical climate today has more or
less effaced the distinction between philosophical inquiry
and science, thereby permitting us to see Hume in a clearer
light.
Of course, Fodor chooses Hume for this exercise because
Hume “holds a fairly rudimentary and straightforward
version of the sort of cognitive psychology that interests
me” (p. 2). That is, Fodor has a partisan rather than purely
exegetical purpose - namely, to use Hume as a vehicle for
advertising the virtues of his own theory of mental
representation. As far as it goes, this is an important and
interesting exercise - not least, because the parallels and
divergences help us to get a clearer picture of Fodor’s own
significant position on issues central to cognitive science
today.
Fodor’s book reveals something of the mutually
illuminating connections between the disjoint literatures of
cognitive science and the history of early modern
philosophy. However, Fodor is not vindicated simply
because he was anticipated by Hume. The ‘Whig’ approach
to history cuts both ways, and Hume’s neglected critic Reid
derives a renewed interest precisely because of Fodor’s
project and its partisanship. Reid gets short shrift from
Fodor, relegated with other ‘pragmatists’, direct-realists and
Wittgensteinians to dismissive footnotes. However, a Reid
Variations would tell a more compelling alternative story
than Fodor allows.
As Fodor notes, Hume’s representative Theory of Ideas
(TOI) was itself derived from Descartes. Consequently,
throughout the book Fodor refers to the doctrine he defends
as ‘Cartesian’ though in this case the adjective is intended to
modify ‘representationalism’ and not the more usual
‘dualism’. However, Hume’s conception of this
representationalism was, in fact, closer to Malebranche’s
version than Descartes’s own. Though a follower of
Descartes, Malebranche held a distinctive and highly
problematic conception of ideas as objects in the mind of
God. Indeed, Descartes shared the ‘pragmatism’ and ‘direct
realism’ of Malebranche’s critic Arnauld and later Reid - the
very doctrine that Fodor combats as “a main concern
throughout this book” (p. 12). Fodor characterizes this
pragmatist doctrine as “the defining catastrophe of analytic
philosophy of language and philosophy of mind in the last
half of the twentieth century” (p. 73,4). Accordingly,
insisting on such issues of provenance and tracing the
genealogy of ideas is no mere antiquarian pedantry or
exegetical nicety. If we take Fodor’s enterprise seriously, on
his own account and example, the historical parallels can be
very instructive about our current theoretical problems. In
particular, the celebrated Malebranche-Arnauld debate and
its subsequent re-enactments were anticipations of Fodor’s
polemic with his critics today. By focusing on Hume alone,
Fodor obscures this broader picture, but the pattern of
recurrence is a striking fact whose significance deserves to
be understood.
Curious & Melancholy Fact?
Despite Fodor’s unfailing optimism, there is a kind of
recurrence which deserves attention because it is a
manifestation of deeper, and therefore specially
illuminating, causes, - a chronic malaise that is symptomatic
of deep pathology. Thus, Yolton (1984, p. 6) has noted that
the burning question among philosophers in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries is that of “objects present to the
mind” - precisely Fodor’s question of “concept possession”
central to the recent book and his earlier Concepts (1998).
Fodor suggests that in the intervening period since Hume
the theory of ideas “seems to have made some modest
progress” while acknowledging that it is, “to be sure, more
modest than some have advertised” (p. 157). Although
relegated to footnotes in Fodor’s book, modern counterparts
of Hume’s critics are also prominent among leading
theorists today. This looks alot less like progress, however
modest, than Fodor suggests. Thus, Putnam (2000) has
recently defended Reid’s “natural realism” and he also cites
John Austin who, significantly, invokes yet earlier writers
saying: “It is a curious and in some ways rather melancholy
fact that the relative positions of Price and Ayer at this point
turn out to be exactly the same as the relative positions of
Locke and Berkeley, or Hume and Kant.” (Austin 1962, p.
61)
In a riposte to Putnam (2000), Fodor (2000) asserts
bluntly, “In fact, there is no direct realist theory of
perception (or of anything else that’s mental)”. However,
Fodor ignores Putnam’s concern about representations as
“interface” between mind and world, though this has been
the classical source of discomfort about the ‘veil of ideas’
central to the Humean conception. Thus, Putnam and Reid
are grouped with Gibson and McDowell as among those
who “reject RTM entirely” in the sense that they hold
“perception isn’t mediated by mental representations.”
Fodor adds that this flies in the face of the evidence from
the success of modern psychology. Referring specifically to
Reid, Fodor suggests “but for the notion of mental
representation, much of what the mind does would be
miraculous. The miracle theory of mind is the natural
alternative to the representational theory of mind” (Fodor
2000). Fodor’s extravagant humour makes it hard to tell
whether he is just exaggerating for effect or plain wrong in
this characterization of the Reid/Putnam view. Of course,
there have been accounts purporting to deny representations
altogether (Brooks 1991, Freeman and Skarda 1990, Clark
and Toribio 1994, Greeno 1989, van Gelder, 1998).
However, even these views are not plausibly seen as a return
to something like behaviorism since, strictly speaking, they
do not reject internal representations at all (see Markman
and Dietrich 2000). For his part, Putnam makes the point
explicitly, seeking “to distinguish carefully between the
activity of “representation” (as something in which we
engage) and the idea of a “representation” as an interface
between ourselves and what we think about, and to
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understand that giving up the idea of representations as
interfaces requiring a “semantics” is not the same thing as
giving up on the whole idea of representation” (Putnam
2000, p. 59). Thus, Fodor’s appears to miss the more subtle
views (not to mention explicit texts) which do not deny
representations as such but only a certain notoriously
problematic conception of them as mental objects with truth
values. Futhermore, as Greco (1995) notes, “it is clear that
Reid does not deny the existence of ideas if ideas are
thought of as operations or acts of thought. Rather, Reid
objects only to ideas as mental entities distinct from any
operation or act” (1995, p. 283).
Jerry-mandering?
Fodor reproaches Putnam and cites Marr’s (1982) research
as exemplary proof of the representational pudding.
However, Marr’s differential equations, zero crossings and
other formalisms are not obviously the widely individuated,
semantically evaluable mental particulars that Fodor takes to
be characteristic of representations. Marr is undoubtedly a
counter-example to any theory that would deny
representations altogether, but fails to address the concern
with ‘object’ theories of Hume and Fodor. Thus, Fodor’s
animadversions against miraculous theories are beside the
point since the “direct” theories of interest are also
“indirect” in Fodor’s uncontroversial sense, namely, in
positing some internal, causal processes which are
responsible for, and in this sense ‘mediate’, perception,
belief and action. This way of putting the point will be
agreed on all sides. Neither Putnam nor Reid would demur
from this way of ‘jerry-mandering’ the issue since everyone
is an indirect representationalist in this sense.
Granny & the Golden Mountain
Fodor’s hard-core Malebranchisme is further confirmed and
illuminated by his un-selfconscious use of the most
venerable argument for ideas as mediating objects of
perception: Fodor asks how he could think about his Granny
if he is in New York and she is in Ohio. Or, “How can I be
in an unmediated relation to Ebbets Field (alas long since
demolished); or to my erstwhile dentist, who passed away a
year ago in August?” (Fodor 2000). This is, of course, just
the notorious Argument from Illusion, and the rhetorical
force of Fodor’s question relies upon the remoteness or non-
existence of things we are supposed to be in a problematic
“direct” relation to. Malebranche, too, remarks “it often
happens that we perceive things that do not exist, and that
even have never existed - thus our mind often has real ideas
of things that have never existed. When, for example, a man
imagines a golden mountain, it is absolutely necessary that
the idea of this mountain really be present to his mind”
(1712, p. 217). The classical conclusion, of course, is that
we must be in a direct relation with something else -
namely, an image, sense datum or ‘idea’. However, the
“directness” of veridical perception (or memory) is not so
easily defeated in this manner, since it need not rely on
some occult relation to its objects as Fodor suggests. Of
course, it is not obvious that Fodor’s causal theory is any
better able to deal with distant or non-existent objects of
thought, as Putnam has pointed out. Conceptual or
inferential role theories offer an alternative conception in
the spirit of Arnauld and Reid. Moreover, as just noted, both
direct and indirect theories of perception are equally
committed to causal intermediaries which will explain
Fodor’s relation to Ebbets Field, his granny and his late
dentist.
Fodor’s deployment of what is in effect the Argument
from Illusion suggests that he may be open to the kind of
charge Putnam makes against Dummett, namely, “that his
picture ... is closer to the ‘cognitive science’ version of the
Cartesian cum materialist picture than he himself may
realize” (Putnam 2000, p. 58).  By this Putnam means the
‘Cartesian Theatre’ conception minus dualism that Dennett,
too, has characterized as ‘Cartesian Materialism’. Despite its
centrality in the tradition of ideas, Fodor nowhere attempts
to escape or even address this potential difficulty, perhaps
on the grounds that modern computational, symbolic
accounts of representation are automatically immune from
the objection. On the contrary, however, statements by
Newell (1986, p.33) and others articulating the foundational
symbol-system paradigm characteristically assimilate
external and internal symbols in such a way as to encourage
just such suspicions (see also Bechtel 1998, Lloyd 2003). It
is striking that the earliest complaints in the 17th century
were precisely about taking things outside the mind as a
model for the things inside (Slezak 2002).
Why God Bothered
There is particular irony in the fact that the problem for
resembling ideas may be, at a deeper level, the problem
shared by Fodor’s RTM as well. It is not only resemblance
that creates difficulties for ideas or representations. Another
manifestation of the same problem may be an ‘externalist’
conception of representations as semantically evaluable - the
claim that mental processes tend to preserve semantic
properties like truth. Fodor (1994, p. 9) has said that this is
“the most important fact we know about minds; no doubt
it’s why God bothered to give us any” (1994, p. 9).
However, Fodor has seen a dilemma arising from the fact
that mental content doesn’t appear to supervene on mental
processes and, therefore, perhaps “semantics isn’t part of
psychology” (Fodor 1994, p. 38). This dilemma seems to
arise from the fact that semantic evaluability of
representations, or old-fashioned ‘veridicality’ of ideas, like
resemblance, depends on being able to make a comparison
between ideas and what they purportedly refer to. In
Berkeley’s idealist response to this problem we can see the
precursor and analog to Fodor’s (1980) methodological
solipsism. In view of these parallels, it is striking, though
perhaps not surprising, that Fodor (1994) sees a deep puzzle
about how misrepresentation could arise if any causal or
correlational theory were true. I have suggested (Slezak
2002, 2004) that the modern problem of misrepresentation
is a unnoticed variant of the classical ‘Argument from
Illusion’ and so it should not be surprising that we saw
Fodor give an explicit endorsement to just this form of
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argument. Fodor argues that if ideas are caused directly by
external objects, we can’t have misrepresentations (i.e.
illusions), whereas the classical argument concludes from
the fact that we have illusions, our ideas can’t be directly
caused by external objects.
 In this regard, Fodor’s latest discussions raise questions
that were central to his seminal book The Language of
Thought (1975). Dennett (1977) noted:
Hume wisely shunned the notion of an inner self that would
intelligently manipulate the ideas and impressions, but this left
him with the necessity of getting the ideas to ‘think for
themselves’. ... Fodor’s analogous problem is to get the internal
representations to ‘understand themselves’ ... If there is any
future for internal systems of representation it will not be for
languages of thought that ‘represent our beliefs to us’, except in
the most strained sense. (Dennett 1977, p. 274, 5)
Fodor acknowledges that Putnam is aware that nowadays
representational theories are formulated so that there is no
“user” or exempt agent as undischarged homunculus, but
suggests that he fails to acknowledge that perception is
direct under these accounts. Fodor asserts that, like
telephone conversations with his wife, perception is
mediated in all sorts of ways, but “still, it is my wife that I
talk to”. However, it is here that we see where the debate
seems to have become derailed. Direct realists would
entirely agree with Fodor’s way of making this last point. It
is emphatically not the “mediation” of causal processes in
all sorts of ways that constitutes the potential problem for
representational theories. The problem arises only from
some of the ways that the mediating causal processes may
be conceived. For example, it is not their mediation as such
that makes pictures problematic as internal representations
subserving imagery. Fodor’s account of what makes
perception (or talking on the telephone) “direct” is exactly
the kind that Putnam, Austin and Reid, inter alia, would
endorse.
Gallstones or Headaches?
Fodor suggests that until recently it was generally supposed
that explaining having a concept is dependent on explaining
what a concept is. That is, the explanation of concept
possession should be parasitic on the explanation of concept
individuation (Fodor 1998, p. 2). Fodor laments the reversal
of this assumption about priority and the direction of
explanatory dependence. Fodor’s particular target in Hume
Variations is the one identified in Concepts, namely,
pragmatists and dispositionalists who hold that having a
concept is a matter of some kind of capacity, a matter of
what you are able to do as a kind of epistemic ‘know how’
(Fodor 1998, p. 3).  Of particular concern for Fodor, and the
reason for Hume’s appeal, is their shared opposition to such
theories:
... an account that renders having concepts as having
capacities is intended to preclude and account that renders
concepts as species of mental particulars: capacities aren’t kinds
of things; a fortiori, they aren’t kinds of mental things. (Fodor
1998, p. 3)
Thus, Fodor insisted that “understanding what a thing is, is
invariably prior to understanding how we know what it is”
(1998, p. 5). He says “epistemic capacities don’t constitute
concepts, but merely presuppose them.” (p. 20).
It is worth remarking that Yolton (2000) notes that the
“pervasive notion” throughout the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries has been that of “presence to the mind”
- precisely Fodor’s question of concept possession.
Thus, Fodor takes it to be a truism about the possession
conditions for concepts that “If concept tokens are mental
particulars, then having a concept is being in a relation to a
mental particular” (1998, p. 3 fn 1). However, such talk of
“possession conditions” is a framework that biases our
theory towards an object-account of concepts since
“possession” is itself, like “mental object” a metaphor with
misleading connotations when we are concerned with states
of the mind-brain. The old-fashioned term ‘presence to the
mind’ is preferable in this regard. Colloquially, we may
speak of “having a headache”, or “having little patience”,
but talk of “possession conditions” in such cases is not
obviously as appropriate as for tables and chairs. For
example, having a headache is more like having indigestion
or being sunburnt than owning something. By contrast,
having gallstones is undeniably object possession but likely
to be a poor model for psychological states. Less
figuratively, the question is whether we should adopt a
Malebranchean-Lockean-Humean object theory or an
Arnauldian-Cartesian-Reidian process, act theory. At the
very least, object implications of colloquial idioms in folk-
psychology propositional attitude talk should not prejudge
the issue.
These foregoing remarks have a distinctly Rylean flavour,
and it is perhaps not surprising that Ryle is among the
culprits in Fodor’s plot. Fodor suggests that “Mid-century
philosophy of mind consisted largely of confusing these
issues by endorsing pragmatism as a remedy for dualism”
(p. 24) and Fodor regards Ryle’s (1949) Concept of Mind  is
the locus classicus for this confusion.
However, this analysis is to misread Ryle in a revealing
manner. Ryle was concerned, in the first instance, to give a
remedy for certain spurious views about our mental life.
That is, the conceptual confusions of interest may encourage
dualism but are independent of it. For Ryle, dualism is a
consequence of holding certain mistaken views about our
mental life and not identical with these views. Thus, Ryle’s
criticism of the “intellectualist legend” and the distinction
between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ have nothing to
do with dualism. Further, Ryle’s criticism of the doctrine of
the ‘mind’s eye’ anticipates Pylyshyn’s polemic against
pictorial theories concluding that “imaging occurs, but
images are not seen” (1949, p. 247). Exactly as Pylyshyn
would argue a generation later, Ryle said that someone
imagining a scene “is not being a spectator of resemblance
... but he is resembling a spectator” (1949, p. 248). Thus, for
Ryle pragmatism was primarily a remedy for certain
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doctrines that may lead to dualism, but may equally lead to
bad theories within a purely physicalist framework.
In Fodor we see the preference for a conception of
representation which reverses the trend discernable in the
seventeenth century. Yolton points out:
... in the writings of the main figures (Descartes, Arnauld,
Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant), we can follow
a gradual emergence of a clear translation or transformation of
the old ontological language of presence to the mind into an
epistemic presence. (Yolton 2000)
Propositional attitudes are explicated in a now-standard
fashion by means of the inner box metaphor. In case anyone
had doubts, Fodor (1998, p. 8) makes it clear that talk of
belief boxes is a little joke which can be translated into
harmless functional terms. However, even when stripped of
its whimsical features, the metaphor and its implications are
by no means so innocent as generally assumed. Specifically,
the locution encourages Fodor’s objectified ontological
analysis and the priority he gives to questions of what
concepts are as opposed to how they might be “possessed”
or known. Arnauld’s book On True and False Ideas was
precisely a response to this conception in Malebranche’s
The Search for Truth. Given such a conception, it is not
surprising that Fodor prefers an atomistic rather than holistic
account of meaning, though he notes that the two issues are
strictly distinct, since he says current fashion “tends to favor
mental objects that are defined by (perhaps all) of their
interrelations (p. 12). Nevertheless, propositions conceived
as mental atoms are more readily seen as objects having
their meanings individually and a holism of a more radical
variety would dispense with mental objects altogether in
favour of acts, processes or dispositions. It is perhaps not
implausible to see a relevant parallel with Locke’s project in
his Essay which Jolley (1999, p. 39) suggests is “self-
consciously modeled on the corpuscularian theory of
matter”. It may be helpful to see that Fodor is true to his
avowed Empiricist progenitors even to the extent of such
analogous commitments. Remarkably and more directly
relevant, Reid, too, captures Fodor’s corpuscularism in his
attack on Hume’s ‘ideas’ “which, like Epicurus’s atoms,
dance about in emptiness” (Reid 1985/1997, p. 22).
Fodor considers Stroud’s (1977) criticism of Hume’s
mental atomism and quotes the following passage:
The Theory of Ideas restricts [Hume] because it represents
thinking of having an idea as fundamentally a matter of
contemplating or viewing an ‘object’ - a mental atom that can
come and go in the mind ... (Stroud 1977, p. 225,6; quoted in
Fodor 2003, p. 11).
What is remarkable about this passage is what Fodor fails to
comment upon (though the same remarks are quoted again
at p. 21), namely, Stroud’s concern with having an idea as
contemplating or viewing an object. Fodor’s complete
neglect of this point is especially surprising because, as
already noted, it has been central to the long tradition of
criticism of the ‘idea’ idea. Of course, Fodor (2000) is right
that the causal mediation of representational theories doesn’t
mean that we perceive the representations themselves, but
this is only to identify the problem and not to show that
particular accounts actually avoid it. In his new book,
Fodor’s off-hand treatment of critics of representationalism
suggests an insensitivity to this concern explicitly raised by
Stroud which, like Putnam’s concern, arises from the
inherent features of a classical tri-partite conception of
ideas. Rorty (1980) too was centrally concerned with what
he describes as “the original sin of epistemology” (1980, p.
60), namely, the kind of representationalism originating
with Descartes. Rorty describes this as “the Cartesian image
of the Eye of the Mind - the very image which has often
been accused of leading to the ‘veil of ideas’ and to
solipsism” (1980, p. 94). Fodor’s new book does not address
such concerns although, of course, he appreciates the way
that traditional scepticism arose for the reasons just noted,
and he says with mild sarcasm that it led “either to the view
that ‘strictly speaking’ nobody ever saw a piano, or to the
view that ‘strictly speaking’ pianos are mental” (Fodor
2000). With this oblique allusion to Berkeleyan idealism,
Fodor suggests that, by contrast, the representational theory
“doesn’t need to say anything like that now” since it has
abandoned its pretensions to being epistemology, content
with being only a psychology of perception. In this form
representational theories hold that  “Causal processes
involving mental representations mediate these perceptual
relations, but you don’t (typically) perceive the
representations themselves either directly or otherwise”
(Fodor 2000).
First, it is undeniable that an explanatory scientific
psychology “doesn’t need to say anything like that now”,
but requiring mental particulars to be semantically evaluable
seems to invoke precisely the sorts of problems of
veridicality arising for an epistemology concerned with
knowledge as true belief. However, be that as it may, the
problems of concern do not arise only if the enterprise is
conceived as epistemology, as the imagery debate has amply
demonstrated. The problem may arise as an unnoticed
consequence of certain ways of conceiving the
representations, typically when they are modeled too closely
on externally perceivable objects. Thus, in a frequently cited
overview of the traditional theory of ideas, McRae (1965)
pointed to the central notion of an idea as the immediate
object of perception or thought that can be traced back to
Descartes. McRae suggests that ideas make their appearance
in Descartes as immediately present objects for looking at or
“contemplating”.
What remains basic for the earlier Descartes, for the later
Descartes, for Malebranche and for Locke, is that ideas are the
immediate objects of perception, that all knowing reduces to
seeing, and that seeing (however intellectual it may be) is the
sole operation of which the understanding is capable. It is of
secondary importance for their conceptions of what knowing is
whether these immediate objects or ideas are in the brain, in the
mind, or in God. (McRae 1965, p. 179)
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We may add that it is of secondary importance whether
these immediate objects are pictures, propositions or other
mental particulars à la Fodor. He writes:
... the questions with which theories of meaning are primarily
concerned are metaphysical rather than epistemic. This is as it
should be; understanding what a thing is, is invariably prior to
understanding how we know what it is. (1998, p. 5)
However, Fodor’s impeccable principle giving priority to
the question of “what a thing is” rather than “how we know
what it is” does not obviously apply as well to knowledge as
to tables and chairs. Arguably, it is exactly in the case of
forms of knowledge that the epistemic questions must take
precedence. Take the case of grammar which Chomsky
insists has no other reality than the knowledge of a speaker-
hearer: Here the question of “what a thing is” collapses into
the question of “how we know what it is”. Grammar is
constituted by being a form of knowledge and, therefore,
how we know it counts as an answer to the question of what
it is. Similarly, in the case of meanings and concepts, unlike
the case of tables and chairs, the question of “what a thing
is” is plausibly construed as the question of what we know.
These critics represent the various pragmatic or
dispositional views that Fodor excoriates. It is no accident
that Gibson’s similarly motivated ‘ecological’ approach
dismissed by Fodor, like the closely related ‘situated
cognition’, are theories of direct realism which have been
proposed as alternatives to the representationalism of
modern computational theories. This is merely one form in
which the Malebranche-Arnauld (or Hume-Reid) debate is
being rehearsed today.
Le plus séduisant cartésien?
We may better understand Fodor and Hume through their
antecedents and their critics. Thus, I have emphasized
Malebranche here in part to correct Fodor’s misleading
allusions to ‘Cartesianism’ as the provenance of Humean
views of representation. Fodor’s reference to Hume’s
Cartesianism needs to be qualified to reflect these nuances
and is correct only if we understand it as reference to
Malebranche’s version of la pensée cartésienne and not that
of Arnauld or Descartes himself who shared precisely the
pragmatism that Fodor is battling. If the interest and
relevance of Malebranche’s theory today is surprising, this
is because its theological trappings and overtones of
mysticism have, in Nicolas Jolley’s words, “so effectively
concealed the seventeenth-century debate from the view of
contemporary philosophers” (Jolley 1990, p. 201).
Nevertheless, it is not without reason that Malebranche was
characterised by a 17th Century author, as we might say of
Fodor too, En un mot, c’est le plus séduisant cartésien que
je connaisse - in a word, the most seductive Cartesian that I
know (quoted in Moreau 1999, p.9).
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Abstract 
This research examines mechanisms underlying the primacy 
in processing of elements over relations.  It is hypothesized 
that elements are detected atomatically even when the task is 
to ignore them, and this automatic detection may interfere 
with the processing of relations.  In Experiment 1, 4 year-olds 
and adults were asked to ignore elemental features and to 
match a test item to a target by detecting the numerical 
equivalence beween the test and the target.  Results indicate 
that only children, but not adults, cannot ignore elements, 
thus suggesting that elements could be processed 
automatically.  In Experiment 2, the same task was presented 
again, except that elements were perceptually-rich.  This time, 
both children and adults exhibited difficulty ignoring 
elements.  These findings point to two important regularities.  
First, attention is automatically attracted to elements, 
interfering with processing of relations, and this interference 
may make relational processing more difficult.  And second, 
perceptual richness of elements amplifies this effect. 
Introduction 
Humans live in a structured environment: we encounter 
entities that are interconnected spatially, temporally, or 
conceptually into larger arrangements.  Those components 
of structure that are entities or separable properties of these 
entities can be considered elements, whereas the manner in 
which elements are arranged can be considered relations.   
However, it is not self-evident as to what constitutes an 
element or a relation.  For example, a letter may constitute a 
relational entity in a letter recognition task, but it constitutes 
an element in a lexical decision task.  Similarly, a word may 
constitute a relational entity in lexical decision, but (as 
demonstrated by Ratcliff and McKoon, 1989) it constitutes 
an element in a sentence comprehension task.).  Because 
there is evidence that stimulus familiarity is established 
early in the course of processing and familiar stimuli are 
processed by dedicated circuits (Hölscher, Rolls, & Xiang, 
2003; Xiang & Brown, 1998), it seems that familiar objects 
are good candidates for being considered elements. 
Processing of structure requires processing of both 
elements and relations because both elements and relations 
carry important information: changing a relation (e.g., the 
ball is under the table instead of the ball is on the table) as 
well as changing an element (e.g., the book is under the 
table instead of the ball is under the table) can radically 
change the nature of the information.  Processing of 
structure and the ability to recognize the processed structure 
at a later time is critically important for both cognition and 
learning.   
There is multiple evidence that pointing to a primacy of 
processing of elements over relations in terms of processing 
time, as well as phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and microgenetic 
time.  First, researchers have found that, across a broad 
array of tasks, elements are processed prior to (or faster 
than) relations (Goldstone & Medin, 1994; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 1989).  Second, there is evidence that processing 
of some relations (e.g., numeric equivalence) is available to 
great primates, but even for great primates this processing 
requires much more substantial training than processing of 
elements (Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997).  Third, there 
are developmental differences in processing of elements and 
relations, with younger children being less likely to process 
relations than older children and with greater age 
differences in the processing of relations than elements 
(Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996).  
Finally, there is also a large body of evidence indicating that 
in knowledge rich domains, novices are more likely to 
process elements (i.e., individual pieces of a chess position, 
or entities in a problem description) more ably then relations 
(i.e., the arrangements of pieces in the position, or equations 
that underlie the solution to the problem), although experts 
often process relations as well as elements (Chase & Simon, 
1973; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Larkin, 1983; Reed, 
Ackinclose, & Voss, 1990; Reingold, Charness, Schultetus, 
& Stampe, 2001). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that elements and 
relations are psychologically distinct. We further contend 
that there might be an attentional mechanism underlying the 
differential processing of elements and relations: elements 
may be detected automatically, and this automatic detection 
may interfere with processing of relations.   
The idea of such a mechanism has been supported by 
several sets of findings.  First, it has been found that the 
likelihood of processing of relations often varies with the 
salience of elements.  For example, when Structures 1 and 2 
(e.g., two sequence of triangles monotonically increasing in 
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size) differ in elemental and relational correspondences (i.e., 
the leftmost triangle in Structure 1 has the same size as the 
rightmost triangle in Structure 2 in terms of an elemental 
match, whereas it corresponds to the leftmost triangle in 
Structure 2 in terms of its position), participants focused on 
relational matches when objects were perceptually 
impoverished.  At the same time, they were more likely to 
focus on the elemental matches when objects were 
perceptually elaborated (see Gentner & Medina, 1998 for a 
review).  Second, introduction of a simple warm-up task, 
which attracts attention to either to relations or to elements, 
markedly increases processing of relations, but not elements 
in a target task (Sloutsky & Yarlas, under review), thus 
indicating that processing of elements is at ceiling.  Both 
sets of findings suggest that elements may be processed in 
an automatic and obligatory manner.   
If this is the case, then elements should be detected even 
when the task is to ignore them, and these automatically 
detected elements may interfere with processing of 
relations.  Furthermore, because young children may have 
difficulty deliberately directing their attention to some 
properties of stimuli, while ignoring others, it seems likely 
that children would exhibit these effects under a wider range 
of conditions than adults. 
To test these hypotheses, we created a task, in which 
participants were asked to focus on a simple relation of 
numeric equivalence.  We selected this relation because 
previous research demonstrated that even primates could 
match items having equivalent number of elements, 
regardless of what these elements were (Thompson, et al., 
1997).  We deemed it reasonable, therefore, that the relation 
of numeric equivalence should be available to 4-to-5 year-
olds.  The task (a variant of Garner’s interference task) was 
presented as a “matching game,” in which participants were 
presented with a Target having a particular number of 
identical elements (e.g., two identical shapes), and a Test 
item.  If the Test item had the same number of elements, 
participants should identify it as a match, otherwise they 
should identify an item as a mismatch.  The items were 
presented under three conditions.  First, there was a “fixed” 
condition, in which the Target and Test items had identical 
elements, and matching or mismatching relation was the 
only source of variance.  Second, there was a “correlated” 
condition, in which elements and relations varied together: a 
relational match accompanied an elemental match, and a 
relational mismatch accompanied an elemental mismatch.  
Finally, there was an “orthogonal” condition, in which 
relations and elements varied independently.  Examples of 
items across the three conditions are presented in Figure 1. 
If elements are not attended to in the course of relational 
processing, there would be no difference in speed and 
accuracy of matching across the three conditions.  If, 
however, elements are processed automatically, there should 
be a difference in speed or accuracy between the orthogonal 
condition and the correlated conditions.  Such a decrease 
would be a strong evidence for automatic processing of 
elements and fro interference of automatically detected 
elements in processing of relations.  As mentioned above, 
we expect that even young children process elements 
automatically, and, therefore, we expect that even young 
participants would exhibit these effects. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
The goal of this Experiment was to test the hypothesis that 
even early in development, elements are processed 
automatically, and this automatic processing of elements 
may interfere with processing of relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of stimuli across the three conditions. 
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Participants 
Participants were 44 young children (Mean Age = 4.41 
years, SD = 0.346 years; 24 girls and 20 boys) recruited 
from childcare centers located in middle class suburbs of the 
Columbus, Ohio area, with approximately equal numbers of 
participants in the fixed, correlated and orthogonal 
conditions.  There was another group of 37 college 
undergraduates (13 women and 24 men) participating in the 
experiment for course credit.  There was also approximately 
equal numbers of participants in the fixed, correlated and 
orthogonal conditions. 
Materials 
Materials were stimuli sets, each consisting of three panels. 
Two of these panels were Target and Choice items and these 
depicted simple geometric shapes (e.g., circle, triangle, 
cross).  The third panel depicted a Trash can.  Stimuli set 
were presented on screen with the Target and Trash can 
above each Choice item, with the latter one placed 
equidistantly to the former two.  Participants were told there 
that if the Choice item has exactly the same number of 
shapes as the Target, there is a match, and they should point 
to the Target, whereas if the number is different, there is a 
mismatch, and they should point to the Trash can.  There 
were a total of 24 trials with 12 matching and 12 
mismatching trials.  As mentioned above, there were three 
between-subjects conditions: fixed, correlated, and 
orthogonal.   
 
There were exactly the same elements employed across 
trials in these conditions.  However, within the trials, there 
were identical elements in all three panels in the fixed 
condition, elements covaried with the relation of 
equivalence in the correlated condition, and elements and 
the relation of equivalence varied independently in the 
orthogonal condition. 
Design and Procedure 
The design included two between subject factors, Condition 
(fixed, correlated, and orthogonal) and Age (young children 
and adults).  Participants were randomly assigned either 
fixed, correlated, or orthogonal condition.  The dependent 
variables were accuracy and latency of responses.  Young 
children were given brief training, in which real three-
dimensional objects were used to explain the rules of the 
“matching game.”  The training was identical across the 
three conditions. 
The child participants were tested individually by a 
female researcher in a quiet room in their schools, whereas 
adult participants were tested in a lab room on campus.  
First, the child participants were trained on a real-object 
version of the computer task (this training was not used with 
adult participants).  The researcher showed the participants 
two clear plastic shoeboxes.  The instructions said: This is a 
toy box (pointed to box with two stars on the front) and this 
is a trash can (pointed to plain box).  There are two stars on 
this toy box, so this is the “two-toy” toy box.  If I give you 
two toys, you put them in here.  If I don’t give you two toys, 
you put them in the trash can.  Then the researcher set one, 
two, or three toys in front of the participants and asked, 
“Should these go in the toy box or the trash can?”  The toys 
were small, colorful, plastic toys (i.e. sunglasses, cars, tops).  
The participant was given feedback for these training trials.  
The participant had four trials with the two-toy toy box, 
after which the researcher replaced it with a one- or three-
toy toy box (designated by stars on the front) and restated 
the instructions.  Each participant had four trials with each 
toy box, totaling 12 training trials.  If the participants were 
successful on the last three trials, they proceeded to the 
computer task.  If a participant was not successful, the 
experiment was terminated because the participant did not 
demonstrate understanding of the task. 
The computer task was the same as the training, except 
that the child participants responded by pointing to the 
Target or Trash can or naming them.  Children’s responses 
were entered by the experimenter.  Adult participants 
entered their choices by pressing appropriate buttons on the 
keyboard.  The experiment was administered on computer 
and was controlled by SuperLab Pro 2.0 software. 
The screen was divided by a horizontal line, with the 
Target and Trash can above the line and the “toys” to be 
moved below.  The toys were actually two-dimensional 
shapes (square, triangle, cross, circle, heart, and diamond).  
The researcher said to the child participants: Now we are 
going to do the same thing, but on the computer.  Here is 
the toy box (i.e., the Target) and here is the Trash can and 
here are the toys (pointed to each as they were mentioned).  
If the number of toys on the toy box is the same as the 
number of toys down here, then you tell me to put them in 
the box.  If the number of toys on the toy box is different 
than the number of toys down here, then you tell me to put 
them in the trash.  The researcher then pressed “1” for box 
and “0” for trash, according to the participants’ responses.  
The adults had similar instructions on the computer screen 
and two examples (one match and one mismatch).  There 
were four warm-up trials on the computer and 24 test trials.  
Warm-up trials were exactly as the test trials, except that the 
former were accompanied by feedback. 
Results and Discussion 
Because procedures for children and adults differed 
slightly, we present their data separately.  Recall that 
children’s responses were entered by the researcher, which 
added time to their latencies.  To adjust for this added time, 
we conducted a separate experiment, in which we used 
measured the speed of pressing buttons by the researcher.  
We then averaged this time across trials, and subtracted it 
from each child participant response. 
 
Children.  Overall child participants exhibited high 
accuracy of responding with 91% correct in the fixed 
condition, 97% correct responses in the correlated condition, 
and 88% correct in the orthogonal condition.  There was an 
approaching significance difference in accuracy between the 
orthogonal and the correlated condition, with greater 
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accuracy in the correlated condition, t (27) = 1.81, p = .08.  
Latencies across the three conditions are presented in Figure 
2. 
Figure 2.  Children’s latencies by condition.  Error bars 
represent Standard Errors of the Mean. 
 
These latencies were subjected to a one-way ANOVA.  The 
analysis pointed to significant differences across the three 
conditions, F (2, 41) = 5, 21, p = .01.  Post-hoc Tukey tests 
indicated that responses in the fixed and the orthogonal 
condition were slower than responses in the correlated 
condition, ps < .05.  These results indicate that there was a 
significant speed up in the correlated condition, pointing to 
an automatic processing of elements. 
 
Adults.  Adults’ data differed from those of young children 
in that there was little evidence of elements interfering with 
processing of relations.  Adults exhibited comparable 
accuracy across the conditions, with 97% correct in the 
fixed condition, 97% correct in the correlated condition, and 
95% correct in the orthogonal condition, ns, p > .3.  
Similarly, they exhibited comparable latencies across the 
conditions, 1017 ms in the fixed condition, 987 ms in the 
correlated condition, and 988 ms in the orthogonal 
condition, ns, p > .8. 
 
Results of this experiment indicate that children, but not 
adults exhibit automatically processing of elements even 
when instructed to focus on relations. 
 
Experiment 2 
The goal of this experiment was to test the second 
hypothesis that perceptual richness of elements may amplfy 
the effects of automatic detection of elements found in 
Experiment 1.   
Participants 
Participants were 40 young children (Mean Age = 4.49 
years, SD = 0.33 years; 24 girls and 16 boys).  They were 
recruited in the same manner as in Experiment 1 and there 
were approximately equal numbers of participants in the 
fixed, correlated and orthogonal conditions.  There were 
also 70 college undergraduates (17 women and 53 men) 
participating in the experiment for course credit.  There was 
also approximately equal numbers of participants in the 
fixed, correlated and orthogonal conditions. 
Materials 
The task was set up identically to the task in Experiment 1 
expect for the nature of the stimuli.  Instead of the simple 
geometric shapes, the stimuli were perceptually rich images 
of common animals (e.g., bird, dog, turtle). An example of 
stimuli is presented in Figure 3. Again, participants were 
told there that if the Choice item has exactly the same 
number of shapes as the Target, there is a match, and they 
should point to the Target, whereas if the number is 
different, there is a mismatch, and they should point to the 
Trash can.  There were a total of 24 trials with 12 matching 
and 12 mismatching trials.  Again, there were three 
between-subjects conditions: fixed, correlated, and 
orthogonal.  
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Figure 3: Example of perceptually rich stimuli across the 
three conditions. 
 
Design and Procedure 
The design of this experiment is identical to the design of 
Experiment 1.  The design included two between subject 
factors, Condition (fixed, correlated, and orthogonal) and 
Age (young children and adults).  Participants were 
randomly assigned to each level of the Condition.  The 
dependent variables were accuracy and latency of responses.  
Again, young children were given brief training, identical to 
the training in Experiment 1 and using the same three-
dimensional objects. 
Results and Discussion 
Data was entered and analyzed in the same manner as in 
Experiment 1. 
 
Children.  Similar to Experiment 1, the child participants 
exhibited high accuracy of responding with 94% correct in 
the fixed condition, 97% correct responses in the correlated 
condition, and 94% correct in the orthogonal condition.  
There were no significant differences between the 
accuracies of the three conditions.  Latencies across the 
three conditions are presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Perceptually rich stimuli.  Children’s latencies 
by condition.  Error bars represent Standard Errors of 
the Mean. 
 
 
These latencies were subjected to a one-way ANOVA.  The 
analysis pointed to significant differences across the three 
conditions, F (2, 36) = 3.60, p = .038.  Post-hoc Tukey tests 
indicated that responses in the orthogonal condition were 
slower than responses in the correlational condition, p = .03.  
These results indicate that there was a significant slow down 
in the orthogonal condition, pointing to an interference on 
the part of perceptually rich elements. 
 
Adults.  Adults exhibited interference effects showing 
somewhat lower accuracy in the orthogonal condition with 
97% correct in the fixed condition, 97% correct in the 
correlated condition, and 92% correct in the orthogonal 
condition.  The one-way ANOVA pointed to significant 
differences across the three conditions, F (2, 67) = 3.41, p = 
.04.  Post-hoc Tukey tests indicated a significant difference 
in accuracy between the orthogonal and the correlated 
condition, with greater accuracy in the correlated condition, 
p = .05, and an approaching significance difference in 
accuracy between the orthogonal and the fixed condition, 
with greater accuracy in the fixed condition, p = .08.  They 
exhibited comparable latencies to the children across the 
conditions, 911 ms in the fixed condition, 943 ms in the 
correlated condition, and 1017 ms in the orthogonal 
condition, ns, p > .8. 
 
Results of this experiment indicate that increasing the 
perceptual richness of the elements produces more 
interference of automatically detected elements with 
processing of relations not only in children, but also in 
adults. 
General Discussion 
Two important findings stem from the reported 
experiments.  First, when elements are perceptually 
impoverished, and the task is to focus on relations, young 
children automatically attend to elements.  And second, 
perceptual richness of elements amplifies this effect in 
children, and it reveals the effect in adults. 
Findings that elements are attended to automatically, even 
when the task is to ignore them, may explain the earlier 
found primacy in processing of elements.  As mentioned 
above, elements are processed prior to (or faster than) 
relations (Goldstone & Medin, 1994; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
1989), younger children are less likely to process relations 
than older children (Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Kotovsky & 
Gentner, 1996), and experts in a domain are more likely to 
process domain-important relations than novices (Chase & 
Simon, 1973; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981).  These 
findings suggest that the difficulty of processing relations 
may often stem from participants inability to ignore 
irrelevant elements.   
This attentional mechanism is capable of explaining 
several existing findings.  In particular, there is evidence 
(see Gentner & Medina, 1998; Markman & Gentner, 1993) 
that when elements are perceptually-rich, participants are 
more likely to focus on matching elements than when 
elements are perceptually-impoverished.  Because 
perceptually-rich stimuli are more likely to engage attention 
than perceptually-impoverished stimuli, it seems that 
differences reported by Gentner & Medina (1998) may stem 
from greater attention automatically attracted to 
perceptually-rich elements.  
Finally, there is evidence that although young children 
have difficulty processing relations under regular 
conditions, they are significantly more likely to process 
relations when relations are labeled (Gentner & 
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Loewenstein, 2002; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996).  Again, it 
seem that labels attract attention to relations thus making it 
easier to ignore elements. 
It seems that these examples demonstrate that, unless 
attention is attracted to relations and away from elements, 
participants are more likely to automatically attend to 
elements, and attention to elements may interfere with their 
processing of relations.  Recall that current research used a 
highly familiar relation of numerical equivalence, and 
interference effects manifested themselves in a decresed 
latency or accuracy.  However, it is possible that when 
relations are less familiar, interference may result in a 
failure to detect a relation. 
In short, reported results indicate that elements are 
detected automatically.  The results also indicate that 
perceptual richness of elements amplifies the effect of 
automatic detections of elements.  It is possible that 
automatic detection of elements may interfere with 
processing of relations, especially when the task is to ignore 
elements. 
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Abstract
The problem of whether human causal judgments could be
better explained by associationistic or probabilistic accounts
is dealt with in the paper that reviews the basic tenets of the
power PC theory (Cheng, 1997), the most famous of the prob-
abilistic explanations, and discusses some results obtained by
Fum & Stocco (2003) that are at odds with power PC predic-
tions. An integrated model is described that is capable of ex-
plaining those findings, and a new experiment is presented in
which the predictions of the model and of the power PC the-
ory are contrasted in the case in which the causal power of a
compound cue is equal to one of its components. The results
clearly corroborate the model that provides, moreover, an ex-
planation for some data that lie outside the scope of the power
PC theory.
Introduction
Recent research on adult causal cognition has been focusing
on two main kinds of theoretical explanations that capture
many of the central findings in the field.
Associative accounts (Shanks, 1995) consider the causal
reasoning performed by humans as similar to the classi-
cal conditioning happening in animals and claim that, be-
cause both processes involve the detection of the same pre-
dictive relations, they may use a common mechanism. The
most famous model in this class is that of Rescorla & Wag-
ner (1972)—henceforth R&W—that has been successfully
applied to account for a series of phenomena—like blocking
(Kamin, 1969), overshadowing (Price & Yates, 1993), con-
ditioned inhibition (Chapman & Robbins, 1990), and con-
tingency effects (Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984), to
name only a few—that were originally discovered in animals,
and that have been demonstrated to play a critical role in hu-
man causal learning, too.
Probabilistic theories, on the other hand, rely essentially on
the analysis of the contingencies that organisms are supposed
to acquire by interacting with their environment, and try to
estimate the extent to which a cue (or potential cause) can
determine a given outcome. The most famous among these
accounts is constituted by Cheng’s power PC theory (Cheng,
1997), an extension of the probabilistic contrast model devel-
oped by Cheng & Novick (1990).
Fum & Stocco (2003) argued that associative and proba-
bilistic models possibly cover distinct steps in human causal
induction, with associative accounts describing the processes
by which people (and animals) notice and extract statistical
connections between events, and probabilistic models captur-
ing the reasoning skills brought to bear in causal cognition.
Investigating the role of compound cues in causal judgments,
however, they obtained experimental findings that could not
be explained, in their entirety, by either group of theories.
In the paper we review the power PC theory and illustrate
some results obtained in Fum & Stocco (2003) that seem to
falsify it. We present a new model that, while being compat-
ible with previous data, is able to explain those puzzling re-
sults. We describe an experiment in which our model and the
power PC make contrasting predictions, and we present find-
ings that corroborate our hypothesis. We discuss some further
data that, while implied by our model, are out of the scope of
the power PC theory. We conclude the paper by summarizing
the features of our account of human causal cognition and by
outlining some possible developments.
A Probabilistic Account
Perhaps the simplest of the probabilistic models of causation
is given by the ∆P rule (Jenkins & Ward, 1965) that formal-
izes the idea that people mentally compare the frequency of
an outcome O in presence and in absence of a given cue C:
∆Pc = P(O|C)−P(O|¬C). If the difference is around 0, the
outcome is just as likely when the cue is present as when it is
absent; if it approaches 1, C is perceived as producing O; if it
approaches −1, the cue is seen as preventing the outcome.
Relying on this idea, Cheng & Novick (1990) developed
their probabilistic contrast model assuming that, in presence
of a set of possible causes for an effect, the ∆P for each cause
is computed on the so-called focal set, defined as “a contex-
tually determined set of events that the reasoner uses as input
to the covariation process” (Cheng, 1997, p. 371). When a
putative cause is taken into account, all other causal factors
are kept constant within the focal set, and ∆P is computed on
a background of constant alternative causes.
The transition from the probabilistic contrast model to the
power PC theory was motivated by a series of problems that
could not be adequately explained by the former nor by al-
ternative associative accounts like the R&W. The power PC
theory essentially computes how much a ∆P judgment should
be discounted for providing an estimate of the causal power
of a cue. It also detects special conditions in which the causal
power cannot be deduced from ∆P.
One of the tenets of the theory is that, whenever the possi-
ble alternatives to a candidate cause C are kept under control
and ∆P is non negative, C (i.e., the causal power of C to gen-
erate the outcome O) is given by:
C = ∆Pc
1−P(O|¬C)
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According to the power PC theory, identical values of ∆P
associated with different values of P(O|¬C), the base rate,
will lead to different causal judgments. When the alternative
causes are controlled, the theory predicts that, with ∆P kept
constant, the causal power increases with an increase in the
value of the base rate. As a special case, if the base rate is
equal to 1, the causal power remains undefined, because the
denominator becomes 0. If the base rate is equal to 0, the
power PC reduces to the probabilistic contrast model, and the
causal power depends exclusively on ∆P. Finally, if ∆P is 0,
the causal power of C is 0, too.
Fum & Stocco (2003) focused on some interesting conse-
quences of Cheng’s theory concerning the role of compound
cues, and set up an experiment to test them. To reduce the
complexity of the theoretical framework, and to establish a
clear experimental paradigm, four assumptions were made.
First, the causal power of a generic cue A was defined as the
probability that, all other things being equal, the cue would
produce the outcome O: A = P(O|A). Second, a given out-
come had a null probability of being obtained in absence of
the cue: P(O|¬A) = 0. Third, all cues were considered as
independent. Fourth, all the cues were pure causes: none of
them was an enabling condition (Cheng & Novick, 1991) nor
needed any enabling conditions to produce its effect.
Given these assumptions, it is possible to deduce1 some
important consequences from the power PC theory. We focus
here on two of them:
Irrelevance of Compound Previous experience with a cue
presented in a compound form should be irrelevant to the
judgment of its causal power, given that there are trials in
which the cue appears alone. It is a tenet of both the power PC
theory and of the probabilistic contrast model that only items
in the focal set—where everything, but the candidate cause
whose causal power is being evaluated, is kept constant—are
taken into account to compute ∆P. Let us consider, for in-
stance, the classical backward blocking paradigm (Chapman,
1991; Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Shanks, 1985), where com-
pound trials of the form (A,B → O) are followed by a set of
trials of the form (A → B). In this context, an adequate fo-
cal set to evaluate the causal power of the blocking cue A
is constituted by trials (A → O) only, because by including
(A,B → O) in the set, the cue B would also vary. The power
PC theory therefore predicts that a previous presentation of a
compound cue (A,B→O) should not influence the following
judgment for cue A.
Equalization to Compound Sometimes it could be neces-
sary to estimate the causal power of a cue over an inadequate
focal set. Taking the example of backward blocking again
into account, it should be noted that the trials (A,B → O)
constitute an inadequate focal set for evaluating the causal
powers of A and of B because both cues are covariant within
the same set. However, this is exactly what participants in the
control group of that paradigm are requested to do, and what a
theory is supposed to provide an explanation for. When par-
ticipants are forced to make a judgment, they should adopt
the trials (A,B → O) as a focal set, and this would lead them
to assign both cues the same causal power of the compound.
1We refer to the original paper for the mathematical derivations.
Given the fact that the effect is never obtained without the
cause, and that each possible cause appears in the set of trials
(A,B → O), it is possible to demonstrate that A = P(O|A,B)
i.e. the causal power of cue A should be equal to the probabil-
ity of obtaining the outcome given the compound. The same
should be true for B.
The experiment carried out in Fum & Stocco (2003) ob-
tained findings that falsified these predictions. More pre-
cisely, contrary to the irrelevance of compound hypothesis,
judgments concerning a cue A, experienced only in a com-
pound form (i.e. together with another cue B), were signif-
icantly higher than judgments for the same cue experienced
alone. In a similar vein, and contrary to the equalization to
compound prediction, the judgments for a cue A, experienced
only in a compound form, were significantly lower than judg-
ments given to the compound cue embedding A.
While no theoretical explanation for these results was pro-
vided in the paper, the findings clearly suggested the exis-
tence of important factors determining causal judgements that
lie beyond the scope of the power PC theory.
An Integrated Model
Trying to find an explanation for the results reported in Fum
& Stocco (2003), we assume that people are able to acquire
some knowledge about the contingencies that exist between
cues and outcomes. A significant role is played in this phase
by associative processes that contribute to the construction of
an internal representation for the magnitude of the (single and
compound) cues that were directly experienced. There is ev-
idence that it is possible to spontaneously learn such knowl-
edge by interacting with the environment (e.g., Hasher & Za-
cks, 1984), and we assume that people rely on this informa-
tion in providing the judgments for those situations they ac-
tually encountered.
When a judgment about the causal power of a cue expe-
rienced only in compound form is required, the information
about the stored magnitudes is used to infer the causal power
of the individual novel stimuli, too. This process resembles
reverse engineering, because people are supposed to figure
out a conceivable distribution for the magnitudes of the sin-
gle cues that could originate the magnitude of the compound
representation.
Let us consider the top panel of Figure 1, that depicts the
situation typically encountered in a blocking paradigm. The
model assumes that, by interacting with the environment and
by noticing the contingencies between cues and outcomes,
people are able to construct an internal representation for the
causal power of the cues they experience directly—for in-
stance, A, (A,B), and others, like C. The stored magnitude
could be a more or less faithful representation of the actual
causal power of a given cue but, in any case, it constitutes the
basis for causal judgments. To estimate the causal power of
an experienced cue, people rely on its magnitude representa-
tion, and translate it into the required numerical scale.
When requested to provide an estimate for a cue that was
experienced only in compound form (B, in our example), they
try to figure out a sensible value for it—in our case, a magni-
tude for B compatible with the magnitude of both A and the
compound (A,B). This process involves a comparison only
between those cues that are relevant for deriving the causal
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Figure 1: Phases of causal judgement. Top (associative):
Causal powers for cues represented as inner magnitudes. Bot-
tom (probabilistic): Inferring the value of cue B, that has not
been experienced.
power of B (in our example A and (A,B)) and excludes the
others (in our case, C). The set of cues taken into considera-
tion conforms to the notion of focal set.
First, we shall observe that the causal power of B, which
we denote through its boldface name B, cannot be smaller
than the difference between (A,B), the causal power of the
compound, and A: if it were so, a certain part of the overall
compound effect would remain unexplained: a “rod” shorter
than (A,B)−A could not cover the whole length of the rod
representing (A,B). Therefore, Bmin = (A,B)−A. Gener-
ally, some part of the causal power of B will be shadowed by
A: if we simply subtract A from the compound (A,B), we
would in fact grossly underestimate the causal power of B.
On the other hand, B cannot be greater than (A,B), so that,
Bmax = (A,B).
The model therefore assumes that is “rational” to provide
as a judgment for the causal power of B a value lying between
Bmin and Bmax. All the values between this range are plausi-
ble and coherent with the magnitude of the associatively ex-
perienced contingencies. The particular judgments provided
by participants vary stochastically between this range. The
mean expected value for B is therefore obtained by weighting
each possible B by its probability P(B):
B =
∫ Bmax
Bmin
BP(B)dB
For any symmetrically distributed probability function
P(B), the previous equation reduces to the average between
Bmin and Bmax:
B = (A,B)− 1
2
A
Explaining Previous Results
Not surprisingly, the model can accommodate the results ob-
tained by Fum & Stocco (2003). Two main findings were
reported in that paper. First, some associative effects resulted
in a systematic distortion of the causal judgments provided
by the participants. The model assumes that these effects are
confined to the first phase of the process leading to causal
judgments, where inner magnitudes of contingencies are sup-
posed to be acquired.
The second result is more interesting, and it seems critical
for the power PC theory. In order to account for backward
blocking—one of the most robust and popular contingency
learning phenomena—a theory should be able to explain how
people make a causal judgment about a cue that has been
experienced only in compound form. As previously noted,
power PC either should exclude taking into account the inad-
equate focal set (A,B→O), denying thus itself the possibility
to account for backward blocking, or should predict, by using
only that available set, that the judgments about the causal
power of A and B will be equal that of the compound (A,B).
Our model makes a different prediction. According to it,
participants are supposed to construct a mental representa-
tion of the causal power of A and B such that, by joining (and
possibly overlapping) them, they will cover that of the com-
pound (A,B). Because the magnitude of the causal power of
one of the cues, let us say A, should be obviously comprised
between 0 and (A,B), the estimate for the mean causal power
B could be computed by averaging on the predicted values of
B, computed on all the values for A comprised between these
extremes:
B =
∫ (A,B)
0
(
(A,B)− 1
2
A
)
dA
/
(A,B)
By solving this equation we obtain:
B =
3
4
(A,B)
The same result will hold, of course, for A.
In the experiment of Fum & Stocco (2003) the value for
(A,B) was set to 0.80. Under this condition, the model pre-
dicts that A = B = 0.60. The judgments provided by par-
ticipants were A = 0.62 and B = 0.61, respectively, with
the difference being not statistically significant. It is useful
to remind that, according to the power PC theory A = B =
(A,B) = 0.80.
Some New Predictions
A model should be considered as good not because it is able
to explain previous data but because it allows making bold
predictions about future events. For most of the cases, our
model produces estimates of the causal power that are close to
those provided by the power PC theory. It makes, however, a
completely different prediction when, in an extreme blocking
situation, the causal power of the compound is equal to the
causal power of one of its components: (A,B) = A.
Causal Judgments Under this condition, the power PC the-
ory predicts that, independently of the values assumed by
(A,B) and A, the cue B will be perceived as having a null
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causal power. In this case, B is the candidate cause, and A is
a background cause, as assumed in Cheng’s framework. The
focal set for B is constituted by all of the trials (A,B→O) and
(A→ O). In this set, P(O|B) may be estimated as P(O|A,B),
and P(O|¬B) is given by P(O|A). Given that, we can apply
the standard equation for the causal power:
B =
P(O|A,B)−P(O|A)
1−P(O|A)
Since P(O|A,B) = P(O|A), it follows that B = 0.2
On the contrary, according to our model, B will be given a
value equal to (A,B)−A/2. Because, (A,B) has been sup-
posed equal to A, it follows that B = A/2, i.e, we expect that
the causal power of B will be judged to be about half of the
value of the causal power of A.
Because the model provides some details about the pro-
cesses underlying causal judgment, it allows making some
predictions that lie outside the scope of competitive accounts.
More particularly, it predicts the following:
Confidence Ratings According to the model, trying to pro-
vide a judgment about the causal power of an experienced
cue (e.g. A in the backward blocking paradigm), participants
rely on an existing stored representation. On the other hand,
when requested to assess the causal power of a cue that has
been experienced only in a compound form (e.g., B, in the
same paradigm) they cannot access a similar representation
to assign a reliable value to B, and that constitutes an im-
portant source of uncertainty. When requested to estimate the
confidence according to which they provide their causal judg-
ments, participants should therefore trust their judgment for
cue A more than that provided for B.
Latencies In the backward blocking paradigm—in which
the presentation of a compound stimulus (A,B → O) is fol-
lowed by the presentation of one of the its components, e.g.,
(A → O)—the judgment concerning the causal power of A
could be produced by reading off the value of its internal
representation built according to associational principles. To
provide a judgment for B, on the other hand, it is necessary to
take into account the range of possible values that a coherent
judgment could assume, i.e., it is necessary to resort to the
second phase hypothesized by the model. As a consequence,
the time need to provide a judgment for B should be longer
than that spent in trying to assess the value for A.
The Experiment
To put these ideas under empirical testing, we carried out an
experiment, using the Tanks paradigm introduced by Shanks
(1985), in which the predictions of our model were directly
compared with those deriving from the power PC theory.
Method
Participants The participants were 111 college students
(28 males and 83 females) aged between 18 and 36 years
2Cheng (1997) derived a computational analysis of the R&W
model showing that, under particular conditions—that were met by
our experiment—it asymptotically computes a probabilistic contrast
over a focal set. It is therefore possible to conclude that, the R&W
model makes here the same prediction of the power PC, i.e., B = 0.
(mean and median = 20) enrolled in an introductory Psychol-
ogy course.
Design and Procedure Participants saw a series of trials in
which a picture of an army tank moved across a computer
screen. On every trial a weapon system fired, and the tank
was hit by one or two projectiles; in some trials the tank was
destroyed, in others it remained undamaged. At the moment
the weapon fired, one or two colored lights went on in the
lower part of the computer screen. The color of the light indi-
cated the kind of projectile that was used. Conceptually, each
light could be considered as a separate cue, and the explosion
of the tank could be regarded as the outcome.
The experimental session consisted of two sets of 20 tri-
als each. In every trial from the first set two projectiles were
contemporaneously fired—this phase could be indicated by
(A,B → O). In each trial from the second set one of the pro-
jectiles was fired alone (A → O). Three experimental condi-
tions were set up, each condition differing in the probability
of the tank being distroyed by the projectiles. The probabil-
ities were equal to 0.2 (Low), 0.5 (Medium) and 0.8 (High).
In the Low condition, therefore, the tank was (randomly) de-
stroyed 4 times in 20 trials, while in the Medium and High
condition it was destroyed 10 and 16 times, respectively. The
probability of the tank being destroyed by two projectiles
in trials from the first set was the same as the probability
of being destroyed by a single projectile in the others, i.e.,
P(A,B → O) = P(A → O). Finally, trials from the two sets
were randomly interleaved for each participant, and partici-
pants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition.
Participants were requested to judge the efficacy of each
kind of projectile on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, where
0 indicated null efficacy (i.e., the projectile never destroyed
the tank) and 100 maximum efficacy (i.e., the projectile al-
ways destroyed the tank). They were also asked to indicate,
on a seven point scale, the confidence with which they formu-
lated their judgments about the causal power of each projec-
tile. The last main dependent variable that was recorded was
constituted by time needed to provide each causal judgment.
At the beginning, participants read an instructions sheet,
written in Italian, that explained the task. After that, they saw
four practice trials. The tank was randomly destroyed in two
of the trials, and in the remaining two it was left undamaged.
At this point the experiment could start. Two colors (cho-
sen in a set that comprised red, yellow, green, and blue) were
randomly assigned to the two projectiles used in each exper-
iment session, and the participants were exposed to the 20
trials of the first phase and 20 trials of the second one. To
ensure that participants paid attention to the presentation tri-
als, during the experiment four “control” screens appeared at
randomly chosen times asking participants to indicate what
they had just seen, i.e. which projectile/s was/were fired and
whether the tank had been destroyed.
At the end of the presentation trials, participants were
asked to provide their judgment about the efficacy of each
of the two projectiles they had experienced. After that, they
were requested to rate their causal judgments, i.e., to indi-
cate how confident they were about the correctness of their
answers.
Stimuli and Apparatus The experiment was performed on
a PC equipped with a 15” LCD flat screen and headphones. A
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custom-made program written in Java was utilized to present
the stimuli and to record the participants’ judgments. During
the presentation trials, the picture of a tank (120 x 45 pixels)
moved at constant speed crossing the screen from right to left.
A disk (with a diameter of 300 pixel) in the center of the
screen simulated the view finder of the weapon system and
displayed a desert landscape. The area of the screen outside
the disk was kept blank. The tank was visible only when it
crossed the disk (employing 3300 ms to cover its diameter),
in the remaining time participants could only hear the engine
sound through the headphones.
When the tank was approximately at half of its path, com-
pletely visible within the view finder, the weapon fired: one
or two gunfire sounds were heard and one or two lights, rep-
resented by round LEDs (with diameter of 150 pixels) were
lit up with the color of the projectile that had been shot.
The tank was always hit, and 1000 ms after the LEDs were
brightened, it flashed for 300 ms to simulate the projectile
impact. In the trials in which the tank was destroyed, an ex-
plosion sound was heard, and the tank was covered by a dust
cloud that, after it dissolved, left visible only the wreck. In
the trials in which the tank was left undamaged it continued
its course until disappearing from the view. In both cases the
LEDs remained lit. Each trial lasted approximately 7.5 s; af-
ter that, with a shutter effect, the view finder was closed and
opened again, and a new trial began.
The control screen utilized to monitor the participants’ at-
tention had four LEDs placed at the vertices of an imaginary
rectangle positioned at the center of the monitor, each LED
associated with two radio button labeled “Yes” and “No”, re-
spectively. Participants were asked to indicate which LEDs
were lit (and which projectiles were fired) in the very last
trial. Moreover, they had to indicate whether the tank had
been destroyed or not by choosing between two more yes/no
buttons.
The judgments about the efficacy of each projectile were
collected through separate screens. In each screen a colored
LED was presented together with a request to provide a judg-
ment about the projectile by setting a slider. The mark was
positioned at the middle of the slider and the value for the
judgment was set to “unassigned”. As soon as the participant
started moving the mark, an integer value appeared on screen
indicating the mark position on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.
The confidence rating were collected by having participants
check one of seven radio buttons. The buttons at the extremes
were labeled with the Italian equivalents of “No Confidence”
and “Complete Confidence”, respectively.
Results
To avoid considering data that did not accurately reflect the
phenomena under investigation, participants that made four
or more errors (over a total of 20 possible answers) in the
control task were excluded from the sample.3 The data of
19 (out of 111) participants were thus discarded, and the fol-
lowing analyses were carried out on the remaining ones: 28
participants in the Low condition, 30 in the Medium, and 34
in the High condition, respectively.
3The same criterion had been adopted in Fum & Stocco (2003).
Table 1: Mean causal judgments for A and B
Low Medium High
Judgment for A 41.32 64.53 75.44
Judgment for B 23.48 39.83 48.53
Causal Judgments The causal judgments provided by par-
ticipants are reported in Table 1 and illustrated in the top
panel of Figure 2. A mixed-design ANOVA was carried out
having Condition (Low vs Medium vs High) as a between-
subjects and Judgment (A vs B) as a within-subjects variable.
The analysis showed as significant the main effects of the
Condition (F(2,89) = 34.44, MSE = 1125.90, p < .0001)
and of the Judgment (F(2,89) = 55.29,MSE = 24357, p <
.0001) but not their interaction. Contrary to the power PC
predictions, participants provided judgments for the causal
power of B that were completely different from the expected
zero value (t(88) = 14.50, p < .0001). In accordance with
the predictions of our model, their judgments for the causal
power of A and B differed significantly, and the value of the
judgments increased with an increase in causal power of the
compound stimulus (A,B). The model, however, makes a
stronger prediction, i.e., that the ratio between the two stimuli
should be constant. We calculated this ratio for each partici-
pant, and then computed the mean of the ratios for each con-
dition. Results are reported in the bottom part of Figure 2:
ratios remained constant across conditions, with only slight
and insignificant differences among them. Values of the ra-
tios were around 0.6, close to our estimate, i.e. 0.5. This
result could be considered more than satisfactory being our
model completely parameter-free.
Confidence Ratings In analyzing confidence ratings and
latencies, we pooled the data of all the participants because
Figure 2: Mean causal judgments (top) and mean ratios be-
tween B and A (bottom) in the experimental conditions.
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our model does not discriminate, under these aspects, among
the different conditions.
We found that the confidence ratings for A (mean = 3.85)
were indeed greater than those for B (mean = 3.52), the
difference—as revealed by a two-tailed, paired t-test—being
statistically significant (t(91) = 2.48, p = 0.01). However, to
take into account the possibility that the confidence ratings—
collected through a seven point Likert scale—did not con-
form to a normal distribution, we conducted also a Wilcoxon
Matched-Paired test that confirmed the existence of the effect
(T = 676.00, N = 92, p = 0.04).
Latencies An even strongest corroboration for our model
came from the analysis of latencies. As predicted, the mean
time needed to express a jugdment for A (17.18 s) resulted
smaller than the time needed for B (21.31 s). A t-test con-
firmed that the difference was significant (t(90) = 2.14, p =
0.04). The difference remained significant taking into ac-
count the square root (t(90) =−2.11, p = 0.03) and the log-
arithm (t(90) = 2.07, p = 0.04) of the latencies. Causal in-
duction processes seem to respect the time course we hypoth-
esized.
Conclusions
In the paper we presented a model of high level cognitive
processes in causal induction that is able to explain previous
findings that resulted antithetical to some predictions of the
power PC theory, and that can take into account new data
that are at odds with, or beyond the scope of, that theory.
The model assumes that, when required to provide a causal
judgment, people recur to both associative and probabilistic
processes. These processes play, however, a different role in
causal cognition: associative processes contribute to the con-
struction of an internal representation of the power of directly
experienced cues, while probabilistic reasoning is required to
estimate the magnitude of the non directly perceived ones.
In the paper we have gone one step further in the descrip-
tion of the cognitive processes underlying such judgments,
and we have extended the set of data that may be taken into
consideration to discriminate between different accounts. We
find particularly important the fact that participants were able
to express faithful subjective confidence about their own abil-
ity to estimate the causal power of different cues, an indi-
cation that these estimates lie above the subjective threshold
(Dienes & Perner, 1999) and, therefore, that some kind of
explicit knowledge is required to provide these judgments.
We are currently working to extend the model on
paradigms other than blocking, and to provide finer estimates
of human causal judgment. In particular we think that as-
sociative effects, probably reflecting an evolutionarily older,
non-specific learning system, shall be further investigated.
Our model might be of guidance in determing under which
conditions such effects may overcome the explicit processes
we described.
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Abstract
Psychological similarity has been invoked to ex-
plain many phenomena, including judgments of
the strength of inductive arguments (Osherson et
al., 1990). The present work follows the sugges-
tion of Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001) that judg-
ments of similarity and judgments of argument
strength cohere because they are essentially judg-
ments of the same kind, which consult the same
knowledge of properties of objects or classes. I
work backward from people’s judgments of argu-
ment strength and similarity to the knowledge of
properties–specifically, knowledge of probable prop-
erty extensions–that might explain the coherence
among those judgments. I show that the knowl-
edge inferred can be used to predict other such judg-
ments. I then examine this knowledge for structural
properties such as taxonomic organization.
Induction, or generalization from examples, is a
central cognitive capacity in need of two kinds of ex-
planation: (1) What representations and processes
underly induction? (2) Why do we have those repre-
sentations, and carry out those processes? That is,
to the degree that they work, what relation to right
reason explains their success? I focus here on the
second question, and with respect to just one much-
studied inductive task, category-based induction.
To illustrate this task, consider the following in-
ductive argument (after Osherson, et al. , 1990)
Chimpanzees require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis.
Gorillas require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis.
Mammals require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis. (1)
Horizontal lines separate conclusions from their
premises. The premises assert facts about categories
of objects, and the conclusions do not (in general)
follow deductively.
Osherson et al. collected extensive judgments of
the strength of such arguments–that is, the sub-
jective probability of the conclusions, given the
premises. The arguments contained various mix-
tures of ten species of mammals in the premises,
but all conclusions were about either ‘horses’ or ‘all
mammals’ (the set of all mammals is approximated,
in all models discussed here, by the set of ten mam-
mals used in the arguments)1.
In order to study argument strength, rather than
particular knowledge of predicates, the premises
and conclusion assert so-called ‘blank’ predicates of
species, about which experimental participants will
not have direct knowledge. The biological sound of
the predicates, and the fact that they are asserted
to be true of all members of one or more species, are
clues that they are biological properties. The inten-
tion, then, is that participants have no choice but to
fall back on categorical biological knowledge.
Osherson et al. propose the similarity-coverage
model, which predicts the judged strength of these
arguments as a function of judgments of pairwise
similarity among the species of animals in them. The
strength g(X,Y ) of a conclusion, according to this
model, is a weighted sum of (1) the similarity of
the premise categories X to the conclusion category
Y , and (2) the degree to which the diversity of the
premise categories ‘covers’ the lowest superordinate
category S including both the premise categories and
the conclusion category:
g(X,Y ) =
αmax
i
sim(Xi, Y ) +
(1− α)
∑
j
max
i
sim(Xi, Sj).
1In what follows, in addition to the 81 judgments
studied by Osherson et al. , I use data on 28 addi-
tional judgments, collected by Sanjana and Tenenbaum
(2003). They designed these additional generalization
judgments to demonstrate effects which their Bayesian
model could explain, but which the Osherson et al. model
could not. Again, ‘horse’ was the only species in the con-
clusions. The innovation was repeated examples of the
same species, which required a cover story that makes
such examples reasonable. Participants observed a set
of example animals–individual animals–with a particu-
lar disease, and were then asked to judge the probability
that horses could get the disease. Trusting that par-
ticipants assume that disease susceptibility is a species
property, I aggregate these data with the Osherson et al.
data.
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Osherson et al. test their model against a number
of robust qualitative patterns in the way the plau-
sibilities people assign to such arguments relate to
the similarities of the categories used. A few exam-
ples of these patterns will illustrate the utility of the
similarity and coverage terms. The argument
Chimpanzees require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis.
Gorillas require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis. (2)
is stronger than the argument
Chimpanzees require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis.
Dolphins require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis. (3)
because gorillas are more like chimpanzees than dol-
phins are. The argument
Chimpanzees require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis.
Dolphins require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis.
Mammals require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis. (4)
is stronger than argument (1), which may be ex-
plained by the greater ‘coverage’ of the set of mam-
mals by ‘chimpanzees and dolphins’ than by ‘chim-
panzees and gorillas’.
It may strike the reader that these intuitions re-
quire more than purely psychological, ad hoc expla-
nations, for surely they are correct. If so, they re-
quire normative (Bayesian) explanation. This point
has been addressed by several authors, beginning
with Heit (1998).
There are a number of other reasons for dissat-
isfaction with an explanation of judgments of argu-
ment strength in terms of judgments of similarity,
having nothing to do with the degree of predictive
success of the similarity-coverage model. The most
obvious, perhaps, is that similarity and argument
strength are judgments of equal status, equally in
need of explanation. Another objection is that the
judged similarity of x to y is not a stable, context-
free property of the pair (Tversky, 1977). If judg-
ments of similarity must be computed on-the-fly,
as judgments of the strength of arguments presum-
ably are, then whatever knowledge is consulted when
computing similarities could be consulted when com-
puting argument strengths, without computing sim-
ilarity as an intermediary. This is, in essence, the
kind of explanation proposed in the Bayesian mod-
els of Sanjana and Tenenbaum (2003) and Kemp and
Tenenbaum (2003). For purposes of direct compar-
ison, they predicted argument strengths from simi-
larities, just as Osherson, et al. did, but did so by
way of inferring taxonomic knowledge presumed to
underly both similarity and argument strength judg-
ments.
Bayesian generalization
Before discussing the details of particular proposals,
I will briefly review the notion of category-based in-
duction as Bayesian generalization, as formulated by
Tenenbaum and colleagues. We assume that:
• The premise categories are random samples from
the set c of categories having the target ‘blank’
property.
• Prior to receipt of any examples, the generalizer
has a hypothesis space H, where each hypothesis
h ∈ H is a possible extension for the target prop-
erty. The generalizer also has a probability distri-
bution over H, which represents the prior degree
of belief that each candidate is the extension of
the target property. This prior distribution may
itself be sensitive to (conditional on) other infor-
mation, for instance, about the kind of property
being generalized.
The probability that a category y is a member
of the set c, given a set of n examples x drawn at
random from c , can be found by summing over hy-
potheses:
P (y ∈ c|x ∼ c, ξ) =∑
h
P (y ∈ c|c = h)P (c = h|x ∼ c, ξ).
Here x ∼ cmeans that the examples x are random
draws from c, and ξ represents background informa-
tion. The first term is 1 if y ∈ h, and 0 otherwise.
The second term can be re-written in an enlighten-
ing form by Bayes rule:
P (y ∈ c|x ∼ c, ξ) =∑
h3y P (x ∼ c|c = h)P (c = h|ξ)∑
h′ P (x ∼ c|c = h′)P (c = h′|ξ)
.
The terms P (x ∼ c|c = h) represent the prob-
ability of seeing just the examples x in n draws
from h. Assuming that items in h are drawn with
equal probability, then the probability of drawing
any particular item in a single draw is 1/|h|. Then
P (x ∼ c|c = h) is |h|−n, if h contains all the exam-
ples in x, and zero otherwise. The likelihood term
P (x ∼ c|c = h) depends only on the examples and
the contents of h, so we see now that ξ represents
information we may have, prior to seeing the exam-
ples, about the probability of the various possible
extensions. In what follows, I suppress this term to
make the notation simpler.
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Further abbreviating P (c = h) to P (h), we can
re-write the above as
P (y ∈ c|x ∼ c) =
∑
h⊃y∪x |h|−nP (h)∑
h′⊃x |h′|−nP (h′)
. (1)
Note that the sum in the denominator can be bro-
ken into two sums: one is the same as that in the
numerator, and the other is over those hypotheses
that contain the x but not y. Generalization, then,
depends on two weighted sums: one over the prop-
erties common to both x and y, and another over
those distinctive to x. Each summand is weighted
by both its prior plausibility and its likelihood or
‘fit’ to the examples.
The two terms have different jobs to do. The fit
for extension h–that is, |h|−n–gives an advantage to
smaller extensions, which is exponential in the num-
ber of examples. Without a likelihood term sensi-
tive to the number of examples, we miss an impor-
tant phenomenon: given that examples are consis-
tent with two extensions, increasing the number of
examples ought to shift weight to the more specific
extension. For instance, suppose our prior gives high
weight to the classes ‘mammal’ and ‘rodent’. Then,
given ‘mouse’ as an example of a species with prop-
erty P , either class is quite plausible. But adding
the further examples ‘gerbil’ and ‘hamster’ ought,
intuitively, to give a strong advantage to ‘rodent’,
because the selection of three rodents from the larger
class is highly coincidental. The likelihood term cap-
tures this focusing effect.
Without prior preferences for some extensions
over others, the likelihood or ‘fit’ term will always
favor the extension consisting of just the examples,
and will have no preference among larger extensions
of the same size. For example, given ‘mouse’ and
‘gerbil’ as examples of species with some property,
generalization to ‘turtle’ will be just as strong as
that to ‘hamster’. A prior favoring the natural class
‘rodents’ over ‘rodents minus hamsters, plus turtles’
prevents this bizarre behavior.
Similarity as a function of generalization
probabilities Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001)
have argued that the similarity of x to y is a func-
tion of the probability of generalizing from x to y, or
vice-versa, or both. This move gives the infamously
slippery notion of similarity some solid footing on
the ground of reason, because generalization has a
normative foundation in Bayesian statistics. They
also show how this view rationalizes earlier work on
formalizing similarity and generalization.
For present purposes, we need not delve deeply
into the question of just how generalization proba-
bilities determine similarities. I assume, as Osherson
et al. do, that similarity is symmetrical, and, further,
that it has this particularly simple form:
sim(x, y) ≡ (2)
P (y ∈ c|x ∼ c) + P (x ∈ c|y ∼ c)
2
.
Intuitively, this definition says that two items are
similar to the degree that one is likely to have a
property that the other exemplifies.
Previous work on Bayesian modeling of
category-based induction
Various restrictions on the form of the prior could be
entertained. For instance, each species might corre-
spond to a location in a low-dimensional Euclidean
‘psychological space’, with higher priors assigned to
sets contained by convex or connected regions. The
restricted families of priors investigated by Tenen-
baum and colleagues are based on binary trees, with
species at the leaves. The sets with highest priors
are those corresponding to single subtrees, but some
probability is assigned to sets picked out by multi-
ple subtrees. Sanjana and Tenenbaum use a generic
method for assigning probabilities to disjunctions of
a basis set of hypotheses (in this case, single sub-
trees), while Kemp and Tenenbaum define a simple
‘mutation’ process that can generate arbitrary hy-
potheses, but assigns lower probability to those that
require many mutations, or mutations over short
branches.
The proponents of these tree-based priors stress
that taxonomic trees are not just another restricted
family of priors; they are also an independently-
motivated theory of the domain. People around
the world seem to organize creatures into ‘folk tax-
onomies’ (Atran, 1995), and the geneology of species
does, indeed, form a tree. This kind of theory may
be applicable in domains besides biology: even arti-
fact kinds are often the result of a process of copying
and modifying earlier designs.
One obvious way to compare various proposed
families of priors is to compare predictive accura-
cies: fit the parameters (for instance, the locations
of the points in a metric-space model, or the topol-
ogy and branch lengths of a tree) to subsets of the
judgments and see how well each model predicts the
rest.
Rather than competing with previous models on
data fit, I take a complementary, ‘empirical Bayes’
approach (see, for instance, Gelman, et al. , 1995):
I place no constraints on the form of the prior, find
priors that do a good job predicting the data, and
then examine those priors for structural properties.
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This strategy has an obvious pitfall: an unre-
stricted search for a prior that makes the data prob-
able may over-fit the accidental properties of the
training data, especially, as in this case, when there
are many more parameters than data points. Before
examining the prior for interesting structural prop-
erties, therefore, I demonstrate that the model is not
over-fitting so badly as to be uninformative.
Computing a prior from judgments
For any given hypothesis space and prior, Bayesian
generalization yields point estimates for a set of sim-
ilarities and/or argument strengths. To accommo-
date noisy human data, I take these point estimates
to be central tendencies.
In what follows, I refer to the model’s prediction
of the ith judgment, given a prior, θ, as jmi (θ) (this
is given by either equation 1 or equation 2, above).
The actual human judgment I denote jhi . A simple
noise model that respects the constraint that both
generalization probabilities and similarities must be
between 0 and 1 assumes that
log
(
jhi
1− jhi
)
∼ N
(
log
(
jhi
1− jhi
)
, σ2
)
.
In words, we apply a transform to each model pre-
diction that may (conveniently) take on any real
value, and assume that the similarly-transformed
human judgment is normally distributed around this
transformed prediction.
A bit of work (omitted here) reveals that the log-
likelihood (up to an additive constant) of a set of
judgments j is
P (j|θ) = (3)∑
i
log
(
jhi
1− jhi
+
1− jhi
jhi
+ 2
)
+
1
2σ2
(
log
(
jhi
1− jhi
)
− log
(
jmi (θ)
1− jmi (θ)
))2
.
The log likelihood of a set of judgments has a com-
plicated but readily-computed gradient with respect
to the prior, involving only the second term in equa-
tion 3, which can therefore be optimized by off-the-
shelf techniques. I used the method of conjugate
gradients, stopping whenever several iterations pro-
duced less than a set increase in the log likelihood of
the training data. The model was parameterized by
‘soft-max’ parameters z, where the prior probability
of extension i is given by θi = e
zi∑
j e
zj . On each run,
the z were randomly initialized such that the θ were
nearly uniform.
proportion correlations of model
used in training and data on remaining
args sims arguments similarities
0 1 .50±.026 n. a.
1 0 n. a. .88±.006
0.5 0.5 .61±.029 .77±.033
0.9 0.9 .80±.026 .72±.104
0 0.5 .29±.046 .60±.064
0.5 0 .54±.030 .67±.043
0 0.9 .41±.033 .79±.084
0.9 0 .67±.038 .82±.018
Table 1: Predictions of held-out data given various
training data. All rows show averages of ten runs,
with associated standard errors.
Predicting held-out judgments
Remarkably, this rather lavishly parameterized
model does a reasonable job of predicting randomly
held-out judgments when fit to the rest.
Tuned to the judgments of argument strength,
the model’s predictions of pair-wise similarity agree
strongly with the actual judgments, approaching a
correlation of 0.9. A number of experiments, us-
ing various proportions of each kind of judgment as
training data, are reported in table 1.
This model does relatively poorly on the task that
has been the focus of the previous work–predicting
the argument strengths, given the similarities. A
possible explanation for the deficit relative to the
other published fits is that the assumptions about
the form of the prior made explicitly by using a
tree with mutations (and perhaps implicitly in the
similarity-coverage model) are essentially correct, in
which case opening up the space of priors, as I have
done, can only reduce predictive accuracy. As fur-
ther evidence of over-fitting, early stopping would
usually have yielded better predictions, although I
could not find a single stopping rule that consistently
did so.
Given these results, we can expect that the pri-
ors converged to will reflect both the underlying
structure of people’s knowledge and, to some de-
gree, peculiarities of the data set fit by the over-
parameterized model. In the next section, I examine
the priors converged on for taxonomic structure.
The ‘shape’ of the prior
For the purpose of examining the structure of the
prior that best explains the data, I focus on results
obtained by optimizing the prior over the entire set
of judgments.
If we examine the hypotheses with highest priors,
certain patterns can be found by eye or statistical
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test. Table 2 lists the 10 sets with the highest aver-
age prior probability in a typical optimization run.
If the most probable sets are those correspond-
ing to sub-trees of a taxonomic tree, then we should
expect that most pairs of such sets will obey taxo-
nomic constraints: either one will contain the other,
or they will be disjoint. There are a suspiciously
large number of these containment relations among
the top-ranked sets–randomly generated collections
of sets have as many containment relations between
pairs as the top-ranked 100 sets only about 40 out
of 1000 times. There is an even more extreme num-
ber of disjoint pairs–exceeded not even once in 1000
random sets. Forcing the random sets to match the
top-ranked 100 in number of members makes no dif-
ference to these results.
However, there are also quite a few partially over-
lapping sets, which is not what we would expect
from a single, strictly-observed tree. The overlap
is notably non-arbitrary, however. For instance, the
sets ‘chimp, gorilla, mouse, squirrel’, ‘chimp, gorilla,
dolphin, seal’, and ‘mouse, squirrel, dolphin, seal’
are composed of just the three pair ‘dolphin, seal’,
‘chimp, gorilla’, and ‘mouse, squirrel’ (‘Mouse, squir-
rel’ is not shown here, but ranked 14th in this solu-
tion. ‘Horse, cow’, another pair one might expect, is
not far behind.).
What this might point to is a ‘mutation’ pro-
cess, as suggested by Kemp and Tenenbaum (2003).
While there are sets above that could only be ex-
plained by mutations, if a single tree is assumed,
they seem to be restricted to cases where the mu-
tations could occur over relatively long branches;
members of the very short subtrees, such as ‘dol-
phin, seal’, seem to be present or absent in tandem,
as predicted by the mutation process.
Another possibility is that the prior reflects uncer-
tainty over several taxonomies. Uncertainty about
just which taxonomy to consult may be of two kinds:
uncertainty about which taxonomy is correct ; and
uncertainty about which taxonomy is relevant to the
property under consideration. The first is a com-
monplace of probabilistic modeling, and quite intu-
itively understandable, in this case. If I perform
bottom-up, agglomerative clustering by eye, using
the two-dimensional multidimensional scaling solu-
tion in figure 1, I come up with the tree topology
used in both the Sanjana and Tenenbaum and the
Kemp and Tenenbaum papers. But only the lowest-
level clusterings are obvious. Is the ‘seal, dolphin’
cluster closer to the ‘gorilla, chimp’ cluster than the
‘mouse, squirrel’ cluster is? It is hard to tell.
The second kind of uncertainty is about which of
several trees is relevant. Even if some properties are
sealdolphin
gorilla
chimp
squirrel
mouse
cow
horse
rhino
elephant
Figure 1: A two-dimensional MDS solution for the
similarities of the ten mammals (Euclidean metric,
variance accounted for = .81)
distributed according to a particular tree/mutation
process, others are likely not to be. This is true
even if we restrict attention to biological properties
of the kind that are likely to be universal across a
species (and which therefore are sensible fodder for
the kinds of judgments we consider here). ‘Deep’
biological properties, such as having a certain or-
gan or metabolic process, are quite likely to respect
the ‘tree of life’–that representing the genealogy of
species. The distribution of other species properties,
such as what and how members eat, may be quite
random with respect to this tree, but might still re-
spect a different tree.
How might people come to have these
priors?
I proceeded above with no constraints on the form of
the prior over possible extensions of a new predicate.
People or machines asked to make these judgments,
however, have no such luxury. They must assume
that the extension of the new predicate is systemat-
ically related to some known predicate or predicates
(and, more generally, that predicates are likely to
have systematically related extensions), or have no
basis for generalization.
In addition to positing coherence among new
properties and old ones, real learners must learn
from the kind of data available in the real world.
Similarity-like data may sometimes be available, but
they are not necessary; people can observe objects
and their properties–for instance, that cows, horses,
elephants and rhinos all eat grass. Lists of such
properties are standard fodder for machine-learning
methods, including agglomerative clustering or more
sophisticated tree-finding methods. Several strate-
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rank contents
1 horse cow chimp gorilla mouse squirrel dolphin seal elephant rhino
2 dolphin seal
3 chimp gorilla mouse squirrel
4 mouse squirrel dolphin
5 chimp gorilla dolphin seal
6 horse cow gorilla squirrel elephant rhino
7 mouse squirrel dolphin seal
8 horse cow chimp gorilla mouse squirrel elephant rhino
9 chimp gorilla
10 horse cow rhino
Table 2: The 10 sets with the highest prior probability, on a single optimization over all judgments. There
are many instances of nesting, but they are not strictly compatible with any single taxonomic tree.
gies of tree-learning from such data have been ap-
plied to a number of standard machine-learning
datasets in Kemp et al. (2003).
Summary and discussion
I have suggested a novel technique of general utility
for fitting a Bayesian model to a set of judgments. I
applied this technique to a large collection of human
judgments. Without imposing a taxonomic form on
the prior, the prior of a Bayesian model optimized to
fit human judgments nevertheless shows significant
conformity to taxonomic constraints. It seems that
either participants have a bias, in the domain of ani-
mals, toward priors that respect the taxonomic con-
straints, or the raw facts about mammals have this
structure (which would, in turn, justify a taxonomic
bias).
The technique is not limited to the case of a struc-
tureless prior over a small set of possible extensions.
Any prior that has tractable derivatives with respect
to its parameters could be so optimized. In the case
of a larger number of categories, whose power set is
too large for enumeration, an approximate gradient
could be computed using a sample from the current
estimate of the prior.
A principled alternative to using held-out data
to check models, and to using null-distribution hy-
pothesis tests to look for structure in the prior, is
Bayesian model comparison: compare the marginal
likelihoods of various structures. For most interest-
ing structure classes, the sums or integrals involved
are intractable, but they can be approximated by
Markov Chain Monte Carlo or other methods.
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Abstract 
 
The belief in the hot hand was suggested to be a “cognitive 
illusion” since no significant evidence was found in the 
basketball-shooting data to reject the simple binomial model 
(Gilovich, Vallone & Tversky, 1985). The present study 
argues that in order to evaluate the validity of human 
perception and cognition such as the hot hand belief, a data-
driven approach is needed to compare multiple alternative 
models. A hot hand model with nonstationary shooting 
accuracy was tested and showed significantly better 
approximation to the data than the binomial model, indicating 
that the simple binomial model may not be accurate enough to 
serve as a normative model. This finding suggests that the hot 
hand might indeed have existed, and weakens the argument 
that the hot hand belief might be “seeing patterns out of 
randomness.” 
 
The Hot Hand and the Perception of 
Randomness 
The “hot hand” in the game of basketball has received much 
attention in cognitive psychology because it touches an 
interesting topic about human perception and cognition of 
random and non-random events outside the psychological 
laboratory. A long-lasting debate about whether the hot 
hand exists, hence, whether the hot hand belief is a valid 
cognitive activity, was triggered by three articles by 
Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky (1985), and Tversky and 
Gilovich (1989a, 1989b) (later “GVT” refers to these three 
articles as a group, unless specified otherwise). The 
researchers interpreted the hot hand belief as a manifestation 
about statistically significant deviations from what is 
expected by the simple binomial model, namely, 
nonstationary shooting accuracy or positive dependence in 
basketball shooting sequences. However, no statistical 
evidence was found to support such belief. After a number 
of statistical analyses on a large set of data, the researchers 
found that actual basketball shooting sequences were 
“indistinguishable from that produced by a simple binomial 
model” (Gilovich et al., 1985, p. 297). They concluded, 
“perhaps, then, the belief in the hot hand is merely [italics 
added] one manifestation of this fundamental misconception 
of the laws of chance” (Tversky & Gilovich, 1989a, p. 16). 
Since GVT, many studies have been carried out to 
investigate the hot hand in basketball or other sports such as 
baseball. These studies roughly fell into four categories: a) 
studies that conducted null hypothesis tests but failed to 
reject the binomial model (e.g., Adams, 1992; Albright, 
1993; Chatterjee, Yilmaz, Habibullah, & Laudato, 2000), (b) 
studies that raised concerns about the power of significance 
tests conducted by Gilovich et al. (1985) and Albright (1993) 
(e.g., Miyoshi, 2000; Stern & Morris, 1993; Sun, 2001, 
2003; Wardrop, 1999), (c) studies that proposed alternative 
models that may support the hot hand belief (e.g., Albert, 
1993; Albert & Bennett, 2001; Larkey, Smith, & Kadane, 
1989), (d) a study that addressed the adaptive value of the 
hot hand belief, assuming the accuracy of the binomial 
model (Burns, 2001).  
The present paper takes a step further and examines the 
accuracy of the simple binomial model in a side-by-side 
comparison with an alternative model that assumes the 
existence of the hot hand. The importance of such a 
comparison is obvious since which model is more accurate 
would inevitably affect researchers’ opinion about the 
validity of the hot hand belief. As Brunswik (1956) and 
Simon (1982) suggested, the environment in which human 
perception and cognition originate and operate must be 
carefully studied. On one hand, it is possible that the hot 
hand does not exist and the hot hand belief is another 
example of misperceptions of randomness outside the 
psychological laboratory, in addition to many previous 
findings when random events were clearly defined (e.g., 
Falk, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1971, 1974; Wagenaar, 1972). On the other 
hand, it is possible that the hot hand does exist, even with a 
substantial effect size (e.g., substantial changes in shooting 
accuracy), and traditional statistical tests are generally low 
in power thus not capable of detecting the effect. The fact is 
that a truly random process can produce seemingly non-
random “patterns,” but a truly non-random process can 
produce seemingly random events as well. Lopes and Oden 
(1987) demonstrated that although human subjects 
sometimes misidentified random events as nonrandom (i.e., 
false alarms), they could also correctly detect truly 
nonrandom signals (i.e., correct hits). Thus, it is important 
to find out whether the simple binomial model is accurate 
enough to serve as a normative model. Then, researchers 
might be able to answer the question whether the hot hand 
belief is more about signal detections, or, just “seeing 
something out of randomness.” 
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Model-driven vs. Data-driven 
GVT concluded that actual basketball-shooting records 
“may be adequately [italics added] described by a simple 
binomial model” (Gilovich et al., 1985, p. 313). However, 
such a conclusion was solely based on the non-significant p 
values in null hypothesis tests under the binomial model. 
Sun (2003) and Wardrop (1999) pointed out that GVT’s 
statistical tests were largely redundant and generally low in 
power, and in many cases, GVT failed to report large 
deviations from the binomial process or misinterpreted the 
test results. In the present paper, I only address the 
importance of comparing multiple models and why non-
significant p values do not necessarily suggest the accuracy 
of the simple binomial model. 
Criticisms of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) 
have been leveled for decades. Many researchers warned 
that when alternative hypotheses abound, misinterpretations 
of statistical significance could easily arise (e.g., Cohen, 
1994; Lykken, 1991; Oakes, 1986). Nevertheless, many 
researchers tend to ignore the fact that NHST only estimates 
p(D | H0), the probability that data D could have arisen if the 
null hypothesis H0 were true, not p(H0 | D), the probability 
that H0 is true, given D. In modeling basketball shooting, the 
fact that no significant deviation was found to reject the 
binomial model, namely, p(D | HBinomial) > .05, only 
indicates that the binomial model may not be terribly 
erroneous. However, not being terribly erroneous is not the 
same thing as being accurate or being unique. A p value 
greater than .05 only prompts researchers to retain the null, 
not to accept the null as if it were true or even likely to be 
true. 
Let HBinomial denote the event that the binomial model is 
true, HHot Hand denote the event that the hot hand theory is 
true, and D denote the event that a certain statistic from the 
shooting data reaches a certain level. In order to 
demonstrate the adequacy of binomial model or the 
invalidity of the hot hand theory, given the available data, 
one needs to find out which hypothesis the data are in favor 
of, namely, to compare p(HBinomial | D) and p(HHot Hand | D). 
In Bayes’ theorem,  
 
)|()(
)|()(
)|(
)|(
HandHotHandHot
BinomialBinomial
HandHot
Binomial
HDpHp
HDpHp
DHp
DHp
= .  (1) 
 
If one is not biased toward either one of the two hypotheses 
before examining the data, it is reasonable to assign equal 
prior probabilities to both models, p(HBinomial) = p(HHot Hand) 
= .50. Then, the comparison between p(HBinomial | D) and 
p(HHot Hand | D) comes down to the comparison between 
p(D | HBinomial) and p(D | HHot Hand). GVT’s statistical 
analyses showed that in a number of statistical tests, 1 
p(D | HBinomial) was not significantly small. Nevertheless, 
such information alone cannot invalidate the hot hand 
________ 
1 Note that most of GVT’s tests were mathematically redundant 
(see Wardrop, 1999). 
theory, another piece of information, p(D | HHot Hand) is still 
missing. 
The argument here actually calls for a data-driven 
approach that compares at least two rival models, rather 
than a model-driven approach that conducts null hypothesis 
tests only on one model. The distinction between these two 
approaches is not a clear cut but rather a difference in 
emphasis. The data-driven approach eventually has to come 
down to evaluations of a limited number of models one by 
one. If a certain model superior to others arises, it will be 
tested against further data for a need to abandon or modify 
the model. In this sense, the distinction between two rival 
models often is not an absolute dichotomy. It is true that in 
hypothesis testing, such as in Equation 1, two hypotheses 
have to be exclusive to each other. Nevertheless, in data 
modeling, two models might only differ in the degrees they 
approximate the actual process. Which model is selected 
would be based on which model provides a better 
approximation of the data, rather than some “mechanical 
dichotomous decisions around a sacred .05 criterion” 
(Cohen, 1994, p. 997). 
 
Extracting Relevant Statistics from the Data 
To compare multiple models by a data-driven approach, it is 
essential to extract relevant statistics from the available data. 
Sun (2003) pointed out that the statistical tests conducted by 
GVT, such as the test of serial correlation (compared to zero) 
and runs test were largely focused on the first moment 
estimate of the time series, namely, the hit rate (i.e., 
observed hitting percentage in a sequence of a certain length) 
as an estimate of shooting accuracy (i.e., the probability for 
any given shot to be a hit). However, by the law of large 
numbers, hit rate only provides a good approximation of 
shooting accuracy when shooting accuracy remains constant 
and the sample size is considerably large. Thus, assuming 
the hot hand is about the nonstationarity of the shooting 
accuracy, fluctuations of shooting accuracy would not be 
easily detected by fluctuations of hit rate, when a player 
only took a limited number of shots in each game. For 
instance, given a result of 5 hits in a sequence of 10 shots, a 
null hypothesis test alone cannot distinguish whether the hit 
rate of 50% is a result of a shooting accuracy of 40% or a 
shooting accuracy of 60%. 
By focusing on higher moments of the shooting sequences, 
Sun (2003) found significant fluctuations of serial 
correlations in the field goal data that were originally 
reported by Gilovich et al. (1985). That is, a player 
sometimes shot in streaks (i.e., successive hits or misses), 
such as in {1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0}, yielding a positive serial 
correlation, and sometimes shot alternatively (hits and 
misses alternated very often), such as in {1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 
0}, yielding a negative serial correlation. The observed 
changes in serial correlations were unlikely to be accounted 
for by the simple binomial model, namely, p(D | HBinomial) 
< .05, where D represents the event that the serial 
correlations changed significantly. Only when the data were 
aggregated across all periods, the overall averaged serial 
correlation was close to zero (e.g., comparing the overall 
1280
  
 
serial correlation with zero, p > .05). This finding has at 
least two indications. First, the actual basketball shooting 
might not be a stationary process since hits and misses are 
not evenly distributed in the observed shooting sequence. 
Second, fluctuations of hit rates and the overall serial 
correlation are not sensitive enough to capture such 
nonstationarity. In the following, I will present an 
alternative model that can be distinguished from the simple 
binomial model by examining the fluctuations of serial 
correlations. Furthermore, this model may provide a better 
approximation to the observed data. 
 
A Model of the Hot Hand 
Model and Parameter Settings 
In real basketball games, it is very possible that potentially 
high or low shooting accuracy (“hot hand” or “cold hand”) 
might exist but were interrupted by other activities such as 
shot selection and defensive pressure. For example, after 
making one or two shots, a player may become confident 
and try more difficult shots, or the opposing team may 
intensify their defensive pressure on that player. Less 
frequent interruptions tend to produce shooting sequences 
with positive serial correlations, since the player’s shooting 
accuracy, either high or low, remains comparatively 
unchanged, for example, an extreme case would be 
something like {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}. And vice versa, 
more frequent interruptions tend to produce shooting 
sequences with negative serial correlations, for example, a 
resulting sequence like {1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0}. 
Figure 1 represents a Markov switching model (hence 
referred to as “the hot hand model”). Similar models have 
been used by Lopes and Oden (1987) in studying human 
subjects’ ability of distinguishing between random and 
nonrandom events, and by Albert and Bennett (2001) in 
modeling the “streakiness” in baseball. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Markov Model of the Hot Hand 
 
 
To accommodate the hot hand theory, the major 
characteristic of this model is that it has two states, “hot 
hand” and “cold hand,” representing two different levels of 
shooting accuracies, pH and pC, respectively. If a player’s 
overall shooting percentage in the entire season was pOverall, 
pH and pC were shifted higher or lower in the same amount 
of d from pOverall. Then, this player’s simulated shooting 
sequence will be generated as the player switches between 
the “hot hand” and the “cold hand.” How often the player 
makes the switch depends on the switching probability, 
pswitch. A high pswitch value (e.g., pswitch > .50) means the 
player switches between two states very often. In an actual 
basketball game, this would represent the situation in which 
a hot hand or a cold hand is detected and a real-time 
adjustment is immediately deployed by either the player or 
the opposing team. And vice versa, a low pswitch value (e.g., 
pswitch < .50) means that the player rarely switches between 
two states. This would represent the situation in which a hot 
hand or a cold hand remained uninterrupted or real-time 
adjustments rarely occurred. 
Actually, when pH = pC = pOverall (d = 0) and pswitch = .50, 
the hot hand model is in effect equivalent to the binomial 
model. If the binomial model were truly adequate and 
unique, one would expect that a model with dramatically 
different parameter settings would be less capable of 
describing the observed data. For this reason, I chose a set 
of extreme values to represent the hot hand model, in which 
d = .30 (i.e., pH – pC = .60) and pswitch was randomly selected 
from (.95 and .05) with a 50-50 percent chance for every 10 
shots, whereas the binomial model only took a constant 
shooting accuracy pOverall. Figure 2 illustrates the difference 
between two models in terms of the shooting accuracy along 
the time line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Two Possible Models of Basketball Shooting 
 
Simulation Procedure 
Gilovich has kindly provided the field goal data that were 
reported in Gilovich et al. (1985). There were 18 players in 
the data set, and 16 of them were included in the simulation 
(2 players were excluded because their shooting sequences 
were too short). 
For each player in the simulation, I computed a statistic 
called “MMAC” (Max-Min Moving Autocorrelation) from 
his actual shooting sequence, whereas MMAC was defined 
as the absolute difference between the largest and smallest 
moving serial correlations, where the moving serial 
correlations were calculated as the serial correlations within 
a window of 100 shots, starting from the first shot then each 
time moving 1 shot further until the end of the sequence. 
The purpose for choosing such specific statistic is to capture 
the fluctuations of the serial correlations. In the meantime, 
to reduce chance errors, a large sample size is needed so that 
the window width of 100 shots was chosen. 
For each of the 16 players, I ran 10,000 simulations with 
the binomial model and another 10,000 simulations with the 
hot hand model, each simulation generating one shooting 
Hot Hand: pH = pOverall + d 
pswitch pswitch 
Cold Hand: pC = pOverall – d 
Sh
oo
tin
g 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
Time 
The Binomial Model 
Sh
oo
tin
g 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
Time 
The Hot Hand Model (d > 0) 
d 
1281
  
 
sequence in the same length of the player’s actual shooting 
sequence and with the same overall shooting accuracy. The 
statistic MMAC was calculated from each simulated 
sequence, then compared to the observed MMAC from the 
player’s actual shooting record. The probabilities for each 
model’s simulated MMAC to include the observed MMAC 
were computed as p(D | HBinomial) and p(D | HHot Hand). Then, 
given equal prior probabilities p(HBinomial) = p(HHot Hand) 
= .50, posterior probabilities p(HBinomial | D) and 
p(HHot Hand | D) were calculated by Equation 1. Since there 
were only two hypotheses considered, p(HBinomial | D) + 
p(HHot Hand | D) = 1. 
 
Simulation Results 
The simulation results are listed in Table 1. Columns 2 to 5 
list the probabilities p(D | HBinomial), p(D | HHot Hand), 
p(HBinomial | D), and p(HHot Hand | D), respectively. Column 6 
lists the probabilities of detecting significance (a = .05, two-
tailed) by runs test (Siegel, 1956) on the sequences 
generated by the hot hand model. The table is ordered in the 
ascending order of p(D | HBinomial). 
Considered separately, the probabilities p(D | HBinomial) 
and p(D | HHot  Hand) (Columns 2 and 3) in effect provided p 
values for null hypothesis significance testing, assuming 
either of the two models as the ture hypothesis (a = .05, 
two-tailed). For players 24, 10, and 3, the simulation results 
p(D | HBinomial) < .05 actually provided significant p values 
to reject the binomial model. For players 18 and 50, 
p(D | HBinomial) were only slightly greater than .05. 
(Considering the fact that there were 16 players tested, the 
probability of family-wise Type I errors needs to be 
calculated, which was found to be less than .05. see Sun, 
2003)  On the other hand, none of the p values in 
p(D | HHot Hand) reached the significance level of .05. 
Assuming one is unbiased toward either of the two 
models prior to examining the data, so that p(HBinomial) = 
p(HHot Hand) = .50, the comparisons between p(HBinomial | D) 
and p(HHot Hand | D) (Columns 4 and 5) would reveal which 
model obtains more support from the observed data in terms 
of the MMAC statistic.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Comparisons between the binomial model and the hot hand model 
 
Player 
 
p (D | HBinomial) p (D | HHot Hand) p (HBinomial | D) p (HHot Hand | D) Power (runs test) 
24 .0178 .3380 .0500 .9500 .1911 
10 .0223 .3127 .0666 .9334 .1909 
3 .0232 .4116 .0534 .9466 .1891 
18 .0508 .1299 .2811 .7189 .1836 
50 .0690 .4709 .1278 .8722 .1824 
7 .1517 .5929 .2037 .7963 .1854 
25 .4084 .6539 .3844 .6156 .1836 
2 .5343 .9610 .3573 .6427 .1951 
11 .5446 .8983 .3774 .6226 .1795 
22 .6472 .9640 .4017 .5983 .1769 
53 .7094 .9766 .4208 .5792 .1936 
5 .7370 .9855 .4279 .5721 .1928 
4 .7625 .9953 .4338 .5662 .1918 
6 .8004 .9993 .4447 .5553 .1872 
1 .9393 .9993 .4845 .5155 .1871 
9 .9886 .9999 .4972 .5028 .1845 
Mean .4632 .7297 .3161 .6839 .1872 
 
Note: D represents the event that the simulated MMAC is greater than or equal to the observed 
MMAC calculated from each player’s shooting record. Column 6 is the estimated power of runs 
test based on detections of significance (a = .05, two-tailed) on the simulated sequences by the hot 
hand model. 
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For individual cases, MMAC appeared to be substantially 
in favor of the hot hand model rather than the binomial 
model for a certain number of players (e.g., players 24, 10, 3, 
18, 50, 7, 25, 2, and 11), as p(HBinomial | D) was much 
smaller than p(HHot Hand | D) (see Table 1, Columns 4 and 5). 
One may calculate a c2 statistic for each player to test the 
null hypothesis that MMAC is indifferent to either of the 
binomial model or the hot hand model. However, c2 
statistics tend to be over-sensitive when the expected 
frequency in a certain cell is too low (for example, the 
players 6, 1, and 9). The result that all c2 were significant 
(df = 1, p < .01) for all of the 16 players might have 
overestimated the superiority of the hot hand model. 
Taking all 16 players together, the hot hand model 
appeared to be substantially superior to the binomial model 
in accounting for the observed MMAC. On the average, 
p(D | HBinomial) = .4632, and p(D | HHot Hand) = .7297. By the 
criterion of maximum likelihood, given equal priors 
p(HBinomial) = p(HHot Hand) = .50, the observed data seemed to 
support the hot hand model rather than the binomial model: 
on the average, the posterior probabilities are p(HBinomial | D) 
= .3161 and p(HHot Hand | D) = .6839. 
It may be possible that the hot hand model appeared to be 
superior to the binomial model only in terms of the statistics 
of MMAC. To see whether the hot hand model was 
“truthful” to other observed statistics such as the number of 
runs, I also conducted a runs test for each simulated 
sequence by the hot hand model, since out of those 16 
players, runs test only detected one significance at the .05 
level in the observed shooting sequence (player 53, see 
Gilovich et al., 1985). (Note that because of the symmetrical 
setting of the model, there is no need to check the hitting 
percentage.) The results of runs test suggested that the hot 
hand model was largely truthful to the observed shooting 
sequence in the statistic of number of runs, since on the 
average, only 18.72% of the simulated sequences were 
detected as significant deviations from what is expected by 
the binomial model (see Table 4, last column). A further 
check found that during 10,000 simulations for each player 
with the hot hand model, the overall serial correlations were 
symmetrically distributed around the mean of zero, with a 
standard deviation slightly larger than the expected value 
(1/ 3-N ) assuming binomial process (N is the number 
of shots in each sequence). Together, these observations 
provided confirmations to my previous claims. That is, a 
nonrandom process (such as the hot hand model) can 
produce seemingly random sequences and may not be easily 
detected by traditional statistical methods (such as the runs 
test, or, comparing the overall serial correlation with zero). 
 
Discussion 
One might argue that the “hot hand model” fitted the data 
better than the binomial model simply because the former 
has more parameters than the latter. I have three reasons to 
counter this argument. First, basketball shooting is a 
complex process. It is very reasonable to believe that a 
useful model needs more parameters than just a single 
constant shooting accuracy. Second, the extra parameters in 
the hot hand model may not be counted as “free parameters” 
because they feasibly represent actual situations in which a 
player’s shooting accuracy may change and real-time 
adjustments take place quickly (or slowly). Lastly and most 
importantly, as mentioned before, the hot hand model 
actually took parameter values that were substantially 
different from the simple binomial model. Yet, it provided 
more accurate descriptions of the observed data. This would 
have seriously challenged the accuracy of the simple 
binomial model. 
It should be pointed out that the primary purpose for 
building the hot hand model is not to argue about its 
uniqueness. Nevertheless, such model may prompt 
researchers to consider the possibility that non-random 
process may easily produce seemingly random sequences 
and the possibility that the hot hand belief is indeed a valid 
cognitive activity in detecting non-random events. It is 
important to notice that particular statistics such as number 
of runs, serial correlations, including the MMAC statistic I 
used in this study, may not be sensitive enough to tell the 
difference between two different processes. Nevertheless, 
researchers need to consider multiple models in evaluating 
the validity of human perceptions, since multiple models 
can co-exist and provide different levels of approximations 
to the actual underlying process. 
The simulation has shown that for a certain number of 
players, the hot hand model is substantially superior to the 
binomial model. For the other players, these two models are 
not easily distinguishable. By Bayes’ theorem in Equation 1, 
if both models account for the data with the same capability 
so that p(D | HBinomial) » p(D | HHot Hand), which model is 
more likely to be “perceived” from the data, namely, 
p(HBinomial | D) and p(HHot Hand | D), then, is entirely 
determined by personal beliefs, p(HBinomial) and p(HHot Hand). 
There is no prior reason why basketball fans and players 
should agree with researchers on such personal belief. In 
other words, the hot hand belief may not be readily 
dismissed as merely a misperception of randomness simply 
because the researchers failed to reject the binomial model 
by null hypothesis significance testing. 
 
General Conclusion 
The primary purpose of the present paper is not to dispute 
whether ordinary people misperceive probabilistic events in 
basketball, but to prompt further investigations of the actual 
process of basketball shooting. Lacking normative 
knowledge such as probability theory and theories of 
stochastic processes, ordinary people are often prone to 
mistakes. However, it is also possible that the hot hand 
belief was describing a true anomaly that was not detected 
by traditional statistical methods. The present study 
presented a case when statistical methods are applied 
objectively rather than subjectively toward the plausible 
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models, how a different point of view, regarding the validity 
of human perceptions of the environment, could be obtained. 
That is, comparing to a model-driven approach that only 
conducts null hypothesis testing on a single model, a data-
driven approach can be more revealing by comparing 
multiple models. Then, it was suggested that the simple 
binomial model might not be accurate enough to serve as a 
normative model in evaluating the validity of the hot hand 
belief. From Brunswik’s (1956) point of view, an organism 
and the environment in which the organism was embedded 
should receive equal emphasis in psychological theory and 
research. In this sense, the primary purpose of the present 
study is to serve as “a propaedeutic to functional 
psychology” (Brunswik, 1956, p. 119), a necessary step 
before psychologists can fully understand the belief in the 
hot hand. 
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Abstract 
 
The present study investigates the properties of the spatial 
updating in terms of intrinsic frames of reference. We 
hypothesize that the efficiency of dynamically updating 
object-to-object relations is based on two main factors, a 
relatively stable frame of reference provided by the orienting 
object (or object array), and the behavioral significance 
(salience) level of the target objects. Three experiments were 
conducted using tasks of direction pointing. It was found that 
responses were significantly slower when the orienting object 
was constantly rotating. Given a relatively stable frame of 
reference, responses to the salient objects were faster than 
those to the non-salient objects when the number of salient 
objects was limited. The salience effect disappeared and re-
appeared in the absence and presence of a stable frame of 
reference, respectively. These findings indicated that spatial 
updating in intrinsic frame of reference is not automatic and is 
limited by the number of target objects. 
 
Introduction 
As people move through an environment, they continuously 
update the spatial relations between themselves and the 
environment and the relations between the objects in the 
environment. For instance, a pedestrian who is waving on a 
taxi may also notice that a dog is chasing the taxi from 
behind. In this scenario, two kinds of information have to be 
encoded by the pedestrian, the relation between his body 
and the taxi, and the relation between the taxi and the dog. 
In fact, this example illustrates the distinction between an 
egocentric reference system (body-centered) and an 
allocentric reference system (more specifically in this 
scenario, an object-centered intrinsic system). It has been 
generally agreed that in encoding spatial information, 
different reference systems can be involved. Many 
researchers adopted the distinction between egocentric and 
allocentric reference systems and conjectured that 
participants in their experiments used either one of such 
systems (e.g, Bryant & Tversky, 1999; Diwadkar & 
McNamara, 1997; Franklin & Tversky, 1990; Shelton & 
McNamara, 1997; Sholl & Nolin, 1997; Simons & R. Wang, 
1998. For a recent treatment, see McNamara, 2003, and 
Mou & McNamara, 2002). 
A large body of research has been focusing on spatial 
updating with respect to the egocentric system. It has been 
indicated that spatial memories are primarily egocentric and 
updating by the egocentric system is of high fidelity and 
automatic (e.g., Rieser, 1989; Shelton & McNamara, 1997; 
Simons & R. Wang, 1998; R. Wang, 1999). Nevertheless, 
Mou and McNamara (2002) and McNamara (2003) recently 
proposed that spatial information is encoded primarily of 
object-to-object spatial relations, and therefore is allocentric. 
This new theoretical framework calls for a systematic study 
on properties of spatial updating in intrinsic systems in 
dynamic situations, as compared to updating in egocentric 
systems. For example, Sholl and Nolin (1997) and R. Wang 
(1999) have suggested that egocentric self-to-object spatial 
relations are updated automatically as people move through 
an environment. It remains unclear whether updating in 
intrinsic frame of reference is also automatic. Furthermore, 
what kind of information is to be updated in intrinsic 
systems? Are all objects in the environment being updated 
with equal priorities? The present paper attempts to answer 
these questions by reporting three experiments.  
Our working hypothesis on spatial updating in intrinsic 
frame of reference is that such a process involves paying 
attention to both the orienting objects that anchor the 
intrinsic frame of reference and the target objects in their 
relations to the orienting objects. In other words, there are 
two sequential components in such a process: establishing 
and maintaining a frame of reference, then, updating the 
object-to-object relations. Thus, we hypothesize that 
updating in intrinsic systems can be achieved dynamically 
only when a relatively stable frame of reference can be 
maintained. In the taxi example above, in order to update 
the relations between the taxi and the dog, the pedestrian 
first needs to identify the orientation of the taxi. Second, we 
hypothesize that updating of object-to-object relations is 
affected by the behavioral significance of the target objects. 
This hypothesis is based on previous findings that visual 
selection can be prioritized by the object’s properties, by its 
specific location and background (e.g., Duncan, 1984; 
Wolfe, 1994), or even by cues in time (e.g., Watson, 
Humphreys, & Olivers, 2003). In the taxi example, a dog 
chasing the taxi probably is more salient than other objects 
on the street (say, a post stand), thus it is more likely to be 
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 attended to continuously by the pedestrian. We will refer to 
this effect as the “salience effect” throughout this paper. 
We conducted three experiments to test our hypotheses. 
The task we used was similar to the direction pointing task 
in the visual map condition in Hintzman, O’Dell, and Arndt 
(1981). Two major modifications were made to fit our 
specific needs. First, we added settings to test the salience 
effect. That is, the target objects had two different salience 
levels, determined by both behavioral and perceptual 
significance. Second, to test real-time updating, our 
experiments were implemented in dynamic settings, which 
involved continuous relative movement between the 
orienting object (intrinsic frame of reference) and the target 
objects. We tested three different movements: the 
translation-only movement (Experiment 1), the movement 
in which the orienting object rotated while the target objects 
remained still (Experiment 2), and the movement in which 
the orienting object remained still but the target objects 
rotated (Experiment 3). 
 
 
General Method 
Since all three experiments reported here shared similar 
settings and procedures, we summarize the common aspects 
of the experimental settings and data analyses in this section. 
The experiments were conducted on a Pentium II computer, 
and the stimuli were presented on a 19-inch CRT monitor. 
The stimuli consisted of one blue submarine image (bird’s 
eye view) and a certain number of white dots (non-salient 
objects) and red dots (salient-objects) on a grey background. 
All three experiments used a 2x8x8x2 within-subjects 
design, in which there were two salience levels (salient vs. 
non-salient), eight submarine orientations, eight target 
directions, and two levels for the number of salient objects. 
Each participant completed 256 trials, with each trial 
representing one combination of all levels of all factors. The 
order of the 256 trials was randomly shuffled. A trial 
consisted of three steps. First, the submarine and the 
surrounding dots were presented and the submarine flashed 
three times to help participants identify its location and 
orientation. Then, depending on the specific experiment, 
either the submarine or the surrounding dots started to move 
(translating or rotating). Finally, the relative movements 
stopped and at the same time one of the surrounding dots 
flashed as the target. The instruction for all three 
experiments was the same. Participants were instructed to 
imagine being on the submarine and an enemy submarine 
(the target) was hiding at the location of one of those 
surrounding dots. The red dots were more likely to be 
enemy positions thus participants should pay particular 
attention to them. When the target flashed, participants were 
told to indicate the direction of the target relative to the 
orientation of the submarine. 
 The responses were made with a number keypad on a 
standard PC keyboard. On the keypad, the number keys 1, 2, 
3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 were used as response keys, with each 
representing one of the eight directions relative to key 5. 
These keys were re-labeled with drawings of arrows 
pointing to the corresponding directions. All other keys 
were removed and the key for number 5 (which was in the 
center of all eight response keys) was replaced with a stud 
that could not be pressed. Participants were instructed to use 
only one finger to press the response keys. At the beginning 
of each trial, they were told to rest the finger on the stud, 
and after they made the response, to put the finger back on 
the stud. 
 The primary dependent measure was the reaction times 
(RT) measured in milliseconds. To avoid confusion, we 
adopted the same labeling scheme as used in Hintzman et al. 
(1981). Descriptive names were used for responses (target 
direction relative to the submarine’s orientation), such as 
front, right-front, right, right-back, back, left-back, left, and 
left-front. For submarine orientation (equivalent to the 
arrow orientation in Hintzman et al.’s experiment 1 and 2), 
we used digits 0 through 7, representing the number of steps 
by 45° clockwise from upright (e.g., digit 0 for the upright 
submarine orientation, and digit 4 represents the downright 
orientation). 
 
 
Experiment 1 
Participants Twelve college students and graduate students 
in the Houston medical center area participated in 
Experiment 1 (six males and six females, and the average 
age was 29.3 years with an SD of 4.81 years). Participants 
were paid for participation. 
Procedure Figure 1 shows a typical display in Experiment 
1. At the beginning of each trial, one blue submarine image 
and 400 dots (in which 2 or 4 of them were red and the rest 
were white) arranged in a 20 x 20 array were presented 
simultaneously. Red and white dots were the same size, 
with a diameter of approximately 0.40 cm. The horizontal 
and vertical distance between every adjacent two dots 
(hence referred to as one unit) was approximately 0.85 cm, 
and the submarine image, when upright, was approximately 
0.80 cm high and 0.44cm wide. The salient objects were 
randomly plotted (without overlapping with each other) 
within a 5 by 5 array in the center of the entire array. The 
initial position of the submarine was 4, 5 or 6 units 
(randomly selected) away from the center of the array, 
randomly taking one of the 8 possible orientations but 
always approximately pointing to the center of the dot array. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
At the beginning of each trial, the submarine flashed three 
times and then started to move (translation without rotation) 
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 toward the center of the array. The moving speed was 
constant for all trials, which was approximately 2136 ms per 
unit (0.47 units per second). When the submarine reached 
approximately the center of the array, it would stop and at 
the same time, one of the eight dots in the 3 by 3 square 
where the submarine was located would flash (the 
submarine image covered the dot in the center of the square). 
Participants pressed the response key to respond to the 
target direction relative to the submarine. The accuracy and 
reaction times were recorded. A regular experimental 
session took approximately one and a half hour (in which 
the training session took approximately 20 minutes). 
 
Results The mean RT for the 12 participants was 1247.4ms 
with a standard deviation of 542.40ms. The mean accuracy 
rate was 93.5% with a standard deviation of 4.56%. RT as a 
function of the target direction is shown in Figure 2, and RT 
as a function of the submarine orientation is shown in 
Figure 3, with RT broken down by two salience levels, 
where error bars represent standard errors. The target names 
in Figure 2 are abbreviated (F for Front, FR for Right Front, 
etc.). To emphasize the symmetry and continuity, the 
direction F in Figure 2 and the orientation 0 in Figure 3 
were represented twice. This convention is used in other 
similar figures throughout this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1, RT as a function of target direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 1, RT as a function of 
submarine orientation. 
 
A significant orientation effect was observed. RT as a 
function of the target direction showed an “M” shaped 
profile, fastest on the front and back directions and slowest 
on the right-back and left-back directions (F7, 77 = 16.14, p 
< .001, estimated effect size = .595). As a function of 
submarine orientation, RT was fastest when the submarine 
was upright (orientation 0), and slowest when the submarine 
was pointed down (orientation 4) (F7, 77 = 16.74, p < .001, 
estimated effect size = .603). 
Of primary interests to us was the salience effect. It is 
clear from both Figures 2 and 3 that the salience level had a 
significant effect on RT. In all target directions and 
submarine orientations, responses to salient objects were 
faster than that of non-salient objects, with an average 
difference of 128.6 ms (F1, 11 = 27.95, p < .001, estimated 
effect size = .718). Moreover, the salience effect appeared to 
be very stable in size across all target directions and 
submarine orientations: the two curves in each figure are 
essentially parallel, and both interactions (salience by target 
direction, and salience by submarine orientation) were not 
significant (F7, 77 = 1.185, p = .321; and F7, 77 = 1.471, p 
= .190, respectively). 
The number of salient objects (hence abbreviated as NOS) 
appeared to have a small effect on RT. On average, RT was 
faster when NOS = 2 than when NOS = 4 (mean difference 
= 26.5 ms), which was marginally significant (F1, 11 = 4.57, 
p = .056). The effect of NOS would be observed more 
clearly through the interaction between NOS and salience, 
which was statistically significant (F1, 11 = 6.09, p = .031, 
estimated effect size = .356). It appeared that NOS had little 
effect on RT when the target was a non-salient object 
(1314.9 ms when NOS = 2, compared to 1308.3 ms when 
NOS = 4), but the effect was considerably larger when the 
target was a salient object (1153.3 ms when NOS = 2, 
compared to 1212.9 ms when NOS = 4, mean difference = 
59.6 ms). 
Other factors remaining constant, faster RT for the salient 
objects in Experiment 1 suggests that spatial information 
about salient objects was updated with a higher priority thus 
retrieved more quickly than the information about the non-
salient objects. Moreover, the orientation dependence was 
presented in responses to both salient objects and non-
salient objects: both main effects of target direction and 
submarine orientation were significant but none of the 
interactions (target direction and salience, submarine 
orientation and salience, respectively) reached significance, 
implying the important role the orientation plays in spatial 
updating.  
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the salience 
effect remained but reduced in size when the number of 
salient objects increased (from 161.6 ms when NOS = 2, to 
95.4 ms when NOS = 4). One explanation is that more than 
four salient objects were prioritized but the retrieval of the 
corresponding information was achieved in a serial fashion. 
Another explanation is that the capacity of such 
prioritization was already exceeded when there were four 
salient objects. Then, participants might randomly choose, 
say, two of the salient objects for particular attention. As a 
result, the averaged salience effect in the four salient objects 
condition was reduced, compared to the two salient objects 
condition. In either case, it appears the salience effect would 
eventually disappear when the number of salient objects 
exceeds a certain level. It would be interesting to conduct 
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 experiments to further investigate the capacity of such a 
“salience buffer.”  
 
Experiment 2 
Participants Twelve college students and graduate students 
in the Houston medical center area participated in 
Experiment 2 (four males and eight females, and the 
average age was 26.3 years with an SD of 4.49 years). 
Participants were paid for participation. 
Procedure The procedure was essentially the same as in 
Experiment 1. The following were the major differences. 
The potential targets were 8 dots aligned on a circle at 45° 
intervals, with the submarine located in the center. When 
the submarine is aligned upright, these eight dots are on the 
front, right-front, right, right-back, back, left-back, left, and 
left-front, respectively (see Figure 4). For the two levels of 
the number of salient objects, instead of 2 salient objects vs. 
4 salient objects, Experiment 2 compared the conditions of 1 
salient object vs. 2 salient objects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
At the beginning of each trial, one blue submarine image 
and 8 dots (in which 1 or 2 of them were red and the rest 
were white, on a circle with a diameter approximately of 
5.93 cm) were presented simultaneously. All dots were in 
the same size with a diameter approximately of 0.80 cm. 
The submarine image, when upright, was approximately 
1.98 cm high and 0.88 cm wide. The positions of salient 
objects were randomly selected (without overlapping with 
each other). The initial orientation of the submarine was 
always upright. After flashing 3 times, the submarine started 
to rotate around the center of the circle. The rotation speed 
was constant for all trials, which was approximately 0.033° 
per ms (approximately 2763ms for every 90°). When the 
submarine reached a certain orientation, it would stop and at 
the same time one of the eight dots would flash. The 
rotating distance was determined by the trial settings on the 
submarine orientation, with a minimum of 45° and a 
maximum of 360°. Among 256 trials, each 32 trials had the 
same rotating angle ranging from 45° to 360° in the step of 
45°. The order of the trials was randomly shuffled before 
presentation. 
 
Results The mean RT for the 12 participants was 1772.7 ms 
with a standard deviation of 663.54ms. The mean accuracy 
rate was 94.7% with a standard deviation of 6.13%. RT as a 
function of the target direction is shown in Figure 5, with 
RT broken down by two salience levels. (RT as a function 
of the submarine orientation showed the same overlapping 
pattern. The figure is omitted here to save space.) 
The most obvious observation in Figure 5 is the absence 
of the salience effect: RT for the salient objects was almost 
identical to that for the non-salient objects. Overall, there 
was little difference between RT for salient objects and RT 
for non-salient objects (mean difference = 18.4 ms, F1, 11 = 
0.841, p = .379). Moreover, both the main effect of NOS 
and the interaction of salience and NOS were not significant 
(F1, 11 = 0.436, p = .522; F1, 11 = 4.190, p = .065, 
respectively). Though statistically it is impossible to prove 
the null hypothesis (i.e., the salience effect did not exist), 
compared to the magnitude of the salience effect observed 
in Experiment 1, we are confident that the salience effect 
was at least largely reduced in Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 2, RT as a function of target direction 
 
Another interesting finding was that RT in Experiment 2 
was much slower than that in Experiment 1 for all target 
directions and submarine orientations. (Figure 6 shows the 
comparison between all three experiments.) The average 
difference in RT between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
was 525.3ms. We suspect that the absence of a stable frame 
of reference played a major role. Compared to Experiment 1, 
the major difference in Experiment 2 was that the submarine 
was rotating constantly before the target was presented. As a 
result, no stable frame of reference was provided in terms of 
a fixed submarine orientation. In such a situation, there were 
two possible strategies of establishing and maintaining a 
frame of reference. One was that participants could first 
establish a frame of reference as the submarine was initially 
presented, then update (i.e., rotate) that frame of reference 
along with the submarine as it rotated. The other was that 
participants just waited until the submarine stopped then re-
established a frame of reference. We had two reasons to 
believe that the second strategy was preferred and actually 
utilized by participants. First, it would take much less effort 
to re-establish a frame of reference when the submarine 
stopped rotating, than to maintain a frame of reference by 
constantly updating it with the rotating submarine. In 
extreme cases, the submarine would have rotated 360° 
before it stopped. It would make little sense to update the 
frame of reference if it would return to its initial position. 
Second, if the first strategy was actually applied and our 
participants indeed were updating a frame of reference 
along with the rotating submarine, Experiment 2 would 
have had similar RTs as in Experiment 1. 
Nevertheless, one may raise the question whether RTs in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were directly comparable 
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 since there were confounding factors such as the size of the 
stimuli and the difference between translation and rotation. 
For example, it was found that imagined rotation was more 
difficult than imagined translation (e.g., Presson & Montello, 
1994). Due to this consideration, we conducted Experiment 
3 with these factors controlled. 
 
Experiment 3 
Participants Twelve college students and graduate students 
in the Houston medical center area participated in 
Experiment 1 (four males and eight females, and the 
averaged age was 27.7 years with an SD of 5.55 years). 
Participants were paid for participation. 
Procedure The procedure and device was essentially the 
same as in Experiment 2. The only difference was that in 
Experiment 3, the eight surrounding dots were rotating 
simultaneously while the submarine remained still. Other 
factors such as the image sizes, the arrangement of the 
display, and the relative rotation speed, remained the same. 
The initial orientation of the submarine was randomly 
selected as one of eight possible orientations. After flashing 
the submarine three times, the surrounding dots started to 
rotate around the center of the circle. When they reached a 
certain location (determined by the trial settings), they 
would stop and at the same time one of the eight dots would 
flash. 
Results The mean RT for the 12 participants was 1373.1 ms 
with a standard deviation of 401.68ms. The mean accuracy 
rate was 93.8% with a standard deviation of 4.52%. 
Similar to in Experiments 1 and 2, we observed 
significant effects of target direction and submarine 
orientation in Experiment 3 (F7, 77 = 31.590, p < .001, 
estimated effect size = .742; F7, 77 = 41.075, p < .001, 
estimated effect size = .789, respectively). Similar to 
Experiment 1, we observed a significant salience effect. 
Through all target directions and submarine orientations, 
responses to salient objects were faster than that to non-
salient objects. The average difference in RT for salient 
objects and non-salient objects was 88.8ms, which was 
statistically significant (F1, 11 = 16.546, p < 0.01, estimated 
effect size = .601). (RT as a function of the target direction 
and a function of the submarine orientation showed the 
similar split patterns as in Figures 2 and 3. The figures are 
not shown here.) The salience effect appeared to be very 
stable across all target directions and submarine orientations: 
both interactions (salience by target direction, and salience 
by submarine orientation) were not significant (F7, 77 = 1.123, 
p = .358; and F7, 77 = 0.999, p = .439, respectively). 
The number of salient objects (NOS) showed significant 
effect on RT. On average, RT was faster when NOS = 1 
than when NOS = 2 (mean difference = 79.4 ms, F1, 11 = 
32.588, p < .001, estimated effect size = .748). The 
interaction between NOS and salience was statistically 
significant (F1, 11 = 42.025, p < .001, estimated effect size 
= .793). As a result, it appeared that NOS had little effect on 
RT when the target was a non-salient object (1415.8 ms 
when NOS = 1, compared to 1419.2 ms when NOS = 2), but 
the effect was considerably large when the target was a 
salient object (1251.1 ms when NOS = 1, compared to 
1406.4 ms when NOS = 2, mean difference = 155.3 ms). In 
addition, the salience effect here was larger when there was 
only one salient object (1415.8 ms compared to 1251.1 ms, 
with a difference of 164.7 ms), but essentially disappeared 
when there were two salient objects (1419.2 ms compared to 
1406.4 ms, with a difference of 12.8 ms). The diminished 
salience effect could be due to participants’ limited capacity 
in prioritizing salient objects, or due to the conflicting 
relations between the two target objects and the orienting 
submarine (for example, the two salient objects could be on 
the opposite sides of the submarine). We will leave this 
question to future investigations. 
On average, RT in Experiment 3 was faster than in 
Experiment 2 (average difference was 399.6ms), but still 
slower than in Experiment 1 (average difference was 
125.7ms) (see Figure 6). This observation confirmed the 
previous hypothesis that rotation was indeed more difficult 
than translation. However, it also confirmed the hypothesis 
that faster reaction times can be produced by a relatively 
stable frame of reference. 
 
General Discussion 
We summarize the general findings in the present study by 
comparing all three experiments. The experiments had 
similar task instructions (direction pointing by paying 
specific attentions to the salient objects), but differed mainly 
in the forms of relative movements between the orienting 
object and the target objects. By manipulating the relative 
movement, we obtained different response times. Figure 6 
shows the comparison. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of RT among three experiments 
 
From a computational point of view, updating of the 
object-to-object relations in intrinsic frame of reference 
depends mainly upon two factors: a frame of reference, and 
a potential target. The different reaction times in the three 
experiments suggest that a stable frame of reference is 
critical when the object-to-object relations are to be updated. 
When the orienting object was rotating, it appeared that the 
intrinsic frame of reference based on that object was not 
continuously updated: responses tended to take longer as if 
a frame of reference had to be re-established. Previous 
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 studies have suggested that egocentric self-to-object spatial 
relations are updated continuously as people move through 
an environment (e.g., Sholl & Nolin, 1997; R. Wang, 1999). 
Our results indicate that maintaining an intrinsic frame of 
reference is not automatic. The difference might be due to 
the fact that an egocentric system is relatively easier to be 
maintained. 
Furthermore, we found that given a relatively stable frame 
of reference, responses for salient objects were significantly 
faster than those for non-salient objects (Experiments 1 and 
3). In addition, the salience effect was largely reduced when 
a fixed frame of reference was removed (Experiment 2), and 
re-appeared when a fixed frame of reference was provided 
(Experiment 3). This observation confirmed our hypothesis 
that updating of spatial relations can take place dynamically 
with different priorities when a relatively stable frame of 
reference is maintained. 
Responses to both salient objects and non-salient objects 
manifested the same orientation dependence in all three 
experiments, similar to the orientation dependence found in 
the experiments where egocentric systems were used (e.g., 
Hinzman, et al.). This similarity might provide an 
interesting link between the egocentric systems and intrinsic 
systems. Either participants were imposing an egocentric 
frame of reference on an external object (e.g., imagine 
themselves on the orienting submarine), or, as suggested by 
McNamara (2003), people could in effect treat their bodies 
as just another object in the space. 
  Overall, the present study identified several properties of 
spatial updating in intrinsic frames of reference. In the real 
world situations, the surrounding environment is constantly 
changing and people have to adaptively and efficiently 
prioritize and organize necessary spatial information. 
Therefore, salient spatial entities, determined by both 
behavioral and perceptual significance, would receive 
higher priorities in processing and updating. Furthermore, 
the current study supports the general claim that multiple 
reference systems can co-exist in the brain and in the mind 
to represent space, with each supporting a different class of 
spatial tasks (H. Wang, Johnson, and Zhang, 2001). For 
example, while egocentric systems (body-centered) are 
more convenient for directly supporting motor actions, 
allocentric systems are more important for representing 
object-to-object relations in the environment. When a stable 
allocentric frame of reference is not available, the spatial 
information will have to be inferred from egocentric 
information. 
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Abstract 
 
We hypothesize that statistically unsophisticated people 
perceive event likelihood with a coarser scale with a limited 
number of categories, before they report exact numerical 
probability values. Refinement of the scale beyond a certain 
level would therefore not improve overall judgmental 
accuracy and consistency but just impose a heavier burden on 
their limited computational capacity. An experiment of 
probabilistic judgment was conducted to test this hypothesis. 
Results from both behavioral data and event-related potentials 
in EEG recordings supported our hypothesis. 
 
Introduction 
Assessing the likelihood of uncertain events is an essential 
aspect of human reasoning and decision-making. In the 
absence of adequate formal models for computing the 
probabilities, people often rely on intuitions and heuristics 
to assess uncertainty. The question of how lay people and 
experts evaluate the probabilities of uncertain events has 
attracted enormous research interest. (For a historical review, 
see, e.g., Goldstein & Hogarth, 1996). Proponents of the 
“heuristics and biases” program argued that intuitive 
probabilistic judgment is often systematically biased and 
error-prone (Kahneman, Slovic, & Teversky, 1982). Various 
violations of normative models, including overconfidence, 
base-rate neglect, and the conjunction fallacy, have been 
attributed to applications of a small number of distinctive 
judgmental heuristics. However, others argued that the 
human mind has evolved to deal with the structure of the 
social and physical environment rather than to solve abstract 
probability problems (Chase, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 1998; 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Wang, Johnson, & Zhang, in press). 
When external information is presented effectively, people 
can be good intuitive statisticians (e.g., Cosmides & Tobby, 
1996). For instance, Gigerenzer and colleagues found that 
when problems were stated in terms of frequencies instead 
of probabilities, the stable errors of judgments disappeared 
(Gigerenzer, 1991; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001). For a 
recent collection of different perspectives on interpreting 
human intuitive probabilistic judgment, see Gilovich, 
Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002. 
The theoretical claim that the human mind is not adapted 
to process probabilities has been a magnet for controversy 
(e.g., Gigerenzer, 1994; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). In spite of the centrality of 
the question, the internal representations and functional 
neural foundations underlying human probabilistic 
judgment are poorly understood. Until recently, most 
research has relied on observations and interpretations of 
behavioral experiments. In this paper we report a study that 
investigates the internal representations of human intuitive 
probabilistic assessment, from both behavioral and 
neurological perspectives. 
 
Uncertainty Assessment by Approximation 
A common scheme in psychological experiments of 
probabilistic judgment is to ask participants to report 
probabilities in numerical values, such as the chance of 
breast cancer in percentage given a positive test result (e.g., 
Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001). One question with this 
scheme, however, is that participants’ response of numerical 
probability values may not genuinely reflect the true internal 
representation of their likelihood assessment. The following 
example illustrates this point. When asked to give a 
numerical estimate of the probability of a certain event 
provided with probabilities of other events, people often 
give incoherent answers (e.g., Osherson et al., 2001): 
 
(a) Prob (Clinton is re-elected to the Senate in 2006) = .75 
(b) Prob (Giuliani runs for the Senate in 2006) = .5 
 
Participants’ response: 
(c) Prob (Clinton is re-elected to the Senate in 2006 and 
Giuliani runs for the Senate in 2006) = .1 
 
Apparently, the numerical estimate of .1 is incoherent 
with the other two given probabilities, and the correct 
answer should be at least .25. However, it is possible that 
participants did not distinguish small increments on the 
continuous scale of probabilities. The estimate of .1 
probably is only an approximation by the idea that the 
chance for Clinton may drop dramatically if Giuliani joins 
in the competition, rather than the result of exact 
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 calculations. In other words, the incoherence is likely to be 
produced by the application of a coarser scale, rather than 
by some systematically biased heuristic. 
We propose two hypotheses on the internal 
representations when people intuitively assess the event 
likelihood without exact calculations. First, the task of 
judgment of probabilities can be partitioned into two 
separate phases: the internal representation and the response 
(see Figure 1). The internal representation of event 
likelihood is the result of an approximate estimation of 
presented information (cues) on a coarser scale (internal 
scale). Only when subjects need to report probability values 
(e.g., in a typical psychological experiment), the internal 
scale is projected onto a finer continuous scale (response 
scale). Second, the internal scale has only a limited number 
of categories that represent different magnitudes of the 
perceived event likelihood. Together, these two hypotheses 
allow us to distinguish two fundamentally distinctive types 
of internal representations underlying human probabilistic 
judgment. We illustrate each of them in detail next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internalization by Anchoring and Adjustment 
The hypothesis that people’s perception of the event 
likelihood may not be infinitely refined is based on the 
notion that human beings have limited computational 
capacity. Miller (1956) suggested that the number of levels 
of any variable that can be internalized is not only finite but 
also small. Miller’s finding has been widely cited in 
psychometric research on whether there is an optimal 
number of response alternatives in designing a scale. Many 
researchers believe that a further refinement of scales is 
meaningless if it is beyond human information processing 
capacity (for a review, see Cox, 1980). 
In assessing the event likelihood, the number of 
categories on the internal scale is determined by the way 
these categories are formed. Previous studies show that 
people often use the “anchoring and adjustment” heuristic in 
judgments of belief and value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Tversky and Kahneman presented anchoring as a process in 
which “people make estimates by starting from an initial 
value that is adjusted to yield a final answer” (1974, p. 
1128). Chapman & Johnson (2002) provided a review on 
recent development in understanding the mechanisms of 
anchoring. One important implication of anchoring is that 
the number of categories on the internal scale is limited, 
rather than infinitely refined, since there are only a limited 
number of anchors that can be processed at the same time 
(see Figure 1). Note that it is not to suggest that people can 
not distinguish two very alike events with subtle difference. 
However, such distinction can only be achieved based on a 
side-by-side comparison, as one of the two events serves as 
an anchor. 
The anchors can be directly provided by external cues, 
predefined action thresholds, or by knowledge retrieved 
from memory (for example, availability heuristic, Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). In the example of incoherent estimate 
mentioned before, the anchors would be likely provided by 
the probabilities stated in the first two statements, .75 and .5. 
Thus, there would be only three categories of likelihood 
divided by these two numbers, more likely than .75, less 
likely than .5, and a category in the between. When asked to 
report a numerical probability estimate to the third statement, 
the category of the lowest possibility was projected onto a 
continuous scale As a result, a small number such as .1 was 
likely to be generated. It is very conceivable, however, that 
in a different occasion the same person would give an 
answer of .2 instead of .1 to the same question without 
changing his or her perception of the event. 
In everyday life situations, it is often the case that one of a 
few options is chosen based on predefined action thresholds 
rather than on exact probability values. It was found that 
physicians often significantly overestimated the probability 
of disease given a positive test result. In one study, 95 out of 
100 physicians estimated the probability of breast cancer 
between 70% and 80% given a positive mammography 
while the correct answer is merely 7.8% (Eddy, 1982). 
Nevertheless, such large deviations do not necessarily mean 
that they are poor physicians. Probably to a physician, what 
matters most is a dichotomy whether a test result is positive. 
Consequently, a two-category internal representation (for 
example, “more likely” and “less likely”) would be adopted 
until further diagnosis is conducted. When the physicians 
were asked to report an exact numerical value, they simply 
just obtained a number that would represent the category of 
the highest likelihood on the internal scale. Thus, a large 
number was likely to be reported. 
 
Coarser Scales versus Finer Scales 
The above argument actually suggests the need to partition 
the errors of intuitive probabilistic judgment. By 
distinguishing the internal representation from the numerical 
responses, we in effect partition the errors into two sources: 
systematic errors when the external information is 
internalized onto a coarser scale, such as overconfidence, 
availability bias, and conjunction fallacy (e.g., Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Teversky, 1982), and “random errors” when the 
internal representation are projected onto the continuous 
scale of numerical values. From Figure 1, it can be seen that 
a large portion of errors is elicited by the projection of a 
Internal Scale 
Cues 
Responses 
0% 
100% 
Figure 1. Internal representation on a coarser scale 
Anchors 
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 coarser scale onto a continuous scale. Thus, a direct 
comparison between human perception of event likelihood 
and criteria derived from a normative model very likely has 
exaggerated the irrationality of human intuitive judgment. In 
the previous example of incoherent estimate, incoherence 
would be greatly reduced if a coarser scale is used to 
evaluate participants’ responses. 
We reason that in assessing uncertainty, people prefer a 
coarser scale (e.g., fewer categories) to a finer scale (e.g., 
more categories) as the internal representation, since the 
former may function effectively and demand less 
computational load in a variety of cognitive tasks. People 
assess the event likelihood only to the extent that it is 
adequate to reach a conclusion or choose an action. For 
example, when a person needs to decide whether or not to 
bring an umbrella to work based on the chance of rain, a 
chance of 70% and a chance of 80% probably would not 
make much difference in such a decision. Sometimes a finer 
judgment can be obtained but such refinement might have 
little effect to improve the choice. For example, Kareev and 
colleagues suggested that the limited capacity of working 
memory could actually help the early detection of 
covariation (Kareev, 1995; Kareev, Lieberman & Lev, 
1997). In Sun & Tweney (2002), researchers found that 
participants chose their actions based on a heuristic of using 
small samples, and their performance in the task was very 
close to that obtained by the optimal strategy. 
Our hypothesis that there exists a coarse representation of 
uncertainty for intuitive probabilistic judgment is consistent 
with the large body of literature on mental presentations of 
quantity and numbers. Dehaene and colleagues (Dehaene, 
1997; Dehaene et al, 1998) have suggested that there is a 
coarse and analog mental number line, which is the 
foundation of a "number sense" and shared by humans and 
animals. Recent studies using brain-imaging techniques 
have provided further support for the existence of such 
coarse scale representations. It has been found that the 
approximation and exact calculation tasks of large numbers 
(as compared to rote arithmetic operations) put heavy 
emphasis on the left and right parietal cortices, which may 
encode numbers in a non-verbal quantity format (e.g., 
Dehaene et al., 1999; Pesenti et al., 2000; Stanescu-Cosson 
et al., 2000).  
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an experiment in 
which participants performed a task of probability 
estimation. The task was to estimate the winning 
probabilities of poker hands in a standard “draw poker” 
game when presented with the highest two cards out of the 
five cards on a hand. The reason we selected this task is that 
it provides an objective criterion for evaluating participants’ 
estimates. Most importantly, this task offers a distribution of 
probabilities ranging from zero to close to 100% with 
extremely small increments. This feature allows us to look 
into the refinement of the internal scale when people need to 
make estimates intuitively. We compared two conditions in 
the experiment. The coarser-scale condition required 
probability estimation within an increment of 30% (e.g., less 
than 30%, 30% ~ 60%, and greater than 60%). The finer-
scale condition required probability estimation within an 
increment of 10%. Both behavioral data and the event 
related potentials (ERP) in EEG recordings were collected. 
The experiment results supported our hypotheses. First, 
estimates by the finer scale showed significantly worse 
performance in terms of overall accuracy and consistency. 
Second, significant ERP difference was found over the 
parietal area between two conditions, indicating that 
different levels of effort were involved in the application of 
different internal scales. 
 
Method 
Participants Six graduate students in the Houston medical 
center area participated in the experiment. All participants 
were right-handed males. The averaged age was 27 years 
old. None of the participants reported having any in-depth 
knowledge of probabilistic theories. All participants 
reported having some experience of playing poker games 
but only at a novice level. 
Procedure The stimuli in the experiment (two-card poker 
hands) consisted of 18 levels of winning probabilities, 
ranging from 5% to 90% with a step of approximately 5% 
(as in a one-deck and two-person game). With suit 
variations, there were 36 different hands used in the 
experiment. (Note that in this experiment, the suit variation 
does not change the winning probability since the highest 
hand is a one-pair of aces.) Participants were introduced 
with the rules of hand ranking before the experiment (e.g., a 
pair is higher than single cards; the Ace is higher than the 
King, and etc.) without being informed of the corresponding 
probability values. 
Figure 2 shows the procedure of the experiment. Stimuli 
were displayed on a 17-inch CRT monitor. To reduce eye 
movements, the viewing angle of the displays on the screen 
was limited to 2%. After the fixation display, two poker 
cards were presented. Participants were instructed to form 
an estimate of winning probability in their mind 
immediately. After the second fixation, a number was 
displayed and the participants needed to compare their 
estimate to the displayed number as quickly as possible. A 
Microsoft PC mouse was used to collect the responses (the 
left button for “less than,” and the right button for “greater 
than”).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There were two experimental conditions: the coarser-scale 
condition and the finer-scale condition. In the coarser-scale 
condition, participants were instructed to estimate 
probabilities in three categories (less than 30%, 30% ~ 60%, 
and more than 60%). The number displayed as the 
+ 
Response 
Criterion 
Figure 2. Experiment Procedure 
+ 30 
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 comparison criterion is either 30 or 60, randomly selected. 
In the finer-scale condition, participants were instructed to 
form the estimate accurate to the single digit. The 
comparison criterion was either 5% plus or 5% minus 
(randomly selected) the true winning probability. For 
example, a pair of aces has a winning probability of 90%. 
Then, participants needed to compare their estimates with 
either 85% or 95%, depending on which number was 
displayed. Each participant completed both conditions. The 
order of two conditions was balanced among participants. 
Each condition consisted of 72 trials in 2 trial list cycles, 
and each of the 36 poker hands was displayed once in each 
cycle. The order of trials was randomly shuffled. Response 
time was recorded as the latency after the onset of 
comparison criterion. During the experiment, ERPs were 
sampled at 250 Hz with a 128-electrode geodesic sensor net 
(GSN) reference to the vertex (Tucker, 1993). 
 
 
Results 
Behavioral Results Table 1 shows the comparison between 
two experimental conditions on participants’ probabilistic 
estimates in three categories, accuracy, consistency, and 
response time. Accuracy was calculated as the percentage 
when participants made the comparison correctly. For 
example, if the true winning probability was 70 percent, and 
the number displayed as the comparison criterion was 60, 
the correct response should be “greater than.” (In case of 
identical numbers, either response was counted as correct.) 
All participants showed higher levels of accuracy in the 
coarser-scale than in the finer-scale condition. On average, 
the accuracy was 76.4% in the coarser-scale condition, and 
56.0% in the finer-scale condition, with a difference of 
20.4% (t(5) = 4.576, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Furthermore, we 
compared participants’ accuracy in two trial list cycles in 
each condition and found little improvement in accuracy 
over the trials. The low accuracy level in the finer-scale 
condition was not significantly different from random guess 
(comparing to the expected value of 50%, t(5) = 1.836, p 
= .12, two-tailed), indicating that participants were not able 
to distinguish winning probabilities of poker hands in the 
increment of 10%. 
To evaluate participants’ judgmental consistency, we 
calculated Pearson correlations in their responses over two 
identical sets of stimuli (36 poker hands in each set) in each 
condition. All six participants in the coarser-scale condition 
and only one participant in the finer-scale condition showed 
correlations significantly different from zero (n = 36). The 
averaged correlation was .472 in the coarser-scale condition, 
and .076 in the finer-scale condition, with a difference 
of .396 (t(5) = 7.906, p = .001, two-tailed). This finding was 
consistent with the difference in accuracy between two 
conditions, supporting the speculation that participants were 
more likely to make a random guess in the finer-scale 
condition. 
 
 
Table 2 Comparing Coarser-scale and Finer-scale 
 Coarser-scale Finer-scale 
 
Difference 
Accuracy 76.4% (8.61) 56.0% (8.05) 20.4% 
Consistency .472 (.060) .076 (.094) .396 
RT 
664.1ms 
(233.75) 
798.4ms 
(298.93) -123.2ms 
N = 6. Standard deviations were listed in parentheses. All 
three comparisons were significant p < .05 (two-tailed). 
 
 
The response time was also significantly different 
between two conditions. The averaged RT was 664.1ms in 
the coarser-scale condition and 798.4ms in the finer-scale 
condition, and the former was 123.2ms faster that the latter 
(t(5) = -3.118, p < 0.05, two-tailed). Since the response time 
was recorded as the latency after the onset of comparison 
numbers rather than the onset of poker cards, it is not clear 
whether probability estimation or number comparison, or 
both, produced the difference. Previous studies found that 
the time to make magnitude comparisons decreases linearly 
as the numerical distance between two numbers (e.g., Moyer 
& Landauer, 1967). Nevertheless, the large RT difference in 
our experiment indicated that the task of probability 
estimation and comparison as a whole might take more 
efforts in the finer-scale condition than in the coarser-scale 
condition. 
 
ERP Results We rejected trials with voltages exceeding ± 
100 mV. The remaining trials were segmented then averaged 
in synchrony with stimulus onset (display of poker cards) in 
a window of 1100ms (100ms before and 1000ms after 
stimulus onset), digitally transformed to an average 
reference, band-pass filtered (0.5 to 20 Hz), and corrected 
for baseline over 100ms before stimulus onset. 
Experimental conditions (Coarser vs. Finer) were compared 
on the 10 central-parietal electrodes by a repeated-measure 
ANOVA. We found significant ERP difference between two 
conditions at 400 ± 20ms (peak values) following stimulus 
onset (Greenhouse-Geisser F(1,5) = 12.511, p <0.05), where 
the finer-scale condition yielded more positive voltages over 
parietal electrodes. Figure 3 shows the wave forms of 
electrode CP1 (GSN 38) and the voltage difference map 
(finer-scale minus coarser scale) by spherical spline 
interpolation. The comparison between the left and right 
hemispheres over the parietal area was not significant 
(Greenhouse-Geisser F(1,5) = 5.339, p = .127). At the 
current stage of the study, we have not found significant 
voltage differences over other brain areas. Furthermore, 
examinations on latency did not reveal any significant 
differences between two experimental conditions. 
Examination of the waveforms showed that the ERP 
difference occurred after the P300 component, when 
participants were viewing identical displays and had not yet 
received the comparison stimuli. The P300 and its sub-
components p3a and p3b have been considered as a process 
that indexes the ensuing memory storage operations, as 
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 P300 amplitudes were found related to memory of previous 
stimulus presentations (e.g., Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 
1990; Johnson, 1995; Paller, McCarthy, & Wood, 1988; for 
a recent review, see Polich, 2003). Our results are also 
consistent with those of Dehaene and colleagues (Dehaene 
et al., 1999; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001), who showed that 
200-400ms after the stimulus onset is critical to distinguish 
among different numerical operations with distinctive 
semantic implications. Based on this observation, we 
speculate that the difference in ERPs in our experiment 
probably was due to different working memory load. 
Specifically, when judging the winning chance of a certain 
poker hand, other poker hands (either from previous trials or 
by temporary construction) were used as anchors to build 
categories on the internal representation. Fewer anchors 
were needed in the coarser-scale condition. On the contrary, 
the finer-scale condition demanded more effort because 
more hands needed to be considered at the same time. This 
speculation is consistent with the participants’ oral report 
after the experiment. For example, one participant reported 
that he had to think of more hands with “nearby” rankings 
in the finer-scale condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
In sum, the findings in our experiment were consistent with 
our hypotheses of the internal representation of a coarser 
scale in intuitive judgment of event likelihood. The analyses 
of behavioral data suggested that if participants were only 
able to distinguish event likelihood with a coarser scale, a 
large portion of errors would be produced when they were 
forced to estimate probabilities with a finer scale. This kind 
of errors was manifested in both judgmental accuracy and 
consistency. The low accuracy level (close to random guess) 
and the low consistency level (close to zero) in the finer-
scale condition indicated that participants were not able to 
distinguish winning probabilities of poker hands in the 
increment of 10%. Therefore, if the internal scale indeed 
had a limited number of categories, most likely this number 
was not greater than 10. It is interesting to point out that in 
our experiment, there were 36 different hands at 18 equally 
distributed levels of winning probabilities. If these hands 
were presented externally at the same time in the order of 
their rankings, it is reasonable to assume that any participant 
can report probability values accurate to the 5% increment 
by anchoring and adjustment. Nevertheless, their poor 
performance in the finer-scale condition indicated that the 
number of anchors that can be processed internally was 
quite limited. Furthermore, the ERP difference occurred 
when participants were viewing identical displays, 
indicating that participants followed the experimental 
instruction in forming their estimates at different levels of 
refinement. And estimating by a finer scale appeared to 
require more computational effort.  
Note that the present study is still at its preliminary stage 
and there are many questions left to be answered. For 
example, more replications are needed and the ERP analyses 
can be extended such as comparisons over other brain areas 
and source localization. It would also be interesting to test 
someone who is an expert at poker and to see whether the 
performance would be better, especially in the finer-scale 
condition. Another example is that the model of a coarser 
internal scale can be further examined by manipulating the 
external representations, as previous studies indicated the 
important roles of the interaction between internal and 
external representations in human numerical cognition (e.g., 
Zhang & Norman, 1995; Zhang & Wang, in press). Upon 
further experiments and analyses, we believe that the 
present study will provide a better understanding of human 
intuitive probabilistic judgment. 
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Abstract
This work explores the importance of similarity-based
processes in human everyday reasoning, beyond purely
rule-based processes prevalent in AI and cognitive sci-
ence. A unified framework encompassing both rule-
based and similarity-based reasoning may provide ex-
planations for a variety of human reasoning data.
The paper implements this analysis in a cognitive ar-
chitecture Clarion, which has previously succeeded
in capturing a variety of human learning data in sim-
ulations. The exploration of similarity-based reason-
ing in this architecture leads to a more complete and
more comprehensive framework of human reasoning and
learning. The simulation within this architecture accu-
rately captures human reasoning data, including numer-
ical measures and verbal protocols. This work demon-
strates the significant role played by similarity-based
reasoning. Furthermore, it demonstrates how such a
reasoning process falls out of the existing structure in
the cognitive architecture Clarion.
Introduction
What is human everyday reasoning like? Is it suitably
captured by formal models developed by logicians and AI
researchers? Or is it different? What are its similarities
and differences to these models? After all, computation-
ally speaking, what are the essential patterns in such
reasoning?
In this paper, we will attempt to describe some data of
human everyday (i.e., mundane or “commonsense”) rea-
soning in computational terms. We will instantiate our
analysis in the form of a computational model imple-
mented in a generic cognitive architecture — Clarion
(Sun 2002).
A little background is in order here. Sun (1991) pro-
posed a theory of human everyday reasoning based on a
combination of rule-based reasoning and similarity-based
reasoning, implemented with a mixture of localist and
distributed connectionist models. This theory was fur-
ther developed and elaborated in Sun (1995). The basic
tenet of this theory is that, to a significant extent, human
everyday reasoning may be described by a combination
of rule-based and similarity-based reasoning. Human ev-
eryday reasoning may be reduced to these two types of
processes. The intermixing of rule-based and similarity-
based reasoning can lead to complex patterns of infer-
ences as commonly observed in human everyday reason-
ing. And these two types of processes may be captured
within a unified connectionist model; that is, they fall
out of the very same model (albeit with a combination
of localist and distributed representations).
The theory was backed up by psychological evidence
in the form of verbal protocols as in Collins (1978) and
Collins and Michalski (1989). In Sun (1995), these pro-
tocols were analyzed based on two mechanisms: rules
and similarity (Tversky 1977, Hahn and Chater 1998).
The analysis showed that vast majority of the proto-
col data might be easily captured by the intermixing
of these two mechanisms. This theory was crystallized
into a two-component model whereby rule-based reason-
ing was carried out in one component with localist rep-
resentation, and similarity-based reasoning in another
with distributed representation (Sun 1995). Relevant to
this approach, Sloman (1993) published a set of experi-
ments, which provided support to the hypothesis of Sun
(1991) (see also Sun 1995). He found that similarity
played a significant role in determining outcomes of in-
ductive reasoning and similarity might be characterized
by feature overlapping (as in Sun 1991). Five years later,
Sloman (1998) described further experiments that again
supported the hypothesis that there were two parallel
mechanisms at work in human everyday reasoning (Sun
1991).
In the remainder of this paper, we first describe the
three pertinent experiments of Sloman (1998), which
were consistent with the theory advanced in Sun (1991)
and Sun (1995). We then describe the generic cognitive
architecture, Clarion, used in capturing human every-
day reasoning. Next, the particular setup of the archi-
tecture for capturing this set of human experiments is
described. We then describe the results from simulat-
ing the experiments of Sloman (1998) using Clarion.
Finally, some general discussion completes the paper.
The Categorical Inference Task
Let us examine some human reasoning data that illus-
trates combinations of similarity-based and rule-based
reasoning (SBR and RBR, respectively). We will look
into the data from experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Sloman
(1998), which are most relevant to this issue.
Among them, according to our interpretation, al-
though experiment 1 used forced choice while experiment
2 used rating of argument strength, both involved SBR
to a very significant extent. Experiment 4 involved ex-
plicit use of categorical relations, and thus mainly RBR.
Experiment 5 involved more of SBR, as well as RBR.
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Specifically, in experiment 1, subjects were given pairs
of arguments, either in the form of premise specificity:
a. All flowers are susceptible to thrips. =⇒ All roses
are susceptible to thrips.
b. All plants are susceptible to thrips. =⇒ All roses
are susceptible to thrips.
or in the form of inclusion similarity:
a. All plants contain bryophytes. =⇒ All flowers
contain bryophytes.
b. All plants contain bryophytes. =⇒ All mosses
contain bryophytes.
Subjects were to pick the stronger of the two arguments
from each pair. 73 subjects were tested and each was
given 18 pairs of arguments (among other things not
related to this task).
The results showed that the more similar argument
from each pair of arguments was chosen 82% of times (for
inclusion similarity) and 91% of times (for premise speci-
ficity). t tests showed that these percentages were signif-
icantly above chance, either by subjects (t(72) = 18.64
and t(72) = 33.09 for premise specificity and inclusion
similarity, respectively; p < 0.0001) or by argument pairs
(t(8) = 6.97 and t(8) = 15.61 respectively; p < 0.0001).
We note that, if only RBR had been used, then sim-
ilarity should not have made a difference, because the
conclusion category was contained in the premise cate-
gory and thus both arguments in each pair should have
been equally, perfectly strong. Therefore, the data sug-
gest that SBR was involved to a significant extent.
In experiment 2, subjects were instead asked to rate
the likelihood (“conditional probability”) of each argu-
ment. Ratings could range from 0 to 1. 18 subjects were
tested.
The mean rating was 0.89 for inclusion similarity and
0.86 for premise specificity. Both were significantly be-
low 1, both by subjects (t(17) = 2.75 and t(17) = 3.23
respectively; p < 0.01), and by arguments (t(17) = 8.87
and t(17) = 6.14 respectively; p < 0.0001). Again we
note that it would have been the case that the out-
come was 1 if only RBR had been used (because the
conclusion category was contained in the premise cat-
egory). Thus, SBR was significantly present here too.
Indeed, ANOVA showed that across subjects, there was
a significant main effect of similarity (low vs. high;
F (1, 17) = 18.90, p < 0.001). So was the case across
argument pairs (F (1, 16) = 12.64, p < 0.001).
In experiment 4, subjects were asked to rate the like-
lihood of each argument. Ratings could range from 0 to
1. However, in this case, each category inclusion relation
was specifically presented as part of each argument. For
example,
All plants contain bryophytes. All mosses are
plants. =⇒ All mosses contain bryophytes.
The results showed that the mean judgment was 0.99. 23
out of 27 subjects gave all 1’s. 32 out of 36 arguments re-
ceived judgments of all 1’s (excluding one individual who
Bottom Level
Top Level
non−action−centered
non−action−centered
explicit  representation
implicit  representation
action−centered
explicit representation
     
action−centered  implicit
modules
Figure 1: The CLARION architecture.
gave 0.99 throughout). In other words, the similarity-
based phenomena almost disappeared. Instead, an ex-
plicit RBR mode based on category inclusion relations
was used.
Experiment 5 was similar to experiment 2, in that rat-
ings were obtained. However, before any ratings were
done, subjects were asked to make category inclusion
decisions. Thus, in this case, subjects were reminded of
rule-based reasoning explicitly involving category inclu-
sion relations. Therefore, they were more likely to use
RBR, although probably not as much as in experiment 4,
due to the separation of category inclusion judgment and
argument likelihood rating in the experiment procedure
(unlike that of experiment 4).
The results showed that no one of the 18 subjects gave
a likelihood judgment of 1 for every argument, indicating
SBR was probably at work. Compared with experiment
2, having subjects make category inclusion judgments
increased the likelihood ratings. The mean judgment for
experiment 5 was 0.92 as opposed to 0.87 for experiment
2. 1 This increase might reflect the increased involve-
ment of RBR. Nevertheless, ANOVA showed a signifi-
cant effect of similarity (low vs. high), across subjects
(F (1, 17) = 9.33, p < 0.01), and across argument pairs
(F (1, 16) = 11.42, p < 0.01).
Below, we will utilize this task of categorical inference
for the further testing of cognitive architecture Clarion.
The simulation shows indications of the significance of
similarity-based reasoning (as opposed to probabilistic
or Bayesian reasoning; cf. Anderson and Lebiere 1998).
The Clarion Model
Clarion is an integrative model with a dual represen-
tational structure (Sun et al 2001, Sun 2002). It consists
of two levels: the top level captures explicit processes
and the bottom level captures implicit processes. See
Figure 1.
First, the inaccessible nature of implicit knowledge is
suitably captured by subsymbolic distributed represen-
tations provided by a backpropagation network. This
is because representational units in a distributed rep-
resentation are capable of accomplishing tasks but are
1However, the difference was not statistically significant
by subjects, although significant by arguments (t(35) =
3.81, p < 0.0001).
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subsymbolic and generally not individually meaningful
(see Smolensky 1988, Sun 1995). This characteristic of
distributed representation accords well with the (direct)
inaccessibility of implicit knowledge.
In contrast, explicit knowledge may be captured in
computational modeling by a symbolic or localist rep-
resentation (Clark and Karmiloff-Smith 1993), in which
each unit is more easily interpretable and has a clearer
conceptual meaning. This characteristic captures the
property of explicit knowledge being (directly) more ac-
cessible and more manipulable (Smolensky 1988, Sun
1995).
This radical difference in the representations of the two
types of knowledge leads to a two-level model whereby
each level using one kind of representation captures one
corresponding type of process, either implicit or explicit.
The model may select to use one level or the other, based
on current circumstances (e.g., experimental conditions;
see Sun 2002 for details). When both levels are used,
the outcome from the two levels may be combined in
some ways, which may be partially domain specific (Sun
2002).
At each level of the model, there may be multiple
modules, both action-centered modules and non-action-
centered modules (Schacter 1990, Moscovitch and Umilta
1991). The reason for having both action-centered
and non-action-centered modules (at each level) is be-
cause, as it should be obvious, action-centered knowl-
edge (roughly, procedural knowledge) is not necessarily
inaccessible (directly), and non-action-centered knowl-
edge (roughly, declarative knowledge) is not necessar-
ily accessible (directly). Although it was argued by
some that all procedural knowledge is inaccessible di-
rectly and all declarative knowledge is directly accessi-
ble, such a clean mapping of the two dichotomies is un-
tenable in our view. We will refer to these two sets of
modules as the action-centered subsystem (the ACS) and
the non-action-centered subsystem (the NACS), respec-
tively. There are also other components, such as working
memory, episodic memory, etc., which are not important
to this work.
In this work, we will focus on the NACS, due to the
declarative nature of the task. This subsystem, as stated
earlier, consists of (1) a top level (known as the GKS, or
the general knowledge store), which is made up of a set
of chunks and a set of explicit associative rules linking
chunks, and (2) a bottom level (known as the AMNs, or
the associative memory networks), which is made up of
implicit associative memories (Sun 2002).
At the top level of the NACS, the essential ele-
ments are chunks, each of which is specified by a set
of dimension-value pairs (i.e., attribute-value pairs) that
describes an entity (or an object), along with a chunk la-
bel. Each chunk is represented by a chunk node, which is
linked to the nodes at the bottom level (the AMNs) rep-
resenting the individual dimension-value pairs involved.
The support for the conclusion of an associative rule,
which is a chunk, is calculated as follows (Sun 1994):
Sa
j
=
∑
i
Sc
i
∗ W a
i
(1)
where j indicates the jth rule at the top level, Sa
j
is the
support for associative rule j, Sc
i
is the strength of the
ith chunk in the condition of the rule, i ranges over all
the chunks in the condition of rule j, W a
i
is the weight
of the ith chunk in the condition of rule j (which, by
default, is W a
i
= 1/n, where n is the number of chunks
in the condition of the rule).
The conclusion chunk has a strength level that is de-
termined by the maximum of all the support from all the
relevant rules:
Sc
ck
= max
j:all associative rules leading to ck
Sa
j
(2)
where Sc
ck
is the strength of chunk ck (resulting from
associative rules), and j ranges over all the associative
rules pointing to ck.
In addition, similarity-based reasoning falls out of
knowledge encoding with chunks (i.e., with sets of
dimension-value pairs). A known (given or inferred)
chunk is automatically compared with another chunk.
If their similarity is high enough, then the other chunk
is inferred. The strength of a chunk ci as the result of
similarity-based reasoning is:
Sc
ci
= max
j
(Scj∼ci × S
c
cj
)
where Scj∼ci measures the similarity from cj to ci (Tver-
sky 1977), Scj∼ci × S
c
cj
measures the support to ci from
the similarity, and j ranges over all the chunks.
The default similarity measure (Sun 1995, Tversky
1977) is:
Sc1∼c2 =
Nc1∩c2
f(Nc2)
where Sc1∼c2 denotes the similarity from c1 to c2. Nc1∩c2
is the weighted sum of the identically valued dimensions
in c1 and c2 (among all the specified dimensions of c2
— the dimensions that have specified values). That is,
Nc1∩c2 =
∑
i∈c2∩c1 W
c2
i
× Ai, where Ai is the strength
of the value of dimension i in chunk c1, which is nor-
mally 1 (representing full strengths). The weights (W c2
i
)
in the weighted sum are specified with respect to c2
(the target of similarity, not the source of it). Nor-
mally, these weights are the same and equal to 1. Nc2 is
the weighted sum of the specified dimensions (the di-
mensions that have specified values) of c2. That is,
Nc2 =
∑
i∈c2 W
c2
i
× Ai, where normally Ai = 1 and
W c2
i
= 1. f is a super-linear, but close to linear, func-
tion (such as f(x) = x1.0001 as in our simulation of this
task). 2 For further details, see Sun (1995).
Similarity is automatically computed whenever rea-
soning involves multiple chunks that are similar to one
another. Therefore, there is no dedicated representation
of similarity between any two chunks.
Similarity-based and rule-based reasoning can be
inter-mixed. When both SBR and RBR are employed,
we have:
Sc
ci
= max(c14 × max
j:all rules leading to ci
Sa
j
,
2Similarity is thus limited to [0, 1).
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c15 × max
j:all chunks similar to ci
(Scj∼ci × S
c
cj
))
where c14 and c15 are two constants that balance the
two measures (rule versus similarity), and Scj∼ci is the
similarity measure.
As a result of mixing SBR and RBR, complex patterns
of reasoning can emerge. As explicated in Sun (1995),
the conclusion from one step of reasoning can be used as
the starting point of the next step. The iterative process
of combined rule-based and similarity-based reasoning
allows all possible conclusions to be reached (including
“inheritance” reasoning; Sun 1995). These different se-
quences together capture essential patterns of human ev-
eryday reasoning (see Sun 1995 for details).
Note that all of the operations of the non-action-
centered subsystem are under the control of the action-
centered subsystem, which makes action decisions each
step of the way. To do so, the top level of the ACS con-
sists of a set of explicit action rules, either externally
given or extracted from the bottom level (from implicit
knowledge), while the bottom level consists of implicit
decision networks (trained with reinforcement learning
algorithms, negligible in this task). For details regard-
ing the ACS and its parameters, see Sun et al (2001) and
Sun (2002). We will not get into these details here, as
they are not directly relevant to this work.
It is worth noting that Clarion has been successful
in simulating a variety of cognitive tasks. These tasks in-
clude serial reaction time tasks, artificial grammar learn-
ing tasks, process control tasks, alphabetical arithmetic
tasks, and the Tower of Hanoi task (Sun 2002, Sun and
Zhang 2004). In addition, we have done extensive work
on a complex minefield navigation task (Sun et al 2001,
Sun and Peterson 1998). We are now in a good position
to extend the effort to the capturing of a wide range of
human reasoning and memory processes, through simu-
lating reasoning and memory task data. This paper is
but one aspect of this effort.
Simulation Setup
At the top level of the NACS (i.e., the GKS), all relevant
category inclusion relations, such as “flowers are plants”
or “mosses are plants”, were encoded as associative rules.
Chunk nodes in the GKS were used to represent the
concepts involved, such as “flowers” and “plants”. The
dimensional values of these chunks were represented as
separate nodes in the AMNs, and thus the chunk nodes
were linked to the AMNs.
For simulating various experimental settings, the fol-
lowing manipulations were used: For simulating settings
where SBR was dominant, RBR was de-emphasized. For
simulating settings where RBR was dominant, RBR was
emphasized. The relative emphasis of the two methods
was accomplished through the balancing parameters. We
set c14 = 0.5 and c15 = 1.0 for experiments 1 and 2, be-
cause of the heavy reliance on SBR as opposed to RBR
as suggested by the analysis of the human data (see the
earlier discussion of the human data). For simulating ex-
periment 4, they were set at c14 = 1.0, c15 = 1.0, because
this setting prompted more reliance on RBR as indicated
by the human data. For simulating experiment 5, they
were set at c14 = 0.88, c15 = 1.0, because the experi-
ment involved an intermediate level of reliance on RBR
as suggested by the human data. In all, these values
were set in accordance with our interpretations of what
happened under these different experimental conditions
respectively.
At the bottom level of the NACS (the AMNs), al-
though the associative memories were present, they were
not very relevant for the performance of this task, be-
cause there was no sufficient prior training of the network
with any data directly relevant to this task. 3
Training of the model, before the simulation of the
experimental test, consisted of presenting categorical
features (dimension-value pairs) along with the cate-
gory labels, to both levels of the NACS. The features
(dimension-value pairs) captured similarities between
entities. That is, if A was more similar to C than B
was, then A would have more features in common with
C than B would. And so on. Note that repeated pre-
sentations were not required. The one-pass presentation
enabled the formation of chunks and associative rules in
the GKS, but not much implicit knowledge in the AMNs.
With a proper process of chunk encoding and associative
rule encoding as in Clarion, one-pass presentation was
sufficient for the GKS.
During test, when a category name was given, the cat-
egory name was matched with a corresponding chunk
label. The matching chunk was activated to the full
extent (i.e., 1). Then, through associative rules as well
as through similarity-based processes, conclusion chunks
were also activated (to varying extents). Conclusion
chunks were retrieved along with their strengths, com-
bining SBR and RBR according to the balancing param-
eters.
For simulating ratings of conclusions (as in experi-
ments 2, 4, and 5), the strengths of chunks derived from
a proper combination of the results of SBR and RBR (as
determined by the balancing parameters) were directly
used. However, for simulating forced choices (as in ex-
periment 1), a stochastic decision process based on the
Boltzmann distribution was used to select between two
possible outcomes.
Simulation Results
We simulated the data from experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5 of
Sloman (1998) as described earlier. For each experiment,
a set of simulation runs (i.e., simulated “subjects”) equal
to the number of the human subjects involved were used.
The results and the statistical analysis of the results were
as follows.
As described before, in experiment 1, subjects were to
pick the stronger of the two arguments from each pair.
The simulation of experiment 1 showed, the same as the
human data, that the more similar argument from each
3For the associative memory network, the number of input
units was 1800 (for representing all chunks specifiable with 60
dimensions of 30 possible values each), the number of hidden
units was 500, and the number of output units was 1800. The
learning rate was 0.2 and the momentum was 0.1.
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pair of arguments was chosen more often: 82% of times
(for inclusion similarity) and 83% of times (for premise
specificity). t tests showed that these percentages were
significantly above chance, either by subjects (p < 0.001)
or by argument pairs (p < 0.001), the same as in the
human data. In our simulation setup, there was a sig-
nificant involvement of SBR (with c14 = 0.5, c15 = 1.0).
If only RBR had been used, then similarity could not
have made a difference, and thus both arguments in a
pair should have been equally strong. This simulation
demonstrated that the conjecture of the involvement of
SBR in producing the human data in this experiment
was a reasonable interpretation (see the earlier exposi-
tion of the human experiments), given the close match
with the human data.
In experiment 2, subjects were instead asked to rate
the likelihood of each argument. In this simulation, the
mean rating was 0.86 for inclusion similarity and 0.87 for
premise specificity. Both were significantly below 1, dif-
ferent from what would have been predicted if only RBR
had been used, both by subjects (p < 0.001) and by ar-
guments (p < 0.001), the same as in the human data.
ANOVA also showed that across subjects and across ar-
gument pairs, there was a significant main effect of simi-
larity (low vs. high; p < 0.001). With the same setup as
the previous simulation, this simulation again demon-
strated the same pattern of significant involvement of
SBR in the human performance.
In experiment 4, subjects were asked to rate the like-
lihood of each argument, right after being presented
relevant category inclusion relations. The simulation
produced the mean judgment 0.99, exactly the same as
the human data. Compared with experiment 2, explicit
RBR based on category inclusion was much more promi-
nent in this case, as specified in our simulation setup
(c14 = 1.0, c15 = 1.0), which captured the human data
accurately.
In experiment 5, ratings were obtained after subjects
were asked to make category inclusion decisions. In this
case, subjects were reminded of RBR involving category
inclusion relations and therefore they were more likely to
use RBR (compared with experiment 2), although not
exclusively (unlike experiment 4). In the simulation, the
mean judgment for experiment 5 was 0.91 for both in-
clusion similarity and premise specificity, as opposed to
0.86 and 0.87 for the two cases in experiment 2. ANOVA
also showed a significant main effect of similarity (low vs.
high), across subjects (p < 0.001), and across argument
pairs (p < 0.001). This simulation replicated the human
data well, which showed that our interpretation as em-
bodied in the simulation setup (c14 = 0.88, c15 = 1.0),
that is, less involvement of RBR compared with exper-
iment 4 but more compared with experiment 2, was a
reasonable one.
In all, simulation of this task successfully validated the
interpretation and the analysis of human performance in
this task and, to some extent, our framework in general.
Concluding Remarks
Overall, the simulation accurately captured the human
reasoning data from Sloman (1998). The simulation was
conducted based on our framework of mixed rule-based
reasoning and similarity-based reasoning, which, along
with other simulations published elsewhere (e.g., Sun
1995, 2002, Sun et al 2001, Sun and Zhang 2004), showed
the cognitive plausibility of the Clarion architecture to
some extent.
This simulation demonstrates the importance of
similarity-based reasoning in human everyday reasoning.
This similarity-based process is quite distinct from prob-
abilistic reasoning as implemented in other existing cog-
nitive architectures, such as ACT-R (see Anderson 1993
or Anderson and Lebiere 1998). Let us compare the two
different approaches. ACT-R as described in Anderson
and Lebiere (1998) tries to capture all inferences in a
probabilistic framework. In so doing, it lumps together
all forms of weak inferential connections in a unified way.
Although this approach leads to uniformity, it has short-
comings as well. All similarity relations between any pair
of any two objects must be explicitly represented with
all the associated parameters, which specify probabilis-
tic computation used to capture similarity-based reason-
ing (along with other inexact inferences). The problem
is the complexity of representing all similarity pairings.
This complexity is very high in ACT-R but in contrast
is avoided in Clarion.
The limitations of probabilistic reasoning (Pearl 1988)
in general include its neglect of many heuristics, simpli-
fications, and rules of thumb (Tversky and Kahneman
1983, Sun 1995, Yang and Johnson-Laird 2001) useful in
reducing the computational complexity of formal math-
ematical models. As a result, it suffers from higher com-
putational complexity (Sun 1995).
We should also look into the framework of Collins
and Michalski (1989), which apparently incorporated
“similarity-based” reasoning through explicitly repre-
senting similarity in a complex logical formalism. Sim-
ilarity was explicitly represented as a logical operator:
That is, for almost any pair of any two objects, there
would be a logical relation explicitly represented, denot-
ing their similarity. Inferences could be performed on
the basis of similarity operators, using a search process.
The complexity of this representational framework was
extremely high.
In general, logic-based models suffer from a number of
well known shortcomings, including their restrictiveness
concerning pre-conditions, consistency, and correctness,
and their inability in dealing with inexactness (see, e.g.,
Israel 1987, Sun 1995). Their restrictiveness renders such
models costly, difficult to specify, and difficult to use.
In a different vein, psychological work on reasoning is
relevant also. Such work mostly centers around either
mental logic (Rips 1994, Braine and O’Brien 1998) or
mental models (Yang and Johnson-Laird 2001). Neither
approach deals with similarity-based reasoning as cap-
tured in Clarion. Their focuses are elsewhere.
In sum, this line of work, combining similarity-based
reasoning and rule-based reasoning (Sun 1995, Sloman
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1998, Hahn and Chater 1998), offers a new approach
for capturing some essential patterns of human every-
day reasoning (albeit not all patterns of human reason-
ing). It complements logic-based “commonsense” rea-
soning models prevalent in AI, which is very much cen-
tered on logic and thus limited by logic. This work also
points to new avenues of cognitive modeling, beyond the
current psychology of reasoning (which largely focuses
on various logics and mental models) and beyond exist-
ing cognitive architectures (Anderson and Lebiere 1998).
In addition, this approach may well be extended to case-
based and/or analogical reasoning (e.g., Sun 1995a).
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Abstract 
Perceptual processing of emotional facial expressions occurs 
very quickly, even without awareness. To determine whether 
the fast processing of facial expressions is categorical, we 
studied temporal characteristics of categorical perception (CP) 
of facial expressions. We investigated the effect of shortening 
stimulus duration on participant performance with respect to 
identifying and discriminating morphed facial expressions. 
The results of two experiments showed that CP was 
attenuated or even disappeared when facial stimuli were 
presented for as briefly as 50-75 milliseconds. These findings 
indicate that CP is irrelevant to the fast perceptual processing 
of facial expressions. 
 
Facial expressions of emotion are processed very quickly, 
even without awareness (Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998; 
Whalen et al., 1998). It has been proposed that this fast 
emotional processing provides a ‘dirty’ image of the 
external world, enabling organisms to detect salient stimuli 
immediately (Adolphs, 2002; LeDoux, 1996). What is still 
not understood, however, is how this fast and dirty 
processing of facial expressions works. 
A hallmark of facial expression recognition is its 
categorical nature, that is, facial expressions are recognized 
as belonging to discrete categories of emotion, so-called 
basic emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1992). Reports on 
categorical perception (CP) of facial expressions are thought 
to provide strong evidence that people process facial 
expressions categorically (Calder et al., 1996; DeGelder, 
Teunisse, & Benson, 1997; Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Young 
et al., 1997). Previous studies have confirmed that 
recognizing facial expressions fulfills the following features 
of CP: (a) in identifying a stimulus within a continuum 
extending from one category to another, the rate of 
categorizing the stimulus changes abruptly at a boundary 
(category boundary); and (b) in discriminating a pair of 
stimuli that differ by a constant physical amount, 
discrimination is superior for pairs straddling the category 
boundary (between-category pairs), as compared to pairs 
falling within one category (within-category pairs). It has 
been argued that the perceptual system transforms the 
information continuously received from a given facial 
expression into categorical information corresponding to the 
most likely emotion (Etcoff & Magee, 1992). 
In previous research, however, facial stimuli were 
presented for a relatively long period (≧750 ms), so it 
remains unclear whether the fast perceptual processing of 
facial expressions is categorical in nature. Our goal was to 
investigate the effects of shortening stimulus duration on CP 
of facial expressions and to examine whether the fast 
perceptual processing is categorical. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, participants identified facial expressions 
from three continua extending from anger to happiness, 
from happiness to fear, and from fear to anger. We 
investigated how shortening stimulus exposure duration 
(750 ms, 150 ms, 50 ms) affected the abrupt change in the 
rate of identification at the category boundary. 
Method 
 
Participants Twelve undergraduates and postgraduates 
participated (8 men, 4 women; 20-24 years old). 
 
Facial Stimuli Three sets of eight gray-scale images of 
facial expressions were used. Each set consisted of a 
continuum extending either from anger to happiness, from 
happiness to fear, or from fear to anger. The original 
(endpoint) facial expressions were posed photographs of a 
Japanese woman, and interpolated (morphed) expressions 
between the two continuum endpoints were created with 
software for facial expression processing (Information-
technology Promotion Agency, Japan (IPA), 1998). 
The morph transformation started with the delineation of 
two endpoint expressions; landmarks were placed manually 
on critical positions of each image. There were 759 
landmarks in total, 88 points of which were placed manually 
on corresponding positions of each image: for the head, 4 
points; for the outline, 28 points; for the eyes, 5 x 2 points; 
for the eyebrows, 4 x 2 points; for the nose, 4 points; for the 
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mouth, 6 points; for the neck, 13 points; and finally for the 
hairline, 15 points. An intermediate face was then created 
with linear interpolation between point-to-point pixel 
intensity values, yielding a weighted blend of both facial 
configuration and texture of the two endpoint faces. Six 
intermediate faces were generated for each continuum, so 
that eight images from one endpoint to the other were 
spaced with a 14.3% gap. 
 
Procedure and Design Participants performed the 
identification task (three sessions) by viewing stimuli 
presented on a 17-inch CRT monitor. Each trial began with 
an 800-ms presentation of a fixation point, followed by a 
blank interval of 300 ms, and then a facial stimulus from 
one continuum for 750 ms, 150 ms, or 50 ms. After a 300-
ms blank interval, participants were asked to decide which 
endpoint category the face expressed. The continuum was 
manipulated across sessions: from anger to happiness (AH 
session), from happiness to fear (HF session), and from fear 
to anger (FA session). The order of the three sessions was 
counterbalanced across participants. Each session began 
with 24 training trials, followed by five blocks of 48 
experimental trials, corresponding to two repetitions of the 
24 combinations of faces (8) and stimulus durations (3). The 
order of the face-duration sets was fully randomized in each 
repetition. 
Results & Discussion 
Figure 1 displays the overall percentage with which a given 
endpoint expression was identified at each stimulus duration, 
for each continuum. As an estimate of the category 
boundary, the point at which two endpoints were identified 
with equal probability was computed by applying a logit 
model to each identification rate curve (Table 1). In general, 
the category boundary lay near the 50% morph. More 
importantly, Table 1 also indicates the slope of the logistic 
curve at the category boundary as a measure of the 
identification rate change at the boundary. Multiple 
comparisons (z tests) with Bonferroni’s method (α=0.017) 
revealed that the slope at 50 ms was significantly, or 
marginally significantly, smaller than at 150 ms and at 750 
ms for the anger-happiness and happiness-fear continua (AH 
session, 50 ms vs. 150 ms, z=2.37, p=0.018, 50 ms vs. 750 
ms, z=3.67, p<0.001, 150 ms vs. 750 ms, z=1.48, p=0.139; 
HF session, 50 ms vs. 150 ms, z=2.69, p=0.007, 50 ms vs. 
750 ms, z=4.07, p<0.001, 150 ms vs. 750 ms, z=1.74, 
p=0.082). No slope change was observed for the fear-anger 
continuum (all ps>0.35). 
The decreased slopes of the identification rate curves for 
the anger-happiness and happiness-fear continua at 50 ms 
indicate that the CP of facial expressions is attenuated with 
the briefest stimulus exposure duration. The lack of slope 
change for the fear-anger continuum may be due to the 
originally weak categorical perception between fear and 
anger, which reflects their remarkable similarity with 
respect to the dimensional information of pleasure and 
arousal (Russell, 1997). Indeed, the slope for the fear-anger 
continuum was the smallest of the three continua at 750 ms. 
Likewise, there are previous reports that have failed to 
detect clear CP for the fear-anger continuum (Calder et al., 
1996; DeGelder et al., 1997). 
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Figure 1: Overall percentage with which a given endpoint 
expression (top: happiness, middle: fear, bottom: anger) was 
identified at each stimulus duration, for each session. Morph 
represents a percentage of happiness (top), fear (middle), or 
anger (bottom) for a given face. 
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Table 1: Estimates of the position of the category boundary 
and the slope at the boundary. 
 
Session Duration Boundary (%) Slope
AH 750 ms 56.9 14.5
 150 ms 52.5 12.5
 50 ms 49.0 10.0
HF 750 ms 43.3 18.1
 150 ms 47.9 14.9
 50 ms 51.2 11.3
FA 750 ms 53.9 13.3
 150 ms 51.8 13.8
 50 ms 49.2 12.6
 
Note Boundary represents a percentage of happiness (AH 
Session), fear (HF Session), or anger (FA Session) for a 
morphed face. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 revealed that the abrupt change in 
identification rate at the category boundary was attenuated 
at the briefest stimulus exposure duration, indicating that CP 
of facial expressions did not reflect fast perceptual 
processing. To further examine temporal characteristics of 
CP, Experiment 2 investigated whether superior 
discrimination for between-category pairs could be observed 
with the brief stimulus exposure duration when compared to 
discrimination for within-category pairs. Because a more 
accurate discrimination performance for between-category 
pairs is regarded as the key indicator of CP (Harnad, 1987), 
its disappearance at the brief stimulus duration provides 
crucial evidence that categorical perception does not occur 
rapidly. In Experiment 2, participants engaged in both 
discrimination and identification tasks of facial expressions 
from the happiness-fear continuum. We selected the 
happiness-fear continuum from the three continua used in 
Experiment 1 because it did not incorporate any gross 
changes in physical features (e.g., from open to closed 
mouth), which might obscure CP (Calder et al., 1996). 
Method 
 
Participants Twenty-three undergraduates participated (12 
men, 11 women; 18-24 years old). 
 
Facial Stimuli One set of 11 gray-scale images of facial 
expressions was used. The set consisted of a continuum 
extending from happiness to fear. The endpoint expressions 
and the morphing procedure to create interpolated faces 
were the same as in Experiment 1. Nine intermediate faces 
were generated so that the 11 images from happiness to fear 
were spaced with a 10% gap. 
 
Procedure and Design Participants performed two 
successive tasks (two sessions each) by viewing stimuli 
presented on a 17-inch CRT monitor. 
XAB discrimination task The sequence of the stimuli 
presented in each trial was as follows: (1) a fixation point 
for 450 ms; (2) a blank interval for 300 ms; (3) a facial 
stimulus ‘X’ for 150 ms or 75 ms (target); (4) a black-and-
white checker-pattern for 150 ms (backward mask); (5) a 
blank interval for 750 ms; (6) and finally, two facial stimuli 
‘A’ and ‘B’, positioned horizontally to the right and left of 
center, displayed until the participants responded (reference). 
Participants were asked to decide which reference was 
identical to the target. 
The backward mask was used to restrict visual access to 
the target over the controlled stimulus exposure duration 
(Enns & DiLollo, 2000). Because the backward mask might 
degrade target perception, we used 75 ms as the brief 
exposure duration, which is somewhat longer than the 50 ms 
tested in Experiment 1. We also used 150 ms as the sole 
longer exposure duration interval, because we speculated 
that task difficulty might differ too much between 75 ms 
and 750 ms. Reference stimuli were spaced with a 20% gap, 
resulting in nine possible pairs. For each pair, there were 
four presentation orders; (X,A,B) = (A,A,B), (A,B,A), 
(B,A,B), (B,B,A). Target duration was manipulated across 
sessions, and the order of the two durations was 
counterbalanced across participants. Each session contained 
10 training trials and two blocks of 36 experimental trials 
representing all combinations of pairs (9) and presentations 
(4). The order of the pair-presentation sets was fully 
randomized in each block. 
Identification task Stimulus sequence in each trial was 
the same as in the XAB discrimination task, with the 
exception that reference stimuli were removed. Participants 
were asked to decide whether the target stimulus expressed 
fear or happiness. The order of the two sessions across 
which the target duration was manipulated was the same as 
in the XAB discrimination task. Each session contained 10 
training trials and two blocks of 44 experimental trials 
corresponding to four repetitions of the 11 faces. The order 
of the faces was fully randomized in each repetition. 
Results & Discussion 
 
Identification Task Figure 2 presents the overall 
percentage of trials in which “fear” was identified at each 
stimulus exposure duration in the identification task. 
Application of a logit model to each identification rate curve 
revealed that the category boundary lay at 52.4% (150 ms) 
and 55.2% (75 ms). Contrary to the results of Experiment 1, 
logit models also showed that the slope at 150 ms (17.9) 
was somewhat smaller than at 75 ms (19.4), though this 
difference did not reach significance (z=1.03, p=0.303). As 
the slope was attenuated in proportion to the decreased 
duration in Experiment 1, these data suggest that the 
duration difference between 150 ms and 75 ms was 
insufficient to cause a significant slope change. 
 
XAB Discrimination Task Figure 3 presents the overall 
correct response rate for each stimulus exposure duration in  
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the XAB discrimination task. The data from the 
identification task revealed that identifying between-
category pairs was 40%-60% and 50%-70% at both 
durations. The peak in discrimination performance at the 
category boundary was found only at the 150-ms stimulus 
exposure duration. 
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We calculated the mean correct rate for between-category 
pairs (40%-60%, 50%-70%) and within-category pairs (the 
remaining seven pairs) for each duration, and conducted a 2 
x 2 ANOVA of the mean correct rate with the two factors of 
pair (between-category or within-category) and stimulus 
duration (150 ms or 75 ms). A significant main effect of pair 
was found (F(1,22)=7.79, p=0.011, MSE=0.008), indicating 
better discrimination for between-category pairs (72%) than 
for within-category pairs (67%). The main effect of duration 
was also significant (F(1,22)=9.74, p=0.005, MSE=0.011), 
indicating worse performance at 75 ms (66%) than at 150 
ms (73%). There was no significant interaction between the 
two factors (p>0.25), suggesting that discrimination of 
between-category pairs was more accurate than that for 
within-category pairs, at both durations. However, post-hoc 
paired t tests revealed that superior discrimination for 
between-category pairs was significant only at the 150-ms 
exposure duration (150 ms, M=8%, t(22)=2.42, p=0.024; 75 
ms, M=3%, t(22)=1.18, p=0.252). Post-hoc comparisons 
also revealed that poorer discrimination at 75 ms was 
significant for both between-category and within-category 
pairs (between-category, M=9%, t(22)=2.36, p=0.027; 
within-category, M=4%, t(22)=2.66, p=0.014). 
Figure 2: Overall percentage with which “fear” was 
identified at each stimulus duration. Morph represents a 
percentage of “fear” for a given face. 
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To indicate CP in the discrimination task, previous 
studies (Calder et al., 1996; Young et al., 1997) have 
reported correlations between observed and theoretical 
performances, predicted from CP. Calder and colleagues 
(Calder et al., 1996) assumed that discrimination between 
two facial expression stimuli depends on two cues: first, the 
physical difference between the stimuli, which is constant 
for any pair, regardless of their expressions; and second, the 
expression categories of the stimuli. To estimate the 
contribution of the first non-categorical cue, they computed 
the mean observed discrimination for the two pairs, placed 
at both ends of the continuum. To estimate the contribution 
of the second categorical cue, they calculated the difference 
in identification rates for the two relevant stimuli observed 
in the identification task, and multiplied the obtained 
difference by 0.25 (a constant). Calder et al. (1996) argued 
that summing the two estimates measures theoretical 
performance in the discrimination task. 
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Figure 3 also presents theoretical performance, based on 
the same formula as Calder et al. (1996), along with 
observed performance. The fit between observed and 
theoretical performance looks better at 150 ms than at 75 
ms; indeed, their correlation was significant only at the 150-
ms exposure duration (150 ms, r=0.667, t(7)=2.37, p=0.050; 
75 ms, r=0.362, t(7)=1.03, p=0.338). 
Figure 3: Overall correct response rate in the XAB 
discrimination task for each duration. Observed=observed 
rate. Theoretical=theoretical rate predicted from CP. Morph 
represents a percentage of “fear” for the less fearful  face of 
a given pair. 
Analyses revealed that the superior discrimination 
performance for between-category pairs disappeared at 75 
ms but was present at 150 ms, providing decisive evidence 
of null CP at the brief stimulus duration. In response to 
objections claiming that observing only one continuum is 
insufficient, studies using neuroimaging (Morris et al., 
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1996; Morris, Friston, et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 1998; 
Wright et al., 2001) and developmental data (Kotsoni, 
DeHaan, & Johnson, 2001) have indicated that happiness 
and fear are the most distinct categories, and that the lack of 
CP between the two expressions is important. Critics might 
also insist that the disappearance of CP at 75 ms is a floor 
effect; however, discrimination for any stimulus pair at 75 
ms was above chance (all ps<0.01), indicating that residual 
perception of differences in some visual properties was 
present. Moreover, the 75-ms duration was sufficient for 
accurate identification of near-endpoint facial expressions 
(see Figure 2). Thus, categorical perception did not occur, 
even with such well-preserved visual processing. 
General Discussion 
The present experiments revealed that categorical 
perception of facial expressions was attenuated and even 
disappeared with brief stimulus exposure durations. The 
abrupt change in identifying facial expressions at the 
category boundary was weakened at the 50-ms stimulus 
duration (Experiment 1), and the more accurate 
discrimination observed for between-category pairs than for 
within-category pairs was eliminated at the 75-ms stimulus 
duration (Experiment 2). Our findings indicate that the fast 
perceptual processing of emotional facial expressions is not 
categorical. 
It has been postulated that the fast processing of facial 
expressions involves subcortical structures, specialized in 
the detection of salient stimuli (Adolphs, 2002). However, 
categorical perception refers to the processing of ambiguous 
stimuli or the transformation of an indistinctive facial 
configuration into a distinctive emotion category. Such fine 
analysis of emotional information may involve cortical 
structures, implying slower processing (LeDoux, 1996). 
Etcoff and Magee (1992) have claimed that their 
observation of CP in facial expression recognition rejects 
the possibility that categorical processing of facial 
expressions is performed by higher conceptual and linguistic 
systems. There are data, however, demonstrating that verbal 
interference eliminated CP of colors and facial expressions, 
suggesting the essential role of verbal coding over visual 
coding (Roberson & Davidoff, 2000). Medin and Barsalou 
(1987) have argued that it is important to distinguish 
between sensory perception categories (SP categories), 
categories related to low-level perceptual experiences, and 
generic knowledge categories (GK categories), categories 
related to high-level knowledge representation. Shibui and 
colleagues (Shibui, Yamada, Sato, & Shigemasu, 2001) 
found that discrimination accuracy for within-category pairs 
of facial expressions was proportional to their semantic 
distance, and they inferred that facial expressions belong to 
cognitive GK categories. Our findings are consistent with 
the view that categorical processing of facial expressions is 
performed by higher cognitive systems. 
Some researchers have postulated that CP of facial 
expressions supports the notion of basic emotions 
(DeGelder et al., 1996; Ekman, 1994), such that each 
emotion possesses an innate and specialized neuro-cognitive 
system. However, categorical perception is also known to 
occur for non-emotional visual categories such as identity 
(Beale & Keil, 1995; Levin & Beale, 2000), race (Levin & 
Angelone, 2002), and even familiar objects (Newell & 
Bulthoff, 2002). Categorical perception of facial expressions 
may thus reflect visual information processing that is 
common to general object recognition rather than specific to 
emotional content. 
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Abstract 
Although an increasing number of cognitive scientists are 
convinced that cognition is embodied, there still is relatively 
little agreement on what exactly that means. Notions of what 
it actually means for a cognizer to be embodied range from 
simplistic ones such as ‘being physical’ or ‘interacting with 
an environment’ to more demanding ones that consider a 
particular morphology or a living body prerequisites for 
embodied cognition. Based on experimental evidence from a 
range of disciplines, we argue that one of the keys to 
understanding the embodiment of cognition is the sharing of 
neural mechanisms between sensorimotor processes and 
higher-level cognitive processes. The latter are argued to be 
embodied in the sense that they make use of (partial) 
simulations or emulations of sensorimotor processes through 
the re-activation of neural circuitry also active in bodily 
perception and action. 
Introduction 
Although an increasing number of cognitive scientists are 
convinced that cognition is embodied (e.g. Varela et al., 
1991; Clancey, 1997; Clark, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; 
Ziemke, 2002), there still is relatively little agreement on 
what exactly that means. Notions of what it actually means 
for a cognizer to be embodied range from simplistic ones 
such as ‘being physical’ or ‘interacting with an 
environment’ to more demanding ones that consider a 
particular morphology or a living body prerequisites for 
embodied cognition (cf., e.g., Chrisley & Ziemke, 2002; 
Wilson, 2002; Anderson, 2003; Ziemke, 2003).  
This lack of agreement or coherence, after more than a 
decade of research on embodied cognition, has unfortunate 
consequences. Firstly, critics commonly argue that the only 
thing that embodied cognitive theories have in common is in 
fact the rejection of traditional, computationalist and 
supposedly disembodied cognitive science. Secondly, there 
is a certain trivialization of embodiment, not least among 
many AI researchers who consider as embodied any 
physical system, or in fact any agent that interacts with 
some environment, such that the distinction between 
computationalist and embodied cognitive theories 
disappears since, in some sense, all systems are embodied, 
and thus cognitive science has always been about embodied 
cognition (Chrisley & Ziemke, 2002). Thirdly, there is the 
‘misunderstanding’ that perhaps embodiment is only 
relevant to sensorimotor processes directly involving the 
body in perception and action, while higher-level cognition 
might very well be computational in the traditional sense 
and only dependent on the body in the sense that mental 
representations ultimately need to be grounded in 
sensorimotor interaction with the physical environment. 
This paper, on the other hand, argues that one of the keys 
to understanding the embodiment of cognition, in an 
important, non-trivial sense, is to understand the sharing of 
neural mechanisms between sensorimotor processes and 
higher-level cognitive processes. Based on experimental 
evidence from a range of disciplines, we argue that many, if 
not all, higher-level cognitive processes are body-based in 
the sense that they make use of (partial) simulations or 
emulations of sensorimotor processes through the re-
activation of neural circuitry that is also active in bodily 
perception and action (cf. Clark & Grush, 1999; Grush, in 
press; Hesslow, 2002). As Barsalou et al. (2003) put it, the 
main point is that “simulations of bodily states in modality 
specific brain areas may often be the extent to which 
embodiment is realized”. 
The next section elaborates the key idea of this paper, i.e., 
cognition as body- and simulation-based in the above sense, 
in more detail. In the following sections then supporting 
empirical evidence from a range of disciplines is presented. 
The final section then presents a brief summary as well as 
some open questions and directions for future work. 
Cognition as body-based simulation 
The idea that even higher-level cognitive processes are in a 
strong sense grounded in bodily activity and experience is, 
of course, hardly new, but was developed already in the 
1980s, most influentially by Maturana and Varela (1980, 
1987) from a neurobiological perspective, and by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980, 1999) from a linguistic perspective. 
Lakoff (1988) summarized the basic idea as follows: 
Meaningful conceptual structures arise from two sources: (1) 
from the structured nature of bodily and social experience and 
(2) from our innate capacity to imaginatively project from 
certain well-structured aspects of bodily and interactional 
experience to abstract conceptual structures. 
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Back in the 1980s, however, relatively little was known 
about exactly how such an imaginative projection from 
bodily experience to abstract concepts might work. In recent 
years more detailed accounts of how the sensorimotor 
structures of the brain are involved in cognition have been 
developed in several disciplines, often taking into account 
data from neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies. 
These accounts show that the traditional strong division 
between perception and action, as well as between 
sensorimotor and cognitive processes, needs to be revised. 
A particular kind of “embodiment” theory that has 
emerged in different contexts are so-called emulation or 
simulation theories1  (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003: Decety, 
1996; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Grush, in press; Hesslow, 2002; 
Jeannerod, 1994, 2001). The basic idea is that neural 
structures that are responsible for action and/or perception 
are also used in the performance of various cognitive tasks. 
As Hesslow (2002) pointed out, this idea is not entirely 
new; e.g. Alexander Bain suggested in 1896 that thinking is 
basically a covert form of behavior that does not activate the 
body and thus remains invisible to external observers. 
Today simulation theories, based partly on data from 
neuroscience, can further clarify the possible role of 
simulation in cognition, thus explaining in a more concrete 
way than before the embodiment of cognition. 
One of the more comprehensive descriptions of the idea 
has been presented by Grush (in press; see also Clark & 
Grush, 1999). Based on the control theoretic concept of 
forward models (emulators), previously used to account for 
motor control (e.g., Wolpert & Kawato, 1998), Grush 
developed an emulation theory for several types of cognitive 
processes, including perception, imagery, reasoning and 
language. In a nutshell, he argued that emulation circuits are 
able to calculate a forward mapping from control signals to 
the (anticipated) consequences of executing the control 
command. For example, in goal-directed hand movements 
the brain has to plan parts of the movement before it starts. 
To achieve a smooth and accurate movement 
proprioceptive/kinesthetic (and sometimes visual) feedback 
is necessary, but sensory feedback per se is too slow to 
affect control appropriately (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000). 
The ‘solution’ is an emulator/forward model that can predict 
the sensory feedback resulting from executing a particular 
motor command.2  
The following section summarizes a number of the many 
empirical studies that support the idea that cognition is 
body-based, especially as predicted by simulation theories.  
                                                           
1 The terms simulation and emulation are used somewhat 
interchangeably in this paper, as in much of the literature, but it 
should be noted that they are sometimes used differently (e.g., 
Grush, in press).  
2 According to Blakemore, Frith and Wolpert (1999), this is also 
why it is not so easy to tickle oneself: the forward model produces 
predicted sensory feedback that ‘prepares’ the agent.  
 
Empirical Evidence 
Several sources of evidence support the basic tenet of the 
simulation account, viz., that perceptual and motor areas of 
the brain can be covertly activated either separately or in 
sequence for use in cognitive processes. In particular, 
several studies have indicated that there are extensive 
similarities between the neural structures activated during 
preparation (and execution) of an action and mentally 
simulating an action (i.e., motor imagery), as well as 
between visual perception and visual imagery. The 
similarities are so striking that some have argued that 
internally activated actions and perceptions are the same as 
overt ones, except that the overt execution or sensory input 
is missing (e.g., Hesslow, 2002; Jeannerod, 2001). 
The following subsections review some of the empirical 
evidence that suggest that sensorimotor structures of the 
brain are deeply involved in the generation of cognitive 
phenomena, such as imagery and problem solving.  
Motor imagery  
There is an extensive literature on the neural and behavioral 
similarities between actions and motor imagery (e.g., 
Decety, Jeannerod, & Prablanc, 1989; Jeannerod & Decety, 
1995; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999; for reviews see Decety, 
1996, 2002; Jeannerod, 1994, 2001).3 
Motor imagery is the recreation of an experience of 
actually performing an action, e.g., the person should feel as 
if he/she was actually walking (Decety, 1996; Jeannerod, 
1994). The evidence cited in support for the equivalence of 
performing an action and simulating an action comes mainly 
from three different sources: mental chronometry, 
autonomic responses, and measurements of brain activity. 4 
In mental chronometry experiments, it has been found 
that the time to mentally execute actions closely 
corresponds to the time it takes to actually perform them 
(Jeannerod & Frak, 1999). For example, Decety and 
Jeannerod (1996) found that Fitt’s law (i.e., the finding that 
execution times increase with task difficulty) also holds for 
motor imagery. Decety et al. (1989) compared the durations 
of walking towards targets (with blindfolds) placed at 
different distances and mental simulation of walking to the 
same targets. In both conditions times were found to 
increase with the distance covered.  
Autonomic responses, such as the adaptation of heart and 
respiratory rates, which are beyond voluntary control have 
been shown to be activated by motor imagery to an extent 
proportional to that of actually performing the action, and as 
a function of mental and actual effort (Decety, 1996; 
Jeannerod, 1994; Jeannerod & Decety, 1995). 
                                                           
3 There are also similarities between actions and other cognitive 
tasks, such as observing an action and prospective action 
judgments, which differ from motor imagery in that they do not 
produce a conscious motor image of performing an action and the 
brain activation is not as similar to overt actions as in motor 
imagery (cf., Jeannerod, 2001). 
4 Further evidence comes from effects on action performance after 
mental training using motor imagery and also from lesion studies. 
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Since the first study that investigated motor imagery using 
regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) to indicate active brain 
areas (Ingvar & Philipson, 1977) there have been many 
neuroimaging experiments that confirm the first study’s 
indication that similar brain areas are activated during action 
and motor imagery. The general conclusion is that there is a 
functional equivalence between performing an action and 
mentally simulating it (Decety, 2002; Jeannerod, 2001).  
Together, these three types of evidence point to an 
explanation of motor imagery that implicates sensorimotor 
structures.5 Although the focus above has been on actions, it 
should not be forgotten that the motor system also integrates 
sensory information when planning and executing an action 
(e.g., Grush, in press; cf. Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; 
Jeannerod, 1997). Thus, simulating an action might also 
involve an emulator mechanism that predicts the sensory 
feedback that would have resulted from the executed action 
(Decety, 2002; Grush, in press; Jeannerod, 1997, 2001).  
Mental visual imagery  
The discussion of motor imagery can be extended to the 
visual modality in that the same type of studies report that 
perceptual structures can and are internally reactivated 
when, e.g., visually recreating a previous perception. Many 
studies in cognitive psychology have found similarities 
between visual perception and visual imagery (Farah, 1988; 
Finke, 1989). For example, Shepard and Metzler (1971) 
performed a number of mental chronometry type 
experiments, where they compared the concrete 
manipulation of physical objects and corresponding 
manipulations performed mentally. In their experiments, the 
time between the two conditions was closely correlated, 
which suggests that mental imagery uses the same 
mechanisms as the visual system. Although alternative 
explanations are difficult to rule out, neuropsychological 
and neuroimaging studies offer more conclusive evidence of 
the involvement of sensorimotor areas of the brain in mental 
visual imagery (Farah, 1988; Hesslow, 2002). 
Note that these findings do not necessarily influence 
debates on representational format, since both perception 
and imagery may be said to use the same format (Block, 
1983). On the other hand, explaining cognition as 
reactivation of sensorimotor structures does not (at least in 
some cases) rely on the computer metaphor of symbol 
manipulation, and thus may offer a novel view that does not 
see the vehicle and the content of representations as separate 
entities but as constitutive of each other (Gallese, 2003; cf. 
                                                           
5 There are a number of unanswered questions concerning motor 
imagery worth mentioning here, which, however, do not affect the 
paper’s main point concerning the embodiment of cognition. To 
what degree do actions and mental simulations of actions engage 
executive motor structures (such as, the primary motor cortex) (cf., 
e.g., Decety, 2002; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999), and how is the overt 
movement hindered (Jeannerod, 2001; Hesslow, 2002)? Although 
there may not be a complete overlap between the neural structures 
involved in real and mentally simulated action, the evidence 
suggests that they are not different in nature, but only in degree. 
Dreyfus, 2002; Thomas, 1999). Gallese argued that 
canonical neurons in the monkey brain illustrate how the 
interaction between an agent and its environment provides 
an example of such representations. 
Canonical neurons 
In the macaque monkey, neurons located in the rostral part 
of the inferior premotor cortex (area F5) of the monkey 
brain discharge during goal directed movements, such as 
grasping, holding, or tearing. However, they do not respond 
to similar movements, but only actions that have the same 
“meaning” (di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Rizollatti et al., 1996; 
Rizzolatti et al., 2002), which is why they are often 
interpreted as internal representations of actions, rather than 
motor or movement commands (Jeannerod, 1994; Rizollatti 
et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 2002). Gallese (2003) 
emphasized seeing them as coding not physical parameters 
of movement, but a relationship between agent and object.  
Some of the neurons in area F5, so-called canonical 
neurons, also have sensory properties and discharge both 
during the action they code and when an object that affords 
that action in the Gibsonian sense is perceived. Canonical 
neurons have a strict congruence between the type of 
grasping action and the size or shape of the object they 
respond to (Gallese, 2003). This implies that they 
implement affordances, e.g. code things that are graspable-
in-a-certain-way, specifying not only perceptual and action 
aspects but a particular relationship between agent and 
environment (cf. Gallese, 2003, cf. also Dreyfus, 2002). 
Problem solving using covert perception and action  
Instead of adverting to symbol manipulation, a flexible 
inner world, in which an agent might try out possible action 
sequences, can be explained by internal activation of 
perceptions and actions (Clark & Grush, 1999, Grush, in 
press; Hesslow, 2002). That means, an agent can sustain 
such an inner world by letting an internally activated action 
elicit through an anticipatory mechanism internally 
generated perceptions that would be the likely result of 
executing that action in the particular external situation. As 
discussed above, the internal activation of sensorimotor 
structures is well supported, but the neural underpinnings of 
the anticipation mechanism are still an open issue. Some 
suggest the involvement of the cerebellum (e.g., Hesslow, 
2002).  
Some support for the involvement of this type of 
simulation of behavioral chains comes from the problem 
solving and planning involved in the Tower of London 
(ToL) problem (Shallice, 1982). Dagher et al. (1999) found 
that planning and problem solving activated higher motor 
areas (premotor cortex, prefrontal cortex) and the basal 
ganglia, and that they seemed to interact with visual and 
posterior parietal areas (cf. Schall et al., 2003). This gives 
some support to the idea that the subjects solved the 
problem by simulating the action of moving one ball to 
another location through the use of reactivated perceptions 
and actions (Hesslow, 2002). 
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Social cognition and language 
The use of internally reactivated sensorimotor structures has 
also been suggested to play a crucial role in social cognition, 
especially emotive states (cf. Barsalou et al., 2003; Nielsen, 
2002). The evidence that is reported in this subsection 
emphasizes that perceptual and motor processes are not 
different in nature at the neural and behavioral level, but 
seem to be intimately linked in social cognition possibly 
through simulation mechanisms.  
 
Embodiment effects Barsalou et al. (2003) argued that 
there are at least four types of well known phenomena in 
social cognition which can be explained by simulation of 
bodily states. The types of effects they mention are: a) 
perceived social stimuli produce bodily states, b) perceiving 
bodily states produce bodily mimicry, c) bodily states can 
produce and affect emotion states, and d) compatibility 
between bodily states and emotional states increases 
performance (see also Nielsen, 2002). These effects seem to 
arise automatically without any conscious mediating 
knowledge structures (Barsalou et al., 2003; Nielsen, 2002).  
Firstly, social stimuli do not only produce cognitive 
responses, but at the same time automatically and 
unconsciously cause bodily responses (e.g., movement 
patterns, facial expressions). For example, subjects induced 
with an elderly stereotype (e.g., by watching elderly people) 
perform in a manner more similar to the elderly stereotype 
than control subjects (Barsalou et al., 2003).  
Secondly, bodily responses sometimes are the same or 
similar to the eliciting social stimuli as in the many cases of 
facial mimicry. For example, watching somebody yawning 
often causes oneself to yawn too (cf. Barsalou et al., 2003).  
Thirdly, bodily states can directly induce effects on 
affective states (Barsalou et al., 2003). One such effect is the 
facial feedback hypothesis, which states that a person’s own 
facial expressions can (either directly from the brain areas 
responsible for the facial expression or through processing 
of proprioceptive feedback) produce or modify his/her 
experience of the emotional state (Nielsen, 2002). 
Finally, when there is a mismatch between bodily state 
and affective state cognitive performance is degraded. 
Barsalou et al. (2003) argued that this is perhaps the most 
important effect because it indicates that embodied states 
are directly involved in higher cognition. That is, the 
affective states are thought to involve sensorimotor states 
and when there is an incompatible bodily state co-present it 
produces a competing sensorimotor state, which reduces 
performance. For example, Wells and Petty (1980) showed 
that head movements were faster when compatible with the 
message (e.g., nodding vertically to an agreeable message) 
than when incompatible (cf. Barsalou et al., 2003).  
The findings discussed in this section suggest that bodily 
states are involved in social cognition and that they might 
constitute the very foundations of the particular social 
cognitive phenomena in question. An example of how 
perception, action, and social cognition come together at the 
level of single neurons is so-called mirror neurons in 
macaque monkeys (Decety & Sommerville, 2003).  
 
Observation execution matching system Besides 
canonical neurons, area F5 of the monkey brain contains so 
called mirror neurons, which are neurons with sensory 
properties that become activated both when performing a 
specific action and when observing the same goal-directed 
hand (and mouth) movements of an experimenter (di 
Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). Mirror 
neurons provide a key example of sensorimotor brain 
structures also involved in (social) cognitive processes. 
Although different hypotheses exist, many of the theories 
of the function of mirror neurons emphasize their role in 
social cognition (e.g., Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Gallese 
& Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti et 
al. 2002). These researchers acknowledge that area F5 and 
mirror neurons can be interpreted as a kind of observation-
execution mechanism or resonance mechanism, which links 
the observed actions to actual actions of the subject’s own 
behavioral repertoire. That is, it enables the monkey to 
understand the meaning of the observed action. Thus, mirror 
neurons can be interpreted as representations of actions, 
used both for performing and understanding actions (e.g., 
Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). 6 
Gallese and Goldman (1998) hypothesized that mirror 
neurons might be a basic mechanism necessary for “mind-
reading”, i.e., attributing mental states in others. They 
further argued that such mechanisms can explain how an 
agent determines what mental states of another agent have 
already occurred. When mirror neurons are externally 
activated by observing a target agent executing an action 
(allowing the subject to evaluate the meaning of the other’s 
action), the subject knows (visually) that the observed target 
is currently performing this very action and thereby “tags” 
the “experienced” action as belonging to the target. 
However, how the subject can distinguish its own actions 
from those performed by others is relatively unknown (cf. 
Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 2002). 
 
Language Some researchers have argued that 
conceptualization and language understanding cannot be 
achieved through the manipulation of amodal, arbitrary 
symbols alone, but has to be grounded in bodily interaction 
with the environment. In particular, Glenberg and Kaschak 
(2003) have outlined an explanation of language in line with 
the idea of cognition as body-based simulation as expressed 
in this paper, suggesting that language is partly achieved 
through the same neural structures used to plan and guide 
action.  
                                                           
6 For practical and ethical reasons it is so far not possible to 
investigate the existence of mirror neurons (and canonical neurons) 
at the single neuron level in humans. However, many researchers 
have presented strong arguments for the existence of a similar 
system in humans (e.g., Fadiga et al., 1995; Grafton et al., 1996; 
Rizzolatti, & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). 
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Under the heading of the indexical hypothesis they 
developed an account of language comprehension partly 
based on simulation of action. They argued that the meaning 
of a sentence is achieved by a process that indexes words to 
perceptual symbols which in turn retrieves the available 
affordances in the situation and determines their relevance 
through the particular sentence construction. Thus, the 
understanding of a sentence is essentially achieved through 
a simulation of action using the same neural systems active 
in overt behavior.  
An empirical result that supports the close coupling 
between language and action is the “action-sentence 
compatibility effect” (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). It was 
found that the sensibility of a sentence is modified by 
physical actions. Reaction times increased when subjects 
read “toward sentences” that implied action toward the 
reader, such as “Open the drawer” and had to give the 
answer through an incongruent action, i.e., moving the hand 
away from the body. Conversely, when subjects answered 
through an action congruent with the sentence, reaction 
times decreased. Glenberg and Kaschak interpreted the 
result as indicating that understanding a sentence is 
dependent on structures usually used for action. Readers 
interested in more comprehensive reviews of the coupling 
between language and action/perception are referred to 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2003) or Zwaan (2004). 
Summary and conclusions 
This paper has presented an emerging framework of 
simulation based on terminology and ideas from control 
theory and data from neurophysiological and neuroimaging 
studies that explain higher-level cognitive processes as at 
least partly based on reactivations of sensorimotor structures 
of the brain. By reactivating mechanisms used in perception 
and action together with a predictive mechanism a flexible 
inner world emerges that can be used for many different 
higher-level cognitive tasks (cf. Grush, in press; Hesslow, 
2002). Crucial to the embodiment of cognition, according to 
this account, is perhaps not so much the physical nature of a 
cognizer’s body, or its interaction with the environment as 
such, but the relation between sensorimotor and higher-level 
cognitive processes, more specifically, the way that the 
latter are fundamentally based on and rooted in the former. 
Although corroborating evidence comes from several 
disciplines, the simulation account is not yet a well 
established or coherent theory of cognition in general, and 
there are many questions still to be answered. For example, 
in current accounts it is unclear exactly what constitutes the 
difference between an executed, overt action and a 
simulated/imagined, covert one. Can this be accounted for 
in terms of simulation theories or are other, presumably 
higher-level, mechanisms required after all to selectively 
trigger one or the other?  
Moreover, there is a level of granularity problem (cf. 
Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002) that seems to apply to many 
simulation accounts. That is, at what level of abstraction 
does the simulation occur? During imagery it seems that the 
simulation occurs on a low-level including very many of the 
aspects of actually perceiving or acting, as indicated by 
neuroimaging studies (e.g., Jeannerod, 2001), whereas in 
problem solving, as in the ToL task, more abstract aspects 
of actions may be employed, which might be supported by 
the finding that problem solving activity in the ToL seem to 
activate only higher motor centers, such as prefrontal and 
premotor cortex (Dagher et al., 1999). However, this is a 
speculative interpretation of the neuroimaging results. 
The level of granularity is also an important issue in 
robotic models of simulation theories (e.g. Ziemke, Jirenhed 
& Hesslow, in press). Previous work in our lab has dealt 
with internal simulations at the lowest level, but current 
work also addresses simulation at more abstract levels of 
granularity. We believe that robotic models offer a fruitful 
approach to further investigating this and other open 
questions that need to be answered in the future 
development of simulation theories.  
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Abstract 
In artificial intelligence, researchers have begun to look at ap-
proaches for computational humor. Although there appears to 
be no complete computational model for recognizing verbally 
expressed humor, it may be possible to recognize jokes based 
on statistical language recognition techniques. This is an in-
vestigation into computational humor recognition. It considers 
a restricted set of all possible jokes that have wordplay as a 
component and examines the limited domain of “Knock 
Knock” jokes. The method uses Raskin's theory of humor for 
its theoretical foundation. The original phrase and the 
complimentary wordplay have two different scripts that 
overlap in the setup of the joke. The algorithm deployed 
learns statistical patterns of text in N-grams and provides a 
heuristic focus for a location of where wordplay may or may 
not occur. It uses a wordplay generator to produce an utter-
ance that is similar in pronunciation to a given word, and the 
wordplay recognizer determines if the utterance is valid.  
Once a possible wordplay is discovered, a joke recognizer de-
termines if a found wordplay transforms the text into a joke.  
Introduction 
Thinkers from the ancient time of Aristotle and Plato to the 
present day have strived to discover and define the origins 
of humor. Most commonly, early definitions of humor relied 
on laughter: what makes people laugh is humorous. Recent 
works on humor separate laughter and make it its own dis-
tinct category of response. Today there are almost as many 
definitions of humor as theories of humor; as in many cases, 
definitions are derived from theories (Latta, 1999). Some 
researchers say that not only is there no definition that 
covers all aspects of humor, but also humor is impossible to 
define (Attardo, 1994).  
Humor is an interesting subject to study not only because 
it is difficult to define, but also because sense of humor 
varies from person to person. The same person may find 
something funny one day, but not the next, depending on the 
person’s mood, or what has happened to him or her recently.  
These factors, among many others, make humor recognition 
challenging. 
Although most people are unaware of the complex steps 
involved in humor recognition, a computational humor 
recognizer has to consider all these steps in order to 
approach the same ability as a human being. 
A common form of humor is verbal, or “verbally ex-
pressed, humor” (Ritchie 2000). Verbally expressed humor 
involves reading and understanding texts. While 
understating the meaning of a text may be difficult for a 
computer, reading it is not. 
One of the subclasses of verbally expressed humor is the 
joke. Hetzron (1991) defines a joke as  “a short humorous 
piece of literature in which the funniness culminates in the 
final sentence.” Most researchers agree that jokes can be 
broken into two parts, a setup and a punchline. The setup is 
the first part of the joke, usually consisting of most of the 
text, which establishes certain expectations. The punchline 
is a much shorter portion of the joke, and it causes some 
form of conflict. It can force another interpretation on the 
text, violate an expectation, or both (Ritchie, 1998).  As 
most jokes are relatively short, it may be possible to recog-
nize them computationally. 
Computational recognition of jokes may be possible, but 
it is not easy. An “intelligent” joke recognizer requires 
world knowledge to “understand” most jokes.   
Theories of Humor 
Raskin’s (1985) Semantic Theory of Verbal Humor has 
strongly influenced the study of verbally expressed humor.  
The theory is based on assumption that every joke is com-
patible with two scripts, and those two scripts oppose each 
other in some part of the text, usually in the punch line, 
therefore generating humorous effect. 
Another approach is Suls’ (1972) two-stage model, which 
is based on false expectation. The following algorithm is 
used to process a joke using two-stage model (Ritchie, 
1999): 
 • As a text is read, make predictions • While no conflict with prediction, keep going • If input conflicts with prediction: 
o If not ending – PUZZLEMENT 
o If is ending, try to resolve: 
 No rules found – PUZZLEMENT 
 Cognitive rules found –HUMOR 
 
There have been attempts at joke generation (Attardo, 
1996; Binsted, 1996; Lessard and Levison, 1992; 
McDonough, 2001; McKay, 2002; Stock and Strapparava, 
2002) and pun recognizers (Takizawa, et al. 1996; 
Yokogawa, 2002) for Japanese. However, there do not 
appear to be any theory based computational humor efforts.  
This may be partly due to the absence of a theory that can be 
expressed as an unambiguous computational algorithm. In 
the cases of Raskin and Suls, the first does not offer any 
formal algorithm, and the second does not specify what a 
cognitive rule is, leaving one of the major steps open to 
interpretation.  
Wordplay Jokes 
Wordplay jokes, or jokes involving verbal play, are a class 
of jokes depending on words that are similar in sound, but 
are used in two different meanings.  The difference between 
the two meanings creates a conflict or breaks expectation, 
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and is humorous.  The wordplay can be created between two 
words with the same pronunciation and spelling, with two 
words with different spelling but the same pronunciation, 
and with two words with different spelling and similar 
pronunciation. For example, in Joke1 the conflict is created 
because the word has two meanings, while the pronun-
ciation and the spelling stay the same. In Joke2 the wordplay 
is between words that sound nearly alike. 
 
Joke1: “Cliford: The Postmaster General will be making 
the TOAST. 
 Woody: Wow, imagine a person like that helping 
out in the kitchen!” 
Joke2: “Diane: I want to go to Tibet on our honeymoon. 
 Sam: Of course, we will go to bed.”1 
 
Sometimes it takes world knowledge to recognize which 
word is subject to wordplay.  For example, in Joke2, there is 
a wordplay between “Tibet” and “to bed.”  However, to un-
derstand the joke, the wordplay by itself is not enough, a 
world knowledge is required to “link” honeymoon with 
“Tibet” and “to bed.” 
A focused form of wordplay jokes is the Knock Knock 
joke. In Knock Knock jokes, wordplay is what leads to the 
humor. The structure of the Knock Knock joke provides 
pointers to the wordplay. 
A typical Knock Knock (KK) joke is a dialog that uses 
wordplay in the punchline.  Recognizing humor in a KK 
joke arises from recognizing the wordplay.  A KK joke can 
be summarized using the following structure: 
 
Line1: “Knock, Knock” 
Line2: “Who’s there?” 
Line3: any phrase 
Line4: Line3 followed by “who?” 
Line5: One or several sentences containing one of the 
following: 
Type1: Line3 
Type2: a wordplay on Line  3
Type3: a meaningful response to Line3. 
 
Joke3 is an example of Type1, Joke4 is an example of 
Type2, and Joke5 is an example of Type3. 
 
Joke : Knock, Knock 3
 Who’s there? 
 Water 
 Water who? 
 Water you doing tonight? 
Joke : Knock, Knock 4
 Who’s there? 
 Ashley 
 Ashley who? 
 Actually, I don’t know. 
Joke : Knock, Knock 5
 Who’s there? 
 Tank 
 Tank who? 
 You are welcome.2 
 
From theoretical points of view, both Raskin’s (1985) and 
Suls’ (1972) approaches can explain why Joke3 is a joke. 
Following Raskin’s approach, the two belong to different 
                                                          
1 Joke1, Joke2 are taken from TV show “Cheers” 
2 http://www.azkidsnet.com/JSknockjoke.htm 
scripts that overlap in the phonetic representation of “wa-
ter,” but also oppose each other.  Following Suls’ approach, 
“what are” conflicts with the prediction.  In this approach, a 
cognitive rule can be described as a function that finds a 
phrase that is similar in sound to the word “water,” and that 
fits correctly in beginning of the final sentence’s structure.  
This phrase is “what are” for Joke3. 
N-grams 
A joke generator has to have an ability to construct mean-
ingful sentences, while a joke recognizer has to recognize 
them. While joke generation involves limited world 
knowledge, joke recognition requires a much more 
extensive world knowledge.   
To be able to recognize or generate jokes, a computer 
should be able to “process” sequences of words.  A tool for 
this activity is the N-gram, “one of the oldest and most 
broadly useful practical tools in language processing” 
(Jurafsky and Martin, 2000). An N-gram is a model that 
uses conditional probability to predict Nth word based on N-
1 previous words.  N-grams can be used to store sequences 
of words for a joke generator or a recognizer. 
N-grams are typically constructed from statistics obtained 
from a large corpus of text using the co-occurrences of 
words in the corpus to determine word sequence probabili-
ties (Brown, 2001).  As a text is processed, the probability 
of the next word N is calculated, taking into account end of 
sentences, if it occurs before the word N.   
“The probabilities in a statistical model like an N-gram 
come from the corpus it is trained on. This training corpus 
needs to be carefully designed.  If the training corpus is too 
specific to the task or domain, the probabilities may be too 
narrow and not generalize well to new sentences. If the 
training corpus is too general, the probabilities may not do a 
sufficient job of reflecting the task or domain” (Jurafsky and 
Martin, 2000). 
A bigram is an N-gram with N=2, a trigram is an N-gram 
with N=3, etc.  A bigram model will use one previous word 
to predict the next word, and a trigram will use two previous 
words to predict the word.   
Experimental Design 
A further tightening of the focus was to attempt to recognize 
only Type1 of KK jokes. The original phrase, in this case 
Line3, is referred to as the keyword.  
There are many ways of determining “sound alike” short 
utterances. The only feasible method for this project was 
computationally building up “sounds like” utterances as 
needed.   
The joke recognition process has four steps: 
 
Step1: joke format validation 
Step2: generation of wordplay sequences 
Step3: wordplay sequence validation 
Step4: last sentence validation 
 
Once Step1 is completed, the wordplay generator gener-
ates utterances, similar in pronunciation to Line3. Step3 only 
checks if the wordplay makes sense without touching the 
rest of the punchline. It uses a bigram table for validation. 
Only meaningful wordplays are passed to Step4 from Step3. 
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If the wordplay is not in the end of the punchline, Step4 
takes the last two words of the wordplay, and checks if they 
make sense with the first two words of text following the 
wordplay in the punchline, using two trigram sequences. If 
the wordplay occurs in the end of the sentence, the last two 
words before the wordplay and the first two words of the 
wordplay are used for joke validation. If Step4 fails, go back 
to Step3 or Step2, and continue the search for another 
meaningful wordplay. 
It is possible that the first three steps return valid results, 
but Step4 fails; in which case a text is not considered a joke 
by the Joke Recognizer.  
The punchline recognizer is designed so that it does not 
have to validate the grammatical structure of the punchline.  
Moreover, it is assumed that the Line5 is meaningful when 
the expected wordplay is found, if it is a joke; and, that 
Line5 is meaningful as is, if the text is not a joke. In other 
words, a human expert should be able to either find a 
wordplay so that the last sentence makes sense, or conclude 
that the last sentence is meaningful without any wordplay.  
It is assumed that the last sentence is not a combination of 
words without any meaning. 
The joke recognizer is to be trained on a number of jokes; 
and, tested on jokes, twice the number of training jokes. The 
jokes in the test set are previously “unseen” by the 
computer.  This means that any joke, identical to the joke in 
the set of training jokes, is not included in the test set.   
Generation of Wordplay Sequences 
Given a spoken utterance A, it is possible to find an utter-
ance B that is similar in pronunciation by changing letters 
from A to form B.  Sometimes, the corresponding utterances 
have different meanings.  Sometimes, in some contexts, the 
differing meanings might be humorous if the words were 
interchanged.  
A repetitive replacement process is used for generation of 
wordplay sequences.  Suppose, a letter a1 from A is replaced 
with b1 to form B.  For example, in Joke3 if a letter ‘w’ in a 
word ‘water’ is replaced with ‘wh’, ‘e’ is replaced with ‘a’, 
and ‘r’ is replaced with ‘re’, the new utterance, ‘what are’ 
sounds similar to ‘water’. 
A table, containing combinations of letters that sound 
similar in some words, and their similarity value was used.  
The purpose of the Similarity Table is to help computation-
ally develop “sound alike” utterances that have different 
spellings. In this paper, this table will be referred to as the 
Similarity Table. Table 1 is an example of the Similarity 
Table. The Similarity Table was derived from a table devel-
oped by Frisch (1996). Frisch’s table contained cross-refer-
enced English consonant pairs along with a similarity of the 
pairs based on the natural classes model. Frisch’s table was 
heuristically modified and extended to the Similarity Table 
by “translating” phonemes to letters, and adding pairs of 
vowels that are close in sound. Other phonemes, translated 
to combinations of letters, were added to the table as needed 
to recognize wordplay from a set of training jokes. 
The resulting Similarity Table approximately shows the 
similarity of sounds between different letters or between 
letters and combination of letters.  A heuristic metric indi-
cating how closely they sound to each other was either taken 
from Frisch’s table or assigned a value close to the average 
of Frisch’s similarity values. The Similarity Table should be 
taken as a collection of heuristic satisficing values that 
might be refined through additional iteration. 
 
Table 1: Subset of entries of the Similarity Table, showing 
similarity of sounds in words between different letters 
 
a e 0.23 
e a 0.23 
e o 0.23 
en e 0.23 
k sh 0.11 
l r 0.56 
r m 0.44 
r re 0.23 
t d 0.39 
t z 0.17 
w m 0.44 
w r 0.42 
w wh 0.23 
 
When an utterance A is “read” by the wordplay generator, 
each letter in A is replaced with the corresponding replace-
ment letter from the Similarity Table.  Each new string is 
assigned its similarity with the original word A.   
All new words are inserted into a heap, ordered according 
to their similarity value, greatest on top.  When only one 
letter in a word is replaced, its similarity value is being 
taken from the Similarity Table.  The similarity value of the 
strings is calculated using the following heuristic formula: 
similarity of string = number of unchanged letters + 
sum of similarities of each replaced entry from the table 
Note, that the similarity values of letters are taken from 
the Similarity table. These values differ from the similarity 
values of strings. 
Once all possible one-letter replacement strings are found, 
and inserted into the heap, according to the string similarity, 
the first step is complete. 
The next step is to remove the top element of the heap.  
This element has the highest similarity with the original 
word. If this element can be decomposed into an utterance 
that makes sense, this step is complete.  If the element can-
not be decomposed, each letter of the string, except for the 
letter that was replaced originally, is being replaced again.  
All newly constructed strings are inserted into the heap 
according to their similarity. Continue with the process until 
the top element can be decomposed into a meaningful 
phrase, or all elements are removed from the heap. 
Consider Joke3 as example. The joke fits a typical KK 
joke pattern.  The next step is to generate utterances similar 
in pronunciation to ‘water.’   
Table 2 shows some of the strings received after one-letter 
replacements of ‘water’ in Joke3. The second column shows 
the similarity of the string in the first table with the original 
word.  
Suppose, the top element of the heap is ‘watel,’ with the 
similarity value of 4.56.  Watel cannot be decomposed into 
a meaningful utterance. This means that each letter of 
‘watel’ except for ‘l’ will be replace again.  The newly 
formed strings will be inserted into the heap, in the order of 
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their similarity value. The letter ‘l’ will not be replaced as it 
not the ‘original’ letter from ‘water.’   The string similarity 
of newly constructed strings will be most likely less than 4.  
(The only way a similarity of a newly constructed string is 
greater than 4 is if the similarity of the replaced letter is 
above 0.44, which is unlikely.) This means that they will be 
placed below ‘wazer.’  The next top string, ‘mater,’ is re-
moved.  ‘Mater’ is a word. However, it does not work in the 
sentence ‘Mater you doing.’  (See Sections on Wordplay 
Recognition and Joke Recognition for further discussion.)  
The process continues until ‘whater’ is the top string.  The 
replacement of ‘e’ in ‘whater’ with ‘a’ will result in 
‘whatar’.  Eventually, ‘whatar’ will become the top string, at 
which point ‘r’ will be replaced with ‘re’ to produce 
‘whatare’.  ‘Whatare’ can be decomposed into ‘what are’ by 
inserting a space between ‘t’ and ‘a’. The next step will be 
to check if ‘what are’ is a valid word sequence. 
Table 2: Examples of strings received after replacing 
one letter from the word ‘water’ and their similarity 
value to ‘water’ 
New String String Similarity to ‘Water’ 
watel 4.56 
mater 4.44 
watem 4.44 
rater 4.42 
wader 4.39 
wather 4.32 
watar 4.23 
wator 4.23 
whater 4.23 
wazer 4.17 
 
Generated wordplays that were successfully recognized 
by the wordplay recognizer, and their corresponding key-
words are stored for the future use of the program.  When 
the wordplay generator receives a new request, it first 
checks if wordplays have been previously found for the re-
quested keyword.   The new wordplays will be generated 
only if there is no wordplay match for the requested key-
word, or the already found wordplays do not make sense in 
the new joke. 
Wordplay Recognition 
A wordplay sequence is generated by replacing letters in the 
keyword. The keyword is examined because: if there is a 
joke, based on wordplay, a phrase that the wordplay is based 
on will be found in Line3.   Line3 is the keyword.  A 
wordplay generator generates a string that is similar in 
pronunciation to the keyword. This string, however, may 
contain real words that do not make sense together.  A 
wordplay recognizer determines if the output of the 
wordplay generator is meaningful.  
A database with the bigram table was used to contain 
every discovered two-word sequence along with the number 
of their occurrences, also referred to as count. Any sequence 
of two words will be referred to as word-pair.  Another 
table in the database, the trigram table, contains each three-
word sequence, and the count.  
The wordplay recognizer queries the bigram table. The 
joke recognizer, discussed in section on Joke Recognition, 
queries the trigram table.  
To construct the database several focused large texts were 
used.  The focus was at the core of the training process. 
Each selected text contained a wordplay on the keyword 
(Line3) and two words from the punchline that follow the 
keyword from at least one joke from the set of training 
jokes. If more than one text containing a given wordplay 
was found, the text with the closest overall meaning to the 
punchline was selected.  Arbitrary texts were not used, as 
they did not contain a desired combination of wordplay and 
part of punchline.  
To construct the bigram table, every pair of words occur-
ring in the selected text was entered into the table. 
The concept of this wordplay recognizer is similar to an 
N-gram. For a wordplay recognizer, the bigram model is 
used. 
The output from the wordplay generator was used as input 
for the wordplay recognizer. An utterance produced by the 
wordplay generator is decomposed into a string of words.  
Each word, together with the following word, is checked 
against the database.    
An N-gram determines for each string the probability of 
that string in relation to all other strings of the same length.  
As a text is examined, the probability of the next word is 
calculated. The wordplay recognizer keeps the number of 
occurrences of word sequence, which can be used to calcu-
late the probability. A sequence of words is considered valid 
if there is at least one occurrence of the sequence anywhere 
in the text.  The count and the probability are used if there is 
more than possible wordplay.  In this case, the wordplay 
with the highest probability will be considered first. 
For example, in Joke3 ‘what are’ is a valid combination if 
‘are’ occurs immediately after ‘what’ somewhere in the text. 
Joke Recognition 
A text with valid wordplay is not a joke if the rest of the 
punchline does not make sense.  For example, if the 
punchline of Joke3 is replaced with “Water a text with valid 
wordplay,” the resulting text is not a joke, even though the 
wordplay is still valid.  Therefore, there has to be a 
mechanism that can validate that the found wordplay is 
“compatible” with the rest of the punchline and makes it a 
meaningful sentence. 
A concept similar to a trigram was used to validate the 
last sentence. All three-word sequences are stored in the 
trigram table. 
The same training set was used for both the wordplay and 
joke recognizers. The difference between the wordplay 
recognizer and joke recognizer was that the wordplay 
recognizer used pairs of words for its validation while the 
joke recognizer used three words at a time. As the training 
text was read, the newly read word and the two following 
words were inserted into the trigram table. If the newly read 
combination was in the table already, the count was 
incremented.  
As the wordplay recognizer had already determined that 
the wordplay sequences existed, there was no reason to re-
validate the wordplay.   
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To check if wordplay makes sense in the punchline, the 
last two words of the wordplay, wwp1 and wwp2, are used, for 
the wordplay that is at least two words long.  If the punch-
line is valid, the sequence of wwp1, wwp2, and the first word 
of the remainder of the sentence, ws, should be found in the 
training text.  If the sequence <wwp1 wwp2 ws> occurs in the 
trigram table, this combination is found in the training set, 
and the three words together make sense. If the sequence is 
not in the table, either the training set is not accurate, or the 
wordplay does not make sense in the punchline.  In either 
case, the computer does not recognize the joke.  If the pre-
vious check was successful, or if the wordplay has only one 
word, the last check can be performed. The last step in-
volves the last word of the word play, wwp, and the first two 
words of the remainder of the sentence, ws1 and ws2.  If the 
sequence <wwp ws1 ws2> occurs in the trigram table, the 
punchline is valid, and the wordplay fits with the rest of the 
final sentences.  
If the wordplay recognizer found several wordplays that 
“produced” a joke, the wordplay resulting in the highest 
trigram sequence probability was used. 
Results and Analysis 
A set of 65 jokes from the “111 Knock Knock Jokes” web-
site3 and one joke taken from “The Original 365 Jokes, Puns 
& Riddles Calendar” (Kostick, et al., 1998) was used as a 
training set.  The Similarity Table, discussed in the Section 
on Generation of Wordplay Sequences, was modified with 
new entries until correct wordplay sequences could be 
generated for all 66 jokes.   The training texts inserted into 
the bigram and trigram tables were chosen based on the 
punchlines of jokes from the set of training jokes. 
The program was run against a test set of 130 KK jokes, 
and a set of 65 non-jokes that have a similar structure to the 
KK jokes.   
The test jokes were taken from “3650 Jokes, Puns & Rid-
dles” (Kostick, et al. 1998).  These jokes had the punchlines 
corresponding to any of the three KK joke structures 
discussed earlier.  
To test if the program finds the expected wordplay, each 
joke had an additional line, Line6, added after Line5.  Line6 
is not a part of any joke. It only existed so that the wordplay 
found by the joke recognizer could be compared against the 
expected wordplay. Line6 consists of the punchline with the 
expected wordplay instead of the punchline with Line3.  
The jokes in the test set were previously “unseen” by the 
computer.  This means that if the book contained a joke, 
identical to the joke in the set of training jokes, this joke 
was not included in the test set.   
Some jokes, however, were very similar to the jokes in 
the training set, but not identical.  These jokes were in-
cluded in the test set, as they were not the same.  As it 
turned out, some jokes to a human may look very similar to 
jokes in the training set, but treated as completely different 
jokes by the computer.   
Out of 130 previously unseen jokes the program was not 
expected to recognize eight jokes.  These jokes were not 
                                                          
3 http://www.azkidsnet.com/JSknockjoke.htm 
expected to be recognized because the program is not 
expected to recognize their structure.     
The program was able to find wordplay in 85 jokes, but 
recognized only seventeen jokes as such out of 122 that it 
could potentially recognize. Twelve of these jokes have the 
punchlines that matched the expected punchlines.  Two 
jokes have meaningful punchlines that were not expected. 
Three jokes were identified as jokes by the computer, but 
their punchlines do not make sense to the investigator.  
Some of the jokes with found wordplay were not recog-
nized as jokes because the database did not contain the 
needed sequences. When a wordplay was found, but the 
needed sequences were not in the database, the program did 
not recognize the jokes as jokes.   
In many cases, the found wordplay matched the intended 
wordplay.  This suggests that the rate of successful joke 
recognition would be much higher if the database contained 
all the needed word sequences.   
The program was also run with 65 non-jokes. The only 
difference between jokes and non-jokes was the punchline.  
The punchlines of non-jokes were intended to make sense 
with Line3, but not with the wordplay of Line3. The non-
jokes were generated from the training joke set.  The 
punchline in each joke was substituted with a meaningful 
sentence that starts with Line3.  If the keyword was a name, 
the rest of the sentence was taken from the texts in the 
training set. For example, Joke6 became Text1 by replacing 
“time for dinner” with “awoke in the middle of the night.”  
 
Joke6: Knock, Knock 
Who’s there? 
Justin 
Justin who? 
Justin time for dinner. 
 Text1: Knock, Knock 
    Who’s there? 
    Justin 
           Justin who? 
            Justin awoke in the middle if the night. 
 
A segment “awoke in the middle of the night” was taken 
from one of the training texts that was inserted into the 
bigram and trigram tables.  
The program successfully recognized 62 non-jokes. 
Possible Extensions 
The results suggest that most jokes were not recognized 
either because the texts entered did not contain the neces-
sary information for the jokes to work; or because N-grams 
are not suitable for true “understanding” of text.  One of the 
simpler experiments may be to test to see if more jokes are 
recognized if the databases contain more sequences. This 
would require inserting a much larger text into the trigram 
table.  A larger text may contain more word sequences, 
which would mean more data for N-grams to recognize 
some jokes.  
It is possible that no matter how large the inserted texts 
are, the simple N-grams will not be able to “understand” 
jokes.  The simple N-grams were used to understand or to 
analyze the punchline.  Most jokes were not recognized due 
to failures in sentence understanding.  A more sophisticated 
tool for analyzing a sentence may be needed to improve the 
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joke recognizer.  Some of the options for the sentence ana-
lyzer are an N-gram with stemming or a sentence parser.   
A simple parser that can recognize, for example, nouns 
and verbs; and analyze the sentence based on parts of 
speech, rather than exact spelling, may significantly im-
prove the results.  On the other hand, giving N-grams the 
stemming ability would make them treat, for example,  
“color” and “colors” as one entity, which may significantly 
help too. 
The wordplay generator produced the desired wordplay in 
most jokes, but not all.  After the steps are taken to improve 
the sentence understander, the next improvement should be 
a more sophisticated wordplay generator. The existing 
wordplay generator is unable to find wordplay that is based 
word longer than six characters, and requires more that three 
substitutions.  A better answer to letter substitution is pho-
neme comparison and substitution. Using phonemes, the 
wordplay generator will be able to find matches that are 
more accurate. 
The joke recognizer may be able to recognize jokes other 
than KK jokes, if the new jokes are based on wordplay, and 
their structure can be defined.   However, it is unclear if 
recognizing jokes with other structures will be successful 
with N-grams. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Computational work in natural language has a long history.  
Areas of interest have included: translation, understanding, 
database queries, summarization, indexing, and retrieval.  
There has been very limited success in achieving true com-
putational understanding.  
A focused area within natural language is verbally ex-
pressed humor.   Some work has been achieved in computa-
tional generation of humor.  Little has been accomplished in 
understanding. There are many linguistic descriptive tools 
such as formal grammars.  But, so far, there are not robust 
understanding tools and methodologies.  
The KK joke recognizer is the first step towards compu-
tational recognition of jokes.  It is intended to recognize KK 
jokes that are based on wordplay.  The recognizer’s 
theoretical foundation is based on Raskin’s Script-based 
Semantic Theory of Verbal Humor that states that each joke 
is compatible with two scripts that oppose each other.  The 
Line3 and the wordplay of Line3 are the two scripts. The 
scripts overlap in pronunciation, but differ in meaning.  
The joke recognition process can be summarized as: 
 
Step1: joke format validation 
Step2: generation of wordplay sequences 
Step3: wordplay sequence validation 
Step4: last sentence validation 
 
The result of KK joke recognizer heavily depends on the 
choice of appropriate letter-pairs for the Similarity Table 
and on the selection of training texts.  
The KK joke recognizer “learns” from the previously rec-
ognized wordplays when it considers the next joke.  Unfor-
tunately, unless the needed (keyword, wordplay) pair is an 
exact match with one of the found (keyword, wordplay) 
pairs, the previously found wordplays will not be used for 
the joke.  Moreover, if one of the previously recognized 
jokes contains (keyword, wordplay) pair that is needed for 
the new joke, but the two words that follow or precede the 
keyword in the punchline differ, the new joke may not be 
recognized regardless of how close the new joke and the 
previously recognized jokes are. 
The joke recognizer was trained on 66 KK jokes; and 
tested on 130 KK jokes and 66 non-jokes with a structure 
similar to KK jokes.   
The program successfully found and recognized wordplay 
in most of the jokes. It also successfully recognized texts 
that are not jokes, but have the format of a KK joke.   It was 
not successful in recognizing most punchlines in jokes.  The 
failure to recognize punchline is due to the limited size of 
texts used to build the trigram table of the N-gram database. 
While the program checks the format of the first four lines 
of a joke, it assumes that all jokes that are entered have a 
grammatically correct punchline, or at least that the punch-
line is meaningful.  It is unable to discard jokes with a 
poorly formed punchline.  It may recognize a joke with a 
poorly formed punchline as a meaningful joke because it 
only checks two words in the punchline that follow Line3.    
In conclusion, the method was reasonably successful in 
recognizing wordplay.  However, it was less successful in 
recognizing when an utterance might be valid. 
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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to examine the use-
fulness and limitations of vector diagrams, con-
sisting of lines with arrows representing variables,
in statistical training. Nineteen undergraduates
learned advanced level statistics either with vec-
tor diagrams or in the conventional way and solved
three problems. Vector diagrams sometimes helped
the students understand descriptions in the text
which were difficult in conventional explanations,
but caused other difficulties. Vector diagrams were
useful for solving one of the three problems, but not
the other two. It is concluded that a property of di-
agrams or formulae can be a double-edged sword.
Students who are majoring in psychology or other
relevant disciplines have to study statistics. Despite
substantial effort by teachers, understanding statis-
tics is often difficult for many students. This paper
reports the results of a practical experiment in which
the students learned to employ either “vector dia-
grams” or a conventional formula-based approach to
the basics of regression analysis. The students were
then asked to solve three problems using the given
technique they learned.
Unlike many previous studies on using diagrams in
educational settings, which focus only on the useful-
ness of diagrams, this study also investigates limita-
tions of diagrams. Research on diagrammatic rea-
soning has found many “good” properties of dia-
grams (e.g., Barwise & Etchmendy, 1996; Cheng
& Simon, 1995; Larkin & Simon, 1987). The re-
searchers seem to consider these properties as if they
are always support (at least do not impair) under-
standing and problem solving. The results of this
study suggest that the same property, which defi-
nitely makes the solution of a problem easy, some-
times makes another problem difficult. Similarly, the
results suggest that formulae do not necessarily have
“bad” properties.
The vector diagrams used in this study consist of
several vectors drawn as lines with arrows, each of
which corresponds to a variable. For example, the
correlation coefficient is defined as cos θ where θ is
the angle between two vectors, ~x = {x1− x¯, · · · , xn−
x¯} and ~y = {y1 − y¯, · · · , yn − y¯}. The regression
analysis is described as the projection of the depen-
dent variable (actually the vector of the dependent
variable like ~y in Figure 1) on the linear space of
independent variables ( ~x1 and ~x2 in Figure 1).
Tasks and Prediction
These are two basic assumptions in this study about
the nature of diagrammatic and algebraic represen-
tations and operators.
One assumption is that the diagrammatic repre-
sentation of a problem affords a far smaller number
of operators than the algebraic representations of
that problem. This assumption is two-fold. First,
the problem space (the set of all possible problem
states) is smaller when a problem is represented by
a diagram. In the chapters on vectors in mathemat-
ics textbooks, the only diagrammatic operators one
can commonly find are: extension (or reduction), ro-
tation, projection, and (de)composition. Algebraic
representations, by contrast, allow many kinds of
manipulations such as the four basic operations of
arithmetic, expansion or factorization, fraction oper-
ations, root operations (e.g.,
√
a ∗
√
b =
√
ab), sum-
mation operations (e.g.,
∑
(a + b) =
∑
a +
∑
b),
substitution, and so on. Second, I assume that the
search space (the set of problem states a student ac-
tually considers), is also smaller when a problem is
represented by a diagram. Whether a problem is
represented by a diagram or a formula, students do
not consider all possible operators because in each
case some operators are difficult to use.
The other assumption is that a formula and its
transformation become more concrete when they are
connected to a diagram. This assumption seems
to have no room for doubt because connecting a
formula to a diagram increases the number of at-
tributes the formula has. This assumption is related
to the first assumption. Because of the limited num-
ber of diagrammatic operators, “diagrammatic infer-
ence” often requires using algebraic representations,
although the diagrams play a crucial role in the in-
ference. This means that students often have to do
“heterogeneous inference,” inference that use multi-
ple forms of representation (Barwise & Etchemendy,
1996).
This study claims that any property of diagrams
or formulae can be either a help or a hindrance in
problem solving. For example, considering only a
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~x2
~y
~ˆy
~x1
R =cosθ
θ
Figure 1: The definition of the multiple correlation coefficient R using a vector diagram
Table 1: Three Problems used in This Study.
Problem 1: The multiple correlation coeffi-
cient R indicates the goodness of fit of the
model in multiple regression analysis. Consider
the multiple correlation coefficient “R” in the
case of simple regression. Please explain the
relationship between this R and r, the simple
correlation coefficient for the two variables x
and y.
Problem 2: In the case of simple regression, if
the number of paired values (xi, yi) is two, we
can describe the values of one variable by using
the other variable without any error, indicating
r = +1 or −1. Give an explanation for the
reason of this perfect description.
Problem 3: Explain the relationship between
the regression coefficient aˆ1 (= Sxy/Sxx) and
the correlation coefficient r in the case of simple
regression by using only the two variances Sxx
and Syy. Sxy means the covariance for the two
variables x and y.
small number of diagrammatic operators can serve
either as a constraint on the search (This is expected
to be the case in Problem 1 in Table 1, as described
below), or as a limitation if the correct solution path
is outside of the search space (This is expected to be
the case in Problem 2). The abstractness of formulae
also can be an advantage or a disadvantage (This
contrast is expected to be shown between Problem
1 and Problem 3).
Problem 1 If students learn regression analysis in
a conventional way, R is defined by the formula
R =
1
n
∑
(yi − y¯)(yˆi − ¯ˆy)√
1
n
∑
(yi − y¯)2
√
1
n
∑
(yˆi − ¯ˆy)2
.
This formula means that R is defined as the corre-
lation coefficient between the expected value yˆ and
the observed value y. In the case of simple regres-
sion, we can say yˆi = a0 + a1xi1 and ¯ˆy = a0 + a1x¯1.
If these relations are used in the formula for R then
the conclusion R = |r| is obtained after a long series
of algebraic manipulations.
Using a vector diagram, R is defined as cos θ for
two vectors ~ˆy = {yˆ1 − ¯ˆy, · · · , yˆn − ¯ˆy} and ~y = {y1 −
y¯, · · · , yn − y¯} as shown in Figure 1. Vector ~ˆy is the
orthogonal projection of ~y on the plane spanned by
~x1 and ~x2. If we delete ~x2 from Figure 1 and redraw
the orthogonal projection, we will obtain the answer
as shown in Figure 2.
According to the basic assumption mentioned
above, the problem/search space of the diagram-
matic version of this problem is assumed to be
smaller than the problem/search space of the for-
mula version. The solution with vector diagram,
consequently, should require less computation than
the conventional solution. Note that in both solu-
tions we started with the definition of R. In general,
diagrammatic approaches often require less compu-
tation than conventional approaches (Cheng, 1992).
Other than the small problem/search space of the
diagrammatic solution, the concreteness of diagram-
matic operators also can contribute to finding the
answer to this problem. In contrast, the formula ver-
sion of the definition of R and its transformation are
more abstract with no diagrammatic meaning, and
the solution is a pure algebraic solution. Cheng and
Simon (1995) pointed out that conventional math-
ematical approaches are often more complex than
diagrammatic approaches because the bulk of the
reasoning must center around abstract equations.
We therefore predict that a group of students
which uses a vector diagram to solve this problem
will show better performance than another group of
students which tries to solve it in a conventional way.
In this study, after trying to solve the problems,
the students read the correct solution and evaluated
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θR =cosθ = r
θ
R =cos(π − θ) = −r
~x
~y
~ˆy
~x
~y
~ˆy
Figure 2: The answer to Problem 1 with vector diagrams
the degree of their understanding (to what degree
they could understand the solution) and the degree
of their conviction (to what degree they could accept
it) on a 5-point scale. In Problem 1, we can expect
some differences in these scores in accordance with
the difference in difficulty of problem solving. How-
ever, there may be no difference in these evaluations
between the two groups of the students. Even if
it is difficult to make a long sequence of appropri-
ate operators by their own efforts, just following the
correct sequence may not be a tough task as long as
the students are familiar with these operators.
Problem 2 This problem was chosen in this study
to show that the limited number of diagrammatic
operators, which is the property of vector diagrams
considered to make Problem 1 easy, can also be a
hindrance in problem solving. Among diagrammatic
operators one can find in mathematics textbooks, I
assume that the decomposition of a vector is rela-
tively difficult to use for students because the pair of
vectors that would be generated does not exist in the
current problem state. If a diagrammatic solution of
a problem requires students to use the decomposi-
tion operator, the correct solution path is likely to
be outside of the search space, although this path is
in the problem space. A crucial difference between
the vector solutions of Problem 1 and 2 is in whether
the correct solution path is within the search space
or not, although some other differences remain un-
controlled. This experiment puts the external va-
lidity above the internal validity, and it is difficult
in this kind of practical study to strictly control all
factors.
In many conventional textbooks, the correlation
coefficient is explained with a scatter diagram. In
the case of Problem 2, two points will be plotted on
the scatter diagram. The regression straight line is
uniquely specified because two points define a unique
line. For this problem, the comparison is not dia-
gram vs. algebra but vector diagram vs. conven-
tional way.
A vector diagram which can be used to solve this
problem is shown in Figure 3. The vector ~x lies at
~x
(y¯, y¯)
~y
(y1, y2)
(x¯, x¯)
(x1, x2)
Figure 3: A vector diagram used to solve Problem 2
right angles to the vector (x¯, x¯); the vector ~y lies
at right angles to the vector (y¯, y¯). Students could
find these spatial relations by drawing a diagram
of concrete data chosen arbitrarily or by calculat-
ing the inner product. The fact that the vector ~x is
parallel to the vector ~y means that the vector ~y is
described as α~x where α is a scalar. Note that this
solution needs only one kind of diagrammatic opera-
tor: Participants need to decompose each of (x1, x2)
and (y1, y2) into two vectors as shown in Figure 3.
Our prediction is that the difficulty of using the
decomposition operator will impair performance of
the students. It is also expected that these students
will have trouble in understanding and accepting the
correct solution because the decomposition would be
outside of the search space. This is contrary to the
case of algebraic solution of Problem 1 because all
problem states in this solution are expected to be
included in the search space.
Problem 3 This problem was chosen to use in this
experiment to show that the abstractness of alge-
braic solutions can sometimes help problem solving.
Recall that it is thought that this property of for-
mulae would make difficult the algebraic solution of
Problem 1.
A conventional solution to this problem consists of
a sequence of simple transformations of the equation
defining the regression coefficient:
aˆ1 =
Sxy
Sxx
=
Sxy√
Sxx
√
Syy
×
√
Syy√
Sxx
= rxy ×
√
Syy√
Sxx
.
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ab
θ
~x
~y
aˆ1~x
Figure 4: A vector diagram used to solve Problem 3
The transformations used in this solution look very
formal and it is difficult to find any concrete meaning
in them. For example,
√
Syy is forced to be put
into the formula but this looks like a manipulation
without any concrete meaning.
This problem represents a class of problems which
could not be solved by purely diagrammatic think-
ing; rather, it requires heterogeneous inference, re-
cruiting both diagrammatic and algebraic represen-
tations. Figure 4 shows a vector diagram which
can be used to solve this problem. If two relations
a = aˆ1
√∑
(xi − x)2 and b =
√∑
(yi − y)2 are put
into the equation r = cos θ = ab , we will obtain the
correct answer. The diagram gives some concrete
meaning to this solution (the second basic assump-
tion in this study mentioned above).
The prediction is that the students who use a
purely algebraic approach will show better perfor-
mance than the students who try to use a vec-
tor diagram. As mentioned in Problem 1, conven-
tional algebraic approaches are often more complex
than diagrammatic approaches because the bulk of
the reasoning must center around abstract equations
(Cheng & Simon, 1995). This study, however, claims
that the abstractness of algebraic manipulation is
not a “bad” property of formulae by nature. Het-
erogeneous inference requires students to use multi-
ple representations simultaneously and it can burden
students with a cognitive load. A pure diagrammatic
solution, if any, is thought to be easier if this solu-
tion is as simple as the algebraic part of the hetero-
geneous inference.
We can expect some differences in the score of un-
derstanding and acceptance in accordance with the
difference in difficulty of problem solving. However,
similar to the case of Problem 1, there may be no dif-
ference in these evaluations between the two groups
of students because just following the solution steps
might not be very difficult.
Method
Participants
Participants were 19 undergraduate students majoring in
psychology at Wakayama University, Japan. They had
all taken or were taking a first introductory statistics
course for psychology students, but did not know about
the regression analysis taught in this experiment. In
Japan, most of the undergraduate students learn algebra
and vectors in high schools. This means they are ready
for learning statistics either by conventional method or
by an alternative, diagrammatic method.
Design
There were two experimental groups. In formula group,
participants studied the basics of regression analysis in
the conventional way in which formulae were mainly
used. In vector group, the basics of regression analy-
sis were taught with vector diagrams. The participants
were assigned to one of these groups.
Before this experiment, participants received a sim-
ple pretest, the purpose of which was to evaluate their
basic knowledge of statistics. This pretest consisted of
five items, which required students to write formulae of
mean, variance, SD, covariance, and correlation coeffi-
cient. Students got one point for each correct answer
giving a maximum score of 5 points.
I tried to make sure that the two groups were of
roughly comparable ability. Based on the results of the
pretest, students were divided into nine pairs with one
left over. Paired students’ scores differed by a maximum
of one point. Within a pair, the students were randomly
assigned to one of the two groups. One remaining par-
ticipant was assigned to the vector group. Thus, the
vector group had 10 and the formula group had 9 partic-
ipants. The two groups had roughly comparable spread
of ability.
Materials
The text material was written by the author because no
appropriate material was found. Two types of textual
material was used corresponding to the two groups. To
make these two textual materials have the same difficulty
as much as possible, I first wrote the material to be used
in the formula group and then “translated” it into the
text used in the vector group.
Three problems shown in Table 1 were used in this
experiment. All of the statistical concepts that were
needed to solve these problems were explained in the
textual material for both groups. Because of space lim-
itation, I omit the detailed description of the content of
these textual materials.
Procedure
There were two sessions in this experiment: understand-
ing the text material, and problem solving. The experi-
ment was conducted in groups of 3 to 8 participants.
In the first session, participants tried to understand
the text material. If they found a description that was
difficult to understand, they were required to underline
that part in the textbook and to note the reason for the
difficulty in the margin. The participants took about
one hour to finish this session although there was no
time limit.
After reading the text material, each participant re-
ported to the experimenter (i.e. me) their difficulties
in understanding the text. The experimenter gave each
participant additional explanations about the difficult
points in the text. All of the questions were resolved
before the participants proceeded to the second session.
In the second session, the three problems shown in Ta-
ble 1 were presented one by one. Fifteen minutes were
allocated to solving each problem. Participants were al-
lowed to look at the text material at any time. All par-
ticipants were given a paper-and-pencil version of the
test.
The participants received the correct answer after they
had finished trying to solve each problem. They were re-
quired to evaluate to what degree they could understand
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each solution and to what degree they could accept it on
a 5-point scale ranging from 1: “very difficult to under-
stand (or accept)” to 5: “very easy to understand (or
accept).”
Results
Understanding text
It turned out that the two textual materials were
similar in the sense that they had almost the same
difficulty. Column 4 in Table 2 presents the number
of descriptions reported as being difficult to under-
stand in the text for each participant. There was
very little difference in the number of reported diffi-
culties during the learning session between the two
groups in this experiment. The number was 8 in the
formula group and 9 in the vector group.
A closer look at the reported difficulties revealed
that vector diagrams often helped the students in
understanding several points in which the students
in the formula group had a difficulty, while other
obstacles arose with vector diagrams. In the for-
mula group, 5 of 9 participants (N, P, Q, R and
S) said that it was difficult to understand the proof
which showed that the range of correlation coeffi-
cient is from −1 to +1. Two participants (O and
S) found difficulty in understanding the reason why
dividing covariance by two standard deviations was
the most proper way to capture the relation between
two variables. One participant (R) said that she
had trouble in understanding where a0 and a1 in
the formula yˆi = a0 + a1xi came from. In the vec-
tor group, all these points were not problematic for
the students. No students in this group reported
any difficulties in understanding the corresponding
points in their textual material. Instead, they had
trouble in understanding other points. Four of the
10 participants (D, G, H, and J) said that they did
not know the concept of orthogonal projection (see
Figure 1). Two participants (G and H) said un-
derstanding inner product—which was used in this
group to define correlation coefficient—was difficult.
Two participants (H and I) had difficulty in imagin-
ing n-dimensional vectors. One participant said the
equation which describes the relation between the
variance and a vector was difficult.
Problem solving
Columns 5, 8 and 11 in Table 2 present the per-
formance of each participant and success S (%) in
problem solving for each group; F means failure in
problem solving. For each problem, the two columns
to the right of the column indicating success or fail
in problem solving show participants’ self-evaluation
of the degree of understanding and acceptance of
the correct solution presented after their attempt at
problem solving.
All in all, the results supported our prediction.
Problem 1 Vector representations facilitated so-
lution of Problem 1. In the vector group, one par-
ticipant (Participant F in Table 2) reached the con-
clusion R = |r| and 5 participants found the answer
R = r in the case of r ≥ 0. All of these students
used vector diagrams. In the formula group, no par-
ticipant got the answer R = |r| or R = r to this
problem. The difference in success S (%) between
the two groups was significant (Fisher’s exact test,
p = .011).
No significant difference was found in the self-
evaluation scores for understanding and acceptance
of the given correct solution.
Problem 2 and 3 In contrast to the good perfor-
mance on Problem 1, no participant in the vector
group succeeded in solving Problem 2 and Problem
3. The participants in the formula group showed
relatively good performance. The difference in suc-
cess S (%) between the two groups was significant
in Fisher’s exact test, p = .003 for Problem 2 and
p = .011 for Problem 3.
The scores for understanding and acceptance of
the correct solution to Problem 2 in the vector group
were lower than the scores in the formula group. The
differences in means between the two groups were
significant, t(9.0) = 5.28, p = .001, for understand-
ing; t(17) = 3.15, p = .006, for acceptance.
There was no significant difference in the scores of
the two groups for understanding and acceptance in
Problem 3.
Discussion
The limited number of diagrammatic operators can
make the problem space smaller, and raise the prob-
ability of reaching the correct answer. We predicted
that this property would improve performance on
Problem 1 and the results supported this prediction.
Formulae allow students to do many kinds of ma-
nipulation. For example, in Problem 1, participant
R tried to get R × 1r and participant M considered
{1/n
∑
(xi−x¯)(yi−y¯)}
2
R . Note that it is next to impos-
sible to do these manipulations on a vector diagram.
If a diagram rules out these messy manipulations, it
must be a big help for students.
Interestingly, the same property, namely, affording
a small number of operators, could prevent students
from finding the solution and understanding an ex-
planation. This is the case in Problem 2. No partic-
ipant in the vector group succeeded in solving this
problem. The participants also had trouble in un-
derstanding and accepting the correct answer to this
problem. After the experiment, participant A told
me that understanding the decomposition of vec-
tors was difficult, especially, (x¯, x¯) and (y¯, y¯) looked
strange. This feedback suggests that the students
were likely to rule out the decomposition operator
necessary
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Table 2: Summary of the Data from Experiment 2.
Problem 1 Problem 2 Problem 3
Groups Participants Pre Difficulties S/F Un Ac S/F Un Ac S/F Un Ac
Vector A 3 0 F 5 2 F 2 1 F 4 4
B 3 1 S 4 4 F 2 3 F 2 2
C 3 0 S 5 5 F 4 3 F 5 5
D 1 1 F 1 1 F 4 2 F 4 2
E 1 0 S 5 5 F 2 3 F 5 5
F 1 0 S 4 4 F 4 4 F 4 4
G 1 2 F 3 3 F 1 1 F 5 5
H 1 3 F 4 3 F 1 1 F 1 1
I 1 1 S 4 4 F 4 4 F 4 4
J 1 1 S 4 5 F 4 4 F 4 4
Mean/%correct 1.60 0.90 60.0% 3.90 3.60 0.0% 2.80 2.60 0.0% 3.80 3.60
SD 0.92 0.94 1.14 1.28 1.25 1.20 1.25 1.36
Formula K 3 0 F 4 3 F 5 3 F 5 4
L 3 0 F 2 4 S 5 5 S 5 5
M 2 0 F 4 3 S 5 5 S 4 3
N 2 1 F 4 4 S 5 5 F 5 5
O 1 1 F 5 5 F 5 4 S 5 5
P 1 1 F 4 4 S 5 5 F 4 2
Q 1 1 F 5 5 F 5 2 S 3 3
R 1 2 F 4 4 S 5 5 S 4 4
S 0 2 F 4 2 S 5 5 F 4 4
Mean/%correct 1.56 0.89 0.0% 4.00 3.78 66.7% 5.00 4.33 55.6% 4.33 3.89
SD 0.96 0.74 0.82 0.92 0.00 1.05 0.67 0.99
Notes. Pre: the score of pretest (1–5)
Difficulties: the number of descriptions in the text which were difficult to understand
S/F: success (S) or failure (F) in problem solving
Un: the score of evaluating the degree of understanding the correct solution (1–5)
Ac: the score of evaluating the degree of acceptance of the correct solution (1–5)
to solve this problem. The low ratings for under-
standing and acceptance of the correct answer refute
the possibility that the inability to solve this prob-
lem means that the participants carelessly failed to
apply a familiar operator.
Similar to the case of properties of diagrams, a
property of formulae can be either an advantage
or a disadvantage. Abstractness is an example of
such properties. This property was predicted to
work against solving Problem 1 but to be an aid
in solving Problem 3 in the formula group. The
results of the experiment were consistent with this
prediction. A formula and its transformation be-
come more concrete when they are connected to a
diagram. This is the case in heterogeneous inference,
inference that use both diagrammatic and algebraic
representations. A pure diagrammatic solution is
easier if this solution is as simple as the algebraic
part of the heterogeneous inference.
Conclusion
Previous research on diagrammatic reasoning has
pointed out many “good” properties of diagrams
and has claimed advantage for diagrammatic ap-
proaches over conventional (usually algebraic) ap-
proaches. From the results presented here, it seems
that the story is not so simple. The results of this
experiment indicate that the vector diagram is not a
panacea for students struggling with statistics. The
same property of certain diagrams or formulae can
be either an advantage or a disadvantage. Teachers
should keep this in mind and ponder how properties
of diagrams or formulae can work in a particular sit-
uation.
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Abstract
The purpose of this fMRI study was to provide evidence for
the mathematician’s belief that mathematical thinking
emerges from the interplay between symbolic and visuo-
spatial systems. Twelve participants were given algebra word
problems and depicted the quantitative relations on a mental
number line or made parts of an equation. The regions
activated in depicting the picture were also recruited to make
an equation.
Mathematics is a language. Many scientists say that
mathematics is a language to describe the nature of
phenomena they are looking at. It is well known that
Nicolas Burubaki, a group of mathematicians, stressed the
crucial role of formal symbol systems in mathematics.
On the other hand, many mathematicians and physicists
emphasize the role of visuo-spatial reasoning in
mathematics, which recruits qualitative, language-
independent representations. For example, Albert Einstein
stated “Words and language, whether written or spoken, do
not seem to play any part in my thought process.”
As Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, and Tsivkn (1999)
suggested, mathematical thinking may emerge from the
interplay between symbolic and visuo-spatial systems. In
this fMRI study, we approach this problem and provide
evidence for this kind of mathematical thinking.
Psychological studies have revealed that if a problem
apparently looks like a pure symbolic task, it can require
students to have some visuo-spatial representations. For
example, Griffin, Case and Siegler (1994) showed that the
mental “number line”, a qualitative representation of the
number system, is crucial readiness for early arithmetic.
Lewis used a number-line-like diagram to train
undergraduate students having difficulty to solve “compare”
word problems (problems containing more-than or less-than
relations), and succeeded in improving their performance.
Paige and Simon (1966) proposed that solving word
problems is not a simple translation of problem sentences
into equations, as Bobrow’s (1966) STUDENT did, but
needs “physical cues,” a visuo-spatial representation. The
6th grade students who used our “Picture Algebra” strategy
(Koedinger & Terao, 2002) to solve the compare word
problem showed relatively high performance. We expect
that using this strategy may better prepare students to learn
formal algebra.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) gives us a
new source of information about the mental representations
used in mathematics. Dehaene et al. (1999) showed two
different mental representations are used for different tasks.
Exact calculation (e.g., 4+5=9) elicited left-lateralized
activation in the left inferior frontal lobe, together with left
angular gyrus and left anterior cingulate. This pattern was
interpreted as suggesting that the participants recruited their
symbolic systems and did language dependent encoding.
Approximation (e.g., 4+5 is closer to 8 than 6), on the
contrary, elicited bilateral parietal lobes activation. This
pattern was interpreted as suggesting that the participants
recruited visuo-spatial systems and did language
independent encoding. Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel and Cohen
(2003) reviewed neuro-imaging and neuropsychological
evidence concerning various numerical tasks and proposed a
hypothesis that three parietal circuits are related to number
processing. The horizontal segment of the intraparietal
sulcus (HIPS) appears to be a core quantity system,
analogous to a mental number line. This area seems to be
supplemented by two other circuits. One is the bilateral
posterior superior parietal lobule (PSPL), which is
considered to be involved in attention orientation on the
mental number line. The other is the left angular gyrus,
which is likely to support manipulations of numbers in a
symbolic form (e.g., exact calculation).
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Dehaene et al. (1999, 2003) suspected that mathematical
thinking may emerge from the interplay between symbolic
and visuo-spatial systems but did not provide direct
evidence for this idea. For example, exact calculation and
approximation mainly depend on the symbolic system and
the visuo-spatial system, respectively, not necessarily a
collaboration between these two systems.
In this study, we try to provide direct evidence for such a
collaboration. We decided to use algebra word problems for
three reasons. First, previous psychological research
suggests that visuo-spatial reasoning plays a crucial role in
solving these problems while they explicitly require
students to use symbols (i.e., equations). This kind of
problem is expected to show the interplay between symbolic
and visuo-spatial systems. Second, algebra word problems
are widely used in school mathematics curriculum, so that
we can say the observed interplay is a prevailing form of
reasoning, not a special form isolated to a very specific task.
Third, there are plenty of studies using algebra word
problem, the accumulated findings help us in valid
reasoning from our results.
If algebra word problems recruit the visuo-spatial system
as well as the symbolic system, we should see activation of
some visuo-spatial areas when students try to make a correct
equation for a problem. To find visuo-spatial areas, we
asked our participants to make a pictorial representation of
the problem in one condition. This task should activate
visuo-spatial areas and most of these areas should also be
activated when we ask the participants to make an equation
of the same problem in another condition. We especially
expect that the two hypothesized parietal visuo-spatial
systems, HIPS and PSPL, show activation in both
conditions.
Method
Participants
Participants were 12 right-handed, native English speakers.
They were recruited by advertisement posted on an electric
bulletin board in Carnegie Mellon University. Participants
were provided written informed consent in accordance with
the Institutional Review Boards at the University of
Pittsburgh and at Carnegie Mellon University.
Tasks and Design
There was one representation factor and four problem
factors. They were all manipulated within subjects. The
representation factor was the mental representation the
participants made from the problems. In the picture
condition, the participants draw a mental image describing
the critical relations in the problem; in the equat ion
condition, the participants were required to construct an
equation to the problem.
Table 1 shows two example problems. Each problem
consisted of three problem sentences and used three letters
as unknown quantities. The first sentence was an assignment
sentence. In the equation condition, the
Table 1:  Sample of Problems.
Consistent/more-than/intransitive problem
Assignment x=A
R1 B is 6 more than A.
R2 C is 8 more than A.
Inconsistent/less-than/transitive_n problem
Assignment x=A
R1 A is 6 less than B.
R2 B is 2 less than C.
Figure 1:  An example of pictures made from problems.
participants memorize what letter the “x” is assigned to. In
the picture condition, the participants imagined a number
line and picked locations for the letters. The second and the
third sentences described a qualitative relation between two
letters. Hereafter we call them R1 (meaning “Relation 1”)
and R2, respectively. Participants could not find a numerical
solution to these problems because they did not have a
sentence referring to the total amount of the three unknown
quantities. For example, if the first problem in Table 1 has
the sentence “The total of the three quantities is 44,” we can
make an equation to find the three quantities like
x+(x+6)+(x+8)=44. In the equation condition, the
participants were told that the total sentence would be
omitted and were required to make the left side of the
correct equation like x+(x+6)+(x+8). For the first problem
in Table 1, the participant can make the parts (x+6) and
(x+8) from R1 and R2, respectively. In the picture
condition, the participants imagine a picture describing the
critical relations in the problem as shown in Figure 1. For
the first problem in Table 1, the participants can imagine B
to the right of the location A on the mental number line and
add the distance, 6, to this picture. When they read and
represent R2, the whole picture can be obtained.
A first problem factor was the relation, whether R1 and R2
use more-than or less-than relations.
A second problem factor was the consistency, whether the
relations used in R1 and R2 were consistent with the correct
equation. A more-than problem was labeled either as a
consistent problem if the correct equation uses “+”or labeled
as an inconsistent problem if the correct equation uses “-”.
We use a similar labeling for the less-than problems.
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Figure 2: The 42-second structure of an fMRI trial.
A third condition was defined in accordance with the
target stimuli presented at the end of each problem (trial).
The problem was labeled either as a correct problem if the
target is the correct target or as an incorrect problem if the
target is incorrect.
A forth factor was transitivity. This factor was defined by
the two relational sentences, R1 and R2. Considering the
picture the participants were required to make seems to be
an easy way to explain this factor.  For the intransitive
problem, an arc will be drawn over another arc as shown in
Figure 1. This will be the case if either the former letter or
the latter letter is common in R1 and R2. For example, R1
and R2 of the first problem in Table 1 use the same latter
letter (A), and this is an intransitive problem. For the
transitive_n problem (n stands for Normal), one arc should
be drawn at the next position to another arc in the correct
picture. A third level of this factor is represented by another
problem. This type of problem, called the transitive_d
problem hereafter (d stands for Delay), was made by
changing the R1 and R2 of the transitive_n problem. In the
transitive_d problem, participants in the equation condition
are not able to make a part of the equation until they read
R2. They need to remember R1 and make the two parts of
the equation when R2 is presented. The purpose of making
this unusual problem was to find brain regions which play a
role in making equations going beyond simple encoding of
problem sentences. Comparing the transitive_n problem
with the transitive_d problem in the time period of
presenting R1 might reveal differences between memory
and processing areas but we will not say much about this
comparison in this paper. There may be no difference
between the transitive_n and transitive_d problems in the
picture condition because the participants can describe the
relation when they see R1. For example, for the transitive_d
problem made from the second problem in Table 1 (R1: “B
is 2 less than C.”), the participants can imagine the spatial
relation between B and C by just ignoring A used in the
assignment sentence.
Combinations of the four problem factors (2x2x2x3)
yielded 24 types of problems. The participants went through
all of these 24 types in both the picture condition and the
equation condition in the MRI scanner, so that each
participant encountered 48 problems. The 48 problems were
divided into four blocks: two blocks in the picture condition
and the other two blocks in the equation condition.
Procedure
Pre-scan Practice Participants took about 20 minutes of
pre-scan practice just before the scan. They went through
one block of 12 trials (problems) in the picture condition
and another block of 12 trials in the equation condition. Half
of the participants started with the picture condition and the
other half of the participants started with the equation
condition. The time course in each trial was the same as the
one in the scanner.
Event-related fMRI scan Event-related fMRI data were
collected by using a singe-shot EPI acquisition on a
Siemens 3T scanner, 1500 TR, 30 ms TE, 600 flip angle,
210 mm FOV, 26 axial slices/scan with 3.2 mm thick,
64x64 matrix, and with AC-PC on the 6th slice from the
bottom. There were 28 scans (42 seconds) for each trial, 12
trials for a block and 4 blocks for each participant. Two of
these 4 blocks were for the picture condition and the other
two blocks were for the equation condition. Half of the
participants started with the first block in the picture
condition and proceeded to the second block in the equation
condition, the third block in the picture condition, and the
last block in the equation condition. The other half of the
participants started with the first block in the equation
condition, then went through picture, equation, and picture
conditions in this order.
The protocol of each trial of scan is illustrated in Figure 2.
The three problem sentences appeared on the screen one by
one. The assignment sentence was on the screen for 3500
ms; R1 and R2 were on the screen for 7500 ms. A target
equation or picture was presented after the disappearance of
R2. Participants responded to this target by pressing the
button. If they thought the target was correct they pressed a
button with the index finger of the right hand; if they
thought the target is incorrect, they pressed the other button
with the middle finger of the right hand.
fMRI data analysis Data processing was conducted using
SPM99 software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Slice
timing was corrected first and images were realigned.
Realigned images were normalized to Talairac coordinates.
Normalized images were smoothed with an 8 mm FWHM
isotropic Gaussian Kernel. Analysis was carried out using
the general linear model with a box-car waveform
convolved with a hemodynamic response function. Only
correct trials were used for analysis.
To find brain regions of interest (ROI), a random effects
model was used. At the first level, mean images for each
participant were created, depicting the subtraction of BOLD
response during assignment sentence from BOLD response
during R1 in each condition (picture and equation).  Data
from transitive_d problems were excluded to do this
subtraction because of the unique nature of these problems.
At the second level, these mean images were combined in
one-sample t-test. We used a height threshold of P < 0.0005
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Figure 3: Regions of the brain that show activation in
depicting a relation between two quantities in the picture
condition as compared to the encoding of the assignment.
Figure 4: Regions of the brain that show activation in
constructing parts of an equation in the equation condition
as compared to the encoding of the assignment.
uncorrected (t > 4.44), with an extent threshold of eight
contiguous voxels in an ROI. This analysis should show us
the regions activated when constructing a number line to
describe a quantitative relation or constructing parts of an
equation from this relation. The subtraction between picture
and equation conditions might be interesting but we did not
conduct it, because this subtraction might hide visuo-spatial
areas that are recruited not only in picture condition but also
in equation condition.
Results
Figure 3 shows the brain regions which show activation
during the period of R1 as compared to the assignment
sentence in picture condition. We can infer that these
regions may be related to using a mental number line to
depict a relation between two quantities.
Figure 4 shows the brain regions in the equation condition
obtained by the same subtraction (R1 - assignment). These
regions should be related to constructing parts of an
equation from sentences.
Comparing these two figures, we can see an overlap of
activation especially in the parietal lobe (HIPS and PSPL).
This means that constructing an equation, which apparently
is a symbolic task, recruits the visuo-spatial system.
Areas for constructing a mental number line
A pattern of bilateral activation was obtained for drawing a
mental number line to represent a quantitative relation.  As
we had expected, the active areas in parietal lobes occupied
HIPS and PSPL (Tarairach coordinates of main peaks: -40, -
40, 48, Z=3.75; -28, -60, 54, Z=4.63; 38, -46, 48, Z=4.62;
24, -68, 56, Z=4.12). Activation was also found during
constructing a number line from R1 in the bilateral premotor
cortices (-30, 2, 52, Z=3.79; -46, 2, 34, Z=3.72; -48, 0, 50,
Z=3.68; 28, -2, 56, Z=4.52; 54, -2, 40, Z=3.51), bilateral
supplementary motor areas (-4, 12, 56, Z=3.59; 10, 12, 54,
Z=3.73), left Broca area (-52, 12, 4, Z=3.69), right inferior
frontal sulcus (54, 8, 20, Z=4.75), left and right insula (-32,
26, 4, Z=4.27; 36, 16, 0, Z=4.05), left and right corpus
striatum (20, -6, -2, Z=4.49; -24, -2, 6, Z=3.51), and right
DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (-36, 34, 16, Z=4.07).
Activation found in left and right visual cortex should
reflect longer exposure to the visual stimulus: The period of
R1 was longer than the period of assignment sentence.
Areas for constructing an equation
A pattern of left-lateralized activation was obtained for
constructing parts of an equation from a sentence referring
to a relation between two quantities. The bilateral PSPL and
left HIPS activation were also found as in the picture
condition (-34, -54, 46, Z=4.93; 16, -62, 50, Z=3.85). This
means that the hypothesized parietal visuo-spatial system
(Dehaene et al., 2003) was recruited when constructing parts
of an equation from a problem sentence. Activation was also
found during construction of parts of the equation from R1
in the left premotor cortex (-58, 2, 28, Z=3.87), bilateral
supplementary motor areas and right Brodmann area 8 (-28,
-2, 62, Z=4.00; -14, 8, 58, Z=3.79; 0, 12, 56, Z=4.53; 34, 8,
58, Z=4.06), bilateral inferior frontal sulci (-38, 8, 22,
Z=3.44; -48, 6, 38, Z=4.43), left basal ganglia including
thalamus and globus pallidus (-16 -10 14, Z=4.43), right
parahippocampal gyrus (24, -30, -2, Z=4.38), and left and
right DLPFC (40, 32 28, Z=3.95; -36, 50, 8, Z=3.77).
To confirm that several brain areas activated in picture
condition also showed activation in equation condition, we
plotted percent signal change along the time course. The
base line for calculating the signal change was set by the
average of first two scans. Remember that these areas were
found in picture condition and no data from equation
condition were used. Data from intransitive problems and
transitive_n problems were combined in each condition.
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Figure 5: Percent signal change in BOLD response in four ROIs found in picture condition.
After finding ROIs, the signal change was calculated for
each of the four problem types (picture--transitive_d,
picture--others, equation--transitive_d, and equation--
others) and for each participant, and then averaging across
the 12 participants. Among many ROIs found in picture
condition, because of the limited space of this paper, we
only show the percent signal change at left PSPL and HIPS
(-28, -60, 54; The number of voxels is 333), right HIPS (38,
-46, 48; The number of voxels is 303), right PSPL (24, -68
56; The number of voxels is 241), and right premotor cortex
(28, -2, 56; The number of voxels is 220.). These are the
four biggest clusters of active voxels.
Figure 5 shows the percent signal change in each of these
four ROIs. We can see that these areas found in picture
condition also played a role, more or less, in equation
condition. Other areas found in picture condition also
showed a similar pattern of activation.
Discussion
The results of this experiment indicate that mathematical
thinking emerges from the interplay between symbolic and
visuo-spatial systems. The hypothesized two parietal visuo-
spatial regions (Dehaene et al., 2003) showed activation not
only when participants imagined a picture from a problem
sentence but also when participants constructed parts of an
equation from the sentence. We cannot deny a possibility
that these parietal regions are involved in non-visuospatial
mathematical reasoning. But it is reasonable we consider
them as picture regions until some evidence is fond for this
possibility in brain imaging research.
We might expect language areas to show greater
activation on these symbolic tasks than in the more visuo-
spatial picture task.  However, while we found activation in
language areas, particularly Broca’s and the inferior frontal
sulcus, we did not find clear differences in those areas
between the two conditions. Perhaps the language areas are
doing different kinds of computations in the two conditions,
but we found no evidence to support this claim.
Our results seem to be consistent with the recent version
of the ACT-R theory (Anderson et al., submitted). The
ACT-R theory hypothesizes several buffers and their
locations in the brain. For example, the goal buffer is
supposed to be in DLPFC and the imaginal buffer in the
parietal lobe. The theory also hypothesizes that production
rules are stored in the corpus striatum. We found activation
in these regions in this experiment. The recent version of
ACT-R theory can predict the percent signal change in
BOLD response based on the task analysis. We did a task
analysis before conducting this experiment. Constructing an
ACT-R model could provide us an explanation about the
signal change in this experiment.
Readers might suspect that the parietal activation in PSPL
and HIPS only reflects longer exposure to the relational
sentence R1 (7500 ms) than the assignment sentence (4500
ms). This effect might be the case but it cannot explain the
different pattern of activation between the picture and
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equation conditions (see Figures 3 and 4) because it should
have the same effect in both conditions.
Readers might also suspect that activation of visuo-spatial
areas in the equation condition was an effect of use of the
mental number line in the picture blocks spilling over to the
equation blocks. Because we used a within-subject design,
we cannot deny this possibility. Even if it is true, however,
it is the effect that we expect in educational settings. Those
participants who used visuo-spatial systems on equations
may have enhanced their performance. Using a framework
of production systems, we can write production rules that
represent a purely symbolic processing of a problem
sentence. For example, we can think of the following
production rule to process R1:
IF x is bind to $A
and R1 says “$B is $N more than $A
THEN represent $B as x+$N,
where the letter with $ means a variable. Visuo-spatial
systems are not necessary if using this kind of production
rule but it appears participants still used visuo-spatial
reasoning to construct an equation. The following
alternative set of production rules illustrates how use of the
visuo-spatial systems may make this task easy:
IFR1 says “$B is $N more than $A
THEN
    $B is to the right of $A on the number line
IF x is bind to $A
and $B is to the right of $A on the number line
THEN represent $B using a plus sign, as x+$N,
If the first production is already exists prior to algebra
instruction, the second rule is easier to learn, perhaps, then
the one above.
It has been shown that using a pictorial representation
helps students solve algebra word problems (e.g.,
Koedinger & Terao, 2002; Lewis, 1989). These results can
be interpreted that the students who learned to use visuo-
spatial systems improved their ability to solve algebra word
problems. Even if the results of this study only show that
students can use visuo-spatial systems to solve algebra
word problems only after trained with a pictorial
representation, this encourages the educational practice of
using a pictorial representation as a scaffold of learning.
 There is an interesting episode in the pre-scan, practice
session. A few participants showed bad performance in the
equation condition. We asked them what they did to make
equations. They revealed that they used a “direct
translation” strategy which was similar to the strategy
Bobrow’s (1966) STUDENT used. For example, if R1 says
“B is 6 more than A,” they translated this sentence into the
form of “B=6+A” before substituting “x” for a quantity.
This strategy does not seem to need any visuo-spatial
reasoning. The fact that the poor performer first used this
kind of strategy suggests that students having difficulty
with word problems may not learn to make use of visuo-
spatial systems.
This study is still in progress and we only have scratched
the surface in dada analysis. Further data analysis (e.g.,
statistical comparisons of the two conditions) should be
done and it will provide insight into mathematical thinking.
Conclusion
Mathematical thinking emerges from the interplay between
symbolic and visuo-spatial systems. Algebra word
problems, which are widely used in current school
curriculum, are not a pure language processing task. They
appear to depend on the use of visuo-spatial systems.
Conclusion
Mathematical thinking emerges from the interplay between
symbolic and visuo-spatial systems. Algebra word
problems, which are widely used in current school
curriculum, are not a pure language processing task. They
appear to depend on the use of visuo-spatial systems.
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Abstract 
Whenever heterogeneous experts work together, shared 
knowledge comes into play. In recent years, two important 
research questions have emerged that we will address in the 
present paper. First, we analyzed if collaborative problem 
solving leads to the construction of shared knowledge. The 
second goal of this study was to demonstrate the assumed 
positive effect of shared knowledge on collaborative problem 
solving. Following Newell and Simon’s (1972) classic view 
of problem solving, we distinguish shared knowledge about 
the initial situation, the goals, and the operators. The kind and 
amount of prior shared knowledge was varied as an 
independent variable in four experimental conditions. We 
showed that participants acquired shared knowledge during 
the cooperation and that most of this information was correct. 
Further results indicate that if collaborating partners have 
knowledge in common, their overall problem solutions are 
better than if they lack any kind of shared information. 
However, this effect seems to be mostly due to shared 
knowledge about initial situation and goals, as this leads to 
better solutions than shared knowledge about operators.  
Introduction 
Complex tasks often require the collaboration of experts 
with heterogeneous background knowledge. If we refer to 
this kind of collaborative problem solving, the construct of 
shared knowledge plays a very important role. Two lines of 
research dealing with the role of shared knowledge can be 
distinguished. On the one hand, there are studies that 
address the acquisition of shared knowledge in collaborative 
activities, especially in collaborative learning. On the other 
hand, many researchers focus on the effects of shared 
knowledge as a prerequisite for effective collaborative 
problem solving. In the present paper, we will address both 
issues in a net-based scenario. 
Concerning the acquisition, it is mostly assumed that 
collaborative learning leads to the construction of shared 
knowledge (e.g. Pfister, Wessner, Holmer & Steinmetz, 
1999; Roschelle & Teasley, 1995) through interaction and 
communication (Clark & Brennan, 1991). Although there is 
evidence for this assumption, this issue is seldom addressed 
quantitatively. In addition, the possibility of the emergence 
of false shared knowledge is often neglected. Only a few 
studies try to quantify the amount of shared knowledge (e.g. 
Fischer & Mandl, 2000; Jeong & Chi, 2000) and to analyze 
the way of its emergence (either through individual but 
similar experience with the learning material or by co-
construction). There are several possibilities of co-
constructing shared knowledge. One is that two interacting 
partners mutually build a piece of shared knowledge that 
contains novel information, which none of them possessed 
in full before (e.g. Roschelle & Teasly, 1995). Another 
possibility, analyzed here, is that one person communicates 
some of his specific information to his partner, so that the 
latter learns and understands it, which constitutes shared 
knowledge between the two. One goal of this article is to 
analyze and quantify if collaborative problem solving leads 
to the acquisition of shared knowledge and to determine if it 
is correct or not. As collaborative problem solving also 
requires participants to communicate and interact in order to 
find a solution and, furthermore, in this experiment, to 
represent it in a common whiteboard, we hypothesize that 
participants will acquire some sort of shared knowledge. 
Concerning its’ effects, shared knowledge is supposed to 
be an important variable determining the functioning of 
groups consisting of members with heterogeneous 
background knowledge (e.g., expert groups; Hinsz, Tindale 
& Vollrath, 1997, Smith, 1994). Shared knowledge about 
the distribution of information within the group is regarded 
as a major constituent of the group’s transactive memory 
system, which guides information encoding and retrieval on 
the group level (Wegner, 1987). This shared meta-
knowledge augments the group’s memory capacity and 
enables effective retrieval of information held by the group 
members when needed for problem solving (Moreland, 
Argote & Krishnan, 1996). Shared mental models 
comprising shared knowledge about task, team, equipment 
and situation have been found crucial for effective expert 
team decision making, problem solving and co-ordination in 
complex dynamic environments (Cannon-Bowers, Salas & 
Converse, 1993; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1992). 
Furthermore, effective communication requires common 
ground and shared vocabulary (Clark & Brennan, 1991; 
Waern, 1992). As shown by this brief summary, the 
importance of shared knowledge for collaborative activities 
is widely acknowledged throughout the literature, although 
the term ‘shared knowledge’ refers to rather different things. 
Empirical studies on problem solving that demonstrate the 
effectiveness of shared knowledge are still rare. In the 
present paper, we therefore want to develop a taxonomy of 
shared knowledge that is applicable to problem solving 
activities in general. Furthermore, we will analyze it’s 
facilitating effects in collaborative problem solving and find 
out whether some components of shared knowledge are 
more effective than others. 
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A Taxonomy of Shared Knowledge for 
Collaborative Problem Solving 
In line with Stasser and Titus (1985, 1987) we define shared 
knowledge as the kind of information two or more persons 
have in common, i.e., possess and understand in essentially 
the same way. Information available to only one person is 
called individual or distributed knowledge. Based on this 
definition our taxonomy of shared knowledge follows 
Newell and Simon’s (1972) classic view of problem solving. 
According to Newell and Simon, knowledge about the 
initial situation, goals and operators is needed to solve a 
problem. Expanding this view to collaborative problem 
solving, shared knowledge can be conceptualized as shared 
knowledge about the initial situation, the goals and the 
operators. This taxonomy provides a more detailed 
description of shared knowledge and allows for the testing 
of differential effects of its components. Moreover, it is 
applicable to any problem without undue commitments 
concerning specific initial situations, goals and operators.  
Analyzing the Effectiveness of Shared Knowledge 
Design tasks are a widely used but scarcely investigated 
example of problem solving (Smith & Browne, 1993; 
Strube, Garg & Wittstruck, 2002). For our study, we chose 
the domain of web design with its heavy use of net-based 
communication between multiple experts as our 
experimental task: Dyads of subjects adopting the role of an 
information technology advisor (IT expert) and a 
representative of a fictitious company (company expert) 
have to design an online-shop that meets the company’s 
needs. From the perspective of problem solving, the 
company expert’s knowledge is characterized by 
information about the company’s initial situation and goals. 
The expertise of the IT expert comprises knowledge about 
operators, i.e., rules to transform the company’s goals and 
constraints into technical solutions. 
As hypothesized above, shared knowledge is needed and 
facilitates collaborative problem solving whenever 
heterogeneous experts work together. Following this 
hypothesis and taking into account that individual problem 
solving requires individual knowledge about initial 
situation, goals and operators (Newell & Simon, 1972), we 
assume that collaborative problem solving requires shared 
knowledge about the initial situation, goals and operators. 
Therefore, we state the following hypotheses: 
 
1. Shared knowledge, in general, leads to better 
problem solving performance than a total lack of 
shared knowledge. 
2. Sharing knowledge about all components, the initial 
situation, goals and operators, is more effective than 
just sharing knowledge about the initial situation and 
goals.  
3. Shared knowledge about the initial situation, goals 
and operators is more effective than sharing 
knowledge about operators alone. 
4. Finally, we are interested in the particular difference 
of shared knowledge about the initial situation and 
goals as compared to shared knowledge about 
operators. Information about the initial situation and 
goals frame the problem and help to decide when a 
solution is reached. In contrast operators are means 
to transform one state into another, so we expect that 
sharing knowledge about the initial situation and 
goals has different effects than sharing knowledge 
about operators. 
Method 
Tasks and Materials 
Design Task. Information needed for the design task was 
provided in two introductory texts, one for the role of the 
company expert and one for the role of the IT advisor.  
After having acquired their task-relevant information (see 
next section), two participants worked on the design 
problem, one as the company expert and the other as the IT 
advisor. They were instructed to discuss solution features of 
the online-shop in preparation, via chat. Features which 
were chosen as part of the final solution were to be noted on 
a common whiteboard.  
The introductory text for the company expert comprised 
36 knowledge elements, 27 about the company’s initial 
situation (IS) and goals (G), and 9 containing either shared 
knowledge or irrelevant filler information (depending on the 
experimental condition). Knowledge about IS and G was 
considered as a whole because a) this resembles the natural 
expertise of a company expert, e.g. a manager and b) 
knowledge elements about IS and G were of the same form, 
with the only difference that the goals were formulated as a 
request, e.g. “The company wants their customers to find 
the desired products quickly and easily”. The introductory 
text for the IT advisor consisted of 27 knowledge elements 
about operators (O) and 9 shared elements or fillers. The 
operators had the form of if-then clauses with the ‘then’ part 
specifying a technical feature of the solution, and the ‘if’ 
part describing constraints to be fulfilled by the company. If 
the company’s initial situation and goals match the ‘if’ part, 
the solution feature provided in the ‘then’ part should be 
marked as a desirable feature (DF) of the online-shop. If 
not, the solution feature should be marked as not being part 
of the online-shop’s functionality (No DF). By integrating 
the 27 knowledge elements about initial situation and goals 
with the 27 operators, a total of 24 solution features (15 to 
be part of the shop and 9 to be rejected) were 
unambiguously determined. The following example should 
illustrate the task and a filler item (FI) for the company 
expert: 
IS: Products cost between 7 and 180 Euro. 
O1: If medium payments (5-1000 Euro) are expected, 
then the online-shop should provide the opportunity to 
pay by check or credit card. 
O2: If micro payments (0.1-5 Euro) are expected, the 
online-shop should use systems like e-Cash.  
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DF: The online-shop should provide the possibility to 
pay via check and credit card. 
No DF: E-Cash should be used for payments. 
FI: The well known designer Philippe Starck designed 
the layout of the stores. 
 
As participants were not true experts in the domain 
assigned to them, materials had to be simplified as 
compared to reality. Despite this simplification, the 
knowledge elements and solution features provided should 
be correct. Therefore, three experts on matters of the 
internet rated the correctness of the knowledge elements and 
the resulting solutions. As a result, several items were 
changed or eliminated. 
 
Memory Test. To make sure that information provided in 
the introductory texts was acquired sufficiently, participants 
performed a memory test, similar to a recognition test. (The 
difference was that test items were not identical verbatim, 
but instead in meaning, to items presented during the 
learning phase.) The following example shows target (T) 
and distractor (D) for a knowledge element concerning the 
company’s initial situation (IS). Items were presented in 
random order and should be classified as correct or false. 
IS: Online sales should be integrated into the current 
business practices of the company, as it would be too 
costly to add additional personnel to process the 
online shop’s orders by hand. 
T: Due to personnel and administrative 
considerations online sales should be integrated into 
the business practices. 
D: Due to personnel and administrative 
considerations online sales should be separated from 
the current business practices. 
 
If the criterion of 95 percent correct responses was not 
reached, text and the subsequent test were presented again. 
This procedure was repeated until both subjects reached the 
criterion, or a time limit of 80 minutes was exceeded. 
 
Further Tasks. In addition to the design task, participants 
had to complete two additional tasks. Prior to the 
experiment, they answered a questionnaire about relevant 
aspects of the IT advisor’s knowledge. In order to make the 
experimental manipulation effective, only naive participants 
were accepted. As a fictitious company was used, there was 
no need to control for prior knowledge concerning the 
company. The final task was an unexpected repetition of the 
memory test already applied after reading the introductory 
texts. As opposed to the first time, the test now comprised 
all information relevant to the task for both subjects so that 
the amount of acquired shared knowledge can be 
determined. 
Experimental Design 
The kind and amount of prior shared knowledge (SK) was 
manipulated as an independent variable in four experimental 
conditions. In the first condition, no shared knowledge is 
available prior to collaboration (No SK). The company 
expert’s introductory text only contains the 27 knowledge 
elements about the initial situation and goals (IS+G), as well 
as 9 fillers. Accordingly, the IT-expert is provided with 27 
operators (O) and 9 fillers. In the second condition, SK 
(IS+G), knowledge about IS+G is shared. Prior knowledge 
of the company expert remains unchanged, whereas the 9 
fillers of the advisor’s prior knowledge are replaced by 9 
knowledge elements about initial situation and goals. These 
9 elements form the dyad’s shared knowledge. Similarly, 
condition 3 with shared operators is realized, SK (O): Fillers 
in the company expert’s introductory text are replaced by 9 
operators, whereas the advisor’s prior knowledge stays the 
same as in the first condition. Condition 4, SK (IS+G+O), 
provides shared knowledge about both components, starting 
situation and goals, as well as operators. Like in conditions 
SK (IS+G) and SK (O), the company expert receives 9 
knowledge elements about operators, and the advisor 9 
elements about initial situation and goals, in addition to the 
27 knowledge elements of their own expertise.  
By sharing either 9 IS+G elements or 9 operators in 
conditions SK (IS+G) and SK (O), 9 solution features can 
be determined by the advisor (condition IS+G) or by the 
company expert (condition O) alone, since the shared 
knowledge elements provide all the information they need 
in addition to their own expertise. Although each participant 
is provided with some shared information in condition SK 
(IS+G+O), the number of solution features that do not 
require any collaboration remains 9 because the shared 
knowledge is distributed redundantly. Both partners are able 
to find the same 9 solution features on their own in 
condition SK (IS+G+O). In sum, the maximum possible 
correct solution features is 24 in all conditions. 
The variation of shared knowledge as described above 
focuses on task-relevant shared information such as 
operators or goals. However, as many of the knowledge 
elements contained technical terms, providing some of the 
same knowledge elements to both participants might also 
have encouraged participants to develop a shared 
vocabulary around the terms both were exposed to. 
Furthermore, shared meta-knowledge is another aspect of 
what is meant by shared knowledge in the present 
experiment: In conditions SK (IS+G), SK (O) and SK 
(IS+G+O) participants were told that there is some 
information they both have in common. 
Dependent Variables 
Acquisition of Shared Knowledge. The amount of shared 
knowledge that was acquired during the collaboration was 
measured by the relative number of items that were 
recognized in the same way by both cooperation partners in 
the final recognition test. Initially shared items in the 
conditions with shared knowledge were excluded as well as 
all items that had not been discussed during the cooperation 
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task1. This measure also allowed to differentiate between 
correct (items that were recognized correctly by both 
partners like a ‘hit’) and false shared knowledge (items 
recognized in the same way by both partners, but falsely like 
a ‘miss’). 
 
Effects of Shared Knowledge. As an indicator of the 
effectiveness of shared knowledge, we chose solution 
quality as our dependent variable. It was measured by the 
amount of correctly noted solution features, ranging from 0 
to 24. All features in the whiteboard were analyzed, only 
features mentioned more then once were excluded. Solution 
features were scored as correct if they corresponded to the 
ideal solution, as determined through the integration of the 
company expert’s and the IT advisor’s knowledge. 
Conversely, solution features contradicting the ideal 
solution were scored as false. Features that were neither 
correct nor false, were coded as irrelevant, e.g., intrusions or 
underspecified features.  
In order to detect eventual differences in the difficulty of 
learning the knowledge supplied about IS+G and O, we 
measured the time required to read the introductory texts 
and to acquire the information, until the learning criterion 
was reached.  
Subjects and Procedure 
64 participants (47 females, 17 males) were randomly 
assigned to the 4 experimental conditions, as well as to the 
role of company expert or IT advisor. None of them had 
task-relevant prior knowledge as controlled by the first 
questionnaire. After having acquired the information 
presented in the introductory text according to the learning 
criterion, participants performed the design task for 50 
minutes. This limit seemed to be appropriate as subjects 
finished their task quite easily within this timeframe. 
Afterwards, they completed the net-based questionnaire. 
The only task not expected by the participants was the final 
memory test. The experiment took between 2.5 and 3 hours 
all together.  
Results 
Acquisition of Shared Knowledge  
As expected the hypothesis stating that collaborative 
problem solving leads to the acquisition of shared 
knowledge could be accepted for correct (t(31) = 23.25, 
p < .05) as well as for false shared knowledge elements 
(t(31) = 4.71, p < .05). 
As table 1 shows, about one third of the discussed 
knowledge elements enter the pool of subject’s shared 
knowledge. The amount of shared knowledge did not differ 
significantly between experimental conditions (F(3,56) < 1), 
but participants acquired significantly more correct than 
false shared items (F(1,56) = 447.86, p < .05).  
                                                          
1 Note that information in the partner’s domain can only be 
acquired by communication within the dyad. 
Table 1: Mean relative number and standard deviations 
of correct and false shared knowledge (SK). 
 
Condition Correct  
SK 
False  
SK 
No SK .37  
(.07) 
.01  
(.02) 
SK (IS+G) .36  
(.06) 
.02  
(.06) 
SK (O) .38  
(.12) 
.09  
(1.0) 
SK (IS+G+O) .33  
(.09) 
.03  
(.04) 
 
Effects of Shared Knowledge 
As the 24 solution features were unambiguously determined 
by combining the company expert’s and the IT advisor’s 
knowledge, solution features noted on the whiteboards had 
to be compared to this ideal solution. Because the features 
that subjects noted were often incorrectly formulated and 
thus ambiguous, criteria were defined to determine what 
variations could be accepted as correct. For example, if a 
solution feature was called ‘eMoney’ instead of ‘eCash’ this 
was counted in the same way. To control for objectivity, a 
second rater, blind to the hypotheses of the experiment, 
assessed all solution features again. 94 percent of all 
features were rated identically. 
 
Table 2: Mean number and standard deviations of 
correct, false and irrelevant features. 
 
Condition Correct 
features 
False 
features 
Irrelevant 
features 
No SK 9.00 
(3.46) 
1.50 
(1.41) 
4.50 
(3.46) 
SK (IS+G) 14.50 
(3.16) 
.88  
(.35) 
6.38 
(3.85) 
SK (O) 11.25 
(2.71) 
2.00 
(1.20) 
4.88 
(2.85) 
SK (IS+G+O) 14.50 
(2.39) 
1.88 
(1.25) 
3.75 
(3.24) 
 
ANOVA was carried out to compare the quality of the 
solution in the four experimental conditions. Table 2 shows 
the means in the 4 experimental conditions (main effect of 
shared knowledge: F(3,28) = 6.59, p < .05). Linear contrasts 
were carried out to assess overall effectivity of shared 
knowledge (hypothesis 1), as well as the difference between 
shared knowledge about initial situation and goals, 
compared to shared knowledge about operators (hypotheses 
4). Hypotheses 2 and 3 were tested by post hoc tests 
(Scheffé). 
The first hypothesis was tested via a linear contrast of 
condition (No SK), in contrast to the average of conditions 
SK (IS+G), SK (O) and SK (IS+G+O). As expected, 
solution quality was poorer when shared knowledge was 
missing, compared to conditions SK (IS+G), SK (O) and SK 
(IS+G+O), which had different components of shared 
1336
knowledge (t(28) = 3.65, p < .05). Concerning the relative 
effectiveness of shared knowledge about IS+G (hypotheses 
4), compared to shared knowledge about O, the former lead 
to significantly better solutions than the latter 
(t(28) = 2.20, p < .05). Hypothesis 2, stating better results 
with shared knowledge about IS+G+O, compared to shared 
knowledge about IS+G alone, was refuted. The same is true 
for hypothesis 3, stating better results with shared 
knowledge about IS+G+O, compared to shared knowledge 
about O alone, although means pointed towards the 
expected direction. All these analyses were computed for 
the correct answers. 
Only a few false solution features were noted on the 
whiteboards, without significant differences between 
experimental conditions (F(3,28) = 1.60, p > .05). The number 
of irrelevant features was also unaffected by the amount of 
prior shared knowledge (F(3,28) < 1). 
Subjects needed significantly more time to read and learn 
information about operators (M = 2420 m/sec, SD = 618), 
than those about the initial situation and goals (M = 2025 
m/sec, SD = 632; F(1,56) = 6.61, p < .05). There were no 
differences between the experimental conditions (F(3,56) < 1). 
Discussion 
Concerning knowledge acquisition we assumed that the 
interaction during the design task would lead to the 
construction of shared knowledge. As results showed, 
participants in fact acquired shared knowledge even if the 
amount was smaller than it could have been. This result can 
be conceived as a first indicator for the importance of shared 
knowledge as it was acquired even though participants were 
not instructed to do so and testing was unexpected. 
Furthermore, most of this shared knowledge elements were 
correct, so that they can really help participants to construct 
a common representation of the task and the solution. In 
contrast to other studies (Fischer & Mandl, 2000; Jeong & 
Chi, 2000) we did not have problems in determining how 
this shared knowledge came about, as participants had no 
common learning or working material, so that the only way 
this could have happened is through co-construction. We 
also could be sure, that this shared knowledge did not exist 
prior to collaboration as the company expert’s information 
was fictitious and knowledge in the domain of online-shops 
was controlled for.  
Concerning the effectiveness, shared knowledge prior to 
collaboration leads to better solutions in net-based 
collaboration than working together without shared 
knowledge. Overall, solution quality was higher if there was 
shared knowledge (as in conditions IS+G, O and IS+G+O) 
than if shared knowledge was lacking, as in condition No 
SK. Although this general benefit of shared knowledge 
could be demonstrated, certain kinds of shared knowledge 
were more helpful in our task than others. Shared 
knowledge about initial situation and goals seemed to be 
more effective than shared operators, since the solution 
quality did not improve when shared operators were added 
in condition SK (IS+G+O). This result contradicted the 
hypothesis that sharing information about both components 
of shared knowledge, initial situation and goals on the one 
hand, and operators on the other, is most effective. In the 
present study, sharing initial situation and goals alone, was 
as effective as additionally sharing operators. Apparently, 
sharing operators did not seem to have a facilitating effect 
on collaborative problem solving. Although the comparison 
between conditions SK (IS+G+O) and SK (O) lacked 
statistical significance, means were in line with the 
assumption that sharing operators is not very effective in a 
task like our experimental one. This interpretation is 
strengthened by the results of directly comparing the 
effectiveness of shared knowledge about the initial situation 
and goals, with that about the operators. Shared knowledge 
about IS+G clearly led to better performance than sharing 
operators.  
But how can this effect be explained? First, the structure 
of the operators is more complex than that of the initial 
situation and goal elements. While the latter are simple 
sentences, the operators always combine an ‘if’ part with a 
‘then’ part. This means that the operators contain technical 
solution features (in the ‘then’ part), in addition to 
information about possible situations and goals of the 
company (in the ‘if’ part). Besides their more complex 
structure, operators contained more information, framed in 
technical terms, that was new to the participants. Finally, 
information about the company provides company experts 
with a more coherent view of the company, whereas 
operators, in comparison, form a rather loose collection of 
rules for possible situations. We may assume, therefore, that 
operators are more difficult to process than knowledge 
elements about IS+G. This assumption is supported by the 
higher reading and learning time for operators than for 
IS+G. As a consequence, understanding and applying 
operators should be more difficult for the company expert 
than understanding information about IS+G is for the IT-
advisor. From this, it follows quite naturally that sharing 
knowledge about IS+G should be more effective than 
sharing knowledge about operators. 
Secondly, the structure of the operators has an impact on 
the ease of integrating information about IS+G into the ‘if’ 
part of the operators. As an operator’s ‘if’ part already 
contains information about possible states of the company’s 
initial situation and goals, it should be easy for the advisor 
to integrate the shared IS+G information into his or her 
operators, since it is just an instantiation of what is already 
provided in the operators’ ‘if’ part. Thus IS+G information, 
either shared, or newly received during collaboration, does 
not provide information completely new to the IT advisor. 
In contrast, if the company expert receives operators, the 
solution provided in their ‘then’ part is completely novel 
information to him, and not just a specification of what he 
already knows. To deduce the resulting solution feature 
might therefore be more difficult. In addition, the advisor is 
able to realize (when he or she receives the shared 
knowledge elements) that the task-relevant information 
from the company expert is just a specification of the 
knowledge already provided by his or her operators. Asking 
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the right question to gather the information needed should 
therefore be easier for the advisor than for the company 
expert. Having shared knowledge about operators does not 
allow the company expert to infer other possible solution 
features, since knowledge about the initial situation and 
goals does not contain underspecified information about 
possible solution features. So in contrast to the IT advisor, it 
should be more difficult for the company expert to develop 
a coherent view of the partner’s expertise and thus ask for 
the appropriate information.  
In conclusion, shared knowledge is an effective variable 
facilitating collaborative problem solving. In the present 
paper, we show that sharing knowledge about operators is 
less effective than sharing the initial situation and goals, as 
the latter is easier to understand and integrate, and 
additionally, allows making assumptions about the partners’ 
expertise. But shared knowledge is not only a facilitator for 
collaborative problem solving that can be provided 
externally or already exists but is also co-constructed during 
the problem solving process. Of course, it should also be 
noted that on the basis of the single experiment reported 
here, it is an open question whether the results hold for other 
problems and materials as well. Furthermore, the problem 
reported here is a well-defined one with a clear solution. 
Concerning ill-defined problems it can be assumed that the 
positive effect of shared knowledge about IS+G is reduced. 
In fact, operators will always be more complex, because per 
definition they consist of an ‘if’ and a ‘then’ part. What is 
said about the ease of integrating the IS+G information 
compared to integrating operators and inferring the partner’s 
knowledge will also hold true for ill-defined problems. But 
it is questionable whether these factors will be as helpful in 
finding a solution because in ill-defined problems several 
solutions are possible. So, having all information to 
integrate operators and IS+G information does not 
unambiguously allow to deduce all solution features. 
Therefore, we assume that sharing knowledge about IS+G is 
still effective, given the structural differences explained 
above, but that this effect is less strong. 
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Abstract 
The effect of prior experience on bias in time predictions on two 
different types of laboratory task was examined in two studies. 
Experiment 1 revealed that prior experience of performing a 
substantial part of the same task led to greater time prediction 
accuracy. However, contrary to the weight of previous research, 
there was little evidence of the temporal underestimation indicative 
of the planning fallacy. In fact, temporal underestimation only 
occurred on a longer duration task when it was preceded by a much 
shorter task, which was either related (Experiments 1 and 2) or 
unrelated to it (Experiment 2). In contrast, temporal overestimation 
prevailed on tasks ranging from about 30 seconds’ to four minutes’ 
duration. Contrary to the theory of the planning fallacy, these 
studies indicate that people do take account of their performance 
on previous tasks and use such distributional information when 
predicting task duration. The potential role of the anchoring and 
adjustment cognitive heuristics in determining temporal 
misestimation is discussed. 
 
Introduction 
The process of predicting task duration has been the subject 
of considerable research (e.g., Buehler, Griffin & 
MacDonald, 1997; Koole & Van’t Spijker, 2000). In 
general, such research has produced evidence of temporal 
underestimation on various laboratory (e.g., Josephs & 
Hahn, 1995) and real world tasks (e.g., Buehler, Griffin & 
Ross, 1994). Such research supports the cognitive judgment 
phenomenon known as the planning fallacy, which is the 
tendency to underestimate task duration despite being aware 
that previous similar activities took longer than anticipated 
(Buehler, Griffin & Ross, 2002).  
The planning fallacy was identified by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), who suggest that distinct two types of data 
are available to people when predicting task duration. 
Namely, singular information, which is data about the task 
at hand; and distributional information, which concerns data 
about previous tasks. An aspect of singular information is 
the amount of work involved in completing a current task, 
whereas personal performance on previous similar tasks is 
an aspect of distributional information. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that the planning 
fallacy is a consequence of heuristic information processing 
whereby singular information becomes the focus of 
attention at the expense of distributional information, which 
is overlooked. Hence, temporal underestimation occurs 
because the current task is treated as a unique event, which 
is dissociated from previous similar activities.  
Given that the neglect of distributional information has 
been suggested as a possible cause of the planning fallacy 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it is notable that the issue of 
prior task experience has received little empirical treatment 
in relation to time estimation. One exception is the work of 
Thomas, Newstead and Handley (2003; see also Thomas, 
Handley & Newstead, 2004), which revealed that prior 
experience of performing (or mentally planning how to 
complete) certain laboratory tasks led to a reduction in 
temporal misestimation. However, Thomas et al. (2003) 
found little evidence of the temporal underestimation 
indicative of the planning fallacy on short duration (i.e., up 
to four minutes’ duration) laboratory tasks such as the 
Tower of Hanoi.  
In fact, there was evidence of general temporal 
overestimation on such tasks, with underestimation only 
occurring on longer tasks when they were preceded by a 
shorter version of the same task. For example, temporal 
underestimation prevailed on the five-disk Tower of Hanoi 
task only when the three-disk version of this task was 
performed beforehand. The findings of Thomas et al. (2003) 
indicate that there are certain tasks on which the temporal 
underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy does not 
occur and is reversed. 
Thomas et al. (2003) suggest that the temporal 
underestimation they observed may have been a 
consequence of participants using the anchoring and 
adjustment cognitive judgmental heuristics (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982). That is, information such as the 
perceived duration of the first task served as an anchor for 
time predictions on the second task, which were 
insufficiently adjusted according to the greater demands of 
the upcoming task. Such a judgment strategy would be 
expected to result in temporal underestimation if the 
perceived duration of a just-completed shorter task served as 
a basis for time predictions on a current task. 
A principal aim of the present research was to further 
address the issue of prior experience by employing 
laboratory tasks that are not only less artificial than those 
employed by Thomas et al. (2003), but are more akin to the 
ones used in previous research supporting the planning 
fallacy (e.g., Byram, 1997). That is, tasks that have well-
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defined components and must be completed sequentially by 
following a set of instructions.  
The present studies also sought to determine the direction 
in which time predictions were biased (i.e., under or 
overestimation) on a laboratory task that takes longer to 
complete than those used in our earlier work, but is of 
similar duration to some of the laboratory tasks employed in 
previous research (e.g., Buehler et al., 1997). Given that the 
tasks employed by Thomas et al. (2003; 2004) were of 
shorter duration than the laboratory tasks used in research 
supporting the planning fallacy (e.g., Josephs & Hahn, 
1995), it could be that temporal underestimation is only 
evident on tasks that take longer than four or five minutes to 
complete. Consistent with this suggestion, temporal 
underestimation has been observed on laboratory tasks 
ranging in duration from about 10 minutes (e.g., Francis-
Smythe & Robertson, 1999) to over one hour (Byram, 
1997). The issue of task duration was addressed in the 
present studies by employing tasks that were of similar 
duration to those used in our previous research alongside 
one that took longer to complete. 
Experiment 1 
The issue of task duration was addressed in this study by 
using three different versions of the same miniature 
construction kit (i.e., toy castle) manufactured by 
Playmobil®. One of these tasks (long duration task) took 
about 11 minutes to complete whilst the others took either 
four minutes (medium duration task) or 30 seconds to finish 
(short duration task). The medium and short tasks were sub-
component versions of the long duration task, and involved 
constructing different parts of the same miniature castle. 
The issue of prior task experience was addressed by varying 
the order in which the long duration task was performed. 
That is, whether time prediction bias differed when the long 
task was performed after, or was preceded by, one of the 
two shorter tasks. 
 
Method 
Participants. Eighty (64 female and 16 male) students at 
the University of Plymouth participated voluntarily in 
partial fulfillment of a psychology course requirement. No 
biographical data other than gender was recorded. 
 
Design, Materials and Procedure. A 2 (time: predicted vs. 
actual duration) x 4 (task experience: long then short task 
vs. short then long task vs. medium then long task vs. long 
then medium task) mixed factorial design was used. The 
time factor was a repeated measure, with participants 
producing a predicted and actual task completion time. Task 
experience was manipulated between groups, with 
participants being randomly assigned to one of the four 
equal-sized conditions.  
Prior to judging task duration, the amount of time that 
participants were given to view the task components and 
instruction booklet differed according to the type of task 
that was about to be performed. Pilot testing revealed that 
80 seconds were needed to preview the instruction booklet 
and the plastic components of the long task. Pilot testing 
revealed that the instruction booklet and the plastic 
components of the short and medium tasks could be 
previewed in 20 and 40 seconds, respectively. 
The long duration task involved building a multi-turreted 
castle with surrounding jetty and battlements by assembling 
a series of molded plastic components in a pre-specified 
order. The medium duration sub-component task involved 
building the castle without the surrounding jetty and 
battlements. The short duration sub-component task 
involved building one wall of the castle. A digital stopwatch 
was used to measure task duration. 
 
Results 
Means (and standard deviations) of predicted and actual 
completion time on the second task are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Predicted and Actual Duration of the Second Task 
Per Task Experience Condition (In Seconds). 
 
Time Task Experience Condition 
 Short-
Long 
Task 
(n = 20) 
Long-
Short 
Task 
(n = 20) 
Medium
-Long 
Task 
(n = 20) 
Long-
Medium 
Task 
(n = 20) 
Predicted 435.00 
(181.70) 
28.15 
(20.12) 
550.50 
(129.59) 
254.25 
(109.20) 
Actual 556.25 
(147.18) 
18.55 
(18.00) 
497.85 
(124.14) 
178.95 
(35.68) 
There was considerable variability within the predicted 
and actual task completion time data, and frequency 
distributions of these data from each task experience 
condition were positively skewed. Hence, these data were 
subjected to a logarithmic transformation before being 
statistically analyzed.  
A 2 (time) x 4 (experience) split-plot analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) produced a main effect of task experience, 
F(3,76) = 637.66, MSE = .14, p < .001, with overall time 
being longest in the medium then long task condition. 
Pairwise comparisons (Scheffé) revealed significant 
differences between the means of all conditions (ps < .05) 
except those of the medium then long task and the short 
then long task conditions (p > .10). The main effect on the 
time factor was not significant (F < 3, p > .10). 
The ANOVA also produced an interaction, F(3,76) = 
6.12, MSE = .11, p < .01 (see Figure 1 below). This 
revealed that temporal overestimation was evident on the 
medium and short duration tasks, whereas the direction in 
which time predictions were biased on the long task differed 
according to the relative duration of the previous task. 
Specifically, temporal overestimation was evident when the 
medium task had just been completed, whereas 
underestimation occurred when the short task was 
performed initially. Tests for simple effects revealed that 
predicted and actual time differed significantly on the 
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medium and short duration tasks (ps < .05). On the long 
duration task, the difference between predicted and actual 
time was significant when the short task (p < . 05), but not 
the medium task was performed beforehand (p > .10).  
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Figure 1: Predicted and actual completion time on the 
second task per task experience condition 
 
Discussion 
Temporal overestimation was evident on the medium and 
short duration sub-component tasks when they were 
performed after the long task. Consistent with the work of 
Thomas et al. (2003; 2004), this finding indicates that the 
temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is not evident (and is 
reversed) on another type of laboratory task with a duration 
of less than five minutes.  
There was some evidence of temporal underestimation on 
the long duration task, but only when the short sub-
component task had just been completed. The latter finding 
concurs with the notion that individuals might use the 
anchoring and adjustment cognitive heuristics when judging 
the duration of the second of two consecutive tasks (Thomas 
et al., 2003). That is, information about the previous task 
serves as an anchor for time predictions, which are 
insufficiently adjusted according to the relative demands of 
the current task.  
In contrast, temporal overestimation (rather than 
underestimation) prevailed on the long task when the shorter 
duration medium sub-component task was performed 
beforehand. Thus, it seems that an anchoring and adjustment 
strategy was not used when judging the duration of the 
second task when a sizeable portion of this task had just 
been completed.  
A possible explanation for these findings is that, due to 
differences in the extent of prior experience, different kinds 
of task-related information were used when predicting the 
duration of the long task. As completion of the medium task 
involved assembling half of the long task, participants in 
this experimental condition possessed considerable 
information about the nature of the long task when 
predicting its duration.  
Given the extent of these individuals’ prior task 
experience, they might have engaged in more thorough 
information processing when making a second time 
prediction. For example, they may have calculated the 
number of large plastic components required to complete 
the medium task, and appropriately scaled up this figure as a 
function of the greater number of major components 
involved in finishing the long duration task.  
Using such a judgment strategy could result in temporal 
overestimation if it involved thinking about factors that 
delayed the completion of the previous task (e.g., fitting 
some plastic components together incorrectly). Thus, these 
participants may have erred on the side of caution because 
they took account of their previous task performance. In 
fact, time predictions were more accurate when the long 
task was preceded by the medium rather than the short task, 
suggesting that greater prior task experience was used to 
good effect.  
As participants who performed the short task initially 
constructed only one wall of the Playmobil® castle (i.e., one 
part of the long task), they possessed little information about 
how to complete the long task when predicting its duration. 
In the absence of substantial prior task experience, these 
individuals may have used heuristic information processing 
when making a second time prediction. For example, time 
predictions may have been anchored on the perceived 
duration of the first task with insufficient upward 
adjustment for the longer duration of the second task. Thus, 
due to insufficient prior task experience, these participants  
may have relied on the anchoring and adjustment cognitive 
heuristics when judging the duration of the long task. 
Whilst this study suggests that time predictions on the 
longer of two successive tasks might be based on 
information about the first task, the nature of this task-
related information is not known. Given that the present 
tasks differed in duration, it could be that an anchoring and 
adjustment judgment strategy involving the perceived 
duration of the previous task is responsible for temporal 
underestimation when a longer task follows a shorter one.  
In contrast, as the present tasks share the same structure 
(i.e., they are different versions of the same task), it could be 
that  information about the nature of the first task formed 
the basis of time predictions on the second task. For 
example, the number of major plastic components involved 
in completing the previous task could serve as an anchor for 
time predictions on the current task. Temporal 
misestimation would be expected to occur as a consequence 
of using this kind of judgment strategy if the number of 
major plastic components differed between the first and 
second tasks. That is, if time predictions were not 
sufficiently adjusted from an anchor value to take account of 
the number of major plastic components needed to complete 
the second task. 
Having found evidence of temporal underestimation on 
the long duration task when a much shorter version of it had 
just been completed, Experiment 2 sought to determine the 
type of information about a just-completed shorter task that 
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formed the basis of time predictions on the long duration 
task. 
 
Experiment 2 
The issue of the relevance of prior task experience was 
addressed in this study, where a related or an unrelated 
shorter duration task was performed before the long 
Playmobil® task. The related task was the short duration 
task from Experiment 1, whereas the unrelated task was the 
three-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task. Pilot testing 
revealed that the three-disk task and the short sub-
component task were of similar duration (Ms = 28.59 and 
25.37 seconds, respectively). 
Performing the short Playmobil® task initially would 
provide participants with some information about the nature 
of the long duration task, whereas no information about the 
long duration task would be acquired whilst completing the 
three-disk task.  
If time predictions were based on information about the 
nature of the previous task, then they should be more 
accurate on the long duration task when the related task was 
performed beforehand. Conversely, if time predictions were 
based on information such as the perceived duration of the 
previous task, then the extent of judgment bias on the long 
task should not differ according to the relevance of prior 
experience. 
 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-six (42 female and 14 male) students at 
the University of Plymouth participated voluntarily. Forty-
three individuals participated in partial fulfillment of  
psychology course requirement whilst the remainder were 
paid £2.50 each. No biographical information other than 
gender was recorded. 
 
Design, Materials and Procedure. The long duration 
Playmobil® task, and a wooden Tower of Hanoi task 
apparatus containing three different-sized disks were used. 
A digital stopwatch was used to measure task duration. 
There were two equal-sized groups of participants who 
performed either the three-disk task or the short sub-
component task before the long duration Playmobil® task. 
The amount of time that participants were given to preview 
the plastic Playmobil® task components and instruction 
booklet differed according to the type of task that was about 
to be completed.  
On the three-disk and short duration sub-component tasks, 
participants were given 20 seconds to preview the 
instructions and task apparatus or plastic components. 
Participants previewed the plastic components and 
instruction booklet of the long duration task for 80 seconds.  
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
Means (and standard deviations) of predicted and actual 
completion time on the long task are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Predicted and Actual Duration of the Long Task 
Per Prior Experience Condition (In Seconds). 
 
Time Prior Experience Condition 
 3-disk Task  
First (n = 28) 
Short Task  
First (n = 28) 
Predicted 412.50 
(137.99) 
432.86 
(177.66) 
Actual 614.04 
(125.32) 
599.07 
(140.91) 
For the same reasons that were specified in Experiment 1, 
the predicted and actual completion time data were 
subjected to a logarithmic transformation before being 
statistically analyzed. A 2 (time) x 2 (task experience) split-
plot ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(1,54) = 
61.81, MSE = .07, p < .001, with completion times 
exceeding predictions (Ms = 606.56 and 422.68 seconds, 
respectively). This finding indicates that temporal 
underestimation was evident on the long duration task. The 
main effect of prior experience and the interaction were not 
significant (Fs < 1, ps > .10). The absence of a significant 
interaction suggests that the extent of temporal 
underestimation on the long duration task did not differ 
according to the type of shorter task that was performed 
beforehand. 
 
Discussion 
Consistent with the results of Experiment 1, temporal 
underestimation was evident on the long duration 
Playmobil® task when the short sub-component task was 
performed beforehand. Temporal underestimation also 
prevailed on the long task when it was preceded by an 
unrelated task that was of much shorter duration (i.e., the 
three-disk Tower of Hanoi task).  
The presence of temporal underestimation on the long 
task is consistent with Thomas et al.’s (2003) suggestion 
that the anchoring and adjustment cognitive heuristics are 
used when judging the duration of the second of two 
successive tasks. However, as the extent of underestimation 
did not differ significantly according to the relevance of 
prior experience, it seems that information about the nature 
of the previous task was not used as a basis for time 
predictions on the long duration task. Instead, some other 
kind of task-related information presumably served as a 
basis for time predictions on this task. 
A possible candidate source of such information is the 
perceived duration of the previous task. That is, individuals 
judged how long the first task took to complete, and used 
this figure as a basis for their second time prediction. 
Indeed, at the end of the first experimental trial, several 
participants commented that the just-completed task had 
taken them less time to finish than they predicted. Whilst 
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such evidence is purely anecdotal, it indicates an awareness 
of temporal misestimation on both of the short tasks, and 
suggests that several individuals estimated the duration of 
the first task retrospectively. 
An anchoring and adjustment judgment strategy involving 
the perceived duration of the previous task should result in 
time prediction bias when successive tasks differ in 
duration. That is, temporal misestimation is a consequence 
of failing to increase or decrease the current prediction 
according to the longer or shorter duration of the upcoming 
task (Thomas et al., 2003). Such insufficient adjustment 
from an anchor value (i.e., the perceived duration of the 
previous task) would lead to temporal underestimation if the 
current task took longer to complete than the previous one.  
 
General Discussion 
The present studies provide further insight into the role of 
prior experience in the process of predicting task duration. 
In Experiment 1, we found that, relative to building just one 
wall of the Playmobil® castle initially, constructing half of 
the castle on the first trial resulted in greater time prediction 
accuracy on the long duration task. This finding is 
consistent with previous research, which has found that 
prior experience attenuates bias in temporal (e.g., Josephs & 
Hahn, 1995) and non-temporal judgments (e.g., Smith & 
Kida, 1991) of task performance.  
More importantly, this finding suggests that performance 
on previous similar activities is not only considered when 
judging task duration, but can also be used to good effect 
(i.e., to improve time prediction accuracy). Given that 
distributional information seems to be a key component of 
the planning fallacy, the role of prior task experience in 
mediating temporal misestimation is in need of further 
study. That is, further insight into how such distributional 
information can be used effectively will enhance our 
understanding of the planning fallacy phenomenon.  
Whilst it has been shown that possessing considerable 
prior task experience reduces temporal misestimation 
(Experiment 1), the present research also indicates that the 
use of such distributional information does not always 
improve judgment accuracy. In both studies, there was 
evidence of temporal underestimation on the long 
Playmobil® task when it was preceded by a much shorter 
duration sub-component task. However, the extent of this 
temporal underestimation was similar when either the short 
sub-component task or an unrelated short duration task was 
performed initially (Experiment 2). 
Consistent with our previous work (Thomas et al., 2003; 
2004), this finding indicates that information about a just-
completed similar task is considered when predicting task 
duration, but can lead to judgment bias. If, as we propose, 
an anchoring and adjustment strategy involving the 
perceived duration of a previous shorter task forms the basis 
of time predictions on a longer task, then an alternative 
interpretation of the planning fallacy suggests itself. That is, 
temporal underestimation is a consequence of time 
predictions being based on the shorter duration of a previous 
task, but being insufficiently scaled up according to the 
greater demands of the current task.  
Whilst it is for future research to determine whether the 
present findings generalize to more everyday kinds of task, 
the use of the anchoring and adjustment cognitive heuristics 
could explain the prevalence of the planning fallacy on 
many large scale projects. That is, individuals who 
undertake such projects will typically have experience of 
performing similar but less complex tasks (Kidd, 1970). 
Moreover, as large scale (e.g., construction) projects tend to 
be performed infrequently, judgments of their duration can 
only really be based on the shorter duration of previous less 
complex tasks. If time predictions are anchored on the 
duration of previous smaller scale tasks, then temporal 
underestimation would be expected to occur. 
In both studies, there was some evidence of the temporal 
underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy on the 
long duration Playmobil® task. This finding suggests that 
temporal underestimation might only be evident on 
laboratory tasks that are of longer duration than those 
employed in our earlier research. However, temporal 
underestimation was not evident on the long duration task 
when the medium sub-component task was performed 
initially (Experiment 1).  
It was suggested that temporal overestimation on the long 
duration task was due to participants taking account of 
factors that delayed the completion of the medium task (e.g., 
incorrectly fitting some plastic components together) and 
incorporating such information into their second time 
prediction. Although further research is required to test the 
validity of this claim, it has been shown that thinking about 
such information can reduce bias in non-temporal 
judgments of task performance (e.g., Koriat, Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff, 1980).  
Given the present findings, it could be that, when prior 
experience is substantial, people incorporate potential 
impediments to optimal task completion into their temporal 
judgments on subsequent tasks. This kind of judgment 
strategy might lead to temporal overestimation, and also to 
greater time prediction accuracy. Support for the latter 
suggestion comes from Experiment 2, where time 
predictions on the long duration task were less biased when 
participants possessed more extensive prior task experience. 
That is, when the medium rather than short duration sub-
component task was performed beforehand. 
The existence of temporal overestimation on the short and 
medium duration sub-component tasks (Experiment 1) 
highlights the directional nature of time prediction bias. A 
possible explanation for the presence of temporal 
overestimation on tasks with a duration of up to four 
minutes is that people tend to judge task duration in whole 
minutes rather than seconds, or by using longer temporal 
units such as 5 or 10 minutes (Fraisse, 1984).   
Given the duration of the two shorter tasks used in 
Experiment 1, temporal overestimation should prevail if 
participants used temporal units such as five minutes when 
judging their completion times on the medium sub-
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component task. Likewise, giving a time prediction of two 
or three minutes would be expected to result in temporal 
overestimation on the short sub-component task. Thus, the 
reversal of the temporal underestimation indicative of the 
planning fallacy on the two shorter Playmobil® tasks could 
be a consequence of the type of time unit used to judge task 
duration. 
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Abstract
Previous studies using fMRI have found that the Fusiform
Face Area (FFA) responds selectively to face stimuli.   More
recently however, studies have shown that FFA activation is
not face-specific, but can also occur for other objects if the
level of experience with the objects is controlled. Our
neurocomputational models of visual expertise suggest that
the FFA may perform fine-level discrimination by amplifying
small differences in visually homogeneous categories. This is
reflected in a large spread of the stimuli in the high-
dimensional representational space. This view of the FFA as a
general, fine-level discriminator has been disputed on a
number of counts. It has been argued that the objects used in
human and network expertise studies (e.g. cars, birds,
Greebles) are too “face-like” to conclude that the FFA is a
general-purpose processor.  Further, in our previous models,
novice networks had fewer output possibilities than expert
networks, leaving open the possibility that learning more
discriminations, rather than learning fine-level
discriminations, may be responsible for the results. To
challenge these criticisms, we trained networks to perform
fine-level discrimination on fonts, an obviously non-face
category, and showed that these font networks learn a new
task faster than networks trained to identify letters.  In
addition, all networks had the same number of output options,
illustrating that visual expertise does not rely on number of
discriminations, but rather on how the representational space
is partitioned.
Introduction
The Fusiform Face Area (FFA) in the ventral temporal lobe
has recently received much attention.  Initial work appeared
to show that this area was selective for processing faces.
Several fMRI studies showed high activation in the FFA
only to face stimuli and not other objects (Kanwisher et al.,
1997; Kanwisher, 2000).  Further, studies involving patients
with associative prosopagnosia, the inability to identify
individual faces (Farah et al., 1995), and visual object
agnosia , the inability to recognize non-face objects
(Moscovitch et al., 1997), seemed to indicate a clear double
dissociation between face and object processing.
Prosopagnosic patients had lesions that encompassed either
right hemisphere or bilateral FFA, while object agnosic
patients’ lesions did not (De Renzi et al., 1994).
Gauthier and colleagues have challenged the notion of the
face specificity of the FFA by pointing out that the earlier
studies failed to equate the level of experience subjects had
with non-face objects, to the level of experience they had
with faces (Gauthier et al., 1997; Gauthier et al., 1999a;
Gauthier et al., 1999b).  She showed that the FFA was
activated when bird and dog experts were shown pictures of
the animals in their area of expertise.  Further, she
illustrated that, if properly trained, individuals can develop
expertise on novel, non-face objects (e.g. Greebles), and
subsequently show increased FFA activation to them
(Gauthier et al., 1999a). Expertise in these studies was
operationally defined as the point in training when a
subject’s default response level (i.e. entry level) “shifts”
from basic to the individual level.  This is indexed by the
subject’s reaction time for verifying individual names
becoming as fast as the time to verify category membership.
Neurocomputational models done first by Sugimoto and
Cottrell (2001) and later extended by Joyce and Cottrell
(2004) began to address the question of how and why the
FFA gets recruited for these other tasks (Sugimoto &
Cottrell, 2001, Joyce & Cottrell, 2004).  Using four different
types of stimulus classes (books, cans, cups and faces),
Sugimoto and Cottrell found that the amount of expert-level
experience on a previous task correlates with faster
subordinate level learning relative to a system that processes
the same stimuli, but not to a subordinate level. Thus, an
area that is used for one expertise task will learn a second
expertise task faster than an area used only for basic level
discriminations.  Joyce and Cottrell (2004) further found
that an expert network’s ability to separate individuals is
reflected in highly variable responses at the representational
layer (the hidden layer). This response variability extended
to novel categories, permitting faster learning of these
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categories.  This suggests that the FFA is primed to win the
competition for a new expertise task because of its ability to
fine-tune its feature representations when given a novel
fine-level discrimination task (Joyce & Cottrell, 2004).
While the human and computational studies of expertise
are compelling, they are not undisputed. For example,
proponents of the view that the FFA is face-specific claim
that the objects used in human expertise studies, such as
cars, dogs, birds, or Greebles, are “face-like”, meaning they
possess properties similar to faces.  Thus any response of
FFA to these stimuli is due to their featural similarity with
faces, not because the FFA is a general-purpose, fine-level
discriminator. While the network simulations, which
illustrate expertise across a wide variety of non-face objects,
may seem to argue against this criticism, a methodological
issue makes these results less compelling.  In previous
simulations, non-expert networks were trained on a lesser
number of discriminations (4 category labels) than expert
networks (10 individual labels plus the 4 category labels).  It
has been argued (Mike Tarr, personal communication) that
if an object recognition network simply had to make as
many discriminations as the expert one, then it would also
be able to learn Greebles faster.
The current simulations were designed to address the
criticisms cited above. First, we train the networks to
perform fine-level discrimination on an obviously non-face
category: fonts.   In this case, the basic level networks learn
to identify letters presented in a variety of different fonts (a
task any human can do with ease) while the subordinate
level networks learn to distinguish the particular font in
which a letter is written (a task few humans can do).  To
address the second criticism, we present both basic and
subordinate level networks with the same stimulus set and
have them perform an equal number of discriminations (e.g.
6 letter vs. 6 font discriminations).  Thus, any advantage to
learning to distinguish Greebles by the font network over
the letter network cannot be due to the number of
discriminations learned.
Experiments
We ran two sets of experiments. In the first, we investigated
the ability of our basic visual object processing architecture
(Dailey & Cottrell, 1999; Dailey et al. 2002; Joyce &
Cottrell, 2004) to recognize letters and fonts. This allowed
us to discover which fonts were difficult and which letters
gave good generalization once their font had been learned
(by training on other letters).  We then used these results in
the second set of experiments to perform a very controlled
version of our previous “basic versus expertise network”
experiments, and investigate generalization to Greeble
expertise.
Experiment 1: Stimuli and Methods
The images used were 300x300 pixel images of letters.  For
this experiment, 15 different fonts were used, and for each
of those 15 fonts, we had images of all 26 letters.  The fonts
were chosen to be somewhat difficult.  Image preprocessing
of the different letters and fonts followed the procedures
outlined in Dailey and Cottrell (1999).  Each image was first
processed using 2-D Gabor wavelet filters (5 spatial
frequencies at 8 orientations each), a simple model of
complex cell responses in visual cortex.  The filters were
applied at 64 points in an 8x8 grid, resulting in a vector of
2560 elements (Buhmann, Lades & von der Malsburg,
1990; Dailey & Cottrell, 1999).  The vectors were then
normalized via z-scoring (scaled and shifted so that they had
zero mean and unit standard deviation) on a per-filter basis,
a local operation.  A principal components analysis (PCA)
was then applied to the normalized vectors.  The top 40
components were saved and renormalized.   Projections of
the stimuli onto these 40 dimensional vectors constituted the
input to the networks. Figure 1 shows the expertise model,
which includes the image preprocessing procedure.
   A standard backpropagation network architecture was
used for learning classifications.  The network had 40 input
units, each representing a principal component vector, a 30-
unit hidden layer using the logistic sigmoid function, and 15
linear output units for the font network, and 26 linear
outputs for the letter network. The learning rate and
momentum were 0.01 and 0.5, respectively.
Letter training  Letter networks were trained to identify
letters across a subset of the 15 different fonts.  Each
network was given the letters from 13 different fonts as the
training  set  and another font as the holdout set.  It was then
   Figure 1: The expertise model.
Figure 2: Training for Experiment 1.  26 letters and
15 fonts were used.
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tested on the letters from the remaining font.  Training was
stopped at either an RMSE of 0.02 or when overtraining
started to occur.  The result was 15 letter networks, all
trained and tested on different fonts.  Figure 2 illustrates the
training and test sets for Experiment 1.
Letter networks learned their task quickly.  Figure 3
illustrates the average activation of letters for each font
when that font was used as the test set.  The amount of
activation of an output unit can be thought of as the level of
confidence that the letter unit activated corresponds to the
correct letter. Although the letters in some fonts were harder
to generalize to than others, the average activations were
quite high across all fonts.  Accuracy of the networks was
also computed: if the activation of the unit corresponding to
the correct letter is the highest among all other units, then
the network was correct in naming the letter.  As expected,
all letter networks were able to name the correct letter with
100% accuracy.
Font training Training networks to be font experts (i.e.
identify the font a letter is written in) for 15 different fonts
proved to be quite difficult. Our networks never
satisfactorily learned the problem.  In order to determine
which fonts were easy enough to learn, we performed
multidimensional scaling on the distances between the fonts.
Distances  between  fonts  were  defined  as  one  minus  the
average correlations between their corresponding letters,
using their PCA representations. We then formed a 15 by 15
matrix of inter-font distances, and submitted this to a
standard non-metric multidimensional scaling routine.  The
results for a two dimensional solution are shown in Figure
4.   The plot shown had a stress of 1.9694.
We used this graph to find the three most separated and
the three most correlated fonts. One group of networks was
trained on the easier fonts (3 least correlated) and another
group of networks was trained on the harder fonts (3 most
correlated).  Here, 24 letters from each font were used as the
training set, 1 letter as the holdout set, and 1 letter as the test
set.  This was repeated so that each letter had a chance to be
the test letter once.  Training was stopped when overtraining
started to occur.  The result is 52 different networks, 26
from the easy font training and 26 from the hard font
training.
With these reduced training sets, networks were
successfully able to learn to discriminate fonts.  Verifying
our analysis, the hard font networks had a slightly harder
time learning the task than the easy font networks (Table 1).
Although the RMSE for both networks were high, they were
still accurately able to name the correct font. In fact many of
the networks had an accuracy of 100%.
We again computed average activations of output units,
except this time for fonts across a test letter (Figure 5).  The
importance of this plot comes in the activation for particular
letters.  A high activation means that the network had an
easier time generalizing to the font in that letter.  This
assisted us in choosing the highly generalizable letters as
stimuli for Experiment 2.
Experiment 2: Stimuli and Methods
As discussed in the Introduction, Experiment 2 was carried
out in order to provide a novel control for our computational
model of  the  visual  expertise hypothesis.   We used the six
Avg. RMSE Avg.Accuracy(%)
Easy Font Network 0.3419 86.19
Hard Font Network 0.4382 76.62
Table 1. Average RMSE and accuracy for font networks
Figure 3: Average activation of letters for test fonts.
Figure 5: Average activation of fonts across a test letter.
Figure 4: MDS of fonts.
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most discriminable fonts, and the six letters that were the
easiest   to   generalize  to   between   fonts.   Two   sorts of
networks, both with exactly the same training set,
preprocessing, architecture, and number of outputs, were
then trained to be either letter classifiers or font experts.
While one might consider a letter network an “expert,” for
our purposes,  we consider it  a basic level classifier.   The
main characteristic of basic level categorization is that
similar things are classified into the same category.  The
font expert, on the other hand, must take similar things (the
same letter in different fonts) and differentiate between
them.  Our hypothesis is that such a network will learn the
Greeble task faster than a letter network.  Thus, training in
Experiment 2 was divided into two separate phases.  Phase 1
involved training the letter and font networks in a manner
similar to that of Experiment 1.  In Phase 2, the letter and
font networks trained in Phase 1 were then trained to
classify Greebles.  Examples of Greebles are shown in
Figure 6.
Using the results from Experiment 1, the 6 most
generalizable letters and the 6 most discriminable fonts were
chosen as the stimuli.  In addition to these 36 stimuli, 5
different images of 10 unique Greebles were introduced in
phase 2.  The five different images were produced by
jittering the image of a specific Greeble a few pixels on the
x, y or x and y axes.  Preprocessing of the images was as
described in Experiment 1.  Greeble images were also
preprocessed using Gabor filters and PCA, however they
were not included in the generation of the PCA
eigenvectors. Rather, the eigenvectors produced via the
PCA on the letter/font stimuli were applied to the Greebles.
Thus, the PCA representations given to the networks
contained no a priori information about how Greebles fit
into the representational space.
As in Experiment 1, the networks consisted of 40 input
units.  The hidden unit layer was increased to 40 units due
to the increased difficulty of having to solve two tasks.
Finally, there were 16 output units, where 6 represented the
category (fonts or letters), and 10 the Greebles.  Learning
rate and momentum remained the same.
Training procedures in Phase 1 were similar to that of
Experiment 1, except that only 6 letters and 6 fonts were
used.  Here, 10 letter networks were trained such that for
each network, the letters for a randomly selected font were
used as the test set, the letters from another font were the
holdout set, and the remaining 4 were used for training.  For
font networks, each of the 10 networks was tested on the
fonts for a randomly selected letter, another randomly
selected letter was used as holdout, and the rest were for
training.  All networks were trained to 2560 epochs. At each
log base 2 epoch of training in Phase 1, the weights of the
letter and font network were saved.  These weights were
used as the starting points for networks in Phase 2 in order
to show how varying levels of experience with a preliminary
task affected learning  of  a  secondary  subordinate  level
task.   For this phase, both font and letter networks ignored
the 10 Greeble output units.  This training procedure is
shown in Figure 7.
In Phase 2 training, the networks trained in Phase 1 were
trained to perform subordinate level classification on 10
Greebles.  Training for this phase stopped when an RMSE
of 0.05 was reached.
Experiment 2: Results
Phase 1 Training  Based on the results from Experiment 1,
we trained letter and font networks on stimuli that seemed
the easiest to generalize to.  Both networks were able to
learn the task with extremely low error.  As expected, the
letter networks initially had an easier time learning the
letters than the font networks did learning fonts.  More
importantly, accuracy on the fine-level discrimination task
(classifying fonts) became just as good as basic level
discrimination (classifying letters).
Phase 2 Training  In the second phase of Experiment 2, the
letter and font networks were trained to perform fine-level
discrimination on Greebles.  Again the results were as
   Figure 6: Examples of Greeble images.
   Figure 7: Phase 1 training for Experiment 2.  6 letters
and 6 fonts were used.
Figure 8: Number of epochs to learn the new task.
Error bars denote standard error.
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expected.   Figure 8 shows the time in epochs needed for
both the letter and font networks to learn the Greeble task as
training on the initial task (either classifying letters or fonts)
increased. All font networks, regardless of amount of
training, learned the Greeble task faster than the letter
networks.  In addition, more experience with the font task
resulted in improvement on learning the Greeble task while
more experience with the letter task yielded little
improvement (although there is some indication that the
letter networks may catch up eventually). Further work will
be necessary to evaluate this trend. However, the point
remains that expertise in fonts is better than expertise in
letters for Greeble training.
To further understand the behavior of the networks, PCA
was done on the hidden unit representations prior to Greeble
training.  Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the spread of the stimuli
in representational space based on the 2nd and 3rd principal
components (the first PC just codes the overall magnitude
change in the weights). In Figure 9 the six points in each
symbol represent a given letter in 6 different fonts for a
letter network, with one additional symbol representing how
Greebles are represented prior to any training on Greebles.
In Figure 10, each symbol represents a given font for a font
network, and each individual point in that symbol a different
letter.
Notice that for the letter network (Figure 9), the letters are
grouped together by letter identity regardless of font.
Similar inputs (the letters) are made more similar by this
mapping.  In the font network (Figure 10), over training, the
fonts  spread  farther  apart  over  time.   Hence,  in order  to
classify the font of each letter, the network must amplify
small differences between similar items -- all the stimuli
representing the same letter must be classified differently.
This  generalizes  to  the  Greebles;  in the font network,  the
Greebles are more spread out, making it easier for the font
network to learn the distinctions between them. Figure 10
also shows that the fonts appear less spread out than the
Greebles. This is because the network has learned to see all
of the letters in the same font as “the same,” whereas it has
not learned anything about Greebles yet. It should be noted
that each Greeble point is a different Greeble, so the
network is already individuating them to some extent. These
results are similar to those gathered in our previous network
simulations using faces, cups, cans, books, and Greebles
(Sugimoto & Cottrell, 2001; Joyce & Cottrell, 2004)
illustrating that expertise in the font networks is due to the
same mechanism as expertise in face and non-face object
networks.
Conclusion
The current studies illustrate that: 1) expertise can be
obtained with decidedly non-face-like stimuli and that font
expertise exhibits similar properties to that of face and non-
face objects seen in previous simulations, and 2) the
expertise in previous simulations cannot be explained by a
         Figure 9: PCA of hidden units of letter network.  Grouped by letter.
         Figure 10: PCA of hidden units on font network.  Points grouped by font.
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greater number of subordinate level discriminations than
basic level discriminations: in the current work these were
equated and the results were qualitatively similar to those
we have obtained previously.
Our  first  experiment  gave  us useful preliminary data for
training font experts; it showed that the task of classifying
fonts was possible, and revealed which letters and fonts
were the easiest to generalize to and train on.  The behavior
of the networks in the second experiment was similar to
previous studies, although our stimuli were different fonts,
not “face-like” objects. When training the networks on a
new task, the font expert networks learned Greeble
classification faster than the letter networks, suggesting that
previous visual expertise, whether it be on object or non-
object, leads to relatively faster learning in a novel
discrimination task.  In addition, an equal number of
discriminations were required of both letter and font
networks. Thus, the expertise advantage could not be due to
the sheer number of partitions the representational space
was divided into, but instead is due to how the space was
divided.  We conclude that visual expertise does not depend
on the type of stimuli, nor on the number of stimuli used for
training, but on how you slice the space.
Future Work
We plan to train face networks to become font experts, thus
generalizing the Greeble expertise work. We expect face
expert networks will learn font expertise faster than basic
level categorizers. We then plan to train human subjects to
become font experts, using fMRI to image both prior to and
after training to ascertain if font expertise training engages
the FFA. We expect that the letter areas found in the left
hemisphere will not become more highly activated by font
training. Although it should be obvious from the way that
letters are grouped together by the letter network, a future
simulation should show that letter networks are difficult to
train in font expertise.
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Abstract 
 
Based on Guo and Holyoak’s (2002a, 2002b) work, we 
propose a stochastic comparison-grouping theory of 
multialternative decision making to explain three context-
induced violations of rational choice. The attraction effect and 
the similarity effect are explained by stochastic comparison 
grouping, according to which similar alternatives are 
compared more frequently than dissimilar alternatives are. 
The compromise effect is explained by the assumption that 
attribute values are perceived according to a basic 
psychophysical function, in addition to the comparison 
grouping mechanism. Furthermore, this model explains 
individual differences in choice by assuming interpersonal 
differences in pre-existing attitude toward products.  
Introduction 
Rational theories of decision making suggest that choice is 
intrinsically determined by the utilities of individual 
alternatives, thereby unaffected by relationship among 
alternatives, which is a part of  choice context. However, 
violations of this tenet have been found in many studies (e. 
g., Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; Simonson, 1989). Three 
much-studied findings of the so-called context-dependent 
choice warrants specific attention, as they constitute 
violations of axioms that are believed to be fundamental to 
rational choice. They are addressed together in this paper as 
they share important commonalities and can be explained by 
a unified framework. These findings include the attraction 
effect, the similarity effect, and the compromise effect 
(Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; Tversky, 1972; Simonson, 
1989; Simonson & Tversky, 1992).  
   These effects all occur with the addition of a third 
alternative, called the decoy, to a two-alternative choice set 
and are all called decoy effects. Like in most research of the 
same line (e. g., Guo & Holyoak, 2002b; Roe, Busemeyer, 
& Townsend, 2001), they are examined in the present paper 
in a two-attribute form, which is schematized in Figure 1. 
The alternatives that constitute the core set are commonly 
referred to as the target and the competitor (also called the 
core alternatives in this paper), and the addition the decoy. 
The target and the competitor form a trade-off, that is, one is 
better than the other on one attribute but worse than the 
other on the other attribute. Depending on the position of 
the decoy relative to that of the target, three phenomena 
could occur. Two of them happen when the decoy is more 
similar to the target than to the competitor. If it is inferior to 
the target on all attributes, the choice probability of the 
target would increase relative to that of the competitor. This 
is called the attraction effect (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982). 
On the other hand, if a trade-off exists between the decoy 
and the target, the choice probability of the target would 
decrease relative to that of the competitor. This is called the 
similarity effect (Tversky, 1972). The third phenomenon 
occurs when the decoy sits between the target and the 
competitor, in which case the decoy, now constituting a 
compromise of the core alternatives, would be chosen most 
often. This is called the compromise effect. All three 
phenomena would potentially lead to violations of axioms 
of rational choice (will explain in detail later). 
   A number of explanations have been advanced for each of 
the three findings (e. g., Simonson & Tversky, 1992; 
Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Simonson, 1993), however, Roe 
et al. (2001) were the first to explain all three (in addition to 
other findings) with a single framework, implemented in a 
connectionist model derived from a previous stochastic 
mathematical theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). Their 
model accounts for these findings by variable lateral 
inhibition determined by similarity relations among 
alternatives and momentary shifting of attention from 
attribute to attribute. Subsequently, Guo and Holyoak 
(2002b) proposed a connectionist model accounting for the 
attraction effect and the similarity effect that is also based 
on inter-alternative similarity. They conceived the decision 
process as divided into two stages: the two more similar 
alternatives (i. e., the target and the decoy) are compared 
first, and joined by the competitor later. The first stage has 
an impact on the second stage and finally leads to these 
phenomena (will explain in detail later). The two-stage 
model derives its idea from perceptual grouping, according 
to which similar shapes are visually perceived as forming a 
unit. Analogously, similar alternatives are processed 
together at the early stage of decision process. In analogy to 
perceptual grouping, this mechanism is called comparison 
grouping in the present paper. Compared to Roe et al.’s 
model, the two-stage assumption is more consistent with 
some empirical studies that investigate decision processes of 
multialternative choice (Russo & Rosen, 1975; Satomura, 
Nakamura, & Sato, 1997). To explain the compromise 
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effect, Guo and Holyoak (2002a) used another feature of the 
same model in addition to the two-stage assumption. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A summary of the phenomena simulated. 
The letters S, A, and C stand for the decoys for the 
similarity effect, the attraction effect, and the 
compromise effect respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses are attribute ratings. 
 
   Despite its explanatory simplicity and consistency with 
certain experimental data, the two-stage model seems 
oversimplified for describing human behavior – it is 
unlikely that people completely limit evaluation to just one 
pair of alternatives for a long period of time. Studies have 
shown that in multialternative choice tasks that resemble 
those giving rise to the three effects, people 1) momentarily 
shift attention across pairwise comparisons, and 2) similar 
pairs were compared more frequently than dissimilar pairs 
were (Russo & Rosen, 1975; Satomura et al., 1997). In 
addition, the second stage in that model was proposed to 
consist of triple-wise comparisons, whereas these studies 
suggested that choice predominantly consists of pairwise 
comparisons. Based on data from these studies, we propose 
a stochastic comparison-grouping model, in which all 
possible types of comparisons are performed momentarily 
with differential frequencies (Russo & Rosen, 1975; 
Satomura, Nakamura, & Sato, 1997). In addition, whereas 
Guo and Holyoak’s model estimates choice probabilities 
from results of just one simulation by a mathematical 
conversion (Luce, 1959), the present model runs a large 
number of simulations to reflect decisions across 
individuals, thereby directly estimating choice probabilities. 
The psychophysical assumption (Guo & Holyoak, 2002a), 
proposed in conjunction with comparison grouping to 
explain the compromise effect, remains unchanged in the 
current model. 
 
The Model 
Decision Scenario and Model Architecture 
The decision scenario used for simulation is adapted from 
that used by Roe et al. (2001). The decision maker has to 
choose one car from a set of two or three alternatives by 
evaluating two attributes; gas mileage and performance, 
which are measured on a 1 – 10 scale (see Figure 1). 
Accordingly, a connectionist model is constructed (see 
Figure 2). Each attribute or alternative is represented by one 
node (circle) in the network, with their relations represented 
by connections (lines with arrowheads). Each node has a 
certain degree of activation. For an alternative node, the 
activation stands for the valuation of the corresponding 
alternative; for an attribute node, it stands for the evaluative 
importance of that attribute. Node activations are within the 
range of 0.0 - 1.0. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The architecture of the model. External 
Input represents the motivational and attentional 
sources that drive the decision process. 
 
   The connection between an attribute node and an 
alternative node, called the attribute-alternative connection, 
has an excitatory weight (i. e., when one node is more 
active, the other would be more active as well). The 
connection between each pair of alternative nodes has an 
inhibitory weight (i. e., when one node is more active, the 
other would be less active), also known as lateral inhibition 
in the literature. The lateral inhibition reflects the 
competitive relationship among alternatives. Via this 
mechanism, which would commonly result in one node 
achieving higher activation than the rest, the model 
“chooses” the winning alternative. All connections are bi-
directional, reflecting the idea that influences can go either 
way between factors involved in decisions. The external 
inputs to the attribute nodes represent the motivational and 
attentional sources that drive the decision making. 
   This network representation was similar to Guo & 
Holyoak’s (2002a, 2002b) model, and is consistent with 
common connectionist architecture used in decision 
modeling (e. g., Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Tsuzuki, 
Kawahara, & Kusumi, 2002). 
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Connection Weights and Initial Activations 
The attribute-alternative weights reflect the perceived 
goodness of alternatives according to their attribute ratings, 
and were initially set to the corresponding attribute-
alternative ratings. For example, the performance-target and 
gas mileage-target weights were first set to 8.0 and 2.0 
respectively. 
   Recall that in Guo and Holyoak’s model (2002a, 2002b) 
the perception of goodness follows a basic psychophysical 
function. In particular, this function reflects the idea that 
perceived goodness increases with negative acceleration 
with actual attribute value. Consistent with this idea, each 
attribute-alternative weight was further transformed by a 
logarithmic function: 
 
wij = (loge (wij + α) + β) / γ.                     (1) 
 
Here, wij is the weight of the connection from node j to node 
i. α, β, and γ are set to 31.00, –3.35, and 0.905 
respectively. Equation 1 reflects a weakly convex  function. 
In addition, it serves as a normalization function that 
compresses these weights to values within a small range, 
which is comparable in magnitude to node activations 
(whereas the attribute values range from 0.0 to 10.0, the wijs 
range from  0.090 to 0.400.)  
   The lateral inhibitions are all set to -0.60. The initial 
activations of all nodes are conveniently set to 0.5, the 
middle point of the activation range, with the following 
qualification.  
   In reality, people usually have different pre-existing 
preferences regarding products. Accordingly, randomness 
was introduced to the initial activations of the alternative 
nodes, which were in the range of 0.5±0.25. The values 
follow a uniform distribution. As will be seen later, this 
randomness provides an explanation for individual 
differences in choice. 
 
Running the Model 
Connectionist models commonly run in an iterative fashion. 
In each iteration the activation of each node is updated 
according to the total influence it receives from the rest of 
the model – the activation increases if the influence is 
positive and decreases if otherwise. This influence can be 
understood as the overall reason for liking or disliking an 
alternative or attribute. A common activation function is 
used to specify this process (c. f., McClelland & Rumelhart, 
1988).  
 
ai(t + 1)  = ai (t)+ Δai(t),   where                                          (2) 
if    netinputi＞0， 
Δai = netinputi（MAX－ai）－ decay . ai 
otherwise 
Δai = netinputi（ai－MIN）－ decay . ai 
 
ai(t+1) is the activation of node i at iteration (or time) t + 1; 
it is a function of ai(t), the activation of the same node at the 
previous iteration (or moment). Δai(t) is the amount of activation 
change. The decay parameter reflects how much a neural 
signal decays over time (connectionist models draw 
analogies to neural processing), and is set to 0.04. The 
decay, however, does not play an important role in 
explaining the effects. MAX and MIN are the upper (1.0) and 
lower (0.0) limits of node activations. This equation 
specifies that node activation asymptotically approaches the 
upper or lower activation limit as a consequence of the total 
influence it receives from other components of the network. 
The total influence, netinputi, is determined by the following 
equation. 
 
 netinputi = istr. intinputi＋estr . extinputi , where        (3) 
intinputi = Σjwij aj (t)                                                                     
 extinputi = 1 
 
Intinput is the internal input that comes from all the attribute 
and alternative nodes, and depends on both the activation of 
the node feeding input to i and the connection strength that 
links the two nodes. Extinput, standing for the external 
input, should be a stable source of attention and motivation 
and is set to a constant. Istr and estr, set to 0.12 and 0.05 
respectively, are constants that scale down activation 
changes so that the changes are not abrupt. Since the 
internal input is the source of these effects, istr is set to be 
larger than estr. 
   The model runs iteratively – in each iteration, the 
activation of each node in the model is updated according to 
Equation 2 and 3. The process reflects the evolution of 
valuation over time. This iterative process continues until an 
externally determined period of deliberation time, arbitrarily 
set to 100 iterations, is met.1 The final winning choice is the 
alternative with the highest activation. 
 
Stochastic Comparison Grouping 
In a series of eye fixation studies, Russo & Rosen (1975) 
found that pairwise comparisons between similar options 
happen earlier and more frequently than other types of 
comparisons in multialternative choice. Consistent with that, 
Satomura et al. (1997) found that in decision tasks leading 
to the attraction effect, for the participants who chose the 
target (i. e., exhibited the attraction effect), 74% 
retrospectively reported that they compared the target to the 
decoy, while only 19% of them reported that they compared 
the target to the competitor. These studies give rise to the 
following modeling assumptions – All four kinds of 
possible comparisons (target-decoy, competitor-decoy, 
target-competitor, and target-decoy-competitor) are 
performed momentarily with different frequencies. To 
instantiate this in the model, for each iteration, a specific 
type of comparison is randomly chosen according to 
specified probabilities, and only the involved alternative 
nodes are updated.  
                                                          
1 Other stopping criteria might be used. For example, the model 
can stop when the amount of activation difference across nodes is 
very large, or the amount of activation change becomes very small. 
However, according to our analysis, the type of criterion does not 
affect the qualitative pattern of the simulation results. 
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   In simulating the attraction effect, the frequencies of these 
types of comparisons, in the order mentioned above, were 
set to the percentages of 74.0%, 10.4%, 10.4%, and 5.2% 
respectively. For example, for a random 74.0% of the 
iterations, only the activations of the target and the decoy 
were updated. These percentages were arbitrarily 
determined to roughly reflect previous experimental data 
(Russo & Rosen, 1975; Satomura et al, 1997), which 
suggested pairwise comparisons constitute the majority of 
the deliberation process, and the two similar alternatives 
were compared most often. To be consistent, the same 
decision process was employed for the similarity effect. 
Simulations and Results 
A total of 10,000 independent simulations, each standing for 
the deliberation of one individual, have been performed. For 
each simulation, the alternative with the highest final 
activation is the one chosen. Choice probability was 
obtained across all the simulations. The simulation results 
are presented both as choice probability (Table 1) and 
average node activation (Table 2). Note that choice 
probability is the criterion by which the modeling is judged.  
 
Modeling Individual Differences 
Note that node activation evolves as a continuous function 
of time. This means a node with high initial value tends to 
stay strong. For instance, if the initial value of the target is 
higher than that of the competitor, the target would tend to 
maintain relative advantage over the competitor in  
deliberation. Recall that initial activation values randomly 
vary across simulations. This randomness therefore leads to 
choice differences across simulations, and explains why 
sometimes the unlikely alternative was chosen. For 
example, the decoy was chosen with a slim chance in the 
attraction effect scenario – when the initial value of the 
decoy was very high relative to the target and the 
competitor, such initial advantage was too strong to be 
offset by the comparison-grouping mechanism. The 
modeling is consistent with the intuition that people have 
different pre-existing beliefs that randomly favor one 
alternative over another and tend to bias later decisions.  
 
Binary Choice 
The target and the competitor are set to equal additive 
attribute ratings: the target is rated 2.0 on gas mileage and 
8.0 on performance, whereas the competitor is rated 8.0 on 
gas mileage and 2.0 on performance. The two attributes are 
assumed to be equally important. Consistent with the trivial 
prediction that their choice probabilities should be the same, 
the simulations yielded probabilities of 0.504 and 0.496 for 
them respectively. The slight inequality was due to the 
randomness in initial activations of the alternative nodes. 
  
Attraction Effect 
When the attraction effect occurs, the target benefits from 
the addition of the decoy more than does the competitor. 
Under some circumstances, this tendency leads to a higher 
choice probability for the target in the trinary set than in the 
core set. This constitutes a violation of the regularity 
principle of rational choice, according to which adding 
alternatives to a given choice set should not increase the 
probability of any alternative (Huber et al., 1982). In the 
simulation, the decoy was chosen to have attribute values of 
1.5 and 7.5 for gas mileage and performance, respectively. 
   Comparison grouping, in conjunction with the competitive 
relationship among the alternatives, is able to explain this 
effect. Any time when the target is compared with the 
obviously inferior decoy (in modeling terms, this means the 
target node receives more input via the attribute-alternative 
connections than does the competitor), the activation of the 
target node increases whereas the activation the decoy node 
decreases. This differentiation is an intrinsic property of this 
type of connectionist model (c. f., McClelland & Rumelhart, 
1988). Given that the deliberation process primarily consists 
of target-decoy comparisons, the target node would finally 
acquire higher activation than does the competitor.  
   The above analysis suggests that if the initial node 
activations were identical across the alternatives, the target 
would have been chosen for all simulations. However, with 
some randomness, it is possible that the competitor has a 
higher initial activation than does the target. If this initial 
difference, which has an impact on later comparisons, is 
large enough, the competitor would be chosen. This also 
suggests that with extreme initial values even the rather 
inferior decoy might be chosen. This seems consistent with 
the intuition that pre-existing beliefs regarding products 
carry a weight on later decisions.  
  The simulated choice probabilities of the target, the 
competitor, and the decoy were 58.7%, 36.6%,       4.8%. 
The probability of the target exceeds that in the binary 
choice scenario, thereby leading to a violation of the 
regularity principle. 
 
Similarity Effect 
In the decision situation that leads to the similarity effect, 
the target looks less attractive relative to the competitor 
once the decoy is introduced. Under certain situations, this 
would lead to a change of rank order of the target and the 
competitor. For example, in the simulated scenario, the core 
alternatives rank the same in the binary set, but the 
competitor would rank higher than the target if the 
similarity effect occurs. This constitutes a violation of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives principle of rational 
choice, which states that adding a decoy to an original 
choice set should not alter the rank order of the alternatives 
(c. f., Tversky, 1972). Decoy was set to have attribute 
ratings of 2.5 and 7.5 for gas mileage and performance 
respectively. Note that its additive attribute rating is 
identical to that of the target.       
   Like in the case of the attraction effect, comparison 
grouping and inter-alternative competition are able to 
explain the similarity effect. Any time when the target is 
compared with the similarly attractive decoy, the activation 
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of both the target and the decoy nodes decrease due to their 
mutual inhibition of equal strength. This again is an intrinsic 
property of this type of connectionist model (c. f., 
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988). Because the target-decoy 
comparison is the predominant type of comparison, 
compared to the competitor node, the target node hurts more 
from the comparison with the decoy, and would finally 
acquire lower activation than does the competitor.  
   The simulated choice probabilities of the target, the 
competitor, and the decoy were 27.8%, 39.7%, and 32.6%. 
Note that the tie between the target and the competitor was 
broken, indicating a violation of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives principle. 
   In summary, the similarity effect and the attraction effect 
can be explained by frequency difference between the 
target-decoy and competitor-decoy comparisons.   This also 
suggests that simulations of these effects should not depend 
on a particular specification of frequency ratio for the four 
types of comparisons – so long as this frequency difference 
is substantial, the two effects should be observed. In fact, 
other frequency ratios were used in our simulations and the 
same pattern was obtained (not reported here due to space 
limit). 
 
 
 
 
Compromise Effect 
When the decoy for the similarity effect moves toward the 
competitor and finally reaches the middle point between the 
target and the competitor, the similarity effect turns into the 
compromise effect – The decoy changes from the least 
popular to the most popular alternative. In a decision 
scenario slightly different from the present one, this effect 
can also lead to a violation of the regularity principle (see 
Simonson, 1989 for more detail).  
   The comparison grouping assumption suggests that 
frequency of pairwise comparison increases with inter-
alternative similarity. Accordingly, the percentages of the 
target-decoy,  competitor-decoy, and target-competitor 
comparisons have the ratio of 2 : 2 : 1, inversely 
proportional to psychological distance1. The triple-wise 
comparison, being the least frequent, was arbitrarily set to 
one half as frequent as the least frequent pairwise 
comparison. Hence, the percentages of the four types of 
comparisons were set to 36.36%, 36.36%, 18.18%, and 
9.10%.  
   The psychophysical assumption implemented in Equation 
1 gives rise to this phenomenon. (This mechanism was still 
at work in the simulations of other two phenomena, but it 
did not play a causal role in producing them.) Take the 
target-decoy comparison for an example. The advantage of 
the decoy over the target (ratings of 5 versus 2 on gas 
mileage) looms larger than the advantage of the target over 
the decoy (ratings 8 versus 5 on performance) after the 
attribute ratings have been transformed into connection 
weights. (Calculated by Equation 1, the sum of the two 
attribute-alternative weights is 0.512 for the decoy, higher 
than the 0.505 for the core alternatives.) Hence the total 
input the decoy node receives via the attribute-alternative 
connections is the largest among the alternative nodes, 
making the decoy the winner. 
   The simulated choice probabilities of the target, the 
competitor, and the decoy were 21.3%, 21.9%, and          
56.8%. Note that the specification of comparison 
percentages is not unique – so long as there is no frequency 
difference between the target-decoy and the competitor-
decoy comparisons, neither the target nor the competitor 
would be bolstered relative to the other. The psychophysical 
mechanism would then guarantee choosing the  decoy.  
   Comparison grouping provides a unified framework 
toward understanding the three phenomena. In particular, it 
explains why difference between the core alternatives exists 
in the similarity effect but disappears in the compromise 
effect, as comparison grouping can be modified by changing 
the similarity between the decoy and the core alternatives. 
                                                          
1 This is just one way of specifying the inverse relationship 
between frequency ratio and similarity, which should be viewed as 
qualitative rather than quantitative. Note that in simulations of the 
other two effects, frequency ratios are not determined by the same 
function and just roughly reflect the inverse relationship. 
Table 1:  Simulation results as choice probability 
(estimated from 10,000 simulations). 
   
Choice scenarios         Choice probability 
    Target  Competitor  Decoy 
Binary choice   0.504  0.496  ----- 
Attraction effect  0.587  0.366  0.048 
Similarity effect  0.278  0.397  0.326 
Compromise effect  0.213  0.219  0.568 
Table 2:  Simulation results as average node activation 
and SD. 
   
Choice scenarios  
       Average Node Activation 
(SD) 
    Target  Competitor  Decoy 
Binary choice   
0.293 
(0.060)  
0.294 
(0.060)  ----- 
Attraction effect  
0.320 
(0.034)  
0.305 
(0.046)  
0.233 
(0.038)
Similarity effect  
0.286 
(0.033)  
0.300 
(0.046)  
0.291 
(0.033) 
Compromise effect  
0.275 
(0.021)  
0.276 
(0.021)  
0.291 
(0.022)
Note. The results are computed from the simulations
summarized in Table 1. 
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 Conclusion 
We propose a stochastic comparison-grouping theory cast in 
a connectionist model to explain three important violations 
of rational choice. In addition, this model lends us 
understanding of the decision processes involved in these 
tasks.  
   A comparison is made between this model and previous 
accounts of the same findings. It extends Guo & Holyoak’s 
(2002a, 2002b) model by incorporating insights from 
experimental data (Russo & Rosen, 1975; Satomura et al., 
1997). In addition, it better accounts for individual 
differences in choice by introducing randomness in intial 
beliefs to the model. In comparison with Roe et al.’s (2001) 
model, both models use similarity relationship, but in 
different manners. Their model uses variable lateral 
inhibition that increases with inter-alternative similarity, 
whereas the current model proposes a similarity-based 
grouping mechanism. In addition, both models suggest 
momentarily shifted attention, again in different manners. In 
their model attention shifts from attribute to attribute, 
whereas in the present model attention shifts across different 
types of pairwise comparisons. The assumptions of this 
model seem more consistent with the aforementioned 
experimental data. Future studies are in order to further test 
the relative merits of the two models.  
   One apparent problem of the present model is that the 
modeling seems to depend on manually specified parameter 
values rather than psychological principles. Our justification 
is that these parameters specify linear transformations that 
do not alter the essence of the modeling assumptions. In 
addition, the same set of parameter values applies to all 
three phenomena.  
   Finally, this model is consistent with theoretical 
frameworks that relate cognition to perceptual processes (c. 
f., Medin, Goldstone, & Markman, 1995, Goldstone & 
Barsalou, 1998), and its proposed perceptual mechanisms 
might help us understand decision behavior at large. 
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Abstract 
The paper clarified how actual expert dealers made profits 
and reduced the risk of loss in a virtual foreign exchange 
market, by comparing the way novice or general investors 
showed. As a result, we could find that the experts were risk-
averse for losses and risk-seeking for profits while the novices 
showed the opposite behavioral tendency. This result was 
analyzed in terms of the prospect theory: It was found that the 
expert could be (partially) free from deposition effect and 
sunk-cost effect while the novices were not. It was also 
suggested that the experts’ strategy of dumping losing 
currencies could be socially transmitted by the dealers’ 
managers. 
Introduction 
How people make decision and learn in dispersed complex 
social systems has recently been considered important to be 
investigated. Here a dispersed complex social system is 
defined as a system without a centralized information 
resource and mechanism for deciding its behavior and, at 
the same time, with rapidly changing environments which 
provide their decision makers with information that 
continually changes. In this paper, we will focus on the 
(spot) foreign exchange market as a typical example of the 
complex social systems. This is because (1) the foreign 
exchange market have, as their constituents, a lot of market 
players (such as banks, investors, governments, and so on) 
who are different from one another in investment motivation, 
speculation, and stake etc., (2) it is not a centralized market, 
as the stock market, so that its market players have to 
fathom out market consensus based on limited information, 
and (3) it has rapidly changing environments which provide 
its decision makers with information on the order of seconds 
– the rate of change is typically faster than the decision 
makers can respond. So it is considered a good target of 
cognitive research to clarify how expert or skilled dealers 
make decisions, especially make profits and reduce the risk 
of loss, in the exchange market. 
 How can we investigate the process of expert dealers’ 
decision making? For this purpose, experimental market (or 
economics) approach (for instance, Friedman & Sunder, 
1994) seems useful: Experimental market is the field that 
attempts to understand the behaviors of the markets and 
their players by conducting experiments using real human 
subjects. From a cognitive perspective, the experimental 
market approach can be used to clarify the way of human 
biased decision making, by analyzing how market players 
actually make decisions in their conducting transactions on 
a virtual financial market that simulates the corresponding 
real market (Smith, 1996; Ueda, Taniguchi & Nakajima 
2003). Namely, from the result of such a cognitive 
experiment on the markets, it is considered to understand 
how people or market players make decisions, in the real 
markets, under some biases such as representativeness 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). This paper also adopts this 
cognitive experimental market approach, as its research 
methodology, in order to clarify what kind of biases 
influence expert dealers’ decision making (profit making 
and risk hedge) in a virtual exchange market. We will 
pursue this research target, specifically by comparing the 
performance of expert or skilled dealers with that of novice 
or general investors. 
   There are some previous studies using the cognitive 
experimental market approach. For example, the U-Mart 
project aims to analyze the behaviors of the market, 
especially the conditions under which bumpy ride occurs, 
using a virtual future stock market (Kita, Sato, Mori & Ono 
2003; Ueda, Taniguchi & Nakajima 2003). Because human 
players, as well as computer agents, participated in a series 
of experiments, it is possible to analyze the relation between 
the macroscopic behaviors, such as price fluctuation, of the 
market and the microscopic features of human players, 
which has not been realized yet. 
 Smith (1996 & 1997) analyzed, using three trained 
dealers as his subjects, how they reduced risks in dealing on 
a virtual spot currency market and proposed a feedback-
control model of their risk management. Because he did not 
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compare the performance of his skilled subjects with that of 
novice or general investors, he did not clarify what kind of 
biases the skilled dealers had or were free from. In addition, 
it is a question that his subjects were actually expert dealers. 
In the experimental environment used in (Smith 1996; 
Smith 1997), each skilled subject was asked to make deals 
with a pre-installed computer dealer while, in that used in 
(Izumi, Nakamura & Ueda 2002), subjects were asked, in 
pairs, to make deals with one another through computer 
network, which virtually realized human-human dealing. In 
this sense, the latter environment can be said to be closer to 
the real dealing situation than the former. However, it is also 
a question that all of their subjects were actually expert 
dealers. 
So, in this paper, we will ask real expert dealers to 
participate in our experiments and compare their 
performance with novice or general investors’ one. Here, 
“expert” dealers mean those who had engaged in currency 
dealing or stock trading for more than five years, since this 
business field is a competitive jungle so that “engaging for 
five years” can be an index of being expert or skilled. On 
the other hand, we will ask graduate students majoring in 
economics to participate, as novice or general investors, in 
our experiments. Under this circumstance, we made two 
experiments in order to clarify how and under what kind of 
biases the expert dealers make profits and reduce the risk of 
loss in a virtual foreign exchange market. In this virtual 
market, only dollars and yen will be dealt. 
This paper will be constructed as follows: In the second 
section, necessary terminology will be introduced. In the 
third and fourth section, the method of two experiments, 
which were made to clarify dealers’ decision making, and 
their results will be explained. In the fifth section, the results 
obtained will be discussed from the perspective of the 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In the final 
section, this paper will be concluded. 
Terminology 
Before we will explain our experiments, technical terms 
necessary for understanding dealers’ trading behavior 
should be introduced. 
Position: We will use this term from the point of the 
amount of dollars that each dealer has. “Long” means 
owning or holding dollars (i.e., the amount of dollars bought 
exceeds that of dollars sold). “Short” is the opposite of a 
long position. “Square” means the situation that the amount 
of dollars bought is equal to that of dollars sold. In our 
experiments, all the subjects were asked to start from the 
square position and to go back to the square at the end of the 
experiments. 
Unrealized profits and losses (UPL): An increase/decrease 
in the value of dollars that is not “real” or “unrealized” 
because the dollars have not been sold. Once dollars are sold 
by a dealer, the profits/losses are “realized” by the dealer. If 
a dealer started from the square and bought one dollar at the 
rate of $1=Y100 and, after that, the rate has changed to 
$1=Y110, the dealer has Y10 as UPL, which will be 
Figure 1:  The user display of VDS (stand-alone type). 
 
realized when he/she sells the dollar to get back to the 
square. In our experiments, the performance of each dealer 
will be estimated in terms of UPL. 
Lengthening vs. liquidation, profit-taking vs. loss cut: In 
this paper, such a dealing that the absolute amount of 
position increases is called “lengthening” while such a 
dealing that the absolute amount of position decreases is 
called “liquidation”. Because it is related to dealers’ risk 
management, the latter will be analyzed in detail. Moreover, 
liquidation can be divided into two sub-categories: profit-
taking and loss cut. 
Experimental Environment 
The virtual dealing system (for abbrev., VDS; see Figure 1)1, 
which we originally developed using Java language, was 
used in our experiments. The VDS was constructed so that 
users (subjects) could make dealings with one another 
through computer network; it simulates the functions and 
display of the actual dealing systems, such as Reuter 2000, 
so that users can get various fundamental information, such 
as interest rates and balance of trade, news and trends to buy 
and sell dollar/yen with other users or a broker2. 
 The VDS is available both as a server-client system, in 
which multiple users make dealing with one another, all at 
once, through computer network, as is actual dealings, and 
as a stand-alone system, in which only one user makes 
dealing with the system’s broker, as was in the experiment 
by Smith (1996 & 1997). In Experiment 1, it was used as 
the server-client system while, in Experiment 2, it was as 
the stand-alone system. 
 The VDS is designed so that we can get various users’ 
dealing logs: For example, logs about what type and amount 
of dealing a user made at which time, and those about what 
type of information, news or trends a user referred to in 
his/her dealing. Therefore, by using the VDS, we can 
                                                          
1 Because it was so built that the Japanese dealers would use, this 
VDS has Japanese signage, as denoted in Figure 1. 
2 Only one broker is assumed to exist in this VDS. 
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analyze what type of decision a user made referring to what 
kind of information. 
Experiment 1 
Purpose 
The purpose was to make a hypothesis about how expert 
dealers made profits and reduced the risk of loss in a virtual 
foreign exchange market, by comparing the performance of 
the expert dealers with that of novice or general investors. 
The target was a dollar-yen exchange market, as already 
explained. Because this experiment aimed to explore a 
hypothesis about the way experts made decision, the server-
client system was used so that it could provide the subjects 
with a dealing environment similar to the actual one. 
Subjects 
Eleven dealers, who had engaged in actual dealing or 
trading for more than five years, participated as “expert” 
dealers (we call this group of subjects expert group) while 
ten graduate students, who majored in economics, 
participated as “novice” or “general” investors (we call this 
group of subjects novice group). 
Procedure 
All the subjects of each group were gathered together, at a 
time, into one meeting room; the experiment of the expert 
group and that of the novice one were made independently. 
 The news and fundamental information given to the two 
groups were the same actual data during August, 1997; in 
the first half of this period, the rate was gradually moving 
up while, in the latter half, it rapidly and sharply declined, 
which was caused both by a decline in U.S. stock prices and 
by Japan's current account surplus. The rate change during 
the experiment was not calculated endogenously, i.e. as a 
result of dealings in the VDS, but given exogenously, i.e. 
the same as the actual change during this period: This was 
because the rate would have fluctuated quickly if the rate 
change had been endogenously calculated in such a dealing 
environment only with small number of market players. All 
the subjects were, in fact, given such an instruction that 
exchange rates were calculated by the orders of participating 
players, since the dealing environment of the experiment 
needed to be as close to the actual one as possible. 
 The subjects of each group were first explained about how 
they could use the VDS interface and make dealings 
through the VDS for 30 minutes. They were then given the 
information about the economic situation and fundamentals 
just before August, 19973. After that, they were asked to 
make dealings through the VDS for 20 minutes4. 
                                                          
3 Because all the names of the currencies dealt, the target nations, 
and the proper names that came on were renamed, all the subjects 
did not notice that the rate and data given were the actual ones in 
the past. Of course, during the experiment, news was, from time to 
time, given to the subjects while the data of economic 
fundamentals and the trends of rate were always available. 
4 The events occurred in August, 1997 was compressed in the time 
frame of 20 minutes. 
 The data collected were the logs of each subject’s 
positions, orders, referred economic information and 
messages of chatting, through the VDS, with other subjects. 
 
Figure 2:  The risk space. 
Method of analysis 
The main purpose of the experiment was to make a 
hypothesis about how the respective groups made profits 
and reduced the risk of loss. So, for each subject, we plotted 
every log of dealing on the risk space (Smith, 1996): The 
risk space5, which has an x-axis that denotes the value of 
UPL6 for each dealing and has a y-axis that denotes the rate-
of-change (RC) of exchange rates whose sign shows the 
increase in the absolute value of UPL7, visualizes how each 
subject managed the risks caused by taking his/her positions 
(see Figure 2). By comparing the risk spaces of the expert 
group with those of the novice one, we can analyze how the 
expert dealers made decisions, especially reduced the risk of 
loss. 
Result 
Typical examples of the risk spaces plotted for the expert 
and the novice group are shown respectively in Figure 3 and 
4; in these figures, a circle denotes buying dollars, a upside-
down triangle does selling dollars, blue color does 
lengthening and red color does liquidation. From the nature 
of the figures, the lines of the graphs will extend towards 
high positive values of the x-axis if a subject waits to lock in 
profits after enough profits are made; in the same way, the 
lines will extend towards high negative value of the x-axis if 
he/she is so slow in cutting losses. Therefore, the higher the 
average profit is, the slower a subject tends to be in taking 
profits; the higher the average loss is, the slower he/she 
tends to be in cutting losses. 
 From these figures, we can find a tendency that the 
novices cut losses later than the experts. So, to statistically 
confirm the above, we calculated the average loss and profit 
respectively for the two groups in order to compare the 
average loss (or profit) of the expert group with that of the 
novice one. As a result, as for the average loss, we could 
                                                          
5 The risk space used in this study was a little different from that 
used in (Smith 1996). 
6 The value of UPL was normalized, being divided by the amount 
of the maximum position of the subject. 
7 When a subject’s position is long, ⊿RC>0 if dollar appreciation 
occurs while ⊿RC<0 if yen appreciation does. 
⊿RC 
 
UPL 
It is idealistic to 
take a profit here 
Liquidation is needed 
as soon as possible 
Cut loss is needed 
Chance to lengthen 
his/her position 
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find significant difference between the two groups (expert = 
-0.02854 (SD = 0.00035), novice = - 0.12315 (SD = 
0.01124); p = 0.041<0.05, one-sided) while, as for the 
average profit, we could find no significant difference 
between the two groups (expert = 0.46511 (SD = 0.03293), 
novice = 0.37609 (SD = 0.02344); p = 0.190, one-sided).  
 From the above result, it is possible that experts can cut 
losses so fast that they may prevent the losses from 
increasing and, at the same time, can take profits at the right 
time while novices cannot: This is, however, considered to 
be little better than a hypothesis. It is because, as for the 
average profit, the number of dealings was so scarce that we 
could find no significant difference and because this result 
may be specific to a set of the exchange rate and news given 
to the subjects (hereafter, we call this set “scenario”). We 
therefore need to make an additional experiment to confirm 
the hypothesis obtained, with augmenting the number of 
dealings: The reason the number was small is considered to 
be attributed to the experimental environment of face-to-
face dealing because almost all the expert subjects were 
acquainted with each other so that they, for a while, 
hesitated to make dealings. So we will make an experiment, 
as Experiment 2, by using a stand-alone type of VDS. 
Figure 3:  An example of the risk space of expert. 
 
 
Figure 4:  An example of the risk space of novice. 
Experiment 2 
Purpose 
The purpose was to confirm the hypothesis derived from the 
result of Experiment 1: The hypothesis was that expert 
dealers could cut losses so fast that they might prevent the 
losses from increasing and, at the same time, could take 
profits at the right time while novices could not. Because of 
the reasons explained above, a stand-alone type of VDS 
was used in this experiment. 
Subjects 
Ten dealers, who had experienced more than five years’ 
dealing, participated as “expert” dealers (expert group) 
while ten graduate students, who majored in economics, 
participated as “novice” investors (novice group). 
Procedure 
In this experiment, a stand-alone type of VDS was used so 
that all the subjects needed not to be gathered together at a 
time; each subject participated in this experiment 
independently. They were asked to make dealings with a 
computer dealer (computer-driven trading program) of the 
VDS. 
 The scenario (news and fundamental information) given 
to the two groups were the same actual data during 
September, 2000; through this period, the exchange rate 
showed a box or range rate, i.e. the rate fluctuated within the 
expected range. The rate change during the experiment was 
given exogenously, as was the same in Experiment 18. 
 All the subjects were first explained about how they could 
use the VDS interface and make dealings through the VDS 
for 40 minutes. They were then given the information about 
the economic situation and fundamentals just before 
September, 2000. After that, they were asked to make 
dealings through the VDS for 50 minutes. 
 The procedures other than the above were the same as 
those in Experiment 1. 
Method of analysis 
The same as that in Experiment 1. 
Result 
We calculated the average loss and profit respectively for 
the two groups in order to compare the average loss (or 
profit) of the expert group with that of the novice one. As a 
result, we could find significant difference between the two 
groups, both as for the average loss (expert = -0.01849 (SD 
= 0.00010), novice = - 0.031 (SD = 0.00005); p = 0.029 < 
0.05, one-sided) and as for the average profit (expert = 
0.09915 (SD = 0.00086), novice = 0.03619 (SD = 0.00013); 
p = 0.003 < 0.01, one-sided). 
 So our hypothesis was confirmed: We can say that the 
experts could cut losses so fast that they might prevent the 
losses from increasing and, at the same time, could take 
                                                          
8 All the subjects were, in advance, informed of it. 
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profits (or lock in profits) after enough profits were made, 
whereas the novices could not.  
Discussions 
Analysis in terms of the prospect theory 
From the results of the two experiments, we can say as 
follows: Expert dealers can cut losses so fast that they may 
prevent the losses from increasing and, at the same time, can 
take profits (or lock in profits) after enough profits are made. 
On the other hand, novices seem to be reluctant to sell 
currencies that lose value while they are inclined to lock in 
profits no sooner than the currencies they hold are profitable. 
Why is there a sharp contrast between the way experts make 
decision and that the novice do? 
 To answer this research question, we will introduce the 
prospect theory by Kahneman & Tversky (1979): The 
theory shows, based on the results of a laboratory 
experiment, that people's attitudes toward risks concerning 
profits may be quite different from their attitudes toward 
risks concerning losses. Namely the theory claims that 
people are, in general, risk-averse for profits and risk-
seeking for losses.  
 By using the theory, the tendency that people are 
reluctant to lock in profits even when the losses increase 
while they are willing to do no sooner than their holdings 
become profitable can be explained by “deposition effect” 
(Shefrin & Statman 1985; Weber & Camerer 1998) and 
“sunk-cost effect” (Kahneman & Tversky 1979): The 
former means that people prefer certainty to uncertainty 
over a reference point while they show the opposite 
preference under a reference point. And the latter means that 
people tend to overestimate the cost needed for making a 
position; decision-makers are unduly influenced by 
resources that have already been spent and are therefore 
more likely to continue pursuing a previously chosen course 
of action. 
 This theoretical explanation seems to be true of the 
dealing behaviors of our novice subjects, because they sold 
promising currencies or winners too early and rode 
unpromising currencies or losers too long. That is, our 
novice subjects were considered not to be free from the 
biases of deposition effect and sunk-cost effect. On the other 
hand, our expert dealers seemed to avoid being distorted by 
these biases, because they could cut losses early and wait to 
lock in profits after enough profits were made.  
 Then the next question arises about whether expert 
dealers can be completely free from the biases. To clarify 
this point, we analyzed the dealing data in more detail. As a 
result, we could find that some expert dealers sometimes 
showed stepwise profit taking (see Figure 5). This stepwise 
way of profit-taking can be interpreted in two ways: One is 
that this indicates partial irrationality, which is subject to the 
biases, of their dealing behaviors and the other is that they 
were forced to take profits stepwise and to hedge risks 
caused by rapid price fluctuation because they could not 
fully predict the future exchange rate. Anyway, it can be 
said that even the expert dealers were not wholly free from 
the biases. 
  
Figure 5:  An example of the stepwise profit taking 
that some of the experts showed. 
 
 We also asked two investment managers why expert 
dealers can be free from the biases. Both of the managers 
said that dealers were taught, by their managers, to sell 
losers as early as possible because riding losers too long 
would only compound their losses, which might develop 
into a major management issue. On the other hand, the 
managers did not explicitly teach how to make profits. If 
this holds of dealers in general, it is possible that expert 
dealers have socially learned to be free from the biases. The 
investment managers added that a lot of dealers in the 
making had to drop out because it was quite difficult to 
learn to be free from the biases, which seemed easy on the 
surface. 
 To sum up, expert dealers can be (partially) free from the 
biases, in their decision making, that a lot of people are 
considered to have (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). This 
clarification, by using actual expert dealers as subjects, is 
the main contribution of this paper. 
Conclusion 
How people make decision and learn in dispersed complex 
social systems has recently been one of the important 
research issues. Especially the way of decision making 
needs to be investigated in real situations or settings. So, in 
this paper, we focused on the (spot) foreign exchange 
market as a typical example of the complex social systems 
and clarified how and under what kind of biases the expert 
dealers make profits and reduce the risk of loss in a virtual 
foreign exchange market. For this purpose, we asked real 
expert dealers to participate in our experiments and 
compared their performance with novice or general 
investors’ one. 
 Our two experiments showed that the expert dealers could 
cut losses so fast that they might prevent the losses from 
increasing and, at the same time, could take profits (or lock 
Stepwise 
profit taking
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in profits) after enough profits were made. On the other 
hand, novices were reluctant to sell currencies that lost 
value while they were inclined to lock in profits no sooner 
than the currencies they held were profitable. 
 We analyzed this result in terms of the prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The prospect theory claims 
that people tend to sell promising currencies or winners too 
early and ride unpromising currencies or losers too long, 
under the influence of deposition effect and sunk-cost effect. 
This theoretical explanation was clarified to be true of the 
dealing behaviors of our novice subjects. On the other hand, 
it was also clarified that our expert dealers could avoid 
being distorted by the biases. In addition, it was possible 
that even the expert dealers were not wholly free from the 
biases because some of them showed stepwise way of 
profit-taking, which was considered not fully rational. 
 “Artificial market” research (Arthur, 1991) attracts 
attention of many researchers in recent years. In the 
artificial market research, computer programs as virtual 
market participants are built and simulated, where these 
computer programs mutually trade, for understanding the 
phenomena and features of real markets. The key is to build 
an artificial market with the appropriate features of the 
actual markets and their participants. The result of this paper 
is considered to be applicable to this artificial market 
research, especially to the construction of agents with the 
way of risk management in the artificial market model by 
Izumi & Ueda (2001). In this way, the result of this research 
is also of practical use. 
Acknowledgments 
We thank to all the subjects for kindly participating in our 
experiments. This research is partially supported by grant 
(Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Scientific Research 
in Priority Areas 2003, No.A06-14) from Japan Society for 
the Promotion of Science. 
References 
Arthur, B. W. (1991). Designing economic agents that act 
like human agents: A behavioral approach to bounded 
rationality. The American Economic Review, 81, 353-359. 
Friedman, D. & Sunder, S. (1994). Experimental methods: 
A primer for economists. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Izumi, K., Nakamura, S. & Ueda, K. (2002). Identification 
of agents’ strategy making process by an experimental 
market. Proceedings of the 6th Joint Conference on 
Information Sciences, 1081-1084. 
Izumi, K. & Ueda, K. (2001). Phase transition in a foreign 
exchange market: Analysis based on an artificial market 
Approach. IEEE Transaction on Evolutionary 
Computation, 5, 456-470. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective 
probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive 
Psychology, 3, 430-454. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An 
analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-
291. 
Kita, H., Sato, H., Mori, N. & Ono, I. (2003). U-Mart 
system, software for open experiments of artificial market. 
CIRA IEEE 2003 Computational Intelligence in Robotics 
and Automation (CD-ROM). 
Shefrin, H. & Statman, M. (1985). The deposition to sell 
winners too early and ride losers too long: Theory and 
evidence, Journal of Finance, 40, 777-792. 
Smith, K. C. S. (1996). Decision making in rapidly 
changing environments: Trading in the spot currency 
market. Ph. D Thesis, Department of Information and 
Decision Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. 
Smith, K. C. S. (1997). How currency traders think about 
the spot market’s thinking. Proceedings of the Nineteenth 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 703-
708. Mahwah, NJ: Laurence Erlbaum Associates. 
Ueda, T., Taniguchi, K. & Nakajima, Y. (2003). An analysis 
of U-Mart experiments by machine and human agents. 
CIRA IEEE 2003 Computational Intelligence in Robotics 
and Automation (CD-ROM). 
Weber, M. & Camerer, C. (1998). The decomposition effect 
in securities trading: An experimental analysis. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and organization, 33, 167-184. 
1362
Cross-Modal Interaction in Graphical Communication
Ichiro Umata (umata@atr.jp)
ATR Media Information Science Laboratories;
Seika Soraku Kyoto, 619-0288 Japan
Yasuhiro Katagiri (katagiri@atr.jp)
ATR Media Information Science Laboratories;
Seika Soraku Kyoto, 619-0288 Japan
Abstract
Cross-modal interaction in graphical communication
is observed in collaborative problem-solving settings.
Graphical communications, such as dialogues using
maps, drawings, or pictures, provide people with two in-
dependent modalities: speech and drawing. Although
the amount of drawing/self-speech overlap is strongly af-
fected by activity-dependent constraints imposed by the
task, the amount of drawing/partner’s speech overlap is
affected only weakly by these constraints. However, they
do affect the function of the utterances in the case of
drawing/partner’s speech overlap. These results show that
activity-level constraints affect the way speech coordi-
nates drawing activities in cross-modal interaction. Fur-
thermore, it suggests that turn-taking in multimodal com-
munication requires general analyses integrating the func-
tions of different modalities.
Introduction
Every joint activity requires coordination among its par-
ticipants. When a band plays a piece, each member has
to work on the same key, keep the same rhythm, and start
and end at the same time (Clark (1996)). Some of these
coordinating acts can be done across different modali-
ties. In the case of music, a soloist can signal the end of
her inprovisation not only with a phrase suggesting the
solo’s end, but also with eye-contact.
Communication is also a joint activity, and partici-
pants must coordinate with each other. One outstand-
ing coordination principle in conversation is sequential
turn-taking in speech channels. Several studies have
been carried out on speech turn coordination, and some
of them analyze cross-modal interaction between speech
and nonverbal behaviors such as gaze and posture (Ar-
gyle et al. (1976), Kendon (1967)). In this paper, we
investigate the interaction between speech and drawing,
another powerful communication medium.
Turn-taking in speech involves a wide variety of fac-
tors such as sociological principles, the limitations of hu-
man cognitive capacity, and so on. One potentially strong
factor for sequential turns in speech is the resource char-
acteristics of media: speech media affords only one per-
son’s speech sounds at a time. Sacks et al. (1974) re-
gard verbal turns as an economic resource, distributed to
conversation participants according to turn organization
rules. According to them, one of the main effects of these
turn organization rules is the sequentiality of utterances.
They observe that one party talks at a time in most cases.
Drawing, on the contrary, has quite different character-
istics from speech. First, drawing is persistent whereas
speech is not. Drawing remains unless erased, whereas
speech dissipates right after it occurs. A drawing can
be understood much later than when it is actually drawn,
whereas speech must occur in real time. Second, drawing
has a much wider bandwidth than speech. Two or more
drawing operations can occur at the same time without
interfering with each other, whereas simultaneous utter-
ances are hard to understand. These resource charac-
teristics allow for simultaneous drawing. There have
been several studies on drawing interaction in the Human
Computer Interaction field in the context of computer-
supported collaborative work. Some researchers are op-
timimistic about the possibilities of simultaneous draw-
ing (Stefik et al. (1987), Whittaker et al. (1991)), though
others are not (Tatar et al. (1991)).
To approach this problem, Umata et al. (2003)
have introduced yet another view based on the activity-
dependent constraints imposed by the task performed in
the interaction. The analyses show that sequential struc-
ture is mandatory in drawing either when the drawing
reflects the dependency among the information to be ex-
pressed or when the drawing process itself reflects the
proceedings of a target event. Further analyses show
that speech interaction, which is already restricted by
the resource characteristics of media, is not affected by
activity-dependent constraints (Umata et al. (2004)).
The relation between drawing and speech modalities
is, however, still not quite clear. Takeoka et al. (2003) an-
alyzed face-to-face graphical communication and found
that both utterances without drawings and utterances fol-
lowed by the speaker’s drawings behave similary in turn-
holding function. They also show that longer silences
are allowed while drawing is taking place. These results
suggest that turns in communication can be maintained
across speech and drawing modalities. This is also sup-
ported by the finding that drawing/self-speech overlap is
much more frequent than drawing/partner’s speech over-
lap (Umata et al. (2004)). The assumption of continuous
turns across modalities is appealing from the viewpoint
of modal integration: speech and graphic modalities de-
cribe their target not just independently but also jointly,
with linguistic phrases describing the target via graphics
(Umata et al. (2000)).
In the following part of this paper, we analyze interac-
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tion across these two modalities, focusing on drawing-
speech overlap. The results show that the activity-
dependent constraints strongly affect the amount of
drawing/self-speech overlap, whereas they only weakly
affect the amount of drawing/partner’s speech over-
lap. These constraints, however, do affect how their
drawing activities are coordinated verbally. We argue
that activity-level constraints affect not only drawing-
drawing interaction organization but also cross-modal in-
teraction organization.
Drawing Turns and Speech Turns
As we have seen in the previous section, the sequential-
ity of speech turns has been attributed to the resource
characteristics of speech, namely non-persistence and re-
stricted bandwidth. The assumption is that we cannot
comprehend two spoken utterances at the same time be-
cause of the bandwidth limitation, while we cannot de-
lay comprehending one utterance until later because of
the non-persistent characteristic. Drawing, on the con-
trary, functions quite differently in regard to these as-
sumptions, and it may have potential for parallel turn
organization. There have been seemingly contradictory
observations of drawing turn organization; one is that
drawing turns can be parallel, and the other is that they
cannot be parallel. Umata et al. (2003) suggested that
there is yet another kind of constraint based on the activ-
ities people are engaged in. According to this view, se-
quential structure is mandatory in drawing in some cases
but not in others.
Sequentiality Constraints
1. Drawing interaction occurs in sequential turns
under either of the following conditions:
(a) Information Dependency Condition: When
there is a dependency among the information to
be expressed by drawing;
(b) Event Alignment Condition: When drawing op-
erations themselves are used as expressions of
the proceedings of target events.
2. Sequential turns are not mandatory in drawing
activities when neither condition holds (and when
persistence and certain bandwidths of drawing
are provided).
The rationale for the information dependency condi-
tion is the intuition that when one piece of information
depends on another, the grounding of the former piece
of information is more efficient after the grounding of
the latter has been completed. This should be the case
whether a particular speaker is explaining the logical de-
pendency in question to her partners or all participants
are following the logical steps together.
Event alignment is a strategy for expressing the un-
folding of an event dynamically, using the process of
drawing itself as a representation. For example, when
you are reporting on how you spent a day in a town by
using a map, you might draw a line that shows the route
you actually took on the map. In doing so, you are align-
ing the drawing event with the walking event to express
the latter dynamically. Our hypothesis is that simultane-
ous drawing is unlikely while this strategy of event align-
ment is employed. Under this condition, the movement
or process of drawing is the main carrier of information.
The trace of drawing has only a subsidiary informational
role. Thus, in this particular use of drawing, its persis-
tency is largely irrelevant. The message must be com-
prehended and grounded in real time, and the bandwidth
afforded by the drawing surface becomes irrelevant. This
requirement effectively prohibits the occurrence of any
other simultaneous drawing.
An analysis on the corpus gathered from collabora-
tive problem-solving tasks demonstrates that these two
activity-dependent constraints can override the resource
characteristics of the drawing media, thereby enforcing a
sequential turn organization similar to those observed in
verbal interactions (Umata et al. (2003)).
These activity-dependent constraints, however, do not
affect the speech turn organization that is already af-
fected by resource characteristics. The amount of simul-
taneous speech shows no difference among different task
conditions (Umata et al. (2004)).
In the following part of this paper, we will look into
the details of cross-modal overlap, based on the analy-
sis of collaborative problem-solving task data gathered
by Umata et al. (2003). We will compare the speech
turn organization patterns in different task settings to see
whether activity-dependent constraints affect the amount
of drawing-speech overlap.
Method
An experiment in which subjects were asked to commu-
nicate graphically was conducted to examine the effect of
the two factors presented above on their interaction orga-
nization. In these experiments, 24 pairs of subjects were
asked to work collaboratively on four problem-solving
tasks using virtual whiteboards.
Experimental Setting
In the experiments reported here, two subjects collabo-
ratively worked on four different problem-solving tasks.
All of the subjects were recruited from local universities
and paid a small honorarium for their participation. The
subjects were seated in separate, soundproof rooms and
worked together in pairs using a shared virtual white-
board (50 inches) and a full duplex audio connection.
The subjects were video-taped during the experiment.
They also wore cap-like eye-tracking devices that pro-
vided data indicating their eye-gaze positions. The order
in which the tasks were presented was balanced between
the 24 pairs so that the presentation order would not have
an affect on the results. The time limit for each task was
six minutes.
At the start of each task, an initial diagram was shown
on the subjects’ shared whiteboard and the subjects were
then free to speak to one another and to draw and erase on
the whiteboard. The only limitation to this drawing ac-
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tivity was that they could not erase or occlude the initial
diagram. All drawing activity on the whiteboard was per-
formed with a hand-held stylus directly onto the screen,
and any writing or erasing by one participant appeared
simultaneously on the whiteboard in the partner’s room.
The stylus controlled the position of the mouse pointer
and, when not drawing, the positions of both subjects’
mouse pointers were displayed on the shared whiteboard.
Tasks
Deduction Task with an Event Answer (1e) A logical
reasoning problem with a correct answer. The problem
asks the subjects to describe the arrangement of people
around a table and the order in which the people sit down.
This seating arrangement and order must satisfy some
restrictions (e.g., “The fifth person to sit is located on
the left-hand side of person B.”). A circle representing a
round table was shown on the whiteboard at the start of
the task. This task has strong informational dependency
and strong event alignment.
Deduction Task with a State Answer (1s) A logical
reasoning problem with a correct answer asking that the
subjects design a seating arrangement satisfying some re-
strictions (e.g., “S cannot sit next to M.”). A circle rep-
resenting a round table was shown on the whiteboard at
the start of the task. This task has strong informational
dependency and loose event alignment.
Design Task with an Event Answer (2e) A task with
an open-ended answer, asking subjects to make an excur-
sion itinerary based on a given town map. A complete
town map was shown on the whiteboard at the start of
the task. This task has weak informational dependency
and strong event alignment1.
Design Task with a State Answer (2s) A task with an
open-ended answer, asking the subjects to design a town
layout to their own liking. An incomplete town map was
shown on the whiteboard at the start of the task. This
task has weak informational dependency and loose event
alignment.
Data
During each task, all drawing, erasing, and mouse move-
ments by each subject were recorded in a data file. Using
this data, the amount of simultaneous drawing was calcu-
lated as the total time spent drawing simultaneously as a
percentage of the total time either subject spent drawing
(i.e., the sum of the time intervals in which both sub-
jects drew simultaneously divided by the sum of the time
intervals in which at least one of the pair drew on the
1Note that these categories are relative rather than absolute.
For example, (2e) also has informational dependency to a cer-
tain extent in that each path has to start from the icon of the
previous place they decided to visit. However, they can choose
the next destination freely. Thus informational dependency is
much weaker than in the cases of the seat arrangement tasks
where one decision significantly narrows down the subsequent
alternatives; e.g., seating a person M in a certain position means
only S or O can sit right next to P, and so on.
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Figure 1: Proportion of drawing/self-speech overlaps
whiteboard). Speech was recorded with video-data and
labeled by hand. As with the drawing data, the amount
of simultaneous speech was calculated as the total time
spent talking simultaneously as a percentage of the total
time either subject talked.
Analysis 1
Drawing/Self-Speech Overlap
As shown in Figure 1, the proportion of drawing/self-
speech overlap time to total drawing time was the small-
est in the design state (2s) condition. This data was
entered into a 2 x 2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).
Both problem type (deduction and design) and solu-
tion type (state and event) were treated as within-
subject factors. Analysis revealed a main effect of
problem type F(1,47)=24.968, p<.001 and solution type
F(1,47)=21.783, p<.001 and showed no interaction Fs a
1.
Thus, it was shown that the proportion of drawing/self-
speech overlap is smaller when the task has either weaker
informational dependency or weaker event alignment, or
both.
Drawing/Partner’s Speech Overlap
As shown in Figure 2, the proportion of draw-
ing/partner’s speech overlap time to total drawing time
demonstrated a significant, but smaller, difference in
each condition compared to the case of self overlap.
This data was entered into a 2 x 2 ANOVA. Both
problem type (deduction and design) and solution type
(state and event) were treated as within-subject factors.
Analysis showed a simple main effect of solution type
F(1,47)=4.484, p=.04. No effect was found for the prob-
lem type, and analysis showed no interaction Fs a 1.
The analysis showed that the proportion of draw-
ing/partner’s speech overlap is only weakly affected by
the event alignment condition.
Discussion for Analysis 1
The amount of drawing/self-speech overlap is smaller
when the task has either weaker informational depen-
dency or weaker event alignment, or both. The activity-
dependent constraints work on self-cross-modal overlap
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Figure 2: Proportion of drawing/partner’s speech over-
laps
in the opposite way of simultaneous drawing: the amount
of simultaneous drawing is smaller when the task has
stronger information dependency or weaker event align-
ment, or both.
This result seems quite reasonable if we consider the
way people coordinate their drawing activities verbally.
Whittaker et al. (1991) observed verbal coordination
of drawing activities through the examination of shared
whiteboard communication with and without the addition
of a speech channel. They found that permanent media
such as a whiteboard provides users with space for con-
structing shared data structures around which they can
organize their activity. With the addition of a speech
channel, people used the whiteboards to construct shared
data structures that made up the CONTENT of the com-
munication, while speech was used for coordinating the
PROCESS of communication.
As observed in Umata et al. (2004), utterances coor-
dinating drawing activities are also commonly found in
our tasks. Figure 3 is a snapshot from the deductive state
task (1s). Subjects A and B have just agreed to fix M’s
seat first, and A suggests “M’s seat should be ... here,
right?” while drawing the sign M. Then, B gives verbal
acknowledgement, “Yes.” Here, A’s utterance serves as a
signal for his drawing activity.
Such signal utterances typically preceed drawings, and
drawings follow, overlapping them. Signal utterances are
expected to occur more often when people feel a stronger
need to coordinate their drawing activities; i.e., in cases
where activity-level constraints require sequential draw-
ing turns. As expected, drawing/self-speech overlap is
most frequent when the task has strong informational de-
pendency or tight event alignment, or both.
There are two other possible explanations for the re-
sult. The first is that drawers have to give more verbal
explainations of what they are doing as the task increases
in difficulty. This does not seem to be the case, though.
First, those signal utterances are usually quite simple and
short: e.g., “M is here,” “Station,” etc. Second, their
drawings are generally simple and easy to understand
even in the tasks with stronger constraints. In the seat
arrangement tasks ((1e), (1s)), each icon is an alphabetic
Figure 3: Sequential drawing interaction coordinated
verbally (1)
letter standing for a person. Its position on the table icon
simply shows where the person has to be seated, and the
sequence of letters beside the table icon means the or-
der of the seating. In the case of the excursion itinerary
task (2e), the drawings were mainly route icons and la-
bels showing time of arrival/departure and so on. The
meaning of each drawing is also clear to the partner in
this case. On the other hand, some icons can be unin-
telligible to the partners in the case of the town layout
task (2s): a box can mean a building icon, a station icon,
or anything else. Actually, people sometimes had to ask
their partners for more clarification in (2s). Thus, the ut-
terances about what they are drawing are likely to be just
signals rather than detailed explanation of their drawing.
The second possible explanation is that simultaneous
drawing and cross-modal overlap are affected not by the
activity-level constraint but by the symbolic status of the
drawing. That is, the drawing requires sequential draw-
ing turn organization in (1s), (1e) and (2e) because they
are not just a set of icons but rather a language-like sym-
bolic system. This is also unlikely, since the drawings
are almost equally simple throughout the tasks, as de-
scribed above. It is possible, though, that more compli-
cated symbolic systems require sequential turns and that
it is difficult to separate the effect of the activity-level
constraint and that of symbolic constraction. More work
is required to illuminate the detailed mechanism under-
lining sequential drawing turn organization.
The activity-level constraints have a much weaker ef-
fect on the amount of drawing/partner’s speech overlap.
Because people cannot precisely predict when and where
their partner will start drawing, verbal coordination of
drawing activities typically takes the form of signal ut-
terances. This may be why these constraints did not im-
pact strongly on the amount of drawing/partner’s speech
overlap.
Another possible explanation is that turns in graphi-
cal communication tend to be maintained across speech
and drawing modalities. Drawing/self-speech overlap
is much more common than partner’s speech overlap
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Figure 4: Frequencies of verbal signals for drawing
(Umata et al. (2004)). The effect of activity-level
constraints is much weaker, perhaps because the cross-
modal turn organization already blocks speech overlap
by partners.
Analysis 2
It was shown that the activity-dependent constraints af-
fect the amount of drawing/partner’s speech overlap
only weakly, whereas they strongly affect the amount
of drawing/self-speech overlap. In this section, we an-
alyze drawing/partner’s speech overlap in more detail to
determine whether there are any differences among task
conditions.
The drawing occurences analyzed above were all
recorded as the time duration that the pen is touching
the screen. Some drawing activities are divided into seg-
ments that are too small under this method. For exam-
ple, some subjects drew many dots or lines to give colors
to some icons. It is unreasonable to divide such an ac-
tivity into many drawing occurences when we perform
closer analysis on each overlapping case of drawing and
speech modalities. The drawing occurences within 400
msec gaps are regarded as a drawing unit for the analysis
below, in the same way as when we divide speech into
utterance units. One member of each of the 24 dyads
tested was randomly selected for the following analyses.
Verbal Signals for Drawings
The frequencies of verbal signals in all drawing/partner’s
speech overlap were compared among different task con-
ditions. The analysis showed significantly different pro-
portions among conditions (χ2 æ 3 çéè 13 ê 775 ë p a ê 003).
More concretely, verbal signals in drawing/partner’s
speech overlap are most frequent in the design state con-
dition (2s), as shown in Figure 4 (adjusted residual: (1e)
èì
1.2, (1s)
èì
8.7, (2e)
è
-5.4, (2s)
è
15.3). The
design state condition has fewer verbal signals for draw-
ing overall, so their high frequency in drawing/partner’s
speech overlap is rather outstanding.
Other Findings: Drawing Preceeded Overlaps
We also compared the frequencies of drawing preceeding
overlap in drawing/partner’s speech overlap among dif-
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Figure 5: Frequencies of utterance preceeding overlap
ferent task conditions. The analysis shows significantly
different proportions between deduction conditions (1e,
1s) and design (2e, 2s) conditions (χ2 æ 3 ç
è
7 ê 740 ë p a
ê 005). More concretely, the design conditions have fewer
drawing preceeding overlap than the deduction condi-
tions, as shown in Figure 5 (adjusted residual: (1e, 1s)
è ì
19.2, (2e, 2s)
è
19.2). People start drawing while
their partners are speaking more often in the design con-
dition than the deduction condition.
Discussions for Analysis 2
Drawing/partner’s speech overlap includes more verbal
signals for drawings in the design state condition (2s)
than in any other condition. This reflects the parallel in-
teraction style of drawing in (2s). While verbal signals
serve to maintain sequential drawing interaction in the
case with stronger activity-level constraints, these signals
often serve to coordinate parallel drawing activities when
they occur in (2s). Verbal signals also overlap the part-
ner’s drawings in some of these cases. Figure 6 shows
one such case. Subjects A and B agreed to divide the de-
sign task into two sub-tasks, the design of a station plaza
and that of a park. Then, A said “Station,” and B said “I’ll
make the forest,” before starting their respective drawing
activities. Here, they verbally coordinated their simulta-
neous drawing activity, and their verbal signals overlap
their partner’s drawings.
Drawing preceeding overlap is more frequent in the
design condition (1) than in the deduction condition (2).
This means only the information dependency constraint
affected the frequency of speech preceeding overlaps.
Although we cannot give any clear explanation for this
phenomenon, we assume this result reflects the differ-
ent characteristics of these two activity-dependent con-
straints. The information dependency constraint has a
more general nature across modalities: when one piece
of information depends on another, the grounding of
the former piece of information is more efficient after
the grounding of the latter has been completed. On
the contrary, event alignment is rather drawing-modality-
specific: the drawing process reflects the process of the
described event. In this sense, drawing activities are less
dependent on the information given in speech modalities
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Figure 6: Parallel drawing interaction coordinated ver-
bally
than in cases with strong information dependency. How-
ever, the mechanism causing this phenomenon remains
unclear. More work is required to demonstrate how the
two modalities interact.
Conclusions
Based on the data of collaborative task solving set-
tings, we have analyzed cross-modal interaction in
graphical communication. We found that the amount
of drawing/self-speech overlap is strongly affected by
the activity-dependent constraints, while the amount of
drawing/partner’s speech overlap is affected only weakly
by these constraints.
There are, however, significant differences in the func-
tion of the utterances in the case of drawing/partner’s
speech overlap. Drawing/partner’s speech overlap in-
cludes more signal utterances for drawing when the
activity-level constraints are weaker. This result re-
flects the parallel interaction style of drawing under weak
activity-level constraints.
The precedence of drawing/partner’s speech overlap is
also affected by the information dependency constraint.
Although it is likely that the modality-general nature of
this constraint plays a significant role, the mechanism of
this phenomenon is still not clear.
These findings indicate that the activity-level con-
straints affect the way speech coordinates drawing ac-
tivities in cross-modal interaction and suggest that in-
teraction organization in multimodal communication is a
complex phenomenon that requires general analyses in-
tegrating the functions of different modalities.
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Abstract
Irony is perceived through a complex interaction between an
utterance and its context and serves many social functions such
as to be sarcastic and to be humorous. The purpose of this pa-
per is to explore what role linguistic style and contextual in-
formation play in the recognition of irony (i.e., assessing the
degree of irony) and in the appreciation of ironic functions
(i.e., assessing the degree of sarcasm and humor). Two exper-
iments demonstrated that the degree of irony and sarcasm was
affected primarily by linguistic style (i.e., sentence type and
politeness), while the degree of humor was affected by both
linguistic style and contextual information (i.e., context neg-
ativity and ordinariness of negative situation). These results
are almost consistent with the predictions by the implicit dis-
play theory, a cognitive theory of verbal irony. Discussion of
the findings also suggests that the implicit display theory can
account for an indirect effect of context on the degree of irony.
Introduction
Irony is an interesting pragmatic phenomenon whose process-
ing involves complex interaction between linguistic style and
contextual information. There are also good reasons for prob-
ing the mechanism of irony processing in cognitive science.
First, irony offers an effective way of accomplishing various
communication goals for maintaining and modifying social
and interpersonal relationships that are difficult to do literally.
Second, irony processing requires higher-order mindreading
ability (Happe´, 1993), which has been argued to play an im-
portant role in the interpretation of ordinary utterances (Wil-
son and Sperber, 2004). Third, as Gibbs (1994) argues, an
ironic way of talking about experiences reflects our figurative
foundation for everyday thought.
Recently, many studies have paid much attention to irony
processing (e.g., Gibbs, 1994; Sperber and Wilson, 1995; At-
tardo, 2000; Colston, 2002; Giora, 2003). However, most of
these studies focus only on the difference of processing be-
tween ironic utterances and literal ones, in spite of the fact
that irony is communicated by various kinds of expression
(Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, and Brown, 1995; Utsumi,
2000). For example, to your partner who stepped on your feet
many times during a dance, you can say ironically in various
ways: not only an opposition statement like “You’re really a
good dancer”, but also a true assertion “I love good dancers”,
a rhetorical question “Could you step on your own two feet?”,
a circumlocutory utterance “I guess you have a broken leg”,
and so on. The purpose of this study is to empirically ex-
amine how irony processing differs among different kinds of
ironic utterances and what role style and context play in caus-
ing such differences.
The issue of controversy in irony research is according to
what features of irony people distinguish irony from non-
irony. Beyond the fallacious view that irony is a meaning
opposition or a mere violation, a number of studies have pro-
posed a variety of views of irony: Irony is an echoic interpre-
tation of an attributed thought (Sperber and Wilson, 1995),
joint pretense (Clark, 1996), relevant inappropriateness (At-
tardo, 2000), or indirect negation (Giora, 2003). However,
these theories suffer from the same problem that they have
attempted to provide necessary and/or sufficient properties
for distinguishing irony from nonirony; there appear to be
no such properties shared by all ironic utterances. To over-
come this difficulty, I have proposed a more comprehensive
view of irony, implicit display theory of verbal irony (Utsumi,
2000). The implicit display theory takes a comparative view
that irony is a prototype-based category, which is the idea un-
derlying cognitive linguistic research. Another point in which
the implicit display theory radically differs from the previous
views is that it claims a differential role of style and context,
whereas the previous theories do not address such a difference
or they confuse the different roles. According to the implicit
display theory, style of an ironic expression is used to assess
to what degree a specific ironic utterance is similar to the pro-
totype of irony, while context motivates the addressee to in-
terpret an expression ironically. The study I present in this
paper empirically examined to what degree people perceive
an utterance as ironic depending on style of the utterance and
its context, and tested whether the claims of the implicit dis-
play theory can explain the observed result.
Another heated topic in irony research is the social func-
tion of irony, which provides a plausible answer to why peo-
ple use irony. The functions are divided into negative ones
such as to be sarcastic and to criticize, and positive ones such
as to be humorous. Previous studies (e.g., Dews and Win-
ner, 1995; Colston, 2002) have compared the degrees of neg-
ative effect between ironic utterances and literal equivalent
utterances. However, these studies have not addressed how
various kinds of ironic utterances differ in negative and pos-
itive functions. My study thus examined both negative and
positive effects of various ironic utterances by asking people
to rate the degree of sarcasm and humor, and tested whether
the obtained finding can be explained by the implicit display
theory.
Implicit Display Theory
The main claim of the implicit display theory is threefold
(Utsumi, 2000). First, irony presupposes ironic environment,
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of irony
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Figure 1: General hypothesis for irony processing elicited from the implicit display theory.
a proper situational setting in the discourse context. Ironic
environment consists of (a) speaker’s expectation, (b) in-
congruity between the expectation and the reality, and (c)
speaker’s negative attitude toward the incongruity. In order
for an utterance to be interpreted ironically, the implicit dis-
play theory argues, the discourse situation must be identified
as ironic environment through the process of checking or in-
ferring these constituents. In the ‘dance’ example presented
above, you have expected that your partner dances well with
you but your expectation is not fulfilled, and you gets disap-
pointed or angry at the result. That situation is thus identified
as ironic environment.
Second, irony is an utterance that implicitly displays ironic
environment. Implicit display of ironic environment is
achieved by an utterance which (d) alludes to the speaker’s
expectation, (e) includes pragmatic insincerity by violating
one of pragmatic principles, and (f) expresses indirectly the
speaker’s negative attitude by being accompanied by ironic
cues. For example, your utterance “You’re really a good
dancer” in the above situation satisfies the three conditions
of implicit display. First, it mentions, and thus alludes to,
your expectation of the partner dancing well. Second, it is
a literally false statement that violates the maxim of quality.
Third, the hyperbolic word “really” is used to exaggerate the
ironic attitude.
Third, as I mentioned in the introduction, irony is a
prototype-based category characterized by the notion of im-
plicit display. The prototype of irony is an abstract exem-
plar which completely meets all the three conditions for im-
plicit display. The degree of irony can be assessed by the
similarity between the prototype and a given utterance with
respect to the three conditions. Let us consider again the
‘dance’ example. A circumlocutory statement “I guess you
have a broken leg” can be interpreted ironically, but its de-
gree of ironicalness may be much smaller than the typical
type of irony “You’re really a good dancer”. This differ-
ence can be explained in terms of to what degree an utterance
achieves the implicit display. The circumlocutory statement
is only weakly related to the speaker’s expectation by a num-
ber of coherence relations, whereas the opposition statement
directly refers to the expectation. Furthermore, the circumlo-
cutory statement is pragmatically insincere to a much lesser
degree than the opposition statement including an apparent
violation.
General Hypothesis
The implicit display theory posits the hypothesis for irony
processing, which is summarized in Figure 1. On the one
hand, style of an ironic sentence, which corresponds to prop-
erties of implicit display, governs how similar it is to the irony
prototype, i.e., the degree of irony. On the other hand, context
determines how likely one is to make an ironic remark, i.e.,
likelihood of irony, based on to what degree each of the three
constituents for ironic environment holds in that context.
This differential role of style and context allows us to draw
a general hypothesis about the degree of irony: The degree
of irony is affected by linguistic choice, not by contextual set-
ting, and it is high to the extent that the properties of implicit
display are satisfied. Furthermore, it is reasonably assumed
that the degree of sarcasm of ironic utterances proportionally
depends on the degree of irony because sarcasm is often con-
veyed in the form of irony. It is therefore hypothesized that
the degree of sarcasm of an ironic utterance is affected only
by linguistic style and it is high to the extent that the proper-
ties of implicit display are satisfied. Note that the hypothesis
on the degree of sarcasm does not hold true for victimless
irony, which are often perceived as nonsarcastic (Kreuz and
Glucksberg, 1989). Because this study attempts to explore
the negative function toward a victim of irony, I did not use
victimless ironies in the experiments.
Unlike irony and sarcasm, how the degree of humor is de-
termined cannot be directly explained by the implicit display
theory. I thereby adopt an incongruity-resolution model of
humor (Attardo, 1997), a cognitive model widely accepted
in humor research. The incongruity-resolution model argues
that humor involves an incongruity between what was ex-
pected based on our conceptual pattern and what occurred
in the humorous event, which is often expressed by a punch
line in humorous texts. When such incongruity is resolved
immediately by generating a reinterpretation of a humorous
expression, humorous effect takes place. Since we are con-
cerned with interpretable ironic utterances (i.e., they are as-
sumed to be equally resolvable), it is hypothesized that the de-
gree of humor proportionally depends on the degree of incon-
gruity involved in ironic utterances. According to the implicit
display theory, ironic utterances involve two kinds of incon-
gruity: (a) incongruity between an expected type of utterance
(e.g., ironic or literal) and the actual type of a given utterance
(i.e., irony in this paper), degree of which is inversely related
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to the likelihood of irony; and (b) incongruity (i.e., dissimilar-
ity) between the irony prototype and a given ironic utterance.
If the incongruity-resolution model and the implicit display
theory are plausible, a general hypothesis about the degree of
humor is as follows: The degree of humor of an ironic utter-
ance is affected by both linguistic style and context, and it is
high to the extent that a discourse context is incongruous to
the ironic environment or that the utterance is dissimilar to
the irony prototype.
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 is to test the implicit display
theory by examining how linguistic style affects the degree of
irony, sarcasm and humor. Linguistic style of irony was ma-
nipulated by two factors: sentence type and politeness level.
Three sentence types were used in Experiment 1: opposi-
tion, rhetorical question and circumlocution. An opposition
is a statement whose positive literal meaning is the opposite
of the negative situation and thus includes the speaker’s ex-
pected event or state. A rhetorical question is an interrogative
statement by which the speaker rhetorically asks for the ob-
vious fact to the addressee. A circumlocution is a kind of
understatement which is weakly related to the speaker’s ex-
pectation by a number of coherence relations. It is reasonably
assumed that an opposition is more related to, and thus more
alludes to, the speaker’s expectation than a rhetorical question
and a circumlocution, and that an opposition and a rhetorical
question are pragmatically more insincere than a circumlocu-
tion. It follows that an opposition would be the most similar
to the prototype of irony and that a rhetorical question would
be more similar than a circumlocution.
Politeness is also an important linguistic property which
can signal irony. Some experimental studies (Kumon-
Nakamura et al., 1995; Okamoto, 2002) found that overpo-
lite utterances are perceived as more ironic. In Experiment 1,
politeness level was manipulated by the combination of the
use or nonuse of Japanese honorifics (i.e., a system of po-
liteness expressions incorporated into the grammar) and the
relationship between the speaker and the addressee (good or
bad). The reason for considering speaker-addressee relation-
ship is that whether the use of honorifics shows overpoliteness
is determined according to the speaker-addressee relationship
(Okamoto, 2002). Generally speaking, when the speaker and
the addressee are intimate or on good terms, an utterance with
honorifics would be overpolite and unnatural. On the other
hand, when they are not intimate or on bad terms, honorifics
are usually used for an utterance to be appropriately polite; an
utterance without honorifics would be impolite or rude. Ac-
cording to the implicit display theory, overpolite utterances
are pragmatically insincere because they can be seen as vio-
lating the convention in linguistic politeness. Therefore, other
things being equal, overpolite utterances are more similar to
the prototype of irony than appropriately polite or impolite
utterances.
Prediction
The general hypothesis by the implicit display theory makes
the following predictions on the stylistic effect.
(1) Oppositions are the most ironic and the most sarcastic,
and rhetorical questions are more ironic and more sarcas-
tic than circumlocutions. On the other hand, circumlocu-
tions are the most humorous, and rhetorical questions are
more humorous than oppositions.
(2) Overpolite utterances, i.e., utterances with honorifics by
the speaker who is on good terms with the addressee, are
more ironic, more sarcastic and less humorous than ap-
propriately polite or impolite utterances.
Method
Participants One hundred and twenty undergraduate stu-
dents participated for this experiment. All were native
Japanese speakers.
Materials and Design Twelve stories were constructed in
which the addressee was responsible for the negative situation
(and thus a victim) and in which the speaker gave a remark
toward the addressee. Each of the stories had two versions:
Speaker-addressee relationship is good or bad. Each story
was followed by one of the six versions of the final utterance
(three sentence types×with/without honorifics). An example
of the stories and the final remarks is as follows1:
In the restaurant, the customer was not served the ordered
dishes for a while. He said to the master of the restaurant,
who is on {good / bad} terms with him:
Opposition: “This restaurant serves the dishes quickly.”
(Kokoha ryouri wo dasunoga hayai {ne / desu ne}.)
Question: “Do you know the recipe for the dishes?”
(Ryouri no tsukurikata wo shitteiru {no? / no desuka?}.)
Circumlocution: “I think you are just going to buy recipe
ingredients.”
(Ima zairyou wo kai ni itteiru kato {omotta / omoimashita} yo.)
Procedure Each participant was assigned to 12 different
stories involving 12 combinations of conditions. The par-
ticipants read each story and rated the final utterance at the
end of the story on the following two 7-point scales: “How
sarcastic is the speaker’s remark?” (1 = not at all sarcastic;
7 = extremely sarcastic) and “How humorous is the speaker’s
remark?” (1 = not at all humorous; 7 = extremely humorous).
After reading and rating all stories, they read the stories again
and rated the degree of irony (“Do you feel the speaker’s re-
mark is ironic?”) of all the final utterances on a 7-point scale
(1 = not at all ironic; 7 = extremely ironic).
Results and Discussion
Type (opposition, rhetorical question, circumlocution) ×
Honorifics (with honorifics, without honorifics) × Relation-
ship (good, bad) repeated-measures ANOVAs were con-
ducted. In all analyses, the data were analyzed by subjects
(F1) and by items (F2).
Irony and Sarcasm Ratings The main effect of sentence
type was significant both for the degree of irony (only by sub-
ject analysis), F1(2, 238)= 5.30, p< .01, and for the degree
of sarcasm, F1(2, 238) = 16.18, p < .001, F2(2, 22) = 5.39,
p < .05. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (p < .05) revealed
that oppositions were significantly more ironic and more sar-
castic than circumlocutions, and more sarcastic than rhetor-
ical questions, as shown in Figure 2. Moreover, rhetorical
1The original Japanese remarks used in the experiment are indi-
cated by italics and honorific words are indicated by underlines.
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Figure 3: Mean irony and sarcasm ratings for honorific and
nonhonorific utterances and mean humor ratings for hon-
orific and nonhonorific circumlocutions in different speaker-
addressee relationships.
questions were found to be significantly more sarcastic than
circumlocutions. These findings are almost consistent with
Prediction (1).
There was also a significant Honorifics × Relationship in-
teraction only by subject analysis for the degree of irony,
F1(1, 119) = 5.44, p < .05; and for the degree of sarcasm,
F1(1, 119)= 7.85, p < .01. As shown in Figure 3, when the
speaker was on good terms with the addressee, honorific ut-
terances were rated as significantly more ironic and sarcastic
than nonhonorific ones, but such difference disappeared when
the speaker was on bad terms with the addressee. This result
is consistent with Prediction (2) in that overpolite utterances
are more ironic and sarcastic than appropriately polite utter-
ances. However, the observed higher degrees of irony and
sarcasm for the utterances by the speaker who is on bad terms
with the addressee are not compatible with the prediction.
This finding against Prediction (2) was due to the signifi-
cant main effect of speaker-addressee relationship. The final
utterances were rated as more ironic and sarcastic when the
relationship was bad than when the relationship was good,
F1(1, 119) = 21.73, p < .001, F2(1, 11) = 17.26, p < .01
for the degree of irony; F1(1, 119) = 60.55, p < .001,
F2(1, 11) = 41.60, p < .001 for the degree of sarcasm. This
finding can be explained as an effect of contextual informa-
tion (in this case, speaker-addressee relationship) on judg-
ment whether an utterance indirectly expresses the negative
attitude, i.e., condition (f) for implicit display. Information
about the speaker-addressee relationship may provide an indi-
rect cue to the speaker’s negative attitude; the speaker is more
likely to have a negative attitude, and thus his/her utterance is
perceived as including more indirect cues and as more typical
of irony when they have a bad relationship than when they
have a good relationship. A number of empirical findings
suggest that this explanation is plausible. Especially, in order
to explain the finding that the speaker’s occupations affected
sarcasm ratings, Pexman and Olineck (2002) stated a similar
view based on the implicit display theory: “ The occupation
stereotype influences interpretation because it contributes to
the ironic environment. It contributes to that environment by
indicating that the speaker is likely to have a negative attitude
(tendency to be critical) and that such an attitude is likely to
be indirectly expressed” (ibid., 268).
Humor Ratings There was a significant interaction of
Type×Honorifics×Relationship, F1(2, 238)= 4.11, p < .05,
F2(2, 22)= 4.42, p< .05. The nature of this interaction was
that the simple interaction of Honorifics × Relationship was
observed for circumlocutions, F1(1, 357) = 7.64, p < .01,
F2(1, 33) = 7.51, p < .01, but such interaction was not ob-
served for oppositions and rhetorical questions. When the
speaker and the addressee had a good relationship, circumlo-
cutions without honorifics were rated as more humorous than
those with honorifics but this difference was not observed
when the relationship was bad, as shown in Figure 3. This
result is consistent with Prediction (2).
There was a significant main effect of sentence type,
F1(2, 238) = 28.55, p < .001, F2(2, 22) = 19.14, p < .001.
Pairwise comparisons (p < .05) indicated that circumlocu-
tions were significantly more humorous than oppositions and
rhetorical questions, as shown in Figure 2. This result is com-
patible with Prediction (1).
The main effect of speaker-addressee relationship was also
significant, F1(1, 119)= 22.93, p< .001, F2(1, 11)= 37.14,
p< .001, showing that the utterances were rated as more hu-
morous when the relationship was good than when the rela-
tionship was bad. We can consider two possible explanations
for why good interpersonal relationship increases the degree
of humor. One possible explanation may be that speaker-
addressee relationship affects judgment for implicit display
and thus the degree of humor, as I described above. Another
explanation can be elicited from the motivational condition
in which humor is experienced. Wyer and Collins (1992)
stated that when the objective of the reader is to understand
and enjoy humorous expressions, humor is more likely to be
elicited. Therefore, a good relationship may motivate the ad-
dressee to enjoy ironic remarks, while a bad relationship may
interfere with the addressee’s enjoyable attitude toward them.
Experiment 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to test the implicit display
theory with respect to contextual effect on the degree of irony,
sarcasm and humor. In Experiment 2 two independent vari-
ables were considered: situational negativity (the situation is
weakly or strongly negative) and ordinariness of negative sit-
uation (the negative situation is usual or unusual).
Situational negativity manipulates the degree of incon-
gruity between the expectation and the reality, i.e., condi-
tion (b) of ironic environment, in such a way that the incon-
gruity is perceived more easily, and thus irony may be more
likely to be made, in the strongly negative context than in the
weakly negative context. Ordinariness manipulates the man-
ifestness of speaker’s expectation, i.e., condition (a) of ironic
environment. The expectation is more manifest in the con-
text where an unexpected negative event occurs than in the
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context where the same negative event repeatedly happens.
Therefore, irony is more likely to be elicited from an unusual
context than from an usual context.
Prediction
The general hypothesis by the implicit display theory makes
the following predictions on the effect of context.
(3) Neither negativity nor ordinariness has an effect on the
degree of irony and sarcasm.
(4) Ironic utterances in a weakly negative context are more
humorous than those in a strongly negative context. In
the same way, ironic utterances in an usual context are
more humorous than those in an unusual context.
Method
Participants Forty-eight undergraduate students partici-
pated for this experiment. All were native Japanese speakers.
None of them participated Experiment 1.
Materials and Design Eight out of 12 stories used in Ex-
periment 1 were selected, because natural manipulation of
negativity and ordinariness was not possible in the other four
stories. Each story had four versions: a situation where a
weakly negative event is usual or not, and a situation where
a strongly negative event is usual or not. The stories of the
weakly negative and unusual version were identical to the sto-
ries used in Experiment 1 except that the descriptions of the
speaker-addressee relationship were deleted. Each story was
followed by the final remark identical to the opposition utter-
ance without honorifics used in Experiment 1. An example of
the stories is as follows:
{In the restaurant / In the restaurant where it usually takes a
while to serve dishes}, the customer was not served the ordered
dishes {for a while / at all even after a very long time}. He said
to the master of the restaurant,
Procedure Each participant was assigned to eight different
stories involving the four versions equally. The procedure
was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
The data was subjected to Negativity (weakly negative,
strongly negative) × Ordinariness (usual, unusual) repeated-
measures ANOVAs.
Irony and Sarcasm Ratings There were no significant
main effects and no interactions for both ratings, which fa-
vors Prediction (3).
However, as I discussed in the result section of Experi-
ment 1, there is a possibility that context (i.e., negativity and
ordinariness) has an indirect influence on the degree of irony
and sarcasm through its effect on judgment for implicit dis-
play. Especially, judgment on allusion to the speaker’s expec-
tation highly depends on manifestness of the expectation, be-
cause when the addressee does not know the speaker’s expec-
tation before interpreting an utterance the expectation must
be inferred from the literal meaning of the utterance and con-
textual information (Utsumi, 2000). It is thus predicted that,
other degrees of implicit display being equal, the degree of
irony would be affected by context, primarily by ordinariness,
when the speaker’s expectation is implicit, but that it would
not be affected by context when the expectation is explicit.
This prediction was tested by reanalysis of the data of Ex-
periment 2. The stories used in Experiment 2 include two
kinds of speaker’s expectation: an expectation about a desir-
able event/state and an expectation about the addressee’s be-
lief. Because the speaker’s expectation about the addressee’s
belief presupposes that the addressee does not notice it be-
forehand, it is assumed to be less manifest to the addressee
than other types of expectation. Hence, the eight stories could
be divided into two groups — explicit expectation version
(n=4) and implicit expectation version (n=4) — according to
whether the speaker’s expectation is about the addressee’s be-
lief or not. An example of the texts including an implicit ex-
pectation is as follows:
To a friend who eats sweets though she is on a diet:
“You eat nothing at all today, are you?.”
(Kyou ha zenzen tabenai nee.)
In this case, the speaker’s expectation is something like that
the addressee (the speaker’s friend) should know that her be-
havior is undesirable for a diet. Then the data of irony and sar-
casm was subjected to Negativity× Ordinariness× Expecta-
tion (explicit, implicit) ANOVAs with repeated measures on
the first two factors.
Concerning the degree of irony, there was a significant in-
teraction of all the three factors, F2(1, 6)=8.94, p<.05. The
nature of this interaction was that the simple interaction of
Negativity× Ordinariness was significant for the implicit ex-
pectation context where the speaker’s expectation was about
the addressee’s belief, F2(1, 6) = 6.44, p < .05, but such in-
teraction was not observed in the explicit expectation context.
This finding is consistent with the prediction that context has
an indirect effect on the degree of irony when the speaker’s
expectation is implicit.
The observed simple interaction of Negativity × Ordinari-
ness for the implicit expectation was that in the weakly neg-
ative contexts the final utterances were rated as more ironic
when the negative behavior was unusual (M = 5.11) than
when it was usual (M = 4.54), but that in the strongly neg-
ative contexts the final utterances were rated as more ironic
when the negative behavior was usual (M =5.21) than when
it was unusual (M =4.58). This result can be interpreted as
follows: The addressee is less likely to notice the speaker’s
expectation about his/her own belief, and thereby perceives
an utterance as less ironic when his/her own negative behav-
ior is usual than when it is not usual because of habituation
effect. However, once the addressee’s usual negative behav-
ior becomes worse, he/she is more likely to be aware of the
speaker’s expectation because of dishabituation effect.
For the degree of sarcasm, however, there were no signif-
icant effects and interactions in the reanalysis. This result
suggests that the speaker’s expectation may be an important
property which distinguishes irony from sarcasm; sarcasm
may not need the speaker’s expectation.
Humor Ratings Only the main effect of ordinariness was
significant by item analysis, F2(1, 7)= 7.81, p< .05. Ironic
utterances in the expected contexts in which the addressee’s
negative behavior was usual (M = 3.23) were rated as more
humorous than the same sentences in the unexpected context
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in which the negative behavior was unusual (M=3.06). This
result is consistent with Prediction (4). However, the result
that the main effect of negativity was not significant suggests
that context negativity may have little influence on the likeli-
hood of irony.
General Discussion
As I mentioned in the introduction, the prototype-based view
permits the implicit display theory to explain the obtained
finding that the degree of irony differs among various ut-
terances and contexts. For example, allusion-based theories
such as Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) echoic interpretation
theory cannot explain why overpolite utterances were rated as
more ironic than appropriately polite utterances. On the other
hand, insincerity-oriented theories such as Attardo’s (2000)
relevant inappropriateness view cannot account for the find-
ing that the speaker’s expectation affects the degree of irony.
(For details of the superiority of the implicit display theory
over other theories, see Utsumi, 2000).
Furthermore, the echoic interpretation theory also fails to
explain the finding that the degree of irony was affected by
contextual information only when the speaker’s expectation
about the addressee’s belief triggered irony. The reason for
the difficulty in explaining such effect lies in their view that
irony interpretively echoes not only the speaker’s expectation
but also other sources such as someone’s utterances, opinions
or even general norms, whereas the implicit display theory
assumes that only the speaker’s expectation is alluded to by
irony. Therefore the echoic interpretation theory need not,
and indeed does not, assume the speaker’s expectation about
the addressee’s belief to explain irony like the ‘diet’ example;
it assumes that irony echoes the general norm that teenagers
want to be slim by a diet.
Concerning the functions of irony, the implicit display
theory is more consistent with the obtained findings than
the contrast-assimilation theory recently proposed by Colston
(2002). He has claimed that the degree of negative effect of
irony can be explained in terms of “contrast and assimilation”
effects, which are often observed in perceptual judgment. If
the discrepancy between the positive surface meaning of an
ironic utterance and its referent negative situation is large, the
ironic utterance is perceived as more negative than the lit-
eral one because of a contrast effect. On the other hand, if
the discrepancy is relatively small, then an assimilation effect
is more likely to occur, resulting in that ironic utterances are
perceived as less negative. Although the contrast-assimilation
theory seems to be compatible with the finding of Experi-
ment 1 that the degree of sarcasm was graded according to the
similarity to the irony prototype, the finding of Experiment 2
that situational negativity did not have an influence on the
degree of sarcasm may provide evidence against the contrast-
assimilation theory. If Colston’s theory is right, an utterance
should be more sarcastic in the strongly negative context and
less sarcastic in the weakly negative context than the literal
equivalent utterances, because negativity changes the degree
of discrepancy between the utterance and the situation.
To sum up, it can be concluded that the implicit display
theory provides a more consistent explanation of the obtained
findings on both irony recognition and ironic function than
other theories.
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Abstract 
We present a connectionist model of false memories called 
the Associative Self-Organizing Network (ASON) model. 
Four mechanisms underlying the Constructive Memory 
Framework (CMF) guide the design of the ASON model, a 
connectionist operationalisation of the CMF. Simulation 
studies of experiments in the DRM paradigm reveal the 
ASON model to exhibit false memories. In addition, the 
effects of Mean Backward Associative Strength and output 
order on the probability of false recall are simulated. We 
conclude that the ASON model is capable of simulating and 
explaining the main findings on false memories.  
Introduction 
Memory is fallible. Every day people are confronted with 
the shortcomings of their memory, when forgetting things 
such as -for example- the phone number of a good friend, 
the title of a book, or the location of their car keys. Memory 
can also fail in another way; instead of forgetting things that 
did happen, people may remember events that never took 
place. These memories can be just as realistic as memories 
of real events. Such memories of never-happened episodes 
are called commission errors or false memories. False 
memories may occur in different situations and their 
severity can range from attributing a memory to the wrong 
source to confabulating a complete event (Parkin, 1997).  
Various studies suggest that false memories are not 
simply random errors (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Schwartz et 
al., 1998). Instead, they appear to be an inevitable 
consequence of the dynamics of human memory (Schacter 
et al., 1998). False memories are considered to arise from 
the very same mechanisms that underlie veridical recall and 
recognition of true memories. More specifically, we 
hypothesize that false memories result from the way in 
which memory representations are stored, processed, and 
retrieved.  
Our approach is to investigate the occurrence of false 
memories in a connectionist model called the Associative 
Self-Organizing Network (ASON) model. The ASON 
model is made up of two associatively connected self-
organizing maps, for storing and representing stimuli and 
the contexts in which they occur. Although the scientific 
literature on false memories is abundant (e.g. Gallo & 
Roediger, 2002; Johnson et al., 1993; Schacter et al., 1998), 
to our knowledge, no connectionist model of false memories 
has yet been proposed.  
The outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In 
the next section we discuss the theoretical background. 
Then, we present the Associative Self-Organizing Network 
as a model of false memories. In addition, three simulations 
are described. Finally, we discuss the results and conclude 
upon the approach. 
Theoretical Background 
The common view of memory is that of a (re)constructive 
process (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Schacter et al., 
1998). This means that memories, rather than being literal 
reproductions of past events, are considered to be 
reconstructions that are susceptible to a variety of distorting 
factors.  In this view, memories are distorted by schemes, 
attribution processes, prior knowledge, assumptions, and so 
forth. This makes it almost impossible to draw a clear 
boundary between true and false memories in real life 
situations. For this reason, our study focuses solely on false 
memories occurring in the experimental setting of the 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. A false 
memory is formalized as a recollection of a stimulus that is 
ascribed to the experimental context, whereas it was not 
presented during the experiment. Below, we describe the 
DRM paradigm in more detail. 
The DRM Paradigm 
In order to investigate false memories experimentally, 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) developed the DRM 
paradigm, which was a variation of a design originally used 
by Deese (1959). The experimental set up is as follows. 
Subjects are presented with lists of twelve or fifteen words 
that are the strongest associates of a “critical lure”; a target 
word which is not presented. Immediately following the 
presentation of a list, subjects are instructed to recall as 
many of the list items as possible and to mention only those 
words of which they are certain that they appeared on the 
list. Despite this instruction, subjects are about equally 
likely to recall the critical lure as the other items on the list 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). After completion of the 
experiment, which usually involves the presentation of 
multiple lists, recognition performance of items on all the 
lists is tested. It is found that subjects identify the critical 
lure as being a list item as often as or more often than words 
that were actually presented (Roediger & McDermott, 
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1995). These results have been widely replicated, using 
various lists and different variations on the basic paradigm.  
The propensity to elicit false recall and false recognition 
of the critical item varies widely with the type of list used.  
Roediger et al. (2001) investigated the causes of this 
variability and found that the strongest predictor of false 
recall of the critical lure was a variable called Mean 
Backward Associative Strength (MBAS). MBAS is defined 
as the average probability that a list item elicits the critical 
item as its associate. Roediger et al. found that MBAS 
correlates positively with both false recall (r = + .70) and 
false recognition (r = +. 43) of the critical lure.  
The ASON model is inspired by the Constructive 
Memory Framework of Schacter et al. (1998). In the 
following section this framework is discussed in detail. 
The Constructive Memory Framework 
Many different theories exist that address the topics of 
memory formation, source monitoring or reality monitoring 
and false memories (e.g. Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Johnson 
et al., 1993; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). The general 
assumption underlying these different theories is that 
memory is constructive. This is also the central assumption 
of the Constructive Memory Framework (CMF) (Schacter et 
al., 1998). CMF proposes four mechanisms that are involved 
in a constructive memory system.  
First, according to CMF, episodic memories can be 
viewed as patterns of features, with different features 
representing different aspects of the episode. The 
constituent features of a memory representation are 
distributed widely across different parts of the brain. 
Forming an episodic memory involves binding together an 
arbitrary configuration of information from different sources 
(visual, auditory, affective, semantic etcetera) about a 
specific episode into a unitary whole (O'Reilly & Rudy, 
2001; Rolls & Treves, 1998; Schacter et al., 1998). This 
process is called feature binding.  
Second, each episode activates a unique representation 
that can easily be discriminated from memories of similar 
events. Even if different memories overlap extensively, the 
memory system is able to retrieve the unique characteristics 
of each particular episode, rather than retaining only the 
general similarities or gist (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). This 
requires a process called pattern separation (Schacter et al., 
1998). 
Third, retrieval of memories involves a process of pattern 
completion. At retrieval, a small part of the original memory 
is used as a retrieval cue. The subset of features representing 
this part of the memory is activated. Activation spreads 
from the activated features to the rest of the constituent 
features that represent that experience, and the complete 
memory is reconstructed.  
Fourth, once a memory is reconstructed, it must be 
decided whether the retrieved information constitutes a real 
memory or is derived from internally generated information, 
such as thoughts or fantasies. This process is called reality 
monitoring. Source monitoring is a broader concept and 
refers to determining the source of a retrieved memory. 
According to Source Monitoring Theory (Johnson et al., 
1993), memories from different sources have different 
qualitative characteristics. Source monitoring decisions 
capitalize on these differences. When the source monitoring 
mechanism fails, source amnesia occurs. One is then able to 
remember specific information, but unable to recall the 
source of this memory.  
The four mechanisms of the Constructive Memory 
Framework lead to the notion that false memories result 
from a combination of two factors: (1) memories from 
different sources (e.g. internal and external) may form 
overlapping representations, and (2) the source monitoring 
mechanism fails to distinguish between those 
representations.  
The activation/monitoring framework, (Gallo & Roediger, 
2002; Roediger et al., 2001) explains variations in the 
probability of false remembering in the DRM paradigm in 
terms of the two factors. According to this framework, two 
processes, activation and monitoring, take place during the 
encoding and retrieval of memories. Although activation 
occurs mostly at the encoding stage and monitoring mostly 
at the retrieval stage, both processes are at work during both 
encoding and retrieval. The activation/monitoring 
framework assumes that the presentation of some items can 
activate entire knowledge structures or schemata. As a 
consequence, non-presented items can be activated because 
they are strongly associated with the presented items (i.e., 
they are part of the same knowledge structure). The 
activation may be the result of conscious, deliberate 
association, or of automatic and unconscious spreading 
activation. In the case of the DRM paradigm, activation 
spreads from the list items to related or associated concepts. 
The critical lure receives much activation because this item 
is strongly associated to each of the presented list items. 
This assumption is supported by the high correlation 
between MBAS and false remembering of the critical lure. 
The stronger the association between the list items and the 
critical word, the stronger the activation of this critical word 
due to automatic or deliberate spreading of activation.  
Summarizing, false remembering of the critical lure 
occurs when the monitoring process fails to correctly 
attribute its activation to an internal source and the critical 
lure is falsely ascribed to the learning context. This 
monitoring process is analogous to the source monitoring or 
reality monitoring mechanism proposed by Johnson et al. 
(1993).  
Implementing CMF in a Connectionist Network 
The CMF acted as a guideline for the design of the ASON 
model. The four mechanisms of the CMF translate into the 
following four desired abilities of the ASON model.  
(1) Ability to form episodic memories, whereby each 
episode leaves a unique, distinctive trace that is easily 
distinguishable from memories of similar episodes 
(i.e., demonstrate feature binding and pattern 
separation).  
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(2) Ability to retrieve or reconstruct a complete 
representation when cued with only a small part of the 
original memory (i.e., exhibit pattern completion).  
(3) Ability to spread activation among related or 
associated concepts.  
(4) Ability to monitor memory using a mechanism that 
decides upon the trueness of each retrieved 
representation.    
 
We incorporate the four abilities in the ASON model as 
follows.  
(1/2) Feature binding and pattern completion. Feature 
binding is accomplished by using an associative network, or 
more specifically, an auto-associator. An auto-associator 
typically consists of one fully-connected layer. The 
network’s task usually is to produce an output that is similar 
to its input. When an input pattern is presented, the 
network’s connection weights are changed according to a 
Hebbian learning algorithm. Connections between 
simultaneously active neurons are strengthened, whereas 
connections between non co-active neurons are weakened. 
In this way, the network is able to associate co-occurring 
input elements. In addition, the auto-associator is able to 
completely reconstruct a stored pattern, when provided with 
only a small part of that pattern. In other words, it can also 
perform pattern completion (McLeod et al., 1998).    
(1/3) Pattern separation and spreading activation. In an 
auto-associative network, pattern separation is obtained by 
using sparsely distributed representations. A competitive 
network can be used to transform densely distributed input 
patterns into more sparse, separated patterns which can be 
processed by an auto-associator without suffering from 
interference. A specific kind of competitive network is the 
Kohonen network or self-organizing network (Haykin, 
1999). For our purposes, the self-organizing network has 
two important advantages over a standard competitive 
network. First, the self-organizing network creates a 
topological map of the input space (Haykin, 1999). A 
distributed, multidimensional input is transformed into a 
localist representation. The self-organizing principle ensures 
that the information regarding relations or similarities 
among input patterns is not lost in this transformation. By 
creating a topological map of the input space, the similarity 
between two input patterns is reflected in the lateral distance 
between the two neurons representing them. This is a 
biologically plausible way of representing information. 
There is evidence that at least lower level sensory 
representations are organized topologically (Haykin, 1999). 
However, it is still uncertain whether semantic information 
in higher association areas is represented in a topological 
way as well.  A second important characteristic of a self-
organizing network is that there is spreading of activation 
among neighboring neurons. When a specific neuron in the 
network is excited, activation spreads to its neighbors. The 
degree of spreading activation is a function of the distance 
between the excited neuron and its neighbor. The nearest 
neighbors receive the most activation, and activation 
decreases with increasing distance. Since the neighbors of 
the winning neuron represent concepts resembling the input 
pattern, there is spreading activation between related 
concepts. In this way the network resembles a semantic, or 
conceptual map. It is generally assumed that much of our 
knowledge is indeed stored in the form of semantic maps or 
knowledge structures.  
(4) Memory monitoring. A memory monitor mechanism 
may be implemented in the form of a module that modulates 
the response thresholds or connection weights of neurons in 
the associative layer.   
In the next section the incorporation of the ASON model 
is described in detail. 
The Associative Self-Organizing Network 
The ASON model, shown in figure 1, receives two different 
types of input; context input and stimulus input. Input is first 
processed by the input/output layer of the model. This layer 
is made up of two unconnected parts. One part processes 
contextual information, the other part deals with stimulus 
information. Both parts of the input/output layer have I 
neurons. The input of the model is formed by 
multidimensional binary patterns. In those patterns, each bit 
represents the presence or absence of a specific feature by 
which the stimulus (item) or context is characterized. The 
input patterns therefore reflect conceptual representations of 
different stimuli and contexts. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic drawing of the Associative Self-
Organizing Network. Each input pattern corresponds to one 
winning neuron in the hidden layer. Simultaneous 
presentation of a stimulus input and a context input causes 
an increase in the connection strength between the hidden 
neurons representing that stimulus and context, respectively. 
 
Information is propagated from the input/output layer to 
the hidden layer. The hidden layer consists of two self-
organizing maps. These maps are organized as two-
dimensional lattices, each having N × N neurons. The part 
of the hidden layer that represents stimuli is henceforth 
called the stimulus hidden layer. The neurons making up 
this layer are called stimulus neurons. The other part of the 
hidden layer is called the context hidden layer and the 
constituent neurons are called context neurons. Both hidden 
layers are fully connected to each other via two-directional 
modifiable associative connections.  
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The Four Processing Stages 
The processing of information in the ASON model proceeds 
in four stages: (i) the initialization stage, (ii) the topological-
mapping stage, (iii) the learning stage, and (iv) the 
performance stage. Below, we discuss each of these stages 
in detail.  
In the initialization stage, the connection weights between 
the input/output layer and the hidden layers, and those 
between both hidden layers are set to small random values.  
In the topological-mapping stage, contexts and stimuli are 
presented to the input layer of the network and, using the 
Kohonen learning algorithm or SOM algorithm (Haykin, 
1999), a topological organization in the hidden layers is 
created: semantically related concepts (overlapping input 
patterns) are represented by neurons that lie close to one 
another in the two-dimensional grid that makes up the 
hidden layer. In addition, associations are formed between 
stimuli and contexts. Whenever a particular stimulus co-
occurs with a particular context, there is simultaneous 
activation of the winning context neuron and the winning 
stimulus neuron. Following an associative learning 
algorithm, the (associative) connection between these two 
hidden neurons is strengthened. Simply said, the stimulus is 
coupled to the context. 
The learning stage simulates the learning phase of the 
DRM task. It refers to the presentation of the list items. 
During this stage, a number of stimuli are presented in one 
specific context -the learning context- and associations 
between the presented stimuli (the list items) and this 
context are formed. Due to spreading of activation, not only 
the connections between the winning context neuron and the 
winning stimulus neurons are strengthened, but also those 
between the context neuron and the neighbors of the 
winning stimulus neuron. The connections between the 
context neuron and even further neighbors of the winning 
stimulus neuron are actually decreased.  
During the performance stage, the network can either 
perform a recall task or a recognition task. When 
performing a recall task, a context input is presented to the 
network as a recall cue. The winning context neuron in the 
hidden layer is determined and activation is propagated 
forwards through the associative connections towards the 
stimulus hidden layer. The stimulus neuron that is most 
strongly associated to the winning context neuron is 
activated and propagates its activation to the stimulus 
input/output layer. The weights of the connections between 
the winning stimulus neuron and the input/output layer have 
changed during the topological-mapping stage so that they 
have come to resemble the input pattern to which this 
neuron responds most strongly. Therefore, propagating 
activation through these connections will result in an output 
that resembles the original input pattern to a large degree. In 
other words, reconstruction of the stimulus that is most 
strongly associated with the presented context takes place. 
Subsequently, the connection between the winning context 
neuron and the activated stimulus neuron is ‘blocked’, the 
stimulus neuron with the second-strongest association to the 
context is determined and the next stimulus is recalled.  
Most of the time, the stimulus recalled is one that was 
actually presented during the learning stage (a list item). 
Occasionally, however, the network recalls a stimulus that 
has not been presented. In other words, it has false 
memories. Clearly, false memories occur whenever there 
exists a strong association between the non-presented 
stimulus and the context, caused by spreading activation.  
When performing a recognition task, the network is 
presented with a number of stimuli, both list items and a 
number of non-presented distractors (including the critical 
item). Based on the stimulus input, the winning stimulus 
neuron in the hidden layer is determined. The strength of the 
association between this winning stimulus neuron and the 
learning context is determined. If the strength exceeds a 
certain threshold, the stimulus is marked as a target and as a 
distractor otherwise. The decision whether to accept or 
reject a retrieved item is based on the strength of its 
association to the learning context. Raising the threshold 
reduces the probability of falsely recognizing the critical 
item, but it also decreases the hit rate. On the other hand, 
lowering the threshold leads to more hits, but also to more 
false alarms. This process is a formalization of the memory 
monitoring or source monitoring mechanism in various 
theories of memory (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Johnson et 
al., 1993; Schacter et al., 1998).  
To evaluate the ability of the ASON model to exhibit the 
false-memory performance as observed in the DRM 
paradigm, we performed a number of simulations that are 
described in the following section.  
Simulations 
Our simulations focus on three aspects of false memories in 
the DRM paradigm: the DRM effect, the role of association 
strength and the output order effect. All simulations were 
performed with the following parameter values: I = 30 and 
N = 10. The results reported do not depend critically on 
these choices. 
 
The DRM effect The simulation of the DRM effect has two 
conditions; the DRM condition and a control condition. In 
the DRM condition, the network learns six list items that are 
semantically related to the critical lure. Their input patterns 
closely resemble the input pattern of the critical lure. In the 
control condition, the six list items are randomly chosen 
from the input set. After learning the six list items, the 
network performs a recall task. The results of the simulation 
are shown in figure 2. As is evident from the graph, the 
probability of recalling the critical lure is much higher in the 
DRM condition (P = 0.65) than in the control condition (P = 
0.05), but it is lower than the average recall rate of the list 
items (P = 0.78).  Hence, the ASON model simulates the 
DRM effect faithfully.  
 1378
Condition
List itemsCL DRMCL Control
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f r
ec
al
l
1,0
,8
,6
,4
,2
0,0
  
Lateral dis
32
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 fa
ls
e 
re
ca
ll
1,0
,8
,6
,4
,2
0,0
 
Figure 2: Probability of recalling the list items and the 
critical lure in the DRM (CL DRM) and control (CL 
Control) conditions. 
 
The effect of association False recall and recognition of the 
critical lure is affected by a number of factors. As stated in 
the introduction, the most important factor is the Mean 
Backward Associative Strength (MBAS). A stronger 
association between the list items and the critical lure is 
correlated with stronger false recognition and false recall 
effects (Roediger et al., 2001). In the Associative Self-
Organizing Network, spreading activation from the list 
items to the critical lure causes false recall and recognition 
of the latter. It is important to realize that in the ASON 
model concepts are related semantically instead of 
associatively. In contrast to what is proposed by the 
activation/monitoring framework, activation spreads along 
semantic relations rather than along associative connections. 
However, if we disregard this difference, we can define the 
Backward Associative Strength between two concepts as the 
lateral distance between the winning neurons that represent 
these concepts. The smaller the distance, the more related 
the two concepts are. In the network, the degree of 
spreading activation is a function of the distance between 
the excited neuron and its neighbor. Consequently, the 
smaller the average lateral distance between the list items 
and the critical lure, the stronger the activation of this 
critical item due to spreading activation from the list items 
will be. This stronger activation leads to a stronger 
association of the critical lure to the context, and therefore 
to an increasing likelihood of falsely recalling the critical 
lure. Figure 3a shows the results of a simulation in which 
the average lateral distance from the list items to the critical 
lure is varied. As can be seen, the probability of recalling 
the critical lure decreases sharply with increasing distance. 
The correlation between lateral distance and probability of 
recalling the critical lure is -.76. We compare our results 
with the results from a multiple regression analysis done by 
Roediger et al. (2001) where MBAS was found to be the 
strongest predictor of false recall of the critical lure (with 
the correlation between MBAS and probability of recalling 
the critical lure being +.73). Figure 3b shows the probability 
of recalling the critical lure as a function of MBAS, as 
found in the study of Roediger et al. (2001). Clearly, the 
results of the ASON model agree very well with those of 
Roediger et al. 
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Figure 3: The probability of recalling the critical lure as a 
function of (a) average lateral distance between list items 
and the critical lure: r = -.76, and (b) MBAS: r = +.73. 
 
The effect of output order In the third simulation we 
investigated the effect of output order on the probability of 
false recall. The output order effect (Schwartz et al., 1998) 
refers to the finding that the probability of a false memory 
increases with the position of items in the recall sequence.  
The output order effect can be explained by the variation 
in association strength of presented and non-presented 
stimuli. False memories occur when non-presented stimuli , 
become strongly connected to the learning context through 
the processes of spreading activation and association. The 
association strength of those stimuli to the context is usually 
smaller than that of the most strongly associated targets, but 
larger than that of the most weakly associated targets. Since 
memories are generated in the order of their association 
strength, the probability that a false memory is generated 
increases with the position in the recall sequence. In our 
third simulation, the network performed a simple recall task, 
rather than a DRM task. The network learned twenty stimuli 
in a single context. Afterwards it performed a recall task. As 
can be seen in figure 4a, the probability of a false memory is 
largest in the last quartile of the output. Figure 4b shows the 
results of Schwartz et al. (1998), in which subjects 
performed a similar task. Evidently, our results have a 
striking similarity to the experimental results of Schwartz et 
al. 
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Figure 4: Number of false positives as a function of output 
order. Results of (a) our simulations, and (b) Schwartz et al. 
(1998). 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The ASON model demonstrates how the essential features 
of a constructive memory system, as put forward by CMF, 
can be translated into a connectionist model. Specifically, 
the ASON model incorporates the encoding processes of 
feature binding and pattern separation, as well as the 
retrieval processes of pattern completion and memory 
monitoring. In addition, it explains how spreading activation 
leads to high false memory scores for the critical lure in the 
DRM paradigm. The remaining question is to what degree 
the model’s architecture resembles that of brain structures 
that are involved in the processes of storing, retrieving and 
monitoring of memory. 
The brain structure that is considered to be responsible for 
the storage of episodic memories is the hippocampus (Rolls 
& Treves, 1998). The hippocampus is not thought to be the 
site of storage itself. Rather it is regarded as the mechanism 
that binds together the sensory features of a situation or 
episode to create a unitary representation of the experience. 
In other words, it is the structure that performs feature 
binding. The hippocampus receives, via the adjacent 
parahippocampal gyrus and entorhinal cortex, inputs from 
virtually all association areas in the neocortex. In addition, it 
gets input from the amygdala and from cholinergic and 
other regulatory systems (Rolls & Treves, 1998). It thus 
receives highly elaborated, multimodal information from 
various sensory pathways. Within the hippocampus, 
information is processed along a mainly unidirectional path, 
consisting of three major stages; the Dentate Gyrus (DG), 
the Cornu Ammonis 3 (CA3) and the Cornu Ammonis 1 
(CA1). From CA1, backprojecting pathways lead via the 
subiculum and the entorhinal cortex back to the neocortex. 
The hippocampus shares two essential characteristics with 
our model. First, there is a large degree of interconnectivity 
among neurons in the CA3 area of the hippocampus. This 
interconnectivity makes this area perfectly suited to perform 
auto-association. In fact, the idea that the CA3 area serves 
as an auto-associator that binds together the various 
elements of an episode is a core assumption in a number of 
computational models (O'Reilly & Rudy, 2001; Rolls & 
Treves, 1998). Second, the hippocampus receives a load of 
multimodal information from various cortical areas. The 
forward pathways to the hippocampus are thus characterized 
by strong convergence. It is hypothesized that these 
pathways, and the DG in particular, serve as a competitive 
network, transforming the widely distributed information in 
the cortex into more sparse, orthogonal and separated 
patterns that can be processed by the auto-associator without 
much interference (O'Reilly & Rudy, 2001).  
Instead of a standard competitive network, the ASON 
model features a self-organizing map. The specific 
characteristics of this type of network, its ability to form a 
topological map of the input and spreading activation 
among neighboring neurons, can provide an explanation of 
false memories. Specifically, according to our model, false 
memories arise when activation spreads from the list items 
to the critical lure, causing a faulty association between this 
non-presented item and the learning context. This explains 
how false memories occur in the DRM paradigm, and gives 
an account of the effect of MBAS on false recall of the 
critical lure. 
By incorporating the four mechanisms of the CMF, the 
ASON model is able to simulate the occurrence of false 
memories in the DRM paradigm and the effects of MBAS 
and output order on the probability of false recall of the 
critical item. Furthermore, its architecture is compatible 
with that of the hippocampus, the brain area that is widely 
acknowledged as being involved in the storage and retrieval 
of episodic memories. We conclude that this connectionist 
operationalisation of the CMF is able to simulate and 
explain the main findings on false memories.  
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Abstract 
Past studies examining the effects of action on memory for 
route distance have overlooked the problem of the control of 
visual information. A new methodology was developed to 
investigate the involvement of action on the representation of 
route distance information in two experiments which 
eliminated the possible confounding effects of visual cues. In 
both experiments the number of turns was manipulated. 
Blindfolded participants learned new environments through 
verbal descriptions by imagining themselves walking in 
synchronization with metronome beats preset to match their 
natural walking speed. During turns, they were carefully 
moved. Following instructions, they performed an action at 
mid-route. Upon reaching the destination, their memories for 
the newly learned environments were tested through recall 
and measured again (with metronome beats representing 
footsteps). In Experiment 1 participants were exposed to the 
environment only once, and in Experiment 2 they were 
exposed to the environment twice. The results were consistent 
across the experiments and showed the influence of number 
of turns on remembered distances. Our data support the 
segmentation hypothesis with regard to the perception of the 
segment length and the influence of the number of turns on 
path distance estimates. However, our data point to a more 
parsimonious explanation in terms of body movement that 
triggers attentional processes which signal memory for events.  
Introduction  
When asked how far it is from one place to another there is 
much evidence that people do not give very accurate 
distance estimations. Investigations into the relationship 
between physical distance and cognitive distance have 
shown that the two differ. Furthermore, the differences 
between actual and cognitive distance are not random; 
cognitive distance is systematically distorted from the 
physical distance (Golledge, 1987).  
    The disparity in distance estimations has been explained 
as a function of the hierarchical organization of memory 
(e.g., Hirtle & Jonides, 1985; McNamara, 1986; Steven & 
Coupe, 1978), the organization of reference points (e.g., 
Sadalla, Burroughs, & Staplin, 1980), the modes of 
acquisition at learning (e.g., Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 
1982), the contexts of learning (e.g., Gauvain & Rogoff, 
1986; Taylor & Naylor, 2002), or the environment 
complexity (e.g., Sadalla & Magel, 1980; Thorndyke, 
1981). Hence there is a disparate range of explanations for 
biases in distance estimation. 
    One possible explanation for bias in distance estimation, 
which has not been explored in detail, is that it may be a 
function of the actions we perform in the environment, and 
how those actions are cued on retrieval. This may provide a 
means of incorporating these multiple accounts of distance 
bias within a single unified framework. The view that 
cognition is grounded in the individual bodily interaction 
with the environment (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997) 
is widely supported. Empirical evidence supporting the 
embodiment framework can be found across a range of 
domains. There is a tight coupling between visual 
perception and action. It has been shown that the 
representation of a visual stimulus generated from pictures 
or from purely linguistic descriptions can activate motor 
affordance, i.e., merely viewing an object, an image of an 
object, or hearing a description of an object results in the 
activation of the motor patterns necessary to interact with it  
(e.g., Richardson, Spivey, & Cheung, 2001; Tucker & Ellis, 
1998). In language comprehension, understanding a 
sentence may call upon the same cognitive mechanisms as 
those used in planning and executing actions (Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002). It has also been shown that the 
representation of action or motor representation shares the 
same neural mechanisms as those that are responsible for 
the preparation and programming of actual movements 
(Decety, Jeannerod, & Prablanc, 1989). This evidence 
indicates that motor activation can occur as part of a 
cognitive process.  
    A number of studies have examined the effects of turning 
during route navigation. Sadalla and Magel (1980) found 
that paths containing several turns were perceived as being 
longer than paths of equivalent objective length with fewer 
turns, and the segmentation hypothesis has been used to 
explain this effect. The segmentation hypothesis claims that 
a right angle turn divides a pathway into segments and that 
the perceived lengths of the segments are combined to 
produce an estimate of total pathway length. Given two 
pathways of the same length but differing in the number of 
turns contained in each, the pathway with fewer turns will 
necessary have longer segments. These segments will be 
psychologically compressed to a greater extent than shorter 
segments (longer segments are underestimated relative to 
shorter segments). Therefore, the combination of a number 
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of compressed segments will yield an underestimation of 
total pathway length. This underestimation will be greater 
for the pathway with fewer turns. However, this study does 
not separate out a range of possible explanations for these 
effects, such as visual cues, or the rate of motion (stepping 
up or down, or turning) that influence the perception of 
traversed distance (Hermann, Norton, & Klein, 1986; 
Rieser, Pick, Ashmead, & Garing, 1995). For example, 
Hermann et al. (1986) found that the size of the effect of 
turns on memory for distance is affected by the number and 
complexity of visual cues in the environment. Therefore, to 
examine whether action is implicitly part of cognitive 
processes, it is important to have strict control over the 
visual information that participants could perceive and 
extract from the environment during navigation, and the 
performance of action (walking and turning). A new 
methodology was developed that considered all these 
factors in order to allow us to adequately measure whether 
action exerts an effect on distance estimation during 
navigation. In the present study, we manipulated the 
influence of turns on traversed distances to assess more 
precisely the mental mechanisms that mediate why complex 
routes (with many turns) were estimated differently from 
less complex ones (with fewer turns). 
 
Experiment 1 
The methodology was designed to control for the 
confounding factors present in previous studies, while 
maintaining realism for participants. In order to do this, a 
blindfold methodology was developed where participants 
heard linguistic descriptions describing environments over 
headphones, and had to imagine themselves walking around 
the environment in time with a series of metronome clicks 
preset to control for speed of walk and size of step (number 
of clicks heard). The aim was for participants to listen and 
visualize the landmarks’ descriptions (thus minimizing the 
risk of participants gauging distances by counting steps).  
The environmental descriptions were formulated as guided 
tours, and were read by a female colleague and tape 
recorded for use in the experiments.  
     The linguistic descriptions used were controlled for 
number of words and detail presented. Typically the 
environments included five landmarks (e.g., a school, a 
museum, a post-office, a bank, a library, etc.). Each 
landmark was described by specifying its physical or 
historical features. Following is an excerpt of a typical 
description of an environment, used in the study (landmarks 
are in bold): “You are in a place called Charlestown, a typical 
New England town. Your starting place is Victoria Park. I am 
going to take you on a walk from Victoria Park to St John's 
Basilica. It is quite a nice walk with lots of things to look at on the 
way. You are now standing at the gate of a place called Victoria 
Park. Victoria Park is renowned for its formal and shrub gardens. 
They are of interest and beauty in all seasons. During summer, 
Victoria Park hosts a Folk Music Festival. … You are now at the 
entrance of a place called the Central Library. Built of silvery-
grey stone, the front of the building has columns and triple arches 
with elaborated decoration at the tops. Inside the Library, there is 
an intricately carved oak staircase. You are standing directly in 
front of the book return box. Now I will let you post the book in the 
return box. You can actually feel the return box in front of you. So 
feel the box and post the book. …”. 
    To encourage participants to visualize only the described 
scenes, a blindfold was used in order to eliminate visual 
information that they could have gathered from the test 
laboratory. Furthermore, to examine the influence of action 
the actual walking was replaced by mental walking. A 
metronome pre-set to each participant’s natural walking 
speed (stride length and frequency of stepping) emitted 
beats to simulate their walking rhythm. So instead of 
actually walking, participants heard a certain number of 
metronome beats, which corresponded to the exact measure 
of the distance to be traversed. When the distance was 
mentally traversed the metronome beats ceased. However, 
during the simulated navigation through the environment, 
participants performed an action (e.g., put an object into a 
box) which occurred at mid-route. This manipulation 
allowed us to determine whether there was any difference in 
the perception of distance before versus after performing the 
action on the representation of distance. Participants also 
experienced the change in angular displacement when 
he/she arrived at 90-degree turn in the mental walk. In this 
instance, they were rotated to face in the appropriate 
direction. Once participants reached the destination 
landmark, their memories for the newly learned 
environments were measured through recall. Participants 
were told that they were now at the starting landmark again 
and had to “walk” on their own towards the destination (still 
wearing the blindfold). They had to describe what they 
“saw” on the way, and to instruct the experimenter to 
engage/disengage the metronome to signal the start of the 
mental walk or to stop walking. The dependent variables 
were the remembered traversed distances, which were again 
measured by metronome clicks. The experimental 
arrangement is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Arrangement during tests. The participant is on the 
right, with the experimenter behind her. 
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Environment Characteristics. Participants learned two 
routes (Route A and Route B). They were not aware that 
Route B was the mirror image of Route A.  
     As each route contained 5 landmarks, there were 4 paths 
in each (denoted P1 to P4). Each path measured 64 meters 
which meant the total route length measured (64 m x 4) 256 
m. Ninety-degree turns divide a path into segments. Each 
route contained 11 segments. The segment lengths were 
fixed at 8, 12, 16, 24, 32, and 40 m.  These distances were 
combined to make up the length of 64 m for each path. 
Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of one of the 
environments used in the experiment. Note that in Route A, 
P1, P2, and P3 contained 1 turn each followed by P4 with 4 
turns; in Route B, P1 contained 4 turns followed by P2, P3, 
and P4 with 1 turn each. The performance of action 
occurred at mid-route (at the middle landmark); P1 and P4 
were located at the outer positions of each route, while P2 
and P3 were located at the inner positions of each route.  
 
 
Figure 2: Configuration of Route A, in Experiment 1 
 
Pilot Study. Before we ran the study, we tested the 
methodology on two pilot subjects in order to check 
whether they felt any discomfort during the test given that 
they had to wear a blindfold, and had to be physically turned 
during the testing procedure. However, the subjects 
commented that they were perfectly comfortable and 
relaxed during the test. We then proceeded to the first 
experiment using the new methodology. 
 
Presentation. The study was presented to the participants as 
an investigation into people’s memory for described places. 
They were told that they were going to listen to descriptions 
of imaginary walks through new environments, and were 
told that during the simulated walks they had to visualize 
the described landmarks. Additionally, they were asked to 
return a book or a parcel at some point en-route. The 
participants were not aware that their memory for distances 
was being tested. 
 
Experimental Design. To examine the influence of action 
and the effect of number of turns on traversed distances, the 
experimental design used was a 2 route (Route A vs. Route 
B) x 2 position (inner vs. outer) x 2 action (before action vs. 
after action) within-subjects design. 
 
Participants. Twenty-nine undergraduate students agreed to 
participate in the experiment in exchange for course credit. 
They were between 18 and 35 years old (mean age = 20.50, 
SD = 4.80). By agreeing to participant in the experiment, 
they were aware that they would wear a blindfold during the 
test. 
 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a 
session lasting about 45 minutes. Initially, participants were 
instructed to walk round the room (following a pre-
designated path) at their own natural walking speed so that 
step length and speed of walk could be established. Next, 
they were asked to put on the blindfold and headphones, and 
to stand comfortably at the centre of a circle marked on the 
floor. The experimenter familiarized the participants with 
the turning procedure: she spun the participant around on 
the spot, finishing by positioning him/her facing a box that 
was sitting on a table. At this time, the experimenter gave 
the participant the book or the parcel to carry with him/her. 
Then the participants were instructed to visualize the 
landmarks when they heard the descriptions, and to imagine 
walking in synchronization with the metronome clicks, and 
to stop imagining walking when the metronome ceased 
clicking. The experimenter then started the tape player and 
both listened to route descriptions through headphones. At 
the appropriate times, the experimenter stopped the player 
and engaged the metronome to implement the mental 
walking. During turns, the experimenter intervened by 
physically rotating the participants on the spot. Note that all 
turns were 90 degrees turns. At mid-route, participants 
performed the dispatch task as instructed, i.e., he/she 
extended his/her arm to reach the box, touched it to find the 
slot, and then dropped the objects into the box. Once the 
destination was reached, the experimenter spun the 
participant around again and positioned him/her in front of 
the box. Still blindfold, the participant’s route memory was 
tested through recall. After the recall of the first route, the 
second route was immediately presented which was 
followed straight away by the recall.  
    For the recall, participants were told that they were taken 
back to the starting place from which they had to re-walk 
the routes. They were asked to describe back as accurately 
as possible what they “saw” en-route. They had to tell when 
they wanted to walk away from the landmarks and when 
they wanted to stop walking, so that the experimenter could 
engage and disengage the metronome. At turns, they had to 
rotate themselves on the spot and to indicate verbally the 
direction of turns. Once it was established that participants 
understood the recall instructions, the experimenter 
switched on the recorder that participants carried with them. 
 
Data Treatment. The participants’ recalls were transcribed. 
Then we proceeded to check the order of landmarks recalled 
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by the participants. In order to ensure that participants had a 
good understanding of the environments they learned, only 
responses with the correct sequence of landmarks were used 
in the analyses.  
    Data were obtained by first translating the number of 
metronome clicks (= steps) into traversed distances 
expressed in meters. The accuracy of turns with regard to 
amplitude and direction was not recorded in the present 
experiment. 
Results 
Responses from 13 participants (45%) were excluded. 
Twelve of these produced incorrect sequences of landmarks 
for one or both routes, and the remaining participant was 
eliminated because of poor English. Responses from 16 
participants were used in the analysis (55%). 
     To check whether participants were not gauging distance 
by counting the number of steps a correlation between the 
total number of steps to walk Route A and Route B and the 
re-walked distances of both routes across participants was 
performed. The results showed no significant correlation, 
indicating that participants were not counting clicks and 
remembering the number of clicks on recall. As both Route 
A and Route B contained 11 segments each, in total there 
were 22 segments. For each segment, we averaged the 
remembered distances across participants in order to 
examine the correlation with the corresponding actual 
distances. We found an overall significant correlation 
between actual and remembered distances, r (22) = 0.68, p < 
0.001 (1-tailed), which indicates that longer segments were 
associated with remembering walking longer distances on 
recall. To examine the influence of action and the effect of 
number of turns on traversed distances, a 2 route (Route A 
vs. Route B) x 2 position (inner vs. outer) x 2 action (before 
action vs. after action) within-subjects ANOVA was 
performed on path distances. The results of the 3-way 
ANOVA are displayed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Results of the 3-Way ANOVA on Path Distance 
Estimation in Experiment 1. 
 
Source df and F value MS (error) Significance 
Route (R) F (1, 15) = 1.89 442.53 ns 
Position (P) F (1, 15) = 8.88 1922.00 ** 
Action (A) F (1, 15) = 0.93 94.53 ns 
R x P F (1, 15) = 0.90 105.12 ns 
R x A F (1, 15) = 0.85 195.03 ns 
P x A F (1, 15) = 0.30 128.00 ns 
R x P x A F (1, 15) = 8.44 430.13 * 
Note. ns: p > .05; *: p < .05; **: p < .01 
     
No main effects of route, or action were found. However, 
there was a main effect of position on remembered path 
distances. Overall, participants remembered walking 
significantly longer distances on the outer paths (one of 
which contained 4 turns) than on the inner paths (which 
contained one turn). There was also a significant 3-way 
interaction between route, position, and action on 
remembered path distances. Follow up analyses indicated 
that in Route A, after the performance of action the outer 
path (i.e., P4 contained 4 turns) was remembered as being 
significantly longer than the inner path (P3 contained 1 
turn), F (15) = 6.16, p < 0.05. In Route B, the reverse was the 
case; before the performance of action the outer path (P1 
contained 4 turns) was remembered as being significantly 
longer than the inner path (P2 contained 1 turn), F (15) = 
6.64, p < 0.05. This result confirmed that the influence of 
number of turns was a robust effect on remembered 
distances. 
Discussion 
We developed a new procedure in order to allow us to 
adequately measure whether action exerts an effect on 
distance estimation. During the experiment, none of the 
participants expressed any discomfort during or after the 
task, indicating that the methodology was appropriate.  
    That said, there was a large dropout rate (45%) due to 
participants not being able to reproduce the landmarks in the 
correct order (or to remember all the landmarks completely). 
This may have been because the task was too difficult, or 
because participants were exposed to the environment only 
once.  
     Despite the high dropout rate, we found that within the 
same routes, distance estimation was influenced by the 
number of turns contained in a path; paths containing four 
turns were remembered as being longer than paths with one 
turn. This result is in line with evidence from other studies 
(Sadalla & Magel, 1980), but with more control over visual 
information and action. Our procedure allowed us to 
observe the effect of number of turns on the same route 
through auditory simulated navigation, while Sadalla and 
Magel (1980)’s result was on separate paths, and involved 
actual walking. However, taking together both studies 
indicate that the influence of number of turns on memory 
for distance is a robust effect. 
    The absence of the effect of performing an action may be 
due to the salience of the action itself. The movement of 
dispatching (dropping) an object into a box may be 
perceived as a simple and routine activity therefore was not 
salient enough to exert an effect on spatial representation. A 
sequence of more pronounced movements to perform the 
dispatch task may make the action more memorable. For the 
moment, we were concerned by the high dropout rate. For 
that reason, in Experiment 2 we exposed participants to the 
same environments twice before their memories were tested 
using exactly the same methodology as in Experiment 1. 
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
The method used was the same as in Experiment 1, except 
that this time participants were exposed to each environment 
twice before recalling routes.  
    As in Experiment 1, participants learned two different 
routes (Route A and Route B), and then they had to 
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reproduce each route trip in free recall. Route A and Route 
B were presented to participants in counterbalanced order. 
 
Participants. Twenty-three undergraduate students agreed 
to participate in the experiment in exchange for course 
credit. Participants were between 18 and 46 years old (mean 
age = 24.17, SD = 7.84). They were tested individually. 
 
Procedure. The procedure was exactly the same as in 
Experiment 1, however here participants were guided 
through each route twice before their memories for each 
route were tested through free recall. The tests lasted about 
one hour. 
 
Results 
As in Experiment 1, to be included in the analyses 
participants’ responses must show the correct sequences of 
landmarks in both routes. Responses from 18 out of 23 
participants (78%) were used in the analyses. Responses 
from 5 participants (22%) were eliminated (4 incorrect 
sequences of landmarks, 1 poor quality recording). The 
exposure to the environment twice seemed to work as the 
rate of data inclusion has much improved, although there is 
still quite a high rate of exclusion. 
    On average, we found that short distances were 
overestimated, whereas longer distances were 
underestimated. The overall correlation between actual and 
remembered distances was highly significant, r (22) = 0.68, p 
< 0.001 (1-tailed). This result indicates that if the actual 
distances were longer, participants remembered walking 
longer distances as well.  
    To examine the influence of the number of turns, 
position, and action on path distance estimates, a 2 route 
(Route A vs. Route B) x 2 position (inner vs. outer) x 2 
action (before action vs. after action) within-subjects 
analysis of variance was performed on path distance 
estimates. There were no significant effects of route, or 
action. However, there was a main effect of position on path 
distance estimates. Overall, participants walked 
significantly longer distances at the outer paths (one path 
contained 4 turns) than the inner paths (1-turn paths). There 
was a significant 2-way interaction between route and 
action; before action, remembered distances were shorter in 
Route A than in Route B; however after action, remembered 
distances were larger in Route A than in Route B. This 
effect was observed because of the influence of number of 
turns. There was also a significant 3-way interaction 
between route, position, and action. As in Experiment 1, the 
follow up analyses indicated that in Route A, after the 
performance of action the outer path (i.e., P4 contained 4 
turns) was remembered as being significantly longer than 
the inner path (P3 contained 1 turn), F (17) = 4.09, p = 0.05. 
In Route B, the reverse was the case; before the 
performance of action the outer path (P1 contained 4 turns) 
was remembered as being significantly longer than the inner 
path (P2 contained 1 turn), F (17) = 9.41, p < 0.01. This result 
confirmed the robust effect of number of turns on 
remembered distances; the inner paths (P2 and P3) were not 
remembered significantly differently from one another. 
 
Discussion 
The fact that participants were exposed to the environments 
twice in order to acquire route knowledge substantially 
improved the data collection. Although the rate of exclusion 
was still high (22%) suggesting that some participants’ 
memories for routes were imprecise, the majority of 
participants produced the landmarks in the correct order, 
and therefore distance estimates could be analyzed. 
    The results replicated those in Experiment 1. As 
expected, the effect of number of turns was also observed in 
this experiment; paths with more turns were remembered as 
being longer than paths with fewer turns. The absence of the 
influence of action may be due to the salience of the action 
itself. A more pronounced sequence of movements to 
perform the dispatch task may make the performance of 
action more memorable thereby the prediction of a 
difference between remembered distances before and after 
the performance of action would stand more of a chance of 
being found if present. 
 
General Discussion 
The new procedure was developed with the aim of 
controlling confounding factors, such as visual cues and the 
speed of walk in order to adequately investigate whether 
action exerts an effect on distance estimation during 
simulated navigation. 
    To begin with, in general during tests participants 
claimed they felt comfortable and relaxed with the task, 
which indicated that the methodology was an appropriate 
and sensitive procedure, especially given that participants 
had to wear a blindfold for the whole duration of the test 
that lasted about one hour. However, despite the relatively 
high dropout rate, the data we collected across both 
experiments indicated nevertheless that the methodology 
was successful. Future studies could present the 
environment a third time, which might improve the 
inclusion rate further. 
    Let us now consider how our data fit with current theories 
of environmental knowledge. Our results are in line with the 
segmentation hypothesis with regard to the perception of the 
segment lengths and the influence of the number of turns on 
path distance estimates. However, we found the same effect 
of number of turns on remembered distances without 
actually traversing any distance. Our data actually point to 
an interpretation in terms of attention processes that signal 
memory for events. Participants heard the metronome clicks 
representing their footsteps during mental walks. It was 
clear that they had internalized distance and direction as 
well as turns information for use during recall that had 
enabled them to get from the starting landmark towards the 
final destination. As they were not walking any distance, 
they seemed to have been encoding the action of turning. In 
the absence of direct visual information, the body 
movement triggers the retrieval process; i.e., the 
1385
participants’ attention would focus on memory for events 
(actual turning). However, this form of representation is 
available for limited periods only; as time went on, memory 
faded and decayed (Thompson, 1983). The attention process 
then must be shifted in order to attend to the next event that 
came to mind. To proceed still further, the attention process 
had to be re-initialized. When walking naturally one average 
footstep measures about 70 cm, and there are two footsteps 
forward per second. Therefore, it will take 10 sec to walk 14 
m. It is not surprising in terms of the attentional process that 
people remember only a certain distance (14 m) given that 
they can focus their attention only for the first 10 sec during 
retrieval. The fact that participants remembered walking 
longer distances in paths containing 3 turns than paths 
containing 1 turn corresponded to the fact that they were 
actually moving (turning) more often in paths with several 
turns as well. Consequently, the more turns in a path the 
more attention shifts were required and the longer the 
perceived distance. The cognitive mechanism uncovered in 
the present study is different from that of the segmentation 
hypothesis. We attributed the fact that paths with more turns 
were remembered as being longer than paths with fewer 
turns to the attention shifts during the retrieval process, and 
suggested that the function of body movement was to re-
initialise the retrieval process.  
      Although the new procedure permits a more precise 
examination of processes involved in spatial judgment, 
work needs to be done regarding the large drop out rate. 
Maybe repeating the simulated walk three times would 
improve data collection. Additionally, the influence of 
action at the midpoint would stand more of a chance to be 
found if present by making the action more pronounced 
(through more extensive turning or walking on the spot).   
     More importantly, further work needs to be done in order 
to establish whether our results can be generalized. For 
example a comparison between the present study and a 
study where actual walking takes place is desirable.   
     Despite these limitations, the new procedure has allowed 
control over action and visual information during testing, 
and provides a means for future investigation of a range of 
possible action manipulations that have hitherto evaded 
controlled experimental procedures. It also provides 
important indication that basic processes underlying mental 
distance estimation seem to persist even in rather extreme 
sensory deprivation conditions. 
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Abstract 
 
The Context Dependent Sentence Abstraction (CDSA) 
model and Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) were 
compared in their ability to predict sentence similarity.   
Evidence supports the conclusion that the CDSA model 
better predicts human ratings for short phrases and 
sentences than does LSA.  Alternative theoretical reasons 
are given for this finding. 
 
Introduction  
Researchers in many disciplines within cognitive science 
have proposed and tested theoretical claims about the 
meaning of natural language expressions. One of the 
contemporary models is Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA; 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997). LSA is a statistical, corpus 
based technique for representing world knowledge. It 
computes similarity comparisons between words or 
documents by capitalizing on the fact that words are similar 
when they are surrounded by similar words (i.e., the 
company a word keeps).  
LSA takes quantitative information about co-occurrences 
of words in documents (paragraphs and sentences) and 
translates this into a K-dimensional space. The input of LSA 
is a large co-occurrence matrix that specifies the frequency 
of words in documents. LSA reduces each document and 
word into a lower dimensional space by using singular value 
decomposition. This way, the initially extremely large word-
by-document co-occurrence matrix is typically reduced to 
about 300 dimensions. Each word ends up being a K-
dimensional vector. The semantic relationship between 
words can be estimated by taking the cosine (normalized dot 
product) between two vectors. Although LSA performance 
has been shown to be impressive at the paragraph level 
(Foltz, Gilliam, & Kendall, 2000; Landauer, Laham, 
Rehder, & Schreiner, 1997), other research has found 
limitations of LSA at the sentence level (Kintsch, 2001).  In 
this paper we will present the Context Dependent Sentence 
Abstraction (CDSA) model, a corpus-based model that 
builds sentence meanings based on combinations of pooled 
adjacent neighbors of individual words.   We will first 
discuss a weakness with vector representational systems 
(e.g., LSA) in handling sentence comprehension and then 
turn to a description of the CDSA model, with evidence 
supporting it. 
 
A  weakness with LSA 
One major strength of LSA is its versatility and simplicity in 
handling word meaning and sentence meaning by the use of 
vector representations. It could be argued, however, that 
there are potential theoretical problems with combining 
word vectors to form sentences.  For example, the meaning 
created from a sentence in LSA is a linear combination of 
word vectors, without eliminating information for any word.  
Consider the sentence the cow ate in the field. In LSA all 
information about cows (e.g., animal, milk, burger), ate 
(e.g., food, grocery, digest), and field (e.g., grass, baseball, 
football) may be included in the sentence representation.  It 
could be argued that this assumption is not theoretically 
plausible because much of this associated information is not 
relevant to the word in context.  There must be constraints 
that narrow down the vast array of information that may be 
“primed” in the first stages of sentence comprehension.  
Indeed, Kintsch’s construction-integration model (1998) has 
attempted to explain this convergence of activated 
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information by principles that guide the integration 
mechanisms.   
Whereas the standard use of LSA is based on the 
assumption that a sentence’s meaning is the sum of all the 
individual word meanings, there are extensions. Kintsch’s 
predication algorithm (2001) tries to build meaning of a 
sentence by using syntactical information and LSA to create 
dependencies between subjects, predicates, and objects.    
For example, consider the sentences the horse ran and the 
color ran.  The context established by ran has different 
meanings in these two sentences. Therefore, in the 
predication algorithm, constraints are made on what ran 
means in these sentences.  The first step is to find the near 
neighbors of the word ran (i.e., words that give the highest 
cosine to ran).  For the horse example, all the neighbors of 
ran are compared to the word horse.  This provides words 
like walk, gallop, crawl, rode, etc.  These neighbors of ran 
that are closest to horse (i.e., highest cosine) are then 
included into the vector for the sentence the horse ran.  The 
same is done for the color example, resulting in different 
overall meanings. Including this additional information has 
been shown to more accurately capture the meaning of a 
sentence when we consider metaphor and causal inferences 
(Kintsch, 2001). 
Kintsch’s predication algorithm (2001) therefore imposes 
augmentations and constraints on the standard use of LSA. 
However, this algorithm still may not go the distance in 
solving the problem of information overload mentioned 
earlier.   That is, predicating the verb ate to cow does give 
relevant information like graze, but all information about 
cows and ate are also included.  To successfully implement 
context in the given example, we would want to include 
only information about “cows eating”, not about “cows and 
ate and graze and field and pasture”.  While the predication 
algorithm solves some problems by adding information, it 
also may be limited by not taking any information away. 
 
T he need for contextual constraints 
Computational representations like LSA go beyond general 
word meanings, but may not adequately handle contextual 
constraints.  LSA may go some distance in handling 
proposition meanings that constrain words in context 
(Kintsch, 1998), but there still is a large landscape of 
representations and algorithms for combining information 
from words.  We propose a new way of implementing 
contextual constraints.  These contextual constraints are first 
built from simple individual word meanings that get 
established over time from their occurrences in the 
environment. But as sentences are constructed, similarities 
between the words in the constrained construction build a 
new meaning different from the sum of its parts.  
 
The CDS  Model A 
Associationist frameworks (Landauer, 2002; Louwerse & 
Ventura, in press; Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1992) assume 
that it is critically important to measure and model the 
correlations between occurrences or events in the 
environment.  We pursued a corpus-based model of word 
and sentence meaning, called the Context Dependent 
Sentence Abstraction (CDSA) model.  In the CDSA model, 
semantic information within any word w is the pooled 
words that co-occur with word w in every context.  One of 
the goals of this model is to try and capture the associations 
between words under a new level of specificity that 
considers the pool of their surrounding words.      
In order to implement this model, it was necessary to 
make decisions about the learning rule and training set to be 
used. For this model, the deciding factor in each of these 
cases was psychological plausibility. That is, this model 
considers a corpus of prior experiences with words in 
context and the theoretical weights between words that 
change with experience, as opposed to a priori sets of 
features that are dictated by a brittle, symbolic model.  The 
central question is how these weights change with 
experience.  The proposed CDSA claims that they change 
by accumulating specific sentence exemplars.   
Consider two words chair and table.   The central 
question to be asked is what are all the possible relevant or 
useful relations that can exist between these two concepts?    
Each word has a neighborhood set that includes all words 
that co-occur with the target word.  These words are the 
extensional meaning of the target word and serve as the 
basis for all associations.     The neighborhood intersection 
is the relation that occurs when two words share similar co-
occurrences with other words.   Much like LSA, words 
become associated by their occurrence with many of the 
same words.  For example, food and eat may become 
associated because they both occur with words such as 
hungry and table.   Therefore the neighborhood set N for 
any word w is all the information we have in the exemplars 
for a word.    
       
N eighbor weights 
The neighborhood set for any word is intended to represent 
the meaning of a word from a corpus.   But there were 
several theoretical challenges that arose when we developed 
the model.  One dealt with how to differentially weight 
neighborhood words.   We assigned neighborhood weights 
to each neighborhood word n of word w according to 
Equation (1).   
 ( )
( ) ( )nfwf
wnf
wn
|=λ      (1) 
                                 
The expression f(n|w) designates the frequency of 
occurrence of the neighbor word n to target word w, 
whereas f(n) is the total frequency of the neighbor word n, 
and f(w) is the total frequency of the target word w. This 
formula essentially restricts the weights for the neighbor 
words as being between 0 and 1 in most cases.  We adopted 
this simple assumption but we acknowledge that there are 
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other ways to guarantee the range of the weights being 
within 0 and 1.   
Therefore, the weighting function was aimed at giving 
more importance to words that consistently co-occur and 
less importance to words that occur frequently in the corpus.  
Additionally, rare co-occurrences may be given low weights 
because they do not consistently co-occur with the target 
word.          
Some important assumptions had to be made in order to 
build relevant associations to target words most effectively.  
The next section will explain the procedures of the 
algorithm written to perform these operations.   
 
N eighborhood Intersection Algorithm 
In order to construct the neighborhood set for any word, an 
algorithm was written that pooled all words N that co-
occurred with the target word w.  We used the Touchstone 
Applied Science Associates (TASA) corpus because of its 
size (750,000 sentences) and diversity of topics (reading a 
diversity of texts up to college level). Each sentence in the 
corpus served as the context for direct co-occurrence. So for 
entire set of sentence sentences (s1...sC) that target word w 
occurs in, every unique word in (s1...sC) is pooled into the 
neighborhood set N.  For example the neighborhood of 
chair may consist of:  table, sit, leg, baby, kitchen, talk, etc.  
This represents the neighborhood N of each target word w.  
Each word in the set (n1...nK) of N is weighted by the 
function described in equation (1).  To evaluate the relation 
between any two words w1 and w2, we follow the following 
algorithmic procedure: 
 
1. Pool neighborhood sets for w1 and w2 (N1 and N2 
respectively), computing the weights for all the 
neighbor words using Equation (1).   
2. Calculate neighborhood intersection as follows:   
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The numerator is the summation of weights over the 
intersection of the neighborhood sets (N1 and N2) whereas 
the denominator is the summation of weights over the union 
of the two neighborhood sets.  This formula produces a 
value between 0 and 1.   
In the next section we will discuss how the CDSA model 
was evaluated. 
 
C DSA Model Evaluation 
In four experiments we evaluated the CDSA model against 
LSA and human raters.  The estimations of word and 
sentence meanings in the CDSA model and LSA were 
trained on the TASA corpus.   Ratings in all four 
experiments were made by 10 undergraduate psychology 
students who were instructed to rate the similarity of various 
pairs of words (i.e., primarily from words from Spellman, 
Holyoak, & Morrison, 2001) on a 6-point scale that varied 
from 1 (very unrelated) to 6 (very related).   A rating of 1 or 
2 meant the rater could not easily find a functional or 
physical relationship between the word pairs (e.g. fish-
office). The mean among the raters for each pair was taken 
as the basic data to test the models.        
 
Experiment 1  
Word Pairs A total of 64 word pairs was constructed that 
had a frequency over 10 in the TASA corpus.  Some of the 
words were expected to be unrelated (e.g., chair-hear) and 
some related (e.g., chair-sit) in order to provide a sensitive 
range of values.   
 
R esults and Discussion  
Human ratings (M = 3.57, SD = 2.20) were significantly 
correlated with the values produced by the CDSA model, r 
= .71, p < .001, and with LSA cosines, r = .78, p < .001.  So 
both models fared quite well in accounting for the ratings of 
word pairs.    
Neighborhood intersection estimation shared a relation to 
human ratings, so we might conclude that this type of 
association between words is used in human judgments.   
That is, by using all the co-occurrence information about a 
word, one can capture the meaning of a word.   As can be 
seen, LSA was slightly more predictive of word relations 
than the CDSA model, although the difference was not 
statistically significant. 
  The lack of difference between models may be due to 
the construction of neighborhood sets for a single word in 
the CDSA model.  Since there are many neighbors that exist 
for any particular word, there are many degrees of freedom 
that exist for determining the meaning for a single word.  
For instance, if one is asked to give an association to the 
word cow, there are many possible associations (e.g., 
animal, milk, burger, etc), which will lead to a very general 
non-specific representation of a single word.    
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to try to use the model to 
represent the meaning of word-pairs.  This involves 
imposing constraints on the neighbors for each pair in order 
to more accurately represent the contextual meaning of the 
pair.   For instance, cow-graze should give a more specific 
representation of cow than cow without a context because 
constraints are built on the meaning of cow.  These 
constraints initially involve measuring the neighborhood 
overlap between the neighbors of cow and the neighbors of 
graze, which then are used to compare to another set of 
information (e.g., word, sentence).    
 
Experiment 2  
A central theoretical assumption in Experiment 1 was the 
idea that neighborhood intersection plays a prominent role 
in the relation between words.  But how can the current 
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model account for conceptual relationships beyond the word 
level?  Figure 1 gives an illustration of how this could be 
done.  If two pairs are being compared, the neighborhood 
overlap of each pair is pooled into F1 and F2.  Then the 
intersection (Equation 2) is calculated to access the 
similarity between the two pairs.  This constrains the 
degrees of freedom for the pair, which eliminates any 
information that is not mutually shared by both words in the 
pair (i.e., the problem found in Kintsch’s predication 
algorithm). Therefore, each word is always dependent on 
the context in which it appears. As the context for a word 
becomes more specific (i.e., as reflected by the number of 
unique words it appears with), the less likely that the same 
context will be associated with any random word.  For 
instance, chair-sit has a smaller neighborhood set than the 
sum of neighbors for chair and the neighbors for sit.  This 
assumption therefore states that word pairs, or even 
sentences, are different than the sum of its parts, an 
assumption quite different from current models of 
associative learning like LSA.    
Additionally the union of the neighborhood weights (i.e., 
the entire neighbor weights of all words in each pair) was 
calculated for F to compare the effectiveness of intersecting 
the neighborhoods. 
 
Word Pairs We constructed 53 word pairs that had a 
frequency over 10 in the TASA corpus.  Separate sets of 
pairs were intended to be unrelated (e.g., bear/cave—
pen/write), related by analogy (e.g., bear/cave—fish/pond), 
or related by both analogy and semantic relation (e.g., 
teeth/bite—leg/kick).   
 
R esults and Discussion 
Human ratings (M = 3.46, SD = 1.62) were significantly 
correlated with CDSA intersection, r = .60, p < .001, and 
union, r = .51, p < .001.    LSA cosines were also related to 
human similarity ratings, r = .64, p < .001.   
It appears that imposing context reduced the correlation 
with rated similarity of 2-word pairs, compared with single-
word pairs.  As can be seen LSA performance also drops.  
Most notably, the union of neighbor sets does not perform 
as well as the intersection version of the CDSA model.  
 
       
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to examine how 
performance would be affected by implementing more 
context through comparison of 3-word phrases. 
 
Experiment 3  
The process we used in building constraints on three-word 
combinations involves a multinomial neighborhood overlap 
(N-O) among all neighborhood pairs.   Each neighbor that is 
shared by at least two neighborhoods is then pooled into F.  
Figure 2 gives an illustration of how this can be achieved.. 
                                   
Figure 1:  The recursive nature of neighborhood overlap.  
The neighborhood overlap (F1) of chair (N1) and sit (N2) is 
intersected with to the neighborhood overlap (F2) of bed 
(N3) and lay (N4 ).   
Figure 2:  3-word neighborhood overlap for two 3-word 
combinations.   The neighbors of each combination are 
compared for neighborhood overlap, which are then pooled 
into a neighborhood F for each pair. 
 
M odel modifications 
Neighborhoods were first built on words within the pair as 
described in equation 1.  As described in Figure 1, the 
neighborhood N1 of chair is intersected with the 
neighborhood N2 of sit to yield a new neighborhood F1 that 
represents the “chair sit” neighborhood.  Since any shared 
neighbor in N1 and N2 each have a separate weight, the 
average of the two weights (Equation (3)) is calculated to 
represent the new weight for each neighbor in F1.  
 [ ]
211 2
1
2 wnwnwwn
λλλ +=        (3) 
  
In the same manner, we obtain F2. Once F1 and F2 have 
been calculated for both word-pairs, the neighborhood 
intersection is calculated (as described in Equation (2)), to 
access the relationship between the 2-word pairs.  
M odel Modifications 
Equation 3 is used to compute weights for the words that are 
in the intersection of any two neighborhoods (o1, o2, and o3).   
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By making all possible intersections between each 
neighborhood N1,  N2, and N3, a select number of words may 
be counted three times.  Therefore neighbors shared by all 
three sets (o4; see figure 2) will be averaged (i.e., divided by 
3) and eliminated from any other N-O to avoid multiple 
counts.   The computation for the weights in the intersection 
of the three neighborhoods is simply an extension of 
equation 3, where the average is taken with three weights 
instead of two.  Additionally each neighbor in o4 is a special 
neighbor because it is shared by all neighbor sets.  Therefore 
these neighbors are multiplied by a constant of 3 (i.e., since 
there are three sets) to give greater importance to these 
context bound neighbors.  Once F1 and F2 have been pooled 
together by all the N-O for each pair, the neighborhood 
intersection is calculated (Equation 2), to access the 
relationship between the 3-word pairs.  
Additionally the union of the neighborhood weights (i.e., 
the entire neighbor weights of all words in each pair) was 
calculated for F to compare the effectiveness of intersecting 
the neighborhoods. 
 
Short phrases We constructed 58 three-word phrases that 
had a frequency over 10 in the TASA corpus.  Some pairs 
were intended to be unrelated (e.g., bird/nest/fly—
brush/paint/art), related by analogy-like relations (e.g., 
gun/shot/bullet — axe/chop/wood), and related by both 
analogy and semantic relation (e.g., dog/loud/bark—
cat/quiet/meow). 
 
R esults and Discussion 
Human ratings (M = 3.10, SD = 1.78) were significantly 
related to the CDSA intersection, r = .63, p < .001, and 
union, r = .44, p < .001.    LSA cosines were related to 
human similarity ratings, r = .47, p < .001.    The results 
give evidence that imposing context improves performance 
in calculating similarity. Furthermore, LSA performance 
continues to drop as more word context is introduced.  This 
in part could be due to the lack of constraints that are put in 
the sentence representation in LSA.    
 
Experiment 4  
The purpose of the present experiment is to test the CDSA 
model to sentences of varying lengths (i.e., sentences 
ranging from 4 to 6 words).  One challenge that arises in 
calculating sentence similarities is how to handle all the 
possible intersections between word neighbors within one 
sentence.  Therefore three conditions were tested on how to 
calculate the final sentence neighbor set F. First, a 
multinomial approach entailing N-O among all 
neighborhood sets was pooled to get F.  Weightings were 
computed between any N-O words as an extension of 
Equation 3, where the neighborhood intersections could 
entail 2-6 neighborhoods. 
Second, a word-chunking maximum likelihood approach 
was used that calculated a set P for every three words in a 
sentence (Johansson, 2000).   This chunking approach using 
a 3-word context to any target word was found to give equal 
performance to 5-word and 7-word contexts in syntactic 
tagging.  So if a sentence had five words, a multinomial    
N-O calculation between the 1st 2nd and 3rd word 
neighborhoods would produce P1 (i.e., as described in 
Experiment 3), then N-O would be calculated between the 
4th and 5th neighborhood words to produce P2 (as described 
in Experiment 2).  Then the N-O between P1 and P2 would 
be calculated to produce the final neighborhood F for the 
sentence.  The intersection between F1 and F2 (Equation 2) 
will give the final similarity between the two sentences.  
This word-chunking hypothesis is consistent with the 
intuition that adjacent words in a sentence constrain 
meaning more than nonadjacent words in a sentence.   
Finally, the union of the neighborhood weights (i.e., the 
entire neighbor weights of all words in each pair) was 
calculated for F to compare the effectiveness of intersecting 
the neighborhoods. 
 
Sentences We constructed 42 sentences whose words had a 
frequency over 10 in the TASA corpus.  Sentences pairs 
were constructed of varying length (e.g., blue bird fed 
babies nest tree -- bear protected cubs den; articles, 
pronouns and prepositions were removed).   Sentences were 
constructed so that about half were considered related and 
half unrelated. 
 
R esults and Discussion 
Human ratings (M = 2.12, SD = 1.48) were significantly 
correlated to CDSA model 3 word chunking intersection, r 
= .69, p < .001, CDSA union, r = .65, p < .001, and the 
CDSA multinomial intersection, r = .56, p < .001.   LSA 
cosines were also related to human similarity ratings, r = 
.50, p < .001.   
The results give evidence that imposing context may be 
important when calculating sentence similarity.   By 
applying an arbitrary rule set to sentences of varying lengths 
seems to yield better performance than just making all 
possible intersections among neighbors.   Alternatively, the 
union of all the neighbors seems to perform just as well as a 
rule based intersection procedure.    Possible reasons for this 
will be discussed next.  
 
General Discussion  
In sentence comprehension, comprehenders must 
understand the nature of word context and the constraints 
one word places on another (Kintsch, 1998).  In other 
words, comprehenders will have to ask themselves: how 
does the meaning of one word affect the meaning of another 
word?   The most straightforward relationship among words 
is an additive one, where the meaning of one word has no 
influence on the meaning of another word.  In contrast, in 
the case of sentence comprehension, the levels of a one 
word can dramatically change the effects of another word.  
In this model, context refers to N-O among words in a 
sentence.  That is, changing levels of one word can 
dramatically affect the meaning of another word.  Thus, 
without structural constraints involving processes similar to 
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N-O, sentence meanings proceed in a radically different 
manner.   Many relations shared between the pairs in the 4 
experiments were abstract relations, ones that were only 
clearly established by filtering the individual word meanings 
and keeping shared information among words.    
The word-chunking N-O approach appears to perform 
better than the multinomial N-O approach among all 
neighbors.  Making all possible intersections among 
neighbors does not seem to be very psychologically 
plausible since it would involve making many comparisons 
between words that may not be relevant.  For instance, 
comparing the first word to the last word in a sentence may 
not be important in evaluating the meaning of a sentence. 
 
P ossible improvements 
As can be seen in experiment 4, N-O did not seem to help 
predict sentence similarity to a great extent over the union 
of all the neighborhoods in a sentence.  This may be due to 
the arbitrariness of the rules used to calculate N-O for 
varying sentence lengths.  For instance, if the sentence was 
6 words long, N-O would be calculated for the three words 
and the last three words.   With these two pools we would 
then calculate F.  This type of rule makes the assumption 
that all 6-word sentences follow the same syntactic 
structure.  This obviously will not do for all 6-word 
sentences.  Therefore, it seems likely that if the CDSA 
model was implemented with a syntactic parsing 
mechanism, it could give the correct word pairs to calculate 
N-O for any sentence.   
 
Conclusion  
The computational model presented here captures both word 
and sentence meaning. There are several reasons why using 
the CDSA model is advantageous.  First, it uses simple 
mechanisms that are psychologically plausible.  Second, it 
gives the freedom to add more information to the corpus at 
any time.  Since the measures derived are computed on-line 
on the corpus, dynamically adding text to the corpus is not a 
problem.   Essentially, many weights are changed between 
words as soon as text is added.      
The proposed computational model captures word and 
sentence meaning by appealing to constraints reflected in a 
corpus analysis. Embodiment theorists (Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000) may claim that there is no meaning 
derived from a corpus analysis because the words are not 
grounded in sensory-motor experience.  In principle, one 
could have a more grounded corpus with units extensively 
embedded in sensory and motor experience.  The TASA 
corpus was simply readily available. Whether the episodic 
experiences are reflected in TASA or in sensory-motor 
experience, the theoretical assumptions of the CDSA model 
are that, specific exemplars and associative processes are 
sufficient to account for the judgments of meaning 
similarity.  The CDSA model uses simple mechanisms that 
rely on co-occurrences of words in exemplars. 
One additional advantage of the CDSA model is that it 
allows more information to be added to the corpus at any 
time.  Since the measures derived are computed on-line on 
the corpus, dynamically adding text to the corpus is not a 
problem.   Essentially, weights are changed between words 
as soon as text is added.      
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Abstract 
In this paper, a two by three approach to modeling categorization is 
presented. Similarity representations based upon a geometric, an  
additive tree and an additive cluster model are combined with an 
exemplar model and a prototype model in a single approach. The 
six models are applied to the categorization of pictorial known and 
unknown fruits and vegetables (Smits et al., 2002). For novel 
stimuli, the geometric exemplar model and the cluster models gave 
the best account, indicating a strategy where people compare 
stimuli with stored members on more general continua or a limited 
set of features.  For well-known stimuli, the tree-based models 
gave the best account of the data, suggesting more elaborate 
taxonomic knowledge. More generally, the results show that 
different categorization models may perform better for different 
sets of stimuli, and that a systematic empirical comparison of such 
models is needed.  
Introduction 
A major contribution of categorization research over the last 
decades has been to establish the relation between similarity 
and categorization. Rosch and Mervis’ (1975) seminal paper 
on the graded structure of categories showed that categories 
are ill-defined, and that the extent to which an instance of a 
category is seen as a typical member is positively related to 
similarity towards the category in question and inversely 
related to similarity towards relevant contrast categories 
(e.g., Verbeemen et al., 2001). Given the importance of 
similarity in categorization, a formal model should take a 
clear stance on two issues: The nature of similarity 
computation and the relevant objects of comparison in this 
calculation.  First, the model must make assumptions about 
the nature of similarity, especially when the structure of the 
stimuli under investigation is not experimentally 
controllable. There are two main approaches to similarity, 
geometric and feature-based. The geometric approach (e.g., 
Carroll & Arabie, 1980; Shepard, 1964) represents stimuli 
in abstract space where similarity is inversely related to the 
distance between stimuli. In the feature-based approach (e.g. 
Shepard & Arabie, 1979; Tversky, 1977), similarity is 
considered a function of feature overlap, where 
commonalities increase and differences decrease overall 
similarity. Second, a model should specify the objects used 
in similarity calculation. In particular, information 
employed in making category decisions may be stored at the 
category level, or it may be stored at the level of individual 
instances of a category. The former approach is known as 
the prototype view (e.g., Hampton, 1979; Smith & Minda, 
1998), and the latter as the exemplar view (e.g., Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986). In this paper, we argue for 
a systematic evaluation of these formal models in a two by 
three approach that compares prototype and exemplar 
models on the one hand, and geometric and feature 
representations on the other hand.  
The Generalized Context Model and a 
Geometric Prototype Model 
In the generalized context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1984, 
1986, 1992), an exemplar model, categorization is assumed 
to be a function of similarity towards all relevant stored 
exemplars. In case (physical) dimensions are unavailable, 
the GCM fitting procedure starts with a multidimensional 
scaling procedure (MDS; Borg & Groenen, 1997) on 
proximity measures of all stimuli involved. The coordinates 
of these stimuli are then used as input for the model. In the 
case of two categories, A and B, the probability that stimulus 
x is classified in category A is given by: 
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X)|P(A −+=                                             (1)  
 
where βΑ   lies between 0 and 1 and serves as a response 
bias parameter towards category A. The parameters ηXA and 
ηXB denote the similarity measures of stimulus x toward all 
stored exemplars of category A and B, respectively: 
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with yxk and  yjk as the coordinates of stimulus x and the j-th 
stored exemplar of category A (or B for ηXB, respectively) 
on dimension k. The weight of the k-th dimension is denoted 
by wk, with all weights restricted to sum to 1. The power 
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metric, determined by the value of r, is usually given a 
value of either 1 or 2, corresponding to city-block and 
Euclidean distance, respectively.  
A prototype model can be constructed with the GCM as a 
start (Nosofsky, 1986, 1987, 1992; Smits et al., 2002). With 
the prototype defined as the central tendency of a category 
(Malt & Johnson, 1992; Malt & Smith, 1984; Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975), the object created by taking, on each 
dimension, the average coordinate over all members of the 
category, is a good way to define a prototype. The similarity 
function changes to: 
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where ky.  denotes the mean value of all stored members of  
category A on dimension k. We will refer to (3) in 
combination with (1) as the Geometric Prototype Model 
(GPT). 
 A number of studies have already been conducted that 
compared prototype and exemplar models (e.g., Nosofsky, 
1992; Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002; Smith & Minda, 1998, 2000; 
Smits et al., 2002). In many, the GCM performed better than 
prototype models. In the next section we elaborate on the 
major alternative to geometric similarity models, the 
contrast model (Tversky, 1977). 
The Contrast Model and Categorization 
In the contrast model, similarity between two stimuli is 
defined as a function of the features that these stimuli 
possess: 
        
)()()(),( ABfBAfBAgbaSim −−−−= βαθ I                  (4) 
 
where )( BAg I  is a function of the features shared by 
objects a and b (the common features), and )( BAf −  and 
)( ABf −  are functions of the features that belong to one 
stimulus but not the other (the distinctive features). 
Different models have been proposed, mostly focused on 
either the common feature component or the distinctive 
feature components. 
Pruzansky, Tversky and Carroll (1982) reanalyzed 20 data 
sets taken from various published studies, divided into two 
groups depending on the hypothesized structure of the 
stimuli used: conceptual (e.g., vegetables) and perceptual 
(e.g., polygons) stimuli. For 10 out of 11 studies of 
conceptual stimuli, analyses of proximity data proved better 
when performed by ADDTREE, a distinctive features 
approach to similarity. Seven out of nine studies of 
perceptual stimuli showed a clear advantage for low-
dimensional MDS solutions.  
A number of studies have been conducted that compared 
geometric and featural exemplar models. Lee and Navarro  
(2001) used additive clustering to extract common features 
from similarity data and provided excellent accounts of an 
artificial learning experiment with ALCOVE (Kruschke, 
1992). Takane and Shibayama (1992) analyzed 
identification data of digits taken from Keren and Baggen 
(1981) and they too obtained excellent results for a featural 
version of the similarity-choice model (Luce, 1962) based 
on ADDTREE (Corter, 1982; Sattath & Tversky, 1977). 
Whereas clustering provides a very flexible way of 
representing similarity, allowing for overlapping clusters, 
additive trees are more restrictive in that they impose a 
hierarchy. There are, however, reasons to apply tree models, 
especially in the case of conceptual knowledge.  A tree 
model produces, in general, a higher amount of features for 
the total set than additive clustering. But the amount of 
shared features is lower in general, and most weight is given 
to idiosyncratic features. This may be appropriate for well-
known stimuli (McCrae & Cree, 2002), as people can be 
expected to have a fair amount of background knowledge 
about these stimuli, but it is unclear whether this is plausible 
in the case of novel stimuli.      
The implementation of the feature structure in the GCM 
yields the featural exemplar model with similarities as: 
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where yjk = 1 if stimulus j has feature k and yjk = 0 
otherwise. Therefore, the term yxk (1-yjk) is 1 if and only if 
the target stimulus x possesses the feature and the 
“reference” stimulus j does not, and vice versa for yjk (1-yxk). 
Each feature has a weight wk that corresponds to the length 
of the segments in the tree. We will refer to this model as 
GCM-F (generalized context model – featural).  
The featural prototype model will be illustrated using 
Figure 1, for an additive tree solution for birds and 
mammals. Distances between objects are defined by the 
sum of the horizontal segments on the shortest path between 
two stimuli (vertical segments are added for visual ease 
only). Each segment represents a feature that applies to all 
of its children with more general features closer to the left 
(“root”) and more specific features located towards the right 
(endpoints) of the tree. The model is again formally similar 
to the featural GCM with the prototype treated as a pseudo-
exemplar. The distance function equals: 
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where ypk is 1 if the prototype of A has the feature, and 0 
otherwise. The frequency weighting term corresponds to the 
relative frequency or proportion with which the feature  
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Figure 1: Example of a rooted additive tree. 
 
occurs within A, i.e. the proportion of stored members of 
category A that possess that particular feature. This 
corresponds to the idea that the impact of the features in the 
prototype, which is seen as a pseudo-exemplar, depends on 
the prevalence of those features in the category1. We will 
refer to this model as FPT (featural prototype model). 
 The application of the featural models to an additive 
clustering solution, i.e. a common features model, is 
straightforward, as the feature structure is defined. This is 
not the case for additive trees as they produce distinctive 
features: a feature that adds to the difference between two 
stimuli may belong to one or the other. This is not a 
problem for exemplar models as distances between objects 
remain unchanged, but it will be required for a prototype 
model. To define a particular structure, one needs to define 
a root. If the root in Figure 1 is placed anywhere else it 
would imply that some members of one category possess 
some of the most general features of the other category but 
share none of the features belonging to members of their 
proper category. This is implausible as it would imply that 
some stimuli are seen as members of a category on a purely 
idiosyncratic basis and not because they share any features 
with that category, even though these stimuli would possess 
the most general features of a related contrast category. 
Therefore, in the remainder of this article, we will assume 
that the root is placed on the segment or path that best 
approximates this linearly separable structure (Medin & 
                                                          
1 As the similarity structure was derived from the presented 
stimuli, we assume that a presented exemplar has all of its features 
to the full extent. Because a prototype is a construction after 
encountering exemplars, we assume that the activation and impact 
of its features is dependent on the frequency of those features in its 
own category (Kellogg, 1980). Because the prototype is treated as 
a pseudo-exemplar, we assume that its features can be no more 
than fully active (in the case of a feature that applies to all of its 
members), resulting in a factor of 1. We assumed that the features 
of stored exemplars in the exemplar model were not weighted 
dependant on the frequency of occurrence in other exemplars. This 
was confirmed post hoc: fit values were much worse when 
weighted for frequency.  
 
Schwanenflugel, 1981) for stored (well known) categories2. 
(This implies that one has to decide, a priori, which objects 
are considered to be stored members of a given category, as 
is the case for all other models. The choice of a root that 
best approximates separability serves to define the feature 
structure and not category membership for stored items, 
which is already determined.) 
Analysis of Smits et al.’s data 
Smits et al. (2002) analyzed a stimulus set consisting of 
pictures of 79 well-known items, retained after an exemplar 
generation task for the categories fruit and vegetables, and 
30 fruits or vegetables, mostly exotic, that were completely 
unknown to participants. Ten participants completed a 
feature applicability task for all stimuli, for the 17 most 
frequently generated features for fruit and vegetables, 
generated by a different group of thirty participants. (Taking 
the most frequently generated features ensures that the 
analysis is not clouded by potentially unreliable features that 
are important to only a few subjects.) A similarity matrix 
was then obtained by correlating the feature applicability 
vectors for all 109 stimuli, after summing over participants. 
A different group of thirty participants classified the well-
known stimuli as belonging to either fruit or vegetables. A 
group of twenty different participants did the same for the 
novel stimuli. Smits et al. then predicted category decisions 
based on the geometric versions of the GCM and the GPT 
and found a clear advantage of the GCM over the prototype 
model. Since their data from the categorization task had a 
fair amount of variance in the categorization proportions 
even for the well-known stimuli, it is possible to fit the 
respective models to old and novel stimuli separately. 
Therefore, we will analyze the data in a 2 × 3 × 2 
framework, where the last factor is added to assess the fit of 
the models for old and novel stimuli separately.  
Generating Similarity Representations 
In order to obtain dimensions, similarities between 109 old 
and novel fruits and vegetables were reanalyzed with 
ALSCAL (Takane, Young & De Leeuw, 1977), using the 
BIC criterion (Schwarz, 1978)3 to determine the optimal 
                                                          
2 ADDTREE starts by grouping together the closest pair of objects, 
and then creates a dummy object with the average of the distance 
of the original objects to all other objects. This procedure is 
repeated until there are three objects left, and the root is placed so 
as to minimize the variance to the last three objects. Here we 
minimize the variance on the path that provides the best linear 
separation for well-known stimuli in a similar way. 
3 BIC = -2 ln(L) + k ln(n), where L is the likelihood value (the 
probability of the data given a certain model), k is the number of 
free parameters, and n is the number of data points. Lower means 
better, and only the difference in free parameters needs to be taken 
into account. The first term decreases with increasing model fit, the 
second is a penalty term that increases with the number of free 
parameters and data size. As such, the measure is a trade-off 
between model fit and model complexity. The statistic is most 
appropriate when the information provided by the data is relatively 
large as compared to any prior information, as is the case in all the 
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dimensionality (Lee, 2001b). A three-dimensional solution 
was chosen that explains 96 percent of the variance. 
 Following the same procedure for additive clustering, an 
analysis with ADCLUSGROW (Lee, 2001a) resulted in 32 
clusters that explained 96 percent of the variance.  
Finally, the same similarity matrix was reanalyzed using 
ADDTREE/P (Corter, 1982). The explained variance was 
84 percent.  The algorithm does not readily lend itself to the 
BIC-guided approach and usually fits to maximum 
complexity, in this case with 209 arcs (features). To the 
extent that this may cause the fitting of error, it may cause a 
drawback for the categorization models as the error would 
be “plugged” into the model, clouding the explanatory 
power of the underlying feature structure. At first sight this, 
and the lower fit value, would indicate that these models are 
less appropriate. 
(It is important to note that these analyses were based on 
correlation patterns and not on the rough feature vectors, so 
the similarity algorithms, especially in the featural 
approach, are in no way restricted to have as much or less 
features than the original feature vectors.) 
Fitting the Similarity Representations to the 
Categorization Models 
The geometric models were fitted with the Euclidean 
distance metric (r = 2), as this resulted in clearly better fit 
values. The GCM and GPT were fitted as discussed 
previously with four free parameters: the bias parameter β, 
the sensitivity parameter c, and two dimension weights, as 
weights are restricted to add to 1. Feature weights for the 
tree- and cluster-based models were taken from the original 
solutions, however, to keep the number of parameters 
feasible for estimation, hence there are two free parameters, 
β and c. Stored members are the same in all models and are 
based on the earlier exemplar generation task. (Note that the 
tree-based models were based on the original ADDTREE 
solution after placing the root so as to provide the best linear 
separation, for known stimuli, between fruit and vegetables. 
Compared to the actual generation task for well-known 
stimuli, only one item, rhubarb, was generated as a fruit but 
closer to vegetables according to the ADDTREE solution.4)  
Results and Discussion All models were fitted by 
maximizing the binomial likelihood. Correlations between 
predicted and observed category decisions ranged from .85 
to .93 with the best performing models ≥  .92, indicating a 
fair but not perfect amount of explained variance. The 
models were evaluated using BIC. Results are summarized 
in Table 1. 
 Analyses of the 30 novel stimuli separately are presented 
in the first panel of Table 1. The lowest (best) BIC value 
was obtained for the GCM, but the difference with the 
                                                                                                  
analyses presented here. It is also fit to compare nonnested models. 
(For an extensive discussion, see Kass & Raftery, 1995.)  
4 In the actual classification task (not the generation task), the 
proportion of classifications for rhubarb as a fruit was only .33. 
cluster-based exemplar and prototype models is small. All 
ADDTREE-based models performed clearly worse. The  
current results do not clearly favor exemplar or prototype 
models for novel stimuli, but it appears that the geometric 
approach to prototypes provides less explanatory power as 
compared to the clustering approach. 
 
Table 1: -ln(L)5 and BIC (only the difference in parameters 
taken into account) for the category fruit for all models.  
 
          MDS ADCLUSGROW ADDTREE/P          
  GCM GPT GCM-F FPT GCM-F FPT 
1.New             
-ln(L) 73.95 83.27 81.38 82.12 90.83 93.01 
BIC 160.69 179.33 162.76 164.24 181.66 186.02 
2.Well-             
known             
-ln(L) 351.75 405.29 364.87 388.51 334.75 330.18 
BIC 719.04 826.12 729.74 777.02 669.50 660.36 
  
 Analyses of the well-known stimuli resulted in a very 
different pattern. BIC values for the analyses of the 79 well-
known stimuli separately are presented in the second panel 
of Table 1. The BIC values for the geometric and the 
cluster-based models were clearly higher (worse) than for 
the tree models. Clearly, the data from the well-known 
subset is best accounted for by the tree-based models that 
assume more elaborate taxonomic knowledge. The 
difference between the exemplar and prototype model is 
rather small and should be interpreted with caution. This 
result appears to contradict the earlier fit values where the 
MDS and additive clustering solutions provided a 
substantially better fit to the similarity data. In fact, a better 
fit to similarity data need not imply a better fit of the 
categorization model: those aspects of stimuli that are 
activated in a similarity task may very well be different 
from what is activated in a categorization task, especially 
after a concept has become well-elaborated. In other words, 
the less flexible and hierarchic structure of trees may not 
have captured all aspects of similarity, but the aspects it did 
capture may be more relevant for categorization of well-
known concepts. Indeed, every aspect of similarity that is 
not used in categorization can be considered error in the 
model. 
 In fact, the most interesting pattern that emerges from 
these data is the fact that categorization of novel stimuli is 
best explained by those models that are based on the flexible 
representations that best explain similarity. These models 
have either a limited number of dimensions or a limited 
number of features, with little idiosyncratic features in the 
                                                          
5 This value is the most “democratic” measure as it only 
incorporates model fit, (incorrectly) disregarding the penalty term 
for free parameters. The measure is equal to the sum of minus the 
log likelihoods of the individual data points and is therefore 
sensitive to the size of the data set; hence differences in fit between 
the two datasets are not directly interpretable (the same is true for 
the BIC measure).  
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latter case. Categorization of well-known stimuli, on the 
other hand, is best explained by the models that use a 
representation that is less close to the similarity data but that 
impose a more elaborate taxonomy and more idiosyncratic 
features. 
 An interesting interpretative property of additive trees in 
this respect is the fact that, at each node of the tree, a feature 
that applies to all of its children is linked to a limited 
number of alternatives. Second, branches in the tree tend to 
have a higher weight as one goes down in the tree. This 
implies that the number and weight of commonalities 
decreases with the number of nodes between stimuli. It also 
means that those features that add most weight to the 
difference are less likely to be related as the number of 
nodes increases and vice versa. A similar argument was 
made by Markman & Gentner (1993) who presented stimuli 
with different ontological distances and found a similar 
pattern when subjects listed commonalities and alignable 
and nonalignable differences. A possible explanation for the 
good results of tree-based models could be that, as a concept 
becomes more elaborated, people tend to gravitate to an 
alignable structure that might dominate other, presumably 
less alignable, aspects of similarity.  
Conclusion 
The goal of the present paper was two-fold. First we 
presented a general framework, in which different models 
(i.e., exemplar and prototype models, embedded in either 
dimensional or featural similarity representations) could be 
systematically formulated, compared and tested. Given the 
framework, one can investigate precisely in what situations 
which model aspects perform best. Second, the framework 
was applied to categorization data of well-known and novel 
stimuli in the context of familiar natural language concepts. 
The results indicate that, depending on the amount of 
knowledge and mastery of the stimuli, different 
representational structures and different decision processes 
may operate. 
 One may wonder how these results relate to the findings 
from the category learning literature (e.g., Nosofsky, 1992; 
Smith & Minda, 2000; Stanton, Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002). In 
most of these studies, exemplar models embedded in 
multidimensional representations have been shown to 
account very well for the categorization data. However, in 
these studies, artificial categories are used almost 
invariably, with stimuli that vary along a limited number of 
salient dimensions. Formal models, such as the ones 
described in our paper, have seldom been applied to natural 
language concepts, which are far more complex than the 
stimuli used in the artificial category literature, and of which 
our participants arguably have a much richer and more 
elaborate knowledge than even the best trained participants 
have of artificial stimuli. (For other attempts to apply formal 
models to natural language concepts, see Bailey & Hahn, 
2001; Smits et al., 2002; Storms, De Boeck, & Ruts, 2000, 
2001; Verbeemen et al., 2001.) However, in spite of 
participants’ extensive knowledge of such concepts, 
determining the relevant underlying dimensions or features 
for categorization with natural language concepts is perhaps 
the most crucial problem in modeling natural language 
categories (see, e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985). The two by 
three framework that was presented here may serve as a 
valuable tool in this endeavor.  
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Abstract 
There are two accounts explaining how background 
information can affect the conditional reasoning 
performance: the probabilistic account and the mental 
model account. According to the mental model theory 
reasoners retrieve and integrate counterexample 
information to attain a conclusion. According to the 
probabilistic account reasoners base their judgments on 
likelihood information. It is assumed that reasoning by 
use of a mental model process requires more working 
memory resources than solving the inference by use 
of likelihood information. We report a thinking-aloud 
experiment designed to compare the role of working 
memory for the two reasoning mechanisms. It is found 
that when working memory is preloaded participants use 
less counterexample information, instead they are more 
inclined to accept the inference or to use likelihood 
information. The present results add to the growing 
evidence showing that working memory is a crucial 
determinant of reasoning strategy and performance.  
Introduction 
 
There is evidence for a general link between working 
memory capacity and performance in a range of 
reasoning tasks (see e.g., Barrouillet, 1996; Gilhooly, 
Logie, & Wynn, 1999; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). 
Previous studies showed that skilled reasoners 
generally give more normative answers and follow a 
high demand reasoning strategy (see e.g., Copeland & 
Radvansky, in press; Gilhooly, Logie, & Wynn, 1999). 
It is assumed that these normative answers are obtained 
by an analytic reasoning mechanism that hinges on 
working memory capacity (Klauer, Stegmaier, & 
Meiser, 1997; Meiser, Klauer, & Naumer, 2001). The 
present research continues this line of research and 
concerns causal conditional reasoning with everyday 
sentences.  
Without labeling conclusions as (in)valid, we will 
investigate how people solve the following two 
conditional inferences with everyday causal sentences:  
Modus Ponens (MP)  
If cause, then effect   
Cause occurs.    
Does the effect follow?  
 
Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) 
If cause, then effect 
Effect occurs. 
Did the cause precede?  
Examples of everyday ‘if cause, then effect’ sentences 
are:  If you phone someone, then his telephone rings. 
If you eat salty food, then you will get thirsty. 
If someone has a high income, this person will be rich. 
If a dog has fleas, then it will scratch constantly.  
Abundant research established that when people reason 
on everyday conditionals, they spontaneously bring 
relevant background knowledge into account (for a 
review see Politzer & Bourmaud, 2002). This 
contextualization process is characteristic for common-
sense reasoning and is responsible for our ability to 
adaptively cope with everyday situations. The current 
study focuses on how background knowledge is used 
for deriving conditional inferences.  
There are two reasoning mechanisms describing how 
background information is used during reasoning. First, 
according to the probabilistic account reasoners derive 
the probability that the conclusion follows given the 
categorical premise and use this probability to draw a 
gradual conclusion (Lui, Lo, & Wu, 1996; Oaksford, 
Chater, & Larkin, 2002). For MP, reasoners will 
confine their knowledge base to the situations where 
the cause occurs. Based on this range of situations they 
then determine the likelihood that the effect follows. If 
they can induce that a particular effect always or 
mostly follows the cause, they conclude that the effect 
will (probably) follow. The endorsement of MP is thus 
directly proportional to L(effect|cause). AC is solved in 
analogy with MP. Reasoners activate all relevant 
situations where the effect occurs. Within this subset 
they infer the likelihood that the cause preceded the 
occurring effect. This likelihood L(cause|effect) 
directly reflects the AC acceptance rate.  
According to the second reasoning mechanism the 
conclusion is attained by taking possible 
counterexamples into account. There is a strong and 
reliable effect of the number of available 
counterexamples on inference acceptance (see e.g., 
Cummins, Alksnis, Lubart, & Rist, 1991). The mental 
models theory describes how participants reason with 
counterexample information (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991; Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002). When given a 
problem based on a causal rule, for instance, ‘If you 
water a plant well, the plant stays green’, reasoners 
will start by representing the content of the conditional 
as a possibility: It is possible that a plant is well 
watered and green. Active consideration of the problem 
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content will then lead to an automatic activation of 
relevant background information. This information is 
used to complement the initial model. For MP and MT, 
the categorical premise triggers the retrieval of 
disablers. Some examples of disablers are: ‘the plant 
caught a disease’ or ‘the plant was deprived of 
sunlight’. When reasoners retrieve at least one disabler, 
they do not conclude that the effect follows. For AC an 
automatic search for alternative causes starts, for 
example, ‘the lack of water was compensated by 
adding fertilizer’ or ‘the plant is a succulent’. When 
reasoners retrieve an alternative cause, their mental 
models inform them that there are two conclusions 
possible (watered and not watered). As a result, they do 
not accept the default conclusion.  
It is clear that the probabilistic and the mental model 
reasoning mechanisms both rely on available 
background information, but they focus on a different 
type of background knowledge: probabilities versus 
exemplars. Both information types have already been 
brought together by, e.g., Weidenfeld & Oberauer 
(2003); Verschueren, Schaeken and d’Ydewalle (2003; 
2004a) integrated the two theories that explain how the 
information is taken into account in a dual process 
perspective. They label the probabilistic mechanism as 
heuristic and the mental model mechanism as analytic. 
Heuristic processes are generally considered as fast, 
automatic mechanisms that operate at a low cognitive 
cost and at the periphery of awareness. Analytic 
processes are generally slower, more demanding 
reasoning mechanisms that operate in a conscious and 
strategic manner (Stanovich & West, 2000). 
Verschueren et al. (2004a) manifest three reasons for 
linking the two reasoning processes to a heuristic-
analytic polarity. (1) The heuristic reasoning process is 
mainly implicit - reasoners have no recollection of the 
range of situations that are taken into account to 
calculate a likelihood estimate whereas people 
reasoning by use of mental models are conscious of the 
counterexample(s) they retrieve. (2) The process based 
on likelihood information yields relatively fast results 
whereas using counterexamples requires a sequential 
thus slower reasoning process. (3) The heuristic 
conclusion is overwritten when a more analytical 
conclusion can be produced (see Verschueren, et al., 
2004a for experimental evidence for 2 and 3). At 
present we will investigate whether both reasoning 
mechanisms differ in their working memory demands. 
If indeed the mental model account describes an 
analytical reasoning mechanism it should pose more 
demands on working memory capacity than the 
heuristic likelihood process.  
Experiment 
  
It is assumed that reasoning with counterexample 
information draws heavily on working memory 
resources, whereas the use of mere likelihood estimates 
imposes a far lesser demand on working memory. 
When participants reason based on counterexample 
information, the problem content as well as all models 
of relevant situations have to be represented. The larger 
the number of mental models that participants have to 
represent and maintain, the heavier the load on working 
memory during reasoning (Barrouillet & Lecas, 1999). 
Additionally, it has been found that counterexample 
retrieval efficiency suffers from dual task loads, which 
indicates that working memory is also involved in the 
retrieval of counterexample information (De Neys, 
2003). In case the reasoners have a representation of 
both the conditional sentence and at least one 
counterexample, they subsequently have to integrate 
this information to see that there are two different 
conclusions for the same problem. This information 
manipulation and integration is considered as a crucial 
task of working memory.  
For the reasoning process based on likelihood 
information, the demands on working memory are far 
less. The situations used for attaining a likelihood 
estimate are not actively represented in working 
memory, but rather briefly accessed. There is neither an 
active controlled search process nor a need for premise 
integration. The likelihood estimate is based on all 
relevant situations at a time and the final conclusion 
directly mirrors the obtained likelihood estimate.  
When reasoners are asked to think aloud during 
reasoning, we can monitor which information they use 
for deriving conclusions. By concurrently checking the 
information that people use we get a direct indication 
of the underlying reasoning process. Only in case 
where people do not provide extra information but 
accept the conclusion without further argumentation, 
this procedural aspect is unclear. It can be that 
participants did use their background knowledge and 
found that the likelihood that the conclusion follows is 
sufficient to grant acceptance or that there are no 
counterexamples available. Or else it can be that they 
did not rely on background information and just 
satisfied the conclusion by restating the given 
information.  
In a previous thinking-aloud study Verschueren, 
Schaeken and d’Ydewalle (2004b) showed that 
participants with low working memory capacity more 
often use likelihood estimates to solve an inference, 
whereas participants with a larger working memory 
capacity rather use counterexample information. These 
results can be considered as an indication for the 
difference in working memory demands of the heuristic 
and analytic process. This setup provides however only 
correlational evidence. Indeed, it is still possible that a 
third factor (e.g., general intelligence, motivation, etc.) 
explains both the performance on working memory 
tests as well as on reasoning tasks. The following 
experiment was designed to test whether there is a 
difference in the actual working demands of the two 
processes. 
In this experiment we examined the effect of 
secondary task interference on the applied reasoning 
mechanisms. In the dual task methodology, a secondary 
task chosen to burden working memory capacity has to 
be carried out concurrently to the criterion task. The 
degree of disruption in the criterion task under dual 
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task conditions – as compared to single task conditions 
– is taken to reflect the dependence of the criterion task 
on working memory. The criterion task we used was a 
thinking-aloud conditional reasoning task. Concurrent 
verbalization allows us to monitor the information that 
reasoners consult for deriving conclusions. By 
checking the information that people refer to 
(likelihood or counterexample information) we get a 
direct indication of the underlying reasoning process. 
Because the criterion task entails spontaneous 
verbalization, the choice of secondary tasks is limited. 
Pilot work revealed that concurrent motor, auditory or 
articulatory activity interfered with the participants 
verbalization. We therefore opted for a preload 
paradigm. Because a spatial load is less likely to 
interfere with verbalization than a verbal or numerical 
load, we worked with a spatial preload set-up. The 
evidence that spatial storage tasks tap a working 
memory feature crucial for reasoning is twofold: 
Klauer, et al.(1997) report that a concurrent spatial load 
led to a significant disruption of propositional 
(including conditional) reasoning. Second, in the 
visuospatial domain simple storage tasks have a similar 
correlation with executive functioning and reasoning as 
classic processing-and-storage tasks (Miyake, 
Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001; Suess, 
Oberauer, Wittman, Wilhelm, & Schultze, 2002). We 
can thus assume that the preload task taps working 
memory resources that are needed for reasoning, while 
at the same time minimizing a possible interference 
with the verbalization process. The dot memory task 
we used is a classic simple storage task (adapted from 
Miyake, et al., 2001; Oberauer, Suess, Wilhelm, & 
Wittman, 2003). We briefly presented a 3x3 matrix 
with 4 dots forming a complex pattern, afterwards 
participants were asked to reproduce this dot pattern. 
In the preload-condition participants had to memorize 
the pattern of the dots while solving a reasoning 
problem. We will verify whether the use of 
counterexample information decreases when working 
memory is preloaded, compared to performance in the 
control condition. The decreement in the use of 
likelihood information should be significantly smaller 
than the decreement in counterexample use. 
Method 
 
Participants A total of 52 first year psychology 
students participated in the study.  
 
Procedure and Design The participants were tested 
individually. The experiment was run on computer. 
Participants started by reading the instructions. They 
were told that they will be asked to think aloud while 
solving conditional inference problems. The reasoning 
instructions read that they should answer the question 
as in an everyday setting. Each participant then solved 
two test problems, e.g.,  
 
If someone catches a cold, then he will cough.  
Someone coughs. 
Did this person catch a cold or not?   
The participants read the premises aloud and answered 
immediately. When they found that they had completed 
their answer, they pressed a key to go to the following 
problem. After the presentation of the reasoning 
instructions, the participants either reasoned with or 
without working memory preload. In the preload 
conditions participants started by practicing two dot 
patterns: A pattern was presented for 500ms and 
participants were immediately asked to reproduce this 
pattern. The overall performance on the test problems 
was nearly perfect. After these dot pattern practice 
trials, participants were given instructions for reasoning 
under preload. First, a dot pattern was presented for 
500ms, next the reasoning problem occurred, 
participants read the premises aloud and answered 
immediately. The answers participants gave were 
recorded on tape. When they finished their answer, they 
pressed a key and a blue screen appeared where they 
were asked to reproduce the dot pattern. When they 
completed the dot pattern, they pressed a key to start 
the next trial. It was explicitly mentioned that they had 
to memorize the dot patterns correctly; they were told 
that an incorrect reproduction rendered the trial invalid. 
This was done to make sure that participants actively 
attended the dot pattern and tried their best in 
memorizing it. In the control condition, the dot patterns 
were presented for 500ms before the premise 
presentation. Participants were told that these dot 
patterns are presented as a control condition, they were 
asked to look at the dot patterns but not to memorize 
them. They read the premises and pressed a key when 
their answer was complete, the next trial started 
immediately. The time that participants needed to read 
and solve the reasoning problem was measured.  
 
Materials and Design Based on previous research we 
selected 12 sentences with a maximally varying 
necessity and sufficiency of the cause (maximal 
variation in L(effect|cause), L(cause|effect), and in the 
number of available disablers and alternatives). We 
made sure that the reading time of all 12 sentences was 
comparable (Mnumber of words = 9.5, SD = .314). Twenty-
six participants solved 12 AC inferences; the others 
solved 12 MP problems. The 12 sentences occurred 
always in the same order; the causes of the first six 
sentences and the last six sentences were equally 
necessary and sufficient. For both reasoning forms, half 
of the participants solved the first six problems under 
preload; the other six problems were solved without 
preload (control condition). For the other half of the 
participants the order of the preload/control conditions 
was reversed. Because we used 12 different sentences, 
transfer effects between the two conditions could be 
excluded. 
 
Results  
The obtained reasoning answers were literally 
transcribed. Next, the condition-codes were removed 
and the answer types were rated. It was indicated 
whether the answer reflected a simple acceptance of the 
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default conclusion or whether there was reference to a 
counterexample or to a likelihood estimate. There was 
no overall difference in the average response time for 
the preload (18.19s) and the control condition (18.53s). 
In the control condition, there was 26% inference 
acceptance, in 22% of the trials participants used 
likelihood information and in 64% they referred to 
counterexamples. These results are similar to those 
observed by Verschueren et al. (2004a; 18%, 18% and 
66% respectively).  
In the preload condition there were 6.4% combination 
trials (in a ‘combination trial’ participants refer to 
counterexample and likelihood information) whereas in 
the control condition there were 23.1% combination 
trials. The observation that combining the two types of 
information becomes less prevalent when working 
memory is preloaded, suggest that the information 
integration process that is characteristic for 
combination answers taps on working memory 
resources. For comparing the relative importance of 
both reasoning processes, we confined the analysis to 
trials where participants either referred to a likelihood 
or to counterexample information. Combination trials 
were excluded from the analysis (14.4%).  
Task interference. Only 69% of the dot patterns were 
reproduced correctly. There was an effect of answer 
type on the correct reproduction of the dot patterns, 
F(2, 21) = 6.696, p < .01 (Wilks’ lambda = .611). This 
interaction is displayed in Figure 1. When the dot 
patterns were correctly reproduced, there were fewer 
counterexamples mentioned than when the dot patterns 
were incorrectly reproduced, F(1, 22) = 11.96, MSE = 
.458, p < .05. On the correctly reproduced trials, there 
were more answers where participants referred to 
likelihood information, F(1, 22) = 5.21, MSE = .037, p 
< .05. There was no significant effect on the inference 
acceptance rates. These results reflect a task 
interference. When participants rely on a reasoning 
process that puts only a minor demand on working 
memory there are enough resources left to maintain and 
reproduce the dot pattern. In contrast, when participants 
rely on retrieval, manipulation and integration of 
counterexample information, working memory capacity 
is severely burdened. There are then not enough 
resources left to actively maintain the dot patterns, 
resulting in an incorrect reproduction. These results 
support the idea that using counterexample information 
draws heavily on working memory resources. 
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Figure 1: Difference in the proportion of the three types of 
answers for preload trials where the dot pattern was correctly 
versus incorrectly reproduced. 
Effect of preload on the reasoning process. For 
examining the effect of preload on the types of 
answers, we only included the preload trials where the 
dot pattern was correctly reproduced. All analyses were 
run on proportions; the number of times each answer 
type occurred was divided by the total number of 
correctly reproduced trials. We ran an analysis of 
variance with sentences as the unit of analysis, and a 2 
(inference type, between subjects) * 2 (preload, within 
subjects) * 3 (answer type, within subjects) design. We 
found a main effect of answer type. There were more 
answers referring to counterexample information 
(60.1%) than there was plain inference acceptance 
(27.7%) or likelihood information used (5.6%), F(2, 
21) = 102, 72, p < .001 (Wilks’lambda = .08). The 
interaction between answer type and preload condition 
was marginally significant, F(2, 21) = 3.120 p = .065 
(Wilks’lambda = .771). Figure 2 illustrates this 
interaction. There was a clear yet marginally significant 
decrease in the use of counterexample information 
when working memory was preloaded, F(1, 22) = 3 
304, MSE = 0.078, p = .082. There were significantly 
more inferences accepted in the preload condition, F(1, 
22) = 8.255, MSE = 0.131, p<.01 while there was no 
significant increase in the use of likelihood 
information. No other interaction effects reached 
significance. The observation that there is more 
inference acceptance under preload corroborates 
previous effects of secondary task load on the 
conditional reasoning performance (De Neys, 2003).  
 The explanation provided by De Neys (2003) is that 
under preload, the resources available to participants 
are insufficient to retrieve counterexample information. 
The currently observed decrease in counterexample use 
is in line with this explanation. The increase in 
inference acceptance can also be - at least partially - 
related to an enhanced matching heuristic. We can 
assume that some reasoners do not engage in an active 
reasoning process based on counterexample retrieval, 
but simply restate the information from the conditional 
and blindly accept MP and AC. In this case the 
preloading should cause more participants to accept all 
conclusions, even on sentences where counterexamples 
can be automatically retrieved and likelihood 
estimations are high. In the preload condition, there 
were indeed more participants (13.5%) who accepted at 
least 75% of the inferences than in the control 
condition (7.7%). Even for sentences with many 
available counterexamples – for these sentences 
counterexamples can be retrieved automatically and 
likelihood estimations are very low - we found an 
increase in the inference acceptance rates (7.1% control 
vs. 19.8% preload). This shows that it is unlikely that 
participants consulted their background knowledge for 
deriving the conclusion and lends support for the 
hypothesis that the working memory preload led to an 
enhancement of the computationally low demanding 
matching heuristic.  
In sum, as expected the resource dependent use of 
counterexample information decreased under preload, 
while the use of likelihood information was unaffected  
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Figure 2: Proportion of answers of the three types for the 
preload versus control condition (only preloaded trials with 
correctly reproduced dot patterns). 
 
by preload conditions. The decrease in use of the 
counterexample based reasoning process is at least 
partly compensated by shifting to inference acceptance. 
 
Number of counterexamples used. Does the decrease 
in the use of counterexample information under preload 
reflect a decrease in a strategic validation tendency? If 
participants retrieve counterexample information to 
merely check whether the default conclusion can be 
falsified (see e.g., Schroyens, Schaeken, & Handley, 
2003) they would need to retrieve only one 
counterexample to falsify the given conclusion. 
However, we did not find a difference in the number of 
trials where participants referred to only one 
counterexample (preload: 73% vs. control-condition: 
82.4%). This raises doubt on the validation-hypothesis. 
In contrast, we observed a decrease in the proportion of 
trials where more than one counterexample was 
mentioned, t(23) = 2.77, p < .05 (preload: 17% vs. 
control-condition: 26%). This underscores the idea that 
in tasks without deductive instructions reasoners 
retrieve counterexample information to provide an 
adequate and informative conclusion rather than to 
merely falsify a default conclusion. When looking at 
the total number of specific counterexamples used, 
there were significantly more counterexamples used in 
the control condition (1.09) than when working 
memory was preloaded (0.86), t(23) = 3.97, p < .01.  
If counterexample retrieval, representation and 
integration demand effort, we should observe an effect 
of counterexample retrieval on the secondary task 
performance. We tested whether there was a difference 
in the number of counterexample answers for the trials 
where the dot pattern was correctly versus incorrectly 
reproduced. We included the number of available 
counterexamples (few/many; measured by the 
generation task) because it is a strong predictor of 
counterexample use. There was a marginally significant 
interaction between the number of counterexamples 
used and the (in)correct reproduction of the dot pattern, 
F(1.20) = 4.120, MSE = 2.866, p = .056. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that for sentences with many 
available counterexamples there were significantly 
more counterexamples produced when the dot patterns 
were not recalled correctly, F(1, 20) = 6.946, MSE = 
4.832, p<.05 (not significant for few-sentences). This 
converges with the observed interference of 
counterexample use and correct dot pattern recall.  
In general, these results sustain the idea that using 
counterexample information draws heavily on working 
memory resources whereas using likelihood 
information or matching is less resource demanding.  
 
Discussion  
Correlational studies revealed that differences in 
working memory capacity relate to differences in the 
conditional answer patterns. A possible explanation is 
that differences in reasoning performance do not 
simply relate to differences in a single reasoning 
predisposition, but are mediated by differences in the 
working memory demands of the active reasoning 
mechanisms. Highlighting the distinction between more 
heuristic strategies (such as matching and likelihood 
use) and more cognitively demanding analytical 
strategies (relying on counterexamples) may provide a 
more differentiated picture of the specific role of 
working memory in conditional reasoning. We found 
evidence for two conditional reasoning mechanisms 
with a differing working memory demand: a 
probabilistic account relying on likelihood information 
and a mental model account relying on counterexample 
information.  
The results reveal that using counterexample 
information to attain a conclusion taps heavier on 
working memory resources than deriving the 
conclusion based on likelihood information. This 
provides additional support for considering the 
reasoning process based on likelihood information as 
heuristic and the reasoning process based on 
counterexample information as analytic. The 
differences in use of counterexamples/likelihood on 
participants with varying working memory capacity 
observed by Verschueren et al. (2004b) may thus be 
attributed to the working memory demands of the two 
reasoning mechanisms.  
We found a large effect of working memory preload 
on the inference acceptance rates. When relating 
inference acceptance to the two reasoning strategies, it 
can reveal that either no counterexamples can be 
retrieved or that the likelihood estimation is sufficiently 
high. However, because we also observed an increase 
in inference acceptance on sentences for which pretests 
revealed many available counterexamples as well as 
likelihood estimates that are well below 1, it rather 
seems that the inference acceptance rates show that 
under preload some reasoners do not consult their 
background knowledge. When working memory 
capacity is burdened by preload, these participants are 
discouraged to engage in a demanding retrieval 
process. Instead they provide an answer that satisfies 
the inference question, simply by restating information 
from the premises. This strategically placed escape 
hatch can explain the increase in inference acceptance 
rates under preload. 
Taken this together, we found evidence for the 
involvement of working memory in conditional 
reasoning. By analyzing the answers participants gave 
we were able to pinpoint which information 
participants used to attain their conclusion. We found 
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support for distinguishing two heuristic reasoning 
strategies -use of likelihood information and matching- 
and for an analytic strategy that takes counterexamples 
into account. Working memory preload yielded an 
increase in the use of heuristic strategies whereas the 
use of the analytical strategy decreased.  
The present study is one of the first to combine a 
secondary task paradigm with a verbalization criterion 
task. Using a preload-paradigm is probably the best 
way to investigate the working memory demands of 
tasks involving verbalization. Although we cannot be 
entirely conclusive on a possible secondary task 
interference on verbalization processes (the answers 
were structurally similar to baseline results) this 
procedure enabled us to experimentally test the 
difference in working memory demands.  
The effect of working memory capacity on inference 
making is at present only discussed on an intensive 
level: We investigated the global effect of a working 
memory dependent secondary task on the use of 
likelihood and counterexample information. Whether 
the working memory demands of the two processes 
coincide with the assumed differences in 
representation, retrieval and manipulation cost cannot 
be decided upon based on the present results. The data 
may also reflect the cost of determinacy: Giving a 
gradual uncertain answer may be overall less 
demanding than providing a determinate conclusion. 
There is also no information about the relative 
functional involvement of the different working 
memory components. Specific research with different 
types of well-chosen secondary tasks may reveal this 
crucial information.  
In sum, distinguishing different reasoning 
mechanisms that can be used to solve conditional 
inferences can enhance our comprehension of how 
working memory mediates the reasoning performance. 
The specific working memory demands of different 
reasoning strategies co-determine the robust effect of 
working memory capacity on the conditional reasoning 
performance.  
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Abstract 
Two experiments assessed whether grammatical gender of 
Italian nouns referring to animals and tools affects conceptual 
representations of the corresponding objects, comparing re-
sults from Italian and English. In the first experiment, we elic-
ited semantic substitution errors (e.g., saying “hammer” when 
“axe” is intended), finding language-specific gender effects 
(more errors in Italian than English for words sharing gender) 
for words referring to animals but not for words referring to 
tools. In the second experiment, words sharing gender were 
judged as more similar in meaning by Italian speakers than 
English speakers, again only for animals and not for tools. 
Moreover, no such gender effect was observed for pictures of 
the same animals.  
Introduction 
As Roman Jakobson (1959) put it: "Languages differ essen-
tially in what they must convey and not in what they may 
convey" (p.236). That is, languages differ in which concep-
tual or formal properties must be realized in sentential form. 
For example, in English the word "friend" does not indicate 
the sex of the friend, while in Italian the corresponding word 
is differentially inflected for a man ("amico") or a woman 
("amica"). In English, adjectives used as predicates (e.g., 
"tall" in "The boy is tall" and “The girl is tall”) do not agree 
in gender with the subject of the sentence, while they must 
in Italian (e.g., "Il ragazzo e’ alto" or “La ragazza e’ alta”). 
Such differences in obligatory expression may imply that 
speakers of different languages pay more or less attention to 
those dimensions of meaning. For example, Italian speakers 
may pay more attention to the sex of referents than English 
speakers. By extension, Italian speakers may tend to think of 
objects in the world as more male- or female-like on the 
basis of the words’ grammatical gender (as suggested by the 
work of, e.g. Boroditsky, Schmidt & Phillips, 2003; Sera, 
Elieff, Forbes, Burch, Rodriguez, & Dubois, 2002). But how 
strong and pervasive can these effects be? 
Here we present experiments investigating the conditions 
under which effects of a language-specific property (gram-
matical gender of Italian nouns) are present, contrasting 
performance by Italian and English speakers on translation-
equivalent nouns. Grammatical gender allows a conserva-
tive test of language-specific effects on cognition because it 
is largely arbitrarily linked to meaning (although see Foun-
dalis, 2002).  
How could grammatical gender affect conceptual represen-
tations for objects? Effects of grammatical gender could 
arise as a consequence of general language-learning mecha-
nisms based on similarity. According to this hypothesis (to 
which we will refer as “Similarity and Gender”), words that 
are similar to each other on any linguistic dimension (in-
cluding but not limited to grammatical gender) may become 
more semantically similar as a consequence of the fact that 
words of the same syntactic class (e.g., same gender, same 
grammatical class, etc.) appear in the same syntactic con-
texts. For example, in languages with grammatical gender, 
nouns are used in sentences along with gender-marked de-
terminers and adjectives, whether the nouns refer to 
sexuated entities or not. Sensitivity to shared sentence con-
text could allow children to bootstrap properties of similar-
ity in meaning from the syntactic contexts in which the 
words occur during language acquisition (Landauer & Du-
mais, 1997). This hypothesis does not require any explicit 
associations between grammatical gender and sex of human 
referents; instead it predicts that any effects of grammatical 
gender on semantic representations should be found in any 
gendered language (no matter how many gender classes are 
in the language), and that they should be found for all words 
(whether the referents are sexuated or not).  
However, mechanisms mediating such effects may be more 
specific and limited. According to this other hypothesis (to 
which we will refer as “Sex and Gender”), effects of gram-
matical gender could arise because children would treat all 
grammatical categories as revealing specific semantic prop-
erties (Boroditsky, et al., 2003). In the case of grammatical 
gender, these effects would require linking the grammatical 
gender of nouns referring to humans to the sex of referents. 
Across languages there is a core correspondence between 
grammatical marking of gender and biological sex (Corbett, 
1991), although the consistency of this mapping differs 
across languages. According to this view, children learning 
a gendered language would first notice the core correspon-
dence between the gender of nouns and male/female seman-
tic properties of human referents (and some animals). They 
would then generalize this correspondence to other nouns 
for which there is no clear conceptual foundation of gender, 
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assigning male or female features to referents in agreement 
with the grammatical gender of the corresponding words. 
Thus, words of the same gender would be more similar 
among themselves than words of different gender because 
they share male or female-like properties. Such a mecha-
nism could be strongest for languages with the greatest de-
gree of correspondence between the gender of nouns refer-
ring to humans and the sex of referents. This is the case in 
Romance languages which have only two genders and few 
exceptions to the consistent mapping between the gender of 
nouns referring to humans and sex of the referents. It could 
be weaker (if present at all) in languages with multiple gen-
ders and/or in which nouns referring to humans fall into 
more than two classes. Moreover, any effect of gender could 
be stronger for words referring to sexuated entities (e.g. 
animals) than for words referring to objects and abstract 
concepts, because semantic properties of sex are less rele-
vant in these latter domains. Most of the studies investigat-
ing language-specific effects of grammatical gender (e.g. 
Boroditsky, et al., 2003; Sera, et al., 2002) have tested this 
hypothesis, either implicitly or explicitly. 
In the experiments below we tested some predictions stem-
ming from these views, considering grammatical gender of 
Italian nouns. As in other Romance languages, all nouns in 
Italian are marked for gender, either masculine or feminine. 
For nouns referring to humans and some animals, the gender 
depends on the sex of the referent (e.g., “ragazzo/ragazza” 
[boy/girl]; “leone/leonessa” [lion/lioness]), while for other 
animals gender does not depend upon the sex of the referent 
(e.g., “lupo” refers to both male and female wolves, al-
though it is possible to mark the gender in some cases). For 
words referring to objects and abstract entities, instead, 
there are no such clear semantic correlates (with certain 
exceptions not addressed here). We investigate two seman-
tic fields, animals and tools, to test the hypotheses outlined 
above. Both predict language-specific effects of grammati-
cal gender on meaning, such that word pairs sharing Italian 
gender will show greater semantic similarity effects than the 
same word pairs in English translation. The two hypotheses 
make different predictions, however, suggesting that these 
effects may have different breadth. The Sex and Gender 
hypothesis predicts that greater language-specific gender 
effects should be observed for animals than for tools (as 
animals are sexuated entities), while the Similarity and 
Gender hypothesis predicts no category difference.  
Experiment 1 
Here we assessed whether grammatical gender affects on-
line linguistic tasks such as picture naming. We begin with a 
linguistic task, as finding language-specific gender effects is 
not only evidence for a “thinking for speaking” view of lan-
guage-specific effects on cognition (Slobin, 1996), but is 
also a pre-requisite to testing for broader language specific-
ity in tasks less tightly tied to linguistic encoding. We focus 
upon semantic substitution errors (i.e., instead of producing 
a target word, speakers produce another word related in 
meaning, e.g., saying “hammer” when “saw” is intended) in 
picture naming. In previous work we have introduced a con-
tinuous picture-naming paradigm to elicit such errors (Vig-
liocco, Vinson, Lewis & Garrett, in press). Here we investi-
gate whether semantic substitution errors in Italian tend to 
preserve the gender of the target word (i.e., masculine nouns 
are more likely to substitute for other masculine nouns, and 
feminine nouns for other feminine nouns). It is generally 
agreed upon in the language production literature that se-
mantic substitutions arise during the process of retrieving 
the lexical entry corresponding to a concept, thus tapping 
into the interface between linguistic and conceptual knowl-
edge (e.g., Garrett, 1984; Levelt, 1989). Moreover, these 
errors are sensitive to fine-grained semantic similarity: the 
likelihood of errors increases with greater semantic similar-
ity (Vigliocco et al., in press). Thus, other factors being 
equal, if grammatical gender has a semantic effect, it should 
increase the likelihood that words of the same gender substi-
tute for each other in a language such as Italian. However, 
other factors may not necessarily be equal, particularly non-
language-specific factors such as semantic similarity not 
related to gender in a language-specific manner, or visual 
similarity among pictorial referents. In order to provide the 
tightest controls, we selected English as a baseline compari-
son language, using the same items (translation equivalent 
words) and the same tasks. This allows us to test for lan-
guage-specific effects of Italian gender while avoiding con-
cerns related to general semantic or visual similarity among 
the items used in our experiments. We investigate whether 
Italian errors tend to preserve gender above the English 
baseline level (based upon assigning Italian gender to Eng-
lish translations). It should also be noted that substitution 
errors are sensitive to phonological similarity between target 
and intruder (Dell & Reich, 1981), and Italian gender does 
have strong and reliable phonological correlates. To mini-
mize the possibility that any observed language-specific 
effects of gender are due to phonological similarity, we also 
conducted analyses in which we excluded all errors with 
substantial phonological similarity to the target word.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 27 native speakers of Italian from the 
London community and 20 English speakers from the UCL 
subject pool. The Italian participants had only rudimentary 
knowledge of English, and none of the English speakers 
reported moderate or better competence in any Romance 
language.  
Materials  
We selected 27 black and white line drawings of animals, 
avoiding those animals for which the gender of the noun 
strictly depends upon the sex of the referent. We further 
selected 50 black and white line drawings of tools. Most 
pictures came from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980), with 
additional ones prepared for the experiment. Name agree-
ment was established for each of our participants during the 
experimental session (see also Vigliocco et al., in press); in 
general there was very strong name agreement in both lan-
guages, further ensuring that the words are suitable transla-
tion equivalents. Because in previous work we have estab-
lished that substitution errors in this paradigm do not cross 
1406
semantic fields, we used a blocked presentation design, ana-
lyzing the data for the animals and the tools separately. We 
presented 77 blocks of 10 pictures each to every participant. 
Each block contained only animal or tool pictures (pre-
sented in random order within the block), and each picture 
appeared 10 times in the course of the experiment.  
Procedure 
The experiment began with a name agreement phase in 
which each picture was presented and participants were 
asked to name them. This phase allowed us to ensure name 
agreement across participants and also to identify specific 
naming preferences by individual participants (which might 
otherwise have been considered errors). Next, a practice 
series of blocks were presented in which the speed of pres-
entation of each picture was adjusted for each participant 
(between 600ms and 1100ms) in order to render the task 
difficult but manageable for each speaker. After the training, 
the experiment started.  Participants were told that their task 
was to name each picture as it appeared on a computer 
screen as quickly as possible.  
Scoring Criteria 
Participants' responses were transcribed and scored in the 
following categories: Correct responses: participants uttered 
the correct target word. Different label: participants used a 
different word than our intended target (e.g. "stag" for 
"deer"), but this different label was consistently used by that 
participant and did not refer to another item in the experi-
ment. Lexical errors: participants produced a word that dif-
fered from the target and that did not qualify as a "different 
label". Lexical errors were further classified as "out of set" 
(intruding words that are not among the experimental items) 
and "within set" (those items from within the present re-
sponse set).  Because of the repeated presentation of a lim-
ited set of pictures to be named, most lexical errors tended 
to be other items from the response set. Because of this, and 
to minimize the possibility of linguistic variability beyond 
this particular set of item, analyses were performed only 
upon within-set lexical errors items. Miscellanea: other re-
sponses not included above, such as dysfluencies, incom-
plete utterances, inaudible responses, omissions and self-
corrections. Table 1 reports a breakdown of the proportions 
of responses in the different scoring categories.  
 
Table 1:  Response Types  
(IT: Italian, EN: English; A: Animals, T: Tools) 
 
Response type IT: A EN: A IT: T EN: T 
Correct &  
Different Label 
 
.876 
 
.935 
 
.948 
 
.910 
Lexical errors 
Within-set 
Out of set 
 
.021 
.004 
 
.024 
.001 
 
.013 
.002 
 
.018 
.002 
Miscellanea .100 .04 .133 .062 
Results and Discussion 
All analyses were carried out on within-set lexical errors. 
First, we eliminated all those items for which the average 
correct performance was not above 75% in both languages 
or for which the average correct performance differed more 
than 15% across the two languages in order to exclude addi-
tional cross-cultural differences. For each semantic field 
(animals and tools) we carried out two 2x2 ANOVAs. In all 
ANOVAs, proportion of errors was the dependent variable 
with target-error pair as a random factor. Independent vari-
ables were language (Italian, English) and Italian gender 
(shared between target and intruder or not shared). English 
words were assigned Italian gender for the purpose of the 
analysis. The first ANOVA was carried out on the within-
set errors remaining after we excluded the cases discussed 
above (for animals: 103 errors in Italian and 73 errors in 
English; for tools: 90 in Italian, and 117 in English). For 
animals, this analysis showed a significant interaction be-
tween language and Italian gender, such that errors sharing 
gender with the target were more common in Italian (68%) 
than in English (41%); F(1,63) = 8.03, p = .006. Neither 
main effect was significant (F < 1). The results of the analy-
sis for tools were similar; only the interaction between lan-
guage and gender was significant: gender preservation was 
greater in Italian (61%) than in English (36%); F(1,79) = 
4.6, p = .04; main effect Fs < 1).  
In the second analysis we excluded all errors for which the 
target and the intruder shared phonological similarity. Pho-
nological similarity between target and intruder was as-
sessed as in Vigliocco et al. (in press). In this second analy-
sis, only errors for which either of two measures of phono-
logical overlap did not exceed the average + one standard 
deviation of that measure (in either language) were consid-
ered (for animals, leaving 64 errors in Italian and 42 in Eng-
lish; for tools, leaving 39 errors in Italian and 42 in Eng-
lish). This analysis for animals also showed a significant 
interaction between language and gender; such that even 
among target-intruder pairs with low phonological similar-
ity, Italian target-intruder pairs tended to share gender 
(77%) more often than English pairs (43%) (interaction F(1, 
37) = 5.88, p = .020; main effect Fs < 1). However, this in-
teraction was not significant in the analysis for tools (all Fs 
< 1). Thus, for the tools, the language x gender effect ob-
served in the complete set of errors may just be a conse-
quence of greater phonological similarity in Italian for 
words sharing the same gender.  
To summarize the results of this experiment, we found lan-
guage-specific effects of grammatical gender; gender affects 
the likelihood of producing a lexical error for Italian speak-
ers, compared to the errors produced by English speakers 
naming exactly the same pictures. This language-specific 
effect of grammatical gender, however, survives only for 
words referring to animals once phonological similarity is 
taken into account. This result suggests that language-
specific effects are constrained even in a linguistic encoding 
task such as picture naming.  
Experiment 2 
The results of the error induction task in Experiment 1 show 
that language-specific effects of grammatical gender can be 
observed in an on-line task requiring lexical retrieval. In this 
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second experiment we sought to obtain converging evidence 
using a very different task. Moreover, we assessed the gen-
eralizability of these effects beyond linguistic materials by 
performing the same experiment using pictures as well as 
words as stimuli. As in Experiment 1, we contrast responses 
from Italian speakers for words and pictures referring to 
animals and tools with responses from English speakers.  In 
this experiment we used the triadic similarity judgment task. 
Speakers of Italian and English were presented with triplets 
of words or pictures (translation equivalents in Italian and 
English) and their task was to judge which two of the three 
were more similar in meaning. This task has been success-
fully used in previous studies investigating semantic organi-
zation and its impairments (Fisher, 1994; Garrard, Carroll, 
Vinson & Vigliocco, in press). Particularly relevant here are 
the following facts. First, because all possible combinations 
of triads of a relatively small set of items are presented to 
the participants, this task allows us to consider semantic 
similarity at a very fine-grained level. Second, this task has 
been shown to be sensitive to linguistic variables at the in-
terface between meaning and syntax. For example, Fisher 
(1994) showed that English speakers’ judgments reflected 
differences in the subcategorization requirements of seman-
tically related verbs; Garrard et al (in press) showed that 
English speakers’ judgments reflected the distinction be-
tween “count” and “mass” nouns for words referring to food 
items (for which the semantic divide between entities and 
substances is less obvious). Thus, if grammatical gender of 
Italian nouns exerts influence upon semantic similarity, we 
should observe language-specific effects in this task. If this 
effect extends beyond the use of linguistic materials we 
should observe it also with pictures.   
Because all possible triads within a category are to be pre-
sented to the participants, and in order to maximize the op-
portunity of observing grammatical gender effects, which 
could be masked by extreme semantic diversity in the item 
set, all participants were presented with words from only 
one of two categories (land animals in Experiment 2a, and 
tools in Experiment 2b), reported separately below.  
Experiment 2a: Animals 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 24 native speakers of Italian from the 
London community, and 24 native English speakers from 
the University College London participant pool. The Italian 
participants had only rudimentary knowledge of English, 
and none of the English speakers reported moderate or bet-
ter competence in any Romance language. 
Materials 
Words (and corresponding pictures) referring to 20 animals 
were selected for the experiment. Words were translation 
equivalents in Italian and English. The words and the pic-
tures used were a subset of those used in Experiment 1.  
Triads for the Italian and English conditions were created by 
first assembling all possible three-word combinations of the 
20 items in the experimental set (for a total of 1,140 triads). 
The order of words in each triad was randomized; then the 
order of triads was randomized across participants.  A sepa-
rate set of picture triads were then created by replacing each 
word with its corresponding picture (this set was identical 
for Italian and English participants). Twelve participants 
from each language were assigned to the word condition and 
twelve to the picture condition. In each modality (word or 
picture) and language (Italian or English) condition, the 
1,140 triads were divided into three lists, each containing 
380 triads of words or pictures. 
Procedure 
All participants were told that the experiment concerned 
participants' judgments of meaning similarity among groups 
of words (or pictures), and that their task was to choose the 
two words (or pictures) out of the three which were more 
similar in meaning and to delete the odd one out. Instruc-
tions emphasized that the decision was to be made on the 
basis of meaning and not other types of similarity between 
the items (e.g., phonological similarity among the words or 
visual similarity among the pictures). After completing the 
task, participants were asked to describe the strategies they 
may have used to perform the task, to list the easiest and 
most difficult decisions, etc. For the purpose of the present 
study, the most important aspect of these questions was 
whether any Italian participants mentioned grammatical 
gender as an overt basis for making their decisions. 
Design and Analysis 
The dependent variable was similarity ratio: the number of 
times that a given pair of words/pictures was selected as 
“similar”, divided by the number of triads in which those 
two items appeared in the experiment. Four participants 
completed each list of 380 items; thus each triad (either 
words or pictures) was judged by four different speakers of 
a language. Results were analyzed using a three-way mixed 
ANOVA with item pairs as a random factor. Independent 
variables were language (English or Italian, manipulated 
within item pairs), modality (words or pictures, manipulated 
within item pairs) and Italian gender (same Italian gender; 
different Italian gender, manipulated between item pairs). 
As in Experiment 1 this latter factor refers to the gender of 
the Italian translation or label.  
Results and Discussion 
No Italian participant indicated that they used grammatical 
gender in their similarity judgments in the post-
experimental questionnaire.  Table 2 reports the average 
similarity proportions for items of same vs. different Italian 
gender as a functions of language and modality.  
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Table 2:  Average similarity ratios in Experiment 2a  
(Standard errors in brackets) 
 
    Grammatical Gender 
Language Modality Same       Different 
______________________ _________________ 
 
Italian  Words  .336 [.022]   .331 [.021] 
  Pictures  .315 [.026]   .351 [.025] 
 
English  Words  .311 [.026]   .354 [.025] 
  Pictures  .315 [.025]   .351 [.024] 
 
Results were analyzed using a three-way mixed ANOVA 
investigating the effect of language, modality and Italian 
gender on similarity proportions. Only the three-way inter-
action (Language x Modality x Gender) reached signifi-
cance (F(1,188)=6.539, p=.013); no other main effects and 
interactions were significant (all Fs < 1). Analysis of simple 
interaction effects within each modality revealed that the 
similarity proportion for same-gender items was relatively 
higher for Italian word judgments than for English word 
judgments (with the corresponding difference in the oppo-
site direction for words differing in Italian gender), while 
there was no such language difference for picture judgments 
by speakers of either language. 
Thus, in this experiment we found language-specific effects 
of grammatical gender for words referring to animals, but 
not for pictures referring to the same animals; Italian speak-
ers’ judgments of meaning similarity seem to be affected by 
shared grammatical gender. Experiment 2b assessed 
whether such a gender effect is present for tools.  
Experiment 2b: Tools 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 48 native speakers of Italian from the 
London community, and 48 native English speakers from 
the University College London participant pool. The Italian 
participants had only rudimentary knowledge of English, 
none of the English speakers reported moderate or better 
competence in any Romance language. None of them had 
participated in Experiment 2a.  
Materials 
Words (and corresponding pictures) referring to 24 tools 
were selected for the experiment. Words were translation 
equivalents in Italian and English. The words and the pic-
tures used were a subset of those used in Experiment 1. 
Word and picture triads for the Italian and English condi-
tions were created as in Experiment 2a. In this experiment 
all possible three-word combinations of the 24 items in the 
experimental set yielded a total of 2,024 triads. These triads 
were divided into six lists each containing 337 or 338 words 
or pictures. This experiment was otherwise the same as in 
Experiment 2a.  
Results and Discussion 
No Italian participant indicated that they used grammatical 
gender in their similarity judgments in the post-
experimental questionnaire.  Table 3 reports the average 
similarity proportions for items of same vs. different (Italian 
gender as a functions of language and modality.  
 
Table 3:  Average similarity ratios in Experiment 2b (Stan-
dard errors in brackets). 
 
    Grammatical Gender 
Language Modality Same       Different 
______________________ _________________ 
 
Italian  Words  .318 [.018]   .348 [.017] 
  Pictures  .314 [.020]   .352 [.019] 
 
English  Words  .316 [.017]   .348 [.017] 
  Pictures  .308 [.019]   .357 [.018] 
 
Results were analyzed using a three-way mixed ANOVA 
investigating the effect of language, modality and Italian 
gender on similarity proportions. No main effects or interac-
tions were significant (Fs < 1), with the exception of the 
main effect of gender which was marginal (F(1,274) = 2.49, 
p = .115). This indicates an underlying tendency for tools 
sharing Italian gender to be more similar than items with 
different Italian gender. Because no interaction between 
language and Italian gender was observed, this main effect 
cannot reflect language-specificity. Thus, whereas gram-
matical gender affected Italian speakers’ judgments of 
meaning similarity for words referring to land animals, no 
such effect was observed for either words or pictures refer-
ring to tools.  
General Discussion 
In the experiments reported above, we explored language-
specific effects of Italian grammatical gender on semantic 
representations for the corresponding objects. These ex-
periments combined on-line and off-line methodologies, 
assessing effects for two different semantic fields: one for 
which associations between grammatical gender and sex can 
be plausibly built (animals) and one for which they cannot 
(tools). Moreover, we further explored gender effects within 
the same task, using both words and pictures as stimuli, in 
order to establish the generalizability of any effect.  
We found that language-specific effects of Italian gram-
matical gender are present, but highly limited. They are lim-
ited to a semantic field (animals) in which entities have bio-
logical gender, and in which the gender of some nouns can 
depend on the sex of the referent. However, this effect does 
not extend to a field for which distinctions in grammatical 
gender have no conceptual foundation (tools). These effects 
are further limited to tasks that recruit linguistic knowledge 
(picture naming or similarity judgments for words, but not 
similarity judgments for pictures).  
1409
Our results suggest a far more limited role of grammatical 
gender on semantic representations than it has been sug-
gested in previous studies. For example, Sera et al (2002) 
showed that grammatical gender of Spanish and French 
nouns influenced speakers’ assignment of a male or female 
voice to inanimate (and animate) objects, regardless whether 
the task was carried out using words or pictures as stimuli. 
However, speakers might have used gender in a strategic 
manner in this task. Boroditsky, et al. (2003) report studies 
suggesting that grammatical gender may have implicit ef-
fects. However, these studies are reported without enough 
methodological detail to address possible reasons for the 
different results.   
Our results suggest that these gender effects are linked to 
assigning male- or female-like semantic properties to refer-
ents in agreement with the gender of the nouns. They pro-
vide evidence for a very constrained version of the Sex and 
Gender hypothesis described in the introduction. According 
to this view, language-specific grammatical gender effects 
should be stronger for semantic fields in which there is a 
conceptual motivation for establishing a link between gen-
der of words and sex of the referent (such as animals), than 
for fields for which there is not such a clear conceptual mo-
tivation (such as tools). This hypothesis also predicts that 
language-specific effects of gender on meaning should be 
stronger for languages such as Italian that have strong trans-
parent links between gender of nouns and sex of referents 
(male entities strongly tend to have masculine gender, and 
female entities strongly tend to have feminine gender). Al-
though the present experiments do not directly address this 
second prediction, some other evidence is relevant here. 
Vigliocco, Vinson, Indefrey, Levelt and Hellwig (2004) 
investigated gender effects on semantic substitution errors 
in German, in a study similar to Experiment 1. Although 
German has grammatical gender, in contrast to Italian it has 
three genders (masculine, feminine and neuter) and a less 
transparent correspondence between the gender of nouns 
and sex of referents.  No effect of grammatical gender was 
found on semantic substitution errors for animals (at least 
when speakers were asked to produce bare nouns). These 
different lines of investigation converge in suggesting that 
language-specific effects of gender do not arise as a conse-
quence of a general mechanism sensitive to similarity.  
Finally, the difference we observe in Experiment 2 between 
word and picture stimuli suggests that grammatical gender 
of Italian nouns (referring to animals) affects “thinking for 
speaking”, but does not affect conceptual representations 
when language is not required (Slobin, 1996).   
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Abstract 
In the past decade the traditional falsificationist view of 
hypothesis-testing tasks, such as Wason’s selection task, has 
become criticized from a Bayesian perspective. In this report 
a normative extension of Oaksford’s and Chater’s (1994, 
1998) influential Bayesian theory is proposed, that not only 
takes quantitative but also qualitative (structural) knowledge 
into account. In an experiment it is shown that humans appear 
to be sensitive to both the quantitative and the qualitative 
preconditions of the proposed normative models. 
Introduction 
According to falsificationism only tests of hypotheses that 
may lead to a falsification are normatively justified (Popper, 
1934/2002). In the psychology of thinking Wason’s (1966) 
selection task (WST) has become the most studied single 
task to investigate the testing of hypothesis, typically a 
indicative conditional in the form of “if p then (always) q.” 
In this task, four cards are presented. The visible front sides 
of these cards represent the logical cases p, non-p, q, non-q. 
It is known that one side of each card shows either a p- or 
non-p-case and the other side either a q or non-q-case. In 
order to test whether the hypothesis is true or false, 
participants should turn over those cards that are needed to 
test the hypothesis. To falsificationists, who have been pre-
dominant in psychology of reasoning for long, only the 
selection of a p-card and a non-q-card is correct.  
Since over three decades studies have shown that humans 
do not act in a falsificatory manner (e.g., Johnson-Laird & 
Wason, 1970): most participants selected the p-card and the 
q-card and only 4% selected the ‘correct’ combination of a 
p- and a non-q-card. Since 96% gave wrong answers in this 
very basic logical task, this finding casts doubt on the 
rationality of the so-called animal rationale/zoon echon 
logon (Aristotle).  
In psychology, theories have been developed which kept a 
falsificatory core, but which explained the selections by 
additional mechanisms (e. g. mental model theory). Also 
other theories flourished, which completely broke with the 
concept of normative rationality altogether (Cheng & 
Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). 
In the last decade, however, probabilistic and Bayesian 
approaches to the WST have been also proposed  (early 
proposals were e. g. Kirby, 1994; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; 
Evans & Over, 1996). The optimal data selection model of 
Oaksford and Chater (1994, 1996, 1998; Oaksford, Chater 
& Grainger, 1999) represents the most refined approach and 
has received most attention (e. g.: Evans & Over, 1996; 
Laming, 1996; Klauer, 1999; Oberauer, 2000; Osman et al., 
2001). Hence, I am here going to focus on this approach. 
Models 
The model of hypothesis testing by Oaksford and Chater 
(1994, 1998), shown in Table 1, distinguishes a dependence 
sub-model  MD and an independence sub-model MI, which 
represent the truth or falsity of the conditional. As in logics 
P(p∧¬q|MD) is set as zero. Different to logics the other cells 
in this model are quantified. By comparing of MD and MI it 
can be seen (without the further modeling steps) that in such 
a model not only the falsificatory selections p-/non-q-card 
selections, but also q-card-selections may provide a certain 
information gain. However the non-p-card never becomes 
informative, since Oaksford & Chater (1994) set P(p) and 
P(non-p|q) to be equal in both sub-models, which in turn 
cause a flexible q-marginal probability.1  
This setting of parameters has been criticized by Laming 
(1996) as post hoc data model fitting, designed to preclude 
the prediction of (actually infrequent) non-p-selections. 
Laming argued that these assumptions could not be 
justified, since one may equally construct a model with 
different parameters that appears completely weird 
(Table 3). Oaksford & Chater (1996, p. 386) defended their 
setting of parameters: “Psychologically it reflects the 
finding that participants regard false antecedent instances 
(i.e., the not-p cases) as irrelevant to the truth or falsity of a 
conditional rule.” (Cf. recently similar ideas by Over, in 
press, and by Evans,  Headley and Over, 2003)  
von Sydow (2002) argued at length against this view and 
in favor of a different approach. Oaksford’s and Chater’s 
above argument, for example, is against the spirit of their 
own approach, since by this argument also non-q-card 
selections could have been excluded a priori. Inspired by 
Laming’s criticism, I discussed and empirically examined a 
model in which the resulting marginal probabilities w(pres) 
and w(qres) are set to be constant in both sub-models 
(Table 2). This model is actually long known from the 
philosophical literature on the raven paradox, but von 
Sydow has combined it with the further calculations of the 
refined model of Oaksford and Chater (1998), stressing that 
this model has necessary preconditions to be fulfilled by the 
empirical situation. At about the same time similar 
proposals were made (Hattori, 2002) and even Oaksford & 
                                                           
1 Oaksford and Chater (1994, 1998) modified the probabilities used 
in Table 1 according to the following formula: q:=[P(q)-P(p) 
P(MD)]/[1-P(p) P(MD)].  Both models were analyzed, the pure 
model without the modification of P(q) (Model 1) and the model 
with the modification. The predictions of both models are similar 
and in this paper I focus on the pure model (cf. table 4).  
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Wakefield (2003) in a revision turned to this model.2 
However, in these other proposals it was never stressed that 
in principle all models could be normatively justified (also 
the original one of Oaksford & Chater, 1994). In contrast, 
von Sydow argued that all could be justified, provided that 
their (implicit) preconditions hold in the experimental 
situation. In three experiments von Sydow (2002) ensured 
that the preconditions of the model from Table 2 were 
fulfilled, by ensuring fixed marginal probabilities. The 
results showed the predicted increase of non-p- and non-q-
selections in high base rate conditions. 
The aim of this present paper is to directly investigate 
whether humans are actually sensitive to these different 
structural preconditions. Therefore the original model of 
Oaksford and Chater (1994, 1998)1, the model of von 
Sydow (2002) and also the model of Laming (1996) were 
modeled along the same lines. In regard to further steps of 
modeling (Bayes’ Theorem, Wiener-Shannon-Information 
and the resulting expected information gain measure) 
I completely followed  Oaksford and Chater (1998).3  
Here only an extract of the modeling results can be pre-
sented (see Table 4). Expected information gain (EIg) 
values are shown for the different models for the parameter 
values used in the experiment (low base rate: P(p)=.10, 
                                                           
2 Oaksford, Chater & Larkin (2000) had distinguished a similar 
model of reasoning from their model of hypothesis testing. The 
revision has been announced – without any reasons and without 
own data – in an overview article (Oaksford & Chater 2001, p. 
353), which can not count as a full revision of their model. 
3 For alternative proposals cf. Laming (1996), Klauer (1999), and 
Chater & Oaksford (1999).  
P(q)=.20, P(HD)=.50, high base rate P(p)=.80, P(q)=.90, 
P(HD)=.50). Additionally also the normative predictions for 
the estimates of the marginal probabilities are shown. (The 
predictions are also mentioned in the results section.) 
 
Table 4:  Expected information gain and standardized 
expected information gain (with an error parameter) for card 
selections in different structural models (for low, .10→.20, 
and high base rates, .80→90). Resulting marginal pro-
babilities P(pres|MD), P(qres|MD), P(pres|MI), P(qres|MI).1 
 
von Sydow-Model Oaksford-Chater-Model 1EIg
SEIg p ¬p q ¬q p ¬p q ¬q 
low .61
.58 
.01
.09 
.15
.20 
.05 
.20 
.61 
.63 
.00 
.09 
.07
.15 
.05
.13 
MD P(pres)=.10 P(qres)=.20 P(pres)=.10 P(qres)=.28 
MI P(pres)=.10 P(qres)=.20 P(pres)=.10 P(qres)=.20
high .05
.12 
.15
.20 
.01
.09 
.61 
.58 
.05 
.14 
.00 
.09 
.00
.09 
.61
.67 
MD P(pres)=.80 P(qres)=.90 P(pres)=.80 P(qres)=.98
MI P(pres)=.80 P(qres)=.90 P(pres)=.80 P(qres)=.90
Oaksford-Chater-Model 2 Laming-Model EIg 
SEIg p ¬p q ¬q p ¬p q ¬q 
low .67
.63 
.00
.08 
.10
.16 
.05 
.12 
.61 
.67 
.00 
.09 
.00
.09 
.05
.16 
MD P(pres)=.10 P(qres)=.24 P(pres)=.02 P(qres)=.20 
MI P(pres)=.10 P(qres)=.16 P(pres)=.10 P(qres)=.20
high .09
.17 
.00
.09 
.00
.09 
.61 
.65 
.05 
.13 
.07 
.15 
.00
.09 
.61
.63 
MD P(pres)=.80 P(qres)=.97 P(pres)=.72 P(qres)=.90
MI P(pres)=.80 P(qres)=.83 P(pres)=.80 P(qres)=.90
Table 1:  Model of Oaksford and Chater (1994, 1998). 
P(p) and P(q|1-p) are set to be the same in both sub-models (cf. footnote 1). 
Notes for Table 1 to 3: The cells show probabilities for the Dependence Model MD and the Independence Model MI .  
Resulting marginal probabilities, P(pres) and P(qres), can differ from P(p) and P(q). ‘p’, ‘q’ in italics abbreviates P(p), P(q). 
 
MD q non-q   MI q non-q  
p p 0 p  p pq p(1-q) p 
non-p (1-p)q (1-p)(1-q) 1-p  non-p (1-p)q (1-p)(1-q) 1-p 
 q+p-pq (1-p)(1-q) 1   q 1-q 1 
 
Table 2:  Model of von Sydow (2002), Oaksford and Wakefield (2003). P(p) and P(q) are set to be constant. (Cf. Table 1) 
 
MD q non-q   MI q non-q  
p p 0 p  p pq p(1-q) p 
non-p q-p 1-q 1-p  non-p (1-p)q (1-p)(1-q) 1-p 
 q 1-q 1   q 1-q 1 
 
Table 3:  Model of Laming (1996). P(q) and P(p|q) are set to be constant. (Cf. Table 1) 
 
MD q non-q   MI q non-q  
p pq 0 pq  p pq p(1-q) p 
non-p (1-p)q 1-q 1-pq  non-p (1-p)q (1-p)(1-q) 1-p 
 q 1-q 1   q 1-q 1 
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Method 
Design and Participants The experiment had a 2 (low 
versus high base rate condition) × 3 (the three structural 
models) between-subjects design.  
Seventy-two participants from the University of 
Göttingen took part in the experiment. The participants were 
randomly assigned to the six experimental conditions.  
 
Materials and Procedure. Each participant was presented 
with what I call a ‘Many Cards Selection Task’ (MST) with 
many depicted cards (instead of four cards in a WST) in a 
paper and pencil version. 
In all conditions the same cover story was used. Parti-
cipants were asked to suppose that they were physicians at a 
university hospital. Their task was to find out whether the 
following hypothesis was true or false: “If a patient is in-
fected by the Virus Adenophage (A), then he always shows 
the symptom Thoraxpneu ()” This hypothesis was set in 
bold print. In order to set the parameter P(MD) in all models 
to 0.5 the participants were told that it is equally likely, that 
the hypothesis is true or that there is no correlation between 
the virus and the symptom at all. The participants were told, 
that the head nurse is in charge of all the patient files, in the 
form of 100 patient cards. Each patient card on the front 
side provides information about tested viruses and on the 
backside information about symptoms.  
The cards were then shown to the participants. First the 
head nurse laid out the front sides of the cards, showing 
whether a patient had the specific virus (A) or not (-). Then 
she quickly takes up the cards. Thereby the cards are com-
pletely mixed (bold print). Secondly she then laid out the 
backsides of the cards, showing whether a patient has shown 
the specific symptom () or not ().  
Depending on the experimental condition it varies which 
cards are shown. The proportion of cards p- versus non-p-
cards and q- versus non-q-cards resulted from how the 
parameters were set (low base rate: P(p)=0.1, P(q)=0.2, 
high base rate condition P(p)=0.8, P(q)=0.9).  
In the structural condition with constant marginal 
probabilities (von Sydow; 2002) P(p|HD)=P(p|HI) and 
P(q|HD)=P(q|HI) were induced by showing all fronts and 
backs of the cards (after mixing them in between). For the 
Oaksford and Chater (1994)-model, with P(p|HD)=P(p|HI) 
and P(q|non-p | HD)=P(q|non-p| HI), also all cards were first 
shown with the virus-side facing upwards (P(p|Hx)). But 
after mixing, the symptom-sides only of those patients were 
shown who had no virus (P(q|non-p | Hx)). Thereby I 
directly provided information on P(¬p∧q) and P(¬p∧¬q), 
which should remain constant in this model. No direct 
information was provided of the q-/non-p-marginal 
probabilities, which are not constant in this model. 
Similarly, in the Laming (1996)-condition, with 
P(q|HD)=P(q|HI) and P(p|q | HD)=P(p|q | HI), all cards were 
first shown now with the symptom-side visible. After 
mixing, the virus-sides of the cards only of those patients 
were shown, who have had the specific symptom. Thereby I 
directly provided information on P(p∧q) and P(¬p∧q), 
which are constant in that model and no direct information 
on the p- and non-p-marginal probabilities.  
All participants were then instructed that the head nurse 
was not willing to turn over many cards separately. She 
would only allow one card to be turned over on its own. 
Participants were asked, what card they would select to test 
their hypothesis. Firstly the participants should suppose the 
head nurse had put two patient cards in front of them, one of 
a patient with the virus (A) and one card of a patient without 
the virus (-) (p-card, non-p-card).4 Secondly they should 
instead suppose a situation in which two patient cards were 
placed before them, one of a patient with the symptom (), 
one of a patient without the symptom () (q-card, non-q-
card). In both cases they had to choose which card they 
would turn over.  
Finally, four questions were used (in a frequency format), 
to survey the participant’s estimation of the marginal 
probabilities resulting in each model, that is: P(pres|HD), 
P(qres|HD), P(pres|HI), P(qres|HI). The participants were asked 
how many of all 100 patients would have the Virus A and 
how many of all 100 patients would have Symptom T, 
assuming that the hypothesis is true or false. 
Results and Discussion  
First the card selections are described, then the estimations 
of the marginal probabilities.  
 
Card selections  
 
Table 5:  Percentages and number of selections of the  
p- and non-p-cards and q- and non-q-cards. (N=72) 
 
Structural Models 
Sydow Oaksford Laming 
 
low high low high low high 
p 92%, 
11 
25% 
3 
83% 
10 
83% 
10 
83% 
10 
58% 
7 
non-p 8% 
1 
75% 
9 
17% 
2 
17% 
2 
17% 
2 
42% 
5 
q 75% 
9 
25% 
3 
58% 
7 
17% 
2 
42% 
5 
45% 
5 
non-q 25% 
3 
75% 
9 
42% 
5 
83% 
10 
58% 
7 
55% 
6 
 
                                                           
4 The original WST with its four cards may be interpreted as a 
sequential task, in which the first selection may influence the 
second, or in which even a planned second selection may influence 
the first. This would not be modeled by the general approach of 
Oaksford & Chater (1994). Such effects are minimized by this 
forced choice design. (Cf. also Klauer 1999.) 
Moreover, this design is a severe test of the predicted increase of 
non-q- and non-p-card selections: not only the relevance of these 
cards, but their relative predominance is tested against the 
normally common p-card and q-card selections.  
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von Sydow (2002)-Model  For this model a rise in the 
proportion of non-q-selections and non-p-selection was 
predicted for the high base rate condition. The descriptive 
results are shown in Table 5 and visualized in Figure 1. 
Both differences were statistically significant, the q-/non-
q-effect (Pearson: χ2 (1, n=24)=6.0, one-tailed, df=1; 
p<.01) as well as the p-/non-p-effect (Pearson: χ2(1, n=24) 
=10.9, one-tailed, p<.001). The parameters in this experi-
ment were chosen that for this model EIg(non-q|high)= 
EIg(q|low) and EIg(non-p|high)= EIg(p| low). The results of 
the q-/non-q-effect are indeed perfectly symmetrical, the p-
/non-p-effect descriptively only shows a small p-bias. 
Within the high base rate condition more non-p than p and 
more non-q than q-selections were predicted. These cards 
even became predominant in a statistically significant way 
(both: χ2 (1, n=12)=3.0, one-tailed, p<.05).  
 
highlow
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
non-p
p
highlow
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
non-q
q
 
Figure 1: von Sydow-Model: (a) Proportion of p-/non-p-
card selections and (b) proportion of q-/non-q-card 
selections in high and low base rate conditions. 
 
Oaksford and Chater (1994)-Model This model similarly 
predicts an increase of non-q-card selections in the high 
base rate condition, but it does not predict an increase of 
non-p-card selections. The results are visualized in Figure 2. 
For the p-/non-p-cards there was indeed no difference 
between the low and high base rate condition (Fisher-Yates 
test (1, n=24, one-tailed): p=0.70). As also hypothesized, 
the frequency of non-q-card selections was significantly 
higher in the high base rate condition than in the low base 
rate condition (Fisher-Yates test (1, n=24, one-tailed): 
p<.05). Even the perhaps surprising high rate of non-q-card 
selections in the low base rate condition appears reasonable 
with regard to the EIG and SEIg values (cf. Table 4). 
 
highlow
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
non-p
p
highlow
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
non-q
q
 
Figure 2: Oaksford-Chater-Model: Proportion of selections.  
Laming (1996)-Model Although Laming’s proposal was 
originally only thought as an absurd example, it was 
modeled and the prediction of a constantly high non-q-card 
selection and a p-/non-p-effect was derived.  
As expected, no q-/non-q-effect was found (Fisher-Yates 
test (1, n=23, one-tailed): p=.58). But in difference to the 
predictions the p-/non-p-effect was not significant (Fisher-
Yates test (1, n=24, one-tailed): p=.18). However, even 
here the results descriptively point in the predicted direction 
and in the high base rate condition over 40% preferred a 
non-p-card (figure 4).  
 
highlow
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
non-p
p
highlow
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
non-q
q
 
Figure 3: Laming-Model: Proportion of selections.  
 
In summary, the card selections were clearly confirmative 
for both the von Sydow-model and the Oaksford-Chater-
model, and they at least pointed in the predicted direction 
for the Laming-model. 
 
Estimates of marginal probabilities Participants’ 
estimates of the resulting marginal probabilities was a 
second depended variable to assess whether the participants 
fully understood the implications of the induced models. 
Only an abridged analysis of these data can be given here. 
In Table 5 the means and modes of the subjective estimates 
of the marginal probabilities P(pres) and P(qres) are shown, if 
the participants had to assume the rule to be true or false. 
An analysis of the data shows that the means are not the 
appropriate measures to assess the differences between the 
conditions, since in some cases two types of answers clearly 
predominated. Hence Table 5 also shows the modes (two 
modes are shown when both have the same frequency or 
when their frequency differed only by one). It was tested 
whether the number of cases represented by each mode of 
the estimations (or by the two modes) is predominant 
relatively to all other cases not matching that mode(s). This 
was tested for significance with a Chi2-test (df=1, one-
tailed, 12≥N≥9). (For Results cf. Table 5.) 
In the von Sydow-Model the modes were all normative. 
Each mode had a frequency of over 70%. The χ2-tests 
showed, that the number of estimations matching the modes 
was in all but one case significantly higher than all other 
estimations taken together (Table 5). 
In the Oaksford-Chater-Model and in the Laming-Model 
a relevant number, but not all, of estimations confirmed the 
predictions. But it will be shown that the deviations also 
showed an interesting inner consistence.  
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Table 5:  Estimates of the resulting marginal probabilities 
given the truth (MD) or falsity (MI) of the hypothesis.  
For each model the following values are shown: normative 
answers for P(pres), then for P(qres), means of these answers, 
modes. A mode (or two taken together) got an asterisk (*),  
if their predominance was also statistically significant. 
(They also always united over 75% of the answers.) 
 
Sydow Oaksford Laming P(pres) 
P(qres) 
N
or
m
at
iv
e 
M
ea
n 
M
od
e 
N
or
m
at
iv
e 
M
ea
n 
M
od
e 
N
or
m
at
iv
e 
M
ea
n 
M
od
e 
M
D
 10 20 
10 
18 
10*  
20* 
 
10 
28 
10
19 
10* 
28;10* 
  2 
20 
13
17 
 2; 20* 
20* 
Lo
w
 b
as
e 
ra
te
 
M
I 
10 
20 
10 
19 
10* 
20* 
10 
20 
10
18 
10* 
18* 
10 
20 
 5
19 
 2* 
20* 
M
D
 80 90 
73 
79 
80* 
90* 
80 
98 
77
81 
80* 
98,80* 
72 
90 
76
84 
72;90*
90* 
H
ig
h 
ba
se
 ra
te
 
M
I 
80 
90 
76 
85 
805 
90* 
80 
90 
73
58 
80* 
90; 50 
80 
90 
67
77 
72 
90* 
 
In both models the results clearly and significantly con-
firmed the predictions in regard to the constant marginal 
probabilities, that is in regard to P(pres) in the Oaksford-
Chater-Model and in regard to P(qres) in the Laming-
Model). In each of these four cases there was only one 
mode, which in number outweighed all other predictions 
significantly. Also as predicted, a change of modes 
(between MD and MI) was found in the Oaksford-Chater-
Model in regard to P(qres), and conversely in the Laming-
Model in regard to P(pres). But opposed to the predictions in 
both models two modes were found, given the hypothesis is 
assumed to be true. The two modes taken together signi-
ficantly outweighed all other predictions in all four cases. In 
all these cases – independent of a high or a low base rate – 
one of the two modes exactly was the predicted one. The 
other mode in all cases was consistent with an equivalence 
interpretation of the hypothesis. In the Oaksford-Chater-
Model this second mode of P(qres|MD) matched the correct 
estimations of P(pres|MD).  Conversely in the Laming-Model 
the second mode of P(pres|MD) exactly matched P(qres|MD). 
Hence in both models one set of answers exactly shows the 
expected changes between MD and MI. Another set of ans-
wers is consistent with an interpretation of the hypothesis 
not as implication, but as equivalence. (Based on the low N 
no further analysis of this additional effect was possible.) 
In summary, also the results for the estimations show that 
participants distinguished the tested models. The results for 
the von Sydow-model were unambiguously positive. In the 
                                                           
5 Also here 70 % (of 11 answers) matched the mode. 
Oaksford-Chater-Model and the Laming-model a substantial 
number of answers fully confirmed the predictions. In these 
models a second group, however, was consistent with an 
interpretation of the rule as equivalence. Interestingly, the 
ambiguity of the interpretation of the hypothesis appears to 
be a function of the induced model.  
 
General Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The empirical results provide evidence that humans are 
sensitive both to the structural as well as to the quantitative 
aspects of the tested Bayesian models.  
The card selections largely confirmed the predicted differ-
ential effects of structural models and of the card frequen-
cies. Estimates of the resulting marginal probability provide 
evidence that at least a substantial part of the participants 
also understood these implications of the models.  
Implications for Non-Bayesian Approaches 
Approaches that are normatively based on basic formal 
logics (excluding e. g. fuzzy logics) and its falsificationist 
interpretation have clear normative predictions in all condi-
tions of the experiment. In each and every case one equally 
ought to select the p- and the non-q-card, since these are the 
only cards by which a (conclusive) falsification could be 
achieved. The main traditional psychological theories of 
conditionals, the mental logics theory and the mental model 
theory (cf. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) are normatively 
still tightly linked to the falsificationist research program. 
But also with their additional psychological assumptions 
these theories cannot explain the particular pattern of 
probabilistic results found in this experiment.   
Likewise the psychological theories which even break 
with any concept of normativity,  such as the original prag-
matic reasoning theory (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) or the 
evolutionary social contract theory (Cosmides, 1989; 
Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992) cannot explain the fit of data to 
these normative models of reasoning. 
The normative models as well as the empirical results of 
the experiment at least show the incompleteness of all these 
theories. This has to be said in such a cautious manner, 
since one has to concede that Bayesian models have not yet 
explained all the effects predicted by all these quite different 
theories either.   
Implications for Bayesian Approaches 
On the one hand the results of the present work show that 
the discussed Bayesian approaches of hypothesis testing (of 
single conditionals) need to be extended by  a structural 
component, which determines what parameters are constant 
in that models.6 On the other hand this extension (norma-
                                                           
6 The structural component proposed in this paper may be regarded 
as the microstructure of a conditional, which perhaps complements 
the effects of macrostructure already discussed in the context of  
causal Bayes-nets (cf. Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001) 
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tively as well as empirically) strongly confirms the general 
approach of exactly these extended Bayesian models.  
Working with a MST and by clearly fixing the precon-
ditions, the results, not only of the model von Sydow 
(2002), Hattori (2002) and Oaksford & Wakefield (2003) 
but also the original model of Oaksford & Chater (1994, 
1998, similarly now Over, in press, Evans et al., 2003) 
could be supported. (The evaluation of the model of Laming 
remained ambivalent.) Moreover the objection of Laming 
(1996) that the assumptions of the discussed basic models 
are licentious, which in principle affects all models, has 
been ruled out by introducing experimentally exactly the 
preconditions of these models.  
But these largely confirmative results also show the 
necessity to extend Bayesian models discussed by the 
structural aspect examined. From this it results that it is 
false, both normatively and empirically, to assume that only 
one universal Bayesian model could and should fit all data. 
Also those authors who have adopted a probabilistic or 
Bayesian account, mostly still seek a universal model for 
hypothesis testing or reasoning with conditionals (e. g. 
Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 1998; also Oaksford & 
Wakefield, 2003; and even Evans et al., 2003 and Over, in 
press). Instead the results of my experiment show that 
additional hidden preconditions need to be taken into 
account. In this regard I do follow early writings of Evans & 
Over (1996), which stressed that there is no universal 
technical measure of uncertainty reduction. On the other 
hand, in my opinion, only the more sophisticated models in 
the tradition of Oaksford & Chater do allow a detailed 
investigation of the phenomena in question. This paper 
could be seen as contribution towards a synthesis of these 
positions. 
On the larger scale such a synthesis would sustain 
normative necessity, as the logicistic research program also 
has done. Nevertheless it allows for a plurality of pre-
conditions, which has been stressed by domain specific 
accounts.  Whether domain-specific normative Bayesian 
models may serve as a more general research program can 
only be found out by further theoretical analysis and 
empirical investigation. 
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Abstract 
Interruptions are often seen as distracting or sometimes 
devastating elements that need to be minimized or eliminated. 
However, interruptions are also used to increase efficiency, 
productivity, prevent errors, and even influence behavior. 
Existing theories and taxonomies of interruptions fail to 
account for the helpful aspects of interruptions. Therefore we 
propose a theoretical framework to help explain the positive 
aspects of interruptions. Warnings & alerts, reminders, 
suggestions and notifications are examples of interruptions 
that have beneficial outcomes by changing and influencing 
behavior. We propose a cognitive theory of interruptions 
based on the properties of the users, their tasks, and best 
presentations depending on the desired effectiveness of the 
interruption. Norman’s 7-stage action model serves to explain  
how and why an interruption is accepted, and potential 
mismatches between the goal of the interruption and the user.  
Potential applications of this model include better 
understanding the effects of interruptions, and guidance to 
design effective and persuasive warnings and alerts, 
reminders, suggestions and notifications. 
Introduction 
Interruption has been an active area in human-computer 
interaction research for some time. A comprehensive review 
was provided by McFarlane and Latorella (2002). 
Interruptions are typically defined as a change or 
disturbance in a process or in people’s activities.(Cooper & 
Franks, 1993; McFarlane & Latorella, 2002)  Interruptions 
are categorized along different dimensions by different 
researchers, such as source, effect, content, applicability, 
and duration by Cooper & Franks (1993) and individual 
properties, methods, meaning, source, channel, change, and 
effect by McFarlane and Latorella (2002). 
Significant research  has been expelled in determining 
how to classify, prevent, minimize, and provide tools to help 
users deal with interruptions. However, there is little 
understanding how interruptions can be exploited for 
positive outcomes, while at the same time minimizing some 
of their most disruptive properties. After all, interruptions 
are constantly used to help manage and complete important 
everyday tasks. Such interruptions also have the ability to 
influence and change behavior. In order to better understand 
and explain how interruptions can be engineered to be 
positive and persuasive we propose a theoretical framework 
and conceptualization. The theoretical framework may also 
guide designers on discovering factors to help develop 
appropriate interruptions. 
Effects of Interruptions 
Detrimental Effects of Interruptions 
The effects of interruptions are generally described as 
negative  Users perceive an interrupted task as being more 
difficult to complete than an uninterrupted task (Bailey, 
Konstan, & Carlis, 2000). An interruption is also thought to 
take longer to process and return back to task when it is 
unrelated to the task at hand (Cutrell, Czerwinski, & 
Horvitz, 2001). The added memory load seems to make it 
difficult for a task to be resumed. It also becomes difficult to 
remember what task was being processed before the 
interruption. (Burmistrov & Leonova, 1996; Dix, Ramduny, 
& Wilkinson, 1995).  Further, the complexity of the task 
being interrupted effects the disruptiveness of an 
interruption. Interrupting complex tasks inhibits 
performance, and has no effect on simpler tasks (Burmistrov 
& Leonova, 1996).   Interestingly, people can recall details 
about interrupted tasks better than uninterrupted 
tasks.(McFarlane & Latorella, 2002)  
People  also have individual differences in their ability to 
respond and manage interruptions (McFarlane & Latorella, 
2002). Interruptions also affect performance.  Users are 
thought in general to perform slower on interrupted tasks 
(Bailey et al., 2000), although some evidence exist that an 
interruption may actually speed up task completion (Zijlstra, 
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Roe, Leonara, & Krediet, 1999). However, the actual effect 
of an interruption will likely depend on the actual tasks 
being performed, and the interruption itself. There is 
conflicting evidence if similarity between the interrupted 
and interrupting tasks has any effect on performance (Bailey 
et al., 2000; Gillie & Broadbent, 1989).  
Timing of interruptions may also have an effect. 
Interruptions coming early during a search task are 
described as likely to result in the user forgetting the 
primary task goal than an interruption arriving later on 
(Cutrell et al., 2001).  The presentation of the interruption  
are also important. For example aurally presented 
interruptions are thought to be acknowledged more quickly 
than visual stimuli.  Auditory ongoing tasks are more 
resistant to interruptions than visual ones (Latorella, 1996) 
Thermal interruptions have larger detrimental effect than 
light on disruptiveness and performance (Arroyo, Selker, & 
Stouffs, 2002). Motion as a notification system is effective 
compared with static items (Bartram, Ware, & Calvert, 
2001). Traveling motions as a visual stimuli are more 
disruptive than anchored motions (Bartram et al., 2001)  
Therefore much effort has been expended to determine 
the negative effects of various interruptions and their 
modalities. However there are also different perspectives 
from which the effects of interruptions may be viewed. 
Indeed an interruption may be devastating to the task in 
progress. But when looking at the individual performing 
various tasks, the interruption may not have a detrimental 
impact on the whole. Most research has focused on the task 
level, which may be an inappropriate level of analysis in 
some cases.  
Beneficial Effects of Interruptions 
Types of interruptions that may serve beneficial purposes 
include warnings and alerts, reminders, notifications and 
suggestions. Of course warnings and alerts etc., may not 
always be interruptions. We define a warning and alert etc. 
as an interruption when it causes a change or disturbance in 
a person’s activity or behavior. Table 1 summarizes the 
characteristics of these interruptions. We provide examples 
in a healthcare context, although these types of interruptions 
would also exist in other domains. Our examples are also 
technologically focused and include persuasive interruptions 
embedded into computer systems, mobile devices, and 
medical equipment which are increasingly being used in 
healthcare. 
 
Warnings & Alerts are usually a sign or signal of 
something negative occurring, or a notice to be careful. 
They are intended to make people aware of an impending 
danger or difficulty. For example, drug interaction warnings 
embedded into drug prescribing systems warn doctors and 
pharmacists about dangerous drug-drug interactions when 
prescribing or filling a prescription.  These warnings are 
designed to interrupt the current task, and alert the clinician 
to a potential adverse event. Although such warnings may 
be critical in preventing errors, it is found that in practice 
such warnings are often ignored or overridden (Wilson, 
2003), suggesting the need for better designed warnings.  
Hospitals are increasingly ‘buzzing’ with auditory alerts 
from a variety of medical equipment (Meredith & 
Edworthy, 1995). The purpose of such devices are to 
monitor patients and alert physicians or nurses when they 
need to take action. However, there is rarely any 
synchronization or awareness between the large number of 
standalone medical equipment emanating various alerts and 
tones; resulting in many ignored warnings.  
Warnings and alerts are often urgent and need to be 
handled quickly. Warnings and alerts may either have an 
explicit or implicit action associated with them. For 
example a drug interaction warning may indicate explicitly 
that there is a potential interaction with a drug and provide a 
list of medications that may be suitable replacements. An 
audible alert may be more implicit, simply indicating an off 
nominal state, without providing any explicit instructions or 
actions. 
 
Reminders are a form of interruption that cause an 
individual to remember or recall an event. Clinical decision 
support systems often remind physicians of standard tests or 
procedures that conform to clinical practice guidelines. 
(Bates et al., 2003) Such reminders are deemed important as 
they provide a mechanism to foster uniformity in treatment 
and to assist in managing the burgeoning costs of 
healthcare. These reminders often occur while the 
physicians is documenting or ordering the tests and 
procedures. Medication reminders may also assist patients 
in adhering and complying with their medication regimens 
(Bennett & Glasziou, 2003). Although the urgency or 
importance of reminders may vary, many will include an 
explicit associated action. For example a medication 
reminder may announce the time, dose and route for the 
drug. 
 
Suggestions are ideas or proposals that are propagated to 
individuals. Patients often receive suggestions and 
recommendations from their care-givers. For example 
diabetics are urged to exercise more and eat healthier. 
Physicians may be informed that their patient may be 
eligible for a particular clinical trial. Pharmaceutical 
companies also engage in suggestive practices to prescribers 
when they promote their particular brand of medication. 
Such suggestive interruptions can be from face-to-face 
encounters with a pharmaceutical sales representative or 
through the use of sponsored drug reference databases. 
Suggestions are unlikely to be of high urgency or 
importance. But effective suggestions may explicitly state 
associated actions that are recommended. 
 
Notifications are usually described as the process of 
informing. Notifications are defined as the most generic 
type of interruption, with the least degree of importance or 
urgency. A notification may purely be informational in 
purpose with no explicit instruction for action. For example 
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a notice stating the availability of a patient’s lab results 
informs a physician that their requested order is ready. 
However, notifications may lead to actions implicitly 
without specific instructions. For example the lab test may 
indicate that a particular patient needs an immediate surgical 
procedure. Therefore notifications may lead to implicit 
actions. 
 
Table 1: Beneficial Interruptions and their Characteristics 
Interruption Type Importance / 
Urgency 
Action 
Warnings & Alerts High Implicit or Explicit 
Reminders High-Low Explicit 
Suggestions Medium – Low Explicit 
Notifications Low Implicit 
Persuasive Interruptions 
Fogg (1998) suggests computers and technology can be 
persuasive (change attitudes or behavior) as tools, social 
actors and/or media. We suggest that technology-based 
interruptions  can be designed so they too can influence 
behavior and attitudes in order to achieve positive 
outcomes. In fact beneficial interruptions described earlier 
as warnings and alerts, reminders and suggestions disrupt a 
person’s current task, and may cause them to change their 
behavior. Of course not all positive interruptions need to 
change or influence behavior. The persuasiveness of 
interruptions may be directly linked to the interruption type 
and their corresponding importance to deliver a particular 
message. For example warnings may be high in importance, 
and need to influence a change in behavior immediately and 
therefore very persuasive. While a notification, which is just 
informational in content, may not influence behavior and 
therefore may not be particularly persuasive.  
Theoretical Framework 
We propose a theoretical framework for interruptions 
(figure 1) to help explain the different dimensions that are 
involved in making an interruption persuasive and 
beneficial. Table 2 shows the details of the framework in a 
form of taxonomy. 
User Properties 
Individuals or users that are affected by interruptions are 
likely to have unique characteristics and properties. 
Therefore it is important to identify key features that may 
impact the effectiveness of interruptions and how they 
respond and deal with them. For example a physician has 
different characteristics than a nurse. A challenge in 
producing effective interruption are to deliver them when 
most opportune and least detrimental. Therefore a users 
location, environment, time of day (or week or year), or 
schedule (in Outlook for example) may be exploited to 
establish if they can be interrupted. Horvitz et al have 
explored the use of subtle clues in design of attentive user 
interfaces to discover the attention of users combined with 
user preferences in design of notification platform to 
intelligently route messages (Horvitz, 1999).  
Task Properties 
In addition to determining user characteristics, it is also 
important to determine properties of the interrupted and 
interrupting tasks. Certain tasks may be particularly 
susceptible to the detrimental effects of interruptions. 
However, determining a user’s current task is challenging. 
Computer based tasks may be more amenable to discovering 
current task or workload. But in more complex, dynamic or 
distributed domains, it is likely that the users will interact 
with a multitude of (unlinked) devices including phones, 
pagers, PDA’s, among others.  
Various methods to determine user interrupt-ability have 
been explored. Instant messaging applications allow users to 
indicate their current availability. Alternatively, task 
complexity may be automatically measured. The number 
and type of applications the user has open, or number of key 
strokes, or mouse clicks within a certain time period may 
indicate the user’s workload. The user’s contextual 
information may also be exploited, such as time of day or 
week. A user may conduct certain tasks at certain times of a 
week. However, many users do not follow a rigid schedule 
and may elect to make changes. Another approach has been 
to discover “activity awareness” between groups which take 
into account situational, group, task and tool factors and 
subsequently provide a notification system to indicate 
availability. (Carroll, Neale, Isenhour, Rosson, & 
McCrickard, 2003)  However, further work is needed to 
discover how best to determine current task properties in 
order to present an interruption at the most optimal time. 
Presentation 
In addition to user and task properties, the presentation of an 
interruption may be critical. The presentation of an 
interruption involves two stages. First, the interruption must 
alert the user of its presence. Heat, light, sound, vibration, 
and motion may capture attention differently with different 
efficiencies. Second, a message representation must be 
delivered. Analysis of the user, task and priority of the 
interruption context will help determine the appropriate 
mode of interruption. The presentation may also differ 
depending on type of interruption and on the device used to 
interrupt. A visual pop-up may effectively capture a users 
attention while using a computer, but may be ineffective on 
a cell phone stowed in coat pocket.  
In addition to being effective and minimally disruptive, 
the message of the interruption can also be engineered to be 
persuasive. In a multi-tasked environment, users are 
presented with a multitude of interruptions and are 
constantly deciding whether to act upon the interruption. If 
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different interruptions (such as a warning or notification) are 
presented with the same degree of persuasiveness they may 
be handled in the same manner. However, persuasive 
elements such as positive reinforcement, personalization, 
and social cues amongst others can also be used to enhance 
the persuasiveness of an interruption when appropriate. 
Currently there is little research on how modifying the 
persuasiveness of a message of an interruption effects its 
acceptance. 
Individual Action Cycle 
Norman’s 7-stage action model has been incorporated into 
the cognitive theory in order to help explain at the 
individual action level why an interruption is accepted and 
acted upon (Norman, 1988). The seven stages are divided 
into three categories, one for goals, 3 for stages of 
executions and 3 for evaluation. The goal stage may be 
particularly important because an individual’s perceptions 
or intentions may need to be related to intention of the 
interruption itself as personified by its presentation. The 
stages of execution are also useful in determining if the 
suggested interruption can be acted upon. The evaluation 
stage where the individual perceives the state of the world 
after executing an action may also assist in determining the 
success of an interruption. Therefore the 7-stage action 
model provides a useful perspective in helping to explain 
how modifying the presentation of an interruption impacts 
discrete stages of individual action. 
Interruption Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of an interruption will largely depend 
upon the original goal and perspective used. A drug 
interaction warning that interrupts a physician while 
inputting order entry may be effective if it results in a 
change of medication; as it may avoid a hospitalization for 
the patient. However, it may also cause the physician to lose 
focus and forget the original task.  Therefore it is important 
to clarify the perspective from which effectiveness is 
judged. In our model we propose cognitive, perceived value 
and performance based measures to evaluate and engineer 
interruptions once the perspective has been defined. 
Cognitive factors may include loss of memory or 
disruptiveness of interruptions. Perceived value factors such 
as annoyance and anxiety are often associated with 
interruptions. Interruptions affect performance, by changing 
time to complete tasks, providing opportunities for errors, 
and forgetting to resume previous tasks. 
Similarly they may effect financial performance or result 
in a more favorable outcome (such as prevention of 
hospitalization) In our model, information from the context 
of the user, tasks and presentation can be exploited in order 
to find an optimal balance between cognitive, perceived 
value and performance measures depending on the 
perspective and desired outcomes.  
Assessing Context 
The surrounding conditions or circumstances that make up 
the environment around an individual may provide 
important information in order to successfully deliver an 
interruption. The dynamics of interruptions in team 
environments are different than those of single individuals. 
In team environments, a team member can intercept an 
interrupting activity for another team member who is 
already engaged in a previous task. An audible interruption 
targeted to one team member may interrupt the work of 
colleagues nearby. Or an interruption for one individual 
may result in a cascade of interruptions for others. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Cognitive theory of persuasive interruptions 
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Benefits of Persuasive Interruption Model 
Other models of interruptions have been developed in an 
attempt to eliminate, minimize or manage the detrimental 
effects of interruptions. However, these models fail to 
describe the positive effects of interruptions.  Latorella’s 
(1996) Stage Model of interruption management is a 
detailed description of how people may manage an 
interruption and how it effects a current task in terms of 
detection, distraction, disturbance and disruption. The model 
of persuasive interruptions is more concerned with 
dimensions of the user, task and presentation properties and 
how that influences the effectiveness of the interruption.  
We suggest Norman’s 7-stage action model can explain how 
and why an individual receives an interruption. McFarlane 
 
Table 2:  Taxonomy of Persuasive Interruptions 
 
  Examples  
User Properties Individual characteristics of users, their contextual 
situations and preferences 
 
Context Where is the individual? Where can an individual 
be interrupted? Is an interruption more 
appropriate at a certain location or time 
Hospital, Emergency Room (ER), Attending to 
critical patient, etc. 
Characteristics What are the individual characteristics of users? 
What are their strengths and limitations? 
Expertise, skills, knowledgebase, age, education, 
cognitive capacities and limitation 
Task Properties The properties of the interruption itself and the 
task it will interrupt 
 
Interruption Type What is the intent of the interruption? Warning, alert, reminder, suggestion or 
notification 
Interrupted Task 
Type 
What task will be interrupted? Work related (computer based, meeting etc.), 
Social (lunch, sleep etc.) 
Task Interrupt Scale How important is the task to be interrupted? Low, Medium, High 
Stage of Interruption What is the stage of the current task? Goals, Intention to Act, Sequence of actions, 
Execution of action sequence, Perceiving state 
of the world, Interpreting the perception, 
Evaluation of interpretations 
Broadcast or Single 
Interruption 
Is the interruption in the context of team or 
collaborative environment, or individual 
environment?  
Individual, small team, large team, etc. 
Presentation Factors addressing how the interruption can be 
presented to the user 
 
Customization To what degree is the presentation customized? Generic, Personalized, Targeted or Tailored 
Mode of 
Interruption 
How will the user be alerted of the presence of the 
interruption? 
Heat, lights, sound, vibration, and motion 
Display type How will the message be communicated? Prompt, pop-up, voice alert 
Device What device will be used to convey the message of 
the interruption 
Personal Computer (PC), Personal Digital 
Assistant (PDA), Telephone, Cell phone, Pager  
Persuasive elements What types of persuasive techniques are 
incorporated into the interruption? 
Media, Tool, Social Actor, Positive reinforcement, 
personalization, credibility etc. 
Interruption 
frequency 
How often will the interruption be presented? Once only, more than once, every hour etc. 
Resumption method How will the individual be assisted to resume their 
original task? 
Log of previous tasks, reminder of previous task, 
screenshot of previous state etc. 
Interruption 
Effectiveness 
Assessing the effectiveness of the interruption  
Perspective Who is the intended beneficiary of the 
interruption? What is the net benefit? 
Physician being interrupted, Patient, Healthcare 
system 
Cognitive What is the cognitive impact of the interruption on 
the individual? 
Loss of memory, disruptiveness, number of errors  
Perceived value What are the individual perceptions of the 
interruption? 
Annoyance, anxiety, interest, boredom, curiosity 
Performance How does the interruption effect the performance 
of the interrupted task? To what degree is the 
task associated with the interruption completed?
Completion of tasks, time to complete task, 
number of errors, dollars saved  
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(2002) has also proposed a taxonomy of human 
interruptions that includes elements such as source, 
individual characteristics, method of coordination etc. Our 
model incorporates features of McFarlane’s taxonomy but is 
more operationalized and detailed. For example McFarlane 
suggests looking at the individual characteristics of users, 
while we expand this view to also consider other relevant 
contextual features, such as time, location and environment.  
Conclusion 
In this work we identify and discuss four types of beneficial 
interruptions: warnings and alerts, reminders, suggestions 
and notifications. We then propose a theoretical framework 
and taxonomy in order lay the foundation to develop 
guidelines for persuasive interruption design.  
 Future work will improve the framework by 
experimentally testing and validating the model of 
persuasive interruptions. We are particular interested in 
discovering the effects of various persuasive techniques 
when applied to the message of an interruption. Potential 
applications of this model include better understanding the 
effects of interruptions, and guidance to better design 
effective and persuasive interruptions. 
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Abstract 
The aim of our studies is to examine how contradictions affect 
causal beliefs. For example, the discovery that your colleague 
Mark who has been following diet A suffers from iron 
deficiency may lead you to revise your belief that diet A 
provides a sufficient supply of iron. Would you also revise 
your belief that it causes you to lose weight? Experiment 1 
shows that our belief that Mark will lose weight is reduced 
after encountering the contradiction. Experiment 2 shows that 
people are also less likely to believe that others will lose 
weight. The results suggest that people resolve contradictions 
by generating explanations that revise their causal model. 
Belief Revision 
As we go through life, we are constantly changing our 
beliefs. We give up old attitudes and we add new ones. 
When we discover credible information that contradicts our 
existing beliefs, then rationally we must revise our beliefs in 
order to restore consistency. Our aim is to examine how this 
is done.  
For example, imagine you believe the following: 
If the drink contains sugar, then it tastes sweet       
and you believe that in fact: 
       
Studies show that people frequently focus on conditionals 
more than categorical facts when they revise their beliefs 
(e.g., Elio & Pelletier, 1997) although less so when they 
describe familiar causal than unfamiliar relations (Byrne & 
Walsh, in press, Walsh & Byrne, 2004) and the tendency to 
do so will depend on the initial degree of belief in the 
conditional (Diuessaert, Schaeken, De Neys & d’Ydewalle, 
2000).  Furthermore, when people revise a causal statement, 
they rarely reject it outright (Byrne & Walsh, 2002). 
Instead, they may revise their interpretation of the relation 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). They frequently modify 
their causal belief by stating that the contradictory example 
is an exception to the rule or by imagining that possible 
disabling conditions are present (i.e., factors that prevent a 
cause from producing its usual effect; Byrne & Walsh, 
2002). And people retain a higher degree of belief in a 
causal conditional when there are few available disabling 
conditions (Elio, 1997). 
The drink on the table contains sugar. 
But when you taste the drink you discover that it is not 
sweet leading you to withdraw your earlier inference. Much 
of our everyday reasoning is non-monotonic. People 
frequently overturn old conclusions in the light of new 
evidence. They readily suppress valid deductive inferences 
when they are presented with new information (Byrne, 
1989; Byrne, Espino & Santamaria, 1999). 
The discovery that the drink does not taste sweet may also 
lead us to revise our initial beliefs. Perhaps the drink does 
not contain sugar. Or it may be that a drink containing sugar 
doesn’t necessarily cause it to taste sweet. For example, 
perhaps it contains a lot of lemon which suppresses the 
sweetness. Both possibilities are sufficient to resolve the 
inconsistency so one question is how to choose from among 
these possibilities. Logic provides no guidance (Revlin, 
Cate, & Rouss, 2001). The problem has been studied in 
philosophy (e.g., Harman, 1986) and in artificial 
intelligence (e.g. Gärdenfors, 1988). The focus there has 
been to develop formal principles to guide rational belief 
change (e.g., Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, & Makinson, 1985). 
The major principle underlying all existing theories of belief 
revision is that we should minimize the amount of 
information that is lost when we revise our beliefs (e.g., 
Gärdenfors, 1988; Harman, 1986; James, 1907). 
Despite the extensive research in developing formal 
models of belief revision, evidence on how people revise 
their beliefs is sparse. The way they do so may be very 
different from the formal systems developed in artificial 
intelligence (Legrenzi, Girotto, & Johnson-Laird, 2003). 
Work on attitude change does suggest that, in the face of 
new evidence, people will treat all contextually relevant 
beliefs as modifiable in order to increase consistency 
(Festinger, 1957; Simon & Holyoak, 2002; Thagard, 1989). 
What should we do when we discover information that 
contradicts a causal belief? To the extent that causal 
relations describe law-like generalizations, the minimal 
change may be to retain the causal belief and to give up 
some of the factual information that led to the contradiction. 
Alternatively, when causal beliefs describe a theory, then 
evidence to the contrary is reason to dispense with the 
theory (Popper, 1959).   
We address three questions which examine how a 
contradiction to a causal belief impacts on our belief system. 
The questions provide clues to the processes underlying 
belief change.  In Experiment 1, we examine whether 
resolving a contradiction to a causal belief leads people to 
revise their judgment about that single belief or whether it 
has implications for other causal judgments. In attempting 
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to minimize the changes they make, people may alter a 
causal belief in a way that leaves other causal beliefs 
unchanged. Alternatively, if people introduce disabling 
conditions to modify a causal belief, this may lead to 
changes which resonate through the belief system. Support 
for this latter view comes from the finding that when people 
discover that a cause does not produce an expected effect, 
they may doubt whether other expected effects will follow 
(Walsh & Johnson-Laird, 2004). 
People may mentally construct a causal model to 
represent the causal relations between events (e.g., Sloman 
& Lagnado, 2004). In Experiment 2, we examine whether 
people use their existing causal model to generate 
explanations about the situation in which the contradiction 
occurred or whether their explanations involve a change to 
the causal model itself. In addition, we examine whether 
people generate just one or several alternative hypotheses to 
explain the contradiction. 
Experiment 1  
We propose that when people encounter a contradiction to a 
causal belief they generate an explanation for why the cause 
occurred without the effect (Walsh & Johnson-Laird, 2004). 
Rather than giving up their belief in the causal relation, they 
tend to modify it (Byrne & Walsh, 2002) and they may do 
so by specifying certain conditions that will disable the 
relation. For example, imagine that despite your belief that 
exercise causes weight loss, you discover that Anne has 
exercised but didn’t lose weight. Rather than inferring that 
exercise is not effective you may decide that it is only 
effective if it is cardiovascular or if you do not at the same 
time consume more calories. If our hypothesis is correct, 
then the explanation may influence other causal judgments, 
for example, whether the exercise increased Anne’s fitness 
level. Our experiment was designed to test this hypothesis. 
Method 
We constructed six experimental problems. Each problem 
began by stating a pair of causal statements with a common 
antecedent, for example:  
Jogging regularly causes a person to increase their 
fitness level. 
Jogging regularly causes a person to lose weight. 
To measure initial belief in the first statement, we asked the 
following question: 
Tim jogged regularly. What is the probability that his 
fitness level increased? 
We then introduced a contradiction to the second causal 
statement and we examined whether this influenced their 
belief in the first statement:  
Sam jogged regularly but he did not lose weight.  What is 
the probability that his fitness level increased? 
The six problems were of the same form but with different 
causal materials.  
We also constructed two control problems, which did not 
involve any contradiction and again we measured whether 
there was any belief change. For example: 
Sam jogged regularly and he did lose weight.  What is the 
probability that his fitness level increased? 
Participants responded to the questions by giving a number 
between 0 and 100 (where 0 = definitely not and 100 = 
definitely).  
The participants were 23 undergraduates of Brown 
University who took part in return for payment or course 
credit. 
Results 
Table 1 shows the mean probability ratings before and after 
the contradiction. The probability of the second consequent 
was rated as significantly lower after reading the 
contradiction (mean = 59%) than before reading the 
contradiction (mean = 77%; t (df = 22) = 6.07, p < .001). 
The pattern occurred for 21 out of 23 participants and the 
remaining two were tied. The pattern also occurred for each 
of the six types of semantic content and there was no 
significant difference in the amount of belief change 
between the different contents. In the control problems, 
there was no significant change in the probability of the 
second consequent when no contradiction was presented (p 
> .5).  
 
Table 1: Mean probability ratings for experimental and 
control problems in Experiment 1 
 
Problem format:  If A then B 
   If A then C 
 
Experimental Problems 
Given:       Probability of B (0-100) 
A    77 
A and not C   59 
 
Control Problems 
A    81 
A and C    82 
 
The results show that when people receive information 
that contradicts one causal statement, they will be less 
confident that other expected consequents will follow from 
the same cause.  One explanation for our finding is that 
people resolve the contradiction by introducing conditions 
which would disable the relation. These disabling conditions 
may also reduce the probability that other consequents will 
follow from the same cause. An alternative explanation is 
that people are generally less confident about what they’ve 
been told, perhaps because they consider the source less 
credible, so they reduce their judgments. In our second 
experiment, we compare these hypotheses. 
Experiment 2 
The aim of our second experiment was twofold. First, we 
wanted to know whether people’s causal judgments depend 
on the explanation that was generated for the contradiction 
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and on that explanation alone. If their probability judgments 
depend on their explanations, then their judgments should 
be predictable from their explanation regardless of the 
contradicted fact. In contrast, if a contradiction just reduces 
confidence, then their probability judgments should vary 
with contradiction, and not with the explanation. We tested 
this by explicitly asking participants to generate an 
explanation for the contradiction before making a causal 
judgment, e.g.,  
(1) Anne jogged regularly but she didn’t lose weight.  
Why? 
What is the probability that her fitness level 
increased? 
We then asked participants to use this explanation to make 
another causal judgment. For example, if a participant gave 
the explanation that Anne’s appetite increased, then we 
asked them the following question: 
(2) John jogged regularly and his appetite increased. 
What is the probability that his fitness level 
increased? 
If people use their stated explanation (and not the 
contradicted fact) to make the causal judgment in (1) and 
they don’t consider any other hypotheses, then we expect 
the probability judgments in (1) and (2) to be equal. 
Previous research has shown that people frequently neglect 
to consider alternative hypotheses (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 
1987). However, if reasoners do consider other explanations 
or if their causal judgments are reduced merely because they 
have less confidence in what they have been told, then we 
expect these judgments to differ.  
The second question that we address in this study is 
whether people draw on information that already exists in 
their causal model to generate an explanation for a 
contradiction or whether resolving a contradiction leads 
people to revise the causal model itself. We did this by 
asking participants two further questions. Before reading the 
contradiction we asked them the following: 
(3) Tom jogged regularly. 
What is the probability that his fitness level 
increased? 
And after reading the contradiction and generating the 
explanation, we asked them the following: 
(4) Mary jogged regularly and you don’t know if her 
appetite increased. 
What is the probability that her fitness level 
increased? 
If a reasoner’s causal model already contains information 
about the relation between appetite and fitness level and 
they use this information in answering (3), then we expect 
their responses to questions (3) and (4) to be equal. But if 
they change their causal model when resolving the 
contradiction, we expect their answer to these two questions 
to be different. This study examines these two questions. 
Method 
We used the same six pairs of causal beliefs as used in the 
experimental problems in Experiment 1. Each pair was 
followed by five questions as presented in Table 2. The 
questions were presented orally to the participants and the 
experimenter recorded their responses. The first question 
again measured participants’ initial belief in the probability 
of the first conditional. Question 2 introduced a 
contradiction to the second conditional. This time we 
explicitly asked participants to generate an explanation for 
why the contradiction might have occurred before asking 
them to rate the probability that the consequent of the first 
conditional occurred. 
The following three questions measured the probability of 
the consequent of the first conditional under different 
conditions, namely, when the explanation given in question 
2 was either, unknown, absent, or present. For example, take 
the problem described in Table 2. If participants answered 
question 2a by saying that Kevin was taking sleeping pills, 
then in question 3 we told participants that Frank was 
worried but it is not known if he is taking sleeping pills and 
we asked for the probability that he had difficulty 
concentrating. In question 4, we asked for the same 
probability judgment given that Helen was not taking 
sleeping pills. And finally, in question 5, we asked for the 
probability given that Evelyn was taking sleeping pills. 
 
Table 2: The format of the problems used in Experiment 2 
 
Worrying causes difficulty in concentrating. 
Worrying causes insomnia. 
 
1. Mark was worried. What is the probability that he had 
difficulty concentrating? 
 
2. a. Kevin was worried but he didn’t have insomnia. 
Why?  
b. What is the probability that he had difficulty 
concentrating? 
 
3. Frank was worried but you don’t know if the 
explanation holds. 
What is the probability that he had difficulty 
concentrating? 
 
4. Helen was worried and you know that the explanation 
does not hold. 
What is the probability that she had difficulty 
concentrating? 
 
5. Evelyn was worried and you know that the explanation 
does hold. 
What is the probability that she had difficulty 
concentrating? 
 
The experiment allows us to examine whether the 
probability ratings depend on the single explanation that 
was generated for the contradiction. The experiment also 
allows us to test whether participants change their causal 
model before and after the contradiction.  
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The participants were 20 undergraduates of Brown 
University who took part in return for payment.  
Results 
The mean responses for each question are presented in 
Table 3. The results replicate the finding of Experiment 1. 
The probability of the second consequent was rated as 
significantly higher in question 1 before reading the 
contradiction (mean = 85%) than in question 2 after reading 
the contradiction (mean = 63%; t = 5.03, p < .001).  
 
Table 3: Mean probability ratings for each of the five 
questions in Experiment 2 
 
Problem format:  If A then B 
   If A then C 
 
Given:        Probability of B (0-100) 
1. A     85 
2. A and not C    63 
3. A and explanation unknown  71 
4. A and explanation absent  85 
5. A and explanation present  62 
 
Our second finding was that responses to question 2 and 
question 5 did not differ significantly (t = 0.60, p > .5) and 
this pattern occurred for all six types of problem content. 
For problems in which the contradiction reduced the judged 
probability of B (response to question 2 was lower than to 
question 1), participants gave the same answer to question 2 
and 5 for 53% of problems. We would expect greater variety 
if participants were considering multiple hypotheses. Hence 
the results are consistent with the view that in many cases, 
people consider just the one hypothesis given in their 
explanation and they fail to consider other possibilities. 
They allow this hypothesis to mediate their later causal 
judgments without considering the possibility that they are 
wrong (see also Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982). 
Finally, our results suggest that people resolve 
contradictions by making a change to their causal model. 
Ratings for question 1 were significantly higher than for 
question 3 when the explanation was unknown (mean = 71; 
t = 5.37, p < .001). People do not merely change their causal 
judgments about the specific case in which the contradiction 
occurred. They extend these changes to new situations. 
Responses to question 1 did not differ significantly from 
responses to question 4 (mean = 85; t= 0.1, p > .8). People 
do not generally resolve contradictions by drawing on 
events that they have already represented in their causal 
model. 
We also examined the nature of explanations given for the 
inconsistency. The most common explanation was to 
introduce a disabling condition which would prevent the 
cause from producing its usual effect. 74% of responses 
were of this type. In many cases, the conditions disabled the 
cause from both consequences. For example, the fact that 
worry did not lead to insomnia may be explained by the fact 
that the person did relaxation exercises. This in turn may 
reduce the probability that worry will lead to a difficulty in 
concentrating.  The next most common type of response was 
to suggest that the level or amount of the cause was not 
sufficient to produce the effect, for example, there was not 
enough sugar in the drink or the person was not very 
worried. 18% of responses were of this type. In both cases, 
the pattern of responses and significance ratings for the 
probability of B were the same as for the overall ratings. 
Discussion 
The results of our experiments confirm previous findings 
that people prefer to modify than to give up a causal belief 
when they encounter a contradiction. The results also give 
us insight into how those modifications alter other causal 
judgments. In Experiment 1 we showed that when we 
discover a situation where a cause does not produce an 
expected consequence, we become less certain whether the 
cause will lead to other expected consequences in this 
instance. The results of Experiment 2 show that we also 
become uncertain about whether other expected 
consequences will follow in a situation involving a different 
agent.  
The findings suggest that discovering a contradiction can 
lead us to change the information that we use to make 
causal judgments. The contradiction makes salient or forces 
us to imagine conditions that may impact on these 
judgments. Hence the basis for making our judgments has 
changed.  
The results reaffirm the view that monotonic logic 
systems are inadequate for understanding how people 
reason. In most cases, when people reason from cause to 
effect the conclusion is indeterminate. It is rarely possible to 
state all of the conditions in which the cause will necessarily 
produce an effect (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). One 
approach used by artificial intelligence researchers is to 
make the default assumption that all of the necessary 
conditions are present unless there is information to the 
contrary (Minsky, 1975). Similarly, people may mentally 
construct models that do not represent all of the information 
explicitly (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) although they 
may consider additional factors if they come to mind easily 
(Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis & Rist, 1991).  
An alternative way to approach these problems is to 
assume that judgments are probabilistic. Probabilistic 
judgment does not require specification of all of the 
conditions that prevent a cause from having its usual effect; 
the judgment merely reflects the likelihood that this occurs.  
Our results suggest that when people encounter a 
contradiction they generate explanations. The most common 
type of explanation is to describe a condition that disables 
the cause from its effect. These disabling conditions may 
often be ones that people haven’t previously considered and 
as a result they introduce these new conditions into their 
causal model. These new conditions may have the effect of 
disabling the cause from other possible consequences. 
Introducing a new disabling condition into a causal model 
could have two possible results. One is that it could explain 
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why the effect does not always follow from the cause but 
the probability judgment may remain unchanged. A second 
possibility is to decide that this new condition should lower 
the probability that the effect will follow from the cause. 
Our results suggest that people tend to use the second 
approach. When our participants considered new conditions, 
they used these to reduce their probability judgment further.   
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Abstract 
Attention is a complex multilevel system subserved by at least 
three interacting attentional networks in the brain. This paper 
describes a multilevel computational model of attentional 
networks, developed in both the symbolic architecture of 
ACT-R and the connectionist framework of leabra. We 
evaluated the model using the Attentional Networks Test and 
the simulation results fitted the empirical data well. We argue 
that developing multilevel computational models helps to link 
findings at different levels. 
Introduction 
Suppose a student S was asked to solve the equation “2x + 3 
= 9” (Figure 1A), and he used 2 seconds to produce the 
answer “x = 3”. Both cognitive scientists X and Y were 
interested in understanding how S did it. Scientist X 
recorded S’s detailed verbal protocol (Figure 1B), based on 
which, and other relevant behavioral measures, X 
hypothesized the possible knowledge structures underlying 
S’s problem solving and developed a symbolic 
computational model that simulated the process (Figure 1C). 
On the other hand, scientist Y adopted sophisticated brain 
imaging techniques such as electroencephalograph (EEG) 
and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and 
acquired a high-resolution recording of S’s brain dynamics 
during problem solving (Figure 1D). Based on some well-
established neural computing principles, Y then developed a 
biologically realistic connectionist model to simulate the 
brain activities underlying S’s performance (Figure 1E). 
Though both models fitted the data well, the two models are 
clearly different. While the symbolic model offers a 
description of the process with psychological plausibility 
and high behavioral relevance, the connectionist model 
emphasizes the process’ biological realism and brain 
foundations. One question is, do we, cognitive scientists 
who endeavor to discover unified theories of cognition, 
have justifiable reasons to prefer one to another? 
This question and similar others have led to a long 
debate in the rather brief history of cognitive science (e.g., 
Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Newell, 1990; Rumelhart 
& McClelland, 1986). Recently a BBS (Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences) target article was dedicated to this issue 
(Anderson & Lebiere, 2003). The authors adopted a set of 
12 criteria, which they called “The Newell Test”, to 
systematically compared and contrasted ACT-R, a rule-
based cognitive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), 
and the connectionist modeling framework. Their 
conclusion was that both frameworks had great strengths as 
well as serious limitations as candidates of the unified 
theory of cognition.  
 
A) 
2x+3=9 
x=? 
 
B) 
"To solve x, I move 3 to 
the right, and subtract it 
from 9 so I get 6. Then I
divide ..…, x is 3.”
D) 
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Figure 1. A hypothetical equation-solving problem is 
presented in A. Verbal protocol and brain imaging data 
are presented in B and D. Sketches of a symbolic model 
and a connectionist model of task are presented in C 
and E. 
 
This is hardly surprising given the inherent complexity 
of the human mind itself. It has long been recognized that 
the mind is a multilevel construct and can be analyzed at 
different levels. Marr, for example, distinguished and 
separated among computational theory, representation and 
algorithm, and hardware implementation (Marr, 1982). 
Similar distinctions were made by Newell among different 
bands of cognitive functions (Newell, 1990). Newell argued 
that different bands utilize different basic operators, which 
have different time scales. More importantly, different 
bands form a hierarchy. Multiple lower lever basic operators 
can be combined to form higher level basic operators. In 
other words, lower level operators can be summarized up at 
higher level though this summarization may not be linear. 
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 Single level analyses have been the dominant 
methodology in cognitive science. Experimental psychology 
and symbolic modeling, for example, largely depend on 
controlled experiments and behavioral observation. Recent 
advances in cognitive neuroscience allow us to directly 
observe, with high temporal-spatial resolutions, how an 
active brain functions during cognitive performance (Posner 
& Raichle, 1994). As a result, biologically realistic neural 
networks modeling has flourished (O'Reilly & Munakata, 
2000). Efforts have also been made to probe the function of 
mind at lower molecular levels (e.g., Bellugi & George, 
2001; Squire & Kandel, 2000). While all these levels of 
analyses tell us important aspects of the mind, neither of 
them alone is adequate to describe the whole picture. The 
human mind is a complex entity and may leave shadows at 
different levels when it works (Penrose, 1996). However, in 
order to achieve a unified theory all of the pieces have to be 
somehow linked together. 
One approach would be to develop so called “hybrid 
systems”, which typically combine symbolic and 
subsymbolic components together (e.g., Sun & Alexandre, 
1997). We, for example, have developed a hybrid model of 
human abductive reasoning by combining a Soar component 
(a symbolic architecture) for hypothesis generation and a 
connectionist component for hypothesis evaluation 
(Johnson, Zhang, & Wang, 1997). Although hybrid systems 
take advantage of both types of components and can become 
quite powerful, they often bear little true psychological and 
neurophysiological significance due to the fact they are 
artificially assembled systems. While it is well agreed that 
human cognition involves mechanisms and operations at, 
among others, both psychological and neuronal networks 
levels, simply piecing them together is ad hoc and trivializes 
the problem (see also Wang, Johnson, & Zhang, 2003) 
In this paper we argue that we need a multilevel 
modeling approach. That is, we need to develop well-fitted 
computational models at multiple levels for any given 
cognitive phenomenon. Because the mind manifests itself at 
multiple levels, each level is real and tells a unique story of 
the mind on its own. When we develop models for a specific 
phenomenon at multiple levels, we would be able to 
compare them, contrast them, and more importantly, 
mutually justify them.  By doing so, we expect that a more 
complete picture of the mind might emerge. 
This paper is organized as follows. We first briefly 
review findings on human attentional networks and 
introduce the Attentional Network Test (ANT) (Fan, 
MaCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). We then 
demonstrate the multilevel modeling approach by reporting 
and cross-validating two computational models for the same 
ANT task, one developed in ACT-R, and the other in leabra, 
a biologically realistic connectionist modeling framework 
(O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000). While both models fitted data 
well they emphasized different levels of explanations. 
Finally the implications of this practice are discussed. 
Human Attentional Networks 
Although “everyone knows what attention is” (James, 
1890), how attention works remains one of the most 
challenging questions in science (Parasuraman, 2000; 
Pashler, 1998). Recent advances in cognitive psychology 
and cognitive neuroscience have suggested that there exist 
multiple attentional networks in the brain, each of which 
subserves different types of attention (Fan et al., 2002; 
Posner & Dehaene, 2000; Posner & Petersen, 1990). At 
least three attentional networks, for alerting, orienting, and 
executive control, have been distinguished at both cognitive 
and neuroanatomical levels (see Figure 2A). Specifically, 
alerting involves a change in the internal state to become 
ready for any incoming task-related events. Neuroimaging 
evidence has revealed that the alerting network consists of 
some frontal and parietal areas particularly of the right 
hemisphere. Orienting, closely related to the conventional 
selective visuo-spatial attention, involves selectively 
focusing on one or a few items out of many candidate 
inputs. Evidence has shown that the orienting network 
includes parts of the superior and inferior parietal lobe, 
frontal eye fields and such subcortical areas as the superior 
colliculus of the midbrain and the pulvinar and reticular 
nucleus of the thalamus. Finally, executive control of 
attention is related to monitoring and resolving conflicts. 
Executive control is often needed in higher level mental 
operations including planning, decision making, error 
detection, novel or not well-learned responses, and 
overcoming habitual actions. Converging evidence from 
neuroimaging and neuropathology studies has suggested 
that the executive control network consists of the midline 
frontal areas (anterior cingulate cortex), lateral prefrontal 
cortex, and the basal ganglia. 
The ANT paradigm was recently developed to 
simultaneously measure the performance of the three 
attentional networks and evaluate their interrelationships 
(Fan et al., 2002). It is essentially a combination of a spatial 
cueing task (Posner, 1980) and a flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974), as illustrated in Figure 2B. The stimulus 
consists of a row of 5 horizontal arrows and the participants’ 
task is to report the pointing direction (left or right) of the 
center arrow (the target) by pressing a key. The four arrows 
surrounding the target, with two on each side, are called the 
flankers. These flanker arrows point either in the same 
direction as that of the target (the congruent condition), or in 
the opposite direction (the incongruent condition). An 
additional condition (the neutral condition) is also included 
in which the flankers are four straight lines with no 
arrowheads. To introduce an orienting component, the row 
can be presented at two locations, either above a fixation 
point (top) or below it (bottom). To introduce an alerting 
component, the row may be preceded by a cue (the cued 
condition) or may not (the no-cue condition). In addition, 
when there is a cue, this cue may be presented at the center 
fixation location (the center-cue condition), at the top or 
bottom location where the stimulus row is to appear (the 
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Figure 2. Human attentional networks (A) and the ANT task (B) 
 
spatial-cue condition), or at both top and bottom locations 
(the double-cue condition). Note that while a spatial-cue 
precisely predicts where the stimulus is to appear, in both 
the center-cue condition and the double-cue condition the 
participant cannot infer that information from the cue. 
 Fan et al. (2002) tested 40 normal adult participants 
using the ANT paradigm. Their reaction time (RT) results 
are shown in Figure 3A. They then proposed the following 
formula as a measure of the efficiency of each of the three 
attentional networks: 
· Alerting efficiency  = RT(no-cue) – RT(double-cue), 
· Orienting efficiency = RT(center-cue) – RT(spatial-cue),  
· Conflict efficiency = RT(incongruent) – RT(congruent), 
which resulted in the efficiency measures of 47 ± 18 ms, 51 
± 21 ms, 84 ± 25 ms, for alerting, orienting, and executive 
control, respectively.  
Fan et al. (2001) also reported an fMRI study using the 
ANT paradigm. Their results were consistent with the 
general findings shown in Figure 2A. 
Multilevel Computational Modeling of Human 
Attentional Networks 
While both the behavioral and neuroimaging studies using 
the ANT paradigm revealed important psychological and 
neurophysiological characteristics of human attentional 
networks, there exists a gap between these two levels of 
analyses. In particular, how do these different attentional 
neural networks work together to generate psychologically 
meaningful behavior? It has been well agreed that the link 
between neural activities and psychological performance is 
nontrivial and must be taken into account seriously to avoid 
“neo-phrenology”. Developing well-principled and 
constrained computational models help in the regard (Cohen 
& Tong, 2001). 
Traditional computational modeling approaches to 
human attention have typically adopted various 
connectionist modeling techniques (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar, & 
McClelland, 1990). While it has been fruitful, this practice 
fails to account for the manifestations of attention at 
symbolic/cognitive levels. As we illustrated earlier, 
attention, as an essential aspect of human cognition, is a 
complex multilevel construct. In order to understand the 
computational mechanisms of attention at different levels 
and the links among them, we need multilevel models.  
We have developed a multilevel model for the ANT 
task. One sub-model was developed in the symbolic 
modeling framework of ACT-R and focused on the 
psychological aspects of the task. The other was developed 
in the connectionist modeling framework of leabra and 
emphasized the neurophysiological aspects of the task. A 
preliminary cross-validation of two models is discussed. 
ANT on ACT-R 
ACT-R is a production rule based cognitive modeling 
architecture developed by John Anderson and colleagues 
over a period of nearly two decades (see Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998). In essence, ACT-R explains human 
cognition by proposing a model of the knowledge structures 
and knowledge deployment that underlie cognition. 
Although ACT-R consists of a nontrivial subsymbolic 
component for computations involving activation and 
association, it is fundamentally a symbolic modeling 
framework in that it relies extensively on various symbolic 
structures for knowledge representation. For example, ACT-
R makes a fundamental distinction between declarative and 
procedural knowledge. Declarative knowledge corresponds 
to things people are aware of and can usually describe to 
others and is represented in ACT-R by chunks. Procedural 
knowledge is knowledge that people display in behavior but 
are not conscious of and is represented by production rules 
(condition-actions pairs). Both chunks and production rules 
are fundamental symbolic structures in ACT-R and are 
regarded as the atomic components of thought in the sense 
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Figure 3. Experimental (A, based on Fan et al. (2002)) and modeling results (B and C). 
 
 
that they are as far down as one can go in the symbolic 
decomposition of cognition. In ACT-R, on average every 
fifty (50) milliseconds, one production rule is chosen to fire, 
a few declarative chunks are processed, and cognition 
advances one step. Therefore, it is claimed that ACT-R 
captures the symbolic grain size of cognition. 
We developed a computational model for the ANT task 
in the framework of ACT-R (Wang, Fan, & Johnson, 2004). 
Our purpose is two-fold. First, we want to explore how 
different types of attention work together in a single 
framework to produce the cognitive performance. Second, 
such a model offers a solid testbed for us to cross-validate 
those models based on various connectionist modeling 
results and neuroimaging data.  
We started by analyzing the major functional 
components in the ANT task. We distinguished six major 
stages in a typical ANT trial: fixation and cue expectation; 
cue or stimulus judgment; cue processing; stimulus 
expectation; stimulus processing; and response. We then 
mapped these functional components onto 36 ACT-R 
production rules. With these rules our model could perform 
the ANT task and interact with the same experimental 
environment that human participants interact.  
We evaluated the performance of the model by using the 
model as a “simulated subject” to perform the ANT 
experiment. The RT results of 100 “simulated subjects” are 
presented in Figure 3B. A correlation analysis shows very 
high correlations (0.99 for RTs and 0.97 for error rates) 
between the simulation and experimental results. We then 
followed the same procedure discussed early to estimate the 
effects of the three attentional networks based on the 
simulated RT data, resulting in the efficiency measures of 
55 ± 7.4 ms, 45 ± 7.0 ms, 86 ± 7.4 ms, for alerting, 
orienting, and executive control, respectively. A close match 
between the two sets of data is apparent, with a notable 
exception that the simulated standard deviations are 
consistently smaller than the empirical ones. The reason is 
that we did not add any between-subject variance in our 
model. As a result, these simulated variances actually 
reflected those within-subject variations in performing the 
ANT task. Overall these results suggest that the model 
captured well the various attentional effects that the ANT 
task was designed to measure. 
The concept of production rule is fundamental to our 
model of attention. One of the key features of the model is 
that it mapped the effects of attentional networks to 
production rules. Rules fire in sequence and operate at a rate 
of about 40-50 ms per production rule. As argued by ACT-
R, production rules define the atomic components of 
thought at the symbolic level. When we examined the 
efficiency measures of attentional networks reported in Fan 
et al (2002) it seemed that they (51 ms, 47 ms, and 84 ms, 
for alerting, orienting, and executive control, respectively) 
fell well into the range of a few rule firings time period. 
Perhaps all we need is about one (for alerting and orienting) 
or two (for executive control) additional production rules to 
explain symbolically the work of attentional networks. This 
is indeed what our model demonstrated. 
ANT on Leabra 
Leabra (local, error-driven and associative, biologically 
realistic algorithm) is a connectionist modeling framework 
proposed recently by O’Reilly and Munakata (2000). There 
are at least three features that distinguish it from other 
connectionist modeling frameworks. First, it has sound 
neurological foundations. It is biologically realistic in 
multiple aspects.  Its neurons compute based on membrane 
potentials and ion channels.  Its neuronal connections are 
often bi-directional and cannot change signs (i.e., changing 
from an excitatory link to an inhibitory link, and vice versa). 
It uses biologically inspired learning rules such as Hebbian 
learning for unsupervised learning and the generalized 
recirculation algorithm (but not the biologically unrealistic 
backpropagation) for error-driven learning. Second, leabra 
is a coherently integrated framework. Many distinctions in 
traditional neural network modeling, including supervised 
vs unsurprised learning, feedforward vs recurrent networks, 
and pattern recognition vs self-organization maps, are all 
unified in a single coherent framework, based on well-
supported biological principles. Third, partly due to its 
biological realism, it is now possible, for example, to 
designate a specific neural network to simulate a specific 
area of brain, and flexibly connect the multiple such 
networks, each of which can have its own properties such as 
the average activation level and the connection density, to 
simulate various brain pathways. As a result, it offers great 
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 flexibility to build a hierarchy of neural networks and link 
network activities to higher-level symbols.  
A connection model of the ANT task was developed in 
the framework of leabra. The structure of the model is 
shown in Figure 4. This model contains modules for all the 
three attentional networks. In addition, it contains modules 
for perception (visual input and primary visual cortex), 
object recognition (object pathway), and response (output). 
The networks are connected in such a way that they 
conform to the known functional an anatomical constraints 
as much as possible (Farah, 2000; O'Reilly & Munakata, 
2000).  
The model works as follows. When a cue comes on, the 
primary visual cortex module is activated, which in turn 
triggers the alerting network. This cue-induced alerting 
affects later stimulus processing because the alerting 
network will remain excited for a while which will activate 
the orienting network in general causing it to become ready 
for the incoming stimulus. In addition, when the cue is a 
spatial one (i.e., a cue that indicates where the target 
stimulus is to appear), it will further make the corresponding 
sub-region of the orienting network even more excited. This 
occurs because the orienting network adopts a retinotopy-
based spatial representation of the environment. This extra 
excitation in the sub-region of the orienting network will 
facilitate the corresponding stimulus processing in the 
object pathway network, due to the connections between 
them. This accounts for the orienting effect. Finally, note 
that it is the object pathway network that is responsible for 
the arrow direction detection. When the incongruent 
stimulus (e.g., a left arrow flanked by four right arrows) is 
presented, the object pathway network may propose 
different responses, which compete for the final expression 
in the output network. The executive control network then 
activates making the center arrow defeating the flankers. 
This is where the executive control attention plays a role. 
 
Visual Input
Primary
Visual Cortex
Object
Pathway
Orienting
Network
Alerting
Network
Executive
Control Network
Output
 
Figure 4. A leabra model of ANT. 
 
The performance of the model was evaluated by using it 
to perform the ANT task. Stimuli are presented to the model 
in a similar way as to a human. Depending on the 
conditions, a cue, which can be either a center cue or a 
spatial cue, may be presented for a fixed time period before 
the stimulus presentation (note that the double cue condition 
was not simulated here since the current version of model 
were not equipped with enough neurons). The number of 
cycles the output module takes to produce a stable response 
after the stimulus presentation serves as a measure of the 
reaction time. The simulation results are shown in Figure 
3C. A regression analysis showed that 
RT(ms) = 12 * RT(cycle)   
with a R-square of 0.99. It is clear that the model fits the 
behavioral data reasonably well. 
Discussion 
Human attention is a multi-component multilevel construct. 
Both behavioral and neuroimging studies using the ANT 
paradigm revealed important aspects of the function of 
human attentional networks. Multilevel computational 
modeling helps to probe how these multiple components 
work together and manifest themselves at multiple levels. 
The multilevel model we reported in this paper consisted 
of a sub-model developed in the framework of ACT-R and 
the other in the framework of leabra. While the former sub-
model focused on the symbolic knowledge structure of 
cognitive performance and psychological plausibility, the 
latter focused on the subsymbolic neural information 
processing and biological realism. However, since both 
models simulated the same ANT task and fitted the 
empirical data well, the combined multilevel model offered 
a real possibility to cross-validate the models and probe the 
computational link among different levels. 
First of all, the model illustrated interesting relationships 
between production rules and underlying neural 
computation. As demonstrated in the ACT-R model, rules 
are fundamental units of psychological reality and typically 
proceed serially. However, the underlying neural networks 
process information in parallel. The parallelism of neural 
computation and the serial nature of rule firing can be 
mapped against each other along the time line. Since both 
types of models decompose the cognitive performance into 
sub-units that occur at tens of millisecond scales, the 
mapping may be able to tell how rules are implemented in 
neural level computation. Based on the models, for 
example, we can map one ACT-R rule (40 ms in the current 
model) to about three leabra cycles (about 12 ms per cycle). 
Though such a simple and linear mapping should not be 
taken literally, it does provide a vivid footnote about how 
parallel neural computing is summarized psychologically by 
serial rule firings. It illustrates that we may not be able to 
find a “rule center” in the brain. Instead, rules can be 
implemented anywhere in the brain – they are simply 
pattern matching. For example, there is a symbolic rule that 
summarizes the conflict monitoring and detection operation 
typically subserved by the anterior cingulate cortex. The 
general neural priming underlying alerting in the alerting 
networks is summarized by another task switch rule.  
Our model also demonstrates how functionally identical 
operations can be implemented by different mechanisms at 
different levels. One interesting finding from Fan et al. 
(2002) is the small but reliable difference in RT (about 11 
ms) between the center-cue and the double-cue conditions. 
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 A convenient explanation is that in the double-cue condition 
due to diffused attention both stimulus locations had been 
primed a little, which saved a little time when the stimulus 
appeared later. While it is easy to model priming and 
diffused attention in a connectionist model (e.g., our leabra 
model), how it is implemented at a symbolic rule level 
raises a challenge. Our ACT-R model adopted a mechanism 
in which several symbolic and psychologically meaningful 
move-attention operations were carried out sequentially. 
The simulated RT difference was 19 ± 8 ms. 
The multilevel model for human attentional networks we 
reported in this paper has allowed us to compare/contrast 
the computational mechanisms at different levels and to 
probe the important computational links between 
psychologically meaningful mental operations and neural 
activities. It also enjoys potentially significant prediction 
power in that the model at one level can lead to nontrivial 
predictions about the operations at another level. However, 
we recognize that for this approach to work models at each 
level have to be independently and/or mutually validated. 
Further analyses and more detailed alignments of our 
current model remain to be done. 
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Abstract 
 
Previous research has shown that interlocutors in a dialogue 
align their utterances at several levels of representation. This 
paper reports two experiments that use a confederate-priming 
paradigm to examine whether interlocutors also align their 
spatial representations during dialogue. Experiment 1 showed 
a significant reference frame priming effect: Speakers tended 
to use the same reference frame to locate an object in a scene 
as the frame that they had just heard their interlocutor use. 
Experiment 2 demonstrated the same pattern even when the 
speaker’s description and their partner’s previous description 
involved different prepositions. Hence the effect cannot be 
explained in terms of lexical priming of a particular 
preposition. Our results are strong evidence that interlocutors 
in a dialogue align non-linguistic as well as linguistic 
representations. 
 
 
Research on dialogue has suggested that the traditional 
methods employed in psycholinguistics may not give a true, 
or at least complete, account of human language. The 
traditional approach focuses largely on monologue and 
involves investigating single word utterances in isolated 
controlled circumstances, e.g. the picture naming paradigm, 
or the lexical decision task. However, Clark (1996) pointed 
out that the natural setting for language is dialogue, and that 
language does not normally occur in these isolated 
circumstances, thus questioning the ecological validity of 
traditional methods. The realization of this has led to a 
research program into how language is used in dialogue 
(e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Horton & Keysar, 1996; 
Garrod & Anderson, 1987). Research in this framework has 
shown that interlocutors in a dialogue tend to align their 
utterances: Over the course of a conversation participants 
will come to communicate in a similar fashion to each other. 
This occurs at several levels of communication, including 
the conceptual (Garrod & Anderson, 1987), lexical (Clarke 
& Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) and syntactic (Branigan, Pickering, 
& Cleland, 2000) levels. In these experiments, participants 
usually achieved alignment without resorting to overt 
negotiation. In the case of syntactic alignment at least, many 
subjects were not aware that they were aligning.  
Pickering and Garrod (in press) proposed a mechanism for 
how alignment is achieved between interlocutors. According 
to this theory, alignment is the basis for successful dialogue; 
misunderstanding occurs when alignment is not achieved. 
Alignment occurs when the two interlocutors employ 
equivalent representations at different levels, and arises 
from an automatic priming mechanism. This allows 
alignment to be achieved quickly and efficiently without 
reliance upon time-consuming strategies of open 
negotiation. Indeed, such strategies are only employed when 
the primitive mechanisms fail. To prevent unnecessary 
negotiation Pickering and Garrod suggest a second primitive 
mechanism that allows repair of representations when 
misalignment occurs; see Garrod and Pickering (2004) for a 
summary. 
Dialogue research has shown alignment of linguistic 
representations, but alignment is hypothesized also to occur 
for conceptual representations, such as those associated with 
object location. A speaker’s conceptual representation of 
where objects are located is reliant upon an overall spatial 
representation, which underpins the use of spatial language. 
In order to describe object locations effectively it is 
important that both interlocutors take the same perspective 
(Levelt, 1989) concerning the objects they are locating. For 
example, an addressee must understand whose left a speaker 
is talking about. In the same way that interlocutors align on 
which lexical terms should be used to describe a scene, it 
would be advantageous for interlocutors to align on which 
perspective a scene should be described from. 
The perspective that is taken depends upon the reference 
frame that is applied to a spatial representation of a scene. A 
reference frame is an axial co-ordinate system that defines 
regions extending from the origin, whose axes are labelled 
with directional terms. The object to be located (figure 
object) can then be located in relation to another object 
(reference object) based upon the directional axes of the 
reference frame. However, there are three different types of 
reference frame (at least in English; other languages use 
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only two or even one; Levinson 2003) that a speaker can 
employ in order to locate an object: absolute, relative, and 
intrinsic. It is important that the addressee knows which of 
these the speaker is using in order to successfully 
understand an utterance. 
The absolute reference frame locates an object based upon 
salient, stable features of the environment, for example, the 
cardinal directions. The dot in Figure 1 can be described as 
west of the chair if the page is held horizontally with the top 
of the page facing north.  
The intrinsic reference frame locates an object based upon 
the directional features of the reference object. The dot in 
Figure 1 can be described as above the chair because it is in 
alignment with the top of the chair. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The dot can be described as west using an absolute 
reference frame, above using an intrinsic reference frame or 
left using a relative reference frame. 
 
The relative reference frame locates an object in relation 
to the viewpoint of an observer. The axes of the reference 
frame are labelled based upon the features of the person 
upon whose viewpoint the location is based. In Figure 1 the 
dot would be described as left of the chair using a relative 
reference frame. (In many cases the relative reference frame 
is used from the viewpoint of a speaker or an addressee, but 
it can also be from a third person perspective.) 
The above tripartite classification of reference frames 
follows that proposed by Levinson (1996, 2003), and is 
distinct from the classification traditionally employed in the 
psycholinguistic literature, which identified absolute, 
deictic, and intrinsic reference frames, all defined on the 
basis of their origin. (Deictic reference frames are all 
reference frames with an egocentric origin.) Levinson 
pointed out that this traditional system is not an appropriate 
way to categorize reference systems because it is possible to 
have a non-deictic relative reference frame, such as The ball 
is to the right of the tree as you look at it, and a deictic 
intrinsic reference frame such as The ball is in front of me. 
When describing an object’s location, an individual has to 
select one of these reference frames to use in preference to 
either of the other two reference frames. Carlson-Radvansky 
and Jiang (1998) showed that reference-frame selection is 
achieved via inhibition of non-selected reference frames. 
When participants used a relative reference frame to identify 
an object’s location, they were slower to describe an 
object’s location using an intrinsic reference frame 
immediately afterwards. Inhibition operates not only on the 
endpoint of an axis, but on at least the entire axis, e.g. if left 
(intrinsic) is inhibited then using right or left (intrinsic) in 
the subsequent description will take longer than using a 
relative reference frame. 
The findings of Carlson-Radvansky and Jiang (1998) 
suggest that reference frames are influenced by low-level 
priming. However, the results do not establish whether or 
not this occurs during dialogue: Reaction time was used as a 
measure of cognitive effort in trials whereas in dialogue any 
effect of priming must manifest itself by a change in the 
person’s linguistic behaviour. Furthermore, Carlson-
Radvansky and Jiang’s (1998) experiment only investigated 
inhibition of the endpoint of an axis and the inhibition of the 
axis itself. If interlocutors align reference frames, we would 
expect them to align the entire reference frame rather than 
just part of it. Therefore it is unclear whether this kind of 
priming is enough to cause the alignment of reference 
frames between interlocutors in the manner described by 
Pickering and Garrod (in press). 
In two series of experiments Schober (1993, 1995) showed 
that the reference frame which an individual selects is 
affected by their partner in a conversation. Individuals who 
described the location of an object to a partner who viewed 
the scene from a different perspective were more likely to 
describe the location from their partner’s perspective. When 
the partner queried such descriptions, they used their own 
perspective to describe object location. Schober concluded 
that interlocutors use conscious strategies to collaborate in 
ways of describing object location. 
Schober’s results suggest that interlocutors may align 
reference frames. However, it is not clear that this is 
necessarily the case. In his experiments, two participants 
interacted freely, allowing little control over what was said 
by each pair. This means that pairs of participants may be 
reverting to default reference frames. Furthermore, in a 
large proportion of trials participants located objects using 
terms that required no reference frames (e.g. next to, 
between and so on). 
The present work is an experimental investigation to 
discover whether or not interlocutors align reference frames. 
The investigation uses a confederate-priming paradigm (e.g. 
Branigan et al., 2000) where a naïve participant and a 
participant who is - unknown to the naïve participant - a 
confederate of the experimenter and who is following a 
script, communicate during the experiment. If interlocutors 
do align reference frames then they will use a reference 
frame significantly more when they have just heard an 
utterance using that reference frame than when they have 
just heard an utterance using an alternative reference frame. 
Alternatively interlocutors may select a reference frame 
based solely upon the perceptual properties of the spatial 
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array, in which case they should be unaffected by the 
reference frame just used by their partner. Our experiments 
also set out to separate priming for reference frames from 
lexical priming. If priming of reference frames exists 
separately from lexical priming, we can expect subjects to 
use a reference frame significantly more if they have just 
heard an utterance using that reference frame even if the 
same spatial term is not applicable to both utterances. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 12 students of the University of Edinburgh 
were paid volunteers in the experiment, which lasted 20 
minutes. All were native English speakers.  
 
Materials The experiment was run on two computers 
positioned back to back, using E-prime software. One 
program was created for the confederate and consisted of 
sentences positioned in the centre of the screen of the form 
“The dot above the chair”. This formed the script for the 
experiment. The second program was for the participant and 
displayed pictures for the match and describe phases of the 
experiment. 
12 monochrome objects were used as reference objects, all 
fitting into a rectangle 93 pixels high and 121 pixels wide. 
Two versions of each object were used, one rotated 90° 
clockwise and one rotated 90°anti-clockwise. 
The figure object was an 11x11 pixel square rotated so 
that its vertices were the top, bottom, leftmost, and 
rightmost points. The figure object was located above, 
below, left, or right (in a relative reference frame) of the 
reference object. The centre of the figure object was 
positioned between 125 and 130 pixels from the centre of 
the reference object. 
 
Design There were 3 within-participants and within-items 
factors: Prime Reference Frame (Relative vs. Intrinsic); 
Preposition (Same Preposition vs. Different Preposition); 
and Target Plane (Vertical vs. Horizontal). These are 
exemplified in Figure 2. The prime scene in Figure 2 can 
either be described as The dot above the camera (relative 
reference frame) or The dot right of the camera (intrinsic 
reference frame). In the top diagram of Figure 2, alignment 
requires using the same preposition (either above or right 
of); in the bottom diagram, alignment require using a 
different preposition (either left or below). Finally, the top 
target scene is aligned vertically whilst the bottom target 
scene is aligned horizontally. 
Two lists of 96 trials were constructed, with each trial 
consisting of a match phase and a describe phase. The 
reference objects in each list were rotated clockwise and 
anti-clockwise on half of the trials each. Reference frame 
was counterbalanced across list and rotation. Preposition 
overlap was counterbalanced across rotation in each list. 
Participants saw 12 trials in each of the 8 conditions formed 
by crossing the three factors. The trials were presented in a 
fully randomized order, which was different for each 
participant. 
 
 
Figure 2: The top diagram shows the ‘same preposition’ 
condition. The bottom diagram shows the different 
preposition condition. 
 
Procedure The two participants were introduced to each 
other (throughout the experiment, the experimenter treated 
the confederate as if she was a naïve participant). 
The participant and confederate each sat at a computer 
each. The computers were situated back to back so that 
neither could see each other, or the other’s screen. After 
hearing instructions, participants pressed the space bar to 
begin a practice session of 8 trials, one trial corresponding 
to each of the 8 conditions. Instructions then appeared on 
the screen signalling the end of the practice session and the 
start of the experiment. Each trial proceeded as follows: 
After participants pressed <space> to begin, the match 
screen appeared. The match screen contained two examples 
of a reference object (both the same, with one on the left and 
one on the right) and a dot located above, below, left or 
right of each one. The confederate gave a description of the 
location of the dot in relation to the object. The participant 
then chose which of the two examples on the screen 
matched the confederate’s description of the dot location 
accurately, pressing the M key if it was the right-hand 
example and the Z key if it was the left-hand example. 
Participants were told that if they were not sure which 
picture matched their partner’s description to pick the one 
they thought matched most closely. 
After selection the match scenes disappeared (no feedback 
was given) and a fixation cross appeared in the centre of the 
screen. This remained on screen for 1000ms. The fixation 
cross was then replaced by a reference object in the centre 
of the screen with a dot above, below, left, or right of it. 
Participants then described the location of the dot in relation 
to the object. After describing this they pressed space and 
the scene disappeared. It was replaced by a fixation cross in 
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the centre of the screen for 500ms. This then disappeared 
and the next trial began with a match task. 
Results 
For the analysis participants’ first responses were used. The 
percentage of intrinsic responses were then analyzed using 
two 2x2x2 repeated measures ANOVAs (by participants 
(F1) and by items (F2)), with Prime reference frame 
(intrinsic or relative), preposition (same or different), and 
Target plane (horizontal or vertical) as factors.  
Table 1 shows the mean number of intrinsic responses 
used by subjects in each of the 8 conditions. There was a 
significant main effect of Prime reference frame (62.9% vs. 
53.3%; F1(1,11) = 26.86, p < .01; F2(1,11) = 9.35, p < .05). 
That is, participants were significantly more likely to use an 
intrinsic reference frame after the confederate had used an 
intrinsic reference frame, compared to when the confederate 
had used a relative reference frame. 
 
Table 1: 
Mean percentage of intrinsic responses in Experiment 1. 
 
 Relative Prime Intrinsic Prime 
 Same Diff Same Diff 
Vertical 32.3 52.8 54.9 52.3 
Horizontal 63.6 64.4 73.3 70.9 
 
When the figure and reference objects were aligned 
vertically, participants used an intrinsic reference frame 
48% of the time compared to 68% when the alignment was 
horizontal. This difference was significant (F1(1,11) = 8.07; 
p < .05; F2(1,11) = 101.17; p < .01), showing that 
participants were significantly more likely to use an intrinsic 
reference frame when the objects were aligned horizontally 
than when they were aligned vertically. 
As expected there was no effect of preposition (p > .05): 
Participants used an intrinsic reference frame as much when 
the prepositions were the same as when they were different. 
This is regardless of which reference frame the confederate 
used. 
There was a significant two-way interaction between 
Prime Reference Frame and Preposition (F1(1,11) = 13.07; 
p < .01; F2(1,11) = 6.19; p < .05). All other two-way 
interactions were non-significant (p >.05). Post-hoc analyses 
showed that these interactions occurred because of a 
difference between two of the eight conditions, relative, 
same, vertical and relative, different, vertical: The former 
yielded 32.3% intrinsic responses whereas the latter yielded 
52.8% intrinsic responses (t(23) = -2.91; p = .01).This 
means that participants were more likely to use a relative 
reference frame when the reference and figure object were 
aligned vertically (i.e. they would use above and below to 
describe the dots’ location) following the confederate using 
a relative reference frame when there was preposition 
overlap (i.e. the confederate used above or below) than 
when there was no preposition overlap (i.e. the confederate 
used left or right). 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 show an effect of alignment of 
reference frames. Participants were more likely to use an 
intrinsic reference frame after the confederate had used an 
intrinsic reference frame. 
The significant effect of Target Plane indicates that 
participants preferred to use the lexical terms above or 
below to left or right, regardless of reference frame. This 
was expected because the top/bottom axis is easier to 
identify (than the left/right axis) due to asymmetries of the 
reference objects along this axis (Bryant & Wright, 1999). 
One of the important goals of the experiment was to 
distinguish lexical priming effects from reference-frame 
priming effects. A sole effect of reference frame priming 
would have meant that participants aligned reference frames 
as much when the prime and target scenes were the same 
(represented in the upper portion of Figure 2) as when the 
prime and target scenes were different (represented in the 
lower portion of Figure 2). However, the presence of a 
significant interaction between Prime reference frame and 
preposition condition meant that this was not the case. This 
interaction was caused by two of the conditions; the other 
three pairs of same/different conditions yielded no 
significant differences between them. This indicates that the 
apparent lexical priming effect was evident only when the 
relative reference frame was used and the figure and 
reference objects were aligned vertically. Such a situation 
would seem unusual, because it should be the case that 
lexical priming is evident for all same/different pairs of 
conditions. 
However, there is an alternative explanation for this 
pattern of data that does not rely upon lexical priming. We 
noted that participants used intrinsic left and right 
differently (in fact, inversely) to the confederate. Thus, 
participants would describe the prime scenes in Figure 2 as 
the dot left of the camera, whereas the confederate described 
them as the dot right of the camera. Therefore for half of the 
match tasks in the relative, vertical, different condition, the 
non-matching scene also provided a match to the 
confederate’s description if an intrinsic reference frame was 
applied (according to the participant’s interpretation). This 
would be the only condition in which potential confusion 
could arise. Therefore, for this condition, if participants 
chose the non-matching scene in the match task they would 
effectively be primed to use the intrinsic reference frame 
rather than the intended relative reference frame. 
In Experiment 2, we therefore made the confederate 
describe intrinsic left and right in the way that participants 
had done in Experiment 1, in order to see whether the 
observed interaction was due to lexical priming, or was 
instead an artefact of the participants’ misinterpretation of 
what the confederate was describing as intrinsically left and 
right. 
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Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1, with the 
exception that what was described as left and right intrinsic 
was reversed in accordance with participants’ interpretations 
from Experiment 1.  16 further students from the University 
of Edinburgh were paid volunteers in the experiment, which 
lasted 20 minutes.  
 
Results 
The analyses were conducted in the same fashion as 
Experiment 1. Table 2 shows the mean number of intrinsic 
responses used by subjects in each of the 8 conditions. As in 
Experiment 1, there was a significant main effect of Prime 
Reference Frame (F1(1,15) = 6.79; p < .05; F2(1,11) = 
24.36; p < .01): Participants used an intrinsic reference 
frame more often following an intrinsic description by the 
confederate than following a relative description by the 
confederate. 
 
Table 2: 
Mean percentage intrinsic responses in Experiment 2. 
  
 Relative Prime Intrinsic Prime 
 Same Diff Same Diff 
Vertical 32.1 26.6 41.2 39.1 
Horizontal 39.6 38.1 52.1 48.9 
 
However, the interaction between Prime Reference Frame 
and Preposition did not reach significance, indicating that 
there was no effect of using the same lexical item for the 
prime and target (F1(1,15) = .018; p > .05; F2(1,11) = 3.02; 
p > .05). All other interactions were non-significant (all p > 
.05). 
 
General Discussion 
The results of this study show that interlocutors align 
reference frames when describing objects’ locations. 
Importantly, the results indicate that alignment is not due to 
lexical priming caused by the experimental participant 
repeating the preposition just used by the confederate. 
The apparent lexical priming effect shown in Experiment 
1 was due to the participants interpreting left and right 
intrinsic differently to what was intended by the 
confederate. When the source of this difficulty was 
addressed in Experiment 2, this effect was not evident. The 
results showed no difference in the proportion of reference-
frame alignment when the naïve participant used the same 
preposition as the confederate, as when a different 
preposition was used. 
 Our results support the hypothesis that interlocutors align 
at many levels of representation when conversing (Pickering 
& Garrod, in press). Furthermore, it extends this alignment 
beyond linguistic representations and into an aspect of 
conceptual representation, i.e., the spatial domain. These 
results, however, do not precisely determine the mechanism 
by which alignment is achieved. In particular it is not clear 
whether participants make some use of a deliberate strategy 
to make the task easier for their partner. For example, it is 
possible that participants may be partly aware of the 
importance of aligning without realizing exactly what they 
are aligning on. 
What is surprising about these results is that there was no 
cumulative effect of lexical priming and reference frame 
priming. Other studies have shown a larger alignment effect 
when more factors are common between the prime and the 
target (e.g. Branigan et al., 2000; Cleland & Pickering, 
2003). The lack of a cumulative effect may be due to the 
nature of the lexical items used in this experiment. The 
prepositions were used to refer to both their intrinsic relation 
and relative relation, and so held little meaning independent 
of the reference frame. 
The results also support the work of Carlson-Radvansky 
and Jiang (1998) who showed that reference frames were 
subject to negative priming. Their investigation only 
focused upon inhibition along a single axis of a 
representation. The results of this study extend these 
findings and show that activation of one axis of a reference 
frame activates the whole reference frame (at least in 2 
dimensions), indicating that reference frames are a holistic 
representation. 
Previous work (Schober, 1993, 1995) has shown that 
interlocutors will co-ordinate the reference object and origin 
of a reference frame to the matcher in a match-and-describe 
task. However, this did not show that interlocutors were 
aligning reference frames; as Levinson (2003) has argued, it 
is possible to have a non-egocentric relative reference frame 
and an egocentric intrinsic reference frame. The results 
presented here provide strong evidence that interlocutors do 
align reference frames. Ongoing work is investigating the 
predictions made by Levinson’s definitions of reference 
frames that an egocentric/intrinsic description (e.g. the ball 
in front of me) can prime the use of an allocentric/intrinsic 
description (e.g. the ball in front of the car). 
Previous work (Branigan et al., 2000; Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986; Garrod & Anderson, 1987) has shown that 
interlocutors align representations during dialogue. The 
results of these experiments extend this body of evidence to 
show that independent of lexical priming, alignment extends 
beyond the language faculty and that interlocutors also align 
reference frames to describe objects’ locations in a scene. 
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Abstract
Many evaluations of cognitive models rely on data
that have been averaged or aggregated across all ex-
perimental subjects, and so fail to consider the possi-
bility that there are important individual differences
between subjects. Other evaluations are done at the
single-subject level, and so fail to benefit from the
reduction of noise that data averaging or aggrega-
tion potentially provides. To overcome these weak-
nesses, we develop a general approach to modeling
individual differences using families of cognitive mod-
els, where different groups of subjects are identified
as having different psychological behavior. Separate
models with separate parameterizations are applied
to each group of subjects, and Bayesian model selec-
tion is used to determine the appropriate number of
groups. We demonstrate the general approach in a
concrete and detailed way using the ALCOVE model
of category learning and data from four previously
analysed category learning experiments. Meaningful
individual differences are found for three of the four
experiments, and ALCOVE is able to account for this
variation through psychologically interpretable differ-
ences in parameterization. The results highlight the
potential of extending cognitive models to consider in-
dividual differences.
Introduction
Much of cognitive psychology, as with other empiri-
cal sciences, involves the development and evaluation
of models. Models provide formal accounts of the ex-
planations proposed by theories, and have been de-
veloped to address diverse cognitive phenomena rang-
ing from stimulus representation (e.g., Shepard 1980),
to memory retention (e.g., Anderson & Schooler 1991;
Estes 1997), to category learning (e.g., Ashby & Per-
rin 1988; Berretty, Todd, & Martignon 1999; Kruschke
1992; Tenenbaum 1999). One recurrent shortcoming of
these models, however, is that (whether intentionally,
or as an unintended consequence of methodology) hu-
mans are usually modeled as ‘invariants’, and not as
‘individuals’. This occurs because, most often, mod-
els are evaluated against data that have been averaged
or aggregated across subjects, and so the modeling as-
sumes that there are no individual differences between
subjects.
The potential benefit of averaging data is that, if the
performance of subjects really is the same except for
‘noise’ (i.e., variation the model is not attempting to
explain), the averaging process will tend to remove the
noise, and the resultant data will more accurately re-
flect the underlying psychological phenomenon. When
the performance of subjects has genuine differences,
however, it is well known (e.g., Estes 1956; Myung,
Kim, & Pitt 2000) that averaging produces data that
do not accurately represent the behavior of individuals,
and provide a misleading basis for modeling.
Even more fundamentally, the practice of averaging
data restricts the focus of cognitive modeling to issues
of how people are the same. While modeling invariants
is fundamental, it is also important to ask how people
are different. Experimental data reveal individual dif-
ferences in cognitive processes, and in the psychological
variables that control those processes, that also need
to be modeled.
Cognitive modeling that attempts to accommodate
individual differences usually assumes that each sub-
ject behaves in accordance with a different parame-
terization of the same basic model, and so the model
is evaluated against the data from each subject sep-
arately (e.g, Ashby, Maddox, & Lee 1994; Nosofsky
1986; Wixted & Ebbesen 1997). Although this avoids
the problem of corrupting the underlying pattern of
the data, it also foregoes the potential benefits of aver-
aging, and guarantees that models are fit to all of the
noise in the data.
Another problem with individual subject analysis,
from a model theoretic perspective, is that fitting each
additional subject requires an extra set of free parame-
ters, and so leads to a progressively more complicated
accounts of the data as a whole. As has been pointed
out repeatedly in the psychological literature recently
(e.g., Myung & Pitt 1997; Pitt, Myung, & Zhang
2002), it is important both to maximize goodness-of-
fit and minimize model complexity to achieve the basic
goals of modeling. Unnecessarily complicated models
that “over-fit” data often do not provide any insight
or explanation of the cognitive processes they address,
and are less capable of making accurate predictions
when generalizing to new or different situations.
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A better approach, therefore, is to partition subjects
according to their individual differences, and model the
averaged or aggregated data from each group. Under
this approach, data are addressed by a set of models,
called a model family, where a different parameteriza-
tion is applied to each group of subjects. Where av-
eraging is appropriate, within groups of subjects, it is
applied. Where averaging is not appropriate, between
groups of subjects, it is not applied.
In this paper, we apply these ideas to model individ-
ual differences in category learning, using Kruschke’s
(1992) well known, empirically successful, and widely
used ALCOVE model. Our basic approach, however,
is applicable to any model of category learning or, in-
deed, models of other cognitive phenomena.
Modeling Individual Differences in
Category Learning
Formally, a model family M partitions the subjects
S into G groups S → {S1, . . . , SG}, and so parti-
tions the complete data D into G averaged data sets
D → {D1, . . . , DG}. For the ith data set, a model fam-
ily also specifies a model parameterization θi. Any pos-
sible partitioning of subjects can be considered, includ-
ing the possibility that all subjects are in the same par-
tition (corresponding to aggregating across subjects),
or that each has their own partition (corresponding to
a complete individual analysis). Differences in the cat-
egory learning processes between groups are revealed
by differences in the parameter values they use.
Because of the enormous flexibility allowed by model
families, they can be made almost arbitrarily compli-
cated, and could potentially fit any data set perfectly
by adding new models, with extra parameters, to ac-
count for any remaining unexplained variation in data.
It is necessary, therefore, for model fitting methods to
use model selection criteria that balance goodness-of-
fit and model complexity. The application of Bayesian
model selection criteria (e.g., Pitt et al. 2002) is most
easily pursued by specifying a probabilistic account,
in the form of a likelihood function, of the relationship
between a parameterized model family and empirical
data.
To develop a likelihood function for category learn-
ing, suppose, under a proposed partitioning of sub-
jects, the ith partition has ki subjects, and that the
n category learning trials are divided into blocks, with
the jth block having bj trials. Choosing one block with
b1 = n corresponds to an analysis of the average re-
sponse probabilities over all trials. Choosing n blocks
with all bj = 1 corresponds to a trial-by-trial analysis.
In a two category learning experiment, the data take
the form of counts, dij , of the number of correct re-
sponses made by all of the subjects in the ith par-
tition on the jth block of learning trials. Suppose
also that a category learning model M , with its pa-
rameterization θi, predicts a correct response proba-
bility of γij at the ith group of subjects on the jth
block. Then the likelihood of the data arising un-
der the model is given by the binomial distribution:
p (dij |Mi, θi) =
(bjki
dij
)
γdijij (1− γij)
bjki−dij . The like-
lihood of a model family simply extends this result to
consider every block of trials and every partition, so
that
p (D | M) =
∏
i
∏
j
(
bjki
dij
)
γdijij (1− γij)
bjki−dij . (1)
The extension of this likelihood function to more gen-
eral category learning experiments with more than two
possible category responses, using a multinomial dis-
tribution, is straightforward.
Having defined the likelihood function, the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC: Schwarz 1978) can be ap-
plied to balance goodness-of-fit with the complexity of
a model family. The BIC is given by:
BIC = −2 ln p (D | θ∗) + P lnN, (2)
where P is the number of parameters in the model
family (i.e., the sum of all the parameters used by the
models for each group), N is the total number of data,
and θ∗ is the maximum likelihood parameterization
over all the models. Different possible model families,
corresponding to different groupings of subjects, can be
compared in terms of their BIC values, with the mini-
mum BIC corresponding to the most likely account of
the data.
Demonstration Using ALCOVE
Kruschke’s (1993) Study
ALCOVE is a model of category learning that uses
an exemplar-based stimulus representation, similarity-
based generalization that is mediated by selective at-
tention, and error-based learning from external feed-
back. The standard ALCOVE model Kruschke (1992)
uses four free parameters. These control the rate of
learning for attention weights (λa), the rate of learning
for the associations between stimulus representations
and category responses (λw), the gradient of the gen-
eralization function that measures stimulus similarity
(c), and the way in which different levels of evidence for
category alternatives are mapped onto response prob-
abilities (φ).
Kruschke (1993) considered the ability of ALCOVE
to model human category learning for filtration and
condensation Categorization tasks (Garner 1974). The
results of four separate experiments were reported,
covering two filtration tasks (called position-relevant
and height-relevant, due to the nature of the stimuli)
and two condensation tasks (called condensation A and
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Figure 1: The application of the heuristic for partition-
ing subjects to find two groups for the position-relevant
filtration data.
condensation B). The data involved a total of 160 sub-
jects, with 40 completing each task. Kruschke (1993)
fit ALCOVE to all four sets of experimental results
simultaneously, using trial-by-trial data formed by av-
eraging across all 40 subjects. An examination of the
individual learning curves in the raw data, however,
reveals a large degree of variation between subjects
within each experiment, and raises the possibility that
there are psychologically meaningful individual differ-
ences in category learning.
Heuristic for Partitioning Subjects
In classification and clustering, an essential require-
ment for the determination of homogenous classes is a
calculable similarity or distance measure between ob-
jects being compared (Gordon 1999). For category
learning, the objects are the individual experimen-
tal observations for each subject, (i.e., each subject’s
learning curve). A candidate measure for describing
the similarities between these curves is the correlation
coefficient, which we used in a two-stage heuristic. In
the first stage, singular value decomposition is applied
to produce an ordered eigenvector-based representa-
tion of the similarities between the learning curves of
subjects. In the second stage, a simple k-means clus-
tering algorithm is applied to this representation to
find clusters of subjects.
For each of Kruschke’s (1993) four category learning
tasks, this heuristic was applied to produce a range of
partitions of the data, from a single group with all
40 subjects, to seven groups with differing numbers of
subjects in each group. As a concrete example of this
process, the clusters found when the subjects were di-
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Figure 2: The pattern of change in BIC values for
each clustering of the position-relevant filtration (FP),
heigh-relevant filtration (FH), condensation A (CA)
and condensation B (CB) category learning data.
vided into two groups for the position-relevant filtra-
tion task are shown in Figure 1. Each circle represents
the learning curve of a subject, represented according
to their values along the first two component eigen-
vectors. The two groups of subjects identified by k-
mean clustering are superimposed using broken lines.
One cluster on the left encompasses 28 of the subjects,
while a much tighter cluster on the right encompasses
the remaining 12 subjects.
Model Fitting and Evaluation
For each of the clusterings for each task, maximum
likelihood fits of ALCOVE were found using a different
parameterization for each group according to Eq. (1).
BIC values were then calculated for each model family
using Eq. (2), giving the results1 shown in Figure 2.
It is clear that the minimum BIC for three of the four
tasks (position-relevant filtration, condensation A and
condensation B) is achieved when two separate groups
of subjects are considered, while the height-relevant
filtration data are best modeled by considering all of
the subjects as learning in the same way.
Figures 3 and 4 give more detailed results for, respec-
tively, the position-relevant filtration and condensation
1The full range of BIC values for the CB task is not
shown because, when four or more groups are considered,
at least one of the groups contains only subjects who be-
come less accurate as learning blocks progress. ALCOVE
is qualitatively unable to accommodate the decrease in the
averaged learning curve for this type of group, leading to
very poor fit, and very large BIC values. We have omitted
these values.
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Figure 3: The change in accuracy across learning
blocks for the subjects (broken lines) and ALCOVE
(solid lines), for the one group (“All”) and two group
(“G1” and “G2”) model families on the position-
relevant filtration task.
A tasks. In both of these figures, the top panel, labeled
“All”, shows the average accuracy of all subjects across
the eight learning blocks, and the maximum likelihood
fit of ALCOVE to these data. The middle and bottom
panels show the first (G1) and second (G2) groups of
subjects proposed by the two-group model family that
is prefered by the complexity analysis. These panels
show the average accuracy for both groups of subjects
separately, together with the maximum likelihood AL-
COVE learning curve.
Figure 3 shows that the moderate learning evident
when treating the subjects as having no individual dif-
ferences is better modeled as coming from two dis-
tinct groups of subjects. Some subjects, in the first
group, maintain near-perfect accuracy throughout the
category learning task. Other subjects, in the sec-
ond group, learn more gradually, only achieving near-
perfect accuracy in the last few learning blocks. Figure
3 shows that, with the exception of the rapid achieve-
ment of accuracy in the first block for the first group
of subjects, ALCOVE is able to model both of these
patterns of learning2.
In a similar way, Figure 4 shows that the gradual in-
crease in accuracy, evident when treating the subjects
as having no individual differences, is better modeled
2It is possible the application of one of ALCOVE’s de-
scendents, such as RASHNL (Kruschke & Johansen 1999)
or the unified mixture of experts model (Kruschke 2001),
which emphasize rule-oriented learning and incorporate a
rapid attention shifting capability (Kruschke 1996), could
overcome the deficiency.
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Figure 4: The change in accuracy across learning
blocks for the subjects (broken lines) and ALCOVE
(solid lines), for the one group (“All”) and two group
(“G1” and “G2”) model families on the condensation
A task.
as coming from two distinct groups of subjects. The
first group exhibits almost no learning, while the sec-
ond learns at a moderate rate. Once again, ALCOVE
is able to model both of these patterns of learning.
In fact, ALCOVE has more difficulty accommodating
the learning data resulting from averaging across all of
the subjects. What the individual differences analy-
sis developed here suggests is that this inability may
not indicate a fundamental weakness in ALCOVE, but
rather that the averaging process involved in summa-
rizing human performance has masked important indi-
vidual differences, and corrupted the underlying learn-
ing patterns in the original data.
Table 1 shows the maximum likelihood parameter
values for each group of subjects in the model family
with the lowest BIC value, for all four learning tasks.
These parameter values are generally interpretable in
terms of the different learning behavior revealed by the
individual differences analysis. For example, for the
position-relevant filtration task, the first group of sub-
jects have a greater λw value than the second group,
consistent with their more rapid learning. For this
task, both groups have high φ values, consistent with
their decisiveness (or ‘confidence’) in mapping evidence
into response probabilities. Both groups of subjects in
the condensation A task, however, have much lower φ
values, consistent with their inferior learning perfor-
mance, and the first group in this task, who basically
fail to learn, have a very low φ value. Other com-
parisons of this type, both within and across tasks,
generally have meaningful and useful interpretations,
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Table 1: Maximum likelihood parameter values for
each group of subjects in the model family with
the lowest BIC value, for all four learning tasks.
FP=position-relevant filtration, FH=height-relevant
filtration, CA=condensation A, CB=condensation B.
Task Group λw λa c φ
FP G1 0.38 0.49 1.68 3.20
G2 0.06 27.0 6.83 2.66
FH All 0.23 0.58 1.56 1.00
CA G1 0.47 1.14 2.53 0.27
G2 0.24 0.38 7.52 0.93
CB G1 0.41 0.32 0.79 0.31
G2 0.17 0 .02 3.37 1.09
and highlight the ability of ALCOVE to represent psy-
chologically important variations in category learning
through its free parameters.
Discussion
There are at least two conclusions that can be drawn
from modeling individual differences in Kruschke’s
(1993) category learning data using ALCOVE. The
first is that there is strong evidence for large and mean-
ingful differences in the learning behavior of groups of
subjects for three out of the four tasks. Previous analy-
ses, adopting the standard cognitive modeling practice
of considering all of the subjects as a single group,
are insensitive to these potentially important patterns
of variation. The second conclusion is that, for these
data, the basic ALCOVE model is generally able to
capture the individual differences in learning, when
asked to model appropriate groups of subjects. It does
this by applying different psychologically meaningful
parameterizations to accommodate variations in learn-
ing behavior. In this sense, what the results presented
here demonstrate is that accounting for individual dif-
ferences using model families has the potential to ex-
tend and increase the usefulness of existing cognitive
models significantly.
From this promising start, there are a number of
directions in which the basic approach described here
can be refined and extended. Most generally, the ex-
tension to other cognitive phenomena provides a rich
set of opportunities for future research. As with cat-
egory learning, there is evidence of individual differ-
ences in the similarity data used to model stimulus
representations (e.g., Ashby et al. 1994), and in the
curves of forgetting used to model memory retention
(e.g., Anderson & Tweney 1997; Heathcote, Brown,
& Mewhort 2000; Myung, Kim, & Pitt 2000; Wixted
& Ebbesen 1997), and in a range of other data from
which cognitive models have been developed.
Considering a broader range of cognitive phenomena
highlights the possibility of extending individual differ-
ence accounts to incorporate fundamentally different
models to capture between-subject variation, rather
than relying solely on parametric variation within the
same basic model. In memory retention, for exam-
ple, one group of subjects could be modeled using a
power function while another group is modeled using
an exponential decay function. For stimulus represen-
tation, some groups of subject could be modeled us-
ing a featural representation while others use a dimen-
sional representation. In the category learning con-
text considered here, it may make sense to model some
subject groups using ALCOVE or its descendants, but
apply a very different category learning model to oth-
ers, such as the fast and frugal account provided by
Categorization-By-Elimination (Berrety et al. 1999).
One of the weaknesses of the demonstration pre-
sented here is the reliance on the BIC to compare dif-
ferent competing individual differences models. While
the BIC is conceptually and computationally straight-
forward, it is insensitive to the complexity effects aris-
ing from the functional form of parametric interaction
within the individual models (Myung & Pitt 1997).
This is a potentially important shortcoming, especially
if fundamentally different models are used to explain
performance for different subject groups. There are,
for example, many competing models of retention that
use two parameters (Rubin & Wenzel 1996), with dif-
ferent complexities that the BIC is unable to distin-
guish. The obvious remedy for this problem is to use
more sophisticated model selection criteria that are
sensitive to all of the components of model complex-
ity. These include measures such as the Stochastic
Complexity Criterion (SCC: Rissanen 1996) and Nor-
malized Maximum Likelihood (NML: Rissanen 2001).
For cognitive models that resist the formal analysis
needed to derive these measures, an alternative is to
use numerical methods, such Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (e.g., Gilks, Richards, & Spiegelhalter 1996) to
approximate the Bayesian posterior distributions that
compare model families.
A final possibility for refining the approach demon-
strated here is to use a more principled optimization
approach to determine the groupings of subjects. The
method used here, based on k-means clustering of cor-
relations, is a sensible heuristic one. It is particularly
well suited to a model like ALCOVE that requires con-
siderable computation effort when finding maximum
likelihood parameter values. The clustering heuris-
tic is designed to identify good partitions of the sub-
jects into groups, and only requires parameter fitting
to be done once for each possible number of subject
groups. For other models, however, such as analytic
models of memory retention, finding maximum like-
lihood parameterizations is straightforward. In these
cases, a more explicit optimization approach to find-
ing partitions could be adopted, because repeated pa-
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rameter fitting is possible. For example, a stochastic
hill-climbing procedure could be used to find subject
groups that minimize the BIC, SCC or NML of the
model family.
Collectively, these possibilities describe a principled
and general approach for building and evaluating cog-
nitive models, using a variety of basic models and num-
bers of parameterizations, to accommodate individual
differences. It is a more general approach to cognitive
modeling than one that averages data, assuming there
are no individual differences. It is a more powerful
and succinct approach than one that uses subject-by-
subject analysis. While much of the work to realize this
potential remains to be done, the demonstration pre-
sented here, using multiple ALCOVE models to cap-
ture differences in category learning, provides a good
concrete example of its potential. It shows how using
model families, and relying on principled model selec-
tion criteria, can be used to develop detailed and inter-
pretable accounts of both how people are cognitively
the same, and how they are different.
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Abstract
Two eye-tracking experiments examined linguistic gender
effects in non-native spoken-word recognition. French
participants, who knew German well, followed spoken
instructions in German to click on pictures on a computer
screen (e.g., Wo befindet sich die Perle, “where is the pearl”)
while their eye movements were monitored. The name of the
target picture was preceded by a gender-marked article in the
instructions. When a target and a competitor picture (with
phonologically similar names) were of the same gender in
both German and French, French participants fixated
competitor pictures more than unrelated pictures. However,
when target and competitor were of the same gender in
German but of different gender in French, early fixations to
the competitor picture were reduced. Competitor activation in
the non-native language was seemingly constrained by native
gender information. German listeners showed no such
viewing time difference. The results speak against a form-
based account of the linguistic gender effect. They rather
support the notion that the effect originates from the
grammatical level of language processing.
Introduction
Gender is a grammatical category that varies largely across
the languages of the world. The range goes from elaborate
gender systems in some languages to the absence of gender
in others. Both German and French are languages with
grammatical gender. The form of definite articles, for
example, marks gender in both languages. German definite
articles are der(masc.), die(fem.), and das(neut.); French definite
articles are le(masc.) and l a(fem.) respectively. Grammatical
gender usually becomes most noticeable when we learn a
second language with gender. Is it der Berg (“mountain”) or
die Berg in German? Do the French say le citron (“lemon”)
or la citron? The present study investigated how gender
marking influences the recognition of spoken-words in a
non-native language. Results help clarify the origin of the
linguistic gender effect.
It is generally accepted in the psycholinguistic
community that during the recognition of spoken words,
multiple word candidates get simultaneously activated and
compete against each other (e.g., Marslen-Wilson & Welsh,
1978; McQueen, Norris, & Cutler, 1994). When a native
speaker hears, for example, the German word Perle
(“pearl”), lexical representations of words with similar
onsets, such as Perücke (“wig”), will initially be activated
along with Perle. Activated word candidates compete for
recognition until they no longer match incoming segmental
information. Thus, Perücke will drop out of the competitor
set as the /l/ in Perle is being heard. It has also been shown
that non-native listeners consider candidate words in both
the non-native and their native language simultaneously
(e.g., Marian & Spivey, 2003; Weber & Cutler, 2004). Thus,
for French listeners the beginning of German Perle may
additionally activate French words like perruque and persil.
Eye-tracking is a methodology that has been found to
be eminently suited for the investigation of competitor
activation (e.g., Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, &
Sedivy, 1995). It makes use of the fact that participants
make saccadic eye movements to pictures of objects on a
computer screen as the names of the objects are mentioned
in spoken sentences. Locations and latencies of eye
movements on pictures are recorded using a camera
mounted on a headband and can be used to examine lexical
competition in spoken-word recognition. While participants
hear the name of a target picture, they look more often to
pictures with names that are similar in onset with the target
name than to pictures with phonologically unrelated names.
It has been shown that such competition effects, defined as
fixation proportions to pictures, closely map to activation
levels of word candidates as simulated in computational
models of spoken-word recognition such as TRACE
(Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998; Dahan,
Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 2001).
By now, numerous eye-tracking studies have successfully
confirmed phonological competitor activation in spoken-
word recognition. Dahan, Swingley, Tanenhaus, and
Magnuson (2000) took the subject one step further by
testing whether morphosyntactic context can affect
competitor activation. In particular, they tested whether
gender marking on definite articles influences the
recognition of subsequent nouns. A number of studies had
already looked at lexical gender effects in word recognition
using experimental paradigms other than eye-tracking (e.g.,
Bates, Devescovi, Hernandez, & Pizzamiglio, 1996; Colé &
Segui, 1994; Grosjean, Dommergues, Cornu, Guillelmon, &
Besson, 1994). These studies found that the presence of
gender-congruent articles or adjectives enhances the
recognition of target nouns whereas gender-incongruent
forms slow recognition down. Dahan et al. (2000),
investigated the role of gender information on spoken-word
recognition more directly: They tested the activation of
competitors that matched the initial sounds of a target noun
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but mismatched the gender marking on the article. They
found that the presence of a gender-marked definite article
could prevent early activation of competitors inconsistent
with that gender: Upon hearing cliquez sur le bouton (“click
on the(masc.) button”), French listeners did not fixate the
picture of a bouteille (“bottle(fem.)”) more often than pictures
with unrelated names.1
The study by Dahan et al. (2000), however, could not
assess the origin of the lexical gender effect. Are listeners
really sensitive to grammatical gender information in the
preceding context or is it simply listeners’ sensitivity to the
co-occurrence of the form of the article with the form of the
noun that restricts lexical access? In order to reduce the high
co-occurrence of definite articles and nouns, Dahan and
colleagues interposed a gender-marked adjective in a
follow-up study. In their preliminary results, activation of
gender-mismatching competitors was no longer reduced
when low frequency gender-marked adjectives preceded
target nouns. This was seen as evidence for a form-based
origin of the gender effect. In a Russian eye-tracking study,
however, Sekerina (2003) found that gender-marked color
adjectives do restrict referential sets to gender-matching
nouns. She interpreted the results as evidence for a
grammar-based effect of gender in spoken-word
recognition.
Spoken-word recognition in a non-native language offers
the possibility to distinguish between a form-based and a
grammar-based account of the linguistic gender effect. The
gender of a noun can differ across languages: Canon is, for
instance, feminine in German but masculine in French. The
present study tested whether French listeners, who are
highly proficient in German, use native French gender
information during the recognition of spoken words in
German. Since the form of the article differs in German and
French, presentation of the German article should not give
rise to co-occurrence information for the French form of the
article and a given noun. Thus, if the gender of words in
French exerts an effect on the recognition of spoken words
in German (even though French is not presented), this
would strongly suggest that the locus of the gender effect is
not form-based.2
Recent eye-tracking studies have shown that listeners
cannot deactivate the lexicon of the native language even in
a monolingual non-native situation where the native
vocabulary is irrelevant (Marian & Spivey, 2003; Spivey &
Marian, 1999; Weber & Cutler, 2004). Native language
competitors that were phonologically related to the non-
                                                           
1 Dahan et al. (2000) also showed that when no phonological
overlap between picture names was given, gender-marked articles
were not sufficient to restrict participants’ attention to pictures
with gender matching names.
2 Only very few studies have looked at gender marking effects in
non-native spoken-word recognition. Guillelmon and Grosjean
(2001), for example, found in an auditory naming study no effects
of congruency for late English-French bilinguals. It is not
established yet whether gender marking influences competitor
activation in a second language.
native target were activated more than phonologically
unrelated words: Upon hearing the English target desk,
Dutch listeners, who knew English well, fixated the picture
of a lid more than unrelated pictures because the Dutch
name for lid (deksel) was phonologically related to desk
(Weber & Cutler, 2004). Similarly, grammatical information
from the native language might interfere with non-native
listening. Imagine native French speakers listening to
German in an eye-tracking study. Spoken instructions in
German tell them to click on target pictures on a screen. The
name of the target picture is preceded by the definite article
in the instructions, and target and competitor names overlap
in onset in both languages. In the non-native presentation
language German, target and competitor names share
gender, so the gender marking on the article cannot exclude
the competitor as a lexical candidate. In the native language
French, however, target and competitor differ in gender. If
we find no competitor activation for French listeners, this
would suggest that they use native French gender
information to disambiguate between target and competitor.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants Eighteen native speakers of French, mostly
students (mean age of 22), took part in the experiment for
monetary compensation. They had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and normal hearing. On average, they had
studied German as a foreign language for 10 years in
secondary education, starting at a mean age of 12 (ranging
from 10 to 16). To confirm their high proficiency in the
non-native language, they underwent a vocabulary test in
German after completing the eye-tracking experiment. For
each target and competitor noun in the experiment plus a
number of filler nouns with neuter gender, they had to name
the correct gender. The average score was 78% correct.
Figure 1:  Example of visual display presented to
participants.
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Table 1:  Examples of German (G) target-competitor pairs
and their French (F) translations.
target competitor
same-gender pair G
F
Perle(fem.)
perle(fem.)
“pearl”
Perücke(fem.)
perruque(fem.)
“wig”
different-gender pair G
F
Kassette(fem.)
cassette(fem.)
“tape”
Kanone(fem.)
canon(masc.)
“canon”
Materials Thirty German nouns referring to picturable
objects were chosen as targets.3 Each target was paired with
a competitor. The onset of the competitor overlapped
phonemically with the onset of the target in both German
and French (e.g., German target Perle /pErl´/ was perle
/pErl/ in French; German competitor Perücke /pEryk´/ was
perruque /pEryk/ in French). The target was always of the
same gender in German and French, but the gender of the
competitor divided the pairs into two groups (see Table 1).
In 15 “same-gender” pairs, target and competitor shared
gender in both languages. The target Perle (“pearl”),
feminine in both German and French, was for example
paired with the competitor Perücke (“wig”), also feminine
in both languages. In these pairs, neither German nor French
gender information could constrain initial competitor
activation. In 15 “different-gender” pairs, target and
competitor still shared gender in German, but were of
different genders in French. The target Kassette (“tape”),
feminine in both languages, was for instance paired with the
competitor Kanone (“canon”), which is feminine in German
but masculine in French. Whereas German gender
information could not exclude the competitor as a potential
lexical candidate in these pairs, French gender information
could.
Two phonologically unrelated distractors, with random
gender, were added for each target (e.g., snail and belt).
Neither the German nor the French names of the unrelated
distractors overlapped with the German target nouns. The
target was heard in the experiment, whereas competitor and
unrelated distractors were not heard. The overall lexical
frequency of targets and competitors did not differ
significantly in either of our target-competitor pairs.
Thirty filler trials were added. Great care was taken in
the fillers to dispel expectations that pictures with
phonologically similar names or matching gender were
likely targets. Three more representative trials were
constructed as practice trials.
All pictures were colored line drawings, taken from the
IMSI MasterClips Image Collection (1990). In pre-tests, we
asked participants to name and rate target and competitor
pictures. The agreement between participants’ responses and
                                                           
3 Since the French gender system is limited to feminine and
masculine, selected German target nouns were either of feminine
or masculine gender, but never neuter.
intended names was 88% correct, and the goodness of the
pictures was rated with a mean of 5 on a scale from 0 to 6.
German target nouns, preceded by their definite article
with nominative case marking, were embedded in a carrier
sentence (e.g., Wo befindet sich die Perle, “Where is the
pearl”). Spoken instructions were recorded. The duration of
putative overlap between target and competitor (e.g., the
duration of /pEr/ in Perle) was on average 200 ms for same-
gender pairs and 174 ms for different-gender pairs.
Procedure Participants were tested individually. At the
beginning of a session, they received instructions in
German, telling them to click on the object on the screen
that was mentioned in a sentence. Sentences were presented
auditorily over headphones and started 550 ms after the
appearance of the pictures on the screen. The set of pictures
was not shown to the participants before the experiment.
While they were listening, participants’ eye movements
were monitored using an SMI EyeLink head-mounted eye-
tracker. A camera on the participants’ dominant eye
provided the input to the tracker. Onset and offset times and
the spatial coordinates of the participants’ fixations were
recorded (250 Hz sampling rate). All pictures were
presented in color on a 3 x 3 gray grid (see Figure 1). Each
cell measured 7.5 x 7.5 cm, corresponding to a visual angle
of approximately 7°, which is well within the resolution of
the eye-tracker (better than 1°). The pictures of a target
item, its competitor, and two unrelated distractors were
displayed together in one trial. Positions of target and
competitor objects were randomized across trials. Each
experimental trial was preceded by at least one filler trial.
Along with the eye movements, the position of the mouse
click was recorded.
For the analysis, graphical software was used to display
the locations of the participants’ fixations as dots
superimposed on the four pictures for each trial and each
participant. Fixations were coded as pertaining to the cell of
the target object, the competitor object, or one of the two
unrelated distractors. Fixations that lay clearly outside the
cell of an object were not used for the computation of the
fixation probabilities. Saccade times were not added to
fixation times.
Results and Discussion
Seventeen trials were removed from the analysis because
participants clicked on an object other than the target or no
fixation on the target object was found (3.2% of all trials).
The low percentage of errors suggests that French
participants had no difficulties performing the task in
German. Fixation proportions, at successive 10 ms time
frames, were averaged over participants and items for
separate analyses.
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Figure 2:  Same-gender pairs. Fixation proportions of
French listeners over time for German targets, competitors,
and averaged distractors.
Figure 2 presents the averaged proportions of fixations after
target noun onset for trials with same-gender pairs. Fixation
proportions for the two unrelated distractors were averaged.
It takes typically about 150 to 200 ms before a programmed
eye movement is launched (e.g., Matin, Shao, & Buff,
1993). Thus, fixations on the target object that are triggered
by acoustic information are observable starting around 200
ms after target noun onset.
In same-gender pairs, French listeners fixated
competitor objects more than distractor objects. Between
200 and 600 ms, the proportion of fixations was on average
23.9% for the competitor and 14.9% for the unrelated
distractors. A one-factor ANOVA on the mean proportion of
fixations between 200 and 600 ms, with picture (with the
two levels ‘competitor’ and ‘unrelated distractors’) as the
within-participants factor, showed that the competitor was
fixated significantly more than the average of the unrelated
distractors (F1[1, 17] = 11.41, p < .005; F2[1, 14] = 13.92, p
< .005). Neither gender information from the non-native
presentation language, nor gender information from their
native language could narrow the lexical candidates down to
the target. In consequence, the competitor was activated
during the presentation of the target due to their
phonological similarity.
Prior to the point that fixations could be driven by
acoustic information from the target noun, no variation
between fixation proportions was found. Analyses in the 0-
200 ms time window showed no reliable difference in initial
fixations between competitor and unrelated distractors
(F1[1, 17] = 2.15, p > .1; F2 < 1). Thus, the difference
between fixations to the competitor and the unrelated
distractors in the 200-600 ms time window cannot be
attributed to a general bias toward the picture of the
competitor.
The pattern of results changed for different-gender
pairs. French participants no longer fixated competitor
objects more than distractor objects (see Figure 3).
Figure 3:  Different-gender pairs. Fixation proportions of
French listeners over time for German targets, competitors,
and averaged distractors.
Over the 200-600 ms time window, 17.9% of the fixations
were on average to the competitor and 15.6% to the
distractors. A one-factor ANOVA confirmed the lack of a
difference in viewing times (F1 & F 2< 1). As before, no
reliable differences were found for different-gender pairs in
initial fixation proportions between 0 and 200 ms after
target noun onset (F1 & F2 < 1).
In different-gender pairs, gender information carried by
the article in German could not constrain competitor
activation, but French gender could. Despite its
phonological similarity with the target noun, the competitor
was not activated when the article of the target noun did not
match in gender with the competitor in French. Evidently,
French listeners used native French gender information to
constrain competitor activation in German.4 The experiment
was conducted in German, and the linguistic form of the
article did not exclude the competitor as a potential lexical
candidate. In other words, the probability of the target noun
being Perle or Perücke was equally high after hearing the
phoneme sequence /di˘pEr /, die Per. Nevertheless,
competitor activation was eliminated for French listeners.
This suggests that the high form-based co-occurrence of
article and target did not constrain lexical access in our
experiments, but rather grammatical gender carried by the
article did.
Experiment 2
As a control, we presented the same stimuli to listeners
whose native language was German. If native gender
information of the pictures had restricted eye movements in
Experiment 1, both same-gender pairs and different-gender
pairs should now offer competition for German listeners in
Experiment 2, since in German target and competitor share
gender in both pairs.
                                                           
4 The same analyses were run again after removing trials for which
the French native speakers made a mistake in the vocabulary test.
The results were comparable.
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Figure 4: Same-gender pairs. Fixation proportions of
German listeners over time for German targets, competitors,
and averaged distractors.
Figure 5:  Different-gender pairs. Fixation proportions of
German listeners over time for German targets, competitors,
and averaged distractors.
Method
Part i c ipants  Twelve native speakers of German
participated, in return for a small payment. They were all
students (mean age of 21), and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and normal hearing. They had all learned
French as a second language in school, but were not
required to exercise their proficiency here.
Materials The materials were as in Experiment 1.
Procedure The procedure was as in Experiment 1.
Participants were not made aware of potential cross-
language competition in the experiment.
Results and Discussion
Participants never clicked on an object other than the target.
Figure 4 shows the averaged proportions of fixations after
target noun onset for trials with same-gender pairs. As is
immediately apparent, higher fixation probabilities were
observed for the competitor than for the unrelated
distractors. Over the 200-600 ms time window, the
proportion of fixations was on average 26.74% for the
competitor and 11.16% for the unrelated distractors. This
difference was significant in a one-way ANOVA (F1[1, 11]
= 22.97, p < .002; F2[1, 14] = 19.47, p < .01). Just as the
French listeners in Experiment 1, German listeners activated
competitors when gender-marked articles could not exclude
them as potential lexical candidates. No reliable difference
in viewing times was observed in the first 200 ms after
target noun onset (F1[1, 11] = 1.30, p > .2; F2[1, 14] = 1.97,
p > .1).
In contrast to the French listeners, however, German
listeners also looked more often at the competitor than at the
unrelated distractors in different-gender pairs. Between 200-
600 ms after target noun onset the proportion of fixations
was on average 20.98% for the competitor and 11.84% for
the unrelated distractors. An ANOVA showed a significant
effect of type of picture (F 1[1, 11] = 10.68, p < .01;
F2[1, 14] = 8.34, p  < .02). Again, viewing times for
competitor and unrelated distractors did not differ in the first
200 ms after target noun onset (F1 & F2 < 1).
The results of Experiment 2 showed that during the
presentation of the target noun, German listeners activated
the competitor in both same-gender and different-gender
pairs.
Summary
A recent eye-tracking study by Dahan et al. (2000) has
shown that grammatical context can constrain lexical
access. In their study, French participants followed spoken
instructions in French to click on pictures on a screen while
their eye movements were monitored. Eye movements to
pictures were interpreted as evidence for the activation of
the words corresponding to those pictures. We know from
previous eye-tracking studies that competitor pictures with
names that overlap in onset with the name of a target picture
are fixated more than pictures with unrelated names (see
e.g., Tanenhaus et al., 1995). In the spoken instructions in
Dahan et al’s study, the names of the target pictures were
immediately preceded by articles. In the absence of gender
marking on the article (i.e., French plural article les) ,
competitor activation was found for phonologically related
nouns. However, when competitors matched in initial
sounds with a target noun but mismatched in gender
marking on the preceding article, early competitor activation
was eliminated.
The present eye-tracking studies investigated the role of
linguistic gender for the process of listening to a non-native
language. An interesting aspect of non-native listening is
that the gender of words can vary between the native and the
non-native language. Thus, gender information as conveyed
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by the presentation language, i.e. the non-native language,
can be opposed to gender information from the listeners’
native language. In Experiment 1, French participants
followed spoken instructions in German to click on pictures
on a computer screen (e.g., Wo befindet sich die Perle,
“Where is the pearl”). When target and competitor noun
shared gender in both German and French, French
participants fixated competitor pictures more than unrelated
pictures. However, when target and competitor were of the
same gender in German but of different gender in French,
early fixations to the competitor picture were eliminated.
This result was interpreted as evidence that competitor
activation in the non-native language was constrained by
native gender information. In Experiment 2, German
listeners were presented with the same materials and
showed no such difference in viewing time.
In general, our results support Dahan et al’s (2000)
findings that gender information influences lexical access,
but also crucially offer new insights with respect to the
origin of the gender effect. On one account, listeners
compute distributional regularities between the co-
occurrence of the form of the article and the form of the
noun and use these form-based regularities to restrict lexical
access. On another account, distributional regularities would
be computed using grammatical categories. On the form-
based account, probabilities would express the likelihood of
the target being Perle upon hearing the segmental sequence
/di˘pEr/; on the grammar-based account, probabilities would
express the likelihood of the target being Perle upon hearing
/pEr/ plus having feminine gender information from the
context. Within one language, these two accounts are
difficult to tease apart. However, non-native listening
offered the possibility to separate them, because linguistic
gender effects of the non-presentation language are unlikely
to be caused by form-based regularities of that language.
The fact that, for French listeners in Experiment 1,
competitor activation in German was eliminated when
French gender information mismatched the gender of the
target speaks against an form-based account of the linguistic
gender effect. Our results rather support the notion that the
linguistic gender effect originates from the higher,
grammatical level of language processing.
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Abstract 
We explored reasons why categories of abstract items, such as 
cognitive processes or communication, are weak determinants 
of abstract item similarity.  Three experiments, using 
exemplar listing tasks and similarity ratings on the exemplars, 
compared the structure of taxonomic categories of abstract 
versus concrete entities.  In comparison to concrete item 
categories, we found that there were consistently fewer 
typical items for abstract item categories, but that nonetheless 
item pairs within abstract item categories were rated about as 
similar to each other as items matched in typicality in 
concrete categories.  Abstract item pairs from different 
categories were more similar than concrete item pairs from 
different categories, indicating lower semantic distance of the 
categories.  Taken together, these data suggest that taxonomic 
categories are less informative for abstract than concrete 
items.  We discuss alternative factors in abstract concept 
organization. 
Taxonomies for Abstract Items 
When asked to sort the items apple, cabbage, squirrel and 
duck into stacks, most people will presumably sort them into 
types of produce and animals.  Concrete item categories 
have a strong, graded structure organized around 
prototypical items, and are relatively distinct from other 
categories.  As a consequence, concrete item categories 
offer salient dimensions that are readily used in reasoning 
involving their members.  Because of their family 
resemblance structure, in which items share groups of 
features with other category members, two typical items 
from the same category, such as squirrel and duck, are likely 
rated as similar.  Categories are important organizational 
structures that enable us to use our knowledge in reasoning 
processes such as classification, similarity judgments, and to 
effectively acquire new knowledge through analogies and 
inferences.  As such, categories touch upon and inform 
many areas of research that are central to cognitive science. 
Categories for concrete things are only a subset of our 
knowledge.  We also have representations of abstract and 
complex entities, such as processes, events, mental 
experiences, stories, and relations.  Abstract concepts 
constitute a large and important part of our daily 
experiences and actions.  Even so, very little is known about 
categories of abstract concepts.  A complete understanding 
of the organization of our knowledge cannot be achieved 
unless we understand how other kinds of things are 
organized. 
There are several reasons to expect that taxonomic 
categories for abstract items are not as distinct and salient as 
those for concrete items.  First, some research has shown 
that abstract items (in this case, verbs) are not organized 
into distinct clusters, but that classes of such items overlap 
with others on many dimensions (Huttenlocher & Lui, 1979; 
Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976).  The features of concrete 
items are highly correlated; that is, given that two items 
share a feature, they typically share some other features as 
well, making them more similar to each other than to items 
in different categories.  As a consequence, categories are 
more distinct from one another.  In contrast, a verb may 
share features with verbs from many different categories to 
a similar extent.  Hampton (1981) has made a similar 
proposal for abstract concepts in general.  Thus, categories 
of relational concepts may overlap more and offer less 
constraint on their processing. 
Second, taxonomic similarities appear to have little 
impact on similarity judgments of abstract concept pairs.  
When people rate the similarity of item pairs that are 
taxonomically similar and that also share a thematic 
relation, people tend to focus on the thematic relation for 
abstract items, but on the taxonomic relation for concrete 
items.  For example, participants often rate jealousy and 
anger as similar because jealousy may lead to anger.  Much 
less frequently, participants refer to the information that 
both are emotional states (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2003).  
In contrast, given an item pair like cat and mouse, 
participants will more frequently refer to both being animals 
than to one chasing the other (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 
2003; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999).  Participants use 
thematic relations as explanations for concrete item 
similarity judgments mostly when no taxonomic similarity 
is present; for abstract item pairs, thematic relations are used 
frequently also when items are taxonomically related. 
One possible explanation for this striking effect is that 
taxonomic similarity of abstract items, e.g., the similarity of 
two emotions, or two cognitive processes, is not salient 
information.  This raises the question how useful taxonomic 
abstract item categories are.  Abstract categories may be 
useful for talking about groups of abstract items, such as 
events, but they may not reflect actual knowledge 
organization in memory.  For example, the concepts joy, 
sadness, wedding and farewell could be organized into 
emotion terms and events, or into concepts of positive 
versus negative connotation, respectively.  There is no 
salient dimension here along which to unambiguously split 
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the four words into two groups, and the relations between 
joy and wedding, or sadness and farewell, are quite salient.  
If taxonomic classes of abstract items turn out to be of little 
functional use, the next question would be whether abstract 
items are organized around some alternative information.  
The results discussed above suggest thematic relations as 
one possible source for abstract category organization.  
Recently, it has been found that when given a choice, 
individuals routinely sort even concrete items around 
thematic relations (Murphy, 2001; Lin & Murphy, 2001).  
For example, when presented with the four items squirrel, 
mouse, nut, and cheese, people may sort them into pairs of 
animal and type of food (squirrel – nut; mouse – cheese) 
instead of animals and foods.  Since such thematic relations 
have already been shown to play a very prominent role in 
similarity judgments of abstract item pairs, chances are 
good that they will provide dominant information to their 
categorization as well. 
The main concern of this paper is the question why 
people do not effectively use taxonomic abstract item 
categories, such as emotions, cognitive processes, actions, 
attitudes, attributes, and so on in category-related tasks such 
as similarity ratings.  The main hypothesis was that abstract 
and concrete item categories differ in the amount of 
constraint that they place on membership.  This was 
examined in two separate hypotheses.  First, it was 
hypothesized that participants would generate fewer typical 
examples for abstract than for concrete item categories.  
That is, we expected that fewer abstract items would be 
listed by a large number of participants.  Related to this 
issue, we also hypothesized that abstract item categories 
would be less distinct than concrete item categories.  That 
is, we predicted that members of two abstract item 
categories would be almost as similar to each other as 
members of the same abstract item category.  Abstract items 
from the same category may share comparatively fewer 
category-specific features, and may share relatively more 
features with members of other categories.  Three 
experiments tested these hypotheses. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 compared the numbers of types and tokens 
generated for abstract versus concrete item categories.  In 
accordance with the first hypothesis, it was predicted that 
significantly more participants would list the same items for 
concrete categories than for abstract ones. 
Method 
Twenty participants generated exemplars for 24 commonly 
used categories, 12 for concrete, and 12 for abstract items.  
Example categories are tools, pets, object attributes, and 
positive emotions.  Category lists were constructed from 
taxonomic trees and extended to include a variety of 
categories.  Since there is no well-established taxonomic 
model for abstract items, abstract item categories were taken 
from ontologies and social categories.  Each participant 
listed exemplars for all categories, to control for individual 
differences.  Categories were listed in random order.  There 
was no time limit.  Participants were instructed to list as 
many exemplars for each category as they could think of. 
Results & Discussion 
For each category, types and tokens were calculated.  Type 
scores count different exemplars, whereas tokens also count 
repeated mentions of exemplars.  The ratio of both indicates 
the agreement among participants or the mean production 
frequency for each exemplar.  A highly available exemplar 
should be mentioned by many participants, resulting in a 
higher production frequency or token / type ratio.  
Categories that place strong constraints on cognitive 
processing would be characterized by higher token / type 
ratios. 
Abstract and concrete categories did not differ in the 
number of types that were generated.  However, more 
idiosyncratic responses were generated for abstract item 
categories.  Consistent with the prediction, more participants 
listed the same exemplars for concrete item categories (see 
Table 1), t (10)=7.93, p<0.001.  For the vast majority of 
abstract item categories, individual exemplars were listed by 
fewer than 2 participants, whereas on average, at least 3 
participants listed exemplars for concrete item categories. 
 
Table 1: Types and Token / Type Ratios from Experiment 1 
 
 Types Tokens / Type 
Concrete 37.75 3.41 
Abstract 35.42 1.57 
 
Token / type ratios for concrete item categories varied 
from 2.25 (foods) to 4.78 (pets), SD=0.79.  In contrast, very 
few participants listed the same exemplars for abstract item 
categories.  The token / type ratio varied only very little 
across the different abstract item categories (SD=0.43), with 
the token /type ratios ranging from 1.06 (prosocial actions) 
to 1.82 (social offenses).  The only exception to this 
dichotomy was one abstract item category, object attributes, 
which is actually relatively concrete, and which had a ratio 
of 2.71.  Without this category, the standard deviation of 
ratios for abstract categories was reduced to SD=0.26.  
Overall, it seems that low agreement is a general 
characteristic of abstract item categories, which could 
indicate that these categories do not reflect actual 
organization in memory.  Instead, participants may retrieve 
exemplars out of a different organization, leading to high 
response variation.  A possible confound that may account 
for the observed differences was that abstract item 
categories tend to be broader categories than concrete item 
categories.  Experiment 2 varied the broadness of the 
categories systematically to test this. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 replicated the procedure used in Experiment 1 
with categories of different specificity levels.  One set of 
categories was at a broad, abstract level, another set was 
more specific.  Generally, specific categories contain fewer 
members and should thus place stronger constraints on 
exemplar production.  The expectation was, accordingly, 
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that agreement would be higher for specific categories.  The 
categories used in this Experiment are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Categories Used in Experiment 2 
 
 Broad Specific 
Abstract Actions 
Mental Processes 
Communication 
Events 
Attitudes 
Reasoning 
Mental Disorders 
Object attributes 
Character Traits 
Offensive Actions 
Concrete Animals 
Plants 
Foods 
Liquids 
Natural Substances 
Wild animals 
Pets 
Tools 
Office Supplies 
Beverages 
 
We also selected abstract and concrete item categories 
that were based on situations.  Three such categories were 
based on scenes or settings, and three were based on events 
or scripts.  Both have been shown to be efficient schemata 
for organizing knowledge in a systematic way (Shank & 
Abelson, 1977; Tversky & Hemenway, 1983).  It has been 
argued that abstract items are characterized by situational 
contexts, rather than by internal features (Barsalou & 
Wiemer-Hastings, in press; Wiemer-Hastings & Graesser, 
2000).  Abstract concepts typically involve agents, goals, 
relations, actions and events, and emotional or cognitive 
experiences.  As such, they are akin to abstract situation 
schemata, and may be organized around situations.  Thus, 
we predicted that abstract, but not concrete, items generated 
for a given situation, are perceived as similar to each other. 
Method 
Sixty undergraduate students at Northern Illinois University 
participated in this experiment.  Twenty participants each 
generated exemplars for broad categories, more specific 
categories and for situation categories that were either a 
setting (e.g., workplace) or an event (e.g., wedding).  For the 
situation-based categories, abstract item instructions asked 
for “actions, events, or mental processes that could occur in 
the situation”; concrete item instructions asked for ”objects 
occurring in the situation”.  The settings and events were 
identical for both groups to allow for direct comparison.  
Altogether, there were ten broad and ten specific categories 
(five abstract, five concrete), and six situation-based 
categories. 
Results & Discussion 
As in the first experiment, we evaluated the results through 
token /type ratios.  The data replicated the findings from 
Experiment 1.  Table 3 shows the results.  Interestingly, the 
use of more specific categories (e.g., offensive action instead 
of the broad action) did not improve agreement scores, even 
though it had an effect on the number of types listed. 
The token / type ratio for broad category exemplars did 
not statistically differ between concrete and abstract items, 
suggesting that broad superordinate categories of concrete 
items structurally resemble abstract item categories.  A 
significant difference was found for specific categories, 
where the token / type ratios were significantly higher for 
concrete than for abstract items (t(8)=3.76, p<0.01) and also 
higher than for concrete items listed for broad categories 
(t(8)=3.10, p<0.05).  That is, switching to a more specific 
category level increased category constraint for concrete, 
but not for abstract items. 
The data suggest that the abstractness level does not have 
much of an impact on how many typical exemplars are 
produced for abstract categories.  It seems, then, that the 
differences observed for concrete versus abstract items 
reflect a more general difference: Abstract item categories 
do not have many typical exemplars, and the few typical 
exemplars have relatively low typicality scores, as measured 
by the number of participants naming each.  These first 
results suggest that categories may not provide the strong 
basis for inferences and similarity judgments for abstract 
items that is usually seen for concrete items. 
 
Table 3: Types and Token / Type Ratios from Experiment 2 
 
  Types Token / Type 
Broad Abstract 42.2 1.63 
 Concrete 34.8 1.78 
Specific Abstract 30.6 1.49 
 Concrete 28.6 3.25 
Situation Abstract 36.3 1.60 
 Concrete 57.7 2.07 
 
Surprisingly, the pattern did not change much for 
situation categories.  Participants generated substantially 
more items for concrete situation categories than for other 
categories, suggesting that this category type places low 
constraint on concrete items.  This is not the case for 
abstract items.  Still, the token / type ratio was significantly  
higher for concrete than for abstract items, t(10)=2.72, 
p<0.05.  That is, there seems to be more consensus on what 
concrete items occur in situations than what abstract 
processes, events or states may. 
Experiment 3 
Previous experiments suggested that taxonomic category 
membership plays a minor role in similarity judgments for 
abstract items (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2003).  We suspect 
that this is due to overlapping categories, such that members 
of the same category may be only slightly more similar than 
members of different categories.  Accordingly we predicted 
that, overall, item pairs should be more similar for items 
from the same category, but that this effect should be more 
pronounced for concrete item pairs than for abstract ones.  
That is, we expected that the difference in similarity for 
same- vs. different-category abstract item pairs would be 
significantly smaller than for concrete item pairs.   
Alternatively, item pairs used in previous experiments 
were very untypical exemplars of their respective 
categories, which could have lowered the salience of their 
category membership.  In the present experiment, we 
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control for this by collecting similarity ratings only for the 
most typical items for abstract item categories.  If 
membership in the same taxonomic category does not 
substantially increase similarity ratings, compared to ratings 
of members of different categories, then typicality is 
unlikely the reason for people’s neglect of taxonomic 
similarity in similarity judgments. 
With respect to the situation-based categories, we had no 
strong predictions.  However, we suspected that concrete 
items may be less constrained by such categories than by 
taxonomic categories, thus that situation-based abstract item 
categories may actually be more distinct. 
Method 
We used high-frequent exemplars collected in Experiment 2 
for different category types to make sure they would be 
typical items for the categories.  There were two constraints: 
first, we omitted some items that had been generated for 
multiple categories (with the exception of happiness and 
happy for one set for lack of alternative choices).  Second, 
the exemplars selected from concrete versus abstract item 
categories were matched in typicality, for fair comparison.  
This means that the concrete item pairs used in Experiment 
3 were not the most typical of their categories, but instead 
were matched in typicality (as measured by generation 
frequency in Exp. 2) to the abstract item pairs.  Accordingly, 
the actual differences between these categories are likely 
strongly underestimated in this Experiment. 
Fifty-seven undergraduates from Northern Illinois 
University participated in this experiment for course credit.  
Four participant groups were formed at random to judge the 
similarity of items generated for broad, specific, abstract 
situational, or concrete situational categories, respectively.  
For the broad and specific categories, participants were 
presented with three items from each of five categories, 
resulting in 15 items presented in random order.  Abstract 
and concrete items were rated by the same participants, but 
were blocked to avoid contrast effects on the ratings.  For 
the situation-based categories, there were six categories for 
abstract and concrete items each.  Since 18 items had to be 
rated in pair-wise combinations, concrete and abstract items 
were presented between-subjects to avoid fatigue effects. 
Each item was rated against each other item in the context 
of the entire list, to allow for category information to affect 
the ratings.  Thus, if category information was accessible 
from the items, we expected that items associated with the 
same categories would be rated as more similar to each 
other than to items not belonging to the category.  The order 
of ratings was varied so that item pairs were presented in 
ascending vs. descending order, and so that each item was 
presented equally often in first vs. second position of the 
item pairs.  Ratings were made on a 6-point scale. 
Results & Discussion 
We predicted that the difference in similarity for abstract 
item pairs within and between categories would be 
significantly smaller than for concrete item pairs.  A mixed 
ANOVA tested the effects of within-subject variables 
abstractness (concrete vs. abstract) and category 
membership (same vs. different), and between-subjects 
variable category level (broad vs. specific) on similarity 
ratings.  The mean similarity scores for these variables are 
shown in Tables 4 for broad and specific categories. 
 
Table 4: Ratings from Experiment 3 
 
 Broad Specific 
Category Abstract Concrete Abstract Concrete 
Same  3.63 3.88 2.94 3.84 
Different 2.74 1.98 2.00 1.45 
Difference 0.89* 1.90* 0.94* 2.39* 
 
Category Distinctness of Abstract Items Similarity was 
rated significantly higher for items of the same categories 
than those of different categories across all item groups, 
F(1, 25)=154.88, MSE=0.21, p<0.001.  This was a large 
effect, ε2=0.86.  Further, consistent with our prediction, an 
interaction of category membership with concreteness was 
revealed, F(1, 25)=46.68, MSE=.21, p<0.01.  This effect 
was moderately high, ε2=0.65.  As can be gathered from the 
difference scores in Table 4, concrete item categories had a 
larger semantic distance overall (difference M=2.14) than 
abstract item categories (M=0.92).  Similarity ratings among 
abstract items were significantly higher for same-category 
pairs than between-category pairs, but, consistent with our 
predictions, this difference was significantly smaller than 
for concrete item categories. 
 
Category Type There was a small significant effect of 
category level, F(1, 25)=4.77, MSE=1.35, p<0.05; ε2=0.16.  
Overall, as we expected, specific categories produced 
greater differences in same-versus different category pair 
similarity.  Table 4 shows that this effect is almost absent 
for abstract item categories (the interaction of category 
membership and concreteness approached significance, 
p=0.09).  So, specific categories of abstract items are not 
more distinct than broad categories – their members are 
quite similar to members of other specific categories.  This 
suggests that low category distinctness is a general problem 
for abstract items categories that spans different category 
levels.  This finding is consistent with the results from 
Experiment 2, which showed that category specificity had 
no impact on the production frequency of the exemplars. 
 
Situations and Abstract Items Table 5 shows the mean 
similarity scores obtained for situation-based categories.  
The pattern of similarities is almost reverse from the one 
obtained for taxonomic categories: Abstract item pairs are 
more similar for same-category pairs than concrete ones, 
and abstract item categories are more distinct. 
In comparison to taxonomic categories, the most striking 
difference is the low similarity of concrete items of the same 
situation-based category.  Abstract items that are typical for 
a given situation seem to be as highly similar to each other 
as members of the same taxonomic abstract item category.  
This is an important finding because it suggests that 
situations put semantic constraints on abstract, but not on 
concrete items.  Accordingly, situation knowledge may 
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affect abstract item processing (such as similarity ratings) 
relatively more than concrete items. 
 
Table 5: Ratings for Situation–Based Categories 
 
Category Abstract Concrete 
Same  3.44 2.28 
Different 2.50 1.78 
Difference 0.94* 0.50 
 
In an ANOVA, the interaction of concreteness and 
category membership approached significance, p=0.07.  
Specifically, only similarity ratings of abstract items 
differed significantly for pairs of the same versus pairs of 
different categories.  The semantic distance was the same 
for taxonomic and situation categories for abstract items.  In 
contrast, there was a drop in distinctness for concrete 
situation-centered categories (M=0.50) as opposed to the 
taxonomic categories. 
Conclusions 
We have shown that abstract and concrete item categories 
differ systematically.  The observed differences may explain 
some of the processing differences for abstract and concrete 
items.  In particular, abstract item categories were found to 
have exemplars with low production frequencies, i.e. very 
few exemplars are named by two or more individuals.  
Experiment 2 showed that the token / type ratio for abstract 
item categories is at the same level as that for general 
concrete item categories.  Thus, asking for exemplars of 
mental processes may be somewhat akin to asking for 
exemplars of objects.  However, they differ from broad 
concrete item categories in at least two important respects: 
First, more specific subcategories of abstract items do not 
evoke exemplars with higher production frequencies, as 
they do for concrete items.  Experiment 2 showed that in 
fact, the token / type ratio dropped slightly from broad 
(1.63) to specific (1.49) abstract item categories.  At the 
same time, the number of different exemplars mentioned 
was lowered, suggesting that the more specific categories 
were indeed smaller categories. 
Second, Experiment 3 shows that broad concrete item 
categories are more distinct than either broad or specific 
abstract item categories.  Thus, we do not think that the 
difference between abstract and concrete item categories can 
be reduced to a difference in the abstraction level with 
abstract item categories being “super-superordinate” 
categories.  An alternative explanation may be that abstract 
item categories are not organized around typical exemplars 
which, having most resemblance to the other exemplars, are 
recollected most often.  Instead, it may be that participants 
have to actively construct the category as an ad hoc 
category.  Memory for abstract concepts does not seem to be 
organized around taxonomic categories that can be recalled 
easily using a category label. 
Further, the data suggest that abstract categories, 
regardless of category level, are less distinct from each other 
than concrete categories.  Rated similarity is significantly 
higher for members of the same category versus members of 
different categories.  However, the difference is much 
smaller than for concrete item categories (with the notable 
exception of situation-based categories).  At this point, it is 
important to remember that the concrete exemplars used in 
the third Experiment were actually not the most typical 
exemplars of their categories by far, that is, the differences 
we observed in category distinctness probably substantially 
underestimate actual differences. 
Considering these differences, it does not come as a 
surprise that taxonomic categories are used less as a basis 
for similarity judgments of abstract than of concrete item 
pairs.  We also predict based on these data  that there would 
be little agreement in sorting tasks using abstract items since 
there does not seem to be a strongly organized categorical 
structure for abstract items. 
The data raise the question how meaningful abstract item 
categories are.  Are they merely nominal in function, to 
enable us to talk about them at an abstract level?  Or do they 
have any impact on the representation and processing of 
abstract concepts?  Our data do not give conclusive answers 
to these questions but suggest that categorization of abstract 
items follows different principles and perhaps 
functionalities from that of concrete items.  Referring to 
related studies, in what follows we will outline a few 
hypotheses.  First, it is informative to link the present 
findings to studies that explore the content of abstract 
concepts in comparison to concrete concepts.  Second, 
research on similarity processes, which are presumably 
involved in categorization, suggests that thematic relations 
may be an important source for structuring abstract 
concepts.  It is possible that this is linked to the first issue – 
that the content of abstract concepts is more compatible with 
thematic than with taxonomic processing. 
Conceptual Content 
Hampton (1981) found that not all abstract concepts fit a 
prototypical structure and suggested that this may be due to 
lower feature correlations.  Most likely, this is related to the 
content of abstract concepts.  Hampton suggested on the 
basis of feature lists that their content consists of social 
components of situations, e.g., agents, behaviors, and goals.  
More recent findings are consistent this view.  Analyses of 
conceptual content through property generation tasks 
suggest that abstract concepts have few “properties” in the 
classical sense (i.e., perceptual or functional features, parts) 
but instead have a high percentage of features that are 
related to situations and to subjective experiences in a 
situation (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, in press; Wiemer-
Hastings, Krug & Xu, 2001; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, under 
review).  Knowledge of situations is also linked to concrete 
concepts (e.g., part of our knowledge of chairs is that a 
person can sit on them to eat or to write), but concrete 
concepts are further distinguished through a high proportion 
of entity properties (i.e, external and internal parts, surface 
features, etc.), of which abstract concepts have very few or 
none. 
Abstract concepts have two specific characteristics that 
are likely related to the observed lack of distinctive 
categories for abstract items.  One is the smaller set of 
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features that are used to describe them, which may reflect 
that the concepts themselves have a lot more overlap than 
concrete concepts do.  This could be directly linked to the 
high similarity scores of exemplars listed for different 
categories (Experiment 3).  This may be accentuated even 
more by the other characteristic, namely that features of 
abstract concepts are significantly less specific than those of 
concrete concepts (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu).  For example, 
a concrete item may be linked to a specific action (e.g., 
eating) while an abstract item may simply be linked to some 
action.  The differentiation of categories requires a relative 
large feature basis to arrive at categories that are 
characterized by somewhat distinct clusters of features.  
General features are not likely to offer such differentiation. 
Hierarchical category structures have been linked to 
correlated features.  Concrete item properties such as parts 
and functions may be systematically correlated, e.g. because 
of causal links between their features (e.g., a bee can fly and 
has wings – it can fly because it has wings).  In contrast, 
situation properties can be more flexibly linked to form a 
seemingly unlimited variety of abstract concepts.  An agent 
can be found in a large variety of situations and there are 
few constraints on their specific set-up.  Thus, categories 
governed largely by situational features may all overlap 
since they would all involve the same kinds of features, to 
different extents.  For example, emotions and cognitive 
processes would both involve a person, a situation that the 
emotion / cognition is related to, and an element of 
introspective experience.  As a result, abstract item 
categories may have more overlap with less distinction. 
Taxonomic versus Thematic Relations 
One central purpose of categories is to allow for 
inferences about novel objects, based on their similarity to 
known objects.  Likewise, categories in memory enable us 
to generate instances that could serve a particular function.  
Categories can be structured around taxonomic information, 
where several items are a kind of X (e.g., gadgets, emotions) 
or thematic information, where items fill complementary 
roles in a proposition.  For example, they may be related via 
an instrument function (knife, meat), a causal relation 
(cause, effect) a temporal sequence (question, answer) or  
through a variety of other relations.  Both taxonomic and 
thematic relations are part of our knowledge of abstract and 
concrete concepts, but there may be a functional advantage 
in the majority of situations to using one over the other 
when dealing with concrete or abstract concepts.  In 
particular, as suggested by the findings discussed initially in 
this paper, taxonomic inferences may be more critical for 
novel concrete objects or reasoning involving objects, while 
thematic inferences may be more functional when 
processing abstract concepts.  For example, to specific 
actions require objects with specific functional or perceptual 
features; identifying one is facilitated by categories 
organized around functional and perceptual features.  In 
contrast, abstract item categories may have less practical 
relevance.  For example, to understand an emotion, it may 
be more important to process events and traits leading up to 
it than to have quick access to other emotions. 
Our data suggest that taxonomic relations of abstract 
items are comparatively weak.  We suggest that abstract 
items may be organized quite differently from concrete 
items.  For example, Experiments 2 and 3 show that 
situations provide as much structure for abstract items as 
taxonomic categories.  While concrete items are used across 
different situations, abstract items that occur in a similar 
context are perceivably interrelated.  We suspect that in the 
future, cognitive scientists may discover quite different 
structural principles for abstract item categories, and that 
they will centrally involve thematic relations. 
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Abstract 
This paper aims to study the effect of structure in a graphical 
layout on object-location memory. In two experiments several 
structures have been examined in respect to the performance 
of object-location retrieval. The results show that beside 
simple object-to-object spatial relations also the spatial 
relation of three objects is encoded in human spatial memory 
as a noisy distance-angular pair. Further the results show that 
noise in spatial memory is not symmetric, but seems to be 
distorted towards a higher accuracy to the horizontal 
directions. 
Introduction 
One aspect of human spatial memory is the usage of 
allocentric frames of references to encode and retrieve the 
location of an object. This aspect of human spatial memory 
implicates that the structure of a graphical layout might 
affect the performance of object-location encoding and 
retrieval.  
Basically the study presented in this paper is motivated by 
some experiments performed recently in the community of 
information visualization. One experiment of Travanti & 
Lind (2001) investigated object location memory in 
hierarchical information structures across different instances 
of 2D and 3D displays. The results of their tests show, that 
the 3D display improves performance in the spatial memory 
task they designed. They were aware that their result does 
not prove their hypothesis that the natural appearance of the 
3D display used in the test actually affected the improved 
performance. They speculated that possibly other visual 
properties of an item in the 3D display were used as a 
reminder for the memory task. Cockburn (2004) showed 
that neither the natural appearance nor the different sizes of 
the items in the 3D display affected the performance of 
object-location retrieval. In both studies the memory task 
was to associate alphanumerical letters to the items. 
Therefore Cockburn suspected that the vertical orientation 
of Travanti & Lind’s 2D display made the formation of 
effective letter mnemonics more difficult than the horizontal 
3D layout, because words and word combinations normally 
run horizontally left to right. By analyzing these studies we 
came to the conclusion that one major factor had not been 
considered - the factor of the object-to-object spatial 
relations (the structure of the graphical layout respectively).  
The effect of layout structure on object-location encoding 
and retrieval could best be investigated if a computational 
model of human spatial cognition is considered. Recently 
some compelling works toward this goal has been published 
(Wang et al 2002; Johnson et al 2002). This paper shows 
one application area for computational models of human 
spatial memory, but also sheds some new light on the 
requirements of such a model.  
Design of the Experiments 
The papers cited above inspired the design of the 
experiments in this study. There were two phases in the 
cited experiments. In the encoding phase the subjects had to 
learn associations of alphanumerical letters to one object in 
the structure. During the encoding phase a click on one of 
the objects in the display highlighted the object and revealed 
a letter at the top of the display, which had to be associated 
to the position of the object. In the retrieval phase the 
subjects had to find all of the letters, one at a time. A 
randomly selected letter had been shown at the top of the 
display area, and the subject had to click the object 
associated with it.  
This design of the experiment has two drawbacks. First 
the subjects are free to choose the objects in the encoding 
phase and second that alphanumerical letters are used as 
retrieval cues. The first point gives subjects the opportunity 
to develop strategies for learning the object-letter 
associations. In combination with the usage of 
alphanumerical letters this increases the probability that 
subjects create mnemonics through possible abbreviations 
of words that can be read from a row.  
In respect to a cognitive model these are task specific 
aspects. The study of this paper was interested in more 
general mechanisms of object-location encoding/retrieval. 
To meet this goal the design of the experiment had to 
prevent subjects from further processing object-locations in 
the encoding phase. This suggested the task of memorizing 
a randomly created sequence of highlighted objects from the 
structure. The number of correct repeated sequences is used 
as a measure of performance. Furthermore allows this kind 
of memory task an effective analysis of the errors subjects 
make. 
Two experiments were performed. The first experiment 
investigated the factor horizontal vs. vertical orientated 
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layout structure and the factor of the existence vs. non-
existence of symmetric features in the layout structure. The 
second experiment focused on the investigation of noise in 
the encoding of spatial object-to-object relations.  
Subjects and Apparatus 
30 volunteer subjects (only male, average age 35) were 
recruited from the staff of our institute to perform both 
experiments. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Three sets of different structures have been created. 
Each structure consisted of red spheres of equal size. The 
layout structures were presented against a black background 
on a 21’’ VGA monitor with a resolution of 1280x1024 
pixels. The monitor was in front of the subjects within 2 
feet. Subjects were asked to respond by clicking with a 
mouse. Subjects wore a head-mounted eye-tracking device 
while they were conducting the experiments. 
Experiment 1 
The first experiment aimed at showing if the performance of 
recalling objects is still improved in the horizontal oriented 
structures, even if in the experimental design no semantic 
content is used. Further one horizontal structure was added 
that contains not the symmetric features of the horizontal 
structure used by Travanti & Lind and Cockburn. Another 
purpose of this experiment was to show if there is any 
learning progress in the performance of object-locations 
encoding/retrieval. It might be possible, that subjects 
become more familiar with a structure the longer they are 
exposed to them. In combination with the factor of 
symmetric features in the structure it might be speculated, 
that in the presence of symmetric features a subject needs 
less time to become familiar with the structure.  
Materials 
Figure 1 shows the three structures that were used in the 
first experiment. The first two structures are similar to the 
structures used by Travanti & Lind. Each structure consists 
of 25 spherical items. The first structure represents a 2D 
display of a tree-structure, like it is used in most common 
graphical user interfaces. The second structure represents 
the structure of the 3D display, where any perspective clues 
have been removed. The third structure is equivalent to the 
first one except that it is rotated by 900 counterclockwise.  
 A1 A2 A3 
 
Figure 1: Set of structures used in experiment 1. 
Design and Procedure 
In each encoding retrieval trial, the subject was presented 
one structure. After an acoustical signal the computer started 
to highlight objects of one randomly created sequence. Only 
one object of the sequence was highlighted at once. The 
sequences were five items long. The highlighted object 
differed from the not highlighted objects by color (blue 
instead of red), increased size and a cross that appeared 
within its circle shape. The end of a sequence was indicated 
by an second acoustical signal. Subjects were instructed to 
repeat the highlighted objects in correct order, by clicking 
them with the mouse. After five objects had been clicked, 
another acoustical signal rang out and a short online 
questionnaire with a subjective rating occurred. Subjects 
had to rate how confidant they were about their answer and 
the degree of difficulty to memorize the sequence. The 
questionnaire was inserted between the tests of two 
sequences to reduce stress by diversion. Each subject was 
tested on all structures. The experiments consisted of three 
blocks. In each block the same structure was tested four 
times in succession. Between each block there was a break 
of one minute. Subjects were randomly divided into six 
groups with five persons, where in each group the order of 
the three blocks belongs to one of the six possible 
permutations.  
Before the main experiment started, each subject passed 
through a training run, consisting of two blocks of four 
sequences. The structures presented in the training run 
consisted of 16 objects randomly located on the display. The 
length of the sequences subjects had to learn varied between 
four and six items. 
All sequences for the training run and for the actual test 
were created randomly only with the property that not the 
same item occurred in the sequence one behind another. For 
each subject new random sequences were created. This was 
done to avoid that for one structure an easy sequence would 
have been created by chance (e.g. the items of a sequence 
are only in one row). In general for each structure there 
might be sequences that are easy to learn, but for some 
structures these are more likely than for others. And clearly 
this is a property of a structure that one likes to deduce from 
its spatial layout. To fix the sequence across subjects would 
mean that two different factors are controlled. Creating 
random sequences for each subject means to balance the 
factor of the sequence among subjects. To fix a sequence 
across subjects would be interesting to study one specific 
factor in detail. This was done in parts in the second 
experiment that is reported in the next section.  
Results and Discussion 
Accuracy data The number of correct and incorrect 
repeated sequences for each structure is shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Contingency table (2x3) of correct and erroneous 
sequences 
 
Structure A1 A2 A3 
Correct seqs.  46 61 63 
Erroneous seqs.  74 59 57 
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The effect of structure approaches significance (2x3 
contingency table p = 0.056, χ2 =5.77). When comparing the 
numbers of correct repeated sequences between each pair of 
structures with a one-sided analysis of the corresponding 
2×2 contingency tables, the exact Fisher test yields that 
performance in the horizontal oriented structures are 
significantly higher (p<0.05), whereas the symmetric 
features in the structure did not show any significant effect. 
 
Learning progress Figure 2 shows the development of the 
performance by each trial in the same structure.  
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Figure 2: Development of performance in dependence of 
number of trials. 
 
Structure A1 with no symmetric features exhibits an 
increasing performance with each trial, whereas the 
horizontal oriented structure with symmetric features even 
shows a decrease in the last trial. The effect of trials on 
performance is not significant in any structure (2x4 
contingency table χ2 statistical test). Hence, this effect may 
result from noise in the data. 
The most important result of experiment 1 is that it shows 
that the horizontal oriented structures do improve 
performance, even if no alphanumerical letters are used as 
retrieval keys. However, this result may be culture 
dependent. For example people, who are used to read in 
columns instead of rows, might be more familiar with 
horizontal oriented structures.  
One culture independent reason for this result might be 
that the human field of view is more extended into the 
horizontal direction. This increases noise of allocentric and 
egocentric memory chunks in vertical directions. If this 
hypothesis was right, people used to read in columns would 
profit from a horizontal oriented tree view in two ways: 
First the horizontal structure would increase performance of 
object-location retrieval and secondly, inscriptions could be 
written in columns instead of rows.  
Experiment 2 
The second experiment aimed at showing how the aspects 
of human spatial memory, like they are discussed in Wang 
et al (2001, 2002), affect the performance of object-location 
encoding/retrieval in dependence on different graphical 
layout structures. Another purpose of experiment 2 was to 
collect eye movement data for a more detailed analysis of 
how subjects encode object-locations.  
Materials 
The structures used in the second experiment are shown in 
Figure 3. They are divided into two subsets, because the 
limited pool of subjects didn’t allow testing all permutations 
needed to prevent order effects.  
 B1 B2 B3 
C1 C2 
 
Figure 3: Set of structures used in experiment 2. 
 
Justification The structures in set B and C were created to 
test some factors assumed to play an important role in the 
process of object-location encoding/retrieval in structures. 
The motivation to choose these structures is founded in the 
assumptions and expectations before the experiments were 
performed. Mainly the following factors were expected to 
contribute to the overall performance:  
1. Hierarchical features.  
2. Noise in the location of an allocentric memory 
chunk. 
3. Noise in the location of an egocentric memory 
chunk  
4. Higher activation of allocentric memory chunks 
if objects are in spatial vicinity. 
The last factor seems plausible, because the effort to assess 
spatial object-to-object relations is smaller if objects are 
close together; possibly no eye movement is needed. This 
last factor would give the spatial narrow matrix B1 an 
advantage over the spatial wide matrix B2 in respect to 
performance of object-location encoding/retrieval. But also 
the other factors listed above may contribute. In the linear 
structure the noise in the memory chunks are more grievous 
than in the matrices, because there is only one dimension 
that contributes information, whereas in the case of the 
matrices also the direction contributes. The tables below 
show which structure profits by which factor compared to 
another structure in its set. A + sign in one cell means, that 
the structure of the row takes an advantage over the 
structure in the column in respect to the factor of the table, 
whereas a – sign indicates the opposite The factor of 
hierarchical features is balanced within each set, so this 
factor is not included in the tables. (For this purpose the 
linear structure has been separated into three groups with 
four objects). 
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Table 2: Which structure profits by which factor in set B. 
 
Less noise in 
allocentric memory 
chunks 
 B1 B2 B3 
B1  0 ++ 
B2 0  ++ 
B3 -- --  
 
Less Noise in 
egocentric memory 
chunks 
Higher activation of 
allocentric memory 
chunks 
 B1 B2 B3 
B1  ++ + 
B2 --  - 
B3 - +  
 
 B1 B2 B3 
B1  -- - 
B2 ++  + 
B3 + -  
 
 
Table 3: Which structure profits by which factor in set C. 
 
Less noise in 
allocentric memory 
chunks 
 C1 C2 
C1  + 
C2 -  
 
Less noise in 
egocentric memory 
chunks 
Higher activation 
caused by spatial 
vicinity 
 C1 C2 
C1  - 
C2 +  
 
 C1 C2 
C1  + 
C2 -  
 
 
 
To estimate the overall performance, the tendencies shown 
in the tables have to be quantified. Furthermore, not any 
factor might contribute equally to the overall performance. 
Without any computational model it can only be speculated 
about these questions. However, in the setup used in the 
experiment, it can be assumed that the differences in the 
noise of the egocentric memory chunks are nearly 
negligible, because the changes in the average visual angles 
between the different objects in the scene are small 
compared to the human field of view. Whereas the 
directional angular of the allocentric memory chunks 
possibly covers the whole range. The effect of noise in the 
allocentric memory chunks in the structure B1 and B2 are 
expected to have an equal effect, because all relative 
distances are equal. It was expected, that the effect of 
decrease in performance in the linear structure would be 
very distinct. 
Structure C1 and C2 differ only by the distances between 
the six pairs of objects; the distances between the two 
objects within a pair are equal. The hypothesis for this 
structure is that for sequence containing transitions between 
objects of two far distant pairs it will become more difficult 
for the subject to encode the location of the object within a 
pair. This results from a higher noise in the spatial object-to-
object relation. To show this effect one predefined sequence 
was used. This allows analyzing behavior of subjects more 
efficient. Data from experiments can be used for the 
parameterization of stochastic models. The regularities 
found by the algorithms can be analyzed and interpreted 
(Winkelholz et al., 2003). 
Design and Procedure 
The experimental design was similar to experiment 1. This 
time the sequences were six items long. Furthermore, the 
experiment consisted of two blocks instead of three and in 
one block each structure from each set was presented once. 
The first three structures in each block were chosen from set 
B ordered by one of the possible six permutations. The last 
two structures in each block were C1 and C2, which order 
again was balanced within groups of subjects.  
Except for one sequence in each block all sequences were 
created randomly for each subject. One sequence for the 
structures of set C was predefined. Like mentioned above, 
this was done to be able to analyze experimental tracing 
data effectively. The sequence was predefined for the 
structures C1 and C2 respectively. The predefined sequence 
is shown in Figure 4 on the left. It was used in the first 
block for structure C1 and in the second block for C2 or vice 
versa. By alternating, which structure in the first block starts 
with the predefined sequence, the effect of remembering the 
sequence in the second block had been balanced between 
the structures C1 and C2.  
Results and Discussion 
Accuracy data The numbers of correct repeated sequences 
are shown in the contingency tables 4 and 5.  
 
Table 4: Contingency table (2x3) of correct and erroneous 
sequences in set B. 
 
 B1 B2 B3 
Correct seqs. 38 34 16 
Erroneous seqs. 22 26 44 
 
Table 5: Contingency table (2x2) of correct and erroneous 
sequences in set C. 
 
 C1 C2 
Correct seqs.  35 25 
Erroneous seqs. 25 35 
 
The performance in the linear structure is significantly 
lower than in the structures of the matrices (exact Fisher-test 
p<0.001). Although the number of correct sequences in the 
narrow structure is a little bit higher than in the wide matrix, 
this difference is not significant. In table 5 the number of 
correct and incorrect sequences from the randomly created 
sequences and the predefined sequence are combined.  
 
Analysis of errors A look at the errors subjects made in 
their answers gives more insight into the underlying 
cognitive processes. To analyze the answer sequences for 
the predefined sequence in set C we used a modified 
algorithm for variable length markov chains (VLMC) (Ron 
et al 1996, Bühlmann & Wyner 1998) to parameterize a 
stochastic model by the answer sequences. Roughly 
speaking this algorithm can be seen as a filter for 
subsequences (called contexts) from the data that contain 
predictive information. We modified this algorithm in a way 
that only contexts that contain significant predictive 
information in a statistical sense are included into the model 
(Winkelholz et al 2004). To apply this algorithm to the 
answer sequences the objects in the structure has to be 
assigned to symbols. The contexts of erroneous behavior 
found by this method in the answer sequences of the 
structures C1 and C2 are shown in Figure 4. In the first 
column of the table the contexts found by the algorithm are 
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shown in parenthesis, followed by an arrow, and the most 
probable next symbols that occur in the answer sequences, if 
this context is given. E.g. “(7,10)->3”, means: If subjects 
had clicked on object 7 followed by object 10, the most 
probable object they will click next is object 3. If on the 
right side of an arrow, more than one symbol/number is 
listed, they are ordered by their probabilities, with the most 
probable next symbol first. On the right of an arrow possible 
next symbols are listed, as far as their frequencies for the 
given context meet one of the two conditions: First, the 
frequency is significantly higher than for the symbols with 
lower frequencies. Second, the frequency does not differ 
significantly from the frequency of the symbol with the next 
higher probability. 
 
 
 
 
5 
6 
1 
2 
9 
10 
7 
8 
3 
4 
11 
12 
 
Context -> Next 
Symbol 
Interpretation 
(4)->10, 11 Omission of object 10. 
(6)->7,9 Omission of object 7. 
(10) ->11, e Surprised by the end. 
(b)->6,7 
(7,6) -> 9 
(b, 7) -> 6 
Changed order of the first two 
events in the sequence 
(4,9)->11 
(9)->4,11 
The spatial vicinity, caused 
subject to mistake 9 for 10. 
 
C1 
 
 
 
 
5 
6 
1 
2 
9 
10 
7 
8 
3 
4 
11 
12 
 
Context -> Next 
Symbol 
Interpretation 
(9)-> 4,3 
(3)->10 
The spatial vicinity, caused 
subject to mistake 3 for 4. 
(7) -> 9,10 The spatial vicinity, caused 
subject to mistake 9 for 10. 
(7,10) -> 3 If subject mistake 10 for 9 he 
also mistake 3 for 4.  
(4)->10,11 
(4,11)->e 
Omission of object 10.  
 
C2 
 
Figure 4: Contexts of erroneous behavior found by 
the parameterization of a stochastic model. Left: The 
structure with symbols assigned to the objects and 
the predefined test sequence. Right: Table with 
contexts and possible interpretation.  
 
In structure C2 with the more distant pairs there are more 
contexts concerning with the confusion of the objects within 
the pairs of the upper left, and down right corners, whereas 
for structure C1 there are more contexts concerning the 
omission of an object. The most notable context for 
structure C2 is “(7,10)->3”. The angular between the line 
from 7 to 10 and the line from 10 to 3 is nearly similar to 
the angular between the lines 7 to 9 and 9 to 4. Therefore 
this context indicates that subjects used the relative change 
in angular direction of two transitions as a reminder.  
 
Eye movement data Currently only the eye movement data 
of the structures C2 and B2 have been analyzed. Only these 
two structures exhibit spatial distinct features that allow a 
reliable assignment of fixations to attended features in the 
structure. In the structure C2 the fixations were only 
assigned to one pair. The resolution of the eye tracking 
device was not sufficient to distinguish between fixations 
within each pair. For the analysis of the eye movement data 
in the encoding phase of the predefined test sequence the 
same method as in the analysis of the errors in the answer 
sequences was used. The pictures obtained from this 
procedure are shown in Figure 5. Each picture shows the 
transitions in the eye movement between the pairs of 
objects, when the object shown as a filled circle is 
highlighted. The most probable pairs of objects that will be 
fixated next if one fixation and the highlighted object is 
given are presented as arrows starting at the currently 
fixated pair of objects.  
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Figure 5: Eye movement data during the encoding phase for 
the predefined sequence (see figure 4). 
 
The sizes of the arrows are scaled by the frequency of this 
transition. Although the predefined test sequence does 
contain two transitions that connect the objects from the 
upper left corner to the down right corner, there is only one 
transition in eye movement that connects these pairs 
directly. Even in the case of a transition from the down right 
to upper left corner in the test sequence subjects first fixated 
the group more near to the currently fixated pair of objects 
(picture 3-4). It was expected that after these transitions in 
the test sequence occurred, subjects would tend to repeat 
these transitions by eye movement to create memory chunks 
for this spatial relation. Instead subjects seem to create 
spatial relations to the pairs in the middle column. This 
result becomes more affirmed by taking a look at the eye 
movement data of the randomized sequences of the 
structures C2 and B2. An overlay of the transitions in the 
randomized test sequences and the corresponding transitions 
in the eye movement data are shown in Figure 6.  
Although the transitions in the test sequences contain 
equally transitions between distant objects, these transitions 
are merely absent in the eye movement data. In both 
structures most transitions in eye movement are transitions 
between locations in the vicinity of the two objects in the 
middle of the screen. In the case of the matrix, movements 
of the fixation toward objects at the border are very sparse, 
whereas in the structure with the pairs of objects there are 
noticeable more fixation movements toward each pair of 
objects. This also explains the not expected result, that there 
is no significant difference in the performance of the wide 
and the narrow matrix structure. Possibly, it is sufficient to 
fixate a location in the middle of the screen to asses most of 
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the spatial object-to-object relations. Moving attention in the 
visual buffer to repeat transitions is possible without moving 
fixation. Therefore the effort to repeat transitions of the test 
sequences in structure B1 and B2 are similar. Different in 
structure C2; here subjects needed to move fixation to 
resolve which object within a pair had been highlighted. 
 
Overlay of all transitions 
in the randomized test 
sequences 
Overlay of all transitions in 
eye movements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of transitions in the randomized test 
sequences with transitions in the eye movement data. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
The experiments reported in this paper showed how single 
aspects of human spatial memory affect the overall 
performance in memorizing tasks of object-locations in 
layout structures. A computational model that quantifies the 
interaction of the different aspects of object-location 
memory is needed to get reliable predictions about the 
overall performance. The development of such a model 
within a general architecture of cognition like ACT-R, 
(Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) enables the implementation of 
meaningful cognitive models for the application field of 
information visualization.  
The results of the two experiments make the following 
suggestions with regard to a computational model within the 
ACT-R architecture: 
First, like Wang et al (2002) suggested the model should 
encode spatial object-to-object relations between the 
previously and currently attended objects as memory 
chunks. 
Second, also the relation between three objects should be 
encoded in a memory chunk. In the same fashion as object-
to-object relations are encoded this can be done by the 
visual module whenever attention shifts between three 
different objects. This memory chunk should be of the form 
of a noisy angular. Thus the model would show the 
systematic failures found in the analysis of the answer 
sequences. 
Third, the results from the comparison of the horizontal 
and vertical oriented structures in the first experiment 
suggest that noise in the memory chunks of spatial memory 
is distorted towards a higher accuracy in the horizontal 
direction. This is a plausible assumption, because the human 
vision field of view is more extended into the horizontal 
direction and this should be true for coordinates in all 
frames of references.  
Fourth, eye movement data showed, that subjects need not 
to gaze at objects they are attending to assess their locations 
in different frames of references. Therefore it may be 
disputed, if developers of cognitive models within ACT-R 
need to control fixation and attention independently. The 
noise in the assessed object locations should depend on the 
distance to the current location of fixation.  
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Abstract 
E-consulting services such as asynchronous helpdesks for 
hardware and software are a common and comfortable way to 
get expert advice. However, the constraints of asynchronous 
communication and the experts’ inclination to forget about 
the exclusiveness of their specialist knowledge may impair 
the advisory success. Against this background, an assessment 
tool has been developed which aids helpdesk experts in 
evaluating an inquirer’s background knowledge. In a previous 
study, it could be demonstrated that the assessment tool in-
creased the effectiveness and efficiency of asynchronous 
communication. In order to test the mechanisms that make the 
assessment tool effective, another dialogue experiment was 
conducted that varied the validity of the information dis-
played in the assessment tool. The results showed that the in-
formation presented to the experts did not only sensitize them 
for the inquirers’ needs but also allowed for specific adapta-
tion to their individual knowledge state. Hence, the validity of 
the information provided by the assessment tool is crucial. 
Introduction 
Inasmuch as knowledge becomes ever more specialized and 
complex, individuals often lack the expertise necessary for 
making a decision or solving a problem on their own (Nück-
les & Bromme, 2002). Thus, in many situations, laypersons 
are reliant on expert advice. The proliferation of the Internet 
offers new possibilities for laypersons to enlist the assis-
tance of experts. Not only can laypersons retrieve expert 
information publicly available from the World Wide Web 
but they can also obtain personal advice from experts in a 
one-to-one fashion. Helpdesks for hardware and software 
are a prominent example of e-consulting services that enjoy 
increasing popularity (Moncarz, 2001). Virtually every 
large computer company and university computer centre 
offers helpdesk support, often in a text-based, asynchronous 
way via electronic mail. The aim of computer consulting is 
to convey knowledge, which enables the inquirers to solve 
their problem by themselves, for example, when new and 
complex software has to be learned or an unexpected tech-
nical problem with the computer suddenly occurs. The advi-
sory success heavily depends on the experts’ ability to pro-
vide intelligible and informative explanations for inquirers 
with differing levels of experience, ranging from very inex-
pert to more advanced users (Chin, 2000; Kiesler, Zdaniuk, 
Lundmark, & Kraut, 2000). Thus, in order to give effective 
and satisfactory advice, experts should adapt their commu-
nication to the knowledge prerequisites of the client (Clark 
& Murphy, 1982). Both from an educational (e.g., Renkl, 
2002) and psycholinguistic perspective (e.g., Clark, 1996), 
adaptation to a communication partner’s prior knowledge is 
regarded as fundamental for comprehension and learning.  
Research on expertise has shown that experts, as com-
pared to novices, possess an extensive and highly differenti-
ated knowledge base that facilitates a rapid categorization of 
problem situations and the activation of routine problem 
solving strategies (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988). However, 
these very characteristics of expert knowledge might inter-
fere with the task of taking into account the limited domain 
knowledge of a layperson. Hinds (1999) called this phe-
nomenon the ‘curse of expertise’. She reported two experi-
mental studies in which experts systematically underesti-
mated the difficulties laypersons faced when performing a 
complex task. Alty and Coombs (1981) analyzed face-to-
face advisory dialogues between computer experts and cli-
ents. They found that the computer experts rarely attempted 
to ascertain the clients’ prior knowledge and rarely moni-
tored the clients’ comprehension of their explanations. As a 
result, the clients often did not understand the advice given. 
From these studies it can be concluded that in order to as-
sure effective advice, experts should be supported in taking 
into account the knowledge prerequisites and comprehen-
sion of the client.  
In face-to-face communication, the communication part-
ners can use a variety of situational and interactional cues to 
monitor their interlocutor’s comprehension moment by 
moment and thereby refine and update their mental model 
of what the other person knows or does not know (Clark, 
1996; Nickerson, 1999). In Internet-based counselling, 
however, the evaluation of an interlocutor’s knowledge and 
the continuous construction of a mutual understanding are 
considerably more difficult when compared with face-to-
face communication (Clark & Brennan, 1991). First, in 
asynchronous communication, nonverbal feedback is virtu-
ally impossible because the interlocutors cannot see nor 
hear one another. Second, the costs of message production 
are higher than in verbal communication because every 
message has to be typed on a keyboard. Third, there is no 
set sequentiality between a message and its reply, because 
the interlocutors’ turn taking may be interrupted by mes-
sages from third parties, which can impair comprehension 
(Clark & Brennan, 1991). Given these constraints, the pos-
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 sibilities to establish a mutual understanding are clearly 
more restricted as compared with face-to-face communica-
tion. On the other hand, asynchronous communication also 
offers affordances that can facilitate adaptation to a com-
munication partner. It allows for a careful planning and re-
vision of a message before it is sent. There is time to reflect 
about a communication partner’s background knowledge 
and communicational needs.  
The Assessment Tool - A Measure to Support 
Asynchronous Communication 
From the preceding discussion it can be concluded that it 
would be useful to provide helpdesk experts with a support 
procedure that compensates for the constraints of asynchro-
nous communication on the one hand, and takes advantage 
of the affordances on the other hand. When computer ex-
perts communicate with clients via an Internet-based help-
desk, they are in an anonymous communication situation 
with only little information available about the client. 
Therefore, the procedure should enable the expert to achieve 
a relatively concise and veridical evaluation of a client’s 
knowledge state right from the start, because the lack of 
nonverbal feedback, the raised production costs and the lim-
ited sequentiality impede the continuous construction of a 
mutual understanding considerably. With regard to experts’ 
inclination to forget about the exclusiveness of their knowl-
edge, the procedure should encourage them to carefully re-
flect about a client’s knowledge prerequisites in order to 
facilitate adaptation to the client’s communicational needs. 
The better the computer experts’ model of the client’s 
knowledge is, the better the experts can adapt their explana-
tions to the client’s knowledge (Clark & Murphy, 1982). 
 In this paper, an assessment tool will be empirically tested 
that supports computer experts in constructing a mental 
model of the client’s knowledge state in asynchronous com-
munication (see also Nückles, Wittwer, & Renkl, 2003). 
The tool consists of a small Internet-based questionnaire by 
which users who place a technical support inquiry are asked 
to provide the expert with several self-assessments of their 
computer expertise (cf. Figure 1). For example, the clients 
are asked to rate their general level of computer knowledge 
as well as their knowledge of concrete specialist terms se-
mantically relevant to the topic addressed by their inquiry. 
The assessment tool can be especially useful to the expert if 
it enables them to form a picture of the client’s knowledge 
level based on a small number of highly relevant informa-
tion items. The assessment tool provides the expert with 
information about the client right from the start, which nor-
mally can only be collected during the course of the interac-
tion process. Consequently, it should facilitate the collabo-
rative effort of communication (Clark, 1996). However, the 
assessment tool can only be effective if the medium of 
communication allows for careful planning and the revision 
of one’s communicational contributions. Therefore, the as-
sessment tool seems to be especially suitable for asynchro-
nous, written communication because there is time for re-
flection and revision before a message is sent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The assessment tool has already been successfully tested 
in a web-based dialogue experiment between computer ex-
perts and clients (Nückles & Stürz, in press). With the as-
sessment tool, the clients acquired significantly more 
knowledge than the control group without the assessment 
tool (increased communicative effectiveness). At the same 
time, they wrote back only half as often in response to the 
experts’ explanations (increased communicative efficiency). 
Although the study demonstrated that the assessment tool 
approach was successful, it is unclear which mechanisms 
led to the increase in communicative effectiveness and effi-
ciency. There are two main theoretical explanations that 
may account for these findings. 
Theoretical Explanations of the Assessment Tool 
Effect 
In Nickerson’s theory (1999), the construction of a mental 
model of another person’s knowledge is conceptualized as 
an anchoring and adjustment process (Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1974), where one’s model of one’s own knowledge 
serves as a default model of what a random other person 
knows. This default model is transformed, as individuating 
information is acquired, into models of specific other indi-
viduals. Accordingly, one could argue that the assessment 
tool presented individuating information about the client’s 
knowledge level that provided the computer expert with a 
relatively specific anchor right from the start of the advisory 
dialogue. This enabled the expert to calibrate their mental 
model of the client’s knowledge more quickly and accu-
rately than would have been possible without the assess-
ment tool, that is, only on the basis of the client’s written 
questions and comments. According to this explanation, 
communicative effectiveness was raised because the as-
sessment tool provided the expert with specific information 
that helped them to adapt to the client’s individual knowl-
edge level. 
 On the other hand, it may be argued that communicative 
effectiveness was raised not because of the information pre-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Dialog with client                                              Field for your answer 
Computer knowledge 
  My knowledge about 
  computer is 
 
Internet knowledge 
  My knowledge about  
  the Internet is 
Knowledge about concepts 
 
 
 
 
    Trusted Zone 
 
     
    Applet 
 
low    rather low    moderate   rather high   high 
low    rather low    moderate   rather high   high 
Sometimes when I visit websites I get 
the following message: „Your current 
security settings prohibit running 
Active X controls on the page. As a 
result, the page may not display 
correctly.” I would like to understand 
why this happens and how can I get 
rid of the problem. 
The Internet Explorer divides internet 
addresses into four zones the most 
important of which is the "Internet 
Zone". As almost every single site 
you ever visit will be in this zone, you 
should pay particular attention to 
what its security settings are. 
Therefore, the default security level 
SEND DELETE 
low    rather low    moderate   rather high   high 
 
low    rather low    moderate   rather high   high 
Figure 1: Screenshot of the assessment tool 
available to the computer expert. 
 
1465
 sented, but simply because the assessment tool increased the 
expert’s awareness of the client and counteracted the ten-
dency of de-individuation in Internet-based communication 
(Gunawardena, 1995). The experts were sensitized to reflect 
about the client’s knowledge, for example which computer 
concepts are typically known by laypersons and which are 
not. This may have helped them to produce explanations 
that were more intelligible or informative for the typical 
layperson, irrespective of the specific knowledge level of an 
individual client. According to this explanation, the assess-
ment tool had a more or less non-specific sensitizing effect 
on the expert. Against this background, the goal of the pre-
sent experiment was to test whether the availability of spe-
cific information about the client’s knowledge would make 
a difference at all, that is, support the experts’ adaptation 
and thereby enhance communicative effectiveness and effi-
ciency.  
 To this purpose, we modified the experimental design 
employed by Nückles and Stürz (in press). First, instead of 
using self-assessments, the assessment tool in this experi-
ment provided the expert with objective information about 
the client’s knowledge. Although self-assessments have 
proven to be good predictors of computer expertise (cf. 
Richter, Naumann, & Groeben, 2000; Vu, Hanley, Strybel, 
& Proctor, 2000), they still are not completely valid. There-
fore, by using objective data about the client’s computer 
knowledge, we increased the power for detecting a potential 
effect of specific adaptation. Secondly, a third experimental 
condition was included, in addition to a communication 
condition with the assessment tool and a condition without 
assessment tool. The information displayed in this addi-
tional condition was randomly drawn from the pool of 
knowledge data of clients who had previously participated 
in the experiment. The random data condition checked to 
see whether a distortion of the information about the client’s 
knowledge level would impair the communication process. 
Consequently, the inclusion of this experimental condition 
would enable us to evaluate whether the specific informa-
tion displayed by the assessment tool would influence the 
adaptivity of the experts’ explanations. 
Predictions 
Sensitization hypothesis. If the assessment tool mainly had 
a sensitizing effect on the computer expert, that is, the in-
formation about the client was of little surplus value, it 
should make no difference whether the displayed informa-
tion was valid or distorted. Accordingly, the mere presence 
of an assessment tool is supposed to increase the experts’ 
awareness of the client and this alone should help them to 
improve their explanations. Consequently, in the conditions 
with the assessment tool the clients should acquire substan-
tially more knowledge compared with clients in the condi-
tion without the assessment tool. Moreover, if the clients 
received explanations that were more intelligible and more 
informative compared with the condition without the as-
sessment tool, they should experience less comprehension 
problems and should be more satisfied with the explana-
tions. Hence, this should lessen their need of writing back in 
response to an expert’s explanation. Consequently, the fre-
quency of questions, and more specifically, the frequency of 
comprehension questions should be reduced in both condi-
tions with the assessment tool.  
 
Specific adaptation hypothesis. If the information pro-
vided by the assessment tool facilitates the adaptation to a 
specific client’s knowledge, both the increase in communi-
cative efficiency and effectiveness should be substantially 
larger in the condition presenting valid data about the client 
as compared with the other conditions. In contrast, commu-
nicative effectiveness and efficiency should be the lowest in 
the random data condition, because the distorted informa-
tion should result in a biased mental model of the client’s 
knowledge and this should impair the expert’s adaptation to 
the client’s actual knowledge state to some degree. 
Method 
The assessment tool. The assessment tool provided the 
computer experts both with ratings of the client’s general 
computer knowledge and their Internet knowledge (see Fig-
ure 1). Apart from these global evaluations, it was also dis-
played to what extent the client already knew the meaning 
of two specialist concepts semantically relevant to the un-
derstanding of the problem addressed by an inquiry. Thus, 
the experts had the possibility to adapt their explanations 
both to the client’s general knowledge background and, on a 
more concrete level, to their prior knowledge regarding a 
specific inquiry. The values displayed in the assessment tool 
were determined through an objective and standardized as-
sessment procedure. To this purpose, an updated version of 
the computer and Internet knowledge test developed by 
Richter et al. (2000) was constructed and pre-tested on 40 
humanities students. In the experiment, the number of items 
that a client had solved correctly in the general computer 
knowledge subtest (10 items) and in the Internet knowledge 
subtest (10 items) was translated into values on the corre-
sponding five-point scales in the assessment tool (cf. Figure 
1). For example, if a client had solved only one or two items 
out of the ten items of the Internet knowledge subtest, this 
was indicated as a low Internet knowledge level. In contrast, 
if the client had solved nine or ten items of a subtest, this 
would be represented in the assessment tool as a high 
knowledge level. To assess the client’s knowledgeability 
regarding the specialist concepts they were asked to de-
scribe the meaning of each of the concepts. Two raters in-
dependently scored the written descriptions for correctness 
by using the five-point rating scale displayed in the assess-
ment tool (see Figure 1). Inter-rater reliability was .92. 
 
Participants. 60 computer experts and 60 clients partici-
pated in the experiment. Computer experts were recruited 
among advanced students of computer science. The layper-
sons serving as clients were recruited among students of 
psychology and the humanities. The results of the knowl-
edge tests showed that the clients covered a wide range of 
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 different knowledge levels. In the general computer knowl-
edge test, a mean of 5.33 correctly solved items was ob-
tained with a standard deviation of 2.50 and a range of 10 
items. In the Internet knowledge test, the clients were able 
to solve 5.80 items on average with a standard deviation of 
2.33 and a range of 8 items. Thus, there was ample opportu-
nity for the experts to adapt their explanations to clients 
with different prior knowledge levels. 
 
Design. Computer experts and clients were combined into 
dyads that were randomly assigned to the experimental con-
ditions. A one-factorial between-subjects design was used 
comprising three different conditions: (a) communication 
with an assessment tool displaying valid information about 
the client’s knowledge (in the following labeled ‘valid AT’), 
(b) communication without assessment tool (‘no AT’), and 
(c) communication with an assessment tool displaying ran-
dom information about the client’s knowledge (‘random 
AT’). Dependent variables encompassed measures of com-
municative effectiveness (i.e., the client’s increase in 
knowledge) and communicative efficiency (i.e., the number 
of questions asked by the client in response to an expert’s 
explanation). 
 
Materials. A pool of 20 inquiries was constructed that de-
manded explanations of relevant Internet topics and prob-
lems. Based on expert ratings regarding the familiarity and 
relevance of the inquiries, six of them were selected for the 
experiment. Three inquiries required the computer expert to 
explain a technical concept. The other three were more 
complex. They asked the expert to instruct the client how to 
solve a problem and, additionally, to provide an explanation 
why the problem occurred in order to help the client under-
stand the nature of the problem (e.g., “I’m running Internet 
Explorer 6. Whenever I try to print a website consisting of 
several frames, my printer only prints out one frame. I 
would like to understand why this happens and what I can 
do so that the frames are printed out all at once?”). 
 
Procedure. In the beginning of the experiment, the students 
serving as clients were administered the general computer 
knowledge test, the Internet knowledge test, and the concept 
description task. In addition, their prior knowledge about 
the six inquiries to be discussed in the communication phase 
was determined. The students were encouraged to try to 
answer each of the inquiries if possible. They were in-
formed that they were participating in a study on students’ 
knowledge about computers and the Internet. Thus, it was 
made certain that the students had no reason to assume that 
their test results would later be relevant to the communica-
tion phase of the experiment. This was important because 
otherwise the students’ self-perceptions of their test per-
formance might have influenced their behavior during the 
advisory exchange with the computer expert. In the com-
munication phase, the expert and client sat in different 
rooms and communicated through a text-based interface. 
The client’s task was to sequentially direct each one of the 
prepared six inquiries verbatim to the expert by typing the 
prepared wording of the inquiry into the text form of the 
interface. The expert was asked to answer each inquiry as 
well as possible. The clients were encouraged to write back 
and ask as many questions as needed. In the experimental 
conditions with the assessment tool, the completed form 
was visible to the expert during the entire course of the ex-
change. When the client asked a new inquiry, the assess-
ment tool was automatically updated with regard to the cli-
ent’s knowledge about the specialist concepts relevant to the 
current inquiry (see Figure 1). After the communication 
phase, the clients were again asked to write down their 
knowledge about each of the six inquiries. In this way, it 
was possible to calculate the individual increase in knowl-
edge for each client (cf. Table 1). 
Results 
Before the client’s individual increase in knowledge was 
computed, it was made sure that the clients had no substan-
tial prior knowledge about the inquiries. The mean scores of 
the clients’ answers collected before the communication 
phase clearly ranged below one (4-point rating scale, cf. 
Table 1) indicating that, on average, the clients did not 
know the correct answer to the inquiries prior to the ex-
change with the computer expert. There were no differences 
between the experimental conditions, F < 1. 
 
Communicative effectiveness. In order to compute the 
clients’ individual increase in knowledge, the mean scores 
of the clients’ answers to the six inquiries prior to the com-
munication phase were subtracted from the corresponding 
mean scores after the communication phase (cf. Table 1). 
The maximum score to be attained was three points. An 
ANOVA performed on the individual difference scores re-
vealed an overall effect of experimental condition, F(2, 57) 
= 5.37, p < .01, η² = .16 (strong effect). Following the sensi-
tization hypothesis, a substantial increase in knowledge 
should be observed in the conditions with an assessment 
tool but not in the condition without an assessment tool. The 
validity of the displayed information should make no differ-
ence. This prediction was represented by the following con-
trast: valid data: 1, random data: 1, no assessment tool: –2.  
 Following the specific adaptation hypothesis, the infor-
mation displayed by the assessment tool should indeed 
make a difference: The client’s increase in knowledge 
should be larger in the valid data condition compared with 
the condition without the assessment tool and the random 
data condition. The smallest knowledge increase would be 
expected in the random data condition, because the distorted 
information should impair the expert’s adaptation to the 
client’s knowledge level. This linear trend hypothesis was 
represented by the following contrast weights: valid data: 1, 
no assessment tool: 0, random data: –1. 
 The results of the contrast analysis clearly contradicted 
the sensitization hypothesis and supported the specific adap-
tation hypothesis. The planned contrast representing the 
sensitization hypothesis failed to reach statistical signifi-
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 cance, F < 1, whereas the contrast testing the specific adap-
tation hypothesis was highly significant, F(1, 57) = 9.99, p 
< .01, η² = .15 (strong effect). Table 1 shows that the mean 
values of the clients’ increase in knowledge evidently dis-
played the predicted linear trend with the largest increase in 
knowledge occurring in the valid data condition and the 
smallest in the random data condition.  
Communicative efficiency. To obtain a measure of com-
municative efficiency, we counted the total number of ques-
tions the client produced in response to the expert’s expla-
nations during the whole exchange, that is, throughout the 
six inquiries. An ANOVA performed on the total number of 
questions revealed a significant overall effect of experimen-
tal condition, F(2, 57) = 6.27, p < .01, η² = .18 (strong ef-
fect). When the analysis was restricted to the frequency of 
comprehension questions, that is, to those questions by 
which the client explicitly articulated a comprehension 
problem, a similar result was obtained, F(2, 57) = 6.36, p < 
.01, η² = .18 (strong effect). To test the sensitization hy-
pothesis and the specific adaptation hypothesis, planned 
contrasts were computed with the contrast weights reported 
above. As before, the data analyses yielded no support for 
the sensitization hypothesis, regardless of whether the total 
number of questions or the number of comprehension ques-
tions was used as the dependent variable, F(2, 57) = 1.87, 
ns, and F(2, 57) = 2.95, ns, respectively. On the other hand, 
the specific adaptation hypothesis was also confirmed with 
regard to communicative efficiency. The linear contrast was 
significant when the total number of questions was consid-
ered, F(1, 57) = 10.67, p < .01, η² = .16 (strong effect), and 
also when the analysis was restricted to the comprehension 
questions, F(1, 57) = 9.76, p < .01, η² = .15 (strong effect). 
With valid data in the assessment tool, the laypersons wrote 
back only about half as often in response to an expert’s ex-
planation as compared to the other experimental conditions 
(cf. Table 1, last two rows). Thus, only the provision of 
valid information reduced the frequency of questions by 
which the client explicitly articulated a comprehension 
problem or asked for further information. On the other hand, 
most of the questions occurred in the condition that pre-
sented distorted information about the client’s knowledge.  
Discussion 
The dialogue experiment presented in this paper replicates 
the results found in a previous study (Nückles & Stürz, in 
press). The approach to support asynchronous communica-
tion between computer experts and laypersons by means of 
an assessment tool has indeed proven to be successful. More 
importantly, the present findings also allow for conclusions 
about the mechanisms that led to the increase in communi-
cative effectiveness and efficiency. The clients acquired the 
most knowledge and asked the fewest questions when the 
computer expert was presented valid data about the client’s 
knowledge. When the information was distorted, the client’s 
knowledge acquisition was impaired. The clients in the ran-
dom data condition profited the least from the experts’ ex-
planations and asked the most questions. These results 
clearly contradicted the sensitization hypothesis and sup-
ported the specific adaptation hypothesis. Thus, it can be 
concluded that it was in fact the individuating information 
about the client’s knowledge that led to the increase in 
communicative efficiency and effectiveness. From the per-
spective of Nickerson’s anchoring and adjustment model 
(Nickerson, 1999) the assessment tool improved the com-
munication between expert and client because the informa-
tion about the client’s knowledge provided the computer 
expert with a specific anchor right from the start of the 
counselling process. This enabled the expert to calibrate 
their mental model about the client’s knowledge more 
quickly and accurately than would have been possible with-
out such individuating information or with distorted infor-
mation.  
 The present findings show that the assessment tool fos-
tered specific adaptation to the clients’ knowledge. It is still 
unclear how the experts exactly used the information about 
the client to produce adaptive explanations. It is plausible to 
assume that the experts used a ‘linear strategy’. For exam-
ple, they might have reasoned that ‘the lower the client’s 
knowledge level, the more extensive my explanations 
should be’ in order to provide the client sufficient context 
for comprehension (cf. Clark, 1996). Indeed, we found such 
a correlation between the extensiveness of the experts’ ex-
planations and the client’s displayed knowledge level (r = –
.32, p < .05). Still, the correlation was rather low. It cannot 
help to fully understand the cognitive heuristics the com-
puter experts used to adjust their explanations to the client’s 
knowledge. Thus, beyond the tendency to link explanatory 
Table 1: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of 
the dependent variables of the experiment. 
 
 Experimental Condition 
Dependent Variable Valid  AT 
No 
AT 
Random 
AT 
Mean scores of the clients’ 
answers before the 
communication phase* 
0.46 
(0.38) 
0.68 
(0.73) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
Mean scores of the clients’ 
answers after the 
communication phase* 
1.97 
(0.71) 
1.66 
(0.55) 
1.37 
(0.59) 
Mean differences of the 
clients’ increase in knowl-
edge 
1.52 
(0.81) 
0.99 
(0.78) 
0.80 
(0.54) 
Total number of questions 
per expert-client exchange 
2.15  
(1.73) 
4.35 
(2.98) 
4.70 
(2.54) 
Number of comprehension 
questions per expert-client 
exchange 
1.75 
(1.74) 
3.80 
(2.44) 
3.85 
(2.13) 
Note. *For each answer up to three points could be assigned (0 = 
no or wrong answer, 1 = predominantly wrong answer, 2 = roughly 
correct answer, 3 = completely correct answer). 
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 extensiveness to the client’s knowledge level, the experts 
apparently used the information displayed by the assessment 
tool to adjust their explanations in more sophisticated and 
individualized ways. One possibility is that the experts re-
ferred to the information in the assessment tool to make 
decisions during the planning phase of an explanation, for 
example, whether a technical term they intended to use in 
their answer would already be known by the client, or 
would have to be introduced in case it was not known (so-
called ‘pruning’, see Chin, 2000). To explore such possibili-
ties, we are currently running a ‘think-aloud’ study in which 
we are investigating how the experts developed a qualitative 
representation of the client’s knowledge from the quantita-
tive information provided by the assessment tool and how 
this qualitative representation was used to generate instruc-
tional explanations for the client. In addition, ‘thinking 
aloud’ protocols of the client’s comprehension processes 
could help to identify features of the expert’s explanations 
that hinder or enhance the clients’ understanding. The iden-
tification of features that make an expert’s explanation well 
adapted to a specific knowledge level could be interesting 
both for the design of advice-giving systems (e.g., Chin, 
2000) and intelligent tutoring systems (e.g., Dede, 1986).  
 The finding that information about a client’s knowledge 
fostered the provision of adaptive instructional explanations 
might also be suggestive of ways in which Internet-based 
collaborative settings other than helpdesk communication 
could be supported. In the realm of distance learning, many 
universities offer online courses where students of diverse 
educational backgrounds and with a wide range of different 
knowledge participate. As the tutors in these courses have to 
provide instructional explanations for people they – at least 
initially – do not know, an assessment tool could provide 
valuable information that may help the tutors to adapt their 
explanations to the learners’ knowledge level. Hence, an 
assessment tool might also be an appropriate method to 
support online tutoring (Siler & VanLehn, in press). 
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Abstract
We present a model of transitive inference (TI) using
ACT-R which strengthens the hypothesis that TI is not
dependent on underlying sequential ordering of stimuli,
but rather on the learning of productions. We neverthe-
less find a weakness in the ACT-R sub-symbolic learning
system and suggest improvements.
Introduction
The last decade has shown an increasing body of work
indicating that ACT-R (Anderson and Lebiere, 1998)
can be used to model human learning in an impressive
variety of tasks. However, ACT-R has been slow to gain
acceptance in mainstream experimental psychology as a
useful model, possibly because it does not seem a very
good correlate to the physical learning systems we find
in the brain.
In previous and concurrent work, we have been ex-
ploring another model of task learning which also seems
at first blush artificial and not particularly parsimo-
nious, but has also shown an impressively tight fit to
human and animal experimental data otherwise unac-
counted for. This is the Harris (1988) production-rule-
stack model of one of the main testbeds of task learning
in the animal literature, the transitive inference task.
We developed the two-tier model (Bryson, 2001; Bryson
and Leong, 2004), which accounts for all of the Harris
model’s data, while extending the model to account for
both learning and failing to learn this task (a common
outcome in live subjects). We’ve also found potential
neurological correlates for the two-tier model.
The two-tier model hypothesises two learning systems:
one for connecting perceptual contexts to actions, and
another for prioritising which of those perceptual con-
texts to attend to if more than one are present simulta-
neously. We realised that this model had similar aspects
to ACT-R, which also has two learning systems, one sym-
bolic and one statistical. We therefore decided to apply
ACT-R to the transitive inference learning task. Our re-
sults show that ACT-R is far better than the standard
TI models at accounting for the particular (and some-
what controversial) data set that prompted the Harris
(1988) model, and for some individuals provides a bet-
ter model than Harris (1988), though for others it can-
not. Our results lead us to believe that the two-tier
model is the best existing model of transitive inference,
although ACT-R is close enough that it is probably fix-
able. ACT-R demonstrates one significant simplification
over the two-tier hypothesis, and has one important dif-
ference from real mammalian task learning.
Transitive Inference
Transitive inference (TI) formally refers to the process
of reasoning whereby one infers that if, for some quality,
A > B and B > C, then A > C. In some domains, such
as integers or heights, this property will hold for any
A, B or C, though for others it does not (see Wright,
2001, for a recent discussion). TI is classically described
as an example of concrete operational thought (Piaget,
1954). That is, children become capable of doing TI
when they become capable of mentally performing the
physical manipulations they would use to determine the
correct answer, a stage they reach at approximately the
age of seven. In the case of TI, this manipulation involves
ordering the objects into a sequence using the rules A >
B and B > C, and then observing the relative location
of A and C.
Since the 1970’s, however, apparent TI has been
demonstrated in much younger children (Bryant and
Trabasso, 1971) and a variety of animals, from mon-
keys (McGonigle and Chalmers, 1977) to pigeons (Fersen
et al., 1991) — not normally ascribed with concrete oper-
ational abilities. The behaviour of choosing A from AC
without training after having previously been trained
to select A from AB and B from BC is consequently
sometimes referred to as “transitive performance”, and
whether it implies sequential ordering at all is now an
open issue.
The main motivation for not considering TI in animals
to be based on a sequential structure is a dataset due to
McGonigle and Chalmers (1977), which they have sub-
sequently replicated both with monkeys and children.
This data set concerns what happens if subjects demon-
strating TI are asked to select between three items rather
than two. Some individuals show significant, systematic
degradation in performance, which cannot be explained
by a sequential model. Some researchers have dismissed
the triad data as resulting from confusion in the sub-
jects due to the extra item. These criticisms were dealt
with in a replication by McGonigle and Chalmers (1992)
which provided the main data set used in this paper
and by Harris and McGonigle (1994). The fact that the
systematicity of the degradation has now been success-
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fully accounted for further validates this data set. This
data concerns monkeys trained on 4 adjacent pairs drawn
from a 5 item sequence, AB,BC,CD,DE.
The Models
Due to space constraints we will not review the more
traditional, sequence-based or simple-associative models
of TI, but see further (Wynne, 1998; Bryson and Leong,
2004). These models cannot account for the triad data
set.
Harris and McGonigle
Harris (1988) showed that both pair and triad TI perfor-
mance could be accounted for if we assume that monkeys
learn a production rule stack. A production rule is a ba-
sic AI representation which connects a stimulus to a re-
sponse. A stack is a prioritised list. In the Harris model,
each monkey learns one rule per possible stimulus, or
up to 5 rules in total. One of two actions is associated
with each rule, either select or avoid. If a subject applies
the rule A→s(A) (see A implies select A), then it will
simply pick up A, regardless of whether other items are
present. However, if a subject applies the rule A→a(A)
it will pick up anything but A. If more than one other
item is present, the subject is at chance for which object
it will pick up. If more than one rule could apply, then
whichever rule is higher in the stack (has higher priority)
will be applied.
Although Harris’ hypothesis may seem obscure, it
shows a remarkable match to the data. If one assumes
that rules are limited to the case that the action refers
to the object attended to, then only 16 of the 1920
(10 × 8 × 6 × 4) possible stacks of four rules operate
correctly on all training pairs (Harris and McGonigle,
1994). All 16 of these stacks also correctly perform TI
on all pairs automatically, thus already accounting for
one of the mysteries of transitive performance.
The degradation some subjects display on the triad
tests is a consequence of the random aspect of the
avoid rules. In fact, triads can be used to discrimi-
nate which rule stack an individual subject has learnt.
For example, a stack that consists entirely of selects
(s(A), s(B), s(C) . . .) will never make any errors. One
that starts with a(E) will be at chance between the other
two options whenever E is present in a triad.
Table 1 shows all of the possible discriminable stacks
as identified by Harris and McGonigle (1994). Because
only the highest-priority applicable rule fires and there
are always at least two applicable rules (since there are
at least two stimuli), there is no way to discriminate the
two lowest-priority rules using triad performance. These
stacks therefore only reflect the top three rules of the
stacks.
The Two-Tier Model
A successfully trained two-tier model creates a replica-
tion of the production-rule-stack model (Bryson, 2001).
However, the two-tier model is dynamic, and as such
gives us insight into why animals have trouble learning
the initial pairs for the TI task, the sorts of mistakes they
Table 1: Enumeration of Harris and McGonigle Stacks
Rule Depth Rule Depth
# 1 2 3 # 1 2 3
1 s(A) s(B) s(C) 5 a(E) s(A) s(B)
2 s(A) s(B) a(E) 6 a(E) s(A) a(D)
3 s(A) a(E) s(B) 7 a(E) a(D) s(A)
4 s(A) a(E) a(D) 8 a(E) a(D) a(C)
Table 2: Primate TI training re´gime (Chalmers and Mc-
Gonigle, 1984; McGonigle and Chalmers, 1992)
P1 Each pair in order (DE, CD, BC, AB) repeated
until 9 of 10 most recent trials are correct.
Reject if requires over 200 trials total
P2a 4 of each pair in order. Criteria: 32 consecutive
trials correct. Reject if requires over 200 trials total
P2b 2 of each pair in order. Criteria: 16 consecutive
trials correct. Reject if requires over 200 trials total
P2c 1 of each pair in order. Criteria: 30 consecutive
trials correct. No rejection criteria
P3 1 of each pair randomly ordered.
Criteria: 24 consecutive trials correct.
Reject if requires over 200 trials total
T Pair and triad testing
may make, and the impact of training re´gimes. The first
tier of the two-tier model is a single-vector neural net-
work (NN) which learns the prioritisation of the stimuli.
The second tier is a set of small two-item vectors which
each learn to associate an action with one of the stimuli.
The learning rule for the NNs is a slight simplification of
standard delta learning (Widrow and Hoff, Jr., 1960).
Simulations using the two-tier model show artificial
subjects successfully learning the training data only
about 25% of the time when training pairs are presented
in a random order. However, switching to the train-
ing re´gime applied by McGonigle and Chalmers (1992)
shown in Table 2, which is standard for primates, the
success rate increases to about 75%, which is compara-
ble to live subjects (Bryson and Leong, 2004).
Further, the sorts of errors made by artificial subjects
failing to learn are consistent with those shown by live
subjects — they tend to confuse the middle pairs. Anal-
ysis of the networks shows that this is nearly always a
consequence of misprioritising the rules representing the
end pairs. An agent can guarantee it always selects A
in the pair AB (the only pair A appears in) by learning
a(B), and there is a great inclination to learn about mid-
dle rules because these are the ones that have the most
data (and the most confusing data, since B is sometimes
rewarded but sometimes penalised.) However, there are
no successful stacks which do not have one end point or
the other at the highest priority (see Table 1). The train-
ing re´gime greatly increases the probability of learning
correct prioritisation. For further details see Bryson and
Leong (2004).
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ACT-R
As for the above models, ACT-R also learns production
rules, but any number of these rules may have their pre-
conditions for firing satisfied at any given time. In this
case, ACT-R’s conflict-resolution system selects the rule
with highest utility value.
Rule utilities are changed by ACT-R’s sub-symbolic
processing system. It is possible to attach success or
failure tags to productions and when such a rule is fired,
ACT-R backtracks to discover which rules fired previ-
ously and increments or decrements their utilities respec-
tively. More precisely, the utility of a rule is given by:
U = PG− C + ²(s) (1)
where G is the goal value, C is the expected cost, ²(s) is
the expected gain noise and P is the expected probability
of success:
P =
Successes
Successes + Failures
(2)
In our experiments, rather than make arbitrary changes
to ACT-R’s many available parameters in an attempt
to best fit the data, we have used mostly defaults. The
most notable exception to this is that we set the initial
Failure count to 1 which, along with ACT-R’s default
setting of 1 for Successes1, gives an initial probability of
success of 0.5. This change was also made by Belavkin
and Ritter (2003) in their Dancing Mouse model. To
maximise the number of successful agents, we also tried
a range of values for s (which affects the variance of the
noise function), finally deciding upon s = 1.
One trial consists of two or three items displayed on-
screen which the agent encodes into its goal buffer. The
goal state is then changed, enabling it to make decisions
about which item to pick (see below). Once an item has
been picked, either a reward or no reward is displayed
appropriately, the agent notes its success or failure re-
spectively and the next trial begins.
We have tested two different approaches to solving the
TI problem in ACT-R. In the first, the select and avoid
rules for each item are independent, concurrent candi-
dates for execution. For three displayed items, this cor-
responds to six conflicting rules that have their precon-
ditions satisfied. Henceforth we refer to this approach as
ACT-R-1.
In the second, the agent must focus on a displayed
item before either select ing or avoid ing it, as in the two-
tier model. This results in an extra stage of conflict-
resolution for the agent. With three options there are
at first three candidate focus rules whose actions alter
the agent’s goal state. This, in turn, satisfies two further
rules; select and avoid for the focus-item. We call this
approach ACT-R-2.
Results
As with the two-tier model and live subjects, our ACT-R
model produces both agents that successfully learn the
task and agents that do not. 44 of the 100 agents tested
1The default is Failures = 0⇒ Pinitial = 1.
with ACT-R-1 successfully passed the training re´gime.
This compares to 35% of those using ACT-R-2, or 75%
of those using the two-tier system. We examine these
groups separately.
Successful Agents
The stack model proposed by Harris and McGonigle
(1994) attempts to fit the McGonigle and Chalmers
(1977) triad data to any of the eight discriminable cor-
rect stacks (Table 1). In contrast, the ACT-R agents
learn only two possible solutions.
There are two rules which are always successful for all
pairs: s(A) and a(E). This means that, provided these
rules are discovered by the agent, their utilities will begin
to converge to maximal, given by:
lim
t→∞U = limt→∞ (PG− C) (3)
= lim
t→∞
(
Successes
Successes + Failures
)
G− C
= lim
t→∞
(
1
1 + FailuresSuccesses
)
G− C
= G− C
where t is the number of trials, and G and C remain
constant at ACT-R default values throughout. Therefore
any successful ACT-R agent will have these two rules at
highest priority. This eliminates half of the Harris and
McGonigle stacks, leaving 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Table 1).
In addition, because the top-two rule utilities are con-
verging to the same value, it becomes essentially ar-
bitrary (in fact, governed by the expected gain noise)
whether s(A) or a(E) occupies the top stack position for
any given choice. In other words, the ACT-R agents do
not learn a totally ordered stack, but effectively a pair
of stacks. The two possible pairs are:
Hybrid Stack 1 (HS1): s(A)a(E)s(B) & a(E)s(A)s(B)
Hybrid Stack 2 (HS2): s(A)a(E)a(D) & a(E)s(A)a(D)
Table 3 shows each triad with the expected percentage
of trials in which each item in that triad is chosen. These
probabilities are the same for both Hybrid Stacks, except
for the triad BCD. In this case, the format is HS1 / HS2.
A 75%/25% split occurs when both A and E are present
in the triad. We assume that half the time s(A) has top
priority and is thus selected. Otherwise, a(E) has top
priority, giving an even chance of A or the other item
being selected.
Taking into account the noise added to the system,
this model well describes the behaviour of many of the
ACT-R agents. In 45% of cases, one of the Hybrid Stacks
fitted the agent’s distribution better than any of the in-
dividual stacks, and a further 47% were best fitted by
Stack 5; a contributor to HS1.
Failed Agents
Despite these encouraging results, a majority of the
ACT-R agents failed the training re´gime (Table 2), which
is not true of the monkeys (albeit there were only seven
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Table 3: Projected percentage choice distributions for
Hybrid Stack 1 / 2
Triad A B C D E
ABC 100 0 0 - -
BCD - 100 / 50 0 / 50 0 / 0 -
BDE - 50 - 50 0
CDE - - 50 50 0
BCE - 50 50 - 0
ABD 100 0 - 0 -
ACD 100 - 0 0 -
ADE 75 - - 25 0
ABE 75 25 - - 0
ACE 75 - 25 - 0
Mean 52.5 22.5 / 17.5 12.5 / 17.5 12.5 0
test subjects) or children (Chalmers and McGonigle,
1984). Virtually all of the agents which failed did so
at stage P2a (Table 2), typically having seen less than
300 training pairs in total. There are two exceptions for
both ACT-R models which failed at P3.
To best understand why agents fail, we examine each
training pair and determine what causes agents to pick
the wrong item:
AB Since s(A) almost always has a high utility, errors
on this pair tend to be caused by interference from
s(B), whose utility is driven up by its success on pair
BC. Ironically, then, it is agents who are too successful
too soon who fail because of this pair, training stage
P2a having the most stringent pass criteria.
BC C is picked when s(C) is too high relative to s(B)
or, less frequently, a(C). Occasionally a(B) adds to
this interference but, due to the success of s(A), rarely
attains a high enough utility.
CD The symmetric case of BC. Here a(C)/a(D) inter-
ference is the chief cause of error (see Figure 1).
DE As for AB, if a(D) is discovered early to be a good
rule, it interferes with a(E) causing small but signifi-
cant errors in P2a.
For some agents (around 25%), failure is a result of
a combination of the above interferences. If many of
the interfering rules are interdependent (eg. s(B), s(C),
a(C), a(D)) then this can lead to a more even distribu-
tion of errors across all training pairs. Conversely, if two
sets of independent rules (eg. s(A), a(B), a(D), a(E))
are interfering, often two training pairs are consistently
incorrect, with little or no error on the other two.
As Tables 4 and 5 show, agents confuse the middle
pairs far more often than the end pairs (see also Anal-
ysis). This, in turn, is most often the result of s(C) and
a(C), both of which perform incorrectly for one of the
middle pairs. We have restricted these data to the last
200 trials carried out by the failed agent. This focuses
on the specific phase of training at which the agent failed
and removes the noisiest choices, made during P1.
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Figure 1: a(C) and a(D) fight for control of the pair CD
Table 4: Aggregate percentage error on each pair
Group AB BC CD DE Mean
ACT-R-1 6 25 30 7 17
ACT-R-2 6 43 39 9 24
Table 5: Percentage distribution of failed agents
Modal Error Pair
Group AB BC CD DE
ACT-R-1 2 39 54 5
ACT-R-2 0 42 50 8
Analysis
For ease of statistical comparison, we applied the χ2 test
in the same way as Harris and McGonigle (1994): by
excluding item E, which (usually) has an expected value
of 0.
For three of the five individual test subjects for whom
McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) triadic data is avail-
able, one of the hybrid stacks fits better than any of the
eight others (Table 6). As explained in the Successful
Agents section above, and in contrast with the Harris
and McGonigle stacks, the hybrid stacks do not repre-
sent a total ordering. Thus it would seem that neither do
some monkeys form a total ordering, and their choices
cannot be perfectly modelled by a simple production-
rule system. For Bump and Brown, however, our model
is rejected (p < 0.01), suggesting that other monkeys
do come up with a total ordering, which cannot be well
modelled in ACT-R.
The two-tier model does support both models, al-
though its admittedly simplistic learning rule tends to
favour the total ordering. These results suggest that
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Table 6: Comparison of individual triadic choice data
(1977) with both Hybrid and Harris’ Stack models
A B C D E χ2 p(O)
Bill 55 17 20 8 0 - -
HS2 52.5 17.5 17.5 12.5 0 2.1 n.s.
S 4 60 15 15 10 0 2.8 n.s.
Blue 55 25 14 6 0 - -
HS1 52.5 22.5 12.5 12.5 0 4.0 n.s.
S 3 60 20 10 10 0 4.9 n.s.
Bump 53 34 8 4 1 - -
HS1 52.5 22.5 12.5 12.5 0 13.3 < 0.01
S 2 60 30 5 5 0 3.4 n.s.
Brown 36 29 24 11 0 - -
HS2 52.5 17.5 17.5 12.5 0 15.3 < 0.01
S 7 35 25 25 15 0 1.8 n.s.
Roger 51 26 6 17 0 - -
HS1 52.5 22.5 12.5 12.5 0 5.6 n.s.
S 5 45 25 15 15 0 6.5 < 0.1
an improved priority-learning rule for either the two-tier
model or ACT-R could result in a highly accurate model
of TI and possibly task learning in general.
There were just five monkeys who passed criteria and
so were included in the triad phase of the 1977 exper-
iment. These five only represented three of the eight
stacks in Table 1. This may render the grouped data
unrepresentative, but our ACT-R model still displays a
better correlation than Harris and McGonigle (1994) of
α-choices, as shown in Table 7, where α represents the
correct choice in a given triad (see also Table 8).
Table 7: Correlation of α-choices to group data
Group r p
ACT-R-1 0.688 p < 0.05
ACT-R-2 0.692 p < 0.05
Hybrid Stack Model 0.616 p < 0.1
H & M Stack Model 0.634 p < 0.05
Upon closer examination of the choices made for
each triad, we see ACT-R closely matching the monkey
data for those triads which do not contain the item E
(Table 8). For those that do, ACT-R makes more mis-
takes, suggesting that the monkeys do not have a(E)
at as high a priority. This might reflect a primate bias
against having identical priorities for rules.
There may be a good reason for favouring priorities
over utilities for ordering rules. For example, there is
no circumstance in which an ACT-R agent can reach a
stable enough solution to reduce error to zero. Suppose
such a situation was attained. Then every decision made
would result in success and thus increase the utility of
the executed rule. Eventually, these rules (of which there
must be at least three to produce a correct stack) would
converge upon the same value (see Equation 3 above).
But since no three rules in a correct stack are indepen-
dent for all triads, they will start to interfere with each
other, causing error to be re-introduced.
This phenomenon is best demonstrated by examining
the errors of agents who did not take part in structured
training, but were presented with the training pairs in a
random order. Here, as is usual, the s(A) and a(E) rules
have high, convergent utilities (these rules are indepen-
dent for all training pairs). Then the utility of one (or
both) of the other successful rules, s(B) and a(D), will
also start to converge. This results in errors made on the
end pairs since s(B) interferes with s(A) for AB (Figure
2) and a(D) interferes with a(E) for DE. Neither s(C) nor
a(C) can attain a high utility, because they will perform
incorrectly on one of the middle pairs (BC and CD). The
final result is that the middle pairs are chosen consis-
tently correctly, whereas the end pairs have small errors
(typically around 15%). This certainly seems somewhat
biologically implausible, and contradicts the End-Anchor
Effect (Bryant and Trabasso, 1971; Wynne, 1998).
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Figure 2: Interference with s(A) prevents the utility of
s(B) reaching above a certain level
Conclusions and Further Work
The ACT-R models lack in their ability to represent sta-
ble, totally ordered stacks, which some real subjects ap-
pear to form. On the other hand, the Harris and McGo-
nigle (1994) stacks lack the flexibility to represent more
dynamic solutions to the TI problem. For this reason
we conclude that the two-tier model is the best exist-
ing model of TI. On the other hand, the fact that there
is no significant difference between ACT-R-1 (where no
initial item focus is required) and ACT-R-2 (where this
focus is required) implies that the two-tier model can be
simplified to allow arbitrary numbers of stimulus action
pairings, as is the default case in ACT-R.
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Table 8: Percentage of items selected - triadic analysis
Triad Monkeys ACT-R-1 ACT-R-2 Hybrid Stack Model H & M Stack Model
αβγ α β γ α β γ α β γ α β γ α β γ
ABC 80 18 2 83 17 0 86 14 0 100 0 0 94 6 0
BCD 70 26 4 70 29 1 72 26 2 75 25 0 75 25 0
BDE 66 34 0 59 35 6 56 37 6 50 50 0 63 38 0
CDE 62 38 0 49 41 10 48 44 7 50 50 0 56 44 0
BCE 78 22 0 58 42 0 58 42 0 50 50 0 63 38 0
ABD 80 20 0 79 21 0 80 20 0 100 0 0 88 13 0
ACD 86 12 2 90 9 0 91 8 0 100 0 0 88 13 0
ADE 86 14 0 72 24 4 71 26 4 75 25 0 75 25 0
ABE 88 12 0 68 32 0 70 30 0 75 25 0 75 25 0
ACE 80 20 0 76 24 0 74 25 0 75 25 0 75 25 0
Means 78 22 1 70 28 2 71 27 2 75 25 0 75 25 0
There are several obvious next steps. First, as stated
in the Introduction, the learning rules for priorities in
both the two-tier model and ACT-R need improvement,
though in different ways. We will be focusing on im-
proving the two-tier model, but would be happy to see
or support ACT-R being modified to reflect these re-
sults. Also, we suggest two possible improvements to
the ACT-R model. Allowing ACT-R to compile its own
system of rules from a minimal starting set (Anderson
and Lebiere, 1998) may provide a more natural solution,
although interpreting the underlying decision processes
would be more difficult. Starting with a high initial noise
would allow the agents to always discover and benefit
from the most successful rules, while rapidly reducing
this noise level (in conjunction with the entropy of suc-
cess (Belavkin and Ritter, 2003)) would be necessary in
order to obtain a stable enough solution to pass stage
P2a of the training re´gime.
The other obvious next step would be to collect and
analyse more triad testing results across a larger number
of primates. For our purposes, it would be useful to have
triad testing on subjects who fail TI training as well as
those who succeed. We are investigating collaborations
in this area.
The greatest significance of this work is that it gives
further evidence for a non-sequence-based representation
underlying the TI task and further supports the utility
of the McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) triad data set.
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Abstract 
In daily life we often perform sequences of actions, which 
with practice are accomplished by overlapping mental 
operations for successive actions. Is it possible to derive 
performance predictions for such sequences from a 
characterization of the mental operations for a single 
stimulus-response pair? We explore this by examining the 
joint timing of eye movements and manual responses in a 
typing-like task following Pashler (1994). Participants made 
separate choice responses to a series of five stimuli spread 
over a wide viewing area. Replicating Pashler’s results, 
responses to the first stimulus (RT1) were elevated, with 
inter-response intervals (IRI) for subsequent items rapid and 
flat across items. The eyes moved toward the next letter about 
800 ms before the corresponding manual response (eye-hand 
span). Analyses of manual responses show multiple 
components to the RT1 elevation. Analyses of dwell times 
show that the eyes move to the next stimulus before the 
completion of all central processing. 
Introduction 
Current frameworks of human performance modeling often 
follow traditional theories of human cognition, treating 
human behavior as a succession of stages composed from a 
limited number of component mental operations, such as 
perceptual, cognitive and motor processes. The nature and 
duration of these mental operations are derived from studies 
of response time in discrete tasks, which often last less than 
one second. In the real world, however, tasks are rarely 
completed with a single discrete action. Rather, they often 
require the performance of a series of discrete actions 
integrated into a fluid behavior sequence in response to 
multiple stimuli during an extended period of time. In the 
transition from discrete to continuous new behaviors 
emerge, not previously observed, such as coordination and 
overlapping among component mental operations. It is an 
important question for human performance modeling 
whether models of single-task performance, described at the 
level of elementary mental operations, are sufficient to 
characterize behavior in extended, fluid sequences.  
The successes of current human performance modeling 
suggest the answer is yes, at least for highly skilled behavior 
(e.g., Gray et al., 1991; Matessa et al., 2002). Coordination 
and overlapping among component operations are simulated 
by enforcing logical dependencies among operations 
distributed across different resources, interleaving upcoming 
operations in the slack time created by queued bottleneck 
processes, and allowing operations from different resources 
to proceed concurrently. The success of this approach 
depends on the underlying assumption that component 
mental operations inferred from discrete task performance 
do not function differently in extended task environments. 
This assumption has yet to be tested. Also, success has been 
achieved for tasks that are largely perceptual-motor, with 
good fits obtaining after about 100 contiguous trials (e.g., 
John et al., 2002).  
The goal of the present research is to investigate the 
coordination of component mental operations in extended 
task sequences that require a sequence of simple choice 
responses. To better contrast the coordination among 
component operations that may arise in extended task 
performance with the simple progression through set stages 
thought to underlie discrete task performance, we choose an 
extended task that consists of a monotonic sequence of 
identical discrete tasks. This approach helps place the 
emphasis on the coordination among component operations 
of different instances of the same task rather than among 
different tasks. Of all possible cases of coordination, we are 
especially interested in how movements of the eyes are 
coordinated with other underlying mental operations. Eye 
movements are an integral part of most cognitive activities. 
Their effortless and seamless integration with other 
components of task performance provides possibly the best 
example of coordination and the most challenging task for 
human performance modelers. Yet in existing frameworks 
the implementation of eye movements (or gaze resources) 
tends to be greatly simplified. In addition, the way by which 
eye movements are used is usually based on empirical 
findings from task conditions where eye movements are 
specifically made to meet instructions rather than generated 
naturally in accord with task goals. Little has been known 
on how task-driven eye movements are coordinated with the 
succession of stages and processes thought to characterize 
the underlying mental operations. 
In this paper, we present our recent work on how eye 
movements are integrated with underlying component 
mental operations in extended tasks. We begin by reviewing 
existing literature on extended task performance with eye 
movement measures. Then we present the results of two 
earlier extended task experiments, followed by a new 
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experiment designed to address specific issues raised by the 
previous work. In the end, we discuss the implications of 
our results with an emphasis on how they inform us on 
modeling human performance in extended tasks.  
Eye movements in extended tasks 
Although eye movements occur naturally in almost all daily 
activities, to characterize the patterns of eye movements 
researchers in the past have focused activities with a clear 
script. Examples of such activities range from golf putting 
(Vickers, 1992), driving (Land & Lee, 1994), to tea making 
(Land & Hayhoe, 2001), and block-copying (Pelz et al., 
2001). A common finding in such observations is that the 
eyes move in anticipation of upcoming actions during 
activities that involve scripted behavior.  
The existence of preview in extended task performance 
characterizes the proactive nature of eye movement control. 
In tasks that require mostly non-visually based decisions, it 
seems intuitive that the eyes could move away prior to the 
response as soon as information acquisition is completed. 
But, when can the eyes move and what determines it? 
Answers to these questions are critical to understanding  the 
coordination between eye movements and other mental 
operations. As typical fixation durations generally range 
from 200 to 400 ms, exceeding the time needed for 
perceptual registration, which can be estimated at around 
100 to 150 ms (Salthouse & Ellis, 1980), this suggests that 
certainly other variables are involved.  
Previous Research 
Previously, we (Wu & Remington, 2004) examined the 
coordination between ongoing mental processing and the 
generation of eye movements in a task requiring multiple 
manual responses to multiple stimuli on each trial. 
Specifically, we were interested in two empirical questions. 
First, in an extended task with multiple stimuli to be 
responded to, when do the eyes move away from a 
stimulus? Second, in such an extended task how is the 
processing sequence affected by difficulty manipulations at 
separate stages? By independently varying the difficulty of 
perceptual and central stages we can determine which is on 
the critical path for the sequence of responses. 
We adopted a typing-like task introduced by Pashler 
(1994). Participants viewed a series of five letters 
sequentially and responded to each individually in different 
preview conditions. Pashler manipulated preview to test 
how the mental processing of two or more stimuli were 
overlapped in time. He measured the reaction time (RT) to 
the first stimulus (RT1) and computed the inter-response 
intervals (IRIs) for subsequent responses. With no preview, 
RT1 and subsequent IRIs were roughly equivalent and 
constant across the stimulus sequence. With preview, RT1 
was elevated, compare to no preview, while IRIs were 
constantly low. The same effects were observed regardless 
of whether 1 or 4 preview items were presented. Pashler 
interpreted the constant IRIs as an indication of a bottleneck 
central processing stage of response selection, which would 
only allow the selection of one response at a time. The fact 
that IRIs reflected the duration of response selection is 
further supported by the findings that varying the duration 
of stimulus recognition and response production had little to 
modest effect on the durations of IRIs.  
Pashler’s (1994) task presents a simple example of the 
operations of three critical mental components (perception, 
response selection, and response production) and a clear 
theoretical account for the coordination among them. In this 
case, characterization of a single task was sufficient to 
account for the IRI results without further assumptions. The 
model, however, did not predict the elevated RT1. The 
experimental paradigm represents a good compromise 
between the simplicity of typical discrete trial experiments, 
and real-world behavior.  
In our previous work, we adopted Pashler’s complete 
preview condition and incorporated an eye movement 
component by reducing the size of stimulus letters and 
increasing the separation between them. Identification of 
stimulus letters thus required successive saccades and 
fixations. In two separate experiments, we examined 
response time, dwell time (fixation duration), and eye-hand 
span associated with manipulation of the duration of 
perception and response selection stages.  
Our first experiment examined the effect of perceptual 
difficulty on dwell time. Perceptual difficulty was 
manipulated by having two luminance conditions for the 
stimuli, Dim and Bright (5.2 and 46.2 cd/m2, respectively). 
Participants made sequential fixations to each of the five 
stimulus characters randomly drawn from the set T, D, and 
Z, and made choice responses accordingly. Those three 
letters were mapped to three response keys (V, B, and N) on 
a PC keyboard and assigned to the first three digits of the 
right hand. We measured the manual RT to each of the five 
stimuli and the IRIs. In addition, we derived three eye 
movement related measures: 1) eye-hand spans, which 
represent the elapsed time between the initial fixation on a 
particular stimulus to the moment when the corresponding 
manual response is generated; 2) dwell time, which 
represents the duration for which fixation is maintain on a 
particular stimulus; and 3) release-hand spans, which 
represent the elapsed time between the end of fixation on a 
particular stimulus to the moment when the manual 
response is generated. In fact, dwell times and release-hand 
spans make up eye-hand spans.  
Figure 1 shows mean manual RTs, eye-hand spans, and 
dwell times as a function of stimulus in our first experiment. 
The pattern of manual RT results resembled what Pashler 
(1994) found in conditions with preview; specifically, the 
elevation of RT1 and constantly short IRIs of subsequent 
responses. The effect of perceptual difficulty was minimal 
on RT1/IRIs and appeared to be restricted to S1. Dwell time 
was lengthened in the Dim condition, though the amount of 
increase did not reach statistical significance. Results of this 
experiment confirmed that dwell time encompasses 
perceptual processes.  
Our second experiment examined the effect of response 
selection difficulty on dwell time. The difficulty of response 
selection was manipulated by using two sets of stimuli to 
create two mapping conditions. One set included four 
alphabets T, D, Z, and Q mapped in this arbitrary order onto 
keys V, B, N, and M, and assigned to the four digits of the 
right hand; another set included digits 1, 2, 3, and 4 mapped 
in this natural order to the same four keys and fingers.  
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Figure 2 shows mean manual RTs, eye-hand spans, and 
dwell times as a function of stimulus in our second 
experiment. Again, the manual RT results replicated the 
general pattern observed in our first experiment and in 
Pashler’s (1994) study; RT1 was elevated, and IRIs were 
constant and rapid. In addition, mapping difficulty had a 
strong effect on manual as well as oculomotor responses. 
Difficult response mapping resulted in increases in IRIs. It 
also significantly increased dwell times. Results from this 
experiment suggest that fixation durations appear to include 
response selection related processes as well.  
Present Experiment 
Results from our previous work (Wu & Remington, 2004) 
provided some answers to the questions posed earlier. In an 
extended task such as this, the eyes move away at some 
point during the response selection stage but definitely after 
completion of the perceptual stage. Results from our 
previous work also featured some unexpected patterns of 
coordination between the eyes and the hand. One in 
particular is the interrelated temporal constraint among 
dwell times, IRIs and eye-hand spans. Except for the Hard 
mapping conditions in the second experiment, dwell times 
were mostly constant across stimuli, as were IRIs. In other 
words, the eyes dwell for a constant duration, and the hand 
releases responses also at a constant but faster rate. This 
leads to the observed decrease in eye-hand span across 
stimuli.  
The response of RT1 to the Easy and Hard mapping 
conditions was also unexpected. Though we always see an 
elevated RT1, its increase of approximately 400 ms in the 
hard condition was about twice the increase in IRI and dwell 
time, which were both about 200 ms. This means that the 
dwell time did not fully accommodate the increase in RT1. 
Certainly, this is difficult to account for in a model that 
assumes that eye movements are triggered at a fixed point in 
processing. It is difficult to speculate about the reasons for 
the greater increase without more information about the 
source of the general elevation of RT1 seen in all our 
experiments. Thus, the present experiment was designed in 
part to investigate variables responsible for elevated RT1. In 
particular we examine the role of planning for a sequence of 
responses or fixations. 
We also attempt to vary the central difficulty within a 
trial. One explanation for constant IRIs is that the earlier 
responses are delayed in order to be coordinated with stages 
in the processing of the subsequent response. It follows that, 
if no subsequent response is required, eye-hand spans 
should not be elevated. In the present experiment, we vary 
central difficulty using a Go/No-Go procedure. On each 
trial, only 2 or 3 positions contained target characters 
mapped with a key response. The rest were filled with 
dummy characters and participants were asked to skip them. 
We compare dwell time on Go and No-Go responses, and 
eye-hand spans on Go responses that are preceded and/or 
followed by No-Go responses to evaluate the impact of 
central difficulty.  
Method 
Participants Fourteen undergraduate students recruited 
from local colleges near NASA Ames Research Center 
participated in the experiment for course credits. 
Apparatus The experiment was conducted using a PC with 
a 21-inch monitor. Participants were seated in a comfortable 
chair with their head secured on a head-and-chin rest placed 
53.5 cm in front of the monitor. Eye movements were 
recorded with an infra-red video-based eye tracking system 
(ISCAN), which outputs data at a temporal resolution of 120 
Hz and a spatial resolution of approximately 0.5˚ visual 
angle.  
Stimuli and Display The primary stimulus display 
consisted of a row of five small characters (letters or 
symbols) spread over a wide viewing area. The characters 
were spaced equally (5.5˚ apart) and centered on the middle 
of the display. Each character subtended 0.34˚ in height and 
was presented at 11.7 cd/m2. 
Design and Procedure Each trial began with the 
presentation of a white fixation cross (0.3˚) in the center of 
the display. After the participant had maintained fixation 
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within a 6˚ radius around the fixation for 500 ms, the 
fixation was erased and a small filled square (0.34˚) 
appeared at the leftmost stimulus position. Participants were 
instructed to move their eyes to fixate the small square when 
it appeared and maintain fixation at that location. The small 
square remained for 1 sec, followed by a blank interval of 
500 ms. Then the five stimulus characters appeared 
simultaneously. Participants were asked to look at the 
characters one at a time, decide what they are, and make 
responses accordingly. Participants then pressed the 
spacebar to proceed to the next trial, which began following 
an inter-trial-interval of 250 ms.  
There were six experimental conditions and two control 
conditions. Trials of different experimental conditions 
differed in the number of required successive responses in a 
sequence (one, two, and three), and in the stimulus position 
on which these sequences occurred (first and second). The 
six types of trials can be represented as the following: 
TXXTT, TTXXT, TTTXX, XTXXT, XTTXX, and 
XTTTX, with T denoting letter stimuli that required a key 
response (Go stimuli) and X denoting letter stimuli that 
required no response (No-Go stimuli). Go stimuli were 
randomly drawn from the letter set T, D, and Z, with the 
constraint that no letter was repeated in two adjacent 
positions. This constraint however does not prevent 
repetition of responses; the same letter could occur in two 
positions interposed by Xs. Five participants had 40 trials of 
each type administered in 2 blocks of 120 trials. Nine 
participants had 60 trials of each type administered in 3 
blocks of 120 trials.  
Trials in both of the two control conditions consisted of a 
single target (Go) stimulus in the first position (i.e., 
TXXXX), though different instructions were given for each. 
In the first condition, called Respond-Then-Scan (i.e., 
TXXXX), participants were asked to respond to the first 
letter stimulus, as before, and fixate each of the rest. In the 
second condition, called Respond-Only (i.e., T____), they 
were asked to respond as quickly as possible to the first 
stimulus only. There were 40 trials in each control 
condition. The two control conditions were administered 
after the experimental conditions and in the same order 
(Respond-Then-Scan first, Respond-Only second) to each 
participant.  
No single aspect of task performance (e.g., manual or 
oculomotor, speed or accuracy, etc) was emphasized. The 
only specific instruction given to the participants was to 
treat each character independently and not group responses.  
In all experiments eye movements were monitored and 
recorded. The recording of eye movements began at the 
moment when the small square appeared, and ended after 
the participant had responded to the rightmost stimulus. A 
calibration procedure was administered before each block of 
trials to maintain accuracy of recordings.  
Results and Discussion 
Figure 3 presents mean manual RTs and eye-hand spans as a 
function of stimulus. Cases where RT1 occurred to S1 (S1-
RT1) are plotted separately from cases where RT1 occurred 
to S2 (S2-RT1). We discuss manual responses and eye 
fixations separately. 
 
Manual Responses The general pattern of elevated RT1 
followed by rapid, flat IRIs is apparent in Figure 3. It is 
striking how closely aligned the curves for all stimulus 
conditions are. The only significant effect of the 
arrangement of stimulus was that RT1 was significantly 
slower when made to S1 (S1-RT1) than to S2 (S2-RT1). 
The general elevation of RT1 for both S1-RT1 and S2-RT1 
suggests that cost is incurred for the first response in a 
sequence, not just to the first possible stimulus position. 
These similarities in patterns and magnitudes strongly 
suggest that the RT1/IRIs patterns are related closely to the 
production of sequences of responses. Indeed, the fact that 
RT1s for sequences such as “TTTXX” are equivalent to 
those for “TXXTT” is a strong indication that the difficulty 
of the next item has no effect on the current response. In 
other words, difficulty does not propagate backwards. 
There are at least two possible explanations for the 
difference in RT1 between S1-RT1 and S2-RT1. It is 
consistent with at least some of the RT1 elevation being due 
to retrieval of stimulus-response mappings. If one assumes 
that the No-Go stimulus can elicit retrieval of response 
mapping for Go stimuli then that retrieval would have been 
done during S1 processing. This account is similar to 
accounts of first-trial cost in task switching studies (Logan 
& Bundesen, 2003). Alternatively, there is more uncertainty 
associated with S1 targets. If S1 is a non-target then S2 will 
always be a target. This reduction in uncertainty is a 
possible confound, though it is difficult to see how it would 
produce a speed up since the identity of S2 is not known 
until it is fixated. 
Comparisons with the two control conditions provided 
evidence of sources contributing to the general RT1 
elevation. RT1 was fastest (575 ms) in the Respond-Only 
condition, where participants were instructed to respond 
only to the first item and ignore the rest. RT1 was 72 ms 
slower (647 ms) in the Respond-Then-Scan condition, 
where participants were instructed to respond to the first 
item and fixate the others in turn. A plausible explanation 
for this overhead is that the elevated RT1 in the Respond-
Then-Scan condition reflects a dual-task cost (cf. Pashler, 
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Carrie, & Hoffman, 1993), where the response task and the 
fixation task compete for a limited-capacity resource. There 
were no instructions as to how to perform manual and eye 
movement components; participants were free to do them 
concurrently or in sequence. We cannot say at present 
whether this overhead in combining the two behaviors, 
respond and fixate, arises from trying to do the two 
concurrently or would also be present with a strictly serial 
strategy. Some evidence suggests that trying to do the 
manual response concurrently with the fixation scan would 
cause interference. Pashler et al. observed interference 
between manual responses and voluntary eye movements in 
dual-task conditions, where participants were instructed to 
do both task as rapidly as they could. However, in their 
experiments substantial cost occurred only for anti-saccades, 
where subjects had to move away from a newly presented 
stimulus. A small cost obtained when moving to a specified 
color. Note that in both conditions the cost could reasonably 
be ascribed to a decision on the stimulus to determine where 
to move. In the present experiment the scan is fixed, making 
it difficult to see how stimulus decision processes could 
account for cost in the Respond-Then-Scan condition. 
It is also hard to see why there should be a dual-task cost 
unless participants attempted to do the two tasks 
concurrently. Since there were no constraints or instructions 
on how to perform the task, any attempt to do them 
concurrently would have arisen naturally.  
Another explanation might be that the Respond-Then-
Scan condition forces participants to switch between tasks, 
resulting in a task-switching cost. However, task-switching 
costs are generally thought to arise from the retrieval of 
task-relevant knowledge, usually stimulus-response 
mappings. It is hard to explain how a switch cost would 
appear on S1 rather than on S2.  
We prefer at present a more general explanation in terms 
of increased preparation time for the more complex 
behavior of Respond-Then-Scan. This account also helps 
explain why RT1 is further elevated in the full-response 
condition, with 2-3 targets. Here the preparation involves 
not only the sequencing of an initial response with a 
subsequent pattern of fixations, but of interleaving the 
responses. 
There was one other significant RT1 effect whose 
meaning is not clear. S2-RT1 decreased significantly (from 
837, 784, to 761 ms, ps < .05 based on pairwise t tests) as 
the number of required subsequent responses went up. This 
decrease was not observed for S1-RT1. It is hard to see how 
subsequent targets could facilitate a response to a current 
target. One argument is that the presence of a subsequent 
target could induce participants to rapidly complete the first 
item. The eyes fixated the next item prior to responding to 
the current one. If the next item is not a target they might 
decide to delay responding, and continue moving the eyes. 
If it is a target they know they must respond quickly and 
deal with the new item. 
 
Dwell Time and Eye-Hand Span As in previous 
experiments, fixation durations remained relatively constant 
across stimuli. Not surprisingly, fixation durations on target 
(Go) stimuli were always longer than No-Go stimuli. More 
interesting comparisons arise when one regards fixation 
durations as a consequence of the previous stimulus (Figure 
4). Here the dwell times suggest that the attempt to 
interleave the mental operations for successive stimuli 
pushes cost on to the subsequent stimulus. When the fixated 
stimulus is a target (a Go stimulus) dwell times were shorter 
by ~60 ms for targets that were preceded by dummy stimuli 
(i.e., XT) than by target stimuli (i.e., TT). When the fixated 
stimulus was a dummy stimulus this difference (TX 
compared to XX) was ~30 ms. This effect was found in 
several individual comparisons as well as in an analysis 
grouping all occurrences of each.  
Lengthened dwell times for stimuli preceded by targets 
suggest that the demand of making manual responses 
interfered with eye movement related processes. The eyes 
leave a stimulus prior to the completion of all the 
processing, such that the remaining processing for the 
previously fixated item delays one or more operations on the 
subsequent stimulus. A more detailed explanation rests on 
assumptions about the underlying resource architecture, 
which specifies the operations that can occur in parallel and 
those that must be done sequentially. The effect can be 
explained by adopting the common assumption that 
perceptual, cognitive, and motor operations execute in 
parallel, constrained only by logical or data dependencies. 
By this account, dwell times for the second stimulus are 
lengthened because cognitive resources required for 
stimulus-response mapping for the first stimulus postpone 
central processes on the second. Since central cognitive 
operations logically require data from perception, the 
inference is that this time is shorter by ~70 than that 
required for response selection. With continued explorations 
of similar factors it should be possible to obtain parameter 
estimates for processing operations that would permit a full 
model of extended task performance based on individual 
trial data. 
Other aspects of the eye-hand span results resembled 
those found in previous experiments. As before, eye-hand 
spans decreased across the stimulus/response sequence. 
Figure 5 shows the results of the two constituents of eye- 
hand spans, dwell times and release-hand spans. There are 
several notable findings. First, it is evident that the 
difference among RT1s in cases where RT1 occurred to S2 
was mainly due to the difference in release-hand spans. If 
one assumes that release-hand spans represent the time 
taken to complete remaining processes after fixation is 
terminated, it is foreseeable that release-hand spans may 
also include processes necessary for programming and 
coordinating response sequences. The fact that eye-hand 
spans decreased at a constant rate suggests that the 
coordination may not be restricted to each pair of responses. 
In the present set of experiments the maximal number of 
responses is set at five. It is possible that participants could 
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plan for five responses. Whether the trend will hold for 
longer sequences has yet to be tested.  
General Discussion 
The conditions of the experiment were designed to identify 
variables contributing to the elevation of RT1, and provide 
insight into the relationship of eye movements to manual 
responses by examining the effects of stimuli that required 
no manual response. Our previous experiments showed 
large eye-hand spans indicating that substantial processing 
remained on previous item after the eyes had moved. 
Analyses of dwell time responses to manipulations of 
stimulus-response compatibility suggested that dwell times 
encompassed central processes associated with response 
selection. Here dwell times for targets were elevated by ~70 
ms when the preceding stimulus required a response. A 
straightforward account in terms of stage processing might 
estimate that the processing remaining after the eye 
movement is ~70 ms + the time for perceptual processing on 
the next task. Given a reasonable estimate of perceptual 
processing time of ~150 ms, it would seem that ~220 ms of 
central processing remain after the eyes move.  
However, this explanation has difficulty accounting for 
the smaller increase (~30 ms) found on No-Go fixations in 
the same condition. That there is any effect of previous 
target at all is evidence that central processing is required to 
decide whether or not to respond to the No-Go stimulus. It 
might be assumed that the smaller effect for No-Go dwell 
times indicates more than postponement. That is, there may 
be interference between response-related processes on the 
two adjacent target stimuli. Since evidence for 
postponement is well known in dual-task studies, more 
evidence will be required to determine whether interference 
is acting here, rather than a more complicated postponement 
process. 
Conclusions 
We have evidence that RT1 elevation is due to a 
combination of factors including preparation for eye 
movement sequences, preparation for hand response 
sequences, and retrieval of stimulus-response mappings. 
Dwell times indicate that there is imperfect time sharing of 
the processing and response to successive stimuli. Mental 
operations on the previously fixated stimulus result in 
delays in processing the subsequent stimulus. These data 
can provide numeric estimates of internal processing times 
required to fully model these results. 
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Abstract
Holyoak and Thagard proposed that the retrieval and mapping
tasks of analogy can be viewed as constraint satisfaction prob-
lems, and described a connectionist implementation of their
proposal. In this paper, we describe another constraint satis-
faction method for the two tasks in the context of visual anal-
ogy: in our method, the source cases are organized in a dis-
crimination tree, and all the source cases are searched at once.
We also present an evaluation of the method for retrieval and
mapping of 2-D line drawings from an external memory. The
evaluation is based on structural constraints, and uses subgraph
isomorphism as the similarity measure. One result is that a de-
composition of the retrieval task into feature-based reminding
and structure-based selection appears to provide little compu-
tational benefit over just selection.
Introduction
Holyoak and Thagard proposed that the retrieval (Thagard,
Holyoak, Nelson, & Gochfeld, 1990) and mapping (Holyoak
& Thagard, 1989) tasks of analogy can be productively
viewed as constraint satisfaction problems. Their proposal
incorporated structural, semantic and pragmatic constraints
and used graph isomorphism as the primary similarity mea-
sure. Their mapping system, called ACME, and the com-
plementary retrieval system, named ARCS, provided connec-
tionist implementations of their proposal. In ACME, nodes
are constructed for each map hypothesis (between a source
element and a target element), with inhibitory and excitatory
links between different nodes, and the network is run until
it reaches quiescence. The work described here builds on
Holyoak and Thagard’s proposal but seeks a different solution
to the retrieval and mapping tasks. While we also view the re-
trieval and mapping tasks as constraint satisfaction problems
(CSPs), our method for addressing the tasks (i) organizes
the source cases in a discrimination tree, (ii) uses (general-
purpose) heuristics to guide the search, (iii) performs a back-
tracking search, and (iv) searches all the source cases at once.
The goal of our current work is to develop a computational
theory of visual analogy. Analogies transfer relational knowl-
edge from a source (or base) case to a target problem. De-
pending on the nature of the target and the source, the knowl-
edge transferred in an analogy may pertain to different kinds
of relations, for example, causal, functional or teleological
relations. In visual analogy, the pertinent relations are spa-
tial relations among visual elements. In a different part of
the project, we have developed a technique for transfer of
spatial knowledge, given a target problem and a source case
and given a mapping between the two (Davies & Goel, 2001,
2003). In the part described in this paper, we focus on the
retrieval and mapping tasks.
Our methodology is to start with simple problems and in-
crementally add complexity to them. This incremental na-
ture of the methodology is manifested in three ways: firstly,
visual knowledge can be of many forms, such as depictive
bit-mapped representations, sketches, or animations, but our
work deals specifically with diagrammatic knowledge rep-
resented symbolically as discrete geometric elements and
the spatial relations between them; secondly, though visual
analogies, like analogies more generally (as proposed by
Holyoak and Thagard), can involve semantic and pragmatic
constraints, we start with just the structural constraints im-
posed by requiring source and target to match structures; and
thirdly, from a graph theoretic perspective, there may be more
than one sort of graph isomorphism measure that may be the
ideal measure, such as maximal common subgraph, but we
begin with subgraph isomorphism as our metric.
The retrieval task, in this work, assumes a computer-based
library of 2D line drawings, takes as input a query (target) in
the form of a drawing (and no other information), and gives as
output the source drawings that are most similar to the target.
The mapping task takes as input a target problem and a source
case, and gives as output correspondences between the basic
elements of the source case and the target problem.
Retrieval
Following earlier work on analogical retrieval—e.g.,
MAC/FAC (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995)—our retrieval
architecture supports a two-stage process for diagram
retrieval: reminding (or initial recall), and selection. The ar-
chitecture consists of (up to) six basic components: an initial
stage generating feature vectors, a process that generates a
semantic network describing the contents (spatial structure
in this case) of an drawing, a process that matches a target’s
description (semantic network) to source descriptions from
memory, a working memory with potential sources to match
with the target, and finally, an interface to the rest of the
analogy system in which this retrieval would be taking place.
The reminding task takes as input a target example and re-
turns as output references to stored drawings whose feature
vectors match that of the target. The stored drawings are
indexed by feature vectors describing their spatial elements;
the feature vector for the target is constructed dynamically.
References to those drawings with sufficiently similar feature
vectors (according to some appropriate criteria, as explained
below) are brought into the working memory. In the selec-
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tion stage, the semantic networks of the drawings in working
memory are matched with that of the target example. Draw-
ings whose descriptions match the target description suffi-
ciently well are collected and returned.
While the reminding stage of the retrieval process uses a
vector of features—i.e. a vector of attribute-value pairs—as a
heuristic to gauge the potential of a source drawing matching
the target drawing, the selection task uses the spatial structure
of line drawings—i.e. the qualitative arrangement of the vari-
ous shapes in them—to actually match the target to the source
drawings.
Visual cases are represented in three distinct ways: the
the drawings themselves, the feature vectors, and the net-
work of spatial relations. The representation of the draw-
ings themselves is simply object-based: a list of each visual
element, such as lines, triangles, etc., and their specific ge-
ometric properties (location, and so on). The feature vec-
tor is a multiset of the object and relation types contained
in a semantic network. A multiset is a set that can con-
tain more than one of each element (e.g. f2 A;3 B; : : :g).
Given a semantic network describing an drawing, a fea-
ture vector in our system would look something like this:
f3 rectangle;2 circle;3 leftOf;1 contains; : : :g.
A drawing is recalled, in the first stage, if the multiset of
shape and relation types contained in it is a superset of that
of the target. The method scans all stored drawings, calcu-
lating whether or not the multiset of objects and relations in
the target is a subset of the multiset of objects in each source
drawing, and returning those for which this is the case. That
is, if Q is the feature vector for the target, and S1;S2; : : : ;Sk
are the feature vectors of the drawings currently in memory,
then the method returns those drawings for which Q Si.
Figure 1 illustrates a simple 2D line drawing and its repre-
sentation in terms of spatial relations in our system. The sys-
tem at present recognizes four types of spatial elements: in-
dividual lines, triangles, rectangles, and ellipses (circles and
squares are special cases of ellipses and rectangles, and are
not treated as being of a separate type). Also, it presently rec-
ognizes five types of relations among the elements: left-of,
right-of, above, below, and contains. The automatic
generation of a semantic network for a target drawing works
by taking the input drawing (in XFig format) and comparing
every pair of shapes using the available predicates. If a par-
ticular predicate holds, a link is added between the associated
nodes in the semantic network, with the appropriate label. As
an example, the semantic network in Figure 1 would repre-
sent the drawing shown above it.
Memory Organization
When a source drawing is added to memory, several things
happen. First, its description is generated, the network of re-
lations describing the spatial layout of the drawing, as well
as its feature vector. Second, once this network is generated,
each “term” in the network, by which we mean a link (re-
lation) together with its incident nodes (elements), is added
to a discrimination tree. This allows the selection method to
match individual terms in the target with all terms of the same
form that appear across all source drawings in memory, thus
allowing all of the descriptions of all of the drawings to be
searched at once.
below
above
containsbelow
above
triangle
rectangle
circleB CA
Figure 1: An example of a three-node semantic network in
our language. Each pair of objects is tested, and links added
for each relation that holds.
The selection method, described below, builds a set of po-
tential assignments for each target element, and in evaluating
these, it looks to see what terms each source element is in-
volved in, and this involves the index into memory by indi-
vidual terms. The overall scheme is to build a representation
of all possible mappings, and reduce this list by screening out
the ones that don’t work. Ones that don’t work are screened
out because they do not satisfy the constraints imposed by
the problem. This is constraint satisfaction, and this is what
it means to solve the problem by constraint satisfaction.
Constraint Satisfaction
The core of the system is the selection process. The process
finds a correspondence between the target drawing and the
source drawings in working memory, eliminating drawings
for which no correspondence can be found.
The selection problem is essentially one of matching ob-
jects (variables and constants) in the target and the source
under the constraints imposed by the terms in which they ap-
pear. The target has a set of variables (its objects, the nodes
in the semantic net) to be matched to some constants (i.e.
values) from the sources and the relationships between these
variables impose constraints on the values to which they can
be matched. This is constraint satisfaction. This algorithm
works by maintaining an index of all the terms across all of
the source descriptions. It recalls individual terms from mem-
ory and puts them together to form the complete matching.
When a source drawing is stored in memory, its description is
generated and indexed in this way, by each term that appears
in it. There is a separate table for each type of term, i.e. one
for left-of, one for above, etc.
Treating the target elements as variables to be assigned val-
ues, the potential values are the nodes from the source de-
scriptions in memory, all of which are considered at once.
That is, the method is not performing a separate test on each
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source in memory, but, rather, it is running a search procedure
on the entire memory considered collectively. The constraints
on the values assigned to the variables (the target nodes) are
precisely those imposed by the subgraph isomorphism prob-
lem: if nodes A and B from the target are to be matched with
nodes X and Y from memory, respectively, then, first, X and
Y must be in the same description; second, all relations that
hold between A and B must also hold between X and Y , re-
spectively. If these constraints are met, then A can be matched
with X and B can me matched with Y . Here the constraints
are all either unary (say, A is a circle—a type constraint), or
binary (say, A is left of B—a relational constraint). The only
exception is the constraint that all values be from the same de-
scription, but this can be inferred from the binary constraints.
This matching process works in three phases: initializa-
tion of domains, reduction of domains, and finding the match-
ing, where matching means subgraph isomorphism. The first
phase initializes the target domains to sets of values that have
the same incoming and outgoing edges. The second phase re-
duces these domains by eliminating values that are not all in
the same drawing. These two phases reduce the selection of
values for each variable. The third phase actually computes
the isomorphism using constraint satisfaction and backtrack-
ing.
The first phase (initialize domains) works by finding nodes
in memory that “look similar” to the target nodes: if a tar-
get node A is incident on, say, three links whose labels are
R, S, and T , then the algorithm builds a list of all nodes
in memory—across all the source descriptions—that have at
least three incident links with labels R, S, and T . The sec-
ond phase (reduce domains) works by ensuring that the set
of source descriptions (document IDs) that are represented in
the domain of (list of values for) each variable is the same.
This serves to eliminate any value from the domain of any
variable that does not come from a description represented in
every other variable’s domain.
These two stages are the “real” first stage of the algorithm,
and our results, described in (Yaner & Goel, 2003), showed
that the feature-vector-based first stage was really quite re-
dundant, and offered little improvement. Viewed as such, this
first stage applies two heuristics to the sources from memory:
(i) prune any individual element (as opposed to entire draw-
ings) that don’t have the same “signature” (as just described)
as the corresponding target element, and (ii) prune any terms
whose associated drawings are not represented in every target
element’s domain. The latter one enforces subgraph isomor-
phism. It is important to note that these are both logically
implied by the similarity metric that the last phase, described
below, implements. It would be an interesting experiment to
look at other heuristics that prune out mappings that might
have otherwise been returned by the last phase.
The last phase (find matchings) is the one that actually does
the work. The basic procedure is one that generates match-
ings, checking them for consistency as it goes, and backtrack-
ing when necessary. The test, here, is actual subgraph iso-
morphism: if A is related to B in the target, then the relations
(links, edges) between m(A) and m(B) must include at least
those that held between A and B, where m() is a mapping
from target to source. This algorithm returns all valid map-
pings. The idea is that the first two phases have restricted the
set of possible mappings so that there aren’t nearly as many,
now, as there would have been if a pure depth-first search had
been done.
In general, the time complexity of depth-first search, such
as this is, is on the order of O(kd) in the worst case, where k is
the branching factor of the state space and d is the maximum
depth. In this case the depth is the number of elements in
the query, and the branching factor is the number of elements
across all sources in memory. However, the space complex-
ity, as with depth-first search in general, is only O(kd), i.e.
it’s linear in the size of the problem. Note that this is a back-
tracking search, however, so large portions of the state space
are cut off at each step. With 42 test images in memory, the
number of objects in a drawing ranging from 3 to over 50 (the
average was about 12), the number of terms in the description
ranged from a couple of dozen to over eight thousand. There
were 21 queries with this test set, with two to five spatial el-
ements in each, and up to several dozen terms. With this test
data, the system was retrieving drawings in about 9.32 sec-
onds on average (across all 21 drawings), doing an average
of about 1.49 million memory accesses (to the index of terms
across all the drawings) per retrieval.
Galatea
Since the system does retrieval essentially by producing all
possible mappings that it is capable of finding, we adapted a
version of the system to the mapping process for use in a sys-
tem called Proteus, a visual analogical reasoning system. The
transfer stage of Proteus—implemented in a system called
Galatea—is described in Davies and Goel (2001, 2003).
Galatea solves problems represented in a high-level visual
language called Covlan (Cognitive Visual Language). The
system solves these problems by analogy to existing prob-
lems whose solutions are mapped out as a sequence of trans-
formations on the knowledge states that are represented in
this language. Galatea solves the problem by taking a map-
ping between the initial knowledge states of the source and
target and mapping the transformations and generating the in-
termediate knowledge states (and mappings between them),
and thereby constructing the rest of the transformations and
knowledge states leading to the solution to the target prob-
lem. The mapping system, then, needs to connect the initial
knowledge state of the source and the target drawing. From
the perspective of retrieval and mapping, the relevant issues
pertaining to Galatea are: (1) what is that knowledge repre-
sentation, and (2) what are the nature is of the required map-
pings?
Covlan consists of knowledge states, primitive elements,
primitive relations, primitive transformations, general visual
concepts, and correspondence and transform representations.
In Covlan, all knowledge is represented as propositions. In
this paper we will only be concerned with the primitive el-
ements and the primitive visual relations. The primitive
elements are polygon, rectangle, triangle, ellipse,
circle, arrow, line, point, curve, and text. There is
also a set element type, with members that have in-set re-
lations back to the set they are members of, though these do
not correspond to visible entities—this is purely for group-
ing purposes. Each element is represented as a frame with
attribute slots such as location, size, orientation, and
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thickness, but these attributes will not concern us, since
mappings between attribute values are not part of the required
mappings, and thus representing them in the semantic net-
work is not necessary.
Primitive visual relations represented are touching,
above-below, right-of-left-of, in-front-of-behind,
and off-s-image. A typical knowledge state is represented
with a node corresponding to that knowledge state (e.g.
L14-simage1), and elements (which may be sets) are repre-
sented with contains-object relations from the knowledge
state element to the visual elements themselves.
We describe next some example problems originally de-
signed for Galatea. The first example problem is a fairly sim-
ple one: dividing a pizza into some number of slices based
on analogy to the problem of dividing up a cake into some
number of pieces. In this case, there is a cake (or pizza), and
a set of people in the initial problem state. Set members are
not mapped, and the division is made in transformations in
later problem states, so the only possible mappings are cake
to pizza and set of people to set of people, or cake to set of
people and set of people to pizza. The problem, as repre-
sented in Galatea, does not contain any visual relations be-
tween the set of people and the cake (or pizza), and thus there
is nothing constraining the mapping to be the “correct” map-
ping. The latter mapping will probably lead to failure in the
transfer stage, but both are returned by our system.
A more complex and interesting example is based on Gick
and Holyoak’s fortress/tumor problem (1980). In this prob-
lem, we have an army attacking a fortress over mined roads,
and the general decides to split his army to avoid setting off
the mines, and a target case in which there is a patient with
a tumor and a doctor who wants to kill the tumor with radi-
ation. The supposed analogy is to split the beam (somehow)
to avoid killing the healthy tissue that is in the way. The vi-
sual representation of these problems has a fortress (and a
tumor represented similarly) and four roads (sections of the
body surrounding the tumor), and an army represented by an
arrow (a ray of radiation represented similarly). The “cor-
rect” analogy maps the set of roads to the set of body parts,
the fortress to the tumor, and the army to the ray. However,
there being three of each thing to match, and the particular
representation chosen not using the visual relations (though
it could have), there was nothing constraining the mapping,
and all six possible correspondences were returned. Had vi-
sual relations constrained it, the number of possible mappings
would have been smaller.
Mapping
Galatea has set up the requirements for the mapping task
such that only visual elements are to be mapped, not attribute
values, and so attribute values (which can be represented as
propositions, and hence can be represented in a semantic net-
work) are not included in the input to the mapping system. In
addition, members of sets are (generally) not to be mapped,
and so any visual element on the left-hand side of an in-set
relation can be pruned from the mapping system’s input, as
well. With these two constraints, the mapping system was
run on several sample problems, two of which were described
above. Four other problems of similar nature and size were
also run on this system.
function GENERATEMAPPINGS
1: sourceRels first simage from source problem
2: targetRels target problem simage
3: sRelLables names of all relations represented in
sourceRels
4: tRels remove from targetRels all relations that don’t
match one in sRelLabels and all relations involving a
literal (i.e. attribute-value pairs)
5: tRelLabels names of all relations represented in tRels
6: sRels remove from sourceRels all relations that don’t
match one in tRelLabels and all relations involving a
literal (i.e. attribute-value pairs)
7: sNodes list of all nodes (elements) from sRels
8: tNodes list of all nodes (elements) from tRels
9: domains GENERATEDOMAINS(sNodes,
LENGTH(tNodes))
10: rDomains GENERATEDOMAINS(tNodes,
LENGTH(sNodes))
11: f Mappings FINDPROJECTIONS(sRels, tNodes,
tRels, domains)
12: rMappings FINDPROJECTIONS(tRels, sNodes,
sRels, rDomains)
13: rMappings reverse each of the mappings returned in
rMappings so that they map source onto target properly
instead of target onto source
14: return f Mappings⋃ rMappings
Algorithm 1: Generate Mappings
The mapping algorithm (see Algorithm 1) works as fol-
lows: the outer procedure (generate mappings) first retrieves
the named source and target representations from memory,
then applies the above heuristics to it, and finally generates
the mappings and returns them. Since it computes subgraph
isomorphism, as above, we run it both ways—attempting to
map source onto target, and also attempting to map target
onto source and reversing the returned mappings. Thus it
is possible to find the target within the source or vice versa,
finding the source within the target. The algorithm for FIND-
PROJECTIONS is identical with that of the third phase, “find
matchings”, above.
It’s important to note that this does not actually solve the
mapping problem; it particular, it returns all mappings, so
that an additional search or evaluation stage is necessary to
find the relevent ones. This is where pragmatic and semantic
constraints may start to enter back into the picture. Our work
to date has begun with only structural constraints as an ex-
periment, and we plan to reintroduce other constraints as the
larger problem context is reintroduced.
At any rate, the cake/pizza example described above, when
run through this system, came up with two mappings: one
that maps the cake to the pizza and the set of people to the set
of people, and one that maps the cake to the set of people and
the other set of people to the pizza:
Cake maps-to Pizza
Set12 maps-to Set14
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Cake maps-to Set14
Set12 maps-to Pizza
Set12 is the set of people in first cake problem knowledge
state, and Set14 is the set of people in the first pizza problem
knowledge state. Proteus, recall, does not map members of
sets, and so the individual people are not mapped onto each
other, only the sets. The first one, obviously, is the ”correct”
one, the one that would lead to a successful transfer and eval-
uation of the problem solution.
The fortress/tumor problem was more interesting. The
heuristics pruned out the set of roads and body parts, as well
as the shapes and sizes and positions of all the elements, and
so the only details left to influence the mappings were the
fact that the elements were part of the problem. There were
three elements, thus, remaining, for each one: Fortress and
Tumor, Soldier-Path and Ray, and Set1 (the set of roads) and
Set2 (the set of body parts surrounding the tumor), and six
mappings produced:
Fortress maps-to Tumor
Soldier-Path maps-to Ray
Set1 maps-to Set2
Fortress maps-to Tumor
Soldier-Path maps-to Set2
Set1 maps-to Ray
Fortress maps-to Ray
Soldier-Path maps-to Tumor
Set1 maps-to Set2
Fortress maps-to Ray
Soldier-Path maps-to Set2
Set1 maps-to Tumor
Fortress maps-to Set2
Soldier-Path maps-to Tumor
Set1 maps-to Ray
Fortress maps-to Set2
Soldier-Path maps-to Ray
Set1 maps-to Tumor
Now, this really represents all correspondences between
three things and three things. The primary reason for this is
that the representation chosen for this particular problem does
not involve any reference-frame relations such as left-of or
right-of. If it had, these relations would constrain the map-
pings.
Discussion
In the introduction, we mentioned Holyoak and Thagard’s
ACME system (1989) and noted the similarities and differ-
ences between our work and theirs. ANALOGY (Evans,
1968) was an even earlier AI program that performed the task
of finding similarities and differences between visual cases.
It performed simple geometric analogies of the kind that ap-
pear on many intelligence tests. Let us suppose that each of
A, B, C, D, E and F is an arrangement of simple geometric
objects, e.g., a small triangle inside a large triangle, a small
circle inside a larger circle, etc. Given an analogy A:B, and
given C and multiple choices D, E and F, ANALOGY found
which of D, E, and F had a relationship with C analogous
to that between A and B. It represented the objects and the
spatial relationships between them in the form of semantic
networks, which enabled it to compare the spatial structure of
the various arrangements. However, since ANALOGY per-
formed an exhaustive and linear search of the mappings, its
method cannot scale up to any realistic problem.
While ANALOGY was an early program that matched
symbolic descriptions of two drawings and found similari-
ties and differences between the drawings, MAGI (Ferguson,
2000) and JUXTA (Ferguson & Forbus, 1998) are two recent
systems that find mappings between symbolic representations
of two drawings (or two portions of the same drawing). These
systems use truth maintenance as the mechanism for keeping
track of new constraints and retracting old conclusions.
Our decomposition of the retrieval task into feature-based
reminding and structure-based selection is similar to that of
MAC/FAC (Forbus et al., 1995). The similarity is specially
striking because in its current stage ours deals only with struc-
tural constraints; as noted in the introduction, we plan to ex-
plore and exploit semantic and pragmatic constraints in the
next stage. However, in contrast to MAC/FAC, the experi-
ments described in (Yaner & Goel, 2003) indicate that the
two-stage decomposition of the retrieval task provides little
computational benefit over just one-stage retrieval based on
structure-based selection.
In computer-aided design, FABEL (Gebhardt, Voß,
Gra¨ther, & Schmidt-Belz, 1997) was an early project to ex-
plore the automated reuse of diagrammatic cases. In partic-
ular, TOPO (Bo¨rner, Eberhard, Tammer, & Coulon, 1996),
a subsystem of FABEL, used the maximum common sub-
graph (MCS) of the target drawing with the stored drawings
for retrieve similar drawings. Gross and Do (1995) describe
a method for retrieving designs that contain a given design
pattern in the domain of architectural design. Gross and Do’s
heuristic method is very simple: given two drawings, it com-
pares the type and number of spatial elements and the spatial
relations by counting. Their method is roughly equivalent to
the first stage in the two-stage retrieval process.
In computer vision, Grimson and Huttenlocher (1991) de-
veloped a similar method for object recognition. They begin
with a model with a set of features, such as a set of poten-
tial edges in some arrangement, and sensor data with a set of
sensor features (edges, vertices, etc.); a lot of sensor features
might be noise. The task is to find a set of sensor features
that comes from one (and the same) object. Their method
matches model features to sensor features under some trans-
formations within specific limit of tolerance. The model im-
poses constraints, for instance, by its arrangement of features.
Although they do not describe it as constraint satisfaction,
their method in fact is in assigning values to variables under
unary and binary constraints imposed by the arrangement by
using a backtracking depth-first search.
Constraint satisfaction methods have become common in
AI: Prosser (1993) describes methods of constraint satisfac-
tion with backtracking; and Bayardo and Schrag (1997) pro-
vide evidence of applicability of constraint satisfaction with
backtracking for real-world intractable problems in planning
and scheduling. Our method of constraint satisfaction with
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backtracking, with the case memory organized into discrim-
ination trees, builds on the work of Ounis and Pas¸ca (1998).
They view the general problem of associative image retrieval
as one of computing projections over conceptual graphs rep-
resenting their content. Although they do not describe it as
a constraint satisfaction method, their algorithm, in fact, is
doing constraint satisfaction to compute the projection. How-
ever, their method is limited to constraint satisfaction with
generate and test with no backtracking.
Conclusions
We have described a constraint satisfacton method for the
retrieval and mapping tasks of analogy. Our method (i) or-
ganizes the source cases in a discrimination tree, (ii) uses
(general-purpose) heurstics to guide the search, (iii) back-
tracks (if and when needed), and (iv) searches all the source
cases at once. We also presented an evaluation of the method
for the retrieval and mapping of diagrams from an external
memory.
Our laboratory-scale experiments, with drawings contain-
ing only up to fifty spatial elements and their representations
containing only up to eight thousand terms, indicate that the
method of constraint satisfaction is fast and appears quite
promising for use in practice. On the one hand, we fully ex-
pect that the complexity of the task will significantly worsen
for larger drawings and larger libraries of drawings, but, on
the other, we also expect that it should be possible to de-
velop significantly faster methods for the task. For exam-
ple, we expect that use of spatial aggregations and abstrac-
tions to organize the representation of the spatial structure
of a drawing in the form of a linked hierarchy of semantic
networks would partition the search space performance espe-
cially for large, complex drawings (e.g. Papadias, Kalnis, &
Mamoulis, 1999). In addition, more sophisticated constraint
satisfaction techniques such as forward checking and intel-
ligent variable ordering, to name just a couple of common
ones, can be brought to bear on the problem as well, taking
advantage of structure in the knowledge representation and
the search space.
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Abstract
How are art works created by artists? In this study, we
focused on the drawing processes of a Chinese ink painter
through a field study and a field experiment. In the field
study, we observed processes of fusuma drawing in a
temple, and in the field experiment, we asked the painter to
draw sixteen pictures (eight drawings in BLANK condition
and eight drawings LINES condition). We analyzed those
drawing processes and found that: (1) this artist seems to
gradually form a global image of the drawing as he draws
each part one by one; (2) lines that the audience drew seem
to create new constraints for his drawing and force him to
create new patterns; and (3) moving his brush in the air
before actually drawing lines on the paper seems to serve
one of the following functions: Positioning (where to draw),
rehearsal (how to draw), and image generation (what to
draw).
Introduction
It is widely believed that only talented people can create
great works of art. Despite this, the psychology of
creativity has demonstrated that ordinary cognitive
processes underlie the emergence of images or concepts
(Weisberg, 1993). Although cognitive psychology ought
to be interested in such creative cognitive processes, few
empirical studies on the artistic creative process have
been conducted (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976).
Among the few studies that have been conducted, some
are relatively old and pre-date the information processing
revolution that has occurred in the field (e.g., Eindhoven
& Vinack, 1952). More recently, studies have used
techniques such as interviewing in order to understand the
creative process but have neglected on line methods (e.g.,
Mace & Ward, 2002; Cawelti, Rappaport & Wood, 1992).
Despite these efforts, creative cognitive processes are not
yet well understood. At this early stage of cognitive study
on artistic creation, it seems that multi-method
approaches are most appropriate. For example, Getzels &
Csikszentmihalyi (1976) have approached creativity from
several perspectives by using several test batteries, such
as IQ tests, creativity tests, personality tests, and
observations and interviews of art-making processes.
Viewing the state of creative study, in the present study,
we try to answer the question, “How does a painter create
his/her works?” We offer a case study based on
observations, interviews, and a field experiment with
detailed cognitive analyses of the drawing processes of a
Suibokuga (Chinese ink painting) painter.
Method
Subject: Mr. K. is a Suibokuga painter in his early 60’s
with about 18 years of experience of painting in that style.
He usually draws Sansuiga, which are traditional Chinese
landscapes of mountains and valleys, on fusuma
(Japanese sliding doors) or folding screens in temples and
shrines. He has also exhibited his works at museums in
the USA and France in addition to many places in Japan.
He has a special style of drawing. He improvises his
drawing in front of audiences by incorporating random
lines that the audience drew onto blank paper.
Period of observation: This field study was conducted
from 1998 to 2001, with a follow-up interview conducted
in 2003. We observed his drawing processes and
collected substantial on-line data about his drawing. Also,
we investigated his drawing processes through
conducting a field experiment.
Data described in this paper: In this paper, we focus on
the following two data sets in this field study: (1) process
data of a fusuma drawing in temple X; and (2) data from
a field experiment.
In the temple, spending about one and a half-hour, the
painter drew a picture of mountain and river across four
fusuma sliding doors. We set up two video cameras from
both sides of the fusuma doors to capture his drawing
process. After he finished his drawing, we interviewed
him about his drawing process. In this case, he did not ask
the audience to draw random lines because the master of
the temple asked him not to do so.
In the field experiment, we asked him to draw eight
pictures created from fifteen random lines drawn by two
experimenters (we call this the LINES condition) and
eight pictures created on blank paper (we call this the
BLANK condition). The themes of the paintings are the
four seasons. We asked him to draw two pictures of each
season in each condition: spring; summer; fall; and winter.
The order of task presentation was counter-balanced by
condition. The order of the season for each task was
randomized. We recorded the processes of his drawing
with two video cameras. He drew three or four pictures in
his studio in a day. It took a total five days between June
and December to complete the field experiment. Usually
it took about 20 to 30 minutes for him to finish a picture.
In the third day of the experiment, he reported that he1488
could not concentrate on drawing and drew just one
picture. In the second day of the experiment he thought a
picture in the BLANK condition was not good enough.
Therefore he drew another picture with the same theme
once more in the final day.
Goal of this study: This study describes the drawing
process of a Suibokuga painter through a field study.
Unlike laboratory experiments, field studies can be
problematic with regarding to variable control. In
addition, since this is a single case study, we also cannot
generalize our findings to all artists. However, through
field studies such as this, we can propose new hypotheses
or offer useful insights with high levels of ecological
validity. Especially, in domains where few previous
studies exist, starting from field studies can be very useful
in order to find important questions and hypotheses and to
lead to further research projects that follow realistic and
meaningful directions.
Results and Discussion
The following three main features were identified through
our field study;
(1) The painter seems to form a global image of the
drawing gradually as he draws each part one by
one;
(2) The painter draws pictures in fairly patterned ways.
Lines that the audience drew, however, seem to
create new constraints for his drawing and force
him to create new patterns;
(3) The painter often moves his brush in the air before
actually drawing lines on the paper. Based on our
data analyses, we describe three possible functions
of these movements.
Processes of Drawing Images
Mr. K draws his paintings very smoothly and quickly.
Although it might look as if he had already formed an
image of the entire picture before starting to draw, our
analyses of the drawing process and an interview with
him revealed that he starts drawing with a local image of
the picture. Then, he gradually forms a global image as he
draws each part one by one.
When we interviewed him just after he finished
drawing fusuma doors in the temple, he said, “ Not the
entire picture. Starting from here, the pine tree that I first
drew, then there and this bridge and here, then the cedar
trees above the stairway. Then the roof of the hat. I had an
image of only those parts at the beginning”(See Figure 1).
It seems that he does not form the entire image before he
starts drawing. How can he draw so smoothly without
forming the whole image or complete plans in his mind
before starting to draw? We analyzed his drawing
processes in detail to answer this question.
Figure 2 shows the process of his drawing on the
fusuma doors of the temple. The circled numbers on the
fusuma doors indicate where and in what order he drew.
The circled numbers on the tatami mats indicate where
and in what order he moved. We divided the process into
five sections based on his movements. The first four
sections were segmented when he moved backward to
survey the entire picture for more than one minute. The
rest of his drawing processes were combined into one
section, because he moved backward and forward very
often without long pauses. In the first section, he sat on a
tatami mat and started drawing a tree on the left-most part
of the fusuma door. After he drew the central part of the
left fusuma doors for about 22 minutes, he stepped back
in order to see the entire picture. Then he started drawing
on the second door from the right and paused to observe
what he drew many times. When this part of the picture
became more formed, he moved backward and looked at
the picture occasionally. At almost the end of his drawing
in the last section, he moved back and forth frequently,
adding a few lines here and there. This analysis of his
drawing processes and his interview in the temple
suggests that he gradually formed his plans for the
painting while he was drawing. Although this is a single
case analysis, we observed that he drew the fusuma doors
in this way on many other occasions.
 Mr. K cannot look at the entire picture without
stepping backward when he draws on such big fusuma
doors. Although he can take in the entire picture when he
draws on a small-sized paper, he still has to spend a
certain amount of time planning and monitoring when he
draws, even though he can see the entire picture at a
glance. Therefore, we measured the duration and timing
of pauses in the data from the field experiment in order to
infer his planning and monitoring process as while
drawing. We divided drawing processes into small cycles.
One cycle consisted of the period from his soaking the
brush in the sumi ink plate, lifting up, drawing on the
paper, and soaking it in the ink plate again. We counted
the distribution of pauses by length and found that the
frequency drastically dropped above nine seconds. This
suggests that there might be some functional difference in
pauses shorter than nine seconds and those longer than
nine seconds. The frequent occurrence of the shorter
pauses probably indicates that he moves the brush from
one place to another or ink plate, etc. And, the less
frequent occurrence of the pauses longer than nine
Figure 1: Picture on fusuma doors at temple X
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seconds would mean that he spent time thinking about the
pictures, planning and monitoring his drawing processes1.
Table 1 shows the data from the field experiment.
When counting pauses equal to or longer than nine
seconds, we found that there was about the almost same
number of pauses in the first and the second half of his
                                                 
1 Our criterion gains plausibility from experiments in previous
studies. For example, Chase & Simon (1973), with perception
and memory tasks in chess, presumed the long time interval
while glancing chess pieces placed on the board was needed to
combine several chunks, and the short time interval to access to
a single chunk. Thus, it is also reasonable to think that the
difference of time interval reflects upon the processes of
thinking during drawing.
drawing in each condition, t (7) = -2.37, p = .050, t (7) = -
1.80, p = .862 (See Table 1).
 This suggests that he plans and monitors his drawing
through the entire process of drawing. There were more
pauses in the LINES condition than in the BLANK
condition, F (1, 7) = 19.166, p = .003. When we focused
on the frequency of pauses just before he drew from
random lines, we saw about the same frequency of the
pauses as a difference between each condition, F (1,7) =
3.163, p = .119. This probably means that he needs to
think about local drawing plans in order to incorporate
those random lines into his picture when he creates
pictures from random lines.
 In summary, it appears that the painter plans and
monitors through the entire process of drawing.　 He first
forms a mental image of a small area (creates a local
drawing plan), and gradually forms the entire mental
image of the picture as he draws each object.
Lines as Constraints
Analyses of the contents and patterns of Mr. K’s drawing
suggest that he drew pictures in a fairly patterned way.
Through our observation, we found that he drew objects
one by one. In the field experiment, he started to draw his
paintings from a tree in fifteen out of the sixteen pictures.
Then rocks, houses, people and mountains followed. We
observed in many other occasions that he drew pictures in
the same way. It suggests that he uses some strategies in
order to draw certain objects in a relatively stable order in
various situations. However, when we interviewed him,
he said, “All of the pictures that I created from random
lines are more unique and nicer than those created in a
traditional way.” What kind of difference is there between
both conditions? We investigated the differences in time
of drawing and the number of drawing cycles between
pictures in the LINES condition and pictures in the
BLANK condition (See Figure 3 and Table 2).
First, the mean time of drawing (except for the time of
painting shadows or shading ink lines which always
occurs at the end of his drawings) was calculated in each
condition. In the BLANK condition, the mean time of
drawing was about ten minutes (M = 640.13 sec, SD =
170.91 sec), and, in the LINES condition, it was about
eighteen minutes (M = 1050.38 sec, SD = 199.40 sec).
The time of drawing in the LINES condition was
significantly longer than the time of drawing in the
BLANK condition, t (14) = 3.87, p < .01. We also
counted the number of drawing cycles in each condition
and calculated the mean number. The mean number of
drawing cycles in the LINES condition was significantly
higher than that in the BLANK condition, t (14) = 3.91, p
Table 1: Mean number of pauses (nine or more
seconds) during drawing
Whole
drawing
First half:
Second half
Before drawing
with lines
BLANK
condition
5.0 1.4 : 2.4
LINES
condition
11.4 5.6 : 5.8 4.5
Figure2: Processes of drawing on the fusuma doors in
temple X
1. Drew 22mins， then moved
back.
3.Drew 5mins ， then moved
back.
5.Moved back and forth
（5mins.）.
2.Drew 8mins, then moved back.
4. After intermission ， drew
11mins，then moved back.
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< .01. These results indicate that it takes more time and
more drawing cycles to create new pictures from random
lines.
This result suggests that these lines somehow
influenced drawing. Therefore, we investigated how these
lines were used in his drawing. There were fifteen random
lines drawn by the experimenters on each paper in the
LINES condition. With an average of 9.3 out of fifteen
lines, he would create new object starting from others
lines. In the other 5.7 instances he incorporated the
other’s line into an existing object. Thus, the random lines
triggered his drawing process and created new constraints
on his drawing.
There seemed to be some differences in terms of
quality between pictures in the LINES and BLANK
conditions. To check this possibility, we asked twenty
undergraduate students to rate their impressions of the
paintings using a semantic differential method.
The procedure is as follows: Twenty undergraduates
who did not major in art were presented pictures
randomly with twelve word pairs of opposite meaning as
a paper and pencil task. All words were adapted from
adjectives used in the study of emotions when
appreciating pictures (Ichihara, 1968) and interviews of
the painter. Subjects were asked to rate the pictures based
on a seven-point scale for each word pair.
Factor analysis with a principal factor solution was
used to create scales across the word pair items. The three
distinct factors with an eigenvalue above 1.0 were
recovered and the ratio of variance contribution was 65%.
These factors were rotated with Varimax and the factor
loading was calculated (See Table3).
Four items are strongly correlated with the first factor,
which we term good composition: modulated / non-
modulated; well composed / poorly composed; focused /
unfocused; and well-balanced / ill-balanced (alpha = .82).
The second factor, which we term liveliness, is strongly
correlated with the items: lively / dull; static / dynamic;
energetic / non-energetic; and powerful / power less
(alpha = .77). The final factor, which we term simplicity,
strongly correlated with the items: clear cut / mixed up;
simple / complex; relaxed / crowded; and light / heavy
(alpha = .73).
We conducted a single-sample version of Hotelling’s
T2 to compare their rating scores of paintings from the
two conditions (See Figure4).
The mean scores of good composition and simplicity in
the BLANK condition were significantly higher than
those in the LINES condition, Fs (1, 159) = 93.838 and
28.479, respectively, ps < .001. This result indicates that
pictures in the BLANK condition are well composed.
Also, because there is fair amount of white space in these
pictures, it creates the impression of simple picture. The
painter draws the BLANK pictures with the style of
traditional Sansuiga paintings. On the other hand, the
mean score of liveliness in the LINES condition was
higher than that in the BLANK condition, F (1, 159) =
4.153, p < .05. This result indicates that pictures in the
LINES condition were characterized by liveliness and
were dynamic. Thus, the character of LINES pictures is
different from traditional Sansuiga paintings.
Mr. K also thinks that this way of drawing is more
exciting than the traditional way. When we interviewed
him asking why he wanted to draw from random lines, he
answered:
“Creating from random lines, I have to
incorporate the others’ world into my world... I
have to use them with my lines…Seriousness! I
enjoy playing this game in earnest. There is not
just myself. I get serious about drawing in this
way. Yes. I am highly motivated with this way.”
Thus, these lines seem to create new constraints for his
drawing and force him to create new patterns.
Roles of Hand Movements in Drawing Processes
From our observations in the field studies, we noticed that
the painter moved his brush in the air very often before he
actually drew lines on paper. We wondered why he did so.
This kind of hand movement is not unique to this
painter. For example, Henry Matisse moved his brush in a
similar way in the video, “Matisse: Voyage”. When we
talked with researchers in architectural design and in art
education, they agreed with us that painters or designers
often draw in the air before they draw on paper. This kind
of hand movement is not even unique to painters. Sasaki
& Watanabe (1983) also found that when writing Kanji
characters, Japanese people often moved their fingers in
the air. They interpreted this phenomenon to mean that
Figure 3: Picture in the BLANK condition (top) and
picture in the LINES condition (bottom)
Table2: Differences between the BLANK condition and
the LINES condition
Measures
BLANK
condition
Means and
(SDs)
LINES
condition
Means and
(SDs)
p of t
Tests
Time of
drawing(sec)
640.13
(170.91)
1050.38
(199.40)
< .01
Number of
drawing cycles
30.0
(8.80)
43.5
(4.92)
< .01
Time of  one
cycle(sec)
23.3
(7.50)
25.5
(6.85) n.s.
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people use their body to remember Kanji Characters.
Thus, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that moving
in the air would have some important function not only
when writing Kanji characters but also when drawing
pictures.
We identified the timing of when he moved his brush in
the air to investigate the role of the movement in his
drawing. The cycles of drawing that we mentioned above
were divided into three sections in order to identify the
timing of his brush movement in the air. The first section,
beginning section, was from his soaking the brush in the
sumi ink plate until just before putting it on paper. The
second section, middle section, was from his starting to
draw until finishing to draw. The final section, end
section, was from his lifting up the brush from the paper
until just before soaking it in the ink plate. Then, we
counted the number of brush movements in the air for
each section.
 The following coding scheme was used to identify brush
movements. If the painter moved his brush more than
once in a circle in the air, except for changing the posture
of holding his brush or moving the brush from one place
to another, we identify the movement as drawing in the
air. A main coder coded the drawing processes of all
sixteen pictures. After being taught this scheme and
practicing coding independently, another coder coded one
picture. The consistency between two coders was 90%.
The percentage of intra-coder consistency of the main
coder was 96%. Thus, the scheme was considered reliable.
 Table 4 shows the mean number of drawing in the air
and the percentage in each section in each condition.
Although the frequency of drawing in the air in the
LINES condition is higher than in the BLANK condition,
the percentage of the drawing in each section is about the
same between the two conditions. In the beginning
section, the percentage of the drawing in the BLANK
condition was 60% and that in the LINES condition was
56%. In the middle section, the percentage of drawing in
the BLANK condition was 35% and that in the LINES
was 36%. This indicated that Mr. K often draws in the air
at the beginning and middle of drawing cycles. Thus, it
would be reasonable for us to assume that drawing in the
air has some important functions in drawing processes
since they occur before the painter actually draws on
paper.
Next, we focused on the relationship between pauses
and drawing in the air. The percentage of pauses with
drawing in the air in the BLANK condition was 59% and
that in the LINES condition was 86%. This suggests that
he often moves the brush in the air in order to think about
drawing plans to incorporate lines into his picture.
Furthermore, in the LINES condition, the percentage of
pauses with drawing in the air, when he added on to
others’ lines, was 97% and when he drew without adding
lines to others’ lines was 59%. These results suggest that
by moving the brush in the air, he generates a mental
image to facilitate incorporating others’ lines.
In order to further investigate the function of the
drawing in the air, we interviewed him about his drawing
process while showing a video record of his drawing a
Sansuiga picture. While watching a part of the videotape
in which he was drawing in the air, he said to us,
“I might be checking how I feel when I touch the
brush. Umm… Is this my habit? I always do this,
don’t I...I may move my hand in the air to rehearse
my brush stroke…I always draw in the air before
starting to draw on the paper. This seems to be my
habit, doesn’t it? Although I do not draw any
actual objects on the paper, through drawing the
form in the air, I can judge if the balance of the
objects is OK. I have never realized my habit
before you pointed it out. But, now I noticed it…”
This quote tells us that he probably moves his hands in
order to plan how to use his brush and actually draw the
image of objects in his mind. This is a quite reasonable
candidate function of this hand movement. But, we need
to be careful before making any conclusions on this issue
based on the data from this field study. It would be,
however, worth proposing some plausible hypotheses for
future research. At this moment we propose the following
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Figure4: Mean scores of three factors in each
condition. Error bars represent 1SD.
Table3: Result of Factor Analysis
(Varimax rotated factor pattern)
Score: ７------１ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ SMC
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Light--Heavy -.15 -.18 .75 .62
Contributions .410 .319 .271
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three functions as good candidates. First, by drawing in
the air, the painter decides where to put the brush on the
paper. We call this positioning. Second, the painter
rehearses his brush movement so that he can draw
smoothly. This is related to how to draw. We call this
rehearsal. Third, by drawing an object in the air, the
painter generates a mental image of what he plans to draw
next. We call this image generation.
We could not confirm these hypotheses with this field
study, because we could not control variables
systematically. Further studies are needed to investigate
the roles of drawing in the air.
 General Discussion
This study focused on a traditional art, Chinese ink
painting. Mr. K has an enormous amount of knowledge of
the painting style and draws pictures using this
knowledge. However, knowledge is not enough to create
new pictures improvisationally and smoothly. When he
drew the picture in temple X, he went backward to look at
the entire picture. Also he occasionally covered this
picture in progress with his hands to narrow down the
space of focus. That is, he limited the drawing space to
make planning or monitoring the picture easier. Thus, he
could gradually form a mental image of a picture as the
actual drawing on the paper progresses.
Knowledge and skills accumulated in years of
expertise enable an artist to create artworks fairly quickly
and smoothly. It seems that each brush of drawing evokes
a local image of Suibokuga in Mr. K’s memory. He
creates his pictures combining those images based on
certain rules that he learned from books or his experience.
This process is highly effective when producing certain
kinds of artwork.
On the other hand, artists often become bored while
producing similar works too many times. When bored,
artists want to try something new to stimulate their artistic
motivation. In this Suibokuga painter’s case, the method
of asking the audience to draw random lines and
incorporating them into his own picture is one such
example. Creation of new patterns in artistic works seems
to emerge through artists’ intentional manipulation of
constraints in a creation process. We found that even in a
case of traditional art, artists sometimes conduct this kind
of manipulation intentionally.
Artistic creation requires hands-on activities. Just
having an image or a concept is not enough. In order to
implement an image or a concept into an actual artwork,
an artist needs to use his/her body. Sasaki et al. (1983)
suggested that people would imagine the figure of Kanji
characters by moving their hands. In the study of
embodied representation, Barsalou (1999) has argued that
sensorimotor processes, such as body movement, could
affect the cognitive processes. Similarly, body movement
in artistic creation, such as moving a brush in the air, also
seems to play an important role in creative processes. In
this way, artistic creation is a highly embodied process.
We could not make strong conclusions with this field
study, since we could not control variables systematically.
In addition, because this is a single case study, we also
cannot generalize our findings to artists. However, we
believe that our findings offer an essential first step
towards future studies of the process of artistic creation
from cognitive perspectives. We are currently conducting
other studies regarding the creative process of Japanese
contemporary artists in order to uncover potential
similarities and differences between traditional and
contemporary arts in an effort to generalize our
hypotheses.
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Abstract 
Cross-linguistic research in the framework of the Competition 
Model (MacWhinney & Bates, 1989) has shown that case-
marking is the major cue to sentence interpretation in 
Japanese, whereas other cues such as animacy and word order 
are much weaker. Japanese is a pro-drop language. Many 
Japanese sentences are grammatical without subjects and 
objects. When subjects are absent, case-markers are also 
unavailable to use. However, Japanese honorific and humble 
verbs may provide important information to determine the 
agent when the case-marking cue is absent. This study 
examined the usage of honorific and humble verbs as the 
agreement cue in Japanese sentence interpretation by native 
speakers in comparison to their usage by second language 
learners of Japanese. 
 
Introduction 
Japanese uses specific affixes on the verb to mark social 
relations of power and solidarity.  These markings are called 
honorifics. This use of formal grammatical markings is a 
unique feature of Japanese that has often been used as 
evidence for the operation of links between language, 
culture and thought (Whorf, 1967). Apart from these 
fascinating links to culture, honorifics can also serve the 
more mundane function of helping to distinguish the actor 
of the transitive verb. This paper is aimed at discovering the 
role of the verbal agreement cue in processing by native 
speakers. We are also interested in tracking the acquisition 
of this cue by second language learners of Japanese. Our 
study is couched within the framework of the Competition 
Model (MacWhinney & Bates, 1989) which emphasizes the 
relation between statistical regularities in the language and 
the strength of these cues for both first (L1) and second (L2) 
language speakers. 
In order to interpret a transitive sentence, we have to 
identify the actor or agent. In the English sentence, the 
doctor met the patient, native speakers interpret the doctor 
as an agent who was engaged in meeting someone. This is 
because nouns placed before verbs are considered to be the 
actor in English. On the other hand, Japanese uses a 
completely different set of cues to determine the actor or 
agent. Although it has a basic SOV word order as in the 
doctor the patient met, Japanese also allows other word 
orders such as the doctor met the patient (SVO), the patient 
the doctor met (OSV), and the patient met the doctor (OVS). 
Each of these sentences yields the same interpretation with 
the doctor as the agent. Instead of relying on a word order 
cue, Japanese has case markers, such as ga (subject marker), 
wa (topic marker), o (object marker), and ni (dative marker) 
to mark case roles. The exact grammatical characterization 
of these participles has been the subject of dispute for years 
among Japanese linguists (Kuno, 1973), but there is little 
disagreement regarding the general importance of case role 
markings in the language. In general, a noun followed by 
the subject marker ga is likely to have an agentive role in 
any word order in Japanese. For example, a sentence like 
kanja (patient) ni (dative marker) atta (met) isha (doctor) ga 
(subject marker), in the order of OVS provides a meaning 
the doctor met the patient, although OVS order is not 
canonical in Japanese. 
Cue Competition 
Some theories tend to emphasize the universality of 
syntactic types across languages and the importance of a 
single “basic” order within languages (Chomsky, 1981).  
However, from the viewpoint of processing models, online 
sentence interpretation must rely at least initially on surface 
cues to role marking, and these cues vary markedly across 
languages. As we have already seen, English sentence 
interpretation relies heavily on word order (Bates & 
MacWhinney, 1989). This reliance would seem to support 
the central role of a fixed word order, as conceived in 
generative linguistic theories. However, other languages do 
not follow this pattern. A series of previous studies in the 
framework of the Competition Model have shown that case 
marking is the dominant cue in Japanese, Hungarian, and 
German, whereas subject-verb agreement cue is important 
in Italian, French and Spanish, and animacy distinction is 
the crucial determiner of interpretation in Chinese sentences 
(MacWhinney & Bates, 1989). English is unique in this 
sense in that it is the only well-studied language that 
depends so heavily on a word order cue.  
Cue usage also varies developmentally within a single 
language. Children first focus on conspicuous cues that they 
can pick up easily (Slobin & Bever, 1982). Gradually they 
shift their cue usage to those that have high availability and 
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reliability in the language (McDonald, 1989). For example, 
Japanese children first focus on animacy distinction, 
because they already possess fairly clear ideas about which 
nouns are animate and which are inanimate. In contrast, 
learning of the case-marking system is a lot more complex 
than animacy, although it emerges eventually as the 
dominant cue in Japanese. Thus Japanese children rely on 
the animacy cue to interpret sentences first and then they 
later shift their cue usage to the case-marking cue which has 
high availability and reliability, i.e., it is a cue which is 
often present and which usually provides a correct 
interpretation. 
Typically, languages make use of several cues for 
marking case roles. In most sentences, these cues agree with 
each other to guide a correct interpretation, though cues 
sometimes compete against each other. Sentences with 
inanimate subjects, such as The study looked at Japanese 
children, are quite common in written English. Here, word 
order provides a cue indicating that the study is the agent, 
whereas the animacy cue suggests that Japanese children 
should be the agent, because an animate noun is generally 
preferred as agent because of its dynamicity. Despite this 
cue competition, word order wins over animacy because 
word order has the highest availability and reliability in 
English (McDonald, 1987). On the other hand, when word 
order and animacy compete in Japanese sentences, animacy 
wins over word order because animacy is stronger in 
Japanese. Thus, in the parallel Japanese sentence Japanese 
children would be the agent (Sasaki & MacWhinney, in 
press). Similarly, when all of case marking, word order and 
animacy compete, case marking wins over animacy, and 
animacy wins over word order (case > animacy > word 
order), because case is the strongest cue in Japanese (Sasaki 
& MacWhinney, in press). Because Japanese word order is 
so flexible, it is the weakest cue in Japanese. 
Unlike children’s speech or child first language 
acquisition, in adult Japanese language use, in addition to 
theses basic cues, new cue emerges to compete with the 
other basic cues. This new cue is the honorific cue which is 
used along with verbs as morphological markings. Honorific 
and humble verbs are not used in children’s speech because 
children are not yet expected to fully understand 
hierarchical society in Japanese culture that is reflected in 
the language use. However, the appropriate use of honorific 
and humble verbs becomes crucial in order to survive in 
adult Japanese society. 
Cultural and Linguistic Interactions 
Like Spanish and Italian, Japanese allows frequent omission 
of subject and object nominals. In English, pro-drop 
sentences, such as ∅ saw the black cat, are considered to be 
ungrammatical. However, neko (cat) o (object marker) mita 
(saw) in Japanese is completely grammatical. Some 
Japanese linguists even claim that it is inappropriate to use 
the word “pro-drop” to describe Japanese constructions 
because subjects are not dropped but absent from the 
beginning (Kaneya, 2002). In Japanese, sentences without 
subjects and objects are completely grammatical. For 
example, the following short dialogue is very common in 
Japanese conversation. 
 
A: “kuroi neko mita?” 
  [black  cat   saw?] 
B: “un, mita.” 
  [yeah, saw] 
 
The subject is absent in utterance A, and both the subject 
and object are absent in utterance B. Yet, they are both 
grammatical (see more of these examples in Kaneya, 2002). 
Linguistically, word order cannot be an important cue 
because subjects and sometimes objects are both dropped in 
Japanese. 
Japanese also marks cultural preferences regarding the 
status of the grammatical third person through the 
morphology of verbs and adjectives. Some verbs and 
adjectives carry information identifying the agent. However, 
the shape of this information is limited in specific ways, 
because Japanese culture inhibits stepping into others’ 
psychological or physiological territory (Kamio, 1995). 
Verbs and adjectives that describe a third person’s mental 
state have a special conjugation. Adjectives are usually used 
with –garu for third person, and verbs for third person are 
used in the –teiru form. For example, adjectives like hoshii 
(want, desirable), ureshii (happy), itai (painful) are all used 
with the adjectival third person marker –garu as in hoshi-
garu, ureshi-garu, ita-garu. Verbs like omou (think), and 
komaru (have trouble) are used in the –teiru form in omo-
tteiru, and koma-tteiru. It is ungrammatical to say kanja 
(patient) ga (subject marker) ureshi (happy-1st person, 
dictionary form), because a first person adjective cannot 
describe a third person subject. Rather, ureshii here should 
be ureshi-garu (3rd person). Therefore, even if subjects are 
dropped, sometimes verbs and adjectives will provide 
sufficient information to determine the agent. 
Similarly, honorific and humble verbs are very useful 
cues that can be used for a variety of both transitive and 
intransitive verbs in Japanese. Honorific verbs cannot be 
used for the first person, but only for the second or the third 
person particularly for superiors. Humble verbs can be used 
only for the first person or the speaker’s in-group members. 
For example, o-hanashi-ninari-mashita (honor + talk + 
honor + past tense) may indicate that the agent is someone 
superior to the speaker, and cannot be either the speaker or 
someone inferior to the speaker. Similarly, o-hanashi-itashi-
masu (honor + talk + humble + non-past) indicates the 
action of the (humble) speaker or the speaker’s (humble) in-
group members. Even without overt mention of the subjects, 
these honorific and humble verbs provide evidence that is 
sufficient to identify the agent. 
Considering the fact that subjects are frequently absent in 
Japanese, these verbal markings of honorific status should 
be one of the more reliable cues in Japanese. Although these 
cues are not always available, they should always be reliable 
when they are available particularly in adult speech. 
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Previous studies (Sasaki & MacWhinney, in press) have 
shown that the case-marking cue is the dominant cue in 
Japanese. However, when subjects and objects are absent, 
case markers are also naturally absent. When the dominant 
cue is unavailable, other cues must be used instead. As we 
have seen already, other cues such as animacy and word 
order have been examined in relation to the case-marking 
cue. However, the use of Japanese verb marking for 
honorific status has not yet been examined. 
This study has two goals. The first is to measure the use 
of the honorific agreement cue by native Japanese speakers 
in comparison to case-marking cue and word order. 
Honorific and humble expressions are used only when there 
are social and psychological distances between the speaker 
and the listener, or between the speaker and the target 
person addressed. The availability of the honorific and 
humble verb cue would be high, particularly in adult speech 
under a hierarchical pressure, although overall availability 
of the honorific verb agreement cue in general speech may 
not be higher than that of the case-marking cue. Therefore, 
we can hypothesize that honorific verb agreement cue may 
not be stronger than the case-marking cue, yet it should be 
an important cue when case is absent. 
The second goal of the study is to examine how second 
language learners acquire this verb agreement cue. Unlike 
native speakers, second language learners have not yet 
developed an entrenched usage of the case-marking cue. 
Moreover, when they first begin to pay attention to 
honorific marking, they may at first tend to overestimate 
and overgeneralize its importance, because the instruction is 
focusing specifically on this structure which learners tend to 
master in a short period of time. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty native Japanese speakers, 16 advanced level 
Japanese learners as a foreign language, and 29 intermediate 
level Japanese learners participated in the study. Native 
Japanese speakers were recruited in Pittsburgh with a mean 
age of 31.6, and with a mean of length of residence in the 
United States less than 3 years. L2 learners were recruited 
from advanced and intermediate levels of Japanese courses 
at Carnegie Mellon University. Both intermediate and 
advanced learners have learned honorific and humble verb 
systems in class, though advanced learners have been 
exposed to them approximately for a year longer than 
intermediate learners. Some of advanced learners had an 
experience of studying abroad in Japan. No learners have an 
experience of studying abroad more than three months. 
Stimuli 
Three factors controlled in the study were word order, case-
marking, and honorific cues with three levels for each. 
Word orders consisted of NNV, NVN, and VNN (N=Noun, 
V=Verb). Thus there were always two nouns and one verb 
used in every condition. The three levels for case-marking 
factor were nominative, dative and zero. When the first 
noun is marked with a nominative case and the second noun 
with a dative case, it is described as Nom_Dat condition, 
and Dat_Nom is used for the reversed case marking 
condition. Zero indicates the zero case marking condition. 
Honorific agreement cues were manipulated using simple 
transitive verbs such as call, meet, and talk with three levels 
of agreement: agreement-yes, agreement-no, and agreement-
missing. Agreement-yes and agreement-no indicate whether 
the verb used in each condition agreed grammatically with 
the first noun. The agreement-missing condition contains 
plain verbs without modification of honorific or humble 
styles. Half of agreement-yes and agreement-no conditions 
used honorific verbs and the other half used humble verbs 
along with noun features differing in positional superiority. 
In order to control animacy effects, all nouns were animate. 
Each condition consisted of a noun combination differing in 
occupational superiority such as teacher-student, general-
soldier, and president-employee. 
For example, in the condition of order-NNV, case-zero, 
agreement-yes, sentences like, sensei (teacher) gakusei 
(student) ohanashi ninari masu (talk-honorific), was used. 
In this condition, we can see whether participants used 
either the case-marking or the verb agreement cue to 
interpret the sentence. Case is zero, so it provides no clues 
to determine the agent, whereas the verb agreement cue 
suggests that the honorable person should be the agent. In 
another condition where case is available, e.g., sensei 
(teacher) ga (subject marker) gakusei (student) ni (dative 
marker) o hanashi itashimasu (talk-humble), we can see 
clear competition between case and verb agreement cue. 
Case suggests sensei (teacher) marked with ga (subject 
marker) to be the agent whereas verb agreement with 
humble verb suggests gakusei (student) to be the agent 
although it is marked with a dative marker. 
In addition to these three factors, filler sentences were 
inserted to guarantee that subjects treated the task in a 
natural fashion. The filler sentences excluded honorific 
agreement factor and superiority features in nouns. They 
controlled only word order and case-marking factors. The 
fillers also served the function of breaking up any tendency 
to lock into processing for specific verb types. 
All three factors were fully crossed with three levels for 
three participant groups: native Japanese speakers, advanced 
learners, and intermediate learners. The full-factorial design 
of 3x3x3 was manipulated with the total of 54 sentences in 
addition to 18 filler sentences. 
To create each sentence, the total of forty eight words was 
used: six base nouns (three superior and three subordinate 
nouns) with three case-marking forms (nominative, dative, 
and zero), and five base verbs with three agreement forms 
(honorific, humble, and plain) for experimental sentences, 
and five nouns (no superiority difference) with three case-
marking forms for filler sentences. A male native Japanese 
speaker recorded the sentence components with a normal 
reading speed with no accents, and digitized with 16-bit 
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monaural .wav format at a 22-kHz sampling rate using 
CoolEdit 2000. Each sound file of nouns and verbs was 
combined into the appropriate sentence pattern using E-
Prime 1.1 with complete random orders. The intonation 
patterns of combined words for all statements were 
indistinguishable, which prevented listeners from using any 
prosodic cues. 
 
Procedure 
In this task, all participants sat in front of a computer, and 
heard from a headphone a series of sentences that were 
composed of two nouns and a simple transitive verb. As the 
sentence began, the computer screen displayed pictures 
describing two nouns in each sentence. The pictures 
remained displayed until participants pressed a key 
indicating their choice of one of the pictures as the agent. 
Pictures were accompanied by words describing the pictures. 
For example, “teacher” (in Japanese) was shown on top of a 
picture of “teacher”. This is to decrease non-native 
speakers’ processing load. The subject identification task by 
itself for non-native speakers may put heavy processing load 
on their memory particularly when the cue competition is 
high, so they were instructed not to worry about memorizing 
words they did not know. 
Participants were asked to choose or identify the picture 
that performed the action described in each sentence. They 
were instructed to choose either of the two nouns as agent, 
and to push a button corresponding to either of two pictures 
shown on the computer screen. If they thought the person on 
the right side did an action, they pushed the right button. If 
they thought the person on the left side did an action, they 
pushed the left button. They were instructed to press the 
button as quickly as possible after they heard a sentence. 
The response as a choice of the first noun was measured 
after 5 practice sentences. 
All participants were tested individually in a small quiet 
room and were asked to complete the same task, although 
native Japanese speakers and non-native speakers were 
given different instructions before the task. Native Japanese 
speakers were told that sometimes sentences were culturally 
inappropriate or grammatically incorrect, and they were 
asked to respond quickly using their intuitions in the case 
they found some sentences unnatural. As it was mentioned 
earlier, these sentences were set up to test the usage of cue 
competition. For non-native Japanese speakers, additional 
instructions were given. In order to refresh learners’ 
memory and make them comfortable about the use of 
honorific and humble verbs, each non-native participant 
went through a brief review on verb conjugations. They 
were also briefly informed about social and hierarchical 
differences between roles such as general vs. soldier, and 
president vs. employee, which were used in the experiment. 
Results 
ANOVAs were performed using percentage of choice of the 
first noun as agent as the dependent variable. The main  
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Figure 1: The percentage choice of the first noun as agent in 
the condition of (1) Nom_Dat case (the first noun 
is marked with the nominative case, and the 
second noun is marked with dative case) crossed 
with the agreement cue, (2) Dat_Nom case and (3) 
Zero case (neither nouns were marked with case). 
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effects of case and honorifics were significant (Case: F(2, 
61) = 164, p < 0.001; Honor: F(2, 61) = 17.7, p < 0.001), 
but word order was not. The non-significance of the word 
order effect shows that none of the groups, including L2 
learners, relied on the word order cue. The interaction 
between case and honorific agreement was also significant 
(F(4, 59) = 20, p < 0.001). The use of nominative case for 
the first noun and dative case for the second noun is shown 
in Figure 1. In the Nom_Dat condition, native speakers 
consistently used the case-marking cue, despite the presence 
of an agreement cue. L2 learners also made use of the case-
marking cue, though they relied much less on case than did 
native speakers.  Native speakers’ first noun choice for 
Nom_Dat was over 95% in all three agreement conditions, 
whereas the first noun choice of advanced and intermediate 
learners dramatically decreased in the condition where verbs 
do not agree with the first noun feature (advanced: 60%; 
intermediate: 52%).  
 Similarly, in the Dat_Nom case condition, native 
speakers consistently showed the strong use of the case-
marking cue to select the second noun as agent. The second 
noun is marked with a nominative case in this condition, so 
the lower percentage of the first noun choice indicates the 
heavier reliance on using the case-marking cue. The first 
noun choice by native speakers was less than 11% in all 
agreement conditions, whereas L2 learners’ first noun 
choice was higher. When the verb agrees with the honorific 
status of the first noun, learners’ first noun choice increased 
noticeably (advanced: 46%; intermediate: 54%). This shows 
that learners placed heavy reliance on the honorific 
agreement cue even when it contradicted the case-marking 
cue. 
In the zero case-marking condition, the first noun choice 
by native speakers showed a clear decline from agreement-
yes to agreement-no conditions (agreement-yes: 85%; 
agreement-missing: 60%; agreement-no: 18%). Because the 
case-marking cue was unavailable in this condition, native 
speakers relied on the honorific verb agreement cue to 
determine the agent. On the other hand, learners’ usage of 
verb agreement cue was not as robust as native speakers’. 
 
Discussion 
The patterns of Japanese native speakers’ performance in 
the experiments showed that the case-marking cue was still 
the dominant cue in Japanese. Despite the presence of the 
honorific verb agreement cue, native speakers consistently 
chose nouns marked with the nominative case as agent. 
However, when case was absent, the honorific verb 
agreement cue became an important and reliable cue to 
determine the agent. Even though Japanese has a canonical 
SOV word order, we did not find any effects of the word 
order cue in the absence of case. This confirms the results 
from the previous studies. Importantly, we demonstrated 
within a single experiment both inattention to word order 
and attention to honorific agreement. Thus, it appears that 
honorific agreement is the second major cue in Japanese 
sentence processing, after case-marking. 
The second important finding of the study is that cue 
availability determined cue strength. Native speakers’ first 
noun choices were not entirely controlled by the agreement 
cue. There was 85% first noun choice in the agreement-yes 
condition and 18% in the agreement-no condition. This 
suggests that even native speakers are sometimes unsure 
about the correct use of honorific and humble verbs. As we 
have already discussed earlier, honorific and humble verbs 
are not frequently present in younger people’s daily 
linguistic input until they start working in businesses. Some 
of the participants of native speakers in the study were 
graduate students who have no experience working in 
businesses. Therefore, their cue usage of the honorific verb 
agreement cue might not have been as strong as we could 
find in speakers from the business environment. Further 
study of the use of this cue by speakers from the business 
community may help us understand the extent to which 
increased availability of the cue could lead to an increase in 
its relative strength when it is placed in conflict with case-
marking.  
The third finding of the study relates to the cue usage 
patterns by L2 learners. As we predicted, their usage of both 
the case-marking cue and the honorific agreement cue was 
more variable than that of native speakers. Interestingly, 
they overused the honorific agreement cue even when the 
case-marking cue was available to use. On the other hand, 
they did not use the honorific cue as much as they could, 
when case was absent. This suggests that learners’ use of the 
case-marking cue has not yet stabilized at native speaker 
levels after about two years of learning Japanese. Moreover, 
the overuse of the honorific cue indicates that learners tend 
to focus on a single cue when this is at the focus of an 
instructional module or experiment. This tendency to focus 
on individual cues may prevent them from fixing the 
relative strength of each cue among all available cues in the 
target language. To counteract this tendency, instructors 
may need to present learners with input that illustrates 
competition between the relevant cues. In particular, 
learners need more experience with sets of sentences in 
which case marking is either present or absent and in which 
honorific agreement is either present or absent. 
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Abstract
Visual illusion can be strengthened or weakened with the ad-
dition of extra visual elements. For example, in Poggendorff
illusion, with an additional bar added, the illusory skew in the
perceived angle can be enlarged or reduced. In this paper, we
show that a nontrivial interaction between lateral inhibitory
processes in the early visual system (i.e., disinhibition) can
explain such enhancement or degradation of the illusory per-
cept. The computational model we derived successfully pre-
dicted the perceived angle in a modified Poggendorff illusion
task with an extra thick bar. The concept of disinhibition em-
ployed in the model is general enough that we expect it can
be further extended to account for other classes of geometric
illusions.
Introduction
Visual illusions are important phenomena because of their po-
tential to shed light on the underlying functional organization
of the visual system. For simple illusions, a simplistic expla-
nation can be sufficient, but when multiple effects exist in an
illusion, the final percept can be quite complex. For exam-
ple, when we perceive an angle, our perception of the angle
is usually greater than the actual angle (expansion effect), but
when there are multiple lines and thus multiple angles, the
expansion effect can be either enhanced or reduced.
Such an interference effect can be demonstrated in a mod-
ified Poggendorff illusion. In the original Poggendorff illu-
sion (see, e.g., Tolansky 1964; Morgan 1999), the top and the
bottom portions of the penetrating thin line is perceived as
misaligned (figure 1). Figure 2 shows how such a perception
of misalignment can occur. The line on top forms an angle α
with the horizontal bar, but the perceived angle α′ is greater
than α (i.e., exaggerated). As a result, the line on top is per-
ceived to be collinear with line 4 on the bottom, instead of
line 3 which is physically collinear. However, when an addi-
tional bar is added, the perceived illusory angular expansion
effect is altered: the effect is either reduced (figure 3) or en-
hanced (figure 4) depending on the orientation of the newly
added bar. Understanding the functional organization and the
low-level neurophysiology underlying such a nontrivial inter-
action is the main aim of this paper.
Neurophysiologically speaking, in the original case where
two orientations interact, lateral inhibition between orienta-
tion cells in the visual cortex can explain the enlargement in
perceived angle. However, as we have seen in figures 3 and
4, when an additional orientation response is triggered, lat-
eral inhibition alone cannot explain the complex effect. Our
1
5
Figure 1: The Poggendorff Illusion. The original Poggendorff
illusion is shown. The five lines below the horizontal bar are labeled
1 to 5 from top to bottom. Line 3 is physically collinear with the line
on top. In this example, line 4 is perceived to be collinear.
α
5
1
’α
Figure 2: The Angle Displacement in the Poggendorff Illusion.
The actual angle α (= 30◦) and the perceived angle α′ (> 30◦) are
shown. The gray line shows the straight line penetrating the bar. The
dashed line below shows the perceived direction in which the line on
top seemingly extends to.
observation is that this complex response is due to disinhibi-
tion, i.e., inhibition of another inhibitory factor resulting in
effective excitation (Hartline et al. 1956; Hartline and Ratliff
1957, 1958; Stevens 1964; Brodie et al. 1978). Unlike simple
lateral inhibition between two cells, we explicitly accounted
for disinhibition in our computational model to describe the
complex interactions between multiple orientation cells. The
resulting model based on the neurophysiology of the early
visual system was able to accurately predict the perceptual
performance for the modified Poggendorff illusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, a neuro-
physiological motivation for our computational model is pre-
sented, followed by a detailed mathematical description of the
model. Next, the results from the computational experiments
with the model is presented and compared to psychophysical
data, followed by discussion and conclusion.
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Figure 3: The Poggendorff Illusion with an Additional Thick
Bar of 50 ◦. The Poggendorff figure with an additional bar at
50◦ is shown. In this case, line 2 is perceived to be collinear (i.e.,
α′ < 30◦).
1
5
Figure 4: The Poggendorff Illusion with An Additional Thick
Bar of 20 ◦. The Poggendorff figure with an additional bar at 20◦
is shown. For this case, unlike in figure 3, line 4 (or to some, line
5) is perceived to be collinear (α′ > 30◦). (The α′ in this case is
slightly greater than in original Poggendorff figure.)
Computational Model of Disinhibition in the
Visual Cortex
Let us first consider how orientation columns in the visual
cortex interact in response to several intersecting lines. For
each line at the intersection, there are corresponding orien-
tation columns that respond maximally, with a Gaussian re-
sponse distribution. As multiple simple cells are activated by
the different lines at the intersection, the response levels will
interact with each other through lateral connections. Thus,
there are two issues we want to more precisely address: (1)
what exactly is the activation profile (or the response distri-
bution) of the orientation-tuned cells, and (2) how these cells
interact with each other through the lateral connections.
The Activation Profile of Orientation Columns
Each simple cell in the primary visual cortex responds max-
imally to visual stimuli with a particular orientation. The re-
sponse of these cells to different orientations can be modeled
as a Gaussian function:
y = y0 +
A
σ
√
pi/2
exp(−2(x− xc)
2
σ2
), (1)
where y0 is an offset; xc is the center (or mean); σ is the
standard deviation; andA is a scaling constant (Martinez et al.
2002).
It also comes to our attention that the cell tuned for a certain
orientation, say α, should respond to the opposite orientation,
which is α + 180◦. However, experiments have shown that
the peak at the position α+180◦ is somewhat smaller than the
peak at α (Alonso and Martinez 1998). To accurately model
this, we need two Gaussian curves to fit the responses of a
cell to a full range of orientations from −180◦ to 180◦.
The fitting curve can be written as follows:
y = y0
+
A
σ
√
pi/2
exp(−2(x− xc)
2
σ2
)
+
AK
σ
√
pi/2
exp(−2(x− xc + pi)
2
σ2
), (2)
where K is the rate of activation for the opposed direction
(K < 1). Such an asymmetric response enables the the sim-
ple cells to be sensitive to the direction (as well as orienta-
tion).
Using the equation, we can now visualize the response pro-
file of simple cells tuned to orientations ranging from 0 to
360◦. Figure 5 shows the responses of orientation columns
tuned to -90◦to 270◦ (x-axis) to inputs of two different ori-
entations, 0 and 30◦. Figure 6 shows the responses of the
same set of orientation columns to inputs of two orientations
of 0 and 150◦. From these two figures, we can observe that
for each specific orientation input, the excitation is tuned at
that value with a peak in the Gaussian curve, and at the same
time, the opposite orientation tuned cell shows a lower peak
response. The asymmetry in responses occur in both an acute
angle (figure 5) and an obtuse angle (figure 6). Note that even
though the difference in orientation between 0◦ vs. 30◦ and
0◦ vs. 150◦ is 30◦ in both cases, the response profile greatly
differs in the 0◦ vs. 150◦case.
This is an improvement over conventional excitation pro-
file models such as Gabor filters (Daugman 1980), which
make no distinction between these two angles in the two fig-
ures. Using the more accurate response profile, we will next
investigate how these response profiles can interact.
Column Level Inhibition and Disinhibition
Our observation that the angular enlargement sometimes
seems to be weakened when there are more than two bars or
lines in the Poggendorff illusion (figure 3) led us to hypoth-
esize about the potential role of a recurrent inhibition effect,
i.e., disinhibition. Basically disinhibition is the inhibition on
other inhibitory factors, resulting in a net excitatory effect
at the target. Experiments on the Limulus (horseshoe crab)
optical cells showed that the final response of each receptor
resulting from a light stimulus can be enhanced or reduced
due to the interactions through inhibition from its neighbors.
Note that disinhibition has also been found in vertebrate reti-
nas such as in tiger salamanders (Roska et al. 1998) and in
mice (Frech et al. 2001). In the following, the Limulus neu-
rophysiology giving rise to disinhibition is summarized, fol-
lowed by the description of our computational model based
on the Limulus model.
Hartline-Ratliff’s model of disinhibition Experiments on
Limulus optical cells have shown that lateral inhibition effect
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Figure 7: Lateral inhibition in Limulus optical cells. The figure shows the disinhibition effect in Limulus optical cells. (a) The retina of
Limulus. Point light is presented to three locations (1, 2 and 3). (b) The result of lighting position 1 and 2. The top trace shows the spike train
of the neuron at 1, and the two bars below show the duration of stimulation to cell 1 and 2. When position 2 is excited, the neuron response
of position 1 gets inhibited. (c) Both 1 and 2 are illuminated, and after a short time, position 3 is lighted. The top two traces show the spike
trains of cell 1 and cell 2. The three bars below are input duration to the three cells. As demonstrated in the figure, when position 3 is lighted,
neurons at position 2 get inhibited by 3, so its ability to inhibit others get reduced. As a result, the firing rate of neuron at position 1 gets
increased during the time neuron at position 3 is excited. This effect is called disinhibition. Redrawn from (Hartline and Ratliff 1957).
Figure 5: The Activation on Simple Cell by an Acute Angle
(30◦). The dotted curve is the responses of the orientation columns
(x-axis) to a horizontal line of 0◦, and the solid curve is the responses
to 30◦ line.
is recurrent (figure 7; see Hartline and Ratliff 1957, 1958).
The final response of a specific neuron can be considered as
the overall effect of the response from itself and from all other
neurons. Conventional convolution operation using lateral in-
hibition alone does not account for the effect of disinhibition
which plays an important role in the final response. The final
response of each receptor resulting from a light stimulus can
be enhanced or reduced due to the interactions through in-
hibition from its neighbors, which may be important. (Such
disinhibition effects have been found to play an important role
in brightness-contrast illusions Yu et al. (2004).)
Hartline and his colleagues also did significant math-
ematical modeling of the Limulus optical cell response.
The Hartline-Ratliff equation describing disinhibition in the
Figure 6: The Activation on Simple Cell by Blunt Angle. The
dotted curve is the responses of the orientation columns (x-axis) to a
horizontal line of 0◦, while the solid curve is the responses to a 150◦
line.
Limulus can be written as follows (Hartline and Ratliff 1957,
1958; Stevens 1964):
rm = m −Ksrm −
∑
wm←n(rn − tm←n), (3)
where rm is the response, Ks is the self-inhibition constant,
m is the excitation of them-th ommatidium, wm←n is the in-
hibitory weight from other ommatidia, and tm←n the thresh-
old.
Brodie et al. extended this equation to derive a spatiotem-
poral filter, where the input was assumed to be a sinusoidal
grating (Brodie et al. 1978). This model is perfect in pre-
dicting Limulus retina experiments as only a single spatial
frequency channel filter, which means that only a fixed spa-
tial frequency input is allowed (Brodie et al. 1978). Because
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of this reason, their model cannot be applied to a complex
image, as various spatial frequencies could coexist in the in-
put. In the following section, we will build upon the Hartline-
Ratliff equation and derive a filter that can be used in model-
ing orientation columns.
A simplified model of disinhibition Based on the Hartline-
Ratliff equation above, we derived a model for two-
dimensional disinhibition as follows (Yu et al. 2004):
r =W−1 × x. (4)
where r is the output vector, x is the input vector and W is
the weight matrix:
Wij =
 −w(|i, j|) when i 6= j1 when i = j , (5)
where w(i, j) is the kernel function (usually a difference-of-
Gaussian) defining the inhibition rate from the j-th neuron to
the i-th neuron. Based on this simplified model of disinhibi-
tion, we can now more easily derive the disinhibition effect at
the orientation column level.
Applying disinhibition to orientation cells Cells occupy-
ing the same single orientation column in the cat visual cortex
are known to inhibit each other (Blakemore and Tobin 1972).
From this, we can postulate that a group of cells tuned to the
same orientation representing different lines (e.g., intersect-
ing lines) may compete with each other through inhibition.
Now let us consider the mathematical description for the
inhibition at the column level. Suppose a group of orientation
cells tuned to orientation α receives n lines as their inputs.
The initial excitation Eαi for a cell inside this group α can be
calculated as follows:
Eαi = y0
+
A
σ
√
pi/2
exp(−2(α− xc(i))
2
σ2
)
+
AK
σ
√
pi/2
exp(−2(α− xc(i) + pi)
2
σ2
), (6)
where y0 is an offset, A is a scaling constant for the Gaus-
sians, σ is the standard deviation, K is the rate of activation
of the opposite direction, and xc(i) is the orientation of the
i-th input line. In this way, we can calculate the excitation E
of the cell to the i-th line on a certain group of cells tuned to
α. All those parameters in this equation are fairly standard
parameters, which does not require a precise tuning.
Using the Hartline-Ratliff equation (Hartline and Ratliff
1957) for recurrent lateral inhibition and the simplified model
of disinhibition (Yu et al. 2004), the final response R of cell i
in orientation column α can be obtained as follows:
Rαi = Eαi −W ×Rαi, (7)
where W is a constant matrix of inhibition rate (or weight,
controlled by a free parameter η: wij = η if i 6= j, and
0 otherwise). From this, we can finally derive the response
equation which accounts for the disinhibition effect:
Rαi = (I −W )−1 × Eαi, (8)
where I is the identity matrix.
By applying the orientation α to all the columns, the pro-
jection of each line to the columns should shift a little bit de-
pending on the strength of the activation of each line. Thus,
the final perceived line orientation γ can be obtained by find-
ing the maximum response after the inhibition process:
γi = argmaxα∈CRαi (9)
where γi is the perceived orientation for the i-th line, R is
the responses of i-th neuron tuned to orientation α and C is
the set of all the orientation columns in layer 4 of the visual
cortex.
Experiments and Results
Prediction of Angle Expansion without Additional
Context
To test the model in the simplest stimulus configuration, we
used stimuli consisting of one thick bar and one thin line.
The thick bar was fixed at 0◦, and the thin line was rotated
to various orientations while the perceived angle was mea-
sured in the model. The enlargement effect of the angle var-
ied depending on the orientation of the thin line. As shown
in figure 8, we can observe that there are three major char-
acteristics of this varying effect. First, for the acute angles,
there is an increment in the angle of the perceived compared
to actual, but for the obtuse angles, the perceived angle is less
than the actual angle. Second, the peak is around 20◦ for the
largest positive displacement, and around 160◦ for the largest
negative displacement. Third, there is an obvious asymmetry
in the displacements between the acute angles and the ob-
tuse angles. Note that the peak at 20◦ is greater in magnitude
than the dip at 160◦. As compared in figure 8, these results
are consistent with results obtained in psychophysical exper-
iment by Blakemore et al. (1970).
Prediction for the Modified Poggendorff Illusion
Disinhibition effect is the key observation leading to our ex-
tension to the angular expansion model based on lateral inhi-
bition alone. Because of disinhibition, when more than two
lines or bars intersect, the perceived angle of the thin line will
deviate from the case where only two lines or bars are present.
Figure 9 shows the prediction of our model (solid line) when
a second thick bar of varying orientations was added to the
original Poggendorff illusion (see figure 3 and 4 for an exam-
ple). If disinhibition effect did not exist, the solid line would
have come out flat, however, there is an interesting peak and
a valley in the predicted response. The effect demonstrated
in figure 3 is accurately predicted by the peak near 20◦, and
the effect in figure 4 by the valley near 50◦. So, at least for
these two cases, we can say that our disinhibition-based ex-
planation is accurate. However, does the explanation hold for
an arbitrary orientation? To test this, we conducted a psy-
chophysical experiment to measure human perceptual perfor-
mance and compare the results to the model prediction (the
results are shown as data points in figure 9).
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Figure 8: The Variations of Perceived Angle Between Two Inter-
secting Lines. The x-axis corresponds to the angle 6 AOB (inset),
from 0 to 180◦. The y-axis is the difference between the perceived
angle and the actual angle. The solid line is the result predicted by
our model, and the data points * and + are data from human subjects
in Blakemore et al. (1970). The curve was generated in two itera-
tions, with the following parameters: η = 0.009 and σ = 1.0 for
the first pass; η = 0.005 and σ = 0.5 for the second. The other
parameters remained the same for both iterations: y0 = 0.0 and
K = 0.5.
Experimental methods Two subjects with normal vision
participated in the experiment (the authors YC and YY). An
LCD panel with a 1024×768 resolution, which is supposed
to be high enough to avoid line aliasing aritfacts, was used
to display the stimuli. The computer program displayed two
thick bars and one thin line on the screen, similar to the stim-
ulus in figure 3. The first thick bar was fixed in the center
of the screen at 0◦, and the width was 100 pixels. The thin
line, 5 pixels in width, intersected the horizontal bar at a fixed
angle of 30◦. The second thick bar, 100 pixels in width, in-
tersected at the same point as the the other two, where as the
angle was varied from trial to trial. The program also dis-
played up to 10 thin lines (all 30◦) below the horizontal bar,
from which the subjects were asked to choose the one that is
the most collinear to the thin line above the bar. The subject
was allowed to click on the line of choice, and the perceived
angle was recorded for each click, and a new stimulus was
generated. A total of 101 trials were recorded for each sub-
ject.
Results Figure 9 shows the result of the psychophysical
experiment (data points * and + for YC and YY, respec-
tively), along with the prediction of the model (solid line).
The peak (near 20◦) and valley (near 50◦) are apparent in the
experimental data, and the overall shape of the curve closely
agrees with the model prediction. The results show that our
model of angular interaction based on disinhibition can ac-
curately explain the modified Poggendorff illusion, and that
low-level neurophysiology can provide us with insights into
understanding the mechanisms underlying various visual illu-
sions. Note that for this experiment, our disinhibition model
is more comprehensive than the calculation method of simply
summing up two Poggendorff effects by two separate bars.
First it is because disinhibition is the summing up between all
Figure 9: Perceived Angle in a Modified Poggendorff Illusion.
The results from the computational model (solid line) and human
experiments (data points marked * and +) on a modified Poggendorff
illusion (figure 3) are plotted. The second thick bar was rotated while
the perceived angle was measured. The x-axis indicates the angle of
the second bar. The y-axis shows the perceived angle of the thin
30◦ line. The model prediction and the human data are in close
agreement. The parameters used in this experiment were as follows:
free parameter: η = 0.02; standard parameters: y0 = 0, σ = 0.5,
and K = 0.5.
the pairs of bars at neuronal level, and second, simply sum-
ming up the effects of two bars omits the interactions between
the lateral inhibition effects.
Discussion
We have presented a model based on angular inhibition by
considering the disinhibition effect. The soundness of the the-
oretical extension lies in the fact that it is grounded in phys-
iological and psychological facts. First, at the cellular level,
lateral inhibition and disinhibition effects are found in the vi-
sual column of cat (Hubel and Wiesel 1962; Blakemore and
Tobin 1972) and it is known that the opposite directions of
the same orientation evoke an asymmetric response (Alonso
and Martinez 1998). Our prediction of the angle variations
for acute and obtuse angles shows asymmetric properties and
matches these experiments. Second, our model can correctly
predict the disinhibition caused by more than two lines in-
tersected and the results match with our own experimental
observation using the same kind of stimuli.
Besides the Poggendorff illusion, our model has the poten-
tial for explaining other geometric illusions, such as the cafe´-
wall illusion. Fermu¨ller and Malm (2003) showed a variation
of the cafe´-wall illusion where adding some dots in strategic
places significantly reduced the perceived distortion. Such a
correctional effect can be explained by our model. Because
the newly introduced dots give rise to a new orientation com-
ponent (as the second thick bar did in our modified Poggen-
dorff illusion), the disinhibitory effect caused by that new ori-
entation can reduce the distortion formed by the existing ori-
entation components.
Even though the disinhibition model presented in this pa-
per is largely motivated by low-level neurophysiology, disin-
hibition can potentially serve a more general function. For ex-
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ample, disinhibition can also be applied to higher brain func-
tions such as categorization and memory (see Vogel (2001)
for a model of associative memory based on disinhibition).
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a neurophysiologically based
model of disinhibition to account for a modified version of the
Poggendorff illusion. The model was able to accurately pre-
dict a subtle orientation interaction effect, closely matching
the psychophysical data we collected. We expect the model
to be general enough to account for other kinds of geometrical
illusions as well.
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Abstract
Is configural information or featural information more
important for facial identity recognition? How are the
skills for processing these types of information devel-
oped? To investigate these issues, Mondloch et al. de-
signed three sets of face images based on a single face,
“Jane”, to measure featural, configural, and contour
processing. These stimuli were tested on human sub-
jects of different ages in a same/different task. We
test our model [Dailey et al., 2002] of face processing on
these stimuli. We find that our model is overly holistic:
It finds the configural differences the easiest to detect,
while adult human subjects find featural changes the
easiest to detect. We then introduce a representation
of the important parts of the face (eyes and mouth)
to our holistic model. We find that only a relatively
small amount of holistic representation, compared to
parts representations, is necessary to account for the
data.
Introduction
We have developed a model of face processing that ac-
counts for a number of important phenomena in facial
expression processing, holistic processing and visual ex-
pertise [Dailey and Cottrell, 1999, Cottrell et al., 2002,
Dailey et al., 2002, Joyce and Cottrell, 2004]. Here, we
investigate the model’s ability to account for human sen-
sitivity to variations in faces that are considered theoret-
ically important for face identification. Face processing
is typically described as holistic or configural. Holistic
processing is typically taken to mean that the context
of the whole face has an important contribution to pro-
cessing the parts: subjects have difficulty recognizing
parts of the face in isolation, and subjects have diffi-
culty ignoring parts of the face when making judgments
about another part. Configural processing means that
subjects are sensitive to the relationships between the
parts, e.g., the spacing between the eyes. We will use
the two terms configural and spacing interchangeably in
this paper. Holistic processing can easily be captured by
a model that uses whole-face template-like representa-
tions as ours does: interference from incongruent halves
of a face occurs when making judgments about a different
part (e.g, expression on top when a different expression
is on bottom [Cottrell et al., 2002]). However, configu-
ral effects related to spacing information are attenuated
by the alignment procedure that we typically use, which
warps the image so the eyes and mouth are always in the
same three positions.
Diamond and Carey [Diamond and Carey, 1986] were
among the first to discriminate between the types of
processing involved in face/object perception and recog-
nition. Based on studies looking at the inversion ef-
fect to faces, landscapes and dogs in both dog novices
and dog experts, they proposed that first-order rela-
tional information, which consists of the coarse spa-
tial relationships between the parts of an object (i.e.
eyes are above the nose), is sufficient to recognize most
objects. By contrast, second-order relational informa-
tion, which is needed for face recognition and recogni-
tion of individuals within categories of expertise, is re-
served for visually homogeneous categories where slight
differences in configuration must be used to distinguish
between individuals (e.g. a slight change in the dis-
tance between the eyes and the nose). Diamond and
Carey [Diamond and Carey, 1986] suggest that experi-
ence allows people to develop a fine-tuned prototype and
to become sensitive to second-order differences between
that prototype and new members of that category (e.g.
new faces).
One implication of the Diamond and Carey study
is that the inversion effect (a large reduction in
same/different performance on inverted faces, com-
pared to inverted objects) is based on a relative re-
liance on second-order relational information, and that
perhaps this characteristic distinguishes face/expert-
level processing from regular object recognition. Farah
et al. [Farah et al., 1995] found that encouraging
part-based processing eliminated the inversion effect,
whereas allowing/encouraging non-part-based process-
ing resulted in a robust inversion effect. Thus Farah
et al. conclude that the inversion effect, in faces and
other types of stimuli, is associated with holistic pattern
perception.
However, subjects are also quite sensitive to changes
in the features themselves – substitutions of different
eyes or mouths can make the face look quite differ-
ent. The Thatcher illusion [Thompson, 1980] suggests
that parts are processed somewhat independently, and
only loosely connected to the representation of the whole
face. Recently, a study by Mondloch et al. that varied
these different aspects of a face (configuration, feature
changes, and changes to contour of the face) found dif-
fering levels of sensitivity to the type of manipulation in a
same/different paradigm. While the manipulations were
not performed parametrically (no equating of the diffi-
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culty of discrimination was performed), but in a rather
ad hoc manner, the results are consistent across subjects.
Hence this is a crucial set of data to account for with our
model.
In the following, we describe Mondloch et al.’s exper-
iments and our attempts to account for their data. We
find that our model must be augmented with a repre-
sentation of the parts of the face in order to account for
most of the data. Finally, we discuss plans for future
work.
Mondloch’s Stimuli and Experiments
Mondloch et al. began with a single face (called Jane)
and modified it to create twelve new versions (called
Jane’s Sisters). These were divided to three sets of stim-
uli: a configural set, a featural set, and a contour set
(Figure 1). The four faces in the configural set were cre-
ated by moving the eyes and/or the mouth. The four
faces in the featural set were created by replacing Jane’s
eyes, nose and mouth with those of four different females.
The four faces in the contour set were created by pasting
the internal portion of Jane’s face within the outer con-
tour of four different females. The control stimuli were
called “cousins” and consisted of three different female
faces (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Jane is shown as the left-most face in each panel,
along with her “sisters” from the configural set (panel A), the
featural set (panel B), and the external contour set (panel C).
(from [Mondloch et al., 2002])
Figure 2: The control stimuli: the cousin set. (from
[Mondloch et al., 2002])
These stimuli were presented to 6, 8 and 10-year-old
children as well as adults in a series of same-different
trials. One face appeared for 200ms. After a 300ms
interval, the second one appeared until the participant
responded. There were also trials in which upside down
versions of these faces were presented.
In this work, we concentrate on modeling the adult
data, and hence focus on the black bars in (Fig-
ure 3). The results (Figure 3) showed that when stim-
uli were presented upright, the relative accuracy for
adults in each set of stimuli was cousin > featural >
configural > contour. This is interesting because it
suggests that, at least for this stimulus set, subjects
were more sensitive to individual feature differences than
to configural changes. When the face images were pre-
sented upside down, however, the order was featural >
contour > configural, and there was an inversion effect,
i.e. the accuracy rate decreased. Note that the configural
set, for which inverted accuracy was the worst, showed a
larger inversion effect (measured by the mean accuracy
of upright trials minus that of inverted trials) than the
featural set.
Figure 3: Mean accuracy for each face set and each age
group when stimuli were presented upright (left panel) and
inverted (right panel). (from [Mondloch et al., 2002])
A Computational Model of Face
Recognition
Our model is a three level neural network that has been
used in previous work (Figure 4). The model takes man-
ually aligned face images as input. The images are first
filtered by 2D Gabor wavelet filters, which are a good
model of simple cell receptive fields in cat striate cor-
tex [Jones and Palmer, 1987]. PCA (principal compo-
nent analysis) is then used to extract a set of features
from the high dimensional data. In the last stage, a sim-
ple back propagation network is used to assign a name
to each face. We now describe each of the components
of the model in more detail.
The Training Set
The FERET database is a large database of facial im-
ages, which is now standard for face recognition from still
images[Phillips et al., 1998]. We used 662 face images
(545 upright images of 117 individuals and 117 inverted
images of 20 individuals (that were also included in the
upright images)) in the training. The inverted faces
were used in order to give a reasonable representation
1507
Figure 4: Object recognition model (from
[Dailey et al., 2002])
of upside down faces in the PCA layer of the network.
In [Dailey et al., 2002], where the task was to learn facial
expressions, images were aligned so that eyes and mouth
went to designated coordinates. This alignment removed
the configural information which is crucial for our work
because we are trying to understand how configural pro-
cessing and featural processing interact with each other
in the face recognition task. To avoid this negative ef-
fect, we required that the relative spacing between the
parts of the face remain the same. The face images were
rotated, scaled and translated so that the sum of square
distance between the target coordinates and those of the
transferred features (eyes and mouth locations) was min-
imized (Figure 5). Thus, a triangle represented by the
eyes and mouth is scaled and moved to fit closely to a
reference location, but the triangle is not warped. This
way of alignment keeps configural information without
affecting holistic processing. The aligned images were
192 pixels by 128 pixels.
Figure 5: Two examples of face image normalization. The
faces were cropped with the eyes and the mouth as close as
possible to the target position while keeping the shape of the
triangle among these features the same.
Perceptual Layer
Research suggests that the receptive fields of the stri-
ate neurons are restricted to small regions of space,
responding to narrow ranges of stimulus orientation
and spatial frequency[Jones and Palmer, 1987]. DeVal-
ois et al[DeValois and DeValois, 1988] mapped the re-
ceptive fields of V1 cells and found evidence for mul-
tiple lobes of excitation and inhibition. Two-D Ga-
bor filters [Daugman, 1985](Figure 6) have been found
to fit the 2D spatial response profile of simple cells
quite well[Jones and Palmer, 1987]. In this process-
ing step the image was filtered with a rigid 23 by 15
grid of overlapping 2-D Gabor filters[Daugman, 1985]
in quadrature pairs at five scales and eight orienta-
tions [Dailey et al., 2002](Figure 7). We thus obtained
23 × 15 × 5 × 8 = 13, 800 filter responses in this layer,
which is termed the perceptual layer [Dailey et al., 2002].
Figure 6: A Gabor function is constructed by multiplying
a Gaussian function by sinusoidal function[Daugman, 1985].
We use five scales and eight orientations.
Figure 7: An image filtered with a rigid 23 by 15 grid of over-
lapping 2-D Gabor filters in quadrature pairs at five scales
and eight orientations (from [Dailey et al., 2000])
Gestalt layer
In this stage we perform a PCA of the Gabor filter re-
sponses. This is a biologically plausible means of dimen-
sionality reduction[Dailey et al., 2002], since it can be
learned in a Hebbian manner. PCA extracts a small set
of informative features from the high dimensional out-
put of the last perceptual stage. The eigenvectors of the
covariance matrix of the patterns are computed, and the
patterns are then projected onto the eigenvectors associ-
ated with the largest eigenvalues. At this stage, we pro-
duce a 50-element PCA representation from the 13,800
Gabor vectors. Before being fed to the final classifier, the
principal component projections are shifted and scaled
so that they have 0 mean and unit standard deviation,
known as z-scoring (or whitening).
Categorization layer
The classification portion of the model is a two-layer
back-propagation neural network. 20 hidden units are
used. A scaled tanh [LeCun et al., 1998] activation func-
tion is used at the hidden layer and the softmax activa-
tion function yi = eai/
∑
k e
ak was used at the output
layer. The network is trained with the cross entropy er-
ror function [Bishop, 1995] to identify the faces using lo-
calist outputs. A learning rate of 0.05 and a momentum
of 0.5 were used in the results reported here. 10 percent
of the images are selected randomly as a test set and
another 10 percent as a holdout set [Dailey et al., 2000].
The network achieves 85-90 percent accuracy within 50
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epochs. This is remarkable given that for faces in the
test set, there were only 2-3 images in the training set
on average. This classification rate was decent enough
to show that our model represented face images well.
Modeling Mondloch et al.
Training and Learning
For the following experiments, we simply trained the net-
work on all 662 images, since we are only interested in
obtaining a good face representation at the hidden layer.
Training was stopped at the 50th epoch based on the
above pilot experiment, as we assumed the network had
achieved “adult” level identity recognition expertise at
this point. After training, the preprocessed Jane stimuli
images were presented to the network.
Modelling Discrimination
Hidden unit activations were recorded as the network’s
representation of images. In order to model discrim-
inability between two images, we present an image to the
network, and record the hidden unit response vector. We
do the same with a second image. We model similarity
as the correlation between the two representations, and
discriminability as one minus similarity. Note that this
measure may be computed at any layer of the network.
We computed the average discriminability between im-
ages in each of the stimuli sets (featural, configural, etc.,
both upright and inverted). The average within each set
was taken as the measure of the network’s ability to dis-
criminate each set. The average of the discriminabilities
was computed over 50 networks which were all trained in
the same way, but used different initial random weights.
The results (Figure 10 top graph) showed that our
model was too holistic, i.e. the model showed high sen-
sitivity to the configural set. As a first pass at adding fea-
tural information to the model, we took a cue from Pad-
gett and Cottrell (1998), who developed a parts-based
model for facial expression recognition. They simply had
rectangular windows over the eyes and mouth and ex-
tracted features from those as input to a classifier. Sim-
ilarly, Pentland et al. (1994) used “eigenfeatures”, PCA
of local patches, as input to a face identification classi-
fier. From our grid of Gabor filters, we extracted three
sets of Gabor responses that corresponded to the left eye,
the right eye and the mouth respectively (Figure 8). A
10 dimensional PCA representation was extracted from
each of them. Then we gave both the global and local
PCA to the network as input.
We repeated this experiment multiple times, keeping
the 30 local feature principal components (PC’s) as in-
put to the network, while varying the number of global
PC’s. The results (Figure 10) show how different com-
binations of global and local PC’s affect the behavior
of the network. The graph on the top is the result of
the original model (50 global PC’s with no local PC’s).
The graph second from the top is the result of 50 global
PC’s plus 30 local PC’s. The remaining graphs show the
effects of progressive reduction in the number of global
PC’s from 30 to 0 in steps of 10, while holding the num-
ber of local PC’s constant at 30. When the number of
Figure 8: We extracted local PCA representations for the
eyes and the mouth. The responses of Gabor filters from
patches around the eyes and mouth were extracted and PCA
was done on them separately.
global PC’s is decreased below 20, the discriminability
of the feature set began to exceed that of the configural
set in the upright image trials.
Note that the local feature PC’s did help the model
pay more attention to features because the discriminabil-
ity of the feature set has increased. Also, when the num-
ber of the global PC’s was reduced, the discriminability
of the feature, configural, and cousin sets increased. The
discriminability of the cousin set started around 0.35
when 50 global components with 30 local components
were used and ends up at around 0.45 when no global
components were used. We can observe a gradual in-
crease in discriminability over the sequence of the graphs
from top to bottom. This gradual increase is also seen
for the configural set and the feature set, which each
grew from around 0.2 to 0.3. Further, the qualitative
pattern for the inverted faces is reproduced in almost
every variation.
Discriminability at processing stages
Where do these effects come from? Recall our definition
of discriminability: one minus similarity, where similar-
ity is equal to the correlation between representations.
Hence, we can assess similarity and discriminability at
each stage of processing, i.e., original images, aligned im-
ages, Gabor filter, PCA, z-score PCA. Note that for pre-
processing stages, we are only comparing discriminabil-
ity between a small number of images (Jane and her
sisters), because these stages are identical for all 50 net-
works.
The order of discriminability for all combinations of
local and global PC’s and for both image orientations
is the same for the first three stages. The order of the
sets does not change until the PCA and z-score PCA
stages. Figure 9 shows the discriminability of each set
of different combinations of global PC’s and local PC’s
at the PCA level and the z-score PCA level for upright
images. When there are no local PC’s (i.e., the original
model), the configural set exceeds the feature set. When
there are 30 local PC’s and 50 global: the order is cor-
rect (cousin > feature > configural > contour) at the
PCA stage, though the differences are very small. These
differences are enlarged at the z-scored PCA stage. As
reductions in the number of global PC’s leave propor-
tionally more local PC’s, we observe the same correct
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ordering and progressively larger differences between the
sets at these last two stages. Also there is a trend to-
wards increased discriminability for cousin, featural and
contour sets.
A change in set order can also be observed at the PCA
and z-score PCA stages for the inverted image results
(not shown in figures here). The configural set shows a
larger inversion effect than the feature set, which is con-
sistent with human data. We also observe an increas-
ing gap between the featural set and the configural set
(featural > configural) when the local PC’s are intro-
duced and as their proportion is subsequently increased
(as the number of global PC’s is reduced). However, the
contour set is always less discriminable or at most as dis-
criminable as the spacing set, which is the wrong order
– contour should be more discriminable than spacing in
inverted images. The correct ordering shows up in the
hidden layer for all networks except the ones with no
global PCA or no local PCA (see Figure 10), suggesting
that both are needed.
Figure 9: The discriminability of different combination of
global PC’s and local PC’s at the PCA and the z-scored PCA
level.
Figure 10: The discriminability of different combination of
global PC’s and local PC’s at the hidden layer.
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Discussion
While our standard model has accounted for a fair
amount of data over the years, this particular set of data
required substantial modifications. We found that our
original model was too holistic, in that it was more sen-
sitive to configural changes versus featural changes. This
is not surprising given the way the model is constructed.
Global PCA of the Gabor representation should act sim-
ilarly to global PCA of grayscale images. This represen-
tation is known to develop ghostly-looking, whole face
templates that we have called holons, and others have
termed eigenfaces. These representations have proved to
be very useful in modeling holistic processing effects. For
example, when two halves of different faces are aligned,
it is more difficult for the model to identify the top half
of a face due to interference from the bottom half, even
if the input from the bottom half is severely attenuated
to simulate attention to the top [Cottrell et al., 2002].
This is due to the bottom half of the face matching giv-
ing a partial match to the templates corresponding to
the other person’s face.
Adding a parts-based representation, here imple-
mented as a local feature PCA, turned out to be helpful
in making the model more sensitive to features. This
type of representation can be thought of as a schema
for each part. It could be developed through attend-
ing to parts of the face, where the parts become well-
represented via foveation. As proportionally more of this
representation was used, the network’s upright discrim-
inability profile qualitatively matched the human sub-
jects results.
Our model successfully showed inversion effects on the
configural set and the featural set. This effect on the con-
figural set was especially large, which is consistent with
human behavior. The order for inverted trials qualita-
tively matched the human subjects results when both
global and local components were used. While the model
showed a strong inversion effect on the configural set, the
model did not show any inversion effect on the contour
set. This suggests that our model used the information
mostly, if not entirely, from the inside of the face instead
of the contour. Infants, on the other hand, are known
to use the contour of the face before they are able to
use the inside of the face for recognizing their mothers.
In the future, we intend to add a developmental compo-
nent to our model, in order to model this “outside-in”
progression.
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Expanding the linguistic coverage of a spoken dialogue system
by mining human-human dialogue for new sentences with familiar meanings
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How can a system grasp linguistic variety?
Computer systems that interact with people using natural
spoken dialogue offer  many possibilities for  effective and
efficient  interaction.   But,  a  dialogue  system for  a  new
domain requires  a  great  deal  of  expert  attention to either
collecting data for a new domain or designing a model of the
language  that  people  use  when solving  problems  in  that
domain.   Consider  the  extension  of  a  checkers-playing
dialogue system to other games such as Go: game-specific
phrases and terms would need to be added – both “official”
and colloquial versions. Prior work here includes identifying
new  lexical  items,  new  word-sequence  correlations
(Galescu, Ringger, & Allen 1998),  or new phrase patterns
using  existing  words  or  word  classes  such  as  color or
animal (Bulyko, Ostendorf, & Stolcke 2003). In this paper,
we  take  a  slightly  different  approach  by  focusing  on
semantics. Given a specification (as a sample dialogue), we
want to  identify alternate ways of  talking about  the same
things.  These alternates may not necessarily use any of the
words that their counterparts in the script use.  In fact, the
more dissimilar  such new phrases are  in  terms of  surface
features,  the  more  helpful  they would  be  if  added  to  the
vocabulary and syntax that the system can understand.  Such
a  technique  should  prove  useful  when  expanding  the
linguistic  coverage  of  a  dialogue  system  to  cover  what
people say in practice. We describe these techniques in the
context  of  an equipment purchasing system –  part  of  the
multisite CALO project, an intelligent personal assistant. 
Start with a script
Any  dialogue  system  typically  starts  with  some  data
collection  or  user  interviews  or  some  other  technique
designed to give a basic idea of what the users of the system
will eventually say.  The requirements for  the system can
then be easily expressed in terms of a dialogue script.  The
initial script for our domain of computer purchasing began:
System: Hello, this is CALO. User: Hello CALO.
S: Hello.        U: I would like you to buy a computer for me.
S: Ok; what kind of computer would you like?
Add human-human dialogues
As part of the dialogue system effort, Rochester collected a
set of approximately 40 human-human dialogues carried out
by ~20 people playing the role  of “buyer” and ~4 people
playing the role  of  “agent”.   In  order  to  collect  dialogue
aimed at  the computer purchasing domain, we provided  a
short scenario to role-play when buying the first computer -
“You  are  a  small  business  owner  looking  to  buy  a
computer”, etc. The second scenario was self-directed, that
is,  “Now get  a  computer  for  yourself.”   These  dialogues
were recorded and transcribed. Those utterances that closely
matched lines from the script we used directly as additional
training data.   Those utterances about  capabilities beyond
the scope of the initial system – such as warranty purchases
–  we  reserved  for  later  use.   That  left  a  wide  range  of
utterances concerning concepts that are present in the script,
but using different words and syntax.  We wanted those. 
Mine them for semantic matches to script lines
We used Latent Semantic Analysis (http://lsa.colorado.edu)
to extract utterances from the human-human dialogues that
were similar to each line in the script.  For each utterance in
the dialogues, we calculated its similarity to each line in the
script, and assigned it to the line with the highest similarity.
We then hand-filtered the resulting data to yield new ways
of saying lines in the script, such as:
On a similar topic, but system initiative rather than user:
 Script/User: I would like you to buy a computer for me.
 Dialogue/System: Hello would you like to buy a computer
With similar meaning, but very different words and syntax:
  Script/S: Ok, I'll start looking.
  Dialogue/S: I'll go ahead and uh save this.
Less similar in meaning, but still reasonable alternatives.
 For example, after “Ok; what kind of computer would you like?”:
 Script/U: A lightweight laptop computer with 500 mb of ram.
 Dialogue/U: Pentium processor.
From the utterances paired with the 28 lines in the script, 41
were identified to be useful matches. CALO developers at
Rochester  and  IHMC  used  these  to  extend  the  language
understanding of the CALO dialogue system.
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A COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF COLLABORATIVE LEARNING
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There are a large number of research questions on
collaborative learning that cannot easily be answered by
simply collecting and comparing quantitative data on the
performance of individual and collaborative learners. More
often than not, critical information is available only if access
to a detailed recording of the students’ collaborative work is
available. For certain research endeavors in the
collaborative learning domain, we need to know how the
students organized their task, what roles the students played,
and how they participated. Videotaping is an example of a
technology that has been used to investigate collaborations
within the workplace. But there are some difficulties with
using this approach for the studying of collaborative
learning, not the least of which is the extensive time-cost of
collecting and transcribing video data. We argue that
groupware applications are an ideal platform for
experimental investigations of collaborative learning.
At Brandeis we have been developing principles, tools, and
methods for cognitively engineering groupware systems that
support online collaboration. One part of this project is to
develop a toolkit that enables the rapid development of
groupware applications that can be used as experimental
platforms. A key component of the groupware systems that
are generated is that a complete transcript of all the online
activity is automatically captured in a form that is replayable
by an analyst using a replay device (that is created as the
system is developed). Students at Brandeis have
successfully used this toolkit in a HCI class to produce a
working groupware system; each team of students had 28
days to write the code.  Another part of our research project
is to develop discourse analysis techniques for modeling the
online collaborative work of users and the cognitive load it
entails for each of the participants. These techniques have
been taught in a class on Computational Cognitive Science.
In this poster, we will present some of the details of an
experimental study of collaborative learning that we are
currently conducting. Some of the questions about
collaborative learning that we want to investigate are:
• How does the amount and type of participation
affect individual learning?
• What do the participants talk about (i.e. which
aspects of the activity do they spend the most effort
on)?
• How do the participants organize their
collaboration?
• How closely do the participants work together?
Corresponding to each one of these questions are significant
hypotheses about the role of participation and/or explanation
in collaborative learning tasks.
Our study compares the performance of individuals and
pairs of students (with little or no prior programming
experience) as they learn to draw figures using JScheme. As
a part of this study, we constructed a platform (GrewpTool)
for collaborative programming that has been used to support
several kinds of classroom related activities. In our
experimental study, GrewpTool collects, in a replayable
transcript, the representational work of individual subjects
and all of the communication between paired subjects. The
participants in our experiment complete both a pre and a
post test, whose score difference indicates how much they
learn.
Our study has produced an enormous amount of data for
analysis. The replay of an individual session of
collaboration is one of the tools available for analyzing the
interactional data.  Given this tool, extracting specific and
accurate answers to questions about participation is feasible,
but the data is not easily codable and the task is labor
intensive.
We have developed some automatic methods for analyzing
the interaction that can be used to guide the ethnographic
analysis of the subjects’ online behavior. Each of these
representations is relevant to answering questions of the sort
listed above.  We will show automatically generated
representations that depict how close each pair worked
together, how they organized their collaboration, the type
and amount of each subject’s participation, and the content
of their conversation. Each of these representations can be
created because all of the subjects’ participation is mediated
by the computer and therefore automatically recorded and
transcribed. Given this analysis of the data, it is possible to
more selectively engage in the labor-intensive task of
analyzing the replay of each session.  Given these kinds of
representations of data it is easier to explore the effects of
explanation, participation, and organization on learning.
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Introduction
For centuries philosophers have debated the roles that
intuition and reasoning play in making moral judgments.
Hume proposed that people possess a ‘moral sense’ that
allows them to distinguish between right and wrong, while
Kant argued that reason is, or should be, the basis for
making moral judgments.
In the last 40 years psychologists have addressed this
question using scientific methods. Kohlberg (1986)
emphasized moral reasoning in his cognitive developmental
stage model which posits that people progress through a
series of six universal stages of moral reasoning. Haidt
(2001) recently proposed a dual-process model of moral
cognition that rejects reason as the primary cause of moral
judgments and posits intuition as more influential. Intuition
is characterized as fast, automatic processing that is not
available to introspection. Reasoning, on the other hand, is
characterized as slow, deliberate processing. While
reasoning, people are aware of progressing through a series
of steps to generate a judgment (Haidt, 2001; Kahneman,
2003).
We propose a modified version of the social intuitionist
model. This dual-process ‘interactionist’ model proposes
both intuition and reasoning processes are used, but their
use depends on the situation being judged. Specifically, the
model proposes that reasoning processes are used when
people have no intuitions or when they have conflicting
intuitions. However, when one dominant intuition is
generated, reasoning processes are not engaged.
Methods
To asses the interactionist model, an experiment was
conducted in which 60 participants read moral dilemmas
used by Greene et al. (2001) and made judgments about
them in two time conditions. In the fast time condition,
participants made judgments immediately without reasoning
about the dilemma, while in the slow time condition,
participants had as much time as needed to make judgments.
If reasoning processes are important, then disrupting that
process should decrease people’s ability to make judgments.
Participants were tested on three different types of
dilemmas: dilemmas that produced no intuitions; dilemmas
that produced conflicting intuitions; and dilemmas that
produced one intuition.
Findings
The findings support the interactionist position by
suggesting that participants used intuition and reasoning
differently depending on the dilemma being judged. In
situations that were predicted to require reasoning (no-
intuition dilemmas and strong-conflicting intuition
dilemmas), participants did poorly in the fast time condition
(Figure 1). However in the dilemmas when reasoning was
hypothesized to be causally inert (no-conflicting intuition
dilemmas), there was no difference in participants’
performances between the time conditions. These findings
call into question both strong intuitionist and strong
rationalist positions but support the dual-process
interactionist model.
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Figure 1: Judgment accuracy based on agreement with the
empirically established moral norm.
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Introduction and Background 
As is well known, dialog partners manage the uncertainty 
inherent in conversation by continually providing and 
eliciting feedback, monitoring their own comprehension and 
the apparent comprehension of their dialog partner, and 
initiating repairs as needed (see e.g., Cahn & Brennan, 
1999; Clark & Brennan, 1991). Given the nature of such 
monitoring and repair, one might reasonably hypothesize 
that a good portion of the utterances involved in dialog 
management employ meta-language.  But while there has 
been a great deal of work on the specific topic of dialog 
management, and it is widely (if often tacitly) accepted that 
meta-language is frequently involved, there has been no 
work specifically investigating and quantifying the role of 
meta-language in dialog management. Thus, this small 
study investigated the correlation between meta-language 
and dialog management utterances in three dialog files of 
the British National Corpus (BNC).   
Approach and Methods 
The three BNC files used in this study, KRF, KRG, and 
KRH, are transcripts of a series of Ideas in Action radio 
programs, some of which are interviews. Because interviews 
are more structured than informal conversation, they involve 
explicit dialog management, and are therefore a good place 
to start an investigation into the relation between meta-
language and dialog management. Focusing exclusively on 
the interviews in these three files gives 5900 lines to study. 
These three files had been previously annotated for meta-
language, using the annotation scheme and methods 
reported in (Anderson, et al., 2004). 
To identify and annotate the dialog management 
utterances, we were guided by an analogy with the TRAINS 
domain and dialogs (Gross, Allen & Traum, 1993). In the 
TRAINS domain, the base-level actions are moving trains 
between cities, and the assigned task is to plan and manage 
these moves through cooperative dialog. In our case, we 
defined the interview itself as the task domain, the base-
level actions as utterances, and the task as planning and 
managing these base-level actions, i.e. planning and 
managing the interview itself. As in TRAINS, this 
management is accomplished through dialog. The utterances 
involved in planning and managing the interview were 
identified and annotated according to Dialog Act Markup in 
Several Layers (DAMSL) (Allen & Core, 1977).  
We are still analyzing the results of this annotation for 
specific correlations between meta-language and the 
different DAMSL information levels and functions.  
However, we report some preliminary results, below, for the 
overall relation between dialog management and meta-
language. 
Results 
Of the 5900 lines annotated, 581 were dialog management 
utterances, and 1020 included meta-language. 312 lines 
were both dialog management and meta-language. 
 
Table 1: Meta-language and dialog management results 
 
Meta -Meta Totals
DM 312 269 581
-DM 708 4611 5319
Totals 1020 4880 5900
Χ2 = 597.56   p << 0.001   Φ = 0.318247 
 
Thus, 53.7% of dialog management utterances involved 
meta-language. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first quantitative confirmation of the tacitly held assumption 
that meta-language is frequently involved in dialog 
management. Detailed results can be found at 
http://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/metalanguage 
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                            Introduction                                                                                         
 
We report on a study that investigates the relationship 
between visual working memory and verbal working 
memory and a performance measure in endoscopic 
instrument navigation in GI Mentor II (a simulator for 
gastroscopic surgery). Baddeley’s (1998) three-component 
model of the working memory contains a central executive 
and two subsidiary slave systems – the phonological loop 
and the visuo-spatial sketchpad. Both the visual working 
memory, rehearsal processed based, and the verbal working 
memory falls within the phonological loop category – when 
using digit span tasks. We hypothesize that the visual 
working memory test scores will correlate with the 
simulator performance measure. We also predict that tasks 
involving a higher degree of central executive functions will 
be more discriminate in correlation with the performance 
measure. We have added the verbal working memory task to 
distinguish and rule out verbal working memory as a major 
factor for predicting endoscopic simulator performance – 
and thus define and elucidate the visual working memory 
phonological loop function for predicting endoscopic 
simulator performance.   
Method 
22 medical students (novices, 11 women and 11 men), 
ranging in age between 22 and 40 years at Karolinska 
Institutet, Huddinge University Hospital in Sweden, 
participated in the study. All participants completed a one 
hour session in the MIST-VR simulator and the GI Mentor 
II simulator. We will only present findings from the GI 
Mentor II simulator. The selected GI Mentor performance 
score measures the efficiency of screening (ES). The 
working memory (WM) tasks were taken from the WAIS III 
test battery (Wechsler, 2003): Forward digit span task 
(FDS), backward digit span task (BDS) and an 
alphanumerical task (ANT) – with the forward digit span 
being the least demanding on the central executive function 
and with the alphanumerical task being the most 
demanding.  
 
                      
Results & Discussion 
 
There were significant Pearson’s r correlations found 
between the visual working memory test scores and the 
simulator performance score and between the verbal visual 
working memory test score ANT and the simulator 
performance score.  
 
Table 1. Pearson’s r correlations between performance score 
(ES) in the GI Mentor II simulator, Visual Working 
Memory scores and Verbal Working Memory Scores.  
 
Visual WM task Verbal WM task 
Fds  r=.607, p=.031 
Bds  r=.570, p=.043 
Ant  r=.617, p=.029 
Fds  r=.306, p=.166 
Bds  r=.324, p=.152 
Ant  r=.639, p=.013 
         ES           ES 
     
 
Our findings suggest that visual working memory correlates 
with the simulation performance measure. The verbal 
working memory is dependent on more advanced central 
executive functions to discriminate significant differences 
for the performance tasks while the visual working memory 
tasks show a more uniform result regardless of central 
executive effort. An extension of this study is currently 
exploring these findings further 
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Background
We evaluate the relative contributions of two mechanisms
of category learning: 1) abstraction across examples of the
same category and; 2) differentiation between examples of
different categories. A novel "triples" paradigm is
introduced in which each classification target is presented
with two different context items. Learners are informed of
the structure of the triples so they may take advantage of
knowledge about the relative category status of the items.
We use feature-based categories with perceptually subtle
variation among examples. The study is designed to advance
a naturalistic yet controlled basis for the study of category
learning by using multiply-instantiated feature values
(Markman & Maddox, 2003) and three-way rather than
binary classification decisions.
In a control condition, items were presented one at a time.
Learning was also tested under five experimental conditions
based on the following triple structures: aAA (both context
items match the category of the target 'a'), aAB (one
matching and one mismatching context item), aBB (both
context items mismatch the target, but the context items
match one another), aBC (both context items mismatch the
target and the context items also mismatch one another), and
aXX (no systematic structure).
One possible learning strategy is to locate common
features between items known to belong to the same
category and perform abstraction -- in which case the aAA
group should have an advantage. Another potential strategy
is to identify contrasts between items known to belong to all
three categories -- in which case the aBC structure should be
most beneficial. The aAB structure is least informative
under either strategy because the learner is unable to know
for certain whether any pair within the triple are in the same
or different categories. The aBB group benefits from weaker
forms of both abstraction and differentiation on each trial.
Method
The stimuli consisted of organism-like patterns created in
Adobe Photoshop that varied systematically along three
dimensions: body-aspect ratio, flagella length, and stripe
width. Each dimension had eight possible values. Three
categories called Gex, Kij, and Zof were defined using the
higher or lower four dimension values (e.g., Zofs had
rounder  bodies, longer flagella, and wider stripes) for a
total of 192 possible items. Each category was distinct from
the other two in terms of exactly one dimension.
Each of sixty-six college students was randomly assigned
to one of the six conditions described above (single item
control condition, aAA, aAB, aBB, aBC, or aXX) and tested
in two phases, a training phase of 144 trials with feedback
given on target classification responses, and a test phase
without feedback and using all 192 stimuli.  Except for the
single target control condition, stimuli were always
presented in the triples context, and the structure of the
triple was carefully explained to participants at the outset.
Results
The manipulation significantly affected accuracy and speed
of performance during the first (training) phase of the
experiment (F(5,60) = 3.423, p = .0087), with the aBC
condition yielding the best performance (83% correct
overall, with chance performance of 33%). As expected the
least learning took place in the aAB group (55%). To our
surprise, the aAA group was also quite low (63%) and did
not differ significantly from the aAB group. Performance
was intermediate in the aBB (74%), single item control
(73%), and aXX (69%) conditions, which did not differ
significantly.  Examining performance over the course of 12
blocks of 12 training trials, the aBC condition was most
accurate for every single block. Overall accuracy in phase
two ranged from 61% (aAB) to 78% (aBC), but there was
no main effect of condition at that point.
These results indicate that, at least in the early stages of
learning in this context, between-category differentiation is
more important than within-category abstraction.
Additional experiments are underway to explore whether
removing the information given about the triples structure,
or highlighting it more dramatically, will alter the outcome.
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Introduction 
Because language is a discrete combinatorial system in 
which smaller representations at one level combine to form 
larger representations at another level, verbs can differ with 
respect to the number of smaller representations that 
comprise them. The semantic and morphological levels are 
most closely related to a verb’s meaning, and it has been 
shown that lemmas that share overlapping semantic features 
compete for production when encoded in the same local 
context (e.g., Breedin, Saffran, & Schwartz, 1998). This 
study investigated the competition between complex and 
simple verbs using a speech error elicitation task intended to 
induce contextual errors where one verb replaces another in 
a perseveration, anticipation, or complete exchange (e.g., 
Baars. 1992). Here, complex verbs contained all of the same 
semantic features as a simple verb in addition to additional 
features at the semantic and morphological levels. Two 
experiments tested the hypothesis that more complex verbs 
would replace their simpler counterparts more often than 
vice versa in contextual errors due to being associated with 
a greater number of activated semantic features at the point 
of lemma selection. 
  
Experiment 1  
Experiment 1 investigated the antonymic contrast between 
verbs where one is semantically and/or morphologically 
marked. For instance, in the semantic + morphological 
condition, the verb UNTIE has all of the features of TIE 
plus a negation feature at the semantic level and an 
additional morpheme at the morphological level. In the 
semantic only condition, the verb DECODE contains all of 
the semantic features of ENCODE, but does not consist of 
an extra morpheme at the morphological level.  It was 
predicted that complex verbs in both conditions would 
replace their simpler counterparts (denoted simple Æ 
complex) in contextual errors more often than vice versa. An 
asymmetry was also predicted such that the additional 
morpheme and semantic features of the complex verb in the 
semantic + morphological condition would result in an even 
greater number of simple Æ complex speech errors than in 
the semantic only condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
    The results of Experiment 1 are listed in Table 1. As 
predicted, the effect of error type was significant, as was the 
interaction between error type and complexity condition. 
There is evidence that the additional morpheme in the 
semantic + morphological condition gave the complex verb 
lemmas an additional advantage over their simpler 
counterparts. 
 
Experiment 2 
This experiment examined the contrast between simple and 
complex verbs that differed with respect to an added feature 
of manner specification as well as morphological aspect 
features. The lemma representations of complex verbs like 
JOG contain all of the semantic features of the lemma 
representation of a simple verb like GO plus a specification 
of manner. In addition, the morphological features of 
progressive aspect were added to half of the complex verbs 
(i.e. “is jogging”). Again, more simple Æ complex errors 
were predicted than the reverse, and the added 
morphological features were expected to enhance this effect. 
    The results of Experiment 2 are listed in Table 1. The 
effect of error type was significant both conditions, as was 
the effect of complexity condition. The interaction was not 
significant, indicating that the additional morphological 
aspect features in the semantic + morphological condition 
did not contribute to the complex verb’s lemma activation 
beyond that of the additional manner feature. 
 
Table 1. Results for Experiments by Subject (p-values) 
 
Effect Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Error Type <.001 <.001 
Complexity Cond. >.05 .04 
Interaction .02 >.05 
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Analogies in the wild
The research described here is an attempt to understand
analogies that are spontaneously generated by students in
science classrooms and in science discussions.  Most
analogy research and associated models of involve the
interpretation or application and not the generation of
analogies. Analysis of student discourse presented in this
poster shows that analogies generated “in the wild” have
features that are neither elicited nor explained by research
on analogy interpretation.  It is the main thesis of this poster
that generated analogies are best understood as assertions of
categorization in which the base is a prototypical member of
an (often) ad hoc category. Categorization research, perhaps
because of its focus on the categories that participants and
cultures generate, can account for the following phenomena
present in generated analogies: multiple analogies, the
choice of base, and the variable representation of the base.
Furthermore, the ontology of mind implied by a
categorization model is consistent with other findings from
cognitive science, linguistics and education research.
Features of generated analogies
Far from what transfer studies would suggest, analogies are
frequent in discussions about physical phenomena in science
classrooms.  In one fifth grade class, when discussing
whether or not water will spill from a falling cup, students
generate multiple analogies: it is like swinging a toy in a
basket, throwing a bucket of water, an astronaut in a space
shuttle, or tossing a container of dice.  I argue that these
analogies serve to assert and negotiate a category, and that
this assertion is strengthened by multiple analogies.
The choice of the base in these analogies is consistent
with categorization as well.  While students may have
experiences whose features and structure are similar to the
topic at hand, the choice of base is often structurally similar
and perceptually dissimilar.  If one assumes that analogies
are assertions of categorization, then these findings may be
accounted for by arguing that the choice of base is the
category prototype.  In categories, prototypes are the first
category members to be elicited; they are used to reason
about the category as a whole, and are artifacts of cognitive
models. Discourse analysis of analogies finds features of
prototypes to be features of the base of generated analogies.
The representation of the base is generally taken for
granted in models of analogy.  However, there is evidence
in generated analogies that the representation of the base is
variable and can shift depending on the cognitive model a
student applies.  When reasoning about the relationship
between light and heat, students draw an analogy between
light and money.  This base changes representation during
the discussion from one of wealth (in which $1.00 can
unproblematically change to 4 × $0.25) to one of currency
(in which a dollar never “turns into” four quarters).
Consistent with categorization research (Lakoff, 1987), this
shift in representation is indicative of the change in
cognitive model that is applied.
Ontology of mind
Concepts have long been treated as mental representations
that are accessed and acted on by computational processes.
This assumption of concepts as stable representations and its
implications on the ontology of concepts in the mind has
been called into question in several fields, including
psycholinguistics, categorization, and education. Despite
these concerns, the most widely accepted and used models
of analogy ascribe representations to concepts and treat
these as fixed— perhaps an artifact of the nature of the
analogy studies.  A categorization model of analogies, in
particular the relationship between categories and cognitive
models, addresses these concerns and accounts for analogies
using a manifold ontology of mind.
Past research
The claim of analogies as assertions of categorization is not
new to the conversation.  However, past studies on analogy
as categorization have been in vitro studies on the
interpretation of analogies.  Such scenarios limit the ability
to observe variability in analogical reasoning, providing an
incomplete picture of the nature of analogy.  When viewing
analogies that are created by students, the similarities
between analogies and categorization become apparent.
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It is argued that the basic structure of nominals and clauses 
is bi-polar—consisting of a referential pole and a relational 
pole. The locus of the referential pole is the specifier. The 
locus of the relational pole is the head. For nominals, a 
determiner functioning as an object specifier is the typical 
referential pole. The determiner functions to ground the 
nominal in a situation model (Kintsch, 1998). For clauses, 
an auxiliary verb functioning as a predicate specifier is the 
typical referential pole which grounds the clause in the 
situation model. For nominals, a noun functioning as the 
head is the typical relational pole (albeit a non-relation). 
However, some relations may also head nominals (“kick” in 
“the kick”). The reason a relation can head a nominal is 
because the object specifier determines the referential type 
of the expression, not the head. The object specifier coerces 
the relation, causing it to be viewed objectively. For clauses, 
a main verb functioning as the head (or predicate) is the 
typical relational pole. However, most adjectives (“he is 
sad”), prepositions (“he is out”), indefinite nominals (“he is 
a man”) and some adverbs (“he is there”) can also function 
as heads of clauses. Again, the predicate specifier 
determines the referential type of the clause, not the head. 
The referential and relational poles may be combined in a 
single lexical item. For nominals, pronouns, proper nouns, 
demonstratives and some quantifiers may combine the 
referential and relational poles. For clauses, tensed verbs 
combine the two poles. The words which occur between the 
specifier and the head are typically attracted to one pole or 
the other. Modifiers are usually attracted to the relational 
pole where they combine with the head. Referential 
Modifiers which encode referential meaning may also be 
attracted to the referential pole. For clauses, the negative 
particle tends to combine with the referential pole as is 
suggested by the clitic forms “isn’t”, “didn’t”, and “hasn’t” 
and the requirement for do-insertion (“he does not run” vs. 
“he runs”). Adverbial modifiers tend to combine with the 
relational pole. For nominals, ordinal quantifiers tend to 
combine with the referential pole, whereas cardinal 
quantifiers tend to combine with the relational pole 
(“thefirst tenbooks”). Adverbs, which typically 
function to modify relations, usually combine with a 
relational modifier and not the head in nominals (“very” 
combines with “old” in “very old man”).  
The bi-polar structure of nominals and clauses does not 
consider complements which are an element of relational 
meaning. The combination of a relational head with its 
complements interacts with the encoding of referential 
meaning in interesting ways. In nominals, the complements 
of relational heads (“kick” in “the kick”) are suppressed by 
the referential function of the object specifier. Expression of 
the complements requires introduction of relational 
modifiers (“of the ball” and “by the man” in “the kicking of 
the ball by the man”). In tensed clauses, the complements 
are expressed normally, but in non-finite clauses, expression 
of the subject argument (argument and complement are used 
synonymously) is suppressed, and in passive clauses, the 
subject argument is expressed, but corresponds to the object 
in the active construction, with the subject argument of the 
active construction being left unexpressed. 
The bi-polar theory resolves problems that have 
plagued uni-polar theories like X-Bar Theory (Chomsky, 
1970) and Dependency Grammar (Hudson, 2000). The shift 
to functional “heads” in X-Bar Theory leads McCawley to 
lament “…all sorts of things…get represented as heads of 
things they aren’t heads of” (in Cheng and Sybesma, 1998). 
For example, in “the dog” treating “the” as the head of a DP 
taking the NP complement “dog”—when “dog” by itself 
isn’t even an NP. Likewise, Hudson’s strongly endocentric 
version of dependency grammar leads him to suggest that 
“the” is a pronoun that just happens to take a complement.  
The bi-polar theory outlined above is called Double R 
Theory (Referential and Relational Theory). Double R 
Theory is focused on the grammatical encoding and 
integration of referential and relational meaning within the 
broader scope of Cognitive Linguistics (Langacker 1987, 
1991; Talmy 2000; Lakoff, 1987). Adding a specifier as the 
locus of referential meaning is an extension of Langacker’s 
(1991) conception of nominals and clauses with the 
specifier functioning as the locus of Langacker’s grounding 
predication. Details of Double R Theory are available at 
www.DoubleRTheory.com. 
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Introduction 
A number of studies show age differences in source memory 
(see e.g., #1, 2, 5).  However, few studies examine age 
differences in monitoring accuracy for such tasks.  The 
current study uses a paradigm inspired by Koriat and 
Goldsmith (1996) and Kelley and Sahakyan (2003) to 
examine age differences in monitoring accuracy for a source 
memory task when overall accuracy is matched between 
younger and older adults.  This study also examines how 
differences in monitoring accuracy bear on the ability to 
regulate overall accuracy when the option to withhold 
responses is given. 
  
Method and Results 
Older adults (OA), younger adults (YA), and older adults 
who were matched on source accuracy with younger adults 
(O-M) were presented sentences spoken by one of two 
speakers: one male and one female.  At test, participants 
were asked to identify the source of each item as male, 
female, or as new.  Following each response, participants 
were asked to give a confidence judgment and were given 
the choice of either submitting or withholding their answer. 
Source accuracy is shown in Table 1.  OA were worse than 
YA in making source judgments, while no differences were 
found between O-M and YA.  However, while YA were 
able to significantly improve their source accuracy by 
withholding responses, OA and O-M were not. 
 
Table 1: Source accuracy in forced and free testing 
conditions 
 
 OA YA O-M 
FORCED 0.66 0.79 0.76 
FREE 0.68 0.85 0.78 
 
Table 2: Monitoring Accuracy 
 
 OA YA O-M 
Calibration 0.17 0.10 0.15 
Gamma 0.03 0.58 0.45 
 
Monitoring accuracy data are shown in Table 2.  OA and O-
M were significantly worse at monitoring the accuracy of 
their responses compared to YA.  We hypothesized that 
older adults’ diminished monitoring ability was due to 
misrecollections.  We tested this hypothesis by completing 
an analysis in which old items for which high confidence 
source misattributions occurred were removed.  The results 
are shown in Table 3.  Removing misrecollections resulted 
in no monitoring differences between YA and O-M. 
  
Table 3: Adjusted Monitoring Accuracy 
 
 YA O-M 
Calibration 0.11 0.09 
Gamma 0.66 0.67 
# Misrecollected 2.61 6.44 
 
Discussion 
OA were found to be less accurate in making source 
memory judgments than YA.  Furthermore, even when older 
participants were matched with YA on source accuracy, 
they showed an impaired ability to accurately monitor their 
responses.  This impairment was due to a large number of 
misrecollections, and when these items were removed from 
the analysis, no differences were found in monitoring 
accuracy.  OA and O-M were also unable to effectively 
withhold responses to improve their source accuracy scores, 
compared to YA.  This was due to two factors: older 
participants’ impaired monitoring ability and their use of a 
lax criterion in making submit-withhold decisions. 
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Background 
School-age children acquire hundreds of new words each 
year, many of which are acquired incidentally, from uses in 
discourse contexts. Although children are adept word 
learners, lexical acquisition from oral language is not 
necessarily inevitable. Children have particular difficulties 
in the acquisition of terms that involve complex semantic 
representations, such as science terms (Braisby, Dockrell, & 
Best, 1999). Learning science terms poses particular 
challenges for acquisition because they are ‘conceptually 
complex’ and can be understood at various levels of 
abstraction (Meyerson et al, 1991). Our study investigated 
the kinds of knowledge children acquire about a science 
term during the process of lexical acquisition. 
Understanding the process of lexical acquisition requires 
a thorough assessment of the nature of children’s word-
related knowledge (Beck & McKeown, 1991). While 
previous studies of word learning have focused on what 
drives children’s acquisition of word meanings, less is 
known about the nature of children’s lexical representations, 
particularly those relating to complex vocabulary. When 
children acquire a new word, they must identify the sound 
in the speech stream to encode a phonological 
representation and then establish a mapping between the 
word and concept. Ultimately a detailed semantic 
representation is developed for the new term. 
Because of this multifaceted representation, ascertaining 
the nature of vocabulary knowledge requires multiple 
measures (Beck & McKeown, 1991). These measures 
should include both production and comprehension, moving 
beyond the conventional multiple-choice comprehension 
task. Indeed, recent research has indicated that tapping into 
children’s knowledge of conceptually difficult concepts may 
necessitate creative methods, such as drawing-based 
assessments (Gross & Teubal, 2001).  
Assessing knowledge across a range of tasks does not, on 
its own, provide information about the maturity of 
children’s lexical representations. Although seldom used in 
lexical acquisition research, comparison with adults’ 
performance allows us to identify knowledge gaps. 
The Study 
The present study examined children’s representations of 
a science term following a fortuitous exposure to the term. 
Thirty children’s (mean age = 6.7 years) knowledge of the 
term eclipse was examined before and after a partial solar 
eclipse that was visible throughout Europe in the summer of 
1999. There was considerable media interest at the time, but 
no general formal educational instruction occurred because 
children were on summer break.   
Our study assessed the nature of understandings that 
children acquired about the term eclipse and a control term, 
comet (which was not related to an eclipse) at three points 
in time (baseline test, two-week post-test, and five-month 
post-test), using a range of assessment tasks (multiple-
choice comprehension, picture-naming, drawing, and 
eclipse ‘making’ task). Also, children’s knowledge was 
compared to 15 adult controls during the baseline test and 
two-week post-test. According to the two-week post-test 
and five-month post-test, children acquired extensive 
knowledge about eclipses, but not comets. The majority of 
children successfully named and drew eclipses and ‘made’ 
an eclipse using models of the sun, moon, and earth. Also, 
children’s eclipse knowledge more closely approximated 
adult-level understandings at the two-week post-test than at 
the baseline test. Overall, the study offered an important 
insight into the nature of children’s lexical knowledge when 
words are acquired. The study also identified effective 
methods for tapping into children’s lexical knowledge.  
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The Overlapping Cues Paradigm (OCP) and Cue 
Onset Asynchrony (COA) are introduced as an 
experimental tool to investigate the dynamics of 
control mechanisms involved in task switching in a 
situation with “competition” between two concurrent 
task goals. We report three experiments focusing on 
the questions (1) what are the consequences for task 
performance when two sequentially implemented and 
overlapping goals are in “conflict”? (2) In such 
overlapping goal situations, what are the consequences 
of differences in time pressure (externally paced Cue 
Target Interval)? (3) How are task switch costs 
affected by stimulus driven factors (Convergent vs. 
Divergent trials)?  
 
Experimental paradigm 
  In the experiments there were two tasks, detection of 
a form-match or a color-match between a colored 
geometric figure functioning as a reference and an 
array of four figures. Which of the two tasks the 
participant had to perform was indicated by 
corresponding cues, either the word “Form” or the 
word “Color” (see figure). Two cues, separated by 8 
trials, were presented within each block of 16 trials in 
two possible combinations: non-conflict (Cue1=Cue2) 
or conflict (Cue1≠Cue2). Two trials after Cue2, a star 
was presented as warning signal, which forced a task 
switch in the conflict condition, but not in the non- 
conflict condition. The Cue Onset Asynchrony refers 
to the distance between Cue2 and the Warning-signal.  
 
 
Manipulated factors 
Within the experiments we manipulated the 
following factors: 1. Task type with levels “Color” 
match and “Form” match; 2. Cue type with levels non-
conflict (Cue1=Cue2) and conflict (Cue1≠Cue2); 3. 
Stimulus convergency with levels Convergent stimuli 
(the two different tasks require the same response) and 
Divergent stimuli (the two tasks require different 
responses); 4. Cue Target Interval duration (CTI): 
self-paced (Experiment1); 200ms (Experiment 2) and 
900ms (Experiment 3). 
 
Results and discussion 
The results show (1) Slower performance for the 
conflict than for the non-conflict condition on trial 9 
(after Cue2) and on trial 11(after warning signal) 
associated with top-down control during COA in 
order to suppress a conflict if Cue1≠Cue2; (2) For 
non-conflict condition and self-paced CTI, better 
performance on trial 9 than on trial 8, and on trial 11 
than on trial 10: elimination of restart costs 
presumably based on forward facilitation; (3) On 
trial 9, faster and more accurate performance for 
convergent than for divergent condition, because of 
stimulus driven, bottom-up control. And a 
consequence: On trial 10 better performance if trial 9 
was divergent rather than convergent, presumably 
associated with backward inhibition; (4) Different 
patterns of performance for self-paced and externally 
paced CTI, associated with different control strategies 
for the conflict and the non-conflict condition for 
different CTI.   
 
Issues for further research  
These findings reconcile some opposite previous 
views regarding control mechanisms in task switching 
and provide a perspective for new investigations on 
executive control. In the next step we intend to 
implement two main modifications: a spatiotemporal 
manipulation of COA, concerning the variation of the 
relative position at which Cue2 and Warning signal 
are presented, and second, a spatiotemporal 
manipulation of Convergency, concerning the 
variation of the relative position at which Convergent 
stimuli are presented.  
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Introduction 
Klahr and Simon (1999) identified four approaches to 
scientific studies of science emerging in recent decades: 
(a) Historical accounts of scientific advances, (b) 
psychological experiments of non-scientists on structured 
and ill-structured problems, (c) observations of 
researchers’ daily work in science, and (d) computational 
modeling of scientific discovery processes.  Our study fits 
as (c) observations of daily work in organic synthesis 
laboratories as others have done in biomechanical 
engineering (Nersessian, et al, 2002) and molecular 
biology (Dunbar, 1995). We expect to develop a grounded 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) of scientific reasoning 
within a community of practice (COP). 
Theoretical Framework & Methodology 
Cognitive apprenticeship is situated learning within a 
proficient COP through each participant’s immersion with 
frequent opportunities for practice, reflection and 
discussion while pursuing goals (Lave & Wenger, 1991). 
When Dunbar studied four different laboratories, all four 
COPs practicing molecular biology reasoned very 
similarly, i.e., similar experimental heuristics, mental 
representations, and problem solving heuristics, and 
differed only in their own combinations of these features.  
He noted that researchers interacted with the COP’s 
domain knowledge and fellow researchers to reduce 
reasoning errors. Logic in scientific reasoning requires 
substantial leaps from the data to infer conclusions 
(Toulmin, 1977). Toulmin explains that each field (COP) 
has different things to reason about, different 
consequences to gauge, and thus, different criteria for 
justifying inferred conclusions. Thus, apprentices must 
learn COP-specific standards of justifiable reasoning. 
   Video data collected included 80 hours of researchers 
working in the lab, gathering and interpreting data, 
interacting with mentors, and attending group meetings.  
Semi-structured interviews, field notes, and laboratory 
notebook pages supplemented video data. All COP data 
were analyzed for norms, practices and reasoning.  
Results & Conclusions 
We asked how scientific reasoning, is instantiated when 
apprentice researchers pursue their daily work towards 
Ph.D. “certification” as scientists. This organic COP 
synthesizes compounds for potential in treatment of 
diseases, e.g., HIV. The research director determines 
norms of distributed work from success in funding  
 
proposals; each project proceeds from a different 
foundational molecule, however uses similar techniques, 
equipment, and instruments to perform chemical 
reactions. Long series of reactions and what makes them 
work (a mechanical system) lead to a molecule 
engineered to possess specific and valuable properties.  
   Problems punctuate researchers’ progress. We define a 
problem as a difficulty when the issue shows a basic lack 
of understanding of the process or inability to get the 
mechanical system working whereas an anomaly is an  
unexpected and therefore, problematic, piece of evidence. 
Experience with COP problems inspires integration of 
explicit declarative knowledge of chemical properties and 
mechanisms with functional procedural knowledge, 
whose product is often tacit expertise.  
   Scientific reasoning is instantiated as “street smarts” 
developed in a specific research COP where reasoning: 
(a) Is guided by expectations of the organic synthesis 
COP’s norms and standards (constraints) while 
researchers do valued COP work. (b) Leads to and 
develops further apprentices’ learning in what to notice, 
understand, and take advantage of in terms of physical, 
human, and disciplinary COP resources (affordances). (c) 
Determines causal interactions of relevant variables in a 
mechanical system causing difficulties. (d) Is learning 
how to interpret the COP’s typical kinds of evidentiary 
formats in feedback because evidence is often evident 
only to COP members. (e) Recognizes anomalies in 
feedback.  (f) Deciphers and explains anomalies. 
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In early childhood, words are acquired at a very fast
pace. Yet there is also much variation in the overall
number of words children learn.  While these differences
have often been attributed to learning abilities of the
child, there is also considerable evidence that this
variation can be attributed to the amount of language
exposure (Huttenlocher et al, 1991).   At the same time,
there is some debate about whether grammatically simple
or complex child-directed speech (CDS) aids in lexical
development.  On one hand, some results suggest the
number of isolated words in CDS predicts words known
(Siskind, 2001), but on the other, there are findings that
longer CDS utterances are correlated with improved
vocabulary scores (Hoff & Naigles, 2002). 
Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997) offer one explanation of
how differences in speed of lexical learning might result
from cognitive changes that are influenced by linguistic
input.  Here, a childs ability to learn new words
improves with the realization that objects can be
classified through grouping new words into known
categories.  Evidence that the vocabulary spurt coincides
with the ability to sort objects into multiple categories
lends support to this hypothesis.  However, these data are
derived only from indirect measures of categorization
abilities in children, and it remains unclear what variables
might promote the emergence of category knowledge that
could facilitate word learning.  
In this study, we use simple recurrent networks (SRNs)
to explore the relationship between language input (in
amount of input, the frequency distribution across
categories, and grammatical complexity) on category
formation, and the relationship between category
formation and rate of acquisition of new words.
Methods
Input: 6 corpora, ranging in size from 20-1000
sentences were developed.  52 nouns were assigned to
one of four categories: animals (15), humans (15), food
(12) and objects(10).  33 verbs were assigned to eating,
motion, perception, action, communication, change of
state categories.  Sentences were either transitive (NVN)
or intransitive (NV).  One additional corpus of 1000
sentences was developed with additional constructions of
NVNN, NVNV and NVNVN.
Simulations: Each of the 7 corpora were used to train
10 SRNs on a next-word prediction task.  
Analysis:  Every 20,000 sweeps, each network was probed
to determine (a) rate of new noun learning and (b) internal
category structure developed by each network.  Category
structure was measured by average precision (Keibel &
Elman, in prep), which quantifies the similarity of hidden unit
values of all nouns in a category.   New word learning was
tested by training each network on new words in sentences.
Learning was measured by the activation value of the words
node when tested in five unseen sentence contexts.
Results and Discussion
Networks that had been exposed to larger vocabulary had a
strong effect in facilitating rate of acquisition of new words.
Additionally, networks trained with simpler grammatical
constructions learned new words faster than ones with
complex input. The measure of category formation, AP,
correlated well with these results:  we found that category
coherence values were higher in networks that learned words
faster.  That is, networks that had been trained with more
sentences and simpler syntax showed evidence of better
category formation. 
These results support the idea that category knowledge
plays an important role in lexical acquisition; new words are
learned more quickly with better developed category
structures.  These data also suggest that both the amount and
nature of the input (e.g., grammatical complexity; frequency
distribution across specific items) play a role in the induction
of lexical categories.
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Novel expressions frequently emerge during 
everyday language use.  For example, a 
demographic group of middle class mothers 
who spend time chauffeuring their children to 
soccer matches and other activities has come 
to be referred to as “soccer moms.”  Such 
terms are introduced to provide labels for 
meanings that may not have been previously 
characterized in an efficient manner.  These 
are examples of what Gerrig (1989) has 
referred to as sense creation.  The present 
study concerns the retention of such newly 
created meanings. 
In the series of experiments reported here, 
participants were asked to read a series of 
vignettes.  All of these vignettes were 
designed to bias a rare interpretation, as 
established through out-of-context pre-testing.  
In the first experiment, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three groups.  
One group was allowed to define the target 
conceptual combination immediately after 
reading the vignette, another group read all of 
the vignettes, then defined the target 
combinations, and a third group read the 
vignettes, then completed a 30-minute filler 
task prior to defining the target combinations.  
The second experiment was similar to the first 
in that a series of time delays were introduced 
to examine the time course of contextual bias.  
In this experiment, however, type of 
instruction (explicit reference to a subsequent 
memory test versus no such mention) was 
manipulated, in addition to length of delay (in 
this case, immediate, within one hour, or after 
two days). 
Results from both experiments indicate that, 
while not permanent, contextual bias has a 
powerful and relatively long-lasting influence 
on the way people interpret novel noun-noun 
combinations.  The present study provides 
evidence that the interpretation of conceptual 
combinations cannot be completely 
understood by considering the relationship of 
the two nouns in the pair or by the relationship 
between the head and the modifier noun, but 
must also consider the powerful effects of 
disambiguating discourse contexts.  In our 
study, it was shown the discourse contexts 
provided a more powerful influence on 
interpretations of noun-noun pairs than did the 
similarity of the nouns considered out of 
context.  Meanings (or interpretations) that 
were rarely given to a pair of nouns seen out 
of context were strongly biased by 
accompanying discourse contexts.  
Furthermore, these contextualized 
interpretations persisted over time, with 
effects observed up to a two day retention 
interval even though they were only exposed a 
single time to the brief discourse contexts.  
Although discourse contexts had a strong 
effect on interpretations of noun-noun pairs, 
the number of out-of-context dominant 
interpretations increased following longer 
retention intervals.  In sum, these findings 
indicate that interpretations of noun-noun 
combinations can be strongly affected both by 
discourse contexts as well as the relationship 
between the two nouns in each pair. 
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Introduction
Change blindness, an inability to spot changes in a visual
scene, occurs when normal motion transients are masked by
factors such as blank screens, “cuts” from one camera to
another, and the like (Simons, 2000).  Rensink, O’Regan, &
Clark (1997) employed a “flicker” technique to induce
change blindness: two versions of an image are presented in
alternation, but a blank visual screen is shown between each
image.  Under these circumstances subjects may take many
seconds to notice even large changes in the image,
especially if the change occurs in a background element.
Change blindness reveals important limitations in our
ability to process visual scene information.  Several
explanations have been advanced to explain why change
blindness occurrs.  To date, no single explanation has gained
broad acceptance (Simons, 2000).
In the current report, we consider a complementary
question: given that change blindness occurs, what factors
enable people to overcome it?  Our methodology is to
exploit the natural individual differences that appear
between individuals in their ability to detect changes.
Method
Our methodology was to administer a broad variety of
individual differences tests to a large set of subjects then
perform correlational and regression analyses to determine
the ability factors that predict change blindness detection.
Following the administration of a demographic question-
naire (not discussed further), subjects completed a battery of
tests: Integrating details (Alderton, 1989); shape memory
(Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976); identical
pictures (Ekstrom et al., 1976); perceptual speed (Guilford
& Zimmerman, 1947); a change blindness test; and a
measure of operations span (Hambrick & Engle, 2002).
The change blindness task included 20 trials.  On each
trial two different versions of a photograph were shown
repeatedly in sequence, with a blank gray screen appearing
between each pairing of the images.  Subjects knew a
change appeared in each trial and were allowed to view the
images until they detected the change.  After detection one
version of the image reappeared with a set of 5 regions
identified, and subjects selected one region to indicate
where the change took place.
85 subjects completed the battery of tests during a 1-hour
session for class credit.  Data from 8 subjects were
discarded due to computer errors.
Results
The correlational analysis showed that several ability tests
correlated significantly with the accuracy  of change
blindness detection (Table 1), while other factors correlated
with the latency of change detection .
Table 1: Correlations with Change Blindness Accuracy
Int.
Details
Shape
Mem..
Indent
Pictures
Percept.
Speed
Op.
Span
Change
Blind.
Accuracy
.448** .406** .240* .472** .493**
A stepwise regression analysis revealed that only three
factors independently predicted accuracy on the change
blindness task: operation span, perceptual speed, and shape
memory.  The heavy involvement of operation span
indicates an important role of working memory in
successfully detecting changes in an image.  Curiously,
measures that are designed to measure spatial ability, such
as integrating details, did not show an independent effect. A
different set of factors correlated with the latency of change
blindness detection, suggesting different mechanisms are
involved.
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The present experiments examined memory for procedural 
instructions following three presentation formats.  In three 
experiments participants learned procedures for assembling 
toys either with instructions presented in text-only, picture-
only, or multimedia formats.  Testing examined recall, serial 
order knowledge, and source knowledge.  In Experiment 
1A, multimedia learning produced faster and more accurate 
serial order determinations and greater recall, but more 
source monitoring errors, compared to the other formats.  
Experiment 1B demonstrated that additional multimedia 
exposure following initial learning can further influence 
memory.  Experiment 2 examined working memory 
processes during multimedia learning by attempting to 
selectively interfere with visuo-spatial and articulatory 
resources.  Contrary to Baddeley’s (1992) working memory 
model, verbally- and spatially-based divided attention tasks 
failed to selectively interfere with individual slave-system 
processing, suggesting central executive involvement in the 
sequential 2-back concurrent tasks.  These results provide 
empirical support for the underlying nature and potential 
benefits of mental representations following multimedia 
experiences.  
Experiment 1 
Participants were presented with a total of 18 5-step Kinder 
Egg™ toy assembly sequences in picture-only (6), text-only 
(6), or multimedia (6) format.  Half of the participants 
performed a verbal concurrent task.  Subsequent testing 
included order verification (O.V.), instructions recall (I.R.), 
and source monitoring tasks.  Order of testing for the O.V. 
and I.R. was reversed in Experiment 1B to test the effects of 
subsequent multimedia exposure on recall performance.      
Results 
Congruent with past research (e.g., Mayer & Anderson, 
1991), multimedia produced the highest accuracy rates on 
both the order verification and recall tasks.  Interestingly, 
multimedia also produced the highest source monitoring 
error rates, with a tendency for participants to inaccurately 
recall multimedia presentations as picture-only.  No 
evidence for selective verbal interference was found.  
Additionally, later exposure to pictures following text-only 
presentations increased recall accuracy. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1B with the addition of 
a spatially-based divided attention task.       
Results 
In line with Experiment 1, dependent measures revealed 
significant multimedia effects.  Verbal and spatial 
concurrent tasks did not selectively interfere with 
articulatory or visuo-spatial working memory, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Percent correct response as a function of 
presentation condition and attention group. 
Conclusions 
The combination of pictures and text consistently produced 
higher accuracy rates on tests examining memory structure 
and content in comparison to pictures or text alone.  
However, learners are more prone to source monitoring 
errors after learning with multimedia in comparison to the 
other two presentation formats.  Further research should 
examine selective working memory interference, with a 
particular emphasis on multimedia processing. 
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Holistic processing has been studied in faces, and may represent one process underlying
the development of expertise. In this work we examine how fingerprint examiners show
evidence of configural processing when viewing fingerprint fragments. We find evidence
for configural processing when fingerprints are presented in noise. Converging evidence
was demonstrated in electrophysiological recordings. A particular component of the
EEG/ERP known as the N170 is reliably delayed for inverted faces. This component was
also delayed for inverted fingerprints, but only for fingerprint experts. The results
constrain models of perceptual expertise and provide converging evidence that the
delayed N170 component reflects the absence of configural processing.
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Introduction
Research on naturally occurring gestures during face-to-face
communication has often taken second-seat to the study of
spoken  communication.  This  might  be  due,  in  part,  to
widespread beliefs that gesture is too unconstrained to study
in  a  controlled  way.  Studies  in  the  past  have  often
confounded message selection and gesture/speech form.  For
example, in one often-used paradigm, participants describe a
video they’ve recently watched to a partner.  In these studies
the participants 1) select which episodes they describe,  2)
decide how to describe the episodes (including word choice
and the  choice  to  use gesture),  and  3)  decide  how much
information  is  “enough” to  say  in  order  to  get  the  point
across  to  the  listener.  This  confounding  of  parameters
increases noise and adds to the perception that gesture is too
unconstrained  to  study  in  a  controlled  way.  This  study
demonstrates that gestures can be predicted precisely when
the referential domains are controlled, and it offers a tool for
future studies of gesture production.
Method
Participants  were  11  individuals  from  the  University  of
Rochester community. They received either course credit or
$7.50  in  compensation  for  their  time.  Participants  were
seated at a table, across from a partner with a laptop. The
participant  was shown a card  (figure  1)  and instructed  to
“get their partner to click on the target quadrant by doing
anything [they wanted], short  of getting out of [their] seat
and pointing directly to the target”. There were no further
restrictions  on  communication.  The  partner’s  screen  was
identical to the participant’s card, except that the quadrant
locations  did  not  necessarily  correspond  and  the  target
quadrant was not indicated in any way. The trial continued
until the partner clicked on one of the quadrants.
Figure 1: Target quadrant (top left hand corner) might be
described as “the square and the squiggle” (with gesture)
Critically, for each trial there were 4 quadrants that the
participant could potentially refer to, so the participants had
to consider the contents of these quadrants when deciding
what to  say to  their  partner  (Grice,  1975).  Each quadrant
contained  two  “features”,  which  were  usually  separate
objects.  In  each  quadrant  one  feature  would  be  easy  to
describe  verbally  and  the  other  feature  would  be  more
difficult  to  describe  verbally.  There  were  a  total  of  four
features on each screen – two nameable features that never
occurred  in  the  same  quadrant,  and  two  less  nameable
features that never occurred in the same quadrant. 
Results
We examined the gestures produced by the participants for
each  trial,  focusing  on  the  participants’  first  attempts  to
describe  the  target  quadrant.  Participants  did  produce  co-
occurring  speech  and  gesture  when  describing  the  target
quadrant. They were more likely to gesture for the feature
that was more difficult to describe (83%) than for the feature
that was easy to describe (21%).  This pattern held  for each
individual  subject,  and for  each individual  item. We then
tabulated the types of gestures that were produced in each
case – gestures that were produced while the participant was
describing the easy to describe entity were likely (75%) to
be  beats  (McNeil,  1992)  or  tokens  (Lidell  1994),
specifically  gestures  that  indicated  that  the  co-occurring
speech introduced a new entity to the discourse. They were
less  likely to  be  iconic  gestures  (25%).  This  pattern  was
reversed for the gestures that occurred while the participant
was  describing  the  feature  that  was  more  difficult  to
describe. In this case gestures were more likely (95%) to be
iconic. 
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Theories of gaze control in scene perception predict that 
viewers will fixate on aspects of visual scenes that are either 
visually salient or informative.  Thus far, research has 
focused mainly on the bottom-up processes that direct a 
viewer’s gaze to salient aspects of a display.  However, 
Semantic knowledge also plays a major role in directing 
attention toward the most relevant aspects.  The current 
research applies this paradigm to graphical weather map 
interpretation.   
Several studies involving experts from many domains 
have demonstrated that experts focus on the most relevant 
information of a display, and because of this they are able to 
process complex visual information related to their domain 
much faster than novices.   
Although these effects have been well documented, it is 
still not well understood how these processes develop, or 
how much knowledge and experience are required before 
these processing differences begin to appear. 
This study examined whether and how the process of 
focusing on the relevant graphical aspects (while ignoring 
the irrelevant), changes with a brief period of instruction. 
The main hypothesis tested was that after instruction in 
meteorological principles, novice participants would spend 
more time fixating on relevant aspects of a weather map, 
and less time fixating on irrelevant aspects.  
Methods 
Novice participants (N = 16), were shown a series of 
weather map displays, in which they were asked to 
determine whether an arrow shown within a target circle, 
see Figure 1, was showing the correct direction of wind in a 
target area (true), or the incorrect wind direction (false) .   
Participants made judgments on an initial block of 30 
trials, were then provided with training on the principles of 
surface air movement, and finally made judgments on a 
second block of 30 trials. 
Throughout the experimental trials, participant’s eye 
movements were tracked using an SMI EyeLink head 
mounted eyetracking system.   
Eye fixations were analyzed using pre-determined regions 
of interest, which were assumed to have high or low 
relevance for successful task completion.  These areas 
included the closest pressure system (relevant) and the 
temperature scale (irrelevant). 
Results and Discussion 
Participants showed a significant improvement in 
performance from before, to after instruction F(1, 15) = 
32.297, p < .001, h2 = .683, demonstrating that they learned 
how to make better judgments about surface wind direction.   
There was also support for the main hypothesis that after 
training novice participants would spend more time fixating 
on the relevant map aspects, and less time fixating on the 
irrelevant aspects.  Participants spent more time fixating on 
the closest pressure system (highly relevant to the task) after 
training compared to before F(1, 15) = 5.162, p = .038, h2 = 
.256, and spent less time fixating on the temperature scale 
(irrelevant to the task) F(1, 15) = 5.162, p = .038, h2 = .256, 
after training compared to before.  These results, suggest 
that participants interacted with the weather maps in a 
qualitatively different way as a result of training.  
This study makes two significant contributions to this field 
of research.  First it demonstrates that minimal instruction 
can influence novices to behave more like experts.  Thus, 
the eye fixation analysis indicated that, participants were 
able to search the graphic more efficiently (and more like an 
expert) after a brief amount of instruction. Second this study 
demonstrates that semantic knowledge influences eye 
fixations on graphical displays, and not just on pictorial 
displays or real-world scenes, which have received much 
more attention in the literature. This research has 
implications for training of individuals who must interpret 
complex graphical displays, and for the design of these 
displays.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Sample weather map shown to participants. Their 
task was to judge whether the arrow displayed the correct 
or incorrect surface wind direction. 
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    Intentions can be represented theoretically as active, 
structured states of working memory.  This approach is 
complementary to standard componential and capacity 
approaches to understanding executive control.  We report 
the results of several studies examining hypotheses derived 
from this view of intentions.   
Carlson (1997, 2002) described intentions as mental states 
that instantiate goals and have a schematic structure that 
specifies desired outcomes, operations for achieving those 
outcomes, and mental or physical operands.  This structure 
is dynamic, such that instantiating a goal to apply a specific 
operator evokes a procedural frame to which operands can 
be assimilated. Instantiation as an intention is one phase of 
an intention-outcome cycle in which goals are first 
represented prospectively (Figure 1). In a complex activity, 
this intention-outcome cycle is embedded in a plan that 
represents a larger goal structure. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The intention-outcome cycle 
 
Applying this analysis to routine skills with repetitive 
sequential structures (e.g., counting, running arithmetic) 
provides a basis for examining several specific hypotheses. 
The deictic specification hypothesis suggests that fluent 
performance is achieved in part by streamlining intention 
representations such that their elements are specified 
deictically rather than semantically, and error monitoring is 
implicit rather than explicit.  The temporal tuning 
hypothesis suggests that instantiating a goal as an intention 
serves to establish a temporal frame of reference that can be 
used to coordinate cognitive processing with the perceptual 
pickup of information.  
Deictic Specification 
Carlson and Cassenti (in press) examined the deictic 
specification hypothesis in an event-counting paradigm.  
Participants counted visual events in a variety of timing 
conditions. We found support for a model in which events 
are specified by when they appear rather than by their 
identity, when temporal regularity makes that possible.  This 
deictic specification allows intention-outcome confusions 
and promotes implicit error monitoring. Only disruptions to 
the flow of events (e.g., non-rhythmic trials) seem to trigger 
error detection, leaving errors in rhythmic trials largely 
undetected. 
Temporal Tuning 
Carlson and Stevenson (2002; Stevenson & Carlson, in 
preparation) examined the temporal tuning hypothesis in a 
running arithmetic paradigm.  We found that preview of at 
least one upcoming operator seems to be necessary for 
participants to establish a temporal reference frame. This 
reference frame is adjusted to the structure of the task, and 
allows individuals to learn to coordinate  self-paced displays 
with ongoing mental operations. Neither declarative nor 
procedural knowledge of upcoming operators appear to 
substitute for preview. Temporal tuning thus depend on 
environmental support for the specification of operators. 
Conclusions 
Analyzing intentions as active, structured states of 
working memory suggests new hypotheses about the control 
of routine activities.  The experimental results reported here 
support several of these hypotheses, and suggest boundary 
conditions for them.  Other results support hypotheses 
concerned with information-acquisition strategies and the 
coordination of information in working memory and in the 
environment. The present analysis can be related to recent 
work on the computational modeling of executive control.  
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Introduction 
Traditionally, the processing of spatial terms has been 
explained independently of more general cognitive 
processes, operating upon strictly geometric representations 
of the objects being spatially related.  Challenges to this idea 
have focused on either process or representation. Research 
on process has linked spatial language with attention, but 
has assumed only abstract representations of the objects; 
research on representation has shown that both geometric 
and functional information about the objects and their 
interaction influence spatial language – but the process by 
which this is accomplished is left largely unspecified.  We 
bring together process and representation, and offer an 
extension of the Attention Vector-Sum (AVS) model 
(Regier & Carlson, 2001) in which geometric and functional 
information is integrated via the process of attention. 
Two Assumptions  
Carlson-Radvansky, Covey & Lattanzi (1999) observed that 
spatial terms are defined on the basis of both geometric and 
functional information. For example, given the instruction: 
Place the tube of toothpaste above the toothbrush , 
participants were biased to place the toothpaste away from 
the center toward the bristles of the toothbrush.  This 
functional bias was mediated by the typicality of the 
relationship between the objects (i.e., a smaller bias with a 
tube of oil paint). The explanation of the functional bias 
relies on two critical assumptions: 1) attention can be 
allocated to a particular functional part of an object (Lin & 
Murphy, 1997), with a consequent bias to define spatial 
terms with respect to space around that part; and 2) that the 
amount of attention allocated to the part is mediated by the 
typicality of the interaction between the objects. 
Empirical support 
 
Empirical support for the first assumption was obtained 
by manipulating the location of attention within the 
reference object, and assessing whether there was a bias to 
define spatial terms around this locus of attention. In 
Experiment 1, we used an exogenous cueing task to anchor 
attention at various locations within a rectangle, and then 
presented a circle as the located object either at the attended 
location or elsewhere.  In Experiment 2, we used a watering 
can as the reference object, and a plant as the located object; 
with attention presumably allocated to the spout. In both 
experiments, response times for verifying that the located 
object was above/below the reference object were faster 
when the placement of the located object coincided with 
attention.  Empirical support for the second assumption was 
obtained by collecting ratings of the functional importance 
of the parts of the reference objects used by Carlson-
Radvansky et. al. (1999) in the context of functionally 
typical located objects, functionally atypical located objects, 
or in isolation. Ratings of the functional part were greater in 
the context of the functionally typical located objects, and 
were significantly correlated with the linguistic functional 
bias, suggesting that the typicality of the interaction 
mediated the strength of the functional information. 
Computational support 
The Attentional Vector Sum (AVS) model of spatial 
language involves an attentional beam that is focused on the 
reference object, and extends outward toward the located 
object (Regier & Carlson, 2001).  There is a vector-sum 
representation of the direction of the located object relative 
to the reference object, with vectors anchored at points 
within the reference object and pointing toward the located 
object, weighted by the amount of attention paid to the point 
on the reference object.  In order to incorporate functional 
information about the reference object, the attentional 
weight in AVS was modified such that functionally 
important object parts receive greater attention (Lin & 
Murphy, 1997).  With this change, AVS captures the two 
critical assumptions, and simulations successfully account 
for the functional bias effect (Carlson-Radvansky et al., 
1999) and its dependence on the typicality of the interaction 
between the objects. 
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Introduction 
An important dilemma to resolve in instruction is 
distinguishing between short-term performance and long-
term learning in assessing students’ progress.  Conditions 
that appear favorable in acquisition are not always as 
effective at promoting subsequent retention and transfer, 
due to differences in the processing activities involved in 
training and at test; in some cases, poor performance in 
training produced better performance at test (Schmidt & 
Bjork, 1992).  Since global measures of accuracy and speed 
are insufficient predictors of the effectiveness of training, 
we have used a modeling approach to draw inferences about 
the knowledge structures students use to solve problems 
both at test and in training.  We will present the results from 
one study demonstrating the usefulness of such qualitative 
measures in predicting learning outcomes from training. 
Method 
We  collected complete sets of data from 47 statistics-naïve 
undergraduate students in a five-day training study in which 
they received instruction and guided practice in solving 
exploratory data analysis problems.  The focus of the 
instruction was to learn when and how to use pie charts, 
histograms, boxplots, scatterplots, and contingency tables to 
analyze a set of data.  Following each lesson explaining and 
demonstrating how to use the new representation and 
method of data analysis, participants worked through a 
series of practice problems (30 problems in total).  One 
group solved problems in which the problems’ surface 
features were spuriously correlated with their deep structure 
(S-condition), while the other group solved problems whose 
surface features were varied across all the problem 
structures (V-condition).  All participants received problems 
that were broken down into their individual steps, as well as 
correct-answer feedback on their solutions.  On the final 
day, participants solved 25 new problems without any 
scaffolding or feedback.  (See Chang, Koedinger, & Lovett, 
2003, for a fuller description of a similar procedure.) 
Results and Discussion 
Consistent with the claim that good performance in training 
does not guarantee good performance at test, V- participants 
demonstrated a slight disadvantage at training  but superior 
performance at test, in terms of their accuracies and 
latencies in selecting the appropriate representation type for 
analyzing the dataset given in the problem.  Examining 
participants’ actual answers revealed that S-participants’ 
errors were not merely random, but reflected negative 
transfer from the surface features that had been incorporated 
into their training. 
To assess the extent to which their answers were driven 
by surface features or by problem structure, we developed a 
model of participants’ knowledge that specified the different 
possible features they could be using to choose the 
appropriate statistical display to answer each question.  This 
model was fit to participants’ data by adjusting the 
parameters indicating the degree to which different features 
were used.  The best-fitting models indicated that at test, S-
condition participants tended to derive their answers from 
surface features rather than deep structure, whereas V-
condition participants made greater use of deep structure 
than surface features. 
Analyzing the training data using the same modeling 
methodology showed that even during the learning phase, V-
participants demonstrated stronger knowledge of deep 
structure, whereas S-participants exhibited a stronger 
influence from surface features.  The contrast between the 
apparent performance of S- and V-participants according to 
the two different methods of assessment underscores the 
importance of measuring the target skills that students are 
intended to learn.  Examining the accuracy data alone would 
suggest that the V-participants were performing more poorly 
than the S-participants, with average scores about half a 
standard deviation lower.  However, examining the reasons 
why participants chose the answers they did reveals more 
sophisticated understanding in the V-condition.  Revising 
our assessments of students’ learning to reflect their 
knowledge representation, rather than relying merely on 
accuracy scores, may better inform instructional design by 
distinguishing more clearly between learning and 
performance. 
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Much of a person’s knowledgeable interaction with 
the world concerns the use of visual information.  One 
useful place to expand our knowledge of visual cognition 
is in the study of what we will call visual symbol systems.  
These consist of visual domains that are used as sources 
of information about additional domains – target domains.  
Examples include the use of telescopes to study 
astronomy, aerial photographs, and microscopy. 
We report here two studies aimed at understanding 
the use of microscopy in histology.  Histology is the 
microanatomy of biological tissues.  It is a core course in 
both the biology and medical curricula, and it is essential 
to the study and practice of pathology.  
While the target domain in histology consists of 
three-dimensional structures, the information domain 
consists of thin sections through the interiors of these 
structures that have been treated with a variety of stains.  
The outcome is that: 1) Histology includes a visual 
information domain and an anatomical target domain that 
are both very large and complex.  2)  The target domain 
and the information domain are related by a spatial 
transformation (taking thin slices) that does not generally 
preserve structure and appearance.  3)  There is a one-to-
many mapping from the target domain to the information 
domain.  A single type of structure can have a wide 
variety of looks in a microscope.  4)  There is a many-to-
one mapping from the target domain to the information 
domain.  Different structures often look alike. 
An interview study was conducted with 5 pre-
medical or pre-dental graduates of a college histology 
course.  Participants viewed four different microscope 
slides.  In a first phase, participants thought out loud.  In a 
second phase, a structured interview followed up on 
statements from the verbal protocol.  The view through 
the microscope and everything that was said was recorded 
with a digital video camera.  The four slides varied in 
their complexity, their familiarity, and in whether the 
stain was a common one.  The audio recordings were 
transcribed to written form. 
This task was clearly challenging for the students.  
A correct identification of the whole tissue was made 12 
times during the verbal protocol out of the possible 20 
identifications.  One of the slides was identified by 
everyone -- one was identified by four of the five people.  
A slide with an unfamiliar stain was identified by just two 
people, and a tissue that had not previously been seen in a 
slide was identified by just one person. 
Two formal coding systems were developed to help 
guide exploration of the cognitive processes involved in 
the interpretation of histological slides.  One system was 
used to characterize the content of the language used to 
talk about the slides.  The second system was used to 
characterize the manner in which participants worked 
toward the goal of tissue identification. 
The coding of the language revealed that nearly 
sixty percent of all propositions used by the participants 
referred to structures on the slide.  Fourteen percent of all 
propositions were associated with reasoning.  Almost 
sixteen percent of all propositions were expressions of 
prior knowledge. 
A second coding system captured high-level goal-
directed cognitive processes.  First, a master list was 
composed of the types of elementary cognitive process 
used across participants to work toward the goal of 
identification.  Second, for each participant and each 
slide, progress toward identification was diagrammed 
using the listed processes. 
Across all participants and slides, 70 instances of 
13 cognitive processes on the master list were recorded.  
There were 23 attempts at recognition that did not appear 
to include hypothesis generation.  Thirteen of these 
consisted of a participant listing structures on the slide 
and then immediately inferring a whole tissue.  There 
were 39 examples of hypothesis testing across all 
participants and all slides.  Interestingly, disconfirming 
evidence was used more often than confirming evidence. 
This investigation demonstrated that identification 
of histological structures in a microscope is an extremely 
challenging task, and individual differences among the 
students are large.  In addition, identification of 
histological structures in a microscope is remarkable for 
the degree to which it forces an integration of visual 
knowledge, general (anatomical) knowledge, and 
reasoning into a single cognitive system.  This includes 
the use of holistic visual information, analytical 
knowledge about the diagnostic structures in slides, and 
general knowledge of anatomy.  These forms of 
representation combine to allow recognition and 
immediate inference when that is available and extensive 
processes of reasoning when they are needed.   
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In colleges and universities content classes outside
composition classes are providing near-total neglect of
writing. This unfortunate situation appears to be caused by
instructors’ workload in generating feedback on student
writing. As a result, students do not often practice writing.
Therefore, it seems a natural choice to replace instructor or
expert reviews with reciprocal peer reviews to remedy the
problem. Fortunately, peer reviews seem to allow various
advantages beyond the obvious fact that they help
instructors spend more time on pedagogically desirable
activities by reducing instructors’ workload. However,
reciprocal peer reviews may be fundamentally limited in
that student peers are subject-matter novices in their
disciplines and inexperienced in reviewing writing in their
disciplines. To improve these issues, Cho and Schunn
(2003) developed a web-based reciprocal peer review
system called SWoRD (refer to the procedure section). The
goal of this paper is to show the effectiveness of the
SWoRD approaches.
Method
Participants. Participants included 28 students and a
domain expert in a 12-week summer class at the University
of Pittsburgh, USA. The students had an average of 3.4
college years (SD = 1.0). They as writers worked for their
class credits. They individually wrote first drafts and final
drafts on a topic ‘informal science learning’. They as
reviewers also reviewed six peers’ first and final drafts. The
domain expert was a Ph.D. on the writing topic and had
taught similar courses for the past eight years. She was not
the instructor of the class but reviewed all of the drafts.
Design. Based on basic writing skill test scores, the students
were matched into blocks and then randomly assigned to
one of three different conditions: an expert feedback
condition (SE), a single peer feedback condition (SP), and a
multi-peer feedback condition (MP). The writers in SE
received feedback and grades on their drafts only from the
expert. Those in SP received them from a single best peer.
Those in MP received them from six peers. Also, to get rid
of reviewer’s status effect, the writers and reviewers were
blind to each other. The writers were told that they would
not receive writing grades by their instructors, but by their
reviewers. All procedures were undergone without marking
any identity information.
Procedure . The general procedure of the experiment
followed the built-in processes in SWoRD with some
modifications for experimental purposes. All of the
remaining procedure was managed online by SWoRD. After
the writers turned in their first drafts, individual reviewers
received a set of six drafts that were randomly selected by
SWoRD. They individually generated written comments on
six peer drafts and evaluated their qualities on 7-point rating
scale (1:Disastrous to 7:Excellent). The same period, the
expert reviewed all of the drafts. Then, the writers received
selected feedback based on their feedback condition, revised
their writing over a week period. Then, writers turned in
their final drafts, which were reviewed by the same
reviewers. Then, the writers back-reviewed their reviewers’
feedback on a five-point rating scale in terms of how helpful
it was/would be in revising their first drafts. The results of
the back-review were not delivered to the reviewers unlike
the SWoRD normal procedure. As a final cycle, the writers
received the second round of feedback and back-reviewed
the feedback.
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Figure 1: Writing quality improvement
Results
Based on the expert’s blind evaluations on all of the papers,
a two-way mixed ANOVA on the improvement of writing
quality found a significant difference between the feedback
conditions F (2, 25) = 3.50, p < .046 as in Figure 1. Tukey
pairwiswe comparison found only the difference between
SE and MP signficant, p. = .015. Thus, this result supported
the SWoRD approaches in that student writers benefited
from getting multiple peer feedback and rewriting practice.
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Problem Solving and Categorization 
Research on categorization suggests that, when facing a 
goal, people construct goal-derived categories through 
conceptual combination. These categories may be either 
well-established or ad hoc, constructed “on-the-spot” from 
elements from well-established or taxonomic categories. 
Under pressure or uncertainty people tend to employ 
taxonomic categories, that reflect world models (i.e., 
primary categorizations) and are denoted by lexemes (e.g., 
cups), as opposed to goal-derived categories, that are 
unstable, dependent on context, and are denoted by phrases 
(e.g., things to pack when going on vacation; Barsalou, 
1983, 1991; Murphy & Ross, 1994). 
 Insight problem solving is an instance in which the solver, 
being in a state of uncertainty regarding the solution, is 
likely to form solution strategies based on primary 
categorizations. Insight is an abrupt and unanticipated shift 
in the solution path that leads the solver to success. Previous 
studies regard insight as the result of ordinary cognitive 
processes (e.g., Perkins, 1981; Weisberg & Alba, 1981) or 
as indicative of a special way of thinking, characterized by a 
representational shift , a restructuring of the elements of the 
problem (e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). 
Research, thus far, has neither examined: (i) how solvers 
interpret insight problems before they proceed to a solution, 
or (ii) how category construction and categorical induction 
during problem solving are involved in the planning and 
evaluation of strategies to achieve the intended goal.  
 This study examined the effects of training to construct 
goal-derived categories on solving insight problems. We 
hypothesized that participants who received training in 
considering secondary, goal-derived categories, in addition 
to primary, taxonomic categories of items, would exhibit 
better performance on insight problem solving.  
 
Method 
Thirty-six undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions: (i) Control (n = 12), (ii) Alternative 
Categories Task [ACT] (n = 12), and (iii) Alternative 
Categories Task with critical items [ACT -C] (n = 12). The 
Control condition was administered a word association task 
and then received six insight problems. The ACT condition 
was given the Alternative Categories Task and then received 
the six problems. The ACT-C condition received a version 
of the Alternative Categories Task, which included six 
items, each critical for the solution to the problems that 
followed. The six insight problems were Charlie, Fake 
Coin, Candle, Two-Strings, Ten Coins, and Nine-Dots.  
Participants in the ACT and ACT-C conditions also 
received a hint concerning the relevance of the 
categorization task to the problem-solving task. Participants 
were tested individually. Sessions were videotaped with 
subjects’ consent. Participants were given specific 
instructions to think aloud during the experimental tasks 
(Perkins, 1981).  
 
Results and Discussion 
A contrast-based ANOVA on solution rates and times 
revealed that the ACT and ACT-C conditions outperformed 
the Control condition, with the ACT -C condition exhibiting 
the highest performance. Results suggest that the 
construction of goal-derived, ad hoc categories and the ways 
these categories are used to guide participants’ inferences 
may predict problem solving. The primary aim of this study 
was to consider problem solving as an instance of goal-
derived categorization. Our findings may offer a new 
perspective on the mechanisms underlying insight. In 
addition, although much previous research on categorization 
focuses on the taxonomic organization of isolated items, this 
study examined categorization in an ecologically valid and 
dynamic problem-solving task. 
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Instructions 
The motion aftereffect (MAE) is a powerful of motion in 
the visual image caused by prior exposure to motion in the 
opposite direction  (Anstis et al, 1998). The study with use 
of MAE provides information of motion direction property.  
This study was conducted to investigate an effect that 
shape information of stimulus affects orientation 
discrimination of windmill pattern with use of MAE. In 
according to the prior study of visual pathway, shape 
information of objects is processed to separates from motion 
information (Lenny, Trevarthen, 1990). Recently, however, 
there were reports on the interaction between two visual 
pathways. Kim (2001) proposed that the interaction 
chromatic and luminance modulation. Nisida (2001) 
proposed that our brain may process different sensory 
modalities and attributes in an integrative fashion on the 
unified spatiotemporal coordinates.  
Experiment 1: the effect of stimulus property 
In the first experiment, we investigated the effect of 
stimulus shape in case of adapted stimulus is same with test 
stimulus, by measuring the orientation discrimination of 
MAE on windmill pattern. We measured the perceived 
orientation on test stimulus and the duration time of MAE in 
different shapes of stimulus.  
Stimulus and Method 
There were two stimuli in experimental 1. One stimulus 
was a shape of circle and the other stimulus was a shape of 
ring.  
An adapted stimulus was same with test stimulus. An 
adapted stimulus was presented on monitor during 15sec. 
And then test stimulus was presented. Observers experience 
the MAE. They pressed space bar on keyboard when MAE 
finished. It was measuring the duration time of MAE. After 
duration time was measured, observers reported the 
perceived orientation discrimination. Four observers, native 
to the purpose of the study and with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision were participated.  
Results 
All observers reported that the orientation of MAE by the 
shape of circle was different with the orientation of MAE by 
the shape of ring. The orientation discrimination of MAE by 
the shape of circle was higher than the shape of ring, which 
was significant (F(1,3) = 53.53, p < .005). However MAE 
duration difference was not significant (F(1,3) = .422, p 
< .562). The results suggest that motion information is 
affected by shape property of object.  
Experiment 2: the effect of adapted stimulus 
In the second experiment, we investigated only the effect 
of adapted stimulus in case of an adapted stimulus was 
different with a test stimulus. We measured the perceived 
orientation on test stimulus and the duration time of MAE 
for different shapes of adapted stimulus.  
Stimulus and Method 
There were three stimuli in experimental 2. An adapted 
stimulus was circle or a ring and a test stimulus was adding 
shape. A test stimulus was same each condition. A 
procedure was same experiment 1.  
Results 
All observers reported that the orientation discrimination 
of circle shape MAE was higher than ring shape MAE, 
which was significant that the difference of orientation 
discrimination (F(1,3) = 11.457, p < .043). But it was not 
difference for duration time within each observer. The 
results suggest that the shape of object affect the motion 
information. And it implies to attribute integration.   
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Introduction
The present study investigated whether attention control for
grammatical elements plays a role in second language (L2)
proficiency. The meanings of grammatical elements (e.g.,
grammatical morphemes, inflections, and word order
patterns) derive from how they relate various message
elements to each other. Unlike nouns, adjectives and other
content words, the referents of grammatical elements cannot
be "experienced directly in our perceptual, sensorimotor,
and practical dealings with the world" (Slobin, 1996, p. 91).
For instance, in The teacher was reading a new book,  the
elements (the/a, was, -ing) refer to definiteness, time, and
how the action unfolded. These meanings are not directly
available to perception in the same way as are those of
teacher, read, new, and book. Because not all languages use
grammatical elements in the same way, L2 learners may
experience particular difficulty in their use (Slobin, 1996).
Chung and Segalowitz (2003), using a non-matching to
sample task, found that L2 proficiency correlated positively
with performance in a task of L2 attention control for
grammatical elements (pronouns, prepositions, copula
forms, and conjunctions). A potential confound, however,
was that subjects (Ss) may have used meta-linguistic
knowledge about grammatical categories to perform the
task, knowledge that may possibly be correlated with L2
proficiency. The present study attempted to replicate that
study by removing the metalinguistic confound. In the
grammatical condition, only spatial prepositions were used,
divided into four subsets (e.g., above/over/…;
below/under/…; far/beyond/…; and close/near/…). Two
control conditions used non-grammatical words unrelated to
language structure: concrete words, subsets of “animal”
(cat/dog/…; ant/bee/…; trout/salmon/…; sparrow/eagle/…)
and abstract words, subsets of “qualities” (happy/glad/…;
smart/clever/…; polite/honest/…; and beautiful/pretty/…).
Method
Bilingual undergraduates (n=32; First language (L1) =
English; L2=French) performed the following tasks.
Proficiency was operationalized as efficiency of accessing
word meaning in a lexical categorization task. In separate
L1 and L2 blocks, bilinguals were required to panel press to
indicate whether a word referred to a living or non-living
object (136 trials in each language). Intra-individual
variation in reaction time (based on the coefficient of
variation—CV) was the measure of processing efficiency
(Segalowitz & Segalowitz, 1993). L2-specific measures
were obtained by partialling out L1 from L2 measures.
Attention control was operationalized as efficiency of
attention shift judgments in a non-matching-to-sample task.
In a Non-Match condition, Ss saw a sample word at the
bottom of the screen and 4 display words across the top.
They had to press one of 4 buttons to indicate the position of
a word belonging to a different subcategory than the sample.
L1 and L2 versions of the task were created to measure
attention control for grammatical (GRAM), concrete
(CONC), and abstract stimuli (ABST) (40 experimental
trials each). In a Match condition, Ss had to select a stimulus
that matched the sample. CVs provided the measure of
processing efficiency. Attention control indices were
computed by partialling out Match CVs from Non-Match
CVs. L2-specific measures were obtained by partialling out
L1 from L2 attention indices.
Results
The data were submitted to hierarchical multiple regression
with L2-specific proficiency as the dependent measure. In
Step 1, measures of L2-specific attention control for abstract
(ABST) and concrete (CONC) stimuli were entered. In Step
2, measures of attention control for grammatical stimuli
(GRAM) were entered. For the 16 most proficient Ss, in
Step 1 (CONC, ABST), R2= .110 (n.s.), and in Step 2
(GRAM), R2 change = .428 (p = .005). For the 16 least
proficient Ss, total R2 = .020 (n.s.).
Discussion
In more highly proficient bilinguals, efficiency of L2
attention control for grammatical elements accounted for
42% of unique variance of L2 proficiency, after controlling
for non-grammatical attention. Because all L2 measures had
been residualized against L1, the results reflect a language-
specific form of attention, not general processing abilities.
This replicates Chung and Segalowitz (2003), without the
potential metalinguistic confound.
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The instinctive way in which people use notes to augment
their memory suggests one way in which they might
manage the disruptive effects of multi-tasking. In this study
we investigated whether mental notes and/or physical notes
taken before an interruption would reduce time to resume
the interrupted task afterwards. Imagine that you are writing
email to a colleague when the telephone rings. The
interruption lag – the time from when the ringing starts until
you pick up the phone – is an opportunity to make notes that
might help shorten the resumption lag – the time from when
the phone call ends until you resume the preexisting
cognitive state required to compose the email message. A
physical note would be some contextual information
recorded on a physical medium, whereas a “mental note”
would be such contextual information encoded in memory.
The current study indicates that resumption lag is indeed
reduced by having cues available during the interruption lag
(to facilitate mental note taking), but is increased by
requiring participants to take physical notes.
Participants
Participants were 48 undergraduate psychology students.
Task and Materials
Two tasks were used in the experiment. The tank task was a
complex resource-allocation task that involved planning
simulated missions to defeat targets using tanks (Brock and
Trafton, 1999; Trafton, Altmann, Brock, and Mintz, 2003).
The radar task was a simulated tactical assessment task that
involved classifying “tracks” on a radar screen (Ballas,
Kieras et al. 1999; Brock, Ballas et al. 2002; Brock, Stroup
et al. 2002; as cited in Trafton, Altmann et al. 2003).
Design and Procedure
Participants performed the tank task for three blocks of 20
minutes each.  At 12 random points during each block, a
visual alert would appear indicating that the secondary task
was about to start.  The interruption lag following this alert
lasted six seconds, during which input to the tank-task
interface was frozen (meaning that no actions were
possible).  After the interruption lag, the tank task display
was replaced by the radar task display.  The radar task lasted
30 to 45 seconds, after which the tank task display was
immediately restored.
There were two between-participants factors: Cue or No
Cue, and Record or No Record. The Cue/No Cue variable
probed mental note taking, on the assumption that mental
notes are easier to make when cues from the interrupted task
are perceptually available. In the Cued condition, the tank
task display was preserved throughout the interruption lag,
whereas in the No Cue condition the tank task display was
erased at the start of the interruption lag, so that participants
saw a blank screen for six seconds until the start of the radar
task.  In the Record condition, participants were instructed
to use the interruption lag to record data on a prepared form
positioned next to the keyboard.
Measures
The resumption lag was computed as the interval from the
moment the tank task interface was restored following the
interruption to the first mouse click or key press a
participant make to resume the primary task.
Results
Each participant’s 36 individual resumption lags were
extracted from the log files, and the medians entered into an
analysis of variance (ANOVA).  There was a significant
increase in resumption lag for participants in the No Cue
condition, F(1,44)=6.551, p=.014. In the No Record
condition the resumption lag was significantly lower than
the participants in the Record condition, F(1,44)=8.332,
p=.006. There was no significant interaction between the
Cue and Record manipulations, F(1,44)=1.238, p=.272. The
first finding was that visual cues available in the brief
transitional period before an interruption speeded
resumption of the primary task afterwards. The second
finding was that the act of writing contextual information on
a form hindered the resumption of the primary task.
Acknowledgements
This work was funded by ONR grant N00014-03-1-0063.
References
Brock, D., Trafton, J.G. (1999). Cognitive representation
of common ground in user interfaces. User Modeling:
Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference. J.
Kay. New York, NY, Springer-Wien.
Trafton, J. G., Altmann, E. M., Brock, D. P., Mintz, F. E.
(2003). Preparing to resume an interrupted task: effects
of prospective goal encoding and retrospective
rehearsal" International Journal of Human-Computer
Studies 58, 583-603.
1543
Part-Set Cuing: A Connectionist Approach to Strategy Disruption 
 
Edward T. Cokely (cokely@psy.fsu.edu) 
Department of Psychology, Florida State University 
Tallahassee, FL 32306 
 
Roy W. Roring (roring@psy.fsu.edu) 
Department of Psychology, Florida State University 
Tallahassee, FL 32306 
 
 
Part-Set Cuing 
 
In a part-set cuing paradigm, when part of a previously 
studied list of words is provided as a memory aid, a reliable 
and robust impairment of the non-cued list items results.  
Since its discovery (Slamecka, 1968; as cited in Nickerson, 
1984), this paradoxical phenomenon has been characterized 
as a persisting enigma in memory research (Nickerson, 
1984), of both theoretical and practical concern.  One 
leading informal model, the strategy disruption 
interpretation (Basden & Basden, 1995), suggests that the 
part-set cuing impairment results because one’s retrieval 
strategy is changed and differs from the original encoding 
strategy, following the presentation of cues. The strategy 
disruption account is thoroughly supported by empirical 
evidence; however, it has been criticized as theoretically 
vague and poorly defined.  In contrast, the other leading 
account, a formal model using SAM (Raaijmaker & 
Shiffrin, 1981), while precise, has been criticized as overly 
defined, theoretically inconsistent, and unable to account for 
the full range of findings (Roediger & Neely, 1982).  In an 
attempt to more precisely identify and extend the strategy 
disruption interpretation, we examine and compare both 
neural network simulations and human experiments in a 
part-set cuing paradigm.   
 
The Neural Network 
 
The artificial neural network used was a fully-connected, 
auto-associative, three-layer perceptron, using a 
backpropagation algorithm with a learning rate set to 0.1.  
The network used 15 input and 15 output nodes with a bias, 
10 hidden, and 10 context units.  The context layer used a 1 
to 1 association from hidden units to context units and was 
fully connected from context to hidden units.     
 
Experiment 1: Human Results 
 
A within-participant (N=24) design was used and 
counterbalanced for list-order, list-cue-order, and 
randomized part-set cuing.  A typical and robust part-set 
cuing impairment was observed for cued (M=.35) verses 
non-cued (M=.40) items, F (1,23) =  4.99, p < .05.  
 
 
 
             Experiment 2: Simulation Results 
 
A within-simulated-participant (N=24) part-set cuing design 
was used and counterbalanced for list-order and list-cue-
order, with randomized part-set cues.  Output vector error 
served as the dependent variable and was summed and 
analyzed for cued and non-cued states. A typical and robust 
part-set cuing impairment was observed, F (1, 23) = 24.00, p 
< .05, without evidence of catastrophic interference. 
 
Conclusion & Discussion 
 
The neural network was consistent with the observed human 
performance, providing a good fit across a number of 
analyses.  The findings suggest that the neural network 
formalism is consistent with and may serve as an extension 
of the Basden and Basden strategy disruption account of 
part-set cuing.  That is, following cuing, different study and 
activation patterns disrupt the subsequent process of recall.  
This disruption is caused by a change in the availability and 
accessibility of cued items, altering the retrieval process and 
thus the retrieval strategy.   
Although the experimental evidence is from a small set, 
results suggest that the neural network can provide an 
increasingly precise mechanistic account of part-set cuing 
impairment that is consistent with the leading informal 
theoretical account.  Future simulations should attempt to 
replicate key findings including part-set cuing facilitation 
and category-cuing impairment.  
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Introduction
Both general and domain-specific knowledge influence
human performance in tasks as different as scientific
discovery (Shunn,1999), social science reasoning (Voss,
Tyler & Yengo, 1983) and web-based search (Hsieh-Yee,
1993). These types of knowledge are also crucial for
learning in open-ended, ill-structured situations to the extent
that domain-specific knowledge and general metacognitive
skills are critical to the acquisition of complex knowledge
(Lawless & Kulikowich,1996). It is also the case that
learners who have either general or domain-specific skills
seem to be able to learn in new, open online situations but
the absence of either knowledge resource requires that the
environment be well-structured (Steinberg, 1989).
Museum websites are open tasks designed to fit the
expectations and backgrounds of multiples audiences. Goal-
setting for either a web or physical visit is a critical process
for the success of both visits and learning in museums
because goals determine visitors’ paths and learning. Clear
goals can make the difference between a superficial drifting
visit and a meaningful learning experience. Previous
research in real museums shows that visitors develop
specific sets of goals to drive their interaction with the
exhibitions. Visitors attend to three elements: the content
knowledge provided by the exhibitions, the navigational
clues provided by the museum environment and the goals
they have (Leinhardt, Tittle, & Knutson 2002). Here we
explore how visitors to museum websites, with different
backgrounds, set goals, make navigational decisions, and
attend to the exhibition content in the service of learning.
Method
Eight graduate students were asked to think aloud while
they surfed freely through two museum websites of different
domains for 20 minutes (anthropology and natural sciences).
Half (4) of the participants had robust domain-specific
backgrounds in anthropology and half were social science
graduate students in other domains. Within each half, two
had more than four years of graduate study, while the
remainder had less than a year. They were instructed to
explore each of two web sites freely and to think aloud
while doing so. No specific goals or tasks were given to the
visitors. The data were the pages that they visited, the order
of the visits, and the comments made while visiting. The
online pages were classified as: content pages that presented
domain-specific information (e.g. exhibits, articles), and
navigational pages that presented information about what
could be found in the museum (e.g. link pages). Comments
made by participants were coded as to whether or not the
visitor was attending or searching for navigational support,
were setting goals, or if they were elaborating on content.
Results
For this ill-structured task of visiting a web-based museum,
it appears that having high levels of general knowledge
(high experience) has the greatest impact on surfing and
reasoning behavior. The evidence for this is that high
experience visitors elaborated more deeply on content pages
than did non-experienced visitors. However, visitors with
high content knowledge combined with high experience
produced more immediate clear-cut goals and used fewer
moves to meet them than all other groups. Low-experience
higher knowledge visitors seemed to support the
establishment of goals but not the actions of elaboration,
thus they did not benefit as much from meeting goals; while
low knowledge-low experience visitors showed a more
random, rapid “click” behavior. We take this to mean that
high experience positions individuals learn more through
elaborating while high content and experience combined
positions individuals learn more about the content domain
offered by the museum because they are more effective goal
setters in that context.
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Introduction
Negative feedback is information provided by a teacher or
other instructional agent given to correct the errors a learner
has committed. One might expect that corrective feedback is
effective because it helps learners alter their performance.
In fact, it has been suggested that negative feedback should
be given immediately, so that it can more easily be tied to
the cognitive structures responsible for the error.
It is then expected that negative feedback decreases the
chance of committing the same error in future situations
when the error could occur (i.e. due to the corrective effect).
While this position makes intuitive sense, it has been largely
untested.  Studies that compare a negative feedback group to
control often use global performance measures and have not
considered why feedback is effective. Feedback effects,
when obtained, could be due to the corrective effect, or they
might be due to other factors.
To consider the question more carefully, we tracked
individual responses made in a learning experiment
involving multiple trials.  We provided feedback for some
errors, but allowed others to go uncorrected.  It was then
possible to consider whether feedback facilitated the
correction of errors.
Method
Task
A letter extrapolation task was used, similar to those used
by Kotovsky and Simon (1973) and Restle (1970). To make
letter extrapolation into a task with multiple opportunities to
receive feedback, we presented the given sequence via
several short presentations and asked for a response after
each one. The subjects viewed the given sequence for 20
seconds, and then attempted to extrapolate it. They were
asked to reproduce as much of it as they could, guessing the
letters for which they were uncertain. They received
feedback on their extrapolation as described below. Then
the next trial (20 second study period, plus extrapolation
attempt) began. The subjects went through 8 such trials.
The sequence used was [MKNPPNKMNLOQQOLN].
This pattern is composed of the four-letter chunk ‘MKNP’,
which is then reversed to form the chunk ‘PNKM’. The
Chunks ‘NLOQ’ and ‘QOLN’ are translation of the other
two chunks.
Feedback and Design
Two negative feedback conditions were used. In the local
condition, feedback was given for each letter response. In
the global condition, feedback was given for the 4-letter
chunks below. Subjects were told that they would not
receive feedback for all errors.  They were instructed that a
‘none’ message would appear below some responses.  This
message appeared below 25% of all errors, as well as below
all correct responses.  When the subject received this
message, they received no useful information. The study
was completed on a Macintosh computer using the Pyscope
software. Feedback was given after all responses were made
and remained on the screen for 45 seconds.
Results
We have previously reported that subjects in the local
condition outperform those in the global condition.
(Corrigan-Halpern & Ohlsson, 2002). The current goal is to
better understand the source of this effect.
Subjects in the global condition were significantly better
at correcting errors after receiving feedback, F (45,1) =
4.59, p <.05. After receiving negative feedback, subjects in
the local condition corrected errors 26% of the time,
compared to the global condition where correction occurred
32% of the time.
Subjects in the local group were more likely to correct
errors after ‘none’ messages, F (37,1) = 68.46, p < .001.
After receiving the ‘none’ feedback, subjects in the local
condition corrected errors 92% of the time, compared to
28% of the time for the global group.
Subjects in the local condition were more likely to
maintain correct responses, F (43,1) = 5.02, p<.05. Subject
in the local condition reproduced a correct response 71% of
the time, compared to 53% for the global condition.
Discussion
Despite the fact that the local feedback condition resulted in
superior performance, this effect could not be attributed to
the corrective effect.  Subjects in the local condition
perform well because they are able to correct errors made
for responses where feedback was not provided. This result
suggests that negative feedback achieves its effect indirectly
or in a more cumulative fashion.
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Introduction 
Indefinite NPs are usually taken to introduce new referents 
and, thus, are not deemed capable of acting as anaphors. 
Recent research, however, has attested the occurrence of 
indefinite anaphoric expressions (Schwarz, 2000), which 
occur (cf. Cunha Lima, 2004) (i) when the anaphor 
expresses part-whole relations, including partitive and 
specifying relations; and (ii) when the sentence or phrase 
containing the indefinite NP does not enclose a finite VP 
expressing an event which is different from the one in 
relation to which the antecedent was introduced. 
Consider:  
(1) O gato caçou um rato na cozinha. Um rato grande e 
gordo. (The cat chased a mouse in the kitchen. A big, fat 
mouse)  
 (2) O gato caçou um rato na cozinha. Um rato saiu  pela 
porta dos fundos. (The cat chased a mouse in the 
kitchen. A mouse left by the back door) 
(3) O gato caçou um rato na cozinha. O rato saiu pela 
porta dos fundos. (The cat chased a mouse in the 
kitchen. The mouse left by the back door). 
In (1) there is  no doubt that the second occurrence of a 
mouse refers to the very same mouse mentioned previously. 
In (2), however, the second occurrence of a mouse is not co-
referential with the first – it introduces an unmentioned 
referent in the discourse. Contrast this with (3): now, the 
mouse is old information. 
One way to explain the difference between (2) and (3) 
above is to postulate that the verb following an indefinite 
NP forces its re-interpretation as not co-referential with the 
previously focused entity. If this is so, we can predict that 
processing the verb following an indefinite NP will be 
costlier than processing the verb following definite NP.  
Method 
Thirty-six students (native speakers of Brazilian 
Portuguese) at the State University of Campinas took part in 
the experiment. Twenty-four pairs of sentences  (“texts”) 
were constructed. In a self-paced reading experiment 1, the 
stimulus texts were chunked as follows: “Meu gato / caçou / 
um rato / na cozinha. / Um rato (1) / saiu (2) / pela porta (3) 
/ traseira (4)”; and responses were recorded in points (1) -(4).  
                                                               
1 The experiment was run using the DMDX software, developed at 
Monash University and at the University of Arizona by K.I.Forster 
and J.C.Forster 
Results and Discussion 
Reading times for the verb position (see Table 1) was 
significantly slower following indefinite than definite NPs. 
That is, following indefinites, verbs took longer to read. 
Table 1: Mean reading times (ms) for tensed sentences  
 
 1 2 3 4 
Definite 484,13 387,86 684,08 757,20 
Indefinite 519,68 445,67 723,92 795,83 
Difference -35,55 -57,81* -39,84 -38,63 
*F1=(1,99)7.0379, p=0.009 and F2=(1,123) 3.9192, p=0.049.  
 
This result is consistent with the prediction that verbs 
following indefinite NPs are costlier than verbs following 
definite NPs. The source of such cost may be in the 
mechanism which bridges referring exp ressions to discourse 
(Almor, 1999) . Recent data (Nadig et al., 2003) indicate that 
children, in a truth-value judgment test, tend to bridge 
indefinites to previously mentioned entities; similarly, 
adults also bridge indefinites to previously focused referents 
in a forced choice task. It seems that, at least in the case of 
children, bridging is driven by attention, rather than by type 
of referring expression. One can hypothesize that, in the 
present study , referring expressions, either definite or 
indefinite, were bridged to given/focused referents; when 
the verb incrementally makes its contribution, the need for 
re-interpretation becomes apparent – and exerts its tolls. 
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Various strategies such as self-explanation (Chi, 2000), 
collaborative problem solving (Ellis, Klahr, & Siegler, 
1993), scaffolding (Vygotsky, 1978), reciprocal teaching 
(Brown & Palinscar, 1989), and learning from worked-out 
examples (Mwangi & Sweller, 1998), have been used 
successfully to facilitate learning and understanding. 
Psychologists are particularly interested in the cognitive 
processes underlying and affected by these methods, the 
varying effectiveness of each across different domains, and 
the mechanisms that are associated with the learning that 
results from the utilization of each. Although these 
techniques are different in form, each one encourages the 
student to engage in learning during which knowledge is 
actively processed, and mental models and schema are 
constructed and reconstructed. The goal of this study was to 
extend our knowledge of the mechanisms by which students 
acquire knowledge and the strategies that could be used to 
facilitate these processes.  
The effects of feedback and self-explanation have been 
examined under various conditions, and within various 
domains (Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; 
Mwangi & Sweller, 1998; Tudge, Winterhoff, & Hogan, 
1996). Because both have shown to have advantageous 
effects under many circumstances, they were used together 
in this study of algebra problem solving. To extend prior 
research, both the self-explanation of correct and incorrect 
solutions was elicited and compared to the condition in 
which only the correct answer was self-explained. It was 
hypothesized that students who received feedback and were 
asked to explain both correct and incorrect solutions would 
demonstrate the most improvement in solving algebra word 
problems.  
Method 
Participants included 80 college students (60 females, mean 
age = 19.73 years, SD = 2.05), including 50 Caucasians, 12 
African Americans, 10 Hispanics, 6 Asians, and 2 “Others”.  
An algebra pretest consisting of 14 multiple-choice 
compare word problems (4 simple-direct, 5 simple-indirect, 
and 5 complex) was used to assess algebra problem-solving 
abilities. Participants then participated in a directed practice 
session during which they were randomly assigned to one of 
four experimental conditions (No feedback/”Explain own” 
(Control), Ambiguous feedback/”Explain own and 
alternative”, Feedback/Explain correct, and 
Feedback/Explain correct and incorrect”). Students were 
asked to provide algebraic equations for each of 10 
problems, and to explain why they thought these equations 
were correct (or incorrect). Finally, an algebra post-test, 
identical in form to the pretest, was administered. 
Results & Discussion 
Pre- to post-test improvements in performance for students 
in each of the experimental conditions exceeded those for 
students in the control condition. Results indicated that 
feedback and self-explanation conditions positively affected 
post-test performance. Students who self explained both 
correct and incorrect solutions outperformed all others, and 
students in the control group had the smallest increase in 
performance between pre- and post-tests.  
This study extends our knowledge of the strategies that 
could be used to facilitate the processes by which students 
learn, and offers insights that could prove valuable to 
educators in selecting task appropriate instructional 
techniques.  
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The semantic priming effect has been central in many
debates on the structure and dynamics of semantic memory.
One view states that concepts in the memory system are
interconnected via links of variable strength through which
activation spreads. On presentation of a word (prime), its
semantic representation will increase in activation, which
then spreads via the semantic connections to related
concepts. When a second word is presented, whose semantic
representation is close to the prime word, shorter lexical
decision or naming latencies are observed; the basic
semantic priming effect.
This simple semantic network (SSN) model predicts that
the more activation is given to the prime, the larger the
priming effect. However, it was found that when the prime
word had to be retained in short-term memory (STM) while
a lexical decision was being made, the priming effect was
absent (Davelaar, 2004). This prime-retention effect is
modulated by semantic distance and the stimulus-onset
asynchrony (SOA) between the prime and the target, with
weak associates being more affected than strong associates
and especially at long SOAs. In order to account for this
finding, an extension to Dagenbach and Carr’s (1994)
Center-Surround hypothesis was proposed. Here, a
computational structure is sketched that implements this
hypothesis and is easy to incorporate in a recent
connectionist models of priming (Huber & O’Reilly, 2003;
Plaut & Booth, 2000).
Proposed Model Architecture
The single-layer SSN is changed into a two-layer network
and augmented with two types of inhibitory connections that
correspond to known anatomical connections in the human
cortex (local and global inhibition). The architecture is
depicted in Figure 1 and is presented as having a columnar
structure, where every column represents a separate concept.
Within each column, the input unit (bottom unit) sends
activation to the corresponding output unit (top unit) and to
the local inhibitory unit (filled circle). The output and
inhibitory units are reciprocally connected, which lead to the
output unit exhibiting adaptation; with increase in stimulus
duration the activation increases from baseline to a
maximum and then drops to an intermediate level (cf. Huber
& O’Reilly, 2003). Between columns, input units are
connected to output and inhibitory units of related concepts,
where the connection strength reflects the semantic distance.
This inter-columnar organisation implements a semantic on-
center/off-surround receptive field. All output units feed
into a common global pool of inhibitory units that feeds
back to the output units (depicted by the circle-headed
arrow). This dynamically enforces a limitation on the
maximum number of concepts that can be active
simultaneously (cf. Davelaar, et. al., in press). In order to
model the prime-retention effect, the output unit of the
prime word has a self-recurrent connection (dashed arrow)
whose strength affects the probability that the prime remains
in STM (conceptualised as sustained activation).
Figure 1. Architecture of a proposed model that captures the
prime-retention effect.
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The distinctiveness effect in face processing 
A recognition advantage for distinctive faces has been 
widely reported (e.g., Valentine, 1991).  In such studies, 
distinctive faces produce more hits and fewer false alarms 
than typical faces.  Although the finding is robust, the 
mechanism for this advantage has not been carefully 
explored.  The choice of distractors in these studies does not 
guarantee equivalent target-distractor distances for typical 
and distinctive faces.  In fact, because typical faces lie in a 
denser, more central region of face space (Valentine, 1991), 
they will be on the whole more similar to the distractor set 
than distinctive faces.  The location of distractors may thus 
be sufficient to explain the distinctiveness advantage.  In 
fact, theories of perceptual learning would predict a 
processing disadvantage for distinctive faces that we have 
less experience with.  To control for the effect of unevenly 
spaced distractors, we constructed a parameterized face 
space and created equally spaced targets and distractors.  
Parameterized face silhouettes 
Forty-eight face profiles from the FERET database were 
reduced to two-toned silhouettes (Figure 1 A and B).  The 
position of 18 key points was recorded for each silhouette 
from which a 32-dimensional set of principal components 
(PCs) was computed to fully describe the shape of each 
silhouette, up to rotation and dilation (Figure 1 C). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Silhouette parameterization 
Experiment 1 
From this parameterization, 100 typical and distinctive 
silhouettes were constructed by setting two of the first 10 
PC values to +/- 1 (for typical faces) or +/- 3 (for distinctive 
faces) standard deviations from the mean.  This resulted in 
distinctive faces being farther from the origin of face space 
(see Figure 2A), a measure that correlated highly with rated 
distinctiveness.  Distractors were constructed for each face 
by varying two orthogonal PC values to +/- 1 and +/- 2.  In a 
3AFC recognition task, 16 Stanford undergraduates 
observed the randomly presented faces, each followed by a 
2-second mask and a choice of three faces (the target and 
two distractors).  Performance was coded as percent 
identification of the target face.  Mean performance was 
61% for typical and 56% for distinctive faces, a significant 
disadvantage for distinctive faces (p<.05).  To control for 
the possibility of biased online learning of the typical region 
of face space, we conducted a second experiment where the 
size and density of the two regions were matched. 
Experiment 2 
The design was the same as above except that the set of 
distinctive faces was defined as a translation in face space 
from the set of typical faces.  Each distinctive face 
corresponded to a typical face translated by a fixed number 
of units on a set of eight orthogonal PCs.  To control for 
item effects, the direction of translation was reversed in two 
between-participant conditions (see Figure 2 B and C). 
 
 
Figure 2. Relative sizes of typical (dots) and distinctive 
(rings) face regions in Experiments 1 (A) and 2 (B and C) 
 
In conditions 1 (N=16) and 2 (N=14), typical faces were 
correctly identified more often than distinctive faces (62% 
vs. 57% and 64% vs. 59% respectively; p<.05 in each case). 
Discussion 
By using parameterized silhouettes, we were able to 
construct distractors that were equally spaced from their 
respective targets, across typical and distinctive faces.  In 
two experiments, we found that when controlling for 
distractor distance, the advantage associated with distinctive 
faces reverses.  This “reverse distinctiveness effect” is 
consistent with the notion that people have less experience 
with distinctive regions of face space. 
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Introduction 
Age of acquisition (AoA) effects have often been found in a 
large variety of tasks involving word processing. One of the 
ongoing discussions remains the confounding of AoA 
effects with word frequency (e.g. Morrison & Ellis, 1995). 
In this study we removed possible frequency confounds by 
comparing AoA and word familiarity differences with 
young and older participants.  A lexical decision experiment 
was conducted to test if reaction time (RT) differences of 
both age groups might be explained by differences in AoA 
of the words.  
Previous research (Brysbaert, Van Wijnendaele, & De 
Deyne, 2000) has shown that AoA effects might also have a 
semantic origin, apart from proposed origins at the word 
output or word form access level. To further test this 
hypothesis we adapted the lexical decision procedure to 
become a semantic categorization task.  
Method 
Norms 
Subjective ratings of AoA and word familiarity ratings were 
gathered for 309 Dutch words from students (18 to 23 years 
old) and older persons (52 to 56 years old). The rated 
stimuli consisted of early acquired nouns (e.g. apple) and 
late acquired nouns (e.g. radar), of which some are acquired 
only recently by the older participants (e.g. modem) and 
were used for selecting stimuli for the RT experiments. 
Results showed that not only AoA differed significantly, but 
also familiarity differed between both age samples. 
Lexical Decision 
A lexical decision experiment with 108 Dutch words was 
conducted with young (n = 22, 18 to 23 years old) and older 
participants (n = 20, 52 to 56 years old). Due to the 
significant differences between the rated familiarity of 
words for both groups a factorial design was undesirable 
and correlational designs were used. 
 
 
 
Semantic Categorization 
Subjects from both age groups were required to make a 
categorization between manmade concepts and natural 
concepts for 160 Dutch words. Ages varied in the young 
group (n = 21) from 18 to 23 years and from 52 to 56 years 
in the older group (n = 21).  
Results and Conclusions 
 
Results from the lexical decision experiment showed that 
there was an effect of difference in AoA but not familiarity 
when predicting RT differences for the young and older 
participants. The results were complete analogues in the 
semantic categorization experiment. In both experiments no 
effects were found for AoA and familiarity when predicting 
error rates.  
The main conclusions of this study are threefold. First, the 
data show that the normation of words depends on age, both 
for AoA and familiarity. In this respect it is the first study 
where age-specific norms are used. Second, our study 
clearly demonstrates, by only manipulating the age between 
subjects, that AoA is an important factor in lexical decision. 
Third, we provide further evidence for an interpretation of 
the AoA effect as a general effect of learning systems. More 
specifically, besides the proposed effects on word output or 
word form access level, AoA plays a significant role in 
processing the meaning of words. 
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Cognitive style refers to an individual’s preferred and 
habitual approach to organizing and representing 
information (Riding & Rayner, 1998). One of the most 
widely used cognitive styles is the distinction between 
verbalizers and visualizers. If the verbalizer/visualizer 
distinction were valid, the presentation order of verbal and 
visual information should affect learning differently. That is, 
verbalizers should learn better when verbal information is 
presented prior to the visual information, whereas 
visualizers would benefit when visual information is 
presented prior to the verbal information.  
Methods 
Ninety-eight Sungkyunkwan University students, selected 
out of 160 students based on their scores on a cognitive 
style questionnaire (Kirby, Moore, & Schofield, 1988), 
participated in the experiment. They studied three Korean 
historic sites using two different versions of instructional 
material. Forty-eight students, twenty four verbalizers and 
twenty-four visualizers, studied using text with video clips 
presented on computer monitors (text condition). Text and 
video clips were presented on the monitor screen. Fifty 
students, twenty-five visualizers and twenty-five verbalizers, 
studied with narrations and video clips on monitor screens 
(narration condition). Instructions for each site consisted of 
seven segments, each of which lasted twelve to fourteen 
seconds. In the visual first condition, video clips for each 
segment started three seconds prior to the start of text 
presentation, and the screen for the video clips remained 
blank after the end of the segment until the presentation of 
the text segment ended. In the simultaneous condition, both 
text (or narration) and the video clips of the segment started 
simultaneously. In the verbal first condition, text (or 
narration) started to play three seconds prior to the start of 
the video clips, and the monitor screen for the text remained 
blank or silent until the video clips of the segment ended. 
After students finished studying three sites, they answered 
twelve retention questions, four for each site, for four 
minutes, and twelve integration questions, four for each site, 
for eight minutes. 
 
Results and discussion 
The number of correct answers for the retention questions 
and the integration questions were analyzed. The interaction 
effect of cognitive style and the presentation order in the 
retention test was significant in the narration condition 
(F(2,96)=6.97, p<.01), and marginal in the text condition  (F 
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Fig 1. Average mean retention score as a function of 
cognitive style (visualizer vs verbalizer) and order of visual 
and verbal information (vis first: visual precedes, simul: 
visual and verbal simultaneously, verb firs; verbal precedes) 
 
 
(2,92)=2.84, p<.06). The pattern of the interaction effect in 
the integration test was similar to that of the retention test, 
but failed to reach statistical significance. As was shown in 
Fig. 1, visualizers got the most benefit when the visual 
information was presented first, compared to the 
simultaneous and verbal first condition (F(1,24)=3.04, p<.09, 
and F(1,24)=3.61, p,.07, respectively). Whereas verbalizers 
retained more information when the verbal information was 
presented first, compared to the visual first condition and 
simultaneous condition (F(1,24)=8.35, p<.01, F(1,24)=6.68, 
p<.02, respectively). The results suggested that the 
multimedia instructional material would be better if 
separately prepared for visualizers and verbalizers. 
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Introduction 
Recognizing and understanding observed actions is critical 
to effective social interaction. To do this, observers must 
segment complex and continuous human behavior into 
discrete events.  Newtson (1973) developed a paradigm for 
measuring behavior segmentation, in which participants 
observed films of everyday behavior and used a key to mark 
off separate events.  Zacks, Tversky and Iyer (2001) showed 
that people segment observed action according to a 
hierarchical structure: larger (coarse) action units were 
defined by changes in the object being manipulated, 
whereas smaller (fine) units were defined by changes in 
actions performed upon the same object.  Zacks et al. 
suggested that this organization reflected a cognitive bias to 
relate objects to goals and actions to subgoals. Because 
Zacks et al.’s findings could be due to the organization 
inherent in their stimuli, the present study examines the 
possibility of an object bias by asking observers to segment 
differently organized tasks. 
 
Methods 
We filmed two familiar activities: packing a suitcase and 
washing dishes, according to two different organizations.  
One version organized larger goals by object changes and 
subgoals by action changes (object films), and the other 
organized larger goals by action changes and subgoals by 
object changes (action films). Participants viewed both 
object films or both action films and segmented them 
according to the Newtson paradigm.  In Experiment 1, 
thirty-two participants viewed the films twice, marking off 
coarse units on one viewing and fine units on the other.  In 
Experiment 2, sixteen participants segmented the same films 
into whatever events felt natural. 
 
Results and Discussion 
For Experiment 1, linear regression analyses revealed that 
observers changed their segmentation criteria based on the 
organization of the films they observed. For object films, 
changes in objects were the best predictor of coarse event 
boundaries, F(1,560) = 76.2, p < 0.001, and changes in 
actions on the same object were the best predictor for fine 
boundaries, F(1,560) = 96.2,   p < 0.001.  For action films, 
this pattern reversed: changes in actions predicted coarse 
segmentation, F(1,552) = 125.8, p < 0.001, and changes in 
objects predicted fine segmentation, F(1,552) = 27.5, p < 
0.001.  Although segmentation followed event organization 
by action or object, there was greater agreement on segment 
boundaries and greater hierarchical alignment for events 
organized by objects than events organized by actions (Fig 
1). To further test whether objects bias segmentation, 
participants in Experiment 2 segmented the films into 
natural units.  Object changes were the best predictor of 
event boundaries for both object, (F(1,560) =51.068, p < 
0.001) and action conditions (F(1,552) = 72.244, p < 0.001).  
Furthermore, participants in the object condition produced 
segmentation patterns suggesting that they monitored both 
coarse and fine levels of action. Participants in the action 
condition did not show this pattern, suggesting poorer 
identification of hierarchical structure.  Taken together, 
these data suggest that while observers are adept at 
uncovering the structure in different task organizations, 
there is a bias towards object-based segmentation 
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Figure 1: Hierarchical Alignment for action and object 
films.  
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Introduction 
We are developing a system, Cassie, that defines 
unknown words from their linguistic context combined 
with background knowledge [Ehrlich & Rapaport, 1997; 
Rapaport & Ehrlich, 2000]. This work is of significance 
for cognitive  science, education, computational linguistics 
and philosophy of mind.   
    Cassie is built on SNePS, a semantic-network-based  
knowledge representation and reasoning system 
developed by Stuart C. Shapiro and the SNePS Research 
Group [1999], with facilities for parsing and generating 
English and for belief revision.  SNePS has been and is 
being used for several natural language research projects. 
 
Cassie Learns as Humans Learn 
When asked to define of a word, Cassie reports relevant 
aspects of her experience with that word. Which aspects 
are chosen depends upon the type and quantity of her 
exposure to the word, and the contexts in which it occurs, 
as well as what background knowledge she has.  
     Our algorithms for selecting information salient to a 
good definition have been drawn, in large part, from 
observation of humans with very strong verbal skills.  
These humans were asked to reason aloud as they read a 
series of passages containing an unfamiliar word, or a 
familiar word used in a new sense. It was observed that 
certain types of information were almost always regarded 
as salient, while other items would be reported when the 
preferred data was lacking, but would be dropped from 
the definition (even if still believed) once the more 
important information could be observed or inferred. 
    Though monotonic reasoning is preferred where 
possible [Ehrlich, 2004], it is at times necessary to 
withdraw or modify previously held beliefs. Therefore, 
Cassie has been given an ability to analyze her beliefs, 
and to select (from among the beliefs supporting a 
conclusion shown to be erroneous) a belief most likely to 
be at fault. Cassie then withdraws or modifies the belief 
according to pre-defined algorithm. This allows her to 
revise an incorrect definition (as opposed to the more 
typical case of an incomplete definition). 
    Cassie’s ability to define nouns, verbs, and adjectives 
has been developed and refined through work on a 
number of examples, following protocols taken from 
several readers. Current work includes the further 
development of a rudimentary discourse analysis for 
finding the effects of verbs and further development of 
case-based reasoning. 
 
Humans Learn as Cassie Learns 
Meanwhile, the algorithms we have developed and tested 
on Cassie are being used to formulate an educational 
curriculum [Rapaport & Kibby, 2002]. It is well-known 
that the majority of a person’s vocabulary is obtained 
from context, but to date there has been little in the way 
of instruction in methods of acquiring vocabulary from 
context. The explicitly formulated algorithms needed to 
allow Cassie to learn word meanings, however, provide 
what appear to be a useful set of techniques that can be 
explicitly taught to secondary school and college students. 
Investigation is ongoing into how helpful these techniques 
may be in improving reading comprehension, especially 
in reading scientific or technical materials that may 
include a variety of new terms. 
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Introduction
Psychologists (e.g., Wallas 1926; Guilford 1959; Finke et al.
1992) have clarified the existence of a process controlled by
imagination that precedes what is called design, which are
deductive logic operations, for the act of creation, in which
things that had hitherto not existed are created; a creative act
absent this process in mental space is not possible. In other
words, a process that could be perceived as what is called
insight or idea generation before deductive logic operations
substantially controls the creative process. However,
research proposing mathematical models for such as the
creative cognition process for direct linkage to creativity has
seldom been conducted.
When, analyzing the musical work’s structures of Brahms,
Wagner, for example, a melody is present here, although the
melody and harmony are inseparable; there is absolutely no
way to first have the melody and then harmonization with it.
Moreover, the melody and harmony are allocated to
individual instruments for respective sounds and with
harmonic progression are changed to be extremely effective
as melody; if melody and harmony do not exist
simultaneously and if changes in both harmonic progression
and timbre in the process of creation do not exist
simultaneously in the brain of the composer as a sound
image, then creation of a work like this would be close to
impossible. That is, harmony, melody, and timbre are in a
mode where they are blended into one another and creation
must be interpreted to progress with simultaneous
processing of these in parallel in the brain of the composer.
However, the music theory proposed until now is only static
system theory (e.g., Lerdahl & Jackendoff 1983; Forte
1973) and dynamical system theory is not proposed yet.
A Device for Emergent Systems
Two continuous-time autonomous dynamical systems Xa
and Xb are considered in n-dimensional Euclidean space R
n.
  
€ 
˙ X a = F(Xa ), ˙ X b = F(Xb ) L(1)
Here, F is considered to be the Lorenz system for both with
n=3, when considering the Xa and Xb in bi-directionally
coupled by 0<c1,2,3<1 are temporal coupling coefficients and
0<d1,2,3<1 are spatial coupling coefficients, where individual
vector components are
  
€ 
Xa = x1, x2, x3[ ], Xb = x4, x5, x6[ ] L(2)
  
€ 
˙ x1,4
˙ x2,5
˙ x3,6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
σ (x2,5 − x1,4 )
x1,4 (r − x3,6) − x2,5
x1,4 x2,5 − b x3,6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ D
x4 − x1
x5 − x2
x6 − x3
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
L (3)
D =
c1 d2 d3
d1 c2 d3
d1 d2 c3
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
: excitatory connection
˜ D =
c1 d2 1− d3
1− d1 c2 d3
d1 1− d2 c3
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
: inhibitory connection
Discussion
The presented Lorenz model having two parameters c and d
is a device that has coupled three one-dimensional
information codes of {x1-x4, x2-x5, x3-x6}. This device can be
used as an emergent device for three channels through
control of on-off intermittent chaos as observed in this
model with the c and d as parameters. The c and d control
on-off intermittent chaos, although they have no direct
effect on individual vectors and work as independent
parameters without providing internal disturbance. The
wandering on the three one-dimensional information coded
space in the burst phase with seeking and gathering of
valuable information from this, synchronized stabilization
on a point in the laminar phase can be modeled as a process
that intermittently and irregularly repeats and the phase
transition between laminar phase and burst phase
simultaneously occur in three dimensions. Figure 1 shows
the phase transition from chaos→limit cycles→intermittent
chaos→ laminar phase with increase of the value of
d=d1=d2=d3 in case as constant of c=c1=c2=c3. The figure is
plotted in t=0~100000, d=0~1. The d is changing linearly
with t, where d=0.00001t.
Figure 1.  x1-x4 versus d (indicated by 10
5),
where, σ=10, b=8/3, r=28, c=0.4, inhibitory connection.
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We present a model of analogical recall in people which
draws inspiration from recent work in visual classifica-
tion by Ullman (2002). Our model is intended to unify
two bodies of evidence regarding recall in people: on the
one hand, we seek to cover a body of evidence that in-
dicates people drawn from a population without regard
to task expertise are heavily influenced by surface sim-
ilarity during retrieval; on the other hand, we also seek
to account for the fact that experts are able to achieve
analogical recall on a consistent basis. Our model works
by breaking the symbolic graph representation of an in-
put situation into sub-graph structures (structures we
call features), and looking for these features in other sit-
uations. By varying the informativeness of the features
we use to retrieve situations, we are able to promote or
suppress analogical retrieval.
Our model is consistent with previous models of recall
(Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson, & Gochfeld, 1990; Forbus,
Genter, & Law, 1994) which indicate object similarity,
first-order relations, and some small amount of struc-
ture dominate recall in normal subjects. These models
were primarily intended to account for evidence of the
predominance of so-called “mere-appearance” matches
in normal recall (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Rattermann &
Gentner, 1987), while still acknowledging some struc-
tural effects (Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Wharton et al.,
1994)
In contrast to these previous models, however, our
model indicates an explanation for certain results in the
field of expert problem-solving and retrieval, which has
received less attention to date. Evidence drawn from this
literature (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Schoenfeld,
1982; Shneiderman, 1977) indicates that certain sorts of
people do consistently achieve analogical recall in par-
ticular domains: while these people often fall under the
heading “expert,” non-experts are also able to attain
structural reminding under particular circumstances.
We run our model on a dataset of descriptions of com-
plex political scenarios, and show the predicted switch-
ing of preference from mere-appearance to analogical
matches when moving from low average feature infor-
mativeness to high average feature informativeness. Fur-
thermore our results indicate, as Ullman’s did, that fea-
tures of an intermediate size and complexity provide the
most robust recall within analogical category.
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The problems with previous analyses of Korean vowel 
harmony are solved when harmony is treated as a consequence 
of morphological alternation rather than a purely phonological 
process. This morphological alternation is best accounted for 
using morpheme-specific correspondence constraints in an 
Optimality-Theoretic Analysis. 
In Korean, vowel harmony occurs in the semantic contrasts 
of sound symbolic (SS) words. SS words are words whose 
sound bears some symbolic meaning, and are extremely 
productive in Korean (Cho, 1994). The majority of SS Korean 
words alternate between LIGHT and DARK, which have fast 
and slow connotations, respectively. Alternations between 
LIGHT and DARK are based on the vowels that can occur in 
these forms. DARK forms harmonize to contain only DARK 
vowels: [i, y, , e, , u] (as in [teg] ‘chopping slowly’). 
LIGHT forms harmonize to contain only LIGHT vowels: [, O, 
a, o] (as in [tga] ‘chopping quickly’). 
Phonological analyses of vowel harmony must use one 
harmonic feature to capture vowel alternations. The problem 
in Korean is that there is no single harmonic feature. Some 
alternations involve only a change in height, as in [u] to [o] in 
[hull]/[holla] ‘take off clothes’. Some alternations involve 
only a change in advanced tongue root (ATR), as in [e] to [] in 
[teg]/[tga] ‘chopping’. Other alternations involve both 
changes in aTR and HIGH. Analyses using one harmonic 
feature ([low] or [ATR] (see Chung, 2000)) cannot completely 
capture the distinction between DARK and LIGHT without 
significant restructuring or arbitrary assignment of 
phonological features. This problem can be solved if this 
instance of vowel harmony is treated as a morphological 
process whereby morphemes for DARK and LIGHT bear 
phonological features that are in correspondence with the 
output surface form.  
The feature associated with DARK is [+ATR] while the 
features associated with LIGHT are [−ATR] and [−HIGH]. Using 
both [HIGH] and [ATR] captures the fact that the phonological 
alternations result in changes in one or both features. The 
presence of a DARK or LIGHT morpheme triggers morpheme-
specific correspondence constraints which restrict the 
occurrence of vowels in the output. Correspondence between 
the morpheme and the output is governed by left/right 
anchoring constraints and output-contiguity. These constraints 
represent the drive for the morpheme to be in correspondence 
with all vowels in the output. The interaction of the 
correspondence constraints with IO-Faithfulness and 
markedness constraints gives the expected outcome, including 
an account of high vowels, which do not undergo harmony 
after the first syllable. The analysis presented also accounts for 
unexpected behavior, such as the absence of [o] in DARK 
forms and alternations of [u] and [o] after the first syllable. 
Use of correspondence constraints to account for 
morphologically controlled harmony as opposed to agreement 
(Bakovic, 2000) is in line with work on featural affixation 
(Akinlabi, 1994), and is part of a larger project involving the 
use of morpheme-specific faithfulness constraints to account 
for morphologically controlled harmony. 
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The ability to make inductive inferences is crucial for 
humans, and it has long been demonstrated that labels 
play an important role in induction. However, the 
mechanism by which labels contribute to induction 
remained unclear. According to one theoretical 
position, often referred to as the naïve theory, even for 
young children labels presented as count nouns are 
special properties: even young children understand that 
count nouns denote categories, communicating what the 
things are (Keil, et al, 1998; Gelman & Coley, 1991). 
According to a recently proposed alternative model 
SINC (Similarity, Induction and Categorization in 
Children), children perform induction on the basis of 
the overall similarity among compared entities, and 
labels are features contributing to the overall similarity 
(Sloutsky & Fisher, in press). If labels are features 
contributing to the overall similarity then not only 
identical, but phonologically similar labels should 
contribute to the overall similarity, and therefore to 
induction.  This research was designed to test this 
prediction of SINC, which, if supported would present 
challenges to the naïve theory position. Results of two 
experiments supported the prediction.  
Experiment 1: Inductive inference with 
similar, identical, and different labels 
Participants (N = 67, M = 4.9 years; SD = 0.34) were 
presented with an induction task in one of the three between 
subject labeling conditions: identical, similar, and different 
labels. Children were presented with triads of animal 
pictures introduced by identical, similar, or different labels, 
and informed about pseudo-biological properties of two 
members of each triad. Then children were asked to 
generalize these properties to the third member of the triad. 
If labels are category markers as the naïve theory suggests, 
then identical labels should be fully predictive (thus 
promoting inferences), while similar labels should be 
completely non-predictive (thus promoting no inferences). 
According to the SINC model identical, but also similar 
labels should promote inductive inferences (i.e., similar 
labels should be at least partially predictive). Results of 
Experiment 1 supported predictions of the SINC model: 
similar labels were found to be partially predictive and 
likely to promote inductive inferences. 
 
Experiment 2: Label Verification 
Results of Experiment 1 could be due to children 
treating similar novel labels as mispronunciations of 
identical labels. Experiment 2 was designed to 
eliminate this potential confound. Participants (N = 29, 
M = 4.8, SD = 0.45) were presented with sets of 
pictures consisting of a Target and four Test stimuli of 
various degree of similarity to the Target (i.e., identical, 
very similar, less similar, and dissimilar). On each trial 
a Target and one of the Test stimuli was labeled with 
similar labels used in Experiment 1. Children were 
asked whether the labeled entities had the same name. 
If children consider similar labels as mispronunciations, 
then, at least when pictures are identical, they should 
respond that similar labels were the same. However, the 
majority of children considered similar labels as 
different words, and their responses were not affected 
by picture similarity. 
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The starting point for this project was the finding that 
people with a low working memory capacity perform better 
in a covariation detection task (Kareev, Lieberman, & Lev, 
1997). In the task people successively encountered 
envelopes with two different colors and each time had to 
decide which out of two objects they think they will contain. 
The explanation for the low capacity advantage is that 
people with a lower working memory capacity have to rely 
on smaller samples when they make decisions. This helps 
them to detect a correlation earlier, because statistically 
small samples are more likely to indicate a correlation that 
exceeds the correlation in the population (Kareev, 1995b).  
Experiments 
We conducted two experiments with an extended version of 
the original task to test and model the original finding that 
low capacity people perform better in a covariation task. An 
implication of the small sample account is that they are also 
better in detecting a change in the correlational structure of 
the environment. As in the original experiment, working 
memory capacity was assessed with a digit span test. The 
original finding was replicated in the first but not in the 
second experiment, thus it seems to be a weak and unstable 
effect. It is worth noting that the probability of replicating a 
result at the same or a higher level of significance (and in 
the same direction) is only 50% (Goodman, 1992). Contrary 
to the predictions by the small sample account there was a 
high capacity advantage after a change in the first 
experiment. In the second experiment we did not find any 
differences between low and high capacity people, neither 
before nor after a change. Therefore, we focus on the first 
experiment with regard to modeling. 
Modeling 
Two different models have been tested, a naïve window 
model and a reinforcement learning model. Every model 
was fitted to each individual separately since we wanted to 
relate capacity to model parameters. The naïve window 
model that tries to translate the small sample idea directly 
could not capture the low capacity advantage. But we were 
able to model it with the reinforcement learning model 
(Camerer & Ho, 1999) with a decay, a sensitivity and an 
initial attraction parameter, where we forced the variance in 
each of the parameters separately by fixing the other two to 
their means. All three versions were able to capture the low 
capacity advantage on covariation detection, but only the 
initial attraction version was related to capacity and could 
predict behavior after a change.  
Conclusions 
The small sample account is not clearly supported by our 
data. First, the deduced hypothesis of a low capacity 
advantage after a change does not hold, we find either no 
effect or the opposite. Second, the naïve window model and 
the reinforcement learning model version with the decay 
parameter which has the strongest connection to memory 
have to be rejected. Instead, an initial attraction parameter 
model is successful, indicating a faster learning process of 
low capacity people in the beginning, but not later on. Still, 
faster learning can be interpreted as relying on smaller 
samples. But it is also congruent with the finding of Weir 
(1964) that children use the simple but most successful 
payoff maximization strategy (i.e. always choose the more 
frequent option given a color) earlier in a similar task 
because they are simply reinforcement driven. Adults, in 
contrast, develop complex hypothesis and apply complex 
strategies because they believe that there exists a perfect 
solution, but they end up worse. As capacity differs between 
children and adults (Kail, 1984) and plays an important role 
in hypothesis generation (Dougherty and Hunter, 2003) this 
could be an explanation for the low capacity advantage.  
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The A-not-B Error 
Since Jean Piaget’s observations of the A-not-B error in his 
own children, a great deal of scientific effort has been 
applied to understanding how the error occurs and how 
children overcome it.  The error occurs when a young infant 
(around 10 months) watches a toy being hidden and then 
reaches for it.  First the child retrieves the toy, hidden a few 
times at a location A.  Then, when the toy is hidden at a new 
location B and the child must wait a few seconds before 
retrieving it, she will reliably perseverate, reaching to the 
old location for the toy (often with great frustration.)  By 
about 14 months, infants no longer perseverate in this task. 
Dynamical Field Theory And A-not-B 
Dynamical Field Theory has been a source of many 
validated predictions of infant behavior in the A-not-B task 
(Thelen et al., 2001). These have included manipulations of 
age, number of practice trials, delays, spacing between 
target locations, and distinctiveness of hiding boxes.  Field 
theory’s lack of dependence on the object concept in 
conceptualizing the A-not-B error has led to demonstrations 
that the same patterns of behavior are evident even without 
a hidden toy, using only light-up buttons for example. 
The field model accounts for the dynamics of the A-not-B 
task by postulating a nonlinearly interactive activation field 
isometric to the space in front of the infant (Erlhagen & 
Schöner, 2002).  This field, with local excitation and distal 
inhibition, builds up activation into a peak that indicates 
where the baby will reach.  It is driven by perceptual inputs 
as well as bias from motor memory of past reaches.  Young 
infants differ from old in that they are less able to maintain a 
stable reach decision (a peak in the activation field) in the 
absence of a cue.  Therefore, after a short delay, they forget 
the cue at B and reach to A because of motor memory from 
practice trials.  
A New Task 
The A-not-B task does not exhaust the dynamical 
possibilities that the field model is equipped to handle.  
Specifically, the A-not-B task does not lead to inhibitory 
competition between multiple peaks in the activation field.  
(The competition between a peak in activation and a peak in 
motor memory is of a different sort with different 
dynamics.) 
  A new task we are exploring consists of a cue at A, 
followed by a delay during which there is a “distractor” cue 
at B before the baby’s turn to reach.  We manipulate the 
duration and timing of the distractor within the delay, as 
well as the number of  training A-trials before this test. 
Predictions 
Computer simulations of the model allow testing how 
changes in experimental conditions will affect behavior.  
More training trials lead to more perseveration to A.  A 
longer distractor more effectively draws the infant to B.  A 
later distractor is more effective because it occurs closer to 
when the infant may reach. 
  More striking predictions derive from the differing 
dynamics of the older versus younger infants.  Since young 
infants cannot maintain a reach decision over a delay, a 
distractor that is too early is not effective, even if it is long. 
By the end of the delay, they forget B and are dominated by 
motor memory at A.  Older infants do maintain stable 
decisions, so a distractor must compete against the cued, 
stable peak at A.  Thus, for older infants, duration is crucial.  
In the case of a late, short distractor, old infants perseverate 
more than young—a reversal of the classical A-not-B effect.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, each condition follows a different 
dynamical “story,” even if the resulting reach is the same. 
 
 
Figure 1: Simulations of four conditions.  The first test-trial 
after 3 A-trials.  (c+/c- is cue at A.  d+/d- is distractor at B.) 
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Studies with adult and infants have shown that subjects can
learn fairly complex probabilistic relationships. Researchers
have used statistical learning as a laboratory to explore
issues like word segmentation (Saffran, Aslin & Newport,
1996) and the acquisition of grammar (Morgan, Meier &
Newport, 1987). Statistical learning has become a scenario
for an argument between the two competing views about
language acquisition: the view that assumes that humans
have some innate ability to acquire grammar (cf., Chomsky,
1965); and the view that claims that statistical learning is
based on the same learning mechanisms (e.g., distributed
supervised learning) as other domains (see Seidenberg,
1997).
Of particular relevance to our research program are the
studies that focus on learning of relationships between non-
adjacent speech elements.  Newport & Aslin (2004) and R.
Gomez (2002) have shown that, only under some special
circumstances, participants learn relationships between non-
adjacent speech elements (e.g., syllables and words).  Here,
we present the first version of a model that can account for
that data.  The model uses a simple encoding process, and a
decision mechanism inspired in signal detection theory
(Green & Swets, 1966). Our mode supports the notion that
very simple mechanisms are enough to explain non-adjacent
dependency learning without resorting to special language
learning modules.
R. Gomez (2002) has shown that adults and infants can
learn non-adjacent regularities when the set size of the
intermediate element is large (24 elements), but not when
the size set is small (e.g., 2).  In a follow up study, she
showed that participants could learn non-adjacent
dependencies if the intermediate element set size was 1.  In
these studies, words from an invented language were used in
utterances of the form a1 X1 to N b1, where the dependency
was between elements (words) a and b, and the set size of
the intermediate element was N.
Newport & Aslin (2004) showed that participants could
learn non-adjacent dependencies between letters, but not
between syllables. For their experiment with syllables, the
stimulus had the form CV11 CV21 to 4 CV31, where the
dependency was between the consonant-vowel syllables
CV1 and CV3. For the experiment with letters, their
experiment had the form C1V1 to 2 C2V3 to 4 C3V4 to 5, where
the dependency was between the consonants C1, C2 and C3.
Description of the Model
The model assumes that subjects use a minimalist approach
when they encode the training stimuli. If in their subjective
estimation, the adjacent (first order) relationships are
informative about the rules to form the artificial language,
they will tend not to encode the nonadjacent (second order)
relationships.
How informative the first order relationship (say,
between the first and second elements in Gomez’s studies)
is can be determined by a very simple computation:
IX,b=p(Xj|ai) (1-p(Xj|ai)), (1)
where IX,b is a measure of how informative the first order
relationship is, and p(Xj|ai) is the estimated conditional
probability of element Xj given element ai. This measure of
informativeness can be thought of as the probability to
encode the next order of (non-adjacent) relationship.
The grammaticality judgments are based on familiarity
(cf. Signal Detection Theory) at the order of relationship
that the learner estimated as informative using Equation 1.
This simple model can account for the u-shaped pattern
of accuracy that Gomez found as a function of set size in the
intermediate component. In addition, it accounts for the
difference between the syllable and letter conditions found
by Newport and Aslin; this, because the first order
relationship between consonants and vowels had some level
of subjective informativeness in the syllable condition.
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The distributed feature approach to semantic memory
organization has been supported by data from patients with
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (e.g., Gonnerman et al., 1997).
This account makes specific predictions about the types of
errors one would expect in AD as semantic memory
deteriorates, with initially more contrast coordinate errors,
followed by superordinates, and finally an increase in
unrelated responses.  We investigate these predictions using
a picture naming task, with both natural kinds and artifacts.
Method
Participants
The young normal (YN) group included 25 USC
undergraduates, the old normal (ON) group 24 healthy
elderly, and the Alzheimer’s (AD) group 15 individuals
diagnosed with AD, matched with the ON group for age.
Materials and Procedure
Participants named 144 color pictures, with 12 items each
from six natural kinds and six artifacts categories, controlled
for familiarity, imageability, frequency, and typicality.
Results & Discussion
The YN group correctly named 86% of the pictures, ON
85%, and AD 62%, indicating a significant impairment in
naming for the AD group, (t (15) = -4.15, p < .0009), but no
significant difference between YN and ON controls.
To examine the types of errors AD patients made as their
naming impairment progressed, errors were coded into three
categories: 1) contrast coordinate, giving the name of
another category member (e.g., calling a zebra ‘horse’); 2)
superordinate, giving the category label rather than the
object name (e.g., ‘bug’ for beetle); and 3) unrelated, where
the response was not from the same category (e.g., ‘flute’
for cucumber). No responses, ‘I don’t know’, and machine
errors were not included in the analysis.
To determine if the prevalence of a given error type was
affected by the degree of damage, ratios of each error type
over the total number of errors were calculated.  Overall,
there were initially significantly more contrast coordinate
errors than superordinates (t(327)=-4.7, p <.00001),
followed by unrelated responses (t(190)=-3.5, p <.001).
This is consistent with the progression of errors in studies of
patients with semantic dementia (Hodges et al., 1995).
We were most interested in the progression of errors
within natural kind versus artifact categories (see Figure 1
below). The pattern of change varied by domain.  As
expected, there were more contrast coordinate errors in both
natural kinds and artifacts early on, declining with
increasing damage.  Interestingly, while superordinate errors
increased for natural kinds, they decreased for artifacts.  The
distributed feature approach provides a natural account of
this pattern.  As damage increases, the core features of
natural kinds concepts are still available because they have
more intercorrelations.  The activation of these core features
permits activation of the superordinate name, whereas the
lack of similar correlations in artifact categories leads to a
steady decrease in superordinate responses for artifacts.
Finally, there is a greater increase in unrelated responses in
artifacts compared to natural kinds in later damage stages.
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Figure 1. Percentage of error types as naming errors increase for natural kind (left) and artifact (right) concepts.
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The “paradox of the active user” (Carroll & Rosson, 1987) is
the persistent use of inefficient procedures in interactive
environments by experienced or even expert users when
demonstrably more efficient procedures exist. In this study we
examine the procedures that people adopt in response to minor
changes in interface design and how these procedures adapt,
or do not adapt, when the design changes.
Prior Knowledge versus Perceptual-motor Effort
For this work, subjects programmed one of two nearly
identical VCR simulations. To program a setting, the subject
must first click on the setting’s radio button and then use the
up or down arrow to reach the target value. As suggested by
Figure 1, to set the start time the subjects must set start-hour,
start-10min, and start-min. To set the end time, they set end-
hour, end-10min, and end-min. In the interface used here the
three radio buttons to set start time are in one row and the
three buttons to set end time are in another row.
In this study we manipulated whether or not the interface
had buttons above each column of radio buttons. For the
button (BTN) condition (shown in the Figure 1), if a subject
had just finished programming, for example, start-hour and
now wished to program start-10min, they would first have to
deselect the current column button and then select the next
column button before they could click-on the “Start-10min”
radio button. In the no button (noBTN) condition, subjects
could select any radio button at any time.
How easy is it to manipulate the decomposition of the task-
to-device rule hierarchy for a particular device? How
persistent would the influence of practice in one task
environment (either BTN or noBTN) be when subjects were
transferred to the other task environment?
We hypothesized that due to the role of prior knowledge,
subjects in the noBTN condition would adopt a by-row
strategy in which they would program all of start time (hour,
10min, and min) before going off to program something else.
In contrast, the BTN condition increases the perceptual-motor
cost of this “natural” by-row strategy by requiring subjects to
click column buttons on and off prior to selecting a radio
button in another column. Consequently, the BTN interface
would seem to encourage an unnatural by-column strategy (i.e.
setting start- and end-hour, then start- and end-10min, and
then start- and end-min).
Strategies Adopted on BTN and noBTN intefaces
Each subject programmed 8 different shows to the criterion
of two successful trials per show. Half of the subjects (32)
programmed the first four shows with BTN and half with
noBTN. For the last four shows they switched interface
conditions. The dependent variable in this report was the
strategy used by subjects to program time; either by-row or
by-column.
By trial 4, 30/32 noBTN(tr4) subjects used the by-row
strategy. With all else equal, subjects preferred to program
time as a unit. In contrast, 21/32 BTN(tr4) subjects used the
by-column strategy. A very simple manipulation of the
perceptual-motor cost resulted in dropping a strategy that was
congruent with prior knowledge for a strategy that in some
way ran contrary to prior knowledge.
Moreover, further analysis revealed that such minor
interface differences affect effort and performance, as well.
The average time spent memorizing the target values on the
hard interface (BTN) was ~10.4% higher than on the easy
interface (noBTN). This resulted in ~20% less programming
errors on the hard interface than on the easy.
 Start-hour  Start-10min  Start-min
 End-hour  End-10min  End-min
Figure 1. Partial simulated VCR 3.0 BTN interface.
Transfer from BTN to noBTN and vice versa
The results for trial 8 (see Table 1) show that when
transferring from a hard interface (BTN) to an easy interface
(noBTN), the methods acquired with the hard interface persist.
However, in going from easy to hard, subjects quickly adapt to
the hard interface.
From the subject’s perspective, during the second phase of
the study (shows 5-8) the perceptual–motor cost of the by-
column strategy greatly decreased and the memory cost stayed
about the same. Hence, a strategy that worked well under the
conditions of the BTN task environment still worked and was
easier to implement under the noBTN task environment.
Trial 4 Trial 8
noBTN-BTN group ~94% used by-row 75% used by-column
BTN-noBTN group ~66% used by-column ~44% used by-row
Table 1. Strategy use on Trials 4 and 8.
Summary
People do not use one tool or one piece of software. Rather,
we work in multiple task environments and our cognitive
processes seem adapted to these environments, as opposed to
particular subtasks in any given environment.
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Affective state can influence users’ cognitive processing ca-
pabilities and hence their productivity (Picard 1997). The
first goal of our research is to develop methods to timely
and efficiently recognize negative user affective states,
model their influence on cognition and behavior, and pro-
vide the most appropriate intervention in a timely manner to
return the user to his/her productive state. The second, more
distal, goal is to develop an integrated architecture of affect
and cognition. There are four challenges facing this initia-
tive. (1) Users’ affect develops over time, and its expres-
sions vary significantly with individual and context. (2) Af-
fective state observations from a given sensory source are
ambiguous, uncertain, and incomplete. (3) The influence of
cognition on affective state and vice versa is not well under-
stood. (4) Interventions to improve user performance must
be timely and effective.
Our approach contrasts with the state-of-the-art in aug-
mented cognition as well as in affect-based augmentation.
The former assumes normative performance and fails to
adapt to the user’s current affective state. The latter tends to
have low-to-no cognitive fidelity, failing to understand the
cognitive activities that lead to the observed user state. (But
see Hudlicka 2003 for an overview of recent approaches.)
Our framework addresses both sets of challenges.
The proposed framework has five major parts: data sens-
ing, user affective modeling, user cognitive modeling, an
integrated affective–cognitive model, and a probabilistic
user assistance model. Data sensing entails various visual,
physiological, and behavioral data.
The Rensselaer Bayesian Affect Recognition System (R-
BARS) determines the user’s most likely affective states
using both current and stored sensory data. The model’s
context component represents information about relevant
environmental factors such as time of day and type of work.
The affective state component represents the affective states
the system can infer. The affective state we are currently in-
vestigating is confusion. The profile component may include
experience, skill level, etc. It enables us to adapt the model
to individual differences. Finally, the model’s observation
component integrates current data with the longitudinal data
record collected during the session.
The Rensselaer Cognitive Architecture of Cognition
(RAAC) is based on ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998).
Our current focus is on “model tracing”; i.e., the step-by-
step tracing of human performance in real-time. Although
model tracing in real-time has been repeatedly demonstrated
at the 10s level of analysis (Anderson, 2002), behavior at
the 100ms level, such as point-of-gaze, is viewed as non-
deterministic.
We use a dual-task to induce confusion in the user. The
math task is a simple addition/subtraction of two-digit num-
bers. The user must decide whether the result presented on
the screen is correct. The audio task is to determine whether
a letter is lower or higher in the alphabet than the previously
presented one. For example, for the sequence a–c–b the user
must press the higher key first and then the lower key.
The tasks are presented in eight 10min blocks that are sub-
divided into 36s intervals. For each task, one stimulus is
presented every 2s, 4s, or 6s, so that there are 18, 9, or 6
stimuli per interval. By varying the rate of presentation be-
tween intervals for each task we get 9 different combina-
tions, e.g. 6–18: 6 stimuli per interval in the math task and
18 stimuli in the audio task. Varying these combinations
varies the user’s level of confusion, which is confirmed by
pilot data. Although performing the audio task at a rate of 2s
is manageable, the math task proves very challenging – in
particular in conjunction with the audio task. On trials with
challenging (18–18) schedules the performance over a
10min block can drop below 20% for the math task (it is
typically around 60%). The audio task is usually signifi-
cantly better; even for challenging schedules the perform-
ance hardly drops below 80%.
The cognitive implications of the user’s affective state are
established by analyzing the deviation of user behavior from
the optimal path determined by the model. We will interpret
the difference between expected and observed behavior as
the influence of affect on cognition and behavior.
In combining R-BARS with RAAC our proximal goal is
to mimic the effect of affect by identifying low-level pa-
rameters of the cognitive architecture that, when varied,
mimic the cognitive and behavioral consequences of affec-
tive state. Candidate parameters include noise in memory
activation and noise in production choice, cf. Belavkin
(2001).
We face a profound challenge. Even developing a reliable
affective–cognitive model for the task at hand is demanding.
Yet, even a partially validated integrated affective–cognitive
model would be an important step forward for understand-
ing of the relationship between cognition and affect.
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It seems reasonable to believe that problem solving with the 
Tower of Hanoi (TOH) task has been studied thoroughly 
enough to be well understood.  Yet, the discovery of a new 
class of affordance-based strategies was reported recently 
(Guimberteau, 2003), with the finding that problem solving 
strategies issued from that class are capable of explaining 
the famous TOH protocol from Anzai & Simon (1979).  
The above discovery enriches the set of known strategies 
for the task, formalized several decades ago (Simon, 1975).  
Importantly, it also raises an issue, given the prolific nature 
of the research area concerned with problem solving with 
the TOH task: Why has not the new class been specified 
earlier?  
Such a question may be dismissed on the grounds that 
certain aspects of scientific inquiry are not explainable.  
Another approach is to consider that question closely, as an 
opportunity to learn from the past.  The present analysis 
takes a first step in the latter direction.  It examines past 
modelizations of Anzai & Simon (1979)’s first problem 
solving episode (Episode 1), looking for clues to explain 
why those modelizations have not considered the 
affordance-driven explanation of the learner’s problem 
solving behavior.  
The strategy put forth to explain Episode 1 – Selective 
Search – constitutes a classic result in the cognitive science 
literature.  The strategy simplifies search by not repeating 
moves (Anzai & Simon, 1979; Ruiz & Newell, 1989; 
VanLehn, 1991).  It is made of three heuristics:  “Don' t 
reverse a move just made”, “Don' t move the same disk 
twice in a row,” and “Don' t transfer the smallest disk and 
later return it to its previous peg.” Those heuristics constrain 
move selection in such a way that search becomes 
unnecessary after the first move.   
Good fits and convergence of results form the basis of the 
credibility of the Selective Search strategy.  Past accounts 
simulate problem solving in Episode 1 using the Selective 
Search strategy and show that they can reproduce the 
transitions between the learner’s strategies (Anzai & Simon, 
1979), with a good fit to the learner’s moves (Ruiz & 
Newell, 1989), and to her goal utterances as well (VanLehn, 
1991).  Specifically, Anzai & Simon (1979) build a 
production system that can make the same strategy 
transitions as the ones they hypothesize for their human 
learner.  The Soar simulation from Ruiz & Newell (1989) 
produces moves that correspond to 77% of the subject’s 
observed moves in her first problem-solving episode.  The 
production system from VanLehn (1991) accounts for all 
but one of the subject’s 130 observed moves and all but 3 of 
her 41 goal utterances.  
A close examination of the Selective Search 
modelizations reveals three observations. Certain aspects of 
the episode (e. g., a bottom-disk focus) are not explained by 
the Selective Search strategy, requiring additional modeling 
mechanisms.  In addition, two conflicts between the 
heuristics and data from the episode need addressing 
Finally, the fact that those simulations overlook certain 
aspects of the data raises the possibility that other 
mechanisms may be able to explain both the unexplained 
and the explained data.  Indeed, a stronger explanation of 
the problem solving strategies used in Episode 1 is 
affordance-driven, and not based on the above Selective 
Search heuristics:  The subject recognizes task-specific 
affordances during problem-solving, from which she 
devises affordance-driven strategies (e.g., moving the 
second smallest disk first because that disk affords moving 
less than the smallest one.)  In other words, the Selective 
Search characterization rests on a foundation that does not 
address issues of exhaustive protocol coverage, conflict 
prevention, and parsimony. 
The Selective Search strategy discussed here constitutes 
one of the classic results of cognitive science.  Yet, the two 
major criteria underlying its credibility – good fits with the 
protocol data and convergence of past analyses of those data 
– are insufficient.  Other classic results may suffer from 
similar limitations.  The present finding calls for the 
definition of powerful strategies for cognitive science 
research. 
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The success of on agents realistic probability assessment 
for an unknown quantity are greatly enhanced if a pre-stated 
interval is evaluated, rather then produced by the same agent 
(Hansson, Winman and Juslin, 2004). In order to explain 
this format dependence effect we have developed what we 
call a Naive Sampling Model (here after NSM) (Juslin, 
Winman and Hansson, 2004).   
The NSM assumes that a Subjective Probability 
Distribution for an unknown quantity is assessed by a 
retrieval of similar objects from memory which provide a 
sample distribution. This sample distribution is directly 
taken as an estimate of the corresponding population 
distribution. With interval production the sample dispersion 
is interpreted as an estimate of the population dispersion, 
with the fractiles in the distribution defining the upper and 
lower limit for the interval. Because of the fact that sample 
dispersion is a biased estimator of the population dispersion, 
failing to correct this bias (Kareev et al, 2002) leads to 
intervals that are too narrow, thereby producing 
overconfidence.  
The current study tests the NSM with a special eye on 
sampling constrains. We manipulate how much knowledge 
(possibly sample size) that participants could use to make 
these inferences.    
Experiment 
The stimuli used in the current experiment were fictive 
income figures for 136 different companies. The companies 
were divided in to five different fictive regions (the regions 
were supposed to function as cues). Two conditions (13 
participants in each) were used: one (4XTraining) where the 
participant trained on 4 x 136 trials, the other (2XTraining) 
where the participants trained on 2 x 136 trials. Feedback 
was given under the training phase. After going trough the 
training phase participants in both conditions completed a 
test phase consisting in making point estimates and 
producing intervals under three different confidence levels 
(50, 80 and 100%) regarding the income of the 136 
companies. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants in the 4XTraining condition produced 
significantly more correct point estimates in the test phase 
than the participants in the 2XTraining condition 
(t(24)=2.38, p=.03). This indicated that they had received 
more knowledge (i. e. larger sample). Figure 1 (Left Panel): 
although the participants in the 2XTraining condition had 
learned less, they were not worse calibrated then those who 
participated in the 4XTraining condition. Both groups are 
overconfident in their interval productions. Monte Carlo 
simulation of the NSM on the same database used in the 
experiment showed that sample size (n) = 5 fitted the data 
best for both groups. One interpretation of these results is 
that the sample used to make these kinds of inferences is 
constrained by working memory limitations and that 
knowledge produced by the long-time summarizing of the 
complete sample of the observation experienced plays no 
part. One limitation with the model is that it does not predict 
the difference between the two conditions regarding the 
interval width (see Figure 1, Right Panel). 
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Figure 1: Left Panel: Mean proportion of correct values 
included in each confidence intervals in the two 
experimental conditions and the models performance with 
sample size (n) =5. Right Panel: Interval width (upper minus 
lower limit) for the produced interval by the participants in 
the two conditions  
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Introduction 
Researchers describe the development of analogical 
reasoning as a shift from similarity judgments based on 
simple perceptual feature comparisons to more complex 
reasoning based on common relational structures (Gentner, 
1989). Given that this shift entails a selective focus on 
relational information, perhaps attentional development 
affects the development of analogy.  
    Recently attentional processes have been examined in 
terms of three networks of attention; orienting, alerting, and 
executive (Posner & Petersen, 1990).  The executive 
network, an attentional control network required for the 
resolution of cognitive conflict, may be particularly 
important for analogical reasoning tasks.   Recent research 
has shown that the same neurological pathways are 
activated in selective attention activities of the executive 
network and analogical reasoning (Duque & Posner, 2001; 
Luo, Perry, Peng, Jin, Xu, Ding, & Xu, 2003).                     
    Children from low-income backgrounds have been shown 
to have impaired attentional and cognitive abilities (Norman 
& Breznitz, 1992). In the current study, individual 
differences in childrens skills on the three attention 
networks are studied in order to understand the relationship 
between specific attentional processes and analogical 
reasoning in the context of poverty. 
Methods 
Participants were 78 children (Mean age = 56.88 mos, SD = 
5.97) from low-income backgrounds. Children were 
assessed on computerized attention tasks designed to tap the 
three attention networks (Berger, Jones, Rothbart, & Posner, 
2000) Analogical reasoning was assessed using the Matrices 
Subtest of the Kaufman Brief-Intelligence Test (Kaufman & 
Kaufman, 1990).    
Results 
Hierarchical regression was performed to predict analogical 
reasoning ability using median reaction time on the attention 
tasks. Controlling for cognitive ability, the overall model 
was significant, F (4, 72) = 4.091, p < .005. Performance on 
the executive attention task added a significant amount of 
variance (6.4%) to the model.  
 
Discussion 
The present study is unique in its examination of the relation 
between attention and analogical reasoning in the context of 
a high-risk environment. Future studies should examine how 
these findings relate to Halford's (1989) proposals about the 
impact of processing capacity on the development of 
analogy.  Further, studies should examine how executive 
attention interacts with changes in domain knowledge to 
affect analogy task performance. The present results suggest 
that high functioning executive attention may be a 
protective factor in a high-risk environment.  
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Evolution of Deliberative Actions 
While bottom-up approaches to studying cognition have 
proved insightful in many ways, top-down approaches are 
still better at explaining deliberative cognitive processes.  
Deliberative actions are those that go beyond simple 
sensory-motor loops and seem to require some type of 
internal model, map or logical reasoning.  Examples of 
deliberative actions include planning a route to navigate to a 
goal or performing a chain of logical inference to determine 
a likely course of action. 
Bottom-up approaches such as Walter’s tortoise (1951) 
and Braitenberg’s vehicles (1984) are excellent models of 
how simple sensory-motor loops can combine to produce 
complex intentional behavior.  Such behaviors are still 
mainly of the tropic type (e.g. phototropic, chemotropic), 
which rely on detecting and following some type of 
perceptual gradient in the environment.  More recently, 
models such as Brook’s (1990) subsumption architecture 
have shown us how collections of behavior patterns can 
combine in relatively flexible chains, in an emergent 
manner, to produce even more complex behaviors.  Simple 
tropic behaviors are present in even the simplest of single 
celled organisms, while the more complex collection, 
chaining and combining of such sensory-motor behavior 
patterns appear with fish and insects. 
  Deliberative actions appear to require the development 
of more long-term memory mechanisms that allow for the 
storage of past experiences and for these experiences to be 
brought to bear on current situation.  Evolutionarily, the 
development of the limbic system in simple vertebrates, 
such as amphibians, marks the first appearance of primitive 
hippocampal structures.  The hippocampus plays the role of 
forming and remembering more long-term representations 
of experiences.  It is known to participate in the formation 
of episodic memory, logical reasoning and cognitive maps 
(Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997; Arbib, Érdi & Szentágothai, 
1997). Building more deliberative systems in a bottom-up 
whole-system approach would therefore appear to 
potentially benefit from a more complete understanding of 
the biological limbic system. 
 K-IV: Basic Limbic System Model 
The K-IV architecture is a model of what biologists believe 
may be the simplest neural architecture capable of basic 
intentional and deliberative actions, the limbic system 
(Kozma, Freeman & Érdi, 2003). The purpose of the K-IV 
is to model a complete autonomous organism, in a bottom-
up manner, to understand better the neurodynamical 
mechanisms involved in intentional and deliberative 
behavior.  The K-IV uses a neural population model (called 
K-sets) to describe the activity of large populations of 
neurons (as opposed to single unit or more abstract ANN 
models).  It is a highly-recurrent multi-layer model of the 
important neurological structures of the basic limbic system. 
We have been developing pieces of the K-IV for use as 
control mechanisms in autonomous vehicles for exploration 
and navigation problems for NASA.  We have developed 
discrete simplifications of the K-set neural population 
models for use in such autonomous agent simulations 
(Harter & Kozma, submitted).  In this work we will present 
some of our results on modeling and implementing pieces of 
the K-IV model, including how nonconvergent dynamics 
form perceptual categories (Harter & Kozma, in press) and 
how such dynamics may be used to learn and control 
behaviors in an autonomous agent (Harter & Kozma, 2004). 
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The correct semantics for number words has been a 
topic of much dispute in linguistics.  This controversy bears 
directly on our understanding of the development of 
numerical concepts.  The Neo-Gricean theory (Horn, 1989) 
posits that number words, like other scalar terms, possess a 
lower-bounded semantics and only receive exact 
interpretations pragmatically via scalar implicatures. For 
example, two would mean AT LEAST TWO and would only 
be interpreted as referring to exactly two entities because the 
speaker could use stronger terms such as three or four 
to refer to larger quantities.  A second theory (Koenig, 
1991) states that numbers have an exact semantics (two 
means EXACTLY TWO) that can generate both a set reading 
(two establishes numerosity of the set) and a distributed 
reading (two predicates the existence of two individuals 
of a given type).  Situations that are compatible with the set 
readings of a number are also typically compatible with the 
distributed readings of all smaller numbers, leading to what 
appear to be lower-bounded interpretations of number words 
(e.g. if the number of fish in the bowl is four, then there are 
also three/two/one fish that are in the bowl).  The salience of 
these distributed readings will depend heavily on the context 
in which the number word occurs. But critically the 
meaning of number words remains the same across contexts. 
To test these theories we examined childrens early 
interpretation of numbers words.  Children acquire number 
words in a gradual and predictable sequence (Wynn, 1990) 
providing ample opportunity to test the initial semantics of 
each term. Previous research (Noveck, 2001) demonstrates 
that scalar implicatures appears relatively late in 
development.  Therefore, if numbers are semantically lower 
bounded, we would expect to find evidence for this in 
childrens interpretation prior to implicatures.  
In Experiment 1, we presented 10 children (2;6 to 3;5) 
who have demonstrated knowledge of two but not three 
(i.e. 2-knowers) with a card displaying 1 fish and another 
with 3 fish and asked them to select the card with two fish.  
A similar procedure was repeated for 3-knowers (2;8 to 3;7) 
and 4-knowers (2;9 to 3;9) using their most recently 
acquired number.  2-knowers overwhelmingly chose the 
card with 3 fish, an interpretation that is consistent with 
lower-bounded semantics without implicatures.  While these 
results support the Neo-Gricean account, two pieces of 
evidence lead us to refrain from that conclusion.  First, 
according to an Exact Semantics account, 2-knowers in this 
task may assign two to mean EXACTLY TWO but simply 
select out a subset of two fish from a card with three fish 
using a distributive reading.  Consistent with this idea, 7 out 
of 10 2-knowers pointed specifically to two fish on the three 
fish card.  In addition, 4-knowers, who did not differ in age 
from 2-knowers, rejected both card choices, consistent with 
exact semantics.   
In Experiment 2, we minimized the possibility of a 
distributive reading by pushing for the perception of stimuli 
as a bounded set.  We also provided a way for children to 
demonstrate an exact interpretation without having to reject 
both choices.  First, we taught 10 2-knowers (2;6 to 3;5) to 
find target animals that were located in uncovered or 
covered boxes.  Then, in the test phase, we asked them to 
find the box with two fish when presented with uncovered 
boxes with one fish and three fish and a covered box (see 
figure 1). 2-knowers overwhelmingly selected the covered 
box, suggesting that they interpreted two as exactly two 
and inferred that this quantity must be in the covered box.  
A Neo-Gricean theory would have to provide an account for 
why children failed to select the visible option compatible 
with lower bounded semantics (3 fish) when they fail to 
show evidence of scalar implicatures for other terms until 7-
9 years of age. The Exact Semantics account provides the 
most natural and parsimonious explanation of these results.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Experiment 2 Stimuli 
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Introduction
Finding our way from place to place is essential to everyday
functioning. Often, we rely on information from others to
help us navigate. For example, people follow directions to
get to unfamiliar destinations, such as airports and hospitals.
One important goal is to determine the most effective way
to give and follow directions.
What types of information are most effective? Previous
research has focused on two common direction types:  those
using landmark descriptors (e.g., go toward the arena on
Main St.) and those using cardinal descriptors (e.g., go east
on Main St.). In general, landmarks are helpful naviagation
tools.  For instance, routes with landmarks are learned more
quickly than routes without landmarks (e.g., Jansen-
Osmann, 2002; McFadden, Elias, & Saucier, 2003; Saucier
et al., 2002). Many studies have also examined the effects of
gender on navigation (e.g., Lawton, 2001; Sholl, Acacio,
Makar, & Leon, 2000). Findings have revealed gender
differences in navigation tasks, with men often
outperforming women.
The present experiment investigated whether landmarks
or cardinal directions were more effective as navigation
tools and whether there were gender differences in
navigation efficiency using these cues. We predicted that
people would navigate faster and more accurately when
given cardinal directions than when given landmarks and
that men might navigate more efficiently than women.
Method
Ninety-two undergraduate students (46 males, 46
females) participated for extra credit in psychology courses.
A fictitious model town (6 ft. 6 in. x 4 ft.) served as the
experimental space. The town contained 17 landmarks
marked by unique pictures and labels (e.g., hospital). The
town also contained 30 streets marked by blue tape and
street names (e.g., Memory Lane). Bound sets of note cards
contained directions for navigation: one with landmark
directions and another with cardinal directions. A toy car
was used during navigation.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the
landmark condition or the cardinal condition. Participants in
the landmark condition received directions involving
landmarks (e.g., go toward the arena on Main St.), whereas
participants in the cardinal condition received directions
involving cardinal descriptors (e.g., go east on Main St.).
The routes were identical in both conditions; however, the
descriptions differed based on condition. Routes started at a
landmark, included four turns, and ended at a destination.
The order of routes was counterbalanced across participants.
During the familiarization phase, the experimenter
pointed out the four cardinal directions and the 17
landmarks. Then, participants were given 30 seconds to
familiarize themselves with the town. On each trial, the
experimenter placed the toy car at a starting location and
said, “Go.” Participants read a set of directions and moved
the car so it followed the directions to the destination.
Navigation time was calculated by averaging the time for
all 17 trials. The total number of errors was calculated by
summing the errors for all 17 trials. Errors included
reversing, making a wrong turn, ending at the wrong
destination, and not finishing the route.
Results and Discussion
Our main objective was to examine how quickly and
accurately men and women navigated based on cardinal and
landmark directions. As predicted, participants were
significantly faster and more accurate when following
cardinal directions than when following landmark
directions. In addition, men navigated significantly faster
than did women. These findings generally support our
predictions, providing valuable information about the
processes by which men and women use landmarks and
cardinal directions to navigate from here to there.
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Background 
The inverse base-rate effect (Medin & Edelson, 1988) is a 
paradoxical result in human category learning. It occurs, see 
Figure 1 left, after participants have been trained over a se-
ries of trials with corrective feedback to categorize pairs of 
features into high-frequency (C) and low-frequency (R) 
categories, where each category has a perfectly predictive 
feature (PC or PR) and a shared, imperfectly predictive fea-
ture (I).  The term inverse base-rate effect reflects the fact 
that when tested with the conflicting cues together (PC+PR, 
Figure 1 left), participants non-normatively tend to respond 
with R despite its low frequency relative to C even though 
both cues are otherwise equally predictive of their catego-
ries. 
 
Base rates 3x        1x Representation??? 
Categories   (C)ommon  (R)are (C)ommon  (R)are  
 
Features           PC       I  PR PC    I     PR 
Test trial        PC          PR PC          PR 
 Result:           C less than R C less than R 
Figure 1: Left: Abstract category structure plus test trial 
(terminology from Kruschke, 1996). Right: Hypothesized 
asymmetric representation in relationship to the test trial. 
Experiments 
One of the most persistent theoretical explanations (e.g. 
Kruschke, 1996; Medin & Edelson, 1988) of the inverse 
base-rate effect is that the learned category representations 
are asymmetric, Figure 1 right, (for any of several reasons 
which we dont have space to describe) but that, based on 
similarity to this representation, the decision-making at test 
is normative. The purpose of our research was to evaluate 
whether asymmetric representation is a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the inverse base-rate effect in either a 
trial-by-trial category-learning task with corrective feedback 
or a purely decision-making task based on a single presenta-
tion of summary information: base-rate information together 
with feature-category relationships as specified in either the 
left or right hand sides of Figure 1, symmetric or asymmet-
ric respectively. The four experimental conditions are in 
Table 1. Note that the results for the trial-by-trial learning of 
the symmetric structure are from Kruschke (1996). 
Results 
The results, see Table 1, for the pure decision-making task 
(N=33) on the summary information for the Symmetric 
structure indicate strong use of the explicitly presented base-
rate information (C=0.94 > R=0.06) compared to the results 
from trial-by-trial learning of the Symmetric structure 
(C=0.35 < R=0.61). The results of trial-by-trial learning on 
the Asymmetric structure (N=16) show a significant inverse 
base-rate effect (C=0.27 < R=0.63) indicating that asymmet-
ric representation in the context of the learning task is suffi-
cient to produce an inverse-base rate effect. However, the 
results of the pure decision-making task on the Asymmetric 
summary information (N=33) show the absence of an in-
verse base-rate effect (C=0.58 > R=0.42). This indicates that 
asymmetric representation is not by itself sufficient to pro-
duce an inverse base-rate effect, possibly because the base-
rate information is presented explicitly. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the results for the pure decision-making task on the 
Asymmetric structure are qualitatively closer to an inverse 
base-rate effect than the results for the Symmetric structure 
is consistent with Asymmetric representation being a neces-
sary condition whose impact is overcome by the influence 
of the explicitly summarized frequency information. 
In summary, asymmetric representation of the categories 
may be a necessary condition for the inverse base-rate ef-
fect, but it is not by itself a sufficient condition.  
 
Table 1: (C)ommon and (R)are response proportions for 
perfectly conflicting cues (trials PC+PR) by task 
 
 Task category structure 
Learning procedure Symmetric Asymmetric 
 C        R C        R 
Pure Decision Making  0.94   0.06 0.58  0.42 
Trial-by-Trial Learning  0.35   0.61* 0.27  0.63 
*Kruschke (1996)  sum < 1 because of other possible responses. 
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Introduction and Background
If a knowledge representation and reasoning (KRR) system
gains new information that, in hindsight, might have altered
the outcome of an earlier belief change decision, the earlier
decision should be re-examined. We call this operation re-
consideration (Johnson & Shapiro, 2004), and the result is
an optimal belief base regardless of the order of previous be-
lief change operations. This is similar to how discussion in a
jury room can help jurors to optimize their interpretation of
the evidence in a trial, regardless of the order in which that
evidence was presented.
To simplify our example, we assume a global decision
function is used in the belief change operations, and it will
favor retaining the most preferred beliefs as determined by
a linear preference ordering (). Any base can be repre-
sented as a sequence of beliefs in order of decending pref-
erence: B = p1, p2, . . . , pn, where pi is preferred over
pi+1 (pi  pi+1).
Reconsideration requires maintaining a set of all beliefs
that have ever been in the belief base at any time (effectively,
the union of all past and current bases), B∪. The base pro-
duced by reconsideration is defined as B∪! where ! is a
consolidation operation (which eliminates any and all incon-
sistencies) (Hansson, 1999).
A base, B = p1, p2, . . . , pn, is optimal if it has the most
credible beliefs possible without raising an inconsistency:
i.e. it is consistent and there is no B′ = q1, q2, . . . , qm
s.t. B′ ⊆ B∪, B′ is consistent, and either B ⊂ B′
or ∃qi s.t qi  pi and p1, p2, . . . , pi−1 = q1, q2, . . . , qi−1.
Dependency-Directed Reconsideration
Figure 1: A graph showing the elements ofB∪ (circles/ovals)
of a KS connected to their minimally inconsistent sets (rect-
angles), where B∪ = ¬p, p, p→ q, p→ r,m→ r, s→ t, w→
v, w→k, p→v, z→v, n,¬q,¬r, w, s,¬v,m, z,¬t,¬k.
Consider the base beliefs in Figure 1 prior to the addition
of ¬p. The optimal base would be B1 = {p, p→ q, p→
r,m→ r, s→ t, w→ v, w→ k, p→ v, z→ v, n, w, s,m, z},
with ¬q,¬r,¬v,¬t, and ¬k removed. Adding ¬p to B1 now
forces the retraction of p. MOST SYSTEMS STOP HERE.
A literal implementation of reconsideration would examine
all removed beliefs. Dependency-Directed Reconsideration
(DDR), however, only reconsiders removed beliefs whose in-
consistent sets have had changes in the belief status of their
elements. It reconsiders these beliefs in decending order of
preference, updating the base as it goes and maintaining a
global priority queue of beliefs yet to be reconsidered. A re-
moved belief can return as long as any inconsistency it raises
is resolved through the removal of a less preferred belief.
As with a literal implementation of reconsideration, DDR
first produces the following changes: (1) ¬q returns to the
base, and (2) ¬r returns to the base with the simultaneous re-
moval of m, because ¬r  m (consistency maintenance).
However, once DDR determines that ¬v cannot return to
the base (due to its being the culprit for the inconsistent set
{w → v, w,¬v}), it would would prune off the examination
of the inconsistent sets containing ¬k and z. The inconsistent
set containing s would also be ignored by DDR — it is not
connected to p in any way. This latter case is representative
of the possibly thousands of unrelated inconsistent sets for a
typical belief base which would be checked during a literal
B∪! operation of reconsideration, but are ignored by DDR.
DDR is an anytime algorithm: if starting with a consistent
base, a consistent base is always available, and the optimality
of that base improves with increased execution time. Addi-
tionally, an interrupted DDR can be continued at a later time
as long as the priority queue has been maintained. If run to
completion, the base will be optimal (as with reconsideration)
— thus, the KRR system can make the most reliable infer-
ences, and belief change operation order will have no effect.
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A common assumption underlying most category learning
research has been that category information is represented in
terms of intrinsic properties or features (cf., Nosofsky, 1986;
Shepard, Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961).  However, recently
there has been a growing awareness that many concepts are
determined not by features but by the relationships between
category members and members of other categories
(Gentner & Kurtz, in press; Markman & Stilwell, 2001).
For example, while a game cannot be defined in terms of
features (Wittgenstein, 1968), it has a simple definition as
something that can be played (Markman & Stilwell, 2001).
One intriguing implication of this idea is that relational
information may be a central component of object
representations (in addition to feature information), with
objects playing the same roles in predicates or events being
perceived as similar.  For example, the concepts hammer
and baseball bat might be similar because they both
regularly hit other objects.  A further question is whether
similarity is affected by roles per se, or whether
involvement in the same relationship is all that matters.  For
example, are hammers and baseballs similar because they
both participate in the relation hit(x, y)?  This is the
prediction made by models of word learning such as LSA
(Landauer & Dumais, 1997) that derive meaning from co-
occurrence statistics.  Because these corpus approaches are
insensitive to the role an object plays in an utterance, they
predict that similarity will be thematically determined, in
that objects that participate in common relations will be
similar regardless of the correspondence between their roles.
Method
The present experiment tests the potential contributions to
similarity of roles and relations independently.  In the first
phase of the experiment, each subject read 16 atomic
sentences and rated them according to how realistic and
interesting they were.  Certain nouns varied between
subjects in the relations they participated in and the roles
they played within their relations.  The second phase
consisted of a series of forced-choice similarity comparisons
among these nouns, in which subjects selected which of two
base words was most similar to a target word.
Results
The effect of common role was assessed using similarity
comparisons in which one base word played the same role
as the target and the other base played the opposite role in
the same relation. For example, among subjects who read
“The polar bear chases the seal” and “The collie chases the
cat,” 65% later selected at over collie when asked which
was more similar to seal.  Among subjects who instead read
“The seal chases the fish,” only 29% chose cat.  An analysis
combining eight contrasts of this type showed a significant
ffect of common role (c2[1] = 64.8, p < 10-15) with 73% of
subjects choosing the base that matched the target’s role.
Tests for the effect of common relation involved
comparisons in which one base word matched the target in
rela ion but not in role, and the other base was involved in a
diffe ent relation.  The analysis showed a significant effect
of common relation (c2[1] = 7.43, p < .01) with 61% of
subjects selecting the base that had appeared in the same
relation as the target.
Discussion
The present results demonstrate that similarity is affected by
relational information in at least two ways.  First,
participation in the same relation increases the similarity
between objects, even if they play different (or opposite)
roles.  Second, people are sensitive to structure within
relations, such that playing the same role further increases
similarity.  This structure-sensitivity implies that word
learning models like LSA need to be modified to
discriminate among sentential contexts, according to the
role (e.g., agent vs. patient) played by the word in question.
These results also support the claim that the processes by
which humans learn similarity and categories extend beyond
the purely feature-based approaches currently assumed.
Incorporating relational information into experiments and
models will lead to a more encompassing theory that may
shed light on many current unsolved problems.
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Introduction 
Object-based attention can be indexed by an advantage 
of attentional shift along the same object relative to that 
across different objects in the pre-cuing paradigm (Egly, 
Rafal, & Driver, 1994). There are two accounts of the effect: 
within-object benefit (WOB) and between-object cost 
(BOC). The former is explained by prior covert scanning of 
a cued object (Shomstein & Yantis, 2002); the latter is by a 
switching cost from the cued object to the other (Lamy & 
Egeth, 2002). So far, these accounts are indistinguishable 
because the object-based attention effect is defined by 
relative difference in RTs between the within-object and 
between-object conditions. This study examined the WOB 
and BOC separately presenting stimuli in 3D space and 
showed that these can operate in different space/object 
coordinates respectively. 
Methods 
Subjects: Twelve healthy volunteers participated in Exp.1 
(6 females, 19-25 years) and Exp.2 (5 females, 19-28 years). 
Stimuli: Fig.1 shows stimuli presented stereoscopically, 
using shutter goggles (frame rate: 60 Hz per eye) with a 
viewing distance of 57 cm. A square (16°×16°) was 
overridden by a bar (17.4°×3.6°) with horizontal or vertical 
orientation located in back of (segmented condition), the 
same as (flat condition), or front of (completed condition) 
the square. All stimuli had crossed binocular disparity, 27.4’, 
13.7’, 41.0’, and 45.6’ (Exp.1, near space) or uncrossed 
disparity, -27.4’, - 41.0’, -13.7’, and -9.1’ (Exp.2, far space) 
relative to the CRT display for the square, bar in back, bar 
in front, and fixation, respectively. Procedure: An 
experimental block of each condition consisted of 640 
target-present trials and 128 catch trials. After presentation 
of the bar and square for 1,000 ms, the cue (flashed at one 
corner of the square) was superimposed for 100 ms.  After 
another 200 ms, a target (dot diminishment) was 
superimposed at one of the corners until the subject 
responded. The intertrial interval was 1000 ms with blank 
screen.  The task was to detect a target as rapidly and 
accurately as possible by pressing a key. On target-present 
trials, the target appeared at the cued corner on 75 % (valid 
cue) and at an uncued corner on 25 % (invalid cue). 
Results and Discussion 
Mean hit and FA rates were 95.9 % and 5.4 % in Exp.1, 
and 97.9 % and 3.2 % in Exp.2. Summary of RT results is 
shown in Table 1. RTs for valid trials were faster than for 
 
 Fig.1 Schematic illustration of stimuli.  
 
Table 1: Summary of mean RTs (ms). 
Invalid-Valid  Valid Within Between 
Object 
effect WOB BOC 
Exp.1  
Segmented
Flat 
Completed
 
300.8
303.3
303.0
 
3.4 
16.4 
7.6 
 
12.9 
10.1 
13.7 
 
9.5* 
-6.3 
6.0 
 
--- 
13.0* 
4.2 
 
--- 
2.8 
0.8 
Exp.2 
Segmented
Flat 
Completed
295.4
293.4
297.6
16.9 
17.5 
17.0 
27.6 
20.0 
19.7 
10.6* 
2.5 
2.7 
--- 
0.6 
0.1 
--- 
7.6 
7.9* 
Note: WOB and BOC are shown for segmented display relative to flat 
and completed displays; * indicates significant effect (p< 0.05).  
 
invalid trials, confirming pre-cueing effects.  Attention shift 
(indexed by (invalid – valid)) were faster for the within-
region than between-region conditions in the segmented 
condition, replicating a typical object-based attention effect. 
Comparing with the flat and completed conditions, the 
object-based effect was due to WOB in Exp. 1, but to BOC 
in Exp. 2.  
The present results showed separable mechanisms for 
WOB and BOC of attention. The benefit and cost may be 
associated with habits in different space regions (Previc, 
1998): analyses of object shapes for action in near space 
associated with a WOB; search and orienting of objects in 
far space associated with a BOC. Different mechanisms to 
scan visual field can be driven according to stimulus context. 
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Introduction and Method 
This experiment was designed to investigate the roles of 
interactivity and spatial visualization ability in the 
comprehension of 3D computer visualizations. 
Undergraduates were presented with a fictitious anatomy-
like structure in the form of both printed 2D images and a 
3D computer visualization that could be rotated in x, y and z 
dimensions. A superimposed vertical or horizontal line on 
the printed images indicated where they should imagine the 
structure had been sliced. The task was to draw the cross-
section at that point. The drawings were assessed for spatial 
understanding using a standardized scoring scheme. 
Sixty participants were randomly allocated to one of two 
conditions. The active group was allowed to rotate the 
computer visualization at will via keyboard controls during 
the drawing task. The passive group had no control over the 
movements. Using a yoked pairs design, the manipulations 
performed by the active participants were recorded and later 
played back to the passive participants, so that both 
members of each pair received the same visual information. 
Spatial ability was measured via the Mental Rotation Test 
(Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978) and a modified version of 
Guay’s Visualization of Views test (Eliot & Smith, 1983). 
Results 
There was no main effect of condition, indicating no 
significant difference between the active and passive control 
conditions. However, a main effect of spatial ability was 
found (median split; F=9.38, p<.005; Figure 1). Although 
the interaction between these two factors did not reach 
significance, pairwise comparisons revealed that high- and 
low-spatial participants differed significantly in the passive 
condition (t=2.80, p<.01), but not in the active condition 
(t=1.47, p>.1; Figure 1). In line with this finding, the 
correlation between spatial ability and performance was 
relatively attenuated under active control (r=.29, p>.1), 
compared to passive viewing (r=.51, p<.005; Figure 2). 
Discussion 
The data indicate that having active control of the computer 
visualization did not benefit overall performance. A more 
important predictor of success was individual differences in 
spatial ability. However, the contribution of this factor was 
stronger in the passive condition than in the active 
condition, i.e. when participants were allowed to manipulate 
the 3D model, the performance means of high and low 
spatial individuals were brought closer together. While low-
spatial participants were helped by interactivity, this benefit 
did not extend to high-spatial individuals. We are currently 
undertaking a replication study with a more intuitive control 
mechanism, to establish whether these findings arose from 
the nature of the interface or from interactivity per se. 
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Figure 1: Performance on the cross-section drawing task by 
interactivity condition, as a function of spatial ability. 
Figure 2: Correlation between spatial ability and 
performance, by interactivity condition. 
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Myers, Shinjo, and Duffy’s (1987) paradoxical
results showed that the degree of causal relatedness affected
the likelihood of participants making causal inferences:
Whereas memory for the sentences exhibited an inverted-U
shape function, with participants showing the best
performance in the case of moderate relatedness, sentence
reading times increased linearly as the degree of causal
relatedness decreased.  Although recent efforts to explain
these results implicate causal relatedness as being important
(Reichle & Mason, in press), the factors that mediate this
causal relatedness remain under-specified.
In this paper, we report the results of an experiment
that examined one variable that also affects perceived causal
relatedness and the propensity to make inferences—the
topicality of discourse.  Kim, Cho, and Han (2002) showed
that topicality (a global variable that reflects overall text
coherence) affects how well a topic maintains continuity in
a text.  In the present experiment, we manipulated the
topicality of short passages by augmenting the Myers et al.
sentence pairs so that they were preceded by four sentences
that either did or did not maintain continuity (i.e., weak vs.
strong topicality, respectively).  Our main objectives were to
determine if topicality affects the likelihood of making
interferences, and to determine if topicality modulates the
perceived causal relatedness of the actual sentences that
were used by Myers et al.
Method
Participants .  Thirty-eight University of Pittsburgh
undergraduate students participated for extra class credit.
Stimuli Materials. Thirty of the sentence “pairs” from
Myers et al. (1987) was adapted for our study.  Each “pair”
consisted of an outcome sentence and a sentence preceding
it that could be highly, moderately, or distantly related to the
outcome sentence.  Each sentence “pair” was preceded by
four sentences that maintained a strong or weak topicality.
(Topically was assessed through ratings collected in an
earlier normative study.)  Six filler stories similar to the test
items were also included.
Design.  There were six different versions of each story,
with each version being defined by the factorial
combination of two within-subjects variables: relatedness
(highly vs. moderately vs. distantly) and topicality (strong
vs. weak).  Stories were counter-balanced across participates
using a Latin Square design so that each participant read
five stories from each of the six conditions, plus six fillers.
Procedure. Participants read the stories in a self-paced
manner as they were displayed sentence-by-sentence on a
computer monitor.  After reading each story, participants
judged the degree of relatedness between the last two
sentences (which were re-displayed in isolation) using keys
corresponding to a 7-point Likert scale. After reading all of
the stories, participants completed a recognition task in
which they viewed 45 sentences (30 story-final sentences
and 15 distractors) that were displayed one-at-a-time.  Four
dependent measures were recorded: (1) sentence-reading
times; (2) relatedness judgments; (3) recognition accuracy;
and (4) recognition latencies.
Results & Conclusions
Nine participants failed to comply with task
instructions and were excluded from our analyses; data from
the remaining 29 participants were analyzed using within-
subjects ANOVAs.  The degree of causal relatedness
affected sentence reading times [F(2,56) = 7.39, p <.01],
with reading times increasing linearly with decreasing
relatedness.  Although topicality did not reliably affect
reading times (F  < 1), it did lead to differences in the
perceived relatedness, as indicated by the relatedness
judgments [F(1, 28) = 17.82, p<.001].  Importantly, the
Relatedness × Topicality interaction was not significant (F <
1), suggesting that these two variables differentially
influence initial sentence processing and perceived
relatedness.  This finding suggests that local (inter-sentence
relatedness) and global (topicality) variables independently
affect the likelihood of a reader making an inference during
reading.  Finally, although recognition accuracy was at
ceiling and hence did not differ condition (F  < 1), the
reliable Relatedness ×  Topicality interaction in the
recognition latencies [F(2, 56) = 3.49, p  < .05] suggests
these variables may contribute similarly to text memory.
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Most memory experiments require participants to remember 
what events occurred, indirectly providing a measure of 
context availability. A more direct approach requires 
participants to remember when events occur. In Judgment of 
Recency (JOR) paradigms, participants study a list of 
stimuli and are asked to judge the recency of items from the 
list. In life, recency judgments can be made by associations 
to dates or autobiographical timelines. Although such cues 
are probably absent in list studies, participants can 
nonetheless make such judgments (Yntema & Trask, 1963), 
and the results can be used to make inferences about 
temporal context and its changes.   
 The current experiments utilize a study-test variant of the 
forced-choice judgment of comparative recency paradigm 
(Flexser & Bower, 1974). In each experiment, participants 
viewed lists of words on a computer monitor, and were 
subsequently tested in the following manner: two words 
from the list were presented, and participants indicated with 
a keystroke which word they had seen most recently.  
 A pilot study was completed in an attempt to obtain 
baseline data for JORs. Study lists were 90 items in length. 
Following the study phase, participants completed the 
forced-choice JOR for each of 20 pairs of words from the 
study list. Factors were lag (number of words studied 
between the two test items) and list type (fast or slow 
presentation time; each participant received one list of each 
type). Both factors were manipulated within-subjects. To 
our surprise, we found performance did not differ 
significantly from chance (50% accuracy) overall or in any 
of the individual experimental conditions.  
 Given that above chance performance had been found in 
earlier studies using a continuous study-test paradigm, we 
generated two hypotheses that might help explain this null 
result.  First, the longest lag used in the study was 24 items, 
and context may change too slowly in a random word list 
without breaks for tests to allow above chance performance 
at short lags. Second, we had excluded the first ten and last 
ten study items from testing, in order to avoid any 
contamination by special strategies or effects due to primacy 
or recency. It could be that it is only during these parts of 
the list that context changes rapidly enough to allow for 
temporal discrimination. 
  Experiment 1 used longer lags (36) and compared 
performance between pairs in three conditions: those that 
contained one primacy item (primacy-middle), one recency 
item (middle-recency), or neither (middle-middle). Primacy 
and recency regions were set at length 12. The testing 
procedure was the same as in the pilot study. The longer 
lags did facilitate recency discrimination, illustrated by 
above-chance performance in the three conditions.  
However, the three conditions did not differ, even when the 
primacy and recency regions were limited to include only 
four items on each end of the list. These results suggest that 
while primacy and recency items receive a benefit in item 
encoding (as seen in recall), they do not receive better 
temporal encoding than other list items. 
Because longer lags produced above chance performance, 
the hypothesis that context changes quite slowly during list 
presentation received some support. Nonetheless, the results 
seemed weaker than in earlier continuous study-test 
paradigms, leading us to ask what factors induce context 
change. In Experiment 2, participants studied a long list of 
items that was broken in half by the insertion of a 90-second 
task. There were four such tasks: 1) study of  a list of faces; 
2) a math task; 3), an old-new recognition test (on a subset 
of first-half items that would not be later tested for recency); 
4)  answering the following question (aimed to change  
internal context): “What would you do if you were 
invisible?” (Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002). For pairs containing 
one item from the first half (before the break) and one item 
from the second half (after the break), participants who 
received the recognition test performed best, followed by 
the 'invisible' answer condition. Performance in the face 
study and math problem conditions was not different from 
chance. These results are consistent with the idea that 
different tasks cause differential context change, and the 
pattern of results is consistent with certain puzzling results 
from standard memory paradigms (e.g., Shiffrin, 1970). 
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Osaka (2001) suggested that imitative words would be
processed verbally and mimetic words would be processed
visually.  This study investigated whether visual or verbal
second task would interfere with the processing of imitative
or mimetic words.  Our hypothesis was visual task would
interfere with recognition of mimetic words, whereas verbal
task interfere with recognition of imitative words.
Method
Experimental Design
The design used the reading span (high, low) as a between-
participants variable, and the stimuli of memory task
(figures, words) and the target word of sentence recognition
task (imitative, mimetic) as within-participants variables.
Dependent variables were reaction times and error rates for
memory task and sentence recognition task.
Stimuli
Forty sentences including one imitative word and forty
sentences including one mimetic word were used in
sentence recognition task.  In the half of the sentences, these
sentences made sense and else did not make sense.  In
memory task, twenty combinations of three words or figures
were used.
Participants
Participants were thirty-five female undergraduate students.
All were Japanese native speakers and had normal or
corrected vision.
Procedure
Reading Span Test.  We measured each participant’s
working memory capacity by Japanese reading span test
(Osaka, 2002).
Sentence Recognition Task and Memory Task.  The fixation
point was presented for 3000ms.  After that, three figures or
words were presented for 3000ms, so participants were
required to memorize these stimuli.  Participants answered
whether the sentence presented after the figures or words
could make sense as quickly and accurately as possible
(sentence recognition).  Three figures or words were
presented again, participants answered whether these stimuli
were presented previously by pressing allocated keys
(memory task).
Results
Seventeen participants with a high reading span (more than
six sets) and eighteen with a low reading span (less than five
sets) were assigned to the high and low groups, respectively.
Recognition Task
The mean reaction times for correct responses were shown
in Figure 1.  Interaction between the target word (imitative,
mimetic) and the stimuli of memory task (figures, words)
were significant (F [1, 33] = 7.85, p < .01).  Other main
effects and interactions were not significant.  About error
rate, no main effect and interaction was significant.
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Figure 1: Reaction times for recognition of sentences (ms).
Memory Task
In word condition, reaction times for mimetic words were
significantly longer than imitative words (F [1, 33] = 4.75; p
< .05).  In figure condition, error rate for imitative words
were significantly higher than mimetic words (F [1, 33] =
5.25, p < .05).
Discussion
The results of sentence recognition task showed that verbal
dual task interfered with the memory of imitative words and
visual task interfered with the memory of mimetic words.
These results support our hypothesis.  The results of
memory task suggested that there was a tradeoff between
primary task and secondary task, however.  The task
switching between phonological loop and visuo-spatial
sketchpad would affect these results.  Working memory
capacity did not related with performance of words’
maintenance.
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Introduction 
How spatial terms correspond to visual factors has been a 
topic of interest (e.g. Regier & Carlson, 2001). In particular, 
how a spatial term categorizes a space is an important 
problem (Hayward & Tarr, 1995). Most studies have 
considered a line as a prototype of a spatial term. In this 
view, some spatial terms have the same prototypical line. 
However, it is possible to choose an appropriate spatial term 
from similar spatial terms that are based on a line. Therefore, 
a spatial term also has a prototypical point on a prototypical 
line that distinguishes it from another spatial term, also 
categorized by a line (Kojima & Kusumi, 2002). 
This study examined the prototypical points for three 
Japanese spatial terms categorized by a spatial line, which 
are recognized as differing from each other, by using a 
method of adjustment instead of rating tasks. We also 
examine the effects of visual factors on choosing a spatial 
term. 
Method 
In this experiment, we focused on three Japanese spatial 
terms, mae (front), ushiro (back), and saki (ahead), and 
three visual factors, the distance between objects, the height 
of the viewing point, and the position of the viewing point.  
Forty-five Japanese graduate or undergraduate students 
participated in this experiment. They were divided into three 
groups of fifteen, and each group participated in each 
session. 
 
Fig.1. An example of a stimulus in the experiment 
The experiment was run on a computer with a 17-inch 
monitor (Fig. 1) and consisted of one session for each of the 
three spatial terms. In any trial, only one of three scroll bars 
was shown and used to adjust a different factor: the distance 
between the green sphere and the red cube, or the height or 
the position of the viewing point. A Japanese sentence 
including a spatial term was presented in the lower part of 
the screen (e.g., in English the sentence might be “A red 
cube is in front of a green sphere.”). When the participant 
adjusted one factor, the coordinates of the other two factors 
remained fixed. Seven patterns were used in each session. 
The participants adjusted the pattern for each sentence.  
Results and Discussion 
The point of subjective equality (PSE) was computed from 
the data. The PSE values for each condition for the three 
spatial terms were analyzed using one-way ANOVA and 
Tukey’s HSD. We found significant differences between all 
of the conditions: the position of the viewing point 
(F(2,447)=54.06, p<.01); the height of the viewing point in 
the near (F(2,447)=92.28, p<.01), middle (F(2,447)=75.42, 
p<.01), and far (F(2,447)=48.27, p<.01) distance conditions; 
and the difference in the distance between the green sphere 
and red cube in the near (F(2,447)=58.22, p<.01), middle 
(F(2,447)=53.32, p<.01), and far (F(2,447)=68.75, p<.01) 
distance conditions. Tukey’s HSD indicated a significant 
difference between all but four of the conditions with 
respect to the spatial terms. The exceptions were the height 
in middle and far distance conditions, and the distance in 
middle and far distance conditions.  
The result indicated that three visual factors affect the 
choice of spatial terms. It follows that humans can 
distinguish one spatial term from another, based on certain 
visual factors, even if the spatial terms are linked to a 
similar prototypical line in space. In addition, considering 
the values of the mean PSEs, it may be said that human 
beings choose an appropriate spatial term by differentiating 
visual differences accurately. 
 
a green sphere 
a red cube 
a scroll bar a Japanese sentence
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While reading a story, readers feel happy when good 
things occur and worry when characters are in danger 
(Zwaan, 1999). When readers understand the narrative, they 
construct situation models (Kintsch, 1998). Situation models 
are multidimensional representations consisting of five 
dimensions: time, space, causation, intentionality, and the 
protagonist (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Zwaan, Langston, 
& Graesser (1995) developed the event-indexing model to 
explain how readers construct coherent multidimensional 
representations of situations. According to the model, events 
and the actions of characters are important in situation 
model construction. Readers can represent and update 
characters’ emotions (de Vega, Le’on, & Diaz, 1996). The 
present experiments focus on the effect of a character’s 
emotion when people read a story in which a change in the 
character’s emotion is induced. 
Method 
Participants. Thirty Japanese speakers were recruited at 
Kyoto University. 
Materials. The materials were 16 stories (4 themes × 4 
emotional states: worry-relief, relief-worry, worry-worry, 
and relief-relief). Emotional-shift versions were worry-relief 
and relief-worry. No-shift versions were worry-worry and 
relief-relief. There were 24 sentences in each story. 
Presentation of the versions of the stories was 
counterbalanced with a 4 × 4 Latin square. Each participant 
read four stories. 
Procedure. Participants were instructed to read the stories 
in order to appreciate the story and sympathize with the 
characters. Stories were presented one sentence at a time on 
a CRT. Reading was self-paced; readers pressed the space 
bar to proceed. Reading time of each sentence was collected. 
After finishing each story, readers rated their emotional 
response to each on five 7-point scales (sympathy, similarity 
between the character and the reader, experience, interest in 
the theme, and readability of the story). 
Results and Discussion 
 We performed multiple regression analyses of reading 
times to assess that reading times could be predicted by the 
temporal breaks, causal breaks, and a character’s emotional 
shift. Table 1 presents the b-weights from the multiple 
regression analyses. As Table1 indicates, temporal 
discontinuities caused sentence reading times to increase, 
suggesting that the temporal dimension is crucial. The result 
is consistent with Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser’s (1995) 
study. A character’s emotional shift also caused sentence 
reading times to increase. Words and serial positions have 
consistently been robust predictors of reading times (e.g., 
Zwaan et al., 1995). These current results indicate that 
readers monitor temporal continuity and represent a 
character’s emotion. The multiple regression analyses 
suggested that a character’s emotional shift caused sentence 
reading times to increase; therefore, readers monitored a 
character’s emotional shift during the on-line reading process. 
We conclude that, when readers monitor the dimensions of 
the protagonist in an event-indexing model, emotions similar 
to those of that character are invoked. 
Table 1 B-Weights 
 
Variable               B-Weights 
Temporal breaks 134.0* 
Causal breaks  8.6 
Emotional shifts 209.1* 
Words    49.5*** 
Serial positions   -32.2*** 
R2    .30 
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 2 The difference of score in characters’ emotional shifts 
(standard deviation) range: 1-7 
Theme Examination   Moving      Party        Marriage
 S N S N S N S N 
1 4.7 
(1.3) 
4.5 
(1.7) 
4.1 
(2.2) 
2.9 
(1.8) 
3.4 
(2.0) 
4.3 
(2.2) 
1.6 
(.96) 
1.2 
(.58) 
2 4.0 
(1.5) 
4.4 
(1.8) 
4.7 
(1.8) 
4.1 
(2.1) 
5.1 
(1.3) 
5.1 
(2.2) 
2.5 
(1.1) 
2.9 
(1.4) 
3 5.7 
(1.1) 
5.4 
(1.4) 
5.6 
(1.1) 
5.5 
(1.3) 
5.9 
(.89) 
6.5 
(.76) 
4.8 
(1.4) 
3.9 
(1.7) 
4 4.5 
(1.6) 
4.0 
(1.7) 
5.6 
(1.2) 
4.0 
(1.5) 
4.0 
(1.3) 
5.1 
(1.8) 
4.9 
(1.6) 
3.9 
(1.4) 
5 3.9 
(1.5) 
4.2 
(1.6) 
5.3 
(1.4) 
4.0 
(1.9) 
3.7 
(1.3) 
4.6 
(1.4) 
4.7 
(1.6) 
4.2 
(1.4) 
Note. S: shift, N: no-shift 
1: sympathy, 2: similar thinking and action to the character 3: experience, 
4: the interest in the theme, 5: the readability of the story. 
Table 2 displays the score differences in characters’ 
emotional shifts. As Table2 reveals, interest in the story 
theme was higher in the shifting version than in the no-shift 
version, for the moving and the marriage story (t (28) =3.3, 
p =.003, t (28) = 1.9, p = .074). Interest in the theme was 
higher in the no-shift version than in the shifting version, for 
the party story (t (28) = -1.9, p =.069). The readability of the 
story was higher in the shifting version than in the no-shift 
version for the moving story (t (28) =2.1, p =.043). On the 
other hand, the readability of the story was higher in the 
no-shift version than in the shifting version for the party 
story (t (28) =-1.8, p =.078). Because the reader’s experience 
was higher in the no-shift version than in the shifting 
version (t (28) =-2.1, p=.049), the party theme exhibited a 
pattern different from that of the other two themes. The 
present findings suggest that a character’s emotional shift 
influences the reader’s on-line and off-line processes. 
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Introduction
In most conversations, people rely on a process of
grounding, in which people establish the mutual belief that
they have been understood (Clark, 1996).  While the
majority of research on grounding has focused on speech in
conversation, we examine the grounding process when
people may coordinate only through gesture, compared to
speech + gesture, and to speech-only conditions.
Grounding is fundamentally about coordination between
people. Clark & Krych (2004) demonstrated how speaking
and listening are incremental processes and how many of
those increments are determined jointly—whether through
speech or gesture.
In this study, our aim is to achieve a better understanding
of the role of gestures and speech in communication and
what gesturing alone can further inform us of the grounding
process.
Lozano and Tversky (2003) have studied gestures and
speech+gestures when people are videotaped assembling a
TV cart for an undefined audience who would later view the
videotape.  In our research, we are interested in how two
participants interact and coordinate with one another under
different conditions.
While one might predict that not being allowed to talk
with one another would be a disadvantage, resulting in more
time to achieve understanding, we predict that the gesture-
only and speech + gesture conditions should be equivalent
in timing, while the speech-only condition should take
significantly longer.
Methods
Pairs of students worked together as one participant, the
director, instructed the other participant, the builder, how to
create duplicate models of Lego blocks.  Their goal was for
the builder to create identical models as efficiently as
possible based on the director’s instructions. Each pair had a
practice trial to orient them to the task and then constructed
nine other models.  The models used were the same as in
Clark & Krych (2004) and Krych & Clark (1997).
    Thirty-nine subject pairs participated in one of three
separate conditions.  Each condition consisted of 13 subject
pairs who were all undergraduate students.  In one
condition, the director could see the builder’s workspace
and they could converse normally using both speech and
gesture as they wished (speech + gesture).  In a second
condition, the builder’s workspace was not visible to the
director, so participants could only communicate with
speech (speech-only).  A third group of subject pairs
participated in a gesture-only condition in which the
workspace was visible to the director, but the subjects could
not use any words at all.  They could communicate only by
gesturing to one another and pointing to objects.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, there was a large difference in the average
amount of time to complete each model, F(2, 36) = 27.64,
p< .001). The speech-only condition took much longer-- 181
seconds compared to 94.5 seconds in the Speech + Gesture
condition and 112 seconds in the Gesture-only condition.
The latter two conditions were statistically equivalent to one
another. This pattern held true even if the practice trial was
included. Thus, participants who were restricted to gesturing
were not at a disadvantage compared to participants who
could speak and gesture. These results appear consistent
with the findings of Lozano and Tversky’s non-interactive
study (2003) that language and gesture can supplement as
well as complement each other.
In the future, we plan to focus on the process of how
people ground information in the gesture-only condition.
We suggest that studying the process of grounding when
people may only gesture to one another will shed further
information on the underlying processes involved in
achieving understanding in face-to-face conversation.
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Abstract 
We present evidence for the involvement of perceptual feature 
detector cells in the initial stages of processing lexically 
activated concept knowledge.  Participants were slower to 
respond to names for oriented objects after being adapted to 
gratings of matching orientation, relative to opposite 
orientation.  The data are consistent with the view that 
knowledge is perceptually based at a fundamental level, and 
inconsistent with alternative views that perceptual 
representations are generated at a later stage based on amodal 
representations. 
Perceptual Representation: Adaptation Effects 
The view that knowledge representations have a 
perceptual basis has been supported in a variety of 
methodological approaches.  However, many of these 
studies may provide limited evidence for the importance of 
perceptual processing.  Perceptually based aspects of 
knowledge may be generated in a later phase based on an 
initial, perhaps perception-unrelated representation, or they 
may be the knowledge that gets activated initially.  
Influential theories in this domain (e.g., Barsalou, 1999) 
assume the latter, and need to be tested accordingly. 
With the goal to test whether perceptual representations 
are the foundation of knowledge processing as opposed to a 
by-product, we examined participants’ response times to 
names for objects that had standard, vertical or horizontal 
orientations after exposing them to grating patterns that 
were in the same or opposing orientation as the object.  
When processing such grating patterns, specialized 
orientation detector neurons in the visual cortex become 
activated (Hubel & Wiesel, 1959).  After certain exposure 
times, these neurons adapt, leading to lower sensitivity.  We 
predicted that if access to a perceptual representation is by 
necessity part of accessing object concepts, response times 
to object names should be slowed down after adaptation of 
neurons that process critical object primitives (Treisman, 
1986).  Specifically, adaptation to matching orientations 
should slow responses relative to adaptation to the opposite 
orientation.  In contrast, response times should be equal (or 
faster via priming) for matching grating patterns if such 
cells are not involved in initial processing. 
Method 
Twelve graduate students who volunteered to participate in 
the experiment viewed grating patterns for time durations 
that have been shown to create and maintain adaptation of 
the feature detectors for vertical and horizontal orientations. 
Subsequent to viewing patterns, they performed a lexical 
decision task on names for vertical vs. horizontal objects. 
A set of items with standard vertical or horizontal 
orientations was rated with respect to variables that may 
influence perceptual processing, such as their height to 
width ratios and view invariance.  These ratings served as 
covariates in the analyses. 
Results & Discussion 
Adaptation effects were observed for items with strong view 
invariance and high ratios.  A 2 (grating orientation: vertical 
vs. horizontal) x 2 (word orientation: vertical vs. horizontal) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed an interaction of 
grating orientation and word orientation on response time, 
which was slower when grating and object orientation 
matched (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Response Times per Syllable (in msec.) 
 
 Grating 
Object Vertical Horizontal 
Vertical 463.40 326.30 
Horizontal 294.58 435.74 
Conclusions 
Our data suggest that perceptual representations are an 
integral part of knowledge activated during the initial 
processing of words for oriented objects.  These data are 
consistent with the assumption that conceptual processing 
activates brain regions that are involved in processing of the 
actual related percepts.  This finding lends stronger support 
to theories of perceptually based representations than other, 
related studies because the adaptation effects on response 
times are inconsistent with the view that perceptual 
representations are activated at a later stage and are merely 
by-products of a potentially amodal representation. 
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The classification learning paradigm has been the dominant
technique across decades for the study of categorization
(Murphy, 2002). The learning procedure consists of passes
through a set of training items presented one at a time in
random order. On each trial, an example is displayed with a
forced-choice classification question. Responding elicits
corrective feedback followed by an inter-stimulus interval.
The goal of this research is to look inside the
classification trial in order to identify the locus of learning.
The roles of feedback and intentionality have been
investigated elsewhere (e.g., Love, 2002). The factors
addressed here are: 1) unlimited access to the stimulus
during responding; 2) availability of the stimulus during
feedback; and 3) generation of a classification response.
In the Init+During condition, the classification trial is
executed in standard fashion except the stimulus is removed
during feedback. This allows us to evaluate the importance
of coordinated evaluation of the stimulus and the correct
label at the end of the learning trial. In the Init+Final
condition, each stimulus is presented for 3s and then
removed when the classification question appears. After the
response, the stimulus re-appears along with corrective
feedback to allow coordinated evaluation. Speeded
classification has been a topic of past research  (e.g.,
Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997), but the present question is
about limiting access to the perceptual stimulus without any
requirement of fast responding. In the Init-Only condition,
we test the combined effect of limited initial access plus
absence of the stimulus during feedback.
Finally, in the No-Response condition, each trial consists
of presentation of the stimulus and its correct category. The
learner observes the association and presses a button to
continue. This allows us to address the common intuition
that generating a response and evaluating success plays a
critical role in classification learning. Many models of
category learning operate on the basis of error correction
between an output and a feedback signal.
In order to compare these conditions, three category
prototypes were designed using 4x4 grids of half gray and
half white squares. The training set consisted of 16
examples of each category generated by distorting the
prototype with exactly two squares of reversed color.
Participants (n=199) were randomly assigned to one of five
conditions. The study phase consisted of a maximum of 192
trials. After every twelve trials, performance was evaluated
against a 90% criterion for stopping learning. The test phase
consisted of  standard classification of all items.
Ease of learning was measured by percentage of
participants reaching criterion and performance on the test
phase common to all conditions. Impaired performance in
any experimental condition relative to the control group
would highlight a critical aspect of classification learning.
Approximately half of all learners reached criterion
(11/12 correct). In the test phase, participants were well
above chance (33%), though quite far from ceiling.
Table 1: Learning performance across conditions
Condition % Ss reach criterion % correct at test
Standard 54 69
Initial Only 40 63
Init+During 47 69
Init+Final 65 72
NoResponse -- 72
To our considerable surprise, none of the experimental
conditions differed reliably from the control group on either
measure. The only significant difference was between the
Initial-Only and Initial+Final groups. This appears to be
attributable to a slight disadvantage in the Init-Only
condition combined with a slight advantage in the
Init+Final. We draw the preliminary conclusion that none of
the elements considered, i.e., extended evaluation of the
stimulus during responding, coordinated evaluation during
feedback, nor response generation can be considered critical
components of classification learning. Learners are able to
adapt fairly seamlessly in each case. These data suggest that
as long as the learning trial includes the item and its label,
the rest is more or less bells and whistles.
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In classical cognitive models, representations of inputs are 
deliberately built into the operational structure by a model’s 
designers.  Network systems by contrast usually 
automatically construct responses following some generic 
learning scheme, and consequently lack overt 
representations altogether.  Instead, the system’s 
representations are read off the system according to a 
chosen analytical methodology.  The performance of such 
models is therefore independent of how their representations 
are labeled.   
Simple recurrent networks (SRNs) are among the most 
successful network models of cognition (Elman, 1990, 
1995).  These networks are often taken to represent inputs in 
the values of their hidden layer nodes, which can be 
analyzed using principal component analysis or hierarchical 
clustering.  Under this interpretation, representations in 
networks are context-sensitive, static, and non-
compositional.  Significantly different properties result from 
taking as the representation of a sequence the function 
which that sequence causes the network to compute.   
Consider a typical SRN with input weights Win, output 
weights Wout, and recurrent connections in the hidden layer 
with weight matrix C, and call the vector of weights in the 
hidden layer H.  Let S denote the closure of the set of legal 
inputs to the network under concatenation, so that S contains 
all legal sequences (and also an empty input, ε).  Call the set 
of possible output vectors O, and call the function which 
maps input sequences to output vectors i:SÆO,  so that 
i(s)=o exactly when o is the output resulting from running 
sequence s through the network.  Consider the following 
function: 
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r’ can be interpreted as the function which computes, for 
an initial value on the hidden layer, h, the value on the 
hidden layer which results after processing input sequence s. 
Define the family of functions which results from currying  
r’ over s: ),(')( hsrhrs
rr
= , Rrs ∈ .  Then R is the 
representation scheme of the SRN.   i(s) can be easily 
reconstructed from rs.  
A straightforward homomorphism can be constructed 
between concatenation over S and function composition in 
R, making the representations of any SRN classically 
compositional, regardless of the prior training of the 
network (see Fodor & Lepore, 2002;  Zadrozny, 1994).  
This analysis also reveals a limited form of inherent 
systematicity, in that the same representation function, and 
hence the same causal mechanism, is employed in 
processing a particular lexeme or sequence regardless of the 
context in which it appears (see Davies, 1991). 
If the computation specified by rs picks out a type of 
representation, then any particular application of that 
function can be taken to be a token.  The computation 
performed is independent of its context, but the specific 
hidden layer value which results will not be.  Therefore, 
tokens of computations can be picked out by specifying the 
input/output pair (where both input and output are hidden 
layer values) which that application involved.  The method 
of hierarchical clustering which is so useful in analyzing 
hidden layer values can then be performed on this pair, and 
so this technique can be applied essentially unchanged.  
Additionally, the extra information stored in the source 
values allows the method to be applied to sequences as well 
as single inputs.   
Since these representations are the system’s disposition to 
respond to a particular lexeme, rather than the residue of 
state information which results from that response, these 
representations are active processes rather than static data 
structures. Since the important  
 Therefore, representations capture all of the knowledge 
which is involved in generating the internal state of the 
network.   
Because the representation scheme given here 
appropriately encapsulates an SRN’s knowledge and 
presents representations as dynamic processes rather than 
static structures, it is intuitively appealing as a model for 
how SRNs represent.  Inasmuch as it is appealing, SRNs 
represent compound phrases compositionally and context-
independently, which implies that these properties may not 
account for some of the interesting properties with which 
they have been credited (Fodor & Lepore, 2002). 
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Introduction
Much research has been devoted to the way that categories
are represented.  Two of the most influential theories argue
that concepts are represented by prototypes (e.g., Rosch &
Mervis, 1975) or exemplars (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978).
While these views are typically analyzed in terms of their
differences, they share the assumption that category
coherence is a function of intrinsic features of category
members.
In contrast, recent theories have proposed role-governed
categories (Markman & Stilwell, 2001; Gentner & Kurtz, in
press).  Members of role-governed categories cohere
because they fill similar roles within a relational structure.
Role-governed categories differ from feature-based
categories in that membership is determined according to
external relations between categories rather than intrinsic
features.
One reason for the prevalence of feature-based categories
in the literature is that typical laboratory tasks are well
matched with this type of category.  The majority of
categorization experiments employ artificial categories that
are composed of entities isolated from any relational
context.  A critical problem with this approach is that it may
not capture the essence of categorization outside of the
laboratory; natural categories occur in relational contexts.
We present an experiment that addresses whether artificial
role-governed categories can be learned and manipulated in
the lab.
Method
The experiment consisted of a learning phase and two
transfer phases.  Each trial, subjects were shown two objects
that varied in size (big or small), color (blue or orange),
shape (circle or square), and relational role (object that
pushed or was pushed).  After one of the objects was briefly
highlighted, one of the objects moved across the screen and
pushed the other object.  In all phases, the task was to
classify the highlighted object as type F or G.  Subjects were
given feedback in the learning phase, but not in the transfer
phases.  The learning phase lasted until subjects correctly
classified 10 consecutive objects or 50 trials had been given.
Each transfer phase was 10 trials.  Taken together, the
transfer phases were constructed to control for the presence
of non-relational spatial and temporal cues.
There were two between-subjects conditions.  In the first
condition, categories were defined by a Shepard Type I rule
(i.e., a unidimensional rule) involving a relational role and a
redundant Type I rule involving a feature dimension (cf.
Shepard, Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961).  For example, an
object could be classified as type F based on being a
pusher  or based on being blue.  In the second condition,
categories were defined by a Type I rule involving a
relational role and a redundant Type II rule involving two
feature dimensions.  In the transfer phases of both
conditions, the Type I rule involving the role was reversed
such that subjects using the role would reverse their
classifications while subjects using the features would not.
In other words, the rule involving the role and the rule
involving the features were deconfounded.
Results and discussion
In the Type I condition, 20 out of 39 subjects (51%) used
the role, 11 (28%) used the feature, and 8 (21%) did not
meet the learning criterion or could not be clearly classified.
In the Type II condition, 28 out of 41 subjects (68%) used
the role, 4 (10%) used the features, and 9 (22%) did not
meet the learning criterion.  In addition, subjects were more
likely to use relational roles when the rule involving the
features was more complex (51% for Type I versus 68% for
Type II).
These data suggest that artificial role-governed categories
can be learned and manipulated in the lab.  The majority of
subjects (51% in the first condition and 68% in the second
condition) used relational roles to classify the objects.  This
manipulation sets the stage for a systematic set of laboratory
studies to explore the acquisition of feature-based and role-
governed categories.
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Software bugs are an ever-increasing societal problem as computers become more prevalent in
our homes and workplaces, and programs grow in size and complexity. In response, many in the
software engineering community have advocated a shift in the way programs are written: away
from procedural (plan-like) code (e.g., Pascal, Fortran) and toward more declarative (map-like)
Object-Oriented (OO) code (e.g., C++, Java). A central claim is that more declarative, map-like
code allows developers to better deploy their knowledge of a problem domain (what the code is
‘about’) than does procedural code. The latter typically consists of a compact plan for solving a
problem (such as a recipe or driving directions), rather than a more declarative description of
domain entities and their relationships (OO). To test this claim, we conducted an experiment
requiring experienced programmers presented with procedural and OO code isomorphs of the
same algorithm to perform code modification tasks, and crossed this manipulation with whether
or not participants were primed on the domain knowledge of the actual problem solved by the
algorithm (scoring ten-pin bowling). In contrast to the claims of the OO community, our findings
revealed that priming domain knowledge helped those modifying procedural, rather than OO,
code: The procedural group whose knowledge of how bowling is scored was primed created
significantly fewer bugs than the non-primed procedural group, while priming the OO group led
to perhaps even slightly more bugs. This finding suggests that, when trying to modify or “tweak”
problem solutions, knowledge of the problem domain is more important when trying to amend
existing procedural solutions (e.g. a route given as a list of directions) than when trying to amend
more descriptive, declarative solutions (e.g. a map to a destination).  Implications for both
software engineering and cognitive science will be presented.
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Internal representation and causal relations have been 
generally taken as polemically contrasted in the cognitive 
architectures.  Representation bears content; whereas, a 
causal line does not, which at best can be seen as its (the 
representation’s) implementation.  In discussing the nature 
of a certain type of low-level processes, such as those in the 
Watt Governor, that they are ‘mere transition of forces’ is 
taken as a reason to deny the existence of an immanent role 
of representation (Haselager et al. 2003).  To think of it 
more sympathetically, causal complexity and content 
together can be seen as two separate strands to be reconciled 
(Wheeler and Clark 1999).  The possibility of content with 
causal complexity has rarely been considered, as it is not 
easy to figure out a substantial sense of content bound 
intrinsically with the complexity of a causal line.   
As an attempt, Bechtel (1999) argues that there is a 
legitimate sense of representation immanent in the control 
of the Watt Governor.  The reason of its existence is 
grounded on the isomorphism between representation and 
the machine states.  Such a reason, however, is challenged 
by Haselager et al. (2003) that it is risky to incur 
overwhelming representations.  A problem facing a loose 
account of representation is “how a system can be shown 
not to be representational” (Haselager et al. 2003, p. 18).  
This paper will present a sense of content with causal 
complexity but avoid the aforementioned problem of 
overwhelming representations.   
It is easy to understand that the content of intentional 
states arises from machinery with causal complexity, yet 
this is not the attempt of this paper.  Alternatively, in this 
paper I will make clear the existence of a type of content 
that is immanent in the dynamic states of certain complex 
cognitive processes, with those states being possibly 
scattering across intentional states or spreading across a line 
of cognitive control.  Such a special type of content can be 
named dynamic content.   
Sub-symbolic Features with Complex 
Connections 
Consider two examples of dynamic content.  Firstly, units of 
the connectionist network represent certain sub-symbolic 
features, according to Smolensky (1988), which together 
represent intuitive cognitive content.  Consider the role of 
sub-symbolic features in the representation of those units.  
Those features interact mutually under the connecting 
control of the connectionist network, with various weights 
in different between-units connections and certain 
algorithms controlling the activation of units.  When the 
information transformation is in process, the network has 
not yet presented clear intentional (possibly conscious) 
content, but those sub-symbolic features really undergo 
transformation.  That network, meanwhile, is by no means 
empty (though possibly unconscious) in its maintenance of 
cognitive features.  The envisaged content, unlike the 
higher-level content manifested in the output layer, does not 
pertain to a cognitive state under a functional analysis.  
Rather, its nature causes it exist in process.   
Motor Control 
Secondly, motor control is the paradigmatic example of 
dynamic content.   Dynamic content is conceived of as 
consisting of standing-ins of a system that serve as guidance 
of that system’s behavioral control, and in turn as a way to 
supply the maintenance (with its causal power) of that 
system’s performance in its environment with a certain 
degree of flexibility.  Those standing-ins work 
systematically under a scheme which is non-isomorphic but 
can engage external conditions.  Those standing-ins qualify 
the system as content-bearing because they enhance its 
capabilities of performance.  The role of standing-ins in the 
constitution of content is to provide mediating entities for 
the systematic use in the course of behavioral generation.   
A system’s dynamic content qua content, as we can see, 
rests on the amenability of its behavioral guidance in the 
light of enhancing its performance.  Because the 
amenability is a capacity of fine-tuning the causal 
connections of a system’s complex behavioral control, 
dynamic content qualifies as content on grounds of its 
potentiality of amending complex causal connections.  
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Models and Cognitive Neuroscience
The goal of the present work is explore possible mappings
between an existing model from cognitive psychology and
functional brain regions.  There are numerous possible
mappings between these somewhat different levels of
analysis.  For the  the Supervised and Unsupervised
STratified Incremental Network (SUSTAIN; Love, Medin,
& Gureckis, 2004; Sakamoto & Love, in press) model, the
mapping is straightforward: aspects of the model appear to
map onto functional structures in the brain.
SUSTAIN holds that humans represent category
information in terms of natural bundles of information,
referred to as clusters.  For example, knowledge of
mammals might be represented by several clusters (e.g.,
primates, four-legged mammals, whales, bats, etc.).
SUSTAIN posits that learners form new clusters in response
to surprising events, such as when a child is first told that a
whale is a mammal and not a fish.
In this poster, we will focus on SUSTAIN’s cluster
formation process.  Our hypothesis is that a healthy and
intact hippocampus is necessary for forming new clusters to
support cortical learning in the temporal lobe (cf., Gluck &
Myers, 1993).  Forming new clusters can be seen as
constructing conjunctive codes.  A wide variety of tasks rely
on the formation of conjunctive codes such as episodic
memory (a conjunction of item and context), sequence
memory (item and position), list discrimination (item and
list), and item relations (item and item).  All of these tasks
appear to rely heavily on the hippocampus (see Brown and
Aggleton, 2001, for a review).  Assuming reduced ability to
form new clusters, SUSTAIN has been able to model
developmental trends in infant learning (hippocampus not
fully developed) and performance by amnesiacs with
hippocampal lesions (Gureckis & Love, 2003).
Rules and Exceptions: An Aging Study
Our account of hippocampal function predicts that normal
aging will disproportionately affect performance for
exception items in rule-plus-exception classification studies.
To master an exception, a cluster must be recruited to
encode it, despite the fact that similar clusters or conjunctive
codes likely already exist in memory.  As we age, an
accumulation of cortisol released in response to stressful
events differentially leads to atrophy and reduceas the
functioning of the hippocampus (Lupien et al., 1998).  In the
study design, three items from category A and three items
from category B followed a simple rule (e.g., if large, then
category A.  if small, then category B.).  The exception
items ran counter to these rules.  SUSTAIN predicts that
older adults will form one cluster for category A and B,
leading to increasing rule application and insensitivity to old
vs. novel rule-following items with increasing age.  In
contrast, SUSTAIN predicts younger adults will recruit one
cluster for each exception, storing them apart from rule-
following items, which leads to predictions counter to those
of the older population.
Human Results
Thirty-seven University of Texas undergraduates and thirty-
seven healthy older adults (51-84 years-old, mean=67.9)
recruited from the Austin VA outpatient clinic participated
in the study.  All of SUSTAIN’S predictions held.  Only a
subset of results are reported here. In the learning phase,
item type (rule vs. exception) and population interacted such
that the younger population exhibited a smaller difference in
accuracy (.27 vs. .61) for exception and rule-following items
than did the older population, F(1, 72) = 35.39, MSe = 1.09,
p < .001.  For the older population, performance on rule-
following and exception items for the learning and test
phase negatively correlated (r=-.38 and -.72, respectively),
whereas these correlations were positive for the younger
population (r=.52 and .49, respectively).  In transfer,
subjects from the older population made rule consistent
responses to studied rule-following items and all novel
items at about the same rate, .70 vs. .69, t < 1, whereas the
younger population applied the rule more frequently (.88 vs.
.77) to the studied examples, t(36) = 4.99, p < .001.
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Viewing the mind as a sophisticated processor of analog 
signals rather than as a processor of symbolic information 
has led me to conclude that human intelligence emerged 
from nonhuman primate intelligence as a consequence, and 
only as a consequence, of the evolution of natural language. 
A nonhuman animal’s primary cognition processes endow it 
with a sophisticated means of extracting useful features of 
its environment from the signals from its sensors, such as 
the eyes and ears, that enable, some species, flexible 
survival-enhancing and even innovative behavior.  
The powerful primary cognitive system was greatly 
enhanced by the hominid and human species evolving 
natural syntactic speech—a two-tiered system of auditory 
communication. Meaningless sounds combine in restricted 
ways to produce words and words combine in restricted 
ways to form sentences. The secondary cognition system, 
also called the human reason system, not only allows the 
expression of internal representations of the primary 
cognitive system, it has created a new way of thinking that 
has resulted in a entirely new culture on the planet that has 
produced Shakespearian sonnets, jumbo jet aircraft, 
international corporations and a cure for infectious diseases. 
This new model of cognition is presented in two books, I 
am not a machine—Book I: Thinking without words (Lynch, 
2004) and I am not a machine—Book II: Thinking with 
words (Lynch, expected late in 2004) and is introduced on 
the website, NOTaMACHINE.org. Under the proposed 
model of cognition, there is no inner language of thought 
(mentalese), no formal computational rules and procedures 
underlying thought and no inner “engine of reason” that 
controls or guides our behavior or utterances. 
This paper starts with a description of the primary 
cognition system upon which the new conceptualization of 
human intelligence rests. The first of four parts of the 
primary cognition model is a neural network pattern 
classification system (association). In addition, primates 
have a second-order pattern classification system (also 
called relational matching or tertiary cognition). This 
second-order process cannot be implemented by a 
feedforward neural network because the similarities to be 
noted are not in the patterns themselves but in the higher-
order relationships in the patterns.  
 The second part of the model is a mental representation 
system that can be best understood by introducing a new 
term, cogject that labels how minds from hamsters to 
primates mentally represent physical objects, actions and 
events. A critical property of cogjects is that they are 
singular and affirmative—a dog cannot represent, The cat is 
not on the mat. Unlike the popular inner language of 
thought hypothesis, these internal representations are not 
more precise than natural language—they are much less 
precise than natural language. This primary representation 
system has evolved the capability to chunk perceptions and 
representations in appropriately sized “bins,” so that a 
creature can gather statistical information of its world via 
neural network pattern classification processes. 
 The third part of the model includes the well-documented 
specialized core knowledge systems. Also known as a 
cognitive toolkit, this system includes know-how about 
objects, navigation skills and a number sense. 
 The fourth part of the primary cognition model is an 
action planning and evaluation system. An animal’s next 
immediate motor control movements are planned by 
sequencing representations of action control signals, that is, 
cogjects, in a buffer. Evaluation of a planned action is by an 
additional pattern classification process that operates on the 
cogject contents of the action buffer. The result of the 
evaluation process is either a go-ahead or an abort response 
that is simply based on pattern classification. If an action is 
aborted, another action can be planned and perhaps also 
aborted, leaving a human observer to conjecture that the 
momentarily inactive animal is “thinking.”  
 Human cognition is modeled by three systems, the 
primary cognition system just outlined, a language cognition 
system, and a secondary cognition or human reason system. 
Language cognition includes those cognitive processes that 
support natural language. I endorse the cognitive linguists’ 
theory based on patterns and spaces rather than rules, 
procedures, symbols and formal systems. 
The third human cognitive system called, “human 
reason,” may be the least intuitive. Based on natural 
language, it establishes a new world of complexity by 
allowing us to create, name, describe, explain and 
communicate intricate concepts, procedures and theories. 
What can the human mind do with words? My answer is 
that we can tell stories, period. Human logic and truth are 
Greek myths that need comprehensive revision. Even the 
“truth” of science is a value we bestow on a story that has 
been corrected many times by many people who look for 
consistency with other stories (theoretical import) and 
consistency with their observations of the world (empirical 
import). Truth is based upon group consensus and is always 
subject to change and revision. 
Human intelligence is built upon animal intelligence and 
natural language and not on a separate engine of reason. 
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PUNC: Producing and Understanding Novel 
Combinations  
The PUNC model (Producing and Understanding Novel 
Combinations) is the first model to capture both production 
and comprehension aspects of conceptual combination 
within the same theoretical framework.  The comprehension 
side of PUNC has been detailed elsewh ere (see Lynott, 
Tagalakis & Keane, 2004), so here we give a brief overview 
of the production side of the model.   
Lynott (2004) has proposed the Integrated Production and 
Comprehension (IPAC) Theory of conceptual combination.  
The IPAC theory seeks to describe the two sides of the 
conceptual combination coin, comprehension and 
production, within the same theoretical framework.  Lynott 
draws together several factors that have been shown to 
influence both sides of conceptual combination in similar 
ways.  Central to this view are the factors of Diagnosticity, 
Informativeness and Plausibility (inspired by earlier work 
by Costello & Keane, 2000).  PUNC is a computational 
implementation of this theory, with the model taking as 
input short descriptions of novel entities (e.g., “a beetle that 
eats cacti” or “a prickly beetle”) and, using the 
aforementioned factors, outputs candidate labels  together 
with an overall acceptability score for each label.  Below, 
we provide a brief description of the stages the model 
undergoes, from taking in an entity description to outputting 
candidate labels and assigning acceptability scores.  
A description is input to PUNC (e.g., a beetle that eats 
cacti; a beetle that is prickly).  Concepts are activated either 
by being explicitly mentioned in the description or through 
the description containing a feature that is diagnostic of 
another concept.  So, the “is prickly” feature would also 
activate the concept cactus.  Each of these concepts forms 
part of a set of candidate modifiers for the head concept 
(e.g., beetle).  The individual concepts’ features are then 
activated, prioritised by their diagnosticity.  For example, 
for the concept cactus “is prickly” is more diagnostic than 
“can conserve water” and so has greater activation.  These 
features are used to determine whether a modifier is 
informative with respect to the head concept as PUNC 
considers each candidate modifier in turn and whether it can 
form part of a valid, acceptable label for the entity being 
described.  For example, cactus beetle  is output as a valid 
label for the described entity since “is prickly” is a highly 
diagnostic feature of the concept cactus and this feature is 
also informative with respect to the head concept beetle 
(i.e., beetles are not by default prickly).  Labels are 
considered informative if they incorporate some new 
information relative to the head concept.  In this way, the 
informativeness of a label is a binary affair.  A label such as 
“wood tree” meaning “a tree made from wood” would not 
be considered informative and so would be rejected as a 
possible label.  As such, informativeness is a primary 
pragmatic constraint within the theory and model.  
PUNC assigns overall acceptability scores to each of the 
candidate labels, based on the relative diagnosticity of the 
features used, the informativeness of the label and the 
plausibility of the relation that links the two concepts in the 
compound.  For example, using a highly diagnostic feature 
of cactus to form a label contributes positively to the 
acceptability of a compound;   if a less diagnostic feature 
had activated cactus the resultant score would be reduced.   
Finally, the plausibility of the relation linking the head 
and modifier concepts contributes to the acceptability of the 
label.  For the description “a beetle that eats cacti”, the label 
cactus beetle would be considered highly plausible since 
there is a reciprocal “eats” relation between the concepts – 
beetles can eat things, and cacti, as vegetative matter can be 
eaten.  On the other hand, brick beetle as a label for “a 
beetle that eats bricks” is considered less plausible as bricks 
are not usually considered edible.   
Lynott (2004) has found that by using such pragmatic 
constraints in an integrated fashion PUNC not only reflects 
people’s choice of label for novel entities, but its overall 
acceptability scores correlate highly with people’s ratings of 
how good specific compounds are a s  labels for entity 
descriptions.   
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Abstract 
Although, planning and exploration of unknown 
environments has been previously addressed in multi-agent 
environments, we believe that in addition to these activities, 
agents may also benefit from exhibiting creativity so that 
they are able to imagine or invent new things (objects) that 
may be helpful or simply pleasant for the agents that inhabit 
the environment. Psychological and neuroscience research 
(e.g.: Damásio, 1994) over the past decades suggests that 
motivations (emotions, drives and other motivations) play a 
critical role in these activities that involve decision-making, 
and action, by influencing a variety of cognitive processes 
(e.g., attention, perception, planning, etc.). 
We have developed a multi-agent environment (Macedo 
& Cardoso, 2004) in which, in addition to inanimate agents 
(objects), there are two main kinds of animate agents 
interacting in a simple way: the creators, whose main 
function is to create things (objects, events), and the 
explorers whose goal is to explore the environment, 
analyzing, studding and evaluating it. In spite of this 
classification, there are agents that may exhibit the two 
activities, exploration and creation. In addition to these two 
activities, animate agents are able to generate plans. 
Planning plays a central role in the reasoning/decision-
making by supporting the other two activities: exploration 
and creativity. Actually, in our approach, creativity and 
exploration involve planning: when exploring the 
environment an agent has to plan a sequence of actions 
required to visit an unknown region or entity; when 
creating, an agent has to plan the sequence of actions 
required to come up with an original and valuable object. 
The architecture of an agent includes the following 
modules: memory (for entities, plans, and maps of the 
environment), goals/intentions, desires, motivations 
(emotions, drives and other motivations), and 
reasoning/decision-making. The planner is the core of the 
deliberative reasoning/decision-making module. The agent 
uses a planner that combines the technique of decision-
theoretic planning with the methology of HTN planning in 
order to deal with uncertain, dynamic large-scale real-world 
domains. Unlike in regular HTN planning, the planner can 
generate plans in domains where there is no complete 
domain theory by using cases of previously successful plans 
instead of methods for task decomposition. It generates a 
variant of a HTN - a kind of AND/OR tree of probabilistic 
conditional tasks - that expresses all the possible ways to 
decompose an initial task network. The expected utility of 
alternative plans is computed beforehand at the time of 
building the HTN and it is based on the expected positive 
and negative feelings that the agent feels if the plan is 
executed. Plans that are expected to elicit more positive 
feelings (happiness, surprise, etc.) and less negative feelings 
(e.g.: hunger) are assigned a higher expected utility. 
When performing exploration, the aim of an agent is 
twofold: (i) acquisition of maps of the environment – metric 
maps – to be stored in memory and where the cells occupied 
by the entities that populate that environment are 
represented; (ii) construction of models of those entities. 
Exploration may be performed by single or multiple agents. 
Each agent autonomously generates goals for visiting 
unknown entities or regions of the environment (goals of 
kind visitEntity or visitLoc) and builds a HTN plan for each 
one. Goals and plans that are expected to cause more 
positive feelings and less negative feelings are preferred. 
Thus, each agent performs directed exploration using an 
action selection method based on the maximization of the 
intensity of positive feelings and minimization of negative 
ones. Relevant motivations for directing exploration are for 
instance curiosity, surprise and hunger. The exploration 
strategy for multiple agents relies on considering a team 
leader that, based on the information provided to it by the 
members of the team as they perform their single 
exploration, builds a joint metric map, a joint episodic 
memory and a joint plan in order to be shared by all the 
members of the team. 
When performing creativity, an agent generates goals for 
the creation of novel, original and valuable entities (goals of 
kind createObj) and builds a plan for each one. Like in 
exploration, goals and plans that are expected to cause more 
positive feelings and less negative feelings are preferred. 
Motivations such as surprise and curiosity that capture 
variables such as novelty or unexpectedness, respectively, 
are hence important for creativity. 
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The combination of two existing words is a productive 
strategy used by speakers to convey new concepts and 
extend the limits of their vocabulary. In English compounds, 
the first word or modifier attaches further meaning to the 
second word or head, thus creating a reference to the 
intended concept. According to Gagné and Shoben’s (1997) 
Competition Among Relations In Nominals (CARIN) 
theory, there is a fixed, relatively small taxonomy of 
standard relations that can be used to link the modifier and 
head noun concepts. According to this theory, the most 
available standard relation is the one most frequently used 
to interpret other compounds containing that same modifier. 
We investigated whether the alleged importance of the 
modifier in relation selection is due to the fact that it comes 
first or whether it can be attributed to the modifier’s 
functional role. Accordingly, we conducted our study in 
French, a language in which the order of the nouns is the 
reverse of that in English. 
Priming Experiment 
We carried out two experiments using French noun-noun 
combinations which parallel a speeded sensibility study 
carried out by Gagné (2001). Gagné’s study investigated the 
way in which recent exposure to a similar combination 
influences the processing of a subsequent combination. She 
found that when the prime and the target had the same head 
noun, there was no significant different in reaction times 
between cases where they shared the same relation and 
cases where they did not. However, when the modifier was 
the repeated constituent, primes that used the same relation 
were more effective than those that used a different relation. 
Gagné took this as evidence that the modifier is paramount 
in relation selection. We investigated whether the same 
effect would be apparent in a language in which the order of 
the constituent nouns was reversed. 
No Evidence of Word Order Effects 
As predicted by the CARIN theory, we found no influence 
of the prime’s relation on reaction times when the prime and 
target shared the same head noun. However when the 
modifier was a shared constituent, reaction times were 
slower when the target was preceded by a combination with 
the same relation than when it was preceded by a 
combination with a different relation. Participants 
responded to targets following a same-relation prime 45ms 
quicker than they did to targets following a different-
relation prime, Fsubject(2, 34) = 4.349,  p < .05; Fitem(2, 118) = 
4.194, p < .05. Hence “ruisseau de montagne” (mountain 
stream) was more effective than “chaussures de montagne” 
(mountain shoes) at priming “glacier de montagne” 
(mountain glacier) while “sac de voyage” (travel bag) and 
“sac de cuir” (leather bag) were equally effective at 
priming “sac de sport” (sports bag). 
 
Table 1: Response Times for Same-Head Targets. 
 
Prime  
Same 
Head 
Same 
Modifier 
Same 
Relation  
Target 
Response 
Time (ms)
! " !  994 
! " "  999 
" " NA  1153 
 
 
Table 2: Response Times for Same-Modifier Targets. 
 
Prime  
Same 
Head 
Same 
Modifier 
Same 
Relation  
Target 
Response 
Time (ms)
! " !  998 
! " "  1043 
" " NA  1062 
 
Our results follow a similar pattern to those of Gagné 
(2001). They indicate that people’s ability to select a 
relation that was used in a recently viewed combination is 
influenced by whether that combination shares the same 
modifier but not whether it shares the same head. Since 
these effects have been replicated in a language in which the 
order of the modifier and head are reversed, this suggests 
that modifiers and heads maintain the same role in the 
process of interpretation regardless of the order in which 
they are realized. Additionally, it appears as if relational 
information is predominantly associated with the modifier. 
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Introduction  
The search for universally shared elements of word meaning 
can shed light on how human languages are shaped as well 
as on shared aspects of human cognition: Do any such 
elements arise from a universal appreciation of structure that 
exists in the world, from universal properties of human 
information processing, or from universal human needs, 
interests, and concerns? Likewise, understanding how and 
why languages diverge in their word meanings can reveal 
how languages evolve word meanings and how cognitive 
processes shape this evolution.  
We studied naming patterns across three languages 
in the domain of human locomotion (walking, running, 
skipping, etc.). This domain is universally  experienced and 
highly structured, and there is an independent 
biomechanical description of that structure. Any 
universality is not likely determined at the level of the 
sensory apparatus (cf. the much-studied domain of color). 
These features allow us to ask whether a shared perception 
of structure in the world provides a constraint on the 
development of word meanings.  
Portions of this domain vary in their centrality to 
human experience: Walking and running are universally the 
primary gaits, whereas hopping, skipping, etc. are more 
peripheral. And languages differ in how manner of 
movement is lexically encoded.  Some typically encode 
manner in the verb (“She ran out of the room” [the English 
pattern]); others more typically encode path in the verb and 
manner only optionally in an adverbial phrase (”She exited 
the room {optional: running} [the pattern of e.g., Romance 
languages].  These features allow us to ask whether 
centrality to human experience and differences in verb 
lexicalization patterns across languages influence the degree 
of shared meaning.  
We predicted that: (a) Strong universality would be 
found in the central portions of this domain; all languages 
tested would have manner verbs closely equivalent to 
“walk” and “run” in English. (b) Greater diversity would be 
found in more peripheral parts of the domain. (c) Manner 
verb languages would show greater linguistic differentiation 
of the more peripheral parts of the domain than other 
languages. 
Experiment 1  
Monolingual native speakers of English, Spanish, and 
Japanese named 24 video clips of a student locomoting on a 
treadmill that varied systematically in speed and slope from 
low to high. Speakers of all three languages showed strong 
within-language agreement on names for clips and switched 
from one label to a different one at exactly the same points 
in the stimulus continuum -- points that corresponded to 
biomechanical discontinuities in the movements produced. 
Experiment 2  
Monolingual native speakers of English, Spanish, and 
Japanese named 36 video clips of a student locomoting on a  
static walkway.  The student performed a range of examples 
of various bio mechanically distinct gaits (e.g., several 
different versions each of walking, marching, and jumping). 
The central b iomechanical distinction of walking vs. 
running was largely observed by speakers of all the 
languages. However, there were points of between-language 
disagreement on exemplars even here. The between-
language disagreement for gaits more peripheral to human 
experience was greater, and speakers of English (a manner 
verb language) showed greater linguistic differentiation of 
the more peripheral gaits than did speakers of Spanish (a 
path verb language) and Japanese (a path-and-ground 
language).   
Discussion 
These results indicate that structure in the stimulus array 
provides a constraint on the cross-linguistic construction of 
meaning, but not an absolute one.  Even in a strongly 
structured domain, some diversity in the meaning of terms 
can arise. The formulation of meaning is less constrained by 
stimulus structure in parts of the domain that are more 
peripheral to human experience, and independently existing 
typological differences in verb lexicalization patterns are a 
force that can contribute to diversity in meaning.  
1595
Effect of Presentation Style on Children’s and Adults’ Use of Data Characteristics
Amy M. Masnick (psyamm@hofstra.edu)
Department of Psychology, Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11549 USA
Bradley J. Morris (morrisb@gvsu.edu)
Department of Psychology, Grand Valley State University
2117 AuSable Hall, One Campus Drive, Allendale, MI USA
In two studies, we examined children’s reasoning in the
interpretation phase of an experiment: data were presented
as results of a completed experiment, and participants were
asked to draw conclusions based on the information they
had available.  We set up situations with minimal theoretical
background information, to make the variation in data
characteristics particularly salient.
Two of the most important ideas about data involve
expectations about data distribution and expectations about
the effect of sample size, and we used these variables as the
focal variables in our study. We asked participants to draw
conclusions about whether there was a difference between
two sets of data and to explain their reasoning  (Masnick &
Morris, 2002).
In the current study, we wanted to explore how the style
of presentation might influence children’s and adults’
conclusions.  Presenting all of the data to be considered at
one time could be difficult to process.  In addition, the
pairwise presentation of data could facilitate comparisons of
pairs of data points instead of comparisons of the entire
column of data.  We used the some of the same datasets as
in Masnick and Morris (2002) but presented information in
a different format.
Method
Twenty-two third grade students, 29 sixth-grade students,
and 50 undergraduate students participated in this study.
All participants were shown a cover story describing two
engineers testing sports balls.  The engineers programmed
robots to throw or kick balls a certain number of times to
test if they were different.  Participants were then presented
with three datasets, in one of two conditions.
In the pairwise condition, participants saw data presented
in two columns.  First, they were shown one pair of data
points, then two, four, and then six pairs.  After each
presentation, participants were asked if there was a
difference between the two variables, how sure they were of
this difference, and whether they thought the engineers
should test the balls again.
In the column condition, participants saw six data points
in one column, and one in the other column.  They were
asked the same questions as in the pairwise condition, and
then were presented with additional data points in the
second data column (1, 2, 4, and 6 data points at a time).
This condition was included to see if reasoning changes
when pairwise comparisons are less salient.
Results and Discussion
The results of this study replicated the major finding of
Masnick and Morris (2002): Across all grade levels, there
was a significant effect of sample size and level of data
variation that affected students’ sureness that the two
columns of data were different.
In this study, participants were asked if they thought the
engineers should test the balls again.  There were no
differences between conditions in the frequency of replies:
with fewer data points, most participants wanted more data.
When there were six pairs in each column, about 40% of
participants still thought more data should be collected.
Participants’ justifications for their reasoning were most
frequently based on data characteristics such as sample size
and the magnitude of differences.  There were large age
differences, with older participants more likely to name
more characteristics.   Participants in the column condition
were more likely to comment on an outlier affecting their
judgment.  These participants also said that the inequality of
the number of data points in each column was the main
reason for wanting the engineers to test at least one ball
again.
The findings from this study suggest that students pay
attention to data characteristics as early as third grade, and
are able to use this information in drawing conclusions.
Further, the presentation style of the data affects reasoning
about only a small subset of features, suggesting that
students are responding not just to the demands of the task,
but are interpreting data however they are presented.
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There are two serious contestants as to how the mind 
works: the Modularity (MT; Fodor, 1983) and the 
Massive Modularity theses (MMT; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992). Both visions have been targets of criticism. 
Decision making research suggests  that one criticism 
faced by the MT can be overcome by assuming the central 
system relies heavily on simple heuristics. In this paper 
fast and frugal heuristics are presented. It is argued that 
fast and frugal heuristics are the unencapsulated solutions 
to the central system’s potential computational tractability 
problem, thus supporting MT. Moreover, it is discussed 
how these heuristics are task-specific but not domain 
specific, thus undermining MMT. 
 
Modularity vs. Massive Modularity 
The MT (Fodor, 1983) is the thesis that the mind is 
made up of a few modular systems plus a domain-general, 
unencapsulated central system that serves higher-order 
functions, like decision-making. The MMT (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992) is  the idea that the mind is like a Swiss 
Army knife , a collection of specialized tools  designed to 
solve adaptive problems. MMT contrasts with MT in that 
it claims that central capacities can also be divided into 
domain-specific mechanisms . The two approaches are at 
opposing sides of a debate and yet they share concerns 
like computational tractability and domain-specificity. 
However, for MMT domain-specificity is non-negotiable 
at all levels . For MT unencapsulation of the central 
system is the non-negotiable item. 
Both visions face challenges. MT faces the obvious 
criticism that an unencapsulated central system is prone to 
computational intractability problems. MMT has been 
criticized for being based on the unwarranted premise that 
domain-specific mechanisms outperform domain general 
ones  in principle, and for not accounting for the holistic 
nature of human thinking (Fodor, 2000). 
 
Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
The idea that individuals have limited resources, such as 
time, money, and cognitive capacity, has lead some to 
propose that people often rely on simple but accurate, fast 
and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC 
Research Group, 1999). 
Different fast and frugal heuristics have been so far 
identified and tested, including the Take -the-Best and the 
Recognition heuristics for pair-comparison tasks, and the 
Quickest heuristic for estimation tasks. These heuristics 
have been proven to be accurate (i.e., providing more 
often right than wrong decisions), but also faster (i.e., 
requiring less computations) and more frugal (i.e., 
requiring less information) than more standard decision 
models like multiple regression. Moreover, fast and frugal 
heuristics are more robust than these latter models when 
cross-validation is concerned. The reason simple 
heuristics are so successful is they exploit the structure of 
decision environments. Importantly, it has been shown 
that people use such simple heuristics (for a review see 
Gigerenzer et al. 1999). 
 
Unencapsulated, Domain-general Heuristics 
Crucial to the argument exposed here is that simple 
heuristics can be conceptualized as decision devices 
which are both information- and processing-frugal 
without being encapsulated. The fact that they are not 
encapsulated supports MT. The fact that they are not 
domain-specific contradicts MMT. Let us evaluate these 
claims by considering one prototypical heuristic, TTB.  
In order to arrive at a decision about which of two 
objects scores higher on a criterion TTB does the 
following: (1) it retrieves the cue values of the best 
predictive cue for that criterion from memory; (2) assesses 
if one object has a higher value on that cue than the other; 
(3) if the cue discriminates it chooses the object with the 
highest value, if the cue does not discriminate, TTB looks 
up the second best cue, and so forth, until it makes a 
decision. If no dis criminating cues are available TTB 
guesses.  
TTB is  not encapsulated in the sense that it has access 
to all beliefs in principle (e.g., beliefs about the value of a 
cue). However, for TTB there is a limited set of beliefs 
that it needs to use to reach a decision. In sum, TTB 
makes decisions in a computationally tractable way not by 
being encapsulated but by having a stopping rule (i.e., 
stop search and decide after finding a discriminating cue).  
TTB is  task-specific because it can only be applied to 
pair-comparison tasks. However, TTB is domain general 
because it can be applied to any domain (e.g., social, food 
choice). Importantly, it has been shown that people use 
TTB across domains (see Gigerenzer et al. 1999) .  
From this perspective, one might be lead to think that 
the central system is but a collection of simple heuristics. 
However, we still need MT’s concept of a central system 
that chooses between heuristics  and reasons about which 
cues are the best and should therefore be considered first 
(see also Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). 
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We investigated the effect of perceptual and semantic processing on 
concept and preference formation. Matsuda & Kusumi (2002, 2003) found 
three effects using a mere exposure (e.g., Zajonc, 1968) and concept 
formation paradigm (e.g., Barsalou et al., 1999). The first effect, concept 
formation by repeated exposure, is based on the event; the concept builds 
the prototype. The second, prototypical stimuli integrated dimension of 
each individual, are preferred if the value of that dimension is weighted. 
Finally, although formed concepts decrease cohesiveness as a function of 
interval, the prototype is retained.  
In the present study, the learning condition was changed from intentional 
(Matsuda & Kusumi, 2002, 2003) to incidental learning. Category 
classification performance using incidental learning was found superior to 
performance based on intentional learning in Parkinson's disease patients 
(Reber & Squire, 1999). Because the typicality effect on learning by 
semantic processing is higher than that achieved with perceptual processing 
(Fujita & Shimizu, 1990), we also examined levels of processing 
(perceptual vs. semantic) as an independent variable.  
Method 
Design. A 3 (typicality of stimuli: high, medium and low) × 4 
(exposure frequency: 0, 1, 3 and 5 times) × 2 (levels of processing: 
perceptual vs. semantic)× 2 (interval: 5 min vs. 2 weeks) design was used, 
with interval and levels of processing manipulated between participants, 
and typicality of stimuli and exposure frequency manipulated within 
participants. 
Participants. Ninety-six Japanese university students participated in the 
experiment. 
 Material. Unfamiliar fish pictures based on Barsalou et al.(（1999) were 
used. The pictures were classified into types A and B. All stimuli consisted 
of 10 dimensions (D1-D10), and all stimuli shared D7-D10 dimensionality. 
Shared dimensions operated typically as independent variables. High- 
typical stimuli shared D3-D10, medium-typical stimuli shared D5-D10, and 
low-typical stimuli shared D7-D10. No-shared dimensions had a unique 
value. Within-distracters were unpresented prototypical stimuli that were 
integrated with the value of the same- exposure frequency condition. 
Between-distracters were non-presented stimuli integrated with A and B 
types. 
 Procedure. Participants studied unfamiliar fish pictures that consisted of 
10 dimensions (0, 1, 3, 5 times incidentally), and classified the fish into two 
categories (A or B), based on perceptual (shape: round vs. slender) or 
semantic processing (nature: gentle vs. fierce). Each stimulus was 
successively displayed for 7 sec; response times were 2 sec, feedback times 
were 1 sec, and ISIs were 1 sec. After an interval (5 min or 2 weeks), the 
participants judged the typicality, familiarity, liking, prettiness, and 
nostalgia of each picture, using a nine-point scale, as well as indicating 
recognition of new and old items. 
Results and Discussion 
A. Typicality and Familiarity Judgment In the 5-min interval condition 
of the present stimuli, the main effects of stimuli typicality and exposure 
frequency were significant, but the main effects of levels of processing and 
interaction were not. In the 2-week condition, the effect of exposure 
frequency was not significant. The results suggested that interval effected a 
judgment criteria shift from episode to knowledge base. Based on analysis 
of the within-category distracters, the judged value was higher in the 
semantic processing condition than in the perceptual processing condition. 
The data suggest that semantic processing integrates each stimulus and, 
thus, promotes prototype formation. (Figure 1A). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Typicality, Recognition, and Liking judgment scores 
 
B. Nostalgia and Recognition Judgment The effect of exposure 
frequency on presented stimuli was significant in the 5-min condition but 
not in the 2-week condition. There was no effect of intention or levels of 
processing. Analyzing the data from the within-distracter condition 
revealed that recognition was higher in the semantic processing condition, 
which integrates high-frequency dimensions, than in the perceptual 
processing condition (Figure 1B). 
C. Liking and Prettiness Judgment High-typical stimuli were preferred, 
and there was a significant effect of exposure frequency for the low-typical 
stimuli, as well as for intentional learning (Matsuda & Kusumi, 2002, 
2003). There was no effect of levels of processing. The judged value of 
within-category distracters in the semantic processing condition was high, 
as compared to that in the perceptual processing condition (Figure 1C). 
 In conclusion, the effects of intention and levels of processing on 
judgments were weak. Furthermore, semantic processing in the study phase 
(compared with perceptual processing) enhanced typicality and affective 
judgments for the non-presented prototypical stimuli (within-category 
distracters). 
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Several recent articles have emphasized event
representations and their role in language processing. For
example, Vu et al. (2003) used subject nouns such as
astronomer versus director to promote a situation model
that led to disambiguating the meaning of a sentence-final
word such as star. They found that their manipulation was
sufficient to activate selectively the dominant or subordinate
meaning of the ambiguous noun. Ferretti, McRae, and
Hatherell (2001) used short stimulus onset asynchrony
priming to provide evidence that verbs denoting events
quickly activate knowledge of typical aspects of those
events (verbs primed typical agents, patients, and
instruments). McRae et al. (2004) found that nouns denoting
typical aspects of events activate verbs, thus suggesting that
event knowledge is computed quickly via means other than
the name of the event (i.e., a verb). The goal of the present
study was to extend this research by testing for priming
between nouns that denote events or typical aspects of them.
We used generation norms to select six groups of items.
For event nouns such as baptism, subjects were asked to
“List the types of people and/or animals that are typically
found at these events." The norming produced 18 prime-
target pairs such as baptism-priest. A separate norming
study asked subjects to “List the types of things that are
typically found at these events." This produced 26 event-
thing pairs such as trip-luggage. For location nouns such as
tavern, subjects were asked to "List the people and/or
animals that you commonly see in/at each of these
locations." This produced 24 items such as tavern-
bartender. This norming also was conducted for locations
and things, producing 30 items such as garage-car. Similar
norming was also conducted with instrument nouns such as
wrench. These norming studies produced 24 instrument-
living thing pairs such as wrench-plumber and 24 event-
thing pairs such as key-door. Care was taken to exclude
event and instrument nouns that are often used as verbs, and
to exclude prime-target pairs that form common phrases.
We hypothesized that if people's memory representations
are shaped by their experiences with events, then common
aspects of events should activate one another. In our
priming task, the prime was presented visually for 200 ms,
followed by a blank screen for 50 ms, and then the target
word was presented until the subject responded. For the
people/animals experiments, subjects decided as quickly and
accurately as possible whether or not the target referred to a
living thing. For the "thing" experiments, subjects decided
whether or not the target referred to a concrete object.
There was a 32 ms priming effect for event-people/animal
pairs (related: M = 590 ms; unrelated: M = 622 ms; F1(1,
18)=5.30, p < .05, F2(1, 16) = 7.74, p <. 05), and a 32 ms
priming effect for event-thing pairs (related: M = 738 ms;
unrelated: M = 771 ms; F1(1, 18) = 7.74, p < .05, F2(1, 24) =
4.71, p < .05). Both priming effects for locations were also
significant: 37 ms for location-people/animals (related: M =
728 ms; unrelated: M = 765 ms; F1(1, 20) = 4.39, p < .05,
F2(1, 22) = 5.29, p < .05); and 29 ms for location-things
(related: M = 646 ms; unrelated: M = 675 ms; F1(1, 18) =
8.60, p < .01, F2(1, 28) = 5.16, p < .05). Finally, there was a
significant 58 ms priming effect for instrument-things
(related: M = 735 ms; unrelated: M = 793 ms; F1(1, 16) =
9.59, p  < .01, F 2(1, 28) = 10.72, p  < .01), but a
nonsignificant -10 ms effect for instrument-people (related:
M = 766 ms; unrelated: M = 756 ms; both F's < 1).
The present study provides additional evidence that
semantic memory is organized so that knowledge regarding
various aspects of common events can be computed quickly
from multiple types of linguistic cues, thus providing
valuable information for interpreting language on-line and
generating expectancies during language comprehension. As
Sanford and Garrod (1981) have stated, "we use a linguistic
input to call up representations of situations or events from
long-term memory as soon as we have enough information
to do so" (p. 115). The present studies, and other recent ones
related to them, suggest that nouns that denote typical
aspects of common events are often "enough information".
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Despite of the fact that visual features are 
processed separately in specialized subsystems in the brain, 
our perceptual experience is of coherent objects. It has been 
suggested that visual attention acts as a “glue” to bind 
separate features--such as color, shape, size, motion, and 
location—into objects (Triesman & Gelade, 1980). This 
theory would suggest that features outside of visual 
attention remain unbound perceptually. We tested (1) 
whether binding occurs outside the focus of attention, and 
(2) whether feature binding was automatic or dependent on 
top-down attention to each feature individually. To 
determine whether two features were bound together, we 
probed whether paying attention to one feature (color) 
would also influence the processing of another, task-
irrelevant feature (motion) of the same stimulus (cross-
feature attention: CFA: Sohn et al., in press). These CFA 
effects were tested both within the focus of attention (focal 
attention) and outside the spatial location of attention 
(global attention).  
Methods 
The first test was to detect a luminance change in 
one of two colors of dots (red or green) clustered in one 
visual hemifield. After a beep, the subject was cued to pay 
attention to a cluster of dots in the opposite hemifield for a 
motion direction discrimination task. Unbeknownst to the 
subject, a brief (150 ms) sub-threshold motion prime was 
present in the unattended dots during the first (luminance) 
task (for details of the motion prime, see Melcher & 
Morrone, 2003). The use of a sub-threshold prime excluded 
the possibility that the motion signal was attended directly. 
The prime was presented either in same color of dots 
attended for the luminance task or in the other color. 
In addition to this test of the influence of the prime 
outside the focus of attention, separate blocks were run in 
which the prime was in the same dots as those attended for 
the luminance task. In this case, only the dots in one 
hemifield were attended during the trial. 
Results 
 
We found that global CFA modulation outside the 
focus of attention spreads to spatiotemporally co-localized 
features, while inside the focus of attention CFA modulation 
spreads between all features belonging to the same surface 
or object. In other words, CFA effects outside the focus of 
attention were color-specific. An influence of the prime was 
found only when the prime dots were the same color as 
those attended in the opposite hemifield for the luminance 
test. When both tasks were in the same dots, however, the 
prime dots in the cluster always influenced the later motion 
test, suggesting that the entire cluster of dots was bound 
together as a surface.  
Conclusions 
  These results suggest several implications for the 
role of attention in feature binding. First, these findings 
imply the existence of a binding mechanism at the local 
stages of visual processing that links spatiotemporally co-
occurring features across the visual field, and that this 
mechanism is independent of attention. Secondly, these 
results support previous suggestions of another binding 
mechanism that acts at the level of coherent surfaces and 
links all features of the same surface (object-based attention: 
Duncan, 1984; O’Craven et al., 1999). Third, the CFA 
effects found here suggest that features are bound 
automatically, rather than depending on top-down attention 
to each feature separately. The use of the sub-threshold 
stimulus showed that attention influences visual processing 
even when the feature is below the level of conscious 
awareness. 
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The View Association Model (VAM) is a novel 
account of how interacting with a spatial layout in 
different ways can lead to differing representation of 
the space. VAM provides an account of data 
demonstrating the learning of different spatial 
associations when the same layout is learnt through 3D 
Virtual navigation and 2D map navigation. 
Embodied views of cognition suggest that 
representations of the environment can be understood 
by examining how they complement the perceptual-
motor programs used to interact with the environment 
(Ballard et al., 1997).  Inherent in this perspective is the 
suggestion that different environments will typically 
require different perceptual-motor programs that will in 
turn require different internal representations.     
Miles & Howes (submitted) found that spatially close 
items became associated when participants learnt a 
space by navigating through it in a 3D Desktop Virtual 
Environment (DVE), but not when the space was a 
learnt by navigating a 2D map.  The data presented by 
Miles & Howes suggest two questions.  Firstly, what 
are the differences in the way the DVE and 2D map 
were learnt?  Secondly, how do these differences lead 
to spatial association in the DVE condition, and its 
absence in the 2D Map condition? The View 
Association Model (VAM) attempts to explain these 
data and provide answers to both of these questions. 
The View Association Model 
VAM learns the locations of items in a space by 
learning the visual location of an item in a particular 
view of the space.   A view is defined as a single static 
depiction of a space (or a portion of that space) from the 
viewer’s perspective.  In the plan view condition used 
by Miles & Howes participants only see a single view 
of the space.  However in the DVE condition a large 
number of possible views of the environment are 
possible.  A consequence of the views available in the 
DVE and 2D Map conditions is that different 
perceptual-motor programs are required for successful 
navigation. 
Although, VAM moves around the DVE and Plan 
View in similar ways, the motor actions needed to 
facilitate movement are different.  To move in the DVE 
VAM must point the direction of view toward the item 
it wishes to move to and press down the space bar.  
Subsequently VAM adjusts the direction of motion by 
moving the mouse. When VAM interacts with the 2D 
view a similar mode is adopted, but key presses are 
used to navigate. VAM presses a key to start moving in 
a desired direction and that key remains depressed until 
another key is preferred.   
As VAM moves toward an item in both conditions a 
course correction algorithm is periodically engaged.  
VAM searches for the target item in the current view 
and then compares its current heading with the heading 
needed to get to the item. In the DVE it will then adjust 
the view so the target item is in the centre of the view 
(thus correcting the heading).  When interacting with 
the 2D Map VAM will simply decide which key will 
move the red dot closest to the target item.  
The algorithms used by VAM to move toward an 
item rely on bottom up processing to initiate course 
correction.  The bottom up processing not only focuses 
attention on the target item but, by default, focuses 
attention periodically on other items that happen to 
appear in the current view.  This occurs when VAM 
searches the current view for the target item, rejecting 
non-target items before it locates the target item.  When 
attention is focused on these non-target items then there 
is a chance that VAM will elaborate the name of the 
item and an associative link will be formed between the 
item and the current goal item. 
Crucially, only items that appear in view will be 
elaborated.  Hence associative links will tend to form 
between items that appear in the same view.  In Miles 
& Howes’ 2D map condition all items are always in the 
same view.  But in the DVE condition only subsets of 
items appear in any given view and typically items 
appearing in the same view will be proximal.  Hence 
the interaction of the course correction algorithm and 
perceptual display lead VAM to predict the pattern of 
data observed by Miles & Howes. 
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A number of studies have demonstrated that the strength of 
lexical effects on phoneme processing can be modulated by 
attention (e.g., Cutler et al., 1987; Eimas, Hornstein, & 
Payton, 1990; Vitevitch, 2003).  The TRACE model 
(McClelland & Elman, 1986) posits direct feedback from 
lexical processing to phonemic processing, thus accounting 
for lexical influences on phoneme identification.  However, 
the TRACE model lacks a mechanism for modulation of 
this feedback through attention.  Some researchers (Norris, 
McQueen, & Cutler, 2000) have argued that this is a 
weakness of the interactive view of speech perception and is 
one reason to prefer an autonomous model.  
We consider biased competition (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995) as a possible attention mechanism that fits within the 
interactive framework of TRACE.  In the context of 
TRACE, when an input is presented, phonemes that are 
partially consistent with the input compete through lateral 
inhibition.  This competition is biased by lexical feedback 
proportional to the magnitude of lexical activation. 
Activation of lexical items is based on excitatory input from 
the phoneme layer and lateral inhibitory interactions among 
lexical items. The magnitude and rate at which lexical items 
become active can be manipulated by a scaling factor on the 
lexical units’ response to input. This, in turn, influences the 
strength of lexical influences on phoneme perception. That 
is, task or stimulus conditions that cause participants to 
direct attention away from lexical processing may operate 
by causing a dampening of lexical layer activity and thereby 
reducing lexical biasing of phoneme processing.  To 
implement this mechanism in TRACE, an attentional 
scaling parameter (α) was added to the function specifying 
the change in activation for lexical units for each processing 
cycle.  When α=1.0, this is the standard TRACE model as 
implemented by McClelland and Elman (1986), when 
α<1.0, the lexical activation is dampened and lexical effects 
should be reduced. 
This mechanism was tested in two cases of lexical effects 
on phoneme identification. Ambiguous phonemes tend to be 
perceived as lexically consistent (Ganong, 1980), but the 
strength of this effect varies with task and stimulus 
differences (see Pitt & Samuel, 1993, for review and meta-
analysis). The attention parameter captured this variability. 
When lexical attention is high, lexical items become more 
active more quickly, thus providing stronger and earlier 
feedback to the phoneme level and biasing perception of the 
ambiguous acoustic input. When lexical attention is very 
low, lexical items become active more slowly, thus 
providing less feedback to the phoneme level and causing a 
small and late-developing lexical bias. 
A second lexical effect on phoneme recognition is that 
phonemes are recognized more quickly in words than 
nonwords. This word advantage has also been shown to be 
affected by task and stimulus factors (e.g., Cutler et al., 
1987). Variation of the attention parameter also captures this 
variability: at high α values, TRACE is faster to recognize 
phonemes that are embedded in words; at lower α values, 
the word advantage disappears.  This is because lexical 
items are less active, thus they provide less support to their 
constituent phonemes. 
The addition of a scaling parameter that dampens overall 
lexical layer activation provides a simple mechanism that 
works within the interactive framework of the TRACE 
model to modulate the strength of lexical influences on 
phoneme processing.  
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General Formatting Instructions
The aim of this research is to evaluate the extent to which
Thesaurus  allow  us  to  modify  a  researcher's  knowledge
frame.  A  well  calculated  Thesaurus  has  the  power  to
overwrite  existent  knowledge  frames,  or  habitual
"heuristics" for the humanities, if word occurrence data are
rigorously  manipulated  by  the  algorithms  of  statistical
linguistics. However, even if all targets and means of data
gathering and analyzing are readily available, there remains
behind various interpretations  of  subjects a  sort  of  Frame
question of how we partition off the texts and documents to
avoid arbitrary text segmentation. Frames are needed before
we can gather and interpret the data for a word occurrence
computation. 
If the problem of text segmentation remains unresolved,
any experiment in quantitative text analysis will be still far
from  being  realized.  We  need  a  sort  of  “TextTiling”
methodology enabling an objective segmentation based on
objective criteria. 
This holds true for the frame setting in parallel and variant
texts as the synoptic Gospels. We have to point out that the
basic  frame  for  Biblical  research  was taken from second
hand  data  called  the  Parallel  Synoptic  Table  (in
abbreviation, PST), which shows the order and arrangement
of the “pericopes” belonging to the Synoptic Gospels. The
frame  traditionally  prepared  was  built  only  by  a  “Form
Criticism”, which divided the texts into parts by the arbitrary
unities coming from tradition or reduction.
The purpose of the PST framework has been the resolution
of  the  problem  of  "who  quoted  whom"  in  writing
respectively the first three Gospels. However we propose an
alternative  and  more  objective  way  of  segmenting  the
parallel  texts  by  using  our  web-based  biblical  software,
named  “Tele-Synopsis”,  which  is  designed  to  gather
information of the word usage under various conditions and
to  help  further  statistical  approach  to  the  origin  of  the
variant  texts.  A  quantitative  analysis  (factor  analysis)  is
applied to the lexical datasets obtained by changing framing
conditions  in  order  to  verify  some  traditional  hypotheses
made  to  explain  the  mutual  relationship  of  the  synoptic
Gospels. Our framing principle is that the entire texts can be
classified  into  the  following  7  categories  which  are  A:
common  part  of  the  three  Gospels,  B:  part  common  to
Matthew and Mark, C: part common to Mark and Luke, D:
part  common  to  Matthew and  Lukas,  E:  part  peculiar  to
Matthew, F: part peculiar to Mark, G: part peculiar to Luke.
It is natural that the category to which each instance of word
has to belong for  constructing a biblical  Thesaurus varies
according to the way in which we partition off the parallel
texts.  But  the results  of  the factor  analysis applied to  the
multiple datasets showed high robustness in the sense that
the types of loading matrix are more or less similar  except
for the dataset depending on the traditional PST.
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When one starts to learn a new topic, it is essential to 
understand the terminology, to the point where one can use 
them comfortably. For such learning, balance is required 
between concrete experiences and their abstract 
verbalization, but how to achieve the balance has not yet 
been studied systematically.  In this report we compare three 
sets of learning activities to see the effects of the amount of 
concrete experiences and their verbalization on learning.  
While a short demo with high demand on abstraction does 
not yield significant verbalization, ample practices with 
reflection appear to solicit natural generalization. 
Comparison of three classes 
Three undergraduate classes were taught the concept of 
schema through structured activities around the “Day 
arithmetic” (Lindsay & Norman, 1977), where the students 
were to solve problems like 
              When Wednesday + Tuesday = Friday,  
what is Tuesday + Friday? 
The classes differed in the amount of practices of the 
problem, as well as in the types of verbalization required to 
summarize this experience.  In Class 1, students solved 
three problems, while Class 2 solved 3 and then 20, and 
Class 3 solved 3, 72, 60, and 60 problems in chunks. This 
practice was followed by the question of what strategy they 
would choose to solve many Day arithmetic problems.  
After that, a transfer problem, “m+b=?” was posed.  At the 
end of the unit, each class was asked to summarize their 
experiences.  For the numbers of the students, see Table 2.  
Amount of experiences and choice of strategies 
Table 1 shows the students’ choices of strategies to tackle 
many problems, either rote memorization of the answers, 
use of a table of answers, or of rules such as “to add a 
Monday, answer the next day of the addend.” Rules are 
highly effective, but this fact was only graspable after a 
relatively many practices. 
 
Table 1: Strategy choice  
Strategy choice 
Class 
No. 
of 
Trials Memory Table Rules 
1 3 20.0% 70.0% 10.0% 
2 23 16.2% 32.3% 51.5% 
3 195 15.2% 15.2% 69.6% 
 
Micro-generation of a schema 
To the transfer problem of m+b, many students answer “o,” 
paralleling this to the Day arithmetic.  Some even extended 
its rule and solved this by just going down the alphabet two 
more letters from m, without counting.  Both cases indicate 
that the students generate a schema-like understanding, 
applicable to a similar problem. Table 2 itemizes the ratio of 
types of this micro-generation. The success rate of the 
micro-generation of the schema is quite high, and sparing 
the practice time does not affect the generation pattern. 
 
Table 2: Answer types of “m+b” 
Class Count-up Transfer No answer
1 (n=81) 50.6% 44.4% 4.9% 
2 (n=71) 59.2% 38.0% 2.8% 
3 (n=92) 63.0% 35.9% 0% 
Abstraction at the end of the unit  
At the end of this unit, the students were asked to 
summarize their experiences, in different instructions.  The 
answers were categorized as “Concrete” when they only 
referred to specific examples and/or procedures; as 
“Moderate” when they referred to the strategies and effects; 
as.  “High” when they included explicit comments on their  
 commonality and/or generalizability.  Class 1 students were 
asked to describe what kind of knowledge their rules were, 
which was too difficult to answer, particularly after a short 
demo.  Class 2 students were encouraged to explain the Day 
arithmetic to their friends.  Most students chose to stick to 
concrete procedures, ignoring the schemas.  Contrastingly in 
Class 3, the students were asked to comment on the most 
important points of the unit.  Possibly scaffolded by the 
ample amount of experiences as a base for reflection, this 
attempt was most successful among the three classes. 
 
Table 3: Abstraction levels of summaries 
Answer abstraction levels  Ratio of  answerers High Moderate Concrete
1 23.4% 15.8% 42.1% 42.1% 
2 91.5% 6.2% 1.7% 92.3% 
3 100% 24.7% 25.9% 49.4% 
 
The overall pattern indicates the importance of concrete 
experiences, as a basis for significant reflection.  A short 
demo with highly abstracted explanation might appear to 
save time, but could impair the quality of learning.  
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                       Introduction                                                               Results and Discussion       
Witkin et al. (2002) notes that field independents process 
analytically, whereas field dependents process globally.  
Markman and Genter (1993) define alignable differences 
(AD) as arising from an underlying commonality (e.g.,‘one 
has more legs’ arises from ‘both have legs’).  It follows that: 
1) Field independents may produce fewer AD, sort more 
categories, and create less variable-sized categories than  
field dependents. 
2) Cognitive style may interact with artificial stimulus sets, 
which vary in shared attributes (characteristics true of 
multiple category members).  Specifically, the “mixed” set, 
the only one of the three sets allowing selective attention to 
vary between either “common” (i.e., majority shared) or 
“idiosyncratic” (i.e., minority shared) attributes, may elicit 
the largest difference in AD production between field 
independents and dependents.   
3) There should be gender differences in cognitive styles 
(Witkin et al., 2002), number of categories sorted, and/or 
category size variability (Pettigrew, 1958). 
Methods 
Participants 
87 (23M/64F) college students (98% Caucasian; M age = 
19) from a Catholic school, participated for extra credit.  
 
Materials 
The Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) by Witkin et al. 
identified cognitive style. Nine stimulus sets, each with 20 
artificial animal line drawings, allowed category sorting.  
Four “common” sets each consisted of 8 common attributes 
(e.g., “tail”) with varying values (e.g., ‘peacock’) shared by 
16/20 animals. One “mixed” set consisted of 8 common 
attributes; 4 shared by 16/20 and 4 shared by 4/20. Four 
“idiosyncratic” sets each consisted of 8 common attributes 
shared by 4/20 pairs. All sets were counterbalanced to 
ensure the same attributes/values were used across all sets.  
Response sheets were used to record category sort answers 
and the first difference noticed for each of 20 animal pairs. 
 
Design and Procedure 
All individually tested participants were randomly assigned 
one ordered stack of 20 animals, which they sorted into as  
many categories as they wanted. Then they listed the first 
difference they noticed for the same 20 animal pairs, 
followed by a second, identical category sort task with the 
same 20 animals. Finally, all were timed and scored on the 
GEFT test as instructed by Witken et al.  
 
GEFT inter-rater reliability was 99%; AD reliability was 
95%.  Hypothesis 1:  A multiple regression analysis (see 
Table 1) predicting AD, model F(4,71) =4.30, adj.R2=.15, 
p=.004, showed that alignable differences decreased as field 
independence increased and as animal pairs became more 
different from each other (i.e., shared fewer attributes). A 
simple correlation,  r(74) = -.31, p=.003, showed that as 
field independence increased, the sorted category size 
variability at Time 2 decreased. 
 
Table 1: Multiple regression on alignable differences (AD). 
Four I.V.s Stand. B  SE p-value 
GEFT scores  -.31 .01 .009 
Categ. sorted Time 2 +.06 .01 .608 
Stimulus Set  -.26 .04 .021 
Categ. variab. Time 2  -.18 .03 .156 
    Note: 11 participants’ data were removed here due to uncorrected vision. 
 
   Hypothesis 2: There was no cognitive style X stimulus set 
interaction, though a corrected confound and more equal 
numbers tested per condition may change this in the future.  
Hypothesis 3: An unequal variance independent t-test, 
t(55)=2.32, p=.024, showed that females (M=6.20,SD=2.3) 
sorted more categories at Time 1 than males (M=5.17, 
SD=1.61). However, for the Time 2 category sort, a 2-way 
ANOVA, F(5,81)=2.46, p=.04, showed a significant gender 
X stimulus set interaction, F(2,81)=4.88, p=.01.  Females 
(M=7.59,SD=.48) sorted more categories for “common” 
stimuli than males (M=5.20,SD=.78), but males (M=7.63, 
SD=.88) sorted more categories for “idiosyncratic” stimuli 
than females  (M=5.78,SD=.58). No gender differences in  
cognitive styles or sorted category size variability occurred. 
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Introduction
Recent research suggests that the disruptive effects of
interruptions arise from decay of the activation associated
with the primary goal while attending to the interrupting
task (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Monk, Boehm-Davis, &
Trafton, in press; Trafton et al., 2003). This disruption is
seen in the additional time required to resume a task after
it has been interrupted; that is, in the reaction time (RT)
from the onset of a display after an interruption until the
first keypress is made (this RT is called the resumption
lag ). The purpose of this study was to test this
interpretation by looking at the resumption costs
associated with very brief interruptions, where the model
predicts minimal goal decay.
Method
Twelve undergraduates from the George Mason
University psychology subject pool participated for
course credit. The experiment was a single factor within-
subjects design with three interruption lengths (1/4 s, 1 s,
and 5 s) and an uninterrupted condition. The dependent
measure was the post-interruption resumption lag, which
was the reaction time from the onset of the VCR display
(after an interruption) to the first click on a VCR button.
The primary task was to program a simulated VCR,
which consisted of four subtasks: entering the show’s
start-time, end-time, day of week, and channel number.
The screen was blank during the interruptions (there was
no task) and the participant was required to wait until the
VCR was displayed again before resuming the
programming task.  The target information was posted
next to the monitor on a 3x5-index card at all times.
The experimenter trained the participants through
demonstration and practice of uninterrupted and
interrupted trials. Each participant completed 20
experimental trials (five trials for each of four conditions).
For each interruption trial, participants began with the
VCR task and were interrupted every five seconds until
the VCR program entry was completed.
Results and Discussion
The time between keypresses (lag) was measured every
five seconds in the uninterrupted condition to provide a
baseline comparison for the resumption lags in the
interruption conditions. Figure 1 shows the mean resumption
lags and confirms a significant main effect of interruption
condition, F(3, 33) = 48.88, p < .001, MSE = 7,190. Paired
comparisons showed that the 5-second interruption condition
(M  = 1115 ms, SD = 129) took significantly longer than the
other three conditions, and the uninterrupted condition (M  =
706 ms, SD = 80) was significantly shorter than each of the
interrupted conditions. The resumption lags for the 1/4 s (M =
974 ms, SD = 79) and 1 s conditions (M = 974 ms, SD = 107)
were not reliably different.
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Figure 1. Mean resumption lags.
The difference between the interrupted and uninterrupted
conditions confirms the prediction from the goal-activation
model (Altmann & Trafton, 2002). Further, the presence of a
resumption cost for both the 1/4 s and 1 s interruption
conditions shows that goals decay quite rapidly. Even for the
briefest interruptions, there is a penalty to be paid when
resuming the primary task.
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     When solving a logic problem, do reasoners use a 
single processing step or do they use a series of steps? 
Further, are these steps derived from the same inferential 
mechanism or different inferential mechanisms? 
Traditional models of logical reasoning posit a single 
solution using one mechanism (e.g., rules, models). A 
modification of this model, the dual processing model, 
suggests that logical inferences are the result of a 
competition between two different mechanisms. Though 
there are two mechanisms, a single inferential step is 
executed based on a decision between two candidate 
solutions. A third possibility, the Logical Strategy Model 
(LSM), suggests that logical reasoning makes use of more 
than one inferential step making use of a variety of 
inferential mechanisms (i.e., strategies).  
     The LSM predicts that reasoners use strategies based 
on task demands such as believability. For example, given 
familiar content, a reasoner will likely use a knowledge-
based heuristic. Reasoners may use multiple strategies at 
different points within a single problem. For example, 
reasoners might (1) begin with one strategy and shift to 
another strategy or (2) begin using one strategy and revise 
their approach using the same strategy. In either case, 
reasoners would be using a dynamic process in which 
they may begin with a strategy and change their approach 
based on changing problem factors and goal states (see 
Epstien, 1994). To examine this, we performed a verbal 
protocol study of a series of logical syllogisms.  
 
Method 
 
Subjects. Five University students were recruited from 
Introductory Psychology courses.  
Materials. A series of 32 logical syllogisms were created 
varying the following dimensions: Abstract v. Concrete, 
Unfamiliar v. Familiar, Valid v Invalid X True v. False.  
Procedure. Subjects were asked to think-aloud as they 
solved 32 syllogisms. As a warm-up, subjects were given 
a series of multiplication and word scramble problems to 
practice the verbal protocol.  
Coding. Once completed, the session was transcribed. The 
resulting protocol was coded for strategy use. Strategy use 
was coded by matching elements of subject discourse to 
salient elements of proposed strategies. For example, a 
Token-Based strategy involves the creation (and search) 
of models derived from premises (e.g., Some X are Y, so 
some X are not Y). A Knowledge-Based strategy derives 
inferences from a match between problem elements and 
current knowledge (e.g., Its not true that some fish have 
legs so this is false). Finally, each problem was coded for 
cues indicating a change in current strategy (e.g., that 
cant be right). 
 
Results 
 
     All subjects used more than one strategy on a single 
problem, most (4/5) for each problem type. Subjects were 
most likely to use multiple strategies when validity and 
truth or falsity of the conclusion was in conflict (Valid & 
False, Invalid & True, see Table 1). In these cases, 
subjects were likely to re-examine their initial conclusion 
by using a new strategy than by using the same strategy in 
light of new information (i.e., a putative conclusion). 
Table 1 also reports whether the second strategy used was 
the same or a different than the initial strategy. The results 
indicate that reasoners commonly use multiple strategies 
in a single problem and that the type of strategies used 
can be predicted on the basis of task demands.  
 
Table 1- Strategy use by problem type 
 
Problem 
Type 
Mean Number 
of Strategies 
Most frequently 
used first strategy 
Used 
Same 
Used 
New 
A 1.4 Token-based 65% 35% 
C + U 1.4 Token-based 70% 30% 
C + F + 
V + T 
1.2 Knowledge-Based 65% 35% 
C + F + 
I + T 
1.9 Knowledge-Based 25% 75% 
C + F + 
V + F 
2.3 Knowledge-Based 40% 60% 
C + F + 
I + F 
1.4 Knowledge-Based 80% 20% 
 
References 
 
Epstein, S. L. (1994). For the Right Reasons: 
The FORR Architecture for Learning in a Skill Domain. 
Cognitive Science, 18 (3): 479-511. 
1607
The Effect of Spatial Ability on Learning from Text and Graphics 
 
Julie Bauer Morrison (morrison@bryant.edu) 
Department of Applied Psychology, Bryant College 
1150 Douglas Pike, Smithfield, RI 02917-1284 USA 
 
Introduction 
Previous research has shown that participants’ 
comprehension of spatial information described in text  
improves when either graphics or animation accompanies 
the text (Morrison & Tverksy, 2001). This relationship was 
found to be true in all cases for low spatial ability 
participants; however, it was only true under the most 
difficult conditions for high spatial ability participants. 
When given enough time to do so, high spatial participants 
were able to mentally imagine what was described in the 
text, and therefore did not need externally provided 
graphics. 
The high and low spatial ability distinctions described 
above were based on a median split of scores on the 
Vandenberg and Kuse (1978) Mental Rotation Test. The 
study was conducted with undergraduate students from 
Stanford University, raising concerns about the accuracy of 
the categorization and the generalizability of the results. The 
study presented here replicates the original with a more 
typical college population. 
The Learning Study 
Method 
Fifty-nine Bryant College undergraduates participated in the 
study. Although specific GPA data was not available for the 
participants, the average high-school GPA of an entering 
student is 2.95 at Bryant and 3.90 at Stanford 
(Undergraduate Guide, 2003). After completing a test of 
spatial ability, the Vandenberg and Kuse (1978) Mental 
Rotation Test, participants began the learning phase of the 
experiment. They read through a learning interface with 7 
novel rules four times, studying for as long as they wished. 
The interface included text, text plus static graphics, or text 
plus animated graphics. Following the learning phase of the 
experiment, participants completed three timed performance 
tests requiring applications of the rules. The scores on these 
tests have been combined into a composite Problem-Solving 
Score, which can range from 0-100. 
Results 
As with previous analyses, due to a lack of difference 
between the static and animated graphics conditions, these 
conditions were combined into a text plus graphics 
condition. The problem-solving data was analyzed with a 
one-way (text vs. text plus graphics) ANOVA with spatial 
ability as the covariate. Participants performed better in the 
graphics condition than in the text condition, F(1,56)=21.1, 
p<.01. High spatial ability participants performed better 
than their low spatial counterparts, F(1,56)=16.0, p<.01. 
Participants were separated into low and high spatial ability 
groups according to a median split of spatial ability scores. 
Figure 1 displays the Problem-Solving Score earned by the 
low and high spatial ability groups across the text and text 
plus graphics conditions. 
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Figure 1: The relationship between spatial ability and 
interface type for Bryant students.  
Discussion 
Participants with high spatial ability and those who studied 
static or animated graphics were better able to learn the 
spatial rules described in the interface. These results 
replicated the previous research, in part. In the Stanford 
version of this study, the low spatial text participants 
performed more poorly than the three other groups, which 
did not differ, showing that graphics have benefits, but only 
for low spatial participants (Morrison & Tversky, 2001). 
However, the pattern of data seen above is identical to the 
performance of Stanford participants when limited to 
studying the interface a single time and with  instructions to 
do so quickly. This suggests that when spatial ability 
decreases (MRT Score: Bryant M=7.53, SD=3.4; Stanford 
M=9.17, SD=4.2) and/or when the task becomes more 
difficult, the benefits of graphics become more pronounced. 
Although the participants in both studies were college 
students who may have higher aptitude than the general 
population, it is clear that there is a learning advantage when 
spatial material is presented with accompanying graphics.  
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Introduction
Due in part to theoretical advances in cognitive linguistics
(e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Núñez, 1999) and recent
studies in cognitive psychology (Boroditsky, 2000; Gentner,
2001), it has become well accepted that humans apply
spatial principles to their conception of time. Statements
such as, “Cogsci 2004 has arrived,” reflect a mental model
in which temporal abstractions are given meaning via spatial
metaphors. Examining these metaphors, Boroditsky (2000)
used spatial priming to influence subjects’ interpretation of
“forward” (as earlier or later) when disambiguating the
meaning of Move the meeting forward. She reported the
baseline interpretation of “forward” to be “about evenly
split” (p. 9) between earlier (45.7%) and later (54.3%) when
subjects received no priming.
As part of a larger research project, the present report
focuses on these baseline interpretations. In order to
standardize the responses and improve replicability, subjects
were shown a graphic display with no reference to objects
moving toward an observer, or an observer moving toward
objects—the two situations widely believed to exclusively
influence conceptual models when disambiguating the
meaning of “forward” (Gentner, 2001).
Methods
66 undergraduate students at the University of California,
San Diego participated in the study as part of their course
requirements. Subjects were shown a static display of five
stationary colored boxes. Two of the boxes contained balls;
the others were empty. During this presentation, subjects
were asked to respond to five questions, including: What is
the color of the box containing the black ball? and How
many boxes are in the display?
Immediately following these presentations, subjects were
instructed to turn to subsequent pages in their questionnaires
containing the following two target questions, the order of
which was balanced across subjects.
Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two
days.  On what day will the meeting now take place?
Tomorrow’s 12:00 (noon) meeting has been moved
forward two hours.  At what time will the meeting now take
place?
Results and Discussion
Subjects’ responses to the target question are shown in
Table 1. Chi-square analyses indicated that responses are
significantly different from those expected by chance when
the question on the scale of days is asked first (p < 0.005).
This is not the case when preceded by the question on the
scale of hours.
Table 1: Number of responses by order of target questions.
Day then Hour Hour then Day
Monday 8 17
Friday 24 16
10:00am 7 16
2:00pm 25 18
It is widely believed that time is construed specifically in
terms of observers and motion (Gentner, 2001). Our
methodology, which bore no explicit reference to such
concepts, elicited responses significantly different from
those expected by chance.  Furthermore, this difference is
sensitive to the time scale of the target question.  These
findings suggest that the specific spatial metaphors for time
are more complex than previously assumed.
The data in the upper left cells of Table 1, which are
analogous to Boroditsky’s (2000) baseline data, can hardly
be interpreted as “about evenly split.”  This suggests that
there may be many pragmatic constraints to be considered
and that there are more complex variations of conceptual
mappings from space to time.  Without making claims as to
exact baseline responses to ambiguous questions about time,
the present findings suggest a reconsideration of what is
necessary and sufficient to elicit priming effects in the
spatial construal of time.
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Introduction 
It has been reported that delta band waves were observed 
during sleep (Gevins & Cutillo, 1986; Melnechuk, 1988), 
during altered states of consciousness (Jovanov, 1997) and 
during hypnagogium  (Faber et al., 2003).  In this article, the 
delta band waves are shown in spectral power of EEG 
recordings during sensory stimulation of sound. Four 
patterns of spectral power are shown in stimuli of Song and 
Talk by female and male participants. 
While the participants were stimulated by sound, the EEG 
data were recorded into ESA-16 (Musha, 2000) from 10 
electrodes according to the international 10-20 system. We 
present the content and the strength of the delta (1/4 ~ 5 Hz), 
theta (5 ~ 8 Hz), alpha (8 ~ 13 Hz) and beta band (13 ~ 20 
Hz) waves from the spectral power of EEG recordings.  
Experiment 
Eight university students (4 females and 4 males) aged 
between 21 and 23 years participated to the experiment. The 
materials were song and talk.  
Song Boy Soprano: Green grasslands in England (60”), by 
Anthony Way. Rock: Why I’m me (60”), by RIZE. Cheer 
Song: Aida! Decide a goal! (60”). Chorus: Barbie Girl (60”), 
by AQUA. Hip Hop: Return of the Ripper (1’29”), by LL 
Cool J. 
Talk Man’s DJ: The voice of the man in the 40’s who talks 
slowly  and  softly  in  a  low   voice  can  be  heard   (60”). 
Woman’s DJ: The voice of the woman in the 20’s who talks 
clearly in a cheerful voice can be heard (24”).   Woman’s 
Voice: The voice of the woman in the 20’s who talks fast in 
a high-pitched voice can be heard (30”). Conversation: The 
voice of two native speaker men who talk fast in a low voice 
in English can be heard (60”). 
Results 
We obtained the following four patterns of spectral power.  
Pattern 1 (Song, female participants): The delta band waves 
of the content 21.0% with small strength were observed on 
the frontal region, the theta band waves of the content 
13.6% with rather large strength on the lateral and back 
regions, the alpha band waves of the content 57.6% with 
large strength on the frontal, lateral and back regions, and 
the beta band waves of the content 7.8% with small strength 
on the lateral and back regions.  
Pattern 2 (Song, male participants): The delta band waves 
of the content 44.6% with rather large strength were 
observed on the frontal region, the theta band waves of the 
content 3.3% with very small strength on the frontal region, 
the alpha band waves of the content 47.6% with large 
strength on the frontal, lateral and back regions, and the beta 
band waves of the content 4.5% with very small strength on 
the lateral and back regions. 
Pattern 3 (Talk, female participants): The delta band waves 
of the content 16.9% with very small strength were 
observed on the lateral and back regions, the theta band 
waves of the content 9.7% with small strength on the lateral 
and back regions, the alpha band waves of the content 
66.7% with large strength on the frontal, lateral and back 
regions, and the beta band waves of the content 6.7% with 
very small strength on the lateral and back regions. 
Pattern 4 (Talk, male participants): The delta band waves 
of the content 41.8% with small strength were observed on 
the frontal region, the theta band waves of the content 6.7% 
with very small strength on the frontal region, the alpha 
band waves of the content 37.5% with large strength on the 
lateral region and with small strength on the frontal and 
back regions, and the beta band waves of the content 14.0% 
with very small strength on the lateral and back regions. 
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Introduction 
Figurative comparisons consisting of two nouns (a target 
and a base) can be expressed in two grammatical forms, i.e., 
in simile form (X is like Y), or in metaphor form (X is Y).  
Recently, many studies have shown that there are 
substantial differences between metaphors and similes. In 
particular, much evidence has been found for people’s 
grammatical preference for figurative comparisons (e.g., 
Chiappe & Kennedy, 1999). Among hypotheses proposed 
for explaining this grammatical form preference in relation 
to figurative comparisons, we focused mainly on the career 
of metaphor hypothesis, proposed by Bowdle & Gentner 
(1999). The career of metaphor hypothesis suggests that the 
repeated use of a particular base term, as intending a certain 
metaphorical sense, will result in lexicalization of the 
metaphoric sense as a secondary meaning to that of the base 
term, and that this conventionalization process causes the 
metaphor form preference. In contrast, Chiappe & Kennedy 
(1999, 2001) have claimed that the metaphor form might be 
preferred when a comparison is highly apt, because the 
metaphor form implies that the target will inherit almost all 
the features of the base term. In other words, the metaphor 
form implies the category assertion.  
In this study, we conducted an experiment to test the 
career of metaphor hypothesis, based on Bowdle & 
Gentner’s (1999) “in vitro conventionalization”. In addition, 
we observed the interaction between the aptness of 
comparisons and the repeated presentation of the base terms. 
Method 
Design Aptness of comparisons (High/Moderate) X The 
number of repetition of base terms in the study phase (0 /5 
times). Both were within subject variables. 
Participants Thirty-six undergraduates participated in the 
experiment. All were native Japanese speakers. 
Materials and Procedures The experiment consisted of 
two phases; the study and the test phase.  
For the test phase, we prepared 16 comparisons as the test 
items in the test phase. Half of the test items were rated as 
highly apt, and the other half as moderately apt in a 
preliminary study (M=3.52 and 2.39 on a 5-point scale, 
respectively). We defined the aptness according to Chiappe & 
Kennedy (1999). For each comparison, two grammatical forms, 
a metaphor and a simile, were prepared.  
For the study phase, we prepared five target terms for 
each base of the comparison in the test phase. For example, 
for the test “An encyclopedia is (like) a goldmine”, the new 
target terms such as {library, book…} were selected. These 
terms were combined with the base (goldmine) and made up 
the comparison in simile form. Filler statements were 
prepared for both phases: 40 comparisons for the study phase, 
and two category-pairs (e.g., elephant-animal) and two 
literally-similar-pairs (e.g., lemon-orange) for the test phase. 
In the study phase, the participants were presented with the 
study items in random order and required to write down their 
interpretation of the comparison in a few words; they were 
also required to rate the comprehensibility on a 5-point scale. 
After a five-minute delay, they were asked to rate which 
grammatical form (metaphor or simile) was more natural or 
reasonable for each target – base pair, on a 7-point scale.  
Results and Discussion 
The mean grammatical preference rating for the 
comparisons in the test phase are shown in Table 1, 
transformed so that higher numbers indicate a preference for 
the metaphor form over the simile form. Table 1 shows that 
previous repetition of the base term increased the participants’ 
preference for the metaphor form. Moreover, a tendency 
emerged, in that the effect of the repetition differs by the 
aptness of the comparisons. A 2 X 2 repeated measures 
analysis of variance on the subject means showed that the 
main effect of repetition was significant (F(1,35)=11.52, 
p<.01). The interaction between repetition and aptness was 
marginally significant (F(1, 35)=3.03, p<.10).  
Table 1. Mean metaphor form preference ratings (and 
standard deviations) as a function of repetition 
Repetition in Study Phase Aptness of 
comparison None 5 times 
  High 3.13 ( .86) 3.77 (1.41) 
  Moderate 3.17 ( .82) 3.35 (1.03) 
In summary, these results support the career of metaphor 
hypothesis. Furthermore, they suggest that the aptness of a 
comparison promotes the conventionalization of the base 
term. The implication of this interaction is that the newly 
created metaphoric meaning is more likely to be lexicalized 
when it is highly apt, that is, when it has more metaphoric 
implications. 
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Temporal Dynamics of Categorization
Recent research in categorization has seen a growing
emphasis on the temporal dynamics of classification
responses (e.g., Lamberts, 1998, 2000; Nosofsky & Palmeri,
1997).  These dynamic models generally predict that the
degree of fit between an exemplar and the possible
categories to which it might belong is a gradually increasing
function over hundreds of milliseconds for the correct
category and a gradually decreasing function for the
incorrect category (or categories).
The development of experimental techniques that can
provide evidence for these simultaneously partially-active
category representations during the early moments of the
categorization process has faced some methodological
obstacles, such as imprecision in response deadlines, or
limited reaction-time ranges, extensive repetition of stimuli,
and potential strategies resulting from speeded classification
instructions.  The present work recorded eye movements as
a semi-continuous, real-time measure of partially activated
categories during a normal-speed categorization task (cf.
McMurray, Tanenhaus, Aslin, & Spivey, 2003).
Eye Movements During Categorization
Participants were presented with a pair of category bins and
given several toy animals sequentially. Eye movements
were recorded while they placed the toy animal in one or the
other category.  We were thus able to calculate an indirect
estimate of the moment-by-moment partial activation of the
categories being adjudicated among.  Figure 1 shows
example data (averaged over 17 subjects) for two of the
eight critical toy animals used in this experiment.
Figure 1: Proportion of time spent fixating two different
classification bins while categorizing a toy animal.
Localist Attractor Network Simulations
A simple version of the normalized recurrence competition
algorithm (Spivey & Tanenhaus, 1998) was constructed
with five feature banks (limb type, environment, blood
temperature, oxygen source, birth method) and four
taxonomic classes (mammal, reptile, bird, fish).  The
resulting activation curves over time approximated the eye
movement data (compare example items from Figures 1 and
2).  Thus, experimental data and network simulations
coincide with the general predictions of current temporally
dynamic models of categorization (Lamberts, 1998, 2000;
Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997).
Figure 2: Activation of taxonomic classes as normalized
recurrence settles into a stable state.
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Identifying useful questions (tests, experiments, or 
queries) is important for a host of situations, including 
scientific reasoning, word learning, and vision.  If a 
probabilistic belief model is used to describe an inquirers 
knowledge, then each questions usefulness may be 
calculated using an explicit sampling norm (utility).  
Prominent sampling norms in psychological literature 
include Bayesian diagnosticity and log diagnosticity (Good, 
1950), information gain (mutual information or Kullback-
Liebler distance: Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 1996), 
probability gain (minimal error: Baron, 1985), and impact 
(absolute difference: Klayman & Ha, 1987).  Strong claims 
about both the psychological reality and normative basis of 
particular norms have been made, in papers that calculate 
only a single sampling norm.  Yet a literature review 
produced no treatment of when the sampling norms disagree 
with each other, and whether there are theoretical or 
empirical reasons to prefer a particular norm. 
Skov & Sherman (1986) provided an early probabilistic 
study of information gathering.  Participants were told (for 
instance) that on the planet Vuma 50% of creatures are 
gloms and 50% are fizos; that 28% of gloms and 32% of 
fizos wear a hula hoop; and that 10% of gloms and 50% of 
fizos smoke maple leaves.  Given the goal of finding out 
whether a novel Vumian was a glom or fizo by asking either 
whether they wear a hula hoop or whether they smoke 
maple leaves, most participants asked about maple leaves.  
Skov & Sherman took this as evidence that people are 
sensitive to diagnosticity.  Unfortunately, this result does 
not show what sampling norm is closest to peoples 
intuitions, because diagnosticity, log diagnosticity, 
information gain, Kullback-Liebler distance, probability 
gain, and impact make the same prediction.  Other studies 
have also made claims about particular sampling norms 
psychological reality or normative preeminence, without 
considering other sampling norms. 
One frequent task in daily life is to visually ascertain a 
persons gender.  A simplified version of this task (which 
negates low-resolution information available from outside 
the center of gaze) is to learn a persons gender by viewing 
one feature at a time.  This task is formally equivalent to the 
Vuma task.  We collected statistics of the gender and 
features of interest of about 500 passerby, 51% of whom 
were male, in one natural environment (Table 1).  Goals 
were to determine (1) whether different sampling norms 
make contradictory claims about what features are most 
useful, and (2) what sampling norms would best serve in 
this task. 
Results showed that asking about hair length maximizes 
information gain, Kullback-Liebler distance, probability of 
correctly identifying the gender, and impact (absolute 
change in beliefs).  Skirt and beard, however, have infinite 
diagnosticity and log diagnosticity.  This is because in the 
rare event that a person is wearing a skirt or dress, or has a 
beard or other facial hair, their gender is known with 
certainty.  Using diagnosticity or log diagnosticity to select 
questions would be inefficient in this environment. 
Future work will examine what sampling norms 
predictions best match human questions, and whether 
human questions are sensitive to symmetries and other 
class-conditional feature dependencies of natural objects. 
 
Table 1: Features distribution and usefulness. 
 
Skirt/
dress 
Glasses 
(s=sun) 
Beard Earring Short 
hair 
n y n s y y  n y n y n 
% males 100 0 67 6 27 16 84 2 98 93 7 
females 98 2 83 3 14 0 100 47 53 7 93
diag. infinite 1.412 infinite 7.056 13.296 
log10 d. infinite 0.093 infinite 0.532  1.123 
info. 0.010 0.025 0.084 0.235  0.634 
prob. 0.010 0.065 0.062 0.220  0.420 
impact 0.010 0.080 0.080 0.225  0.430 
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The meta-cognitive experience of ease of processing, also
known as fluency, is a central element of our reasoning
repertoire and influences a wide array of judgments.
Fluency has been shown to have an effect on a wide array of
judgments such as intelligence (Oppenheimer, under
review), frequency (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973),
familiarity (Monin, 2003), risk for disease (Rothman &
Schwarz, 1998) and confidence (Norwick & Epley, 2002).
As the widespread impact of fluency becomes more
recognized, researchers have begun accumulating evidence
that fluency plays a part in classification.  For example
Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) have proposed a heuristic
model of categorization learning in which fluency plays a
central role.   In an elegant set of experiments, Whittlesea
and Leboe (2000) constructed a set of words that varied in
fluency and demonstrated that the fluency of an item had a
tremendous impact on categorization judgments.
One potential shortcoming of this set of studies is that
Whittlesea and Leboe (2002) restricted their stimuli to
artificial words.  While this was essential to ensure rigor and
avoid confounds, it leaves open the question of what would
happen if participants had access to more information than
fluency and perceptual similarity of features.  When people
reason about categories about which they already know a
great deal, will fluency still play a role, or is it only used in
novel situations when there are few other cues available?
This question is the impetus for the current study.
Method, Results, and Discussion
71 Stanford University undergraduates participated as part
of a course requirement.  Participants rated how good a
category member a given exemplar was on a nine-point
scale.  Four categories (bird, mammal, vehicle, and unusual
foods) with 15 exemplars each were used.  Exemplars were
selected so as to vary in both typicality and commonness.
A standard font manipulation was used to operationalize
fluency (Norwick & Epley, 2002).  A third of the
questionnaires were printed in standard 12 point, Times
New Roman font.  A reduced fluency condition was created
by printing a third of the questionnaires in 10 point, Mistral
font.  An example of the fonts can be seen in Figure 1.
Times New Roman Font
Mistral Font
Figure 1: Examples of the different fonts used.
Results are summarized in Figure 2.  For all categories,
participants in the fluent condition rated the exemplars as
better category members than participants in the nonfluent
conditions.  (t(14) = 4.7 to 1.5, p = .000 to .07).
These results suggest that even in a domain about which
individuals know a great deal and likely have pre-
experimental notions about what features are relevant to
category membership, fluency still plays a significant role.
0
2
4
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8
BIRD ANIMAL VEHICLE ODDFOOD
Normal Degraded
Figure 2: Results of Study 1.
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Introduction 
Our lab has been investigating data and models of spaced 
memory practice with the long-term goal of applying these 
models to optimizing the learning of material like 
vocabulary items. These continuous paired-associate 
experiments have utilized a recall-or-study trial procedure 
on both of 2 sessions. On first sessions (Session 1), items 
are randomized into conditions where they will receive a 
number practices at various spacing intervals. The memorial 
consequences of these conditions (distributed continuously 
across Session 1) are assessed during second sessions 
(Session 2) in which all of the items are retested several 
times to determine the effects of the practice by spacing 
conditions. 
The procedure in these experiments was to introduce each 
paired-associate with an initial 5-second study presentation 
of the cue-response pair. Subsequent trials were then 
presented as tests of this knowledge. Because we wanted 
each trial to count as a single practice in the model, we 
provided a restudy presentation only when participants 
responded incorrectly. If the response was correct, we 
assumed that the correct response constituted a practice of 
the item. We felt that this recall-or-study procedure resulted 
in roughly equal practice for each trial. 
However, a review of our work suggested that our 
assumption might not be so uncontroversial. Because of this 
we designed an experiment where we compared our 
procedure with a more typical test-and-study procedure 
where a study opportunity was always presented after a test. 
Experiment 
The basic procedures for the experiment are described 
above. The retention interval was 2 days. We looked at our 
results in terms of both session 1 and session 2 performance. 
On session 1, we compared recall performance for the two 
procedures for test trials 2 and 3 (where the effect should be 
strongest since it had not yet approached ceiling). The first 
test was excluded because the difference between conditions 
occurs depending on the success of this test. Means for test 
2 and 3 performance were .684 and .639 for the test-and-
study and recall-or-study procedures, respectively. This was 
significant t = 2.372, p < .05. However, a follow-up 
conditional analysis suggested that some portion of this 
effect was merely noise. 
Not surprisingly, very little of this benefit persisted into 
Session 2 in which performance averages were .9 and .883 
respectively, and the difference was not significant. 
Furthermore, session 2 first test results, which were farther 
from ceiling (Ms = .760 and .746 respectively for test-and-
study and recall-or-study conditions) also showed no 
significant difference. 
Discussion 
Subsequent to the experiment an ACT-R (Adaptive 
Character of Thought – Rational) (Anderson and Lebiere, 
1998) model was created using modifications designed to 
capture the spacing effect described in Pavlik and Anderson 
(2003). This model captures the small differences in 
performance by proposing that study trials immediately 
following successful recall have little effect on long-term 
memory because the effect of these studies decays more 
quickly.  
The data and model have implications for teaching 
material such as vocabulary items because they showed that 
in the typical paired-associate procedure the study trial after 
a correct recall is redundant and thus inefficient. Further, the 
data suggest that it is not crucial for models to consider the 
study after successful recall because its effect is so small. 
Finally, the model was shown to agree with arguments and 
data from Kimball and Metcalfe (2003) which proposed a 
theory of why delayed judgments of learning (JOLs) are 
more effective than immediate JOLs. The model agrees that 
this effect, which occurs only when there is no study after 
the JOL, is not due to enhanced metamemory. 
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Traditionally language models have been evalu-
ated by testing their ability to mark sentences as
grammatical or ungrammatical. But with the emer-
gence of probabilistic, connectionist models etc. on
the computational side and magnitude estimation
tests etc., on the linguistic side, it might make sense
to go all the way and evaluate the models graded
predictions.
We present a language acquisition algorithm that
can learn structural regularities from raw data with-
out any prior knowledge about the data. When
trained on corpora the extracted language structures
can be tested with new sentences to which a graded
score is assigned.
Three experiments were conducted. The al-
gorithm was trained on text from the English
CHILDES database [MacWhinney and Snow. 1985.
The child language exchange system] and then tested
on linguistic acceptability data collected by Keller
[Keller, Frank. 2000. Gradience in Grammar: Ex-
perimental and Computational Aspects of Degrees
of Grammaticality. PhD Thesis, University of Ed-
inburgh] and the algorithm was partially successful
on these.
A linguistic acceptability experiment was per-
formed on a large set of well controlled data from an
ESL multiple choice (English as Second Language)
test and a modest but highly significant correlation
with the algorithm score was found.
Finally a linguistic acceptability experiment was
performed on sentences generated randomly from a
small CFG. 25% of the sentences had 2 neighbor
words permuted and another 25% of them had 2
random words from anywhere in the sentence per-
muted. Both groups got, as expected, significantly
lower acceptability score but furthermore the latter
had a significantly lower score and a higher vari-
ance suggesting that global permutations are more
violating but also sometimes by chance get accept-
able. The algorithm gives a more clear cut division
of the permuted and non-permuted sentences (when
trained on similar sentences) but it remains to be
investigated whether it can distinguish the two dif-
ferent permutations.
These experiments show that our scoring func-
tion is still somewhat unstable and only performs
well when variations are small or the data is highly
structured as in the CFG experiment. But it also
shows that the algorithm is productive under even
slightly absurd circumstances like when we train it
on CHILDES and test it on the more complex sen-
tences from the ESL data. Furthermore, if we ad-
minister the ESL sentences as a multiple choice test
the algorithm performs as ”intermediate” according
to the norms for that test.
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Introduction
The Saussurean assumption that there is nothing inherent
in  the relation  between a  sound pattern  and  a  concept  is
taken for granted in most of cognitive science.  Though the
notion  that  sound-meaning  pairings  are arbitrary is  rarely
challenged,  there  is  some  evidence  indicating  that  this
conjecture  may  not  be  wholly  true.  Sapir  (1929)  first
suggested  that  cross-linguistically,  front  and  back  vowels
are  robustly  associated  with  specific  connotations:  front
vowels like [i] and [ı] are perceived as "smaller" than back
vowels  like  [u].   Other  researchers  have further  explored
this idea, documenting that the same association occurs in
many  languages  and  cultures  (e.g.  Ultan  1978; Jakobson
1937).   A  non-arbitrary  sound-meaning  relation  has  also
been  suggested  of  some  consonants:  for  instance,  Kelly,
Leben, and Cohen (2003) suggest that  obstruents like [g],
[b], and [k] are perceived to be 'hard' and masculine, while
sonorants like [l], [n], and [r] are 'soft' and feminine.  
Most of these findings, though intriguing, rely on asking
subjects  what  connotations  they  associate  with  certain
sounds. To date, there is little research that rigorously uses
implicit and unconscious measures to study whether sound
symbolism  is  a  psychologically  real  and  robust
phenomenon.  This work does so.
Method and Results
24  photos  of  men  and  women  paired  with  names  of
varying phonology and gender connotation  were rated for
attractiveness on a 10-point numerical scale on the website
hotornot.com.  Each photo consisted of a frontal shot taken
in a naturalistic background; names were saliently located
in the upper corner of each photograph.  Each photograph
was  posted  multiple  times  (though  never  simultaneously)
with  names  that  differed  systematically  in  gender
connotation, vowel type, and consonant type.  As a control,
each  name  was  ranked  on  a  7-point  Likert  scale  by  14
English-speaking subjects based on how much they "liked"
it, in general as well as when considered specifically for a
male or a female.
Results indicated that phonology played a significant role
in  perception  of  facial  attractiveness.  (see Figure  1).  For
men, pictures matched with names with front vowels were
consistently perceived as more attractive than pictures with
back vowels; for women the relation went in the opposite
direction  (p<0.01).  Consonants  played  a  smaller  but  still
significant role, but only for women (p=0.01).  
 
Figure 1: Effect of consonant / vowel type on attractiveness.
Interestingly,  names  with  back  vowels  were  liked  less
than names with front vowels, but only when the name was
considered a guy's name – when the exact same name was
considered  for  a  girl,  there  was  no  effect  of  vowel  type.
(Males:  'back'  mean  3.10,  'front'  mean  3.59,  F=6.52,
t=3.627, p<0.001;  Females: 'back' mean 2.86, 'front'  mean
2.93,  F=2.748,  t=-0.502,  p=0.604).   This  suggests  that
although some of the effect of sound symbolism on facial
attractiveness  may be  mediated  by  how much  a  name is
liked, it cannot be the full story.
Conclusion
This  research argues against  the  Saussurean notion  that
word-referent associations are completely arbitrary pairings.
It suggests that at least under some circumstances, there is a
systematic and significant  link between some sounds in  a
language and the semantic associations belonging to words
with those sounds.  
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Task Switching: Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 
The research on task switching has gained a lot of attention 
in cognitive psychology in the last decade. The phenomenon 
observed is the so-called switch cost, which is the decline in 
performance after a task switch, with the base-line 
performance being measured on task repetition trials. 
Generally speaking, the theoretical interpretations for 
switch costs can be divided in two groups: top-down and 
bottom-up interpretations. One of the most prominent top-
down interpretations is the reconfiguration theory proposed 
by Rogers and Monsell (1995), and one of the most recent 
bottom-up interpretations is the activation theory proposed 
by Altmann (2004). The reconfiguration approach assumes 
a functional switching process, with switch costs as an index 
of this process, while the activation approach assumes a 
more distributed, general activation of a task representation 
in memory, with switch cost as a side effect.  
The aim of this study was to test the validity of 
predictions the reconfiguration and the activation theory 
make about task switching. 
Methods and Results 
In 2 experiments, the preparation interval duration and the 
preparation interval type (self-paced vs. externally paced) 
were manipulated. These manipulations occurred within 
subjects in Experiment 1 (900 and 200 ms) and between 
subjects in Experiment 2 (self-paced, 900, 600, 300 and 200 
ms). Color and form matching tasks were presented 
repeatedly in switch and no-switch blocks of 8 trials each. A 
written cue specified the nature of the upcoming task. The 
cue appeared at the beginning of a task block and 
disappeared as soon as a preparation interval was over. No 
switching between the two tasks occurred within the blocks. 
The results showed switch costs, restart costs, and generic 
performance improvement for longer preparation intervals. 
A task-switch specific preparation effect (reduction of 
switch costs with longer preparation intervals) was only 
observed in Experiment 1.  
Conclusions 
The data of this study can just partially be explained by the 
two approaches. On the one hand, our results showed that 
task-switch specific preparation effect is design dependent. 
This contradicts the assumption of reconfiguration theory 
for this effect being robust. On the other hand, the self-
paced condition showed switch costs but no restart costs. 
This observation is at odds with the activation theory, which 
assumes that the basic processes involved in switch and 
repeat trials are qualitatively the same.  
Therefore, we propose an alternative model of task 
switching (see Figure 1). The model focuses on processes 
taking place around the preparation interval, which starts 
with a cue and lasts until the first imperative stimulus. 
Generic preparation is the main part of this model, which 
activates the system if no task switch is required and inhibits 
this generic activation if a task switch is required. The 
generic activation compensates for costs accompanied with 
rule reactivation if the preparation period is sufficiently 
long. The generic inhibition reduces the chance of making 
errors but cannot compensate for rule activation costs. 
Therefore, irrespective of the preparation interval duration, 
the costs of rule activation become apparent if a task 
switches.  
 
cue
encoding
time
rule
reactivation
rule
activation
goal
check
task continuation:
generic activation
task switch:
generic inhibition
cue stimulus  
 
Figure 1: An alternative model of task switching, with 
generic preparation (activation for task continuation or 
inhibition for task switch) as its main part. 
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Localization of cognitive processes to brain regions have 
mainly utilized the location of infarcted brain regions in 
stroke patients or fMRI in normal subjects.  The BOLD 
effect in fMRI studies may be difficult to interpret in stroke 
patients who have areas of hypoperfusion (with resultant 
reduction in hemodynamic response) due to arterial stenosis. 
This study was undertaken to examine the influence of 
hypoperfused regions, in addition to the area of infarct 
itself, on cognitive processes and fMRI in stroke patients.   
 
Methods 
 
Subjects with subcortical strokes in the left MCA or right-
MCA territories, along with normal controls, were imaged 
while performing a verbal fluency task. The experiments 
were performed on a 1.5 T whole-body scanner (Philips 
Medical System, Best, The Netherlands). The study 
population included six normal participants (3M, 3F, ages 
24-57) and six stroke patients (3M, 3F, ages 28-58) with 
MCA distribution subcortical infarcts.  Patients were given 
a verbal fluency task of 1 min. in duration, compared to rest 
of 30 secs, organized in an alternating block design, while 
being scanned with a whole brain fMRI/Stroke MRI-
Protocol that included perfusion weighted imaging (PWI) 
that reveals areas of hypoperfusion  as well as structural 
scans (FLAIR, DWI, T2 sequences) 
 
Results 
 
While normal subjects displayed a left-lateralized fronto-
temporal and bilateral cingulo-striatal-thalamic-cerebellar 
network, the activation pattern of stroke patients was 
determined both by the hypoperfused regions and/or 
infarcted areas of the brain.  Specifically, the left frontal-
temporal network showed diminution of activity in our left 
MCA patients that had cortical hypoperfusion in the 
corresponding regions, although their infarcted areas were 
subcortical.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The observation of a diminished BOLD signal in 
hypoperfused regions of cortex could either reflect reduced 
activation in these areas due to tissue dysfunction or reflect 
normal activation accompanied by increased oxygen 
extraction without a normal hemodynamic response.   The 
results raise the possibility that localization studies should 
take into account brain regions that are hypoperfused, as 
well as infarcted brain regions, in trying to map cognitive 
processes to brain regions. 
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Left Middle Cerebral Artery Stroke Right Middle Cerebral Artery 
Stroke 
Patient MS SB MZ HS TG JH 
Gender Male Female Female Female Male Male 
Age,Race 58, W 34,AA 50, W 52, W 50, AA 28,W 
Infarct  
 
Perfusion 
Defect 
Occurence  
FMRI test 
Minimal left 
posterior 
temporo-
parietal infarct 
Posterior 
temporo-
parietal  
hypoperfusion 
 04/18/02 
 11/07/02  
Minimal left 
frontal infarct 
 
Frontoparietal 
hypoperfusion 
 
02/99 
10/08/02 
Left caudate 
and 
Centrum 
semiovale 
Fronto-
temporo-
parietal   
 Hypoperfusion 
08/18/01 
12/12/03 
Left basal 
ganglia and 
Centrum 
semiovale 
Frontal 
 hypoperfusion   
07/00 
 01/07/03 
Right parietal 
watershed  
 
Fronto-
temporo-
parietal 
hypoperfusion 
1990  
02/05/04 
Right anterior 
temporal lobe 
and basal 
ganglia 
Parietal 
Hypoperfusion 
07/19/02 
09/30/02 
Signs and 
Symptoms 
  
  
Impaired word 
retrieval 
Impaired 
sentence 
comprehension 
Right upper 
extremity 
tingling 
Alexia, 
agraphia 
Minimal word 
retrieval 
difficulty 
Right-sided 
weakness 
Impaired word 
retrieval 
Right upper 
extremity 
weakness 
Impaired word 
retrieval 
Right upper 
extremity 
numbness 
Slurring of 
speech 
Impaired 
word retrieval 
Right arm 
numbness 
Slurring of 
speech 
Left-sided 
facial droop 
Slurring of 
speech 
Right temporal 
headache 
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Many models of problem solving include intuitive
knowledge components such as principles. Principles are
general rules that capture regularities within a domain.
Principles reflect conceptual understanding of the
underlying structure of a problem domain. For example, in
arithmetic, when adding two positive numbers (A + B = X)
the answer (X) will always be greater than both operands (A
and B) (Dixon, Deets & Bangert, 2001). Problem solvers
have been shown to use principles in a variety of problem
domains, including counting and arithmetic.
Dixon et al. (2001) investigated participants’
understanding of principles that apply to arithmetic
operations involving positive numbers. In their study,
participants viewed sets of sample problems that had been
solved by hypothetical students, and rated the level of
understanding that each hypothetical student appeared to
have. The analysis compared participants’ ratings of
problem sets that violated principles and sets that did not
violate principles.
The present study built on Dixon et al.’s prior work to
investigate participants’ understanding of arithmetic
operations involving negative numbers. Problem sets were
created to test participants’ understanding of principles that
apply to addition and subtraction with a positive and a
negative number, as well as addition and subtraction with
positive numbers. The specific principles tested were: (1)
Relationship to Operands, which specifies the magnitude of
the sum or difference relative to the operands, (2) Direction
of Effect, which specifies how the magnitude of the sum or
difference changes as the magnitude of one of the operands
is changed, and (3) Sign, which specifies the sign of the sum
or difference as a function of the relationship between the
magnitudes of the operands. As in Dixon et al.’s study,
participants rated problem sets that violated principles and
sets that did not violate principles. Participants used a scale
ranging from 1 (very bad) to 7 (pretty good) to rate the sets.
In each case, the relevant analysis compares participants’
ratings of violation and nonviolation sets.
As seen in Table 1, participants represented the Direction
of Effect principle for operations involving positive
numbers and for operations involving negative numbers.
Participants represented the Relationship to Operands
principle only for addition with positive numbers.
Table 1:
Mean Ratings Provided for Problem Sets
with and without Principle Violations
for Each Principle, Operation, and Number Type
Principle Operation No.
Type
M
Non
M
Vio
T
RO Addition Positive 3.56 2.89 3.50**
RO Addition Negative 3.31 3.15 0.72
RO Subtraction Positive 3.11 2.92 0.82
RO Subtraction Negative 3.60 3.58 0.10
DE Addition Positive 3.89 2.34 6.26**
DE Addition Negative 3.06 2.63 2.46*
DE Subtraction Positive 3.69 2.53 4.66**
DE Subtraction Negative 3.68 2.79 4.75**
Sign Addition Negative 2.79 2.81 0.07
Sign Subtraction Positive 2.79 2.56 1.17
RO = Relationship to Operands, DE = Direction of Effect,
Vio = Violation, Non = Non-violation
* p < .05, ** p < .01.
The work of Dixon et al (2001) laid a solid foundation for
investigating the principles governing arithmetic operations.
Our findings replicate some of Dixon et al.’s results, and
expand this line of inquiry to negative numbers. Our
findings suggest that adults’ representations of operations
with negative numbers are not as well-established as their
representations of operations with positive numbers.
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Part-Whole Presentations and Cognitive Load 
The acquisition of a problem solving procedure is a 
challenging task often made more difficult by examples or 
presentation methods that heavily tax working memory and 
result in the learner being unable to identify and learn the 
key elements of the example.  In general, cognitive load 
refers to the amount of mental effort required to complete a 
task within a given time frame (Xie & Salvendy, 2000).  
Cognitive load theory is based on the observation that 
working memory capacity is limited.  Because of these 
limitations, cognitive load theory suggests that the methods 
used to present information should be designed to reduce the 
demands on working memory (Tindall-Ford, Chandler, & 
Sweller, 1997) to allow for better processing of examples 
and ultimately more learning.   One technique shown to 
reduce cognitive load and improve learning is a part-whole 
(PW) presentation method (Mayer and Chandler, 2001). 
Mayer and Chandler suggest that initially studying a part 
(piece by piece) rather than a whole presentation allows the 
learner to progressively build a coherent mental model of 
the material without experiencing cognitive overload.   
Overview of Experiment 
To directly test how a PW presentation would affect 
cognitive load ratings and skill acquisition in the statistics 
domain (learning to calculate t-tests and ANOVAs) 84 
undergraduate students at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology studied and completed statistical calculation 
training and testing materials.  The training materials were 
paper based and consisted of 7 different portions, which 
contained a brief introduction to statistical calculations and 
worked examples of how to calculate a t-test and a 2-group 
ANOVA. Those in the PW condition initially received each 
of the 7 portions of the training materials one at a time (part) 
and then were given all 7 portions at the same time (whole).  
This order was reversed for those in the WP condition.   
   The test booklet contained three test problems: 2 near 
transfer problems that were isomorphs to those studied 
during training and a third far transfer problem that required 
participants to conduct an ANOVA with three groups. 
   Participants were asked to rate their cognitive load using 
the NASA-TLX (NASA Human Performance Research 
Group, 1987) three times: at the conclusion of the first 
presentation method (either P or W), at the end of the 
second presentation method but before testing began, and 
after they completed the test problems.   
Results and Discussion 
Contrary to expectations, those who studied the training 
materials in a PW order performed significantly worse on 
the test than those who received a WP presentation order, F 
(1, 83) = 1.21, p = .07; 4.34, p < .05; 4.12, p < .05, for the t-
test, 2- and 3-group ANOVA problems,  respectively.  The 
mean NASA-TLX cognitive load ratings were also found to 
vary as a function of presentation order with participants in 
the PW condition rating the part as more difficult than the 
whole and those in the WP condition reporting the whole 
more difficult than the part. This yielded a significant main 
effect of ratings and a significant interaction between ratings 
and presentation order, p < .01 for both. Together these data 
suggest the PW benefit was not obtained in this experiment 
but it remains unclear whether this was due to the domain or 
our implementation of the PW method.  Perhaps a paper-
based implementation in the domain of statistics is too 
different from Mayer and Chandler’s (2001) multimedia 
science lesson to obtain the PW benefit.  Further research is 
necessary to tease apart these issues. 
 
Table 1: Variables as a Function of Presentation Order 
________________________________________________ 
   Presentation Order      Part First                 Whole First  
                                    M       SD       N          M       SD       N 
Test Performance (out of 6 possible) 
- T-test                       5.38     1.21     41      5.65    1.02     43   
- 2-group ANOVA    4.34     1.50     41      4.92      .99     43 
- 3-group ANOVA    2.94     1.94     41      3.75    1.74     43 
NASA-TLX Cognitive Load Ratings (100=greater load) 
- Part Portion            71.68  11.05    40    64.51   15.35     43 
- Whole Portion        63.15  15.09    40    72.20   13.27     43   
- Test                        62.27  10.65    40    58.84   15.23     43 
References 
Mayer, R. E. & Chandler, P. (2001).  When learning is just a  
   click away: Does simple user interaction foster deeper  
   understanding of multimedia messages?  Journal of  
   EducationalPsychology, 93 (2), 390-397. 
NASA Human Performance Research Group (1987).  Task 
Load Index (NASA-TLX) v1.0 computerized version. 
NASA Ames Research Centre. 
Tindall-Ford, S., Chandler, P. & Sweller, J. (1997).  When  
   two sensory modes are better than one.  Journal of  
   Experimental Psychology: Applied, 3 (4), 257-287. 
Xie, B. & Salvendy, G. (2000).  Review and reappraisal of  
   modeling and predicting mental workload in single- and   
   multi-task environments.  Work and Stress, 14 (1), 74-99. 
1621
Sian Proctor 
Patrick Bartshe 
 
Topographic Map Learning Strategies 
 An important skill of geology is being able to visualize the landscape 
using contoured topographic maps.  This study investigates how students 
develop topographic map learning strategies, and apply these strategies toward 
three-dimensional maps.  Participants were geology students from an urban 
university in the Southwest.  A topographic map memory test was developed by 
the authors using Authorware 6.5.  One component of the test required 
participants to study a two-dimensional map, and then select the corresponding 
three-dimensional map representation from four possible choices.  Another 
component of the test asked participants to describe their strategy for learning 
the two-dimensional map. 
 The results indicate differences between participant topographic map 
learning strategies.  For example, participants who used directional terms (for 
example, North, South, or center) to describe their map learning strategy were 
more successful in selecting the corresponding three-dimensional map 
representation then participants who used geological terms (river, mesa, or hill).  
Gender differences of map learning strategy were also suggested.  In conclusion, 
a better understanding of how students approach the learning of a topographic 
map is gained, and implications for further research are defined. 
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Current models of analogy comprehension use hand - coded 
representations. As Hummel and Holyoak (2003) put it, “the 
problem pf hand-coded representations is among the most 
serious problems facing computational modeling as a 
scientific enterprise: All models are sensitive to their 
representations, so the choice of representation is among the 
most powerful wild cards at the modeler’s disposal” (p. 
247). French (2002) reviews different computational models 
of analogy-making, and points out one of the most 
fundamental problems of the field: case representations are 
authored (hand-coded) to make the model work. Between 
the challenges and future directions he presents “the 
systematic exploration of experimenter-independent 
representation-building and learning mechanisms” (p. 204).   
 
In this poster, we propose LSA as a method to generate the 
much-wanted non-hand-coded representations. However, 
LSA has severe limitations to represent structure. Turney 
and Littman (2003) pointed out that the similarity of 
semantic relations between words is not directly reducible 
to the semantic similarity of individual words. This is also 
the leitmotiv of some analogy models like Gentner’s (1983; 
1989).Thus, LSA alone would fail to explain analogy, where 
relations (structure) between words are fundamental. We 
use a predication (Kintsch, 2001) to represent structure 
comparisons in the LSA semantic space. Predication is able 
to select the features (neighbors) of one component of the 
analogy (the source) that are relevant to the other (the 
target).  
 
Table 1(a):  a sample 
SAT question.  
Table 1(b): predication using
analogy domains 
 Ostrich : bird Number Percent T&L (2003)
(a) Lion : Cat Correct 15741.20% 47.10%
(b) Goose : Flock Incorrect 15040.10% 51.60%
(c) Ewe : Sheep Skipped 6717.20% 1.30%
(d) Cub : Bear Total 374 100% 100.00%
(e) Primate: Monkey Precision 157/307 0.51% 47.70%
Recall 157/374 0.42% 47.10%
F 0.46% 47.10%
We calculated the predication vectors for all the targets and 
alternatives of 374 items from the Scholastic aptitude test 
(SAT). This dataset of analogies was collected by Turney 
and Littman (2003). An example of a SAT item can be seen 
in Table 1(a). To calculate the correct alternative, we 
computed the cosine between the target vector and each 
alternative, and selected the alternative with the highest 
cosine. However, this method had poor results: using LSA 
this way leaves out most of the relational information. For 
example, relations such as is-a, part-of, causal-agent-of, etc. 
are all substituted by a very basic semantic distance measure 
when we compute the cosine between the target and the 
alternatives. To include this relational information in the 
comparison, we constructed a set of ten possible relations 
between the components in the 374 SAT analogies (table 2). 
Then we computed the cosine between the list of words that 
define the analogy domain and each analogy predication 
vector in the dataset. That is, for each analogy we created a 
vector of ten features, where each feature indicates how 
similar the analogy is to each of the analogy domains. For 
example, Ostrich::bird would load primarily in the taxonomy 
and Hyponymy domain components, but also in endonymy, 
synonymy, and degree. Then, we correlated these loading 
vectors for the target and each alternative, and selected the 
alternative that best correlated with the target to solve the 
SAT question.  
 
Table 2: Ten analogy domains and their characteristic words 
 Hyponymy X is a type of Y  (for example - Maple:Tree) 
[Subordinate of, superordinate to, rank, class, category, family, 
genus, variety, type of, kind of, hyponym] 
Degree  X means Y at a certain degree (Pour:Drip) 
[level, stage, point, magnitude, extent, greater, lesser, intensity, 
severity, extreme, degree] 
Meronymy  The parts of X include the Ys  (Body:Arm) 
[part, whole, component, made up of, portion, contains, 
constituent, segment, piece of, composite, meronym] 
Taxonomy X is an item in the category Y 
(Milk:Beverage)[classification, containing, structure, relationship, 
hierarchy, system, framework, taxonym] 
Synonymy is the same as Y (Work:Labor) 
[equivalent, equal, likeness, match, interchangeable, alike, same as,  
similar, close to, like, synonym] 
Antonymy is the opposite of Y (Find:Hide) 
[opposite, unlike, different, antithesis, opposed, contradiction, 
contrast, reverse, anti, not the same as, antonym]
Characteristic X is a characteristic of Y (Dishonesty:Liar) 
[indicative, representative of, typical of, feature, attribute, trait, 
property, mannerism, facet, quality, characteristic]
Plurality  X is many Ys (Throng:People) 
[mass, bulk, several, many, lots of, numerous, crowd, group, more, 
number, plural]
Endonymy  X entails Y (Coop:Poultry) 
[entails, require, evoke, involve, suggest, imply, presuppose, mean]
Use  X is used to Y (Scissors:Cut) 
[do with, manipulate, operate, function, purpose, role, action, 
utilize, employ, use]
The results are displayed in Table 1(b). The performance of 
our model is very close to the state of the art in automatic 
analogy making when considering correct answers (42% vs. 
47%, Turney & Littman, 2003), and precision, recall and F 
measures. Furthermore, our model is psychologically 
plausible.  
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Interleaving, as opposed to blocking presentations of
stimuli sets, can impair learning during training yet
enhance retention after a delay or on transfer tasks
(Battig, 1972; Shea & Morgan, 1979). Since the initial
studies, these effects have been shown in diverse
cognitive and motor tasks. These studies have in common
that two or three stimuli sets were developed such that
materials within each set were distinct yet shared features
with the other set(s) (e.g. two ball toss patterns).  The
similarity was designed to create competition for the
learner, such that the learner had to both learn the
sequences and distinguish them. Battig (1972) described
this competition as the contextual interference effect (CI).
While the CI effect has been widely documented, a
natural confound has been integral to the studies.
Interleaving materials also introduces spacing between the
presentations of each set of learning materials.
The current experiment addresses the relationship
between the CI effect and the spacing effect. The spacing
effect is one of the most robust cognitive scientific
findings (see Dempster, 1990); however, its relationship
to contextual interference is less well understood. In this
study, foreign language vocabulary words were used to
test the prediction that CI is distinct from spacing, and
that the CI and spacing effects are additive.
Eighty undergraduates were taught translations of eight
English words into both Swahili and Estonian, in a task
designed to maximize CI (materials from Pashler,
UCSD). Subjects completed six anticipation trials,
(prompted generation with feedback) and after a brief
delay completed a transfer test. The test required subjects
to discriminate between the two languages and present
both translations for an English word. During training, the
languages were either interleaved (I) or blocked (B)
between subjects. The spacing between repetitions of a
word was kept constant (CS) across the blocked and half
of the interleaved stimuli (7-10 items between repetitions)
to isolate the effect of interleaving.  Spacing was doubled
for the other half of words in the interleaving condition
(DS) (15-18 intervening items).
Learning curves and final test accuracies are shown in
Figure 1. An interaction between performance at trial six
and performance on the transfer test revealed that while
accuracy during training was highest for B-CS items and
lowest for I-DS items, the opposite was true on the test.
Test performance was highest for I-DS items and lowest
for B-CS items.
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Figure 1. Interleaving and spacing effects during training
and on a transfer test.
The data support the prediction that interleaving and
spacing are distinct phenomena, and both impair
performance during learning yet enhance retention and
transfer.  Further, the data suggest the effects are additive.
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Abstract 
A focus being defined as the part in a sentence where new 
information is given, it is assumed that foci in verbal 
communications show distinctive prosodic features as well 
as semantic ones. Sentences were given in pairs and each 
pair contained a question inducing a certain focus and an 
answer to it. Suprasegmental features were investigated in 
priority to detailed physical features of separate sounds.  
     Generally, a narrow focus didn’t show any special 
correlation with stress. An accentual phrase before a focus 
showed 1onger duration in the ratio of 1:1.5, and 75% of 
accentual phrases were actualized as intonational ones. It is 
suggested that a focus in Korean sentences becomes distinct 
not by being embodied with stress, but by remarking an 
accentual phrase before it as pause in an intonational phrase, 
which is quite different from the cases in Indo-European 
language. 
Methods and Analysis 
Materials 
1. ‘What’s up?’ 
2. ‘Who give the TV to her mother?’ 
3. ‘What is given by Sumi to her mother?’ 
4. ‘To Whom Sumi give the TV?’ 
 ‘Sumi give the TV to her mother.’ (in Korean) 
Participants 
20 persons, male and female university students who were 
born in and grew up at Seoul, Korea. 
Analysis 
- Pitch tracks were made with the Praat program. 
- A K-ToBI transcription was made by the author of the 
redorded sentences. Analyses of break indices were 
confirmed by other listeners. 
 
Results 
In this paper, there is no correlation between focus and 
accent.  If an AP become focus, the AP and a AP in front of 
the AP is extended. And, in length, a length of the last 
syllable in the AP is very extended than a total length of the 
AP.  Especially, at the front of focus, it is revealed IP(ex. 
complex tone etc.) 
Therefore, it could be assumed that in stead of accent, focus 
appeared through breaking speech in Korean. 
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Items that violate a salient category regularity are
remembered better than items that follow the reg-
ularity (Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995). A memory
advantage for violating items is also found in the
schema research (e.g., Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992).
Furthermore, work in the schema and category
learning research suggests that the memory for in-
consistent items is stronger when the violated reg-
ularity is more salient (e.g., Rojahn & Pettigrew,
1992; Sakamoto & Love, in press).
In Sakamoto and Love (in press), the salience of
a regularity was manipulated by varying the num-
ber of items that conformed to it. Category A
contained eight items that followed the regularity,
whereas category B contained only four. The clas-
sification learning procedure encouraged subjects to
entertain the rules “If value 1 on the first dimen-
sion, then category A” and “If value 2 on the first
dimension, then category B.” Each category con-
tained an exception item that violated the rule (i.e.,
the regularity). The category B exception violated
the category A rule, whereas the category A excep-
tion violated the category B rule. After learning,
these exceptions were remembered better than the
rule-following items, replicating Palmeri and Nosof-
sky (1995). Furthermore, following findings from the
schema research, memory for the category B excep-
tion, which violated the more frequent category A
rule, was enhanced (cf., Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992).
While SUSTAIN (Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004),
a clustering model, correctly predicted these find-
ings, current exemplar and hypothesis-testing mod-
els could not.
Type vs. Token
The category A rule-following items were more nu-
merous in two ways. There were not only more
rule-following tokens (i.e., instances of the rule) but
also more rule-following types (i.e., distinct stimuli)
in category A (cf., Barsalou, Huttenlocher, & Lam-
berts, 1998). Thus, the strength of the category A’s
regularity was attributable to both more tokens and
more types. These two notions of “more” have per-
fectly co-occurred in the schema literature. The goal
of the current research is to test the contributions of
types and tokens independently of each other.
When repeating rule-following items from the cat-
egory containing fewer types equated tokens, the
exception that violated a regularity consisting of
more rule-following types was remembered better
(.86 vs. .65) than the exception that violated a
regularity consisting of fewer rule-following types,
t(51) = 3.27, p < .01. Preliminary results from
experiments examining the effect of tokens indepen-
dently of types are mixed across manipulations.
Discussion
The current results demonstrate that when tokens
are held constant, items that violate a regularity
consisting of many item types are remembered bet-
ter than items that violate a regularity consisting
of only a few item types. Future research will re-
solve the effect of tokens on recognition of violating
items when types are equated. Stronger manipula-
tions are currently being examined that avoid con-
trastive categories often used in category learning
research. Work along these lines will illuminate fu-
ture schema and category learning research and will
advance our understanding of how humans represent
rules, exceptions, and type/token information.
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Introduction 
This work is an attempt to bring together three topics that 
belong to three different levels of science: (1) symbolic 
unsupervised learning, (2) the self of a cognitive system, 
and (3) a universal criterion for conscious experience. We 
study cases when a cognitive system develops new abilities 
by reinterpreting its own episodic memories, using the self-
concept and the schema of a motivated voluntary action. 
Within our framework (Samsonovich & DeJong, 2003), the 
subject-self per se is not represented as a virtual entity in the 
cognitive system. Instead, the set of axioms that constitute a 
self-concept (Aleksander & Dunmall, 2003; Samsonovich & 
Nadel, in press) are implemented via dynamical rules and 
constraints. These principles are demonstrated in a model 
paradigm and have implications for the philosophy of mind. 
Approach 
The proposed approach is based on the general framework 
of schemas, charts and mental states described previously 
(Samsonovich & DeJong, 2003). The term "schema" was 
introduced by Kant (1781/1929). Here schemas are units of 
semantic knowledge, primitives of action, reasoning, 
sensation, etc. A schema has a header (specifying rules and 
conditions of binding and expected effects of execution) and 
a body (specifying how, if at all, the schema is executed). 
Paradigm: Leveraging Self-Learning with the Self  
In this paradigm, a set of specially designed virtual worlds 
is used as a “training facility” to help the virtual robot to 
develop useful and powerful schemas. Innate schemas may 
include elementary moves and senses, as well as relevant 
reasoning primitives. The robot “wakes up” in a first-level 
world and starts by repeating the following procedure: 
1. Select an action schema and mutate its header to 
produce an idea of an action that is not straightforward.  
2. Take the new header as a challenge and solve it in each 
of several encountered situations (execute the solutions). 
3. Reinterpret own behavior: find an apparent common 
motivation in the performed intermediate steps in all cases.  
4. Based on the above, write the body of the new schema 
and add the schema to semantic memory. 
As the robot learns essentials at the first level, it is taken 
to the next level, and so on. At each new stage, previously 
developed schemas are used for solving new challenges.  
 
Demonstration by Example 
The scheme outlined above will be demonstrated in the 
poster by computer simulations based on a push-push puzzle 
setup. A minimal set of innate schemas includes a one-step 
move and some useful cognitive primitives, e.g., the notion 
of Euclidean distance. At the first stage the robot learns to 
move in an open space. Then it learns to navigate a maze, to 
push blocks, to avoid irreversible moves, etc. After that, 
when given a goal, it is capable of solving simple puzzle 
configurations and learns to deal with more complex ones. 
Philosophical Implications 
The above analysis has interesting implications for the 
philosophy of mind. Some philosophers believe that the 
phenomenon of conscious experience will always remain a 
mystery, while others maintain that this mystery is illusory. 
How can one decide, when and whether this phenomenon 
should occur? Chalmers (1994) answers with the Principle 
of Organizational Invariance. His answer sounds like this: 
there is an abstract mathematical model M of a functional 
organization of a cognitive system, such that, whenever M 
can be mapped onto a given physical object, that object is 
conscious. Therefore, a criterion for consciousness can be 
given in terms of M. We define it as follows: M must 
instantiate the self as a noumenon (a notion introduced by 
Kant, 1781/1929), which we understand as an imaginary 
thing that seems to determine system’s dynamics, and yet it 
cannot be explicitly represented in the system due to  its 
fundamental properties. The proposed framework in which 
the self is implemented via a set of self-axioms (constraints) 
about system’s own dynamics conforms to this concept. 
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Several previous works from Bassok and colleagues (e.g.
Bassok, Wu & Olseth, 1995) put in evidence that, when
solving a mathematical word problem, content is used to
interpret structure: surface features are used as semantic
cues in order to induce an interpretative structure that the
participant will rely on in order to solve the problem. For
instance, a problem involving doctors choosing other
doctors is likely to provoke the inducement of a symetrical
structure wereas a problem involving secretaries choosing
computers is likely to provoke the inducement of an
asymetrical structure (Bassok, Wu & Olseth, 1995). These
structures interfere with the mathematical ones and
influence problem difficulty, solving procedures and
analogical transfer. Bassok (2001) considered this
phenomenon as a special case of the cognitive mechanism
of structural alignment (Markman & Gentner, 1993) and
refered to it as semantic alignment. Two dimensions,
namely symmetry-asymmetry and continuity-discreteness,
were identified by Bassok and colleagues as influencing
semantic alignment for a large range of problems and
identification of other dimensions is important for a better
understanding of the phenomenon and it’s range of
application. We conducted 2 experiments in order to show
that Individualization (I)-Non Individualization (NI) is also
a relevant dimension.
In the first experiment, 80 undergraduate students were
equally split among I and NI conditions and solved
combinatorial problems in two contexts. For instance, one
NI version involved four children choosing one after the
other one strawberry among twelve strawberries wheras the
I version was identical except that strawberries were
replaced by explicitly individualized cakes (a cheese cake,
an apple pie, a chocolate cake…). We found significant
effect of the condition (Table 1). In the NI condition,
students proposed significantly more partitive solutions (e.g.
12/4) which did not require individualizing objects such as
sharing 12 objects among 4 people, than in the I condition.
The reverse was true for the multiplicative solutions (e.g.
12x4) which required individualization, such as each child
having 12 choices. With the same experimental design, we
conducted a second experiment including two problems, the
‘car problem’ and the ‘grocery problem’ in which, contrary
to combinatorial problems, individualization was not a
relevant dimension in the mathematical structure.
Table 1:  Rates of  procedures used by participants (exp. 1)
Procedure Indiv Non Indiv
Correct 8% 10%
Partitive
Multiplicative
25%
28%
51%  *
4%    *
Other 39% 35%
We found again significant effects: Table 2 sums up the
results of the ‘car problem’: John buys a car 10,000 Euros
and sells it 12,000 Euros. He buys it back 14,000 Euros and
sells it again 16,000 Euros (NI) and John buys a red car
10,000 Euros and sells it 12,000 Euros. He buys a black car
14,000 Euros and sells it again 16,000 Euros (I). We found
also significant effect of individualization for the second
problem (NI condition involved two kinds of figs wheras I
condition involved figs and dates).
Individual protocol analyses confirmed that participants
induced different structures depending on the condition. For
instance, most of the participants who found 2000 in the ‘car
problem’ considered that there was a loss of 2000 due to the
buying of the same object sold for 2000 less. Those results
encourage to carry out more extensive studies concerning
the influence of individualization in problem solving.
Table 2:  Rates of results obtained by participants (exp. 2)
Results Indiv Non Indiv
4000 53% 34%  *
0
2000
29%
12%
12%  *
46%  *
Other 6% 8%
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Abstract
In an event-related fMRI-experiment reading during a
supposed inference generation period was compared to
explicit reading. In a subsequent verification task, the
verification of inference and explicit statements were
compared. The results show systematic but minimal inference
processing during encoding (BA 9) and supplementary
activities of text related processes, additional inferencing, and
situational elaborations when verifying inference as compared
to explicit statements.
Introduction
Which brain areas are involved in predictions during
reading and which areas in the subsequent utilization of
predictive inferences in a verification task? While predictive
inferences are supposedly only represented as part of the
situation model, the sentences of a text are additionally
encoded as text information (Schmalhofer et al., 2002).
Previous fMRI experiments have shown involvement of the
prefrontal cortex in establishing text coherence (Ferstl &
von Cramon, 2001) and in generating inferential bridges
(Mason & Just, 2004).
Experiment
In an event-related fMRI-experiment we investigated
1) the reading during a supposed inference generation
period (see Table 1, words 13-18) in comparison to explicit
reading and 2) the subsequent verification of the respective
statement. (e.g. “wine spilled”). Four versions of texts were
constructed so that the same statement constituted an
explicit, a paraphrase, an inference or an incorrect
statement. The collected data were analyzed by SPM2.
Table 1: Sample text material and test statement
Title: Air Travel
Words 1-12 (all conditions): While the flight attendant served the
passenger a full glass of wine
Words 13-18 (explicit): turbulence caused the wine to spill.
Words 13-18 (paraphrase): turbulence caused the wine to splash.
Words 13-18 (inference): turbulence occurred which was very
severe.
Words 13-18 (control) : the plane was at cruising altitude.
Test statement: wine spilled
13 students from the University of Osnabrueck participated.
108 reading passages and subsequent tasks were presented:
The 4 experimental conditions with 18 trials each as well as
18 filler and 18 non-word trials. A trial lasted 27 seconds.
Data were collected by a 1.5 Tesla Siemens Sonata scanner.
Results and Discussion
During reading of words 13-18, the comparison between the
inference versus the explicit condition showed the medial
frontal gyrus (L + R BA 9, 63 Voxels) to be active. For the
statement verification, the contrast between the inference
and explicit conditions showed three clusters predominantly
in the left prefrontal cortex to be differentially active, as can
be seen from Figure 1. For more details see Table 2.
Figure 1: Statement Verification: Inference versus explicit
This experiment confirms previous behavioral results
showing minimal predictive inferencing during encoding. It
involves the medial frontal gyrus (bilateral). During
verification, areas which can be attributed to semantics,
inferencing and situational elaborations were observed.
Table 2: Statement Verification: Inference versus explicit
Location of Activated Areas Z Voxels
1. Cingulate Gyrus / Superior Frontal Gyrus
    Medial Frontal Gyrus (L + R BA 8; L BA 6, 32) 3.8 125
2. Medial Frontal Gyrus (L + R BA 9; L BA 6, 8) 3.8 67
3. Inferior Frontal Gyrus (L BA 10, 44, 45, 46, 47) 4.2 168
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The fundamental process of connecting instances to each
other is essential to many types of learning: from
generalization over instances, to category learning, to
learning from analogies.  The present work seeks an
understanding of these processes by studying how adults
learn about relations.  Learning about relations requires
learning about two kinds of entities: arguments and
predicates.
   Gentner (2003) proposes that arguments, and particularly
arguments that take the form of concrete objects, are
psychologically prior to predicates. Further, she has shown
that object-object similarities play a key role in the
relational mappings that both children and adults make. This
suggests that when learners are presented with a set of
instances in the form of arguments and predicates, the
similarity among arguments may be more important than
among predicates in connecting learning instances to each
other.
   However both Gentner (2003) and Billman and Knutson
(1996) have also suggested that  systematicity of predicates
is important.  More specifically, Billman and Knutson
propose that what is important when learning is how many
cues are systematically predictive of the categories.  All
cues – arguments and predicates – can contribute to
systematicity with the critical issue being the degree to
which cues are mutually predictive.  Thus, it may be the
systematicity relations across a set of instances and not
specifically argument and predicate similarity that guides
learning.
   The present experiment uses a learning task in which
object categories are defined by the relational roles of the
objects and not by their properties. These relational
categories have high systematicity: knowing that object X is
in relation P to object Y determines both what other relation
X enters into and the relational roles of all other objects.  In
order to learn this, learners must link one relation to another.
In these experiments, we manipulate argument similarity
and the systematicity of argument-predicate links; keeping
predicate systematicity high and constant.
Design
The experiment consisted of a training and test phase.  On
each trial there were three objects: two actors (A1, A2) and
one receiver (R).  The actors each performed two actions
relative to the receiver (e.g. A1 might “jump over” R and
also circle R).  On each trial the actions that define A1 and
A2 did not change. Participants were assigned to one of three
training conditions: (1) low argument similarity (different
objects each trial), (2) high argument similarity (same
objects each trial) and (3) high argument similarity but low
argument-predicate systematicity (same objects but different
roles on each trial).
   In the test trials, new object triads were used that were not
superficially similar to the training objects. On each trial the
experimenter demonstrated one of the actions for A1 or A2.
Since the predicates (actions) are systematically related, if
the argument-predicate structure has been learned then
participants should infer the correct object and predicate
pairs from this single cue. In order to measure learning,
participants were asked to perform the demonstration
object’s second action and the two actions of the other actor.
Results and Discussion
A test trial was scored as correct if the actions were paired
correctly and the correct receiver was used for every action.
Participants failed to learn the argument-predicate structure
in  the low argument similarity condition (Mean percent of
trials correct=16%) and in the high argument similarity and
low argument-predicate systematicity condition (M=22%),
but they did learn the argument-predicate structure in the
high argument similarity condition with high argument-
predicate systematicity (M=65%). Our results indicate that
systematicity matters in learning. However systematicity of
predicates alone is insufficient because this was present in
all conditions. The systematicity that was crucial for
learning in this case was the systematicity between
arguments and predicates. This type may be critical to the
learning process because it facilitates the linking of distinct
temporal events.  The arguments may thus serve as the
indexes in working memory that bind one instance to
another and thus enable learning across them.  The next
question is whether objects or arguments in general are
privileged in this role or whether any common index to all
learning instances would do.
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Introduction 
Expression of depth is one of the most important factors in 
constructing the creative vision of a photographer. 
Photographers usually know how to create, with certain 
artistic sense or taste, depth impression in the process of 
flattening objects in a three-dimensional space. To emphasis 
the feeling of depth, photographers tend to choose black and 
white processing. This is because there has been a myth: 
color photography is flatter than black and white. From the 
era of early color photography, pleasure of flatness has been 
pursued rather than feeling of depth(Newhall, 1982). 
The aperture and focal length of lenses are the major 
factors in changing depth impression(London et al, 2002). 
Depth impression increases when the aperture size is 
enlarged, resulting in shallower depth of field.  When the 
focal length of lens becomes longer making the discrepancy 
of relative size among subjects smaller, depth impression 
decreases (Shin, 2002). This study is performed to 
investigate the effects of the presence of color as a 
photographic technique on depth perception.  
Method 
Fifty (N=50) Yonsei University undergraduates and 
graduate students were assigned two experiments. The 
stimuli were taken in color using two techniques: (a) 
aperture; f/2.8, f/5.6, f/11, f/22, and (b)  focal length of lens; 
28mm, 50mm, 70mm, 105mm, which were then duplicated and 
transformed to gray scale images. The conditions were 
consistently maintained to reveal the effects of the specific 
techniques. Every photograph included two same-sized 
mannequins positioned at different distances from camera. 
Participants were asked to compare two photographs at a 
glance, and were forced to identify the photograph in which 
the two mannequins appear to be closer to each other.  
Results and Discussion 
The frequency was analyzed by the method of paired 
comparison(Thurstone1927a; 1927b). In the results(Figure 1, 
2), the smaller aperture size and the longer focal length  
decreased depth perception in both chromatic and 
achromatic images. Color severely  decreased depth 
impression at variations of focal length. In the mean time, 
the flattening effect of color was relatively weak along 
aperture variations. This implies that spatial frequency is a 
strong factor in giving a feeling of depth even in color 
photographs.  
Black and white process is still common in the field of 
photography as fine art. From the results of this work, the 
relatively intense feeling of depth can be one of the reasons 
for that. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The effect of aperture on depth perception. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The effect of focal length on depth perception. 
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Schematizing experiences plays a critical role in learning.  
Verbalizing experiences at a proper abstraction level has 
been identified as important for effective schematization 
(Shirouzu et al., 2002), or learning (Chi et al., 1989), but its 
details need to be studied further.  For instance, in a 
statistics class, a dramatic demonstration can help students 
grasp basic concepts like the law of large numbers.  Though 
the students remember them well, what they could verbalize 
differs depending on the class activities and has different 
effects on learning.  We report here that the students asked 
to verbalize a demo one hour after could express the 
important aspects of the event 18% more than their 
counterparts who did the same twelve weeks later.  
Learning the concept of probability  
When asked what it means that “The probability of getting 
ONE pip when you roll a die is one-sixth,” it is not rare that 
even a college student answers that you get ONE once per 
six rolls of a die.  To change this misconception a 
curriculum was devised.  In Activity 1 each student rolled a 
die 50 to 100 times, counted each pip, and the class tallied 
the results to yield a histogram of over 3000 trials.  This was 
followed by Activity 2 using a deformed die, with four sides 
of 1.5 lengths of the other two.  Each student rolled the die 
200 times, checked the probability of appearances of the 
pips of ONE and SIX (on shorter sides).  Then the class 
collected all the data to histogram them.  The comparison of 
these two patterns aims to clarify the relationship between 
the probability and the likelihood of event occurrences, 
based on the law of large numbers.  
Comparison of two classes 
Using the curriculum, two undergraduate classes in 
cognitive science dept. were taught the concept of 
probability.  Two classes were organized differently to 
compare the timing effect of abstracting the experiences.  
While Class 1 emphasized teacher-guided abstraction, Class 
2, taught by the same teacher, focused more on the students’ 
own verbalization. In Class 1, the teacher explained the law 
of large numbers, had the students engage in Activity 1.  
One week later, he showed to the class the histogram of all 
the data, explained the law, and engaged the class in 
Activity 2.  The results were tallied three times, for 20, 200, 
and 1800 trials.  The students were only explicitly requested 
to verbalize the meaning of their experiences twelve weeks 
later, at the term examination.  In Class 2, the class did 
Activities 1 and 2 consecutively in one day (in two classes), 
without teacher’s explanation of the law. Explicit 
verbalization was requested at the end of the class, in the 
form of revisiting the starting question.  The students had a 
chance to discuss among themselves. 
Results 
The verbal reports of the two classes were categorized in 
terms of their degrees of abstraction.  The reports of 
category “High” refer to the meaning of the law; “If you roll 
the die infinitely, the ratio of getting the pip ONE 
approaches 1/6.” “Moderate” reports mention the effect of 
large numbers; “You get the pip ONE roughly 1/6 times if 
you roll the die many, many times.” “Concrete” reports may 
refer to their class size as an example of a large number, but 
not its effects. “Others” often include their previous 
knowledge about the probability, “The pip ONE occurs 1/6 
times because it is one of the equally possible six events.” 
Table 1 summarizes the results. 
 
Table 1:  Abstraction levels of verbal reports 
 
Answer abstraction levels  Ratio of  answerers High Moderate Concrete Other 
1 85.3% 5.3% 16.0% 45.3% 18.7%
2 92.1% 0% 39.4% 10.5% 42.1%
In Class 2, more students moderately abstracted their 
experiences than concretely.  Lacking the chance to do the 
same, some 45% of the students in Class 1 reverted to the 
concrete level answers when tested.  In order to bridge 
concrete experience with abstraction, the “moderate” 
expressions may play an important role.   
Requiring students only to verbalize from memory may 
have had them focus on resultant pattern of 1/6, bringing 
them back to their previous “common sense” from 
textbooks. There seems to be certain duration of time to 
properly ponder on the exact cause and effect of the 
“surprising” phenomena, to be able to scrutinize their 
newness carefully enough to be able to generalize them. 
Acknowledgments 
This research is supported by JPS to the 1st author and by 
MECSST and CREST/JST to the 2nd author. 
References 
Chi, M., et al. (1989). Self-explanations. Cognitive Science, 
13, 145-182. 
Shirouzu, H., Miyake, N., & Masukawa, H. (2002), 
Cognitively active externalization for situated reflection. 
Cognitive Science, 26, 469-501. 
1632
Basic Questioning Strategies for Making Sense of a Surprise:  The Roles of Training, 
Experience, and Expertise 
 
Winston R. Sieck (sieck@decisionmaking.com) 
Deborah A. Peluso (debbie@decisionmaking.com) 
Jennifer Smith (jsmith@decisionmaking.com) 
Danyele Harris-Thompson (dharris@decisionmaking.com) 
Klein Associates Inc. 
1750 Commerce Center Blvd. North, Fairborn, OH 45324 USA 
 
Information operations (IO) specialists are like US political 
strategists in foreign lands, and they are concerned with 
affecting others decision processes.  In order to be 
effective, IO practitioners must be able to efficiently 
develop an understanding, frame or theory (i.e. make 
sense) about how decisions are made in a particular locale.  
As in scientific reasoning, when IO specialists observe 
surprising events, they have an opportunity to dramatically 
improve their frames (cf. Dunbar, 1995).  But to capitalize 
on such opportunities, they must acquire the skill to ask 
good questions; questions that admit to a basic lack of 
understanding or that specifically challenge their frames.  In 
the current study, we ask, What roles do training and field 
experience have in acquiring skills for questioning ones 
frames? 
Method 
Participants (n=60) were either laypeople (L) with no 
military background, novices (N) who were trained in IO, or 
individuals who had training and IO field experience (F).  
Of the latter group, 4 were identified as IO experts (E) via 
peer nomination.  Participants were presented with a 1-page 
scenario describing a real situation that had occurred in 
Kosovo, and that was obtained earlier from an IO expert by 
CTA elicitation.  The synopsis was that buses with armed 
escorts were used to transport Serb college students to 
school from their familys enclaves. The regional 
commander made plans to reduce the escort due to costs.  
An IO campaign was conducted to convince the students 
that the buses would still be safe.  However, once the escort 
was reduced, the vast majority of students quit riding the 
bus.  This was quite a surprise to US personnel on the scene.  
The reason as eventually discovered was that, unlike in the 
US, the Serb mothers made the ride/no ride decision for the 
students.  This reason was not disclosed to participants.  
Instead, they were asked to explain their understanding of 
the situation in a think-aloud procedure, as well as what they 
would want to know to inform their understanding.   
Results 
 The protocols were coded for key kinds of inquiries 
participants made, in particular, inquiries that would lead 
directly to developing an accurate understanding of the 
scenario.  The two key inquiry types are:  Why are the 
students not riding? and Is someone else influencing the 
students decision?  The proportions of participants who 
asked each of these key decisions by experience level are 
presented in Table 1.  As shown, participants with field 
experience were 3 to 4 times more likely to ask one of these 
critical questions than were those with no field experience 
(trained or not), χ2(1) = 5.31, p = .02 for the why question, 
and χ2(1) = 5.31, p = .02 for the who question.  The 
results were not due to the experienced participants simply 
knowing the answer.  Only 3 participants hypothesized 
the correct answer (coded liberally as family decides is 
the reason).  Also, accuracy did not depend on field 
experience, χ2(1) = 0.04. 
 
Table 1: Proportion who ask each question 
 
 Experience Level 
Key Inquiries L N F E 
Why not ride? .10 .04 .23 .50 
Who decides? .05 .09 .23 .50 
Discussion 
Experienced IO practitioners were much more likely to 
question important aspects of their frames than laypeople 
and trained novices.  At one level, the kinds of questions 
they asked were quite basic, lacking the obvious technical 
sophistication that might often be assumed to be associated 
with experience and expertise.  Nevertheless, these simple 
questions were exactly the kind needed to develop a useful 
frame on which to base decisions and actions, and are quite 
similar to questioning strategies of experienced scientists.  
Indeed, the current study represents an early step toward 
extension of work in scientific reasoning, situation 
assessment, judgment and other areas to a broader collective 
higher-order cognitive topic of sensemaking (Klein et al. 
2004). 
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Introduction 
Several accounts of spatial memory biases propose that 
people "mentally impose" spatial category boundaries (e.g., 
Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). However, in most 
tasks that have reported categorical biases, adults have used 
boundaries aligned with either visible lines or axes of 
symmetry. This raises a fundamental question: can people 
mentally impose a category boundary in the absence of 
perceptual structure supporting such a division? In our 
previous research, we have demonstrated that category 
boundaries can be created and destroyed in a spatial 
memory task by changing the perceptual cues available in 
the task space (Simmering & Spencer, 2004). Thus, in the 
present study, we added or deleted perceptual structure to 
see if people could maintain a categorical division in the 
absence of relevant perceptual information. 
Method & Results 
One behavioral signature of using a category boundary in 
spatial recall is drift away from the boundary over delay 
(e.g., Spencer & Hund, 2002). In the current experiments, 
we used direction of drift as an indication of whether 
participants were using the category boundary. In 
Experiment 1, the presence of perceptual support for the 
boundary alternated across blocks. Participants’ responses 
showed drift away from the category boundary only when 
the perceptual support was provided. Figure 1 shows the 
switch in drift direction based on the presence of perceptual 
structure (negative values indicate drift away from the 
boundary). In both conditions (solid and dashed lines), 
performance depended on the available perceptual structure. 
This suggests that people need perceptual support to impose 
a category boundary. 
In Experiment 2, the presence of perceptual support 
varied randomly across trials . Although imposing the 
category boundary should have been simpler in the 
experiment, participants were still unable to impose the 
reference without perceptual support (see dotted line in 
Figure 1). This provides further evidence that people need 
perceptual support to impose a category boundary. 
Further analysis of the effects in Experiment 2 suggested 
that the order of trials may influence participants’ ability to 
mentally impose the spatial category boundary. That is, 
whether support for the boundary was present on the just-
previous trial seemed to influence performance, but the 
number of trials available for this analysis was too small to 
determine the reliability of this effect.  Experiment 3 was 
designed to test this more directly by providing the most 
supportive conditions for mentally imposing the category 
boundary. In this experiment, we designed mini-blocks of 
trials in which a trial with no perceptual support followed 
sets of 1 or 3 trials with perceptual support. In the min i-
blocks with 3 trials, the memory for the category should be 
stronges t, and therefore easiest to impose on the following 
trial. Data collection for this experiment is in progress.  
Figure 1: Directional error across blocks for Experiments 1 
(solid and dashed lines) and 2 (dotted line). 
Conclusion 
This series of experiments suggests that adults are unable 
to mentally impose a category boundary without perceptual 
support. Even when a category boundary has been used on 
previous trials, when perceptual support is removed, adults’ 
performance indicates a failure to impose the boundary. 
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Introduction 
The perception of short visual durations is dependent on the 
internal and external allocation of attention. When attention 
is concentrated on a single visual event the perceived 
duration of that event will be longer than if attention is 
divided or distracted  (‘Watched Pot Illusion’: Block, 
George & Reed, 1980). Similarly, when we perform 
voluntary saccadic eye movements to an object with a 
discernible temporal signature we perceive the first duration 
following the saccade as being longer than the subsequent 
duration  (‘Stopped Clock illusion’: Yarrow et al, 2001).  
These effects show how ecological time perception can 
lead to perceptual discontinuities. The opposite effect can be 
seen in motion picture perception: the perception of 
temporal continuity from discontinuous visual events. An 
action filmed from two different camera positions appears 
temporally continuous if two frames (83.3ms) of the action 
are overlapped during the cut between shots (Anderson, 
1996). This technique of ‘continuity editing’ is well 
established yet the perceptual foundations for it have rarely 
been empirically investigated. 
The aim of this study was to show how ‘continuity 
editing’ can be explained as the natural result of time 
perception under different viewing conditions (fixation, 
peripheral change, and saccadic eye movements).  
Methods 
Twenty subjects (10 male, 10 female; 19-33 years) were 
shown animations depicting a series of letters within photo-
realistic scenes and asked to judge whether the presentation 
duration of a target letter was longer or shorter than all other 
letters. A Modified Binary Search procedure (MOBS: 
Yarrow et al, 2001) was used to identify a presentation 
duration perceived by the subjects as being equal to 1000ms 
under nine viewing conditions: Saccade target relocation (3) 
x Background (3) (see Figure 1). The presentation order of 
the conditions was either blocked or randomized to create 
predictable and unpredictable viewing conditions. 
Results and Discussion 
The following effects were identified in this study: 
• Predictable viewing conditions lead to perceptual 
extension of fixation duration (estimate = 898ms; t=-3.096 
df=9 p=.013). Unpredictable viewing conditions lead to 
accurate fixation duration perception (estimate=991ms). 
• Unexpected peripheral change leads to perceptual 
shortening of fixation duration (duration = 1049ms; t=-
3.180 df=9 p=.011). This effect disappears when 
coinciding with an unexpected saccade target relocation.  
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Figure 1: Presentation duration perceived as being equal to 
1000ms under the nine randomized viewing conditions. 
 
• Small saccade target relocations (20°) lead to the 
perceptual extension of post-saccadic durations (blocked: 
duration decrease=67ms, p=.041; random: duration 
decrease=53ms, p=.054, one-tail). Large target relocations 
(40°) only lead to a similar extension when they are 
unexpected (duration decrease = 57.2ms, p=.023). 
These results show how involuntary capture of attention by 
peripheral change is perceptually under-compensated and 
voluntary redirection of attention (saccades) over-
compensated when perceiving visual durations. These 
effects are moderated by expectancy.  
This allows us to conclude in favour of and explain in 
more detail the ecological basis of ‘continuity editing’: 
perceived temporal continuity is created by overlapping one 
frame (42.5ms) of a visual event across a cut when the focus 
of attention remains in the same location but the periphery 
changes, and omitting one frame when the focus relocates.      
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Introduction
The perception of events, such as viewing a baseball
game, is typically studied using movies of real-world events
(e.g., Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001). However, people
frequently perceive events by reading, hearing, or talking
about events. Current models of text comprehension suggest
that the process of perceiving events in narrated activity
may be driven in part by changes in various dimensions of
the narrated situation (e.g., Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, &
Curiel, 1998).  Four experiments were conducted to
determine a) whether people are able to reliably perceive
event structure in narratives using a paradigm employed to
study event structure in real-world activities, and b) which
dimensions of the narrated situation are relevant to the
perception of event structure in narratives.
Materials & Method
The stories used in all current studies were excerpts from
One Boy’s Day (Barker & Wright, 1951). Written in the
style of a narrative, this book provides a detailed record of
the activities of a 7-year old boy (Raymond) during a single
day in the 1940’s. The four stories used in these studies
described Raymond waking up, playing in the schoolyard,
working on an English lesson, and attending a Music class.
Task Design
In the first experiment, 32 participants were asked to
listen to each narrative twice: Once while identifying large
units of activity (coarse segmentation), and once while
identifying small units of activity (fine segmentation). In the
second experiment 32 participants were asked to read the
narratives twice on paper, and place a line between words to
identify coarse and fine segments of activity in the same
stories. In a third experiment, clause-by-clause reading
times were collected from 32 participants. In a final
experiment, 32 participants used a 7-point scale to rate the
predictability of the activity described in each clause given
prior information from the story.
Analysis
For each study, the data were analyzed at the level of
clauses. In the first two studies, clauses were considered to
be event boundaries if a participant segmented at least once
during that clause. Each clause was coded for changes on
one of six dimensions: temporal references, changes in the
foregrounding of characters, their spatial locations, the
objects with which they were interacting, their goals, and
the causal relations between their actions. The number of
syllables (or the duration of the spoken clauses) and
punctuation were also coded for each clause.
For each study, these variables were used to predict the
patterns of large and small segmentation, reading time, or
predictability ratings for each participant. The coefficients
generated from these regressions were used to measure the
influence of the independent variables in each study.
Results & Conclusions
Participants identified larger units of activity during
coarse than fine segmentation, indicating that they were able
to perceive structured activity in the narratives.
When identifying large units of activity, participants’
patterns of segmentation were related to changes in the
foregrounding of characters, their locations and goals, and
the causal relations between their actions. In contrast, when
identifying small units of activity, patterns of segmentation
were more strongly related to changes in characters’
interactions with objects. These results were consistent
across presentation modalities, and suggest that fine-grained
events are closely tied to physical interactions, whereas
coarse-grained events are more tied to goals and plans.
Situational changes were also associated with slower
reading times (see also Zwaan, et al., 1998) and lower
ratings of predictability, suggesting a role for transient
changes in predictability in the perception of event structure.
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Introduction 
Today, the WWW is a very prominent resource of health-
related information, both, for medical experts and layper-
sons (e.g. Fox, 2003). The latter often retrieve these infor-
mation to make an informed decision. However, one cannot 
expect laypersons to deal with these information effectively 
offhand. We rather assume that to succeed, laypersons need 
to actively guide their search process on a metacognitive 
level, since metacognitive strategies are known to play an 
important role in the comprehension of  complex documents 
(e.g. Hill & Hannafin, 1997). However, it is yet unclear 
whether laypersons spontaneously guide their web search on 
a metacognitive level and - in case they do so - whether the 
use of metacognitive strategies is related to search success.  
Method 
To answer this question we carried out a study in which 20 
university students with little medical knowledge partici-
pated. Their task was to search the WWW for information 
on cholesterol in order to help a fictitious friend make a 
knowledge based decision: “Is a medical treatment of my 
high level of cholesterol necessary?”. Participants were pro-
vided with 11 pre-selected websites containing controversial 
information on the topic. Search time was limited to 35 
minutes. Knowledge acquisition, decision conflict and de-
tailedness of written credibility assessments functioned as 
measures of search success. Cognitive processes were ascer-
tained using a think-aloud procedure. Verbal protocols were 
analyzed using a category system which comprises the cate-
gories Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Elaboration. 
Inter-rater reliability was 82% across all categories. 
Results 
Results show that participants differ considerably in their 
metacognitive activity (see Table 1). Participants’ metacog-
nitive activity is rather consistent across the four categories 
(Cronbach’s α = .78). Interestingly, metacognitive activity 
is positively related to knowledge acquisition. Correlation 
coefficients range from r = .45, p < .05 (Monitoring), to r = 
.57, p < .01 (Evaluation). No significant correlation could 
be obtained for the relationship of Planning and knowledge 
acquisition (r = -.18, ns.).  
Results concerning subjectively experienced decision 
conflict reveal a negative but nonsignificant correlation with  
metacognitive activity (r = -.23, ns.). The assumption that  
Table 1: Mean number of metacognitive statements and 
standard deviations for each category. 
 
Category M SD 
Planning 10.90 6.61 
Monitoring 13.95 6.86 
Evaluation 19.00 12.60 
Elaboration 11.65 9.48 
 
better knowledge of the topic cholesterol is related to sub-
jectively experienced decision conflict could be confirmed 
only partially. While factual knowledge did not correlate 
significantly (r = -.13, ns.), comprehension of the subject 
matter was significantly correlated with scores on the Deci-
sion Conflict Scale (r = -.49, p < .05). 
Finally, analysis of participants’ written credibility as-
sessments show that the more participants evaluate informa-
tion during the search process, the better they are able to 
report on the credibility of information after their search (r = 
.46, p < .05).  
To summarize, in the present study the importance of 
metacognitive strategies for a successful web search could 
be demonstrated. The results point to the need for metacog-
nitive interventions which support laypersons in dealing 
with complex technical information on the WWW. There-
fore, we have developed the computer based tool 
met.a.ware. The tool enables laypersons to systematically 
store the information they have found on the web. For this, 
laypersons have to assign the information gathered to differ-
ent tabs, which are labeled with aspects of the topic choles-
terol. Furthermore, laypersons are prompted to engage in 
metacognitive activities each time they add information to 
the system. In ongoing experiments, different types of meta-
cognitive prompts (i.e. evaluating information and monitor-
ing ongoing comprehension) are tested against each other. 
Thereby, we seek to seperately examine the contributions of 
different metacognitive activities to a successful web search. 
First results from our current experiments point to the sup-
portive character of met.a.ware. 
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Results Introduction 
A number of auditory tasks, including speech perception, 
require listeners to categorize stimuli on the basis of one or 
more features of the input.  In many cases, especially 
speech, there is no one-to-one mapping between values 
along continuous features and discrete categories (e.g., 
phonemes).  How then do perceptual systems categorize 
stimuli under uncertainty?  One possible solution is that 
perceptual systems identify and use statistical information 
inherent in the acoustic environment.  We propose that 
perceivers incorporate distributional knowledge about the 
acoustic environment with the information provided by the 
signal in order to make optimal (i.e., maximized accuracy) 
categorical decisions.  Statistical approaches such as this are 
widely used in vision research but are rarely applied to 
auditory or speech perception.  Our goal in this study was to 
develop a framework that will provide testable hypotheses 
about the nature of statistical (distributional) learning in 
auditory perception in general and specifically in speech 
perception.  
In decision tasks such as these, optimal performance 
requires listeners to create a criterion boundary on the 
dimension (i.e., a particular frequency).  Stimuli on either 
side of this boundary should receive different category 
labels. Within as few as one block of training trials, most 
listeners displayed a stable category boundary.  Boundaries 
were estimated from categorization functions averaged 
across several training blocks.  These boundaries varied as a 
function of the distribution characteristics and were 
statistically equivalent to the point of distribution 
intersection.  Slopes from categorization functions were 
steeper than the slopes of the training distributions; 
suggesting that listeners were more likely using a criterion 
bound as opposed to simply probability matching the 
distributions.  In general, listeners were responding in a near 
optimal manner with minimal experience with the training 
distributions.  The ability to use distributional information 
to map from continuous dimensions to category labels is 
also essential for speech sound categorization.    
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Methods 
In this experiment, participants were presented non-speech 
sounds sampled from two overlapping distributions.  The 
sounds consisted of 25 narrow-band noise bursts varying in 
center frequency from 1000 to 1360 Hz.  Three different 
conditions were created by varying parameters of the 
training distributions.  The distributions varied in the ratio 
of stimuli in each category (i.e., prior probabilities of each 
category) as well as the amount of overlap between the two 
distributions.  Figure 1 displays the distributions for one of 
these conditions.  The listeners were asked to identify the 
sounds as belonging to one of two categories (“A” or “B”) 
and feedback was provided after each trial.  Due to the 
overlap between the distributions, there was no 
deterministic relationship between center frequency and 
category label for many stimuli.   
Figure 1: Stimulus Distributions 
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Introduction
People are able to learn and use temporal sequences to guide
their perception and behavior. This ability has been
demonstrated in visual search tasks (Olson & Chun, 2001)
and is present in infants as young as eight months (e.g.,
Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). Does seeing the same
sequence of activity repeated in different contexts cause that
sequence to be treated as a coherent perceptual unit? If
temporal sequence learning influences the perception of
others’ activity, observers should be able to use sequences
of activity to prepare for an event predicted by those
sequences. Furthermore, these sequences should have a
direct effect on the structure people perceive in others’
activity: implicitly learned sequences of activity should be
perceived as units of activity. The goal of this study was to
determine the consequences of temporal sequence learning
for the way observers understand the actions of others.
Experiment 1
The first experiment addressed the hypothesis that
participants can learn sequences of human activity and use
those sequences to aid in a target detection task. A series of
pictures (presented for 750 ms with no ISI) of a man with
his arm in six different positions and forming thirteen
different hand gestures were presented to participants. Eight
participants were asked to monitor the gestures and press the
correct button whenever they saw either of two target
gestures. Within the series of pictures a sequence of seven
arm positions was repeated 320 times.  Each repetition of
the sequence was separated by two to twelve pseudo-
randomly selected arm positions. For the first three-quarters
of the task, a target gesture immediately followed the
sequence. In the last quarter of the task the sequence did not
predict when the target would appear. Response times
steadily decreased while the target followed the sequence
but then increased once the target was no longer predicted
by the sequence. None of the participants discovered the
sequence nor were they able to demonstrate knowledge of
the sequence in a cued-generation recognition test.
Experiment 2
The first experiment demonstrated that observers learn
sequences of human activity and can use this knowledge to
prepare for important, task-related activity. In a second
experiment we sought to determine whether these learned
sequences of human activity are treated as perceptual units
and, if so, whether this perception depends upon the
predictive value of the sequence. Twenty-four participants
performed the same target detection task described in the
first experiment. However, the predictiveness of the
sequence was manipulated across two groups (predictive
and nonpredictive groups) and the task was shortened. The
performance of these two groups was significantly different:
The group for whom the sequence was predictive showed
better task performance than the group for whom the
sequence was not predictive. Participants also performed a
segmentation task in which they were asked to identify
boundaries between units by pressing a button when one
natural unit of activity ended and another began (Zacks &
Tversky, 2001). This task used the stimuli and sequence
from the target detection task (though no target gestures
were presented). As they performed the segmentation task
both groups of participants chose boundaries relative to the
sequence of activity they learned in the first task.
Conclusions
As observers watch others perform everyday activities they
build up structured representations of their behavior (Zacks
& Tversky, 2001). These structured representations
influence how they break behavior into smaller units of
activity. The results of these experiments suggest that the
structure people impose on their experience is in part due to
implicitly learned sequences of human activity. These
sequences are learned and used to predict the occurrence of
important events. Moreover, these sequences influence the
way we subsequently perceive the actions of others.
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Introduction
This study investigated the role linguistic attention control
might play in second language (L2) proficiency. Cognitive
linguists have proposed that language, beyond referring to
events, objects and their properties, also directs attention
towards relationships between elements in a message  (e.g.,
Slobin, 1996). This is especially true of function words,
grammatical morphemes, etc. For example, in The book is
under the table, the meaning of the preposition under is not
represented by sensori-motor/perceptual experiences in the
same way as it is for book and table. Instead, under directs
attention to the relationship between book and table. Such
grammatical elements pose challenges for L2 learners due to
these attention-directing functions (Slobin, 1996).
This research used the alternating runs paradigm (Rogers
& Monsell, 1995) to study attentional control when
processing grammatical elements. This paradigm requires
responses to two tasks that repeat and alternate predictably
(e.g.,...AABBAA...), creating a sequence of repeat and shift
trials. Typically, reaction times (RTs) are slower on shift
than on repeat trials, resulting in shift costs that reflect the
burden that shifting places on the attention system.
Decontextualized simple stimuli are often used to
investigate attentional task shifting processes. Recently,
Taube-Schiff and Segalowitz (2003) found significant shift
costs during performance of first language (L1) grammatical
judgment tasks involving contextualized sentence-like
stimuli. The current two experiments aimed to clarify the
specificity of linguistic attention in the grammatical domain
by asking the following questions: (1) Does degree of
grammatical similarity between tasks affect shift costs? (2)
Does attention control in L2 differ for shifts between
grammatical elements versus non-grammatical elements?
(3) Are linguistic attention shift costs similar in L1 and L2?
Method
Bilingual undergraduate participants (Expt. 1: N=24; M=24
years and Expt. 2: N=32; M=22 years; L1=English;
L2=French) performed an alternating-runs task involving 2-
alternative forced choice conditions, with trials predictably
alternating between repeat and shift trials. Stimuli were
displayed on a computer screen and consisted of target
words embedded in sentence-like fragments, appropriately
counterbalanced for their occurrence in specific sentence
contexts. In Experiment 1, participants were tested in two
conditions in L1, each involving the following two tasks: In
a Grammatically-Different (GDIFF) condition, verb targets
were judged for temporal meaning (past versus present
tense) and prepositions for location meaning (above versus
below). In a Grammatically-Similar (GSIM) condition,
prepositions were judged for either one type of location
meaning (above versus below) or another type (near versus
far). In Experiment 2, participants were tested in L1 and L2
in the GSIM condition (same as in Expt. 1) and in a Non-
Grammatical (NOUN) condition in which noun targets were
judged with respect to non-grammatical category member-
ship (air versus water craft, and 2- versus 4-wheel vehicles).
Results
Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted comparing
shift and repeat trials to obtain shift costs. In Expt. 1, shift
costs were significantly greater for the location task in the
GDIFF versus the GSIM condition. In Expt. 2, a significant
interaction effect revealed shift costs were significantly
greater in L2 in the GSIM condition than in the NOUN
condition. Finally, shift costs were significantly greater in
L2 than L1, in the GSIM and not in the NOUN condition.
Discussion
The main findings from these studies were: (1) Increased
grammatical similarity between tasks decreased shift costs,
suggesting a lower attentional burden. (2) There was a
greater impact on attention control in L2 when shifting
attention between grammatical versus non-grammatical
elements, and (3) Linguistic attention shifts costs were
greater in L2 than L1, but only significantly so in the
grammatical judgment tasks. Results speak to psychological
distinctions within the grammatical system and provide
additional support for the idea that grammatical elements
are more difficult to master in L2 (Slobin, 1996).
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Clauses in verbal protocols produced during reading 
reflect relationships among entities (e.g., arguments) and 
events (e.g., verb predicates) in the readers unfolding 
situation model (e.g., Trabasso & Magliano, 1996). The 
content of the clauses come from three knowledge sources: 
the current sentence, the prior text, and the readers world 
knowledge.  In this study, the relative impact of text 
elements, as pertaining to dimensions of situation model 
construction during reading was examined (Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998).  Specifically, we measured the extent to 
which producing an argument (or predicate) influences the 
likelihood of producing a predicate (or argument) within 
each knowledge source.   
Method 
The study included 64 participants enrolled in a critical 
thinking class at Northern Illinois University. Participants 
read and self-explained two of four science texts.  The four 
texts were adopted from high-school textbooks on life 
sciences. Self-explanations were collected after each 
sentence was presented.   
Protocol Analysis 
Readers utterances were parsed into clauses containing 
main verbs.  The verb predicates and arguments within each 
clause were identified as belonging to one of three sources: 
the current sentence, the prior text, or world knowledge. 
Results and Discussion 
We computed the extent to which one constituent type (i.e., 
verb predicate vs. argument) determines the use of the other 
within a knowledge source with the following two 
equations:  
 
Equation 1: Argument Determines Predicate (ADP) = 
p (generate P | generate A) - p (generate P | not generate A) 
 
Equation 2: Predicate Determines Argument (PDA) =  
p (generate A | generate P)  p (generate A | not generate P) 
 
Table 1 presents the mean constraint scores as a function 
of the source of a verb (i.e., current sentence, prior text, or 
world knowledge). A 2 (Constituent Constraint: argument or 
predicate) X 3 (Source: current sentence, prior text, or world 
knowledge) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on 
the constraint scores.  This analysis yielded a main effect for 
constraint score, such that ADP scores (M = .46) were 
significantly different from PDA scores (M = .51), F(1, 126) 
= 32.03, MSE = .008, p < .01.  This main effect was 
qualified by a significant Constituent Constraint X Source 
interaction (F(2, 126) = 142.94, MSE = .005, p < .01).  Post 
hoc analyses revealed that constraint scores differed across 
the knowledge sources.  With respect to current sentence 
and prior text, verb predicates constrained the arguments 
more than arguments constrained the verb predicates.  With 
respect to world knowledge, the opposite pattern was found. 
These data suggest that intra-clause constraints may be 
source dependent.  Specifically, when readers describe 
information from the current sentence, or are accessing 
information from the prior discourse, they tend to describe 
the events and entities associated with those events. On the 
contrary, when entities from world knowledge are activated, 
readers must construct the events which than link them to 
the current discourse information.   
 
Table 1: Constraint scores as a function of source and 
constituent. 
Source  ADP  Score PDA  Score 
Current sentence 0.47  0.52  
Prior text 0.37  0.57  
World knowledge 0.53   0.43   
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Introduction
The human body is designed to interact with its
environment.  Information from all sensory modalities is
integrated to allow for navigation and decision making.
Developing theories of embodied cognition suggest that
thought may be grounded in low-level motor activity and
sensory modalities.
The present study tests whether eye motion affects
memory for spoken verbs.  Vision is a dynamic process in
which saccades are used to gather information from multiple
points in space.  However, these eye fixations are not
random.  Eye scanpaths are often consistent with thought
during the absence of any visual stimulus (Spivey & Geng,
2001, & Laeng and Teodorescu, 2002).  The present
question is whether feedback from low-level motor activity
also plays a role in high-level cognitive processes.  If natural
eye movements are congruent with thought, perhaps it is
possible to influence thought by controlling eye motion.
Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae (2003) found
that certain verbs carry either a vertical or horizontal spatial
orientation, and that spatial orientation is activated upon
stimulus presentation.  Thus, it is hypothesized that
horizontal or vertical eye scanpaths will either enhance
memory for words whose spatial orientation is congruent
with that of the motion and/or inhibit memory for those
words that are incongruent with the motion.
Method
Participants were 45 sighted undergraduates at Indiana
University.  Apparent motion software was used to create a
black circle flipping back and forth vertically or
horizontally.  As participants tracked the stimulus, a pre-
recorded list of verbs played.  The list contained 20 of the
verbs that Richardson et al. (2003) found to carry spatial
meaning.  Ten verbs were played while the participant
observed apparent motion in one direction, and the next ten
words were played while the participant observed apparent
motion in the other direction. After a two minute pause,
participants were given a list of 40 verbs and asked to circle
those which appeared in the previously heard list.
Congruent instances consisted of “vertical” verbs that
were presented while participants’ eyes moved vertically or
“horizontal” verbs while participants’ eyes moved
horizontally.  Incongruent instances consisted of “vertical”
verbs presented during horizontal motion or “horizontal”
verbs during vertical motion.  According to the hypothesis,
performance on the recognition task should be better for
congruent verbs than for incongruent verbs.
Results and Discussion
The results suggest that eye movements do prime memory
for verbs, with vertical eye movements enhancing
recognition of verbs with vertical spatial orientations over
those with horizontal orientations.  The effect was weaker in
the horizontal condition.  A 2(eye motion direction) x
2(order) x 2(congruency) analysis of variance for a within
subjects design yielded a reliable interaction between eye
motion direction and order, F(1,43)=12.470, p<.001.
Horizontal eye movements only primed memory for
horizontal verbs when this direction of motion was
performed first.  The analysis also yielded a reliable
congruence x direction of motion interaction.  The vertical
condition yielded a greater difference between congruent
and incongruent instances than did the horizontal condition,
and the effect was reliable under both orders of presentation.
An ongoing study replicates these findings using a
between subjects design (to eliminate order effects) and
longer scanpaths.  What one thinks is known to determine
how one moves.  The present findings show that how one
moves (at least how the eyes move) determines what is
remembered.  Apparently, verb meanings are represented in
a form close to the sensorimotor surface.
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Introduction
Current theories of graph comprehension are largely silent
about the processes by which inferences are made from
graphs (Freedman & Shah, 2002; Pinker, 1990), although it
is apparent that people are able to make such inferences. In
Trickett & Trafton (2004), we proposed that people use
spatial reasoning, in the form of spatial transformations
(Trafton et al., in press) to answer inferential questions. This
paper is an extension of our earlier study, in which we
standardized the graphs presented, so that the distance from
the x and y axes was identical for all conditions, we
removed typing time from the RT measure. Finally, we
expanded the experiment with an additional “middle
extension” condition.
Method
8 graduate students and faculty at GMU participated.
Participants were shown 40 unlabelled line graphs presented
in random order, 10 in each of 4 conditions. They were
asked for the value of the y axis at a point on the x axis. The
4 conditions were: read-off (arrow beneath line), near
(arrow slightly beyond line), middle (arrow a greater
distance) and far (far beyond end of line) (see Figure 1).
Fig. 1: Schematic of readoff (left) and far (right) conditions.
The readoff condition required no spatial transformations.
However, in the near, middle and far conditions, we
hypothesized that participants would mentally extend the
line (i.e., use spatial transformation) to locate its intersection
with the perpendicular from the red arrow. Spatial
transformation theory predicts that longer extensions take
longer; thus, we predicted that participants would be fastest
in the read-off (no extension) condition, increasingly slower
in the near and  middle  conditions, and slowest in the far
(longest extension) condition. We also predicted that
accuracy would decrease with increased use of spatial
transformations, as people must move further from “anchor
points” on the graph to obtain needed information—i.e,
most accurate in the read-off condition, decreasingly
accurate in the near and middle conditions, and least
accurate in the far condition.
Results and Discussion
We measured accuracy as the absolute value of the correct
response minus the participant’s response. Response times
(RT) represent the time taken to reach an answer.
Consistent with our hypothesis, participants were most
accurate on the read-off task, decreasingly accurate on the
near and middle tasks, and least accurate on the far task,
repeated measures ANOVA F(3, 15) = 12.43, p < .01, linear
trend F(1, 5) = 13.93, p < .05.
RT data also supported our hypothesis. Participants were
fastest on the read-off task, increasingly slower in the near
and middle tasks, and slowest on the far task, F(3, 15) =
7.44, p < .05, linear trend F(1, 5) = 10.99, p < .05. The
linear trend is consistent with the idea that a longer
extension takes more time to execute than a shorter one. If
this is true, it should take a measurable amount of time more
for each extension. In order to calculate how long each extra
extension took, we did a linear regression, using the distance
the participants had to extend the line (recall that the
distance along the x and y axes was constant). This analysis
was significant, r = .43, p < .01. The analysis yielded the
following formula: Response Time = 4.8 + .63, where 4.8
seconds is the baseline time to read information from the
graph and .63 is the amount of extra time required to extend
the line each centimeter distance required. This result
supports our hypothesis that participants used spatial
transformations, by indicating a systematic relationship
between response time and the distance mentally traveled.
As participants had to draw longer mental extensions to the
graph, their response times systematically increased. Thus,
we propose that a comprehensive theory of graph
comprehension should accommodate spatial reasoning.
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Introduction 
Most models of memory and spatial categorization predict 
that people select relevant categorical information at the 
time of stimulus encoding (e.g., Huttenlocher, Hedges, & 
Duncan, 1991). Following encoding, unselected category 
information has no influence on subsequent memory and 
categorization responses. In contrast, the Dynamic Field 
Theory (DFT), a neural network model of spatial working 
memory, suggests that unselected information can still 
exert an influence following encoding (Schutte, Spencer, 
& Schöner, 2004). In particular, the network's activation 
continues to be affected by “unselected” categorical 
information during memory delays.  
 To investigate this issue, memory targets were placed 
in separate spatial categories, but close to a category 
boundary (e.g. to the left and right of the midline axis of 
the task space). Participant’s experience with the targets 
was varied by changing the relative frequency of trials to 
each target. The critical question concerned whether or 
not the longer-term memory of items in the unselected 
(e.g., right) category would affect memory for items in the 
adjacent (e.g., left) category during memory delays. If the 
predictions of the DFT are correct, such cross-category 
interactions would be expected.  
Method 
Participants were seated at a table with a homogeneous 
surface in a dimly lit room. Two dots aligned with the 
table’s vertical axis were presented 15cm to right of 
midline. Previous work has demonstrated that these dots 
form a salient reference axis in spatial recall tasks 
(Simmering & Spencer, 2004). A target appeared for 2s 
and participants were asked to recall the location after 
delays of 0, 10, or 20s.  We examined performance in four 
conditions: no bias (targets -5° to the left of the axis  and 
5° to the right of the axis ), bias right (targets at -5° and 5° 
with twice as many trials to 5°), plus 10 (targets at -5°, 5°, 
and 10°), plus 80 (targets at -5°, 5°, and 80°).  
Importantly, participant’s experience responding to the 
left (-5°) target was the same in all conditions. 
Results 
According to the DFT, performance to the left target 
should differ across conditions based on the frequency 
and spatial distribution of targets in the unselected, right 
category. This is precisely what we found. Repeated and 
different exposures to targets in the right category exerted 
significant effects on responses to items in the left 
category, even though the number and type of trials to 
items in the left category was identical across all 
conditions. 
 
Figure 1: Directional error at the left target across 
conditions. As predicted, Bias Right and Plus 10 differs 
significantly from No Bias. 
Discussion 
Our results are consistent with the proposal that information 
from both selected and unselected categories can exert an 
influence on spatial memory performance. Current studies 
are examining these cross category effects more closely.  
For instance, the DFT predicts that memory biases to the left 
target should vary systematically with the distance between 
the left and right targets.  
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Introduction 
Mathematics in general and statistics in particular are 
notoriously difficult topics for many students.  Part of the 
difficulty may be that students view unfamiliar equations 
and procedures as being extremely complex and, as a result, 
focus on learning the computational procedures involved in 
solving problems at the expense of developing a conceptual 
understanding of the principles which underlie those 
procedures.  One remedy for this situation is to present 
conceptual, rather than computational, equations to students.  
Atkinson, Catrambone, and Merrill (2003) found that 
learners who were trained to perform t-tests using 
conceptual equations were better able to transfer their 
knowledge to solve Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
problems than were learners trained to solve t-tests using 
computational equations.   
Even students who posses both computational skill and 
conceptual knowledge, however, often fail to make use of 
their conceptual knowledge (Trumpower, 2003).  Anecdotal 
evidence is provided by students who are able to perform a 
particular statistical computation accurately, but who then 
fail to draw accurate conclusions based on the computation.  
It is possible that this situation is caused by students’ 
tendencies to solve statistics problems by immediately 
looking for appropriate equations and then plugging 
numbers into those equations (i.e., “plugging and 
chugging”) before thinking about what the equations and 
numbers actually represent.  If so, then forcing learners to 
answer some simple conceptual questions before performing 
computations may create links between conceptual and 
procedural knowledge, and thus allow them to draw more 
accurate conclusions.  This hypothesis was tested in the 
present study. 
Method 
Twenty-eight undergraduate psychology students at 
Marshall University who had not previously taken any 
statistics courses served as participants.  All participants 
were first asked to study a booklet that described a 
procedure for performing an independent-groups t-test and 
provided a solved example.  Participants were then asked to 
perform 2 independent-groups t-tests and to state their 
conclusions based on the results of the tests.  Half of the 
participants were randomly assigned to a conceptual 
condition in which they were asked to answer a series of 
conceptual questions before performing the t-tests.  The 
other half were assigned to a procedural condition in which 
they performed both t-tests before answering the conceptual 
questions. 
Results 
Participants’ computations and conclusions for the two t-
tests were scored for accuracy. Also the percentage of 
conceptual questions answered correctly was determined for 
each participant.  A one-way ANOVA revealed no 
significant difference between the percentage of conceptual 
questions answered correctly by participants in the 
conceptual and procedural conditions, F<1.  A 2 Condition 
(conceptual, procedural) x 2 Assessment Type 
(computations, conclusions) mixed factorial ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the second factor revealed a 
significant main effect of Assessment Type, F(1, 26) = 
58.40, p < .001, that was qualified by a significant 
Condition by Problem Type interaction, F(1, 26) = 8.03, p < 
.01.  Participants in the procedural condition made more 
accurate computations than participants in the conceptual 
condition, whereas participants in the conceptual condition 
drew more accurate conclusions than participants in the 
procedural condition. 
Discussion 
Although participants in both conditions were equally 
capable of answering simple conceptual questions, those 
who answered them before performing computations were 
better able to draw accurate conclusions from the 
computations than those who performed the computations 
first.  However, answering the conceptual questions first 
appears to have interfered with performing the 
computations.  This latter finding may have been due to 
increased cognitive load of participants in the conceptual 
condition, as they may have been thinking about 
implications of the conceptual questions while performing 
computations. 
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Introduction
Disfluencies are a normal part of everyday conversation, yet
until the past few years, they were viewed only as speech
errors and little attention had been paid to their potential
functions.  Recent research has determined that some of
these disfluencies help to coordinate conversational
processes.  For example, speakers use both um and uh to
indicate a delay in speech production, with um indicating a
longer delay than uh (Smith & H. H. Clark, 1983; H. H.
Clark & Fox Tree, 2002).  These signals not only are
systematically conveyed by the speaker but also appear to
be used by the listener when recognizing words (Fox Tree,
2001).
Children are observed to use um and uh as young as two-
years-old, about the same time that they are starting to learn
many other content and function words (Van Der Wege,
1996).  However, the proper adult-like use of these
disfluencies requires cognitive abilities that most other
words do not.   A child must conceive of a listener as a
separate being with a separate understanding from his own.
Preschool-aged children are often described as egocentric,
unable to take another’s perspective when reasoning or
using language (Flavell, 2001; Glucksberg, Krauss, &
Weisberg, 1966).  Nevertheless, two-year-old children
frequently make spontaneous repairs to their speech for the
benefit of their listener, indicating that they have an
awareness both of the communicative purpose of language
and of what their listeners may or may not understand (E. V.
Clark & Anderson, 1979).
The current study addresses whether this level of
metalinguistic awareness is sufficient for the child to use
disfluencies in systematic ways or if the ability to take
another’s perspective is critical.
Method
Sixty children between the ages of 3 years, 11 months and 6
years from two different preschools were interviewed.  All
children completed two tasks with a familiar adult.  First,
they recounted the details of a story, heard for the first time
the morning of the interview.  Second, they described and
discussed a favorite toy.
All conversations were transcribed and digitized.  Using a
sound editing computer program, the lengths of the pauses
surrounding all ums and uhs were measured and recorded.
Results and Discussion
When talking about their toys, older preschool children (age
5-6 years) used um and uh systematically, in the same way
that adults do (i.e., um preceded longer pauses than uh).
Younger children (age 3-4 years) did not appear to
distinguish between their use of the two disfluencies.  The
distinction was also not seen when the children were
recounting the details of the story that they had heard.  This
was a significant three-way ANOVA interaction (F[4,2210]
= 4.01, p < 0.01).
Apparently, children begin to use um and uh early in their
linguistic lives, recognizing the need to mark speech
difficulties.  However, they do not have the ability to use
these disfluencies in an adult-like manner until later, when
they have sufficient cognitive resources to take another’s
perspective.
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Introduction 
Traditional linguistics seeks to specify the universal and 
absolute properties of phonology and produce a set of 
inviolable rules.  These rules serve to make binary 
distinctions between allowable forms and disallowed ones.  
In a thoughtful analysis by Harris (1994) such a set is 
described.  However, this approach has difficulty accounting 
for graded differences in frequency among phonological 
forms that do not violate the rules, except to acknowledge 
certain preferences. For example, post-vocalic stops are 
more frequent in the context of a short vowel than a long 
vowel, though they occur with both. 
The alternative approach taken in this investigation is to 
use a set of graded constraints to determine the frequency of 
a phonological form. This single mechanism captures both 
the binary and graded patterns assuming that the degree of 
concordance with the constraints is what determines the 
frequency.  The less concordant a form is with the 
constraints the lower its frequency, and an unattested form is 
one that is extremely discordant.   The approach taken here 
is similar to a graded version of Optimality theory 
(Boersma, 2000; Prince & Smolensky, 1993).  In the 
following model, concordance with constraints is motivated 
by the observation that more complicated forms tend to be 
less frequently used than simpler forms, perhaps because as 
more phonetic material is added to a syllable there is an 
overall compression that makes articulation and perception 
difficult.   
Graded Model 
Phonotactic constraints differ in word internal and word-
final contexts, and weaken both across morphological 
boundaries and from onset to rhyme. Rather than deal with 
all the sources of complexity at the outset of the 
investigation we limit our analysis to the rhymes of 
monosyllabic monomorphemic words.  Furthermore, only 
those rhymes that contain a stop and follow principles of 
sonority sequencing (Harris, 1994) were considered.  
Vowels were categorized as either long or short with further 
distinctions ignored. So, rhymes under consideration have 
the following form: a long or short vowel followed by an 
optional liquid, optional nasal, or optional coronal fricative 
followed by a requisite stop followed by an optional coronal 
fricative or optional coronal stop.  This yields a set of 64 
possible rhymes, consisting of a vowel plus up to two 
additional phonemes, of which 38 are realized in English.   
Each rhyme was characterized as a set of complexity-
adding features, such as the presence of a fricative after the 
stop. The frequency of occurrence, measured as the average 
number of words that use the rhyme per vowel, was then 
predicted by a linear function which starts with a positive 
baseline and assesses a weighted penalty for each of the 
features.  The weight was adjusted so that the model would 
predict the average number of words that use each rhyme 
type per vowel.  Only those forms that occur in the language 
were allowed to contribute to weight adjustment.  
The features used in the model and their final weighted 
penalty values were: presence of a long vowel (-5.46), stop 
voicing (-4.79), features to indicate whether the stop is 
labial (-4.75) or back (-3.22), the presence of a pre-stop 
homorganic nasal (-10.06), a pre-stop liquid (-13.96), a pre-
stop coronal fricative (-12.93), a post stop coronal fricative 
(-12.80), and a post-stop coronal stop (-15.93).  The positive 
baseline was 21.21.  In terms of predicting which terms are 
attested in English, the model predicts a positive frequency 
of occurrence for 32 of the 38 that do occur, and a zero 
frequency of occurrence for 21 the 26 forms that do not.  
Among the forms that actually occur in English the model 
predicts 89% of the variance in the frequency per vowel. 
Discussion 
Previous linguistic work characterized phonology using a 
set of rules remaining largely unconcerned with graded 
patterns in the language.  The goal for this investigation was 
to formulate a simple graded constraint model that could 
account for the binary distinction of which forms are 
attested in English and which are not, as well as account for 
the variations in frequencies among occurring forms.  Based 
on the results from this simple model, continued 
development seems justified. 
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 Studies of human tutoring suggest that the participants’ use of natural language might be 
crucial to the effectiveness of human tutoring.  In order to study the impact of natural 
language on learning, we compared 2 kinds of human tutoring (spoken and computer-
mediated) with 2 kinds of natural-language-based computer tutoring (Why2-Atlas and 
Why2-AutoTutor) and 2 kinds text studying.  Students solved qualitative physics 
problems by writing paragraph-long explanations and (in some conditions) discussing 
them with a tutor.  Results from 5 experiments suggest that natural language tutoring is 
more effective than studying a text without a tutor unless (a) the students are motivated to 
self-explain the text thoroughly, (b) they have the prior knowledge to successfully self-
explain the text, and (c) the content of the text matches the content of the assessments.  If 
all three conditions are met, as they were in some of our experiments, then studying a text 
elicits the same learning gains as tutoring, even human tutoring.  These results are 
consistent with current theories of cognitive skill acquisition, and with the benefits of 
tutoring in practical settings where students often lack appropriate engagement, prior 
knowledge and texts. 
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Introduction 
The concepts of necessity and sufficiency play a central role 
in explaining the reasoning performance. It is often argued 
that how people interpret the necessity and sufficiency 
expressed by a conditional relation has a causal impact on 
the number and types of inferences that are drawn (see e.g. 
Thompson, 2000). It is however not yet clear whether the 
formal definitions of necessity and sufficiency reflect the 
way reasoners use and interpret these concepts. 
 In logic, one proposition is a necessary condition of 
another when the second cannot be true while the first is 
false, and one proposition is a sufficient condition for 
another when the first cannot be true while the second is 
false. Research on conditional reasoning revealed that 
logical conceptions and definitions are not necessarily 
psychologically relevant or valid. The current experiment 
will verify whether participants adhere to the logical 
definitions of the concepts of necessity and sufficiency.  
 
Experiment  
A total of  28 first-year psychology students were asked to 
indicate whether each of four cause-effect combinations are 
possible or impossible. Figure 1 gives an example of the task 
for sufficiency. According to the logic definition, we should 
observe the pattern listed in Table 1 (the definition of 
sufficiency does not relate to the third combination). For 
necessity, participants should accept the first and the last 
combination and reject the third. When a reasoner considers 
a cause-effect combination possible, the answer is scored as 
1; when it is considered impossible it is scored as 0 
 
Figure 1: Example of the possibility-task.  
 
The cause is sufficient for the effect 
Combinations Possible Impossible 
1. Cause occurs – Effect occurs x  
2. Cause occurs – No effect  x 
3. No Cause – Effect occurs    
4. No Cause – No effect x  
 
Table 1 displays the results. According to the formal 
conceptualisation of necessity the ‘no cause-effect’ 
combination is illegal, whereas the combination ‘cause–no 
effect’ is irrelevant. As expected, the irrelevant combination 
was more often considered possible than the illegal 
combination, Wilcoxon T = 15, Z = 2.35, N non-ties = 14, p 
<.05. For sufficiency, the difference between the irrelevant 
‘no cause – effect’ and illegal ‘cause–no effect’ combination 
was not significant. Surprisingly, the illegal combination 
was considered possible by 60.7% of the participants.   
 
Table 1: Percentage of trials in which each combination was 
considered possible. 
 
 Cause 
Effect 
Cause   
No Effect 
No Cause 
Effect 
No Cause 
No Effect 
Sufficient 100    60.7   46.4    85.7   
Necessary 96.4   57.1   14.3    92.9   
 
When we look at the patterns of relevant combinations for a 
sufficient cause, there were 8 participants (29%) who 
considered the ‘cause–effect’, ‘cause– no effect’ and the ‘no 
cause–no effect’ combinations respectively possible, 
impossible and possible, whereas there were 16 participants 
(57%) who found all three combinations possible. For 
necessity, there were 22 participants (79%) that considered 
the ‘cause-effect’, ‘no cause-effect’ and ‘no cause- no effect’ 
respectively possible, impossible and possible, whereas only 
3 participants (11%) considered all three combinations 
possible. The ‘no cause–effect’ combination is thus 
understood as a combination that contradicts necessity, the 
combination ‘cause–no effect’ does not contract sufficiency.  
 
Conclusion 
Whereas the subjective conceptualisation of necessity 
parallels the formal definition, the subjective concept of 
sufficiency is less stringent than the formal concept. A cause 
can be considered sufficient to grant the effect, even when 
the effect does not always follow. However, when causal 
rules are used to make predictions, it can be adaptive to label 
a cause that increases the probability of the effect as 
subjectively sufficient. The observed divergence between the 
subjective and formal definition raises doubt on the claim 
that reasoners assess the formal level of sufficiency to derive 
conditional conclusions.  
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Introduction 
 
The generation of the “Place Fields” in the hippocampal 
region is a fundamental phenomenon for the processing of 
the declarative memory. The electrophysiological attributes 
are associated to the concomitant generation of theta-gamma 
activity, while, at the behavioral level, they are expressed as 
environmental exploration and attention phenomena, when 
studied in animals. However there were not described robust 
topographical pathways that sustain a direct association of 
the afferent pathways from hippocampus to specific cortical 
regions that would be recipients of the functional processes 
for the consolidation of memory and the navigational 
abilities.  
Another topic refers to the generation of the “Place 
Fields” in the several sub-fields of the hippocampal region: 
the integrated role of these attributes still stays obscure. 
 
Methods 
 
In previous studies we developed a computational neural net 
based on mathematical attributes of the Gated Dipoles and 
the opponent processing for the modeling of the generation 
of place fields. We showed on this model that the temporary 
entrance of frequencies at the net, more than the 
topographical organization, would sustain a memory system 
for the construction of place fields. We used also attributes 
of self-organizing maps to construct the system. 
In this work we expanded the developed net, with the 
integration of the several hippocampal sub-fields, based on 
anatomical and electrophysiological data, trying to get a more 
reliable model of the hippocampal function when working on 
the cited frequencies. 
 
Results 
 
In our results the concomitant generation of the Place Fields 
in different sub-fields and in an independent way would 
work in a combinatory system. So, while the afferent 
connections to the hippocampus show a progressive 
topographical condensation with a transduction for aleatory 
functional patterns in each sub-field, it happens a temporary 
filtration and accentuation of the developed information 
based on the temporal properties of the little variations on 
each frequency arriving the hippocampus. These attributes, 
associated with the internal abilities of frequency 
generation, could create a combinatory amplification of the 
capacities of storage of information that temporally would 
construct a diverse and accentuated basis for the efferent 
processes of the hippocampal system. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Finally, our suggestion is that the hippocampal complex 
functions as a transduction system from topographical to 
frequency-dependent abilities with a combinatory 
generation of memory traces based on the temporary weight 
of the established connections among cells and subfields to 
subserve the several roles attributed to it, as the participation 
on the memory consolidation, navigational abilities, 
emotional expressions, and so, adaptively timed learning. 
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Introduction 
The development of both phonological perception and 
semantic acquisition has been well studied, yet the 
connection between these remains a mystery. Research in 
phonological perception has demonstrated that infants are 
born with the ability to make fine phonetic discriminations 
(Cristophe, Jacques, & Sebastian-Galles, 2001). However, 
word-learning research has suggested infants do not make 
use of this knowledge in learning similar sounding words 
(Werker & Tees, 2002). Why? The current study suggests 
that infants have detailed phonetic representations for newly 
acquired words but suppress this information under certain 
circumstances.  
Method 
Infants from the West Lafayette/Lafayette area were tested 
at four different ages: 14, 18, 22, and 26 months. 
The present study used the splitscreen preferential 
looking paradigm. This paradigm presents two objects, one 
on each side of a screen while audio stimuli requests one of 
the objects. The experiment consisted of two sequences. The 
first sequence attempted to teach infants a novel word (e.g. 
“chab”) while the second sequence attempted to teach a 
second novel word that was phonologically similar to the 
previously taught word (e.g. “chas”). The auditory stimuli 
for this sequence were presented in a different voice 
(differing in gender) from the second sequence. The order of 
voices and specific words were counterbalanced across 
subjects. 
Each sequence consisted of four types of trials. Infants 
first had a training trial where they were presented with a 
single object on the screen and the novel label for that 
object. This was always followed by a salience trial where 
the object the infant heard labeled was presented on one side 
of the screen and another object was presented on the other 
side. Auditory stimulus was played that was not intended to 
direct attention to either object (e.g “What do you see?”).  
The infants then saw the two test trials (label and similar), 
the order of which were counterbalanced to control for order 
effects. In the label condition, the object that the infants saw 
in training was requested. In the similar condition, the 
similar word was requested. The logic of the procedure was 
that if infants learned the word in the test phase, they should 
look longer at it during the label trials than in the salience 
trials or the similar trials.  
Results and Discussion 
Although performance did increase with age, even at 14 
months, infants looked significantly longer at the labeled 
object when it was requested during the first sequence. 
Furthermore, they did not look longer at the label object in 
the salience or similar trials. In those trials, infants looked 
longer at the unlabeled object. This switch in looking 
suggests that infants noticed and rejected phonetic 
differences when the voice was the same, demonstrating that 
they can make fine phonetic discriminations in the context 
of a word-learning task. However, infants did not notice the 
same phonetic differences when the talker was changed in 
the second sequence of trials.   
There are two logical explanations for the results from the 
second sequence of trials. Perhaps infants pragmatically 
noticed the switch between voices and assumed that the 
phonetic differences in this case were not meaningful. This 
strategy may cause mislabeling when the task is to learn 
similar sounding words, but it may ultimately lead to more 
successful labeling in the real world where phonetic signals 
are more variable and normalization is key. Alternatively, it 
is possible that the task of attaching meaning to the second 
word caused the difficulty. Specifically, it is possible that 
infants lost track of which word went with which object 
(something even adults will do, on occasion). In this case, 
the switch in voice was irrelevant. Even if the voice had 
been the same, infants would have had the same difficulties 
in the second block of trials.  
Ongoing studies are examining whether it was the 
change in talker or the learning of a second word that caused 
the difficulties in the second block of trials. However, the 
current results suggest that infants do posses fine phonetic 
distinctions in a word learning task, even at 14 months, and 
that they will ignore these distinctions when memory or 
pragmatic conditions dictate. 
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1. Introduction  
Optimality Theory (OT) (Prince & Smolensky 
1993) has been widely adopted in phonology and has also 
been successfully applied to syntax, semantics, and 
pragmatics.  One reason OT has been so rapidly accepted is 
that its initial presentation was closely tied to a 
connectionist realization (Blutner, et al. forthcoming).  
Goldwater and Johnson (2003) suggest that another reason 
for OT’s recent dominance is that there are algorithms for 
learning constraint rankings.  However, these elements of 
OT’s success  (learning algorithms and connectionist 
realizations) have not yet been unified in a connectionist 
network that learns constraint rankings.  
  A grammar in Optimality Theory is defined by a 
set of ranked violable constraints.  The function GEN takes 
a base form as input and generates an infinite set of 
candidates.  EVAL then selects the optimal realization from 
among these candidates, obeying the criterion that the 
ordering of constraints is strictly dominant.  Archangeli 
(1997) reviews how re-ranking a few violable constraints 
(ONSET, PEAK, NOCODA, *COMPLEX, FAITHC, AND FAITHV) 
accounts for a large number of the syllable structures 
attested in the languages of the world.  Within this domain 
of syllable structure, we explore the dilemma of learning a 
constraint ranking in a connectionist network.  The goal is 
to design a network that can learn the well-formedness of 
test syllables, based on positive training data generated from 
a particular ranking of the violable constraints. 
2. Fixed-Point Membership 
Now, let G be a harmonic grammar.  The task is to 
determine if an input form w is in L(G).  Define language 
membership as follows w ∈ L(G) iff EVAL( GEN(w) ) = w.  
In words, membership is equated with being a fixed-point of 
OT generation.  This concept of membership provides a 
powerful framework, in which recognition can be performed 
via a fixed point test on an input form.  
Translating this notion to a Harmonic Network—
where input is equivalent to clamping the initial activation 
state—if, after the network is allowed to harmonize, the 
input pattern is the same as the output pattern, then the input 
form is in the language of the harmonic grammar described 
by the weights of the network.  If however, the input and 
output pattern differ, then the input form is not in the 
language prescribed by the grammar because the more 
harmonic activation state corresponds to some other output 
form, so the form fails the fixed-point test.  Thus, learning 
well-formedness is tantamount to learning the identity map.  
Poverty of the stimulus issues bear heavily on this problem 
because we require that the identity map be learned from 
only positive data. 
3. Data, Representation, and Learning   
Sample data consists of valid phonetic 
combinations of consonants and vowels, e.g. for a CV 
language, [ba], [mi], and [po] may be present in the training.  
Network evaluation is determined by way of the well-
formedness scores of a random collection of test syllables of 
various structure (CV, CVC, CCV, etc.).  Only those 
syllables that are in the language of the net’s grammar will 
be fixed points, and all forms that are not in the language 
will not. 
We represent syllables in a fully connected-
symmetric network made by copying a set of fillers (one 
unit per consonant or vowel) for every role position (peak, 
onset, etc.).  We allow for complex onsets and codas, by 
placing multiple filler sets in a position. Thus, ‘tint’ =[tInt], 
is represented by activating the t unit in the Onset filler set, 
the I unit in the Nucleus filler set, the n unit on in the first 
coda filler set, and the t unit  in second coda filler set. 
We compare two different algorithms for learning 
the weights of the network: backpropagation through time 
and Boltzmann learning.  Preliminary experiments show 
that the first is unsuccessful at learning the elements in the 
complement of the training set are ungrammatical, whereas 
because of its negative phase of training, Boltzmann 
learning can learn the well-formedness of syllables. 
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It has been suggested that new perceptual features can be 
“created” when they are necessary for a particular task. For 
instance, by “unitization” (Goldstone, 2000), components 
which were previously processed separately become 
represented as a wholistic unit. Certain associative theories 
(McLaren, Kaye and Mackintosh, 1989) explain unitization 
as the establishment of connections between reliably co-
occurring elements of a stimulus. By this account, after 
unitization, sampling a subset of featural elements causes 
retrieval of the whole feature. Given that the model assumes 
that only a proportion of elements are sampled on any 
presentation, unitization could lead to an increase in 
subjective salience of a feature.  
This account does not require that the feature is 
necessary for a task (e.g., diagnostic of a category) for 
unitization to occur, merely that its elements co-occur. 
Experiments 1 and 2 indicate firstly that features emerge 
through simple pre-exposure as well as when they are 
diagnostic, and secondly, that the process of emergence may 
increase the collective salience of the feature’s components.  
 
Method 
 
Our stimuli consisted of 75% trial-unique random noise, and 
25% “feature”, which could occur in any of the four corners 
of a stimulus. There were four “non-obvious” features (NOF 
condition) and four “control features” (control condition), 
which were horizontal lines, vertical lines, and two types of 
square. Figure 1 shows an example of each, with the feature 
in the top left. 
Forty-eight undergraduate students from Exeter 
University participated in each of Experiments 1 and 2, for 
course credits or 4 GBP. In both experiments, half of the 
participants were in the NOF condition and half in the 
control condition. Every participant completed a training 
phase followed by a test phase. The training phase consisted 
of repeated exposure to two of the four features (of the 
participant’s feature type condition). Stimuli were displayed 
one after another on a computer monitor, and each stimulus 
contained one feature, in variable location. In Experiment 1, 
the training phase was a binary choice category learning 
task in which each feature was diagnostic of a category, and 
in Experiment 2, participants had to judge the aesthetic 
appeal of each stimulus on a 9-point scale.  
The test phase (identical for both experiments) involved 
all four features (two trained and two untrained) from that 
participant’s condition. In the first task, pairs of stimuli 
containing a common feature (the remainder of each 
stimulus was independently randomly created) were 
presented for 2 seconds each, after which a similarity 
judgment was made on a scale of 1 (not at all similar) to 9 
(very similar). This was followed by a triad task, in which 
  
Figure 1: Non-obvious feature stimulus (left) and control 
stimulus (right) 
 
participants were presented with three stimuli (X, Y and Z) 
simultaneously, and had to decide which two were the most 
similar. X and Y shared 25% in the form of one of the 
“features”, and X and Z shared 75% but in the form of trial-
unique, randomly created noise. Of principle interest are 
differences in test phase performance with features that have 
been trained as opposed to untrained. 
Results and discussion 
 
In the NOF condition of both experiments, the number of 
times that the X and Y pair in the triads task was chosen as 
more similar than the X and Z pair was significantly greater 
for trained than untrained features. Contrastingly, training 
had no effect on control features’ salience. The sequential 
similarity judgment task showed similar results. In the NOF 
condition of both experiments, similarity judgments were 
higher for pairs of stimuli containing trained than untrained 
features. This was not seen for the control features, whose 
salience significantly decreased with training in Experiment 
2 (and did not change in Experiment 1).  For both test phase 
tasks, effects of training were not significantly different for 
the two experiments.  
The results indicate that novel features, which are 
presumably not represented prior to the experiment, became 
more salient through training. This is not dependent on their 
explicit usefulness. Theories of the allocation of attention to 
existing attributes (e.g., Kruschke 1996) would have trouble 
accounting for the increase in salience due to simple pre-
exposure of a feature, and the McLaren et al. model can 
predict that the unitization process itself may be responsible.  
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The ability to assess the similarity of objects in the
world is fundamentally important to our survival. Many
theories have been proposed for modeling human similar-
ity judgments. Most of these theories involve comparing
the sets of features of the compared items to determine
the overlap between them. Many of them completely ig-
nore the structure of the objects and the relationships
between the parts. Goldstone (1994) showed that such
systems fail to account for human similarity ratings of
structured data. His SIAM system used a (non-learning)
connectionist architecture to create correspondences be-
tween objects and their features in different scenes. Ex-
citatory connections reinforced coherent mappings be-
tween objects (e.g. ObjectA to ObjectC and ObjectB to
ObjectD). Inhibitory connections fought against redun-
dant or contradictory mappings. Likewise, connections
between the features of objects either supported or in-
hibited each other and the corresponding object–object
connections. SIAM’s connectionist architecture allowed
it to take into account the structure of the scenes and
the objects as well as the similarity of the features.
Goldstone examined similarity ratings of visual
scenes. His approach represented a scene as a spatially
related set of objects (for example, pairs of schematic
butterflies). Each object has a set of parts each of
which has some value. For example, one of Goldstone’s
butterflies could be represented as: (object1 (head
square) (tail zig-zag) (body-shading white)
(wing-shading checkered)).
In previous research, we have explored the use of La-
tent Semantic Analysis (LSA) for judging the semantic
similarity of a given sentence to a set of alternative tar-
get sentences. Although LSA has been shown to match
the reliability of raters with intermediate domain knowl-
edge, the correlation between LSA and human ratings
is still somewhat disappointing, generally below 0.5 in a
number of studies (Wiemer-Hastings, Wiemer-Hastings,
& Graesser, 1999). In recent research, we have pursued
the general hypothesis that including structural knowl-
edge would improve the correspondence between human
and LSA ratings. We found that by performing syntac-
tic analysis of the source and target sentences and sepa-
rately comparing their subjects, objects, and verbs with
LSA, we could reduce the error by over 10% (Wiemer-
Hastings & Zipitria, 2001).
In the current research, we explored the use of
SIAM to combine the analysis of the structural as-
pects of the sentences with the semantic similarity rat-
ings provided by LSA. To map this approach to sen-
tences, we broke the inputs into subject, verb, ob-
ject, and indirect object parts. Thus, a simple repre-
sentation of the sentence “The dog bit a man” as an
object would be: (object1 (verb "bit") (subject
"The dog") (object "a man")). The advantage of
SIAM-LSA over the previous model (Structured LSA,
or SLSA) is that its connectionist architecture allows
the different components to “compete” for correspon-
dence, instead of relying on a direct mapping of sub-
ject, verb, and object segments. Our basic hypothesis
was that SIAM-LSA would provide a closer match to
human ratings than SLSA. A secondary hypothesis was
that providing a salience value to give differential weight
to the different structural components of the sentences
would better match human ratings.
In our experiment, we compared human ratings with
the basic SIAM-LSA system and the system augmented
with salience values. Our results did not support the ba-
sic hypothesis. In fact, SIAM-LSA performed worse than
LSA or SLSA. When we included empirically derived
weights which accentuated verb and object matches but
completely devalued subject matches, the ratings corre-
lated with human ratings r = 0.59, another 10% reduc-
tion in the error over SLSA. In accordance with (Resnik,
1993), this suggests that humans essentially ignore the
role of syntactic subjects when matching sentence mean-
ings.
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Background
Food in a natural environment is often distributed in
patches, spots of higher resource abundance than in the
surrounding area. For an animal or human searching on
the sea shore, each patch might be a rock pool. Models of
animal foraging have considered the situation where such
patches vary in their initial quality (return rates), where
this may be hard to judge because food items are hidden,
and where foraging progressively depletes the resource.
As animals learn about and simultaneously deplete a
patch they should eventually decide to move because
greater success is expected elsewhere.
The optimal strategy in such a situation is given by the
Marginal Value Theorem (MVT): leave a patch when the
instantaneous rate of return falls below the long-term
return rate in the whole environment when following the
optimal policy (Charnov, 1976). However, the MVT does
not offer a mechanistic solution if mean return rate in the
environment is not known and if foraging is a succession
of discrete events in which items are encountered
stochastically (McNamara, 1982). Behavioural ecologists
have both derived optimal departure rules in these
circumstances and investigated the performance of sub-
optimal rules of thumb (such as giving up after a constant
time) which may be computationally simpler (Iwasa,
Higashi & Yamamura, 1981; Green, 1984; Bell, 1991).
Which rules perform well depends on whether patches are
evenly dispersed in quality or some are very good and the
others very poor. In the former environment finding an
item should decrease the tendency to stay, whereas in the
latter the opposite is true. This theory indeed explains
why related species of insect utilising differently
dispersed resources use different rules.
Hypotheses
We propose that humans also should be adapted to decide
when to give up on one food patch and move to another,
and that they may apply similar simple heuristics as
animals have been shown to use. But because humans are
intelligent generalists, feeding on some foods which are
evenly dispersed across patches and on some which are
aggregated in a few better patches, we further predict that
humans are sensitive to this aspect of our environment
and are able to adapt our heuristics accordingly.
Additionally we propose that the patch-leaving heuristics
that we use in foraging tasks are also used to decide when
to give up on other tasks. We have designed two
computerised experiments to test these hypotheses.
Methods
External search: the fishing task
Participants are given a virtual landscape in which they
have to monitor ponds (i.e. patches), forage for fish and
decide on how long to stay at each pond. All ponds appear
equal, but the number of fish in each varies. Each
participant experiences either a dispersed, aggregated or
Poisson distribution of fishes per patch, and we will also
vary the mean travel time between ponds. The probability
of finding a fish is proportional to the number left in the
pond. Participants see only the number of fish caught at
the current pond (and must judge times and rates without
reference to a clock). They receive payment at the end
depending on the total number of fish caught at all ponds
in a fixed time.
Internal search: the word puzzle task
Participants are presented with a modified anagram task
in which they search for words from memory. Meaningful
words must be generated out of meaningless sequences of
letters. Analogously to the first task, participants
experience one of three types of patch quality distribution,
must decide when to switch to the next sequence, and are
paid by their overall success. We attempt to match the
environmental parameters in these two tasks as closely as
possible.
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In a polymorphous concept, features are characteristic rather
than defining. In Figure 1a, a triangle, an upwards arrow and
a pound sign are characteristic of category A. Stimuli are
members of category A if they contain more features
characteristic of A than features characteristic of B.  Dennis,
Hampton and Lea (1973) found that polymorphous concepts
took considerably longer to acquire to an errorless criterion
than either conjunctive or disjunctive rules; conjunctive
rules being precisely the sort of structure rejected as
"unnaturalistic" by much of contemporary categorization
research.
Humans are not the only species to find the acquisition
of polymorphous concepts very difficult. In one study with
pigeons (von Fersen & Lea, 1990), separate training on each
of the stimulus feature-pairs was eventually required in
order to train the concept. If it could be demonstrated, with
appropriate control groups, that this sort of pre-training was
more effective than an equal length of training on the full
problem, this would present a challenge to some theories of
learning in both pigeons and in people.
Method
The left-hand panel of Figure 1b shows a stimulus
containing all five features characteristic of category A.
From the outside in, the five feature-pairs are a) flankers
(fine/coarse), b) trapezium, c) stars/blobs, d) colored square
(yellow/blue), and e) lines (orientation).
Sixty undergraduate students from Exeter University
participated for course credit or 4 GBP. Standard category
acquisition procedures were followed throughout - stimuli
were presented one at a time, a category decision requested
("category A or B?") and feedback given immediately after
each decision.
There were three between-subject conditions. In the
SINGLE condition, feature pairs were trained one at a time.
For example, a participant might first be trained on the
problem "stars -> category A / blobs > category B", and
would then move on to the next feature-pair. The order in
which the five feature-pairs were trained was randomized
across participants. Once all five feature-pairs had been
trained individually, participants were moved, in the second
phase, to the full polymorphous set of 32 (25) stimuli for
four blocks of trials. Subjects in the POLY condition
received the same total number of training trials as the
subjects in the SINGLE condition, but all trials were with
the full polymorphous stimuli.
Subjects in the SINGLE (REV) condition received
single-feature training in the same manner as the SINGLE
group. The difference was that the category associations of
three out of the five feature pairs were (unbeknownst to the
subject) reversed prior to the polymorphous training phase.
Thus, if they had initially been trained that "stars ->
category A / blobs > category B", then in the polymorphous
phase, "blobs" were characteristic of category A and "stars"
were characteristic of category B.
Results and discussion
Participants in SINGLE condition were considerably more
accurate on the polymorphous problem than participants
who had done that problem throughout, but they were also
slower (longer RTs).
If these results were entirely due to general motivation
or strategic factors then one might expect the reversal in the
SINGLE (REV) condition to have relatively little effect. In
contrast, if the SINGLE group is more accurate and slower
because specific categorical knowledge acquired in phase
one is transferred to phase two, then this reversal between
the phases should dramatically affect performance. In fact,
participants in the SINGLE(REV) condition were
significantly worse at the polymorphous problem than
participants in either of the other two conditions, but their
reaction times were comparable to those in the SINGLE
condition. Our working hypothesis is that the specific
categorical knowledge acquired in the single feature-pair
phase does indeed facilitate polymorphous categorization,
but that there may also be important strategic/motivational
effects.
Exemplar models (e.g. Nosofsky, 1986) explain
aquisition of categorical knowledge by stating that we store
labelled instances of categories. In "broad-brush" terms, it
seems difficult to explain, from an exemplar-based account,
why trading an exact copy of the stimulus you need to make
a decision about for stimuli that contain only small parts of
it would be beneficial to categorization accuracy.
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This study examines how representations for relations are 
formed during initial stimulus encoding.  One possibility is 
parallel encoding of elements and relations, such that 
detection of relations does not require binding, but rather 
involves matching a new stimulus to a relational template or 
schema that is retrieved from LTM.  A second possibility is 
a serial account: that there is no direct detection of relations, 
but rather binding occurs only after elements have detected, 
at which point their configuration is encoded.   
 These two possibilities make differing predictions 
regarding the encoding of elements and relations.  First, the 
first possibility predicts that elements and relations should 
be represented comparably, whereas the second possibility 
predicts that relations should be represented less often than 
elements.  Second, the two possibilities differ in their 
expectation of illusory binding (i.e., binding of target 
elements to a distracter relation, or distracter elements to a 
target relation).  The first possibility predicts that illusory 
binding should be symmetrical: given that both elements 
and relations are identified, there should be both binding of 
distracter elements to a target relation and binding of a 
distracter relation to target elements.  On the other hand, the 
second possibility predicts that illusory binding should be 
asymmetrical: given that elements, but not relations, are 
identified prior to binding, there should be binding of 
distracter elements to a target relation, but not binding of a 
distracter relation to target elements, since this latter case 
requires an identified relational schema. 
To distinguish between the two possibilities, we 
incorporated an immediate recognition procedure.  The 
general procedure involved subjects receiving on each trial 
two study items in succession (presented on a computer 
screen), one a target and one a distracter, with order of 
presentation randomly counterbalanced across trials.  
Subjects then received two recognition items simultaneously 
on the screen, with one of these items being an old item 
(i.e., identical to the target study item), and the other a foil.  
Subjects’ task was to choose which of these items had been 
presented during the study phase (i.e., the target).  Subjects’ 
choices and latencies were recorded. 
The stimuli used were three horizontally-aligned shapes, 
with elements being shapes of objects and relations being 
the patterns among 3 shapes within each arrangement.  
Three relations were used (ABA, AAB, and ABB), with A 
and B representing different shapes (e.g., an ABA relation 
might be circle-square-circle).  A second within-participants 
factor was the type of foil paired with an Old target (in the 
forced-choice recognition task). There were 5 types of  foils: 
ENew/RTarget foils (same relation as target, but new elements), 
ETarget/RNew foils (same elements as target, but a new 
relation), ETarget/RDistractor foils (same elements as target, but 
relation from the distracter item), EDistractor/RTarget foils (same 
relation as target, but elements from the distracter item), and 
ENew/RNew foils (new elements and relations). 
The two possibilities predict different patterns of accuracy 
across foil types.  If relations are detected directly, then 
there should be no difference in accuracy between 
ENew/RTarget foils and ETarget/RNew foils, since participants 
should be equivalently sensitive to violations of both 
elements and relations.  However, a different pattern was 
found: participants made fewer choices of ENew/RTarget foils 
than ETarget/RNew foils, indicating that they were more likely 
to have encoded elements than relations. 
Comparisons among foils also afford examination of 
illusory binding for elements and relations.  If participants 
directly detect elements during encoding, they should be 
more likely to choose a foil containing elements from the 
distracter study item (EDistractor/RTarget foils) than elements not 
presented in the study phase (ENew/RTarget foils) of that trial.  
At the same time, if participants directly detect relations 
during encoding, they should be more likely to choose a foil 
containing relations from the distracter study item 
(ETarget/RDistractor foils) than relations not presented in the 
study phase (ETarget/RNew foils).  Consistent with both 
possibilities, there was evidence of illusory binding for 
distracter elements onto target relations; however, consistent 
only with the second possibility, there was not symmetrical 
illusory binding for relations.  In other words, participants 
were not more likely to choose the foil containing distracter 
relations than the one containing new relations, indicating 
that distracter relations were not represented above and 
beyond relations never presented during the trial. 
Thus, data clearly support the second possibility, that 
unlike elements, relations are not detected directly during 
encoding, but more likely representations for relations 
emerge from configural binding of elements.  Of course, it 
could very well be the case that this is only true for 
unlearned relations such as those used here.  Future studies 
will involve training of relations to examine whether well-
learned relations are detected directly at encoding.  
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Introduction 
A robust finding in working memory research is that to recall a 
set of phonologically similar words is much more difficult than 
to recall a set of phonologically dissimilar words, which is the 
well-known phonological-similarity effect (Conrad & Hull, 
1964). This finding points out that the capacity of information 
retention in our working memory store more or less depends on 
the phonological nature of the to-be-memorized information. 
The more similar (phonologically) of the to-be-memorized item, 
the more difficult to retain in the working memory store. 
However, most of the Chinese people have the subjective 
experience that to immediately recall a set of colloquial slogans 
in television advertisement is much more easier than to 
immediately recall a set of common sentences due to the 
similarity of prosody. There is also evidence showing that 
rhyming of verbal information usually enhances our 
memorization ability (Fallon, Groves, & Tehan, 1999). 
Therefore, how to explain these contradicting observations is 
very important in order to get a fuller understanding to the 
operation of the working memory model (Baddeley, 1992). 
In the memory study done by Saito (1998), he reported 
that intonation of a sentence might make a contribution to 
participants recall performance (see also Pennington & Ellis, 
2000). Following to this point and together with our 
aforementioned subjective experience, we can see that prosodic 
information may be useful to our recall performance to the 
verbal information to an extent, simply like to recall a colloquial 
slogan in advertisement for a brief period of time. Reviewing 
the relevant literature so far, there are a lot of empirical works 
conducted on this issue in the domain of language research: 
comprehension and production (Sevald & Dell, 1994; 
Slowiaczek, McQueen, Soltano, & Lynch, 2000; Soto-Faraco, 
Sebastián-Gallés & Cutler, 2001). However, little consideration 
has been given to how these different phonological 
characteristics of a word affect the recall performance in 
working memory so far despite of their interdependency. 
Hence, the major objective in the present study is to 
examine how the phonological characteristics of a word 
influence the recall performance in working memory, which is a 
theoretically interesting but still unexplored question. 
Experiment 
A typical word span task with Chinese words as the materials 
was used to examine the phonological characteristics of a word 
on the recall performance. The main variable in the present 
experiment is the different degree of phonological similarity, 
whether those Chinese words presented in the testing lists 
shared any phonological characteristics (onset, rime and tone) 
among themselves or not (see Yip, 2004 for details). 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to read aloud lists of displayed Chinese 
words on the computer screen one by one. And then, they were 
asked to recall the Chinese words from the list out loud as many 
as possible, and the experimenter counted the correctness of 
their verbal responses at the end of each list. Altogether, each 
participant received forty lists with a total of 400 Chinese words 
in the experiment within two sessions with a break. Each 
session included 100 phonologically similar items and 100 
phonologically dissimilar items. The order of presentation for 
the lists was randomly assigned in the two sessions. The whole 
experiment lasted for forty minutes. 
Results and Discussion 
Two main findings in the present study were concluded.  
First, the present results indicate that one major source of 
phonological-similarity decrement comes from the overlapping 
of the segmental information of the to-be-memorized materials. 
This phonological overlapping among the to-be-memorized 
words poses difficulties for participants to perceive and to 
rehearse because of the acoustic confusion among the words, 
which is consistent with the previous research findings. 
Second, the prosodic information of the to-be-memorized 
materials seems to be retained longer in the working memory. 
This overlapping of tonal information among words even 
produces a phonological-similarity facilitatory effect. Finally, 
based on the present results, the traditional concept of the term 
similar in the phonological-similarity effect should be 
re-conceptualized. Because similarity in prosodic information, 
unlike the similarity in segmental information, will not create 
any interference effect in working memory, but a facilitatory 
effect will occur in working memory instead. 
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How can we formally capture the complex semantic 
relationships of the human lexicon? This question has been 
the focus of much recent computational studies. The ability 
to represent semantics faithfully in formal mechanisms not 
only is important for understanding the nature of the lexical 
system of natural languages, but also has significant 
implications for understanding the mental representation of 
meaning and its processing and acquisition.  
Two best-known models in this regard are the Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997) and 
the Hyperspace Analog to Language (HAL; Burgess & 
Lund, 1997). Both of them are based on large-scale 
computational analyses of human speech corpora. The LSA 
model represents the corpora as a high-dimensional co-
occurrence matrix of words in texts, and reduces its 
dimensions using singular value decomposition. The HAL 
model builds a semantic word co-occurrence matrix, which 
is weighted according to co-occurrence frequency. In 
contrast to these two models that automatically extract 
meanings by computational algorithms, a third model, the 
WordNet (Miller, 1990), is a computational thesaurus that 
provides semantic classification of the English lexicon in 
terms of hyponyms, synonyms, and antonyms, as well as 
searchable word entries with semantic definitions. Harm 
(2002) developed a system to extract the semantic features 
of the WordNet definitions so that lexical entries can be 
represented as feature-based vectors. In this study, we 
examine the virtues and drawbacks of the three models with 
respect to their ability to represent semantics accurately.  
Because of our interest in modeling a developmental 
lexicon, we selected as our test vocabulary 600 words from 
the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventories 
(CDI; Dale & Fenson, 1996). The vocabulary can be divided 
into four major grammatical categories (nouns, verbs, 
adjectives, and closed-class words). The nouns can be 
further divided into 12 subcategories according to their 
meanings (e.g., clothes, toys, food, etc). The LSA, HAL and 
WordNet matrices used in our analyses were made available 
either by the authors or by their electronic distributions. 
To examine the accuracy of word classification and 
representations of the three models, we used a simple k-
nearest neighbor (kNN) classifier (Duda, Hart & Stork, 
2000). The average classification rates of 4 grammatical 
categories and the 12 noun subcategories were treated 
respectively with a 5NN classifier. Figure 1 presents the 
results. It shows that the WordNet vectors give the best 
classification rates overall, followed by HAL and then LSA 
for the 4 grammatical categories, and by LSA and then HAL 
for the 12 noun subcategories. The best performance of the 
WordNet model indicates that the lexicographic and 
psycholinguistic analyses of words can yield accurate 
lexical-semantic representations, although it comes with a 
price: a significant amount of work is required to hand-code 
the features of words by human researchers. The better 
performance of HAL for the major grammatical categories 
indicates that HAL captures important information about 
grammatical relationships of words because of its 
representation and weighting of word sequences (word-to-
word co-occurrence matrices). Finally, the better 
performance of LSA for the noun subcategories indicates 
that LSA is able to capture more subtle semantic differences 
and relationships among words, because a word’s 
representation in this model involves a large number of 
other words in text (word-to-text co-occurrence matrices).  
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Figure 1: Average classification rates by a 5NN classifier 
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Introduction 
Ecological systems are quite complex and dynamic, and are 
often poorly understood (Groves & Pugh, 2002). The 
multiple cause-and-effect relationships and second-order 
effects in such systems are difficult to learn and teach 
(Hogan, 2000). One example is the use of “bio-control,” 
where the introduction of a species to prey or feed on an 
unwanted species is used as an alternative to chemical 
herbicides or pesticides. Because of the complexity of 
ecological systems and the potential side effects and long-
term consequences of such actions it is often difficult to 
predict precisely the how the system will change over time. 
Therefore, it is important to understand how individuals 
think about the ecological systems and the environmental 
problems that they are being asked to make decisions about. 
The purpose of this study was to examine students’ 
reasoning about an ecological management proposal. Such 
reasoning can be influenced by many factors including 
conceptual understanding of ecological systems, perceived 
and actual scientific knowledge, the way information is 
presented and the influence of other individuals who support 
or oppose the proposal. In the current study, we focus on 
two of these factors. First, we were interested in exploring 
whether the process of self-evaluation (i.e., making students 
aware of their perceived and actual scientific knowledge) 
would affect reasoning and decision making. Attitudes, 
thoughts and beliefs are often automatic or non-conscious, 
but the conscious evaluation of one’s own beliefs or 
attitudes may be one method for changing thoughts or 
behaviors (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) and so requiring 
individuals to reflect on their current understanding of 
science could affect beliefs, reactions, or decisions. Second, 
we wanted to determine if an ecological management 
proposal described as a species introduction would invoke 
different mental models than one described as a species 
reintroduction. We hypothesized that the word 
“reintroduction” may support the inference that the species 
was “meant” to be part of the ecosystem. 
Methods 
Eighty undergraduates read and evaluated a brief news 
article (294 words) that described a proposed initiative to 
introduce wolves to the Rocky Mountain region. The article 
was adapted from an online newsletter (“Poll shows strong 
support for wolves,” 2001). Two versions were created with 
the initiative described as either an introduction or a 
reintroduction. Participants were asked a number of 
questions, including whether or not they would support the 
initiative if required to vote today, their certainty and 
confidence in their decision, and whether they felt qualified 
to vote on such an issue. Students also completed a 
questionnaire to assess perceived and actual background 
knowledge either before or after reading and evaluating the 
proposal. Five items assessed perceived scientific 
knowledge. Actual background knowledge was assessed 
with a 20-item multiple-choice test covering basic 
ecological knowledge. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of four conditions created by crossing topic 
(introduction vs. reintroduction) with order of self-
evaluation (before or after evaluating the proposal).  
Results 
A relationship between the topic and voting decision was 
evident. Participants in the reintroduction condition were 
more likely to vote in support of the initiative (87.5%) than 
those in the introduction condition (62.5%) (χ2 (1) = 6.67, p 
< .01), supporting the idea that this subtle, one-word 
manipulation may invoke different mental models. Order of 
self-evaluation, however, did not influence voting decisions.  
We predicted that people who took the test before making a 
decision would be less certain, confident, and feel less 
qualified than people who took the test after they made their 
decision. There was a main effect of order (F (1,76) = 7.21, 
p = .009) on this composite variable, but no main effect of 
topic or interaction between order and topic (Fs ≈ 1). This 
effect was not due to differences in either perceived or 
actual knowledge (Fs ≈ 1). Making individuals aware of 
their own knowledge did not affect the decision itself, but it 
did affect certainty and confidence with which they made 
their decisions.   
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